Defense

The U.S. Marine Corps is exploring the possibility of fielding a theater ballistic missile defense capability. A key driver in this discussion is the U.S. Army’s capacity to provide protection against ballistic threats in future conflicts, or lack thereof, something TWZ has highlighted repeatedly in the past. The latest conflict with Iran has underscored the serious threats that ballistic missiles pose even to high-end integrated air and missile defense networks, which would be magnified further in a fight against a near-peer adversary like China.

“We’re exploring theater ballistic missile defense. So we’re doing some studies, we’re running some simulations, to see if that’s a requirement for the service in the future,” Marine Lt. Col. Robert Barclay said during a panel discussion yesterday at the annual Modern Day Marine exposition, at which TWZ has been in attendance.

Barclay is currently the Marine Air Command and Control Systems (MACCS) Integration Branch Head within the Aviation Combat Element Division of the service’s Combat Development and Integration office. His portfolio includes service-wide air and missile defense requirements.

“We know our old sensor used to be able to do it, but it wasn’t really a requirement,” Barclay added. “What we need to determine is, is [defending against] a theater ballistic [missile] like an SRBM [short-range ballistic missile] or MRBM [medium-range ballistic missile], a requirement for the Marine Corps to do? I would argue that it probably is.”

“At the end of the day, I don’t think the Army’s going to have enough capacity with us where we’re operating to actually adjudicate on that threat,” he continued. “So, I think we need to take a hard look at that, and that’s what our intent [is] to do over the next year.”

To take a step back quickly, the Marine Corps’ main general-purpose ground-based anti-air weapon today is the Stinger short-range heat-seeking surface-to-air missile. The service currently fields Stinger in a man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) configuration using shoulder-fired launchers, as well as integrated on the Humvee-based Avenger air defense vehicles. Stinger offers a point defense capability against fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, drones, and certain types of cruise missiles.

The Marines also hope to reach initial operational capability this year with a new Medium-Range Intercept Capability (MRIC), which is a service-specific variation of the Israeli Iron Dome system. MRIC uses a U.S.-made version of Iron Dome’s Tamir interceptor, called SkyHunter, and a trailer-based road-mobile launcher. Each launcher can accommodate up to 20 interceptors, which come preloaded in individual canisters, at a time. The system uses offboard sensors to spot and track targets and cue missiles to intercept them. The Corps’ existing AN/TPS-80 Ground/Air Task-Oriented Radars (G/ATOR) have been presented as the primary sensor for MRIC.

“The primary target set for MRIC is cruise missiles and your higher-end Group 5-type of [anti-]air application, as well as rotary wing, fixed-wing type of aspects,” Marine Col. Andrew Konicki, the service’s Program Manager for Ground Based Air Defense and another panelist at Modern Day Marine yesterday, explained. MRIC “can go after Group 3, because it’s probably a mismatch in terms of ammunition versus what it’s going after. So it’s primarily focused on that growing threat, or that higher-end threat, so to speak, as part of that integrated air missile defense application and layer defense piece.”

Groups 3 and 5 here refer to different categories of uncrewed aerial systems. The U.S. military defines Group 5 as consisting of drones with maximum weights greater than 1,320 pounds, and that can fly above 18,000 feet. The MQ-9 Reaper is a commonly used example of a Group 5 uncrewed aircraft. Drones that fall under Group 3 have maximum weights anywhere between 56 and 1,320 pounds, can operate at altitudes between 3,500 and 18,000 feet, and reach top speeds of up to 250 knots. Group 3 is very broad, but notably includes Iran’s now-infamous Shahed 136 long-range kamikaze drone, and the growing number of variants and derivatives thereof.

Lt. Col. Robert Barclay’s mention of an unspecified previous Marine ballistic missile defense capability seems most likely to be a reference to the HAWK medium-range surface-to-air missile system. The service retired HAWK in the 1990s, but versions of the system remain in use elsewhere worldwide, including in Ukraine. HAWK has used an evolving mixture of radars for target acquisition and engagement since the system was first introduced in the 1950s, as you can read more about here. Improved HAWK interceptors have also been developed, including variants explicitly intended to offer a rudimentary anti-ballistic missile capability.

The video below shows HAWK systems in service in Ukraine.

Американський ЗРК HAWK (Яструб) захищає небо України!

Barclay did not elaborate on what level of ballistic missile defense capability the Marine Corps might look to pursue in the future. In the past year or so, there have been reports of Israel using Iron Dome against incoming Iranian ballistic missiles in the terminal phase. However, the system’s effectiveness against ballistic missiles of any kind, which it was never designed to intercept, and whether the Marines might be able to employ MRIC in this role, is unclear.

Today, the main tool for providing ground-based theater ballistic missile defense across all of America’s armed forces is the Army’s Patriot surface-to-air missile systems. The Army also operates the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, which offers a higher-end ballistic missile defense capability over Patriot. Both Patriot and THAAD are only capable of intercepting incoming ballistic threats during their final terminal phase.

The PATRIOT Missile in Action

At the same time, as TWZ has highlighted several times in recent years, the Army’s Patriot force is heavily strained due to constant demands that it is simply not adequately resourced to meet. The THAAD force is even smaller and is in equally heavy demand.

The latest conflict with Iran has reignited discussions about the Army’s worryingly limited capacity to meet operational needs for ballistic missile defense, as well as protection against other aerial threats. Between February and April, Iranian forces launched repeated missile and drone attacks on key bases across the Middle East. They were successful in many instances in targeting high-value military assets, including aircraft parked on the ground and air and missile defense radars.

WASHINGTON, Apri; 29 (UPI) — Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth alternated between championing a proposed massive increase to defense spending and fielding attacks from Democratic lawmakers during testimony on Capitol Hill Wednesday.

It marked the secretary’s first appearance before lawmakers since the start of a war that has roiled the global economy and decimated Iran’s military.

Hegseth appeared before the House Armed Services Committee alongside Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Pentagon’s comptroller, Jules Hurst III. They entered the hearing room past protesters’ chants of “arrest Hegseth” and yells of “war criminal.” The secretary appeared unfazed.

“We’re rebuilding a military that the American people can be proud of — one that instills nothing less than unrelenting fear in our adversaries.” Hegseth said in his opening statement.

Hegseth’s testimony was intended to serve as a defense of the White House’s petition to Congress for $1.5 trillion in defense spending for 2027, a 44%t increase from the 2026 budget.

It’s an increase that, by itself, would be more than the total defense spending of any other nation, according to recently released figures. The spending level exceeds that spent on the Reagan-era military buildup and would be only overshadowed by levels seen during World War II.

The spending boom would come at the cost of domestic programs and at a time when federal tax revenue is set to take a $4.5 trillion hit over the next 10 years, mostly from tax cuts codified in last year’s One Big Beautiful Bill Act, according to the Bipartisan Policy Center, a Washington-based think tank.

But rather than question Hegseth on the specifics of the budget proposal, many Democratic members grilled him about the war in Iran, recent firings of senior leaders in the Pentagon and lethal strikes against alleged drug traffickers in the Pacific and Caribbean oceans.

In one heated exchange, Rep. John Garamendi, D-Calif., delivered a sharp critique of the war in Iran when questioning the defense secretary, calling it a “blunder” in which the United States had expended much to gain little.

Garamendi said it would take years for the U.S. and global economies to recover. The war has hiked average unleaded gas prices in the country to more than $4.20 a gallon and inflation to its highest level in nearly two years.

“Secretary Hegseth, you have been lying to the American public about this war from Day 1,” Garamendi said. “The strategy has been an astounding example of incompetence.”

Hegseth counterattacked. With his voice raised, he accused the congressman of “handing propaganda to our enemies.”

“I hope you appreciate how reckless it is,” Hegseth said of Garamendi’s description of the two-month-long war as a quagmire. “Shame on you.”

Hurst, the comptroller, told lawmakers the Iran war has cost the Pentagon $25 billion. Committee ranking member Rep. Adam Smith, D-Wash., responded that was the first time he had been given a cost figure, despite repeated inquiries to the department.

In March, the Pentagon reportedly petitioned Congress for an additional $200 billion to replace stocks from the war and prepare for future operations, should they be ordered. When asked about it at the time, Hegseth indicated the report’s veracity.

“That number could move, obviously,” Hegseth said then. “It takes money to kill bad guys.”

Hegseth’s central defense of the war during the hearing was arguing that it served to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Republican members echoed his contention.

Iran maintains uranium supplies that could eventually be used to build a nuclear weapon if it were to be further enriched. But since the U.S. bombed Iran’s nuclear facilities in June, Iran has made “no efforts since then to try to rebuild their enrichment capability,” Tulsi Gabbard, the director of national intelligence, said in a written statement to Congress in March.

“What is it worth to ensure Iran never gets a nuclear weapon?” Hegseth asked rhetorically in Wednesday’s hearing.

A defense budget unprecedented in modern times

The Pentagon’s budget request is composed of $1.1 trillion in base discretionary funding and an additional $350 billion in mandatory spending.

The mandatory funds, which are earmarked mostly for munitions and the expansion of the defense industry, would go through the budget reconciliation process and therefore would be shielded from a potential Democratic filibuster in the Senate.

The expansion of America’s defense industrial base — the network of private manufacturers that supply the Pentagon — is a central facet of the proposed budget.

“President Trump inherited a defense industrial base that had been hollowed out by years of ‘America Last’ policies,” Hegseth said. “Under the leadership of President Trump, our builder-in-chief, we are reversing this systemic decay and putting our defense industrial base on a war-time footing.”

Another of the administration’s top defense funding priorities, as reflected in the budget document, is the procurement of munitions.

“Critical munitions are vital to the administration’s priorities to defend the homeland and deter potential aggression after years of neglect by the previous administration,” the White House wrote in a recent budget justification. Limited munitions stockpiles and the United States’ inability to quickly produce them have long troubled U.S. war planners.

While the Trump administration has pushed to expand munitions stockpiles, it has also expended massive amounts of scarce ordnance in the Middle East in recent months.

An April analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies estimated that the U.S. military has expended more than 850 Tomahawk cruise missiles in the Iran war from an estimated prewar inventory of 3,100.

Key U.S. capabilities like the Patriot and THAAD air defense systems have also seen stockpiles dwindle by about half since the start of the war, according to the report.

“We’re fighting wars”

The administration’s request for the massive infusion of cash comes as Trump has said that federal spending on healthcare and social programs should take a back seat to “military protection.”

In its proposed budget, the White House moved to cut non-defense discretionary spending by 10%. The spending category comprises public health, scientific research and scores of other domestic programs, but excludes mandatory programs like Medicare and Medicaid.

In a speech at a private Easter luncheon, Trump said spending on childcare, Medicare and Medicaid should be left to the states, while the federal government should be focused solely on national defense.

“We’re fighting wars,” Trump said.

