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Ethiopia has received 12 Russian Su-35 fighter jets and will acquire four S-400 air defence batteries, in a deal experts say strengthens Moscow’s foothold in the Horn of Africa while bolstering Addis Ababa’s military amid conflict at home and tensions with neighbouring Eritrea.

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed announced the deal in Moscow during the two-day Russia-Africa Summit.

“I value the friendly relations between Russia and Ethiopia,” Russian President Vladimir Putin said in a statement. “Russia and Ethiopia stand together in international affairs.”

Experts say the agreement builds on decades of military cooperation, offering Moscow arms revenue and diplomatic influence while allowing Ethiopia to strengthen its armed forces amid its ongoing conflict in Tigray.

Here is what we know:

What weapons is Ethiopia acquiring?

Abiy said Ethiopia had taken delivery of its first 12 Su-35s under an earlier agreement with Russia, with four S-400 batteries to follow, but did not say when the air defence systems would arrive.

The aircraft would expand an air force already equipped with Russian fighter jets. The S-400 systems would complement this existing fleet by helping the military defend itself against aerial threats, experts say.

“They would be best used against conventional air threats,” Benedict Manzin, a lead analyst on the Middle East and Africa at risk consultancy Sibylline, told Al Jazeera. “In a war with Eritrea, they could be used against Eritrea’s limited air force and drones.”

However, air defences do not provide protection against every kind of attack.

“As we have seen in Ukraine, conventional air defence systems can be overwhelmed by small, cheap drones,” he said.

Why does Russia want closer ties with Ethiopia?

The relationship predates the current competition for influence in Africa.

“Russia has been engaged in Ethiopia for decades, part of the legacy of the Cold War,” Manzin said.

The Soviet Union backed Ethiopia’s former communist government. Today’s cooperation builds on those foundations, with the two countries having signed military agreements intended to improve the Ethiopian armed forces’ capabilities through technology, knowledge and training, according to the Ethiopian News Agency.

Commercial interests also matter.

“Russia is also in the business of making money through arms sales,” Manzin said. “This is one of Russia’s primary exports to Africa.”

Weapons sales provide revenue while sustaining relationships with governments that require training, maintenance and replacement equipment. But the partnership extends beyond defence.

Abiy said his talks with Putin covered nuclear energy, health and trade, alongside bilateral and multilateral cooperation, while in a statement, Putin said bilateral trade exceeded $1.3bn in January-September, more than twice the figure for all of 2025.

He identified energy, agriculture, industry and education among potential areas for further cooperation.

Ethiopia’s size also makes it attractive to competing powers, with experts saying that because it is Africa’s second-most populous country, it offers a substantial market.

“Everyone engages a bit, and Ethiopia tries to maximise its gains,” Manzin said.

Does this mean Ethiopia is turning away from the West?

Manzin suggested Ethiopia is widening its options rather than committing exclusively to Moscow.

“African states are aware that they are a focus of geopolitical competition,” he said.

That competition gives governments room to seek weapons, investment and diplomatic backing from different partners. Ethiopia’s relationship with Russia coexists with a significant Chinese presence and continuing Western investment in the country.

“China has a huge presence in Ethiopia, and Russian arms have always been a huge factor,” Manzin said. Moscow is seeking to turn those established connections into broader influence as Western sanctions over its war in Ukraine constrain its international relationships.

Russia supplied 15 percent of African imports of major weapons in 2021–2025, behind the United States at 19 percent and China at 17 percent, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

Could the weapons be used in Tigray?

In his statement, Abiy thanked Putin for ensuring the aircraft were delivered a year ahead of schedule and said the equipment would strengthen Ethiopia’s ability to “preemptively deter aggression”.

The delivery comes amid renewed fighting in Tigray, a separate rebellion in Amhara and concerns about a possible conflict with Eritrea.

“Ethiopia is buying a lot of aircraft,” Manzin said. “The timing comes as Ethiopia is going through conflict in Tigray, with speculation about war with Eritrea.”

He cautioned against assuming the latest battlefield developments directly prompted purchases negotiated earlier.

“Aircraft are helpful regardless, as they are using aircraft and the air force heavily during any suppression,” he said.

What’s the conflict about?

Fighting between Ethiopia’s federal army and Tigrayan forces intensified in late September, in effect unravelling the November 2022 Pretoria peace agreement that ended a devastating two-year war.

