China

Israel’s balancing act that allowed it to reap America’s unconditional and, often, blind support, while slowly benefiting from China’s growing economic influence and political prestige, is already floundering.

Thanks to the heated cold war between the US and Chinese economic superpowers, the Israeli strategy of playing both sides is unlikely to pay dividends in the long run.

Soon enough, Tel Aviv might find itself having to make a stark choice between Washington and Beijing.  When US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, visited Israel on May 13, two items topped his agenda: Israel’s imminent illegal annexation of Palestinian land and the growing Israeli-Chinese economic ties.

Pompeo communicated his country’s stand on both issues, reflecting Washington’s long-standing policies regarding Palestine and China. In the case of Palestine, as with the rest of the Middle East, Washington seems to adhere to Tel Aviv’s agenda, often to the letter.  China is a different story.

READ: China rejects Israel’s planned annexation of West Bank

Two significant historical examples come to mind: one, is Israel’s attempt to sell China Israeli-made Phalcon airborne radar system, which relied heavily on American technology in the 1990s; a similar event transpired in 2005, this time concerning Israel’s Harpy anti-radar missile. On both occasions, Israel succumbed to American pressure and canceled both deals.

For the Chinese, Israel matters for two different reasons. One, Israel is a strategic stop in China’s Belt and Road initiative, China’s most significant economic project to date, ultimately aimed at turning Beijing into a center of global trade and financial activities. Two, China is hoping to fight the US on its own political turf in the Middle East – partly in response to the American ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy, which was initiated by the Barack Obama administration.

But the world – in terms of political and economic balances of power – after the coronavirus pandemic is likely to prove a different one when compared with previous years. China’s rise has been in the making for many years and the US political retreat and declining global outreach has been quite evident for some time. The isolationist policies of the Donald Trump Administration, coupled with Washington’s many China-related tantrums in recent years, are all indicators of the vastly changing political realities of a once-unipolar world.

“I will not miss the opportunity to annex the West Bank”- Cartoon [Sabaaneh/MiddleEastMonitor]

A few years ago, Beijing had the time, patience, and resources to play a long-drawn geopolitical game in order for it to challenge the US’s global influence, whether in South America, Africa, or Israel.

The visit by China’s Vice President, Wang Qishan, to Israel in 2018, to “boost business ties”, was part of this Chinese strategy. That visit followed the signing, one year earlier, of the China-Israel Innovative Comprehensive Partnership. As of 2018, China-Israel trade has jumped to $14 billion and has grown exponentially ever since.

China would have been happy to carry on with that strategy for many years to come. Israel, too, would have played along, considering the lucrative financial returns from its China partnership.

READ: Israel ties to China may risk our ability to work with Tel Aviv

Indeed, despite Washington’s warnings against and, at times, explicit demands on Israel to refrain from giving Chinese companies access to fifth-generation infrastructure (5G) projects in the country, Israel labored to make China feel welcomed.

However, the global response to the coronavirus pandemic is likely to change this, as it has already accelerated the cold war between the US and China, pushing the latter to adopt a more aggressive form of diplomacy and pour massive sums into other countries’ economies to help them in their desperate fight against the COVID-19 disease.

The Chinese strategy is predicated on two main pillars: fortifying existing ties and solidarity with China’s allies or potential allies anywhere in the world, while pushing back against China’s foes, especially those who are participating in Washington’s anti-Beijing campaign.

The latter phenomenon is known as ‘wolf warrior diplomacy’. The ‘wolf warriors’ are Chinese diplomats who have, for months, pushed back with unprecedented ferocity against what they perceive to be US and Western propaganda.

READ: China’s ambassador to Israel found dead in Tel Aviv home

“We never pick a fight or bully others,” China’s Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, told reporters in Beijing on May 24, while explaining China’s novel approach to diplomacy. “We will push back against any deliberate insult, resolutely defend our national honor and dignity, and we will refute all groundless slander with facts,” the top Chinese official said firmly.

China’s new aggressive diplomacy, especially if it continues to define the country’s approach to foreign policy in the coming years, is unlikely to permit Israel to maintain its balancing act for much longer.

China’s ambassador to Israel, Du Wei, who was entrusted with implementing Beijing’s soft-diplomacy with Tel Aviv, died in his home only a few days following Pompeo’s visit to the country. Although Wei’s death was not – at least publicly – perceived to be the result of foul play, his absence, especially in the age of coronavirus and ‘wolf warriors’, might signal a shift in China’s approach to its economic and political interests in Israel.

