MONEY

The digital euro is facing fresh delays in the European Parliament after the file’s lead rapporteur, Spanish lawmaker Fernando Navarrete Rojas of the European People’s Party (EPP), formed a minority bloc with far-right groups — leaving shadow rapporteurs unable to secure a workable majority around the draft.

ADVERTISEMENT

ADVERTISEMENT

The latest compromise text seen by Euronews would also narrow the project’s scope in a way that goes to the heart of the Commission’s plan.

Brussels proposed a digital form of cash that could be used both online and offline. Navarrete, by contrast, is pushing for an offline-only model.

As rapporteur, Navarrete is responsible for steering the legislative text and building agreement across political groups through negotiations with shadow rapporteurs — a process designed to produce a majority-backed position in Parliament.

The Parliament has already signalled broad support for a digital euro.

On 10 February, lawmakers adopted the European Central Bank’s annual report and backed two pro–digital euro amendments, with opposition mainly coming from some centrist and far-right MEPs.

The EPP itself is split on the file. The German delegation is strongly in favour, amid pressure from Berlin. In mid-February, Vice-Chancellor Lars Klingbeil told journalists that those opposing the digital euro were harming Europe.

Two sources familiar with the talks told Euronews that amendments tabled by Navarrete in the latest compromise text are a non-starter for groups backing the Commission’s plan, pushing the file into a legislative deadlock.

Euronews contacted lead rapporteur Navarrete for comment but had not received a response at the time of publication.

The impasse surfaced again at a meeting on Thursday, when lawmakers attempted to bridge differences after a heated discussion, claiming “the text is going nowhere”.

Another meeting is scheduled for 10 March, but sources expect a vote currently pencilled in for May to slip.

EU countries have already agreed their position in the Council. Without a Parliament mandate, the legislation cannot move to the next stage.

What is digital euro?

The digital euro has taken on new political weight as economic tensions between the EU and the US sharpen the debate over Europe’s reliance on American payment giants.

Visa and Mastercard, both US-based, underpin much of day-to-day card spending in Europe. ECB data for 2025 shows the two networks account for 61% of card payments in the EU and nearly all cross-border card payments.

The project would create an electronic form of cash issued by the European Central Bank, designed to sit alongside banknotes and the payments services offered by commercial banks.

Supporters argue it would give citizens direct access to digital “public” money — something that, for now, largely exists only in the form of cash.

Under the Commission’s proposal, users would have a digital wallet for both online and offline payments, with transactions designed so they are not trackable.

Critics say the latest compromise text in Parliament risks stripping out key parts of that vision.

“This first taste of a compromise from Mr. Navarrete sadly shines little light on any actual shift in his direction for the digital euro,” Laura Casonato, head of policy at Positive Money Europe, told Euronews.

Casonato said the draft does contain some welcome elements, including language recognising that the digital euro “should be a sovereign and secure digital means of payment that safeguard public access to central bank money” alongside clearer provisions on privacy and data security.

After its failure to strike a deal to tap into the EU’s defence for loan scheme, the UK is now on a charm offensive to secure “Made in Europe” access for its industry.

ADVERTISEMENT

ADVERTISEMENT

UK Business and Trade Secretary Peter Kyle is in Brussels on Wednesday and Thursday to press the case for UK involvement in the European preference scheme the Commission is drafting, as speculation circulates that it will be limited to EU countries only.

“We have a shared challenge on the continent of Europe about economic security,” Kyle told journalists after meeting Commission Vice President Teresa Ribera, adding that “the continent of Europe should come together” to build “resilience” at a time of increasing worldwide economic tensions.

The UK fears Brussels’ push to favour “Made in Europe” products will shut London out of EU public procurement and state aid, escalating post-Brexit trade tensions.

London argues that the EU and UK economies are too deeply intertwined to withstand a strict EU-only European Preference.

The EU’s “Made in Europe” strategy is set to feature in the long-delayed Industrial Accelerator Act, held up for months by divisions among member states and within the European Commission. Baltic and Nordic countries have warned that the plan could curb innovation and restrict access to non-EU technologies, joining Germany in calling for a broad definition of “Made in Europe” that includes the bloc’s “trusted” trade partners.

France, by contrast, wants to limit eligibility to members of the European Economic Area – including Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland – as well as countries with reciprocal procurement agreements with the EU.

Limits of participation

London has previously sought to secure preferential access to the EU’s €150-billion Security Action for Europe (SAFE) defence loan scheme – so far, to no avail.

That programme also contains a European preference, with member states required to ensure that at least two-thirds of the weapon systems they buy using loaned EU money are manufactured in an EU or EEA/EFTA country or Ukraine. Third-country participation is capped at 35%.

Talks to bring the UK to the same level as a member state collapsed last November when they failed to find a compromise over how much London would have to contribute financially.

Euronews understands that those talks fell apart over a major gap between the two sides: whereas the final offer on the table from the EU was around €2 billion, the UK estimated it ought to contribute just over €100 million.

But the UK also wants to participate in the EU’s €90 billion loan to Ukraine, two-thirds of which is earmarked for military assistance.

Starmer said last month that “whether it’s SAFE or other initiatives, it makes good sense for Europe in the widest sense of the word – which is the EU plus other European countries – to work more closely together.”

But the British premier is walking a difficult political tightrope. His Labour party is consistently polling several points behind the right-wing populist Reform UK, led by arch-Brexiteer Nigel Farage.

Yet, a recent YouGov poll showed that a majority of British people (58%) now believe that it was wrong for the UK to leave the EU, with 54% supporting rejoining the bloc. An even bigger majority – 62% – support having a closer relationship without rejoining the EU, the Single Market, or the Customs Union.

