NEWS

Poland has confirmed it is going to arm its M28 Skytruck twin-turboprop utility aircraft for the counter-drone role, a development that is unique for a NATO air arm. This comes after the aircraft from which the M28 was derived, the Soviet-era Antonov An-28 Cash, has found notable success in the same capacity in Ukraine. You can read more about that in our recent coverage here.

Speaking at a panel discussion on air superiority at the recent Defence24 Days event, Maj. Gen. Ireneusz Nowak, the inspector of the Polish Air Force, confirmed that work was underway to modify the M28 for the mission.

“Following the signing of the contract between the Armed Forces Support Inspectorate and the contractor, the first prototype of the armed [M28] will undergo modifications to equip the aircraft with gun armament,” Nowak said. He also referred to the success of the An-28-based solution in Ukraine.

Interestingly, Nowak added that other undisclosed aircraft will also be deployed by Poland in a similar role.

Although the An-28 was manufactured in Ukraine, the production line in that country has long since closed down, meaning that aircraft and spares are limited. On the other hand, PZL Mielec in Poland launched production of the M28 Skytruck development in the early 1990s, and limited manufacture continues to this day. Meanwhile, the Polish Air Force currently operates around two dozen M28s, primarily for transport work.

In Ukrainian hands, the An-28 was initially armed with a six-barrel Gatling-type M134 Minigun, which is pintle-mounted in the cabin door. The aircraft’s high-wing configuration provides a notably wide field of fire for the weapon, which generally fires between 3,000 and 6,000 rounds per minute, or 50 and 100 shots every second.

Subsequently, the Ukrainian aircraft has been adapted to launch two different types of interceptor drones, providing another means of defeating their targets. You can read about this development here.

The primary targets of the Ukrainian An-28 are Shahed/Geran long-range one-way attack drones.

After being vectored to an area where the Russian drones are known to be flying, the crew uses an infrared camera, mounted externally on a turret, as well as night-vision goggles (NVGs), to help engage them.

The An-28 and M28 both offer a significant short takeoff and landing (STOL) capability, making them ideal for operating in and out of shorter and more austere forward airstrips. Ukraine has certainly made use of this capability, and Poland is likely to do the same if it formally adopts the drone-hunting M28.

At this point, it is not entirely clear if there are firm Polish plans to introduce a drone-hunting M28, most likely via conversion or potentially even new production, or if the initial focus will be on testing of the prototype.

As we reported in the past, even before the armed An-28 appeared in Ukraine, Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) had explored the possibility of converting an M28 derivative into a small side-firing gunship, a sort of miniature take on the AC-130 concept, to potentially be able to transfer that capability to American allies and partners. This was based on the C-145A Combat Coyote formerly used by AFSOC, and would have been armed with twin 50-caliber GAU-18 machine guns.

The threat posed by drones to Poland was hammered home last September, when around 20 unarmed military drones entered its airspace after allegedly being launched from Russia. The unprecedented incursion led to the Polish Air Force and other NATO militaries scrambling aircraft. Up to four drones were confirmed to have been shot down, most by the Royal Netherlands Air Force, operating from a base in Poland.

The Polish government concluded that the drone incursion was a deliberate provocation. But it also underscored the vulnerability of Poland’s military and civil infrastructure and cities were it come under full-scale attack by armed drones. In such a scenario, Russia would likely employ them alongside ballistic and cruise missiles and decoys, making an even greater challenge for the air defense network.

There is also the fact that fighter aircraft and surface-to-air missiles offer a very expensive, albeit high-end solution to the drone threat. Compared to missiles, a gun-armed tuboprop comes with a much lower cost-per-engagement and offers greater magazine depth, and potentially a far lower chance of major collateral damage.

Of course, as in Ukraine, Polish counter-drone M28s would be operated as part of a networked air defense system.

Nowak noted that the Polish Army’s forthcoming AH-64E Apache Guardian attack helicopters and its new AW149 combat support helicopters are also expected to be used to counter drones. Of these, the AW149 is already being adapted to use European 70mm rockets with laser guidance, and will also be fitted with guns. Meanwhile, the counter-drone mission is one of increasing importance for U.S. Army AH-64s, and for attack helicopter operators at large.

Nowak said that the U.S.-made laser-guided 70mm Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) rockets will meanwhile be integrated on Polish Air Force F-16 fighters and FA-50 light combat aircraft. The APKWS could potentially be an option for the M28, too.

Within its air defense branch, Poland plans by 2032 to introduce new air and missile defense systems procured under the Narew and Wisła programs, which cover the short-range and medium-range air defense segments, respectively. Directed-energy systems will also be a focus of future planning and could be harnessed for air defense roles.

In terms of air defense sensors, Poland is also making significant investments. It acquired two Saab 340 airborne early warning & control (AEW&C) aircraft under a crash program, and is also planning to field a new airborne early warning system based on an aerostat — a type of uncrewed tethered airship. In the past, Poland has said that the main focus of the aerostat system will be detecting various tiers of drones, as well as helicopters and potentially other lower and slower-flying crewed aircraft. Of critical value here will be its persistent look-down capability that will span the border, keeping watch for incursions from the east.

Once again, while the long-term Polish plans for the counter-drone version of the M28 remain to be confirmed, the fact that a major NATO air force in Europe is taking the drone threat so seriously is worthy of note in itself.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The Strait of Hormuz has become the central strategic battleground in the ongoing confrontation involving Iran, the United States, and regional Gulf powers. What initially appeared to be a military conflict is increasingly evolving into a struggle over maritime control, energy security, and geopolitical influence.

Since the outbreak of hostilities following the joint United States and Israeli strikes on Iran in February, Tehran’s near closure of the Strait of Hormuz and Washington’s retaliatory naval blockade have severely disrupted global energy markets. The conflict has reduced the movement of oil and liquefied natural gas through one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints, creating economic instability far beyond the Middle East.

Recent tanker movements coordinated through informal understandings with Tehran suggest that Iran may now be shifting from blocking Hormuz entirely to selectively controlling access. This emerging dynamic could fundamentally reshape Gulf security and international energy politics.

Hormuz Is No Longer Just a Trade Route

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the most strategically important waterways in the global economy. Before the conflict, roughly one fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas shipments passed through the narrow corridor each day.

Its disruption has exposed the vulnerability of global energy markets to geopolitical conflict. Asian economies have been particularly affected because of their heavy dependence on Gulf energy exports. Oil supply disruptions and rising transportation risks have intensified inflationary pressure, energy insecurity, and market volatility across multiple regions.

The recent passage of a limited number of oil and gas tankers with apparent Iranian approval demonstrates that Tehran may now be exercising selective authority over maritime transit rather than enforcing a complete blockade.

This distinction is critical because it suggests Iran is attempting to transform military leverage into long term political and economic influence.

Iran’s Emerging Strategy of Selective Access

The limited reopening of shipping lanes indicates that Tehran may be developing a new model of strategic control. Rather than permanently shutting down the strait, Iran appears to be determining which countries, companies, or shipments can safely transit through the waterway.

This selective access system gives Tehran several advantages.

First, it allows Iran to maintain pressure on global energy markets without fully halting trade flows that could trigger overwhelming international military intervention.

Second, it creates potential economic benefits through informal transit arrangements, leverage over energy dependent states, and indirect influence on oil pricing.

Third, it positions Iran as a gatekeeper within one of the world’s most important strategic corridors, expanding its geopolitical relevance despite sanctions and military pressure.

The reported coordination involving Pakistan and Qatar also demonstrates how regional diplomacy is becoming intertwined with energy security and conflict management.

Gulf States and the United States Face Strategic Risks

For Gulf Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, any arrangement that allows Iran to regulate maritime access poses a direct strategic threat.

Their economies depend heavily on uninterrupted hydrocarbon exports, and Iranian control over transit patterns would increase Tehran’s regional influence at their expense.

Asian importers are equally vulnerable because selective access introduces political uncertainty into global energy supply chains. Countries dependent on Gulf oil and gas would become increasingly exposed to Iranian political calculations.

For the United States, accepting Iranian dominance over Hormuz would undermine Washington’s broader strategic objectives in the region. The Trump administration has repeatedly emphasized restoring unrestricted freedom of navigation as a core war aim.

Allowing Iran to effectively manage maritime access would signal a major geopolitical shift and weaken perceptions of American regional dominance.

Why the Current Situation May Become More Dangerous

The most concerning aspect of the emerging situation is that temporary wartime arrangements could solidify into a long term strategic reality. Even if a ceasefire is eventually reached, Iran may resist fully restoring unrestricted navigation because Hormuz now represents its strongest source of leverage against the United States and regional rivals.

This creates the conditions for a prolonged state of instability rather than genuine conflict resolution.

A system based on selective transit rights would likely produce repeated confrontations as regional powers, Western navies, shipping companies, and energy importers challenge or negotiate the limits of Iranian control.

Such a situation would institutionalize uncertainty in global energy markets and increase the likelihood of future military escalation.

Analysis

The battle over the Strait of Hormuz reflects a broader transformation in modern geopolitical conflict where control over trade routes and economic chokepoints can become more strategically valuable than territorial conquest.

Iran appears to recognize that its greatest strength lies not in conventional military superiority but in its ability to disrupt the global economy through maritime leverage. By controlling the flow of energy through Hormuz, Tehran can influence oil prices, inflation, international diplomacy, and political stability in rival states.

This gives Iran asymmetric power against economically stronger adversaries.

The United States faces a difficult strategic dilemma. Military escalation aimed at fully reopening Hormuz could deepen regional conflict and further destabilize global markets. However, tolerating selective Iranian control risks weakening American credibility and altering the regional balance of power in Tehran’s favor.

The current situation also exposes the limits of military power in resolving structural geopolitical disputes. Even if active fighting declines, the underlying contest over maritime control, energy security, and regional influence will likely persist.

Ultimately, the future of the Gulf may increasingly depend not on battlefield victories, but on who shapes the rules governing the movement of energy through the Strait of Hormuz. If selective Iranian control becomes normalized, the region could enter a prolonged era of economic coercion, strategic competition, and recurring confrontation.