On May 26, under American pressure, the Israeli Finance Ministry denied China a massive $1.5 billion desalination plant contract, awarding it to an Israeli company, instead.

This is the first time that the US has used its political and economic sway over Israel to curb Chinese influence in the country. China must be anxiously watching events unfold,   to see if US pressure on Israel will continue to undermine Beijing’s long-term strategy.

Deal of the century, embassy relocation, and the Golan Heights – Israel surely can’t believe their luck? – Cartoon [Sabaaneh/MiddleEastMonitor]

The world’s quickly shifting balance of power and the US-Chinese unmistakable fight for dominance is likely to, eventually, force countries like Israel to make a choice, of wholly joining the American or the Chinese sphere of influence. It is all reminiscent of the American-Soviet Cold War, where much of the globe was divided into zones of influence operated by proxy from Washington or Moscow.

Balancing acts in politics only work if all parties are willing to play or, at least, tolerate the game. While this form of politics suited Israel’s interests in the past and was played, quite successfully for years by Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, the country’s balancing act is, possibly, over.

Between Washington’s precise demands to Israel to keep Beijing at bay, and the latter’s aggressive ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy, Israel is facing a stark choice: remaining loyal to a fading superpower or diving into the uncharted waters of an emerging one.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

China’s state-linked media system is preparing a major investment in artificial intelligence aimed at advancing and disseminating President Xi Jinping’s political ideology. According to Shanghai Stock Exchange filings, Xinhuanet, owned by the official Xinhua News Agency, plans to invest over 1.1 billion yuan (about $162 million) in an AI system called “Xinhua Yudian,” or “Xinhua lexicon.”

The AI agent is designed as an “authoritative” tool for learning, researching, and distributing Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. It will draw on a curated state-controlled database and is intended to deliver official narratives, current affairs, and political content in a structured format.

The project builds on China’s broader national strategy to integrate artificial intelligence across governance, industry, and society under the “AI+” initiative launched in 2025, which encourages widespread adoption of AI technologies in both public and private sectors.

Why It Matters

This development highlights how artificial intelligence is increasingly being used not only as a technological tool but also as an instrument of political communication and ideological reinforcement. Unlike commercial AI systems designed for open-ended information retrieval, this platform is explicitly structured to promote state-approved interpretations of policy and leadership thinking.

The initiative reflects Beijing’s growing emphasis on controlling information ecosystems in an era of information overload and competing narratives. By positioning AI as a “trust layer” for political and policy information, China is attempting to address concerns about misinformation while simultaneously strengthening ideological consistency across digital platforms.

The project also signals a broader convergence between state power and emerging technologies. As AI systems become more integrated into education, media, and governance, they are increasingly shaping not only what information is accessed but how it is interpreted. This raises important questions about transparency, bias, and the role of algorithmic systems in political messaging.

Chinese Government and Communist Party
Seeking to strengthen ideological cohesion and ensure consistent dissemination of Xi Jinping’s political doctrine.

Xinhuanet and Xinhua News Agency
Acting as the implementing body, responsible for building and deploying the AI system using state-approved datasets.

Technology Sector in China
Participating in the broader “AI+” initiative, which encourages integration of artificial intelligence across industries.

Chinese Citizens and Digital Users
Target users of the system, particularly students, officials, and professionals seeking policy-related information and official references.

Global Technology Community
Observing China’s use of AI in state communication as part of a wider debate on governance, censorship, and AI ethics.

Future Outlook

The rollout of “Xinhua Yudian” is likely to deepen the integration of artificial intelligence into China’s political and information architecture. If successful, it could serve as a model for other state-backed AI systems designed to standardize ideological communication and policy interpretation.

In the near term, the platform is expected to function as both an information retrieval system and a citation verification tool for official discourse. This may reduce ambiguity in policy communication but also further centralize control over authoritative narratives.

Longer term, the project raises questions about how AI will shape political legitimacy and information control in authoritarian systems. As AI becomes more capable of generating and filtering content at scale, its role may shift from a neutral tool to an active participant in shaping public perception and ideological alignment.

The initiative underscores a broader global trend in which artificial intelligence is not only transforming economies and industries but also becoming a strategic instrument in statecraft and governance.

With information from Reuters.

Published on
03/06/2026 – 17:25 GMT+2

The European Commission confirmed to Euronews on Wednesday that EU trade chief Maroš Šefčovič will meet his Chinese counterpart, trade envoy Li Chenggang, on the sidelines of an OECD ministerial meeting in Paris on Thursday.

