war

Iran’s IRGC says it struck a “giant LPG gas carrier named NV Sunshine” that was “attempting to pass through the illegal route” south of the Strait of Hormuz.

Oct. 9, 2026 1:21 PM PT

WASHINGTON — President Trump said that he has struck a deal to obtain diesel from Russia, a stunning reversal of years of U.S. pressure on Moscow over its war with Ukraine and an attempt to address high fuel prices ahead of the U.S. midterm elections.

Trump said on social media on Friday that he struck the deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin in a phone call in which he was expected to discuss a suspected case of plague in Russia. Instead, Trump announced that Russia will immediately supply more than 300,000 tons of diesel, followed by an additional 500,000 tons in November and 1 million tons “immediately thereafter.” Russia will deliver another 3 million tons “within a short period of time” after that, he wrote.

Trump’s shocking announcement comes after he signed a sweeping Russia sanctions law last month that aimed at clamping down on Russia’s energy economy, among other areas, that fuel its war against Ukraine.

His move casts doubt on the likelihood of the White House imposing sanctions on Russia this month, given that a bipartisan law passed by Congress directs the administration to target the top importers of Russian oil and gas.

Trump, in his announcement, did not address the sanctions or Russia’s war but said, “Lower prices for Americans, especially our Great Farmers, Ranchers, and Truckers, is my Greatest Priority.”

The White House did not immediately respond to questions about who was paying for the diesel from Russia and when the fuel being supplied under the agreement would become available. It also did not clarify whether subsequent supplies of Russian diesel set to come next month would be supplied prior to Election Day on Nov. 3.

Gas prices globally have surged as the war in Iran upends the energy sector. The national average for a gallon of diesel in the U.S. was $6.23 on Friday, according to AAA, after hitting a record $6.52 on Sept. 22.

Russian presidential envoy Kirill Dmitriev reposted the Treasury Department’s announcement on X Friday and said that “Russia-US cooperation on diesel and energy will benefit the world.”

Rep. Don Beyer, the senior House Democrat on the Joint Economic Committee, called Trump’s announcement, “infuriating.”

“This is what we warned anyone who would listen: Trump isn’t the slightest bit trustworthy when it comes to Russia,” Beyer said in a statement on X. “Giving him expanded tariff powers in hopes he would use them to help Ukraine was a mistake. Now he’s lifting sanctions on Russian fossil fuels.”

The law Trump signed last month envisions sanctions on Russian officials, banks and a shadow fleet of tankers and bans all new U.S. investment in Russia and the handling of sovereign debt.

It also directed Trump to impose tariffs of up to 100% on the top five importers of Russian oil or natural gas, with an exception for countries that import less than 15% of Russia’s natural gas exports and have taken significant steps to reduce those imports.

The U.S. has not imported Russian oil or gas since 2022, when the Biden administration banned them because of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration.

Shortly after Trump made the announcement, the Treasury Department said it was immediately issuing a temporary license allowing Russian diesel to be supplied to the global market.

This is the latest in several licenses the U.S. Treasury has issued regarding Russian fuel shipments since the start of the Iran war earlier this year. But it is the first such license to ease sanctions on diesel for a period lasting longer than the standard 30-day window since the start of the Ukraine war.

The new so-called general license means U.S. sanctions will not apply until April 2027 on deliveries of Russian diesel that has been loaded onto tankers as of Friday. The department extended similar easing of sanctions in March and April even though Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent had ruled out such a move earlier in the year.

The extensions continue to underscore how the fallout from the Iran war has boosted Moscow’s ability to profit from its energy exports, which had been restrained by the U.S. and other allies since the invasion of Ukraine.

Price and Binkley write for the Associated Press. AP writer Will Weissert in Washington and Farnoush Amiri in New York contributed to this report.

Eritrea denies backing TPLF as Ethiopia alleges collusion, further straining their already volatile relationship.

Ethiopia has accused Eritrea of an “all-out invasion” in a message to the United Nations Security Council, while Eritrea says it is facing a “war of aggression” from its neighbour.

“The all-out invasion of parts of northern Ethiopia by Eritrea is a matter of public record,” said a letter by Ethiopia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Gedion Timothewos, which was shared with news agencies on Friday.

“It is a blatant act of aggression that engages Ethiopia’s inherent right to self-defence,” added the letter dated Thursday and addressed to French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot.

Gedion said that Eritrean troops had advanced up to 60 kilometres (37 miles) into Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region and demanded their withdrawal, just days after the two nations cut diplomatic ties.

Eritrea’s Minister of Information Yemane Gebremeskel rejected Ethiopia’s claims.

“The Ethiopian regime has been pursuing, in effect, an unprovoked war of aggression against Eritrea for more than three years now,” he said on X.

Yemane said Asmara had shown restraint since landlocked Ethiopia had essentially declared a war against Eritrea when it stated in 2023 that it would gain access to the sea.

Citing statements made by Ethiopian officials, Yemane accused Addis Ababa of using the current conflict ⁠to take Assab, an Eritrean port, in order to restore access to the Red Sea.

Eritrea also denied Ethiopia’s claim that it is backing the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which is part of an alliance of seven armed groups that has been attempting to overthrow Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government since September.

Over the past week, Ethiopia’s army has pushed back the TPLF and seized the Tigrayan capital, Mekelle.

Witnesses also told the AFP news agency that rebels had lost the Tigrayan cities of Shire and Adigrat. Eritrean troops were reportedly seen in Adigrat before Ethiopian drone strikes hit them, according to several witnesses.

Tumultuous history

Ethiopia and Eritrea have traded accusations since the reported ⁠incursions by Eritrean troops this week raised fears of outright war in the region, where the two nations have fought previous conflicts.

The stakes have been raised this time around by conflicts in the Horn of Africa region and tensions across the Red Sea.

Diplomatic ties between the two have collapsed amid the escalation: Ethiopia closed its embassy in Asmara and ordered 10 Eritrean diplomats to leave the country last week. In response, Eritrea announced it was severing ties.

The neighbours have a tumultuous history, as Eritrea won independence from Ethiopia in 1993 and they fought a border war for two years in 1998.

Relations improved slightly in 2018 when Abiy took power in Addis Ababa, and Eritrea fought alongside Ethiopia against the TPLF in a civil war from 2020 to 2022.

Eritrea, however, was not part of the peace deal that ended the war, which soured ties soon afterwards.

Tensions are also fuelled by Abiy’s repeated claim that landlocked Ethiopia – which lost its access to the coast when Eritrea secured independence – has a right to sea access, which Eritrea sees as a threat to seize its Red Sea port of Assab.

Russian forces continue to retreat in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region.

The Kremlin-aligned channel Rybar, on Telegram, said on October 7 that Moscow’s forces were losing villages south of Lyman, a town they have tried to capture as a springboard to mount a full-scale offensive on the “fortress belt” cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.

A Ukrainian counteroffensive named “Operation Vivaldi” this year has reclaimed 175 square kilometres (67 square miles) of previously occupied land around Lyman.

“The enemy is using successes in the Lyman direction to develop attacks [east of Sloviansk], where Russian troops are forced to defend previously occupied positions and expend resources on restoring control, instead of launching their own offensive,” wrote Rybar.

“It is becoming increasingly clear that the possibility of storming the urban area [of Sloviansk] is receding into the more distant future.”

A key battle seems to be building for the village of Kryva Luka east of Sloviansk, which sits on high ground on the Russian-held right bank of the Siversky-Donets River, and which could serve as a base to launch counterattacks further east.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told the Reuters news agency that Operation Vivaldi was successful but incomplete.

To get as far as Kryva Luka, Russian sources acknowledged that Ukraine has recaptured settlements west of it. They blamed the Russian communications strategy of claiming settlements that have not been captured, giving away the plan of attack.

“Premature statements” aided Ukraine, said Rybar. “Some villages were declared liberated even before Russian units arrived, which allowed the enemy to accumulate forces there and launch counterattacks.”

Ukraine built up reserves in the Lyman area before unfolding its counteroffensive. That preparation seems to be yielding results.

Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence said its campaign to disrupt the flow of Russian ammunition and fuel to the front struck a record number of air defence assets and targets more than 50km (30 miles) away in September.

Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed Russia had captured 1,300sq km (500sq miles) of Ukraine in September, echoing claims by his generals.

The Institute for the Study of War, which monitors territorial advances using geolocated, open-source data, said Russia actually lost 80sq km (30sq miles) during that month.

The Russian casualty rate rose to a record for 2026 of 46,230 in September, according to Ukraine’s military.

Of these, 33,087 – more than 70 percent – were confirmed kills, said Ukraine.

The commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, Robert Brovdi, said enemy casualties were up by 40 percent in the first five days of October, compared with the same period in September.

The Ukrainian military on October 7 counted 1,545,950 Russian dead and wounded for the entire full-scale invasion since 2022.

Putin’s response

Putin’s response has been to intensify bombing, causing civilian suffering.

Twenty-two people, five of them children, were killed in the city of Pryluky, in the northern Chernihiv region, when a Russian cruise missile demolished a five-storey apartment building on October 7, Putin’s birthday.

“Today, for Putin’s birthday, the Russian army ‘gifted’ the destruction of a residential building in Pryluky,” said Zelenskyy.

Ukraine’s Air Force said Russia unleashed 130 drones and 48 cruise missiles across 12 regions that day, as well as ballistics. At least two more people died in Kyiv and two in Oleksandria.

At least 30 people died in Kramatorsk on October 8, when a Russian bomb struck two city buses. Video of the emergency response showed bodies strewn across an avenue and in a park.

Recent analysis of the Geran-4 and Geran-5 jet-powered drones Russia increasingly uses for many of its attacks makes it unlikely that these attacks on nonmilitary targets are accidental.

Ukraine’s military intelligence said the attacks use satellite and sophisticated inertial navigation systems, as well as a camera that reads landmark features and checks them against an on-board database – all three systems working in concert to ensure accurate navigation.

Ukraine has responded to the jet-powered drones by speeding up delivery of F-16 fighters from its allies, which are proving an effective first line of defence.

“Currently, F-16s are destroying between 50 percent and 60 percent of the drone attacks,” said Zelenskyy.

Ukraine is also testing five new types of interceptor drones, the most successful of which is 30 percent effective, and experimenting with small-scale missiles, Zelenskyy said.

A dozen AI-driven heavy machine-gun turrets have been placed around Kyiv as a last line of defence, with dozens more planned around the country.

These are a “facility-level” defence, said Serhiy Beskrestnov, a senior Defence Ministry adviser. “It can protect a warehouse, factory, bridge, or power substation.”

Russia has begun hitting bridges across the Dnipro River, striking Kyiv’s southern and northern bridges seven times in the first four days of October. It has previously struck the building where Ukraine’s cabinet met, as well as energy facilities feeding the city, in an effort to cause a blackout.

Russia’s jet-powered drones travel at more than 500km (310 miles) per hour and are more difficult to intercept than its propeller-driven Shahed drones.

Despite this, during the October 7 strike, Ukraine’s Air Force said it intercepted 80 percent of the jet-powered drones, 95 percent of the propeller-driven drones and 80 percent of cruise missiles.

On October 7, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz visited Kyiv to announce a 1.3-billion-euro ($1.46bn) military aid package, and to sign agreements worth 8.5 billion euros ($9.5bn) to jointly develop drone defences and other weapons with Ukraine.

Merz’s visit was an important political gesture following recent elections in two German states where the pro-Russian AfD trounced his governing CDU party.

Ukraine continued long-range strikes inside Russia.

These struck refineries in Volgograd on October 2 and Bashkortostan on October 8, as part of a strategy to starve the Russian economy and military of fuel.

“Over 51 percent of the enemy’s oil refining capacity has been disabled,” said Ukraine’s military.

Ukraine also hit the Samara linear production and dispatch station, which its General Staff described as “a major hub for receiving, storing, and blending oil”.

The staff said eleven 20,000-tonne storage tanks and three 50,000-tonne storage tanks had been destroyed.

“The facility blends high- and low-sulfur oil from various fields to produce the export grade of oil known as Urals, which accounts for up to 50 percent of the total volume of Russian oil exports,” the military said.

Ukraine also struck military targets. On October 7, it struck the Astrakhan Gas Processing Plant, which extracts gaseous sulphur for use in explosives.

On October 4, it destroyed a Sukhoi Su-35 multi-role fighter and a Sukhoi Su-34 fighter-bomber on the Adygea airfield, and also hit the Seshcha airfield in Bryansk.

Its campaign of mid-range strikes to destroy Russian power supply in occupied areas had reached 456 between July 6 and October 3.

United States President Donald Trump has said that he does not intend to bomb Iran again until the November midterm elections, even though several US media outlets have reported that the Pentagon has drawn up plans to relaunch attacks before that vote.

Trump has been accused of misdirection on the issue in the past. The US launched its initial attacks on Iran on February 28, as talks with Iran were ongoing and despite Trump saying just the day before that he had not made any decision. One year previously, the US struck Iran towards the end of Israel’s June 2025 12-day war, despite Trump saying he would announce a decision about attacks “in two weeks”.

Still, striking Iran ahead of the midterm elections would be risky for the administration as the war remains deeply unpopular with Americans.

Resuming the war afterwards may have less of a negative impact on Trump, who is not eligible to run for another term as US president anyway.

Here’s what we know about Trump’s plans.

In the past two days, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal and other publications have reported claims by unnamed officials that the Pentagon has drawn up plans to attack Iran before the midterms, if authorised to do so.

On Wednesday, US publication Axios cited US and Israeli officials saying the Pentagon has instructed US Central Command (CENTCOM) to prepare for imminent major combat operations. The Atlantic also reported along similar lines.

What has Trump said?

On Thursday, Trump posted on his Truth Social media platform that he will not order a resumption of strikes on Iran before November 3, when the US midterm elections will be held.

“I want to make it clear to everybody that, while Iran is in very bad condition…we will not be attacking Iran at any time prior to the Midterm Elections to be held in the United States on November 3rd,” he said.

The president added that the US is presently “having productive discussions” with the Iranian side. However, that was also the case on February 28, the day the US and Israel first struck Iran, triggering the war.

Trump did not make any reference to preparing for potential military operations, nor did he provide more details on the state of talks.

Why might Trump be hesitant about resuming bombing before the midterms?

Trump and Republicans are worried about a voter backlash against the war at the polls. The US war on Iran is intensely unpopular domestically as Americans have had to grapple with surging prices of gas, food and other basic commodities because of the crisis in the Middle East.

Since the start of the war, surveys have shown that large numbers of Americans did not approve of striking Iran.

Now, about 65 percent of Americans say they “disapprove” of the way in which Trump has handled the Iran war overall, according to a Pew Research Center poll released on Thursday. Trump stated at the start of the war that it would go on for just a few weeks, however, it is now into its eighth month.

According to Pew, most Americans now believe the war will continue for at least another year. Even Republican or more conservative-leaning voters are growing more negative about the war, its poll found.

The conflict has also severely affected Trump’s personal ratings and eroded support for Republicans. A Reuters/Ipsos poll on Thursday found that only 30 percent of his supporters were enthusiastic about voting in the midterms, compared with 48 percent of Democratic voters.

About 13 percent of those who voted for Trump in 2024 say they are not sure who to vote for in the congressional elections.

Delaying attacks until after the elections could potentially shield Republican candidates from voter backlash, analysts say.

While analysts say Trump will see a good performance at the polls as approval for renewed strikes, a Republican defeat at the polls could equally further incentivise him to hit Iran again as he will calculate that he has little to lose at that point.

While that could further affect Trump’s ratings, the president is not eligible to run in the next presidential election in any case.

Will the US restart the war after the midterms?

In recent weeks, the US president has threatened to “end” the war with force after the elections as talks with Iran have dragged on.

At a Republican convention in September, he accused Iran of trying to affect the outcome of the midterms and said that conflict “is going to end immediately after the elections”.

