Defense

Authoritarian leaders like President Vladimir Putin are faced with a dilemma: they require their military forces to competently conduct campaigns against external enemies, but these same capabilities make them more capable of successfully initiating coups to remove the incumbent leader.  Putin, like other leaders of his ilk, is forced to balance policies which promote competence in the armed forces with measures that ensure regime survival.  The latter are referred to as ‘coup-proofing’ measures, the implementation of which, to some extent explain the underperformance of the Russian war effort in Ukraine.

Counterbalancing and Parallel Forces

The coup-proofing measure of most consequence to Russia’s military performance in Ukraine is ‘counterbalancing’.  This involves the introduction of new security forces to counterbalance the military and each other.  A splintered security sector filled with various armed groups are in competition with each other for funding, recruits, and supplies, as well as the ruling autocrat’s attention, which is ultimately vital for attaining the aforementioned resources. 

Counterbalancing confers three advantages.  Firstly, it promotes loyalty by encouraging competition and distrust between militarized factions who must demonstrate allegiance to the leader to secure resources.  Secondly, it deters coups because the officers and senior figures distrust their counterparts in other organizations; and thirdly, it prevents the likelihood of a coup succeeding as it is more difficult for military and security forces operating under disparate chains of command to coordinate and cooperate effectively.

To quote, a 2017 paper appearing in the Journal of Conflict Resolution, ‘If coups are akin to coordination games, counterbalancing can be understood as an effort to add additional players to the game – actors who lack the incentive to move in concert with the others.’

Counterbalancing is rarely used in isolation and may be combined with other coup-proofing measures.  For example, authoritarian leaders frequently favour loyalty over meritocracy when selecting staff for senior military and security positions.

Mercenaries as Parallel Forces

Several parallel armed groups exist outside of the Russian military’s chain of command.  The most high-profile example is the use of mercenaries from Wagner Group, formerly led by Yevgeny Prigozhin until his demise in August 2023.  Wagner Group employs an estimated 50,000 soldiers, 40,000 of which are believed to be released prison convicts.  For Putin, the introduction of mercenaries to the war in Ukraine conferred several benefits including a degree of plausible deniability, less domestic blowback from casualties, and an alternative source of manpower which was especially valuable prior to the partial mobilization in September 2022.

From a coup-proofing perspective, the introduction of a private military company (PMC) with overlapping responsibilities to the regular military promoted greater competition between senior leaders.  This rivalry was exacerbated by the contest for vital resources like ammunition, supplies and personnel. 

The feud between Wagner’s late leader with Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov was especially bitter.  Prigozhin frequently levelled scathing criticism at the two men, and other senior military officers for their handling of the war, accusing them of stealing the credit for Wagner’s battlefield successes in Ukraine, and even attempting to sabotage the PMC’s efforts by withholding vital ammunition. 

For a time, this suited Putin.  Prigozhin was careful to avoid directly criticizing the Russian president himself which helped to deflect any blame Putin might receive from the public onto his generals.  Moreover, Prigozhin’s actions appeared to fit a preestablished pattern in Russian politics whereby senior figures jostle against each other to secure the president’s favour. 

There are several Russian PMCs in addition to Wagner Group.  Konstantin Pikalov, once thought to be Prigozhin’s right hand man and the head of Wagner operations in Africa, heads his own mercenary group called ‘Convoy’, which were founded in occupied Crimea in Autumn 2022.  Another group is ‘Redut’, which was likely formed to provide security for Russian-owned facilities in Syria, but it believed to have been one of the first PMCs to provide personnel during the invasion of Ukraine in February last year.

The Russian energy giant Gazprom also has mercenaries in the guise of ‘private security organizations’, which energy companies were permitted to create after a new law was passed by Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin in February 2023.  It is unclear whether the various groups associated with Gazprom subsidiary Gazprom Neft will exclusively guard the company’s energy facilities or whether they will take on active combat roles in Ukraine.

Other Parallel Forces

Mercenaries are not the only parallel forces at play.  In 2016, Putin formed the Rosgvardiya (National Guard) under the leadership of Viktor Zolotov, the president’s former bodyguard.  The formation of the Rosgvariya entailed the reorganization of preexisting internal security forces into a new agency which directly reports to Putin.  Ostensibly, the Rosgvardiya’s responsibilities largely concern public order, policing, and counterterrorism, but the 300,000 to 400,000 strong force certainly acts as a deterrent to would-be coup-plotters.  The Rosgvardiya has also reportedly seen action in Ukraine.

Similar examples of counterbalancing can be seen in the intelligence sphere.  Three of the country’s most important intelligence services, the GRU, the SVR, and the FSB, each have their own elite special forces contingents.  Competition and mutual distrust between the three is rife due to a high degree of overlapping tasks and low degree of cooperation.  The FSB have attracted a particularly high degree of rancour from the GRU and SVR because of its increasingly proactive role conducting operations beyond its domestic remit.  Additionally, counterintelligence officers from the FSB are embedded directly within the armed forces to monitor signs of dissent. 

Finally, there are parallel forces provided by the Russian republics.  Just two days after the invasion of Ukraine, Ramzan Kadyrov, the Kremlin-appointed leader of Chechnya, confirmed that the 141st Special Motorized Regiment – better known as the Kadyrovites – were operating in the country.  The Kadyrovites are essentially a paramilitary organization loyal to Kadyrov, functioning as his private army. 

Like Prigozhin, Kadyrov has been highly critical of the Russian military leadership but avoided levelling such critiques at Putin.  By emphasizing the effectiveness of Chechen fighters over regular Russian forces, Kadyrov may have been hoping to make himself appear more indispensable to Putin.

How Coup-Proofing Degrades Military Effectiveness

The introduction of several players incentivized to hold each other in mutual suspicion is not conducive to an effective and unified war effort, as events in Ukraine have demonstrated.  As explained by James M. Powell, coup-proofing ‘undermines the fighting capacity of a military by creating coordination challenges in the field.’  Unity of command is necessary for a coup to be effective, but it is just as necessary for conducting a war.  The absence of unified command has thus jeopardized the entire Russian war effort.