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The visit comes as EU-China relations remain strained, with Brussels seeking to crack down on Chinese overcapacity and tackle a record-high €359.9 billion trade deficit with Beijing.

After the EU unveiled the so-called Industrial Accelerator Act and the Cybersecurity Act which could exclude Chinese companies from the EU market, China threatened retaliation, fuelling fears of a trade war between the two trading partners.

Tensions escalated further last week when EU commissioners met to discuss the bloc’s strategy towards the Asian giant.

“The current state of the trade and investment relationship is not sustainable,” the Commission said in a statement after the meeting.

An EU official told Euronews that a majority of the Commissioners had agreed to strengthen the EU’s trade defence tools to help counter China. Proposals will be made to EU leaders during their summit on 18 June.

However, member states remain divided over the EU’s China policy. A non-paper signed by France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Lithuania called for faster use of tariffs and quotas on imports threatening EU industrial sectors, with China the principle target. The idea is to restore a level playing field against Chinese trade practices that many in Europe describe as unfair.

Among those countries taking a different line is Germany, whose policy is to preserve access to the Chinese market for its companies even as it faces a deep trade deficit.

Meanwhile, the Commission said it will continue engaging with China. There have been reports that Commerce Minister Wang Wentao could visit Brussels on 28 and 29 June, but the visit has not yet been publicly confirmed.

Venezuela holds the largest proven oil reserves on earth. It has lithium. It has agriculture, a coastline three hours away from Miami, and—for the first time in a generation a political window. The reconstruction investment case is real. So is the obstacle for every actor, across every ideology, that wants Venezuelan assets to perform.

The obstacle is not the oil price. It is not the OFAC sanctions framework, which has been substantially liberalized since January 2026. It is not even the absence of functioning institutions, though that is the proximate problem every investor will encounter. The obstacle has a nucleus with name, a title, and an active intelligence apparatus. And his continued presence in power is not merely a moral affront. 

This is not a story about mismanagement. Mismanagement leaves a paper trail.

What happened across Venezuela’s infrastructure ministries between 2002 and 2012 lest almost none, deliberately. Over $150 billion in documented railway, housing, and infrastructure contracts were disbursed across that decade. The projects largely do not exist. The documentation largely does not exist. The Tinaco-Anaco railway, a $7.5 billion contract signed with China Railway Engineering Corporation, produced looted campsites and empty concrete columns. The National Railway Plan, budgeted at $150 billion, produced less than one percent of its projected track. 

One of the ministers who oversaw that disbursement period of the infrastructure that is so dire, and who preserved an influence only surpassed by Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro, today is the Interior Minister of Venezuela. He controls the national intelligence apparatus, the police, and the armed colectivos. He is Diosdado Cabello, your competing General Partner that has acted without impunity. He carries a live indictment from a New York court on narco-trafficking charges. He is sanctioned by the US Treasury. He hosts a television program that airs every Wednesday evening.

By 2011, the beneficial ownership architecture built by Venezuela’s ruling network spanned more than forty trustees across multiple jurisdictions: a parallel private equity structure embedded inside a sovereign state.

The distinction that every institutional investor must internalize is this: a mismanaged State is recoverable. A State whose productive apparatus was deliberately extracted (not ruined by incompetence but hollowed out because extraction was more profitable than production) presents a categorically different investment problem. The destruction was not the side effect of the governance model. It was the point of it. Cabello remains an icon of that governance model.

The counterparty problem

Conventional private equity rests on a foundational assumption: your counterparty has an interest in the underlying asset performing. Returns depend on it. Exit depends on it. The entire structure of an LP agreement, a term sheet, a co-investment right, all of it assumes a counterparty whose incentive is aligned with asset value.

In Venezuela, the sophisticated actor on the other side of the table for two decades was running a competing structure. One with no limited partners, no fiduciary duty, no quarterly reporting, and a sovereign intelligence apparatus for compliance. That structure had a single mandate: maximum extraction, minimum documentation, zero accountability. It executed that mandate with precision.

By 2011, the beneficial ownership architecture built by Venezuela’s ruling network spanned more than forty trustees across multiple jurisdictions. This is not a warlord’s operation. This is a parallel private equity structure embedded inside a sovereign state.

That sophistication is precisely what makes the residual presence of these networks so consequential for reconstruction capital. They did not disappear with the January 2026 transition. They repositioned. The structures that governed Venezuela’s extraction apparatus are experts at corporate layering: shell companies, nominee directors, off-channel financial instruments designed to distance beneficial owners from the assets they control.

