war

Iran’s World Cup team arrives in Turkiye amid US visa uncertainty | US-Israel war on Iran

NewsFeed

Iran’s national football team has arrived in Turkiye for a pre-World Cup training camp, but players are yet to receive visas for entry into the US. FIFA says it is confident Iran will be able to play in next month’s tournament despite the uncertainty.

Source link

As trade war with China looms, how can the EU defend itself?

As Chinese-made products are flooding the EU market and threatening thousands of jobs, the European Commission is stepping up its work to protect the bloc’s production from the risks of China’s excess production.


ADVERTISEMENT


ADVERTISEMENT

The move comes as data from Chinese customs showed that, in the first four months of 2026, Beijing accumulated a surplus of $113 billion with the EU-27, up from $91 billion over the same period in 2025. The surplus widened by $22 billion over 12 month, while the EU’s trade deficit with China had already reached €359.9 billion in 2025.

Pressure is also mounting on Brussels as Beijing has repeatedly threatened retaliation in recent weeks over several EU laws limiting access to the single market for Chinese companies.

On Friday, China also banned these companies from engaging with the Commission over EU foreign subsidy investigations.

To address the China issue and try to restore a level playing field, EU Commissioners are set to debate the matter on 29 May. What options does Europe have on the table?

1. Cutting dependence on Chinese components

The Financial Times reported on Monday that a plan to force EU companies to buy critical components from at least three different suppliers was in the pipeline at the European Commission.

The idea would be to set thresholds of around 30% to 40% for what can be bought from a single supplier, with the rest having to be sourced from at least three different suppliers, not all from the same country.

The proposal comes after China last year restricted exports of rare earths and chips, which are critical for key EU industries such as green tech, cars and defence.

2. Targeting strategic sectors with tariffs

In its economic security strategy presented last December, the European Commission also said it would present new tools by September 2026 to strengthen the protection of EU industry from unfair trade policies and overcapacities.

“We will fight tooth and nail for every European job, for every European company, for every open sector, if we see they are treated unfairly,” Maroš Šefčovič told Euronews.

A decision to impose new quotas and double tariffs on global steel imports, dominated by Chinese overcapacities, was already agreed by EU countries and the European Parliament in April.

Now the chemical industry is in the spotlight. Chinese chemical imports have surged 81% over five years. But the EU chemical sector also relies on exports abroad, including to China, the industry’s fourth export market, which makes any measure targeting China complicated.

“As an export-oriented industry, the European chemical industry generates over 30% of its sales abroad. That creates a risk of retaliation from third countries,” Philipp Sauer, trade expert at Cefic, the lobby group of the European chemical industry, told Euronews.

3. Hitting imports with anti-dumping or anti-subsidy duties

The Commission can also impose duties on Chinese companies when import prices fall below those at which they sell their products on their domestic market. It can also investigate companies for receiving unfair subsidies.

However, investigations can take up to 18 months, and cases are piling up at the Commission’s DG Trade, which has only around 140 officials to handle them.

Sauer said that between one third and half of all ongoing investigations relate to the chemical sector.

4. Using the Anti-Coercion Instrument

The Anti-Coercion Instrument is a last-resort tool — the so-called trade bazooka — which can be used in cases of economic pressure from a third country and would allow the EU to hit China with strong measures such as restricting access to licences or public procurement in the EU.

But its use would require the backing of a qualified majority of member states, which is not guaranteed.

Germany opposed tariffs adopted by the EU in 2024 against Chinese electric vehicles. Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, who has visited China four times in three years, also supports closer ties with Beijing, seeking to secure major Chinese investment.

5. Unifying member states

At the same time, Brussels faces the risk that its decoupling strategy might face significant resistance from national governments. EU member states remain divided over how to approach China, which could in turn allow Beijing to play capitals against each other.

Such differences are already emerging in the information and communications technology (ICT) sector, where the EU has proposed a new mechanism requiring the phase-out of so-called high-risk suppliers, such as Huawei and ZTE, in strategic industries, starting with telecommunications.

The proposal, included in the revamp of the EU Cybersecurity Act, is sparking controversy among several European governments, most notably Spain and Germany, which have long worked with Chinese equipment now deeply embedded in their digital infrastructure.

This de-risking strategy has also raised financial concerns, since Chinese suppliers tend to be much cheaper than European alternatives such as Ericsson and Nokia, partly because they are publicly subsidised by Beijing.

European telecom operators have asked the EU for financial compensation to replace their Chinese equipment, following the example of the US “rip and replace” programme, but neither the EU nor national governments seem keen to put the money on the table.

In other words, the EU’s full decoupling from China might have high political and economic costs.

Whether European countries are willing to bear it remains to be seen.

Source link

How war affects civilians for generations | TV Shows

War can have a hidden legacy that no one talks about.

For hundreds of thousands of people, today’s wars and genocides will never truly end.

The violence that civilians endure leaves deep, lasting scars – physical, psychological and life-altering. Long after the fighting stops, those wounds continue to shape daily life and entire communities for decades to come.

Join Ali Rae for episode three of All Hail the Military, a five-part series that reveals the systems, power and hidden complicities that sustain global militarism – and the profound impact it has on us all.

Source link

Israel built two military bases in Iraq before war on Iran: New York Times | Military News

Israeli forces had been preparing the makeshift sites in western Iraq since late 2024, the US newspaper reported.

Israel built two covert military outposts in Iraq’s western desert in advance of the US-Israel war on Iran, The New York Times has reported.

The daily reported on Sunday that Iraqi officials had identified two covert Israeli-operated base in Iraq’s western desert, citing an Iraqi official and a lawmaker. It said Israeli forces had been preparing to build one of the makeshift sites since late 2024, citing a regional official.

Recommended Stories

list of 4 itemsend of list

Last week, The Wall Street Journal reported that one base was established shortly before the war began and operated with the knowledge of the United States. It said the installation housed Israeli special forces and served as a logistical hub for their air operations. It also reportedly included search-and-rescue capabilities for downed pilots.

According to the newspaper, Israeli forces launched attacks from the base against Iraqi units that came close to discovering the site in early March. Open-source analysts cited by the report identified the suspected location using satellite imagery near Iraq’s border with Saudi Arabia.

The reports have added to months of conflicting accounts over alleged Israeli activity inside Iraq. On Thursday, Lieutenant-General Qais al-Muhammadawi, Iraq’s deputy commander of joint operations, said authorities had received reports of “individuals or movement” in the Najaf desert near Karbala, about 100km (62 miles) southwest of Baghdad, according to the state-run Iraqi News Agency.

The WSJ also referenced comments made in March by Israel’s former air force chief, Major-General Tomer Bar, who said Israeli special forces had carried out “extraordinary” operations during the conflict with Iran, though he did not specify where.

Iraqi officials have publicly denied authorising any foreign military presence in the area. “There is no agreement or consent for any force to be present in this location,” al-Muhammadawi said last week, before the details of the alleged Israeli outpost were reported.

However, the WSJ report said Baghdad privately lodged a protest with Washington in late March over suspected covert military activity, calling it a violation of Iraqi sovereignty.

US officials quoted by the newspaper said Washington was not involved in the operation. On Sunday, a senior Iraqi security official again denied reports that Israel had established a military base in the desert, speaking to Turkiye’s Anadolu news agency.

On Tuesday, the commander of Iraq’s Karbala operations told Al Jazeera that an Israeli military group had been detected in the Najaf desert in March, although he said it had remained in the area for less than 48 hours.

The reports come as Iraq faces growing pressure amid escalating tensions between the US, Israel and Iran.

Washington has repeatedly urged Baghdad to curb the influence of Iran-backed armed groups operating in Iraq. In March, US forces carried out strikes against the Popular Mobilisation Forces after attacks on a US diplomatic and logistics facility near Baghdad airport.

Iran has also raised concerns over the allegations. Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei said on Monday that Tehran would raise the issue with Iraqi authorities. He accused Israel of seeking to destabilise the region.

“Israel’s behaviour in the region shows that they do not respect any limits or red lines,” Baghaei said.

Source link

Iran war day 80: Trump issues warning; Tehran ready to confront aggression | US-Israel war on Iran News

The fear of renewed US strikes in Iran looms while Israeli attacks continue in Lebanon despite extended ‘ceasefire’.

United States President Donald Trump has warned Iran that the “clock is ticking” to clinch a deal to end the war as reports have emerged that Washington and Israel might be planning to carry out air strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure.

“For Iran, the Clock is Ticking, and they better get moving, FAST, or there won’t be anything left of them,” Trump wrote on his Truth Social platform. “TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE!”

Iranian Ministry of Defence spokesperson Reza Talaei-Nik said on Sunday that the military is “fully prepared” to confront any new aggression from the US and Israel.

Saudi Arabia on Monday said it intercepted three drones, a day after a drone strike hit the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant in the United Arab Emirates.

Meanwhile, Israel has continued its bombardment of Lebanon despite another “ceasefire” extension.

