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Denmark, Greenland and the United States are set to sign a security agreement that Copenhagen says will give NATO a larger role in protecting the Arctic, potentially shifting responsibility beyond the United States and Denmark alone.

The agreement is expected to be signed at the United Nations General Assembly in New York on Tuesday. Its full contents have not been made public, although US President Donald Trump has described it as giving Washington “permanent control” over Greenland’s security.

Denmark and Greenland have not endorsed Trump’s description. Both have said the agreement will benefit Greenland while respecting the island’s sovereignty.

The deal follows months of pressure from Trump, who has repeatedly argued that the United States should control Greenland and at times declined to rule out military or economic measures to acquire the semi autonomous Danish territory.

His demands triggered a diplomatic crisis within NATO and pushed Copenhagen and Nuuk into negotiations with Washington to address US security concerns while maintaining Greenland’s status within the Kingdom of Denmark.

A broader NATO role

Danish Foreign Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen said the agreement would change the way Arctic security is handled.

“It will be in a form where responsibility for security in the Arctic is not only Danish or American,” Rasmussen told Danish broadcaster TV2 on Sunday. He added that NATO would play a major role in protecting the region.

A NATO spokesperson said the alliance welcomed the agreement, describing it as a step that could advance security, stability and cooperation in the Arctic.

Rasmussen travelled to New York for the signing but has declined to disclose the agreement’s details.

He said Denmark had been open from the beginning to addressing what he described as legitimate US security interests.

The negotiations therefore appear to have focused on finding a framework that can accommodate Washington’s strategic concerns without formally transferring Greenland’s sovereignty to the United States.

Trump’s claim raises questions

Trump has offered a different description of what the agreement means.

In a post on Truth Social on Friday, he said the deal gives the United States “permanent control over security, and all other needs” in Greenland. He also said no US adversary would be able to establish a base or military presence on the island without Washington’s written approval.

Copenhagen has not publicly responded to that characterization.

The difference between Washington’s description and Denmark and Greenland’s public statements leaves important questions about the agreement unresolved.

Among the most significant is whether it changes the 1951 US Denmark defence agreement, which provides the legal basis for the American military presence in Greenland.

The document’s provisions on US access, military infrastructure and the role of NATO have not been made public.

Greenland at the centre

The agreement comes as Denmark acknowledges that it underinvested in Greenland’s defence for decades.

Copenhagen has since pledged to increase its military presence on the island and strengthen Arctic surveillance, including through greater NATO involvement.

Greenland’s government has sought to reassure residents that the negotiations do not compromise the island’s sovereignty.

Erik Jensen, an opposition lawmaker in Greenland, said on Facebook that he had read the draft agreement and felt reassured by its contents. He also praised Greenland’s foreign minister for handling the negotiations.

For Greenland, the issue is particularly sensitive because the island has extensive autonomy within the Kingdom of Denmark and has long maintained a political debate over eventual independence.

What the agreement could mean for the Arctic

The deal could mark a significant change in the security architecture of the Arctic.

Greenland occupies a strategically important position between North America and Europe, making it valuable to the United States and NATO as competition over the Arctic increases.

A larger NATO role could provide a multilateral framework for responding to concerns about military activity and strategic infrastructure in the region. At the same time, the agreement’s precise legal and operational arrangements will determine how far that shift actually goes.

Until the text is released, it remains unclear whether the agreement represents a substantial restructuring of Greenland’s defence arrangements or primarily a political framework for closer cooperation.

What is clear is that the negotiations have moved Arctic security from a dispute centred on US ambitions for Greenland toward a broader discussion about NATO’s collective role in one of the world’s increasingly contested strategic regions.

With information from Reuters.

South Korean officers injured in DMZ explosion, possibly caused by a landmine, according to local media reports.

Three South Korean military officers have been wounded in an explosion in the western sector of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that separates North and South Korea, Seoul’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said.

The cause of Monday’s explosion was not immediately clear, the Ministry of Defence said.

Two of the officers were evacuated from the site by helicopter, while the third was transported by land before being airlifted, according to the ministry. The officers are being treated at a military hospital near the capital Seoul, it said.

Mine explosions and other blasts are a recurring hazard in and around the DMZ, where legacy ⁠devices and suspected stray mines have periodically wounded military personnel on both sides.

The DMZ, which is 248km (154 miles) long and 4km (2.5 miles) wide, is one of the world’s most heavily armed borders. An estimated 2 million mines are peppered inside and near the border, which is also guarded by barbed wire fences, tank traps and combat troops on both sides. The zone is a legacy of the Korean War from 1950 to 1953, which ended with an armistice but not a peace treaty.

There have been growing concerns in South Korea about increased activity by North Korean soldiers near the military demarcation line as the North strengthens its border defences during prolonged tensions.

New imagery shared with TWZ by Anduril shows its YFQ-44A Fury Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) configured with air-to-ground weapons, underscoring the fact that the CCA could take on an air-to-ground role in the future in addition to its current air-to-air focus. Yesterday, Anduril executives revealed that the company had begun integration and fit checks for a range of air-to-ground weapons, although they confirmed to us that those weapons had not yet been flight-tested aboard Fury.

The YFQ-44A is one of two aircraft selected by the Air Force for its CCA Increment 1 program, alongside General Atomics’ YFQ-42A Vengeance. The service’s stated priority for the initial aircraft is air dominance, and Anduril says the production FQ-44 will have four external hardpoints capable of carrying four AIM-120 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles. The YFQ-44A, which currently has two underwing pylons for two AMRAAMs, has already conducted a live AIM-120 firing as part of testing with the Air Force’s Experimental Operations Unit.

The new imagery, however, points toward a substantially broader weapons envelope, with the aircraft shown carrying different air-to-ground stores on its two external stations. The weapons are shown fitted to the aircraft during a ground-based fit check, an important step in the integration process before captive-carry and, ultimately, live-release testing, if Anduril and the USAF choose to go down that route.

During a recent roundtable with reporters yesterday at the Air & Space Forces Air, Space and Cyber Symposium that TWZ is attending, Anduril’s Jason Levin, senior vice president for Air Dominance and Strike, and Erin Simpson, vice president for Strategy for Air Dominance and Strike, said the company had already begun integration and fit checks of 500-pound Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), 250-pound Small Diameter Bombs (SDB), and low-cost cruise missiles. Pods for 2.75-inch guided or unguided rockets are also seen fitted to the aircraft. In each case, the stores are mounted on a twin adaptor rack.

Furthermore, Anduril’s plans extend to testing the Fury with other air-to-air weapons and targeting pods.

Importantly, the diversity of weapons will give Fury a range of potential missions beyond high-end air-to-air combat, including counter-UAS, counter-cruise-missile, and air-to-ground or air-to-surface strike missions.

“We’ve begun integration and fit checks of a lot of other munitions,” an Anduril executive said. “We’ve done 500-pound guided bombs. We’ve done Small Diameter Bombs.”

The company said it had also begun engineering work to integrate its Barracuda 500 offering for the Air Force’s emerging low-cost cruise-missile effort.

Introducing: Barracuda-M Family of Cruise Missiles

It should be noted that giving the YFQ-44— or YFQ-42A — the ability to deliver a JDAM or SDB against a predetermined fixed target is not particularly complex. This type of austere air-to-ground capability should be relatively straightforward to add, providing a useful secondary strike function without requiring the aircraft to take on the far more demanding requirements associated with dynamic targeting or more sophisticated air-to-ground missions. This could also allow for these increment one CCAs to be used independently as air-to-ground ‘weapons trucks’ if their air-to-air assistance isn’t needed.