With information from Reuters.

The ‘Blue Wave’ – the enviable nickname given to Curacao’s national football team – will soon be surging across to North America.

The tiny Caribbean island of just over 150,000 people and covering only 443 square kilometres (171 square miles) will become the smallest country ever to compete at a FIFA World Cup when the 2026 tournament kicks off on June 11.

Curacao, a self-governing entity within the Kingdom of the Netherlands, scripted a fairytale story to secure qualification. Now, as one of four debutants at the tournament, the island nation will look to give its people more reasons to celebrate as their team plays in football’s most prestigious global competition.

Here’s everything you need to know about Curacao in Al Jazeera’s World Cup minnows series:

Where is Curacao?

It is 60km (37 miles) off the coast of Venezuela.

Willemstad, in the south of the island, is the capital.

How did Curacao qualify for the World Cup?

Curacao endured two challenging qualification rounds to punch their maiden World Cup final ticket.

They played 10 matches, won seven and finished their campaign unbeaten.

Curacao’s journey began in the second round of the CONCACAF qualifiers. They upset Barbados, Aruba, Saint Lucia and Haiti, scoring 15 goals to remain unbeaten.

In the third and final qualification round, they were in Group B alongside heavyweights Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Bermuda.

Curacao drew 0-0 in Trinidad and Tobago in the first match before defeating Bermuda 3-2 on their home turf. Playing at home, they beat Jamaica 2-0, sending an unequivocal warning to their opponents that World Cup qualification was their clear goal.

In the next game, they drew 1-1 with Trinidad and Tobago before thrashing Bermuda 7-0.

Defying the odds in a crucial final fixture against Jamaica last November, goalkeeper Eloy Room and a resolute Curacao defence kept the Reggae Boyz at bay, holding on for a goalless draw. But the stalemate was not without drama; in stoppage time, Jamaica were awarded a penalty, only for a VAR review to overturn the decision that proved decisive.

The resulting draw secured Curacao top spot in Group B and sealed the most remarkable chapter in their World Cup journey.

“It’s an impossibility that is made possible,” winger Kenji Gorre told the Guardian newspaper. “It’s literally impossible for such a small island, such a small 150,000 population, and now to go to the biggest pinnacle of football is unbelievable.”

Curacao are by far the smallest nation ever to qualify for the World Cup, which is being expanded to 48 teams for the first time. Previously, the smallest country to qualify for the tournament was Iceland in 2018, with a population of around 350,000.

Have Curacao played at a major tournament?

The nation state successor to the Netherlands Antilles in international competition, it only began competing as Curacao after 2010, and first appeared in FIFA World Cup qualifying under the new name before the Brazil 2014 tournament.

With many of their players based in the Netherlands but boasting heritage from the southern Caribbean island, Curacao quickly became a footballing nation on the rise in the CONCACAF region, winning their first World Cup two-legged qualifying tie against Montserrat in 2015.

Two years later, the team qualified for the CONCACAF Gold Cup for the first time, though they crashed out in the group stage, losing all their fixtures. But in 2019, they bounced back in style, reaching the quarterfinals, where they lost to the eventual runner-up, the United States.

Curacao came close to reaching the 2022 World Cup in Qatar, only to be eliminated by Panama in the penultimate round of qualification.

What is Curacao’s FIFA ranking?

Ten years ago, Curacao were 150th in the FIFA world rankings. Now they have jumped to 82nd.

Who will Curacao face at the World Cup?

Curacao are in Group E, alongside former champions Germany, Ecuador and African heavyweights Ivory Coast. They will play all group games in the US.

Curacao’s World Cup 2026 matches:

• June 14: Germany vs Curacao – Houston Stadium
• June 20: Ecuador vs Curacao – Kansas City Stadium
• June 25: Curacao v Ivory Coast – Philadelphia Stadium

Curacao’s head coach carousel

Veteran Dutch coach Dick Advocaat led Curacao to their first-ever World Cup, calling it the “craziest thing” he had achieved in a managerial career spanning nearly four decades.

But four months before the tournament, he stepped down from the post due to his daughter’s ill health.

Fellow Dutchman Fred Rutten, who previously managed Feyenoord, PSV Eindhoven and Schalke 04, was later named the replacement and looked set to lead them at the World Cup.

But there was another twist: on May 11 – exactly a month out from the tournament – Rutten stepped down to protect the squad’s professional environment after calls from players ⁠and sponsors to reinstate Advocaat.

A day later it was swiftly announced that the 78-year-old would return to the head coaching role following improvements in his daughter’s medical condition, according to reporting from ESPN. Advocaat’s reappointment makes him the oldest manager in World Cup history.

Who are Curacao’s key players?

Forward Gervane Kastaneer was Curacao’s top scorer during qualifying with five goals in six matches, which included a hat-trick against Saint Lucia.

Striker Rangelo Janga, Curacao’s all-time leading scorer with 21 goals, bagged a hat-trick against Barbados, while Juninho Bacuna and Gorre scored three goals in total during that phase.

Livano Comenencia, a 22-year-old right-back and Tahith Chong, a 26-year-old midfielder who is a product of the Manchester United academy, are promising players in Curacao’s squad.

What is the Dutch connection in Curacao’s squad?

The majority of the squad are Dutch-born, but have family links that make them eligible to play for Curacao.

Many represented the Netherlands in age-group teams, such as central midfielder Juninho, who played for the Dutch U-18, U-20 and U-21 teams. His older brother, Leandro, also played for the Netherlands’ youth sides before representing Curacao at senior level.

Juninho, who switched allegiance from the Netherlands to Curacao in 2019, said it was a “big decision”.

“At that time, I was only 21 and had a lot of years in front of me to see my chances for the Dutch national team,” he told the BBC. “But I made a choice early to play for Curacao. One of the reasons was that I could play in the same team as my brother, and for the family to see us play together.

“We’re seeing more players that are still young and able to play for Holland, and they come to play for Curacao – and make the team even stronger,” he added.

Chong, who plays for second-tier Sheffield United, is the only squad member born on the island.

How are Curacao preparing for the World Cup?

Curacao played two international friendlies in March, losing 2-0 to China in Sydney before being thrashed 5-1 by Australia in Melbourne. They are due to face Scotland in a friendly in Glasgow in May before heading to the World Cup.

Both Australia and Scotland are also competing in North America this summer.

What can we expect from Curacao?

An uphill task awaits Curacao at the World Cup, beginning with their opening match against four-time champions Germany. Although the Germans suffered a shock group-stage exit in 2022, they remain favourites to top the group and reach at least the quarterfinals.

Curacao fans, however, can expect a determined fight from their team – and perhaps a few goals too. The Caribbean side scored an impressive 28 goals in 10 matches while conceding just five during their World Cup qualifying campaign.

“Generally, if it’s a world championship or European championship, there are always surprises,” coach Rutten told reporters in March. “And why not this year for us?

“We have a team of fighters and they never give up.”

You can follow the action on Al Jazeera’s dedicated FIFA World Cup 2026 page with all the latest news, match build-up and live text commentary, and keep up to date with group standings, real-time match results and schedules.

The U.S. Navy says its future Trump class battleships are now set to be nuclear-powered. This is a huge development that will impact the cost and complexity of the design. With those issues in mind, now-former Secretary of the Navy John Phelan had said this was “unlikely” to happen just four weeks ago.

The Navy announced its intention to fit a nuclear propulsion system to the Trump class warships in its latest annual shipbuilding plan, which was released earlier today. The document also refers to these future large surface combatants as BBGNs, or nuclear-powered (N) guided-missile (G) battleships (BB). USNI News was first to report on this development.

The only nuclear-powered surface vessels in the Navy’s fleet today are its Nimitz and Ford class aircraft carriers. The service has not had a nuclear-powered surface combatant since the 1990s, when the one-of-a-kind cruiser USS Long Beach and frigate USS Bainbridge, as well as four Virginia class cruisers (not to be confused with the subsequent Virginia class of attack submarines) left active duty. Nuclear propulsion offers functionally unlimited range, as well as a major boost in onboard power generation. It also comes with cost and complexity, in terms of a ship’s core design, and what it takes to operate and maintain it. We will come back to those issues later on.

The Navy has now outlined plans to acquire 15 Trump class BBGNs, one virtually every other year, between Fiscal Year 2028 and 2055. Two are also set to be ordered back-to-back in Fiscal Years 2030 and 2031. An initial official estimate has put the price tag of each of these ships at $17 billion. This is more than what the service expects to spend on each of the next three Ford class aircraft carriers, the projected unit costs of which range from roughly $13 to $15 billion.

“Our Fleet deserves and our national security requires the most comprehensive capability a surface combatant can provide, not just what we can make do with tradeoffs. The nuclear-powered Battleship is designed to provide the Fleet with a significant increase in combat power by longer endurance, higher speed, and accommodating advanced weapon systems required for modern warfare,” the Navy’s new shipbuilding plan declares. “Adding capability at the highest end of the high- low mix, the Battleship’s primary role is to deliver high-volume, long-range offensive fires and serve as a robust, survivable forward command and control platform, it is not a destroyer replacement.”

The shipbuilding plan highlights various aspects of the planned arsenal on each of the Trump class warships, including its ability to launch a mix of nuclear and conventional missiles, including hypersonic types, loaded into large vertical launch system (VLS) arrays. Each one of the vessels will also have an electromagnetic railgun, a pair of traditional 5-inch naval guns, laser directed energy weapons, and various additional weapons for close-in defense.

“Vastly increased power generation capacity provides warfighting capability across the entire electromagnetic spectrum, including through electronic warfare tools and high-output lasers that allow us to reduce reliance on high-cost single-use munitions for both attack and defense,” the shipbuilding plan also notes. “The internal volume and capability to embark a fleet command staff allows us to take the Maritime Operations Center concept to sea. As a tactical command-and-control platform, the Battleship can lead a Surface Action Group (SAG), integrate its systems with a Carrier Strike Group (CSG) for layered defense, or operate autonomously, possessing the organic capability to defeat advanced threats and distributing our force capability.”