In an interview with Time magazine two weeks ago, he also said it would be “possible” to ramp up bombing in Iran after the elections, but declined to elaborate. Analysts say his comments were designed to calm voters, while at the same time warning Iran of potential aggression after the vote.

Last week, the US military dispatched about 7,000 sailors and 2,000 Marines aboard several ships now sailing to the Middle East amid threats of new attacks from Trump. The vessel formation included the USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier strike group.

The deployment increases the number of US troops in the region to 20,000, alongside hundreds of aircraft and at least three carrier strike groups.

In the past, US troop build-up in the Middle East and the Caribbean has subsequently resulted in military action.

In June, Washington and Iran signed a ceasefire agreement that quickly broke down over control of the Strait of Hormuz.

Trump has repeatedly said that the US has the upper hand in the strait, citing more oil exports and Iran’s weakened economy. He has also voiced aversion to a deal with Tehran over management of Hormuz, but said he might consider it because “they’re willing to offer us anything to stop”.

Washington rejected a recent proposal from Iran to reopen the strait based on certain conditions it wants the US to meet, including the lifting of sanctions, unfreezing Iranian assets and guaranteeing an end to attacks. Last week, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said Iran was considering a counterproposal from the US.

Gaza City – More than 80 percent of Gaza’s buildings have been damaged or destroyed since Israel launched its war on the besieged enclave in October 2023, according to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, turning whole neighbourhoods into rubble and wiping out much of its infrastructure.

For generations, Gaza’s streets, markets, schools, hospitals and public spaces formed the backdrop to everyday life. They were places where people worked, studied, shopped, met friends and family, and built memories.

Many of the city’s familiar landmarks also carried a much longer history, reflecting Gaza’s thousands of years as a crossroads of different civilisations.

The war has also changed the face of Gaza by damaging or destroying many of those historic and recognisable landmarks.

UNESCO has verified damage to 164 cultural sites since October 2023, including 128 buildings of historical or artistic interest, 14 religious sites, nine monuments, eight archaeological sites, two museums and three depositories of movable cultural property.

Among them are the Great Omari Mosque, Gaza’s oldest mosque, Qasr al-Basha, the ancient Samaritan Bathhouse, al-Qissariya Market and the Church of Saint Porphyrius complex.

Some of these places have been reduced to ruins, while others remain standing but heavily damaged. The destruction has altered not only individual buildings but the streets and neighbourhoods around them, removing landmarks that once helped people recognise and navigate their city.

This photo series contrasts archive images of some of Gaza’s most recognisable streets, markets and public buildings with new photographs taken three years into the war, showing how these familiar places have changed after years of bombardment and destruction.

Iranian media reported “massive explosions” in the southern Strait of Hormuz, with Fars citing unnamed military sources as Trump says US won’t strike Iran before midterms.

Crew members express relief upon return from record-breaking deployment of 265 days that strained conditions on board.

The United States aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln has returned to its home port after a 322-day deployment, including a record 265 consecutive days at sea, during which it helped wage the US-Israel war on Iran.

The vessel returned to Naval Air Station North Island in San Diego, California, on Thursday, where members of its crew were greeted by family and friends.

“It feels amazing,” 20-year-old Abel Ramirez told The Associated Press news agency, adding that his parents had driven from Texas to meet him. “There was a certain point when I never thought I would come off.”

The record-setting deployment of the USS Lincoln became a symbol for larger criticisms of the US war effort, which has dragged on since February with no clear end in sight and has strained US military stockpiles.

The prolonged deployment prompted a series of news reports calling attention to deteriorating conditions, food shortages and a series of reported suicide attempts by crew members.

Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth praised the sailors on Wednesday in remarks that accused the media of trying to turn the ship into “a symbol of dysfunction or a symbol of low morale or a symbol of a failed mission”.

President Donald Trump and members of his administration have frequently lashed out at the news media for critical reporting on the war on Iran. Trump himself has called the reporting about the USS Lincoln “fake news”.

“The Lincoln has been out there for a period of time, a good period of time,” he said at an Oval Office meeting on August 17. “I know people on the Lincoln, and they say it’s beautifully maintained and beautifully taken care of.”

Earlier that month, when confronted with the amount of time the USS Lincoln had spent at sea without a port stop, Trump quipped that its deployment was “not nearly long enough“.

The reports of mental health strain on the USS Lincoln come as public opinion polls show low approval ratings among US voters for the war against Iran.

On Thursday, the Pew Research Center released a poll that found 65 percent of Americans disapproved of Trump’s handling of the war, compared with 33 percent who approved.

The war has also fuelled concerns about the cost of living ahead of the upcoming midterm elections. Since the war began, Iran has hindered commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, a critical waterway for the trade of fuel, fertiliser and other goods.

Sailors returning home on the USS Lincoln said that they were looking forward to fresh meals and spending time with their families.

Alma Solano Velez said that her husband, one of the US service members on board, shared a list of foods he had been craving over his 10-month deployment: oxtail, barbecue chicken, broccoli and shrimp empanadas, among others.

She added that he had spoken about “the lack of food and showers” and was looking forward to seeing their four-year-old daughter.

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia – After nearly two weeks of fierce fighting, Ethiopian federal forces entered the Tigrayan capital of Mekelle as forces from an alliance of rebel groups, including the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), withdrew from the city.

The fighting that erupted late last month has effectively ended the 2022 Pretoria ceasefire and the fragile peace that followed the devastating Tigray war.

But Mekelle’s capture may mark the end of conventional warfare rather than the end of the conflict. Fighting has continued elsewhere in Tigray, while reports of Eritrean troops entering northern Tigrayan towns have added a potentially more dangerous regional dimension.

Ethiopian federal forces used air power and ground forces to advance across Tigray. After suffering successive defeats around the towns of Alamata and Kobo, rebel forces withdrew into the surrounding countryside. They have pledged to continue fighting.

“We will confront the enemy on our terms and where we choose,” TPLF leader Debretsion Gebremichael said.

A war that may not be over

There are echoes of the war that began in 2020, when Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government declared victory after federal forces captured Mekelle. Tigrayan forces subsequently regrouped in the mountains, retook much of the region and recaptured the capital, prolonging the war for nearly a year and a half.

The renewed conflict could follow a similar trajectory, particularly if the TPLF and other armed groups succeed in turning the mountainous terrain into a prolonged armed rebellion. Ethiopia is already fighting insurgencies in Amhara and Oromia, raising the prospect of its federal forces being stretched across multiple fronts.

But the battlefield reversals suffered by the rebels could have implications well beyond Tigray. They have raised concern in Egypt and among other Ethiopian rivals, according to Hossamaldeen Ibrahim, an African analyst at the Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute.

“Egypt views the Renaissance Dam, and any Ethiopian [army] move towards the Red Sea, as a strategic threat, so it has allied with Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia against any Ethiopian unilateralism,” Ibrahim told Al Jazeera.

“Ethiopia is seeking a sea outlet; Eritrea sees this as an existential threat.”

Ethiopia’s Red Sea ambitions

Ethiopia has been landlocked since Eritrea won its war of independence in 1991, leaving Addis Ababa heavily dependent on neighbouring countries for access to international trade.

Abiy has increasingly made access to the Red Sea a strategic priority since 2023, raising concerns in Eritrea over Ethiopia’s ambitions, particularly over the port of Assab.

Ethiopia currently relies heavily on Djibouti for maritime trade, while also pursuing alternative arrangements, including through Kenya and Somaliland.

After being sworn in on Monday for another five-year term following his party’s victory in the June 1 election, Abiy again put the issue at the centre of his parliamentary address.

“Based on the principle of give and take, we will work diligently to ensure that Ethiopia has an outlet to the sea,” he told parliament.

The issue has increasingly become part of a wider regional contest.

A loose regional alignment

In recent months, Egypt, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia have found themselves sharing concerns over Ethiopia’s regional ambitions. On October 4, the leaders of the four countries met for a quadrilateral consultative summit in New Alamein, Egypt, where they discussed regional issues and pledged to strengthen political, economic and trade cooperation as well as consultation and coordination.

The meeting does not amount to a formal military alliance, and the four countries have different interests in their dealings with Addis Ababa. The summit’s joint declaration also called for respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, noninterference in internal affairs and the peaceful resolution of disputes.

