The Yantar, a notorious Russian spy ship, directed lasers at the crews of U.K. Royal Air Force aircraft in waters off the north of Scotland, the British government said today. While the Yantar has been a worrying presence around critical undersea infrastructure for years now, this development represents a concerning new trend, and one that could be very hazardous.
The alleged incident took place after a U.K. Royal Navy Type 23 frigate and Royal Air Force aircraft, including P-8A Poseidon MRA1 maritime patrol aircraft, were sent to monitor and track the vessel. Publicly available flight-tracking data suggests that Royal Air Force Typhoon fighters, supported by Voyager tankers, may also have been involved.
It’s not clear what kind of laser was used by the Yantar, but these encompass a wide range of systems, some of which can have significant power, at least enough to be a major concern. Depending on their output, lasers have the potential to temporarily obscure optics and the vision of personnel or cause permanent damage to both. More powerful laser weapons can burn holes in craft, damaging or destroying them, but are highly unlikely to have been installed on this vessel.
It is worth noting that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has regularly been accused of using shipborne lasers to harass military aircraft, as you can read about here.
As for the Yantar, this vessel has been active off the coast of the United Kingdom for the last few weeks, according to the U.K. defense secretary, John Healey, who disclosed details of its activities today.
“This is a vessel designed for gathering intelligence and mapping our undersea cables,” Healey said.
Referring to the laser incident, the defense secretary described the Russian ship’s action as “deeply dangerous,” noting that this is the second time this year that the Yantar has deployed to British waters.
Healey continued: “My message to Russia and to Putin is this: we see you, we know what you’re doing, and if the Yantar travels south this week, we are ready.”
The Yantar is part of the Russian Defense Ministry fleet, being operated by the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research, a secretive branch that works on behalf of the Russian Navy and other agencies. The ship is around 112 feet long and, among other duties, operates as a mothership for uncrewed underwater vessels (UUVs), which can be used to investigate the seabed and potentially undertake sabotage and other activities, including manipulating objects on the seafloor.
As we have discussed in the past, the Yantar is officially classified as a Project 22010 “oceanographic research vessel,” but its specialized equipment can reportedly tap or cut submarine cables and investigate and retrieve objects from depths of up to 18,000 feet. The vessel is also likely to be able to place devices on the seabed that could cut cables long after the ship has moved on.
Russia has repeatedly claimed that the vessel is used for legitimate maritime “research” or “survey,” but it has an established pattern of operating around critical undersea infrastructure. In particular, it is assessed that the Yantar is used for surveilling the U.K.’s crucial network of undersea cables, around 60 of which branch out into the sea from the British Isles.
The U.K. Ministry of Defense has long considered the Yantar a spy ship and tracks it closely, leading to several run-ins with the vessel in the past.
In September, the U.K.’s National Security Strategy Committee stated that the government was being “too timid” in its approach to protecting British undersea cables, some of which also have a military role.
Meanwhile, another British government oversight body, the Defense Select Committee, recently concluded more broadly that the United Kingdom “must be willing to grasp the nettle and prioritize homeland defense and resilience.”
At the beginning of this year, the United Kingdom confirmed that one of its Royal Navy nuclear-powered submarines surfaced close to the Yantar, to make it clear it was being observed. The Yantar was sailing in British waters in November last year, when that incident occurred. Specifically, the Russian ship was said to be “detected loitering over U.K. critical undersea infrastructure.”
At one point, one of the Royal Navy’s Astute class attack submarines surfaced close to the Yantar “to make clear that we had been covertly monitoring its every move,” Healey said.
Tracking the Yantar is not necessarily a difficult job, since its position is typically broadcast at regular intervals using the automatic identification system (AIS), an automatic tracking system that uses transceivers on ships. This data is then also published by online ship tracking services. However, commercial tracking can be manipulated and spoofed, or it can just go dark, making the vessel harder to pinpoint.
At the same time, it should be noted that the vessel has been operating within the U.K.’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) but in international waters, which is entirely legal.
Earlier this year, the Yantar was reported in the Mediterranean. On this occasion, it was assumed to be involved in searching and potentially salvaging the wreck of the Russian cargo vessel MV Ursa Major, which sank after an apparent explosion in its engine room in late December.
Back in 2018, the U.K. Royal Navy also escorted the Yantar through the English Channel as it headed into the North Sea. At this time, it was carrying a Saab SeaEye Tiger deep-sea robot on its deck. Russia acquired this underwater drone after the Kursk submarine disaster. It can reach depths of 3,280 feet.
A year before that, the Yantar was involved in a high-profile operation in 2017 when it sailed off the coast of Syria to recover the wreckage of two fighter jets, a Su-33 and a MiG-29KR, that crashed into the Mediterranean Sea during operations from Russia’s aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov.
While the reported use of a laser in a hostile capacity by the crew of the Yantar is a new development, its activity comes as NATO becomes increasingly concerned about apparent sabotage to undersea infrastructure carrying oil, gas, electricity, and the internet. More generally, the threat to undersea infrastructure, specifically data cables, is of growing concern internationally.
In the Baltic Sea alone, cables have been damaged on several occasions, with all of them carrying at least some of the hallmarks of sabotage. In the most notable event, on December 25 last year, an oil tanker dragging its anchor damaged a power cable running between Finland and Estonia.
The vessel responsible for that incident in the Baltic was the Russia-connected Eagle S. The oil tanker was reportedly found to be brimming with spy equipment after it was seized by authorities. Finnish authorities filed charges of aggravated sabotage and aggravated interference with telecommunications against members of its crew.
Incidents like this led to NATO launching Baltic Sentry, a mission intended to ensure the security of critical undersea infrastructure in the region. As you can read about here, the mission also involves crewed surface vessels, UUVs, and various aircraft.
The scale of the threat was apparent even before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, after which tensions between the Kremlin and the West heightened significantly.
“We are now seeing Russian underwater activity in the vicinity of undersea cables that I don’t believe we have ever seen,” U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Andrew Lennon, then serving as NATO’s top submarine officer, told The Washington Post back in December 2017. “Russia is clearly taking an interest in NATO and NATO nations’ undersea infrastructure.”
As Russia ramps up its hybrid warfare activities, which you can read more about here, the potential risk to undersea infrastructure is put into a much sharper focus. In many cases, such activities are deniable.
While NATO has long been aware of how difficult it can be to defend this kind of infrastructure against hostile actors, the apparent use of lasers by part of Russia’s spy fleet is another serious cause for concern.
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