The Navy has said in the past that each of the Trump class warships will displace approximately 35,000 tons, very roughly three times that of the newest Flight III subvariant of the Arleigh Burke class destroyer. They are also expected to be between 840 and 880 feet long, have a beam (the widest point in the hull) between 105 and 115 feet, and be able to reach a top speed greater than 30 knots.

As noted, as recently as four weeks ago, the Navy was pushing back on the idea, at least publicly, that the Trump class warships could be nuclear-powered. The service’s proposed budget for the 2027 Fiscal Year, which was rolled out last month, describes the vessels as non-nuclear BBGs that will feature “diesel generators, gas turbines, [and] propulsion motors.”

“That [the $17 billion estimated unit cost of a Trump class warship] is the early initial estimate. We’ll see where we really settle down as we get through that and start to rationalize some of the costs. So let’s see where we land on that first ship, and then what the economies of scale get us to as we move through it,” former Secretary of the Navy John Phelan had also told reporters at a roundtable on the sidelines of the Navy League’s Sea Air Space 2026 exposition on April 21. “I think a little bit with those numbers, they’re still moving around, because this question is it nuclear-powered, is it not nuclear-powered?”

“It could be [nuclear powered], but it’s unlikely, but it could be,” Phelan said at that time. “I think we’re trying to understand all the proper trade-offs.”

Phelan was fired unexpectedly and with little explanation the following day, with veteran Navy officer Hung Cao taking over as Acting Secretary. On April 23, The New York Times, published a report, citing anonymous sources, saying former Navy Secretary’s sudden exit was tied to disagreements with President Donald Trump over plans for the Trump class battleships, including efforts to accelerate their production and entry into service. There have been reports pointing to other factors in Phelan’s dismissal, including friction with Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, as well.

“He’s a very good man. I really liked him, but he had some conflict with, not necessarily with [Secretary] Pete [Hegseth], but with some other[s],” President Trump himself told members of the press on April 23. “He’s a hard charger, and he had some conflicts with some other people, mostly as to building and buying new ships. I’m very aggressive in the new shipbuilding.”

“I think it’s a logical question to think, hey, here’s a big capital ship. It’s going to be carrying a lot of load, you know, in places that we don’t necessarily need a strike enforcement air wing as a large ship there that’s in command of a flotilla,” Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Daryl Caudle also said at a roundtable around the Surface Navy Association’s (SNA) main annual symposium back in January. “Wouldn’t it be logical to be nuclear powered? And that brings a tail to the construction of that that [sic] just really fell outside the scope of what we want to do on the speed to get this thing in the water. And so what you trade off with, with persistency that only nuclear power can do, is you end up having, you know, the ability to go produce that — it pushes the battleship into a timeframe that just didn’t meet the operational need of the ship.”

TWZ has reached out to the Navy for any more information it can offer about when and why the decision was made regarding nuclear propulsion for the Trump class. We have already raised numerous questions about the plans for these warships in the past, including their exact operational utility, as well as the costs and risks involved. As Phelan and Caudle previously indicated, nuclear power can only add to the design’s complexity and up-front price tag, as well as what it will take to operate and maintain the ships once they enter service. These were factors in the Navy’s past decision to move away from nuclear propulsion on surface warships. Russia’s Kirov class battlecruiser Admiral Nakhimov is the only nuclear-powered surface combatant in service anywhere in the world today. Nuclear-powered surface ships of any kind remain a relative rarity globally, as well, even among nuclear powers.

The choice now to use nuclear reactors to power the Trump class comes at a time when naval shipbuilders in the United States are already under heavy strain, and have been struggling in many cases to stay on budget and schedule. Newport News Shipbuilding, a division of Huntington Ingalls Industries, is the only yard in the country currently building nuclear-powered surface vessels of any kind, which are the Ford class aircraft carriers. While the USS Gerald R. Ford is in service now, work on subsequent ships in the class continues to be beset by delays and cost growth.

There is also immense pressure on U.S. shipyards that built nuclear-powered submarines. This has been magnified by plans to provide Virginia class boats to the Royal Australian Navy as part of the trilateral Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) defense cooperation agreement. The same yards are also responsible for producing the new Columbia class nuclear ballistic missile submarines. Those boats have to be delivered on a tight schedule to ensure there is no gap in the ability of the leg of America’s nuclear triad to meet operational requirements, and there is little, if any, margin left.

The Navy has other shipbuilding plans, as well. Naval shipyard capacity in the United States, or the lack thereof, has been an increasingly worrisome issue for years now, and remains concerning despite U.S. government efforts to reverse the trend in recent years. The Navy’s new shipbuilding plan does underscore the service’s determination to avoid past shipbuilding pitfalls with the new battleships.

“Learning from the lessons of prior shipbuilding programs, the Battleship acquisition plan is a prime example of how we are changing the way the Navy does business. This will be the first clean-sheet surface combatant designed in more than 30 years, and we are deliberately incorporating modern digital engineering, advanced production practices, and AI [artificial intelligence] enabled design tools to reduce cost and schedule risk from the outset,” the shipbuilding plan states. “To strengthen this approach, we are adopting proven best practices from foreign partners with advanced shipbuilding techniques. This includes front loading production engineering to ensure high design maturity before construction begins, using precision modular construction methods, and tightly integrating design, planning, and production teams to minimize rework and accelerate throughput.

“We are also applying long term production planning, rigorous process control disciplines, and deeper supplier integration to stabilize the industrial base and improve quality across distributed construction sites. Modeled on commercial shipbuilding, this digital-first approach will accelerate design, reduce manual rework, and create a direct link between design and production,” it continued. “The Battleship will employ a highly modular architecture that enables distributed construction across the industrial base while allowing U.S. shipyards to focus on final assembly, integration, and testing. This strategy strengthens workforce stability, increases industrial base resilience, and delivers a more predictable, affordable path to fielding the capability.”

As it stands now, the Navy is still planning to order the first Trump class warship, set to be named USS Defiant, in Fiscal Year 2028. The current expectation is that it will not enter service until Fiscal Year 2036. This underscores an additional point that the program will carry over into the next presidential administration (and potentially beyond). Further major changes could well be made to its scale and scope, or it could be outright cancelled, in that timeframe.

For now, at least, the Navy has settled on its future Trump class battleships being powered by nuclear reactors.

Update: 5/12/2026 –

A U.S. Navy official has now provided the following statement in response to TWZ‘s queries for more information about the decision to use nuclear propulsion on the Trump class battleships:

“The Battleship requirements entail the appropriate balance of survivability, lethality, affordability, endurance, operational flexibility, and industrial feasibility. The FY27 Navy Shipbuilding Plan’s inclusion of a nuclear-powered Battleship will provide the Fleet with a significant increase in combat power by longer endurance, higher speed, and accommodation of advanced weapons systems required for modern warfare.“

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

After successfully launching Nigeria’s only operational oil refinery in 2024, billionaire businessman Aliko Dangote has set his sights on East Africa as the next location for another mega refinery project, according to recent reports.

It comes as African countries are actively seeking ways to make energy more secure, following huge global disruptions amid the US and Israel’s war on Iran and Tehran’s subsequent closure of the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20 percent of the world’s oil and natural gas is shipped.

Dangote, Africa’s richest man, appeared to be one of the winners from this fallout when his newly operational refinery, located in Nigeria’s commercial Lagos State, began selling large volumes of crude oil across the continent as the war on Iran escalated in March and global oil prices soared.

At present, West, South and East Africa rely primarily on importing refined petroleum products from the Middle East, meaning they are highly vulnerable to disruptions there.

Neighbours of Nigeria – Cameroon, Togo, Ghana and even Tanzania, further to the east – are among the countries that have turned to Nigeria as supplies from the Middle East dry up.

By the end of March, the refinery, which has the capacity to produce 650,000 barrels per day (bpd), reported it was also receiving orders from beyond the continent, especially for severely scarce jet fuel as hundreds of flights were cancelled across regions.

Supply from Dangote’s refinery has cushioned the impact of the war in terms of fuel supply for Nigeria and neighbouring countries, analysts say.

Nigeria is Africa’s largest oil producer, and the $19bn project in Lagos is currently the world’s largest single-train refinery, meaning it employs a single processing line rather than multiple units. But it hit full production capacity in February 2026, the same month the war with Iran started.

Nigeria has no functional state-owned refinery, so Dangote’s refinery is now positioning the country to be a net exporter of jet fuel and diesel.

Here’s why more refining capacity in Africa matters for the continent:

What is Dangote’s plan for an East Africa refinery?

In April, Kenya’s President William Ruto announced that East African countries were in talks to build a joint oil refinery at Tanzania’s Tanga port, which would have a similar capacity to Dangote’s Lagos operation.

“We do not want to be held hostage any more by the Strait of Hormuz,” Ruto said at a Nairobi business event in April, which Dangote was present at.

“We do not want to be held hostage by wars that are started by other people. We have our resources here, and we are saying we are going to use our African resources to industrialise our region.”

In an interview with the Financial Times on Sunday, however, Dangote said he would prefer to build the new operation in Kenya rather than Tanzania.

“I’m leaning more towards Mombasa because Mombasa has a much larger, deeper port,” the billionaire told the UK newspaper.

“Kenyans consume more. It’s a bigger economy,” he said, adding that “the ball is in the hands of President Ruto … Whatever President Ruto says is what I’ll do.”

He has projected construction costs of between $15bn and $17bn.

But venturing into East Africa, which has a very different commercial landscape from West Africa, could prove a challenge, analyst Dumebi Oluwole of Lagos-based intelligence firm Stears told Al Jazeera.

“Dangote has proven it [his operation] can build at scale,” she said. “The East African test will be whether it can also navigate the political and logistical landscape of a fragmented, multi-country market.”

Why aren’t African countries already producing more oil?

Despite having sizeable crude reserves, African countries only refine about 44 percent of the total oil consumed themselves, with imports making up the rest, according to a 2022 African Union report.

