oil

The conflict involving Iran and the disruption of the Strait of Hormuz have shaken global energy markets. Supply constraints and extreme volatility have driven oil prices sharply higher, exposing a growing structural divide in how major oil companies operate across the Atlantic.

European majors profit from trading strength
Companies such as BP, Shell, and TotalEnergies have benefited from strong oil trading performance. Their global trading networks allow them to move crude and refined products across regions, taking advantage of price differences created by supply disruptions.

These firms trade volumes far exceeding their own production, turning volatility into profit. In the current crisis, trading has significantly boosted earnings, offsetting weaker performance in other segments.

Volatility creates both gains and exposure
The sharp rise in Brent crude prices and market instability has created lucrative arbitrage opportunities. Companies have rerouted fuel shipments across longer and unusual routes to capture higher margins.

However, these strategies come with risks. Trading at such scale requires large amounts of capital, and holding cargoes for extended periods increases financial exposure if market conditions shift.

Trading as a shock absorber
For European majors, trading divisions have acted as a buffer during the crisis. Losses from disrupted production or regional exposure have been partially offset by gains in trading, highlighting the strategic importance of these operations in volatile markets.

US majors rely on production strength
In contrast, Exxon Mobil and Chevron focus primarily on large scale oil and gas production. Their output significantly exceeds that of European rivals, giving them a strong advantage when prices rise.

While they have more limited trading operations, their upstream strength allows them to generate substantial cash flow in high price environments without relying heavily on market arbitrage.

Structural differences in strategy
The divergence reflects long term strategic choices. European companies invested more heavily in renewables and diversified energy portfolios, which limited growth in their upstream production. US firms, by contrast, maintained a strong focus on expanding oil and gas output.

As a result, European majors depend more on trading to drive returns, while US majors depend on production scale.

Analysis
The Iran war has highlighted a clear split in the global energy industry between trading focused and production focused business models. European majors have shown that strong trading capabilities can generate significant profits during periods of disruption, effectively turning volatility into an advantage.

However, this model is inherently unpredictable. Trading gains depend on market conditions and may not be sustainable if volatility declines. In contrast, the US model offers more stable returns tied directly to production levels and commodity prices.

In the long term, this divide could shape investor perceptions and valuations. If European companies continue to rely heavily on trading while lagging in production, the gap between them and US rivals may widen. The industry is increasingly defined by a fundamental question: whether it is more profitable to move oil around the world or to produce it at scale.

With information from Reuters.

April 30 (UPI) — Oil prices briefly topped $126 a barrel in Asian trade overnight as markets reacted to news the United States might resume its military offensive against Iran and fears the Hormuz Strait might remain closed for much longer than anticipated.

Brent crude, the global benchmark, surged to $126.31, its highest level since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, after a report that U.S. military commanders were pitching a campaign of “short and powerful” strikes to U.S. President Donald Trump, to force Iran back to the negotiating table.

The price retreated to around $120 by the time markets in Europe opened on Thursday and continued to fall through the morning. The Brent contract for June delivery was trading at $113.91 a barrel in mid-afternoon trade in London, while American crude for June delivery was changing hands at $104.82.

Oil prices have already elevated since the war began on Feb. 28 and began climbing further on Wednesday after Trump met with executives of U.S. oil companies the previous day about how to deal with supply disruption from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran, which has vowed it will continue until the United States’ blockade of its ports is lifted.

The group discussed “steps we could take to continue the current blockade for months if needed and minimize impact on American consumers,” a White House official said.

Around 25% of the world’s oil supply passes through the strait and the prospect of it remaining effectively closed for months has set alarm bells ringing in markets as traders’ faith in an early resolution fades and “the reality of the supply situation” sets in.

“The breakdown of talks between the U.S. and Iran, along with President Trump reportedly rejecting Iran’s proposal for a reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, has the market losing hope for any quick resumption in oil flows,” said William Patterson, ING’s Singapore-based head of commodities strategy.

Trump has said he believes the regime in Tehran will blink first, saying they were less afraid of the bombing than the blockade, with U.S. officials banking it will force Iran to shutter oil production because the oil has nowhere to go and the country lacks sufficient storage facilities.

Published on 30/04/2026 – 10:17 GMT+2•Updated
10:28

Brent crude, the international standard for oil prices, jumped by over 7% during early trading on Thursday, touching $126 per barrel, the highest intraday level since 2022 when Russia initiated the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

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The US benchmark crude, WTI, also rose more than 3% and hit over $110 per barrel.

At the time of writing, prices have corrected slightly with the front month contract for Brent trading at around $122 per barrel and WTI at roughly $108.5.

Prices are now the highest they have been since the start of the Iran war.

The surge in oil prices is a direct consequence of stalled negotiations over the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, the absence of a clear path toward ending the war and a seemingly increased chance of US-Israeli military action returning.

US President Donald Trump is set to meet with the head of the US Central Command, Admiral Brad Cooper, on Thursday and receive a briefing on new military options for action in Iran, according to Axios which cites two unnamed people.