As the US-Israeli war on Iran continues for its 80th day, here is what we know:INTERACTIVE_LIVETRACKER_IRAN_US_ISRAEL_MIDDLEEAST_ATTACKS_MAY5_2026_GMT1435-1777992258

In Iran

  • Mohsen Rezaei, a member of Tehran’s Expediency Council and former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander, issued a warning to the US to lift its blockade of Iranian ports, saying the Iranian military is ready for further confrontation. Rezaei made this warning while speaking to state television.
  • Talaei-Nik said the Iranian armed forces are “fully prepared to confront any new potential attack by the US and the Israeli regime against the country”.

War diplomacy

  • Mikhail Ulyanov, Russia’s envoy to international organisations in Vienna, suggested in an X post that Iran appoint a special envoy to Moscow, similar to Tehran’s arrangement with China.
  • In an X post, Jean-Luc Melenchon, the leading figure of France’s left-wing La France Insoumise party, condemned “European complicity” in the US-Israeli strikes on Iran, which have triggered a wider regional war.

In the Gulf

  • The New York Times reported that the Israeli military has operated two “covert” outposts in Iraq’s western desert and killed a shepherd and a soldier in a bid to hide one of the sites near the town of al-Nukhaib.
  • After the drone attack on the nuclear facility caused a fire, the UAE Ministry of Defence said two other drones had been “successfully” dealt with after they were launched from the “western border”. It did not elaborate.
  • The drone that got through the UAE’s defences hit an electrical generator outside the inner perimeter of the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant, the Abu Dhabi Media Office said. Radiological safety levels were unaffected, and there were no injuries, it said. The UAE’s Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation later confirmed that the plant remained safe with no radioactive material released from the strike.
  • Saudi Arabia said the three drones it intercepted entered from Iraqi airspace and warned that it would take the necessary operational measures to respond to any attempt to violate its sovereignty and security.

In the US

  • Marjorie Taylor Greene, a former US congresswoman and a once-close ally of Trump, has warned in a post on X that any attempt to send US troops into Iran would trigger what she described as a “political revolution”.
  • Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, speaking to the NBC broadcaster, urged Trump to “hurt” Iran, including launching attacks on its energy sites, until it agrees to US terms on its nuclear programme. The US and Israel have hit civilian targets multiple times during the war on Iran. Attacks on civilian facilities are considered war crimes under international law.

In Israel

  • Israel’s Channel 13 reported that dozens of US cargo planes carrying ammunition from bases in Germany have landed in Tel Aviv.
  • Israeli media reported that the military is preparing for renewed hostilities with Iran. The public broadcaster Kan quoted an unnamed security official as saying that Israel would join any new US strikes and target Iranian energy infrastructure.

In Lebanon

  • Israeli strikes have continued in southern Lebanon, where Israel issued evacuation orders for four towns and villages and then struck two of those locations.
  • Strikes were also reported in Az-Zrariyah on a moving vehicle while another raid in Tayr Debba resulted in some significant casualty numbers, Al Jazeera’s Obaida Hitto reported from Tyre, Lebanon.

Global markets

  • Stalled peace efforts between Iran and the US caused oil prices to rise again on Monday. This pushed the price of the global benchmark Brent crude up to about $111 per barrel, close to its highest level in weeks.

Source link

After the Iran War: Seven Dynamics That Will Define the New Middle East

Every major war in the Middle East has left the region permanently altered in ways that nobody fully anticipated at the time. The 1948 Arab-Israeli war created a refugee crisis whose consequences are still being negotiated seventy-eight years later. The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran reorganized the entire regional security architecture around a new fault line that nobody had planned for. The 2003 US invasion of Iraq created a vacuum that Iran filled faster and more effectively than anyone in Washington had anticipated, reshaping the balance of power across the Levant in ways that took a decade to fully understand.

The 2026 Iran war belongs in that category. Not because the outcome is clear, it is not, and the ceasefire that is currently holding is fragile enough that anyone claiming certainty about what comes next is not paying close enough attention. But because the war has already crossed several thresholds that cannot be uncrossed, set several precedents that will shape behavior for years, and broken several assumptions that the regional order was quietly depending on without anyone fully acknowledging it.

Here are seven dynamics that will define the Middle East that emerges from this war, whenever the shooting finally stops for good.

1.      Iran Survives, But the Rules It Played By Are Gone

The Tehran regime is still standing. That matters, and it is worth saying plainly before anything else, because a significant part of the war’s logic, the publicly unstated part, was the hope that Operation Epic Fury would produce regime collapse or at minimum regime change. It did not. The Islamic Republic absorbed the largest US-Israeli military campaign in the region’s modern history, lost its Supreme Leader, saw its nuclear facilities damaged and its military degraded, and is still there.

What has changed is the calculation the regime makes about its own survival. Iran’s leadership watched the same sequence of events that every other government in the region watched: a country that was in active nuclear negotiations got bombed twice during those negotiations. The deterrence lesson available from that sequence is not subtle. Iran’s longstanding policy of maintaining a threshold nuclear capability, staying close to the bomb without building one, using ambiguity as leverage has been tested and found insufficient. The regime that emerges from this war is going to look at that record and draw conclusions about what kind of deterrence actually works. North Korea tested a weapon and got personal summits with an American president. Iran negotiated in good faith and got bombed. Those two data points are now sitting side by side in every serious strategic conversation happening in Tehran.

The regime will also be more paranoid domestically. The war followed the January 2026 protests in which security forces killed at least 30,000 people. A weakened regime with depleted military resources and a traumatized population is not a stable combination. The survival instinct will dominate everything else in the near term, including any serious diplomatic engagement, which is part of why the Islamabad nuclear talks failed and why any future negotiations will start from an even lower baseline of trust than the ones that preceded the war.

2.      The Gulf Has Been Permanently Unsettled

The Gulf Cooperation Council states did not start this war. They absorbed it anyway. Bahrain depleted 87% of its Patriot interceptor stocks. Kuwait and the UAE spent roughly 75% of theirs. Saudi Arabia’s critical east-west pipeline was struck directly. Abu Dhabi’s main gas complex caught fire. Fujairah’s oil refinery burned. More than 60 combined drone and missile attacks hit Kuwait and the UAE in a single day during the Project Freedom escalation. The Gulf’s carefully constructed image as a zone of stability, safety, and economic transformation, the image that had attracted trillions in foreign investment and tens of millions of expatriate workers, was shattered in a way that will take years to rebuild, if it can be rebuilt at all.

The Middle East Council on Global Affairs described the war as having “irreversibly shaken” the region’s image, exposing deep-seated fragility beneath the facade of the Gulf’s rapid economic transformation. The word “irreversibly” is doing real work in that sentence. Previous crises, the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the 2019 Aramco attacks, were absorbed and the narrative of Gulf stability recovered relatively quickly. This war lasted over seventy days, struck civilian infrastructure repeatedly, disrupted food supplies across countries that import the vast majority of their calories, and demonstrated that the bilateral security relationships with Washington that Gulf states had invested so heavily in did not prevent them from becoming targets.

The UAE’s decision to leave OPEC on May 1 is one visible expression of the strategic rethink underway. The Gulf states are going to emerge from this war less willing to subordinate their security architecture to any single patron and more interested in building the kind of integrated regional defense capacity that would give them options Washington cannot or will not provide. The differences among the six GCC states will make a NATO-style collective defense treaty unlikely, but closer integration is no longer aspirational. It is a necessity that the war has made impossible to defer.

3.      The Normalization Project Is Frozen

Before February 28, the Abraham Accords logic seemed to be holding. The UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco had normalized relations with Israel. Saudi Arabia was the prize, and the conversations about a potential Saudi-Israeli normalization — in exchange for a US defense pact and civilian nuclear cooperation — were genuinely advanced. The underlying premise was that Arab publics had moved far enough past the Palestinian cause that their governments could afford to formalize what was already functionally a security alignment.

The Iran war destroyed that premise in full view of everyone. Arab public opinion, which was already running at 87% opposition to normalization in the Arab Opinion Index before the war, has hardened further after watching Israel conduct sustained bombing campaigns across Lebanon, Gaza, and Iran simultaneously over more than seventy days. For many Arab observers, the war is not an isolated conflict. It is the latest chapter in a broader Israeli military dominance project that encompasses Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, and now Iran, enabled throughout by American military and diplomatic support.

Any Arab leader who signs a normalization deal with Israel in the current environment faces a domestic political cost that no US security guarantee or economic package can fully offset. The Saudi normalization conversation is not dead permanently, the strategic logic that made it attractive for Riyadh has not entirely disappeared but it is frozen for long enough that the entire US regional architecture that depended on it as a centerpiece needs to be rethought. Washington’s ability to build a US-Israel-Gulf security framework against Iran was the strategic bet the war was supposed to vindicate. The war has made that framework harder to assemble, not easier.

4.      The US-Israel Relationship Has a New Fracture

American support for Israel has been the most durable constant in US Middle East policy across administrations since 1948. It has survived Israeli settlement expansion, military operations in Gaza that generated international condemnation, and political disputes that have occasionally grown heated. The 2026 Iran war has introduced a new variable into that relationship that previous strains did not: the growing belief among a significant portion of the American public that Israel drew the United States into a war it did not want and cannot easily end.

