Defense

Welcome back to the Times of Troy newsletter, where I am thrilled to announce that the start of the USC football season is here. And a week before the rest of college football, no less!

We’ve reminded you enough by now that this is a make-or-break season for USC and for its head coach, Lincoln Riley. With a new defensive coordinator who’s in the College Football Hall of Fame, a new, state-of-the-art football facility and the nation’s top recruiting class in tow, USC has given Riley everything he needs to succeed.

So what if … he actually does?

Last week, we walked you through the worst-case scenario for USC’s 2026 slate. So this week, let’s put on our cardinal-and-gold colored glasses and consider what this season might look like if everything actually goes right. Because there’s certainly a world in which USC earns a place in the College Football Playoff. Maybe even wins a game or two (or three?).

That picture-perfect scenario, however, hinges in my mind on how fast USC’s stellar freshman class rounds into form.

Imagine for a minute a Trojans defense with Luke Wafle, the nation’s top prospect in 2026, screaming off the edge a la the Bosa Bros at Ohio State. Or what about “Boobie” Feaster, the Trojans’ 17-year-old stud wideout, taking a tunnel screen to the house through the teeth of Oregon’s defense?

USC hasn’t had this much talent on the roster since I started covering the team in 2019. And while it’s fair to be hesitant about relying on so many freshmen, what if, when push comes to shove, they’re just the best players on the team?

It’s not hard to envision that being the case at wide receiver, at tight end and even along the defensive line. Freshmen could even be starting, at some point, on the offensive line, at linebacker and in the defensive backfield. (OK, this might not sound like a best-case yet, but bear with me here …)

USC has the first three weeks of its season to let the freshmen figure it out, followed by a trip across the country to Rutgers, and with no redshirts to worry about, I’d venture to say we’ll see the full breadth of freshmen Trojan talent over those four games. If USC can emerge from that stretch with the confidence of its young players soaring, then it should have a shot when Oregon comes to town.

If there’s one game that could decide the direction of USC’s season, it’s this one. It’s a critical moment for quarterback Jayden Maiava, who had his worst game of the year a season ago in Eugene. Any world in which USC makes a playoff run must include a major leap from Maiava. This is his time to prove that he’s taken that last step in his game, the one that could truly separate him as a first-round NFL draft pick. He has the talent, and in this case, he’ll have to show every bit of it.

Meanwhile, USC’s defense could cast some doubt on the potential of the Ducks’ own quarterback with a promising performance here. Dante Moore has yet to face a ranked team in a true road environment as Oregon’s starter. And the Coliseum is going to be rocking that night. I could see him slipping up on the road.

If Maiava can play to his potential and the defense can rise to the occasion, USC can beat Oregon for the first time in a decade. And if it does, a world of possibilities open up for USC.

With the confidence of its fabulous freshmen soaring, USC rolls through Washington at home. A trip to Penn State, during what’s sure to be a White Out game, marks the second moment in which the Trojans’ young stars could be seriously tested. But who’s to say that the Nittany Lions, under Matt Campbell, have anywhere close to the talent the Trojans will bring to State College. And without its usual pass rush, I could see Maiava picking Penn State apart.

Wins over Maryland and on the road at Wisconsin are locks in this scenario, as is a stomping of crosstown rival UCLA and new coach Bob Chesney.

So what about Ohio State and Indiana, our last two national title winners? The more winnable of those two, in my opinion, is the Halloween home game with Ohio State, considering the questions on the Buckeyes’ defense. But Ohio State is still the deeper, more talented team, and by that point in the season, injuries will have surely affected USC’s roster.

As for Indiana, well, not only have the Hoosiers not lost at home under Curt Cignetti, but they’ve allowed just 10 points per game over Cignetti’s 15 home games as coach. USC has to slip up somewhere in the schedule, and my bet would be Bloomington.

Ten wins would surely secure USC its first-ever Playoff spot, delivering the statement that Riley so desperately needed in his fifth season. And if by this point, its fleet of freshmen just happen to be peaking, then there’s no telling how far this team could go from there.

Thanos down

Jahkeem Stewart (4) reacts against the Michigan State Spartans last season.

(Luke Hales / Getty Images)

In a brutal twist of fate for USC, just ahead of its Week 0 opener, defensive tackle Jahkeem Stewart is now likely to miss the nonconference slate with a foot injury.

It’s terrible news for the sophomore standout and for USC, which needs all the talent it can get along the defensive line. Stewart’s participation throughout camp had been a bit inconsistent already, presumably in an effort to keep him fresh for the season.

The fact that he’s likely to miss the first three games isn’t so much the main concern here. It’s that foot injuries are notoriously tricky. We don’t have much information on whether this was a aggravation or an entirely new problem, but a source downplayed the current injury’s severity. Still, it’s not a great sign for a player that was expected, at least by me, to be all-conference caliber this season.

Does Riley have any interest in adding old Trojans to the roster?

A court ruling bafflingly cleared the way last week for players who have already signed with NFL teams to gain some added college eligibility. And while no one has been added to the mix yet, USC’s coach said this week he wasn’t against adding under the right circumstances.

“Addition doesn’t always mean necessarily making you better, right?” Riley said. “And we feel very strongly about the group that we’ve put together, we feel very strongly about the kind of culture and attitude and vibe of this team right now, and so first and foremost, we’re going to protect that.”

Other than at linebacker, where USC would have to add someone new from the transfer portal midseason, or because of injuries, I don’t see a scenario in which it would really make sense. Anthony Lucas or Lake McRee just don’t move the needle at this point.

Class of ‘26 power rankings: Week 0

USC signed the top-ranked class last recruiting cycle, so as they finally hit the field, the Times of Troy will keep tabs on their progress by doing what we do best: Ranking their performance! In this case, we’ll rank them based on the freshmen we most expect to make a difference when USC kicks off against San José State.

Trent Mosley at USC spring football practice.

(Robert Gauthier / Los Angeles Times)

1. Luke Wafle, DE … the No. 1 overall prospect in 2026 should get plenty of run coming off the edge in these first few games. I wouldn’t be surprised if, over that stretch, he makes it impossible to keep him on the bench.

2. Trent Mosley, WR. Seemingly locked into a starting job since the spring, Mosley is 20 years old and much further along than most freshmen when it comes to football IQ. He could lead the team in targets if all breaks right.

3. Mark Bowman, TE. Bowman was in and out of practice through camp, which might be the only thing keeping him from the No. 1 spot on this list. Don’t be surprised if the breakout doesn’t come right away as he gets into the swing of things.

4. Kayden Dixon-Wyatt, WR. A standout of camp with Tanook Hines sidelined, Dixon-Wyatt should be thrust into a big role right away. He’s a big play waiting to happen, and of all the freshmen position players, he’s the one I’d expect to wow us first.

5. Elbert “Rock” Hill, CB. Another standout of camp, Hill is behind two surefire starters in Jontez Williams and Chasen Johnson. But from what we’ve seen and heard, the freshman cornerback is way ahead of schedule.

6. Boobie Feaster, WR. Feaster is so young — just turned 17 — but his talent is undeniable. He has the potential to be the No. 1 guy on this list by season’s end.

7. Tomuhini “Tom Tom” Topui, DT. Stewart’s injury could open the door for more young guys on the interior, including Topui, who really impressed me in the scrimmage and has been receiving rave reviews from teammates.

8. Talanoa Ili, LB. In a linebacker room with shallow depth, don’t be surprised if Ili emerges early. I like what I’ve seen.

9. Madden Riordan, S. One of the bigger surprises in the class, Riordan added critical weight and now should play a part in the defensive back rotation. Being 20 already helps.

10. Breck Kolojay, OG. Kolojay was a major standout of spring, then cooled in camp while dealing with injuries. He’s likely a next-man-up option on the offensive interior.

11. Tron Baker, WR. Baker has a lot of other freshman wideouts ahead of him on this list, but we’ve heard his name a lot listed among young players who impressed.

12. Deshonne Redeaux, RB/KR. I really like Redeaux’s smooth, effortless running style, and while he’s down the depth chart at running back, he could right away be the kick returner.

Poll results

We asked, “What is the fewest number of wins you’d accept from Riley and USC without calling for a change?”
After 1,507 votes, the results:

Nine wins, 35.6%
10 wins/playoff appearance, 27.9%
Eight wins, 24.6%
Seven wins, 8.8%
Six wins, 3.1%

Olympic sports spotlight

Jane Alukonis was named the Big Ten women’s soccer coach of the year in 2024, but the Trojans trudged their way to a 7-7-3 finish in 2025 and have a lot to prove as their 2026 season begins.

Lucky for Alukonis, she brings in the No. 1-ranked recruiting class in the nation according to Prep Soccer, a class highlighted by forward Jordan Hill, the No. 3 overall prospect, and defender Rhiannon Mahon, the No. 5 overall prospect.

But the Trojans were still picked in the preseason to finish seventh in the Big Ten. And with losses to Duke and Brigham Young already, USC is already facing an uphill climb to start the season.

What I’m Watching This Week

Anne Hathaway as Andy Sachs in “The Devil Wears Prada 2.”

(Macall Polay / 20th Century Studios)

No one told me before I watched “The Devil Wears Prada 2” on a plane last weekend that it was a journalism movie! But even aside from commiserating about the state of journalism through the screen with Anne Hathaway, I enjoyed this second go-round.

So what if it was a blatant cash grab? Put Hathaway, Meryl Streep, Emily Blunt and Stanley Tucci in a room, and I’d probably watch whatever they come up. Tucci, in particular, was a standout for me in this sequel.

In case you missed it

How Boobie Feaster became one of the USC playmakers to watch at age 17

Ohio State and Oregon lead AP top 25 preseason college football poll; USC also ranked

Until next time …

That concludes today’s newsletter. If you have any feedback, ideas for improvement or things you’d like to see, email me at ryan.kartje@latimes.com, and follow me on X at @Ryan_Kartje. To get this newsletter in your inbox, click here.