When the production FQ-44 arrives, it will have four hardpoints, compared with the two currently fitted to the YFQ-44A. Anduril says loading all four stations with AIM-120s for the Air Force’s air-dominance mission would reduce the range of the aircraft but would not require a larger engine or otherwise push the aircraft outside its basic takeoff, landing, climb, and flight-envelope requirements.

While the Air Force’s initial CCA requirement is heavily focused on air dominance, the same aircraft could potentially be configured for different missions by changing its external stores and sensors. Anduril is already positioning Fury as something more than a single-purpose “missile truck.”

That flexibility could become increasingly important as the Air Force considers how CCAs will be employed alongside crewed fighters. During a July Experimental Operations Unit (EOU) exercise at Creech Air Force Base, Fury flew in the same airspace as crewed fighters and other CCAs while Air Force personnel operated its Mission Autonomy system. Anduril says the aircraft has also flown in formation alongside F-35s, although the fighters were not yet controlling Fury.

The company is now working toward what it calls “quarterback integration,” in which a crewed aircraft will direct autonomous aircraft as part of a larger combat formation. Anduril says that work has already progressed through hardware- and software-in-the-loop environments and onto the aircraft itself, with live testing expected in the near term.

A Fury operating under the direction of an F-35 could potentially carry air-to-air missiles for counter-air missions, while other aircraft in the formation could be configured for strike or other effects. Alternatively, the same autonomous aircraft could be reconfigured for a different mission before being dispersed to another operating location. Having four pylons would also give the production Fury greater scope to undertake “swing-role” missions, flexing between prosecuting air and surface targets as required.

The July EOU exercise also demonstrated a rapid “hot reload” capability, with two Air Force personnel replacing an AIM-120 on a running Fury and reducing the turnaround between sorties to single-digit minutes. The demonstration was intended to show how CCAs could be rearmed and returned to the fight without the large maintenance and ground-support footprint associated with traditional combat aircraft. This will be vital as the Air Force integrates CCAs into its Agile Combat Employment concept, in which the drones can be dispersed across multiple operating locations rather than relying on a single large ground footprint.

Also speaking yesterday at the Air & Space Forces’ Air, Space and Cyber Symposium was Air Force Chief of Staff Kenneth Wilsbach, who confirmed that the service hasn’t necessarily made any decisions on Increment 2 of the CCA program yet, but it could include air-to-ground capabilities.

“We’re going through some thought processes about what Increment 2 should be able to do. Increment 1 is air-to-air, so do we want air-to-ground? Maybe, maybe not. Do we want it to have more sensors? Do we want it to be a lot cheaper? Do we want it to be more attritable or expendable, or do we want it to be more exquisite? Do we want shorter range or longer range? Do we want something that can be dropped from another platform, or does it take off and land by itself?”

“These are all considerations,” Wilsbach continued. “It’s still a bit early to make any definitive decisions on that, especially before we really get our hands on the current Increment 1 aircraft and learn from them.”

It’s also important to note that export customers for Fury may demand an air-to-ground capability set, especially if they will only be buying a limited number of CCA types. Having this option ready to go is relevant to prospects beyond the U.S., which are certainly growing.

Fury’s air-to-ground weapons work is part of a broader effort to make the aircraft a flexible combat system rather than simply an uncrewed air-defense adjunct for crewed fighters. The Air Force’s immediate priority may be air dominance, but the weapons integration underway suggests that the same four hardpoints could eventually support a much wider range of missions. This weapons flexibility could ultimately be central to the broader CCA concept, especially as the Air Force works out what it wants Increment 2 to deliver.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

High pressure is building across the UK and this means the weather will become more settled with brighter conditions.

After a chilly start on Monday morning, with sunshine and light winds across much of England and Wales, temperatures will climb into the low 20s.

Even with more cloud in Scotland and Northern Ireland, it will turn warmer with highs also reaching 18 to 22C.

It will also start to feel more humid again.

That more humid air combined with light winds across England and Wales into Tuesday means it will start off rather misty and foggy with areas of low cloud for some.

Once the sun has broken through though, it will feel warmer still.

Temperatures could peak at around 24 or 25C in south-east England, but reach the low 20s Celsius in many other parts of England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Eastern Scotland.

The highest temperature though will be determined by how much the cloud breaks allowing the strong September sunshine through.

2026 has already been a record-breaking year for the number of days above 25C, with last week exceeding the record of 89 days set in 1959.

Fuming Real Madrid manager waves printouts of what he believes were clear red-card tackles by Atletico Madrid players following his team’s loss.

Jose Mourinho needed only a sheet of paper to deliver his verdict on ⁠⁠La Liga’s Madrid derby, waving ⁠⁠images of two first-half tackles as he accused the officials of losing control in Real Madrid’s 2-1 defeat by Atletico Madrid.

Real were furious that Atletico defender Cristian Romero was not sent off for a stamp ⁠⁠on Jude Bellingham and also complained about a challenge by Lee Kang-in on Federico Valverde, before the visitors were themselves reduced to 10 men five minutes after half-time in the heated capital derby on Sunday.

Valverde finished the match but was later diagnosed with “severe trauma to his left ankle”, the ⁠⁠club said in a statement. The midfielder will undergo further tests, it added.

“We could skip the press conference because the story of the match is right here,” Mourinho said, holding up the images in what was the start of a near five-minute rant.

“Those were two clear red cards. The difficulties we’ve faced since the sending-off: 11 against 10. Well, we can imagine what 50 minutes of ‌‌11 against nine would have been like if justice had been done.”

Real defender Dean Huijsen was dismissed for bringing down Giuliano Simeone inside the area as the last defender, allowing Alejandro Grimaldo to score with a low spot kick. Jonathan David doubled Atletico’s lead six minutes later, with Antonio Ruediger heading in a free kick late to reduce the deficit.

Mourinho said he could only “hug” his players after what he described as a first half “full of class and great character”, but he aimed sharp criticism at referee Miguel Angel Ortiz Arias and those who appointed him.

“They’ve put a referee, aged 41, ⁠⁠with no international experience – it’s certainly not because he’s a great referee,” Mourinho said.

“Then the ⁠⁠poor chap has come here and hasn’t been able to cope with the pressure – and it really is intense pressure. I call it ’80s-style pressure’ here in this stadium, which you hardly ever see these days.”

Asked about being six points behind Barcelona, Mourinho offered a pointed reply.

“If they just leave us in ⁠⁠peace and let us compete on a level playing field with everyone else, we’ve still got a long way to go,” he said.

“I don’t want to go so far as to say ⁠⁠this was set up … I want to believe that they simply made a ⁠⁠mistake.”

Asked about Mourinho’s comments, Atletico manager Diego Simeone urged restraint.

“Whoever is speaking – be it me, Mourinho, Hansi Flick or Manuel Pellegrini, anyone – we have to be careful what we say,” Simeone said. “When you step outside the bounds of respect, whoever you are, it’s not on. You can’t cross that line.”

Simeone preferred to focus ‌‌on Atletico’s performance.

“Today we saw a great match; we defended very well against a team that plays very well,” he said.

“We controlled the match when it was 11 against 11. We continued to control it when it became 10 against 11. But ‌‌this ‌‌isn’t just another step towards continuing to grow and improve.”

Atletico climbed above Real to second in the standings on 16 points, five behind leaders Barcelona and one ahead of Real and Real Betis.

Tehran threatens retaliation as Trump weighs military action while Qatar pushes to revive talks.

Iran’s central military command says it has received information that the United States is preparing to resume strikes on the country.

The warning, issued on Sunday by the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, which oversees Iran’s armed forces, raises the prospect of a new round of fighting after months of reduced direct attacks.

Tehran said any renewed US assault would bring retaliation against American bases and interests in the Middle East and warned regional countries against helping Washington.