Brussels, however, has always been clear that the UK cannot pick and choose privileged access to the Single Market without accepting the EU’s “four freedoms”: the full freedom of movement of goods, services, capital and people – the latter of which would feed into Farage’s anti-immigration platform.

Emerging markets are roaring back in 2026, staging a rally that has surprised investors not only for its speed — unmatched in decades — but also for the broader global context in which it is unfolding.

ADVERTISEMENT

ADVERTISEMENT

While US software stocks reel from artificial intelligence disruption fears and the S&P 500 remains broadly flat year-to-date, emerging markets are decoupling.

In a reversal of long-standing market dynamics, the asset class is briefly playing an unexpected role: that of a relative safe haven.

The rally is broad, persistent and increasingly supported by flows, macro conditions and structural shifts in global trade.

Emerging markets dominate global performance rankings

Data from CountryETFTracker show that the five best-performing country-specific exchange traded funds so far this year all belong to emerging markets.

Leading the rally is South Korea’s iShares MSCI South Korea ETF (EWY), up 43.28% year-to-date after a 96% surge in 2025.

The gains reflect the dominance of chipmakers such as Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix, which are benefiting from strong global demand for AI-related memory and advanced semiconductors, lifting exports and corporate earnings.

It is followed by Peru’s iShares MSCI Peru ETF (EPU), which has gained 25.31%, Brazil’s iShares MSCI Brazil ETF (EWZ) at 22.03%, Thailand (THD) at 21.38% and Turkey (TUR) at 21.32%.

The broader MSCI Emerging Markets Index, tracked by the iShares MSCI Emerging Index Fund (EEM), is up nearly 13% year-to-date.

Two elements stand out here: the scale of the relative strength and the remarkable consistency of the rally.

Over the past two months, EEM has achieved the strongest relative surge against the S&P 500 since 2008. Over 12 months, the performance gap has widened to 25 percentage points — the largest divergence since January 2010.

Emerging markets have also recorded 13 positive months out of the last 14 and closed higher for nine consecutive weeks — a streak not seen since 2005.

There is, unmistakably, a structural trend under way.

Record inflows toward geographic capital reallocation

The rally is not only price-driven but also flow-driven.

The iShares MSCI Emerging Markets ETF attracted more than $4bn (€3.7bn) in January 2026, its strongest month for inflows since 2015.

South Korea alone drew $1.6bn (€1.5bn) in January and over $1bn (€0.9bn) in February, while Brazil attracted nearly $1bn (€0.9bn) in January.

The surge in allocations suggests that institutional investors are actively increasing exposure to emerging markets.

Importantly, flows appear broad-based rather than concentrated in a single thematic trade.

While Asia-focused markets have benefited from AI supply-chain positioning, Latin American funds have drawn support from commodities and cyclical exposure.

Why is this happening?

1) Rotation away from crowded US tech

Much of 2026’s market narrative has centred on artificial intelligence disruption, particularly in long-duration US software stocks.

After years of heavy concentration in mega-cap American technology names, investors are reassessing exposure as valuations look stretched and volatility rises.

Emerging markets, by contrast, began the year trading at sizeable discounts to developed peers.

Capital is rotating away from crowded US growth trades into cyclicals, commodities and regions directly exposed to AI hardware demand.

Ed Yardeni of Yardeni Research highlighted that while the US economy still remains exceptional, emerging economies benefit from expanding middle classes, rising industrial output and export growth that increasingly outpaces advanced economies.

2) Dollar weakness supports emerging markets

Currency dynamics are reinforcing the move towards emerging markets.

Jeff Buchbinder, Chief Equity Strategist at LPL Financial, indicates that the US Dollar Index is close to breaking its long-term uptrend, with expectations of further Federal Reserve rate cuts adding pressure.

Central banks’ gradual diversification away from the US dollar towards gold, alongside a persistent US trade deficit that continues to expand the global supply of dollars, is also exerting downward pressure on the greenback.

For emerging markets, a softer dollar eases financing conditions and improves relative returns.

Bank of America strategist David Hauner describes the near-certainty of the next Fed move being a cut as a ‘volatility compressor’ — a backdrop that has historically supported EM assets.

3) AI hardware boom supports Asia

While AI concerns weigh on US software, the hardware backbone of artificial intelligence is largely produced in Asia.

Taiwan dominates advanced semiconductor production, and South Korea’s Samsung Electronics remains a global leader in memory chips.

In Taiwan, technology-related goods now account for roughly 80% of exports and the bulk of recent growth. Revenue at TSMC continues to track the island’s export momentum, with analysts expecting another year of solid expansion in 2026.

4) Commodities and cyclicals add further support

The strength is not confined to technology exporters. Commodity-linked economies such as Brazil and Peru are benefiting from firm metals and agricultural demand, while Thailand and Turkey are gaining from improved financial conditions and cyclical recovery dynamics.

Against a backdrop of stabilising global growth and easing US monetary policy expectations, emerging markets combining export momentum with improving external balances are regaining investor attention.

Why this matters

The resurgence of emerging markets is more than a short-term performance story.

After a decade dominated by US exceptionalism, the current rally points to a potential broadening of global leadership — driven by currency dynamics, shifting capital flows and the geography of AI-driven production.

If sustained, the move could reshape portfolio allocations and challenge the long-standing concentration of global equity returns in a narrow group of US mega-cap stocks.