This is the counterparty environment that reconstruction capital is walking into. Not a post-conflict landscape with residual corruption. An active, sophisticated, multi-jurisdictional extraction network that has spent 25 years perfecting its operational security

These are not improvised operations, they are multi-jurisdictional corporate architectures spanning Switzerland, Brazil, Spain, the Caribbean, and more recently Turkey and the Middle East. Each node chosen for its specific regulatory gap or enforcement lag. The $5.2 billion in gold shipped to Switzerland between 2013 and 2016, the Alex Saab procurement network running through Turkey and Cape Verde, the Zapatero indictment revealing consulting structures designed to siphon money from China, Venezuela, and Spain simultaneously these are documented examples of the same operational capability.

These networks retain the best advisors money can pay. Former heads of state, international law firms, financial intermediaries operating across jurisdictions. The Zapatero case is not the exception, it is the template. And they operate with the enforcement discipline of a cartel: strategic asset moves backed by the implicit and sometimes explicit willingness to use coercion when commercial pressure is insufficient. The SDNY indictments against senior regime figures on narco-trafficking charges are not separate from the financial architecture. They are evidence that the same command structure manages both.

This is the counterparty environment that reconstruction capital is walking into. Not a post-conflict landscape with residual corruption. An active, sophisticated, multi-jurisdictional extraction network that has spent 25 years perfecting its operational security, asset acquisitions by “patriotic”expropriations to serve their drug-logistic hubs and is now repositioning for the reconstruction window. 

Why China doesn’t actually want this

China’s position in Venezuela is widely misread as unconditional support. The reality is more commercially specific. China has over $60 billion in loan-for-oil exposure through CNPC and the China Development Bank. Those loans require one thing: barrels flowing. Barrels require functional production infrastructure. Functional production infrastructure requires institutional stability, contract enforcement, and (critically) a counterparty with an interest in assets performing.

Beijing understands this better than any outside observer because its own institutions have investigated the damage. Xi Jinping’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection placed a CITIC Group vice president under investigation for serious disciplinary violations, the same CITIC that embedded confidentiality clauses in Venezuelan housing contracts barring the Venezuelan government from accessing financial information about its own projects. An Andorran court documented $100 million in bribes paid by CAMC Engineering to Venezuelan officials. China did not need backchannel meetings to understand the corruption. Its own companies were defendants in it.

China also enforces its own code of conduct internally. The CCP’s anti-corruption apparatus, operating through the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, has a long reach, including over state enterprise executives who participated in overseas schemes that damaged China’s institutional reputation. Chinese firms implicated in Venezuelan bribery networks in Andorra for payments to PDVSA lobbyists related to Venezuela’s electricity system did not operate without consequence within their own system. Beijing does not publicize these accountability mechanisms, but they exist. The party does not tolerate reputational exposure that undermines its economic diplomacy, regardless of the geography.

Every dollar that disappears into the extraction apparatus is a dollar that does not produce the barrel that services the Chinese loans.

The Trump-Xi summit concluded in Beijing on May 15, 2026, the same day Lamargas exploded on Lake Maracaibo, a facility operated by China Concord Resources Corp under a PDVSA joint venture contract. At the moment, the US and Chinese governments are navigating toward economic stabilization and a framework for managed competition, building on their South Korea thaw. That G2 stabilization has direct implications for Venezuela: a China that is repositioning toward US capital markets, Boeing purchases, and agricultural commitments is a China with diminishing strategic incentive to backstop a Venezuelan network that embarrasses it commercially.

The Chevron model—US-anchored, internationally governed, with Chinese off-take embedded through structured contracts—is precisely the kind of framework that serves Beijing’s debt recovery needs without requiring it to defend the indefensible.

A ministry based in a kleptocracy whose financial architecture is premised on assets not performing for the state is structurally incompatible with Chinese debt recovery. Beijing is not sentimental about this. It is calculating.

China’s $50-60 billion in loan-for-oil exposure to Venezuela requires one thing above all else: barrels flowing. Barrels require functional production infrastructure. Functional production infrastructure requires institutional stability, contract enforcement, and a counterparty whose economic interest is aligned with assets performing. When the ministry overseeing oil production is the same apparatus that systematically extracted value from every sector it touched, railways that produced concrete columns and nothing else, housing programs with $76 billion in unaccounted deficits, power plants that were paid for and never built, you can see that the problem for Beijing is not political. Every dollar that disappears into the extraction apparatus is a dollar that does not produce the barrel that services the loans.