The lack of a unified command structure was evident in the early stages of the war.  In the first months following the invasion, Western and Ukrainian intelligence agencies and analysts were unable to identify a single overall commander of the Russian forces in Ukraine.  Instead, it was believed that separate formations were drawn from each of Russia’s four military districts and placed under the command of senior officers from each district, with Putin taking on an oversized role, sometimes reportedly giving orders to field formations.  Last April, Army General Aleksandr Dvornikov was finally named as overall commander but there have been at least three reshuffles at the top since then.

Wagner’s increasing share of frontline duties further undermined unity of command, with Prigozhin and his mercenaries not subject to the authority of the regular armed forces.  Tensions between Prigozhin and the miliary leadership culminated in Wager Group’s mutiny in June.  A civil war or coup seemed momentarily possible in Russia until a deal was brokered by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko.  Prigozhin was later killed in a plane crash in August removing him from the chessboard altogether, but his insubordination was a clear sign that Putin had miscalculated and allowed the rivalries simmering between the members of his inner circle to burn too hot.

Beyond Prigozhin’s dramatic rebellion, Coup-proofing has created other unintended consequences which have hindered Russia’s military efforts.  An overemphasis on loyalty at the expense of competence coupled with fierce competition between the security and defence services have created incentive structures that have undermined honesty and integrity, inter-service cooperation, and professionalism. 

These trends were identified by analysts as being particularly pervasive in the Russian intelligence community even before the invasion of Ukraine.  For example, a 2021 Congressional Research Service report noted that ‘Agencies compete with each other for greater responsibilities, budgets, and political influence, often at the expense of other agencies.’  As Mark Galeotti puts it, ‘The competition for presidential approval is especially strong and has led to a perverse competition to tell the boss what they think he wants to hear, not what he needs to hear.’  This culture likely incentivised the Russian intelligence community to provide briefings to Putin prior to the invasion that confirmed his preconceptions that Ukraine would offer little resistance.

It is equally questionable if the most competent officers have been granted the responsibility to lead Russia’s war on Ukraine.  Sergei Surovikin, a veteran of several conflicts and broadly considered to be capable officer by most military analysts, was made the overall commander of Russian forces in Ukraine in October 2022.  However, Surovikin was replaced in January the following year by Valery Gerasimov, despite the latter having already attracted much of the blame for implementing a faulty strategy in his role as the Chief of the General Staff.  In August, Surovikin was then stripped of his role as the commander of the Russian aerospace forces due to suspicions that he was linked to the Wagner rebellion. 

Other officers have met similar fates.  On July 12, Major General Ivan Popov, who led the 58th Combined Arms Army stationed in Ukraine’s southern Zaporizhzhya region, disclosed that he had been relieved of his command after he made complaints to Gerasimov regarding the lack of troop rotations.  He also highlighted issues his soldiers were having with counterbattery radar and artillery reconnaissance.  Popov’s dismissal indicates that senior military personnel are seemingly unable to report the facts on the ground to their superiors without facing charges of disloyalty or disciplinary action.  Such a culture, especially within the Russian military’s highly hierarchal command structure will make it increasingly difficult for commanders to make informed decisions based on accurate information.

Thus far, Putin’s coup-proofing strategy has succeeded in fragmenting the Russian security elite sufficiently to secure his hold on power, despite Prigozhin’s short-lived insubordination.  However, these same measures which have enabled Putin to safeguard his rule have seriously undermined Russia’s war effort in Ukraine.  The constituent parts of Russia’s defence and security apparatuses fail to act as a whole and there is ample evidence that senior leaders have been promoted on the basis of perceived loyalty over competence.  A culture of competition and distrust has hindered cooperation, coordination, and honesty, which has led to poor decision-making, the results of which have played out on the battlefields of Ukraine since February last year.

April 21 (UPI) — Iran on Tuesday demanded the United States release the Iranian-flagged container ship the U.S. military seized over the weekend, threatening to use “all its capacities” to defend itself as the cease-fire neared its end.

The U.S. military seized Touska on Sunday as it enforced a military blockade of Iranian ports and ships, raising already high tensions during a two-week cease-fire rapidly nearing its end that negotiators from both countries are to use to secure an end to the war.

U.S. warships intercepted Touska transiting the north Arabian Sea en route to Iran’s Bandar Abbas port city for allegedly violating the blockade.

Iran responded with accusations of violating the cease-fire and drone strikes targeting U.S. military vessels, according to state-run media, though U.S. Central Command has yet to comment.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry on Tuesday condemned the seizure of Touska as an “unlawful and savage act of the terrorist U.S. army,” saying the “act of maritime banditry and terrorism” terrified the ship’s passengers and crew, some of whose family members were onboard.

“The Islamic Republic of Iran, while warning of the very dangerous consequences of this unlawful and criminal act by the United States, emphasizes the immediate release of the Iranian vessel, its passengers, its crew and its families,” the ministry said in a statement.

The ministry said the seizure is a violation of international and the fundamental principles and rules of the U.N. Charter, and that it had informed the U.N. secretary general, the Security Council and maritime organizations.

“There is no doubt that the Islamic Republic of Iran will use all its capacities to defend Iran’s national interests and security and to safeguard the rights and dignity of its citizens,” the ministry statement said.

“It is obvious that full responsibility for the further complication of the situation in the region lies with the United States.”

The cease-fire is to end at midnight Tuesday.

Iran has accused Trump of ducking real negotiations on ending the war in favor of trying to exert the United States’ economic and military might to force it to capitulate.

“Trump, by imposing a blockade and violating the cease-fire, wants — in his view — to turn the negotiating table into a table of surrender, or else justify starting the war again,” Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said late Monday in a statement.

“We do not accept negotiations under the shadow of threats, and over thee past two weeks we have prepared to reveal new cards on the battlefield.”

Trump has continued to boast online that he was “winning” the war while defending himself from criticism and vowing the deal his administration is working on with Iran will be “FAR BETTER” than the landmark multinational Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action the United States, Iran and several other countries signed during the Obama administration.

“If a deal happens under ‘TRUMP,’ it will guarantee Peace, Security and Safety, not only for Israel and the Middle East, but for Europe, America and Everywhere else,” he said on his Truth Social media platform.

“It will be something that the entire World will be proud of, instead of the years of Embarrassment and Humiliation that we have been forced to suffer due to incompetent and cowardly leadership!”

Turkey, Iran’s neighbor and U.S. ally, has been among nations working to de-escalate tensions in the Gulf and seek an extension to the cease-fire as negotiations appear to be at a stalemate over Iran’s nuclear program.