The military command said states that allowed their territory or facilities to support US attacks would be “considered complicit” and could face an Iranian response.

US President Donald Trump told Fox News on Sunday that he was in a “deciding mode” over Iran and said his options included further military action, economic pressure or a deal.

He also said he would be open to meeting Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York this week.

Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi left Tehran on Sunday evening for the UN General Assembly in New York, state media announced, adding that he is making a brief stopover in Qatar.

Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf told lawmakers on Sunday that Tehran should use military force to push back its opponents before turning to diplomacy to secure any gains.

Tehran has told Qatari and Pakistani mediators that conditions for renewed talks include an end to the war and US attacks, the release of frozen Iranian funds and the lifting of the US naval blockade on Iranian ports.

Ghalibaf said the Strait of Hormuz would remain closed until Washington met what Iran says are its commitments under an earlier agreement.

Al Jazeera correspondent Tohid Asadi, reporting from Tehran, said Iranian officials were sending a deliberate two-track message, signalling that they remained open to diplomacy while preparing for renewed fighting.

Qatar, a Gulf state mediating between the two sides, says its officials are travelling between capitals and exchanging proposals aimed at restarting negotiations.

Qatari Foreign Ministry spokesperson Majed al-Ansari said Doha had heard assurances from US officials that Washington wanted an agreement.

The confrontation is already disrupting the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow waterway linking the Gulf to the Arabian Sea and a key route for global energy shipments.

Shipping data showed 12 commodity vessels crossed the strait over the weekend, down from 35 the previous weekend. The war began in late February after joint US-Israeli strikes on Iran.

A 60-day memorandum reached in June reduced full-scale fighting but expired last month, with attacks around Hormuz increasing since then.

Mark Pfeifle, a Republican strategist and former White House national security official, told Al Jazeera that both countries were “locked in this frozen conflict” and trying to increase pressure before possible diplomacy around the UN gathering.

The NATO Response Force (NRF) and EU Battlegroups have demonstrated that placing multinational forces on standby does not automatically make them immediately operational. German-Dutch military integration, in contrast, has generated a different outcome since cooperation was internalized within permanent command structures, units, training, and capability planning before a crisis occurred.

Such a comparison is becoming increasingly relevant to Northeast Asia. A Taiwan contingency could absorb American military assets at the very moment when North Korea embarks upon a serious provocation towards South Korea. Continued US commitments in Europe and the Middle East could further complicate the allocation of finite resources.

Why Standby Forces Encountered Problems

The NRF was established after the 2002 Prague Summit as a rapidly deployable multinational joint force of roughly 25,000 troops. Yet the NRF was heavily dependent on the member countries assigning their respective forces to particular rotations, while these governments had the final say over whether the forces could ultimately be employed. During the Afghanistan and Iraq wars—when operational demand was high—each government had strong disincentives in introducing scarce high-readiness units and specialized enablers to NRF rotational deployment.

This created a gap between designated readiness and actual availability. Strategic transportation, logistics, specialized support units, and communication capacity could still be subject to competing national demands. Eventually, in 2024, NATO replaced the NRF with the NATO Force Model, which emphasized a substantially larger pool of high-readiness forces that is closely aligned with specific defense plans.

Meanwhile, the EU Battlegroup was faced with an even clearer problem. Although the multinational battlegroups had been maintained on rotational standby since 2007, they had never been deployed. While acknowledging that the battlegroups enhanced interoperability and military transformation, the European Parliament attributed the shortcoming largely to insufficient political will, difficulties in decision-making, implementation problems, and the financing arrangements.

What Germany and the Netherlands Did Differently

German-Dutch cooperation developed according to a different institutional logic. Although the 1st German-Netherlands Corps was created in Münster in 1995, the integration later expanded deep into both militaries’ force structures. The Dutch 11th Airmobile Brigade was incorporated into the German Division Schnelle Kräfte (DSK) in 2014, while the Dutch 43rd Mechanized Brigade was integrated into Germany’s 1st Panzer Division in 2016, and the Dutch 13th Light Armoured Brigade joined Germany’s 10th Panzer Division in 2023.

The relationship was extended below the brigade level. Germany’s Panzerbataillon 414 is operated under the Dutch 43rd Mechanized Brigade, and Dutch personnel operate Germany’s Leopard 2A6MA2 tanks while serving within the battalion. Moreover, German officers serve in Dutch command headquarters and vice versa, turning multinational command into a routine organizational reality instead of a stopgap measure that is only activated during major exercises.

Needless to say, such an arrangement does not eliminate national sovereignty. Both Germany and the Netherlands preserve the political prerogative over whether and where their forces are deployed. Meanwhile, the benefits of integration would become observable once a crisis necessitates the deployment. Staff are already well-versed in each other’s procedures, and units have repeatedly conducted joint exercises, while command and logistics relations do not need to be newly constructed during mobilization.

The distinctions were visibly observable during training. For example, approximately 7,000 German and Dutch personnel participated in the 2026 Fighter Lion—the largest military exercise conducted by the Netherlands in two decades—ten years after the Dutch 43rd Mechanized Brigade was integrated into Germany’s 1st Panzer Division. These types of exercises strengthen existing command relations rather than creating temporary interoperability for a single event.

What Japan and South Korea Can Apply

It is quite obvious that Japan and South Korea cannot replicate the German-Dutch model. Neither country has a formal mutual defense pact nor a NATO-style integrated command structure. Therefore, the directly applicable lessons are more limited. Nonetheless, selected operational relationships can and should be institutionalized before multiple simultaneous contingencies make such coordination necessary.

The practical first step could be a standing bilateral adjustment mechanism that links Japan’s Joint Operations Command (JJOC) with relevant South Korean joint headquarters. Instead of exercising command authority, the mechanism could maintain procedures for intelligence exchange, deconfliction in the air and at sea, movement of US reinforcements, logistics coordination, and the use of Japanese facilities that support a Korean contingency. This would be especially crucial when Japan has to assist US operations related to Taiwan while installations across Japan—including Yokota, Yokosuka, Sasebo, Iwakuni, and other United Nations Command (UNC)-Rear facilities—play a pivotal role in US reinforcement to the Korean Peninsula in accordance with Operational Plan (OPLAN) 5055.

Under this mechanism, small-scale functional cells could concentrate on specific missions. Missile warning would be the most obvious starting point since the United States, Japan, and South Korea have conducted North Korean missile-warning data-sharing since December 2023. Additional cells could treat maritime domain awareness (MDA), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), cyber defense, transportation, medical evacuation, and logistics.

The exchange of officers should accompany the aforementioned measures. Japanese officers could participate in South Korean command posts, while South Korean officers could join Japanese operational staff who deal with naval operations, air defense, logistics, or reinforcement coordination. The goal is to get familiar with each country’s procedures, communications, command relations, and other miscellaneous constraints before wartime pressure markedly shortens the timeframe for decision-making.

Exercise Scarcity Rather Than Ideal Conditions

The most notable changes should be related to exercise design. Trilateral exercises should not be premised on the assumption that the full inventory of United States support capabilities will always be available. A more pessimistic scenario would begin with a Taiwan scenario that is already consuming a substantial amount of US assets—including its ISR capacity, strategic transportation, and precision-guided munitions—when North Korea embarks upon a serious horizontal or vertical military escalation on the Korean Peninsula.

In this particular situation, elaborated by the Atlantic Council report, South Korean military planners should determine which missions could be conducted independently and which can be addressed bilaterally. South Korea may assume greater responsibility for ISR, missile defense, logistics, and conventional firepower on the Korean Peninsula—yet this would be affected by the tempo of wartime operational control (OPCON) transition—while Japan could take on additional maritime surveillance, ASW, sea lines of communication (SLOC) protection, base defense, and logistics. The primary aim is not to divide the Taiwan and Korean Peninsula theaters between Seoul and Tokyo but to identify how both countries could most effectively conduct missions that complement US military operations across the two regions.