The top producers of refined oil are Algeria, Egypt and South Africa. There are about 21 refineries in North Africa.

Southern Africa has another seven, while West Africa has 14. However, most refineries in the two regions are either not operating or are producing below the capacity they are equipped to.

East Africa’s only existing refinery is in Mombasa, but it stopped operating in 2013 due to a combination of slow government policies and exiting investors, who deemed it commercially unviable as a result.

There is currently no refining capacity at all in East Africa, despite the region having about 4.7 billion barrels of crude reserves, according to the African Union, mainly in Uganda, South Sudan, Kenya and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Kenya imported 40 million barrels of petroleum in 2025. It regularly buys oil from the UAE, Saudi Arabia, India and Oman, all of which have been hampered by Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

Nigeria itself is Africa’s biggest net crude producer with a 1.5 million to 1.6 million bpd capacity. The country has not refined meaningfully since 2019.

What difference will local refineries make for African countries?

Exporting most of its crude to then import refined products is expensive and puts Africa on the back foot, analyst Oluwole said.

More oil refined on the continent would mean lower petrol pump prices, lower transport costs, and more energy available for people and businesses, in theory. It would also mean greater access to by-products like fertilisers for farmers, for example, or petrochemicals for manufacturers.

“Dangote has demonstrated that a viable, scalable, intra-African energy supply option is possible – that proof of concept matters enormously,” said Oluwole.

“It reflects a growing continental conviction that Africa can provide for itself, and that this is no longer wishful thinking,” she added.

In Nigeria’s case, Dangote’s refinery is yet to ease pressures, though. Local airlines, for example, have complained about having to pay high prices for jet fuel even with improved local supplies. Analysts say that could be because Nigeria’s government removed fuel subsidies in 2023. Bureaucracy within the state oil company also forced Dangote’s refinery to import crude.

Still, the refinery is contributing to “a more transparent and competitive market”, Oluwole said, adding that results should eventually show.

Other countries are stepping up. Last week, Angola’s $470m Cabinda refinery began supplying domestic as well as foreign markets. The project is owned primarily by the United Kingdom’s Gemcorp Capital and has a capacity of 30,000bpd, with plans to double by the end of 2026.

Dangote’s planned refinery in Kenya, if completed, could also help to reduce East Africa’s reliance on the Middle East.

A separate, government-funded refinery project in Uganda’s Hoima region is also in the works. Authorities expect the project to be able to refine 60,000bpd when it starts operations in 2029. It will be fed by the joint Uganda-Tanzania East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP), an ongoing project which will transport crude from Uganda’s Lake Albert to Tanzania’s Tanga Port.

Uganda also plans to produce diesel, jet fuel, kerosene and Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG).

With big plans in place, Oluwole says it’s now left to African governments to create enabling business environments for the private sector.

“Dangote has opened the door,” she said. “The question now is whether African institutions and governments will walk through it.”

Who: Manchester City vs Crystal Palace
What: English Premier League
Where: Etihad Stadium in Manchester, England, United Kingdom
When: Wednesday, May 13, at 8pm (19:00 GMT)
How to follow: We’ll have all the buildup on Al Jazeera Sport from 16:00 GMT in advance of our live text commentary stream.

Second-placed Manchester City kept themselves alive in the Premier League title race with their solid home win over Brentford on Saturday, but league-leading Arsenal’s controversial win at West Ham United the following day again pegged City behind in the two-team fight for the trophy.

Al Jazeera Sport previews City’s delayed Matchday 31 contest against Crystal Palace on Wednesday and breaks down the Sky Blues’ championship hopes as the season draws to a close.

Where does the Premier League title race stand?

• Frontrunners Arsenal are in a favourable title position on the Premier League ladder; they enjoy a five-point lead over Man City, with the Gunners having two matches remaining in the 38-round season.
• City have three games to go, including their home tie with Palace.

What happens if City win against Palace?

If City beat Palace on Wednesday, they will reduce the gap on league leaders Arsenal to two points. Both teams will then have two games remaining.

A victory against Palace would keep City alive in the title hunt, but they would need to beat Bournemouth in their penultimate match to continue the title fight to the final round of matches on May 24.

What happens if City draw or lose to Palace?

If City draw, they will end up four points behind Arsenal, and in the event of a defeat, the gap would remain at five points. Dropping any points against Palace would mean City all but bowing out of the title race, even if they still have a mathematical chance to contend heading into the penultimate round.

In such a scenario, Arsenal can be crowned Premier League champions as early as Monday, May 18. A win over already-relegated Burnley in Matchday 37 would mean Arsenal would be at least seven points clear, with City only having a maximum of six points available in their last two fixtures.

If the Gunners are crowned champions of England, it would mark the end of the North London club’s 22-year wait for the honour.

How does City’s and Arsenal’s run-in look?

After hosting Palace on Wednesday, City face sixth-placed Bournemouth on May 19 before facing fifth-placed Aston Villa in their final game of the season on May 24. Both fixtures will be challenging as City’s opponents will be fighting to secure European football qualification next season.

Arsenal, on the other hand, have a much easier run-in to the end of the season. They host already-relegated Burnley on May 18 and play away to Palace on the final day of the season. Palace will likely name a weaker side for that fixture, with their eyes certainly on their first European final: The Conference League final vs Rayo Vallecano on May 27.

Is the Premier League trophy Arsenal’s to lose?

Yes.

Arsenal’s dramatic win on Sunday against their London rivals, West Ham, means they already have one hand on the trophy. Should they win their final two matches of the campaign, they will be crowned champions, regardless of Man City’s results.

But any slip-up would allow their title rivals back in.

Opta’s supercomputer has given the Gunners an 87.2% chance of winning the title from hereon.

Can City and Arsenal end the season on equal points?

Yes, it is possible.

If City win all three remaining matches, and Arsenal draw one of their two games, both teams will end the season level on points.

What happens in this case? Rule C.17 of the Premier League Handbook says the final table placings would be determined by the following criteria, in this order:

• goal difference
• goals scored
• points won in head-to-head matches
• away goals scored in head-to-head matches
• a playoff match.

Currently, the goal difference between Arsenal and City is very close. Arsenal have a +42 goal difference, and City’s is +40. It could come down to goals scored across the season: City’s current tally is 72, Arsenal’s is 68.

If the clubs finish level on points, goal difference, and goals scored, City would claim the title on the next criterion – points won in head-to-head matches – because they have won four points against Arsenal this season, thanks to a win and a draw.

The odds of such a scenario are very low, given City are lagging in the title race, but if this were to happen, it would go down as the closest title race ever. The previous closest race was in 2011-12 when City edged their rivals, Manchester United, on goal difference following Sergio Aguero’s stoppage-time winner against Queens Park Rangers on the final day.

City still in the hunt for domestic double

While City’s odds of winning the league title are very slim, they remain on course to complete a domestic double. City, who won the League Cup in March, face Chelsea in the FA Cup final on Saturday. They are bidding for their eighth FA Cup, having last lifted the trophy in 2023.

Manager Pep Guardiola has backed striker Omar Marmoush, who scored off the bench in the last game, to have a key role in the closing stages of the English season.

“We’ve talked many times,” said Guardiola. “I know it’s not easy for them [fringe players], but I’m pretty sure in the next games they’re going to play.

“I want to rotate the team because otherwise we cannot arrive in the final or Bournemouth a little bit (fresh).

“Especially Omar. It’s not easy because normally you just want one striker. He’s a proper striker but Erling (Haaland) is there.

“Erling is so important for us, but the contribution of Omar – the amount of goals for the minutes played – is so high.”

‘I love it’ – Pep Guardiola relishes title run-in

Guardiola said he is “loving” the Premier League run-in, despite his ⁠side no longer controlling ⁠their own fate in the title race.

“It’s ⁠not in our hands now,” Guardiola said. “They have to drop points. The only thing we can do is win again and see what happens.”

Guardiola said win or lose, the thrilling race to the finish has been thoroughly enjoyable.

He pointed to his team’s consistency, as their unbeaten run in the ‌league stretches back to mid-January. With another major final still to come, City have had plenty to celebrate this season, regardless of how the Premier League finishes.

“I love it. I love to be here again, we’ll finish second again in this season, minimum,” Guardiola said. “Last season, we were fighting to qualify for the Champions League, was so ⁠difficult.

“I love too Carabao (League Cup) in our pocket. We play an FA ⁠Cup final in Wembley, it is the most beautiful game of the season.”

What happened the last time City played Palace?

In their reverse fixture at Selhurst Park in December, City won 2-0, thanks to two goals from Haaland, including a penalty, and another by Phil Foden.

Head-to-head

Palace and City have faced each other in 75 games in all competitions since 1921.

City have won 40 of those encounters, while Palace won 18. A total of 17 matches ended in a draw.

Man City team news

Defenders Josko Gvardiol and Abdukodir Khusanov, along with defensive midfielder Rodri, are out injured.

Predicted Man City lineup

Gianluigi Donnarumma (goalkeeper); Matheus Nunes, Marc Guehi, Nathan Ake, Nico O’Reilly; Bernardo Silva, Tijjani Reijnders; Antoine Semenyo, Rayan Cherki, Jeremy Doku; Erling Haaland

Palace team news

Edward Nketiah, Cheick Oumar Doucoure, Evann Guessand and Borna Sosa are sidelined with injuries.

Predicted Palace lineup

Dean Henderson (goalkeeper); Chris Richards, Maxence Lacroix, Jaydee Canvot; Daniel Munoz, Adam Wharton, Daichi Kamada, Tyrick Mitchell; Brennan Johnson, Ismaila Sarr; Jorgen Strand Larsen

Fake online advertisements and social media groups are luring people in Jordan with promises of “quick profits” from cheap gold with sellers disappearing once funds have been transferred or customers defrauded with counterfeit and substandard metals, Jordanians tell Al Jazeera.

Mohammed Nassar said he was quoted a price for gold lower than local market rates due to an “online store” claiming it was exempt from manufacturing fees, government licensing costs or shop rents.