Each side has blamed the other for renewed violence. Tensions grew following the formation of a seven-group alliance seeking to overthrow Abiy’s government and establish a transitional administration.

Government troops and allied forces entered Mekelle, Tigray’s capital, earlier in October after Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) fighters withdrew.

Addis Ababa subsequently installed a six-month caretaker administration, but rebel commanders have promised to continue fighting.

No single Argentine capability shaped British planning during the 1982 South Atlantic conflict more than the pairing of the Dassault Super Étendard strike fighter and its deadly AM39 Exocet anti-ship missile. Against that threat, the British launched a series of special forces operations, all with the same objective: kill the Argentine pilots and destroy their aircraft and missiles before they could be used again. Together, the strike fighter and missile pairing had proven to be the biggest threat to the Royal Navy task force that had been sent to recapture the islands.

Five Super Étendard aircraft and five AM39 Exocet missiles had been delivered to Argentina before a French embargo took hold. The jets were flown by the Argentine Navy’s 2nd Naval Fighter and Attack Squadron out of Río Grande, on Tierra del Fuego, a region at South America’s southernmost tip, shared by Chile and Argentina. The Super Étendard/Exocet combination had already cost the British the destroyer HMS Sheffield on May 4 and the container ship Atlantic Conveyor on May 25.

The special forces operations were broken down into four phases — named PLUM DUFF, MIKADO, KETTLEDRUM, and IMPI — the last of which is the least well-documented, and the focus of this article.

PLUM DUFF was the insertion phase and was a reconnaissance mission. On May 16, an RAF Hercules airdropped eight special forces troops onto RFA Fort Austin to form a recce party. On the night of May 17/18, a Sea King HC4, ZA290, lifted off from the aircraft carrier HMS Invincible for a one-way flight to Tierra del Fuego, where the men were to observe Río Grande and report back. The patrol was set down far from the objective and never completed the reconnaissance; the helicopter crew flew on into Chile, where the aircraft was deliberately burnt to try and hide the evidence, while they tried to evade capture.

MIKADO was the planned attack phase, and it depended on that missing intelligence. Two Hercules were to air-land up to 70 men of B Squadron, 22 Special Air Service (SAS), directly on Río Grande — the air operation order of May 19 also named Río Gallegos, further up the Argentine coast, as an alternative. The men would destroy the Super Étendards and their Exocets on the ground, kill the pilots, and then withdraw overland into Chile. Commander Task Force 317, at Northwood, accepted from the outset that the mission could well cost both Hercules.

The aircrew did not refuse the task, but they were blunt about what it demanded: formation landing by two heavy transports on a possibly heavily defended, icy military runway, with a probable 20-knot tailwind, at night and on passive night-vision goggles in minimum light levels, with intelligence that was inadequate to support any air-land option at all. The RAF planning team recommended an airdrop as the better way to maintain a covert posture, and the Senior Air Staff Officer at Headquarters 38 Group warned the Air Commander to watch for overambitious schemes coming out of the SAS.

The U.K. Ministry of Defense formally cancelled MIKADO on June 4.

KETTLEDRUM was planned as the third of the set. It was aimed at Puerto Deseado, Santa Cruz Province of Argentina, and would have inserted a Special Boat Service party (SBS, the Royal Marines’ special forces unit) from the submarine HMS Onyx — a boat that will reappear before the end of this story.

None of the three was executed as planned.

Less well-known is that the cancellation of MIKADO produced a fourth project: Operation IMPI, named after a Zulu fighting force.

Cancelling MIKADO did not mean the wider operation was over. Also on June 4, the U.K. Ministry of Defense tasked CTF 317 to produce a new plan for special forces to destroy the combat effectiveness of the Super Étendards.

CTF 317’s staff went to work on what became IMPI. The planning document, Ops 1/3, is dated June 14 — the day of the Argentine surrender in the islands. In broad terms, the objective was to be attacked by special forces arriving both by air and by sea.

That much has been known, in fragments.

What has not been published until now is the fact that the operation had already been resourced.

At 2240Z on June 12, Maj. Gen. Jeremy Moore, commanding the land forces as CTG 317.1, signalled Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward’s battle group (CTG 317.8), with Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse at Northwood (CTF 317) and Commodore Michael Clapp’s amphibious group (CTG 317.0) as information addressees. The message called for B Squadron, 22 SAS, to be made available for operations as soon as possible: cover was needed against rapid developments of an unfavorable nature in West Falkland (Gran Malvina), and the theatre’s existing special forces assets were fully absorbed supporting the battle for Stanley — and IMPI. Operation IMPI, Moore noted in passing, was by then self-sufficient.