The meeting signals the potential for fresh escalation in the Middle East as the resumption of combat operations is reportedly “seriously under consideration” and oil markets have reacted swiftly to the news.

A ceasefire has held since early April but recent negotiating efforts have fallen flat with the two sides refusing to meet. Meanwhile, the US and Iran both maintain their blockade of the vital Strait of Hormuz.

US Central Command has also reportedly asked for hypersonic missiles to be sent to the Middle East, which would mark the first time the US army has deployed that type of weapon.

The persistent blockade of ports and the threat of expanded combat have fundamentally reshaped market expectations.

A shifting landscape for OPEC and global supply

The spike in prices is occurring against a backdrop of significant structural change within the global oil hierarchy.

Earlier this week, the United Arab Emirates officially withdrew from the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and its wider alliance (OPEC+), a move the nation claimed was necessary to prioritise its own national interests.

Under normal market conditions, the exit of a major producer from the cartel might be expected to signal a potential increase in supply or a decrease in price stability.

However, the sheer scale of the Iran war has rendered the UAE’s departure secondary in the minds of traders.

Despite the UAE’s exit, which was expected to potentially weaken OPEC’s grip on production quotas, prices have continued their upward trajectory.

This suggests that the “war premium” currently dominates all other market fundamentals.

Investors are currently less concerned with the internal politics of oil-producing nations and more focused on the immediate physical absence of Iranian crude, suspended shipping routes through the Strait of Hormuz and the threat to regional infrastructure.

However, the transition of the UAE to an independent actor still highlights a growing fragmentation in global energy governance at a time when the world’s energy security is at its most vulnerable.

Fifty-nine years of membership, ended with a statement on a Tuesday and an effective date of Friday. The United Arab Emirates announced it will exit OPEC and OPEC+ on May 1, citing national interests, its evolving energy profile, and a long-term strategic vision that no longer aligns with the organization’s direction. The Energy Minister did not consult Saudi Arabia before making the announcement. He did not raise the issue with any other member country. He simply said the time had come. 

The timing tells the whole story. OPEC was preparing to meet in Vienna on Wednesday when the news landed. The Iran war had already wiped out 7.88 million barrels per day of OPEC’s production in March alone, resulting in the biggest supply collapse for the producers’ group in recent decades, surpassing even the 2020 Covid shock and the 1970s oil crisis. The UAE had been absorbing Iranian drone and missile attacks for weeks. The Strait of Hormuz, through which the UAE ships its own oil, has been functionally closed or severely restricted since early March. And sitting across the OPEC table was Iran, the country that had been targeting UAE infrastructure repeatedly, and Russia, which had been a steadfast partner to Iran throughout the conflict.

Walking out was not an impulsive decision. It was the logical conclusion of a calculation that had been building for years.

Why Abu Dhabi Was Already Done With OPEC 

The UAE’s frustration with OPEC production quotas is not new. The quotas have capped UAE output at around 3.2 million barrels per day, while the country has the ambition and the capacity to produce closer to 5 million barrels per day by 2027, suggesting production could almost double without OPEC’s constraints. For a country that has invested heavily in expanding ADNOC’s capacity and has the infrastructure to back it up, being told by a cartel committee how much it can produce has become an increasingly poor trade. 

The UAE’s sovereign wealth fund is so large that its economy is now more significantly tied to global economic growth than to the global price of oil. That shift in economic identity matters enormously for understanding why OPEC membership has become structurally uncomfortable. OPEC exists to keep oil prices elevated through production discipline. The UAE increasingly benefits from a growing global economy that demands more energy, more investment, and more trade, all of which are better served by producing at full capacity and building relationships with the countries that need what Abu Dhabi has to sell. 

An energy industry source familiar with the decision said the UAE felt it was “the right time to leave” and that “this decision is good for consumers and good for the world,” adding that the UAE would gradually increase production to supply global markets once freedom of navigation is restored in the Strait of Hormuz. The framing is deliberate. The UAE is not positioning itself as a cartel defector but as a responsible producer responding to a global energy emergency, which is a considerably more defensible diplomatic position. 

The Saudi Rupture Running Underneath It All

The official UAE statement was carefully worded, full of appreciation for “brothers and friends within the group” and “the highest respect for the Saudis for leading OPEC.” None of that diplomatic courtesy changes the underlying reality, which is that the UAE and Saudi Arabia have been on a collision course for some time and the OPEC exit is the most visible expression of that tension yet.

The two countries had joined a coalition to fight the Houthis in Yemen in 2015, but that coalition broke down into open recriminations in late December when Saudi Arabia bombed what it described as a weapons shipment bound for UAE-backed Yemeni separatists. That incident was the visible rupture of a relationship that had been quietly fraying for years over economic competition, differing visions for regional leadership, and diverging approaches to normalization, China, and the post-war order. Within OPEC, the two countries have clashed repeatedly over quota allocations, with the UAE consistently arguing it deserves a larger share based on its expanded capacity. 