More than 60% of Americans disapprove of the Iran war. Trump’s approval ratings sank to record lows partly on the back of rising energy prices and cost of living impacts that are directly attributable to the Hormuz closure. The war’s unpopularity has given political traction to positions that were previously confined to the progressive wing of the Democratic Party: conditioning military assistance on specific Israeli behavior, demanding accountability for civilian casualties in Lebanon and Iran, and subjecting the strategic value of the bilateral relationship to the kind of cost-benefit scrutiny it has historically been shielded from.

None of this means the alliance is breaking. It is not. But the domestic political foundation that made unconditional US support for Israel possible regardless of what Israel did has developed a crack that the Iran war has widened. Future US administrations will face a political environment in which the Israel relationship is a genuine electoral liability in ways it simply was not before, and Israeli policymakers who have operated on the assumption that US support is structurally guaranteed regardless of circumstances will need to update that assumption.

5.      China Emerged as the Indispensable Power

Beijing did not fire a shot. It did not spend significant diplomatic capital publicly. It did not take on any formal mediation role. What it did was position itself, with considerable patience and skill, as the actor that both Washington and Tehran needed more than either wanted to admit, and then collect the diplomatic credit when the ceasefire materialized.

China helped bring Iran to the Islamabad table, according to Trump’s own public statements. Wang Yi hosted Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi in Beijing days before the Trump-Xi summit, called for Hormuz to reopen, and generated the impression of Chinese diplomatic activism at exactly the moment when Washington needed Beijing’s cooperation and was prepared to pay for it. China invoked its blocking rule against US sanctions on Chinese refiners buying Iranian crude — the first time that tool had ever been used — demonstrating that it had economic instruments available to defend its interests that it had not previously deployed. And it arrived at the Beijing summit as the power that had something Trump badly needed, which is a considerably stronger negotiating position than the one it occupied at Busan in October.

The 2023 Saudi-Iran normalization deal established China as a capable Middle East diplomatic actor. The 2026 Iran war established it as an indispensable one. The distinction matters. Capable means you can play a role when conditions are right. Indispensable means the outcome changes if you are not involved. Beijing has crossed that threshold, and it has done so without making any of the military commitments, incurring any of the costs, or absorbing any of the domestic political blowback that Washington’s Middle East involvement routinely generates.

6.      The Nuclear Domino Is Now Spinning

Iran was bombed twice during active nuclear negotiations. That sequence of events is now permanently part of the strategic record, and every government that has been quietly calculating its own nuclear options has updated its spreadsheet accordingly.

Saudi Arabia has been the most explicit. Mohammed bin Salman said before the war that if Iran developed a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia would pursue one too. The war has moved that conversation from hypothetical to urgent. Riyadh has been building civilian nuclear infrastructure with American assistance and insisting on retaining enrichment rights in any cooperation agreement. The Islamabad talks’ collapse on the nuclear issue, Iran refusing to permanently renounce enrichment in exchange for promises from a government that had bombed it twice during negotiations, has removed any expectation that a clean nonproliferation settlement is achievable in the near term.

Turkey, South Korea, and Japan are all running versions of the same calculation at different registers. The Iran war gave each of them new data points. US Pacific munitions were depleted to feed the Iran campaign. THAAD components were pulled from South Korea. US allies in Asia were publicly rebuked for declining to join the coalition. The message received in Seoul, Tokyo, and Ankara was not the one Washington intended to send, and the conclusions being drawn in those capitals about the reliability of American security guarantees will shape nuclear policy decisions that play out over the next decade.

The nonproliferation architecture was already under serious strain before February 28. The Iran war has accelerated the deterioration of a regime that depended on the belief that non-nuclear states were better off without weapons than with them. That belief is harder to sustain after a country was bombed during the negotiations designed to preserve it.

7.      The Gulf’s Self-Image Is Broken, and Rebuilding It Will Take a Generation

There is a dimension of what the Iran war changed that resists purely strategic analysis, and it is worth naming directly. The Gulf states spent the past two decades building a narrative about themselves: modern, open, economically dynamic, safely removed from the instability that characterized other parts of the Middle East. Dubai and Abu Dhabi positioned themselves as global hubs. Riyadh launched Vision 2030. Doha hosted the World Cup. The region was selling itself as a destination, not a danger zone.

The war shattered that narrative in ways that will outlast the ceasefire. The conflict was described by one analyst as marking the “end of the narrative” that the Gulf is a permanently safe destination for expatriates, immigrants, and tourists. The psychological impact on the tens of millions of people who live and work in the Gulf, who sheltered from missile alerts, watched refineries burn, and scrambled to find formula and medicine during the food import disruption, is not something that press releases about ceasefire agreements can quickly undo.

Foreign investment into Gulf real estate and infrastructure had been tracking the region’s stability narrative for years. That narrative is now complicated by the demonstrated reality that the Gulf can be struck repeatedly during a regional conflict in ways that its air defenses cannot fully absorb. Rebuilding the confidence that underwrites that investment will require not just a ceasefire but a durable regional security architecture that the current situation is nowhere near producing.

The Middle East that emerges from the 2026 Iran war will be defined by the space between what was promised and what was delivered; by US security guarantees that did not prevent the Gulf from being struck, by Israeli military operations whose strategic gains remain unclear, by an Iranian regime that survived when the operational logic suggested it might not, by a ceasefire that is holding without resolving anything, and by a regional order that has been disrupted deeply enough that the shape of what replaces it is genuinely unknown.

That uncertainty is not a failure of analysis, but it is the honest description of where the region actually is.

Source link

BRICS Fails to Reach Joint Statement as Iran War Exposes Internal Divisions

Foreign ministers from the BRICS nations ended a two day meeting in New Delhi without issuing a joint statement, highlighting deep divisions within the bloc over the ongoing conflict involving Iran, the United States, and Israel.

The diplomatic gathering brought together representatives from an increasingly diverse and politically complex alliance that now includes both Iran and the United Arab Emirates, two regional rivals currently on opposite sides of the escalating Middle East crisis.

Because member states could not agree on language regarding the war, host country India released only a chair’s statement summarizing discussions rather than a unified declaration endorsed by all participants.

Iran Pushes for Stronger Condemnation

Iran reportedly sought a stronger collective position condemning the United States and Israel for military operations against it.

Tehran also accused the UAE, a close American partner in the Gulf region, of involvement in military activities linked to the conflict.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi stated that one BRICS member blocked sections of the proposed statement, although he did not directly name the UAE.

Araqchi attempted to soften tensions publicly by emphasizing that Iran did not view the UAE itself as a direct target in the conflict. He argued that Iranian strikes had focused only on American military facilities located on Emirati territory.

At the same time, he expressed hope that relations inside BRICS could improve before the leaders’ summit later this year.

India’s Carefully Balanced Position

India’s final chair statement revealed the difficulty of managing competing geopolitical interests within the expanded BRICS bloc.

The document acknowledged that member countries held different perspectives regarding the Middle East crisis. According to the statement, discussions included calls for diplomacy, respect for sovereignty, protection of civilian lives, and the importance of maintaining secure maritime trade routes.

However, the absence of a formal joint declaration demonstrated that BRICS members remain divided on critical geopolitical questions.

India’s approach reflected its broader diplomatic strategy of balancing relations with multiple global powers simultaneously. New Delhi maintains close ties with the United States and Gulf countries while also preserving strategic partnerships with Russia, Iran, and China.

Gaza and Palestine Also Cause Disagreement

Divisions were not limited to the Iran conflict.

The chair statement noted that BRICS ministers reaffirmed support for Palestinian self determination and described Gaza as an inseparable part of the occupied Palestinian territories.

The document also supported efforts to unify Gaza and the West Bank under the Palestinian Authority and backed the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

However, the statement acknowledged that one unnamed member state held reservations regarding aspects of the Gaza section as well.

This further illustrated the challenge of building unified foreign policy positions within a grouping that includes countries with vastly different regional interests and diplomatic alignments.

BRICS and the Global South Narrative

Despite internal disagreements, BRICS members emphasized the importance of cooperation among developing nations.

India’s statement described the Global South as an important force for positive international change during a period marked by rising geopolitical tensions, economic uncertainty, technological disruption, protectionism, and migration pressures.

The expanded BRICS bloc now includes:

  • Brazil
  • Russia
  • India
  • China
  • South Africa
  • Ethiopia
  • Egypt
  • Iran
  • UAE

The expansion of the bloc has increased its global economic and political weight but has also introduced more ideological and strategic divisions.

The Economic Impact on India

The Middle East conflict has had serious economic implications for India.

As one of the world’s largest oil importers, India depends heavily on energy shipments passing through the Strait of Hormuz. The disruption of maritime traffic in the region has increased energy costs and raised concerns about inflation and supply stability.

Indian personnel have reportedly been killed in incidents linked to the regional conflict, while an India flagged vessel was sunk during the recent escalation.

Against this backdrop, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited the UAE and publicly condemned attacks targeting the Gulf nation.