Though public rhetoric is fiery, negotiations behind closed doors are progressing, Ankara’s foreign affairs minister, Hakan Fidan, said Sunday during a forum in southeastern Turkey’s Antalya.

“The good thing is this: both sides continue to negotiate with a very serious intention, sincerely, they have the will to continue,” Fidan said.

“Now, no one wants a new war to start again with the end of the cease-fire next week.”

Turkey hopes that under international pressure, the United States, Israel and Iran will extend the cease-fire to solve outstanding issues, he said.

“A two-week period is good for a cease-fire, but the file in front of them is so comprehensive that it will not be possible to solve all these issues in two weeks,” he said.

“Therefore, a new extension will be needed. I hope this extension will come. I am optimistic about that.”

April 20 (UPI) — The U.S. military announced late Sunday that it has killed three men in its latest strike targeting a suspected drug-smuggling boat in the Caribbean.

Seventeen people have been killed in six strikes the U.S. Southern Command has carried out in little over a week, marking one of the deadliest publicly announced stretches of the Trump administration’s monthslong anti-drug smuggling operation.

As in previous strike announcements, SOUTHCOM released little information.

The attack occurred Sunday, targeting a boat operated by a designated terrorist organization in the Caribbean, SOUTHCOM said in a statement, without naming the organization or providing evidence.

“Intelligence confirmed the vessel was transiting along known narco-trafficking routes in the Caribbean and was engaged in narco-trafficking operations,” it said.

A 12-second, black-and-white clip of the strike posted to SOUTHCOM’s social media shows a boat moving across the ocean before disappearing in a large fiery explosion.

Since the first strike on Sept. 2, the U.S. military has killed at least 180 people, according to UPI’s tally of publicly released data. Fifty-five boats have been destroyed in the more than 50 strikes.

President Donald Trump argues that the use of deadly military force is warranted as the United States is in “armed conflict” with the 10 drug cartels and gangs he has designated as terrorist organizations since returning to the White House in January 2025.

The operation comes as the Trump administration seeks to expand its influence in the Western Hemisphere, including by using its military to dismantle what Trump has called “narco-terrorist networks.”

The strikes have been repeatedly condemned and their legality questioned by Democrats, rights groups, critics and United Nations experts, who accuse the Trump administration of violating international and maritime law over the use of the military to conduct law enforcement drug operations.

Last month, Ben Saul, the United Nations’ special rapporteur on counter-terrorism and human rights, lambasted the Trump administration over “its phony war on so-called narco-terrorism.”

“These serial extrajudicial killings gravely violate the right to life, which applies extraterritorially,” he said on March 13.

“The attacks were not in national self-defense, since the vessels were not engaged in any armed attack on the U.S. Drug trafficking is crime, not war.”

On Wednesday, the same day the U.S. military killed three people in a strike in the eastern Pacific, a group of Democrats, led by Rep. John Larson of Connecticut, filed six articles of impeachment against Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, with one of the articles accusing him of violating the law of armed conflict over the strikes.

Larson accused Hegseth of abusing his position by ordering “our armed forces to strike boats in the Caribbean,” he said in a statement.

April 19 (UPI) — The Israel Defense Forces confirmed Sunday that a photo showing an Israeli solider smashing the head of a statue of Jesus in southern Lebanon is authentic.

The photo, originally posted on X by Palestinian journalist Younis Tirawi, quickly went viral across social media, drawing condemnation from Christians, Palestinians and others in the war-torn region.

After initially pledging an investigation into the photo, the IDF later announced they had found it to be real and not an artificial intelligence fabrication.

“Following the completion of an initial examination regarding a photograph published earlier today of an IDF soldier harming a Christian symbol, it was determined that the photograph depicts an IDF soldier operating in southern Lebanon,” the military announced.

“The IDF views the incident with great severity and emphasizes that the soldier’s conduct is wholly inconsistent with the values expected of its troops.

“The incident is being investigated by the Northern Command and is currently being addressed through the chain of command. Appropriate measures will be taken against those involved in accordance with the findings.”

The Israeli military added it is “working to assist the community in restoring the statue to its place” and vowed it has “no intention of harming civilian infrastructure, including religious buildings or religious symbols,” in its fight against Hezbollah militia forces in southern Lebanon.

The photo stirred up outrage among Christians, Palestinians and others in the Middle East.

Wadie Abunassar, coordinator of the Holy Land Christian Forum, a group of Christian laity advocating for the Christian presence in the region, called for action on the part of Israeli authorities.

“Israel has to inquire this crime, to apologize for it, to bring suspect to justice, & make sure it won’t be repeated!” he wrote in a social media post.

Meanwhile, Ayman Odeh, a Palestinian member of the Israeli parliament, added sarcastically, “We’ll wait to hear the police spokesperson claim that ‘the soldier felt threatened by Jesus.'”

April 17 (Asia Today) — Japan is moving to strengthen a government-wide system to boost defense exports, including creating a centralized control structure and easing restrictions on what military equipment can be sold overseas, according to media reports.

The government plans to establish a director-general-level coordination body involving key ministries to oversee arms export policy and execution, the Asahi Shimbun reported Thursday.

Tokyo is also considering revising guidelines tied to its Three Principles on Defense Equipment Transfers to remove restrictions on five categories – rescue, transport, patrol, surveillance and mine countermeasures – that have limited exports so far.

According to Reuters, the government could move as early as this month to revise the guidelines, with the ruling Liberal Democratic Party already approving the direction at a party meeting Sunday.

The policy shift reflects a broader strategy with two main goals: expanding the range of weapons Japan can export and overhauling how those exports are managed.

Japan has effectively limited defense exports to non-lethal equipment in the past but is now moving to include systems with lethal capabilities. At the same time, the new coordination body would bring together the foreign, defense and industry ministries, along with private companies, to align export approvals, regulatory changes and sales support.

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said in parliament that easing arms export restrictions would contribute to economic growth, signaling a shift toward treating defense exports as part of industrial policy rather than solely a security measure.

Japanese officials have argued that expanding exports is necessary to sustain the domestic defense industry, maintain production capacity and secure supply chains that are difficult to support through domestic demand alone.

Analysts say the move goes beyond regulatory changes and represents a broader effort to build a national system designed to facilitate arms sales.