Examining two lines of routine signal traffic settles several things at once. Forty-eight hours before the surrender, IMPI was not a staff study but an operation that had been resourced, and that was enough to consume the theatre’s special forces and justify calling a fresh SAS squadron forward. It is also the only contemporary, operational-level reference to IMPI released so far: everything else comes from a narrative written years afterwards.

As that later narrative describes it, the concept behind IMPI was much leaner than MIKADO. Against two Hercules and 70 men, the air element of IMPI rested on a single RAF Hercules.

The aircraft was to fly from Ascension Island, refuel in flight, and then track east of the Falkland Islands and south of Cape Horn before making a low-level approach below Argentine radar cover for a night landing of special forces at the airfields codenamed San Jose and Arco Iris. Other special forces would have been inserted by sea. That air element, as will be seen, is the most questionable part of the entire file.

The routing is worth attention, because it rules out the intuitive picture of a direct run south from Ascension. Instead, the aircraft would have entered from the least-covered and least-expected direction, coming around the bottom of the continent rather than from the northeast.

The precise identities of San Jose and Arco Iris are not established in the declassified record.

The most likely reading is that they stand for Río Grande and Río Gallegos — the airfields at which the planned navigation ended, and the two named in MIKADO’s air operation order a month earlier. For a document circulating through restricted channels, encrypting the names of the two targets was an elementary precaution, although it should be noted that an operational order would more commonly have designated them simply as Target One and Target Two.

None of this rules out Chilean participation in other phases of the operation; if anything, it suggests it’s more likely. The narrative survives inside a folder classified Top Secret and restricted to the Chief of the Air Staff, whose declared subject is cooperation with Chile. That setting contrasts with the earlier stage of the planning, when mounting and recovering a special forces insertion from a Chilean airfield was considered and expressly discounted on political grounds — much as the use of an Antarctic strip was discounted after the New Zealand High Commission advised that the Antarctic winter precluded safe trans-polar flight.

The maritime half of IMPI can be traced in the records of those who were there.

Navigational support for the final phase was to come from the nuclear attack submarine HMS Conqueror. On June 9, 1982, Conqueror was off Bahía Camarones, working as an advanced picket and hunting targets of opportunity that ventured outside the 12-nautical-mile limit of Argentine territorial waters, with authority to sink any civilian vessel judged to be running to the Falklands/Malvinas; that same morning the sub had in fact entered Argentine territorial waters trying to locate the Argentine Navy’s Task Group 79.2.

That day, Conqueror received preparatory information on IMPI. The sub’s task was to come to periscope depth and act as a radio beacon, giving the Hercules a radio reference against which to refine a navigation that, low and at night, allowed no error. The resulting picture is an odd one: a nuclear submarine deployed on interdiction off the Patagonian coast, turned into a navigation aid for a transport aircraft.

The insertion itself fell to HMS Onyx, the Oberon class diesel-electric boat that had already taken part in Operation KETTLEDRUM and the only conventional submarine Britain deployed to the South Atlantic. On June 14, at 0815Z, lying in San Carlos Water, Onyx embarked a party of 10 men from B Squadron, 22 SAS and the SBS for the mission. The timing matches Moore’s signal of two days earlier almost exactly.

The plan called for the submarine to surface some two nautical miles offshore at night. The troops would close the beach in Gemini inflatables and destroy the objective — aircraft and missiles, if any were there — using anti-tank weapons and demolition charges.

What happened next illustrates the inertia of military machinery. The Argentine surrender in the islands came on that same June 14, hours after the party had gone aboard Onyx. Even so, preparations did not stop at once: on June 15 the embarked troops carried out practice landings from a Gemini. That does not mean IMPI was ever executed — it was not — but it does show that with the strategic outcome already settled, the machine was still rehearsing.

The British record closes the matter with administrative dryness: the surrender of the Argentine forces in the Falkland Islands and the cessation of hostile activity by Argentine aircraft resulted in the operation being cancelled.

The air part of the mission is another matter entirely and is where IMPI becomes more uncertain.