Modi praised the UAE’s restraint and described attacks against it as unacceptable, signaling India’s effort to maintain strong ties with key Gulf partners despite its participation alongside Iran in BRICS.

Analysis

The failure of BRICS foreign ministers to produce a joint statement highlights the growing contradictions inside the expanded organization.

Originally conceived as an economic coalition of major emerging powers, BRICS increasingly aspires to become a broader geopolitical platform representing the Global South. However, the inclusion of regional rivals and states with conflicting strategic interests makes unified diplomacy increasingly difficult.

The Iran conflict exposed these tensions clearly. Iran sought solidarity against the United States and Israel, while Gulf states inside the bloc maintain close security relationships with Washington and face direct security threats from Tehran.

India’s cautious wording reflected the reality that BRICS currently functions more as a flexible diplomatic forum than a cohesive political alliance.

The episode also demonstrates a larger shift in global politics. As Western led institutions face criticism from many developing nations, alternative groupings like BRICS are gaining visibility. Yet these organizations must still overcome major internal disagreements if they hope to shape global governance effectively.

For India, the situation illustrates the complexity of its foreign policy position. New Delhi seeks leadership within the Global South while simultaneously maintaining relations with competing regional and global powers.

Ultimately, the Delhi meeting showed both the growing importance and the structural limitations of BRICS. The bloc may continue expanding economically and politically, but achieving consensus on major international crises will remain a significant challenge as geopolitical rivalries deepen across the world.

With information from Reuters.

Source link

Phenomenal period war drama ‘better than Gladiator’ is a ‘masterpiece’

The epic period war drama has enthralled critics and audiences world-over, earning glowing praise from all quarters, with viewers comparing it to the brilliance of Gladiator.

Fans of iconic filmmaker Ridley Scott and his cult classic Gladiator are in for a treat, because there’s another film by the director that viewers feel is giving his OG period war masterpiece a run for its money. With a screenplay penned by Ben Affleck, Matt Damon, and Nicole Holofcener, the 2021 epic historical war drama has enthralled critics and audiences world-over, earning glowing praise from all quarters — and it’s streaming on Disney+ and Amazon Prime Video.

Viewers can’t stop raving about Scott’s 2021 film, The Last Duel, which stars Jodie Comer ( Killing Eve ) in the titular role, alongside Adam Driver and Damon. Affleck also has a supporting role in the movie, and the stars are joined by Harriet Walter, Alex Lawther, and Serena Kennedy to round out a stellar supporting cast.

Filmed in France and Ireland, Scott’s epic period drama is one that most people haven’t heard of, owing to its release during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic in October 2021.

Based on true events, the film’s official plot summary states: “Jean de Carrouges is a respected knight known for his bravery and skill on the battlefield. Jacques Le Gris is a Norman squire whose intelligence and eloquence make him one of the most admired nobles in court. The two knights must fight to the death after Carrouges’s wife, Marguerite, accuses Le Gris of assault. The ensuing trial by combat, a gruelling duel to the death, places the fate of all three in God’s hands.”

Garnering largely positive reviews from both critics and audiences, The Last Duel has made its mark, especially when it comes to the period war drama genre.

One critic said of the film: “A brutal, harrowing, intriguing, stunningly well-made film that will linger in your thoughts for quite some time.”

While another reviewer lavished praise on the director: “Ridley Scott delivers one of his best works in years with this brutal, righteous, superbly acted historical drama.”

A third critic said of the historical epic: “With the stakes set so high, Scott rises to the challenge and delivers a brutal, visceral ‘last duel’ with complex narrative designs and a phenomenal carousel of performances.”

While one reviewer simply declared: “Trust us when we say this is a cinematic epic.”

Audience reviews follow in a similar vein, with one fan saying: “A classic Ridley Scott’s work. A masterpiece.”

While another viewer writes: “Brilliant historic epic, beautifully filmed and captivating characters. If you like historical dramas, this is a great film for you”

A glowing IMDB user review of The Last Duel states: “Ridley Scott is the Master of this Genre for a reason. Best director you can find for this kind of visual storytelling is Ridley Scott, and believe me, he’s still top of his game. To be honest, I don’t think that Gladiator was a best picture because of Ridley’s effort, I think it was Russel’s incredible performance. But this movie shines because of Ridley’s awesome visual style.”

While another impressed audience member commented: “[Ridley] Scott certainly gives us a big, bloody and savage movie. Indeed of all his films, this could be the one most likely to appeal to fans of ‘Gladiator’. It’s a fantastic-looking film. There is so much about ‘The Last Duel’ that is smart, funny and totally unexpected that it just might turn out to be the most unlikely multiplex movie of the year.”

Another IMDB review of the period drama (and Ridley Scott’s brilliance) states: “This is, I think it could be argued, in the absolute top tier of Ridley Scott’s filmmaking oeuvre. More than that — and this might be more controversial, but I stand by it — I think it’s his best film, and that it isn’t close.

“This is a Rashomon-style multiple-viewpoints epic with lavish production values, superb acting across the board from a powerhouse cast, and supremely subtle and skilful directing. It is thoughtful, impactful cinema that should be part of the conversation about the best outings in historical filmmaking.”

The Last Duel is available to stream on Disney+ and Amazon Prime Video.

Source link

Russia pounds Kyiv as its advance in eastern Ukraine slows to a crawl | Russia-Ukraine war News

Russia launched more than 1,400 drones and 56 missiles into Ukraine on Wednesday and Thursday.

Much of the onslaught was aimed at the capital Kyiv, days after Russia threatened to do so only if Ukraine attacked its Victory Day parade in Moscow’s Red Square on May 9. It is a major Russian holiday commemorating the end of the Second World War.

Recommended Stories

list of 4 itemsend of list

Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy had proposed a ceasefire, beginning as early as May 5.

Moscow did not respond until May 7, and presented its peace proposal as a unilateral initiative, accompanied by threats to punish Kyiv if it did not respect its terms.

Moscow said Russian front line units would “launch a massive missile strike” on central Kyiv if attacked.

INTERACTIVE-WHO CONTROLS WHAT IN UKRAINE-1778663483
(Al Jazeera)

Forty-three Russian drones and a number of ballistic missiles were launched into Ukraine on May 9, and another 27 drones on May 10. It was not until May 11 that Ukraine had a day of peace.

Moscow justified these attacks as reciprocity for Ukrainian assaults. Kyiv accused Moscow of breaking its own ceasefire.

Once the ceasefire was over, on the night of May 11, Russia launched 216 drones and followed up with a massive strike involving 892 drones overnight on May 12 and during the day on May 13.

The night of May 13-14 was worse with 675 drones accompanied by 56 missiles.

INTERACTIVE-WHO CONTROLS WHAT IN EASTERN UKRAINE copy-1778663461
(Al Jazeera)

Official Ukrainian reports recorded strikes in at least 20 locations in the capital, including a nine-storey apartment building where 12 people were killed in the collapse.

“These are ordinary residential buildings, a school, a veterinary clinic, and other purely civilian infrastructure,” wrote Zelenskyy on his Telegram messaging channel. “These are definitely not the actions of those who believe that the war is coming to an end.”

Throughout the week, Ukraine said it shot down 92 percent of the 1,930 drones launched, close to Zelenskyy’s 95 percent kill target, with 41 out of 57 missiles downed.

Russia’s army slows down

Russia’s onslaught of came as its armies in eastern Ukraine slowed down.

The Institute for the Study of War, a Washington-based think tank, estimated they had advanced by an average of 2.9 sq km (1.1 sq miles) in the first four months of 2026, compared with 9.76 sq km (3.76 sq miles) a day in the first third of 2025 and 14.9 sq km (5.8 sq miles) a day between October 2024 and March 2025.

Two weeks into May, that daily average had already dropped to 2.63 sq km (1 sq mile), suggesting Russia’s advance is slowing almost daily.

INTERACTIVE-WHO CONTROLS WHAT IN SOUTHERN UKRAINE-1778663439
(Al Jazeera)

The ISW recently estimated that Ukraine made net territorial gains of 116 sq km (45 sq miles) in April – its first such advance since a September 2023 counteroffensive.

Some of that success is attributed to Ukraine’s successful use of drones behind the front lines.

On May 8, the Azov Corps of Ukraine’s National Guard announced it had “returned to Mariupol”, four years almost to the day since it surrendered control of the city to Russian forces.

The Corps filmed drone strikes on Russian diesel tankers, army trucks and other logistics 160 km (99 miles) behind the front line along the T-0509 highway, which feeds the Russian war effort in the Donetsk region.

“The strike depth will increase,” said the Azov Corps.

Their strikes are part of a broader Ukrainian campaign to hit Russian logistics at middle ranges of about 120-150 km (75-90 miles) from the front line as announced by Zelenskyy at the end of April.

“This primarily involves military logistics, enemy warehouses and headquarters, air defence systems and other components,” he said, adding that Ukraine had increased its strikes at this depth five-fold during the past year.

“We’re already carrying out about five thousand successful strikes at a depth of 20 plus km (12 miles) every month,” said Ukrainian Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov this week.