Aug. 24 (UPI) — On his first visit to Ukraine as British Prime Minister Andy Burnham promised Monday to share Anglo-French long-range cruise missile technology with Kyiv in its fight with Russia, saying Britain would stand with Ukraine until there was “a just and lasting peace.”

Burnham said European defense contractor MBDA would be authorized to declassify blueprints for the parts of the Storm Shadow/Scalp missiles that are made by Britain to help Ukraine build its own version of the weapon that Britain has for the past three years been giving to Kyiv.

The Storm Shadow enables Ukrainian forces to hit targets 150 miles inside Russia.

Burnham said Britain would join forces with France to build production plants in Ukraine following a similar pledge of help by President Emmanuel Macron, who also told Zelensky at the weekend that France would supply Kyiv with more anti-missile interceptors in the wake of a series of deadly ballistic missile strikes.

“On Ukraine’s 35th anniversary of independence, the Ukrainian people should be in no doubt: the U.K. is behind you today and for as long as it takes. I am proud of the contribution our country has made to Ukraine and I want the Ukrainian people to hear it directly from me that our support will not waver. After all, Ukraine’s security is our security,” Burnham said in a statement issued Sunday night.

“The friendship between our two countries will long outlast Russia’s illegal war. In both the fight and in the rebuilding to come, we will stand with Ukraine and deliver opportunities for people across both our countries. Russia should be in no doubt of our resolve. We will not back down until there is a just and lasting peace,” said Burnham.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov likened the missile plan to pouring gasoline on relations with Russia and warned Britain over “participating in this war” on Ukraine’s side, saying that the Russian military was actively collecting data to uncover and destroy any missile production sites.

“Britain is methodically and regularly adding fuel to the fire and methodically and regularly plotting to prevent any progress in the peace process,” said Peskov.

Burnham’s high-profile, public backing for Zelensky came as he faces challenges both from nightly Russian ballistic missile strikes and to his authority, amid calls for elections which have been suspended for more than four years since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022.

As well joining Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky for Independence Day celebrations in Kyiv, Burnham was also scheduled to chair a meeting of the U.K.-France-led Coalition of the Willing for talks on providing more help to Ukraine.

Established in 2025, the focus of the 34 country plus Ukraine partnership is to provide security guarantees in the event a cease-fire agreement is reached, including providing a multinational force to support and monitor it from day 1, though not necessarily in the format of a traditional peace-keeping force.

The stand by Burnham, coincided with a similar pledge from from Brussels, backed up by a multi-billion dollar package of fresh European Union military aid.

“On Ukraine’s Independence Day, we show our unfaltering support. Today, we approved $7.1 billion for the air and missile defense systems, missiles, ammunition and radars that Ukraine urgently needs. Europe stands with you today, tomorrow, and for as long as it takes,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said in a post on X.

The package is in addition to $18.7 billion already approved by the 27-country bloc, $9.7 billion of which has already been provided to Kyiv.

Former James Madison linebacker Trent Hendrick — who went undrafted in the 2026 NFL draft and participated in rookie minicamps with the Cleveland Browns and Kansas City Chiefs but never signed with a team — committed to UCLA football Sunday, reuniting with coach Bob Chesney and defensive coordinator Colin Hitschler in Westwood.

Recruiting website On3.com was the first to report his move.

The former JMU linebacker exhausted his eligibility after the conclusion of the 2025 season, but Hendrick, along with 15 other football players, was granted a temporary restraining order Wednesday by a Louisiana judge to play a fifth season of college football and enter the transfer portal.

Hendrick had 106 tackles, seven tackles for a loss, three sacks and two forced fumbles last season at James Madison under Chensey’s direction. His play earned him Sun Belt Conference Defensive Player of the Year honors.

James Madison’s Trent Hendrick tackles Washington State’s Maxwell Woods on Nov. 22 in Harrisonburg, Va.

(Brien Aho / Getty Images)

The restraining order follows a Colorado court ruling on July 31 that granted athletes who began their collegiate careers in the 2022-23 season a fifth year of eligibility for the upcoming season. Although the Colorado ruling stated players would not be allowed to enter the transfer portal, and a federal appeal court granted the NCAA a temporary stay on the Colorado court order Friday, pausing the nationwide injunction.

It is unclear whether the Louisiana ruling covering Hendrick’s transfer will be contested.

While Hendrick reportedly considered multiple schools, including local Virginia Tech — the alma mater of his agent Zach Hoban — and Tosh Lupoi-led California, the middle linebacker opted for comfort with scheme and familiarity with the coaching staff at UCLA.

Hendrick represents a significant addition to Hitschler’s defense and should immediately fortify the center of the Bruins’ front seven.

UCLA’s run defense ranked 18th worst in the nation last season, conceding 190.4 yards per game, while JMU’s unit ranked fifth best, allowing just 85.1 yards per contest. Integral to the Dukes’ run-stopping was Hendrick, who not only captained the defense, but spearheaded the run support.

Oklahoma transfer linebacker Sammy Omosigho has handled middle linebacker duties since the start of the spring, but with the addition of Hendrick, Omosigho could slide back to the weakside linebacker slot — a position he is familiar with in his three years in Norman, Okla.

There Omosigho can elevate the team’s run stopping and use his athleticism to cover the middle of the defense sideline-to-sideline.

The addition of Hendrick could make fifth-year linebacker Jalen Woods the odd-man out in the starting defense, pushing the St. John Bosco High product to the second team alongside JMU transfer Drew Spinogatti and senior returner Donavyn Pellot.

Aug. 21 (UPI) — Authorities in Germany discovered an underground weapons cache in a forest near Berlin and are seeking to extradite a suspect from Romania.

Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt described the suspect as a “low-level agent” and added that several more agents have been detained this year. The call for extradition is part of a monthslong investigation after authorities discovered two firearms and ammunition stowed away in the forest.

The weapons cache is suspected to be linked to Russian intelligence. Investigators left the weapons in place after determining they were rendered useless in hopes of observing someone coming back for them. After months of surveillance, no one had come to the site to retrieve them, leaving investigators to believe that the operation had been abandoned.

Dobrindt said authorities are investigating whether the weapons were meant for a violent threat to national security.

“This case demonstrates that we are operating under a high threat level,” Dobrindt told reporters.

German intelligence has been on elevated alert since Director General of the German Federal Domestic Intelligence Service Sinan Selen said two months ago that Russia may be preparing to carry out assassinations on supporters of Ukraine, members of the defense industry and political opponents.

The Russian embassy in Germany has not commented on the allegations.

Germany’s Leipzig/Halle international airport was the site of an incident two weeks ago in which a drone armed with explosives was discovered. Authorities suspect that the Russian government is involved in the incident.

On the same day, a DHL cargo plane had to abort its landing at Leipzig and divert to another airport after colliding midair with an unknown object. The plane suffered minor damage to its nose.

Cleveland High football coach Mario Guzman loves the Nigerian connection of Oluwafemi Okelola and Moyosoreoluwa Odebunmi, both running backs.

Spelling their names might be the biggest challenge.

They should be major offensive contributors, joining quarterback Domenik Fuentes to fuel the Cavaliers’ attack.

Last season, Odebunmi rushed for 1,139 yards and 11 touchdowns. Okelola had 111 yards rushing and made 83 tackles and had two interceptions on defense.

The Cavaliers open their season on Friday against Narbonne.

This is a daily look at the positive happenings in high school sports. To submit any news, please email eric.sondheimer@latimes.com.

Aug. 21 (UPI) — The Pentagon has fired the publisher, editor-in-chief and Middle East reporter of the venerable military newspaper Stars and Stripes, the publication reported Friday.

Editor-in-chief Erik Slavin, publisher Max Lederer Jr. and civilian reporter Lara Korte, who covers the Middle East, have all received termination notices, a Pentagon source confirmed to the newspaper.

Despite being part of the Department of Defense, Stars and Stripes has long maintained editorial independence from the top leaders but it has faced pressure under the administration of President Donald Trump, whose defense secretary, Pete Hegseth, has repeatedly clashed with media covering the Pentagon.

Slavin said he was fired for insubordination after telling CBS News last month that he would regard any attempt by the Pentagon to interfere with Stars and Stripes’ editorial independence as a “red line.”

Asked in an interview if he had any “red lines” in his mind when it came to censorship, Slavin answered, “Yes, I do,” and gave as an example, “Well, don’t run a perfectly accurate story. Run this instead. Here it is.”

On Friday, Slavin issued a statement to the newspaper saying, “I stand by the principle that Stars and Stripes must remain editorially independent, as required by law and by the department’s own policies.”

During the same interview, Korte said, “I’m working for Stars and Stripes, not for the Pentagon, not for any administration, not for any policy maker. I’m here to cover the military community.”

Korte said Friday she was informed that she, too, had been fired for insubordination due to her remarks in the interview.

“I consider it a great privilege to live alongside members of the military and share their stories. It’s a shame for the institution and service members, who swore to defend the Constitution and deserve the right to a free and independent press,” she said.

Lederer, who announced his retirement on Tuesday, was fired after more than 30 years of working for the paper.

Capt. William Urban, the military deputy to Lederer, didn’t directly address the terminations in an “open letter to stakeholders” published in Stars and Stripes on Friday, but rather spoke of increasing its readership through digital strategies.

“We may never be able to have the same impact for our service members digitally that our paper had during World War II in a vastly different media environment, but I also believe that we can do better — that we must do better for our most important constituency, the men and women who make up the U.S. Armed Forces,” he wrote.

