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The death of Abakar Minuki, one of the most influential leaders of the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), in a joint United States and Nigerian military operation, marks one of the most consequential blows to the insurgent group in recent years. Yet, analysts and insiders familiar with the terror group warn that history offers little reason to assume the killing will significantly diminish the long-term threat posed by the group.

Multiple sources familiar with ISWAP’s internal structure told HumAngle that Minuki’s most likely successor was Baba Shuwa, commonly known as Ba Shuwa. However, indications emerging from the aftermath of the operation suggest he may also have been killed. If confirmed, the simultaneous removal of both men would trigger the most significant leadership transition in the organisation since its emergence from Boko Haram’s internal schism nearly a decade ago.

For the first time, leadership could pass not to the insurgency’s founding generation, but to a second generation of fighters raised entirely within the movement’s war ecosystem. Two names have emerged as the strongest contenders: Abu Salem and Bana Chingori.

“This would represent a generational shift unlike anything the movement has experienced before,” a source familiar with ISWAP’s internal dynamics told HumAngle.

From village barber to insurgent leader

Known variously as Abu Bakr ibn Muhammad ibn Ali al Mainoki, Abor Mainoki, Abubakar Mainoki, and Abakar Minuki, the slain commander was himself a product of the insurgency’s evolution.

Born in 1982 in the village of Mainok, a settlement along the Maiduguri-Benisheikh corridor in Borno State, he adopted his nom de guerre from his hometown. Long before becoming one of the most feared figures in the Lake Chad Basin insurgency, Minuki was known as a young barber operating a modest salon in the village.

Those who encountered him during the rise of Mohammed Yusuf’s movement recall a quiet young man who blended into daily life. That anonymity would eventually disappear. By the time Boko Haram transformed from a fringe religious movement into a powerful insurgent force, Minuki had become part of its military structure.

Abu Mus’ab, Abu Fatima, and other Boko Haram leaders had to secure Minuki’s approval before finalising their escape from Abubakar Shekau in the Sambisa forest to the islands of the Lake Chad Basin, shortly before ISWAP split from Boko Haram. Minuki not only provided refuge for members of the newly formed ISWAP fleeing Shekau’s crackdown, but also protected them and facilitated their settlement in his territory, where he ruled as one of Shekau’s most formidable Amirul Fiya.

He belonged to the first generation of fighters who entered the organisation before the 2009 uprising that transformed the movement forever.

The last men of Yusuf’s generation

To understand what Minuki represented, one must return to Boko Haram’s earliest years. According to sources familiar with the group’s formative history, Mohammed Yusuf’s original armed contingent consisted of fewer than 100 members. These men were responsible not only for security but also for recruitment.

As the organisation expanded, Yusuf reorganised fighters into military formations named after prominent figures from Islamic history. Among them were the Zubair Ibn Awwam Battalion, Umar Farouk Battalion, Salmanu Farisu Battalion, Khalid Ibn Walid Battalion, and Salaudeen Ayubi Battalion.

Several battalions survived years of expansion, state crackdowns, factional disputes, and battlefield losses. Over time, however, only two retained their original lineage and remain operational: the Timbuktu formation, associated with Faruk, and the Buhairiya structure, which absorbed the remnants of several earlier battalions.

Minuki was already a Naqeeb, a junior commander, during the pre-2009 period. Ba Shuwa, by contrast, was merely a foot soldier. While Abu Salem, who is now touted as the likely successor of ISWAP, was still a child. That generational distinction highlights that few survivors remain from the movement’s founding era.

The rise of the second generation

If Minuki and Ba Shuwa are both dead, the succession process could elevate men who never knew the insurgency before it became a regional war. Among them, Abu Salem stands out. Sources describe him as both a military commander and a religious authority within the insurgency. He currently serves as Amirul Fiya, based in Krinua, a battlefield commander with influence extending beyond purely military affairs.

His biography mirrors the insurgency’s own evolution. The son of a respected first-generation Boko Haram member, Abu Salem benefited from mentorship by senior leaders from an early age. His pedigree gave him access to influential networks that many younger fighters lacked.

He also carries the scars of combat. During one battle with members of Nigeria’s armed forces, he sustained serious gunshot wounds to the lower abdomen. The injuries required long-term medical management involving a Foley catheter. According to sources familiar with his condition, he continued participating in military operations despite the injury for years.

Within ISWAP, Abu Salem has cultivated a reputation for bravery, clerical authority, and charisma. Several sources compared his influence to that once exercised by Abu Musab al-Barnawi and Minuki himself.

Another contender is Bana Chingori, regarded as Ba Shuwa’s closest deputy. Unlike Abu Salem, however, Bana faces a structural challenge: He does not originate from the Faruk battalion network, which sources estimate supplies approximately 70 per cent of ISWAP’s current fighters and leadership, including Minuki.

In an organisation where battlefield alliances and battalion loyalties remain deeply influential, that may prove decisive.

The ethnic question behind ISWAP leadership

Leadership succession inside ISWAP is not determined solely by military competence. HumAngle understands that ethnicity, lineage, dialect, and social hierarchy continue to shape power within the organisation.

Public portrayals often reduce Boko Haram and ISWAP to ideological movements driven exclusively by extremist interpretations of Islam. The reality is considerably more complex. The overwhelming majority of ISWAP’s estimated fighting force originates from the Kanuri ethnic nationality, which has historically been dominant across the Lake Chad Basin. Yet, the Kanuris are far from homogeneous.

They are divided into numerous dialect communities, clan networks, and social categories that carry significant political weight, all of which the insurgents take very seriously. These divisions influence recruitment, promotions, alliances, and leadership legitimacy.

Mohammed Yusuf, for example, belonged to the Manga dialect group, one of the most prestigious Kanuri communities. His lineage strengthened his standing within the movement’s formative years. Abubakar Shekau came from the Kaama-speaking Ngala’a community, often viewed as socially marginal within traditional Kanuri hierarchies.

Several researchers and former members argue that Shekau’s relationship with the broader movement was shaped partly by this outsider status. Minuki himself emerged from Borno Central, where multiple Kanuri dialect groups intersect. Ba Shuwa’s ancestry has also been the subject of internal scrutiny.

Sources say rivals occasionally questioned the purity of his Kanuri lineage, reflecting how deeply social stratification continues to influence perceptions of authority within insurgency networks in the Lake Chad basin.

For this reason, sources told HumAngle, the emergence of a non-Kanuri leader remains highly unlikely. Even if such a figure were elevated, sustaining authority would be extraordinarily difficult. “The movement talks about Islam and the caliphate,” one source familiar with internal deliberations said, “But when leadership questions arise, ethnicity still matters.”

The foreign fighters effect

The leadership transition unfolding inside ISWAP is taking place within an organisation that has undergone profound internal transformation in recent years. Sources familiar with the group’s operations told HumAngle that the growing presence of foreign fighters from across the Sahel and beyond has reshaped not only the movement’s military tactics but also its internal security culture.

As foreign fighters increasingly settled in the Lake Chad region, ISWAP imposed some of its strictest operational security measures to date. Members were ordered to delete existing photographs and cease documenting activities through images. The use of smartphones was largely prohibited, reflecting mounting concerns about surveillance, geolocation tracking, and intelligence penetration. 

The restrictions marked a sharp departure from earlier years when both Boko Haram and ISWAP routinely photographed preaching sessions, training exercises, weapon displays, and daily life in territories under their control. Such imagery formed a central component of the group’s propaganda and recruitment machinery.

According to sources, the new rules were enforced ruthlessly. Several fighters accused of taking photographs or retaining images on their devices were reportedly executed. The killings served as both punishment and deterrence, reinforcing a culture of secrecy that now permeates much of the organisation. 

“The message was simple,” one source familiar with the group’s internal directives said. “Any digital trace that could expose fighters, commanders, or locations became a security threat.” The arrival of experienced foreign fighters appears to have accelerated this shift. Many brought with them lessons learned from conflicts across the Sahel, where drone surveillance, signals intelligence, and electronic tracking have increasingly shaped the battlefield.

The influence of foreign fighters introduced a greater emphasis on counter-intelligence, operational discipline, compartmentalisation, and the elimination of digital footprints that could expose personnel, camps, supply routes, or command structures. The result is an insurgent organisation that has become considerably more cautious than its predecessors. While leadership losses continue to disrupt, ISWAP’s evolving security architecture suggests a movement increasingly focused on institutional survival rather than on dependence on individual commanders.

Fractured, not defeated

The killing of Minuki undoubtedly represents a serious disruption, and the elimination of Ba Shuwa, if confirmed, would considerably deepen that disruption. Yet, military and intelligence officials caution against interpreting the development as a strategic defeat for ISWAP.

“The organisation has experienced similar moments before with the deaths of Mohammed Yusuf, Mamman Nur, Abu Musab al Barnawi, Ba Idrissa, and several other senior commanders, each of which generated predictions of organisational collapse,” said Kyari Mustafa, a conflict researcher in Maiduguri.

Those predictions never materialised. Instead, the group adapted. The pattern has become familiar across the Lake Chad Basin.

HumAngle has documented a pattern where successful military campaigns weaken the insurgency. Communities experience a period of relative calm. The group regroups, reassesses, and eventually resumes attacks. This cycle has repeated itself for more than 15 years. What makes the current moment significant is the possibility that an entire generation of commanders may be disappearing simultaneously. If Minuki and Ba Shuwa are indeed gone, the future of ISWAP may soon be shaped by men who were toddlers when Mohammed Yusuf built the movement.

Whether that transition produces fragmentation, renewal, or further violence remains uncertain. What is clear is that the Lake Chad Basin has witnessed enough leadership decapitations to know that the death of a commander, however important, does not automatically mean the end of the war.

Bembou Silaty, Guinea – Mamadou Aliou walks through the small village of Bembou Silaty in northwestern Guinea carrying an irresolvable contradiction.

The 38-year-old works in the environmental health and safety department for a bauxite mining company, yet he is also an activist striving to improve life in his community, which often means criticising the actions of another mining company in the area.