The Jordanian shopper transferred the money to secure what he thought was a bargain before the website disappeared and Nassar realised he had become the victim of a scam.

In another case, a young woman named Tala Al-Habashneh told Al Jazeera that she bought gold through a social media platform after agreeing with the seller and transferring the promised amount.

On closer examination of the product, she found that her gold was counterfeit, mixed with other metals and lacking any official stamps or invoices to prove its origin or carat.

Tala immediately filed a complaint with the Cybercrime Directorate of Jordan’s Public Security Directorate. The case is pending.

Government monitoring

Wafaa Al-Momani, assistant director general for Regulatory Affairs and director of the Jewelry Directorate at the Jordan Standards and Metrology Organisation (JSMO), told Al Jazeera that the institution is the only entity in the kingdom responsible for monitoring precious metal jewellery – such as gold, silver and platinum – and overseeing jewellery trading.

All imported jewellery is examined and stamped by the JSMO before being released onto the market, she said, while local workshops are also required to submit jewellery for inspection and verification before it can be sold.

Al-Momani said her organisation has received some complaints about companies, websites and social media groups engaged in fraud by “promoting the buying and selling of gold, especially broken gold [used or damaged], through unlicensed individuals”.

The JSMO is monitoring sellers engaged in fraud in coordination with security authorities to prevent jewellery from being sold outside licensed shops.

Al-Momani said the JSMO is tightening oversight of gold shops and sellers in the kingdom and said any store found selling unstamped jewellery or violating legal standards will face legal penalties but also warned Jordanians that buying gold through unofficial channels “does not guarantee that the jewellery conforms to legal standards or carats”.

Adornment and treasure

Rabhi Allan, the head of the Jordanian Association of Jewelry and Goldsmiths, explained that gold remains a traditional means of saving and investment for Jordanians as well as an accessory, quoting the popular saying: “Gold is an adornment and a treasure.”

However, he described the sale of gold through social media as “alien to Jordanian society” and stressed that transactions of this “cash commodity” should only take place via official shops with invoices clearly stating the weight, carat and labour costs of the product.

He said the association had filed complaints with the Cybercrime Directorate against unlicensed and anonymous sites, noting that these pages “appear and disappear without warning”, a situation that leaves victims without the ability to secure their consumer rights.

The association has documented numerous complaints and court cases resulting from gold sales conducted through social media platforms that often use edited or fabricated images and fake offers to attract buyers.

Others offer gold at prices significantly below market value to lure buyers, but the product sold is often counterfeit, nonexistent or contains far less of the precious metal than advertised.

He urged citizens to buy gold only via licensed and accredited shops that display official prices and issue proper invoices to protect buyers’ rights.

While questions have been raised about whether some gold sales conducted through social media could be linked to illegal activities, Allan said the cases monitored so far appear to be “individual incidents that do not amount to money laundering”.

Security warning

The Cybercrime Unit of the Public Security Directorate also warned citizens against buying gold through social media advertisements and confirmed that the body has received multiple complaints of fraud linked to the trade.

Colonel Amer Al-Sartawi, Public Security Directorate spokesperson, told Al Jazeera that the grievances ranged from cases where money was wired to fraudsters who subsequently disappeared without delivering the promised gold to incidents in which buyers received counterfeit pieces made from other less valuable metals, such as copper or iron.

Al-Sartawi urged citizens not to deal with such pages and to buy gold exclusively from licensed and accredited shops.

China has intensified its diplomatic rhetoric against Santiago Peña following his recent visit to Taiwan, reflecting Beijing’s growing efforts to isolate Taipei internationally and weaken the remaining countries that maintain formal diplomatic ties with the island.

Paraguay is one of only 12 states that officially recognize Taiwan instead of the People’s Republic of China. During his visit, Peña reaffirmed support for Taiwan and described relations with Taipei as rooted in shared democratic values and political freedom.

Beijing responded sharply, accusing Paraguayan politicians of serving as “pawns” of Taiwanese separatist forces and suggesting that leaders supporting Taiwan may have “ulterior motives.” The unusually aggressive language highlights how sensitive the Taiwan issue has become within China’s broader foreign policy strategy.

Why Paraguay Matters to China and Taiwan

Although Paraguay is not a major global power, its diplomatic recognition carries significant symbolic and strategic importance for both China and Taiwan.

For Taiwan, maintaining formal diplomatic allies is essential to preserving international legitimacy and resisting Beijing’s efforts to diplomatically isolate the island. Each country that continues to recognize Taiwan represents political resistance against China’s One China principle.

For China, reducing Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic partnerships is part of a long term strategy aimed at reinforcing Beijing’s claim that Taiwan lacks the status of an independent state. Over the past decade, several countries have switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing after economic and political engagement with China.

Paraguay therefore represents one of Taiwan’s most important remaining diplomatic footholds in South America.

Economic Pressure Shapes the Debate

The controversy surrounding Paraguay’s Taiwan relationship is increasingly driven by economic considerations. Some Paraguayan politicians, agricultural exporters, and business groups argue that maintaining ties with Taiwan limits access to Chinese markets and investment opportunities.

China is the world’s second largest economy and a major importer of agricultural products, making diplomatic recognition economically attractive for many developing states.

Supporters of relations with Beijing argue that Paraguay could gain greater trade access, infrastructure investment, and financial opportunities if it abandoned Taiwan.

However, Peña and supporters of Taiwan emphasize ideological and political considerations, framing the relationship as a partnership based on democratic governance and political sovereignty rather than purely economic interests.

This reflects a broader global trend where smaller states increasingly face pressure to balance economic incentives against political alignment and strategic values.

China’s Diplomatic Messaging Is Becoming More Aggressive

The sharp rhetoric from China’s foreign ministry demonstrates Beijing’s increasingly confrontational diplomatic approach on issues related to Taiwan.

By describing Paraguayan leaders as “pawns” and questioning their motivations, China is signaling that support for Taiwan will be treated not merely as a diplomatic disagreement but as active opposition to Chinese national interests.

This language also serves multiple audiences simultaneously.

Internationally, Beijing seeks to discourage other governments from strengthening ties with Taiwan.

Domestically, strong rhetoric reinforces nationalist narratives surrounding territorial sovereignty and reunification.

Regionally, China is attempting to increase pressure on Paraguay by suggesting that continued support for Taiwan contradicts public opinion and economic interests.

The emphasis on opinion polls claiming support for relations with Beijing also reflects China’s strategy of portraying diplomatic recognition of Taiwan as politically unsustainable.

Taiwan’s Shrinking Diplomatic Space

The dispute illustrates Taiwan’s increasingly difficult international position as China expands its diplomatic, military, and economic influence globally.

Under President Lai Ching-te, Taiwan has continued emphasizing democracy, sovereignty, and international partnerships. However, Beijing views Lai as supporting separatist policies and has intensified political and military pressure against Taipei.

Taiwan’s formal diplomatic allies have steadily declined over recent decades as China has used economic incentives and geopolitical influence to persuade states to switch recognition.

As a result, every remaining ally now carries outsized symbolic importance for Taipei’s international visibility and diplomatic legitimacy.

Analysis

China’s reaction to Peña’s Taiwan visit demonstrates how the Taiwan issue has evolved into one of the most emotionally and strategically sensitive dimensions of Chinese foreign policy.

Beijing no longer views diplomatic recognition of Taiwan as a minor symbolic issue. Instead, it increasingly interprets international engagement with Taipei as a challenge to China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and geopolitical authority.

The pressure on Paraguay also reflects the broader transformation of global diplomacy under growing United States China rivalry. Smaller countries are increasingly caught between competing geopolitical and economic pressures, particularly when balancing relations with democratic partners against the economic power of China.

For Paraguay, the debate is ultimately about strategic identity as much as economics. Maintaining relations with Taiwan offers political alignment with democratic values and preserves diplomatic independence from Beijing’s influence. Switching recognition to China could deliver economic benefits but may also reduce Paraguay’s foreign policy autonomy.

For Taiwan, retaining Paraguay is important not only diplomatically but psychologically. Every diplomatic loss strengthens Beijing’s narrative that international recognition of Taiwan is disappearing and that eventual reunification is inevitable.

The dispute therefore reflects a much larger geopolitical contest over legitimacy, influence, and the future international status of Taiwan. As competition between China and Taiwan intensifies, diplomatic battles involving even relatively small states are likely to become increasingly significant within global geopolitics.

With information from Reuters.

US Department of Energy moves to transfer 53.3 million barrels amid rising oil prices.

The United States has announced its latest release of emergency oil stockpiles in coordination with the International Energy Agency (IEA).

The US Department of Energy said on Monday that it had begun transferring 53.3 million barrels from the strategic petroleum reserve after awarding contracts to nine companies under its emergency exchange programme.

Trafigura Trading LLC, a Texas-based commodities trading company, was granted the biggest haul of nearly 13 million barrels, with Marathon Petroleum Corporation and ExxonMobil set to receive 12.4 million barrels and 11.4 million barrels, respectively.

Macquarie Commodities Trading US, Atlantic Trading & Marketing, BP Products North America, Energy Transfer Crude Marketing, Mercuria Energy America and Phillips 66 will receive between 1.05 million and 6.55 million barrels each, according to the Energy Department.

Under the department’s exchange scheme, participating firms are required to replenish the stockpile with new barrels at a later date.

“These actions continue to move oil swiftly into the market, address near-term supply needs, and ensure that the Strategic Petroleum Reserve remains strong through the return of premium barrels,” Kyle Haustveit, the head of the department’s Hydrocarbons and Geothermal Energy Office, said in a statement.

The transfer comes after US President Donald Trump’s administration agreed in March to release 172 million barrels of crude as part of the IEA’s coordination of the largest unloading of global stockpiles in history.

Oil prices have surged since the US and Israel launched their war on Iran in late February, with Tehran’s retaliatory blockade of the Strait of Hormuz paralysing one of the world’s most important trade routes.

Maritime traffic in the strait has ground to a halt amid Iranian threats against commercial shipping, disrupting about one-fifth of the global oil trade.