The OPEC exit does not resolve any of those tensions. It sidesteps them entirely, which is probably the more elegant solution. By leaving, the UAE removes itself from a framework where Saudi Arabia holds dominant influence and gains the freedom to pursue its own production and partnership strategy without needing Riyadh’s agreement. That is a significant shift in the regional power dynamic, and it happened without a single confrontational statement.

What Remains of OPEC Now 

The UAE’s exit could prompt other members to follow suit, with analysts pointing to Kazakhstan as another significant producer that wants to grow beyond its current quota constraints. “If there is a time to leave, now is the time,” one Dubai-based energy consultant told CNN. 

The cartel’s power has always rested on a specific mechanism: spare production capacity held back from the market to stabilize prices. That spare capacity is concentrated almost entirely in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, with the other nine member countries possessing little to none. Removing the UAE from that equation means OPEC’s effective spare capacity narrows considerably, and the burden of price stabilization falls almost entirely on Riyadh and Kuwait City. Saudi Arabia will hold an even greater share of the cartel’s remaining leverage, but leverage over a smaller and weaker institution is not the same as leverage over a healthy one.

OPEC has lost members before, but the UAE is a much larger producer than previous departures, and its absence may over time pose an existential risk to the cartel’s sustainability. The organization that has shaped global energy politics since 1960 is now facing its most significant structural test, and it is doing so while simultaneously dealing with a historic supply shock from the Iran war, a closed strait, and a global economy pricing in the possibility that the disruption is not temporary. 

The Geopolitical Implications

Freed from production quotas, the UAE’s most immediate strategic move is likely to deepen its relationship with the countries that need its oil most urgently, and China sits at the top of that list. More production could help the UAE improve ties with oil-importing partners such as China, and given the economic damage caused by the Iran war, the prospect of maximizing energy revenues now is undoubtedly attractive to Abu Dhabi. 

The UAE-US relationship also stands to benefit. With the UAE free to leverage its spare capacity in pursuit of its own strategic interests, the move will likely strengthen the UAE-US relationship, particularly in relation to managing the strategic petroleum reserve and responding to the ongoing Hormuz supply shock. Trump has been publicly critical of OPEC for years, accusing the cartel of exploiting American military protection to keep prices artificially high. An OPEC that is smaller and weaker, with a major member now operating independently and aligned with US interests, is a more congenial arrangement from Washington’s perspective. 

For the global energy market, the picture is more complicated. Once the Strait reopens fully and UAE production ramps up without quota constraints, additional supply should exert downward pressure on prices that have been elevated since February. Whether that actually happens depends on a sequence of events, including a durable Iran settlement and the restoration of free navigation through Hormuz, that are still very much in progress.

Our Take: A Geopolitical Move Dressed as an Energy Decision 

The UAE’s OPEC exit is not primarily an energy story. It is a geopolitical statement about where Abu Dhabi sees itself in the emerging regional order, and the answer is: outside the frameworks that no longer serve its interests, and free to build the bilateral relationships that do. The exit from OPEC follows the same strategic logic as the Abraham Accords, the Huawei contracts, the US base agreement, and the China infrastructure ties. The UAE has been running a multi-alignment strategy for years, positioning itself as indispensable to every major power simultaneously, and OPEC membership was becoming a constraint on that strategy rather than an asset.

What happens to OPEC matters for energy markets in the short term. What the UAE’s departure signals about the fracturing of Gulf institutional solidarity matters considerably more for the regional order that everyone in the Middle East is trying to rebuild in the aftermath of a war that nobody fully planned for and nobody has yet fully ended.

The deeper story is what the UAE’s exit reveals about the post-war Middle East taking shape right now. The institutions that governed the region’s energy politics, security arrangements, and diplomatic alignments for decades were built in a different world, one where the Cold War defined choices, where oil producers had unified interests, and where the US sat at the center of every meaningful regional framework. That world is gone. What the Iran war accelerated, and what the UAE’s OPEC exit makes structurally visible, is that the Gulf’s most capable states are no longer willing to subordinate their individual strategic interests to collective frameworks that were designed for a regional order that no longer exists. 

Abu Dhabi did not leave OPEC because of a quota dispute. It left because it has decided that in the world emerging from this war, the countries that move fastest, align most flexibly, and free themselves from inherited institutional constraints are the ones that will define what comes next. Whether that calculation proves correct depends on what the Islamabad talks produce, how quickly the Strait reopens, and whether the ceasefire holds long enough for the region to build something more durable than a pause. But the signal Abu Dhabi sent on Tuesday was unmistakable, and every government in the region heard it.

Standoff in the Strait of Hormuz is pushing global oil prices above $120 per barrel, with average gas prices in the US hitting a four-year high.

The US naval blockade of Iranian ports and the Strait of Hormuz, in place since April 13, has raised concerns that Iran could run out of crude oil storage capacity and be forced to curb production.

Bloomberg reported analysis on Tuesday from the data and analytics company Kpler suggesting Iran could run out of crude storage in 12 to 22 days if the blockade persists.

Last week, United States Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent claimed that storage capacity at Kharg Island, where most of Iran’s oil is exported, would be full “in a matter of days”.

So how quickly could Iran run out of oil storage, and why does it matter?