Recently, the United States reached a new historic milestone: it produced over 13.6 million barrels per day, a staggering feat for a country that many thought had peaked in 2008 when production bottomed out at 5 million bpd. This staggering increase was not achieved by a state giant, but by an ecosystem of thousands of independent operators driven by market-based incentives that, in Venezuela, might seem from another planet.

Meanwhile, Venezuela has traveled the opposite path: from a proud peak of 3.7 million bpd in 1970, it has collapsed to a stagnant output below 1 million bpd. 

In Texas, the landowner owns the oil; in Venezuela, it is the State—which claims, all the while, to represent us all.

The hundred-year war

Since the Los Barrosos II blowout in December 1922, our oil history has been defined by a relentless tug-of-war between private capital and the State over the capture of oil rent. This conflict is not unique to Venezuela, but as we enter this “third opening,” the question is unavoidable: how do we prevent a third nationalization?

Having done it twice before (1976 and 2006), Venezuela has established a precedent that alters risk assessment across all investment horizons. How can we guarantee investors that history won’t repeat itself? While often sold as a patriotic triumph, nationalization is a terminal breach of contract and a direct assault on property rights, deterring the very capital profiles that otherwise would be participating. International arbitration, legal reforms, and institutional frameworks are necessary, but they are not sufficient.

Government take and the global race

To put things in perspective: before the 2026 reform, the Venezuelan fiscal system was among the least competitive on the planet. Between royalties on gross income, income tax (ISLR), and “windfall profit” taxes, the State extracted a “Government Take” that often exceeded 80%, with marginal tax rates reaching up to 95% depending on price thresholds. In a scenario where the operator’s net margin was squeezed to a minimum, production became a game of survival and reinvestment became technically impossible.

While the January 2026 reform moves in the right direction, we aren’t just competing against our own past; we are competing against the world. Consider the current margins (Operator Share) in the region:

• Canada (Alberta, Heavy Oil): Private 50%-55% | Government 45%-50%
• Texas (Permian Basin): Private 45%-55% | Government 45%-55%
• Colombia (New Reforms): Private ­40% | Government ­60%
• Brazil (Pre-Salt): Private 39% | Government 61%
• Guyana (2025 Model): Private 25%-35% | Government 65%-75%
• Venezuela (2026 Law): Private 20%-35% | Government 65%-80%

Even with the recent reform, Venezuela is far from being a “bargain” for long-term investment.

The proposal: from State-partner to citizen-owner

To mitigate expropriation risk and attract long-term capital, I propose a model built on four foundational pillars:

• Private Capital-Citizen Partnership: The State is removed from operations. Incentives are aligned directly between citizens—the ultimate owners of the subsoil—and those who risk the capital to extract it.

• Zero Corporate Taxes (Tax Displacement): Eliminate corporate income tax, royalties, and all “shadow” taxes at the source. This slashes the operational break-even to technical average levels of $30 to $40 per barrel, turning “iron cemeteries” into profitable ventures even in low-price environments. This is not a tax holiday, but a redirection of the fiscal take: the operator delivers a major share of the value directly to the citizens, while the State sustains itself by taxing the total income of the citizenry and companies in the rest of the economy.

• The Citizen Dividend (Oil-to-Cash): Instead of paying a traditional tax to a discretionary Treasury, the operator delivers 50% of its net profit—effectively a flat tax paid to the owners—directly into a sovereign trust (or similar non-state mechanism) managed by top-tier international banks. While 50% is a significant share, the absence of any other fiscal burden makes this model one of the most competitive in the region. This trust distributes periodical dividends to every Venezuelan citizen, including those abroad. The State then funds its operations by taxing these dividends as part of the citizens’ total income via personal income tax (ISLR) and other tax sources from a diversified economy. This ensures that the government’s budget depends on the collective prosperity of its people, not on political control over the oil.

• The Citizen as “Guardian” and Auditor: This is the ultimate shield. In 1976 and 2006, the State nationalized because it was easy to seize control from a “multinational” and hand it to a bureaucracy. Under this scheme, any government attempting to expropriate would be taking directly from the pockets of 30 million owners. Transparency is embedded: citizens monitor production and distributions through real-time digital platforms, independent audits, and other decentralized oversight mechanisms. The citizen ceases to be a spectator and becomes the industry’s most powerful defender.

Unlike the State, whose lust for oil rent is political and lacks immediate consequences for those in power, the citizen acts with the prudence of an owner—because they become one. Under this model, any attempt to “suffocate” the private partner translates immediately into a drop in personal dividends. Private ownership of the benefit is, in itself, the best guarantee of stability for capital.

Application and reality

Under this model, the direct net profit split for the oil industry would be: Private 50%, Citizens 50%, State 0%.

This “State 0%” applies exclusively to the source to insulate the industry from political rent-seeking. It does not mean a zero-revenue State; the government continues to fund its functions, but through a transparent tax system (ISLR, VAT) derived from a citizen-owned economy.

To illustrate, with oil at $100 and production at 3.5 million bpd, each citizen would have received $1,500 annually ($6,000 for a family of four). At a $60 base price, the dividend would be $640 per person. Today, with production stalled below one million barrels, a citizen would receive a mere $185. It is modest, but it represents the starting point of a virtuous cycle where the State only prospers if its citizens do first.

Herein lies the virtue of the model: the alignment of interests. Under the current system, citizens watch from the sidelines as oil wealth vanishes into the state vortex. With this approach, each Venezuelan has a personal stake: the more their private partner thrives, the more they themselves benefit. Citizens move from passive critics to primary stakeholders in the nation’s industrial growth.