Also this week, a Russian military reporter said Ukrainian Hornet drones were targeting Russian logistics on roads closer to the frontlines.

“Although the front line is more than 35 km away from the M-30, it is currently paralysed due to enemy [First Person View drone] surveillance,” wrote the Russian reporter.

“In 2014-2015 the front line was closer, but the M-30 was safer,” he added. “This is because many people think that if the front line moves away from large cities and logistics routes they become safer, but for some reason no one takes into account that the range of enemy drones, even FPV surveillance, increases more rapidly relative to the movement of the front line.”

Russia’s declining performance is not due to lack of effort.

“The enemy has intensified offensive actions along almost the entire front and is regrouping its troops,” said Ukrainian commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrskii on May 8. “The most tense area is currently the Pokrovsk direction, where the Russian aggressor has concentrated about 106,000 personnel,” he said.

Since March, Ukraine has increased strikes against Russian oil infrastructure as many as 1,700 km (1,056 miles) inside Russia, in an effort to starve its war machine of diesel and export revenue.

Andriy Kovalenko, the head of Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation, said the Ukraine Security Service (SBU) hit the Yaroslavl oil refinery and Perm oil pumping station on May 8 – Perm sends oil in four directions across Russia to refineries and export terminals.

Russian media reports said the fire from a previous strike on the pumping station was not put out until May 11.

Rescue workers carry an injured woman on a stretcher from a house heavily damaged after a Russian strike on residential neighbourhood in Kyiv, Ukraine, on Thursday, May 14, 2026. (AP Photo/Evgeniy Maloletka)
Rescue workers carry an injured woman after a Russian attack on a residential neighbourhood in Kyiv, May 14, 2026 [Evgeniy Maloletka/AP]

The SBU also said it hit the Perm refinery that day.

During the week, Ukrainian forces struck drone bases and a radar research centre in Rostov-on-Don, the Bryansk chemical plant, an explosives warehouse in Nizhny Novgorod and other targets.

Fedorov on Monday thanked Germany for investing $1bn in Ukraine’s deep strike capabilities, when his German counterpart, Boris Pistorius, visited Kyiv.

“Overall, Ukraine’s positions right now – on the front line, in our long-range sanctions, and in our joint results with partners – are the strongest they have been in years,” said Zelenskyy.

Source link

Finland ends drone alert amid regional fears of Ukraine war spillover | Russia-Ukraine war News

Finnish authorities scramble fighter jets; defence chief says false alarm but warns of potential repeats while Russian war persists.

Finland has stood down its defence forces after sounding an alarm over suspected drone activities in its airspace.

The authorities said on Friday that suspected drone activity above the Helsinki region no longer posed a threat and that the situation was ⁠returning to normal hours after launching an emergency response, including the launch of fighter jets and closure of the capital’s airport.

Recommended Stories

list of 4 itemsend of list

The alarm illustrates the tension stalking the region as Finland and the Baltic states eye Russian aggression and daily missile and drone attacks amid Moscow’s continued war on Ukraine.

The Helsinki City Rescue Department had warned the nearly 2 million inhabitants of Finland’s Uusimaa region to stay indoors starting about 4am local time (1:00 GMT), as fighter jets were scrambled. Helsinki’s airport was also closed for about three hours.

Later, President Alexander Stubb wrote on X that authorities had “demonstrated their readiness and capacity to react”, adding that the country was now facing “no direct military threat”.

Kimmo Kohvakka, director general for rescue services at the Ministry of the Interior, called the response a “precautionary measure” and said “daily life can continue.”

The incident arose amid growing concerns about regional spillover from the Ukraine war.

The Baltic states of ‌Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have reported a series of suspected Ukrainian drones headed for Russia entering their airspace, prompting domestic criticism over their ability to respond to military threats.

The situation has led to a full-blown government crisis in Latvia. Prime Minister Evika Silina resigned on Thursday after a coalition partner pulled support. The move followed the ousting of the defence minister after a drone crashed at a fuel storage facility.

In March, two drones crossed into Finnish territory and crashed after flying low over the sea and southeastern Finland.

Finnish authorities did not indicate the source of Friday’s drone activity.

However, defence forces operations chief Kari Nisula suggested that Finland had received information from Ukraine about drones potentially straying into the country, according to the Reuters news agency.

The military head added that there was no evidence that drones had entered Finland, but that such situations could happen again as long as Russia continues its war on Ukraine.

Prisoner swap

The incident in Finnish airspace unfolded as Ukraine maintained its drone attacks on Russian oil and energy infrastructure, and Kyiv continued counting the costs of a huge strike that killed two dozen people.

Russia’s Ministry of Defence said on Friday that its air defence systems shot down 355 Ukrainian drones targeting Moscow overnight, as well as the border regions of Belgorod, Bryansk and Kursk.

Among the targets was an oil refinery ⁠in the central city ⁠of Ryazan, about 200km (125 miles) southeast of Moscow, according to the commander of Ukraine’s drone forces.

Fire and a plume of smoke rise in the vicinity of the Ryazan oil refinery, May 15, 2026. [Supplied via Reuters]
Fire and a plume of smoke rise in the vicinity of the Ryazan oil refinery, May 15, 2026 [Reuters]

The attack killed three people ⁠and wounded 12, regional Governor Pavel Malkov wrote on Telegram. Two high-rise apartment buildings were struck, he said, while debris fell on the grounds of an industrial enterprise.

Meanwhile in Kyiv, the death toll from a Russian barrage on an apartment building on Thursday rose to at least 24 people, including three children, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said. Forty-eight people were wounded.

Amid the ongoing violence, Russia and Ukraine have moved ahead with a prisoner swap that saw 205 POWs repatriated on each side ⁠on Friday. It was the first step of a swap that is planned to ultimately see 1,000 people on each side return home.

The two sides also conducted an exchange of those killed in the fighting, with Russia handing 526 bodies to Ukraine and receiving 41 in return. Both Kyiv and Moscow thanked the United Arab Emirates for mediating the swap.

Zelenskyy wrote on social media that most of the prisoners returned to Ukraine had been in Russian captivity since 2022.

“We will continue to fight for every single person who remains in captivity,” he said.

Source link

Iran war day 77: Trump, Xi discuss Hormuz as Tehran rallies BRICS | US-Israel war on Iran News

The US and Chinese leaders agreed during talks in Beijing that the Strait of Hormuz should remain open to ensure global energy supplies.

United States President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping discussed the Strait of Hormuz during talks in Beijing, with the White House saying Xi agreed the strategic waterway “must remain open to support the free flow of energy” as tensions over the Iran war continue to roil global markets.

Meanwhile, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi urged fellow BRICS nations at a meeting in New Delhi, India, to condemn the US-Israel war on Iran as a violation of international law, insisting Tehran would “never bow to any pressure”.

At the same time, a third round of direct talks between Lebanese and Israeli negotiators is under way in Washington, DC, aimed at ending hostilities, even as Israeli attacks continue across towns and villages in southern Lebanon.

Here is what we know:

In Iran

  • Iran urges BRICS to condemn US and Israel: Araghchi told the BRICS+ bloc that Iran was a “victim of illegal expansionism and warmongering” and called on member states to oppose “Western hegemony” by condemning the actions of the US and Israel.
  • Iran accuses UAE over war: Araghchi also accused the United Arab Emirates of playing an active role in the war against Iran, saying during the BRICS summit in India that the UAE was “directly involved in the aggression against my country”.
  • Iran signals new Hormuz strategy: Iranian media reported that more than 30 ships, including some linked to Chinese companies, were allowed to transit the Strait of Hormuz overnight as Tehran signalled the waterway was “open to all commercial ships” that cooperate with Iranian naval forces.

War diplomacy

  • Xi offers help on Hormuz: Trump said Xi Jinping had offered China’s help to open the Strait of Hormuz and pledged not to send military equipment to aid Iran in its war against the US and Israel.
  • Trump-Xi summit held amid ‘promise fatigue’: Analyst Drew Thompson said Washington and Beijing remain deeply distrustful after years of unmet expectations, with both sides accusing the other of breaking promises. He described the summit as “carefully managed” and focused on preventing further deterioration in ties.
  • US says Israel-Lebanon talks ‘positive’: A US official said talks in Washington on Thursday between Israel and Lebanon about an expiring ceasefire were “positive” and will take place as planned for a second day.

In the US

  • Trump wants Iran’s uranium for ‘public relations’: The US president suggested that hunting down Iran’s enriched uranium was primarily for political optics, after Israel demanded it as a goal in the war. “I just feel better if I got it, actually, but it’s – I think, it’s more for public relations than it is for anything else,” Trump told Fox News.
  • Trump says Iran must make deal: In the same interview, Trump told Sean Hannity he was running out of patience to reach a truce with Iran as peace talks have stalled. “I’m not going to be much more patient… They should make a deal. Any sane person would make a deal, but they might be crazy,” Trump said.

In Israel

  • NYT lawsuit: Israel says it will sue The New York Times after the newspaper published an article by columnist Nicholas Kristof detailing rape allegations by Palestinian detainees against Israeli forces. The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office announced the legal move three days after the report, which was based on accounts from 14 male and female Palestinian victims.