“My vision for the future of Stars and Stripes is simple: More eyeballs on our content and more impact on our service members while maintaining the highest standard of professional journalism with the credibility that comes with editorial independence.”

Stars and Stripes’ independence first appeared to come into the administration’s crosshairs in January when Sean Parnell, chief Pentagon spokesman and a senior advisor to Hegseth, said the department was aiming to bring it “into the 21st century.

“We will modernize its operations, refocus its content away from woke distractions that syphon morale, and adapt it to serve a new generation of service members.”

The firing of its leadership elicited alarm from journalists.

National Press Club President Mark Schoeff Jr. called the moves “another brazen attempt by the Pentagon to dictate coverage of the military and should be immediately reversed.”

He cited the April firing of the the newspaper’s ombudsman, a role “established and charged by Congress to provide independent oversight and protect the paper’s editorial integrity,” and a March memo that imposed content restrictions and tightened the Pentagon’s oversight of the newsroom.

“Firing a newspaper editor after he publicly defended his newsroom’s editorial independence is deeply troubling, and it should concern every journalist and every member of the U.S. military who depends on independent reporting,” Schoeff added.

“This is an assault on the fundamental principle that journalists must be free to report the news without fear of retaliation from the government officials they cover,” he said. “The Pentagon must reaffirm that principle and make clear that Stars and Stripes journalists will not be punished for doing their jobs.”

Aug. 21 (UPI) — Defense lawyers representing Massachusetts mother Lindsay Clancy, on trial for the murders of her three children, rested their case Friday after testimony from a doctor who claimed she is innocent due to mental illness.

Attorney Kevin Reddington told the presiding judge in Plymouth, Mass., Superior Court that the defense had concluded its case following the testimony of Dr. Phillip Resnick, a forensic psychiatrist with expertise in postpartum disorders.

He told jurors Clancy was “frankly psychotic” on Jan. 24, 2023, when she killed her children.

A series of defense witnesses this week sought to show Clancy, 36, is not guilty of murdering her children — 5-year-old Cora, 3-year-old Dawson and 8-month-old Callan — at their Duxbury, Mass., home.

Clancy cut herself and jumped from a second-story window in a failed suicide attempt following the slayings, after which she became paralyzed from the waist down.

While not denying she killed the children by strangulation, they contend she is not criminally responsible because she was suffering from bipolar disorder and postpartum psychosis.

She faces a possible sentence of mandatory life imprisonment without the chance of parole.

When questioned by Reddington, Resnick stated in his video testimony that based on his diagnosis Clancy suffered from a “postpartum psychosis” following the birth of Callum, noting that she heard voices commanding her kill her children and herself.

This, he said, triggered a “delusion of influence” in which a victim feels their body is overtaken by an “external force,” and thus Clancy should not be held criminally responsible for her actions, the Boston Globe reported.

“She felt that she had to obey the instructions,” he said. “It was a matter where she was just following the command, rather than being able to make any decision to do this or not.”

After the defense rested, prosecutors called several rebuttal witnesses including Dr. Avram Mack, a psychiatrist, who agreed with prosecutors that Clancy was able to understand that her actions were wrong when she killed her children, thus making her guilty of murder under state law.

He testified that Clancy had interacted normally with other people in the hours before the killings.

“There was the ability to act normally,” he said, adding that Clancy had said “Go to God” while committing the slayings, which he took to mean she knew her children were innocent as they died.

China opposes the US and Western escalation against Iran and insists on condemning the US and Israeli attacks on Iranian nuclear targets. China considers the US and Israeli military attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities a blatant violation of international law and the UN Charter. While Beijing officially adheres to nuclear non-proliferation, it will hold the US directly responsible and will oppose the imposition of new international sanctions against Iran in the UN Security Council. China will work to hold Washington accountable. Beijing believes that the US withdrawal from the nuclear agreement is the root cause of the current impasse in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) negotiations. The Chinese Foreign Ministry asserts that the policy of maximum pressure and economic sanctions against Tehran will not resolve the crisis but will only exacerbate tensions. China views Tehran’s threat to withdraw from the NPT as an understandable reaction to the maximum pressure exerted upon it, but it consistently prefers diplomatic solutions and supports maintaining the international legal framework to prevent escalation.  The Chinese stance came after Iranian parliamentarians, including Ebrahim Rezaei, asserted that withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the best response to the Trump administration’s escalation of economic warfare.

The main dimensions of the Chinese position regarding the Iranian threat to withdraw from the NPT are embodied in China’s rejection of pressure and sanctions against Iran. China maintains that the escalating US sanctions and policies against Tehran will not resolve the nuclear crisis but rather exacerbate it. Chinese intelligence, military, political, and strategic circles have adopted a strategy of legal consideration versus feasibility. Experts and observers close to Chinese circles argue that Iran’s withdrawal from the NPT is a legitimate legal right for independent states, but Beijing implicitly suggests that such a move could trigger harsher international sanctions against Tehran. Therefore, Beijing is working to (obstruct UN sanctions against Iran). China, along with Russia, has expressed its readiness to block the activation of the snapback mechanism or any harsh international sanctions against Iran in the UN Security Council to protect its interests and regional stability, while adhering to a political settlement. Beijing is calling on all parties to return to the negotiating table and maintain regional and international stability, instead of taking radical and escalatory steps that violate international treaties.

In my analysis, China will insist on referring the Iranian issue to international forums, such as the Security Council, using its veto power to condemn and block any resolutions issued against Iran. Here, China is expected to cooperate with Russia to obstruct any Western or American Security Council resolutions aimed at condemning Iran or imposing new, harsh UN sanctions. China will maintain its commitment to dialogue by continuing to call for a return to the political negotiating table, while publicly acknowledging Tehran’s previous assurances that it is not seeking to produce nuclear weapons. Here, we must understand all the strategic parameters of China’s position regarding the escalation against Iran over its nuclear program through the lens of China’s opposition to nuclear armament. Despite China’s understanding of Iran’s motives and its right to peaceful energy, it categorically rejects Tehran’s move towards acquiring a nuclear military arsenal in order to preserve the stability of the international order and prevent a regional arms race. This is coupled with the desire of relevant circles in Beijing to safeguard their interests. Therefore, Beijing will strive to avoid sliding into a direct confrontation with the West and the United States while continuing to provide Iran with as much economic and diplomatic support as possible in order to alleviate Iran’s isolation.

China supports Tehran diplomatically, emphasizing dialogue and rejecting the unilateral sanctions imposed by Washington. Despite the ongoing pressure, the likelihood of direct war remains low, as a major war of attrition is avoided. China’s position is characterized by its call for diplomatic solutions and dialogue based on mutual respect, its rejection of unilateral US economic sanctions against Iran, and its insistence that all parties address the root causes of the tension and resume the nuclear agreement. This is especially relevant given the Iranian threat to withdraw from the agreement, voiced by several members of the Iranian parliament who believe that remaining in the nuclear non-proliferation treaty is pointless under continued US pressure.  Intelligence, military, political, and strategic circles in Beijing considered the Iranian parliamentary proposal a political response to the tightened US economic sanctions against Tehran. Chinese intelligence circles are well aware that an actual Iranian withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty requires the approval of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. Should this occur—a slim possibility according to Chinese strategic assessments—it would mean the potential outbreak of a full-scale war. Therefore, strategic assessments in Beijing suggest that the potential confrontation between Washington and Tehran will likely escalate into a protracted war of attrition rather than a full-scale military clash. According to Chinese analyses, both Washington and Tehran prefer economic pressure and the prospect of open negotiations to the option of open warfare. Hence, China seeks to curb any military escalation that could threaten energy security and regional stability.

Accordingly, China supports the continuation of the diplomatic and political track to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis. It rejects pressures, escalatory policies, and economic sanctions against Tehran, while simultaneously calling for dialogue based on mutual respect and the preservation of regional stability, without supporting any sudden steps that could fuel the conflict. China’s general position stems from its rejection of sanctions. Beijing believes that the policy of maximum pressure and economic sanctions does not resolve the nuclear issue. Therefore, China consistently calls for adherence to dialogue to resolve differences through peaceful political and diplomatic means and to resume negotiations. China also provides strategic support to Iran. In this regard, China stands with Iran in the face of Western and American pressure. China is working alongside Russia to submit draft resolutions to the UN Security Council to support de-escalation, extend the agreement’s framework, address threats of withdrawal, and avoid mutual escalation. China urges all parties to avoid any unilateral steps or escalatory measures, such as triggering the snapback mechanism or mutual withdrawals from international agreements and treaties, which could lead to a loss of control.  Therefore, Beijing prefers to contain this crisis and the Iranian threats to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty through negotiating frameworks that preserve the basic structure of the non-proliferation regime, while holding the United States and European countries partly responsible due to Washington’s previous withdrawal from the same nuclear agreement that Tehran is now threatening to withdraw from.

SEOUL, Aug. 21 (UPI) — South Korea’s presidential Blue House on Friday called on North Korea to halt its “derogatory remarks” toward Seoul, one day after Kim Yo Jong mocked the South over the scaling back of joint U.S.-South Korea military drills.

“Derogatory remarks toward our government and president do not help in building mutual trust,” the Blue House said in remarks reported by Yonhap News Agency.

“We call on the North to halt unnecessary criticism and march together toward peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula,” it added.

The remarks came in response to a commentary by Kim, the sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, in which she derided Seoul as a “puppet” of the United States and accused President Lee Jae Myung of making “double-dealing remarks.”

This week’s decision to cut short the Ulchi Freedom Shield joint military exercise has “placed Seoul in a poor plight of discontinuing the ‘war game’ it liked very much,” Kim said in the commentary carried by the state-run Korean Central News Agency late Thursday.

She said Lee “uttered shameful words” in a social media post in which he expressed respect for U.S. President Donald Trump’s order to scale back the exercise while also pledging that South Korea would continue to build up a self-sufficient military capacity.