“Before these companies arrived, we cultivated our land, and it sustained us,” Aliou told Al Jazeera.

“We could cover our daily needs, especially food. But now, when a piece of land is registered and belongs to a mining company, you have nothing there any more.”

The foreign-linked mining companies are part of the global scramble for Guinea’s bauxite. The West African nation holds the world’s biggest reserves of the ore, which is the source material for alumina and ultimately aluminium, a metal essential for car and aircraft frames, windows, wind turbines, and solar panels.

Over the past three decades, Guinea has multiplied its bauxite production tenfold. More than a dozen projects of bauxite production are currently ongoing in the country, according to the online cadastre.

As the global energy transition demands ever more aluminium, it has placed Guinea in a strategically crucial position. Approximately 75 percent of the bauxite exported by the country over the past decade has ended up in China, which produces 60 percent of the world’s aluminium.

Companies from Russia, the United States, and the United Arab Emirates have also established themselves in the country to secure the ore. In Bembou Silaty, an Indian company that began operations in 2019 now holds an exploitation concession until 2034.

Located in the prefecture of Telimele (Kindia region), Bembou Silaty has undergone a transformation since bauxite was discovered on its land about five years ago.

Yet, on the ground, many lament the cost: Contaminated water, loss of farmland, and a steep decline in agricultural productivity.

‘No land, no money’

In the traditional bauxite heartlands of Kindia and Boke, the main roads are in notably good condition, a cut above the rest of the country. Steady jobs in technical roles or transport logistics have created economic opportunities for some Guineans.

Yet Bembou Silaty remains a quiet, peaceful village without electricity, and farming methods that are untouched by mechanisation.

Less than 2km (1.2 miles) away, however, the lush green landscape and mild climate of the rainy season give way to the electric-powered site of the Indian mining company.

There, excavators and trucks laden with bauxite constantly traverse the wide, unpaved roads, built to accommodate the heavy traffic, in a noisy, busy zone where the mining economy bulldozes its way forward.

People working in technical roles at the mine can earn up to about $300 a month.

For other locals who make a living from farming, most don’t have a regular wage and rely on the yield from their crops.

Across Guinea, an estimated half of the population depends on agriculture for their livelihood.

Locals in Bembou Silaty say every hectare claimed by mining is a hectare lost to farming, in a country that spent more than $500m importing rice in 2024.

“They give you compensation for your land, but it’s not enough, and in the end, it’s mismanaged,” Aliou said.

“Within a month or two, someone who received 50 or 100 million Guinean francs ($5,700-11,400) has nothing left. No land, no money. They have to start over, from below zero.”

Locals who still own land continue to grow rice, cassava, peanuts and cashews in the village, but they have ever less space and agricultural productivity is falling.

The village women have set up an association, “Allawalli” (which means “God help us” in Fula), to work cooperatively.

‘Not enough’

Walking through the alleys of Bembou Silaty, a few houses stand out.

They are made of cement, which withstands the rains better than the more common mud-brick homes, though many remain unfinished.

Locals say they were built with compensation money.

Fatoumata Binta Bah, a neighbour of Aliou’s, comes from a family of farmers. They once cultivated cashews, their livelihood.

Then the Indian mining company started up operations and offered them less than 50 million Guinean francs (about $5,700) for their land. That compensation, paid as a lump sum, seemed like a decent amount of money, she says.

But now, the money is gone, and their new house is still incomplete.

“The land they took from us was productive. That’s what we lived on,” said Bah, 20, as she prepared tea over a fire in the family courtyard.

“In the end, it wasn’t enough,” she lamented.

The Indian company did not respond to Al Jazeera’s questions on the purchase of land.

Meanwhile, on the outskirts of the village, surgical holes drilled into the ground mark where mining companies have tested for bauxite – a reminder to the farmers that the impact on the land is felt even before extraction begins.

In a recent report, Djami Diallo, the Guinean minister of the environment and sustainable development, stated that each year, certain companies had their impact studies and evaluation reports rejected for failing to comply with environmental standards.

Three or four companies in Boke, Kindia’s neighbouring region that is considered the bauxite capital in the country, were said to be affected. But the minister acknowledged that “just because companies do not meet the conditions to obtain the compliance certificate does not mean that everything stops.”

Clean water, the greatest challenge

Not all homes in Bembou Silaty, a community of about 5,000, have indoor toilets and plumbing. In the centre of the village, there are communal latrines for those who do not have facilities available in their homes. Showers can be taken in the same place, using a bucket and water collected from the spring.

One small gain for the community since the mining company’s arrival is a new water point in the village. The tap serves nearly all the residents. Even Aliou uses it to fill buckets for his household – for cooking and drinking – though he says he knows the water contains iron, as contamination occurs.

Still, he considers himself luckier than his friends in the neighbouring village of Koussadji Dow, who rely on now-brown, contaminated river water.

Tala Oury Sow, a trader and farmer, washes her cooking utensils in the murky river water – a daily struggle.

She starts speaking softly, surrounded by neighbours, but her voice rises to a shout.

“Do you think we can live like this?

“We had hoped the mining company’s arrival would improve things, but it has gotten worse,” she protested.

“Since the mining companies came, we’ve had this problem with the water. The children get sick, and the parents too,” added Mariama Kindi Diallo, a farmer, in her courtyard.

“The doctors tell us not to drink the rain or river water. There are no roads, no school, no phone signal. What are we supposed to do? We are asking for help to have a dignified life,” she pleaded, as her family and neighbours nodded in agreement.

The Indian company did not respond to requests for comment on these issues.

‘We need refineries here’

To escape the increasingly difficult conditions in villages like Bembou Silaty, some people leave the rural areas and head to the capital, Conakry.

Bauxite mining so dominates Guinea that one can chance upon a driver of one of the trains hauling ore from the mines to the port of Kamsar.

Alpha, who did not want his real name published, works for a United States-backed company and provides a window into the immense volume of resources being exported.

“We operate six trains of 150 wagons each day,” he said, explaining that the annual target for 2025 was to export 17.5 million tonnes of bauxite.

“The government wants to change things, because the profits we make in Guinea right now are small. We need refineries here to increase the state’s revenue,” he added.

Alpha lives near the coast, where his job has allowed him to build a house for his family and achieve a standard of living unattainable for most of his compatriots.

The government of Mamady Doumbouya, which came to power in a 2021 coup, is attempting to reorganise the mining sector. It is pressing investors to process bauxite within Guinea, ensuring a portion of the value stays in the country.

Processing bauxite into aluminium can multiply its price by 37 times.

Instability in Iran amid the US and Israel’s war has contributed to rising aluminium prices, which surpassed $3,600 per tonne in April.

Doumbouya is set to lead the country for the next seven years, after winning the December 2025 elections with nearly 87 percent of the vote. While opponents view him as illegitimate, many Guineans agree on the need to reform the mining sector.

Achieving this, however, requires a huge increase in electricity generation – power that is non-existent in villages like Bembou Silaty and unreliable even in Conakry, where blackouts are frequent when fans and TVs are switched on at night.

Guinea is working with neighbouring Senegal on a solution: Using Senegalese gas to generate enough electricity to process its bauxite on African soil. Currently, both countries export raw materials, while jobs and wealth are created elsewhere.

Following the bauxite route

More than 3,000km (1,900 miles) away, across the ocean, Spain is also a part of the Guinean bauxite story.

Parets del Valles, a municipality of 18,000 people less than 30km (19 miles) from Barcelona, represents the journey’s end.

From the town centre to its industrial outskirts, businesses specialising in aluminium are plentiful: Aluminium distribution, carpentry, and window fitting, much of them serving household needs.

For Spain, Europe’s largest consumer of Guinean bauxite, more than 90 percent of its imports come from Guinea-Conakry.

The aluminium produced there, mainly in the country’s north, feeds the automotive industry and serves both industrial and domestic purposes.

Parets is another world compared with the bauxite’s point of origin in Guinea.

In Spain, there is light, hot water, paved roads – all the base elements of a decent life. It’s why many say growing numbers of West Africans are arriving in Parets and across the Valles Oriental region. This is part of a broader trend in Catalonia and Spain, according to the Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE): The Guinean population has quadrupled in Spain since 2000 – from 2,700 to 11,000 people – and in Catalonia from 1,000 to 4,000.

These figures don’t include those who go unregistered.

Increasingly, more boats are leaving directly from Guinea, towards the Canary Islands and on to mainland Europe. According to Frontex, the European Union border security agency, more Guineans arrived in the Canary Islands, Spain, in 2023 (2,324) than in the previous 13 years combined. In 2024 and 2025 combined, another 6,000 Guineans arrived.

Migrants, predominantly men from Senegal and increasingly from Guinea, come alone, settling where they have contacts and job prospects. The newest arrivals, often very young, spend long hours with their mobile phones as their sole companion – the only tether to the country they left behind.

Many left, following the bauxite trail, hoping to find something more in the places where their resources are both enjoyed and exploited.

As Aliou, back in Bembou Silaty, says: “If you compare the bauxite we export with what we get in return, the difference is enormous. We gain almost nothing. Just enough to survive.”

This article was produced in collaboration with the Catalan association SETEM Catalunya, promoted by the Connect for Global Change consortium and Lafede.cat, and with financial support from the European Union and the Government of Catalonia (Generalitat de Catalunya)

Cuba has begun distributing donated powdered milk from Mexico and Uruguay as the island faces severe shortages and a deepening economic crisis. Officials say young children, pregnant women and paediatric facilities will be prioritised.

Far-right outsider Abelardo de la Espriella will face left-wing Senator Ivan Cepeda in the run-off for Colombia’s presidential election next month.

After polls closed on Sunday, the two candidates quickly surged ahead in the vote tally, extinguishing the hopes of right-wing Senator Paloma Valencia, a former frontrunner.

As of Sunday afternoon, with 99 percent of the votes tallied, de la Espriella took the lead, with 43 percent of the ballots cast in his favour.