The sentiment runs contrary to Trump’s long-held foundational critique of his predecessors — that money spent on foreign wars from Iraq, to Afghanistan, to Ukraine, should have been used to benefit Americans at home.

April 29 (UPI) — The United States has sanctioned 35 entities and individuals accused of overseeing a shadow-banking network that moved tens of billions of dollars for Iran, as the Trump administration flexes Washington’s financial might amid a stalemate in peace negotiations with Tehran.

The sanctions announced Tuesday come as U.S.-Iran peace negotiations came to a halt last week after Tehran said it would not participate in talks until the United States lifted its blockade of sea-based trade to the Middle Eastern nation.

Those blacklisted by the Treasury include several private companies known as rahbars, which manage thousands of overseas companies used by Iranian banks cut off from the international financial system to execute payments for Iranian trade.

According to the Treasury, these rahbar companies coordinate with Iranian exchange houses and front companies to conduct international trade on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff, the National Iranian Oil Company and other sanctioned entities.

“By dismantling these financial channels, we advance the administration’s policy in the conflict with Iran and underscore our commitment to imposing maximum pressure on Iran,” State Department spokesman Thomas Pigott said in a statement.

The punitive action was part of what the Treasury calls Operation Economic Fury, a branded escalation of President Donald Trump‘s broader maximum-pressure campaign against Iran.

Coinciding with the sanctions on Tuesday, the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control issued an alert to financial institutions over the risks they face for doing business with so-called teapot oil refineries in China, primarily in Shandong Province, that import and refine Iranian crude oil.

According to the alert, China is the largest purchaser of Iranian oil, and the Treasury has designated multiple small China-based refineries since March of last year.

“The United States will further disrupt illicit funding streams that finance Iran’s malign activities,” Pigott said.

“We will not relent in our efforts to deny Iran and its proxies the resources they use to threaten U.S. interests and regional stability.”

Trump first employed the maximum-pressure campaign strategy to coerce Iran into negotiations over its nuclear program in 2018 after unilaterally withdrawing the United States from a landmark multinational accord that sought to prevent Tehran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.

Iran then breached its commitments under the deal, enriching uranium up to 60%, far exceeding the accord’s 3.67% but below weapons-grade levels.

Trump restored the maximum-pressure campaign after returning to office in 2025, and the United States bombed three major Iranian nuclear facilities that June.

The United States and Israel have since escalated their pressure campaign, attacking Iran in strikes that triggered a war now halted by a fragile cease-fire to permit peace talks.

Iran has imposed restrictions on energy trade through the Strait of Hormuz, prompting the United States to impose a blockade of Iran’s ports in response to what it describes as Tehran holding a major share of the world’s energy supplies hostage.

April 28 (UPI) — The Department of Defense may require reporters to be escorted inside the Pentagon, a federal appeals court has ruled, handing the Trump administration a rare win in litigation challenging its press restrictions.

A divided three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit granted the Trump administration’s emergency request for a stay pending appeal, but only concerning its Pentagon escort requirement.

The 2-1 ruling stays part of U.S. District Judge Paul Friedman‘s April 9 order that had found an interim Pentagon policy was in violation of his earlier order that blocked the Department of Defense’s initial policy requiring journalists to sign a form acknowledging that they could have their credentials revoked for gathering unauthorized information.

The Trump administration argued that the escort requirement of the interim policy was a new rule not affected by the initial order and was put in place to prevent the disclosure of sensitive or classified information.

The appeals court agreed that the administration was likely to win on the merits of its narrow argument.

Chief Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell said Monday that the Department of Defense “welcomes” the court’s decision.

“The department looks forward to presenting its full case to the D.C. Circuit on the merits,” he said in a social media statement.

The Trump administration has repeatedly taken actions critics see as attempting to influence media coverage, including a Defense Department policy announced in October that threatened the credentials of reporters who gather sensitive information.

Most credentialed journalists refused to sign, and The New York Times and one of its reporters sued.

Friedman blocked the rule. The Pentagon then attempted to enact an interim policy that was again blocked on April 9 by Friedman, who ruled that the Trump administration “cannot simply reinstate an unlawful policy under the guise of taking ‘new’ action and expect the court to look the other way.”

D.C. Circuit Judge J. Michelle Childs said in dissent that though the escort policy on its face appeared different from the policy blocked by the March order, its practical effect was the same: denying reporters meaningful access to the Pentagon.

“The point of the injunction, as the district court interpreted it, ‘was to restore The Times journalists’ access to the Pentagon, not merely to ensure that they have possession of a physical credential,” she said.

“Reporters can hardly verify sources, gather information, or speak candidly with department personnel with an escort looming over their shoulders.”

While a multitude of law enforcement agents sprang into action after a shooter tried to storm a ballroom where President Donald Trump and others were attending the annual White House Correspondents’ Dinner, one well-dressed and cool under pressure plainclothes agent went viral after whipping out a Heckler & Koch MP7. The MP7 is a high-end personal defense weapon (PDW) that is already something of a pop culture fascination, being famously used by SEAL Team Six and featured in countless video games. Unlike many of its counterparts, it also remains unavailable in any configuration on the general firearms civilian marketplace. Regardless, the memes have come fast and furious and have made this still unidentified expressionless agent, and his futuristic-looking weapon, internet stars.

What agency this individual belongs to still is not entirely clear, with the U.S. Secret Service, FBI, and U.S. Capitol Police having been raised as possibilities. The latter is very likely to be the agency in question, having adopted the MP7 for its Dignitary Protection Division following another politically-motivated shooting nearly a decade ago.

Cole Tomas Allen was subdued and arrested at the Washington Hilton hotel in Washington, D.C., on Saturday after authorities say he attempted to shoot his way past security to get to the White House Correspondents’ Dinner. He is said to have been armed with a .38-caliber pistol and a 12-gauge shotgun, as well as knives, at the time. A Secret Service agent was hit by gunfire, but the projectile was reportedly stopped by a combination of their protective vest and cellphone, and they are expected to recover. Allen, a resident of Torrance, California, sent a message to family members stating his intention to target members of the Trump administration right before the attack.

The President and First Lady Melania Trump, Vice President J.D. Vance, and other top members of the administration were at the White House Correspondents’ Dinner. Speaker of the House Mike Johnson, a Louisiana Republican, and other members of Congress were also present. A host of other dignitaries were in attendance, as well. Trump and other administration officials were moved first to secure locations on site, before returning to the White House after authorities asked everyone to leave the venue.

It was during that initial response that the plainclothes agent emerged carrying the MP7. A photographer actually caught the individual pulling the gun from what looks to be a Crye Precision EXP-series pack. The MP7 in this case was also fitted with a non-magnifying T2 red dot optic on a raised Unity mount, both of which are made by Aimpoint. What appears to be a Surefire XVL2-IRC laser aiming and light module was also spotted mounted on top of the gun in front of the optic. It also had a collapsible foregrip.

Since Heckler & Koch first introduced the MP7 in 2001, it has been presented as ideally suited to being discreetly carried by individuals tasked with VIP protection duties. In its standard configuration with its built-in buttstock collapsed, the gun is around 16 and a half inches long. Without a magazine loaded or any accessories fitted, it weighs just under four pounds. The MP7 is a bit heavier than the smallest version of Heckler & Koch’s famed MP5 submachine gun, the MP5K, but also has far more modern ergonomics and controls.

MP7A1 vs MP7A2: H&K’s Modern PDW

In addition, the 4.7x30mm round that the MP7 fires is designed to offer excellent low-recoil, armor-penetrating, and range characteristics in a very compact package, especially compared to traditional pistol rounds. Due to its relatively tiny rifle-style ammunition, Heckler & Koch’s gun is regularly compared to the FN P90, a very different weapon design-wise, but which was built around a broadly similar cartridge, the 5.7x28mm. Both offer submachine gun size, but with armor-piercing capabilities that their pistol caliber cousins cannot offer. The accessibility to increasingly capable body armor by civilians is a main reason why units have moved from submarine guns to guns in the PDW class, including the MP7 and FN P90, as well as compact assault rifles.

The MP7’s focus on lower felt recoil also helps increase accuracy. Altogether, the gun, with its rate of fire of around 950 rounds per minute, is intended to offer a potent amount of firepower that a shooter can get on target easily and keep it there, even when drawing quickly from concealment under pressure.

Despite still having a relatively small user base today, as noted earlier, the MP7 has attained a certain spot in popular culture, including video games and movies, in large part due to the gun’s use by SEAL Team Six. This is the same unit, also known as the Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU), responsible for the raid that led to the death of Al Qaeda founder Osama Bin Laden in 2011.

“I ran with a suppressed MP7 submachine gun on a few missions, but lacked the knockdown power of my H&K 416 [5.56x45mm assault rifle]. The submachine gun came in handy during ship boarding, in the jungle, or when weight, size, and the ability to stay extremely quiet were needed,” retired Navy SEAL Matt Bissonnette (writing under the pen name Mark Owen) wrote in his 2012 book No Easy Day. “Several times we shot fighters in one room with a suppressed MP7 and their comrades next door didn’t wake up. The H&K 416s didn’t compare to the MP7 when you were trying to be extremely quiet.”

SEAL Team 6/DEVGRU kit. MP7 and HK416 in matching camo. The real gem is the ‘Pirate Gun,’ the sawed-off M79 40mm break-open grenade launcher made famous by ‘Mark Owen’s’ book No Easy Day. pic.twitter.com/IzwEwun4ZX

— Tyler Rogoway (@Aviation_Intel) October 6, 2020

MP7s are also in service worldwide with a variety of conventional and special operations military units, as well as law enforcement agencies, including in the United States.

At the White House Correspondents’ Dinner, the agent’s stoic action movie mystique and tailored suit also upped the ‘cool factor’ when paired with his intriguing MP7 armament.

All of this has now also contributed to the images of the MP7 agent at the Washington Hilton this weekend going viral on social media. The general visual of the MP7 being drawn from the pack has also prompted comparisons to iconic photos of Secret Service agent Robert Wanko producing a Uzi submachine gun from a custom briefcase during the attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan in 1981. The MP7-armed agent spotted over the weekend is already developing a similar following online. 

As noted, there still remains something of a question as to what agency the MP7-armed individual seen at the Washington Hilton on Saturday belongs to.

The U.S. Capitol Police is a particularly distinct possibility based on its very public adoption of the MP7 for use by its Dignitary Protection Division (DPD). Agents from DPD would have had a clear reason to be among those providing security at the White House Correspondents’ Dinner, given the presence of Speaker Johnson and other legislators. In the United States, the Speaker of the House is an extremely important position, with whoever is serving in that role being second in line to succeed the President if need be.

The USCP’s Dignitary Protection Division (DPD)

The U.S. Capitol Police first began acquiring MP7s as a result of four people, including then-U.S. House Majority Whip Steve Scalise (another Louisiana Republican), being shot at the annual Congressional Baseball Game in 2017. The gunman, James T. Hodgkinson, was also wounded in the ensuing firefight and subsequently died. Authorities concluded that Hodgkinson had deliberately targeted Republican lawmakers at the event.