But their concerns increasingly overlap around Ethiopia’s ambitions in the Red Sea, the Nile and the wider Horn of Africa.

Relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea have also deteriorated sharply since the Pretoria ceasefire. Ethiopia closed its embassy in Eritrea and expelled Eritrean diplomats on October 1, accusing Asmara of hostile acts and involvement in the renewed fighting. Eritrea responded by severing diplomatic ties, while denying that it supported the opposition alliance. Egypt and Sudan have also denied Ethiopian accusations that they are backing the alliance.

The Ethiopian army’s advance into Tigray has added another layer to that rivalry.

“The [Ethiopian army’s] advance in Tigray directly threatens [Eritrean President] Isaias [Afwerki] and the Eritrean state,” said Etana H Dinka, an assistant professor of African history at the University of Miami.

Eritrean forces fought alongside Ethiopian troops during the 2020–22 Tigray war, but relations between Abiy and Isaias have since deteriorated. Eritrean troops have reportedly been seen in towns in northern Tigray, adding a potentially significant new dimension to the conflict. The Associated Press news agency reported Eritrean troops entering Adigrat and Idaga Hamus after crossing into Ethiopia, while Eritrea has neither confirmed nor denied the troop movements.

Eritrea’s role could be decisive

For Eritrea, the location of the fighting matters as much as its outcome.

A prolonged conflict in Tigray could keep Ethiopian forces tied down and limit Addis Ababa’s ability to pursue its Red Sea ambitions. But a decisive Ethiopian victory could leave the federal government with greater freedom to turn its attention towards regional rivals.

“With reports that Eritrean troops are moving into Tigray, Eritrea seems keen on boosting TPLF forces withdrawing northwards, so that the engagement between Ethiopian and Eritrean soldiers takes place in Tigrayan territory, and not in Eritrea,” said Mohamed Kheir Omer, a researcher focused on the Horn of Africa.

That could create an incentive for Eritrea to support forces capable of keeping the Ethiopian army tied down, without necessarily entering a direct confrontation of its own.

Sudan adds another layer

Sudan’s war adds another dimension to the regional rivalry.

Egypt has provided political backing and logistical and technical support to Sudan’s army, according to the Reuters news agency, while the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have been accused of atrocities in Darfur.

Ethiopia has faced accusations of facilitating support for the RSF. A Reuters investigation reported in February that Ethiopia was hosting a camp in its western Benishangul-Gumuz region where thousands of fighters linked to the RSF were being trained. Reuters cited eight sources, including a senior Ethiopian government official, who said the United Arab Emirates financed the camp’s construction and provided military trainers and logistical support. The UAE denied the allegations, and Reuters said it could not independently verify the UAE’s role.

Those competing relationships are part of a broader contest over the Nile, Sudan, the Red Sea and access to trade routes.

For Egypt, its dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam remains a major strategic concern. For Eritrea, Ethiopia’s search for a Red Sea outlet is viewed through the lens of national security. For Sudan’s neighbours, the conflict threatens to reshape regional power balances.

Will Egypt, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia intervene?

The shared interests of Ethiopia’s regional rivals do not necessarily translate into direct intervention.

Egypt has its own calculations over the Nile and Sudan. Eritrea has a direct security interest in developments in Tigray. Somalia is dealing with its own security challenges and a complicated relationship with Addis Ababa. Sudan remains consumed by its devastating civil war.

At the same time, Ethiopia’s federal forces now face the possibility of fighting on several fronts.

The TPLF, Amhara Fano and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) have each sought to challenge the federal government in different parts of the country. If they can maintain pressure on the army while retreating from major population centres, the fall of Mekelle could prove to be only the first phase of a much longer conflict.

For Ethiopia’s rivals, the question is whether to exploit that vulnerability or avoid being drawn into another regional war.

The extent of any regional involvement may ultimately depend on whether the TPLF can keep federal forces tied down in Tigray, and away from the Eritrean border.

“It isn’t difficult to understand Cairo’s commitment to prevent Ethiopia from succeeding in the current warfare, whatever its army’s intended goals, including Abiy’s acclaimed access to the Red Sea, are,” University of Miami’s Dinka said.

The question now is whether those regional calculations will remain largely diplomatic or spill into the battlefield.

The Russian and Iranian presidents met in Turkmenistan ahead of regional summit.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has told Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian that Russia will “do everything” to help end the United States-led war on Iran, Russian news agencies reported.

The two leaders met in Turkmenistan on Thursday ahead of the summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States, a group of former Soviet nations.

“You know our position. On our part, we are ready to do everything we can to help you resolve this situation,” Interfax news agency said Putin told Pezeshkian.

“We know that Iran is making real efforts to end the conflict, which broke out through no fault of its own, no fault of Iran’s,” Putin said, according to Russian media.

Putin also noted what he called a “positive evolution” in Iran-Russia relations.

In a call on Wednesday, Putin told Pezeshkian that Moscow is prepared to mediate efforts to end the war in the Middle East, Iran’s IRNA news agency reported.

Putin and Pezeshkian also met on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Kyrgyzstan last month.

Strategic partnership

The two countries, which are under heavy Western sanctions, have reinforced diplomatic and military ties.

Last year, Moscow and Tehran signed a “comprehensive strategic partnership treaty” that covers areas from trade and military cooperation to science, culture and education.

Ukraine and Western countries have accused Iran of supplying Russia with Shahed drones and short-range missiles for use in the Ukraine war. Russia has also been accused of supplying data to Iran for its attacks on US targets in the Middle East.

The meeting came as Iran-US talks stand at an apparent impasse.

US President Donald Trump said on Thursday that the US will not launch an attack on Iran before the November 3 US midterm congressional elections, saying the two countries are ‌‌holding “productive” talks about ending the ongoing war.

Diplomatic efforts to resolve Russia’s offensive in Ukraine also appear deadlocked, even as both sides intensify attacks.

Syrian authorities questioned why search and rescue operations were called off before the fate of 10 sailors was known.

Syria has called for an “independent and transparent” investigation into the sinking of a cargo ship in the Black Sea, demanding answers over the fate of the ship’s 10 crew members, including nine Syrians and an Egyptian, who remain unaccounted for.

The Togolese-flagged Alfa Watan, went down in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone early on Tuesday, amid a rising number of drone strikes hitting Black Sea shipping during the Russia-Ukraine war.

It is unclear who carried out the attack.

Mazen Aloush, from the Syria’s port authority asked the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and Bulgarian authorities to find out why a search and rescue mission was called off, before the missing sailors were found.

“Their fate is still unknown” said Aloush, adding that “the reasons that led to the suspension of search and rescue operations” had to be established.

The attack on Tuesday also hit the Palau-flagged Able, setting it ablaze. Eighteen Turkish and Indian crew members were rescued from the burning vessel, while the Alfa Watan sank.

Both commercial ships were managed by Turkey-based companies, according to the Equasis merchant shipping database.

The Syrian sailors’ union said contact with the ship’s crew had been lost and no survivors had been found after search operations were halted.

Aloush condemned the targeting of a civilian commercial vessel saying it was a serious breach of maritime security and a threat to sailors.

He said Syrian General Authority for Ports and Customs was closely monitoring the incident.

He urged ⁠authorities to use all available technical means to locate and inspect the wreckage to help establish what caused the ship to sink.

He called for international and maritime bodies to strengthen measures to help commercial shipping as attacks in the Black Sea rise.

Ukraine says it has received proposals from India, Turkiye, Egypt and the United States to broker talks with Russia. The offers come as the two adversaries escalate attacks on each other’s energy and port infrastructure with their war now in its fifth year.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha revealed the four proposals at a briefing in Kyiv on Friday and singled out New Delhi’s. “The most comprehensive is India’s proposal,” he said, adding that India had signalled a willingness to play a role for the first time.

None of the proposals aims to end the war. Each seeks a narrower truce, covering energy facilities, ports or commercial shipping in the Black Sea.

Here’s what we know:

What is India proposing?