Cepeda trailed him by more than 600,000 votes, earning 40 percent support.

Neither candidate breached the 50-percent threshold needed to avoid a head-to-head match-up on June 21. But the results are likely to buoy de la Espriella’s campaign going into the final round.

Cepeda had consistently topped public opinion polls in the final weeks before the vote. A May 24 poll from the National Consulting Centre (CNC) showed him with more than 33 percent support, ahead of de la Espriella’s 30.9 percent.

De la Espriella’s ‘outsider’ campaign

Questions about security were at the forefront of voters’ concerns going into Sunday’s election.

De la Espriella, a businessman and lawyer who has never held elected office, leaned heavily into fears of crime as he launched an outsider campaign, similar to the dark-horse bid of Argentinian President Javier Milei.

By contrast, Cepeda is a well-known quantity in Colombian politics. His father was a senator, too, before he was assassinated in 1994, in what was widely considered to be an act of political violence.

Cepeda himself has served as a senator since 2014. Before that, he served in the Chamber of Deputies, representing the capital, Bogota.

During his political career, he became embroiled in a long-running legal dispute with former right-wing President Alvaro Uribe, whom he accused of complicity with right-wing paramilitaries.

Uribe initially sued Cepeda for defamation, but in a dramatic twist, Colombia’s Supreme Court dismissed the charge and instead investigated Uribe for witness tampering.

While Uribe was initially found guilty and sentenced to 12 years of house arrest, an appeals court ultimately struck down the verdict, citing procedural errors, including insufficient evidence.

Security a top concern

Central to the rift in Colombia’s politics is the country’s six-decade-long internal conflict.

Since 1964, criminal networks, government forces, left-wing rebels and right-wing paramilitaries have all jockeyed against one another for power and territory.

Cepeda has been critical of right-wing efforts to solve the conflict through military might alone.

Instead, he has allied himself with Colombia’s outgoing president, Gustavo Petro, the first left-wing figure ever elected to the country’s highest office.

A former rebel fighter, Petro has championed a policy he calls “Total Peace”, which actively seeks negotiated solutions to the fighting.

While critics have questioned the efficacy of “Total Peace”, pointing to a recent uptick in violence, Cepeda has nevertheless pledged to carry it forward. He represents Petro’s left-wing Historic Pact party in this year’s election.

In an interview this month with CNN, Cepeda acknowledged the policy’s “immense challenges”, saying: “We cannot continue to develop conversations that do not yield clear results.”

But he rejected overly militaristic solutions, as well as the prospect of intervention by the United States. The US-led “war on drugs”, Cepeda said, has “failed spectacularly”.

De la Espriella, meanwhile, has embraced the kind of hardline security platform commonly associated with El Salvador’s leader, Nayib Bukele.

His platform includes a pledge to crack down on crime and build 10 megaprisons in Colombia.

Nicknamed “The Tiger”, he founded the Defenders of the Homeland political party and is known to rally with the slogan, “Stand firm for the nation”.

“The only peace process I believe in is one imposed by the force of arms and the laws of the republic,” de la Espriella told The Associated Press news agency this month.

Like US President Donald Trump, de la Espriella has also threatened to launch a bombing campaign to disrupt drug-trafficking, killing suspects by downing planes and shooting boats.

But such campaigns have been widely denounced as a form of extrajudicial killing, effectively denying suspects the chance of defending themselves in a court of law.

Narrowing odds for Colombia’s left

More than 23.6 million Colombians voted in Sunday’s election, though there was a high number of blank or nullified ballots.

Early estimates, with 99 percent of ballots tallied, indicate that 245,342 voting sheets were null, and another 406,830 were left blank.

The second round is likely to be an uphill battle for Cepeda. Colombia’s right-wing is expected to consolidate behind de la Espriella in the second round.

In Sunday’s vote count, more than 10.3 million ballots were cast for de la Espriella, compared with roughly 9.7 million for Cepeda.

A victory for the right would continue a regional trend in Latin America. Last year alone, left-wing governments in Chile, Honduras and Bolivia were all replaced by right-wing presidential contenders.

De la Espriella signalled his optimism about the second round in a social media post as the results rolled in.

“We are going to defeat tyranny and absolutism,” de la Espriella wrote. “We have advanced to the run-off thanks to the more than 10 million Colombians who answered the roar. In 21 days, we will make history!”

Members of Congress are looking to block the U.S. Navy from starting construction of the first nuclear-powered Trump class battleship until the service provides assurances that key weapon systems are “sufficiently mature.” The battleships are to be armed with railguns, high-power laser directed energy weapons, and other advanced weapons that have yet to be fully proven out. Legislators are also looking to compel the Navy to devise a strategy for future subvariants of the FF(X) frigate, including the potential for a version with a built-in Vertical Launch System (VLS). TWZ was first to confirm that the initial FF(X) design would lack a VLS, a decision that has prompted questions and criticism.

The battleship and frigate provisions are included in an early draft of the annual defense policy bill, or National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), for the 2027 Fiscal Year, which the House Armed Services Committee released late yesterday. The Trump class battleship and FF(X) are set to be some of the Navy’s top shipbuilding priorities in the coming years.

Tying the battleship construction timeline to weapon system progress

The section in the proposed legislation regarding the Trump class battleship is brief, reading as follows:

“The Secretary of the Navy may not enter into a contract or other agreement that includes a scope of work for the construction of the lead ship of the Battleship program until the date on which the Secretary certifies to the congressional defense committees that the weapon systems planned for inclusion in such lead ship are at a sufficiently mature technology readiness level.”

The provision does not name any particular weapon systems or define what level of “technology readiness” would be accepted as “sufficiently mature.”

The Navy currently plans to arm the 35,000-ton-displacement Trump class battleships with a mixture of nuclear and conventional missiles, an electromagnetic railgun, a pair of traditional 5-inch naval guns, various laser directed energy weapons, and additional weapon systems for close-in defense. The missiles, which will include hypersonic types, are to be loaded inside very large VLS arrays.

In terms of technological maturity, the railgun presents particular questions. Between 2005 and 2021, the Navy had an active railgun program. Despite promising developments, plans for an at-sea test were repeatedly pushed back before the entire effort was shelved. Major technical hurdles were cited as a key factor in that decision. The railgun itself was effectively placed in storage at White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) in New Mexico.

However, it emerged earlier this year that the Navy had conducted a new round of testing of the railgun at WSMR in February 2025. Whether the Navy has any plans to pick up where it left off with this prototype design, which was developed by BAE Systems, or pursue a new one remains unclear. General Atomics, which previously supported U.S. Army railgun efforts, has publicly expressed interest in being involved in arming the Trump class.

While the Navy has been very active in developing and fielding laser directed energy weapons, this is another area where the service has faced continued challenges in expanding their operational use. The plans for the Trump class specifically call for a 300-kilowatt-class laser, which is far more powerful than any of the designs the Navy has integrated on its warships to date. The service currently has eight Arleigh Burke class destroyers with the Optical Dazzling Interdictor, Navy (ODIN), as well as another one of those warships with the High Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-dazzler and Surveillance (HELIOS). HELIOS is a 60-kilowatt-class design, though there has been talk about scaling up its power rating to 150 kilowatts. ODIN’s power rating does not appear to be officially confirmed, but it is understood to be significantly lower than that of HELIOS. You can read more about all of this here.

The Intermediate Range Conventional Prompt Strike (IRCPS) hypersonic missile, another key component of the future Trump class arsenal, is also still in development. The first test launch from a warship, the stealth destroyer USS Zumwalt, is expected to come next year. IRCPS is the Navy half of a joint program with the U.S. Army, which is working to field a land-based version of the same missile. The Army refers to its complete weapon system as the Dark Eagle. The Army had suffered significant setbacks in the past with the Dark Eagle, but the service had blamed those issues on the launcher rather than the missile.

More context about what planned weapons systems for the Trump class may have prompted the House Armed Services Committee to include this section in the draft NDAA are likely to emerge as the proposed bill is refined. Nuclear propulsion and other planned aspects of the ship could present their own challenges during development and production. The U.S. Navy has not procured a nuclear-powered surface combatant of any kind since the Cold War.

For its part, the Navy has said it will leverage significant prior work on weapons and other systems to help reduce risk and ensure the battleship program remains on schedule.

“We intend to, with all we can do, use pull-through technologies, [including] things from that we’ve worked on with DDG(X),” Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Daryl Caudle said at a hearing earlier this month. “It will have the SPY-6 radar. It will have the Baseline 10 Aegis combat system. It will pull through, of course, the A1B Ford class reactor plant and all the design that goes with that. The only thing inherently new to it will be the actual hull itself, and so most of the fixtures in it. And I would say the directed energy [weapons] and up gunning, that will also be new.”

One of the “mistakes that we’ve done before, quite frankly,” is “we’ve started to build before the design is mature enough,” the CNO also said at a roundtable on the sidelines of the Navy League’s Sea Air Space 2026 in April. “And we want to make sure that we’re at [sic] least a very, very high level – I won’t try to give a percentage, but you can think like 80% or more design – before the first weld is done.”

The Navy is understood to still be in the very early phases of laying out the Trump class design.

The provision in the draft NDAA could easily delay the start of work on the first of these battleships, which could set back the entire schedule for the program. As it stands now, the Navy is looking to order the lead ship, set to be named the USS Defiant, in Fiscal Year 2028. With an estimated price tag of $17 billion, this ship would cost more than each of the next three Ford class aircraft carriers, and is not expected to enter service in 2036. The Navy also currently plans to buy 14 more battleships between Fiscal Years 2029 and 2055. As TWZ has previously explored in detail, many significant questions remain about the future of the Trump class, including whether the program will ultimately come to fruition at all.

Plans for future FF(X) frigate subvariants

In its current form, the draft NDAA would also require the Secretary of the Navy to “submit to the congressional defense committees a strategy for the iterative development of the FF(X) class frigate” within 180 days of the bill becoming law. The Secretary would also be compelled to provide a briefing to update legislators on their progress in devising this strategy within 90 days.