What is happening in the Strait of Hormuz?

The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow channel that connects the Gulf to the open ocean. It spans the territorial waters of Iran on its northern side and Oman on its southern side. It is not in international waters.

During peacetime, 20 percent of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies are shipped through the corridor.

Two days after the US and Israel launched their first air strikes in their war on Iran on February 28, Ebrahim Jabari, a senior adviser to the commander in chief of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), announced that the strait was “closed”. If any vessels tried to pass through, he said, the IRGC and the navy would “set those ships ablaze”.

As the war has dragged on and negotiations have failed to achieve a settlement, Iran has at times in the past two months allowed some “friendly” ships and those that pay tolls to pass. It is currently refusing to allow any foreign-flagged ships, including those previously deemed friendly, to pass until the US lifts its own naval blockade.

Iranian First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref said on April 19 that the “security of the Strait of Hormuz is not free”.

“One cannot restrict Iran’s oil exports while expecting free security for others,” he wrote in a post on X.

“The choice is clear: either a free oil market for all, or the risk of significant costs for everyone,” he added. “Stability in global fuel prices depends on a guaranteed and lasting end to the economic and military pressure against Iran and its allies.”

Since the US naval blockade on the strait began, the US has opened fire on and taken control of an Iranian-flagged tanker near the Strait of Hormuz while also redirecting vessels on the high seas transporting cargo to or from Iran. Iran’s armed forces have denounced these actions as “an illegal act” that “amounts to piracy”.

The US naval blockade of the strait means that Iran might have to store the oil it produces.

Iran is the third largest oil producer in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) after Saudi Arabia and Iraq and exports 90 percent of its crude oil via Kharg Island in the Gulf for shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.

What has the US claimed?

The US is eager to curb Iran’s oil revenues, which have risen since Tehran closed the Strait of Hormuz to other shipping. This is the primary motive behind Washington’s naval blockade of Iranian ports.

Iran exported 1.84 million barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil in March and shipped 1.71 million bpd in April, compared with an average of 1.68 million bpd in 2025, according to Kpler.

However, the US naval blockade since mid-April now means that most of its exports are having to be stored instead.

Bessent wrote in an X post on April 22: “In a matter of days, Kharg Island storage will be full and the fragile Iranian oil wells will be shut in.”

“Constraining Iran’s maritime trade directly targets the regime’s primary revenue lifelines.”

How much oil can Iran store?

Iran’s domestic refineries have a production capacity of 2.6 million bpd, according to the energy consultancy Facts Global Energy.

Satellite data show the amount of oil Iran has in storage has risen sharply since the US blockade began, and in the days after the US tightened it, stocks were rising so fast that it appeared Iran had been barely able to export any oil at all.

From April 13 to April 21, data showed that stocks rose by more than 6 million barrels, according to the Columbia Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP). From April 17 to April 21, the stock increased very rapidly, growing by 1.7 bpd.

As of April 20, the storage tanks at Kharg were about 74 percent full after the island alone had taken on about 3 million extra barrels of oil, the CGEP reported.

Generally, oil companies avoid filling their storage beyond 80 percent capacity to balance safety, emissions control and flexibility.

However, Iran and other oil producing countries have exceeded this limit before, for instance, during the COVID-19 pandemic. In April 2020, Kharg island’s stocks reached close to 90 percent capacity, an all-time high.

Iran also has some crude oil storage capacity in the form of “floating tanks”, or parked ships. About 127 million barrels can be stored in this way, Frederic Schneider, a nonresident senior fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs, told Al Jazeera in an interview on April 14.

Will Iran need to cut oil production?

Muyu Xu, a senior crude oil analyst at Kpler, told Al Jazeera that the blockade could eventually force Iran to cut production.

“However, given there is still available storage capacity onshore (roughly covering 20 days of Iran’s current production), we expect any production reduction to be gradual over the coming week with a higher likelihood of acceleration into May,” she said.

Analysis by CGEP nonresident fellow Antoine Halff echoed this. Halff wrote in an article published by CGEP on Tuesday that it may be some time before the US blockade causes Iran to shut off its production “in a big way”.

However, Halff added, Iran may still choose to halt production “fairly aggressively” but this “would be more by choice than by necessity”.

He explained: “Doing so would have the advantage of providing Iran with relatively ample spare storage capacity after the shutdown and would allow for a smoother restart of operations once conditions permit, and the constraint is relaxed, thus minimising adverse impacts from the blockade on longer-term supply.”

Why does this matter?

Halting oil production risks damaging underground reservoirs by reducing reservoir pressure, allowing water or gas to encroach into producing layers and changing patterns of oil flow. This can make some oil harder or more expensive to recover later, experts said.

Restarting the process of oil production can also be slow and costly, involving repairs of corroded equipment or unclogging pipelines.

Halting production would also cause Iran’s export revenues to drop. However, analysts said that for a few months, Iran can continue to earn revenue from oil that is already in transit at sea.

Kenneth Katzman, former Iran analyst at the Congressional Research Service in Washington, DC, said Iran is not exporting new oil during the US blockade of Iranian ports but Tehran has 160 million to 170 million barrels of oil on ships around the world currently.