Logistics should be placed at the center of these exercises. A dual contingency could impose on the Japanese government the need to support both US operations on Taiwan and USFJ reinforcement to the Korean Peninsula, which inevitably involves Japanese ports and airfields. It could cause competition for fuel, maintenance, transportation, ammunition depots, runways, and port capacity. Thus, Tokyo and Seoul should develop procedures concerning reciprocal servicing, immediate repair, medical support, transportation, and selected supplies before the bottleneck transmogrifies into wartime problems.

Functional Integration Without a Bilateral Alliance

The German-Dutch case illustrates that political authority is not necessarily the same thing as operational preparedness. A government can maintain full authority over whether its forces enter conflicts and can also prepare in advance to cooperate effectively if that decision is made. These distinctions are highly relevant to Japan and South Korea since they enable a considerable level of operational preparedness without a formal defense pact. For instance, South Korea could discuss target allocations for North Korean TELs with its Japanese counterparts in order to effectively use the finite weapons available to Japan’s enemy base strike capability and South Korea’s Kill Chain and Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR).

Naturally, the primary objective should be functional integration in fields where both governments already have overlapping interests. A large set of measures—spanning from ISR coordination to cyber defense—can be institutionalized without creating either an integrated force or an Asian version of NATO.

Both the NRF and EU Battlegroups revealed the limits of formations that remained dependent on political and operational arrangements being assembled only when crises occur. German-Dutch cooperation worked better since many of those arrangements already existed.

Given the historical baggage that Japan and South Korea carry, it would undoubtedly be a Herculean task for them to take novel steps. Nonetheless, the emerging regional security environment is rapidly narrowing down the available options.

Former adversaries say they will settle differences as fears grow of expanding war in Ethiopia.

Seven Ethiopian armed groups have formed an alliance aimed at overthrowing the government of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.

The groups announced the alliance on Sunday, saying that they would work together to set up an inclusive transitional government.

“We have established a joint alliance called the Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces Alliance for Survival, known in short as the Alliance for Survival,” the groups said in a joint statement.

The alliance includes the Amhara Fano National Movement, a coalition of Fano factions that has fought federal forces in the Amhara region since 2023; the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which dominated Ethiopian politics for nearly three decades before Abiy took office; and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), which has fought federal forces in Oromia since 2018.

Four smaller groups – the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (Ugugumo), the Benishangul Peoples’ Liberation Movement and the Gumuz Peoples’ Democratic Movement – make up the rest.

The groups’ leaders had been talking to form the alliance for about a year, a source close to Fano told Al Jazeera on Sunday.

The announcement comes weeks after clashes in the northern region of Tigray, one of the most serious breaches yet of a 2022 peace deal, deepened fears of a return to full-scale war.

Fighting has gripped parts of Oromia since 2018 and Amhara since 2023.

Abiy came to power in 2018 promising sweeping reforms. He freed journalists, activists and other political prisoners and revoked bans on many political parties after taking power.

But his opponents and human rights activists accuse his government of reversing those gains in recent years.

In the statement, the alliance accuses the government of imposing “dictatorial rule” that has pushed the country towards break-up.

It also says a transitional government guided by a charter would work to end the wars, protect rights and open a national dialogue.

Jaal Marroo, the OLA’s military leader, told a local broadcaster earlier this month that they had met several times before settling on the final announcement.

Zemene Kassie, the Fano leader, first publicly indicated that deals had been reached in an interview with the Swiss newspaper Le Temps, published on August 16.

The government has not publicly commented on Sunday’s announcement.

Fano fought alongside federal forces against Tigray’s fighters in the Tigray war of 2020 to 2022, which killed hundreds of thousands.

Amhara and Tigray also both claim Western Tigray, which Amhara nationalists have administered since the war ended.

Ethiopian academic Eyob Tilahun told Al Jazeera on Sunday that the competing groups had agreed to have a dialogue and form an alliance “in the best interests of the public”.

“Those allied forces believe that they all face a survival threat from the government,” Eyob said.

The 2022 peace agreement, signed in Pretoria, South Africa, ended the war between the federal government and Tigray’s forces but left disputes over disarmament and the TPLF’s legal status unresolved.

In mid-July, the TPLF declared the 2022 Pretoria peace deal “effectively dead”.

For a decade, the United Nations’s most visible role in the Sahel was its peacekeeping mission in Mali.

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established by the Security Council in 2013. Its mandate was terminated in June 2023 at the request of Mali’s transitional government, and the mission completed its withdrawal by the end of that year.

But the end of MINUSMA did not end the UN’s engagement with the region.

Its political work continues through the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), while the wider UN system remains involved in humanitarian and development work.

What has changed is the space in which that engagement takes place.

Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger formally left the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on January 29, 2025. The three countries have also deepened cooperation through the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), putting sovereignty and strategic autonomy at the centre of their political message.

The humanitarian pressures, meanwhile, have not eased.

Displacement, insecurity, food insecurity and other pressures continue to cross borders, even as governments increasingly insist on handling their security and political affairs on their own terms.

The question is what influence the UN can exercise after the departure of the peacekeeping force that once represented its most substantial presence in the region.

What does the UN’s presence look like now?

The UN’s role today is less about troops and more about diplomacy, mediation, humanitarian assistance and development.

UNOWAS is a special political mission rather than a peacekeeping operation. Its work includes preventive diplomacy, good offices, political mediation, conflict prevention and support for political dialogue.

“The influence the UN can actually exercise is narrow. The AES states have stripped away the mechanisms that once gave outside institutions leverage, leaving ECOWAS and the Rome Statute, and building their own confederation and joint force instead,” said Mubarak Aliyu, a political and security analyst in Nigeria.

In February 2026, the Security Council extended UNOWAS’s mandate until January 31, 2029, while requesting an independent strategic review of its mandate and activities, to be finalised by September 30, 2026.

The review comes as West Africa’s political landscape is being reshaped by military governments, new regional alliances and a stronger emphasis on sovereignty.

Russia has also become an important part of that changing security picture.

“What has actually shaped events this year is Russia’s Africa Corps, which helped Mali’s and Niger’s military governments survive shocks the UN was never positioned to influence, functioning mainly as regime protection rather than counterinsurgency,” Aliyu said.

“Moscow’s leverage extends into the Security Council chamber too, since its veto shapes what collective action the Council can attempt on Mali in the first place.”

Kabir Adamu, founder and managing director of Beacon Security and Innovations Limited, an Abuja-based firm that provides security solutions in Nigeria, the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel, said the UN should shift its approach away from large deployments of UN troops to diplomatic and towards diplomatic and development solutions.

“Looking ahead, the UN’s priorities in the Sahel should promote effective security sector governance and security sector reform. This will mean pivoting from traditional, large-scale peacekeeping to deep-rooted and core preventive strategies and diplomacy that addresses the root causes of fragility, conflict and violence, as well as instability,” Adamu said.

For the United Nations, diplomacy has become more important as governments turn to other security partnerships and regional arrangements.

How has sovereignty changed the political space?

Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have made sovereignty and strategic autonomy central to their political outlook and built the AES as a framework for closer cooperation.

Their departure from ECOWAS has changed the regional architecture through which West African governments have traditionally dealt with political and security crises.

The UN still works with regional organisations, including ECOWAS and the African Union, but governments no longer share one political framework or the same approach to external engagement.

Consequently, for the UN, maintaining vital political channels has become potentially more difficult.

Adamu said the fragmented security architecture means the UN should seek to work with and through regional organisations and groups, rather than establishing its own large-scale forces.