Considerations for a new Venezuela

Under other circumstances, I might not be a proponent of direct “cash” transfers. But given the alternatives, it is the “lesser evil”. The political class will likely claim this is neither feasible nor “patriotic.” For many politicians, the incentive is two-fold: the salivating prospect of managing an immense oil “booty,” and the recurring ideal of “doing good” with other people’s resources.

Still in doubt? Look at our track record: despite having the world’s largest proven reserves and over 20 different administrations of every political stripe since 1922, the State captured and managed over $1.2 trillion in rent between 1920 and 2015. The result? A Guinness world record in squandered booms, the largest migration in the hemisphere without a formal war, and unprecedented institutional destruction.

Isn’t it time to withdraw the State from oil? 

This proposal would achieve:

• Real competitiveness: By matching Texas and Alberta margins (50%+ for the private sector), we compensate for institutional risks with top-tier global profitability.
• A limited State: The State ceases to be an inefficient businessman and becomes an arbiter: providing control, arbitration, and security. Its funding would come from taxing other economic activities, forcing it to foster general prosperity rather than living off the subsoil.
• A path towards a dividend-producing nation: Why not extend this to all extractive activities (gas, gold, iron, rare earths)? Perhaps the gold of the Arco Minero would stop being a black hole and become a direct dividend, shielding resources from looting and opacity.

The January 2026 reform is just a sigh in a prolonged agony. We cannot expect different results by doing the same thing. The “Hundred-Year War” over oil rent has left the State as a jailer rich in promises and a citizenry poor in realities.

Avoiding a third nationalization requires moving the subsoil out of the political arena and into the sphere of economic freedom. The US does not dominate markets by government mandate, but through an ecosystem that rewards risk and efficiency. Venezuela can emulate this success, but only by breaking the State lock and allowing a fabric of investors to flourish in direct alliance with citizens.

True sovereignty is not the State running the wells; it is Venezuelans themselves being the real owners of the benefits. Only through this pact of ownership can we hope that oil becomes, at last, an engine of development and not the tool of our own institutional destruction.

Published on 23/02/2026 – 13:58 GMT+1•Updated
14:24

EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič is set to meet G7 trade ministers on Monday after United States President Donald Trump upped the pressure on trading partners with a 15% across-the-board tariffs on imports entering the American market.

ADVERTISEMENT

ADVERTISEMENT

Trump’s move came after a US Supreme Court ruling last week struck down several global duties he had imposed from the White House last year, overturning a central part of his trade policy.

Brussels is now demanding legal clarity. The EU is bound to Washington by a trade pact clinched in July 2025 by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Trump, setting tariffs on EU exports at 15% while committing the bloc to slash its own duties to zero.

“Full clarity on what these new developments mean for the EU-US trade relationship is the absolute minimum that is required in order for us the EU to make a clear-eyed assessment and decide on next steps,” Commission deputy spokesperson Olof Gill said on Monday.

Key Parliament vote expected

Šefčovič’s G7 talks come ahead of a closed-door meeting of EU ambassadors to assess the fallout from the latest developments in the US.

Some member states, including France, are prepared to deploy the bloc’s Anti-Coercion Instrument – the so-called “trade bazooka” that allows restrictions on public procurement, licenses and intellectual property rights if necessary to push back against external pressure.

Attention is now shifting to the European Parliament, which was set to vote Tuesday on implementing the EU-US agreement by cutting tariffs on US goods, as included in the deal. Instead, MEPs are meeting on Monday afternoon to decide on the future enforcement of the agreement.

The Parliament has led resistance to the US administration, arguing the deal signed in Scotland last summer was unbalanced.

German MEP Bernd Lange, who chairs the Parliament’s Committee on International Trade, said on Sunday that he will urge negotiators to suspend the agreement. But Zeljana Zovko, lead negotiator for the EPP – the Parliament’s largest group – struck a cooler tone, telling Euronews that MEPs “keep calm and do our [their] part.”

“No need to add any more fuel to an already existing fire,” she said.

Published on 20/02/2026 – 12:34 GMT+1•Updated
12:35

European steel shipments to the US declined 30% between June and December 2025 compared with the same period a year earlier, according to recent Eurostat data compiled by Eurofer, the Brussels-based industry group.

ADVERTISEMENT

ADVERTISEMENT

The decline underscores the impact of the US’s 50% tariffs on EU steel, even after the EU and US signed a trade agreement in July 2025 agreeing a blanket 15% US tariff on EU goods. Steel was carved out of that deal and talks to ease duties remain stuck.

“A 30% drop in steel exports to the US within just six months is a clear signal that the blunt 50% tariffs imposed by the US government on EU steel are damaging our industry,” Eurofer Director general Axel Eggert said.

“The US decision to include EU downstream steel products, such as machinery, will have another huge negative impact on us and our European customers,” he added.

Washington imposed 50% tariffs on EU steel and aluminium in June 2025 and extended the measures to more than 400 steel and aluminium products in August.

Steel talks tied to EU-US trade deal enforcement

The US has framed the tariffs as a shield against Chinese overcapacity flooding global markets, including Europe.

With Chinese exports increasingly redirected from the US to the EU, the European Commission proposed on 7 October 2025 to halve the volume of steel allowed into the bloc duty-free and to levy a 50% tariff on imports exceeding a quota of 18.3 million tons a year.

The proposal steel needs to be adopted by the EU legislator. Meanwhile Brussels itself hopes to reopen talks with the White House to secure lower duties on EU steel.

But US negotiators have linked any resumption of discussions to the implementation of last summer’s EU-US trade deal, struck by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and President Donald Trump. Under that pact, the EU agreed to cut its tariffs on US goods to zero while accepting 15% duties on its exports to the US.