In Lebanon and Syria

  • Hezbollah claims attacks on Israeli forces: The group said it launched rockets, drones and artillery attacks on Israeli troops and military vehicles in southern Lebanon, and claimed to have downed Israeli drones.
  • Israel-Lebanon talks face uncertainty: According to Al Jazeera’s Manuel Rapalo, Israel is seeking stronger security guarantees and Hezbollah’s disarmament, while Lebanon wants a permanent ceasefire and Israeli troop withdrawal from the south. Rapalo says Hezbollah’s refusal to commit to any future agreement adds significant uncertainty, although diplomats still view the talks as a breakthrough.
  • Amnesty urges Israel to conduct Syria war crimes probe: The rights group called for investigations into Israeli raids and shelling in southern Syria, which residents say have destroyed homes and farmland and led to detentions. Israel has also seized additional territory beyond the occupied Golan Heights, in violation of the 1974 disengagement agreement.

Source link

Russia launches hundreds more drones at Ukraine, killing three people | Russia-Ukraine war News

President Zelenskyy says rescue operations continue after Russia used ‘more than 1,560 drones’ during its overnight attacks.

Russia launched a barrage of missiles and drones targeting Ukraine’s capital Kyiv, killing at least three people and wounding 40 others, Ukrainian authorities have said.

The Ukrainian military said on Thursday that the overnight strikes hit six districts of Kyiv and another six in the surrounding areas. Deputy Prime Minister Oleksii Kuleba said attacks had targeted ports in the southern Odesa region and railways.

Recommended Stories

list of 3 itemsend of list

In a post on X, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said rescue operations were continuing following an attack on a nine-storey building in Kyiv after Russia launched “more than 670 attack drones and 56 missiles against Ukraine”.

“In total, since midnight yesterday, Russia has used more than 1,560 drones against our cities and communities. These are definitely not the actions of those who believe the war is coming to an end,” he wrote on Thursday.

“It is important that partners do not remain silent about this strike. And it is equally important to continue supporting the protection of our skies,” Zelenskyy added.

The mayor of Kyiv, Vitali Klitschko, said 40 people were wounded in the attacks, including two children, while Ukrainian emergency services said three people had been killed.

Reporting from Kyiv, Al Jazeera’s Audrey Macalpine said people are still feared trapped under the rubble of the building.

Macalpine said it was one of Russia’s largest attacks of the war, “in a single 36-hour period just by sheer number of drones”.

The attack comes as a setback for efforts to end the war after United States President Donald Trump raised faint hopes for peace by brokering a three-day ceasefire between Kyiv and Moscow last week, and Russian leader Vladimir Putin suggested the war could be winding down.

epa12956155 Ukrainian rescuers work at the site of a Russian strike on the nine-storey residential building in Kyiv, Ukraine, 14 May 2026, amid the Russian invasion. At least three people were killed, and ten people are missing, dozens of others (including a one-month-old baby) were injured after an overnight combined Russian attack with drones and missiles hit the Ukrainian capital, according to the State Emergency Service of Ukraine. EPA/SERGEY DOLZHENKO
Ukrainian rescuers work at the site of a Russian strike on the nine-storey residential building in Kyiv, Ukraine, 14 May 2026 [Sergey Dolzhenko/EPA]

The truce – put in place as Putin presided over a scaled-down military parade in Red Square to mark the anniversary of World War II victory – was marred by allegations of violations by both sides.

Ukraine and Russia launched long-range drone attacks immediately after it ended on Tuesday.

The Kremlin has poured cold water on the idea that Putin’s vague comments, issued Saturday, about the war “heading to an end” could mean a softening in Moscow’s position.

On Wednesday, it repeated its demand that Ukraine fully withdraw from the eastern Donbas region before a ceasefire and full-scale peace talks can take place.

Kyiv has rejected such a move as tantamount to capitulation.

Source link

Could Iran war trigger a hunger crisis? | US-Israel war on Iran

The UN warns disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz could drive up food and fertiliser costs, and worsen global hunger.

The next global food crisis is unfolding in a narrow stretch of water.

The United Nations warns that if fertilisers cannot pass through the Strait of Hormuz within just a few weeks, the world could face mass starvation.

It says the consequences could be severe if shipping disruptions linked to the Iran conflict drag on.

Food prices are already at a three-year high, while fertiliser costs critical for agriculture have rocketed.

Aid agencies fear a prolonged disruption could push tens of millions more people into hunger.

For vulnerable economies already struggling with debt and high import costs, the risks are growing fast.

Source link

Republican resistance to Iran war grows in the Senate as Murkowski flips

Senate Republicans on Wednesday again blocked Democratic legislation that would halt President Trump’s war with Iran, but the number of GOP senators voting against the war grew.

Republican Sen. Lisa Murkowski of Alaska voted against the war for the first time since it began at the end of February. Two other Republicans, Sens. Susan Collins of Maine and Rand Paul of Kentucky, also voted against the war, as they had done previously.

The war powers legislation ultimately failed to advance 49-50, with Sen. John Fetterman of Pennsylvania the only Democrat to oppose it, yet the close tally reflected growing unease with Trump’s war. Several other Republican senators have signaled they want Congress to weigh in on the direction of the conflict.

“There will be a day — and it might be soon, I believe — where this Senate will say to the president, ‘Stop this war,’” Democratic Sen. Tim Kaine of Virginia, who has spearheaded his party’s tactic of forcing repeated votes on the war, said before the vote.

Even if it passes the Senate, a war powers resolution would have a slim chance of passing the House and would also certainly be vetoed by Trump. But Democrats say the votes are about building political pressure on the president either to withdraw from the conflict or seek congressional authorization to wage the war.

Trump officials downplay role for Congress

The White House, meanwhile, has asserted that it does not need congressional authorization for the war and has circumvented legal requirements to gain approval from Congress to continue the military campaign. It claims that it has “terminated” hostilities with Iran because the U.S. has entered a ceasefire.

That posture has created tension between the Republican-controlled Congress and the White House because presidents under the War Powers Resolution of 1973 are required to obtain authorization from Congress after 60 days of engaging in a conflict.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told lawmakers this week that the U.S. could start attacking Iran again without the White House seeking congressional approval. He told Murkowski during a hearing on Tuesday that the Trump administration believes it has “all the authorities necessary.”

Murkowski voiced skepticism about that argument. She pointed to the troops and war ships deployed to the region, saying, “It doesn’t appear that hostilities have ended.”

GOP leaders back the war, but unease grows

Republican leadership has continued to back the war with Iran, arguing that the stalemate in the Strait of Hormuz that has blocked most commercial shipping puts more economic pressure on Iran than it does on the U.S.

“Iran’s economy is on life support. Its leadership is eliminated,” said Sen. John Barrasso, the No. 2 Republican in leadership, during a floor speech Wednesday.

He also argued that the Democratic effort on the war is all about undermining Trump. Forcing the issue just as he arrived in China for a summit would “pull out the rug from under him,” Barrasso said.

Still, Republicans are also growing uneasy about the high gas prices, especially as the November elections draw near.

Sen. Mike Rounds, a Republican from South Dakota, said Wednesday he’d prefer that the two branches of government work out the constitutional issues instead of a congressional war powers vote or a potential challenge in court.

The two sides should sit down together and say “we have shared constitutional responsibilities,” Rounds said.

Democrats plan to keep forcing weekly votes on war powers resolutions and are looking ahead to put limitations on Trump during the debate over annual legislation that authorizes and funds the military.

Sen. Jeff Merkley, an Oregon Democrat who sponsored Wednesday’s resolution, told reporters that he believes there is an “erosion of support, erosion of enthusiasm, an increase in skepticism” about the war from Republicans.

Groves writes for the Associated Press.

Source link

Trump, Xi and Cold War 2.0: Managing Rivalry in a Fragmented World

The world today is no longer witnessing isolated geopolitical crises. From Ukraine and West Asia to Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific, almost every major flashpoint bears the imprint of an expanding strategic contest between the United States and China. The emerging order increasingly resembles a “Cold War 2.0” — though very different in structure, methods and consequences from the US-Soviet rivalry of the 20th century.

Unlike the earlier Cold War1.0, the present contest is not defined by ideological blocs alone. The US and China remain deeply intertwined economically, technologically and financially even as they posture against each other militarily, diplomatically and strategically. It is therefore a paradoxical competition: adversarial coexistence under conditions of mutual dependence.

The forthcoming summit between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing assumes significance far beyond bilateral optics. It is not merely about tariffs or trade balances. It is about whether the world’s two largest powers can manage competition without pushing the international system into prolonged instability.

Cold War 2.0: Similarities and Differences

There are unmistakable similarities between the old Cold War and the current strategic rivalry. Technology races, military posturing, proxy theatres, sanctions, espionage, supply-chain wars and ideological narratives are again shaping global politics. Taiwan today resembles what Berlin once symbolised during the original Cold War — a potential trigger point with global implications.

Yet the differences are even more important.