Oil markets face renewed instability following the United Arab Emirates’ formal exit from the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and its wider alliance (OPEC+), announced on Tuesday and taking effect on Friday.

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The move, which ends decades of membership, comes as the global economy continues to reel from the ongoing war with Iran and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz remains in place.

Investors are currently weighing the potential for higher future output from the UAE against the immediate and acute risks posed to global supply routes, as well as the increased chances that more countries drop out of OPEC and OPEC+.

Following the announcement, markets reacted swiftly as the potential for oversupply from the UAE was priced in. Oil prices fell by between 2% and 3%, particularly in futures contracts a couple of months ahead.

However, the move was just as quickly offset by the risk premium associated with the Middle East conflict and the current halt to US-Iran negotiations.

At the time of writing, US benchmark crude, WTI, is trading above $105 a barrel, while Brent crude, the international standard, is over $112. Both prices are around 4% higher on Wednesday from the UAE announcement low.

The UAE’s decision follows years of simmering tension between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh over production quotas. The UAE has invested over $150 billion (€128bn) in the state-owned Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) to expand its capacity to five million barrels per day.

However, under OPEC’s restrictive framework, much of this capacity remained underutilised, now prompting the government to prioritise its national interest.

The departure of the group’s third-largest producer is a significant blow to the cohesion of the 60-year-old organisation. Maurizio Carulli, global energy analyst at Quilter Cheviot, noted the limitations this exit places on the remaining members.

“Until tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is safe again, OPEC’s ability to stabilise prices is sharply constrained, while US producers have gained outsized influence,” Carulli explained.

While the UAE has pledged to bring additional production to the market in a “gradual and measured” manner, the sudden lack of coordination within OPEC has introduced a new layer of uncertainty.

For the UAE, the blockade served as a final catalyst for its exit. With its primary export route under threat, Abu Dhabi has sought the diplomatic flexibility to forge independent security and trade partnerships outside the traditional cartel structure.

Despite the geopolitical turmoil, energy equities have remained resilient.

According to Carulli, “integrated majors such as BP, Shell, TotalEnergies, ENI, Chevron and ExxonMobil are benefitting from a price uplift that could add 5-10% to operating cash flow for every $10 increase in oil prices.”

Standoff over the Strait of Hormuz

In a separate but related development, the security situation in the Middle East remains precarious despite a fragile ceasefire. Iran has recently offered a ten-point proposal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz.

In exchange for restoring maritime traffic, Tehran is demanding a full withdrawal of the US naval blockade and an end to the current hostilities.

US President Donald Trump, who recently extended the two-week ceasefire mediated by Pakistan, described the latest Iranian offer as “much better” than previous iterations but still did not accept the terms.

Shortly after, Trump posted on social media claiming that Iran is in a dire and desperate condition with no leverage to negotiate.

Washington continues to insist on a permanent settlement regarding Iran’s nuclear programme and an “unconditional” reopening of the waterway before sanctions are lifted.

The impact of this blockade on global energy security cannot be overstated.

“The prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz has removed roughly 12% of global oil supply from the market, according to the IEA, a bigger disruption than the Yom Kippur war, the Iran‑Iraq conflict, the invasion of Kuwait or even the fallout from Ukraine,” Carulli highlighted.

The UAE’s decision to quit OPEC to prioritise its ‘national interests’ deals a blow to the oil group already grappling with the challenge of shipping Gulf exports through the Strait of Hormuz. Here’s what we know about why it’s withdrawing and the impact it might have.

BOISE, Idaho — Former Idaho Gov. and U.S. Interior Secretary Dirk Kempthorne has died at age 74, his family said in a written statement Saturday.

Kempthorne died Friday evening in Boise, the statement said. No cause was given. He had been diagnosed with colon cancer last year.

“Beyond his public service, he was a devoted husband, father, and grandfather whose greatest joy came from time spent with family and the people he met along the way,” his family said. “He had a rare gift for truly seeing others — remembering names, stories, and the small details that made each person feel known and valued.”

Kempthorne, a moderate Republican, was elected mayor of Boise in 1985 at age 34, and he was credited with revitalizing the downtown by securing an agreement to build a convention center and promoting other development. He served seven years before winning the U.S. Senate seat vacated by Sen. Steve Symms in 1992.

During his time in Washington, he authored legislation — signed by Democratic President Clinton — to end unfunded federal mandates on state and local governments.

Rather than run for reelection in 1998, he entered an open election for governor, trouncing his Democratic opponent by garnering more than two-thirds of the vote.

President George W. Bush appointed him Interior secretary in 2006, a position he held until the end of Bush’s presidency — and during which he lived on a houseboat docked in the Potomac River.

“Dirk was one of the finest public servants I ever knew because he was one of the finest men,” former President George W. Bush said in a written statement Saturday. “He was considerate, smart, and capable. Dirk loved our lands and waters, and as Secretary of the Interior, he was an effective steward of our natural resources.”