If implemented, the revisions would significantly lower barriers to exporting finished weapons, marking a major shift from Japan’s traditionally restrictive defense export framework.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260417010005454

There is another way to read the ongoing Middle East crisis, one that makes legible what standard analysis consistently struggles to explain. It begins not with capability but with the geometry of the system through which capability must travel to produce effects. The United States and its partners possess overwhelming military superiority over Iran, and that superiority is not in question, yet the conflict has produced a pattern that defies its logic. A superpower coalition has been unable to impose coherent strategic outcomes against an adversary operating through proxies, low-cost disruption, and the systematic exploitation of global commercial vulnerabilities.

Over the past two years, we have seen multiple instances of this kind of disruption with consequential effects on the global system. Houthi drones force the rerouting of global shipping, with Red Sea cargo volumes falling by roughly 50% through early 2024 as major carriers diverted around the Cape of Good Hope, adding up to two weeks to transit times, driving freight costs sharply higher across European markets, and costing Egypt nearly $800 million per month at peak in lost Suez Canal revenue. A non-state network spanning Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Gaza has absorbed sustained air campaigns, targeted eliminations of senior commanders, and repeated ground operations without losing its capacity to generate coordinated pressure across multiple theaters simultaneously. The asymmetry seems to follow a deliberate strategic logic that raw power analysis struggles to read, precisely because the conflict operates on a surface that capability assessments were never designed to map. What this suggests is that the decisive variable is not what actors possess but whether the relationships connecting them can transmit coordinated action when the system is under strain.

When that system cannot coordinate, something important breaks down. An alliance that formally exists but faces operational friction at every decision point ceases to be an alliance in any meaningful strategic sense. A security guarantee that cannot be transmitted rapidly to the partner it is meant to protect has, in effect, already failed its primary function. It follows that the gap between what a system formally is and what it can actually do under pressure is not a secondary consideration but the surface on which this conflict is being decided. Conventional analysis, calibrated to count warheads and assess intentions, consistently leaves this gap unmapped.

Analysts know that Saudi Arabia’s OPEC production decisions have repeatedly positioned Riyadh against Washington’s economic preferences, they know that European energy dependency complicates transatlantic alignment, and they know that Iran’s proxy network extends across five countries and absorbs military pressure without fracturing. Yet what the available frameworks cannot do is convert that knowledge into a structural reading of the system. They show that these conditions exist. What they cannot show is how those conditions interact, where they compound, and what the aggregate geometry of their interaction means for whether coordinated action is possible at all.

Power analysis was built to read capability differentials between states, and it does that well. Alliance theory was built to read the conditions under which formal commitments hold or fail, and it does that too. Neither, however, was built to read the operational weight of the ties through which capability and commitment must travel to produce effects.

The instruments available are calibrated to answer questions different from those the current situation poses. Deploying them on a problem they were not designed to read produces the consistent failure to explain what is actually happening that has marked analysis of this conflict from the start.

Adjacency mapping is an instrument designed to read that gap by mapping connectivity, by which I mean their operational weight, specifically their capacity to carry coordinated action under strain. What distinguishes it from standard approaches is its unit of analysis. Rather than the actors themselves, it treats the weight of the relationships as primary. The question it asks is not who holds power but whether the ties connecting power-holders can transmit that power when the system needs them to. Two states can be formally allied, operationally integrated in name, and structurally disconnected at the same time, and nothing in standard analysis will tell you which of those conditions is actually operative until the moment of crisis reveals it.

The instrument assigns each significant relationship in the system a weight between 0 and 1, reflecting how frequently the two actors interact operationally, how reliably information moves between them, how the tie has behaved under recent stress, and how quickly it transmits pressure when the system is under strain. At the higher end of the scale, a weight at or above 0.6 indicates that coordination approaches automaticity, and the tie carries load without constant investment to maintain it. Around 0.3, friction accumulates. In this setting, decisions require deliberate effort at every juncture, slowing the system and making it susceptible to gradual degradation that never triggers a visible rupture. At or below 0.2, the tie has effectively ceased to function as a transmission pathway, leaving the actors operationally disconnected regardless of what their formal relationship nominally says.

These weights are analytical judgements calibrated against observable evidence. In other words, their value lies in making visible what experienced analysts already carry as intuition and in giving that intuition a structure precise enough to argue about. The numbers are therefore analytical judgements, not measurements. A more rigorous application would derive them from quantifiable indicators across each dimension, including military interoperability, intelligence exchange depth, crisis responsiveness, economic interdependence, and signaling consistency, averaged and weighted systematically. That work lies beyond the scope of this piece, but the architecture is designed to accommodate it.

There is a risk management dimension to this reading that is worth making explicit. Standard geopolitical risk assessment focuses on actor-level variables such as regime stability, military capability, and leadership intentions. What adjacency mapping adds is a structural layer that those assessments typically miss. A coalition whose load-bearing relationships operate in the friction zone is exposed to a category of risk that capability assessments do not capture and that becomes visible only when the system is read structurally.

What the matrix adds is the ability to see how compound weakness across multiple relationships produces cascading effects that bilateral assessment alone would struggle to predict. A system whose dominant actor holds several weak partnerships faces more than friction. As a consequence, the geometry of those weaknesses determines whether any concerted response is structurally possible at all. Aggregate capability becomes, in that light, secondary to that question.

If we apply this to the Middle East security complex, the instrument produces one possible reading. This reading differs considerably from the picture conventional analysis generates. Its value is not in the precision of the numbers but in making the system’s geometry visible enough to argue about.

The matrix below maps operational connectivity across the system’s key actors. The numbers are analytical judgements, not measurements.

The geometry they make visible is what matters here.

The matrix is intentionally non-symmetric. Where operational influence flows asymmetrically between two actors, the weights reflect that directionality.

The matrix reveals, in this light, a system whose dominant actors are connected at fundamentally different weights. And more significantly, its most important bilateral relationship is operating in the friction zone. It’s formally excluded adversary has constructed the only alternative connectivity architecture in the system. What this implies is that the geometry of the conflict runs considerably deeper than standard alliance analysis tends to suggest.

On the coalition side, the US has high adjacency with Qatar, Bahrain, Israel, and Kuwait, ties that enable rapid coordination and require little maintenance, constituting the operational backbone of what Washington can actually activate quickly.