India has not made its plan public. Quoting unnamed sources, however, Indian media have reported it has three parts. According to the Hindustan Times, it would aim to protect infrastructure, keep grain and energy supplies moving through Black Sea ports, and ensure the safety of commercial shipping.

The first part – mutually halting strikes on energy facilities and ports – matches what Kyiv has been demanding. Sybiha said any deal must be a complete energy truce that covers port infrastructure as well.

The second part builds on the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which Turkiye and the United Nations mediated in 2022 but Russia abandoned in 2023.

The third part, protecting merchant ships and their crews, is particularly important to India because Indian sailors have been killed or harmed on Black Sea routes.

The sources were quoted as saying India’s plan goes further than the other three proposals because it covers infrastructure and shipping together. A Ukrainian official told the Kyiv Independent that it incorporates elements of the Turkish, Egyptian and US initiatives. The Kyiv Post reported that Sybiha also described the plan as addressing a possible ceasefire along the front lines, although other accounts said he gave no specifics.

The proposal likely took shape during Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar’s first visit to Ukraine last month and in a later meeting with Sybiha at the UN General Assembly in New York, also in September. Jaishankar said New Delhi was “trying to be helpful, starting with the Black Sea safety of shipping issue”.

What do we know about the Turkish and Egyptian proposals?

Very little. Neither Ankara nor Cairo has published details. Both reportedly focus on keeping Black Sea grain supplies moving by suspending attacks on commercial shipping. Some reports said the two countries proposed a grain truce jointly while others described two separate plans.

Turkiye has done this before. With the UN, it steered the 2022 grain deal, one of the few narrow truces of the war to hold for any length of time. Ankara and the UN are now organising new Black Sea talks with a round planned for October.

Beyond its Black Sea focus, almost nothing is known about Egypt’s proposal. Its interest, however, is clear: Egypt relies on Ukraine for nearly one-third of its grain supplies.

What is the US pitching?

According to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Washington has proposed three steps: a mutual halt to energy strikes, a reopening of the grain corridor and a trilateral meeting with Ukraine and Russia, possibly in Abu Dhabi.

The latest effort began in early September when US President Donald Trump’s envoys visited Kyiv and Moscow and secured an agreement in principle for a trilateral meeting. Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner met Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on September 5 while Kremlin envoy Kirill Dmitriev visited the US twice in September.

The trilateral meeting has since been pushed back. It had been expected to take place in the United Arab Emirates in early October. Washington now wants it in late October, and people close to the talks blamed the delay on Russia.

Washington has also invited Putin to the Group of 20 summit in Miami, Florida, in December. “We hope that’s an invitation he’ll accept,” US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said. The Kremlin said no decision has been made.

At the same time, the US is applying pressure to try to end the war. Trump recently signed a law giving him sweeping powers to sanction buyers of Russian energy.

He has also called on Ukraine to stop targeting Russian diesel facilities amid a diesel prices crisis in the US, where Trump faces tricky midterm elections next month. “Mr Zelenskyy has to do one thing,” he said on September 13. “He has to stop knocking out diesel fuel in Russia.” This drew much criticism that Trump instead should focus his comments on Russia, which began the war with its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

He is reportedly sceptical about his own government’s latest diplomatic initiative. People familiar with his thinking have told US media that he doubted Putin would agree to an energy truce before winter.

How have Russia and Ukraine responded?

Sybiha said Ukraine would agree to a truce but with conditions. It would accept an energy and Black Sea shipping ceasefire, but only as a combined package, he said.

He added that Kyiv is also open to an unconditional ceasefire along the current front lines. Zelenskyy backs the US-proposed meeting but stressed it needs “not only Ukraine but also the Russian side” to support it.

Moscow has been warm in tone but has committed to nothing. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said Russia would welcome India’s peace efforts while Putin said Modi has “very good ideas aimed at finding mutually acceptable solutions”, but he did not elaborate.

In private, Moscow appears to have said no. A Ukrainian official told the Kyiv Independent that Russia has rejected India’s proposal although this has not been confirmed publicly. Ukraine’s agriculture minister said Russia had rejected every Black Sea ceasefire option the mediators have presented.

Why are Global South countries becoming more involved?

Food supplies, the lives of their citizens and fuel prices are all at stake.

“I think it’s clear to many countries that this war is not a localised war, but it’s a war that has these global consequences,” Fredrik Wesslau, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, told Al Jazeera.

Russia and Ukraine account for more than a quarter of global wheat shipments, and their attacks on each other’s ports helped push wheat futures to a three-year high in August.

Sailors from countries with no links to the war are being killed. At least five Indian seafarers have died in strikes on Black Sea shipping in recent months along with seven Azerbaijani crew members since June. On Saturday, a Russian strike on a Liberian-flagged ship in a port in the Odesa region killed a crew member. Ukraine, for its part, has targeted tankers it links to Russia’s shadow fleet since July.

The energy war is also being felt in global markets. Ukraine reported more than 194 drone attacks on Russian refineries this year, hitting all 11 of the largest. Bloomberg News estimated that Russia’s fuel output has fallen by more than 30 percent. With Middle East supply already down as a result of the US-Israel war on Iran, global diesel markets are more exposed to the loss of Russian supplies.

Maximilian Hess, a nonresident senior fellow in the Eurasia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, said energy is at least as important as grain in driving the diplomatic efforts. He pointed to a “clear frustration” among many countries over high oil prices, which reflect both the Russia-Ukraine war and the crisis in the Middle East.

“Of course, Ukrainian grain is important for them, but the oil-price factor is important there as well,” he told Al Jazeera. “I think it is those commodity-shock concerns that are pushing them to re-embrace this rhetoric, rather than anything else.”

What are the challenges ahead?

Every previous attempt at diplomacy has failed to end the Russia-Ukraine war. A US-brokered, 30-day energy truce in early 2025 collapsed amid accusations of violations on both sides. At talks in Istanbul in May 2025, Zelenskyy complained that Russia had sent a junior delegation with no authority to sign a ceasefire.

In August 2025, a meeting between Trump and Putin in Alaska yielded no results despite Trump claiming to be close to a deal ahead of it.

Wesslau said Washington’s efforts have faltered partly because Trump – who had boasted he would end the war within 24 hours of taking office in January 2025 – has appeared unwilling to put real pressure on Moscow. “The Russians see this, and they conclude that they can continue this war,” he said.

Deep distrust remains. Oleksandr Merezhko, head of the Ukrainian parliament’s foreign affairs committee, said: “Putin never keeps agreements.”

Moscow’s actions on the ground suggest it is in no hurry, Wesslau said  “They’re trying to strangle Ukraine, strangle the economy, and make it unliveable ahead of the winter,” he said. He added that Moscow’s occasionally softer rhetoric was aimed mainly at the Trump administration and “has always proved to be a bluff”.

Russia’s terms are another obstacle. Hess said Moscow’s demands have not softened at any point since it launched the war and at times have grown. Putin has demanded all of Ukraine’s Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhia regions, including territory Russian forces have never controlled, as well as a buffer zone in northern Ukraine. Moscow is also seeking sanctions relief and military concessions for any Black Sea deal.

“I don’t think it’s a question of who actually mediates. I think it’s really a question of the calculation in Moscow,” Wesslau said. “Fundamentally, the problem is that Putin doesn’t want a ceasefire or a peace agreement. He wants to continue the war. He believes that he can win.”

Analysts said only greater economic pressure is likely to change that calculation.

Wesslau said if Europe can close down Russia’s shadow fleet of oil tankers, “this would be a massive blow to Russia’s war economy.” Hess said the country best placed to shift things quickly is China, rather than the US, by cutting its purchases of Russian oil. However, he added: “I don’t think Beijing is interested in doing so.”

Hess said that unless there is an outside shock, the war “is much more likely to last another four years than another four months”.

In the past three years, following the October 7 attacks and the start of Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza, the wider region has been marked by conflict, economic turmoil, and a shattering of the balance of power.

The network of alliances maintained by Iran, long central to its regional power, has been hit hard and severely weakened. Yemen’s Houthi rebels remain one notable exception.