“As national security structures remain weak and extractive, and regional security architecture fragments, marked by the rise of the Alliance of Sahel States and shifting ECOWAS dynamics, the UN should prioritise pragmatic, inclusive mediation to bridge divides between Sahelian and coastal states, while actively bolstering alternative, functioning frameworks like MNJTF [Multinational Joint Task] and the Accra Initiative,” he said.

Have the problems in the Sahel gone away?

The retreat of peacekeepers has not removed the pressures that brought international organisations into the region in the first place.

Displacement, armed violence, organised crime, food insecurity and climate pressures continue to overlap across the Sahel.

Climate change is perhaps not the root cause of the instability, but environmental and economic pressures can add to existing vulnerabilities, particularly where state institutions are weak and communities are already dealing with conflict and displacement.

For the UN, humanitarian work remains one of the areas where engagement can continue, even when governments reject large-scale military intervention.

Humanitarian work also places greater emphasis on local and regional capacity.

“Crucially, the UN must double down on the core UNISS pillars of governance, resilience, and security by integrating climate-peace initiatives and empowering local capacities, ensuring that international engagement remains flexible, locally owned, and focused on sustainable, multidimensional stability rather than solely militarised responses,” Adamu said.

While the UN cannot determine the security partnerships of sovereign governments or force political processes on authorities that reject them, it can still facilitate dialogue, support humanitarian operations and raise regional crises before the wider international community.

What does UNGA 81 mean for the Sahel?

The 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly opened on September 8, 2026, with its General Debate due to begin on September 22.

The UNGA meets with no UN peacekeeping mission in Mali and with Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger outside ECOWAS, while the AES has become a separate framework for their political and security cooperation.

“That leaves the UN closer to an advocate and service provider than a shaper of outcomes,” Aliyu said. “It can report, brief, fund aid operations and press for access, but it cannot compel it or offer the regime security that has made Russia indispensable to the military governments.”

Yet for the Sahel, insecurity, displacement, humanitarian needs and economic and climate pressures remain.

In the changed regional environment, the UN’s influence is more likely to come through diplomacy than force, through access rather than authority, and through regional relationships rather than a large international security presence.

Officials urge civilians to stay away from site in Al-Eis near Aleppo after series of explosions.

Powerful explosions at a weapons depot in northern Syria have injured at least four people, according to state media, with officials urging the public to stay away from the site.

The explosions occurred early on Monday at a Syrian army site in the vicinity of the town of al-Eis, south of the city of Aleppo, the state-run SANA news agency reported.

The cause of the explosions was not immediately clear.

Faisal Mohammad Ali, the head of civil defence operations in Aleppo, told SANA that rescuers have evacuated four injured people from the site.

Al Jazeera’s Obaida Hitto, reporting from Aleppo, said a series of blasts has followed the initial explosion.

“The explosions are audible from a few kilometres away from the site. We have now seen a series of ambulances and fire trucks enter towards the position,” he reported.

Aleppo Governor Azzam al-Gharib urged residents not to leave their homes for the time being, adding that “hospitals, ambulance and emergency teams are on full alert”.

Roads leading to the site of the explosions were closed “to ensure the safety of civilians”, Aleppo’s Internal Security Command said.

A resident of Aleppo’s Hamdaniyeh neighbourhood told the AFP news agency that they heard a “huge explosion” and when they went up to the roof could see “large flames in the distance”.

Several such blasts have previously occurred in Syria, which is emerging from more than a decade of civil war following the toppling of longtime ruler Bashar al-Assad in late 2024.

An explosion of unknown origin killed 11 people at a military site in the eastern province of Deir Az Zor on Friday.

Earlier this month, an explosion at a weapons depot belonging to the Ministry of Defence killed 14 people and injured 11 in Syria’s northwest Idlib province.

Five people were killed just over a week earlier in the same area when a vehicle carrying munitions exploded.

Measures targeting the court itself could disrupt payments, IT services and investigations.

The Trump administration is reportedly preparing sweeping sanctions against the International Criminal Court (ICC) that could disrupt the tribunal’s finances and day-to-day operations.

The US sanctions would prohibit most transactions with the ICC after a grace period of six to seven months, The Wall Street Journal reported on Sunday.

The move would mark a sharp escalation in Washington’s campaign against the Hague-based court by targeting the institution itself rather than individual judges and prosecutors.

The Trump administration plans to announce the sanctions soon, according to the Reuters news agency, quoting two sources familiar with the matter.

The Journal, citing anonymous officials, said a decision could be finalised during this week’s United Nations General Assembly gathering in New York or soon afterwards.

If imposed, the measures would generally bar US citizens and companies from providing the ICC with money, goods or services without a licence from the US Treasury.

Banks and other companies often take an especially cautious approach to US sanctions because they rely on access to the American financial system.

The ICC president and registrar have previously warned that sanctions on the organisation as a whole could interfere with its ability to buy information technology and insurance services, hire investigators and make routine payments, including salaries for American employees.

The ICC was created in 2002 to prosecute individuals accused of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity when national authorities are unable or unwilling to do so.

Washington has already sanctioned more than a dozen ICC judges and prosecutors under an executive order signed by President Donald Trump in February 2025.

In August, it added the court’s President Tomoko Akane and senior trial lawyer Abdoulaye Seye to the list, with restrictions on them taking effect on September 17.

The United States has never joined the court.

The Trump administration says the court has exceeded its authority by pursuing officials from countries that are not ICC members.

Relations deteriorated sharply after the court issued arrest warrants in November 2024 for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant over alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza.

Israel, like the US, is not an ICC member and rejects the court’s jurisdiction.

Washington has also objected to an earlier ICC investigation into alleged abuses in Afghanistan involving US personnel.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced a campaign in July to further isolate the court and urged other countries to withdraw from it.

Trump’s move adds to growing opposition to the ICC in recent months.

Chad and Venezuela moved in July to withdraw from the court, following Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.

Four US-based rights groups sued the Trump administration in August, arguing that existing sanctions obstruct their legal and human rights work.

Lockheed Martin has unveiled a modular airframe concept for its stealthy and combat-proven AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) family that could support multiple configurations, launch methods, and sensor packages while making use of the existing JASSM and Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) production infrastructure. Highly survivable, the missiles are an incredibly important and staple weapon for the U.S. military, and for select export customers.

Called AGM-158 FLEX, the new concept is centered on a common airframe with interchangeable components. Lockheed Martin says it has invested more than $35 million of its funds in the effort so far, including airframe design, testing, prototype production, subsystem qualification, and work with suppliers.

The company says the FLEX design will use removable nose sections that can accommodate sensor suites associated with the AGM-158 family. A removable boat tail would allow the same basic airframe to be configured for different launch methods, including air, surface, and subsurface launch. That would open the AGM-158 architecture up to ground-, ship-, and submarine-launched applications, although Lockheed Martin has not provided details on the specific launchers, platforms, or configurations envisioned. It’s worth noting the LRASM has been tested in vertical launch configuration for vessels equipped with the Mk 41 launch system.

In addition to the Navy vertical launch tests, the idea of moving the JASSM family beyond its traditional combat aircraft launch platforms is not new. The Air Force’s Palletized JASSM concept, better known as Rapid Dragon, has demonstrated the ability to deploy JASSM-ER from palletized launchers carried inside cargo aircraft, using an expendable airdrop system. FLEX takes a different approach by building those kinds of launch options into the airframe architecture itself, with modularity supporting various launch configurations for the same basic weapon.

Rapid Dragon Flight Test

For aircraft-launched weapons, Lockheed Martin says FLEX will retain compatibility with current and future JASSM and LRASM launch platforms.