Its relationship with Saudi Arabia, however, sits at 0.4. That number is analytically more significant than almost anything else in the matrix. Saudi Arabia remains, on most readings, the relationship on which Gulf order coherence formally depends, the anchor of the security architecture since the 1970s, and it is operating in the friction zone where every significant decision requires renegotiation from scratch rather than flowing through an established channel. Saudi Arabia’s invitation to join BRICS in August 2023, yuan-denominated oil transactions with China, and its participation in the Chinese-brokered rapprochement with Iran in March 2023 all point in the same direction. Riyadh is hedging structurally toward China and the broader non-Western order, a posture that sits uneasily alongside its formal security alignment with Washington. Taken together, these are not isolated political episodes but evidence of a tie that has been operating below the coordination threshold for years and whose weakness is, on this reading, the system’s most consequential structural vulnerability.

Through the normalization architecture, the UAE has arguably become the system’s most structurally reliable node at 0.6 with both the US and Israel, its operational integration exceeding Saudi Arabia’s despite Saudi Arabia’s formal primacy. The Abraham Accords of September 2020 established the formal foundation for that integration. The operational depth it has since generated, across intelligence sharing, defence cooperation, and coordinated positioning on Iran, has made the UAE the coalition’s most functionally connected Gulf partner. Oman holds what is perhaps the system’s most anomalous position, meaningful adjacency with both the US coalition and Iran simultaneously, a profile no other state actor in the matrix replicates. That structural position gave Oman the back-channel role it played through the early phases of the conflict, with documented precedent in the secret US-Iran nuclear negotiations that began in Muscat in 2012 and ran through 2013. As the conflict has intensified, Pakistan has assumed the primary mediation function, but Oman’s position as a quiet facilitator has not disappeared; it has simply been supplemented by a node with more direct access to both capitals at this particular moment.

Pakistan has emerged as the conflict’s primary mediation node, hosting the highest-level direct negotiations between Washington and Tehran since 1979 and brokering the April 2026 ceasefire. That role reflects a structural position the matrix makes legible: high Saudi adjacency, a functioning Iran tie, and a rehabilitated relationship with Washington that no other regional actor currently combines. China’s influence over both Pakistani and Iranian decision-making operates as an exogenous pressure that the matrix only partially captures, and Pakistan’s own domestic constraints, including its difficulty developing direct channels with the IRGC, limit how far that mediation role can ultimately reach.

Iran’s position is where the matrix becomes most analytically revealing. Across the state actors in the system, Iran’s adjacency sits at or near fragmentation, built up through sanctions, absent operational channels, and decades of adversarial signalling that have left Tehran formally isolated from the coordination architecture the United States and its partners have constructed.

And yet the only high-weight tie Iran holds is with its proxy network at 0.7. That single number may go further toward explaining the architecture of the entire campaign than any other figure in the matrix.

It is an asymmetric relationship in which Tehran’s capacity to activate and direct exceeds the reverse influence those actors exert over Iranian strategic decisions. What that single structural condition implies goes further toward explaining the architecture of Iranian pressure operations than most analyses of Iranian intentions or capabilities tend to reach. Iran is geographically central and formally excluded. It is precisely that combination, positioned to apply pressure across every theatre while bearing none of the coordination costs that formal inclusion imposes. That, from this vantage point, is what makes legible a strategy that standard analysis, focused on actors and their capabilities, cannot see.

Seen through this lens, what Iran is doing across the region is something more structurally ambitious than a military campaign. It is attempting to restructure the matrix itself. The goal appears to be less about battlefield victory than about the gradual degradation of the ties connecting the United States to its regional partners, below the threshold at which coordinated response becomes automatic, eroding the will to keep paying the price of alignment while simultaneously building alternative adjacency in the nodes where US-aligned connectivity is weakest.

The Houthi campaign against Red Sea shipping is calibrated to stay below the threshold that would compel a unified military response. It introduces friction into the economic relationships connecting European states to the Gulf system, raising the cost of alignment with Washington’s regional posture without forcing the kind of direct confrontation that would unite the coalition. Strikes on Gulf infrastructure follow the same calibration, persistent enough to signal that the US security guarantee cannot insulate its partners from costs, yet restrained enough to avoid crossing the point at which coalition fragmentation becomes irrelevant because a unified response becomes compulsory. Across Iraq and Syria, simultaneous pressure from affiliated militias prevents the concentration of attention that sustained coalition coordination requires. In each case, the instrument targets a relationship rather than a capability, specifically the weight of the ties whose degradation would restructure the system’s geometry without requiring Iran to displace the existing order directly.

The US-Saudi tie at 0.4 is the primary focus of that degradation effort. Should that threshold be breached, Saudi Arabia hedges. As hedging reduces operational interactivity the tie weakens further. The process risks becoming self-reinforcing. Iranian military superiority over any individual partner is not required to sustain it.

The same logic extends across European actors, though not uniformly. Germany’s industrial exposure to energy price volatility, France’s residual strategic autonomy instinct, and the EU’s institutional preference for de-escalation all produce different thresholds for continued alignment with Washington. Their shared energy dependency gives them asymmetric stakes in the Gulf system’s stability, but their appetite for risk diverges from Washington’s in ways that are not identical across capitals, and each time Iran forces a decision about the cost of continued alignment, that divergence fragments the coalition’s coordination surface further.

By sustaining operational ties with non-state actors across the region, Iran is constructing alternative adjacency in precisely the nodes where US-aligned connectivity is weakest. These are populations and factions that the existing regional order has excluded from the dominant coalition’s coordination architecture. Deliberately so — Iran is building in the structural gaps the system leaves open. Displacing the existing order appears unnecessary. Becoming the more reliable pole of alignment for the actors that order has failed to integrate may be sufficient. All that is required is that the order fragment sufficiently at its margins for that offer to appear credible, and the current trajectory of US-Saudi friction and European hedging is steadily moving in that direction.

The coalition’s instruments are calibrated to military threats. The system, however, is failing along a different surface entirely, or so this reading suggests. The formal architecture remains largely intact, security guarantees have not been withdrawn, Gulf states remain formally aligned, and normalisation agreements hold. And yet the operational adjacency that gives that architecture its functional weight is under sustained pressure from an actor that has correctly identified the gap between formal commitment and operational tie as the system’s primary vulnerability. That identification is outpacing the coalition’s capacity to respond.