Oil prices continued to edge higher on Monday after Trump dismissed Iran’s latest peace proposal and warned that the ceasefire between the sides was “on life support”, dampening hopes for a quick resolution to the conflict.

Facing growing public discontent over rising fuel prices, Trump on Monday also pledged to waive the 18.4 cents-per-gallon federal tax on petrol, though taxation is the purview of the US Congress.

Futures for Brent crude, the international benchmark, were up about 1 percent in Asia on Tuesday morning, topping $105 a barrel.

Rights groups warn that the bill makes the death penalty easier to impose and strips fair trial protections.

Israeli legislators have approved a bill to establish a special tribunal with the power to impose the death penalty on Palestinians accused of involvement in the Hamas-led attacks of October 7, 2023.

The bill passed 93-0 in Israel’s 120-seat parliament, the Knesset, late on Monday.

The remaining 27 legislators were absent or abstained from voting.

Israeli and Palestinian rights groups warn that the bill will make the death penalty too easy to impose while also doing away with procedures safeguarding the right to a fair trial.

Muna Haddad, a lawyer with Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, told Al Jazeera that the bill intentionally lowers the legal protections to a fair trial to secure the mass conviction of Palestinians.

“The bill explicitly permits mass trials that deviate from standard rules of evidence, including broad judicial discretion to admit evidence obtained under coercive conditions that may amount to torture or ill-treatment,” Haddad said.

“This constitutes a severe violation of fair trial guarantees that falls well short of international law requirements.”

In a departure from standard Israeli judicial practice, which typically prohibits courtroom cameras, the bill mandates the filming and public broadcasting of key moments in the trials on a dedicated website.

This includes opening hearings, verdicts and sentencing.

Haddad warned that this provision effectively “transforms proceedings into show trials at the expense of the accused’s rights”.

“The provisions governing public hearings… violate the presumption of innocence, the right to a fair trial, and the right to dignity,” Haddad explained. “The framework effectively treats indictment as a finding of guilt, before any judicial examination has begun.”

Israel has been holding an estimated 200-300 Palestinians, including those captured in the country during the October 7 attacks, who have not yet been charged.

The Hamas-led assault on Israeli communities along Israel’s southern fence with Gaza killed at least 1,139 people, mostly civilians, according to an Al Jazeera tally based on official Israeli statistics. About 240 others were seized as captives.

Israel’s subsequent genocidal war on Gaza has killed at least 72,628 Palestinians, including at least 846 since a United States-brokered “ceasefire” came into effect last October.

The war, which United Nations experts say could amount to genocide, has left the Palestinian territory in ruins.

Several Israeli rights groups – including Hamoked, Adalah and the Public Committee Against Torture in Israel – said on Monday that while “justice for the victims of October 7 is a legitimate and urgent imperative”, any accountability for the crimes “must be pursued through a process which includes rather than abandons the principles of justice”.

The bill is separate from a law passed in March that approved the death penalty for Palestinians convicted of murdering Israelis, a measure harshly condemned by the international community and rights groups as discriminatory and inhumane.

That law applies to future cases and is not retroactive, so it could not apply to the October 2023 suspects.

Hamas spokesperson Hazem Qassem said the new law “serves as a cover for the war crimes committed by Israel in Gaza”.

The International Criminal Court is probing Israel’s conduct of the Gaza war and has issued arrest warrants for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Minister of Defence Yoav Gallant, as well as ‌three ‌Hamas leaders who have all since been killed by Israel.

Israel is also fighting a genocide case at the International Court of Justice.

It rejects the allegations.

Renewed clashes between rival gangs in Port-au-Prince have forced hundreds to flee their homes, forcing some families to the streets. Gang violence has now displaced more than 1.4 million people across Haiti. Gangs control an estimated 90% of the capital after the former president was assassinated in his home in 2021.

The referee blew the whistle a few minutes before 5 p.m., on April 26, to kick off the second half of a football game. The players re-emerged on the field, and the spectators once again gathered to witness the second round of the Guyaku Local Championship Football League in the Sabon Gari area of Guyaku, a small community in the Gombi Local Government Area (LGA) of Adamawa State, northeastern Nigeria. 

Just minutes into the match, another sound pierced the air across the football pitch, but it wasn’t the referee’s whistle this time. It was sporadic gunshots that alerted the players and the spectators that something terrible was about to unfold.

The gunshots continued from different directions, their sound drawing closer. As the confused crowd tried to make sense of the situation, some armed men arrived at the football field on motorcycles. They opened fire on the crowd, and in that instant, people scrambled for safety, while others fell dead on the pitch. 

Within minutes, Istifanus Hassan, an eyewitness who narrowly survived the attack, said that everywhere was thrown into chaos as screams and smoke filled the air. 

“We ran into the bushes, but they [terrorists] followed people with their motorcycles and were shooting them in the bush,” he recalled. Although he survived, Istifanus said what he witnessed while hiding in a nearby bush that evening may haunt him forever. 

The terrorists burnt down houses, motorcycles, shops, and a church. They also looted at least three grocery shops and a chemist. “They used motorcycles to pack the items after killing the shop owners. They packed all the items and burnt the shops down,” he said, adding that they made away with medicines as well.

“I watched my community members and relatives fall dead to the ground. The men were targeted and shot in the head, and the women were spared,” Istifanus said.

But not every woman survived the attack. Other residents told HumAngle that all the women captured by the terrorists were left unharmed, but two women lost their lives in the incident. Their deaths were attributed to stray bullets. 

One of the deceased was 28-year-old Sintiki Dimas, who went to the football pitch to sell snacks to spectators. As a petty trader, Sintiki relied on selling local snacks like kuli-kuli to support herself and her younger siblings. 

Her mother, Bata Dimas, said Sintiki was killed while trying to flee, adding that her daughter’s trade was a great source of support to her eight younger siblings and the rest of the family. 

The other woman, who also lost her life in the attack, was fleeing with her toddler strapped to her back when a bullet hit and killed her. “The baby was also shot on his leg, but he’s currently receiving treatment,” an eyewitness, who asked not to be named, told HumAngle. 

The attack continued for hours. 

By the following day, the Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP), a Boko Haram breakaway, had claimed responsibility for the assault. The attack, which killed at least 33 residents and injured seven others, happened barely two months after ISWAP attacked a military base in Hong, a nearby local government area. 

Residents say it exposed longstanding security gaps in the border community, triggered fresh displacement, and revived fears of a return to the deadly years of insurgent violence that have devastated the region. 

The first attack in a decade 

It is not the first time terrorists have invaded Guyaku, but it is the first time since 2015, when the Boko Haram insurgency was at its peak in Adamawa. Then, “they burnt almost the entire village to the ground that year, but luckily, we all fled, and no one was harmed,” said Hamman Basmani, the Wakili (community leader) of Guyaku.

By 2016, most residents who had fled the area had returned and resumed their usual activities. 

Guyaku is an agrarian community, and residents – over a thousand of them, according to Hamman – mainly rely on farming for survival. Since the 2015 attack, he said, the residents had lived peacefully until the recent incident.

While other residents returned to Guyaku after the 2015 incident, Barnabas Benaiah was among those who did not. He relocated to Hong with his nuclear family, while his extended family remained in Guyaku. 

“I’m not currently staying in Guyaku, but I’m always there,” he said, meaning that he visits regularly. He added that he feels attached to his hometown, which is why he stayed in a neighbouring town. 

When ISWAP attacked Guyaku in April, Barnabas lost three family members. Two were his brothers, and the other was his niece. “They [his brothers] all had families and had left behind pregnant wives,” he told HumAngle. 

Barnabas noted that the attack in Guyaku was tactical. 

“They were after men,” he said, echoing testimonies from other residents. “Mostly young men, so they targeted spots where these men could be found, such as the football pitch, local joints, and front yards. They shot the men in the head, and when they encountered women, they told them to walk away because they had nothing to do with them. The women who died were hit by flying bullets.” 

A recent academic study on gendercide in the Lake Chad insurgency found that such patterns have appeared in previous ISWAP and Boko Haram attacks, where adult men are often perceived as potential fighters, vigilantes, informants, or collaborators with the state.

Residents say the terrorists pursued residents who ran towards neighbouring communities and killed them, while also looting valuables, such as motorcycles. “They went to a commercial charging store and packed all the phones from there. They were still looting shops when soldiers from Garkida town arrived, so they abandoned some of the items and ran,” Barnabas said. 

Tela Bala, Kwari, Kwana, and other communities within Guyaku were also affected. “[Several] people from these communities have now fled to urban centres,” he added. 

Istifanus remained in the bush until the gunshots ceased. He came out and joined other residents in recovering dead bodies. Most of the corpses were found at the football pitch, while some were recovered in front of houses and across the street. 

“The corpses I saw and counted that day were up to 28, but I couldn’t stay to continue identifying the bodies,” he recounted. “I became emotional and left.” 

Hamman, the community leader, told HumAngle that other bodies were recovered in the bushes and roads leading to other villages days afterwards. He said that 33 bodies were found; 30 of them were men, and most were young. 

Guyaku sits in Adamawa’s northwestern region. It is about 20 km from the border with Borno State and less than 15 kilometres from Kwapre, Banga, Larh, and Dabnz Kinging communities, each of which has been abandoned due to Boko Haram attacks over the years.

Guyaku, along with these border communities, falls within known terror hotspots, including forests like Alagarno and towns like Mandaragairu, where terrorists often operate and move through to attack surrounding hinterland communities along the southern Borno-Adamawa border.

In April, HumAngle reported how these abandoned agrarian communities fall within the direct line of influence of terror groups from major enclaves like Sambisa Forest and the other forests connecting local bushes in Adamawa State to those across the border in Borno, allowing them to remain geographically threatened by these groups.

Tale of terror 

For residents in these communities, nowhere is safe anymore. During the April 26 attack, 39-year-old Alheri Gabriel was sitting outside his house, playing cards with his friends, when the terrorists rode towards them on motorcycles. 

“At first, I was confused, and I thought they were trying to catch a thief because someone was running in front of them. I thought he was a thief, and had I tried to help them catch him, but I noticed they had guns,” Alheri recounted. 