China tried to correct this internally before abandoning the effort. In 2018, Margaret Myers at the Inter-American Dialogue pointed out that Beijing “tried over the past couple of years to guide decision-making in Caracas by providing advice or by tying loans to production capacity projects in the oil sector, in order to try to help Venezuela right itself economically. That has not proven successful.”

By 2016, China stopped issuing new loans entirely. That is not a diplomatic signal. That is a credit committee decision. The same kind of decision any institutional lender makes when the counterparty’s governance structure has made repayment structurally unlikely.

The Brazilian vector

Brazil’s relationship to Venezuela’s reconstruction is complicated by a paper trail that runs through the largest corruption scandal in Latin American history. Odebrecht paid the highest figure of any country outside Brazil itself. Venezuela’s own former prosecutor general, Luisa Ortega Díaz, formally linked those payments to senior Socialist Party figures including Diosdado Cabello after being removed from office and forced to flee the country. The investigation was halted by Venezuela’s highest court. The Swiss banking system was asked to provide a list of Venezuelan recipients. Neither process was allowed to reach its conclusion.

In Brazil, the Odebrecht network reached the highest levels of political life. Federal prosecutors investigated Lula for allegedly lobbying foreign governments on Odebrecht’s behalf after leaving the presidency, and for his role in directing state development bank BNDES financing toward Odebrecht projects abroad. The contracts that linked Odebrecht to Venezuela were not arm’s-length commercial transactions. They were, by Odebrecht’s own admission in its US Department of Justice plea agreement, instruments of a coordinated bribery architecture that spanned twelve countries and operated through a dedicated internal division (the Division of Structured Operations) whose sole purpose was managing political payments.

What does not yet exist is the decision—by US institutional capital—to arrive with a governance structure that the extraction network cannot penetrate.

Brazil has significant commercial interests in Venezuela’s reconstruction, across energy, agriculture, and infrastructure. Those interests are legitimate and Brazilian private capital is a natural reconstruction partner. The complication is not Brazil. It is the specific political-commercial network that governed Brazil’s prior engagement with Venezuela. Odebrecht did not select its Venezuelan counterparties through competitive markets. Contracts were directed through political relationships — between heads of state, with BNDES as the financing instrument, and with the Odebrecht Division of Structured Operations managing the payments in between.

Political networks have institutional memory. The preferred partners that flow through certain diplomatic channels into Venezuela’s reconstruction window carry relationships forged in that prior architecture. A governance framework serious about reconstruction cannot simply exclude Odebrecht, the legal entity. It must screen for the network that Odebrecht served. That screening is structural, not political. It is the difference between Brazilian capital that competes on merit and Brazilian capital that arrives pre-selected by the same diplomatic infrastructure that enabled the extraction.

The structure that worked and the decision that remains

One Venezuelan asset survived twenty-six years of chavismo with its value intact. One. CITGO Petroleum, incorporated in Delaware, governed under US fiduciary law, with its governance architecture anchored entirely outside Venezuelan legal jurisdiction. It survived not because of political protection but because of structural protection. US law held when every Venezuelan institution around it failed. That is not a coincidence. It is the blueprint.

Venezuela sits very close to Miami. Capital will flow in. The question is whether it arrives with a governance structure equal to the threat, or whether it arrives the way it always has in captured states: trusting counterparties who already demonstrated, at extraordinary scale, that trust was the wrong instrument.

The SDNY indicted the man who sits in the Interior Ministry. The US Treasury sanctioned him. He is still in the building. Turkish construction conglomerates, Asian commodity traders, and European energy juniors are already positioning—without FCPA compliance costs, without fiduciary obligations, without LP reporting requirements. They will move faster. They will price lower. This is what happened in Iraq after 2003. It is what happened in Libya.

The architecture to do this differently exists. Human capital exists in the diaspora: eight million Venezuelans left and within them there are over a million that hold verifiable credentials embedded in US and European institutions, carrying the technical and legal knowledge to rebuild what was taken. The OFAC licensing framework exists. The proof of concept exists in CITGO’s survival. What does not yet exist is the decision—by US institutional capital—to arrive with a governance structure that the extraction network cannot penetrate. That decision is the only thing standing between reconstruction and a second extraction with better letterhead.

Stephen Curry is a free agent no more.

A sneaker free agent, that is.

The four-time NBA champion has spent his entire playing career with the Golden State Warriors and is under contract through the end of next season.

He has been playing without a shoe deal, however, since parting ways with Under Armour in November.

That won’t be the case when Curry starts his 18th NBA season in the fall. The man who holds the NBA record for most career three-pointers announced on Monday that his Curry Brand is teaming with Chinese sportswear and athletic equipment company Li-Ning for a partnership that is “bigger than a shoe deal” and “bigger than a signature series.”