“It should be noted that we do have the ability to deploy another weapon, the M4, the [5.56x45mm] assault rifle. We have that ability today, and we deploy that when necessary,” then-Chief of the U.S. Capitol Police Matthew Verderosa told members of Congress at a hearing in 2019. “The MP7 is a pilot program that the Board has directed us to engage in, in terms of providing a weapon that meets the needs that sort of bridges the gap between a true assault rifle and a handgun.”

“We currently have a [sic] MP7 assault weapon that is specifically utilized by our Dignitary Protection Division agents,” Assistant Chief of the U.S. Capitol Police Sean Gallagher also said in 2022. “I believe almost 60 to 70 percent of our entire DPD is trained on that weapon.”

Gallagher’s comments came in an interview with the House of Representatives’ Select Committee investigating the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021.

The individual with the MP7 at the White House Correspondents’ Dinner may still belong to another agency, though this seems less likely to be the case. The Secret Service has been brought up as another possibility. However, it is known to have adopted the P90, and it is unclear why it would also have the functionally similar MP7 in inventory. Interestingly, on April 24, the Secret Service also awarded a contract to J.P. Enterprises, Inc., for an unspecified “9mm Pistol Caliber Carbine,” which could be based on that company’s existing JP-5 or GMR-15 designs.

FBI has also been put forward based on the badge the individual has on their belt. It features an eagle on top with wings that are not fully connected with the rest of the badge, as is the case with what the FBI issues to special agents. The FBI is also not known to be a user of the MP7, though this does not rule out the possibility. At the same time, members of the U.S. Capitol Police have been seen wearing badges with eagles with similarly detached wings over the years, as well.

TWZ has reached out to the Secret Service, the FBI, and the U.S. Capitol Police for any additional information they can provide. FBI declined to comment.

More broadly speaking, though the response looks to have largely worked as intended, the shooting at the White House Correspondents’ Dinner has raised questions about security protocols, especially around Trump at public events. Trump, both as President and as a candidate, has already been the target of multiple assassination attempts. He was notably wounded during one attempt at a campaign rally in Butler, Pennsylvania, in 2024. The Secret Service and other law enforcement agencies were widely criticized over that incident.

The White House Correspondents’ Dinner shooting may well trigger further reviews of tactics, techniques, and procedures at the Secret Service and other agencies. Whether it prompts the adoption of new weapons, like the U.S. Capitol Police’s adoption of the MP7 in the wake of the 2017 attack on the Congressional Baseball Game, remains to be seen.

If nothing else, the suit-wearing expressionless agent carrying the MP7 has already been cemented as a core image of the shooting incident at the Washington Hilton this weekend.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

April 27 (UPI) — The U.S. military has killed another three men in its latest attack targeting suspected drug-trafficking boats in the eastern Pacific, U.S. Southern Command announced late Sunday.

It was the 54th strike in the Trump administration’s violent anti-drug smuggling campaign that has killed at least 185 people since early September, according to UPI’s tally of publicly released data. At least 57 boats have been destroyed in the attacks in the eastern Pacific and Caribbean.

SOUTHCOM has announced each strike on social media, accompanied by a short black-and-white aerial video of the attack, showing the boat erupting in flames.

As with the previous strikes, SOUTHCOM said in a statement that the boat it attacked Sunday “was transiting along known narco-trafficking routes in the eastern Pacific and was engaged in narco-trafficking operations.”

The Trump administration claims the vessels are operated by 10 drug cartels and gangs that President Donald Trump has designated as terrorist organizations since returning to office, but has yet to provide evidence.

Trump argues the use of deadly force is warranted as the United States is in “armed conflict” with those organizations, but his administration has come under mounting accusations of conducting extrajudicial killings.

The strikes have been repeatedly condemned and their legality questioned by Democrats and human rights organizations, who accuse the Trump administration of violating international and maritime law by using the military to conduct law enforcement drug operations.

Ben Saul, the United Nations’ special rapporteur on counterterrorism and human rights, chastised the Trump administration last month for “responding with lawless violence that flagrantly violates human rights, in its phony war on so-called narco-terrorism.”

The attacks are not permissible law enforcement action in self-defense, authorized under the law of the sea, in national self-defense or under international humanitarian law, he said.

On Thursday, 125 humanitarian, human rights, peacebuilding and other related organizations from around the world called on all states to “immediately cease or refrain from supporting U.S. extrajudicial killings.”

The letter warned that states could be held legally responsible for aiding or assisting the United States by sharing intelligence as well as providing access to military bases and logistical support with the U.S. military.

The groups argue that the consequences of these killings are being felt throughout the hemisphere.

“Families awaiting the return of their loved ones may never know what happened to them and have no access to recourse,” the organizations said in their open letter.

“Coastal communities have witnessed human remains washing up on shore and fear for their lives when they trade and fish, sowing psychological trauma and undermining livelihoods.”

HOUSTON — While leading the Lakers to a commanding 3-0 lead over the Houston Rockets in the first round of the Western Conference playoffs, LeBron James has stepped out of his airtight postseason mindset for only a few fleeting moments.

He has a good reason.

“All those moments has been with Bronny,” James said Friday after leading the Lakers to a 112-108 win over Houston. “It keeps getting better and better. It’s like, wow.”

Steadily growing under the postseason spotlight, Bronny James scored his first playoff points Friday in a five-point, 26-second flurry in which he drained a three behind a screen from his dad and then hit a reverse layup to complete the NBA’s first father-son postseason alley-oop. The Lakers can clinch the first-round, best-of-seven series Sunday at Toyota Center.

Without Luka Doncic (hamstring) and Austin Reaves (oblique) to run the Lakers’ halfcourt sets, the team has placed an emphasis on running in transition. When Deandre Ayton blocked a shot at the rim with 7:18 remaining in the second quarter, LeBron corralled the rebound and pushed the ball up the court. Bronny, the youngest player on the Lakers’ roster, knows he can beat anyone up the court. He locked eyes with his dad as they sprinted toward the basket.

It’s been a while since Bronny caught a lob from his 41-year-old dad. Maybe not since last year’s training camp, he estimated. Getting to connect again while contributing to the Lakers’ thrilling overtime win is “what I always wanted,” Bronny said.

“Especially a playoff game, the first playoff bucket is great for me, great for my confidence and how I approach the rest of the playoffs,” he added.

The 21-year-old got his first postseason rotation minutes in Game 1, starting the second quarter. The Crypto.com Arena crowd cheered when he got his first touch of the ball.

He had one turnover and two fouls in his nearly four-minute shift. Several of his passes were slightly off the mark, forcing teammates to reach for the ball. Assistant coach Greg St. Jean pulled him aside for words of encouragement before the second-year pro returned to the bench. He didn’t reenter the game.

LeBron remembered the nerves he had during his first postseason game in 2006 against Washington, he said after Game 1, and there was little advice he could give his son that would make the experience easier until he actually did it.

“I was nervous for my first playoff game too,” Bronny said. “I definitely think I’ve gained a little more confidence and relaxed myself over these three games.”

The Lakers are going to need his minutes. Still waiting for Doncic and Reaves to return, the Lakers can’t turn down any advantageous shots, coach JJ Redick said.

Seeing him confidently step into a three-pointer Friday was even more important than the fact that Bronny made the shot for his first playoff points.

Lakers guard Bronny James (9) and Rockets guard Reed Sheppard (15) chase after a loose ball during Game 3 on Friday night in Houston.

(Michael Wyke / Associated Press)

“The amount of confidence that a young kid in our league can get from a postseason game is like — a regular-season game would never,” LeBron said. “You will never get nervous from a regular-season moment ever again when you play meaningful postseason games and postseason minutes. And he’s done that, and I think that’s pretty cool for his career, for his confidence.”

Not only has Bronny gained confidence in his shot, but also Redick praised his improvement on defense throughout the season. Against the famously physical Rockets, the 6-foot-2 guard doesn’t look out of place on defense. In the moments LeBron zooms out to realize his son is playing, he marvels at his oldest child’s attention to detail, improvements on the ball and defensive mindset.

Bronny is appreciative of the coaches’ trust in him. The former five-star recruit out of Sierra Canyon High still is growing into his career, especially after surgery for a congenital heart defect derailed his brief college experience at USC. That he didn’t get to play a March Madness game will irk him for the rest of his life, Bronny said. But the Lakers’ postseason run isn’t a bad consolation prize.

“Got to do it in the playoffs,” Bronny said, “and that’s just the best feeling.”

Injury updates

Austin Reaves remains questionable for Game 4 in Houston on Sunday . Reaves participated in an individual shooting workout Saturday.

Reaves and Doncic are less than four weeks removed from their Grade 2 injuries suffered April 2. Doncic remains out for Game 4, but with the Lakers close to extending their season into the second round, Doncic’s potential postseason return becomes more realistic.

Needing a win Sunday to extend his season, the Rockets’ Kevin Durant is questionable because of a left ankle sprain. The superstar forward missed Game 1 because of a bruised right knee and injured his ankle late in Game 2. He has been receiving treatment “around the clock,” Rockets coach Ime Udoka told reporters Saturday. Durant was running on an underwater treadmill during Friday’s game and will test the ankle again beforeGame 4.

“Every day that goes by, the likelihood goes up,” Udoka said of Durant playing. “But I thought he might be OK [Friday] based on shootaround and that’s different going half speed and then ramping it up right before a game. And so you really can’t tell, but he’s doing everything he can to get back.”

Authors: Rahul Mishra & Harshit Prajapati

The US-Israel conflict with Iran dragged almost every country into a phase of energy insecurity. While Iran’s neighboring countries are directly affected by the armed conflict, immediate regions too have not remained insulated from the ongoing conflict. For India, the conflict has demonstrated the implications of getting caught in the crossfire of a conflict in its vicinity. Two particular incidents—the US sinking of the Iranian warship IRIS Dena in the waters off the coast of Sri Lanka (just 40 nautical miles away) and the reported firing of two ballistic missiles towards the joint UK-US base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean—serve as a grim reminder about a conflict spiraling in India’s maritime backyard in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

For decades, the Indian Ocean region has remained largely peaceful, away from any direct impact of a conflict in a neighboring region or any major power conflict with a regional impact. The two above-mentioned incidents highlight the need for littoral states of the IOR to have a regional security mechanism to deal with any crisis in the region in a more cohesive and coordinated fashion. Being one of the major stakeholders in the region, it is incumbent upon India to foster meaningful and substantial cooperation with IOR littoral states through regional mechanisms such as the Colombo Security Conclave (CSC) and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). It would be a timely exercise to strive to move beyond non-traditional security cooperation mechanisms to protect the shared maritime space, especially during such conflicts.