On this reading, the surface on which the conflict appears to be decided is not the one the coalition is defending.

What adjacency mapping reveals is a story about geometry. The system’s dominant actor holds formal commitments at weights the system cannot sustain under the pressure being applied to it. Its adversary, in turn, has built the only alternative coordination architecture in the space that those weakening ties leave open. The conflict is likely to be determined by which ties the system can no longer afford to lose under sustained and calibrated pressure. The question is whether the actors currently holding those ties in the friction zone can rebuild them to the coordination threshold before the process of degradation becomes irreversible. That is a question that capability assessments are not well-positioned to answer, and one that a structural reading of the system’s connectivity at least helps to make visible.

Donald Trump has indicated that the conflict with Iran could conclude “soon,” citing progress in negotiations and a possible meeting between the two sides in the coming days. A temporary ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon has added to cautious optimism, though the broader regional situation remains unstable. The war, which began with U.S.-Israeli military action, has had sweeping geopolitical and economic consequences.

Ceasefire in Lebanon:
A 10-day truce between Israel and Lebanon has come into effect, offering a brief pause in cross-border hostilities. However, early reports of violations underline the fragility of the arrangement. Hezbollah, aligned with Iran, has been urged by Washington to maintain restraint during this critical window.

Diplomatic Breakthrough Efforts:
Backchannel diplomacy, with Pakistan playing a mediating role, has reportedly led to progress on key issues. Talks are expected to produce an initial memorandum of understanding, potentially followed by a comprehensive agreement within weeks. Engagement between U.S. and Iranian officials is likely to intensify in the immediate term.

Global Economic Shock:
The conflict has disrupted global energy flows, particularly through the Strait of Hormuz, through which a significant share of the world’s oil supply passes. This has triggered sharp oil price fluctuations and raised concerns about a broader economic slowdown, even as markets show signs of stabilizing on hopes of a resolution.

Nuclear Issue as Core Dispute:
Iran’s nuclear program remains the central obstacle in negotiations. Washington is pushing for long-term restrictions, while Tehran seeks shorter commitments and the lifting of sanctions. Bridging this gap will be critical to securing a durable settlement.

Political Pressures and Regional Stakes:
The war has created domestic political challenges for Trump, particularly ahead of upcoming elections. At the same time, regional actors are closely watching the outcome, as any agreement will shape the balance of power and security dynamics across the Middle East.

Analysis:
Momentum toward a deal is clearly building, but the situation remains precarious. The ceasefire in Lebanon and progress in diplomacy suggest a window of opportunity, yet unresolved issues, especially around nuclear limits and sanctions relief, could still derail negotiations. Trump’s urgency reflects both strategic calculation and domestic political pressure, while Iran appears willing to engage but not at any cost. If a preliminary agreement is reached, it would mark a significant de-escalation, but sustaining peace will require careful management of deep-rooted tensions and competing interests on all sides.

With information from Reuters.

April 16 (UPI) — President Donald Trump announced that Israel and Lebanon agreed to a 10-day cease-fire starting at 5:00 p.m., pausing Israel’s six-week war on Hezbollah in that country.

Trump spoke with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Thursday, both leaders confirmed, and agreed to the cease-fire and to work toward a more permanent peace between their countries.

Aoun and Netanyahu spoke to each other separately because Aoun declined to participate in a call with the Israeli leader because Israel was still bombing Lebanon, CNN reported.

“These two Leaders have agreed that in order to achieve PEACE between their Countries, they will formally begin a 10 Day CEASEFIRE,” he said in a post on Truth Social.

Vice President J.D. Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Dan Caine have been directed to work with officials of both countries to achieve a more lasting peace.

Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam in a statement thanked the United States, France, the European Union, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar and Jordan for helping to accomplish the cease-fire he had pursued “since the first day of the way,” NBC News reported.

After the United States and Israel launched the Iran war, Israel also launched offensives against the Iran-backed militia Hezbollah in Lebanon, from which it often launches attacks at Israel.

This week, delegates from the neighboring countries conducted diplomatic talks for the first time since 1993, meeting in Washington, D.C., to discuss a cease-fire and the larger issue of Hezbollah’s hijacking of Lebanese lands in order to target Israel.

Netanayhu said Thursday in a video statement that Israeli forces would “remain in a 10-kilometer security zone, which will allow us to prevent infiltration into communities and anti-tank missile fire.”

Calling the negotiations potentially historic, Netanyahu said that Israel’s chief goal is to disarm Hezbollah and its ability to invade or launch weapons across the Lebanese border into Israel.

“That is where we will remain,” he said. “We are not leaving.”

After the diplomatic talks on Wednesday, Rubio reinforced that a key part of the meeting and now peace talks between the two nations is to end Hezbollah’s destabilizing influence in Lebanon and the wider Middle East.

“We have to remember the Lebanese people are victims of Hezbollah,” Rubio said, also noting that accomplishing a lasting peace “will take time.”

April 15 (UPI) — Democrats in the U.S. House of Representatives on Wednesday filed articles of impeachment against Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, leveling serious criticisms of his handling of the Pentagon and the U.S. attacks on Iran.

As Republicans control the House, this move is unlikely to have an effect in 2026. Rep. Yassamin Ansari, D-Ariz., introduced the resolution, which says Hegseth has “demonstrated a willful disregard for the Constitution, abused the powers of his office and acted in a manner grossly incompatible with the rule of law,” CBS News reported.

The six articles of impeachment cite offenses including waging unauthorized war in Iran and reckless endangerment of U.S. service members, as well as breaking the laws of armed conflict and targeting civilians. Civilian casualties in Iran have included more than 160 people killed in an attack on a girls school in February.

They further accuse Hegseth of mishandling sensitive military information, which refers to his use of a Signal group chat on his personal phone to share information on a military operation in Yemen last year.

The resolution also says Hegseth obstructed congressional oversight by withholding information on military operations and abused his power by using it for political retribution.

Pentagon press secretary Kingsley Wilson dismissed the resolution and its claims as “just another Democrat trying to make headlines,” The Hill reported.

“Secretary Hegseth will continue to protect the homeland and project peace through strength,” Wilson said in a statement. “This is just another charade in an attempt to distract the American people from the major successes we have had here at the Department of War.”