Israel has made gains. Many of the leaders of the Lebanese group Hezbollah and the Palestinian group Hamas have been killed, while Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was also assassinated in February. Israel occupies most of Gaza, where it has also killed more than 74,000 Palestinians and reduced much of the enclave to rubble.

Its military aggression has come at a cost, isolating it from its traditional allies and making it globally unpopular, including in the United States. The potential for more normalisation deals with Arab countries seems unlikely, at least in the short term.

Instead, Israel continues to launch attacks across the region, crossing previously held red lines – such as the 2025 attack on Doha, Qatar – and making many governments around the world view it as the primary source of unrest in the Middle East.

US not a protector

“Before October 7, the US’s entire policy in the Middle East rested on normalising Israel’s presence in the region through its so-called Abraham Accords,” HA Hellyer of the Royal United Services Institute said, referring to the normalisation deals with several Arab states, including the United Arab Emirates. “Israel’s response to the October 7 attack ended that.”

Instead, rather than a stable Middle East with Israel at its centre, the US entered into a war with Iran this year, and has since looked on as Tehran targeted US allies across the Gulf, shattering the perceived security of the US security umbrella.

Drones and missiles hit Qatar’s Ras Laffan gas hub and started fires near Dubai airport and at Fujairah’s oil zone. In September, the Houthis surged down Yemen’s Red Sea coast, taking the port of Mocha and nearby islands. Their gains tightened their grip on the Bab al-Mandeb strait, threatening a key route for global trade and energy supplies that had become even more important amid disruption in the Strait of Hormuz.

“There’s been a loss of faith in the US as a singularly sufficient security guarantor,” Hellyer continued.

“This is why you’re seeing many in the region talk to other external actors, in addition to continuing, and in some cases deepening their US ties, as well as initiatives such as the Mecca security pact as states in the region look elsewhere for ways to safeguard their security,” he said, referring to the defence agreement between Saudi Arabia, Turkiye and Pakistan, signed in August, agreeing that an attack on one was to be regarded as an attack on all.

Alliances

Alongside the loss of confidence in the US as a security guarantor has come a dramatic reordering of alliances and rivalries. Much of Iran’s network – most notably Hezbollah, whose reputation had long served as a deterrent against Israeli attack – appeared to buckle under Israeli pressure.

That, in turn, emboldened an Israeli military push that saw troops invade Lebanon in October 2024 and again in March 2026, and seize Syrian territory during the brief power vacuum that followed Bashar al-Assad’s ouster in 2024.

“The Middle East has always been multi-aligned. However, now it’s even more so,” Sanam Vakil, the director of the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House, said of the increased leverage given to external actors, such as Turkiye in Syria and China’s involvement in negotiations over the end to war on Iran, as Beijing finds its own energy supplies under threat.

“It’s ironic, since October 7, it’s Israel that has emerged as the revisionist power and Iran almost as the status quo power,” she said of the apparent reversal in status of the two belligerents, with Tehran seemingly more focused on regaining the ground it has lost in the last three years rather than advancing beyond them.

However, none of this was to overstate Israeli influence, or liken it to a regional superpower, Vakil cautioned. “Israel may currently be the preponderant military power in the Middle East, but real power is typically classed as being able to project stability, which Israel hasn’t shown itself able or willing to do,” she said.

Clogged arteries

While Israel and the US hoped February’s attacks would swiftly topple Iran’s government, they have instead opened a new front. Tehran now wields economic leverage over Israel, the US and their partners through the Strait of Hormuz, which borders Iran and typically carries about a fifth of the world’s oil and gas, and through Bab al-Mandeb, which is now threatened by its Houthi allies.

Whatever Tehran’s intentions, the economic pain has been uneven. The West, cushioned by emergency reserves, record US oil production and supplies from countries such as Norway, has so far avoided the turmoil of the 1970s oil shocks, when US drivers queued for petrol, even though the current disruption is on a greater scale. In April, the International Monetary Fund trimmed its 2026 global growth forecast only slightly, to 3.1 percent from 3.3 percent.

Gulf exporters, in contrast, have fared far worse. The same assessment cut its forecast for Saudi Arabia from 4.5 to 3.1 percent, and turned Qatar’s from growth of 6.1 percent into a contraction of 8.6 percent.

“It’s curious, in many ways the West’s reduced need for Gulf oil has increased the degree to which Israel has become a liability for the US,” Israeli political economist Shir Hever told Al Jazeera, referring to a diplomatic alliance between the two states long underpinned by Israel’s strategic position in an oil-rich region central to US interests.

“There’s a train of thought in Israel that the current crises may push the Gulf states into allying with it,” he said, while noting the irony that Israel had been the main aggressor in the conflicts that followed October 7. “Though that seems fairly unlikely.”

Ukrainian reports of South Korean fuel exports to Russia come amid strained tensions between Seoul and Kyiv.

South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has said the government will take legal action over illegal fuel shipments to Russia if allegations from an adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy are confirmed.

The Foreign Ministry said on Thursday it had not confirmed whether South Korean fuel, including diesel, had been exported to Russia.

It added that exports of some products, such as diesel and jet fuel for commercial purposes, were not included in a South Korean exports control list to Russia.

On Wednesday, the South Korean presidential office dismissed a statement by Vladyslav Vlasiuk, an adviser to the Ukrainian president on sanctions policy, that 176,000 tonnes of fuel were shipped from South Korea to Russia via sanctioned tankers in July and August.

Ukraine’s top sanctions official said the alleged findings run counter to South Korea’s sanctions policy towards Russia.

“Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, our government has consistently implemented sanctions and export controls against Russia in close cooperation with the international community,” South Korean presidential spokesperson Kang Yu-jung said on Wednesday, according to the Yonhap news agency.

“We ask that Ukraine also refrain from distorting the relevant policies of the Republic of Korea without sufficient verification of the facts and making public remarks that can damage international trust,” she added.

Relations between South Korea and Ukraine have been strained for the past couple of weeks after Seoul accused Zelenskyy of having “unilaterally disclosed” to the United Nations General Assembly that Kyiv had transferred two North Korean prisoners of war to South Korea.

Seoul Korea demanded an official apology from Kyiv, claiming the Ukrainian president had breached a non-disclosure agreement. Kyiv said no such agreement was in place.

Pyongyang and Moscow, meanwhile, have deep ties, with the two countries having signed a mutual defence treaty in 2024. According to Ukrainian and South Korean estimates, about 14,000 to 15,000 North Korean soldiers were sent to support Russia’s war efforts against Ukraine.

North Korea and South Korea remain technically at war because the 1950–1953 Korean War ended in an armistice rather than a peace treaty.

Saudi civil aviation authorities say Houthi attacks on Abha and King Khalid International airports have killed three civilians, including two women, and injured 36 others.

Countries in Central Asia have begun buying oil from Iran as the Russian fuel supplies they have long depended on run dry amid Ukraine’s mounting attacks on Russian energy infrastructure to degrade Moscow’s war effort.

In August, Tajikistan announced it was receiving oil and petroleum products from Iran as Dushanbe faces uncertainty over its fuel supply from Russia. Tehran also agreed to establish a joint refinery in Kyrgyzstan in August, and supply the country with crude oil.

Moscow has been facing fuel shortages due to Ukrainian drone strikes on its refineries as Russia’s war on its neighbour continues to rage.

Can the Russian fuel crisis give Iran a new oil opening in Central Asia?

Here’s what we know:

Which Central Asian countries have been affected by Russia’s fuel crisis?

Ukraine’s offensive against Russian energy infrastructure has caused panic across Central Asian countries like Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which are dependent on Moscow for oil and petroleum products.

Tajikistan has traditionally sourced up to 80 percent of its petroleum products from Russia. Kyrgyzstan also relies on petroleum product imports, sourcing more than 90 percent of its petrol from Russia.

“They’ve been hurt the most,” Galiya Ibragimova, a Moldova-based expert on Central Asia with Carnegie Politika, which has its headquarters in Berlin, told Al Jazeera in an interview in August.

Kyrgyzstan is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, the free trade bloc of five former Soviet nations dominated by Russia and the Kremlin’s political decisions.