He protected polar bears

Environmentalists often found Kempthorne too accommodating to industry, citing his efforts to push oil and gas development in the Gulf of Mexico and off Alaska. More than 100 conservation groups opposed his nomination as Interior secretary, saying that as a senator he had voted to eliminate federal money for recovery of the endangered wolf, to open the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to oil and gas exploration, and to sell off federal public lands.

Yet in 2008, he bucked other advisers in the White House by insisting that the polar bear should be listed as a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act because of the loss of sea ice in the Arctic. He was prepared to resign over it when Bush decided to back him.

“As Governor, Dirk left an enduring mark on our state,” Idaho Gov. Brad Little said in a written statement. With the partnership of his wife, Patricia, Kempthorne “championed children and families, strengthened public education, and led transformational investments in our transportation system that will benefit Idahoans for generations.”

After leaving the federal government, he became the chief executive of a trade association of life insurance companies.

He helped Afghan refugees

In a 2023 question-and-answer session with the George W. Bush Presidential Center, Kempthorne recalled helping evacuate nearly 400 U.S. citizens and Afghan allies from Afghanistan two years earlier, as many were being sought by the Taliban following the U.S. military’s chaotic withdrawal. Kempthorne and others worked frantically for months to raise money and garner the support of diplomatic channels to charter buses and an Airbus A340 to help resettle the evacuees in the U.S. and Canada.

At one point, with the flight fully booked, the organizers received a list of more people who needed to leave urgently.

“That night, at a total loss for answers, alone, I knelt in prayer,” Kempthorne recalled. “I said, ‘Dear God, we cannot leave these people behind, please give a path forward.’”

He said he then had a vision of Mother Mary holding the infant Jesus. It gave him an idea: The babies on the flight didn’t need their own seats, as their parents could hold them. The organizers confirmed that with the airline and were able to add an additional 50 people to the flight, Kempthorne said.

Kempthorne was born in San Diego and grew up in Spokane, Wash. His father was a regional representative for Maytag, the appliance company. His mother, a homemaker, once worked as a secretary for the Legislature in Nebraska, her home state.

Kempthorne attended San Bernardino Valley College in California before transferring to the University of Idaho, where he served as student body president and met Patricia, his future wife. After graduation he worked as executive assistant to the director of the Idaho Department of Lands before joining the Idaho Home Builders Assn. as the executive vice president.

Kempthorne is survived by his wife, as well as their children Heather and Jeff and their families.

Johnson writes for the Associated Press. Johnson reported from Seattle.

The ongoing Iran war has reshaped global energy dynamics, shifting influence away from OPEC toward the United States. Traditionally, OPEC and key producers like Saudi Arabia acted as “swing suppliers,” adjusting output to stabilize markets.

However, disruptions caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz have left millions of barrels stranded, limiting OPEC’s ability to respond and opening space for the United States to take on that stabilizing role.

Collapse of OPEC’s Leverage

The near shutdown of Gulf energy routes has forced major producers to cut output significantly. Even Saudi Arabia’s alternative export routes have proven insufficient to offset the scale of disruption.

This has weakened OPEC’s traditional power, which relied heavily on spare production capacity to manage supply shocks and influence prices.

Rise of U.S. Energy Dominance

The United States has stepped in decisively, leveraging its position as the world’s largest oil producer. Since surpassing both Saudi Arabia and Russia in output in 2018, the U.S. has built unmatched capacity to influence global markets.

Exports have surged to record levels, with both crude and refined products flowing to regions hit hardest by supply shortages, particularly in Asia. This rapid response has helped cushion the global economy from a deeper energy crisis.

Strategic Tools Beyond Production

Washington’s influence extends beyond production alone. The government has released oil from its Strategic Petroleum Reserve, providing an additional buffer against supply shocks.

It has also used sanctions policy as a flexible tool, selectively easing restrictions on Russian and Iranian oil to increase global supply when needed, while tightening measures to maintain geopolitical pressure.

Economic and Political Impact

For U.S. producers, the crisis has generated substantial financial gains through higher export revenues. At the same time, Washington’s actions have helped stabilize global markets, reinforcing its role as a central player in the energy system.

However, these moves carry political risks, including potential contradictions between economic goals and foreign policy objectives.

Limits of U.S. Power

Despite its growing influence, the United States cannot fully replicate OPEC’s traditional role. Unlike centralized producers, the U.S. oil industry operates within market constraints, limiting the government’s ability to directly control output.

Policies such as export restrictions could theoretically impact global prices, but would also risk damaging domestic production systems and relations with international partners.

Analysis

The Iran war has accelerated a structural shift in global energy power. The United States has effectively become a “swing supplier,” not through coordinated production cuts like OPEC, but through a combination of market scale, strategic reserves, and policy flexibility.

This transformation highlights a new model of energy influence, where rapid responsiveness and financial depth replace centralized control. While OPEC remains relevant, its ability to dominate global supply dynamics has been significantly weakened under current conditions.

At the same time, U.S. dominance introduces new complexities. Balancing domestic political pressures, international alliances, and market stability requires careful calibration. The use of sanctions as a supply management tool also raises questions about long term consistency in foreign policy.