The US and Soviet Union operated largely in separate economic ecosystems. In contrast, America and China remain deeply integrated through trade, manufacturing, investment flows and technological supply chains. As a result, Cold War 2.0 is less about total decoupling and more about selective disengagement, strategic denial, and competitive coexistence. China’s rise has also changed the nature of power transition; unlike the Soviet Union, China is economically embedded within the global capitalist system while simultaneously challenging Western strategic dominance. Beijing does not seek immediate overthrow of the international order; rather, it seeks gradual restructuring of global institutions and norms to reflect Chinese power and preferences.

Because of this interdependence, direct conflict is expensive for both parties. As a result, selective disengagement, strategic denial, and competitive coexistence are more important in Cold War 2.0 than total decoupling.

The nature of power transitions has also changed as a result of China’s growth. China, in contrast to the Soviet Union, both challenges Western geopolitical dominance and is economically integrated into the global capitalist system. Beijing aims to gradually restructure international institutions and norms to reflect Chinese strength and preferences rather than topple the current international order.

Trump’s Return: Strategic Pressure with Transactional Flexibility

President Trump’s return has introduced a more personalised and transactional dimension to US-China relations. His approach combines aggressive economic nationalism with pragmatic deal-making. Trump views geopolitics substantially through the prism of economic leverage, tariffs, industrial revival and negotiated advantage.

During his earlier tenure, Trump launched the trade war against China, challenged Chinese technological expansion and questioned assumptions of unlimited globalisation. In his second term his tariff rhetoric and coercive stance seems tampering down by Beijing’s stiff retaliation and domestic vows through courts; hence appears focused on “managed competition” rather than ideological confrontation.

Current indications suggest that Trump seeks three broad objectives from Beijing:

  • Reduction of trade imbalances and greater market access for American companies.
  • Chinese restraint regarding Iran, fentanyl precursors and strategic technology transfers.
  • Taiwan and Indo-Pacific tensions should be relatively stable to prevent unchecked escalation. At the same time, Trump appears willing to negotiate tactical understandings with Beijing if they produce visible economic or political gains domestically.

This reflects an important distinction between traditional American strategic establishments and Trump’s worldview. Washington’s institutional security establishment and deep state often sees China as a long-term systemic challenger. Trump, however, also sees Beijing through the lens of bargaining opportunity. This creates unpredictability both for allies and adversaries.

Xi Jinping’s China: Strategic Patience and Controlled Assertiveness

If Trump represents transactional nationalism, Xi Jinping represents centralised strategic continuity with greater diplomatic maturity.

Beijing’s military modernisation, naval expansion, technological aspirations, and Belt and Road outreach reflect a long-term strategy aimed at reducing dependence on the West while enhancing China’s centrality in global affairs. Under Xi’s leadership, China has evolved from a cautious economic power into an increasingly assertive geopolitical actor. Beijing’s long-term objective to lessen reliance on the West and increase China’s influence in world affairs is reflected in its military modernisation, navy expansion, technological aspirations, and Belt and Road outreach.

Xi’s leadership style is marked by centralised authority, ideological discipline and strategic patience. Unlike the short electoral cycles of Western democracies, China’s leadership can pursue long-duration geopolitical objectives with consistency.

Beijing today appears more confident than during Trump’s first presidency. Despite economic headwinds, demographic pressures and property-sector challenges, China has strengthened domestic technological capabilities and diversified export networks.

China’s approach to global dominance differs fundamentally from America’s traditional model.

The United States historically exercised leadership through alliances, military presence, financial systems and institutional influence. Its dominance relied substantially on coalition-building and normative legitimacy, an approach, which seems to be eroding under President Trump, America First/America only agenda.

China’s model is more infrastructure-centric, economically transactional and state-driven. Beijing prefers influence through trade dependency, technology ecosystems, strategic investments and manufacturing centrality. It avoids formal alliances but expands leverage through economic penetration and calibrated coercion.

In essence, Washington exports political influence backed by military power to dislodge all potential competitors; Beijing exports economic dependency backed by state capacity aims at not dislodging potential markets to include U.S., EU and India.

The Taiwan Factor and Indo-Pacific Competition

No issue captures Cold War 2.0 more sharply than Taiwan.

For China, Taiwan remains a core sovereignty issue tied to national rejuvenation. For the United States, Taiwan represents strategic credibility, Island chain dominance in the Indo-Pacific and the larger balance of power against China.

Neither side currently appears to seek direct military confrontation. Yet both are steadily preparing for prolonged strategic competition around Taiwan. China continues military signalling and grey-zone pressure, while the US strengthens Indo-Pacific partnerships and defence arrangements.

Trump’s Beijing visit is therefore expected to prioritise “stability management” rather than dispute resolution. Beijing seeks assurances against perceived American encouragement of Taiwanese independence and military capacity building, while Washington seeks deterrence against coercive reunification efforts.

With recent claims of President Trump on Greenland, Canada, and Panama and actions in Venezuela, he doesn’t have any moral leverage to lecture China on Taiwan, because his security concerns over these areas are woefully short of Chinese security concerns of Island chains. Thus the reality of Cold War 2.0 is more of escalation management more than genuine reconciliation, as competition remains.

The Real Issue: Supply Chains and Technology Agendas

Artificial intelligence, semiconductors, rare earths, cyber systems, quantum technologies and critical supply chains have become strategic weapons. Economic security is increasingly inseparable from national security.

America still leads in advanced innovation ecosystems, financial influence and military alliances. China dominates large parts of manufacturing, industrial supply chains and infrastructure scalability.

The contest is therefore asymmetric. Washington seeks to slow China’s technological ascent through export controls and alliance-based restrictions. Beijing seeks self-reliance through indigenous innovation and strategic diversification.

Simultaneously, both nations are competing to shape global narratives.

The US projects democratic resilience and rules-based order. China projects efficiency, development delivery and non-interference. Many countries in the Global South increasingly engage both sides pragmatically rather than ideologically.

US-Israel War on Iran: Uneasy Calm Amid Strategic Contestation

China and the United States both need  regional stability in Middle East to avoid economic shockwaves and disruption of global energy flows, but their strategic intentions are quite apart. Trump led America’s action plan, duly influenced by Israeli lobby includes military action, coercive deterrence, and the retaining American strategic dominance in West Asia, especially Petro-dollar domination. China, on the other hand, is attempting calibrated balance, openly supporting de-escalation while covertly defending its long-term geopolitical, economic, and energy links with Tehran.

Beijing will refrain from any overt alignment that could lead to direct conflict with Washington, but it is unlikely to desert Iran. China seems confident that it can endure supply chain crisis in Strait of Hormuz longer than Trump and Iran. In any case a over-engaged US with depleted reserves works towards Chinese strategic advantage.

The larger strategic picture shows for Beijing, the crisis offers an opportunity to project itself as a responsible stabilising power while gradually expanding influence through economic leverage and diplomatic positioning; as a result, the likely outcome is not cooperation in the classical sense, but competitive crisis management—limited convergence to avoid uncontrolled escalation, while China advances through strategic patience, economic penetration, and calibrated diplomacy. Demonstrating credibility and deterrence to adversaries, such as China, is another goal for Washington in the Iran theatre.

Thus, Iran becomes yet another arena in which China gains through strategic patience, economic penetration, and calibrated diplomacy, while the US primarily depends on military power and a weakening alliance structures.

Likely Outcomes of the Trump–Xi Engagement: Competitive Coexistence, Not Resolution

Expectations from the Trump–Xi engagement must remain realistic and free from rhetorical overstatement. The structural contradictions driving US–China rivalry — Taiwan, technological dominance, supply chain control, military competition, sanctions regimes and competing visions of global order — are too deep to be resolved through summit diplomacy alone. At best, both sides may seek temporary stabilisation of tensions to avoid simultaneous economic disruption and strategic overstretch. Therefore, the likely outcome is not reconciliation, but managed confrontation under conditions of deep interdependence.

Trump’s pressure tactics may slow certain aspects of China’s technological rise and compel tactical adjustments, but they are unlikely to reverse Beijing’s long-term strategic trajectory or ambition for greater influence in global governance structures.

Equally, China is not positioned to replace the United States as a singular global hegemon, as yet. Internal economic pressures, demographic decline, debt vulnerabilities, trust deficits and the absence of robust alliance structures remain important constraints on Chinese power projection.

Consequently, the more plausible scenario is a prolonged strategic contest marked by partial economic bifurcation in critical technologies, competing digital and AI ecosystems, intensified military signalling in the Indo-Pacific, and expanded geopolitical competition across the Global South through infrastructure financing, trade dependency, arms transfers and narrative warfare.

Emerging World Order: What should remaining World Do?

Cold War 2.0 will not produce a neat bipolar world nor purely multipolar. Unlike the 20th century, today’s international system is multipolar, economically interconnected and technologically diffused. Middle powers such as India, regional blocs and strategic swing states will play increasingly important roles in shaping outcomes through strategic balancing avoiding bloc politics. The aim remains to avoid collateral damage in a competition, which neither U.S. nor China can decisively win in the foreseeable future.