“Such double-dealing behavior vividly proves uneasiness and impatience of the ROK,” Kim said, using the official acronym for South Korea.

“The world witnesses that the U.S. security aids are no longer free of charge,” she added. “Seoul should be aware of the unavoidable fate of the ‘puppet.'”

The exchange comes after Trump called for the allies’ joint military drills to be “substantially reduced” in a Truth Social post Sunday, saying they are expensive and “send a signal that is totally inappropriate and hostile” to North Korea.

South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff on Wednesday announced that the two sides would cut short the ongoing exercise by almost a week. The command-post portion of the exercise was set to conclude Friday, although a pared-down set of field training drills will continue through next week as originally scheduled.

The directive has been widely seen as an effort by Trump to restart diplomacy with the North, and on Wednesday he told reporters that he expected to meet Kim Jong Un this year.

In an earlier KCNA commentary, however, Kim Yo Jong downplayed the significance of the exercise reduction, calling it “unworthy of comment.”

“If the U.S. calculates that it can propagate its recent measure as the one of so-called good faith, they will not get desired answer,” she said.

On Thursday, Pyongyang fired multiple short-range ballistic missiles toward the East Sea, Seoul’s military said, marking the North’s third missile launch in less than two weeks.

The Blue House on Friday reiterated its commitment to pursuing peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas.

“As a party directly involved in building peace on the Korean Peninsula, the government will continue its close cooperation with the U.S. while making proactive efforts to help resume North Korea-U.S. dialogue as a ‘pacemaker,'” the presidential office said, according to Yonhap.

On July 23, Volodymyr Zelensky told Ukrainians that Raytheon wanted to help produce Patriot interceptors on Ukrainian-linked lines. Five days later, Lockheed Martin signed a second license, this one for the PAC-3 MSE — the hit-to-kill missile that has spent three years picking Russian ballistic warheads out of the sky over Kyiv. For a moment it looked like a watershed: the United States handing a country still absorbing nightly missile and drone barrages the blueprint to build its own air defense. Then, within days, the story came apart in public. US Ambassador Matthew Whitaker said Washington would not allow Ukraine to build PAC-3s at all. Donald Trump called the technology transfer “a hard thing to give away.” NATO’s own envoy said no agreement would close before winter. Something had clearly been decided. Nobody could agree on what.

The Patriot system is the closest thing the West has to a proven shield against ballistic missiles, and it is scarce almost everywhere it is needed. Roughly twenty countries now compete for a production line that turns out about 650 PAC-3 MSE interceptors a year worldwide — Lockheed Martin’s entire global output, shared among Ukraine, Israel, Taiwan, Gulf states and the US Army’s own depleted stocks. Russia, meanwhile, has been firing 55 to 60 Iskander ballistic missiles a month at Ukraine alone, before counting the nightly Shahed drone waves that push crews to expend scarce interceptors on cheaper threats out of necessity. The Pentagon has spent much of the past two years quietly rationing Patriot allocations across allies, reportedly diverting orders meant for Taiwan and Ukraine to replenish American stockpiles. Against that backdrop, “Ukraine will build its own Patriots” is not primarily a sovereignty story. It is a story about whether the system that makes Patriots for everyone else can keep up at all.

What the deal actually requires

Start with what was actually signed, because the headlines overstate it. Raytheon’s license covers the PAC-2 GEM-T, an older blast-fragmentation interceptor effective against aircraft and cruise missiles. Lockheed Martin’s covers the PAC-3 MSE, the missile that actually stops Iskanders and Kinzhals. Neither license includes the radar, the fire-control system or the launchers; those still come from existing Patriot batteries. And neither company has committed to building these missiles on Ukrainian soil in the near term. Reporting from Reuters and Ukrainian officials both point to Germany, which already runs its own PAC-2 line, as the likely first production site, with capacity shifting to Ukraine only “after the war ends.” What was announced in July, in other words, is not a factory. It is paperwork that keeps a door open.

Even so, the paperwork matters, because of what it concedes. Every PAC-3 MSE round carries a 24-month production lead time for the missile itself and 30 months for its solid rocket motor. Boeing manufactures every active radar seeker that guides it from a single facility in Alabama, capped at 650 to 700 units a year — a bottleneck no amount of Ukrainian factory floor changes. Aerojet Rocketdyne is the sole source for the motor. These are not obstacles a co-production agreement dissolves; they are structural limits on how fast the United States can arm anyone, Ukraine included. A government does not open its most tightly export-controlled missile program to a country still under nightly bombardment unless it has concluded that the existing pipeline, working alone, cannot meet demand. That is the admission buried in the announcement: not that Ukraine’s industrial base is ready, but that Lockheed’s and Raytheon’s are strained, and Washington needs help from a country it would ordinarily be supplying, not licensing.

The contradictions among American officials sharpen the point rather than undermine it. Whitaker’s flat denial that Ukraine would ever build PAC-3s, arriving days after Zelensky announced the license, is not really about Ukraine’s trustworthiness. A Republican congressional official close to the process gave the more candid version: the manufacturers are less worried about Ukraine leaking American technology to Moscow than about Ukraine improving on it and producing it “at scale, faster and for much less money.” That fear has a track record behind it. Fire Point’s Flamingo cruise missile, built in Ukraine during the war, reportedly costs around $600,000 — roughly a sixth of a Tomahawk and a fraction of a $2 million PAC-3 ACE round — while Ukraine’s home-grown Freyja interceptor is priced at roughly a fifth of the Patriot missile it is meant to substitute for. A country that has spent three years learning to manufacture air defense under fire, at a fraction of Western unit costs, is not the industrial partner a legacy prime wants loose inside its own supply chain. The reluctance is commercial before it is strategic.

The strongest objection to this reading is that Kyiv already produces a large share of its own weapons, so extending that into Patriots is a natural next step rather than a crisis signal. Zelensky puts the domestically produced share of Ukraine’s frontline weapons at close to 60 percent, up from roughly 40 percent a year earlier — drones, the Bohdana howitzer, the Neptune and Flamingo missiles. That is true, and it matters. But those are systems Ukraine designed and built from scratch under wartime pressure, with no legacy export-control regime standing in the way. Patriot is different: it is Washington’s most sensitive interceptor program, run by companies that have spent decades keeping production onshore for precisely the security reasons Whitaker cited. Handing over any piece of it, even nominally, to a country under active bombardment breaks with everything the export-control system was built to prevent. That the United States is doing it anyway — however slowly, however contested internally — says less about confidence in Ukraine than about how thin the interceptor pipeline has become.

Three ways this goes

What happens next depends on which of the deal’s obstacles proves harder to move: engineering or politics.

Base case (our estimate: roughly 55 percent probability). The license survives, but production stays offshore. Germany’s existing PAC-2 line absorbs the first Ukrainian-linked output sometime in 2027; Lockheed and Raytheon leave the seeker and motor bottlenecks unresolved; and Zelensky’s own target of “production capability by the end of 2026” slips the way most Patriot-related deadlines have slipped since 2022. The deal functions mainly as a signal — to Moscow, to Congress, to the manufacturers themselves — that the West is willing to widen its supplier base, without actually widening it before the war’s most dangerous phase has passed.

Downside case. Export-control friction, not battlefield risk, kills momentum outright. Boeing declines to license seeker technology, Congress balks at formally notifying an ITAR transfer into an active conflict zone, and the agreement quietly becomes what several earlier Patriot-adjacent announcements already have: a signed memorandum with no factory behind it. Unable to close its ballistic-missile gap through licensed production, Ukraine leans harder into Flamingo and Freyja — cheap and available, but not full substitutes for hit-to-kill interception. Iskander and Kinzhal strikes on Ukrainian cities continue at close to current tempo through 2027.

Upside case. Ukraine’s wartime manufacturing culture forces the restructuring the primes have been resisting. Facing a credible cheaper competitor, Lockheed and Raytheon accelerate second-sourcing of seekers and motors — the actual chokepoints — to defend market share rather than out of goodwill toward Kyiv. Patriot output rises for every operator, not only Ukraine, and Kyiv becomes the proving ground for a lower-cost interceptor variant that outlives the war. This is the scenario in which an admission of scarcity turns into a fix for it — plausible, but it requires the manufacturers to treat competition, not politics, as the threat that finally moves them.

The takeaway

So: is licensing Patriot production to a country under bombardment an admission? Yes — but not the one the announcements were built to convey. It does not say Ukraine’s industrial base has arrived. It says the American one has not kept pace with a war of attrition it did not plan for, and that Washington is now willing to test its most sensitive export controls against the same scarcity that has Israel, Taiwan and its own Army competing for the same missiles.

Watch for: whether groundbreaking on a German or Polish production line actually begins before the end of 2026 — Zelensky’s own deadline for “technical capability.” If it hasn’t started by then, treat every subsequent announcement as the political theatre this one increasingly resembles: a scarcity confession dressed up as an industrial handshake.

SEOUL, Aug. 20 (UPI) — U.S. President Donald Trump said Wednesday that he will meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un this year and claimed that Pyongyang currently has 57 “very powerful” nuclear weapons.

Trump made the remarks during a press availability at a new helipad outside the White House, several hours after the United States and South Korea announced they would cut short their ongoing joint military drills in what has been widely seen as an effort by Trump to restart diplomacy with the North.

“Yeah, I will be,” Trump told reporters when asked if he is expecting to meet Kim this year, without offering any further details.

Trump touted his personal relationship with the North Korean leader, saying it is a diplomatic asset and would help in dealing with the nuclear-armed regime.

“I get along with him,” Trump said. “And you know what? The fact that I get along with him, that’s a good thing, not a bad thing.”

“He has 57 very powerful nuclear weapons,” he added, offering an unusually specific public estimate of the North Korean arsenal.