The strategy would have to include the following:

• “Information on the estimated timeline for each planned variant (commonly known as a ‘‘Flight’’) of the FF(X) class frigate”
• “Details on the integration of additional capabilities for future Flights of the frigate, such as vertical launch systems or improved sensors, and implications for the space, weight, power, and cost of the hull form.”
• Any additional mission sets or combat functions that may be added to the concept of operation for FF(X) class frigates.”

The Navy has already confirmed that the FF(X) design will based on that of the Legend class cutter currently in service with the U.S. Coast Guard. As mentioned, the fact that the first of these frigates, at least, will lack a VLS array has raised significant questions about this program.

The FF(X) configuration that has been shown so far will have essentially the same integrated armament as the Navy’s much-maligned Littoral Combat Ships (LCS). The limitations of both subclasses of LCS explicitly led the Navy to pursue the Constellation class frigate. Despite the Constellation class being based on the established Franco-Italian Fregate Europea Multi-Missione (FREMM; European Multi-Mission Frigate in English), repeated design changes turned the program into a boondoggle. It was finally cancelled last November.

The Constellation class would have featured a 32-cell Mk 41 VLS array. There had already been a debate about whether this was sufficient VLS capacity to meet operational requirements, something TWZ previously explored in detail.

The Navy’s current stated vision for the Flight I FF(X) configuration is to utilize containerized weapons and other systems to make up for gaps in integrated capabilities. The frigates are also expected to act as motherships for future fleets of uncrewed surface vessels, which could provide additional distributed weapons and sensor capabilities and capacity.

“While Flight I of the FF(X) Class (currently planned as at least the first 2 ships) does not incorporate a traditional fixed VLS battery, it retains the capability to deploy VLS-equivalent payloads through modular, mission-tailored configurations,” according to the Navy’s 2027 Fiscal Year budget request. “This approach provides an inherent growth path for VLS and other capabilities through containerized solutions in early flights, reinforcing the platform’s adaptability while mitigating cost, schedule, and integration risks associated with fixed VLS installation.”

A containerized VLS, in particular, would be far more limited in capacity than a traditional built-in Mk 41 and Mk 57 array.

At the same time, the Navy’s budget documents make clear that there are already plans for “studies for future flights [that] will consider expanded capabilities including Vertical Launch Systems, and Anti-Submarine Warfare systems.”

Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII), the shipbuilder behind the Legend class design on which the FF(X) will be based, has shown multiple concepts for derivatives with integrated VLS arrays and other additional capabilities in the past, as seen in the video below.

Patrol Frigate Variants – Information Video

When it comes to the battleship and FF(X) provisions in the draft NDAA, it is also important to remember that this legislation is not yet finalized and could easily change in the weeks and months ahead. The House’s version of the bill will also need to be reconciled with what the Senate puts forward, a process often marked by lengthy negotiations. The House and Senate will both need to pass the finalized version, and then the President has to sign it into law.

As the name makes clear, the battleship program is of particular significance to President Donald Trump, which will be an important factor in these processes. Even before his first term, Trump had expressed interest in returning battleships to the Navy’s combat fleets, but there had been no indications of any formal moves to pursue this ship before last year. With the schedule the Navy has laid out now, major decisions about how to proceed in the production of these ships, if at all, will fall to the next administration. There are already massive competing priorities, and some members of Congress have already questioned whether the battleship effort is the best use of available resources.

It’s also worth noting here that Trump has long been very outspoken when it comes to Navy shipbuilding design decisions, especially from an aesthetic perspective.

The House Armed Services Committee has at least taken steps now toward putting a hold on production of the first Trump class battleship until it is confident that key weapon systems are mature, as well as pushing the Navy to lay a formal plan for future versions of the FF(X) frigate.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

New Jersey Governor Mikie Sherrill has imposed a curfew and deployed state police outside Newark’s Delaney Hall immigration detention centre after nights of clashes between protesters and ICE agents.

Gaza will not forget

The suffocating smoke still hangs over her ruins, thick with the acrid stench of explosives powder and dust carrying the scent of betrayal and the mark of courage. Her streets, once filled with children’s laughter, became Israeli fields of slaughter. Now they echo with the names and memories of martyrs.

The mass graves, the broken concrete, and the twisted steel are not just evidence of Zionist hatred. They are witnesses to those who stood with her, and to those who failed her. Today, Gaza’s rubble holds more memories than all the nation’s libraries.

Palestine will remember

She will remember the selfless sacrifices of doctors and healthcare workers who refused to abandon their sick patients as bombs rained on their hospitals; the journalists who became the news, targeted for daring to expose the truth; the mothers who wrapped their children in the red, black, green, and white flag of a nation Israel is desperate to erase.

These are not tales of despair, but of defiance, insisting on its right to breathe life amid death.

Gaza will not forget

She will not forget the silence of Western democracies. In a tragic inversion, most European nations, shackled by the ghosts of their past, traded morality for absolution. The self-proclaimed champions of human rights offered Palestinians on the altar of yesterday’s victims to atone for Europe’s sins.

Gaza will not forget the Biden administration, which vetoed every U.N. Security Council resolution calling to end the genocide. Nor Donald Trump, who poured fuel on the fire, then demanded recognition for dousing his own flames.

This week, Arab, Muslim, and world leaders gather like moths around the American arsonist-turned-firefighter, “celebrating” the ashes of Gaza.

Palestine will remember

She will remember the people who rose for Gaza, from Yemen to Dublin, from Cape Town to London and Madrid, while Arab capitals from Cairo to Riyadh slept. Ireland and Spain led the boycott, while Arab countries from the Gulf to Jordan opened their ports and highways to provide alternative routes for Israeli goods, even as Yemen imposed a sea blockade in the Red Sea.

Gaza will not forget — nor forgive — the Arab governments that opened their ports when shipyard workers in Italy refused, delivering American weapons used to annihilate her children and destroy her hospitals.

Palestine will remember

She will remember South Africa — not an Arab or Muslim nation — that led her case before the International Court of Justice, charging Israel with genocide. A country once scarred by apartheid became the moral conscience of a world too timid to speak. In that act of solidarity, South Africa rekindled the universal truth that justice knows no borders.

Palestine will remember the Lebanese resistance that gave its leaders for Gaza’s defense; Yemen, poor in wealth but rich in dignity, whose solidarity never wavered; and Iran, steadfast against Israeli hubris. She will remember Ireland and Spain, who did not turn away when Arabs did, proving that true solidarity transcends borders, faith, and kinship, resting only on shared humanity.

She will remember the heroes of the flotillas who braved waves of hatred and siege to carry messages of compassion; the nameless volunteers who left the safety of their countries to heal the wounded and feed the hungry; the American students who turned campuses into encampments of resistance; the artists, actors, and musicians who risked careers for justice; the employees who lost their jobs protesting the complicity of Google, Microsoft, and other tech giants in Israel’s crimes.

Gaza will not forget those who betrayed her

Palestine will forever be grateful to those who dared to speak the truth when it was dangerous, who marched when it was forbidden, who grieved when it was unfashionable.

Palestine will remember. History will remember. Justice will remember.

For nearly two years, Gaza has endured a genocide so relentless it defies descriptive language. Israel’s war machine has turned hospitals into morgues, UN schools into mass graves, and refugee camps into craters. Yet Gaza refuses to die.

Each time she is bombed “back to the Stone Age,” she rises — like the phoenix — to rebuild, not only her structures but her indomitable will. In that defiance lies the occupier’s greatest fear: memory.

Israel can destroy buildings but not erase remembrance. The siege may starve Gaza’s body, but it nourishes Palestine’s collective soul.

Gaza’s children will grow up with memories no child should bear. But they will also inherit something indestructible: dignity. In every demolished home and every shattered family lives a story that refuses burial.

Gaza’s memory will not fade. For the mind, unlike stone, cannot be occupied. It is the eternal archive of a people’s resilience, passed from one generation to the next, weaving the indelible tapestry of Palestine today.

The ruins of Gaza stand not only as testimony to Israel’s genocide but to the moral collapse of those who enabled it.

Gaza will rise again, brick by brick.

But what will never be resurrected is the Israeli lie, which, for eight decades, cloaked the Zionist project in the guise of victimhood, occupying Western narratives and manufacturing consent.

Gaza will rise — and the Israeli myth will remain buried beneath her rubble, forever.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

With the pan-European Future Combat Air System (FCAS), which is supposed to include a crewed New Generation Fighter (NGF) aircraft, mired in difficulty, Airbus has raised the possibility of teaming with Saab on the manned tactical component of it — the fighter. As well as France and Germany, Spain is a part of the pan-European FCAS as a junior partner, while Belgium has also joined it. The recent statements mark one of the clearest indications yet that Airbus is actively exploring post-FCAS alternatives, or, at the least, a major overhaul of the program’s structure.

Speaking on the sidelines of the Airbus Defense Summit at Airbus Defense & Space’s Manching site near Munich last week, that company’s CEO, Michael Schoellhorn, said that he was keen to cooperate with Sweden and Saab on a new fighter.

Schoellhorn’s words were provided in an exclusive interview by Johan Wendel, a reporter and analyst for the Swedish Dagens Industri financial newspaper.

At this point, it’s worth recalling that the FCAS nomenclature is also used by the British and Swedish future combat air initiatives. The British effort is now mainly known as the Global Combat Air Program (GCAP).

FCAS System of Systems

Noting that FCAS was in trouble in its current guise, he confirmed that Airbus has been in contact with both the Swedish and German governments on the issue, with “productive but confidential” discussions.

“We are open to a number of things. For Airbus, the crewed fighter aircraft is still an open question,” Schoellhorn told Dagens Industri, when asked if the company is considering developing a crewed fighter together with Saab.

The Airbus boss then reiterated that the company “will be involved in the development of a sixth-generation fighter aircraft.”