The company is also proposing multiple airframe lengths. A 206-inch configuration is associated with the supersized JASSM-XR, while a 168-inch version is consistent with the dimensions of JASSM-ER. Lockheed Martin says JASSM-XR will be the first configuration of the FLEX airframe.

The Brand New AGM-158 Extended Range

The AGM-158 family has already grown well beyond the original JASSM. The AGM-158A is the baseline stealthy air-launched land-attack missile, with a publicly reported range of roughly 230-330 miles, while the AGM-158B JASSM-ER uses a more efficient engine and additional fuel to roughly double that reach, to around 575 miles or more.

Alongside the land-attack variants is the AGM-158C LRASM, which uses the JASSM airframe but substitutes a sophisticated imaging infrared anti-ship seeker, electronic support measures, datalink, and other capabilities, for operations against heavily defended surface combatants.

Finally, the much larger JASSM-XR is being developed with a substantially stretched fuselage to carry more fuel and a larger 1,000-pound-class warhead, with a range expected to approach or exceed 1,000 miles. This would give it a similar striking capability as the Tomahawk cruise missile, although in a stealthier package.

Beyond range and launch options, the company is pitching its new FLEX concept as a way to simplify future upgrades. Components could be replaced as they become obsolete or new capabilities become available without necessarily requiring a completely new missile design.

That approach could have an industrial-base advantage, particularly as the United States seeks to increase production of long-range weapons. Lockheed Martin says FLEX would use the existing JASSM/LRASM production line, supply chain, mission-planning infrastructure, and software ecosystem rather than establishing an entirely new manufacturing and support architecture.

The company says its JASSM/LRASM production infrastructure includes a 225,000-square-foot facility opened in 2022 with increased automation and a robotic paint line.

Notable, however, is the fact that FLEX is being proposed at a time when the U.S. Air Force is pursuing affordable mass as a key priority.

For example, as part of a slew of low-cost cruise missile offerings, the service has been moving ahead with the Extended Range Attack Munition, or ERAM, a new air-launched missile explicitly intended to provide a relatively low-cost, rapidly producible standoff weapon. The Air Force conducted a live-warhead ERAM test in January of last year, less than 16 months after the program received its initial contract, and described the weapon as a means of generating mass against fixed targets. ERAM is understood to have a range of between 150 and 280 miles, putting it below the reach of the baseline JASSM, let alone the JASSM-ER or XR.

However, the emerging class of lower-cost weapons are intended very much more to complement than compete with JASSM. While the Air Force plans to buy thousands of the cheaper missile, the JASSM will still be needed to take up the higher end of the cost and capability list.

Lockheed Martin mentions that FLEX should “unlock future cost savings,” but this sounds more about giving customers the ability to swap out components and upgrade capabilities on existing missile rounds, to avoid obsolescence, rather than facilitate mass production.

As it stands, JASSM has evolved into a family of increasingly capable and longer-range weapons, but those capabilities necessarily come with a different set of cost and production considerations than a weapon designed from the outset around large-scale production. Lockheed Martin’s announcement does not disclose a target unit cost for FLEX, nor does it explain how the eventual cost of a FLEX-derived weapon would compare with a baseline JASSM or LRASM. The unit price of the latest subvariants of the JASSM-ER is around $1.2 and $1.5 million, according to official budget documents.

The new weapon is a way of getting more variants and launch options out of the established JASSM/LRASM architecture, potentially with less development work than creating entirely new weapons. Whether that translates into enough savings or production capacity to satisfy the military’s growing demand for large numbers of standoff weapons remains to be seen.

For Lockheed Martin, the proposal also offers a way to extend the relevance of the AGM-158 family as the company and the Pentagon pursue additional range, new launch platforms, and potentially new launch methods.

The flexibility of the missile could be particularly relevant to the Agile Combat Employment concept, and the wider U.S. military in the Indo-Pacific, where forces are expected to operate from a larger number of dispersed and potentially austere locations. A common missile architecture that can be adapted to different launch platforms and different target sets could allow weapons to be positioned and employed across a distributed force rather than tying particular missile variants to particular launchers.

The original JASSM/LRASM has also become a significant export weapon, with Australia, Finland, Poland and several other U.S. allies cleared to acquire variants of the missile. While the advanced capabilities of the weapon have seen its export opportunities carefully controlled, FLEX could potentially open up the market to more customers, including less-advanced, ‘sanitized’ versions.

Lockheed Martin’s announcement provides few details on FLEX’s eventual cost, production rate, schedule, or specific performance beyond the stated airframe dimensions. For now, the concept demonstrates that the company is seeking to create a more adaptable architecture around an established missile family, one that has played a critical role in numerous operations since its introduction.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Tehran says it has learned the US may be planning a new round of strikes, warns of retaliation ‘without limitations’.

U.S. Space Force’s top officer has shared new details about his service’s use of electronic warfare capabilities during Operation Epic Fury against Iran earlier this year. This underscores how space is steadily becoming an arena where conflict actually occurs, and the implications this has for forces operating inside and outside of the Earth’s atmosphere.

Chief of Space Operations Gen. Douglas Schiess highlighted the actions of a member of the 42nd Electromagnetic Warfare Combat Detachment (EWCD) in support of Epic Fury during a keynote speech earlier this morning. Schiess’ remarks came at the Air & Space Forces Association’s (AFA) 2026 Air, Space & Cyber Conference, at which TWZ is in attendance. This is his first major engagement since taking over as head of Space Force less than two weeks ago.

“During Operation Epic Fury, our components, notably at U.S. Central Command and Space Command, with support from our components at European Command and Pacific Command, demonstrated that Guardians [the official term for uniformed Space Force personnel] are not supporting from the sidelines as a nice-to-have [sic], but we are delivering space power directly into the fight as a need-to-have,” Schiess said. “One of those impressive Guardians is Specialist Gray, who hails from Tampa, Florida. She joined the Space Force just two years ago, but listen to the impact she [has] made in her short term already.”

“She deployed to the CENTCOM AOR [Central Command area of responsibility] as a part of the 42nd Electronic Warfare Detachment [sic], and within hours of OEF kicking off, she received a top priority target package with one critical objective: reconfigure her weapon system and execute critical non-kinetic fires,” he continued. “She locked onto the target, optimized her weapon system, and waged electromagnetic warfare against a determined adversary. Even as ‘Alarm Red’ sirens were blaring, and incoming missiles targeted her site, she courageously held the line, protecting forces, denying adversary capability, and delivering space effects, until her commander had to literally pull her from the console to safety.”

“Specialist Gray is just one of the outstanding members of the entire enterprise of dedicated guardians, including the acquisition professionals that developed and fielded the weapon system that she operated, the intel Guardians that developed the targeting package that she used, and the cyber guardians who ensured communication, connectivity, and network defense for the command and control, the guardian instructors who trained her for combat, and the list goes on and on,” the Chief of Space Operations added.

Schiess did not name the system in question or elaborate further on how it was employed. However, previously released pictures of elements of the 42nd EWCD in the Middle East have shown personnel working with trailer-mounted multi-band antennas that have been associated in the past with variants of the Counter Communications System (CCS). CCS is a family of ground-based electronic warfare jammers primarily designed to disrupt enemy space-based communications capabilities. Prior to yesterday, CCS was the U.S. military’s only publicly acknowledged anti-satellite weapon. Space Force has now confirmed it also has weapons in orbit, which we will come back to later on.

The 42nd Electromagnetic Warfare Combat Detachment has been operating in the Middle East since at least 2024 under the umbrella of Space Force’s main headquarters in the region, U.S. Space Forces – Central (SPACECENT). President Donald Trump briefly called attention to the detachment’s “cutting-edge defense activities” during a Christmas Eve conference call with deployed service members last year.