Trump went on to say that the North never should have been allowed to acquire nuclear weapons but claimed that the situation would be manageable under his leadership.

“I know Kim Jong Un very well, and he’s going to be fine,” Trump said. “As long as we have a smart president, he’s going to be fine.”

South Korean Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back on Thursday estimated that the North has a larger arsenal, citing a range of 80 to 120 nuclear weapons during a parliamentary session.

On Sunday, Trump called for the allies’ joint military drills to be “substantially reduced” in a Truth Social post, saying they are expensive and “send a signal that is totally inappropriate and hostile” to North Korea.

In response, South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff on Wednesday announced that the two sides would cut short the ongoing joint military exercise by almost a week and reduce the scale of field training drills.

Late Wednesday, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung expressed “respect” for Trump’s decision to scale back the exercises, saying it reflects “deep deliberation to build peace on the Korean Peninsula, moving beyond hostility and confrontation.”

“We hope that this decision by President Trump will lead to the establishment of a stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, through the building of trust and the resumption of dialogue between North Korea and the United States,” Lee wrote on X.

North Korea, however, dismissed the decision as “unworthy of comment” and said Pyongyang had “no interest at all” in its significance.

In a commentary published in state-run media, Kim Yo Jong, the powerful sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, rejected the notion that the reduction represented a goodwill gesture.

“If the U.S. calculates that it can propagate its recent measure as the one of so-called good faith, they will not get desired answer,” she wrote.

Later Thursday, South Korea’s military said Pyongyang fired multiple short-range ballistic missiles toward the East Sea, marking the North’s third missile launch in less than two weeks.

While McDaniel and his system have been a hot topic throughout training camp, he isn’t the only new coordinator in town.

Thursday’s game will offer a similar peek at what Chris O’Leary’s starting defense has in store.

“Overall, we played together; we played fast; we played violent,” O’Leary said of the group’s performance in Houston. “The result was a good result for us. We see a lot of stuff we can clean up along the way.”

O’Leary’s defense followed up a strong opening game by playing well against the 49ers’ offense in Tuesday’s practice.

“Honestly, don’t think it was our best day,” San Francisco quarterback Brock Purdy said.

The Chargers would like to hear Purdy — who might play Thursday, according to 49ers coach Kyle Shanahan — say that again.

SEOUL, Aug. 19 (UPI) — South Korea and the United States will significantly scale down their ongoing Ulchi Freedom Shield joint military exercise, Seoul’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said Wednesday, cutting it short by almost a week following an order by U.S. President Donald Trump.

“South Korea and the United States have agreed to make partial adjustments to the exercise period and scale at the suggestion of the U.S. side,” the JCS said in a statement.

“First, it was decided to adjust the duration of this UFS exercise to run from the 17th to the 21st,” the statement said. “Second, it was decided to conduct the combined field maneuver training on a reduced scale.”

The allies are discussing specific details of the field training reduction, the JCS added.

Ulchi Freedom Shield began Monday and was originally scheduled to run through Aug. 27.

The move comes after Trump called for the drills to be “substantially reduced” in a Truth Social post Sunday, saying they are expensive and “send a signal that is totally inappropriate and hostile” to North Korea.

South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun said Wednesday morning that Seoul was not given advance notice of Trump’s directive.

“Neither our government nor officials within the U.S. government had any prior knowledge of what President Trump revealed on Truth Social,” Cho said at a parliamentary hearing. “Consequently, we were not notified beforehand.”

In his Sunday post, Trump said Pyongyang “has been unthreatening and respectful” while he has been in the White House.

Speaking to reporters in the Oval Office on Monday, Trump touted his personal relationship with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, saying Kim had “always treated me with great respect.”

“I understand him. He understands me,” Trump said, adding that Kim had responded to his requests for talks but providing no further details.

The Wall Street Journal, citing U.S. officials, reported Tuesday that Trump is pushing aides to arrange a meeting with Kim as soon as this fall, although no official planning is underway. Trump has privately discussed holding talks during his next trip to Asia, which could come in November when world leaders gather for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Shenzhen, China.

North Korea, meanwhile, has not publicly responded to Trump’s overture. In a commentary published earlier Wednesday, before Seoul announced the reduction, the state-run Korean Central News Agency criticized Ulchi Freedom Shield as “frantic exercises” pushing the Korean Peninsula to the “threshold of a war.”

The commentary threatened that Pyongyang would continue exercising its “right to self-defence” to counter what it called military threats from the allies.

North Korea frequently condemns U.S.-South Korean military drills as rehearsals for an invasion.

Trump similarly called for suspending or scaling back the exercises in his first term, when he pursued direct diplomacy with Kim that included summits in Singapore and Hanoi and a brief meeting at the DMZ.

After the 2018 Singapore summit, Trump surprised observers by announcing that the United States would halt what he called “provocative” joint military exercises with South Korea. That year’s Ulchi Freedom Guardian exercise was canceled, while several subsequent drills were reduced in scale.

Aug. 19 (UPI) — Former Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov called for elections in Ukraine, arguing that the war with Russia was not an excuse and that the suspension of democracy was incompatible with the goal of the war, which was freedom.

Fedorov said in a YouTube video Tuesday that as Ukraine grappled with the fundamental question of how a state should function if war lasts for years he was convinced that the answer was not to effectively give Russia a veto over when Ukrainians could exercise their democratic rights again.

“Democracy cannot be held hostage by Russia. We are fighting precisely because we want to remain a free European state. Therefore, we must find a legal, safe, and realistic mechanism that will allow Ukraine to restore a full democratic process even amidst a prolonged war,” said Fedorov, who was dismissed as defense minister in July.

Fedorov, whose removal sparked protests across Ukraine, added that democracy was not a “peacetime luxury” but was part of “what we are fighting for today, saying that people could not “endlessly live in a state where they do not understand why certain decisions are made.”

Fedorov acknowleged the complexities of holding wartime elections, in particular guaranteeing the voting rights of military personnel, millions of Ukrainians living abroad. and of people living in regions on the frontline.

“We need to ensure the security of the electoral process, the independence of institutions, and trust in the outcome, he said, but stressed that complexity did not mean it could not be done.

“Ukraine has repeatedly done what the world considered impossible. We can find a solution here as well,” said Fedorov.

President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a decree imposing martial law in Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022, immediately after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of the country, suspending certain fundamental rights and processes, including elections.

Zelensky’s five-year term expired more than two years in May 2024, but elections cannot be held while martial law remains in effect, according to the constitution.

In December, Zelensky held up the prospect of holding elections within the next three months in response to allegations by U.S. President Donald Trump that his administration was using the war as an excuse to stay in power.

Zelensky said he was ready for elections and would seek to hold them on condition that the United States and other allies provided guarantees to keep voters safe at a time when Ukraine’s cities were under attack day and night.

“I’m asking now, and stating this openly, for the United States to help me. Together with our European partners, we can ensure the security needed to hold elections. If that happens, Ukraine will be ready to conduct elections in the next 60 to 90 days,” said Zelensky.

The offer came after Trump called for elections, complaining that Ukraine liked to talk about democracy “but it gets to a point where it’s not a democracy anymore.”

Aug. 19 (UPI) — The United Arab Emirates announced it was indefinitely severing trade relations with Iran on Wednesday after accusing Tehran of firing two ballistic missiles at it.

The move was announced by the UAE’s Foreign Affairs Ministry communications director, Afra Al Hameli, who said “in light of regional escalations that undermine regional and international peace and security, all trade, commercial exchanges and financial transactions with Iran have been halted until further notice.”

“The UAE remains firmly committed to safeguarding the integrity of the international financial system, in line with international law and the highest global standards,” she said in a statement, while stressing the UAE’s “steadfast commitment to dialogue cooperation and regional integration as essential means of advancing peace, stability and prosperity in the region.”

The UAE-Iran trade relationship was worth billions a year, with the Observatory of Economic Complexity platform stating the UAE exports nearly $6 billion in goods, mostly electronics, to Iran each year, while Iran exports nearly $500 million, mostly in grapes, nuts and crustaceans.

The announcement came hours after the UAE’s Ministry of Defense said its air defense systems had detected two ballistic missiles fired from Tehran toward maritime traffic, with both falling into the sea, one within the UAE’s territorial waters.

“The Ministry of Defense confirms that it is on high alert and readiness to deal with any threats, and to firmly confront everything that targets undermining the state’s security or the security of navigation in the region, thereby ensuring the preservation of the state’s sovereignty, security and stability, and protecting its interests and national capabilities,” it said in a statement.

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei rejected the accusations that Iran had launched missiles toward the UAE, saying Abu Dhabi was violating “the principle of good-neighborly relations” in doing so, Iran’s Mehr News Agency reported.

According to the UAE’s Ministry of Defense, its air defenses have engaged more than 550 ballistic missiles, 29 cruise missiles and more than 2,265 drones fired at it by Iran since the war began on Feb. 28. However, Tuesday’s launches were the first since May.

Aug. 18 (UPI) — Medical experts and a family member testified in a Massachusetts courtroom Tuesday that Lindsay Clancy’s mental health was so precarious that she cannot be held responsible for the strangulation deaths of her three children.

A trio of doctors and Clancy’s former mother-in-law, Susan Clancy, each testified in her defense as her attorneys sought to show the 36-year-old defendant is not guilty of murdering her children — 5-year-old Cora, 3-year-old Dawson and 8-month-old Callan — at their Duxbury, Mass., home on Jan. 24, 2023 due to mental illness.

While not denying she killed the children, they contend she is not criminally responsible because she was suffering from bipolar disorder and postpartum psychosis.

The Plymouth County, Mass., District Attorney’s Office, however, argues that Clancy was not experiencing psychosis when she strangled the children and jumped from a window, suffering permanent paralysis from the waist down.