Schoellhorn recently visited Sweden and reflected that “Sweden and Saab are candidates with extensive expertise” in the field of fighter design and production. “We have difficulties that everyone knows about. That is why it is time to actively explore other options, which is what we are now doing,” he added, in reference to the FCAS program.

As TWZ only recently reported, questions around FCAS continue to grow.

For a long time, tensions have been evident within the FCAS program, with its two main partners, France and Germany, increasingly at odds. German defense officials are reportedly frustrated by what they see as disproportionate French demands for control and workshare in the project. For a while now, there have been reports that Germany is exploring alternative paths, including the possibility of separating itself from France within the program entirely.

Within France, Dassault CEO Éric Trappier recently declared the FCAS project dead if Airbus refuses to cooperate, while President Emmanuel Macron has made efforts to resuscitate the program.

Now, Sweden, with its position as a builder of tactical aircraft in the West, has emerged as a possible lifeline for FCAS, something that Schoellhorn acknowledged to Dagens Industri.

“We will be involved in the development of such an aircraft. The structure within FCAS could be improved. That could lead to two fighter aircraft within FCAS, or to another form of cooperation, and Sweden and Saab are candidates with extensive expertise in this field.”

When asked whether this was an Airbus tactic to put pressure on Dassault, Schöllhorn pointed to “many” previous cooperations between his company and Saab.

“We are not flirting,” he added. “We want to build sixth-generation fighter aircraft as soon as possible. I do not want to see sixth-generation fighter aircraft bought from the United States, as Europe did with the fifth generation.”

Here, he pointed to the growing customer base for the U.S.-made F-35 in Europe and the prospect that, in the future, the sixth-generation F-47 might also be offered for export in the region, although this might only be in a watered-down form.

Of course, GCAP, the British-led rival to FCAS, with the Tempest crewed fighter as its centerpiece, could be another option, but there are big questions surrounding the future of that program, too. As well as the United Kingdom, GCAP involves Italy and Japan.

“We must act now,” Schöllhorn said, to prevent Europe from looking beyond the pan-European FCAS for its next crewed fighter.

“If we are to have something that can be called sixth generation and that is airborne before the 2040s, we have to act now. We are waiting impatiently to see what the politicians will decide. If we are still in limbo at the end of the year, that would be very challenging,” Schöllhorn added.

As for GCAP, in which Sweden previously had a limited involvement, before stepping away from it, Schöllhorn also refused to rule out rolling the different projects together.

“GCAP is an existing alternative that could be considered,” he explained. “The defense industry submits proposals; the politicians decide what is to be done.”

Then there is the drone issue, or, more accurately, the Collaborative Combat Aircraft, or CCA, issue.

While cooperative projects to develop fighters and their surrounding ecosystems have floundered, CCAs, as a concept, have forged ahead.

“Everyone has seen the need for CCA. There is a European race underway to find the model for CCA in various European countries,” said Schöllhorn.

The Airbus CEO underlined the fact that the company is also developing combat drones and that future uncrewed fighters are part of the plan. “There will not be a one-size-fits-all solution,” Schöllhorn added. “Perhaps we should not all go into the same niche, such as air-to-ground. The goal is to deliver the versatility, but also the scale that Europe will need.”

Airbus and Kratos are already pitching the stealthy XQ-58A Valkyrie drone to Germany, and Airbus has also been working on a stealthy CCA-like concept of its own, known as Wingman. Meanwhile, Boeing Australia has teamed up with Rheinmetall, the largest arms manufacturer in Germany, to offer the MQ-28 Ghost Bat drone to the German military.

Once again, Sweden could provide a key partner to Airbus on CCA-type developments, whether part of a broader FCAS effort or separate.

As we have reported in the past, Sweden is also moving ahead with plans for a new-generation combat aircraft, with Saab undertaking continued conceptual studies for future fighter systems. However, it remains unclear if there will definitely be a crewed successor to the Swedish Air Force’s current Gripen fighter, or if the ongoing studies will lead to a combat air ‘ecosystem’ comprised of different types of drones. A combination of crewed and uncrewed platforms remains possible, too.

Interestingly, Schöllhorn also put forward the possibility of Airbus working alongside Sweden for the airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) segment, specifically Saab’s GlobalEye aircraft.

“If we were to join forces, we could be a very capable team that could contribute many future capabilities,” said Schöllhorn of this idea.

The CEO noted that a NATO procurement decision on its future AEW&C platform is currently under review. Meanwhile, France has chosen the GlobalEye to replace its E-3F Sentry Airborne Warning & Control System (AWACS) fleet.

Ras Baraka, the mayor of Newark in New Jersey, has imposed a curfew on the area surrounding Delaney Hall, the immigration detention centre that has become a flashpoint in the debate over United States President Donald Trump’s mass deportation drive.

The Sunday morning announcement came amid a flare-up in tensions outside the detention centre, which is run by the private contractor GEO Group, as part of a 15-year deal with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

“Due to the escalating situation at Delaney Hall and the increasing need for police intervention, immediate action is required to protect public safety,” Baraka wrote in a statement.

“Multiple individuals have already been arrested and found in possession of weapons, underscoring the seriousness of the threat.”

As part of the curfew, movement will be restricted within half a mile (0.8km) of the detention centre between the hours of 9pm and 6am US Eastern time (1:00 to 10:00 GMT).

A nearby road, Doremus Avenue, will also be closed to pedestrians and vehicles that cannot verify their need to be in the area.

Since the reopening of Delaney Hall as an immigration detention facility last year, it has been the site of confrontations between law enforcement and protesters, including Mayor Baraka himself.

The month of May has seen more than a week of daily protests outside Delaney Hall, after lawyers for the detainees at Delaney Hall announced a hunger strike was unfolding inside.

Detainees have denounced the living conditions to human rights groups, reporting expired food, a lack of medical care and abuse at the hands of authorities.

The Trump administration has justified its mass deportation campaign as an effort to rid the US of “the worst of the worst”, framing undocumented immigrants as a criminal threat.

But critics point out that many of those detained have no criminal record, and some who do have only been cited for minor offences.

The Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, a data-tracking service from Syracuse University, found that, as of April, roughly 71 percent of those in ICE detention had no criminal conviction.

To show solidarity with the hunger strike, protesters have been gathering outside Delaney Hall, locking arms to form human chains and creating barricades to prevent access.

But that has led to tense confrontations with law enforcement, who have used batons and pepper spray to try to clear roads to the facility.

Governor Mikie Sherrill called for the establishment of designated protest zones, to mitigate the likelihood of conflict between officers and demonstrators.

But clashes have continued. Overnight on Wednesday, six protesters were arrested.

Politicians themselves have encountered tense interactions at Delaney Hall.

A year ago, one protest resulted in trespassing charges against Mayor Baraka and assault charges against US Representative LaMonica McIver, after a disagreement over which officials could enter the facility for an inspection.

While the charges against Baraka were dropped, McIver continues to face legal proceedings. She has denied the charges and called the prosecution politically motivated.

“One year ago, the Trump administration threw baseless charges against me for conducting oversight to protect immigrants at Delaney Hall,” McIver wrote on social media on Saturday.

“Have they tried to silence me? Yes. Have the stakes risen? Yes. Am I backing down from speaking up for you? Never.”

This past week, Governor Sherrill was also denied access to the facility. She has since issued a statement calling for Delaney Hall to be shut down.

At a news conference on Saturday, she blamed “national extremist groups” for arriving from out of state and escalating tensions. She added that the current precautions were designed to protect the safety of peaceful protesters.

“I urge those protesting outside of Delaney Hall to bring the temperature down, so we can focus on the detainees and their families,” Sherrill said.

She suggested that the actions of state and local officials would help head off any expanded ICE operations in New Jersey.

“I will not give ICE a pretext to expand operations at Delaney Hall or across our state. I will not put lives at risk,” she said. “I’m grateful to the vast majority of protesters who have assembled peacefully and raised their voices about Delaney Hall’s conditions.”

Millions of Ethiopians are heading to the polls for general elections on June 1.

The governing party of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who has consolidated power since he took office in 2018, says it is confident of victory.

Abiy’s government has faced years of turmoil and conflict. Despite that, it is portraying the vote as the next step on the path towards what it calls genuine democracy.

Critics and the opposition, however, argue that is unlikely because of Ethiopia’s ethnic and regional divisions. Some opposition parties have been excluded and violence is preventing voting in dozens of constituencies.

So, will the vote hold any significance?

Presenter: Mohammed Jamjoom

Guests:

Samuel Getachew – Journalist and commentator specialising in Ethiopian politics and security

Martin Plaut – Senior research fellow at King’s College London

Bizuneh Yimenu – Lecturer in comparative politics at Queen’s University Belfast who specialises in federalism.

Lawmakers in the United States are quietly advancing a proposal that could deepen military ties between the US and Israel in unprecedented ways, at a time when public support for Israel among Americans is increasingly fractured.

Among the provisions included in the 2027 National Defence Authorisation Act (NDAA) released this week is Section 224, the “United States-Israel Defence Technology Cooperation Initiative”.

The NDAA, which Congress passes annually to set military policy and authorise defence spending, will undergo further debate and amendments before becoming law. Some legislators have already signalled opposition, with Representative Thomas Massie saying he would seek to remove the provision if it reaches the House floor.

The measure remains at an early stage, but analysts say if passed, it would limit political oversight over the defence relationship.

Analysts added that it could mark a significant shift in the US-Israel relationship, moving beyond a model centred on American military aid towards deeper institutional integration between the two countries’ defence industries and militaries.

Critics argue that such a move would make support for Israel less a matter of political choice and more a structural feature of US national security policy, embedding the relationship within joint military and industrial programmes that would be difficult to unwind.

What does the proposal include?

Section 224 incorporates elements of the US-Israel Future of Warfare Act legislation introduced by Representative Ronny Jackson, according to Track AIPAC. While the legislation did not advance as a standalone bill, key elements of it were instead folded into the NDAA.