With the EU legislative process still requiring approval from lawmakers and member states, Washington’s patience is wearing thin. Tensions could rise further after EU lawmakers introduced amendments that may complicate talks with capitals.

The European Parliament is expected to vote on the deal in March, paving the way for negotiations with member states.

The talks stalled on the European side after the US threatened to annex Greenland militarily from Denmark in January. Although the US has softened its language, it led to delays. The administration’s continuous lobbying for less stringent rules when it comes to digital legislation in Europe has also added obstacles to the talks.

Published on
19/02/2026 – 17:39 GMT+1

The European Commission’s push to embed a so-called European preference in public procurement is triggering heavy lobbying from EU capitals and foreign partners, Euronews has learned.

ADVERTISEMENT

ADVERTISEMENT

The proposal, designed to counter Chinese and US competition, would see products made in Europe officially favoured in public contracts and support schemes. Critics have branded it protectionist, and several member states have sought to water down the definition of “made in Europe” to ensure access for like-minded countries.

According to EU officials, the Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA), which is set to define what made in Europe means, is likely to face another delay despite appearing on the Commission’s agenda for presentation on 26 February. The strategy was first delayed in November 2025.

A leaked draft of the IAA text seen by Euronews lists strategic sectors targeted for a European preference, including chemicals, automotive, AI and space. It also proposes EU-origin thresholds of 70% for EVs, 25% for aluminium and 30% for plastics used in windows and doors.

The draft has drawn intense pushback. Nordic and Baltic states warn that a strict made in Europe regime could deter investment and limit EU companies’ access to cutting-edge technologies from non-EU countries.

In a separate leak reported by Euronews last week, the Commission appeared to lean toward the German position: a European preference open to like-minded partners with reciprocal procurement commitments and those contributing to “the Union’s competitiveness, resilience and economic security objectives”.

Britain concerned about protectionism

The UK is among the partners wary of a protectionist turn, with British officials stressing that the EU and UK economies are highly intertwined.

“It’s not the moment to mess with what is already working,” one official told Euronews.

In particular, the EU remains the largest export market for British cars, while several European manufacturers produce vehicles in the UK, which in 2024 was the EU’s second-largest export destination after the US.

“Almost half of our trade is with the European Union. We trade almost as much with the EU as the whole of the rest of the world combined,” UK Chancellor Rachel Reeves said last week.

British sources also argue that London’s deep capital markets could help the EU secure investment to revive its industry – unless the bloc closes its market.

The Commission is weighing its next move, aiming to table a proposal ahead of March’s EU summit focused on competitiveness. But pressure is also mounting from within, with pushback from the Trade Directorate-General – traditionally a staunch defender of an open EU market.

Paris, a long-time champion of a made in Europe strategy, says the concept has gained sufficient traction in Brussels to become reality and that the debate has now shifted to its implementation.

EU industry chief Stéphane Séjourné, who is overseeing the file, said on Tuesday that the European preference “entails quite a change of Europe’s economic doctrine”.

“It is therefore no surprises that it takes time and efforts to get to a common and smart version,” he added.

Global Finance has named the 27th annual World’s Best Investment Banks in an exclusive report to be published in the April 2026 print and digital editions, as well as online at GFMag.com. 

Goldman Sachs has been chosen as the Best Investment Bank in the World for 2026.

This year, for the first time, Global Finance has chosen Sector Award Winners by Region where outstanding organizations deserved recognition

“The investment banking sector remains resilient with selective deal-making strength and advisory growth, even as it grapples with persistent macroeconomic headwinds, regulatory scrutiny, and evolving market conditions that are reshaping how firms compete and innovate,” said Joseph D. Giarraputo, founder and editorial director of Global Finance. “The 2026 World’s Best Investment Bank honorees are the organizations that best serve their clients by pairing trusted advice and global reach with innovation and disciplined execution, while setting the standard for excellence, resilience, and leadership across the global investment banking landscape.” 

Winners will be honored at Global Finance’s 2026 Investment Bank and Sustainable Finance Awards Ceremony on April 21st in London at Landing 42.

Global Finance editors, with input from industry experts, used a series of criteria to score and select winners, based on a proprietary algorithm. These criteria include: entries from banks, market share, number and size of deals, service and advice, structuring capabilities, distribution network, efforts to address market conditions, innovation, pricing, after-market performance of underwritings, and market reputation. Deals announced or completed in 2025 were considered.

For editorial information please contact: Andrea Fiano, editor, email: afiano@gfmag.com
###

About Global Finance

Global Finance, founded in 1987, has a circulation of 50,000 readers in 185 countries, territories and districts. Global Finance’s audience includes senior corporate and financial officers responsible for making investment and strategic decisions at multinational companies and financial institutions. Its website — GFMag.com — offers analysis and articles that are the legacy of 38 years of experience in international financial markets. Global Finance is headquartered in New York, with offices around the world. Global Finance regularly selects the top performers among banks and other providers of financial services. These awards have become a trusted standard of excellence for the global financial community.

Logo Use Rights 

To obtain rights to use the Global Finance Investment Bank Awards 2026 logo or any other Global Finance logos, please contact Chris Giarraputo at: chris@gfmag.com. The unauthorized use of Global Finance logos is strictly prohibited.

The United States spends more on its military than any other country. Military spending by the U.S. made up almost 40% of the total military spending worldwide in 2023, according to a report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). When adjusted to 2024 dollars, the U.S. spent $5.74 trillion on WWII alone. That’s more than WWI, Vietnam, Korean, or the post-9/11 Iraq and Afghanistan wars.