The sinking of IRIS Dena in the IOR when it was returning to its home after participating in the International Fleet Review and multinational exercise MILAN, hosted by India, serves as a major strategic lesson to countries of the region. Since the International Fleet Reviews are an acknowledgement by the regional and global peers of the host country’s sovereignty and maritime supremacy in its neighborhood, the sinking of an Iranian warship does not augur well for India’s claim as a net security provider or preferred security partner in the IOR.

Additionally, Iran’s launch of two ballistic missiles, which failed to strike the designated target, towards the Diego Garcia base, reflects the risk of a distant war reaching India’s maritime backyard. The 2025 decolonization agreement between the UK and Mauritius enabled the transfer of the Chagos archipelago, including Diego Garcia Island, to Mauritius; however, the UK retained access to the Diego Garcia military base for 99 years. Thus, in the event of a conflict, Diego Garcia, as the joint UK-US base, may become a target, thereby drawing the war into the Indian maritime backyard. With the escalating conflict with Iran, Hezbollah, and the Houthi rebels, the possibility of repetition of such an incident cannot be ruled out.

During the Cold War, India and the IOR countries endeavored to halt the foreign military presence in the IOR, as illustrated by the UNGA Resolution 2832 of 1971, which sought to establish the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZOP). However, the regional countries failed to implement the declaration because of resistance from the major powers. In 2016, India attempted to revive implementation of the 1971 resolution but failed to garner significant attention from the IOR countries, putting aside any major power.

Rather than seeking IOZOP through restrictions on foreign military presence, India should strengthen its naval capabilities, especially its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms. Earlier, in 2018, India envisioned a 200-ship fleet by 2027; however, in 2026, the goal was revised to a 200-plus-ship fleet by 2035. Despite the induction of new platforms, this goal seems ambitious, as older platforms retire faster than new ones are inducted, especially given the constrained budget allocation to the Indian Navy.

A sizable portion of India’s submarine fleet is aging. The current force comprising Russian-origin Kilo-class submarines and German-origin Type 209 submarines has been in service for decades and is set to retire soon. Although the induction of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine Aridhaman in April 2026 and Arighaat in August 2024 strengthened India’s nuclear triad, the pace of induction of conventional submarines remains lagging. Project 75I, aimed at developing advanced diesel-electric submarines, was originally set in motion in 2007; however, its deal with the manufacturer—a German firm—has yet to be signed.

Earlier, it was planned that India would expand its fleet of long-range maritime reconnaissance Boeing P-8I aircraft from 12 to 28. But then the plan to expand the fleet to 28 P-8I aircraft was reduced to 20-22 due to constrained spending. Additionally, the Indian Navy only possesses 15 MQ-9B high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) drones.

Therefore, if India needs to entrench its position as a preferred security partner in the IOR and realize its vision of Security and Growth for all in the Region (SAGAR)—upgraded to Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions (MAHASAGAR) in 2025—in the IOR, then it needs to support its normative framework with military capabilities.

Given India’s lack of naval capabilities—across all three mediums (air, surface, and undersea)—to conduct persistent surveillance of the enormous IOR (spanning more than 70 million square kilometers), India should collaborate with littoral countries to conduct surveillance in the IOR through regional mechanisms such as the CSC and the IONS. Presently, cooperation in these forums is largely limited to countering non-traditional security threats, such as piracy, trafficking, maritime disasters, etc. Challenges such as differing threat perceptions, disparity in naval capabilities, and a lack of regional consciousness hinder meaningful and substantial cooperation.

However, if the littoral countries of the IOR seek to avoid getting caught in the crossfire of a distant conflict, such as the present one, they need to move beyond non-traditional security cooperation to develop a common understanding of how to protect the shared maritime space in the IOR, especially during such conflicts. India, being the most militarily equipped country in the IOR, should take the lead in forging the collaborative efforts to conduct persistent surveillance in the IOR, as maritime wars do not respect geographical boundaries.

April 24 (UPI) — Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez on Friday dismissed an alleged leak from the U.S. Department of Defense suggesting that Spain could face being suspended from NATO in retaliation for not supporting the United States in its war with Iran.

Arriving in Cyprus for a meeting of European Union leaders, Sanchez said he was not worried and that Spain was fully compliant with its treaty commitments to the collective defense pact.

“No worries. The Spanish government’s position is clear: absolute cooperation with our allies, but always within the framework of international law,” was his response to questions regarding a leaked Pentagon email setting out potential actions that could be taken against NATO allies who failed to adequately support the war or were otherwise seen as uncooperative.

However, Sanchez refused to be drawn directly on the alleged contents of the internal U.S. government communication leaked by a U.S. official to Reuters, which broke the story on Friday.

He said the Spanish government could talk about relevant official U.S. documents and policy positions but “does not comment on emails.”

An outspoken critic of the U.S. military offensive against Iran, Spain was highlighted as the prime candidate for being ejected from NATO, but the United Kingdom was also earmarked for retribution with a proposal pitching a rethink of Washington’s support for British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands.

In 1982, Britain fought and won a 74-day war with Argentina over the South Atlantic territory after its forces overran and seized islands.

President Donald Trump was incensed by Sanchez’s refusal to permit U.S. military aircraft to use U.S.-Spanish airbases or Spain’s airspace to launch strikes on Iran, culminating in him threatening to sever bilateral trade.

Britain initially denied permission for U.S. warplanes to use its airbases but relented two days or so after the start of the war on Feb. 28, allowing aircraft engaged in “defensive” missions to fly out of RAF bases in Britain and Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.

The Pentagon, which the Trump administration moved to rename to the Department of War, appeared to justify taking some type of punitive action.

Pentagon Press Secretary Kingsley Wilson said NATO allies “were not there for us” regardless of “everything” the United States had done for them.

“The War Department will ensure that the president has credible options to ensure that our allies are no longer a paper tiger and instead do their part. We have no further comment on any internal deliberations to that effect,” she added.

Calling NATO “a source of strength,” Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who was also attending the EU summit, called for unity.

“We must work to strengthen Nato’s European pillar… which must clearly complement the American one,” she said.

Berlin dismissed the idea Spain’s position within NATO was under any threat.

“Spain is a member of NATO. And I see no reason why that should change,” a German government spokesman said at a regular news briefing on Friday.

The 1949 treaty under which NATO was formed by the United States, Britain, France, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway and Iceland as a response to the Cold War contains no process or means for the expulsion or suspension of a member country.

Former NATO spokesperson and senior fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, Oana Lungescu, also dismissed the idea Spain could be suspended.

“It’s hard to know how seriously we should take such emails beyond ideological trolling,” she said.

April 23 (UPI) — As tensions simmer across the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan is quietly accelerating a shift toward drone-centric defense.

The nation is betting that swarms of low-cost, domestically produced systems can help offset the numerical and industrial advantages of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy and its expanding network of maritime auxiliaries.

This approach reflects a broader recalibration in Taipei — a move away from expensive, vulnerable platforms toward distributed, resilient and scalable capabilities designed to complicate any attempt at invasion or blockade.

At its core lies a simple calculation. In a high-intensity Indo-Pacific conflict, quantity, adaptability and survivability may matter more than traditional firepower.

From platforms to swarms

Taiwan’s embrace of drones is rooted in the concept of asymmetric warfare. Rather than matching China ship-for-ship or missile-for-missile, Taipei is investing in systems that can be mass-produced, dispersed and rapidly replaced.

“It’s not really about ‘swarms’ yet — it’s about mass. Large volumes of drones used in salvos to overwhelm defenses and increase the probability of a successful strike,” said Molly Campbell, analyst at the Center for a New American Security in Washington, D.C.

Government plans call for the procurement of up to 200,000 drones over the coming decade, spanning aerial, maritime and hybrid platforms in what officials describe as a whole-of-society approach to resilience.

These include a broad mix of air (UAV), surface (USV) and underwater (UUV) drones, designed to operate in contested littoral environments.

The objective is clear: saturate defenses, disrupt amphibious operations and raise the cost of any Chinese military action.

“What Taiwan is trying to do is shift from heavy, high-end defense platforms to a more dispersed and resilient model,” Simona Alba Grano, a senior fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute, told UPI.

In Taiwan’s case, where the goal is not to defeat China outright, but to make any invasion “extremely costly and uncertain,” such systems fit squarely within a broader denial strategy.

Lessons from Ukraine — with limits

Taiwan’s drone push has been influenced by Ukraine’s battlefield innovations, where low-cost unmanned systems have reshaped modern warfare.

Ukraine’s use of maritime drones in the Black Sea, striking high-value naval targets with relatively inexpensive systems, provides a compelling reference point. It has also highlighted the importance of rapid iteration, short development cycles and close integration between operators and industry.

Taiwanese companies have begun engaging with this ecosystem, supplying components and spare parts to Ukrainian operators and seeking to gain exposure to combat-driven innovation.

Yet, the analogy has limits.

The Taiwan Strait presents a far more demanding operational environment as it is wider, more exposed and subject to extreme weather conditions. Systems must operate over longer distances, carry heavier payloads and withstand harsher maritime conditions.

At the same time, Ukraine’s drone ecosystem is shaped by continuous battlefield validation, giving its manufacturers a level of operational credibility that remains difficult to replicate elsewhere.

Advances in unmanned systems, including long-range platforms and “mothership” concepts, also are eroding the Taiwan Strait’s traditional role as a natural buffer, increasing the tempo of gray-zone interactions.

Ukraine has demonstrated what is possible. Taiwan must now determine what is adaptable to its own operational environment.

Industrial ambition meets resistance

Taiwan’s challenge is no longer strategic clarity, but execution on the ground. The gap between planning and implementation, particularly in scaling capabilities and coordinating across agencies, now defines the island’s defense posture.

“Ukraine’s drone production is on a completely different scale. It’s nowhere near comparable to what Taiwan is currently able to produce, ” Campbell said.

Authorities have signaled openness to integrating foreign expertise, pursuing joint production and accelerating domestic manufacturing. Yet, progress has been uneven.

Industry insiders point to reluctance among local manufacturers to share market opportunities within a rapidly expanding defense budget. This has constrained collaboration both domestically and internationally, slowing efforts to build a more integrated ecosystem.

This dynamic is particularly visible in Taiwan’s interactions with Ukraine. Despite Kyiv’s operational experience and willingness to cooperate, Taiwanese firms have at times resisted incorporating Ukrainian know-how into their platforms, limiting co-development opportunities.

At the same time, Taiwanese companies have sought to market their own systems abroad, often with limited success in operationally mature environments. The result is a mismatch between industrial ambition and battlefield credibility in a highly competitive, experience-driven sector.

The fragmentation of Taiwan’s drone ecosystem comes at a critical moment, when speed, scale and integration are essential.

Cutting the China supply chain

Another pillar of Taiwan’s strategy is reducing reliance on Chinese components, long a structural vulnerability in the global drone industry.

“Taiwan is making a concerted effort to eliminate Chinese components from its drone supply chain to reduce dependence and mitigate security risks, said Ava Shen, an analyst at the Eurasia Group.