After the prosecution rested its case last week, the defense continued with its own case.

Among the medical experts taking the stand Tuesday was Dr. Paul Zeizel, a clinical and forensic psychologist who testified about meeting with Clancy at the hospital after the killings.

After testifying that Clancy told him she had “fuzzy” memories of the killings, he said she told him she heard a man’s demanding she kill the children and then herself.

Zeizel forcefully suggestions of having “planted” that story with Clancy.

Also testifying for the defense was another medical expert, former medical examiner Dr. Elizabeth Laposata, who spoke about the injuries Clancy suffered in her suicide attempt in an apparent effort to counter prosecutors’ suggestions that she had not jumped out a window.

Another medical witness, Dr. Donald Condie, testified that Clancy exhibited symptoms consistent with postpartum depression, such as brain fog and anxiety.

The day’s testimony also included emotional words from Susan Clancy, the mother of Patrick Clancy, who said the couple had a “very good relationship,” WBTS-TV reported.

“She was very nurturing, very loving, she was a wonderful mother. Wonderful,” she said of Lindsay. “She loved her children, all of them, very, very much.”

A former nurse, Susan Clancy she said she noticed a change in Lindsay’s personality after the birth of Callan, the youngest child.

“She reached out to me in November and told me that she felt unwell,” she said. “Mostly, she had insomnia, she was losing her appetite, she was very anxious and sad.”

By chaining bilateral naval exercises across a widening circle of partners — Russia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, and now Indonesia — Beijing is not assembling an alliance. It is manufacturing the impression that a Chinese warship’s presence near every regional flashpoint, including the waters off Taiwan, is unremarkable.

On July 29th, the Indonesian frigate KRI I Gusti Ngurah Rai wrapped up a two-day naval drill with the Russian navy in Vladivostok, part of Exercise Orruda 2026. Two weeks later, on August 12th, China’s Ministry of National Defense announced that the same ship, on its way home, would run a “passing exercise” with a Chinese frigate, the Honghe — not in Indonesian waters, not in the South China Sea, but east of Taiwan. Jakarta’s navy described it in the blandest terms available: communications drills, a resupply run, “a universal naval tradition.” Taipei was not reassured. Taiwan’s foreign ministry said it “sternly condemns” the move and complained that Beijing had “unilaterally claimed” Indonesian participation before Jakarta had said a word about where, or why, this was happening.

That gap — between Jakarta’s shrug and Taipei’s alarm — is the story. It is also a useful corrective to how most coverage of Chinese naval activity is currently framed. The default lens is bilateral and confrontational: China versus the Philippines at Second Thomas Shoal, China versus Japan around the Senkakus, China versus Taiwan in the Strait. That lens catches real events, but it misses the connective tissue between them — a growing schedule of joint drills with third parties, each one small and individually deniable as “routine,” that collectively do something the confrontational track cannot: they make China’s presence in the surrounding water look normal to everyone except the state it is actually disputing with.

Indonesia and China have their own maritime dispute: Beijing’s nine-dash line overlaps Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone around the Natuna Islands, and Chinese fishing incursions there froze bilateral naval drills between 2015 and 2021. Those “Sharp Knife” exercises resumed in 2021 and have picked up pace since 2024. That history matters, but it is not what explains this month’s drill, because this drill did not happen anywhere near Natuna. It happened off Taiwan — waters Indonesia has no claim to and, until now, no naval presence in alongside China. Indonesia is simply the newest and most sensitive addition to a list that already includes Russia (the mature anchor partnership, most recently “Joint Sea-2026” in July), Malaysia (“Peace and Friendship 2025” in the Strait of Malacca last October), Cambodia (“Golden Dragon” at the newly built Ream Naval Base logistics center last spring), Thailand (“Blue Strike” and “Falcon Strike,” the latter launched again this month), and Vietnam (a Beibu Gulf coast guard and navy patrol series now past its fortieth iteration). All of this sits alongside a separate, unilateral track — a 100-plus-vessel show of force spanning the Yellow Sea to the western Pacific last December, and routine coast guard patrols around Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal.

The claim of this piece is that these two tracks are not separate stories about Chinese assertiveness. They are one story, working in tandem: the unilateral patrols draw the lines, and the bilateral drills erase them, by training a widening circle of regional navies — and the publics who read about them — to treat a Chinese warship’s presence near contested space as routine bilateral traffic rather than a signal.

The Indonesia case is the clearest evidence yet, because the location was Beijing’s choice, not Jakarta’s. Indonesia had no dispute-driven reason to be operating near Taiwan; its dispute with China sits in the Natuna Sea, hundreds of miles away. What Jakarta had was a frigate already at sea, returning from Russia, and a willingness to let Beijing choose the itinerary’s final leg. Global Times, writing for a domestic Chinese audience, called the drill’s timing “of great significance” — language China’s defense ministry does not use for routine port calls. The exercise also landed in the same week that Elbridge Colby, the U.S. Under Secretary of War for Policy, was in Jakarta courting Indonesia’s alignment. Chaining a Chinese passing exercise onto the tail of an Indonesian-Russian one, in waters adjacent to the most dangerous flashpoint in the region, at the exact moment Washington was making its own pitch, is not the profile of a routine bilateral courtesy call.

The strongest objection to this argument comes from analysts of Malaysia’s drills with China, who point out that Kuala Lumpur treats “Peace and Friendship” as a hedging tool it controls, not a concession Beijing extracted — the exercises are deliberately unsophisticated (humanitarian assistance, counter-piracy, no live fire), and Malaysia’s own defense establishment remains wary of Chinese assertiveness even as it participates. That is a fair description of Malaysia’s intent, and it likely holds for Cambodia and Thailand too: these governments are managing great-power competition on their own terms, not capitulating to it. But intent on the partner’s side does not determine the effect on Beijing’s side. Whatever Kuala Lumpur or Phnom Penh tell their own publics, every additional bilateral drill lowers the diplomatic and psychological cost, for Beijing, of being seen operating a warship near water someone else disputes. Indonesia’s case shows why that distinction matters: Jakarta’s intent was almost certainly routine — a frigate coming home. Beijing’s was not. It picked the coordinates.

None of this means China is close to fielding a formal coalition in the NATO sense; nothing here involves interoperability, shared command, or mutual defense. What it means is narrower and, in some ways, more useful to Beijing: a maintenance routine that makes normalization cumulative rather than a single dramatic claim to defend. Each additional partner adds one more government that has, at least once, treated a joint Chinese naval presence near contested water as unremarkable — and one more precedent for the next invitation.

The guest list is also instructive. The one claimant conspicuously absent from it is the Philippines — the country with the loudest ongoing disputes with Beijing, at Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal, and the one treaty ally the United States has directly on the South China Sea’s rim. Manila gets unilateral coercion, not invitations: coast guard patrols, water-cannon incidents, and jamming, rather than passing exercises. Every partner on the actual list — Russia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia — either has no U.S. mutual defense treaty or, like Thailand, treats its treaty commitments as dormant rather than active. That is not a coincidence; it is a selection criterion. Beijing is not inviting the states most capable of resisting the normalization effect. It is inviting the states most likely to accept it, and saving coercion for the one state structurally immune to the charm offensive.

What happens next

Base case (roughly 55 percent).  The Indonesia relationship deepens but recalibrates location. A higher-tempo revival of the Sharp Knife series continues, concentrated in Indonesian or South China Sea-adjacent waters near Natuna rather than repeated performances off Taiwan. Jakarta absorbs the diplomatic cost of this month’s episode privately — quiet reassurances to Taipei and Washington — while keeping the relationship with Beijing intact. The key assumption: the backlash from Taiwan and the attention from Washington made a second Taiwan-adjacent rerun more costly to Jakarta than its benefit to Beijing.

Downside case.  Beijing repeats the chaining tactic with a second partner within the next twelve months, most plausibly Brunei — the quietest South China Sea claimant, which in February 2025 already agreed to joint oil-and-gas development with Beijing in disputed waters it claims. A first-ever Brunei-China passing exercise, timed to overlap with a Brunei exercise involving another power and staged near a genuinely contested reef rather than international water, would confirm this is a repeatable playbook rather than an Indonesia-specific improvisation — and would be far harder for the U.S. and Japan to counter, since Brunei has never been a vocal claimant to rally around.

Upside case.  Taiwan’s public condemnation, paired with Washington’s trilateral drills with Australia and the Philippines, hardens into an explicit regional habit of naming the chaining tactic itself — not just the individual exercise — making it reputationally costly for the next candidate partner to accept the choreography. The coalition-of-drills strategy stalls not because China stops asking, but because fewer navies say yes.

The takeaway

Beijing did not build a coalition off Taiwan this month; it borrowed one, for two days, from a country with no stake in the fight. That is a cheaper and more durable tool than a formal alliance would be, and it will not show up as a single dramatic escalation — it will show up as a pattern, one passing exercise at a time.

Watch for:  whether Indonesia’s navy does it again, and where. A repeat performance near another sensitive location within the next two quarters would confirm the pattern; a retreat to home waters would suggest Jakarta drew its own line. Watch, too, whether Brunei’s navy — quiet for decades — puts to sea with a Chinese frigate for the first time following its 2025 oil-and-gas pledge in disputed waters.

Aug. 18 (UPI) — Russia is warning Britain that there will be “consequences” following reports that Ukraine has struck within Russian territory with drones provided by London and made by British companies.

In a statement Tuesday, the Embassy of Russia to the United Kingdom accused London of escalating Russia’s war against Ukraine by providing the weaponry, while chastising it for “hypocritically professing a desire for peace.”

“London’s actions will inevitably carry consequences for which it will have to answer,” the embassy said.

“The deeper its involvement in the conflict and the greater its support of Kiev’s terrorist machinery, the higher the price it will pay.”