The prudent course lies in strategic autonomy backed by economic resilience, technological self-reliance, diversified partnerships and flexible diplomacy. Nations will increasingly pursue sector-specific alignments while resisting pressure to become instruments of either camp’s maximalist strategic narratives.

In this evolving landscape, Trump’s coercive unilateralism and “America First” orientation may paradoxically accelerate the very multipolarity Washington seeks to resist. Many nations, including close American partners, increasingly seek strategic hedging against unpredictability in US policy, even while remaining cautious of China’s expanding influence and coercive economic practices

Cold War 2.0 is unlikely to end through a dramatic collapse or military victory. It will instead remain a long geopolitical test of endurance, adaptability, economic resilience and strategic patience in an era of competitive coexistence, issue based cooperation and crisis management below the threshold of military confrontation.

Trump’s leadership may make the contest louder, sharper and more transactional, while Xi’s China may continue pursuing calibrated expansion with long-term strategic discipline. Yet the underlying structural reality remains unchanged: the US–China rivalry is here to stay, and the rest of the world must learn to navigate carefully between pressure and prudence, rhetoric and reality, competition and coexistence.

Source link

Trump arrives in Beijing for talks with China’s Xi on Iran war, trade and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan

President Trump arrived in Beijing on Wednesday for his hotly anticipated talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the Iran war, trade and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

The meat of the summit doesn’t start until Thursday, when the leaders hold bilateral talks, visit the Temple of Heaven, where Chinese emperors once prayed for bumper crops, and take part in a formal banquet. But the Chinese offered Trump a pomp-filled welcome, literally rolling out the red carpet for him after Air Force One landed in the Chinese capital.

The president was greeted by Chinese Vice President Han Zheng; Xie Feng, China’s ambassador to Washington; Ma Zhaoxu, executive vice minister of foreign affairs; and the U.S. envoy to Beijing, David Perdue.

The welcoming ceremony included a military honor guard, a military band and some 300 Chinese youths waving Chinese and American flags and chanting, “Welcome, welcome! Warm welcome!” as Trump made his way to his waiting limousine. The youth greeters were decked out in white and robin’s egg blue outfits that matched the paint job of the iconic presidential plane.

President Trump walks with China's Vice President Han Zheng during an arrival ceremony

President Trump walks with China’s Vice President Han Zheng during an arrival ceremony Wednesday at Beijing Capital International Airport, as Eric and Lara Trump, Elon Musk, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer follow.

(Mark Schiefelbein / Associated Press)

“We’re the two superpowers,” Trump told reporters as he departed the White House on Tuesday for the long flight to Beijing. “We’re the strongest nation on Earth in terms of military. China’s considered second.”

While Trump likes to project a sense of strength, the visit occurs at a delicate moment for his presidency as his popularity at home has been weighed down by the U.S. and Israel’s war with Iran and rising inflation as a consequence of that conflict. The Republican president is seeking a win by signing deals with China to buy more American soybeans, beef and aircraft, saying he’ll be talking with Xi about trade “more than anything else.”

The Trump administration hopes to begin establishing a Board of Trade with China to address differences between the countries. The board could help prevent the trade war ignited last year after Trump’s tariff hikes, an action China countered through its control of rare earth minerals. That led to a one-year truce last October.

But Trump is visiting Beijing when Iran continues to dominate his domestic agenda. The war has led to the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, stranding oil and natural gas tankers and causing energy prices to spike to levels that could sabotage global economic growth. The U.S. president declared that Xi didn’t need to assist in resolving the conflict, even though Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi was in Beijing last week.

Fellow rescuers carry the coffins of two members of the civil defense who were reportedly killed in Israeli airstrikes

Fellow rescuers carry the coffins of two members of the civil defense who were reportedly killed in Israeli airstrikes in Nabatieh the previous day, during their funeral in the southern city of Sidon on May 13, 2026. Israel hammered south Lebanon with strikes on May 12 ahead of talks between the two countries in Washington, as Beirut reported 380 people killed in Israeli attacks since an April 17 ceasefire took effect.

(Mahmoud Zayyat/AFP via Getty Images)

“We have a lot of things to discuss. I wouldn’t say Iran is one of them, to be honest with you, because we have Iran very much under control,” Trump told reporters Tuesday.

Taiwan high on the agenda

The status of Taiwan also will be a major topic as China is displeased with U.S. plans to sell weapons to the self-governing island, which the Chinese government claims as part of its own territory.

Trump told reporters on Monday that he would be discussing with Xi an $11 billion weapons package for Taiwan that the U.S. administration authorized in December but has not yet begun fulfilling. The arms package is the largest ever approved for Taiwan.

But Trump has demonstrated greater ambivalence toward Taiwan, an approach that’s raising questions about whether the U.S. leader could be open to dialing back support for the island democracy.

The Taiwanese flag at Democracy Boulevard is lowered at the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall

The Taiwanese flag at Democracy Boulevard is lowered at the end of the day as the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall is seen in the background in Taipei on May 13, 2026.

(I-Hwa Cheng/AFP via Getty Images)

At the same time, Taiwan — as the world’s leading chipmaker — has become essential for the development of artificial intelligence, with the U.S. importing more goods so far this year from Taiwan than China. Trump has sought to use Biden-era programs and his own deals to bring more chipmaking to America.

The Chinese Communist Party’s news outlet, People’s Daily, published a strongly worded editorial ahead of Trump’s arrival underscoring that Taiwan is “the first red line that cannot be crossed in China-U.S. relations” and is “the biggest point of risk” between the two nations.

Trump was already portraying the trip as a success before he even left White House grounds. He openly mused about Xi’s planned reciprocal visit to the U.S. later this year, lamenting that the White House ballroom under construction would not be completed in time to properly fete the Chinese leader.

“We’re going to have a great relationship for many, many decades to come,” Trump said of the U.S. and China.

Counter snipers and other security forces watch over Air Force One while refueling at Joint Base Elmendorf

Counter snipers and other security forces watch over Air Force One while refueling at Joint Base Elmendorf during a trip with US President Donald J. Trump in Anchorage, Alaska, on May 12, 2026. Donald Trump was due in Beijing on May 13, 2026 on the first visit to China by a US president in nearly a decade, as he seeks to ramp up trade despite potential friction over Taiwan and Iran.

(Brendan Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images)

Trump embarked on Air Force One for the big meeting with a coterie of aides, family members and business world titans, including Nvidia’s Jensen Huang and Tesla and SpaceX’s Elon Musk. While en route to Beijing, he posted on social media that his “first request” to Xi during the visit will be to ask the Chinese leader to bolster the presence of U.S. firms in China.

“I will be asking President Xi, a Leader of extraordinary distinction, to ‘open up’ China so that these brilliant people can work their magic, and help bring the People’s Republic to an even higher level!” Trump wrote.

Tajikistan's President Emomali Rahmon and China's President Xi Jinping attend a welcoming ceremony

Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon and China’s President Xi Jinping attend a welcoming ceremony at the Great Hall of the People on Tuesday, in Beijing.

(Maxim Shemetov—Pool / Getty Images)

Despite Trump’s outward confidence, China appears to be entering the meeting from “a much stronger place,” said Scott Kennedy, a senior adviser on Chinese business and economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank.

China would like to reduce tech restrictions on accessing computer chips and find ways to reduce tariffs, among other goals.

“But even if they don’t get much on any of those things, as long as there’s not a blow-up in the meeting and President Trump doesn’t go away and look to re-escalate, China basically comes out stronger,” Kennedy said.

U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng met on Wednesday to discuss economic and trade issues at Incheon International Airport, just west of the South Korean capital of Seoul, according to the Chinese state run Xinhua News Agency.

Bystanders are kept back by police tape as they film the motorcade of President Donald Trump as he arrives

Bystanders are kept back by police tape as they film the motorcade of President Donald Trump as he arrives at the Four Seasons Hotel on Wednesday in Beijing.

(Kevin Frayer / Getty Images)

Trump wants 3-way nuclear arms deal

Trump also intends to raise the idea of the U.S., China and Russia signing a pact that would set limits on the nuclear weapons each nation keeps in its arsenal, according to a senior Trump administration official who briefed reporters ahead of the trip. The official spoke on the condition of anonymity under ground rules set by the White House.

China has previously been cool to entering such a pact. Beijing’s arsenal, according to Pentagon estimates, exceeds more than 600 operational nuclear warheads and is far from parity with the U.S. and Russia, which each are estimated to have more than 5,000 nuclear warheads.

The last nuclear arms pact, known as the New START treaty, between Russia and the United States expired in February, removing any caps on the two largest atomic arsenals for the first time in more than a half-century. As the treaty was set to expire, Trump rejected a call by Russia to extend the two-country deal for another year and called for “a new, improved, and modernized” deal that includes China.

The Pentagon estimates China will have more than 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030.

Madhani, Weissert and Boak write for the Associated Press. Boak reported from Washington. AP writers Darlene Superville in Washington, Huizhong Wu in Bangkok, Hyung-jin Kim in Seoul, South Korea, and Kanis Leung in Hong Kong contributed to this report.

Source link