Taipei is working with international partners, particularly the United States, to develop a secure, China-free supply chain for unmanned systems. This effort is now backed by policy initiatives in Washington, where bipartisan legislation seeks to expand joint drone production and strengthen industrial resilience between the two partners.

The objective is not only to secure supply chains, but also to align production ecosystems in ways that enhance interoperability and long-term sustainability.

However, decoupling comes with trade-offs. Eliminating Chinese components increases production costs, extends timelines and complicates scaling. These constraints risk slowing deployment at a moment when speed is critical.

Meanwhile, China continues to expand its own unmanned capabilities, including drone swarms, electronic warfare systems and the conversion of legacy platforms into remotely operated assets. The scale of its industrial base and the integration of civilian and military sectors present a formidable challenge.

If Taiwan’s approach emphasizes agility and innovation, China’s rests on mass, coordination and systemic depth.

Southeast Asia as regional test bed

Beyond Taiwan, Southeast Asia, particularly along the South China Sea littoral, is emerging as a practical testing ground for unmanned systems.

The United States has expanded drone support to regional partners, providing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms such as the ScanEagle, RQ-20 Puma and Skydio X10 UAVs to countries including the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia. These systems are primarily used to enhance maritime awareness in contested areas.

The Philippines, under sustained pressure from Beijing, has become a focal point. The United States has deployed MQ-9A Reaper for extended surveillance missions and introduced maritime drones, such as the Devil Ray T-38.

Together, these deployments are turning parts of Southeast Asia into a real-world environment for testing unmanned concepts short of conflict, particularly in maritime surveillance and denial.

China has also deployed uncrewed surface vehicles such as the Sea Wing and Wave Glider types, many of which have been lost or recovered by fishermen and coast guards, in the South China Sea as well as in the Java Sea, highlighting both the spread and the fragility of these systems in contested waters.

Deterrence, escalation and uncertainty

Drones offer Taiwan a pathway to strengthen deterrence by denial, increasing the cost, complexity and uncertainty of any military action. But they also introduce new risks.

The proliferation of low-cost systems may lower the threshold for escalation, especially in ambiguous encounters involving coast guard or maritime militia vessels. What begins as signaling or harassment could escalate more rapidly in an environment saturated with autonomous or semi-autonomous platforms.

Moreover, drone networks depend heavily on communications, data links and supply chains – all of which are vulnerable to disruption through cyber operations or electronic warfare.

Race against time

For Taiwan, the shift toward drone-centric defense is both an opportunity and a race against time.

Drones offer a scalable and cost-effective means of offsetting China’s advantages. But success depends on overcoming internal fragmentation, accelerating production and adapting technologies to local operational realities.

The central question is no longer whether drones will shape the balance in the Taiwan Strait, but whether Taiwan can scale and integrate them fast enough to make deterrence credible.

As China continues to refine its own capabilities, the balance in the Strait may increasingly hinge on a simple but decisive factor: which side can deploy, adapt and sustain unmanned systems at scale.

WASHINGTON — The Pentagon announced Wednesday that the Navy’s top civilian official, Secretary of the Navy John Phelan, is leaving his job.

In a statement posted to social media, Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell said Phelan was “departing the administration, effective immediately.”

Navy Undersecretary Hung Cao will become acting secretary of the Navy, Parnell said.

The sudden departure comes just a day after Phelan addressed a large crowd of sailors and industry professionals at the Navy’s annual conference in Washington, and spoke with reporters about his agenda.

Phelan’s departure also comes just weeks after Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth fired the Army’s top officer, Gen. Randy George, as well as two other top generals in the Army.

Phelan had not served in the military or had a civilian leadership role in the service before President Trump nominated him for secretary in late 2024.

Phelan was a major donor to Trump’s campaign and founded the private investment firm Rugger Management LLC. According to his biography, Phelan’s primary exposure to the military came from an advisory position he held on the Spirit of America, a nonprofit that supported the defense of Ukraine and the defense of Taiwan.

Toropin and Finley write for the Associated Press.

April 21 (UPI) — Uncertainty over Iran peace talks put Vice President JD Vance’s trip to Pakistan on hold Tuesday, as Iranian officials were silent on whether they intend to take part in the talks at all.

The New York Times reported that talks could, however, restart at any time. Officials in Tehran were divided on whether to take part in negotiations while the United States held firm on its embargo on ports in Iran, Axios reported.

President Donald Trump said earlier in the day that he expects to reach a deal with Iran in negotiations to end the war on Tuesday, but if no deal is made, he is prepared to resume bombing.

The two-week cease-fire Trump agreed to is set to expire on Wednesday, with the Strait of Hormuz remaining a centerpiece to the conflict between the United States and Iran.

“What I think is that we’re going to end up with a great deal,” Trump said in an interview on CNBC on Tuesday. “I think they have no choice. We’ve taken out their navy. We’ve taken out their air force. We’ve taken out their leaders, frankly. It is regime change, no matter what you want to call it. Which is not something I said I was going to do but I’ve done, indirectly maybe, but I’ve done it.”

Trump said the United States’ blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has been a “tremendous success,” adding that “we totally control the strait.”

The president added that he does not want to extend the cease-fire, noting that negotiations will take place near the time the two-week cease-fire ends.

If a deal is not agreed to on Tuesday and Wednesday, Trump said, “I expect to be bombing,” and “we are raring to go.”

“We’re totally loaded up. We have so much of everything; much more powerful than it was four or five weeks ago,” Trump said. “We caught a ship yesterday that had some things on it, which wasn’t very nice. A gift from China perhaps, I don’t know.”

Trump claimed that Iran has executed 42,000 protesters in the last two months, a number that has not been verified, though former Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said thousands were killed earlier this year.

On social media, Trump shared a post saying the Islamic Republic is “preparing to hang eight women.” Trump called on Iranian leaders to release the women.

“I would greatly appreciate the release of these women,” Trump wrote. “I am sure that they will respect the fact that you did so. Please do them no harm! Would be a great start to our negotiations!”

Authoritarian leaders like President Vladimir Putin are faced with a dilemma: they require their military forces to competently conduct campaigns against external enemies, but these same capabilities make them more capable of successfully initiating coups to remove the incumbent leader.  Putin, like other leaders of his ilk, is forced to balance policies which promote competence in the armed forces with measures that ensure regime survival.  The latter are referred to as ‘coup-proofing’ measures, the implementation of which, to some extent explain the underperformance of the Russian war effort in Ukraine.

Counterbalancing and Parallel Forces

The coup-proofing measure of most consequence to Russia’s military performance in Ukraine is ‘counterbalancing’.  This involves the introduction of new security forces to counterbalance the military and each other.  A splintered security sector filled with various armed groups are in competition with each other for funding, recruits, and supplies, as well as the ruling autocrat’s attention, which is ultimately vital for attaining the aforementioned resources. 

Counterbalancing confers three advantages.  Firstly, it promotes loyalty by encouraging competition and distrust between militarized factions who must demonstrate allegiance to the leader to secure resources.  Secondly, it deters coups because the officers and senior figures distrust their counterparts in other organizations; and thirdly, it prevents the likelihood of a coup succeeding as it is more difficult for military and security forces operating under disparate chains of command to coordinate and cooperate effectively.

To quote, a 2017 paper appearing in the Journal of Conflict Resolution, ‘If coups are akin to coordination games, counterbalancing can be understood as an effort to add additional players to the game – actors who lack the incentive to move in concert with the others.’

Counterbalancing is rarely used in isolation and may be combined with other coup-proofing measures.  For example, authoritarian leaders frequently favour loyalty over meritocracy when selecting staff for senior military and security positions.

Mercenaries as Parallel Forces

Several parallel armed groups exist outside of the Russian military’s chain of command.  The most high-profile example is the use of mercenaries from Wagner Group, formerly led by Yevgeny Prigozhin until his demise in August 2023.  Wagner Group employs an estimated 50,000 soldiers, 40,000 of which are believed to be released prison convicts.  For Putin, the introduction of mercenaries to the war in Ukraine conferred several benefits including a degree of plausible deniability, less domestic blowback from casualties, and an alternative source of manpower which was especially valuable prior to the partial mobilization in September 2022.

From a coup-proofing perspective, the introduction of a private military company (PMC) with overlapping responsibilities to the regular military promoted greater competition between senior leaders.  This rivalry was exacerbated by the contest for vital resources like ammunition, supplies and personnel. 

The feud between Wagner’s late leader with Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov was especially bitter.  Prigozhin frequently levelled scathing criticism at the two men, and other senior military officers for their handling of the war, accusing them of stealing the credit for Wagner’s battlefield successes in Ukraine, and even attempting to sabotage the PMC’s efforts by withholding vital ammunition. 

For a time, this suited Putin.  Prigozhin was careful to avoid directly criticizing the Russian president himself which helped to deflect any blame Putin might receive from the public onto his generals.  Moreover, Prigozhin’s actions appeared to fit a preestablished pattern in Russian politics whereby senior figures jostle against each other to secure the president’s favour. 

There are several Russian PMCs in addition to Wagner Group.  Konstantin Pikalov, once thought to be Prigozhin’s right hand man and the head of Wagner operations in Africa, heads his own mercenary group called ‘Convoy’, which were founded in occupied Crimea in Autumn 2022.  Another group is ‘Redut’, which was likely formed to provide security for Russian-owned facilities in Syria, but it believed to have been one of the first PMCs to provide personnel during the invasion of Ukraine in February last year.

The Russian energy giant Gazprom also has mercenaries in the guise of ‘private security organizations’, which energy companies were permitted to create after a new law was passed by Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin in February 2023.  It is unclear whether the various groups associated with Gazprom subsidiary Gazprom Neft will exclusively guard the company’s energy facilities or whether they will take on active combat roles in Ukraine.

Other Parallel Forces

Mercenaries are not the only parallel forces at play.  In 2016, Putin formed the Rosgvardiya (National Guard) under the leadership of Viktor Zolotov, the president’s former bodyguard.  The formation of the Rosgvariya entailed the reorganization of preexisting internal security forces into a new agency which directly reports to Putin.  Ostensibly, the Rosgvardiya’s responsibilities largely concern public order, policing, and counterterrorism, but the 300,000 to 400,000 strong force certainly acts as a deterrent to would-be coup-plotters.  The Rosgvardiya has also reportedly seen action in Ukraine.

Similar examples of counterbalancing can be seen in the intelligence sphere.  Three of the country’s most important intelligence services, the GRU, the SVR, and the FSB, each have their own elite special forces contingents.  Competition and mutual distrust between the three is rife due to a high degree of overlapping tasks and low degree of cooperation.  The FSB have attracted a particularly high degree of rancour from the GRU and SVR because of its increasingly proactive role conducting operations beyond its domestic remit.  Additionally, counterintelligence officers from the FSB are embedded directly within the armed forces to monitor signs of dissent. 