The only link between IMPI and an aircraft is a single paragraph in an RAF historical narrative. The folder that holds it was opened on April 18, 1986 — four years after the war — as an eyes-only briefing file for the Chief of the Air Staff, and the pages appear to be a working draft rather than a finished submission, carrying pencil amendments throughout.

Had a Hercules been earmarked, there is no doubt which unit would have provided it. The Special Forces Flight that runs through the whole chapter — five crews, commanded by a squadron leader, exercising regularly with SAS and SBS Sections — appears with its squadron number blanked out, yet the number surfaces a few paragraphs later, where two of its crews are described training on the probe-fitted Hercules C1P. The unit was No. 47 Squadron, RAF, home-based at Lyneham, and it would keep the special forces air support role for decades afterward.

The men who were at Ascension with that detachment, however, say they had nothing to do with it. Reliable sources with direct knowledge of the flight’s activity state that they never saw the codeword at the time, had never heard of the operation until this file surfaced, and consider it inconceivable that a special forces Hercules and crew could have been earmarked for a mission of this kind without the flight — a community of five crews that has stayed in touch ever since — learning of it at some point in the intervening four decades. By June 14, at most one aerial-refueling-qualified special forces crew was at Wideawake.

That skepticism is reinforced by the way the same narrative handles events those crews lived through. Its account of their own work-up does not survive contact with their logbooks.

For example, a practice infiltration into RAF Laarbruch in Germany that the narrative describes as successful had in fact been detected; the Hercules was notionally shot down about two miles out on the approach. The ramp toes (attachable extension plates located at the very end of the rear cargo ramp) it describes as droppable at 20 to 30 knots were never meant to be lowered with the aircraft moving, which would have been unsafe and risked the airframe. There are other anomalies, too.

A document that misstates the squadron’s own exercises is thin evidence on which to place that squadron over Tierra del Fuego.

What is not in question is what the Special Forces Flight could have done, had it been asked.

By mid-May the flight had two crews qualified in air-to-air refueling — one deployed to Ascension, the other held in the United Kingdom to train the others — flying Hercules C1s fitted with probes and, where the task required it, additional fuel tanks in the fuselage. It had rehearsed stream landings and rapid offloads, parachute insertion below radar cover to a pinpoint coastal feature, as well as flying on ANVIS goggles at 250 feet over sea and land. The goggles themselves were fitted to the crews’ helmets by RAE Farnborough specialists in a single day in mid-April. The reach was demonstrated on May 16, when the sortie that dropped the PLUM DUFF party stayed airborne for 24 hours and five minutes, with Victor tankers refueling some 1,800 miles from Ascension. Almost none of it was routine: nearly everything the force did during the conflict was improvised, at speed, in a matter of weeks.

What never had an answer — not for MIKADO, and not for whatever IMPI intended — was the other end of the problem. Putting men ashore deep inside Argentine territory was the solvable half. Getting an aircraft and its passengers out again after a direct action, from a strip in range of the Argentine Air Force, was not.

All of the above is reconstructed from lateral references: the RAF’s narrative in file AIR 20/13036 at the National Archives, unit records, submarine logs, operational signal traffic, and the accounts of participants.

The specific file — the one holding the complete plan with its annexes, the identification of the airfields and the execution sequence — remains closed. It is DEFE 71/980, titled Operation Corporate (Falklands Conflict): Operation IMPI, retained at the National Archives at Kew with no announced opening date. Until it is released, the air element of IMPI cannot be settled either way.

Forty-four years after the conflict, the last British special operation of the war is still, in essence, a document the British state is not prepared to show. That is not a trivial detail: the files touching on cooperation with Chile have consistently been the most reluctantly opened of all.

What remains is an operation of two halves. One of them is solid: a resourced plan, declared self-sufficient on June 12, with a nuclear submarine briefed to act as a beacon, 10 men of the SAS and the SBS embarked in a conventional submarine in San Carlos on the morning of the surrender, and rehearsals continuing the following day. The other half — a lone Hercules coming round Cape Horn to land on a codenamed strip — rests on one paragraph of a flawed staff narrative and is rejected by the only men who could have flown it.

Either way, the obsession is the same.

Between June 4 and June 14, 1982, while the final battle for Port Stanley/Puerto Argentino was being fought and the Argentine land campaign was collapsing, part of the British planning effort was still revolving around five French-built aircraft, their 10 aircrew, and their missiles. That the plan carries the date of the surrender itself, that it was still being rehearsed the following day, and that it remains classified today says a good deal about how far the British were prepared to go to destroy the Super Étendards and their Exocets.