The provision would require the US defence secretary to designate an official responsible for coordinating military cooperation between the two countries. According to the text, that official would be tasked with “synchronising cooperative efforts between the United States and Israel”, including “bilateral defence technology research, development, testing, evaluation, integration and industrial cooperation”.

The legislation envisages cooperation across a wide range of military technologies. It specifically identifies as priority areas; “counter-unmanned systems including aerial, maritime and ground platforms”, “anti-tunnelling and subterranean threats”, and “missile and air defence technologies”.

The proposal also seeks to deepen collaboration on emerging technologies, including “artificial intelligence, quantum machine learning and autonomous systems”, as well as “directed energy and advanced sensing”, “cyber defence, electronic warfare and digital resilience”, and “biotechnology, biomanufacturing, and medical defence”.

The inclusion of “network integration” and “data fusion” has drawn particular attention because it suggests significantly closer integration of military information systems between the two countries.

The United States and Israel already cooperate on defence projects, including missile defence systems such as Iron Dome. However, analysts say that Section 224 would expand cooperation into nearly every major area of emerging military technology, and could create a “lock-in” between the two countries military infrastructure.

Mark Hilborne, a senior lecturer, the School of Security Studies at King’s College London, told Al Jazeera the proposal goes well beyond the traditional foundations of the US-Israel defence relationship.

“While historically, the US-Israel defence relationship has included US military aid and weapons transfers, joint missile defence programmes such as Iron Dome, David’s Sling and Arrow, and intelligence and operational cooperation, the proposed agreement increases cooperation to include a wider set of emerging technologies,” he said.

“So this all suggests a much tighter integration – less about provision and perhaps sharing technologies and capabilities, and more about jointly developing these.

“It would point to a more institutionalised relationship, and perhaps one that might survive changing administrations in the US, as some of the development cycles could be very long and would become entrenched,” he said.

Why is it controversial?

The proposal comes amid growing debate in the US over military support for Israel, particularly as Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza continues, and concerns mount over the use of US-made weapons.

Human rights organisations and United Nations experts have repeatedly raised concerns about Israeli military actions in Gaza, where despite a so-called ceasefire in place since last October, at least 850 Palestinians have been killed. Israel is also advancing into southern Lebanon, where it has killed more than 3,000 people since the beginning of March.

These wars have led to increasing scepticism among Americans towards unconditional support for Israel, recent opinion polls suggest.

A New York Times poll in May found that only 30 percent of respondents believed Donald Trump made the right decision in ordering military strikes against Iran, while 64 percent said it was the wrong decision.

An Institute for Global Affairs poll released last week found that only 16 percent of Americans support continuing weapons transfers to Israel without additional restrictions. Thirty-eight percent said the US should stop supplying weapons entirely, while 24 percent said military aid should be conditioned on how the weapons are used.

Opposition has also emerged from parts of the Republican Party, which traditionally has always been aligned with Israel.

Former Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene criticised the proposal on social media, writing: “This is what complete capture to a foreign government looks like, and there hasn’t been a single shot fired.”

Massie, who has opposed military aid to Israel, likewise pledged to introduce an amendment removing the provision from the NDAA. The Republican senator was defeated in the primary elections last month, highlighting the financial and political influence of pro-Israel lobby groups in the US.

Influential conservative commentator, Tucker Carlson, has increasingly criticised US support for Israel, reflecting divisions within the broader MAGA movement. Criticism has also intensified among left-wing Democrats, with many calling for restrictions on military aid to Israel.

What could it mean in practice?

Critics of the measures warn that the proposal could create a form of institutional “lock-in” that makes both countries simultaneously reliant on each other for military development and procurement.

Some analysts say such integration would move key aspects of the US-Israel relationship away from highly visible aid votes or commercial contracting, and into the less transparent world of defence procurement and industrial partnerships at a state-to-state level.

Hilborne from the King’s College said the initiative could also have direct implications for Palestinians. “If joint R&D produces more effective technology, then systems related to surveillance, autonomous vehicles, AI and targeting, and various counter-drone or counter-missile technology would be improved, providing a capability boost to Israeli forces operating in Gaza or the West Bank,” he said.

“This enhanced integration would further embed US technology into Israeli forces. These would all be concerns from a Palestinian perspective.”

Critics also point to the economic implications, where expanded co-production agreements could lead to new manufacturing facilities and defence jobs in the United States, creating a further reliance on Israel.

Hilborne also argued that deeper integration could reduce Washington’s leverage over Israel. “The deeper integration may also mean that the US loses some degree of leverage over Israel, as it would be less able to withhold certain capabilities from Israel,” he said.

“As a consequence, Israel might be emboldened in its policies.”

The proposal could also have implications beyond the US-Israel relationship, according to Imad Salamey, an international relations professor at the Lebanese American University. “The proposed US-Israeli defence integration can be seen as the next phase of the Abraham Accords: moving from normalisation toward a US-backed regional security regime centred on Israel as the dominant military and technological hub,” he told Al Jazeera.

Such a framework would strengthen efforts to contain Iran, limit Turkiye’s independent regional influence and deepen security cooperation with Arab partners, he said.

“For Lebanon and Gaza, it may translate into greater pressure to accommodate Israeli-led security arrangements as part of a broader emerging Middle Eastern order.”

Whether Section 224 survives the legislative process is uncertain.

But its inclusion in the NDAA shows how some politicians, many backed by the pro-Israel lobby group AIPAC, are attempting to bind the two countries’ militaries closer together, creating long-term industrial links that future administrations may find difficult to reverse.

Nine people have reportedly been rescued from the rubble of a collapsed five-storey building in New Delhi, India.

Some victims’ families are still awaiting news of their relatives as rescuers continue searching.

U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is about to kick off the search for what it is calling a Flyweight Assault Machine Gun (FAMG). This will be a new 5.56x45mm caliber belt-fed machine gun to succeed the Mk 46, a lightweight special operations-specific cousin of the M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW).

Lt. Col. Alan Wood, SOCOM’s Program Manager for Special Operations Forces (SOF) Lethality, touched on the FAMG briefly in an exclusive interview with TWZ‘s Howard Altman during the annual SOF Week conference last week. Readers can find the bulk of the interview here.

There are “three separate machine gun programs within SOCOM: Lightweight Machine Gun-Medium, Light Machine Gun-Assault, and soon to be FAMG, which is the Flyweight Assault Machine Gun,” Wood explained. “The Medium is your .338 [Norma Magnum], the Assault is your 7.62 NATO [7.62x51mm], and then the FAMG is a 5.56[mm]. All belt-fed machine guns.”

We subsequently reached out to SOCOM for more information about the FAMG, an effort that does not appear to have been previously disclosed.

“The Flyweight Assault Machine Gun (FAMG) will be a 5.56mm belt fed weapon that will replace the MK46 Light Machine Gun,” a spokesperson for the command told us. “Details on the requirement will be published on SAM.gov in the near future.”

While we do not know yet what SOCOM is looking for specifically in the FAMG, beyond its caliber, we do know what the command wants to replace. The Mk 46 traces back to the early years of the Global War on Terror. It is based on the M249 SAW, which is itself a version of the Minimi light machine gun from Belgian gunmaker FN (and later its American subsidiaries).

FN had initially developed what it called the Special Purpose Weapon (SPW), a significantly lightened version of the Minimi with a shortened barrel that also had a thinner profile. The gun, which was marketed heavily toward special operations forces, featured the collapsing stock that had already been used on short-barreled ‘paratrooper’ versions of the Minimi and the M249, as well.

The standard Minimi design also has a secondary magazine well that allows it to fire ammunition from NATO-standard box magazines like the ones used with AR-15/M16-series rifles, as well as belts. This feature was carried over to the M249. It was omitted on the SPW to further cut weight.

The baseline Mk 46 Mod 0 was a direct evolution of the SPW concept. It most notably used the polymer buttstock found on standard Minimi and M249 light machine guns, which is fixed in length, but also lighter than the collapsing paratrooper type. It also came with a new handguard with rails on four sides for optics, laser aiming devices, lights, and other accessories. The handguard design is very tall on the top side to bring it in line with an additional rail on the gun’s top cover.

An improved Mk 46 Mod 1 variant was subsequently developed, which “incorporates improved receiver pins, a feed tray with retention pawls and a vented hand guard with improved heat shield and three MIL-STD-1913 rails,” according to the entry on FN America’s website at the time of writing. “The MK 46 MOD 1’s cold hammer-forged MIL-SPEC barrel has a hard-chromed bore for longer life and improved accuracy, and serves as the mounting point for the carry handle.”

To make a more direct comparison, the Mk 46 Mod 1, with its 16.3-inch barrel, weighs just under 15-and-a-half pounds empty with no accessories, per FN America. The version it shows on its website currently does also has a more traditional handguard configuration. A current-generation M249 with a full-length 20-and-a-half-inch barrel tips the scales at 17 pounds without any ammunition, optics, or other attachments.

After years of the U.S. military, including SOCOM, increasingly moving away from 5.56x45mm in favor of calibers that offer longer reach, for rifles and machine guns, there is something of a question as to why the command is now pursuing the FAMG. It had already been relatively rare to see variants of the Mk 46 in actual operational use. For decades now, U.S. special operators have also been using a succession of lightweight 7.62x51mm machine guns, as well, including compact versions of the M60 and a derivative of the Minimi/M249 designated the Mk 48. The aforementioned Light Machine Gun-Assault is a replacement for the Mk 48.

The U.S. Army is also moving to replace at least a substantial portion of its standard M249s with new 6.8x51mm caliber M250 machine guns, which might also make their way into service elsewhere across the U.S. military. The 5.56x45mm M27 Infantry Automatic Rifle (IAR) has also largely supplanted the M249 in the U.S. Marine Corps.

All this being said, U.S. special operators routinely conduct missions in close-quarters environments where the added firepower of a belt-fed machine gun can be beneficial, but the added range offered by a heavier design is not necessary. A design that cuts as much weight as possible is very attractive to fast-moving special operations teams that typically use belt-fed machine guns for brief periods of suppressing fire, as well.