Finally, there are parallel forces provided by the Russian republics.  Just two days after the invasion of Ukraine, Ramzan Kadyrov, the Kremlin-appointed leader of Chechnya, confirmed that the 141st Special Motorized Regiment – better known as the Kadyrovites – were operating in the country.  The Kadyrovites are essentially a paramilitary organization loyal to Kadyrov, functioning as his private army. 

Like Prigozhin, Kadyrov has been highly critical of the Russian military leadership but avoided levelling such critiques at Putin.  By emphasizing the effectiveness of Chechen fighters over regular Russian forces, Kadyrov may have been hoping to make himself appear more indispensable to Putin.

How Coup-Proofing Degrades Military Effectiveness

The introduction of several players incentivized to hold each other in mutual suspicion is not conducive to an effective and unified war effort, as events in Ukraine have demonstrated.  As explained by James M. Powell, coup-proofing ‘undermines the fighting capacity of a military by creating coordination challenges in the field.’  Unity of command is necessary for a coup to be effective, but it is just as necessary for conducting a war.  The absence of unified command has thus jeopardized the entire Russian war effort.

The lack of a unified command structure was evident in the early stages of the war.  In the first months following the invasion, Western and Ukrainian intelligence agencies and analysts were unable to identify a single overall commander of the Russian forces in Ukraine.  Instead, it was believed that separate formations were drawn from each of Russia’s four military districts and placed under the command of senior officers from each district, with Putin taking on an oversized role, sometimes reportedly giving orders to field formations.  Last April, Army General Aleksandr Dvornikov was finally named as overall commander but there have been at least three reshuffles at the top since then.

Wagner’s increasing share of frontline duties further undermined unity of command, with Prigozhin and his mercenaries not subject to the authority of the regular armed forces.  Tensions between Prigozhin and the miliary leadership culminated in Wager Group’s mutiny in June.  A civil war or coup seemed momentarily possible in Russia until a deal was brokered by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko.  Prigozhin was later killed in a plane crash in August removing him from the chessboard altogether, but his insubordination was a clear sign that Putin had miscalculated and allowed the rivalries simmering between the members of his inner circle to burn too hot.

Beyond Prigozhin’s dramatic rebellion, Coup-proofing has created other unintended consequences which have hindered Russia’s military efforts.  An overemphasis on loyalty at the expense of competence coupled with fierce competition between the security and defence services have created incentive structures that have undermined honesty and integrity, inter-service cooperation, and professionalism. 

These trends were identified by analysts as being particularly pervasive in the Russian intelligence community even before the invasion of Ukraine.  For example, a 2021 Congressional Research Service report noted that ‘Agencies compete with each other for greater responsibilities, budgets, and political influence, often at the expense of other agencies.’  As Mark Galeotti puts it, ‘The competition for presidential approval is especially strong and has led to a perverse competition to tell the boss what they think he wants to hear, not what he needs to hear.’  This culture likely incentivised the Russian intelligence community to provide briefings to Putin prior to the invasion that confirmed his preconceptions that Ukraine would offer little resistance.

It is equally questionable if the most competent officers have been granted the responsibility to lead Russia’s war on Ukraine.  Sergei Surovikin, a veteran of several conflicts and broadly considered to be capable officer by most military analysts, was made the overall commander of Russian forces in Ukraine in October 2022.  However, Surovikin was replaced in January the following year by Valery Gerasimov, despite the latter having already attracted much of the blame for implementing a faulty strategy in his role as the Chief of the General Staff.  In August, Surovikin was then stripped of his role as the commander of the Russian aerospace forces due to suspicions that he was linked to the Wagner rebellion. 

Other officers have met similar fates.  On July 12, Major General Ivan Popov, who led the 58th Combined Arms Army stationed in Ukraine’s southern Zaporizhzhya region, disclosed that he had been relieved of his command after he made complaints to Gerasimov regarding the lack of troop rotations.  He also highlighted issues his soldiers were having with counterbattery radar and artillery reconnaissance.  Popov’s dismissal indicates that senior military personnel are seemingly unable to report the facts on the ground to their superiors without facing charges of disloyalty or disciplinary action.  Such a culture, especially within the Russian military’s highly hierarchal command structure will make it increasingly difficult for commanders to make informed decisions based on accurate information.

Thus far, Putin’s coup-proofing strategy has succeeded in fragmenting the Russian security elite sufficiently to secure his hold on power, despite Prigozhin’s short-lived insubordination.  However, these same measures which have enabled Putin to safeguard his rule have seriously undermined Russia’s war effort in Ukraine.  The constituent parts of Russia’s defence and security apparatuses fail to act as a whole and there is ample evidence that senior leaders have been promoted on the basis of perceived loyalty over competence.  A culture of competition and distrust has hindered cooperation, coordination, and honesty, which has led to poor decision-making, the results of which have played out on the battlefields of Ukraine since February last year.

April 21 (UPI) — Iran on Tuesday demanded the United States release the Iranian-flagged container ship the U.S. military seized over the weekend, threatening to use “all its capacities” to defend itself as the cease-fire neared its end.

The U.S. military seized Touska on Sunday as it enforced a military blockade of Iranian ports and ships, raising already high tensions during a two-week cease-fire rapidly nearing its end that negotiators from both countries are to use to secure an end to the war.

U.S. warships intercepted Touska transiting the north Arabian Sea en route to Iran’s Bandar Abbas port city for allegedly violating the blockade.

Iran responded with accusations of violating the cease-fire and drone strikes targeting U.S. military vessels, according to state-run media, though U.S. Central Command has yet to comment.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry on Tuesday condemned the seizure of Touska as an “unlawful and savage act of the terrorist U.S. army,” saying the “act of maritime banditry and terrorism” terrified the ship’s passengers and crew, some of whose family members were onboard.

“The Islamic Republic of Iran, while warning of the very dangerous consequences of this unlawful and criminal act by the United States, emphasizes the immediate release of the Iranian vessel, its passengers, its crew and its families,” the ministry said in a statement.

The ministry said the seizure is a violation of international and the fundamental principles and rules of the U.N. Charter, and that it had informed the U.N. secretary general, the Security Council and maritime organizations.

“There is no doubt that the Islamic Republic of Iran will use all its capacities to defend Iran’s national interests and security and to safeguard the rights and dignity of its citizens,” the ministry statement said.

“It is obvious that full responsibility for the further complication of the situation in the region lies with the United States.”

The cease-fire is to end at midnight Tuesday.

Iran has accused Trump of ducking real negotiations on ending the war in favor of trying to exert the United States’ economic and military might to force it to capitulate.

“Trump, by imposing a blockade and violating the cease-fire, wants — in his view — to turn the negotiating table into a table of surrender, or else justify starting the war again,” Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said late Monday in a statement.

“We do not accept negotiations under the shadow of threats, and over thee past two weeks we have prepared to reveal new cards on the battlefield.”

Trump has continued to boast online that he was “winning” the war while defending himself from criticism and vowing the deal his administration is working on with Iran will be “FAR BETTER” than the landmark multinational Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action the United States, Iran and several other countries signed during the Obama administration.

“If a deal happens under ‘TRUMP,’ it will guarantee Peace, Security and Safety, not only for Israel and the Middle East, but for Europe, America and Everywhere else,” he said on his Truth Social media platform.

“It will be something that the entire World will be proud of, instead of the years of Embarrassment and Humiliation that we have been forced to suffer due to incompetent and cowardly leadership!”

Turkey, Iran’s neighbor and U.S. ally, has been among nations working to de-escalate tensions in the Gulf and seek an extension to the cease-fire as negotiations appear to be at a stalemate over Iran’s nuclear program.

Though public rhetoric is fiery, negotiations behind closed doors are progressing, Ankara’s foreign affairs minister, Hakan Fidan, said Sunday during a forum in southeastern Turkey’s Antalya.

“The good thing is this: both sides continue to negotiate with a very serious intention, sincerely, they have the will to continue,” Fidan said.

“Now, no one wants a new war to start again with the end of the cease-fire next week.”

Turkey hopes that under international pressure, the United States, Israel and Iran will extend the cease-fire to solve outstanding issues, he said.

“A two-week period is good for a cease-fire, but the file in front of them is so comprehensive that it will not be possible to solve all these issues in two weeks,” he said.

“Therefore, a new extension will be needed. I hope this extension will come. I am optimistic about that.”

April 20 (UPI) — The U.S. military announced late Sunday that it has killed three men in its latest strike targeting a suspected drug-smuggling boat in the Caribbean.

Seventeen people have been killed in six strikes the U.S. Southern Command has carried out in little over a week, marking one of the deadliest publicly announced stretches of the Trump administration’s monthslong anti-drug smuggling operation.

As in previous strike announcements, SOUTHCOM released little information.

The attack occurred Sunday, targeting a boat operated by a designated terrorist organization in the Caribbean, SOUTHCOM said in a statement, without naming the organization or providing evidence.

“Intelligence confirmed the vessel was transiting along known narco-trafficking routes in the Caribbean and was engaged in narco-trafficking operations,” it said.

A 12-second, black-and-white clip of the strike posted to SOUTHCOM’s social media shows a boat moving across the ocean before disappearing in a large fiery explosion.

Since the first strike on Sept. 2, the U.S. military has killed at least 180 people, according to UPI’s tally of publicly released data. Fifty-five boats have been destroyed in the more than 50 strikes.

President Donald Trump argues that the use of deadly military force is warranted as the United States is in “armed conflict” with the 10 drug cartels and gangs he has designated as terrorist organizations since returning to the White House in January 2025.

The operation comes as the Trump administration seeks to expand its influence in the Western Hemisphere, including by using its military to dismantle what Trump has called “narco-terrorist networks.”

The strikes have been repeatedly condemned and their legality questioned by Democrats, rights groups, critics and United Nations experts, who accuse the Trump administration of violating international and maritime law over the use of the military to conduct law enforcement drug operations.

Last month, Ben Saul, the United Nations’ special rapporteur on counter-terrorism and human rights, lambasted the Trump administration over “its phony war on so-called narco-terrorism.”

“These serial extrajudicial killings gravely violate the right to life, which applies extraterritorially,” he said on March 13.

“The attacks were not in national self-defense, since the vessels were not engaged in any armed attack on the U.S. Drug trafficking is crime, not war.”

On Wednesday, the same day the U.S. military killed three people in a strike in the eastern Pacific, a group of Democrats, led by Rep. John Larson of Connecticut, filed six articles of impeachment against Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, with one of the articles accusing him of violating the law of armed conflict over the strikes.

Larson accused Hegseth of abusing his position by ordering “our armed forces to strike boats in the Caribbean,” he said in a statement.

April 19 (UPI) — The Israel Defense Forces confirmed Sunday that a photo showing an Israeli solider smashing the head of a statue of Jesus in southern Lebanon is authentic.

The photo, originally posted on X by Palestinian journalist Younis Tirawi, quickly went viral across social media, drawing condemnation from Christians, Palestinians and others in the war-torn region.