Tajikistan is not a member of the group, but it bought discounted Russian fuel as “payment for political loyalty, not because [Russian President Vladimir] Putin is so kind”, Ibragimova added.

Kazakhstan, meanwhile, boasts three giant, Soviet-era oil refineries. Still, fuel prices in the country have increased by 15.6 percent this year, the UlusMedia website reported on July 10.

Uzbekistan, on the other hand, is less dependent on Russian energy, with domestic production capable of reaching 100,000 tonnes of petroleum products per month, satisfying most of the country’s needs. But due to the increase in oil demand from its regional neighbours, Uzbekistan has also been forced to diversify its imports and has begun striking deals with countries like Georgia and Iraq.

Why is there a fuel crisis in Russia?

Russia has been facing a severe fuel deficit as Kyiv’s drone strikes – launched in an effort to degrade Moscow’s ability to maintain its ongoing invasion of Ukraine – have knocked out an estimated quarter to half of its total oil refining capacity.

To tackle the problem, Russia has imposed fuel rationing. Sales are often limited to about 20-30 litres (about 5-8 US gallons) per vehicle, and drivers must pump fuel strictly into vehicle tanks. Filling jerry cans is largely prohibited.

Earlier, the government banned petrol and jet fuel exports. Officials are now weighing a ban on diesel exports, too. Authorities have loosened fuel-quality regulations, temporarily allowing lower-grade fuel for the domestic market.

A state of emergency has also been declared in Russian-occupied Crimea, which Moscow annexed from Ukraine in 2014. A Russian-owned oil firm in India, Nayara Energy, has reportedly sold petroleum to Russia.

While Russian President Putin acknowledges the crisis, he appears reluctant to end the war on Ukraine and insists the situation is under control.

“These attacks on our facilities certainly create problems – that is obvious. We are currently seeing a certain shortage, though I would say it is not critical,” he said earlier this year.

“First and foremost, we have to rapidly and significantly increase production of air defence systems that are most in demand. We must also continue to improve them… Repairs at refineries must be completed more quickly.”

So, how is Iran helping Central Asia?

Amid Russian fuel shortages, Central Asian countries like Tajikistan have begun striking deals with Iran.

In August, Tajikistan’s Energy and Water Resources Ministry told the Asia-Plus news agency that the country is receiving oil and petroleum products from Iran. The ministry has not disclosed the route used to transport the products, but Tajikistan expects to receive 2.55 million tonnes of oil and petroleum products from Iran.

Besides Tajikistan, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian welcomed a proposal from Kyrgyzstan in August to establish a joint refinery in the Central Asian country, according to a report by Iran’s Tasnim news agency,

Under the agreement, Pezeshkian said, “The crude oil needed by the refinery can be supplied by Iran, and the products can be divided between the two sides.”

Will exporting oil to Central Asian countries help Iran?

The United States and Israel’s war on Iran has affected Tehran’s oil revenues. Data released by the government-administered Statistical Center of Iran in September showed that gross domestic product (GDP) shrank by 10.1 percent year-on-year between March 21 and June 20, the first quarter of the Persian calendar.

Tehran’s ability to sell crude has also been dramatically curtailed by the US naval blockade of Iran’s ports, imposed for most of the war, which began in late February.

Iranian crude and condensate loadings collapsed from about two million barrels per day (bpd) in March to roughly 740,000bpd in July and just 220,000-255,000bpd in August, according to estimates from Kpler and Vortexa.

TankerTrackers.com told the Reuters news agency in September that 29 tankers, carrying 36.11 million barrels of crude, were trapped in the Strait of Hormuz. Meanwhile, Vortexa estimated that total Iranian crude afloat had fallen from 135 million barrels at the end of July to 107 million barrels by late August.

Amid these challenges, Iran has been scrambling to find new countries to trade oil with. Russian fuel shortages have opened up new opportunities for Iran in Central Asia, at least in the short term, according to analysts.

How does Iranian oil reach Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan?

Iran does not share a border with either country.

To get to Tajikistan, Iranian “oil and refined products have to cross Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan by rail”, said Frederic Schneider, a nonresident senior fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs.

To get to Kyrgyzstan, Iranian oil would also need to pass through Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

Is trading oil with Iran logistically sustainable for Central Asia?

It is unlikely, Schneider said.

“This opportunity [for Iran] depends on Ukraine continuing to hit Russian refineries, which seems unlikely, both given the waning of Ukraine’s strike capability and the US government’s demand to stop the attacks as they put too much strain on global oil markets,” he told Al Jazeera.

He noted that US President Donald Trump has pressed his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, repeatedly in September for an “energy truce” with Russia, since diesel prices have become a political problem for Trump ahead of the November midterm elections in the US.

“Those truces have so far collapsed within hours, but the direction is clear. Once the strikes stop, or once Russia repairs its plants, Russian fuel will come back to Central Asia duty-free under Eurasian Economic Union arrangements, and Iran will struggle to compete on price,” he said.

Logistics also favour Russia with respect to importing oil to countries like Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, he said.

Unlike Iran, Russia shares a border with both.

“Tajikistan’s own request [for oil] would need around 51,000 rail tank cars, and its main refinery at Dangara has never operated commercially at scale. Russia, by contrast, has decades’ worth of logistics infrastructure, pipelines, rail links, and supply contracts into the region,” Schneider said.

Is Central Asia a big enough market to compensate for Iran’s Hormuz losses?

No, according to Schneider.

Tajikistan’s total demand, Schneider said, was about 50,000bpd.

That is a drop in the ocean compared with the 1.7 million bpd Iran exported by sea a year ago. China reported $9.96bn in two-way trade with Iran in 2025, a figure that does not include some $31.2bn in Iranian oil shipments, according to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission.

“This suggests that Central Asia can be a useful outlet for Iranian diesel and gasoline, but it cannot replace the Chinese market,” Schneider said.

For Tehran, Central Asia’s importance depends on how the US-Israel war on Iran develops, he said, adding that Tehran also needs to stay on good terms with Russia, with which it has a deep strategic partnership.

“Iran cannot afford to be seen as poaching Russian customers too aggressively, so it will present itself as a stopgap supplier, which, again, limits how much it can earn there,” he said.

What other risks does Central Asia face in buying Iranian oil?

Schneider warned that Central Asian nations could be hit with Washington’s secondary sanctions on Iran.

“Legally, US secondary sanctions apply to any foreign company or bank that conducts a significant transaction in Iranian petroleum, wherever it is based, and the Treasury expanded the list of sanctionable conduct in August. A Treasury official has already warned publicly that anyone in this trade ‘incurs that risk themselves’,” he noted.

But Schneider said that, politically, the US sanctioning Central Asian governments is unlikely.

“Central Asia is the arena of a new ‘Great Game’ between Russia, China and the United States, and Washington is courting the region harder than at any point since the 1990s, chiefly for its critical minerals. Kazakhstan alone holds about half of the minerals the US classifies as critical, including uranium and tungsten,” he said.

“Sanctioning a Central Asian government for buying fuel from Iran would push them straight back into closer ties to Russia and China,” he noted.

“What I would expect instead are targeted designations of individual traders, rail and logistics operators and smaller banks, combined with quiet pressure on the region’s correspondent banks. That alone is enough to raise the cost and slow the trade, but will come at the price of these countries redoubling their efforts to decouple economically and financially from the US.”

Yemeni government says one of the missiles hit Aden airport’s runway minutes before a flight from Cairo was due to land.

Yemen’s internationally recognised government has accused the Houthis of firing ballistic missiles and drones at the main international airport under its control, as Saudi Arabia said it had intercepted another missile north of its capital, Riyadh.

In a statement on Wednesday, the Ministry of Transport said the Houthis targeted the runway and passenger terminal at the airport with at least two ballistic missiles and several drones.

“One of the missiles landed near the runway minutes before the Yemeni flight from Cairo was to land,” it said. “We cancelled the landing of the incoming flight from Cairo [in Egypt] and diverted its route to Jeddah [in Saudi Arabia] to protect the passengers.”

The ministry also said it evacuated the airport terminal and removed two planes from the tarmac during the attacks.