U.S. military spending is expected to increase by 10% over the next decade. Congress approved and signed the Department of Defense’s (DOD) new budget into law for fiscal year 2024, which included $841.4 billion in funding for the Air Force, Navy, Army, Marine Corps, National Guard, and more.

According to projections by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), military expenditures will reach $922 billion (in 2024 dollars) by 2038. Almost 70% of that increase will be for the operation and maintenance of military personnel. The DOD requested $850 billion for 2025 to spend on the military. That’s about 3% of the GDP and relatively low compared to other times in U.S. history. The financial methods used to fund these expenditures will include increasing taxes and the national debt.

This level of military spending has national and global impacts and affects the economy.

Analyzing U.S. Military Spending from WWI to Post-9/11

Looking at military spending by war can show us how wars and defense spending affected the U.S. economy, factors that influenced military spending, and trends in defense spending over the years.

The total amount spent on each major U.S. war has been inflation-adjusted to 2024 dollars. All estimates are of the costs of military operations only and do not reflect the costs of veterans’ benefits, interest on war-related debt, or assistance to allies.

WWI (1917 – 1918): $466.91 Billion

The total cost of World War I was about $466.91 billion in 2024 dollars. When WWI began in 1914, the U.S. was in a recession. However, the economy began to recover and boom after European demand for U.S. goods increased during the war. 

This only intensified when the U.S. entered WWI in 1917, causing a massive increase in federal spending due to shifting the economy from peacetime to wartime production. Entering the war also created new manufacturing jobs and left more jobs open in the labor force, as many young men were drafted into the military. The government also funded the war by increasing taxes and selling Liberty bonds to Americans, who were later paid back the value of their bonds with interest. 

Funding WWI increased the U.S. national debt to over $25 billion by the war’s end. However, the U.S. emerged from WWI as an economic world power. Going into the 1920s, the national debt decreased, the government had a budget surplus, and stock market returns increased. The effect lasted until the economy crashed in 1929, the beginning of the Great Depression.

WWII (1941 – 1945): $5.74 Trillion

The U.S. spent nearly $6 trillion on World War II in 2024 dollars. In the peak year of spending, WWII expenditures made up 35.8% of the national GDP. Federal government spending on WWII was unprecedented.

The U.S. had one of the most significant periods of short-term economic growth between 1941 and 1945, largely fueled by government spending on WWII. The government-funded WWII mainly by increasing taxes and taking on debt. Government debt grew to more than $258 billion by the end of WWII. Tax rates also increased sharply, resulting in even families in poverty having to pay taxes. The average tax rate for top incomes rose up to 90% as well.

War-time production also boomed during this time, with over 36% of the estimated GDP solely dedicated to producing war goods. Over this short period, the U.S. produced 17 million rifles and pistols, over 80,000 tanks, 41 billion rounds of ammunition, 4 million artillery shells, 75,000 vessels, and about 300,000 planes, among other equipment and services needed for the war. However, with so many resources going into war production, it became harder for families to purchase household items like washing machines, irons, water heaters, and food that had to be rationed.   

When the U.S. entered WWII, it was reeling from the effects of the Great Depression, the most severe and prolonged recession in modern world history, from 1929 to 1941. Many attribute government spending on WWII to the end of the Great Depression. However, this broken window fallacy challenges the notion that going to war is good for a nation’s economy.

The theory also suggests that a boost to one part of the economy can cause losses in another part. While WWII reduced unemployment from the Great Depression as many were enlisted or worked in factories, the standard of living declined because of rationing and high taxes. Private sector jobs and production fell, along with overall consumption and investment.

Korean War (1950 – 1953): $476.69 Billion

The U.S. spent about $476.69 billion on the Korean War in 2024 dollars. While it was technically a civil war between the two opposing sides of the Korean peninsula, the U.S. and the United Nations joined in 1950 to support South Korea in a clash over democracy versus communism.

The U.S. funded the Korean War by implementing higher tax rates, contrasting funding by debt as in WWII. To do this, the government enacted the Revenue Act of 1950, increasing income tax rates to WWII levels. Individual and corporate taxes were raised again in 1951.

This was a financially turbulent time as the government had to implement price and wage controls to respond to the inflation created by additional government spending. Consumption and investment, two key factors contributing to the GDP, slowed down during this time and did not go back to pre-war levels.

Vietnam War (1962 – 1973): $1.03 Trillion

The U.S. spent about $1 trillion on the Vietnam war between 1962 to 1973. Military operations for the Vietnam War ramped up more slowly than WWII and the Korean War, with troop deployments starting in 1965. However, the U.S. had been providing aid and military training to South Vietnam since 1954 when Vietnam split into communist North Vietnam and the democratic South.

President John F. Kennedy expanded military aid in Vietnam as the conflict escalated between the North and the South, and President Lyndon B. Johnson continued that trend after Kennedy’s assassination. Escalating U.S. involvement in Vietnam was, in part, due to fears of the domino theory—the belief that if communism took over in Vietnam, it would spread through all of Southeast Asia.

The U.S. funded the war effort mainly by increasing taxes and advancing an expansive monetary policy that eventually led to high inflation in the mid-70s. Non-military spending was also very high during this time (unlike in previous wars, where military spending was significantly higher than non-military spending), largely due to President Johnson’s Great Society social programs, which included domestic policy initiatives such as work-study, Medicare, Medicaid, increased aid to public schools, and more.

Financing the war through increasing taxes and expansionary monetary policy left a lasting effect on the economy. It fueled inflation and caused the market to stagnate, which eventually turned into stubborn stagflation.