”This is the partnership of a lifetime. The future of Curry Brand is with Li-Ning,” Curry wrote in a post announcing the deal on his Thirty Ink site. “I couldn’t be more proud to build a long-term vision with Li-Ning that will fuel Curry Brand for years to come and unlock the full potential of this company on a global scale.”

ESPN reports that the deal is for 10 years. Terms were not released.

Curry signed with Nike for the first four seasons of his career before switching to Under Armour in 2013. After announcing his sneaker free agency early in the 2025-26 season, Curry wore shoes from a variety of companies during warmups and games. In April, Curry auctioned off more than 70 pairs of those shoes through Sotheby’s, raising more than $1.7 million for his charitable foundation.

While many of his shoe choices had special significance — like when he honored Kobe and Gianna Bryant by warming up in Nike Kobe 6 Protro “Mambacita” sneakers — Curry also was doing his due diligence as a businessman.

“Throughout my sneaker free agency, I was impressed by the quality, comfort and performance of Li-Ning’s shoes,” Curry said. “It was during that time playing in Dwyane Wade and Jimmy Butler’s sneakers, that I knew that Li-Ning could be the right partner that can deliver on the innovation and design that I want Curry Brand to stand for.”

Li-Ning (the company) was founded by Li Ning — the Chinese gymnast who won six medals, including three gold, during the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics — in 1990. A handful of NBA players have signed with the company , starting with then-Cleveland Cavaliers guard Damon Jones in 2006 and also including former Clippers guard Baron Davis and future Hall of Famers Wade and Shaquille O’Neal.

In addition to Curry’s Golden State teammate Butler, other current NBA stars signed with Li-Ning include Atlanta’s C.J. McCollum and Washington’s D’Angelo Russell.

According to Curry, Li-Ning will open Curry Brand stores in the United States and China.

“We’ll be proudly building Curry Brand into a future leading company that will leave its mark in Basketball, in Golf and across the lifestyle space,” Curry wrote.

“We’ll aim to create game-changing products, launch elevated platforms and bring storytelling that will inspire young boys and girls around the globe. My hope is for young athletes to find the same purpose, joy and drive through sports that I’ve long enjoyed throughout this journey.”

Technology stocks led a broad market rally across China and Hong Kong on Tuesday as investors poured into artificial intelligence related companies despite continuing uncertainty surrounding developments in the Middle East.

The strongest gains came from major technology firms including Tencent and Meituan, helping push Hong Kong’s technology index to one of its biggest daily advances in months. The rally reflected growing investor confidence in China’s technology sector, particularly in artificial intelligence, even as markets monitored fragile diplomatic efforts and ceasefire discussions involving regional conflicts.

The performance highlights an increasingly important theme in global markets: investors are weighing geopolitical risks against the powerful growth narrative surrounding artificial intelligence and technology innovation.

Background

Chinese technology stocks have experienced a volatile few years marked by regulatory scrutiny, slowing economic growth, property market challenges, and shifting investor sentiment.

However, the global artificial intelligence boom has provided a fresh catalyst for the sector.

As major technology companies race to develop AI models, digital assistants, and enterprise applications, investors have increasingly focused on firms capable of benefiting from the next phase of technological transformation.

At the same time, geopolitical developments continue to influence market sentiment. Escalating tensions in the Middle East, concerns about energy prices, and broader uncertainty in global financial markets have periodically weighed on risk assets.

Against this backdrop, Tuesday’s rally suggests that technology driven growth expectations remain a dominant force in investor decision making.

What Happened?

Major Chinese and Hong Kong equity indices posted strong gains:

• Hong Kong’s Hang Seng Index rose 2.5 percent.
• The Hang Seng Tech Index surged 4.7 percent.
• China’s STAR 50 Index gained 1.6 percent.
• The ChiNext Index climbed 2.7 percent.
• The CSI300 advanced 1.5 percent.
• The Shanghai Composite Index increased 0.4 percent.

Technology stocks were the primary drivers of the rally.

Tencent shares jumped more than 10 percent following reports that the company is moving closer to launching an artificial intelligence agent integrated into WeChat, China’s largest social media and messaging platform.

Meituan also gained strongly after investors reacted positively to signs that intense competition in China’s food delivery industry may be beginning to ease.

The rally extended beyond technology, with artificial intelligence related shares and non ferrous metal companies also recording significant gains.

Tencent’s AI Push Captures Investor Attention

Why Tencent’s Move Matters

The strongest market reaction centered on Tencent.