Ultimately, the shift signals a more fragmented and dynamic energy landscape. The United States may not control the market in the traditional sense, but its ability to shape outcomes quickly and at scale makes it the most influential actor in the current crisis.

With information from Reuters.

Four years ago, Robert Brovdi was more comfortable in auction houses like Christie’s than filthy trenches. A well-off grain dealer in those days, with a sideline as an art collector, fragments of his pre-war life survive in the paintings and sculptures by Ukrainian artists dotted around the bunker. They’re displayed beside missile casings and captured drones. He’s an ethnic Hungarian, from Uzhgorod in western Ukraine, and best known by his military call sign, Magyar. Clean-shaven before the war, he now wears a long ginger and grey-speckled beard.

Brent crude rises more than 2 percent after Washington and Tehran fail to hold second round of talks in Pakistan.

Oil prices have climbed higher amid stalled peace talks between the United States and Iran.

Brent crude rose more than 2 percent on Sunday after hopes for a second round of ceasefire negotiations between Washington and Tehran unravelled over the weekend.

After easing slightly, Brent, the primary benchmark for global prices, stood at $106.99 as of 1:30 GMT.

Stock markets in Asia shrugged off the impasse to open higher on Monday, with Japan’s benchmark Nikkei 225 and South Korea’s KOSPI gaining 0.9 percent and 1.5 percent, respectively, in morning trading.

US President Donald Trump on Saturday cancelled a planned trip to Pakistan by his envoys, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, after Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Abbas Araghchi departed Islamabad before any direct engagement could take place between the sides.

Araghchi arrived in Russia’s Saint Petersburg on Monday for talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin and other officials as Tehran seeks a way out of the diplomatic impasse.

Araghchi’s trip, which follows a whistle-stop visit to Oman on Sunday, comes as uncertainty hangs over the fragile ceasefire between Washington and Tehran.

Trump announced an extension to their two-week truce last week, without specifying a deadline for reaching a deal to end the war.

As US and Iranian negotiators struggle to break the deadlock, Tehran’s threats against commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz have reduced traffic to a trickle, paralysing a large portion of the world’s supply of oil and natural gas.

On Saturday, 19 commercial vessels transited the strait, which normally carries about one-fifth of global oil and natural gas supplies, according to maritime intelligence platform Windward.

Before the US and Israel launched their war on Iran in late February, the waterway saw an average of 129 daily transits, according to the United Nations Trade and Development.

WASHINGTON — President Trump has turned to naval blockades to pressure the governments of Venezuela, Cuba and now Iran to meet his demands, but his preferred tactic is confronting a very different reality in the Middle East than in the Caribbean.

Unlike Cuba or Venezuela, Iran choked off a crucial trade route for energy shipments, meaning the longer the standoff persists, the more the global economy will suffer. Tehran also poses a greater military threat than those two adversaries in America’s own hemisphere and requires a sustained military presence far from U.S. shores.

Iran’s leverage over the Strait of Hormuz gives it power during a shaky ceasefire because the widening economic risks, especially higher U.S. gas prices in an election year, could force the Republican president to end the blockade on Iran’s ports and coastline, experts say.

“It’s really a question now of which country, the U.S. or Iran, has a greater pain tolerance,” said Max Boot, a military historian and senior fellow for national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Iran presents ‘major differences’ from other blockades

The effectiveness of Trump’s use of the world’s most powerful navy to block the trade of Iran’s sanctioned oil and other goods is very much up for debate. But it certainly appears to be intensifying as the war grinds on.

The U.S. military on Thursday announced the seizure of another tanker associated with the smuggling of Iranian oil, a day after Iran’s paramilitary Revolutionary Guards took control of two vessels in the crucial waterway.

Trump also announced he has ordered the U.S. military to “shoot and kill” Iranian small boats laying sea mines in the strait.

But the situation in Iran is not exactly analogous to what is playing out with the U.S. operations in Venezuela and Cuba.

Some experts say Trump’s success in Venezuela probably had more to do with the U.S. military raid that captured leader Nicolás Maduro than American warships seizing sanctioned oil tankers to enforce U.S. control over the South American country.

A U.S. oil embargo on Cuba, meanwhile, has caused the island’s most severe economic crisis in decades. While U.S. and Cuban officials have met recently on the island for rare talks, the financial strangulation has failed to produce the Trump administration’s stated goal of leadership change.

“I do think that the success of the Maduro mission in Venezuela has probably emboldened the president,” said Todd Huntley, director of Georgetown University’s National Security Law Program.

That does not make the situations in Venezuela and Iran similar — geographically, militarily or politically. “There are some major differences,” said Huntley, a retired Navy captain and judge advocate general.

While the blockade against Iran has delivered a severe blow to its economy, including stopping freighters from importing various supplies, the country has still been able to move some of its sanctioned oil, ship-tracking companies say.

Iran has rejected Trump’s demands to reopen the strait, where 20% of the world’s oil normally flows, and it has been firing on ships again this week. Stalled shipments through the strait have sent gasoline prices skyrocketing far beyond the region and raised the cost of food and a wide array of other products, creating a political problem for Trump before the November’s elections.