After initially pledging an investigation into the photo, the IDF later announced they had found it to be real and not an artificial intelligence fabrication.

“Following the completion of an initial examination regarding a photograph published earlier today of an IDF soldier harming a Christian symbol, it was determined that the photograph depicts an IDF soldier operating in southern Lebanon,” the military announced.

“The IDF views the incident with great severity and emphasizes that the soldier’s conduct is wholly inconsistent with the values expected of its troops.

“The incident is being investigated by the Northern Command and is currently being addressed through the chain of command. Appropriate measures will be taken against those involved in accordance with the findings.”

The Israeli military added it is “working to assist the community in restoring the statue to its place” and vowed it has “no intention of harming civilian infrastructure, including religious buildings or religious symbols,” in its fight against Hezbollah militia forces in southern Lebanon.

The photo stirred up outrage among Christians, Palestinians and others in the Middle East.

Wadie Abunassar, coordinator of the Holy Land Christian Forum, a group of Christian laity advocating for the Christian presence in the region, called for action on the part of Israeli authorities.

“Israel has to inquire this crime, to apologize for it, to bring suspect to justice, & make sure it won’t be repeated!” he wrote in a social media post.

Meanwhile, Ayman Odeh, a Palestinian member of the Israeli parliament, added sarcastically, “We’ll wait to hear the police spokesperson claim that ‘the soldier felt threatened by Jesus.'”

April 17 (Asia Today) — Japan is moving to strengthen a government-wide system to boost defense exports, including creating a centralized control structure and easing restrictions on what military equipment can be sold overseas, according to media reports.

The government plans to establish a director-general-level coordination body involving key ministries to oversee arms export policy and execution, the Asahi Shimbun reported Thursday.

Tokyo is also considering revising guidelines tied to its Three Principles on Defense Equipment Transfers to remove restrictions on five categories – rescue, transport, patrol, surveillance and mine countermeasures – that have limited exports so far.

According to Reuters, the government could move as early as this month to revise the guidelines, with the ruling Liberal Democratic Party already approving the direction at a party meeting Sunday.

The policy shift reflects a broader strategy with two main goals: expanding the range of weapons Japan can export and overhauling how those exports are managed.

Japan has effectively limited defense exports to non-lethal equipment in the past but is now moving to include systems with lethal capabilities. At the same time, the new coordination body would bring together the foreign, defense and industry ministries, along with private companies, to align export approvals, regulatory changes and sales support.

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said in parliament that easing arms export restrictions would contribute to economic growth, signaling a shift toward treating defense exports as part of industrial policy rather than solely a security measure.

Japanese officials have argued that expanding exports is necessary to sustain the domestic defense industry, maintain production capacity and secure supply chains that are difficult to support through domestic demand alone.

Analysts say the move goes beyond regulatory changes and represents a broader effort to build a national system designed to facilitate arms sales.

If implemented, the revisions would significantly lower barriers to exporting finished weapons, marking a major shift from Japan’s traditionally restrictive defense export framework.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260417010005454

There is another way to read the ongoing Middle East crisis, one that makes legible what standard analysis consistently struggles to explain. It begins not with capability but with the geometry of the system through which capability must travel to produce effects. The United States and its partners possess overwhelming military superiority over Iran, and that superiority is not in question, yet the conflict has produced a pattern that defies its logic. A superpower coalition has been unable to impose coherent strategic outcomes against an adversary operating through proxies, low-cost disruption, and the systematic exploitation of global commercial vulnerabilities.

Over the past two years, we have seen multiple instances of this kind of disruption with consequential effects on the global system. Houthi drones force the rerouting of global shipping, with Red Sea cargo volumes falling by roughly 50% through early 2024 as major carriers diverted around the Cape of Good Hope, adding up to two weeks to transit times, driving freight costs sharply higher across European markets, and costing Egypt nearly $800 million per month at peak in lost Suez Canal revenue. A non-state network spanning Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Gaza has absorbed sustained air campaigns, targeted eliminations of senior commanders, and repeated ground operations without losing its capacity to generate coordinated pressure across multiple theaters simultaneously. The asymmetry seems to follow a deliberate strategic logic that raw power analysis struggles to read, precisely because the conflict operates on a surface that capability assessments were never designed to map. What this suggests is that the decisive variable is not what actors possess but whether the relationships connecting them can transmit coordinated action when the system is under strain.

When that system cannot coordinate, something important breaks down. An alliance that formally exists but faces operational friction at every decision point ceases to be an alliance in any meaningful strategic sense. A security guarantee that cannot be transmitted rapidly to the partner it is meant to protect has, in effect, already failed its primary function. It follows that the gap between what a system formally is and what it can actually do under pressure is not a secondary consideration but the surface on which this conflict is being decided. Conventional analysis, calibrated to count warheads and assess intentions, consistently leaves this gap unmapped.

Analysts know that Saudi Arabia’s OPEC production decisions have repeatedly positioned Riyadh against Washington’s economic preferences, they know that European energy dependency complicates transatlantic alignment, and they know that Iran’s proxy network extends across five countries and absorbs military pressure without fracturing. Yet what the available frameworks cannot do is convert that knowledge into a structural reading of the system. They show that these conditions exist. What they cannot show is how those conditions interact, where they compound, and what the aggregate geometry of their interaction means for whether coordinated action is possible at all.

Power analysis was built to read capability differentials between states, and it does that well. Alliance theory was built to read the conditions under which formal commitments hold or fail, and it does that too. Neither, however, was built to read the operational weight of the ties through which capability and commitment must travel to produce effects.

The instruments available are calibrated to answer questions different from those the current situation poses. Deploying them on a problem they were not designed to read produces the consistent failure to explain what is actually happening that has marked analysis of this conflict from the start.

Adjacency mapping is an instrument designed to read that gap by mapping connectivity, by which I mean their operational weight, specifically their capacity to carry coordinated action under strain. What distinguishes it from standard approaches is its unit of analysis. Rather than the actors themselves, it treats the weight of the relationships as primary. The question it asks is not who holds power but whether the ties connecting power-holders can transmit that power when the system needs them to. Two states can be formally allied, operationally integrated in name, and structurally disconnected at the same time, and nothing in standard analysis will tell you which of those conditions is actually operative until the moment of crisis reveals it.

The instrument assigns each significant relationship in the system a weight between 0 and 1, reflecting how frequently the two actors interact operationally, how reliably information moves between them, how the tie has behaved under recent stress, and how quickly it transmits pressure when the system is under strain. At the higher end of the scale, a weight at or above 0.6 indicates that coordination approaches automaticity, and the tie carries load without constant investment to maintain it. Around 0.3, friction accumulates. In this setting, decisions require deliberate effort at every juncture, slowing the system and making it susceptible to gradual degradation that never triggers a visible rupture. At or below 0.2, the tie has effectively ceased to function as a transmission pathway, leaving the actors operationally disconnected regardless of what their formal relationship nominally says.

These weights are analytical judgements calibrated against observable evidence. In other words, their value lies in making visible what experienced analysts already carry as intuition and in giving that intuition a structure precise enough to argue about. The numbers are therefore analytical judgements, not measurements. A more rigorous application would derive them from quantifiable indicators across each dimension, including military interoperability, intelligence exchange depth, crisis responsiveness, economic interdependence, and signaling consistency, averaged and weighted systematically. That work lies beyond the scope of this piece, but the architecture is designed to accommodate it.

There is a risk management dimension to this reading that is worth making explicit. Standard geopolitical risk assessment focuses on actor-level variables such as regime stability, military capability, and leadership intentions. What adjacency mapping adds is a structural layer that those assessments typically miss. A coalition whose load-bearing relationships operate in the friction zone is exposed to a category of risk that capability assessments do not capture and that becomes visible only when the system is read structurally.

What the matrix adds is the ability to see how compound weakness across multiple relationships produces cascading effects that bilateral assessment alone would struggle to predict. A system whose dominant actor holds several weak partnerships faces more than friction. As a consequence, the geometry of those weaknesses determines whether any concerted response is structurally possible at all. Aggregate capability becomes, in that light, secondary to that question.

If we apply this to the Middle East security complex, the instrument produces one possible reading. This reading differs considerably from the picture conventional analysis generates. Its value is not in the precision of the numbers but in making the system’s geometry visible enough to argue about.

The matrix below maps operational connectivity across the system’s key actors. The numbers are analytical judgements, not measurements.

The geometry they make visible is what matters here.

The matrix is intentionally non-symmetric. Where operational influence flows asymmetrically between two actors, the weights reflect that directionality.

The matrix reveals, in this light, a system whose dominant actors are connected at fundamentally different weights. And more significantly, its most important bilateral relationship is operating in the friction zone. It’s formally excluded adversary has constructed the only alternative connectivity architecture in the system. What this implies is that the geometry of the conflict runs considerably deeper than standard alliance analysis tends to suggest.

On the coalition side, the US has high adjacency with Qatar, Bahrain, Israel, and Kuwait, ties that enable rapid coordination and require little maintenance, constituting the operational backbone of what Washington can actually activate quickly.

Its relationship with Saudi Arabia, however, sits at 0.4. That number is analytically more significant than almost anything else in the matrix. Saudi Arabia remains, on most readings, the relationship on which Gulf order coherence formally depends, the anchor of the security architecture since the 1970s, and it is operating in the friction zone where every significant decision requires renegotiation from scratch rather than flowing through an established channel. Saudi Arabia’s invitation to join BRICS in August 2023, yuan-denominated oil transactions with China, and its participation in the Chinese-brokered rapprochement with Iran in March 2023 all point in the same direction. Riyadh is hedging structurally toward China and the broader non-Western order, a posture that sits uneasily alongside its formal security alignment with Washington. Taken together, these are not isolated political episodes but evidence of a tie that has been operating below the coordination threshold for years and whose weakness is, on this reading, the system’s most consequential structural vulnerability.

Through the normalization architecture, the UAE has arguably become the system’s most structurally reliable node at 0.6 with both the US and Israel, its operational integration exceeding Saudi Arabia’s despite Saudi Arabia’s formal primacy. The Abraham Accords of September 2020 established the formal foundation for that integration. The operational depth it has since generated, across intelligence sharing, defence cooperation, and coordinated positioning on Iran, has made the UAE the coalition’s most functionally connected Gulf partner. Oman holds what is perhaps the system’s most anomalous position, meaningful adjacency with both the US coalition and Iran simultaneously, a profile no other state actor in the matrix replicates. That structural position gave Oman the back-channel role it played through the early phases of the conflict, with documented precedent in the secret US-Iran nuclear negotiations that began in Muscat in 2012 and ran through 2013. As the conflict has intensified, Pakistan has assumed the primary mediation function, but Oman’s position as a quiet facilitator has not disappeared; it has simply been supplemented by a node with more direct access to both capitals at this particular moment.