Afghanistan and Iraq Wars (2001 – 2021): $3.68 Trillion

The U.S. spent a total of $3.68 trillion in 2024 dollars on the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars over two decades. Military spending reached record levels under President George W. Bush, who launched the war in Afghanistan and the War on Terror in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks and the Iraq War in 2003.

The Afghanistan and Iraq Wars began in weak economic conditions owing to the recession from 2001 to 2002 after the Dotcom Bubble burst. Since this was the first time in U.S. history when taxes were cut during a war, both of these wars were completely funded by deficit spending. The government used an expansionary monetary policy that included low interest rates and fewer bank regulations to help stimulate the economy, but it was unsustainable in the long term for the U.S. government’s finances. The Federal Reserve Board increased interest rates again in 2006 and 2007 to help curb the housing bubble before the Great Recession in 2008. 

Military spending on operations in the Middle East peaked at nearly $964.4 billion in 2010, although it decreased in 2012 after the Budget Control Act of 2011, which was enacted in part to limit military spending to help bring down the growing national debt. However, annual caps on military spending were removed as of 2021. The Iraq War ended in 2011 under President Barack Obama, while the Afghanistan War ended in 2021 under President Joe Biden.

Key Drivers Behind U.S. Military Spending

Breakdown of U.S. Military Spending Components

Every year, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) proposes a total budget and its specific allocations, which then go through Congress for approval. 

Military spending includes many different categories. The largest category is generally operation and maintenance, including military training and planning, maintenance of equipment, and a majority of the military healthcare system. In 2023, $318 billion was spent on military operation and maintenance.

The next biggest spending category is military personnel, which goes toward pay and retirement benefits for service members. About $184 billion was spent on military personnel in 2023. Other military spending categories include acquiring weapons and systems, research and development of weapons and equipment, and smaller categories such as building military facilities and family housing.

Influences on U.S. Military Expenditure

Military spending can be influenced by several factors, such as wars, international tensions, and government expenditures. For example, military spending dropped significantly during the 1990s after the end of the Cold War before increasing again in the 2000s because of the War on Terror and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  

A shift in government priorities can affect military spending. After the Budget Control Act of 2011 was passed, military spending decreased, placing annual limits on defense spending—although these limits no longer exist.

Due to the U.S.’s involvement in other countries’ economic and political landscape, humanitarian aid and development in other countries can further affect future military spending decisions. 

Advancements in science and technology influence military spending, too. Developments in medical research, artificial intelligence, and new technologically advanced military systems affect defense spending. The Defense Appropriations Act for FY 2024 approved $21.43 billion in funding for science and technology, about $3.6 billion above the budget requested by the DOD. The bill also included more than $100 million over the requested amount for adopting artificial intelligence.

Economic Impact of U.S. Military Spending

The U.S. government has historically used a combination of methods to help fund wars including increasing taxes, pulling back on non-military spending, debt, and managing the money supply. All of these methods have affected the economy in various ways.

For example, WWII and the post-9/11 wars were largely funded by debt, whereas the Korean and Vietnam wars were financed by increasing taxes and inflation. One common thread between the wars, however, is that they increased pressure on inflation. Though inflation can be useful for reducing debt, the overall effects harm the economy and cause issues such as eroding purchasing power and reducing international competitiveness.

Military spending can also spur technological growth and innovation, creating demand and new jobs. However, some argue that defense spending on military research can divert talent away from other industries. High levels of military spending during WWII helped end unemployment and even increased income distribution. However, consumption and investment decreased because of resource redirection to the war effort. 

While military spending has had some positive effects over the years, the macroeconomic effects of military spending on major U.S. wars have been largely negative, according to an analysis by the Institute of Economics and Peace. War financing through debt, taxation, or inflation puts pressure on taxpayers, reduces private-sector consumption, and decreases investment.

U.S. Military Spending Relative to GDP

It’s important to note that while current U.S. military spending is higher than at any point of the Cold War (when adjusted for inflation), it is still low when considering defense spending as a percentage of the country’s GDP. The DOD has requested $850 billion in spending for 2025, which is about 3% of the GDP—that’s relatively low compared to other times in U.S. history. Looking at military spending in terms of GDP reveals that the U.S. economy has generally grown faster than military spending, so its share of the GDP has been lower. Military spending in the U.S. increased by 62% between 1980 and 2023, from $506 billion to $820 billion after adjusting for inflation. However, military spending still trails behind overall federal spending, which increased 175% over the same period.

The Bottom Line

The U.S. spends more on its military than any other country. The government has financed major wars by increasing taxes and debt and adjusting the money supply. Although military spending has reduced unemployment and has led to new developments in technology, the financing methods have increased inflationary pressures, causing negative long-term effects such as decreased purchasing power.

The larger macroeconomic consequences of large-scale military spending have included issues such as higher taxes, inflation, and larger government budget deficits.

Published on 18/02/2026 – 18:59 GMT+1•Updated
19:20

EU lawmakers have drafted a procedure to select the future host of the European Custom Authority, a new decentralised agency tasked with supporting and coordinating national customs administrations across the bloc.

ADVERTISEMENT

ADVERTISEMENT

The agency is expected to be set up in 2026 and operational in 2028. Many EU countries have put themselves forward as potential hosts for the new body, including Belgium, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Romania.

In a committee meeting in January, all the nine countries presented their candidacy, with Spain, France, Poland and The Netherlands receiving the majority of questions from EU lawmakers.