“Sometimes we have to be within the footprint of the satellite, and so that’s why Guardians go into harm’s way,” Gen. Schiess did tell TWZ and other outlets at a roundtable after his speech this morning when asked for more details about the 42nd EWCD’s role in Operation Epic Fury, and what lessons Space Force has been learning from the conflict more broadly.

“Electromagnetic warfare was a big part of that, but also satellite communications,” he added. “The ability to keep communications, obviously GPS and PNT [positioning, navigation, and timing], were important there.”

“And then, really, missile warning and missile tracking was [sic] incredibly important. Both [Air Force Chief of Staff] Gen. Wilsbach and I talked about ‘Red Alarm’ situations,” the Chief of Space Operations continued. “Being able to tell our forces to be able to take cover was extremely important. And as we’ve seen from Ukraine to Iran, the amount of missiles and the amount of things, the folks that are doing that each and every day are incredible, and they are saving lives.”

Gen. Schiess’ anecdote about Specialist Gray and the 42nd EWCD did highlight how Iran, especially in the opening phases of the conflict earlier this year, was able to deal real blows to U.S. and allied facilities and forces across the Middle East. Iranian missiles, drones, and other capabilities were able to damage and/or destroy a variety of high-value assets, including aircraft and radars, and cause hundreds of casualties, as TWZ has drawn attention to on several occasions in the past. This has already been a sobering wake-up call with serious implications for potential future conflicts against larger and even more capability opponents, especially China.

“I think the whole joint force is learning a lot from Operation Epic Fury, the previous operation there, on exactly what needs to be in underground facilities, [and] what maybe can we do from remote locations,” the head of Space Force said at the roundtable today. “You could also look at what can we do from space to do some of those things? And so we’re looking at all those [lessons learned].”

Gen. Schiess mentioning subterranean facilities and remote operations is particularly notable. Even before Operation Epic Fury began, the U.S. Air Force had been working to expand options for directing operations in the Middle East from a command center in the United States. The service had also been looking to push certain command and control functions at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar underground. Al Udeid was among the many bases Iran subsequently targeted.

Operation Epic Fury has already added new fuel to a larger ongoing debate about balancing U.S. military base defense priorities globally, including the relative value of investing in new physically hardened infrastructure. TWZ has been following these discussions very closely in recent years. The conflict with Iran has raised serious questions about future operations of any kind at certain bases across the Middle East, and there have been reports that a larger reorientation of America’s force posture in the region could be coming.

For Space Force, operations against Iran have provided a broader opportunity for the service to demonstrate its active role in forward-deployed operations. That, in turn, has generated its own lessons learned beyond just steps needed to help better protect units in the field.

This extends to “reconstitution [of forces] in a combat environment, the logistics and the importance of that relationship with TRANSCOM [U.S. Transportation Command] and to be able to get supplies and replenishment into the theater,” Chief Master Sergeant of the Space Force John Bentivegna also said today, speaking alongside Gen. Schiess at the roundtable. That is “something we haven’t really worked on before. So definitely, it was a great lesson learned.”

Space-based capabilities including early warning, general intelligence gathering, weapons guidance, near-real-time communications, and more, are already absolutely central to U.S. military operations. America’s long-standing dominance in space is also steadily being eroded, with China, in particular, surging ahead in the deployment of new satellites to support a host of mission requirements, including intelligence-gathering and long-range targeting. The ability to leverage space is also proliferating to smaller adversaries, including Iran.

In addition, as mentioned, the space domain is no longer limited to just supporting operations within the atmosphere, but is a place where real engagements happen. The U.S. military is now capable of generating so-called counter-space effects using forces and assets within the atmosphere as well as in orbit, as was just disclosed yesterday.

Overall, Gen. Douglas Schiess’ comments today about the role played by Specialist Gray and the 42nd EWCD during Operation Epic Fury are indicative of not just what is to come in future operations, but how the Space Force is already engaged in combat missions now.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Russian President Vladimir Putin has cast the vote as a test of support for his ongoing war in Ukraine.

Polls have closed in Russia’s first wartime parliamentary elections, with the ruling United Russia party on course to win the tightly controlled vote.

The Kremlin wants the elections, the first parliamentary vote since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, to showcase popular support for the war and legitimise its action.

Russian government officials accused Ukraine of trying to disrupt voting after Kyiv launched hundreds of drones at Moscow and other regions in what the TASS state news agency said was the biggest attack of its kind since the war began.

The drone strikes on Sunday killed at least three people in the Moscow region and two more in the Russian-held part of Ukraine’s Kherson region, including an election official, according to the region’s governor and the election commission.

Russian authorities also reported attacks on the country’s electronic voting systems and communication lines during the polls, but said the electoral process was mostly smooth.

Initial results showed the United Russia party comfortably ahead, and Russia’s Central Election Commission said turnout at the close of polls stood at 56.66 percent.

The first official results and turnout are expected on Monday morning.

Voting in Russian-held Ukrainian areas

The vote, which began on Friday for 111 million eligible voters, included residents of four Ukrainian regions that Moscow illegally annexed after the war began, but still doesn’t fully control, as well as those in Crimea, the Black Sea peninsula that was illegally annexed by Russia in 2014.

Authorities in Kyiv denounced the voting in the Russian-held areas as illegal and urged foreign governments not to recognise the result. The European Union on Friday called the action a “blatant violation of international law”.

Voters cast two separate ballots, filling half of the lower house’s 450 seats by selecting political parties listed on the ballot. The rest are contested in single-seat constituencies, with voters choosing individual candidates.

The main Kremlin party, United Russia, is widely expected to retain its overwhelming control of the State Duma. Several smaller parties of the “systemic opposition” that vote in sync with Putin’s views on all key issues are also expected to maintain their presence.

A massive state media campaign and tight control over the elections in the absence of genuine opposition all but assure the Kremlin will keep tight control of Russian politics amid mounting economic costs and increasing Ukrainian drone attacks deep inside the country.

The liberal Yabloko party, the only registered political entity that dared to publicly criticise the war, was removed from the ballot last month by Russia’s Supreme Court. It only has a few dozen candidates in the single-constituency races.

Additionally, some anti-war politicians were imprisoned or forced to flee abroad ahead of the campaign.

Russia didn’t invite election observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Russian Foreign Ministry has accused the body of “double standards” for its criticism of Russia.

A Florida fishing charter boat made a very unusual catch Saturday while operating near Eglin Air Force Base. Located in the western end of the Florida Panhandle, Eglin is home of the U.S. Air Force weapons test wing. Hot Spots Charters pulled a delta-wing aerial drone out of the water during an excursion, according local charter captain Charlie Green. The recovered drone closely resembles a clone of the Iranian Shahed-136 one-way attack weapon, specifically the U.S. military’s Low-Cost Uncrewed Combat Attack System (LUCAS) that took center stage during its first combat use in Operation Epic Fury. The target version of that drone is built by SpecktreWorks and is designated the FLM-136. It was originally designed for mimicking one-way attack munitions, specifically the Shahed-136, which it was reverse engineered from, for testing and training before it was weaponized into LUCAS.

An Eglin AFB spokesperson told us the installation recently lost a drone, but would not confirm it was the same one found by Hot Spots Charters.

“I can confirm that we were doing a test and the test article went down,” the spokesperson told us, declining to provide further details about what kind of drone, when it was lost or the location it went down. They referred us to the Pentagon, which could not immediately provide any additional details. 

“The drone was found by local charter Capt. Daniel Arsenault with Hot Spots Charters,” said Green, who is also an aviation photographer whose work can be found at Aquatic Charlie on social media. “He saw the object at a distance and went over to check it out. When he did, he pulled a good size mahi-mahi out from underneath it, complementing his already stocked cooler full of fish from that morning charter. His passengers helped him haul it aboard.”