Multiple Democrats are cosponsoring the resolution. These include Reps. Dave Min of California, Brittany Petterson of Colorado, Sarah McBride of Delaware, Nikema Williams of Georgia, Shri Thanedar of Michigan, Dina Titus of Nevada, Steve Cohen of Tennessee and Jasmine Crockett of Texas.

April 15 (UPI) — U.S. President Donald Trump said peace talks with Iran “could be happening in the next two days,” with American negotiators most likely to return to Islamabad where the first round of talks at the weekend ended without a breakthrough.

In an interview with the New York Post on Tuesday, Trump said talks between the sides were “happening, but, you know, a little bit slow,” saying a new round of direct negotiations would probably be hosted by a country in Europe.

However, around 30 minutes after the interview had concluded, Trump called back to tell the Post that it should keep its reporter covering the talks in Islamabad in place and not bring them home.

“You should stay there, really, because something could be happening over the next two days, and we’re more inclined to go there [Islamabad]. It’s more likely, you know why? Because the field marshal is doing a great job,” Trump said, referencing Pakistan’s Field Marshal Gen. Asim Munir who has a direct line of communication with the regime in Tehran and a strong relationship with Trump.

“He’s fantastic, and therefore it’s more likely that we go back there. Why should we go to some country that has nothing to do with it?” added Trump.

The Washington D.C.,-headquartered Institute for the Study of War also said a fresh round of negotiations was likely this week but said it believed Iran’s approach would be to try to buy time by spinning out the talks

“Iran likely aims to protract negotiations as long as possible in order to prepare for a potential resumption of conflict,” ISW said in a post on X.

The developments, which came as a fragile cease-fire that took effect April 7 entered its second week, followed earlier reports in which unnamed White House officials told CNBC, CNN and NBC News that in-person negotiations could restart before the truce expires on Tuesday.

Vice President JD Vance said round one of the talks in Islamabad, which ran for more than 20 hours, foundered on differences over Iran’s nuclear program — which the United States wants it to give up completely to ensure it can never develop a nuclear weapon — and control of the Strait of Hormuz.

Reports later emerged that more progress had been made than initially suggested, with the sides getting close to agreement on nuclear enrichment after Iran countered U.S. demands for a 20-year suspension with an offer to halt all enrichment for 5 years.

Trump told the Post he was unhappy with the thinking that a moratorium on enrichment, instead of terminating the program, would make the regime in Tehran more amenable to a lasting peace agreement by providing them a face-saving “success” to sell to the Iranian people.

“I’ve been saying they can’t have nuclear weapons. So I don’t like the 20 years. I don’t want them [Iran] to feel like they have a win.”

Experts concurred with Trump’s analysis, saying the only way to guarantee Iran would not be able to pursue a nuclear weapon in the future was to make sure the entire program was put beyond use, in a verifiable way, and that it needed to happen while Trump was still in office.

Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, a 2025 deal between Iran and the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China, enrichment by Tehran of its 300 Kg stockpile of uranium was capped at 3.67%, in exchange for sanctions relief.

However, that deal lapsed in October, although in practice it was long dead after Trump pulled the United States out of the agreement in May 2018, during his first term, with Iran subsequently proceeding to enrich an expanded 441 kg uranium stockpile to around 60%, not far short of weapons grade.

Top naval commanders of South Korea, the United States and Japan gathered in Seoul on Wednesday to hold a series of talks aimed at strengthening their trilateral maritime security cooperation, the South’s Navy said.

The gathering brought together Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Kim Kyung-ryul, U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander Adm. Stephen Koehler and Adm. Akira Saito, chief of staff of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, for bilateral talks and a trilateral dinner meeting, according to the armed service.

The meetings came amid heightened tensions in the Middle East, raising speculation over whether their talks would address the ongoing U.S. blockade of Iranian ports.

U.S. President Donald Trump earlier called on South Korea, Japan and others to send warships to the Strait of Hormuz to help secure shipping lanes.

In the bilateral talks between Kim and Koehler held earlier in the day, both sides exchanged opinions on the robust South Korea-U.S. combined defense posture as well as cooperation in the area of naval maintenance, repair and operations, the Navy said.

Kim and Saito, meanwhile, held in-depth discussions on expanding personnel exchange and resuming joint maritime search and rescue exercises (SAREX) as discussed in a ministerial meeting between their defense chiefs earlier this year, it added.

In January, Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back and his Japanese counterpart, Shinjiro Koizumi, met in Japan and agreed to resume joint SAREX drills for the first time in nine years as part of efforts to strengthen bilateral defense cooperation.

The top admirals of the three countries were set to attend a dinner meeting later Wednesday to likely discuss trilateral coordination measures to respond to and deter North Korea‘s advancing nuclear and missile threats.

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April 15 (UPI) — The U.S. military’s maritime blockade of Iran has “completely halted” sea-based trade with the Middle Eastern country, U.S. Central Command said late Tuesday.

President Donald Trump announced the blockade on Sunday after negotiations to end the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran collapsed.

The blockade of 12 U.S. warships, more than 100 fighter and surveillance aircraft and more than 10,000 soldiers began at 10 a.m. EDT Monday, an effort to prohibit maritime traffic to and from all Iranian ports.

According to U.S. military officials, it covers the entire southern coastline of Iran, including ports on the Arabian Gulf and Gulf of Oman, between which lies the Strait of Hormuz.

“A blockade of Iranian ports has been fully implemented as U.S. forces maintain maritime superiority in the Middle East,” Adm. Brad Cooper, Central Command commander, said in a statement.

“In less than 36 hours since the blockade was implemented, U.S. forces have completely halted economic trade going into and out of Iran by sea.”

Central Command said earlier Tuesday that no ships had made it through during the blockade’s first 24 hours and that six vessels had complied with U.S. forces’ direction to return to an Iranian port on the Gulf of Oman.

“The blockade is being enforced impartially against vessels of all nations entering or departing Iranian ports and coastal areas,” Central Command said.

The blockade comes amid a two-week cease-fire between the United States and Iran that Trump announced on April 8. During the fragile truce negotiations on a permanent end to the war were to be conducted.

However, negotiations with Iran collapsed in Pakistan on Sunday, seemingly over disagreements on Iran’s nuclear program and control of the Strait of Hormuz.