The need to establish a dedicated selection procedure arises from the fact that no predefined method exists for choosing the host country. As the location of an EU agency often becomes a politically sensitive contest among member states, the institutions have sought to design a detailed procedure aimed at ensuring the decision is as impartial and balanced as possible.

And with the business of customs management and trade surging in importance since US President Donald Trump imposed tariffs on countries worldwide, the debate over which country will host the future European Customs Authority has become particularly tense.

According to a draft procedure seen by Euronews, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union will each independently select two preferred candidates. The two institutions will then meet in a joint session to reveal their selections. If at least one candidate appears on both shortlists, that overlapping candidate will be automatically declared the winner.

If there is no overlap, two or four candidates will move to three rounds of votes, all with different rules.

In the first round, a candidate who obtains a majority in both institutions will be elected immediately. But if no candidate achieves a majority in either body, additional scenarios will apply to determine who advances to the second round.

Specifically, if two candidates are tied with neither securing a majority, both will move forward to the second round. In a scenario with four candidates, the two receiving the fewest votes will be eliminated. However, if there is a very close result between the second- and third-placed candidates, three candidates may advance to the second round instead.

In the second round, a joint vote of the two institutions will take place. A candidate must obtain a three-quarters majority to be elected; if no candidate reaches this threshold, the process will move to the third round.

If three candidates remain, the one receiving the fewest votes will be eliminated. However, in the event of a very close result between the second- and third-placed candidates, all three may proceed to the third round.

In the third and final round, the same joint voting procedure will apply, but the required threshold is lowered to a two-thirds majority. This vote may be repeated up to three times. And if no candidate secures the required majority after these attempts, the threshold will be reduced to a simple majority.

Published on
18/02/2026 – 17:27 GMT+1

Nexfibre, the UK full-fibre broadband venture backed by InfraVia, Liberty Global and Telefónica, is set to buy alternative network provider Netomnia.

ADVERTISEMENT

ADVERTISEMENT

According to an announcement on Wednesday, the deal agreed values Netomnia’s parent company, Substantial Group, at £2bn (€2.3bn), and it is anticipated that it will attract around £3.5bn (€2.3bn) of international investment into the UK.

Shares of Liberty Global are trading over 10% higher following the announcement. As for the other two companies that make up Nexfibre, InfraVia is not publicly traded and Telefónica hasn’t seen much movement as it is down around 1% for the day.

The move consolidates two of the more credible independent fibre operators in the wholesale space and reinforces the market’s position as a top investment choice for long-term infrastructure at a difficult time for the alternative network provider sector.

Rising construction costs, overlapping rollout footprints and tighter credit conditions have squeezed smaller operators. However, Netomnia has built a meaningful full-fibre presence in mid-sized towns and cities beyond the major urban centres.

Folding it into Nexfibre gives the combined entity greater geographic reach and financial firepower.

Analysts have anticipated a shakeout among UK altnets for some time. This acquisition suggests that process is now firmly underway, with capital consolidating around platforms large enough to carry long-term build programmes to completion.

The deal remains subject to regulatory clearance.

Published on
17/02/2026 – 8:00 GMT+1

Four years after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the European Union is still importing Russian steel – and not everyone is happy about it.

ADVERTISEMENT

ADVERTISEMENT

Next week, MEPs and EU member states will begin negotiations on whether to ban Russian steel outright. What began as a sanctions debate has morphed into a high-stakes political fight.

Swedish lawmaker Karin Karlsbro is preparing to take on the EU council, which represents the member states, with Belgium, Italy, the Czech Republic and Denmark all arguing that they still need imports of unfinished steel for major construction projects.

“It is a big provocation that we haven’t done everything possible to limit Putin’s war chest,” Karlsbro told Euronews. “The Russian steel industry is a backbone of Russian war, it is the Russian war machinery.”

Finished Russian steel was banned in 2022, but semi-finished steel, a key input for further processing, was spared after a number of countries secured an exemption until 2028 to cushion the blow to their industries.

“Unfinished steel can’t be produced anywhere in the EU,” a European diplomat from one of those countries told Euronews, “while it is required for big infrastructures.”

Three million tonnes

Karlsbro says she was astonished to learn that EU imports of Russian steel amount to nearly 3 million tonnes a year, roughly equivalent to Sweden’s entire annual output and worth around €1.7 billion.

For her, the type of steel is beside the point.

“There is absolutely no argument that this is special steel or highly qualified steel with any essential quality. There is simply no additional reason to buy this steel,” she said.

To bypass the unanimity required for the adoption of EU sanctions by the member states, Karlsbro inserted a ban on Russian steel into a separate European Commission proposal aimed at shielding the bloc from global steel overcapacity, as US tariffs divert excess supply toward Europe.

The European Parliament’s trade committee approved the move on 27 January.

The procedural shift is crucial. Unlike sanctions, the trade file requires onlythe support ofa qualified majority of EU countries, potentially sidelining governments that might otherwise veto a full ban.

“The Parliament is playing politics on this,” an industry source familiar with the file told Euronews.

Another diplomat from a country dependent on Russian semi-finished steel said the ban was important for his government, which is why the 2028 deadline has been set – highlighting the dilemma the EU faces as it balances industrial needs with the need to confront the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The talks are beginning as the fourth anniversary of Russia’s invasion approaches, and the clock is ticking. By June, the EU must adopt the Commission’s plan to shield its market from a glut of global steel.

One diplomat insisted the two files – banning Russian steel and protecting the EU market from overcapacity – pursue “totally different goals”.

Still, the same diplomat acknowledged the ban could pass, as there are not enough member states pushing to maintain a phase-out only by 2028.