Reports suggesting that the company is nearing the launch of an AI agent for WeChat generated excitement because of the platform’s enormous user base of approximately 1.4 billion people.

If successfully deployed, such an AI assistant could become one of the largest consumer facing artificial intelligence applications in the world.

The development is significant because AI competition is increasingly shifting from standalone chatbots toward integration within existing digital ecosystems.

Companies that already possess massive user networks may have advantages in scaling AI services rapidly.

The Strategic Importance of WeChat

WeChat occupies a unique position within China’s digital economy.

The platform combines messaging, payments, shopping, business services, entertainment, and social networking into a single ecosystem.

Integrating AI directly into this environment could significantly enhance user engagement while creating new revenue opportunities through advertising, commerce, and premium services.

Investors appear to be viewing Tencent’s AI ambitions as a potentially transformative growth driver.

Why Meituan’s Gains Matter

Signs of Competitive Stabilization

Meituan’s rise may appear surprising given its latest quarterly loss.

However, investors focused less on earnings and more on indications that subsidy driven competition in China’s rapid delivery sector is beginning to moderate.

For much of the past year, food delivery companies have engaged in aggressive pricing battles designed to capture market share.

While beneficial for consumers, these strategies have pressured corporate profitability.

Evidence that the competitive environment is stabilizing could improve future earnings prospects across the sector.

Shift Toward Profitability

Investors often reward companies when they believe industry conditions are becoming more rational.

For Meituan, expectations of reduced subsidy spending may be viewed as a pathway toward stronger margins and improved financial performance.

The AI Investment Narrative Continues

Artificial Intelligence Remains a Global Theme

One of the most important lessons from Tuesday’s rally is that artificial intelligence continues to dominate market thinking.

Despite geopolitical uncertainty, investors remain eager to identify companies positioned to benefit from AI adoption.

This trend is not limited to the United States.

Chinese technology firms are increasingly being evaluated based on their ability to develop competitive AI products, infrastructure, and services.

Zhipu AI’s Listing Plans

Another development attracting attention was the announcement that Zhipu AI intends to pursue a domestic stock market listing in Shanghai.

The move highlights growing confidence among Chinese AI firms and demonstrates the sector’s increasing importance within China’s capital markets.

A successful listing could further strengthen investor interest in domestic AI development.

The Middle East Factor

Why Investors Remain Cautious

Although technology optimism drove markets higher, geopolitical developments remain a significant source of uncertainty.

Investors continue monitoring negotiations involving the United States, Iran, Israel, and regional actors.

Potential disruptions to energy markets remain a key concern because rising oil prices can increase inflation pressures and slow economic growth globally.

Markets Are Balancing Two Competing Forces

Current market behavior reflects a balancing act.

On one side are geopolitical risks, including conflict, energy market volatility, and diplomatic uncertainty.

On the other side is enthusiasm surrounding technological innovation and artificial intelligence.

Tuesday’s rally suggests that, at least for now, investors believe technology driven growth opportunities outweigh immediate geopolitical concerns.

Analysis: Why China’s Technology Sector Is Regaining Momentum

The significance of Tuesday’s rally extends beyond a single trading session.

It reflects a broader reassessment of China’s technology sector.

For several years, investors viewed Chinese technology companies primarily through the lens of regulatory risk, slowing growth, and geopolitical tensions.

Today, artificial intelligence is changing that narrative.

Investors increasingly see Chinese firms as participants in a global technological transformation rather than merely domestic internet companies.

Tencent’s gains illustrate this shift particularly well.

The market reaction was not driven by short term earnings or cost cutting measures. Instead, it was driven by expectations regarding future technological capabilities and growth potential.

Another important factor is capital flows.

China remains one of the few major emerging markets attracting investment across equities, bonds, and currencies simultaneously. This provides a supportive backdrop for asset prices even when external risks remain elevated.

At the same time, investors should not ignore underlying challenges.

China’s economy continues to face pressures from weak consumer demand, property sector difficulties, and slower growth compared with previous decades.

Artificial intelligence enthusiasm may boost valuations, but sustained market strength will ultimately require broader economic improvement.

Nevertheless, Tuesday’s performance suggests that global investors increasingly view China’s technology sector as a key participant in the AI revolution rather than merely a recovery story.

Future Scenarios

Scenario One: AI Momentum Continues

Technology companies successfully launch new AI products and attract additional investment.

This could drive further gains across China’s technology sector and strengthen market sentiment.

Scenario Two: Economic Weakness Limits Gains

Artificial intelligence enthusiasm remains strong, but broader economic challenges constrain corporate earnings and consumer spending.