Suddenly, the terrorists ordered him to come forward, but he hesitated, and when they pointed a gun at him, he immediately started running as fast as his legs could carry him. 

“While I was running, they shot me in the left shoulder, but I didn’t stop. I continued running, and they pursued me with their motorcycles, but I fled into a house and hid there until they lost track of me,” he told HumAngle. 

He remained hidden while blood continued to gush from his injured shoulder. When the shooting ceased, he staggered into the street and was assisted by other residents. Alheri was first rushed to a hospital in Gombi town, along with other injured people, before being transferred to the Modibbo Adama University Teaching Hospital in Yola, the Adamawa State capital, for further treatment. 

Later, he learnt the men he had been playing cards with were all shot and their bodies set ablaze by the terrorists in the front yard. 

He underwent surgery on May 1 and is still recovering, but he fears his life will never be the same. “I have a wife and young children. I’m a skilled photographer and a barber, and I don’t think I’ll be able to recover soon or resume work,” he said. 

With a family to feed, Alheri hopes to recover soon so he can return to his business. However, something has changed. “I don’t think I’ll return to Guyaku,” he said.

His wife and children have fled to another town, where they are living with relatives. 

Empty streets 

More than a week after the ISWAP attack, residents – especially women and children – have continued to flee Guyaku despite assurances from the Adamawa State government that security would be strengthened in the area and that justice would be served. 

“Only the men are left here, and we are not more than 20,” Hamman said, adding that residents are worried about the security gaps that exist in the area. 

During an assessment visit two days after the attack, Ahmadu Fintiri, the Governor of Adamawa State, said, “We are intensifying security operations immediately to restore peace and ensure every resident feels safe in their home again. We will rebuild, and we will remain resilient.”

Despite those assurances, residents say the security presence in the community has remained inadequate. Although a group of soldiers, local vigilantes, and hunters were stationed there in the early days after the attack, the military officers have since withdrawn. 

“The local security team goes round the community, but there is no security post or unit we can report to during emergencies,” Hamman said. 

For many residents, however, the absence of formal security is not new. Guyaku has long relied on the local vigilante group for security, but they are poorly equipped to repel major terror attacks. The nearest police stations are in Gombi and Garkida, about a 30- to 40-minute drive away.

The lingering insecurity has also disrupted efforts to bury some of the victims. Barnabas said some of the corpses are yet to be buried as their family members have since fled the area. “A mass burial was scheduled, but no agreement was reached, so individuals began burying their dead, and those whose relatives fled were paired with other victims,” he said. “At the cemetery, we got a call that the terrorists had just been spotted, and that was how the burial rites were abandoned. Everyone fled,” he stated. 

Hamman, who continues to lead the community during the crisis, said residents are pleading with the government to deploy more security personnel to the area.

“[They should] send soldiers to join hands with the vigilantes and protect us. If people see security personnel patrolling the area, they will want to come home. But if there are no security personnel, even if the people want to come back home, they will be discouraged.” 

Bolivia faces growing unrest as widespread road blockades disrupt travel across major cities including La Paz and El Alto. Protesters are demanding the resignation of President Rodrigo Paz amid fuel shortages, rising costs, and wage disputes.

Iran’s parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf says US has ‘no alternative but to accept’ Tehran’s 14-point proposal to end war.

The 2026 Africa France summit in Nairobi marks a significant diplomatic moment in the evolving relationship between Europe and Africa. For the first time, the summit is being held in an African country with no colonial history under France, signaling an intentional shift in symbolism and geopolitical messaging. It is also taking place against a backdrop of deteriorating French influence in parts of West Africa, where countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have sharply reduced engagement with Paris.

The summit reflects a broader attempt to redefine France’s role in Africa under President Emmanuel Macron and to reposition France within a more competitive global environment. At the same time, it highlights Kenya’s growing ambition under President William Ruto to present itself as a continental diplomatic hub and an economic gateway between Africa and global powers.

The convergence of these ambitions has produced a summit agenda focused on innovation, entrepreneurship, climate finance, artificial intelligence, and security cooperation. However, beneath this forward looking framing lies a more complex continuity of historical relationships, economic interests, and strategic recalibration between Africa and Europe.

Macron’s Repositioning of French Africa Policy

The summit reflects the long term evolution of Macron’s Africa strategy, which has sought to move away from traditional post colonial frameworks toward a more diversified and economically oriented engagement model. This approach emphasizes partnerships in innovation, private sector development, and strategic cooperation beyond France’s former colonial sphere.

A central feature of this policy has been an attempt to reduce France’s reliance on its traditional West African alliances while expanding diplomatic and economic ties across the broader African continent. This includes engagement with non Francophone countries and regional institutions, reflecting a recognition that France’s historical influence in West Africa is increasingly contested.

The emphasis on entrepreneurship and innovation, particularly through small business development and technology partnerships, reflects a shift toward a neoliberal development model. This model prioritizes private sector growth, investment facilitation, and startup ecosystems as drivers of economic transformation.

The Nairobi summit continues this trajectory by framing Africa France relations around innovation and growth rather than historical legacy or development aid dependency.

Kenya’s Strategic Diplomatic Positioning

For Kenya, the summit represents an opportunity to consolidate its position as a leading diplomatic and economic actor in Africa. By hosting a major international summit outside the traditional Francophone sphere, Kenya is signaling its ambition to transcend linguistic and colonial regional divisions and present itself as a neutral platform for continental and global engagement.

Under Ruto’s leadership, Kenya has increasingly adopted a development narrative centered on entrepreneurship and economic empowerment. This aligns with the broader summit theme of innovation driven growth and private sector expansion. Kenya’s domestic economic discourse, often framed around the concept of a “hustler economy,” mirrors the emphasis on small business development and market based solutions promoted in France’s external engagement strategy.

The convergence of these narratives allows both countries to present their partnership as forward looking and economically dynamic, rather than historically constrained.

Shared Policy Frameworks and Economic Priorities

A key reason the Nairobi summit bears the imprint of both Macron and Ruto is the overlap in their policy priorities. Both leaders emphasize climate finance, technological innovation, security cooperation, and private sector led development as central pillars of modern governance and international partnership.

This shared framework is particularly visible in discussions around artificial intelligence, climate initiatives, and industrial development. These sectors are presented as areas of mutual benefit, offering opportunities for investment, technological transfer, and economic growth.

However, this alignment is also strategic. It allows both sides to redefine their relationship in terms of future oriented sectors rather than historically sensitive areas such as colonial legacy or aid dependency. By focusing on emerging industries, both France and Kenya seek to establish a partnership narrative that is less politically contentious and more economically aspirational.

Historical Continuities Behind the New Partnership

Despite its modern framing, the France Kenya relationship is rooted in long standing historical interactions dating back to the post independence period. France’s early engagement with Kenya and the wider East African region was partly motivated by its broader strategy to balance British influence in Africa while expanding its own role within European and global institutions.

Kenya, in turn, has historically sought to diversify its international partnerships beyond the Commonwealth framework. Engagement with European economic structures in the early post independence period reflected a desire for greater autonomy in trade and development policy.

The current summit therefore reflects not a break from history, but a continuation of evolving pragmatic cooperation shaped by shifting global power dynamics.

Tensions Beneath Strategic Alignment

Despite the apparent convergence of interests, significant structural tensions remain between France and Kenya in areas such as climate policy, global security, and technological labor markets.

On climate change, both countries acknowledge the urgency of environmental action, but differ in priorities and implementation strategies. Kenya, highly vulnerable to droughts and environmental stress, seeks substantial climate finance and structural adaptation support. France and the broader European Union, however, often balance climate commitments with domestic energy and industrial policy considerations.

Similarly, in the field of artificial intelligence, cooperation masks underlying asymmetries. Much of the data processing and content moderation work that supports global AI systems is conducted in lower wage labor markets, including Kenya. This raises questions about value distribution and economic equity within the emerging digital economy.

In global security, divisions are also evident. Diverging responses to international conflicts, including voting patterns in global institutions, highlight differences in geopolitical alignment between African states and Western partners.

The Geopolitical Logic of the Summit

The Nairobi summit reflects a broader shift in international relations, where traditional post colonial hierarchies are being replaced by more transactional and issue based partnerships. Europe’s search for reliable global partners amid geopolitical uncertainty, combined with Africa’s growing strategic autonomy, is reshaping diplomatic engagement.

For France, Africa represents both an economic opportunity and a strategic necessity in an increasingly multipolar world. For Kenya, engagement with France offers access to investment, technology, and diplomatic visibility within global governance structures.

The summit therefore functions as both a symbolic and practical platform for redefining bilateral relations in a rapidly changing global order.

Analysis

The Nairobi Africa France summit illustrates the transformation of international partnerships from historically anchored relationships into forward looking economic and strategic arrangements. While the rhetoric emphasizes innovation, climate action, and entrepreneurship, the underlying dynamics remain shaped by long standing patterns of influence, economic asymmetry, and geopolitical repositioning.

The convergence between Macron’s and Ruto’s priorities reflects a pragmatic alignment rather than a fully equal partnership. Both sides benefit from framing cooperation in terms of emerging sectors such as artificial intelligence and green development, which carry fewer historical burdens and greater political flexibility.

However, the sustainability of this model depends on whether it can deliver inclusive economic outcomes rather than concentrating benefits among narrow elite and corporate actors. Without broader distribution of gains, the partnership risks reproducing familiar inequalities under a modern technological and developmental narrative.

Ultimately, the summit represents a transitional moment in Africa Europe relations, where historical legacies, contemporary economic interests, and future oriented strategic ambitions intersect in a rapidly evolving global system.

With information from Reuters.

Caracas, May 11, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Attorney General Larry Devoe has opened an investigation into the death of Victor Hugo Quero Navas in state custody in July 2025.

“The investigation aims to clarify the facts in a timely and impartial fashion,” Devoe’s statement, published on Thursday, read. “There will be a prompt exhumation of [Quero’s] body in accordance with Venezuela’s penal code.”