Britain has been an ardent supporter of Ukraine’s defense against Russia, which invaded its eastern neighbor in February 2022, launching the four-year war.

According to a July factsheet from the British government, London has committed more than $33 billion to Ukraine, including more than $21.6 billion in military assistance.

Britain has for years been focused on supplying Ukraine with drones, which have proved effective in Kyiv’s defense against the Kremlin. In April, its Ministry of Defense announced it would deliver at least 120,000 drones to Ukraine by the end of this year, a number it increased to 150,000 in June.

The threat from the embassy follows reports stating drones built by British companies were being used by Ukraine to hit targets within the borders of Russia, resulting in more than $47.3 billion in damages.

In response to the embassy, Britain’s Ministry of Defense told BBC News in a statement that London stands “shoulder to shoulder” with Kyiv.

“Russia should be in no doubt about the resolve of this government to stand against Russian aggression, in Ukraine and against the UK and our allies,” the ministry spokesperson said.

SEOUL, Aug. 18 (UPI) — U.S. President Donald Trump said Monday that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has responded to his overtures for talks, one day after he ordered a sweeping reduction in U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises, citing his “very good relationship” with Kim.

Trump made the remarks during a press availability in the Oval Office, fueling speculation that his directive could be aimed at reopening dialogue with Pyongyang.

Asked why Kim had not responded to his requests for a conversation, Trump replied, “How do you know he hasn’t responded?”

“He has,” Trump said when pressed. He declined to elaborate, saying only that developments were “very positive.”

Trump went on to tout his personal relationship with Kim, saying the North Korean leader had “always treated me with great respect.”

“I understand him. He understands me,” Trump said. “He didn’t like Biden. He didn’t like Obama. He didn’t like anybody, but I get along with him very well.”

In a Truth Social post on Sunday, Trump said the allies’ Ulchi Freedom Shield drills, which began Monday, are expensive and “send a signal that is totally inappropriate and hostile” to North Korea. He said Pyongyang “has been unthreatening and respectful” while he has been in the White House.

Trump also noted that South Korea declined his request to help with the denuclearization of Iran.

“Therefore, and based on the fact that it is too late to cancel, I have instructed Secretary of War, Pete Hegseth, to substantially reduce the Joint Military Exercises!” he wrote.

In a text message to reporters on Monday, an official with Seoul’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said the Ulchi Freedom Shield drills had started as scheduled.

“The UFS exercise is proceeding as planned,” the official said.

Later in the day, the presidential Blue House released a statement saying that Seoul was “paying close attention” to Trump’s comments, adding that it hoped friendly relations between Washington and Pyongyang would lead to meaningful peace talks between the two countries.

“To this end, we will exert necessary diplomatic efforts as a pacemaker under close cooperation with the United States,” the statement said.

The Blue House added that it has actively participated in international discussions for a cease-fire in Iran and freedom of passage in the Strait of Hormuz and is “closely discussing practical and military contribution measures with the U.S. side.”

As of Tuesday, it was not clear what aspects of the exercise would be reduced under Trump’s order. In a statement reported by news agency Yonhap, the Pentagon said it “is actively working on executing the Commander-in-Chief’s directive.”

The order drew criticism from Democrats in Congress, who warned that reducing the exercises could undermine military readiness and weaken confidence in U.S. security commitments.

“When President Trump cuts military exercises to flatter a dictator or punishes South Korea for declining to join a war he started, all of our allies — and adversaries — think that America’s commitments are negotiable,” Sen. Jack Reed, the ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said in a statement. “Kim Jong Un has won a propaganda victory and South Korea, one of our strongest allies, has been punished for no reason beyond Trump’s ego.”

Peter Lee, a research fellow at the Seoul-based Asan Institute for Policy Studies, said Trump’s order reflects his transactional approach to the alliance and longstanding skepticism about the costs of U.S. military commitments in South Korea.

“This latest directive should also be seen as a reminder that President Trump still has many cards he can play to pressure South Korea,” Lee told UPI. “The task for the Lee administration is therefore how to reduce this ‘unfaithful ally’ narrative that President Trump periodically returns to and instead lean into the ‘model ally’ framing that others such as [Defense] Secretary Hegseth have touted.”

Victor Cha, Korea chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said Trump’s move went beyond his repeated public overtures to Kim and appeared aimed at drawing the North Korean leader back to the negotiating table.

“This is really the first concrete action he’s taken to try to entice Kim, and he’s used the timing of these exercises as the way to do it,” Cha said during a CSIS discussion Monday.

Pyongyang has not yet publicly responded to Trump’s announcement, and Cha said he did not expect an immediate reaction.

“I’m sure it’s a message that’s been heard … but I don’t think the North Koreans are going to respond right away,” he said. “I think they’re going to bide their time and wait a little bit.”

Trump similarly called for suspending or scaling back the exercises since his first term, when he pursued direct diplomacy with Kim that included summits in Singapore and Hanoi and a brief meeting at the DMZ.

After the Singapore summit in 2018, Trump surprised observers by announcing that the United States would halt what he called “provocative” joint military exercises with South Korea. That year’s Ulchi Freedom Guardian exercise was canceled, while several subsequent drills were reduced in scale.

In his White House press availability, Trump denied that he was prioritizing North Korea over Washington’s allies in South Korea.

“I’m actually making it much safer,” he said in response to a question.

Trump also elaborated on his request for South Korea’s assistance with the war in Iran, saying he raised the issue in a recent call with President Lee Jae Myung.

“I said, ‘Would you like to give us a little hand? We don’t need help with Iran, but if you’d like, give us a hand with Iran.’ He said, ‘No thanks,'” Trump said.

Trump said he viewed Seoul’s refusal as a matter of “fairness,” citing the cost of maintaining U.S. forces in South Korea and his longstanding push for Seoul to shoulder more of the expense.

“We have 39,000 soldiers over there guarding you from Kim Jong Un, your next-door neighbor, and you are not going to help us on a very easy military operation in Iran,” he said.

The United States has roughly 28,500 troops stationed in South Korea.

Later Monday, Trump posted a meme of Kim on his Truth Social account. The image showed the North Korean leader surrounded by military officials and speaking into a telephone, with the caption: “Hey Donald, we cool … right?”

Aug. 18 (UPI) — The Pentagon has directed 30 U.S. academic institutions to immediately and comprehensively review their collaborations for ties to “foreign entities of concern” under threat of losing future federal research funding.

The Department of Defense announced the directive Monday, giving the unidentified institutions until Aug. 31 to report their findings in order to maintain eligibility for federal grants.

“Universities are critical partners in executing a wide range of Department of War research programs, and the Department must therefore ensure that our research investments are well protected from foreign exploitation,” Joseph Jewell, assistant secretary of Defense for Science and Technology, said in a statement, referring to the Defense Department by its secondary title authorized by President Donald Trump last year. Its statutory name remains the Department of Defense.

The audits are part of a broader effort to protect Defense Department research from foreign adversaries and follow legislation Congress passed in December 2024 as part of the fiscal 2025 National Defense Authorization Act requiring annual reviews of research grants for compliance with Pentagon research-security policies.

The institutions are to review academic, financial and research ties with entities identified under Section 1286 of the fiscal year 2019 NDAA, as well as those associated with rebranded Confucius Institutes.

The list includes 130 academic and research institutions located in China, Russia and Iran. The list was updated last month.

The Pentagon said the audits are to protect U.S. taxpayer-funded research from getting into the hands of adversarial nations as well as from unauthorized transfer and intellectual property theft. It added that the audits will also aid the Department of Defense in better anticipating emerging threats and adapting to evolving adversarial tactics.

The Department of Defense “has zero tolerance for academic partnerships that compromise our national security,” Emil Michael, under secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, said in a statement.

The institutions are also being directed to implement mitigation plans that include terminating what the Pentagon called “problematic partnerships.”

The U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has plans for a new radar to succeed the AN/TPY-2. The AN/TPY-2 is most commonly associated with the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ballistic missile defense system, but it can also be used as a stand-alone sensor in a larger integrated air defense network. MDA’s main desire now is to find a more mobile radar system to make them less susceptible to enemy missile and drone attacks. Iran’s successful targeting of largely static missile defense radars this year, including the reported destruction of at least one AN/TPY-2, has been a wake-up call to just how vulnerable these prized assets have become already. TWZ explored this reality and its implications in a detailed feature earlier this year.

MDA put out a call yesterday for “innovative prototype concepts” for what it is currently calling the Forward-Based Mode (FBM) Radar Next. This notably came just ahead of the annual Space & Missile Defense (SMD) Symposium in Huntsville, Alabama, that opened today and at which TWZ is in attendance.

The contracting notice stresses that the agency is currently in the pre-solication phase of this effort, but that it does have plans to eventually pursue these prototypes through an Other Transaction Authority (OTA) agreement. OTA is a mechanism typically used to support rapid prototyping and other research and development work outside of a typical and often drawn-out contracting process. In its budget request for the 2027 Fiscal Year, which was released earlier this year, MDA also explicitly asked for funding for a pair of “next generation radar prototypes to prove out and mature emerging technologies for the future FBM Radar fleet.”

For some additional context, MDA uses the term FBM here to refer to a radar used to detect threats, traditionally ballistic missiles, after launch. Deployable radars like the AN/TPY-2 employed in this role are typically emplaced at semi-permanent sites. The U.S. military also has higher-end static strategic radar sites around the globe, along with space-based assets, to help provide additional layers of early warning detection.

FBM is one of two typical modes of operation for the X-band AN/TPY-2. The other is a terminal mode where the radar is used to cue interceptors to incoming threats. As mentioned, AN/TPY-2 is most commonly used in the terminal mode as part of the THAAD system, but it also has a demonstrated ability to feed data to Patriot surface-to-air missile systems.