It added, “This incident could easily have turned a civilian flight into a horrific humanitarian disaster, claiming the lives of dozens of innocent people in an instant.”

Aden airport is the main international gateway for parts of Yemen outside Houthi control in the city that has been the seat of the government since the takeover of the capital, Sanaa, by the Iran-supported group in 2014.

The Houthis said in a statement they targeted “Saudi military supplies” arriving at the Badr camp near the airport with ballistic missiles. Saudi Arabia backs Yemen’s government.

Separately, the Saudi-led military coalition fighting in Yemen said it intercepted and destroyed a ballistic missile, launched by the Houthis, north of Riyadh.

In a social media post, Major-General Turki al-Maliki, the spokesperson for the Saudi-led coalition, said it was tracking the launch platform used in the attack via an intelligence system over Sanaa, and promised to destroy it.

The Houthis said in statements on Tuesday and overnight into Wednesday that they had targeted Saudi international airports in Riyadh and Abha.

The intensified fighting in Yemen comes amid mounting regional tensions set off by the US-Israel war on Iran. The Saudi-backed government forces launched a counteroffensive against the Houthis to retake the Red Sea port of Mocha and areas around the Bab al-Mandeb strait.

Fighting has concentrated in the southwestern province of Taiz.

Al Jazeera’s Yousef Mawry, reporting from Sanaa, described “all-out battles to take over the ground, the highlands and the mountains east of Bab al-Mandeb”.

“It’s a battle to take over the strategic western part of Taiz, and whoever controls the wider vicinity will overlook the region and have dominant military control,” he said.

“For the Yemeni government to take control of Mocha and the strategic bases and locations along the Red Sea coast, it first has to drive the Houthis off the mountains east of Mocha.”

Pakistan and Turkiye on Monday agreed to activate “deterrence measures” under their mutual defence pact with Saudi Arabia and rapidly deploy forces to the Gulf kingdom to counter Houthi attacks.

Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree says the group has thwarted attempts by Yemeni government forces to advance toward the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.

I went to bed at a decent hour Monday night and got a pretty good sleep.

I woke up refreshed Tuesday morning, only to see the news that President Trump seemed to have told a crowd in Nebraska that it wouldn’t be such a bad thing if Iran attacked Southern California.

“Let ’em take out Los Angeles. Let ’em take out San Diego,” he said in a typically meandering speech, perhaps trying to justify a war he has repeatedly claimed is keeping the U.S. safe, even as gas prices have spiked. “This is a very small price to pay.”

The Nebraska crowd cheered.

California electeds scolded.

“San Diego is not collateral damage,” said San Diego Mayor Todd Gloria.

Such “dangerous” remarks could “potentially compromise our safety,” said L.A. Mayor Karen Bass.

“He is deranged and dangerous,” said Gov. Gavin Newsom.

President Trump throws a pen into the crowd after he signed an executive order during a campaign rally at Pinnacle Bank Expo Center in Grand Island, Neb., on Oct. 5, 2026.

(Kent Nishimura / AFP via Getty Images)

About 8 a.m., I took my dog Philly out for our morning walk. This is usually a lovely time for us. I clear my head. For Philly, a 3-year-old beagle, these are essentially business trips.

I got to thinking about the similarities in the daily routines of Philly and the president of the United States.

The thing is, I carry bags with me and clean up after Philly. The president to my knowledge has nobody on his staff doing this. We are at a point in American politics at which we must consider posting signs, everywhere Trump travels, that say, “Please Curb Your President.”

Not that it would be easy to clean Trump’s daily messes. You’d need the equivalent of those parade attendants in overalls who run along behind the horses with shovels.

The White House does not use poop bags. Instead, it uses denial and spin.

Critical reactions to Trump’s Nebraska comments were “not rooted in reality,” said White House Director of Communications Steven Cheung, who claimed Trump was misrepresented.

We’ve got to respect Cheung’s opinion. Does anyone in the world have more experience when it comes to analyzing comments not rooted in reality?

Some of you may know there are two topics I often revisit in my column. One is the effects, good and bad, of aging. The other is failure of leadership.

So I feel eminently qualified to psychoanalyze the president.

I don’t mean to generalize, but as people age, it’s not unusual for them to undergo behavioral changes. Some folks mellow, they abide, they lean into the ride. Others can become churlish, combative or grouchy.

Not only is Trump the poster boy for the latter group, but as things go wrong, he becomes more obstinate.

And things have definitely gone wrong.

The war in Iran is a disaster. The president is personally responsible for rising gas prices. He’s ruined the economy with his tariffs. He’s picked a fight with Canada. He may cost his party the House and the Senate because his almost daily outrages have pumped oxygen back into the blood of long-slumping Democrats.

A normal person would have the good sense to scale back or shrink away.

President Trump at the campaign rally at Pinnacle Bank Expo Center on the Nebraska State Fairgrounds on Oct. 5, 2026, in Grand Island, Neb.

(Win McNamee / Getty Images)

Trump keeps doubling down, wants to put his name on everything, and lashes out the way someone does when it’s not clear what’s bigger — their ego or their insecurity.

I’ve been to Nebraska, by the way. Nice place, met a lot of lovely people.

I enjoy corn, on or off the cob.

Popcorn. Caramel corn.

Not wild about “Children of the Corn,” the slasher movie based on Stephen King’s short story. But thank you very much, Nebraska, for Fred Astaire, Johnny Carson and Henry Fonda, who, by the way, was born in Grand Island, where Trump made his cracks Monday about California.

Did it occur to any of the shuckers who cheered Trump’s throwaway line about an attack on San Diego and L.A. that:

A: It wasn’t funny.

B: San Diego has one of the nation’s largest military installations, with thousands of personnel currently deployed to the Middle East because of the war in Iran.

C: Maybe we should expect more from someone serving as president and commander in chief.

In defending Trump, the White House said news outlets had misunderstood and misrepresented the president’s comments in what amounted to a “media freakout.” A White House media post singled out an L.A. Times post that said Trump suggested “letting Iran take out” L.A. and San Diego.

“No, he didn’t, you buffoons,” said the White House. “He was saying the U.S. is fighting to STOP Iran from having the ability to take out LA and San Diego with a nuclear weapon — which they would if they had the chance.”

Please.

This buffoon would like to point out that this is yet another case of Trump using California as a punching bag to prop up support for the war and nail down what’s left of his diminishing base. But even some of his longtime disciples know that he has said on dozens of occasions that the war had ended, was ending, or had been won, and not once were any of those words rooted in reality.

It’s not clear whether we’re any safer in the U.S. as a result of the war, although it is clear that we have paid with lives and higher costs.

So maybe a gratuitous and unfunny line about anyone taking out American cities is better left unsaid.

I’m fresh out of muzzles, but I do have extra poop bags.

steve.lopez@latimes.com

A TRAIN station is set to return to the centre of a tiny UK village after more than 100 years. 

Work has started on bringing the station back following a “major breakthrough” on issues that delayed the scheme.

Villagers in Cheadle, Stockport, last had the use of a train station in 1917, when it was located near to the high street.

Since then, residents have been forced to use public transport and cars when travelling to nearby areas, including Manchester city centre.

Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council said concerns that other trains on the rail network might be delayed had stalled progress of the scheme.

However, in what has been described as a “hugely significant” move, council officials said work had now started on bringing back the station, which will be built near The Alexandra Hospital.

‘BEDBUG EXPRESS’

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OFF RAILS

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Funding for the station was approved in 2022, with planning permission granted in 2023, but concerns over timetabling led to delays. 

In a statement, Cllr Mark Roberts, leader of Stockport Council, said: “This is a hugely significant moment for Cheadle and for Stockport.

“For years we’ve fought for this station because we know the difference it will make to residents, businesses and the future prosperity of the area.

“Cheadle Station has always been about improving connections, creating opportunities and making it easier for people to travel for work, education and leisure and I am delighted that the highways work can now start on site later this month thanks to the persistence and partnership of all involved.”

Services are expected to run from Cheadle into Stockport town, Manchester Piccadilly and Chester. 

It remains unclear when the station will open to the public.