“Arsenault and his charter company did all the due diligence possible to notify local agencies of the recovery- and was eventually collected by one of them,” Green added. He did not know which agency.

Images taken of the drone shared with us by Green show that it did not have the engine, propeller or the nose cone/seeker intact. Losing these kind of components is common for impacts into water.

While the Eglin spokesperson offered scant details, the host unit at the installation is the 96th Test Wing, which is the “test and evaluation center for Air Force air-delivered weapons, navigation and guidance systems, command and control systems, and Air Force Special Operations Command systems,” according to the wing’s homepage. It oversees the massive Eglin Gulf Test Range, which “provides approximately 120,000 square miles of overwater airspace, covering the eastern third of the Gulf of Mexico from the Florida panhandle to the Florida Keys. The land range covers 724 square miles and contains 70 specific test and training areas, including an approved depleted uranium test range and the only qualified air-to-ground supersonic range east of the Mississippi River.”

As noted in the opening of this article, the LUCAS drone was used for the first time in combat during the opening day of the Operation Epic Fury war on Iran on Feb. 28. 

“Costing approximately $35,000 per platform, LUCAS is a low-cost, scalable system that provides cutting-edge capabilities at a fraction of the cost of traditional long-range U.S. systems that can deliver similar effects,” Navy Capt. Tim Hawkins, a CENTCOM spokesperson, told TWZ when the command stood up Task Force Scorpion Strike (TFSS), the military’s first one-way attack drone unit, back in December. “The drone system has an extensive range and the ability to operate beyond line of sight, providing significant capability across CENTCOM’s vast operating area.”

“LUCAS drones deployed by CENTCOM have an extensive range and are designed to operate autonomously,” CENTCOM added in a press release. “They can be launched with different mechanisms to include catapults, rocket-assisted takeoff, and mobile ground and vehicle systems.”

TFSS falls under the auspices of U.S. Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT), which oversees U.S. special operations activities across the Middle East.

While we aren’t sure if the drone found by Hot Spots Charters is the one lost by Eglin, it wouldn’t be the first time something like this has happened in Florida. For example, in 2021, beachcombers in Florida’s Palm Beach County found a U.S. Air Force BQM-167A high-performance target drone that washed ashore.

Indeed, the Air Force has a handful of 120-foot boats, the only vessels in its service, to help recover drones after they are shot down during live-fire exercises, or otherwise need to be recovered from these waters. The boats are operated by a contracted crew from Florida Offshore and retrieve around 100 of the drones each year.

The FLM-136’s origins as a target drone are highly relevant here. Counter-unmanned aerial system (C-UAS) capabilities are being hotly pursued on all fronts across the U.S. military as the threat from them has ballooned. During the war in Ukraine and multiple engagements with Iran, including Operation Epic Fury, one-way attack drones have proven to be a massive threat that is heavily influencing how wars are fought. As far as Eglin AFB goes, maybe the most high-profile C-UAS development as of late that has emerged from there has been arming USAF fighters with FALCO APKWS laser-guided rockets to shoot down exactly the same kind of threat that the FLM-136 is meant to emulate. This program began in 2019, which TWZ was first to report on, but was finally rushed into service years later as the standoff with Iran went hot. Now there are many other programs aimed at dealing with these same threats, including a more capable “fire and forget” air-to-air APKWS.

LUCAS development is continuing at a high-pace, with its ability to swarm cooperatively with other LUCAS drones — a feature we reported as central to the LUCAS vision when the existence of the program was disclosed — being worked on now. You can read more about this here. These systems need sanitized airspace for development activities, and the vast ranges over the gulf are some of the best in the country for it.

So, it’s not surprising to see an FLM-136 floating in the waters off Eglin AFB. Even in the war with Iran, there were multiple losses of LUCAS drones where they were found intact. These weapons are produced to be risked in large numbers, and some failing, for whatever reason, is just part of the calculus.

Locals in Iraq appear to have recovered a crashed and almost entirely intact Low-Cost Unmanned Combat Attack System (LUCAS), an American copy of the Iranian Shahed-136 Attack Drone, which is confirmed to have been used recently by Task Force Scorpion Strike during U.S. attacks on… pic.twitter.com/SEqO6627en

— OSINTdefender (@sentdefender) March 2, 2026

We will update this story with any additional details we can find about this drone. Though we don’t yet know for sure where it came from, one thing is for certain, the folks on the Hot Spots Charters boat that found it will always have a good tale about the one that didn’t get away.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

Iran accuses the French language centre of conducting ‘illegal acts that violated diplomatic conventions’.

France will summon Iran’s ambassador and take “appropriate measures” after Iranian authorities closed a French-language centre linked to its embassy in Tehran, according to the French Foreign Ministry.

“This new attack against France’s cultural presence in Iran, following the assault on two staff members of the French embassy last July, is unjustifiable and unacceptable,” Foreign Ministry spokesperson Pascal Confavreux said in a statement on Sunday.

Iran announced on Sunday the closure of the centre it accused of conducting “illegal acts that violated diplomatic conventions”.

“Based on the Tehran prosecutor’s office, the illegal centre affiliated with the French embassy in Tehran, which has operated for years under the guise of language instruction, was closed,” the Iranian judiciary’s Mizan news website said, referring to the French Language Centre (CLF).

It said the centre “abused its status as a language training facility” and sought to “identify and build networks among the country’s elite figures while facilitating their departure”.

The French Foreign Ministry said it would “take appropriate measures to respond” and would summon Iran’s ambassador in Paris at the request of French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot.

Relations between Tehran and Paris have been strained in recent months.

In August, Iran’s Intelligence Ministry said it detained two French diplomats over alleged foreign interference during a national security investigation before handing them over to the French ambassador.

California is considering Proposition 40, which would impose a one-time 5% tax on its billionaires. This initiative is seen as a way to generate funds for healthcare, education, and food assistance, given that California is home to around 250 billionaires worth over $2 trillion. However, political analysts suggest that the proposition’s chances of passing are uncertain, especially with rising debates around income inequality and the implications for the state’s economy.

Opinion polls indicate a divide in support for the tax. A UC Berkeley poll from August showed 48% of likely voters in favor while 41% opposed, and a September poll showed support at 52%. However, historically, California ballot measures need strong initial support to succeed, and undecided voters often lean towards rejecting measures. Critics of the proposition argue it might drive billionaires out of the state, lowering potential tax revenue in the future.

Notable figures, including billionaires like Sergey Brin, are actively campaigning against Proposition 40, with Brin sharing his personal experiences to express concerns about socialism and its effects. Additionally, Governor Gavin Newsom opposes the measure and is advocating for a federal wealth tax instead.

California’s history with ballot initiatives reveals a complex relationship with taxation. While the state has a history of direct democracy, it has only approved about a third of citizen initiatives in the past. A recent attempt to raise taxes on high earners, Proposition 30 in 2022, was rejected, reflecting that even in a predominantly Democratic state, voters may not support aggressive tax increases on the wealthy.

The uniqueness of this initiative lies in its retroactive tax structure, which could limit billionaires’ ability to avoid the tax by relocating. However, supporters like economist Emmanuel Saez argue that the tax will not significantly deter wealthy individuals or tech startups, stressing California’s attractive qualities, such as its universities and infrastructure, which he believes outweigh potential tax burdens.

Overall, Proposition 40 encapsulates the ongoing conversation about wealth inequality in America and the contentious debate surrounding the taxation of the ultra-rich, making it a critical issue for California voters in the upcoming election on November 3.

With information from Reuters