Quero’s case drew headlines in recent days following reports that a request for amnesty under the Amnesty Law approved in February was denied, only for Venezuelan authorities to reveal that he had passed away months earlier.

On May 6, attorney Moisés Gutiérrez from the Human Rights and Democracy Coalition NGO informed that the Second Control Court in Caracas had denied amnesty for Quero due to the charges against him, which reportedly included terrorism, criminal association, and conspiring with foreign agencies, falling outside the scope of the Amnesty Law.

Gutiérrez argued that Quero, a 51-year-old Caracas businessman and retailer, was in a situation of “enforced disappearance,” having had no contact with relatives or a lawyer of his choice since being arrested in early January 2025.

On May 4, Public Ombudswoman Eglée Lobato met Quero’s mother, Carmen Teresa Navas, and vowed to “activate institutional mechanisms” to provide information on her son’s judicial case.

However, last Thursday, Venezuela’s Prison Ministry issued a statement disclosing that Quero had died on July 24, 2025, due to an “acute respiratory failure” following a “pulmonary thromboembolism.” Authorities added that he had been detained in the Rodeo I prison in the outskirts of Caracas since January 3, 2025 and was admitted to a hospital with “gastrointestinal bleeding” ten days before his death.

The Prison Ministry reported that Quero was buried on July 30, 2025, and that he had provided no next-of-kin information nor had any visits from relatives. Nevertheless, his mother made multiple documented visits to Rodeo I, only to receive no information on her son’s whereabouts.

The 82-year-old Navas was taken to Quero’s grave on Thursday and demanded a DNA test to confirm her son’s identity. She lamented having spent more than a year visiting the prison and judicial institutions without any answers. There was likewise no public information on any hearings in Quero’s case.

During an October visit to the Ombudsman’s office, Navas was informed of the charges against Quero and that he remained in Rodeo I, despite the fact that he had reportedly died three months earlier.

Following the latest revelations, multiple NGOs have accused Venezuelan judicial institutions of recurring human rights and due process violations. The Justicia, Encuentro y Perdón organization called for an “independent and exhaustive investigation” under the Minnesota Protocol on the Investigation of Potentially Unlawful Death.

Lavoe and Lobato took office in April following a parliamentary selection process. Their respective predecessors, Tarek William Saab and Alfredo Ruiz, have yet to comment on Quero’s case. 

Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez did not address the case explicitly but vowed to take action against “deviations in the justice system.”

“The deviations in the penal justice system exist,” she said during a televised event on Saturday. “I have information and call for action against judges who charge fees to grant amnesty. This must stop.”

Venezuela’s February Amnesty Law grants a blanket amnesty for crimes committed in contexts of political violence since 1999. The law excludes serious human rights violations, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.

According to Venezuelan officials, more than 9,000 people have benefited from amnesty in recent months. A majority of them were not imprisoned but were still facing trial or parole-type measures.

In April, Rodríguez created a commission on penal justice reform, headed by Devoe, referring to “evils that persist” in the judicial apparatus and calling for a “truly humane justice system.” Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello, also a member of the commission, said authorities were investigating issues of prison overcrowding and systematic trial delays.

Rodríguez had served as vice president since 2018, while Cabello took over as interior minister in August 2024. In 2021, Cabello headed a parliamentary commission tasked with undertaking a “judicial revolution.” However, complaints of prison overcrowding and poor conditions, as well as due process violations, continued.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Caracas.

A recent development in the Black Sea drone war has seen a Russian Navy patrol boat appear with a screen, commonly known as a “cope cage,” on top of its superstructure to help protect against drones. Whether the modification is a one-off or part of a broader plan, it emphasizes the growing ubiquity of drone threats, a reality that the U.S. Navy is also increasingly having to contend with.

Two photos showing Russian Navy Project 21980 Grachonok class patrol boats underway in the Black Sea were published by Ukrainian defense adviser Serhii Sternenko. The photos were reportedly taken this month, but it’s not clear if they show the same vessel (in one photo, the Russian Navy flag is flying from a mast, and in the other, it is not).

This may well be the first instance of this kind of add-on protection, which is now routinely used by both sides of the conflict in Ukraine on tanks and other fighting vehicles, being installed on a surface vessel. However, as we reported in the past, a cope cage has also appeared on at least one Russian Navy ballistic missile submarine, the Tula.

The Project 21980 vessel is described by Russia as a multi-purpose anti-saboteur boat. Primarily designed to protect ports and other naval installations, they are used by the Russian Navy as well as the Border Service. Around 30 of the vessels have been completed since 2008.

According to Ukrainian sources, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet operates nine Project 21980 boats, while another four are assigned to the Border Service.

Displacing around 150 tons, the Project 21980 is a little over 100 feet long and can be armed with a 14.5 mm machine gun, anti-sabotage grenade launchers, and an Igla-series man-portable air defense system (MANPADS). Ironically, the Russian media has, in the past, heralded the success of the Grachonok class during exercises in which the vessel was used to detect and destroy uncrewed aerial vehicles (as well as uncrewed surface vessels and other small-sized surface targets).

The cope cage covers most of the surface area of the vessel, with three distinct levels: a first section protecting the area above the stern; a second section mounted above the bridge and projecting aft of it, but below the antenna array; and a third section aft of the main superstructure. The sides of the vessel appear entirely unprotected; this may well be to allow normal operations such as docking. Furthermore, access here is required to operate the weapons, as well as the rigid-hull inflatable boat (RHIB) that is typically stowed at the stern, and which is deployed and recovered by crane.

Considering the normal mounting of the machine gun on the bow and the grenade launchers firing aft from the rear of the superstructure, it’s not clear how these weapons function after the cope cage is fitted. At the very least, the additional protection screens would appear to significantly reduce their fields of fire, limiting them to a very depressed trajectory.

Moreover, while the cope cage provides a degree of overhead protection against drone-delivered munitions, it can be easily seen how a skilled drone operator would be able to find a gap in the protection. FPV drones, in particular, are highly maneuverable and have already demonstrated their ability to penetrate inside armored vehicles through open hatches and into buildings through whatever openings might be available. In this case, flying a drone around the static cope cages would not appear to be too difficult.

At the same time, the protection doesn’t address the threat posed by uncrewed surface vessels (USVs, ‘drone boats’) and uncrewed underwater vessels (UUVs) that have repeatedly been used to attack Russian targets in and around the Black Sea.

The threat of Ukrainian naval drones was most recently underscored in an incident on the night of April 30, when, according to reports, a Border Service PSKA-300 class patrol boat was struck, close to the Kerch Bridge. A photograph subsequently published on a Telegram channel showed a memorial plaque indicating that nine members of the Russian crew were killed in the strike. Ukrainian reports suggest that, as well as the PSKA-300, a Project 21980 Grachonok class patrol boat was also hit in the same raid.

🚨⚓ BREAKING: Ukrainian Navy struck Russian patrol boats guarding the Kerch Bridge overnight on April 30.

A Sobol patrol boat of the FSB Border Service and a Grachonok anti-sabotage boat were hit in the Kerch Strait area. https://t.co/dEFbWvQM8M pic.twitter.com/0Ib1M3rbyG

— Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) April 30, 2026

The PSKA-300 and Project 21980 are both regularly used to patrol the waters around the Kerch Bridge, linking mainland Russia with occupied Crimea, which is a regular target of Ukrainian strikes.

At the same time, equipping surface vessels with these kinds of add-on protection is a logical extension of the drone war. Russian forces began installing top protection on their tanks in the build-up to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Armor of this type has since become a common feature on Russian and Ukrainian tanks and other armored vehicles, primarily as a defense against FPV and other types of weaponized commercial drones.

As the war has progressed, the threat of Ukrainian aerial drones has been extended into the Black Sea.

Last summer, we reported on how Ukraine had begun using so-called bomber drones launched from USVs to attack targets in Crimea. The occupied peninsula is especially target-rich, hosting high-value Russian radar and air defense systems, as well as military aircraft. In that context, Ukraine using similar weapons to target Russian surface vessels in the Black Sea should come as no surprise.

Bomber drones launched from drone boats offer various advantages. They give Ukrainian operators the ability to strike more than one target per drone with heavier warheads than typical FPV drones usually carry. They can also travel farther while maintaining their connection, as they don’t have to dive to the ground to hit their targets. As we have reported in the past, Ukraine also has bomber drones that can launch guided munitions with a heavier punch. All of these would offer a significant threat to Russian vessels in the Black Sea.

Already, Ukrainian actions have effectively forced the Black Sea Fleet to vacate Crimea and instead operate from Novorossiysk, although this hasn’t removed the Ukrainian threat entirely.

As well as heavier and more capable bomber drones, Ukrainian drone boats are also increasingly being used as platforms for launching FPV drones. Back in 2024, the first evidence emerged that Ukraine was using a capability like this, with aerial drones being launched from USVs as part of its campaign of attacks on Russian offshore platforms. 

Meanwhile, it was reported recently that the HX-2 strike drone, from German manufacturer Helsing, has been adapted for launch from small boats. The company states that the HX-2s feature standoff range and artificial intelligence (AI) enabled capabilities that make them resistant to electronic warfare systems, and can be employed in networked swarms.

🇩🇪 German HX-2 strike drone, which is used by 🇺🇦Ukraine, has been adapted for deployment from boats, – Militarnyi

Helsing reported that it successfully conducted the first launch of the drone from a coastal vessel. pic.twitter.com/PAujJE2Wd5

— MAKS 25 🇺🇦👀 (@Maks_NAFO_FELLA) May 11, 2026

Further proliferation of FPV drones and new missions for these types include a growing emphasis on using them in a coastal defense capacity. Here, again, patrol boats like the Project 21980 would be exposed to additional threats.

Overall, questions remain about how effective the drone protection on the Project 21980 patrol boat might be in practice. However, the emergence of the fixture again underscores Russia’s concerns about the dangers posed by Ukrainian weaponized drones. This is a threat that is now very real across all domains and one that is steadily growing worldwide.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com