Pakistan has emerged as the conflict’s primary mediation node, hosting the highest-level direct negotiations between Washington and Tehran since 1979 and brokering the April 2026 ceasefire. That role reflects a structural position the matrix makes legible: high Saudi adjacency, a functioning Iran tie, and a rehabilitated relationship with Washington that no other regional actor currently combines. China’s influence over both Pakistani and Iranian decision-making operates as an exogenous pressure that the matrix only partially captures, and Pakistan’s own domestic constraints, including its difficulty developing direct channels with the IRGC, limit how far that mediation role can ultimately reach.

Iran’s position is where the matrix becomes most analytically revealing. Across the state actors in the system, Iran’s adjacency sits at or near fragmentation, built up through sanctions, absent operational channels, and decades of adversarial signalling that have left Tehran formally isolated from the coordination architecture the United States and its partners have constructed.

And yet the only high-weight tie Iran holds is with its proxy network at 0.7. That single number may go further toward explaining the architecture of the entire campaign than any other figure in the matrix.

It is an asymmetric relationship in which Tehran’s capacity to activate and direct exceeds the reverse influence those actors exert over Iranian strategic decisions. What that single structural condition implies goes further toward explaining the architecture of Iranian pressure operations than most analyses of Iranian intentions or capabilities tend to reach. Iran is geographically central and formally excluded. It is precisely that combination, positioned to apply pressure across every theatre while bearing none of the coordination costs that formal inclusion imposes. That, from this vantage point, is what makes legible a strategy that standard analysis, focused on actors and their capabilities, cannot see.

Seen through this lens, what Iran is doing across the region is something more structurally ambitious than a military campaign. It is attempting to restructure the matrix itself. The goal appears to be less about battlefield victory than about the gradual degradation of the ties connecting the United States to its regional partners, below the threshold at which coordinated response becomes automatic, eroding the will to keep paying the price of alignment while simultaneously building alternative adjacency in the nodes where US-aligned connectivity is weakest.

The Houthi campaign against Red Sea shipping is calibrated to stay below the threshold that would compel a unified military response. It introduces friction into the economic relationships connecting European states to the Gulf system, raising the cost of alignment with Washington’s regional posture without forcing the kind of direct confrontation that would unite the coalition. Strikes on Gulf infrastructure follow the same calibration, persistent enough to signal that the US security guarantee cannot insulate its partners from costs, yet restrained enough to avoid crossing the point at which coalition fragmentation becomes irrelevant because a unified response becomes compulsory. Across Iraq and Syria, simultaneous pressure from affiliated militias prevents the concentration of attention that sustained coalition coordination requires. In each case, the instrument targets a relationship rather than a capability, specifically the weight of the ties whose degradation would restructure the system’s geometry without requiring Iran to displace the existing order directly.

The US-Saudi tie at 0.4 is the primary focus of that degradation effort. Should that threshold be breached, Saudi Arabia hedges. As hedging reduces operational interactivity the tie weakens further. The process risks becoming self-reinforcing. Iranian military superiority over any individual partner is not required to sustain it.

The same logic extends across European actors, though not uniformly. Germany’s industrial exposure to energy price volatility, France’s residual strategic autonomy instinct, and the EU’s institutional preference for de-escalation all produce different thresholds for continued alignment with Washington. Their shared energy dependency gives them asymmetric stakes in the Gulf system’s stability, but their appetite for risk diverges from Washington’s in ways that are not identical across capitals, and each time Iran forces a decision about the cost of continued alignment, that divergence fragments the coalition’s coordination surface further.

By sustaining operational ties with non-state actors across the region, Iran is constructing alternative adjacency in precisely the nodes where US-aligned connectivity is weakest. These are populations and factions that the existing regional order has excluded from the dominant coalition’s coordination architecture. Deliberately so — Iran is building in the structural gaps the system leaves open. Displacing the existing order appears unnecessary. Becoming the more reliable pole of alignment for the actors that order has failed to integrate may be sufficient. All that is required is that the order fragment sufficiently at its margins for that offer to appear credible, and the current trajectory of US-Saudi friction and European hedging is steadily moving in that direction.

The coalition’s instruments are calibrated to military threats. The system, however, is failing along a different surface entirely, or so this reading suggests. The formal architecture remains largely intact, security guarantees have not been withdrawn, Gulf states remain formally aligned, and normalisation agreements hold. And yet the operational adjacency that gives that architecture its functional weight is under sustained pressure from an actor that has correctly identified the gap between formal commitment and operational tie as the system’s primary vulnerability. That identification is outpacing the coalition’s capacity to respond.

On this reading, the surface on which the conflict appears to be decided is not the one the coalition is defending.

What adjacency mapping reveals is a story about geometry. The system’s dominant actor holds formal commitments at weights the system cannot sustain under the pressure being applied to it. Its adversary, in turn, has built the only alternative coordination architecture in the space that those weakening ties leave open. The conflict is likely to be determined by which ties the system can no longer afford to lose under sustained and calibrated pressure. The question is whether the actors currently holding those ties in the friction zone can rebuild them to the coordination threshold before the process of degradation becomes irreversible. That is a question that capability assessments are not well-positioned to answer, and one that a structural reading of the system’s connectivity at least helps to make visible.

Donald Trump has indicated that the conflict with Iran could conclude “soon,” citing progress in negotiations and a possible meeting between the two sides in the coming days. A temporary ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon has added to cautious optimism, though the broader regional situation remains unstable. The war, which began with U.S.-Israeli military action, has had sweeping geopolitical and economic consequences.

Ceasefire in Lebanon:
A 10-day truce between Israel and Lebanon has come into effect, offering a brief pause in cross-border hostilities. However, early reports of violations underline the fragility of the arrangement. Hezbollah, aligned with Iran, has been urged by Washington to maintain restraint during this critical window.

Diplomatic Breakthrough Efforts:
Backchannel diplomacy, with Pakistan playing a mediating role, has reportedly led to progress on key issues. Talks are expected to produce an initial memorandum of understanding, potentially followed by a comprehensive agreement within weeks. Engagement between U.S. and Iranian officials is likely to intensify in the immediate term.

Global Economic Shock:
The conflict has disrupted global energy flows, particularly through the Strait of Hormuz, through which a significant share of the world’s oil supply passes. This has triggered sharp oil price fluctuations and raised concerns about a broader economic slowdown, even as markets show signs of stabilizing on hopes of a resolution.

Nuclear Issue as Core Dispute:
Iran’s nuclear program remains the central obstacle in negotiations. Washington is pushing for long-term restrictions, while Tehran seeks shorter commitments and the lifting of sanctions. Bridging this gap will be critical to securing a durable settlement.

Political Pressures and Regional Stakes:
The war has created domestic political challenges for Trump, particularly ahead of upcoming elections. At the same time, regional actors are closely watching the outcome, as any agreement will shape the balance of power and security dynamics across the Middle East.

Analysis:
Momentum toward a deal is clearly building, but the situation remains precarious. The ceasefire in Lebanon and progress in diplomacy suggest a window of opportunity, yet unresolved issues, especially around nuclear limits and sanctions relief, could still derail negotiations. Trump’s urgency reflects both strategic calculation and domestic political pressure, while Iran appears willing to engage but not at any cost. If a preliminary agreement is reached, it would mark a significant de-escalation, but sustaining peace will require careful management of deep-rooted tensions and competing interests on all sides.

With information from Reuters.

April 16 (UPI) — President Donald Trump announced that Israel and Lebanon agreed to a 10-day cease-fire starting at 5:00 p.m., pausing Israel’s six-week war on Hezbollah in that country.

Trump spoke with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Thursday, both leaders confirmed, and agreed to the cease-fire and to work toward a more permanent peace between their countries.

Aoun and Netanyahu spoke to each other separately because Aoun declined to participate in a call with the Israeli leader because Israel was still bombing Lebanon, CNN reported.

“These two Leaders have agreed that in order to achieve PEACE between their Countries, they will formally begin a 10 Day CEASEFIRE,” he said in a post on Truth Social.

Vice President J.D. Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Dan Caine have been directed to work with officials of both countries to achieve a more lasting peace.

Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam in a statement thanked the United States, France, the European Union, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar and Jordan for helping to accomplish the cease-fire he had pursued “since the first day of the way,” NBC News reported.

After the United States and Israel launched the Iran war, Israel also launched offensives against the Iran-backed militia Hezbollah in Lebanon, from which it often launches attacks at Israel.

This week, delegates from the neighboring countries conducted diplomatic talks for the first time since 1993, meeting in Washington, D.C., to discuss a cease-fire and the larger issue of Hezbollah’s hijacking of Lebanese lands in order to target Israel.

Netanayhu said Thursday in a video statement that Israeli forces would “remain in a 10-kilometer security zone, which will allow us to prevent infiltration into communities and anti-tank missile fire.”

Calling the negotiations potentially historic, Netanyahu said that Israel’s chief goal is to disarm Hezbollah and its ability to invade or launch weapons across the Lebanese border into Israel.

“That is where we will remain,” he said. “We are not leaving.”

After the diplomatic talks on Wednesday, Rubio reinforced that a key part of the meeting and now peace talks between the two nations is to end Hezbollah’s destabilizing influence in Lebanon and the wider Middle East.

“We have to remember the Lebanese people are victims of Hezbollah,” Rubio said, also noting that accomplishing a lasting peace “will take time.”

April 15 (UPI) — Democrats in the U.S. House of Representatives on Wednesday filed articles of impeachment against Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, leveling serious criticisms of his handling of the Pentagon and the U.S. attacks on Iran.

As Republicans control the House, this move is unlikely to have an effect in 2026. Rep. Yassamin Ansari, D-Ariz., introduced the resolution, which says Hegseth has “demonstrated a willful disregard for the Constitution, abused the powers of his office and acted in a manner grossly incompatible with the rule of law,” CBS News reported.

The six articles of impeachment cite offenses including waging unauthorized war in Iran and reckless endangerment of U.S. service members, as well as breaking the laws of armed conflict and targeting civilians. Civilian casualties in Iran have included more than 160 people killed in an attack on a girls school in February.

They further accuse Hegseth of mishandling sensitive military information, which refers to his use of a Signal group chat on his personal phone to share information on a military operation in Yemen last year.

The resolution also says Hegseth obstructed congressional oversight by withholding information on military operations and abused his power by using it for political retribution.

Pentagon press secretary Kingsley Wilson dismissed the resolution and its claims as “just another Democrat trying to make headlines,” The Hill reported.

“Secretary Hegseth will continue to protect the homeland and project peace through strength,” Wilson said in a statement. “This is just another charade in an attempt to distract the American people from the major successes we have had here at the Department of War.”

Multiple Democrats are cosponsoring the resolution. These include Reps. Dave Min of California, Brittany Petterson of Colorado, Sarah McBride of Delaware, Nikema Williams of Georgia, Shri Thanedar of Michigan, Dina Titus of Nevada, Steve Cohen of Tennessee and Jasmine Crockett of Texas.