SOCOM is now separately pursuing new hypervelocity 5.56x45mm ammunition that could significantly extend the reach of weapons chambered in that caliber as part of an effort called the Hypervelocity Improved Carbine (HICAR).

In addition, there is value in having commonality in ammunition with other existing rifles and machine guns, as well as those in use with allies and partners. The latter point is especially relevant for special operations forces, which are often forward-deployed alongside their foreign counterparts in locales where access to traditional supply chains is not guaranteed. There are training benefits to being able to use more readily available, less specialized, and often less expensive ammunition, as well.

SOCOM’s Lt. Col. Wood highlighted all of this while speaking more generally during his interview with us last week:

“So, HICAR’s got me excited. Back in the late teens, the Army went down this higher velocity [route], and I’m intentionally using the word velocity and not pressure in what they’ve done with the M7 and M8 rifles. They’ve been able to increase the velocity and therefore create a flatter shooting rifle as well as a rifle that has greater energy on target, and that does incredible things for barrier defeat in a lot of situations. Now we’ve had 10 years, almost, for that technology to mature, people have learned things, and the question then becomes, what could we do for special operators in calibers that are not new?”

“The advantage for SOF [special operations forces] operators is I’ve got, say, the Green Berets who do a lot of partnering with foreign SOF operators, but there’s no [6.8mm] ammo running around central Africa, or you know, pick your favorite spot where we like to do partnering operations around the world. But there’s a lot of 5.56mm and other common cartridges of that nature, and so what we want to…achieve is maybe not the same effect as what the Army’s done with the M7 and the M8 and that high-velocity ammunition that they have, but where could we get close to that in 5.56 and potentially other calibers in the future.”

5.56x45mm could turn out to be just the baseline caliber for FAMG, too. SOCOM has long had a fondness for guns with interchangeable calibers, allowing for different cartridges to be used as appropriate for specific missions. As a tangential example, the command just recently confirmed to TWZ‘s sister site Task & Purpose that its new Mid-Range Gas Gun-Assault (MRGG-A) rifles, now also designated the Mk 24, will be able to be configured to fire either 6.5mm Creedmoor or 7.62x51mm.

It is also worth noting that the U.S. Army’s elite 75th Ranger Regiment has already begun using the 5.56x45mm Light Assault Machine Gun (LAMG) from Knights Armament Company (KAC), at least on a limited level in recent years, alongside current-generation versions of the M249. KAC’s website presents a typical LAMG configuration featuring a 15-inch barrel and weighing 11.4 pounds empty, which is more compact and lightweight than the Mk 46.

The LAMG also has what is known as a “constant recoil system,” which is designed to significantly reduce felt recoil and, by extension, improve accuracy during sustained autonomous fire. KAC says this makes the gun “more controllable than other similar machine guns that weigh nearly twice as much.”

There are other 5.56x45mm machine guns on the market today, which could be adaptable to meet the FAMG requirements, as well. This includes FN’s own newer EVOLYS design, which is available in 5.56x45mm, as well as a variety of other calibers.

As SOCOM has said, more details about its requirements and plans for the FAMG are set to come soon.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia – Ethiopians vote on Monday in a general election to choose members of parliament, who will in turn select the next prime minister. The National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) said 47 political parties and more than 10,900 candidates are in the race, including 2,198 for the federal parliament, 8,736 for regional and city councils and 73 independents.

More than 50 million voters are registered, with official voter registration figures showing women account for around half of the electorate. Young Ethiopians make up a large share of the population, with a median age of about 19 years, according to United Nations population estimates, giving them a substantial presence in the country’s electorate.

The contest brings together ruling, opposition, regional and independent politicians under Ethiopia’s federal parliamentary system, where the government is formed through a parliamentary majority and MPs select the prime minister.

Here is a closer look at the main political parties, coalitions and independent candidates.

Prosperity Party (PP)

The Prosperity Party is the ruling political party in Ethiopia, led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. It was formed in 2019 following the merger of several regional parties that previously made up the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The party holds a majority in the House of Peoples’ Representatives following the 2021 general election.

According to the Prosperity Party programme and public statements, it emphasises national unity, economic reform and state-led development within Ethiopia’s federal system.

The party is fielding candidates for seats in the House of Peoples’ Representatives and regional councils across almost all federal and regional constituencies under Ethiopia’s parliamentary system.

National Movement of Amhara (NAMA)

The National Movement of Amhara is a regional political party operating mainly in Ethiopia’s Amhara region. It is led by Belete Molla and participates in Ethiopia’s federal parliamentary elections through constituency-based contests.

According to party statements, NAMA focuses on political representation, security concerns and cultural and regional rights of the Amhara population within Ethiopia’s federal system.

The party is fielding candidates primarily within the Amhara region for federal and regional council seats under Ethiopia’s electoral framework.

Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (EZEMA)

The Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice is a national political party led by Berhanu Nega. Formed in 2019, it has participated in national elections since 2021 and operates across multiple regions.

According to party statements and its leadership, EZEMA promotes liberal democratic governance, the rule of law, market-oriented reforms and broader national unity.

For this vote, the party is contesting seats in both the House of Peoples’ Representatives and regional councils across multiple federal and regional constituencies.

Peace for Ethiopia coalition

The Peace for Ethiopia coalition is an alliance of smaller regional parties, including the Agew National Council, Gamo Democratic Party, Gambella Peoples’ Freedom Movement, Kaffa Green Party, and Tigray Democratic Cooperation.

According to coalition statements, the alliance brings together member parties to improve coordination and representation of diverse regional interests within Ethiopia’s federal system.

The coalition coordinates candidate lists across its member parties while allowing each to retain separate regional identities. Members are contesting seats in both federal and regional councils.

Regional and ethnic-based parties

Regional parties contest seats across Ethiopia’s federal system, including in Oromia, Somali, Tigray and southern regions. They operate within their respective states and are registered with NEBE to field candidates in federal and regional constituencies.

According to their public positions, these parties generally focus on regional governance, local autonomy, and development priorities specific to their constituencies.

They participate in the House of Peoples’ Representatives and regional councils under Ethiopia’s parliamentary electoral system.

Independent candidates

A total of 73 independent candidates are registered to contest seats in the 2026 elections.

According to political observers, independent candidates tend to focus on local governance issues and constituency-level concerns rather than formal party platforms or national ideological positions.

They are running for both federal and regional council positions under Ethiopia’s constituency-based parliamentary system.

Electoral stakes

The election will determine the composition of Ethiopia’s federal government and which party or coalition controls parliament. Elected MPs will select the prime minister, who then forms the federal government.

The results will shape the distribution of power between federal and regional authorities under Ethiopia’s constitutional system. The vote is part of the country’s regular parliamentary electoral cycle under the 1995 constitution.

The allocation of seats in the House of Peoples’ Representatives will determine legislative authority at the federal level.

The election is being held under Ethiopia’s federal parliamentary system, in which executive power is derived from a parliamentary majority.

Political environment

The National Election Board of Ethiopia oversees the administration of voting and candidate registration across all regions. Polling arrangements have been established nationwide under Ethiopia’s electoral framework.

Voting will take place in constituencies across urban and rural areas in all federal member states.

Electoral procedures are implemented under national electoral law, which defines the responsibilities of federal and regional election authorities.

NEBE is responsible for coordinating polling operations, voter registration, and ballot administration across constituencies.

Youth and voter engagement

NEBE reports that more than 50 million people are registered to vote in the election.

Young people make up a large share of the population, with a median age of about 19 years, according to UN population estimates.

Registered voters include both first-time and returning voters participating in federal and regional elections across the country.

Voting is conducted under Ethiopia’s legal framework for universal adult suffrage, which grants citizens aged 18 and above the right to vote.

Women voters and participation

According to NEBE voter registration figures, women account for around half of registered voters.

They are eligible to vote and contest seats at both federal and regional levels under Ethiopia’s electoral law, and female candidates are participating across multiple regions.

Both sexes are subject to the same voter registration and candidacy requirements under Ethiopia’s electoral framework.

Female candidates are contesting seats in both federal and regional races across the country.

Rescuers face heavy rains, equipment failures in search for two people trapped in central Laos cave by flash floods.

Heavy rains have threatened to delay the search for two people who remain missing in a flooded cave in Laos, after five others were rescued after being trapped underground for more than a week.

Finnish diver Mikko Paasi, one of the first international rescuers to arrive at the site, told The Associated Press news agency that rains on Sunday had filled the cave up to the second chamber, preventing divers from entering until pumps can lower the water level.

A drainage pump also broke, making the situation even more difficult, said fellow diver Yoshitaka Isaji of Japan.

Rescue teams from Laos and neighbouring Thailand have been working together over the past week to rescue the trapped villagers, alongside divers from countries including Finland, Malaysia, Japan, Indonesia, France and Australia.

Seven people entered the cave in a remote mountainous area of central Xaysomboun province last week to look for valuable minerals such as gold, before being trapped by a flash flood that blocked their way out, according to local media reports.

One other person escaped and alerted the authorities.

A Laotian rescue group said on Sunday it had received “substantial” information on the cave system from the five men who were rescued earlier this week. “The hope is that today’s mission will locate both remaining victims,” the group wrote on social media.

The rescued men were being treated at a local hospital and were doing well, Malaysian diver Lee Kian Lie, who is taking part in the operation, told AP.

“We interviewed them about how the deeper part of the cave looks like. We will continue to search based on the information we have, and perhaps we will be able to get to the other two,” he said.

Rescuers said they navigated more than 200m (650 feet) into the cave and discovered five chambers in the system. The five people rescued so far were found in the fifth chamber.

Paasi, the Finnish diver, told AP that the survivors reported a narrow crack in the fifth chamber that could be a passage leading to a deeper part of the cave system.

“This was the only place that we haven’t checked in the mine, where the two lost miners could still be,” he said in a video interview.