“Blockades are usually just one tool of a mechanism used in a conflict,” said Salvatore Mercogliano, a maritime history professor at Campbell University in North Carolina. “They can be important. But it’s only one element. And I don’t think it’s going to be enough to convince the Iranians.”

Effectiveness of U.S. blockade called into question

Adm. Brad Cooper, head of U.S. Central Command, claimed last week that “no ship has evaded U.S. forces.” The command overseeing the Middle East said it has directed 31 ships to turn around or return to port as of Wednesday.

Merchant shipping groups are skeptical.

Lloyd’s List Intelligence said “a steady flow of shadow fleet traffic” has passed in and out of the Persian Gulf, including 11 tankers with Iranian cargo that have left the Gulf of Oman outside the strait since April 13.

The maritime intelligence firm Windward said this week that Iranian traffic continues to flow “via deception.”

Iranian ships have several ways to sneak through the blockade, including spoofing their location tracking data or traveling through Pakistani territorial waters, Mercogliano said. He also noted that the sheer volume of shipping traffic the military needs to screen is a challenging task.

Blockades require patience to work

The last time the U.S. mounted a blockade similar to the one focused on Iranian ships was during the Kennedy administration in the early 1960s, against Cuba, Huntley said.

“And it wasn’t even called a blockade,” he said. “We called it quarantine.”

Some naval blockades over the course of history have had an impact, such as Britain’s blockade on Germany during World War I. “But they tend to be very long-term impacts, whereas Trump is looking for short-term, quick results,” according to Boot, the military historian.

He said Trump probably saw the blockade on sanctioned oil tankers tied to Venezuela as playing a large role in the success of leadership changes in that country. But Boot said it had more to do with the U.S. ousting Maduro and the subsequent cooperation from his vice president, Delcy Rodríguez, who is now the acting president.

“There is no Delcy Rodríguez in Cuba or Iran,” Boot said. “I think his success in Venezuela led him astray, thinking that this was a template that could be replicated elsewhere. He sees it as a huge success at little cost. And, in fact, it turns out to be a unique set of circumstances.”

Finley, Klepper and Toropin write for the Associated Press.

Jump in prices comes as Donald Trump says vessels will need permission of US Navy to transit key waterway.

Oil prices have jumped on heightened tensions between the United States and Iran in the Strait of Hormuz following Washington and Tehran’s tit-for-tat captures of commercial vessels.

Brent crude, the international benchmark, topped $106 per barrel early on Friday morning as Washington and Tehran stepped up their confrontation over the key maritime route for transporting the world’s energy.

Brent stood at $106.80 as of 01:00 GMT, up nearly 5 percent from its closing price on Wednesday, when it surpassed $100 per barrel for the first time in two weeks.

US stocks fell overnight, with the benchmark S&P 500 index dipping 0.41 percent and the tech-heavy Nasdaq Composite dropping 0.89 percent.

Shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, which normally carries about one-fifth of the world’s supply of oil and natural gas, remains at a standstill as Iran continues to demand the right to decide which vessels may pass and the US blocks Iran’s maritime trade.

US President Donald Trump said in a Truth Social post on Thursday that he had ordered the US Navy to destroy any Iranian boats laying mines in the strait, shortly after the Pentagon announced that it had seized a tanker carrying sanctioned Iranian oil for the second time in less than a week.

Trump also appeared to expand the scope of the US naval blockade beyond Iranian ports, writing on Truth Social that no ship “can enter or leave” the strait without the approval of the US Navy.

“It is ‘Sealed up Tight,’ until such time as Iran is able to make a DEAL!!!” Trump said.

Trump’s threats came a day after Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps announced the capture of two foreign cargo ships in the waterway.

The IRGC said it had seized the Panamanian-flagged MSC Francesca and Greek-owned Epaminondas after the vessels had endangered maritime security “by operating without the necessary permits and tampering with navigation systems”.

The Greek Maritime Affairs and Insular Policy Ministry has denied that the Epaminondas was captured and said the vessel remains under the control of its captain.

Only nine commercial vessels transited the strait on Wednesday, compared with seven on Tuesday and 15 on Monday, according to maritime intelligence platform Windward.

Before the US and Israel launched their war against Iran on February 28, the waterway saw an average of 129 transits each day, according to United Nations Trade and Development.

Venezuela’s January 2026 hydrocarbons law reform marks a major shift in the country’s oil sector. It establishes a more flexible fiscal regime in the name of “international competitiveness,” while expanding the private sector role in extraction, operations, and dispute resolution mechanisms.

The reform follows years of US sanctions on Venezuela’s oil industry and coincides with new US licenses allowing Western conglomerates to move into Venezuela’s energy sector.

Join Blas Regnault, energy policy analyst and consultant focused on oil geopolitics, alongside Venezuelanalysis editors Ricardo Vaz and Lucas Koerner, as they break down the reform, its economic and political context, and what it means for control over strategic resources and national sovereignty.

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