Not long after the war began with the United States and Israel attacking Iran on Feb. 28, Iran sharply restricted vessel traffic to the Strait of Hormuz, an important trade route through which flows roughly 27% of the world’s maritime trade in crude oil and petroleum products as well as 20% of global liquefied natural gas trade, according to the U.S. Congressional Research Service.

Iran’s control of trade through the strait has caused gas prices to spike, threatening countries with energy crises.

The U.S. blockade appears aimed at financially squeezing Iran by cutting it off from maritime trade revenue.

According to Maid Maleki, senior fellow of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a nonpartisan Washington, D.C., research institute, the blockade could cost Iran about $435 million a day.

“The blockade makes continued resistance economically impossible,” he said in a statement.

Spring practice continued for the UCLA football program Tuesday morning at Spaulding Field and for the most part head coach Bob Chesney was pleased with his team’s progress.

It marked the sixth of 14 practices leading up to the annual spring game on May 2 at the Rose Bowl.

“The defense took strides today,” said Chesney, who was hired as the Bruins’ 20th head football coach on Dec. 26, replacing DeShaun Foster (fired after an 0-3 start in 2025) and interim coach Tim Skipper. “There were a couple turnovers in there. This was our second day with the officials, it was a different group and they were throwing some flags today. We just have to understand the game we’re in. As you get further along the referees step aside, but early in the season they’re excited to do their jobs and we gave them enough to throw laundry at so we’ll go back and check it all out.”

Receiver Semaj Morgan caught a touchdown pass from quarterback Nico Iamaleava, tight end Brayden Lofton made several fine catches, Troy Leigber rushed for a touchdown, and Donavyn Pellot and Robert Stafford III had interceptions on defense as the squad is motivated to rebound from a 3-9 season (3-6 in Big Ten) — its worst since its debut season under Chip Kelly in 2018.

“Practice six is usually when it dips a little bit,” said Chesney, who led James Madison to the Sun Belt Conference championship and a berth in the College Football Playoff last season. “On defense we did not, on offense we probably slowed down just a little bit. I didn’t feel a dip from the group, which is great, but usually around now is when that starts to happen. [Practices] six, seven, eight are a little bit of a fight and then you gotta come back when you get to nine, 10 and 11. I thought they did a good job today, not a great job, but you have those days. It’s the nature of the beast. I didn’t see any steps backward from anybody, just a little bit of a lull from what they were bringing the other day. ”

One position group that has impressed Chesney since he arrived in Westwood is running back — a unit that returns a number of players.

“Everybody has their pluses and minuses, everyone has things they’re really good at and things they’re mediocre at and our job every day is taking what’s mediocre and turning it into good — and eventually great — and playing to their strengths,” Chesney said. “Each of them has their own running style. I’ve been impressed with them, they’re one of the stronger groups on this team. It’s necessary as a running back for that to be the case. You have to be durable enough, you have to keep your pad level low and keep your body healthy because there’s probably not another position out there that takes as much of a beating … you’re getting tackled by guys who are sometimes much bigger than you.”

Defensive back Scooter Jackson was not at Tuesday’s practice but Chesney expects him to be back Thursday. Offensive lineman Jordan Davis is dealing with a shoulder injury.

“He’s got range, he just doesn’t feel like he has the full strength yet … but he’s close,” Chesney said of Davis. “On Saturday it was a little worse than it is today, so he’s slowly getting better.”

Chesney praised cornerback DJ Barksdale, an All-Sun Belt selection who transferred from James Madison — a player he knows well.

“The nickel and slot corner is important in the bubble game and the screen game,” Chesney said. “You’ve got to be able to fight through some things physically. You’re also tied in a lot as the bonus in the run game and then there’s times when you’re not there and you’re playing straight man-to-man on the other team’s quickest, best receiver so the skillset you’ve got to carry, the confidence you’ve got to carry and the physicality you’ve got to carry is significant. DJ possesses all of those.”

Chesney is excited about the depth in the defensive backfield.

“Rob [Stafford] did a good job,: he said. “In the red zone he’s been really sticky in coverage and he’s done a really nice job. He’s starting to click with his playbook and understand it and that’s kind of where everyone is at this stage of the game, we’re in practice six so everything we’ve done up to this point is six days of full speed stuff. Osiris [Gilbert] made a really big play on a ball that we had trouble with Saturday. To learn and carry that over from the previous practice into the film room and actuality execute it out here was great to see. Jhase McMillan is doing a great job. We’re rotating them through, we put them in different positions to test them in fire and see who can handle all of it. They’re a little more involved in the running game now, Cover 2 things and corner pressures, blitzing off the edge, they’ve done a really nice job.”

Asked who has stood out in the trenches, Chesney cited Aiden Gobaira, Julian Armella and Riley Robell.

“What’s impressed me most about Julian is his passion for this game,” Chesney said. “He’s got to harness that the right way. I’m sure there’s moments when you play with that much emotion and passion it can tip over, but I’ve been impressed with that part. He uplifts a lot of people when he’s out there. There’s never a moment where he’s just out here and it’s not important — it’s all important to him and that’s infectious.”

Pressuring the quarterback is a defensive priority for Chesney and his staff. A year ago the Bruins tied for last in the Big Ten in pass defense, allowing opponents to complete 66% of their passes.

“On the defensive side we have to continue to take bigger steps,” he said. “Our pass rush looks good, the interior pass rush is something we have to work on. A lot of the games that we’re playing inside we’ve got to continue to fine tune things because obviously the offense knows they’re coming and the element of surprise gets defeated The defense is doing a nice job setting them up, then it’s cool watching the chess match go on between both sides.”

Chesney is known for his emphasis on special teams and the Bruins ran drills throughout Tuesday’s practice focused on that phase of the game.

“I don’t want it to be an afterthought — I want to make sure it’s involved in everything we do,” Chesney stated. “I want it to feel like a game as much as it possibly can but I also want our long snapper, our holder, our kickers and our protection guys to know that the whole team is relying on you so when we put them in those situations at the end to pin the ball, they have to know they have to hold up their end of the bargain.”

What has surprised Chesney most in his first few months in Westwood?

“The alums who come out continually and who like being around this program is something I’d hoped for,” Chesney said. “I understood that practices were maybe different and closed and not open to everybody before, but it’s open to all of our alums and to high school coaches. I’d hoped it would happen and to see it actually transpiring day to day is exciting.”

UCLA’s next practice is Thursday on Spaulding Field at Wasserman Football Center.