The five men who were rescued – identified by their first names as Khamla, Mued, Ee, Ing and Laen – were first found last Wednesday.

The first man was safely extracted on Friday, guided through a narrow flooded passage by an expert diver. The remaining four left the cave on Saturday, after the water receded enough for them to walk out on their own, rescuers said.

Videos posted online on Saturday showed emotional moments as the men emerged one by one from the cave. Some collapsed on the ground at the cave’s entrance, and were hugged by a group of workers who cried with joy.

Later moments showed them lying on stretchers, wrapped in foil blankets and fitted with oxygen masks before being transported out.

The government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has vowed not to shut down schools in Ituri province, despite the ongoing Ebola outbreak, which has already killed five schoolchildren since the epidemic began. The government announced the decision on Thursday, May 28, during a press briefing by the Minister of Public Health, Roger Kamba. 

Roger noted at the press briefing that the government’s focus is on enhancing preventive measures in schools rather than shutting them down. 

“We are not going to close schools. Our priority is to implement preventive measures to avoid further hardships for the children,” the Minister insisted. He expressed concern over the five schoolchildren who lost their lives, noting that many of these fatalities were related to self-medication and delays in accessing medical care.

Meanwhile, Congolese health officials had urged families to refrain from treating suspected cases at home and to seek medical help promptly. The officials warned amid heightened health monitoring in Ituri, where local authorities and partners are ramping up awareness campaigns to curb the spread of the virus.

The current outbreak spans three provinces: Ituri, South Kivu, and North Kivu, affecting 13 health zones. As of May 26, Ituri province reported 16 new confirmed cases, bringing the total to 121 confirmed cases and 17 deaths. “We know the outbreak in the DR Congo is more extensive, with over 900 suspected cases and 220 suspected deaths,” stated WHO Director General Tedros Ghebreyesus.

Tedros had earlier warned that the current Ebola epidemic affecting parts of the DRC  is attributed to the Bundibugyo strain of the virus, stressing that there is currently no approved vaccine or treatment available. While discussing the troubling elements contributing to the Ebola outbreak in the DRC, Tedros said that, unlike earlier strains such as Zaire Ebola, which have effective medical solutions, the Bundibugyo strain poses a significant challenge due to the absence of preventive vaccines and effective treatments. 

The lack of medical options raises serious epidemiological concerns, with the WHO director reporting around 600 suspected cases and 139 fatalities. The numbers are likely to increase, as the virus may have been spreading undetected for some time. 

The virus has infiltrated multiple urban areas, and healthcare workers have also been impacted, increasing the risk of transmission nationwide. The situation is further complicated by regional security issues, particularly in Ituri province, which has faced significant violence since late 2025, displacing thousands of people. This area is a resource-rich mining zone with a highly mobile population, contributing to a heightened risk of virus spread.

Given the lack of validated treatments, however,  the WHO is investigating potential vaccines and therapeutics for widespread use. Tedros has called upon the international community to take action, stressing that the five identified risk factors, including population movement, transmission within health facilities, and urban expansion, could collectively worsen the epidemic’s impact on public health. 

Environmental activists in Rome built a mock rocket with caricatures of Giorgia Meloni and Donald Trump, calling for ‘fascists’ to be launched to another planet. The protest condemned government inaction on climate change and the global rise of authoritarian politics.

Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi accuses China of lacking military transparency and stresses the importance of dialogue for regional stability.

Japanese Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi has dismissed claims that Tokyo is pursuing “new militarism” and accused China of rapidly expanding its military with limited transparency.

China continues to increase its defence spending at a high level, Koizumi said on Sunday at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore.

“China’s external approach and military activities are matters of serious concern for ⁠Japan and the international community at the same time,” he added.

“Think about it. There’s a country that has a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons and strategic bombers. Japan has neither of such weapons, and yet Japan is labelled ‘new militarism’?”

Koizumi said Japan’s record since World War II “speaks for itself”, citing its adherence ‌to international law and commitment to the United Nations Charter alongside efforts to uphold a “free and open international order”.

In May, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs called on Asia Pacific countries to be vigilant and “jointly resist the reckless actions of Japan’s neo-militarism”.

At the Singapore forum, Chinese delegate Major General Meng Xiangqing criticised Japan.

“I deeply doubt whether a country that has not thoroughly eradicated the toxic legacy of militarism is qualified to talk extensively about defence cooperation on international occasions and whether it can win the trust of the international community, especially ⁠the Asian countries it once invaded,” he said.

Ties between Japan and China sank to ⁠their worst level in years after Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi warned in November that a hypothetical Chinese attack on Taiwan could draw a Japanese military response.

China claims Taiwan as its own territory over the objections of the island’s government.

Koizumi said transparency comes from “discussion and dialogue” and lamented that China had not sent its defence minister to the conference, but he insisted Japan remains open to engagement.

“We keep the door open,” he said, reaffirming Japan’s ⁠commitment to dialogue with China and other regional players to foster stability.

As China has been rapidly expanding and modernising its military, Japan has been reshaping its own defence policy. Last month, Takaichi’s cabinet scrapped a ban on lethal weapons exports, a major change in its post-war pacifist policy.

Japan pushes for unity

Separately on Sunday, Koizumi praised US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth for his commitment to the Asia Pacific but at the same time stressed the continued need for strong coalitions globally.

“Division weakens deterrence. Unity strengthens deterrence,” he told the conference in Singapore.

“If gaps emerge among the United States, Europe and allies and like-minded countries, forces which take it as an opportunity will surely come in,” he said.

“We must prevent such a situation. We must keep our cooperation going on. Now is the time to make our cooperation even stronger.”

US President Donald Trump has been harsh about fellow members in NATO, and the comments at the Shangri-La conference came the day after Hegseth again chided Western European allies at the forum for not devoting enough resources to defence.

Just over the Litani river line, the IDF has confirmed it has captured one of the key strategic prizes in the area – Beaufort Castle. It was built as a fortress commanding views from high on the cliffs above the Litani river by the Crusaders some 900 years ago, and has been fought over many times since.

Weekly protests in Dublin are growing as people demand justice and accountability for Yves Sakila, a Congolese man who died after being restrained by security guards outside a shopping centre.

Both the US and Iran have recently signaled progress on efforts to reach a deal to end their conflict, though their accounts of its terms differ on some issues across respective media narratives, Anadolu reports.

US President Donald Trump on Saturday said an agreement with Iran to end the war was “largely negotiated” and awaited finalization.

On Sunday morning, Iran’s semi-official Tasnim news agency also published a report on the details of a potential agreement. However, certain aspects of what has been agreed seem to diverge.

Here is a comparison of the US and Iranian versions of the deal by key issues.

Strait of Hormuz

Citing a US official, Axios said the deal that Washington and Tehran are close to signing would extend a ceasefire by 60 days, during which the Strait of Hormuz would be reopened.

During the 60-day period, the Strait of Hormuz would be opened without any tolls, and Iran would remove the mines it has placed there to ensure unrestricted maritime passage.

In return, Washington would lift its blockade on Iranian ports, added the report.

The New York Times also said it was informed by three senior Iranian officials that Tehran had agreed to a memorandum of understanding to halt fighting and reopen the Strait of Hormuz.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio also said on Sunday that the agreement could, if successful, result in a “completely open” Strait of Hormuz, with no tolls or restrictions on passage.

“They don’t own it. It’s an international waterway,” Rubio told reporters of the strait, in remarks that came during his visit to India.

A report by Iran’s semi-official news agency Tasnim, however, said that the Strait of Hormuz will not fully return to its pre-war status if the agreement is reached.

Instead, the number of ships allowed to pass would be restored to pre-war levels within 30 days, the outlet added.

Tehran also demands an end to the US blockade on its ports, arguing that no changes will be made in the strait if the blockade remains in place.

For its part, the US argues that the quicker Iran removes the mines and allows shipping to resume, the sooner the blockade will be lifted.

READ: Iran ready to reassure world it is not pursuing nuclear weapons, president says

Sanctions relief and release of frozen Iranian assets

Iran was seeking the immediate unfreezing of funds and a permanent lifting of sanctions, but the US position indicates these measures would only be granted after Iran made concrete concessions, according to the Axios report.

As part of the proposed 60-day agreement, the US is offering temporary sanctions waivers that would allow Iran to sell its oil freely. These waivers are explicitly linked to Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz, removing mines, and ending restrictions on maritime traffic. Once these steps are taken, Washington would also lift its naval blockade on Iranian ports.

Tehran, however, says no agreement will be reached unless at least a portion of the frozen Iranian assets is released immediately. Iranian media confirmed the discussion of temporary oil sanctions waivers in the latest US proposal but insisted on broader and more permanent sanctions relief.

Nuclear file

The Axios report said the draft deal includes commitments from Iran not to pursue nuclear weapons, along with provisions to negotiate a suspension of uranium enrichment and the removal of its stockpile of highly enriched uranium.

The Iranian media reports, however, indicate that Tehran has not yet accepted anything on its nuclear program.

A potential deal would involve a 60-day negotiation window on Iran’s nuclear program, according to Tasnim.

Extent of ceasefire

Both US and Iranian media reports suggest that the cessation of hostilities would mean a halt to fighting on all fronts, including Lebanon.

This was also highlighted by Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei on Saturday, when he said Tehran was prioritizing an end to hostilities across all fronts, including Lebanon.

Context

Regional tensions have escalated since the US and Israel launched strikes against Iran in February. Tehran retaliated with strikes targeting Israel, as well as US allies in the Gulf, along with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

A ceasefire took effect on April 8 through Pakistani mediation and was later extended by Trump indefinitely. Washington and Tehran also held rare direct talks in the Pakistani capital Islamabad on April 11-12, but have failed to reach an agreement.

Trump’s Saturday remarks came after Pakistani army chief Asim Munir’s visit to Tehran. The visit was the second of its kind in recent weeks, as Munir is directly involved in Islamabad’s mediation efforts.

READ: Trump says Iran talks ‘constructive’ but blockade will remain until final deal is reached