Contact the editor: thomas@thewarzone.com

Mariano Sciaroni holds a master’s degree in Strategy and Geopolitics as well as a postgraduate diploma in Contemporary Military History, both earned at the Argentine Army’s Military Academy. Sciaroni has published five books and numerous articles on military and naval history. He is also an active member of the Argentine Institute of Military History and serves as a sub-lieutenant in the Argentine Army Reserve (Army Aviation Reserve Squadron). You can find out more about his books here.

New satellite imagery shows four of China’s new KJ-3000 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft at the Xi’an Aircraft Company (XAC) facility at Xi’an-Yanliang, raising the possibility that the large radar planes are moving toward or have entered serial production.

Satellite imagery captured on October 5 and provided by Vantor shows three KJ-3000s near the XAC factory in the western part of the facility, with a fourth at the nearby China Flight Test Establishment (CFTE). J. Michael Dahm, a senior fellow at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, assesses that the presence of four aircraft points to the type having entered serial production.

Andreas Rupprecht, an analyst of Chinese military aviation and TWZ contributor, offered a more cautious assessment, noting that the imagery could indicate that series production or low-rate initial production (LRIP) has begun. However, he also pointed out that all four previously identified prototypes could simply have been at the facility at the same time. Specifically, he identified the aircraft seen at the CFTE portion of the airfield as being a prototype.

Whatever the explanation, the imagery offers a fresh look at a program set to significantly expand China’s already substantial airborne surveillance and battle-management capabilities.

The KJ-3000, also referred to as the KJ-20, is based on the four-engine Y-20 transport aircraft, specifically the improved Y-20B variant powered by Chinese-made engines. The aircraft features a large circular radome mounted above the rear fuselage, along with a prominent series of antennas on the forward fuselage. An aerial refueling probe is mounted above the cockpit, while a conspicuous intake at the base of the tailfin is likely intended to provide cooling air for its extensive onboard electronics.

The first low-quality photographs of the aircraft began circulating in December 2024. More detailed imagery emerged in May 2025, showing an example at an undisclosed Chinese airfield. That aircraft, bearing the serial number 7821 and assessed to be the first example, was still wearing primer, in contrast to the examples now seen at the XAC factory.

The KJ-3000 is expected to address longstanding limitations in China’s existing large jet-powered AEW&C fleet. To date, only four KJ-2000 Mainring aircraft have been completed. Based on the Russian-built Ilyushin Il-76MD transport, the KJ-2000 program was constrained by the limited availability of suitable airframes, and now faces the twin issues of reliance on Russian supply chains and aging aircraft.

A domestically produced Y-20-based platform provides a more sustainable basis for a much larger AEW&C fleet, with greater scope for upgrades and potentially export opportunities.

The larger airframe should also provide advantages over China’s numerous turboprop-powered AEW&C aircraft, including greater speed, range, and endurance. Its higher operating altitude would give its radar a better vantage point for detecting and tracking targets, particularly low-flying aircraft and missiles that may be masked from ground-based sensors by terrain or the radar horizon.

The aerial refueling probe could further extend the aircraft’s range and time on station, although the precise operational capabilities of the KJ-3000 remain unclear.

The exact configuration of the KJ-3000’s primary radar has yet to be established. China’s existing KJ-2000 and smaller KJ-500 use fixed radomes containing three active electronically scanned array (AESA) antennas to provide 360-degree coverage, rather than the rotating radomes found on aircraft such as the U.S. E-3 Sentry and Russia’s A-50 Mainstay. Whether the new aircraft follows the same approach remains to be seen.

As well as its large AESA radar, the new aircraft is likely to carry additional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems, while its communications equipment could make it an important networking node for Chinese forces operating across the vast distances of the Indo-Pacific. Such capabilities would be particularly valuable for coordinating combat aircraft, including uncrewed ones, sharing targeting information, and extending the reach of China’s integrated air defense and broader military networks.

The KJ-3000 is also part of a broader expansion and diversification of China’s AEW&C fleet. Alongside the new jet-powered aircraft, the People’s Liberation Army continues to field and develop smaller platforms based on the four-turboprop Y-9 transport family.