At the time of writing, the U.S. military is publicly known to have two AN/TPY-2s deployed in the FBM mode in Japan, as well as three more at sites in Israel, Qatar, and Turkey. Additional AN/TPY-2 are also currently forward-deployed elsewhere globally as a component of the THAAD system.

AN/TYP-2s, as well as the generators needed to power them, are trailer-mounted and technically road mobile. However, they are not designed to be very rapidly relocated from one site to another. This brings us back to the FBM Radar Next.

“As adversarial missile capabilities become increasingly sophisticated, the need for agile, survivable, and highly precise forward-based sensors has never been greater. Current static or semi-mobile radars are vulnerable to counterattacks and lack the rapid relocation capabilities necessary for modern distributed operations,” the pre-solication notice explains. “FBM Radar Next will close this gap by providing a system that can be quickly transported, set up, and operated in austere forward locations while maintaining interoperability with existing Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) networks.”

In terms of transportability and deployability requirements, “the system must be capable of rapid deployment and transport via C-17 military airlift and tactical ground vehicles,” the notice says. “The radar must demonstrate rapid setup and teardown times (e.g., operational within specified hours of arrival, and tear down within minutes to maximize survivability).”

The next-generation radar must also be capable of “high-sensitivity detection, persistent tracking, and precise discrimination of advanced threats in high-clutter and contested electromagnetic environments,” the notice continues. MDA also wants “engineered physical, thermal, and electromagnetic signatures to
ensure platform survivability in contested environments.”

Furthermore, “the design must support remote operations, command and control integration, and automated system health monitoring,” the notice adds. Minimizing the onsite operator footprint is critical to improving personnel safety and increasing overall tactical flexibility.”

MDA wants the FBM Radar Next to be able to slot into more “versatile deployment architectures, with the capability to operate either as a highly integrated single aperture or as multiple distributed arrays to optimize geographical coverage, sensitivity, survivability, or electronic protection.” In line with this demand, there are additional requirements for a modular design with open architecture systems, as well as seamless integration with the existing Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) architecture.

The MDA video below highlights the general capabilities of the C2BMC architecture in the context of a notional engagement of a hypersonic threat utilizing the still-in-development Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI).

GPI Scenario Animation

A highly networked and distributed concept of operations could open the door to more novel radar configurations, including ones involving larger groups of smaller types, to succeed the AN/TPY-2. Smaller individual radars could also have reduced signatures, be easier to conceal, and be more readily relocatable, all helping to reduce vulnerability. This could also make the entire system more resilient in the event that nodes are lost or otherwise rendered inoperable for any reason.

There could be benefits in terms of unit cost and scalability of production from such an approach, too. Prime contractor Raytheon is understood to have only produced 16 AN/TPY-2s to date, in total, for all customers, not just the U.S. military. The unit cost of a single one of those radars is generally pegged at around $250 to $300 million, and these are long-lead-time items that take years to deliver.

“The system design must prioritize manufacturing ease, design-for-manufacturing-and-assembly (DFMA) principles, and cost-efficiency. It is critical that the prototype demonstrates a viable pathway to rapid, high-volume production at an affordable unit cost,” MDA’s FBM Radar Next notice makes clear. “This ensures the capability to quickly scale production and cost-effectively replace radar units in highly active forward-deployed environments.”

Regardless of the approach MDA ultimately decides to pursue, the threat ecosystem that is driving the FBM Radar Next plans is real now, and is not just limited to enemy missile attacks. Weaponized drones, especially long-range one-way attack types, present real dangers to high-value targets. This fact had already been driven firmly into the public consciousness by the ongoing war in Ukraine. It has now been further demonstrated by Iran’s aforementioned targeting of prized air and missile defense radars around the Middle East during fighting earlier this year. The ramifications of all of this go well beyond these particular conflict zones, too.

As we wrote back in March after Iran’s very deliberate targeting of U.S. and allied radars became clear:

“Strategic air and missile architectures, in general, exist in a world now where the threats they face are not limited to very-long-range standoff capabilities possessed only by peer or near-peer adversaries.“

“It used to be, generally, that you had to fire a ballistic missile or high-end cruise missile in an attempt to strike one of these systems. Now, long-range one-way-attack drones, as well as increasingly capable cruise and ballistic missiles, continue to proliferate steadily, including to smaller nation-state armed forces and even non-state actors. An attack could even come from a small drone with a C4 charge launched from a fishing trawler 10 miles away from one of these critical radar installations. The threat of these kinds of near-field attacks has largely been overlooked for years, even as the low-end drone threat has exploded and ‘democratized’ precision-guided weaponry, as they did not fit the established aerial threat matrix and the countermeasures used to repel those threats.”

…

“The scale and scope of Iran’s retaliatory attacks so far, while clearly threatening, pale in comparison to what one would expect to see in a major high-end fight between the United States and China in the Pacific. The overall ramifications would also be more severe.“

“Beyond the more immediate impacts of losing this kind of strategic radar coverage, there are far larger implications. In some cases, these radars are designed to provide critical early warning and verification of incoming nuclear strikes, or other large-scale attacks by a major adversary, targeting a nation’s home soil. They are critical parts of the nuclear deterrent. As such, losing these sensors can have major downstream impacts on strategic decision-making cycles based on concerns about what suddenly is not being seen. Fewer radars also means fewer ways to double-check that a track is not a false positive in a scenario where the total available decision-making time could be seriously truncated, to begin with. These are concerns TWZ explicitly highlighted after Ukraine’s attack on the Armavir Radar Station in Russia in 2024.”

During a panel discussion at the SMD Symposium today, U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Richard Zellmann, Deputy Commander of U.S Space Command, further underscored the reality of the current threat ecosystem, including one-way attack drones layered in with traditional missile barrages. The general also highlighted the impact of more readily available space-enabled targeting and navigation capabilities.

“We see, I think, the low end on Epic Fury [the official nickname for U.S. operations against Iran earlier this year]. Sure, the missiles are more high-end, but we’ve seen our adversary employ a number of one-way attack systems that are coupled with these ballistic missile volleys,” Zellman explained. “We are really at this point in the history of warfare because of the democratization of space. Space isn’t a sanctuary. It’s no longer just the playground of nations with a lot of money.”

“The commercialization of space has created what many call essentially a transparent battlefield. And because I can see everything all the time with commercial ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; in this case primarily satellite imagery], it’s given our adversaries capabilities that they haven’t had in the past,” he continued. “That ISR, if you couple it with a platform that has access to GPS or some other PNT [Position, Navigation, and Timing] system, and then you add in another layer of over-the-horizon comms, like say from an Iridium or a Starlink [satellite communications terminal], and you have a pretty lethal asymmetric weapon system that our adversaries can get a hold of.”

Munitions that use GPS, or a similar form of navigation, alone for guidance are only employable against static targets. This, in turn, only drives home even more the importance of the transportability and deployability requirements that are at the heart of the FBM Radar Next plan.

It’s also important to note that, like AN/TPY-2 now, FBM Radar Next will still be just one part of a larger air and missile defense architecture. In our analysis earlier this year, we noted that Iranian attacks on radars in the Middle East had reinforced arguments for new layered defenses to protect those and other prized assets and for migrating more early warning and missile tracking capabilities into space. There is still a question of how much of that functionality will be shared and eventually ported over into orbital sensing capabilities. As Lt. Gen. Zellmann pointed out today, threats to space-based capabilities continue to grow, and that domain can no longer be considered a sanctuary, either. Having a layered, redundant, and flexible mix of terrestrial and orbital sensing for ballistic missile tracking will remain highly important for the foreseeable future.

What exactly a successor to the AN/TPY-2 looks like in the end remains to be seen. What is clear now is that very real missile and drone threats have prompted a major rethinking on the part of MDA about how future missile defense radars will need to be employed to ensure they can survive going forward.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Aug. 17 (UPI) — Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service accused the intelligence services of a Western country of preparing, together with Ukraine, an operation aimed at portraying Moscow as an illegal supplier of weapons to drug cartels and organized crime groups in Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela.

The Russian agency said in a statement that Russian-made weapons captured by Ukrainian forces during the war are being transported to the three Latin American countries to be used as part of the operation.

According to the Foreign Intelligence Service, those responsible are also preparing photographs and videos intended to show Russia supplying weapons to Latin American criminal organizations through intermediaries.

The agency said the materials would be accompanied by forged documents seeking to link representatives of the Russian Armed Forces to the weapons transfers.

“The authors of this provocation naively hope in this way to undermine Russia’s constructive relations with the countries of this region and induce Latin American governments to support the anti-Russian policy pursued by the West,” the intelligence service said.

The statement did not identify the Western country it accused of orchestrating the operation or provide public evidence to support the allegations.

Russian intelligence said the objective would be to damage Moscow’s relations with Latin American countries and bring their governments closer to Western policies toward Russia.

As of Monday, the governments of Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela had not publicly responded to the allegations. Ukraine had also not issued an official response to the new statement.

The accusation comes after Russia previously linked Ukraine to Mexican criminal organizations. In late June, Russian officials accused Kyiv of maintaining ties with Mexican cartels, allegations that the Ukrainian Embassy in Mexico publicly rejected.

The Ukrainian diplomatic mission at the time described the claims as part of a Russian disinformation campaign and denied that Ukraine had ties to Mexican drug trafficking organizations.

In the final part of its Monday statement, the Foreign Intelligence Service framed the accusation within what it described as an information war waged by “Euro-Atlantic elites” against Russia since the start of the conflict in Ukraine.

The Russian agency cited as precedents the April 2022 Bucha massacre, which it described as a “bloody staging,” and the 1939 Gleiwitz incident, a false-flag operation carried out by Nazi Germany before the invasion of Poland.