These include the KJ-500, which has been produced and delivered at a rapid pace, as well as the newer KJ-700, believed to combine radar with electro-optical and infrared sensors for a broader range of surveillance missions. The precise capabilities of the KJ-700 remain uncertain, but you can read about the platform in more detail here.

The smaller turboprop aircraft offer advantages of their own. They are better suited to operating from dispersed and relatively austere airfields, and they regularly appear at Chinese island outposts and in the strategically important Taiwan Strait. Together, the different types give Chinese forces a range of options for surveillance and command and control, from persistent coverage close to home to operations farther afield.

The U.S. Department of Defense has repeatedly highlighted the growing importance of China’s AEW&C fleet.

In its latest annual report on Chinese military developments, the Pentagon specifically pointed to the KJ-3000:

“The PLA conducted an initial flight with the KJ-3000 Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft, which will serve as a surveillance aircraft to monitor aircraft, ships, and other vehicles. The KJ-3000 will probably be the world’s first model to use digital radar and will be capable of anti-jamming, passive detection, and target identification.”

Airborne radar and command-and-control aircraft are also important force multipliers for increasingly capable Chinese combat jets, including the stealthy J-20 and aircraft armed with long-range air-to-air missiles. Radar planes like these can serve as critical networking nodes for data sharing and, in some cases, allow Chinese fighters to prosecute targets without turning on their own radar.

In 2022, then-Pacific Air Forces commander Gen. Kenneth Wilsbach praised the command and control associated with J-20 operations, noting that some of China’s long-range air-to-air missiles benefit from support provided by the KJ-500.

For China, a larger and more capable AEW&C fleet would support both the defense of its airspace and efforts to project military power across the Indo-Pacific. These aircraft could help coordinate operations around Taiwan and the South China Sea, improve situational awareness over maritime approaches, and support combat operations at greater distances from the mainland.

The same Pentagon report from 2025 further noted:

“China’s integration of support aircraft, such as the KJ-500 airborne early warning aircraft, provides the PLAAF with improved ISR capability to support PLA operations, as demonstrated during surge operations near Taiwan.”

A domestically developed, jet-powered platform such as the KJ-3000 would be a logical centerpiece of that effort, particularly since it can be produced in substantially greater numbers than the KJ-2000.

The prospect of China expanding its fleet of large, jet-powered AEW&C aircraft stands in contrast to the U.S. Air Force’s troubled effort to replace its aging E-3 Sentry. The U.S. E-7 Wedgetail program has encountered major hurdles, raising concerns about a potential gap in airborne battle management as China continues to field new capabilities.

The October 5 imagery does not confirm that serial production has begun. Further imagery showing additional airframes, activity around production facilities, or aircraft in new operational markings may provide a clearer indication of the program’s progress.

Regardless, the KJ-3000 appears poised to become an important addition to China’s expanding airborne surveillance and command-and-control architecture.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Ministry of Defence says warplanes will operate in ‘defensive role’ and not be used to attack Yemeni group.

The United Kingdom has said it will deploy fighter jets to help protect Saudi Arabia from attacks by Yemen’s Houthis.

In a statement on Tuesday, the British Ministry of Defence said the Typhoon warplanes would operate in a “defensive role” and not carry out attacks against the Iranian-backed armed group.

“The UK will fly defensive counter air missions to support the protection of Saudi cities and critical national infrastructure against aerial attack, using RAF Typhoon fighter jets,” it added.

The support includes an extension of air-to-air refuelling support for Saudi air operations, the ministry added.

The announcement comes amid heavy fighting between the Houthis – also known as Ansar Allah, Arabic for Supporters of God – and Yemen’s internationally recognised government, which is backed by Saudi Arabia.

In recent weeks, the Houthis have carried out missile and drone strikes against the kingdom, including Riyadh’s main airport, while the Saudi-led coalition supporting the Yemeni government has launched air attacks on Houthi positions in Yemen.

“The continuing attacks from the Houthis on our ally Saudi Arabia are absolutely despicable. The targeting of the airport in Riyadh in particular shows the lengths the Houthis are going to escalate the situation in the region,” UK Defence Secretary Wes Streeting said.

“That’s why today I have approved further UK military support. RAF Typhoons will fly defensive air missions to help protect Saudi airspace from drones and missiles. This builds on the UK equipment and personnel we already have in the country to defend against Houthi air attacks,” he added.