Technology stocks continue rising, though at a slower pace.

Scenario Three: Geopolitical Risks Reemerge

Escalating tensions in the Middle East or worsening global economic conditions trigger risk aversion.

Investors shift away from growth assets, leading to increased market volatility.

What’s Next?

Investors will closely watch Tencent’s progress in launching AI features for WeChat and monitor adoption rates if the product is introduced.

Attention will also focus on upcoming earnings reports, AI related announcements, and developments surrounding Zhipu AI’s planned listing.

Beyond technology, markets will continue evaluating geopolitical developments in the Middle East and their potential impact on energy prices and global investor sentiment.

The interaction between technological optimism and geopolitical uncertainty is likely to remain one of the defining themes for financial markets throughout the coming months.

Conclusion

Tuesday’s rally demonstrates that artificial intelligence remains one of the most powerful forces shaping global investment decisions. Strong gains in Tencent, Meituan, and other technology companies highlight growing confidence in China’s ability to participate in the next phase of AI driven innovation.

While geopolitical risks continue to create uncertainty, investors appear increasingly willing to look beyond short term tensions and focus on long term technological opportunities. Whether this momentum can be sustained will depend not only on AI breakthroughs but also on the broader health of China’s economy and the stability of the global geopolitical environment.

With information from Reuters.

Department of Commerce issues guidance on chip restrictions amid concerns about loopholes in export control regime.

The United States has issued a notice affirming its restrictions on shipments of semiconductors to subsidiaries of Chinese companies located outside China amid concerns about loopholes in Washington’s export control regime.

The Department of Commerce said in the guidance issued on Sunday that its licensing requirements for the export of advanced AI chips applied to all businesses with headquarters or a parent company in China.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), which falls under the Commerce Department, said it issued the clarification in response to questions about whether it was enforcing preexisting licence requirements after it had overturned former President Joe Biden’s AI Diffusion Framework.

“The answer is yes,” the BIS said in the notice.

Unveiled in the final days of the Biden administration, the AI Diffusion proposed the implementation of a globe-spanning framework to control access to AI chips, including export caps for all but the closest US allies.

The framework drew backlash from tech firms, including Nvidia, the world’s most valuable chip company, which cast the proposal as a threat to innovation and cross-border collaboration.

President Donald Trump’s administration scrapped the framework last May, ahead of its implementation, citing the “burdensome new regulatory requirements” and the harm it would do to Washington’s diplomatic relations with other countries.

Chip giant Nvidia, whose top-of-the-line Blackwell GPUs are banned for export to China, said it had already been operating in keeping with the clarified rules.

“The guidance reaffirms that NVIDIA’s sales and vetting process is correct – consistent with our existing approach, licences are required to ship controlled products to PRC headquartered companies,” a Nvidia spokesperson told Al Jazeera, using the acronym for the People’s Republic of China.

AMD and Intel, Nvidia’s main competitors in the GPU space, did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

TSMC, which manufactures the most advanced chips on behalf of clients such as Nvidia, did not immediately return an email seeking comment.

The BIS also did not respond to inquiries.

Chris McGuire, a former State Department official who worked on technology policy in the Biden administration, accused the Trump administration of providing Chinese companies a loophole to buy export-controlled chips.

“Chinese companies have been buying these chips, very likely at scale. And because BIS has not updated export control regulations to clearly state what it IS enforcing, all of this was legal,” McGuire said in a post on X.

“This clarification does make clear that Blackwell shipments to China-headquartered companies outside of China are now illegal again – which is good, although obviously we have to see how many shipments have already gone to assess how much damage was done,” McGuire said.

“BIS’ statement acknowledges these shipments have been happening when it says companies who bought chips under this loophole don’t have to stop using them.”

The US has rolled out numerous restrictions on the supply of high-end technology to China, as Washington and Beijing battle for dominance in AI.

In December, Trump announced that he would allow Nvidia to sell its H200 chip to China, in a major loosening of Washington’s export controls.

While not Nvidia’s most advanced chip, the H200 is about six times as powerful as the H20, the most advanced chip previously allowed for export to China.

Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi accuses China of lacking military transparency and stresses the importance of dialogue for regional stability.

Japanese Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi has dismissed claims that Tokyo is pursuing “new militarism” and accused China of rapidly expanding its military with limited transparency.

China continues to increase its defence spending at a high level, Koizumi said on Sunday at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore.

“China’s external approach and military activities are matters of serious concern for ⁠Japan and the international community at the same time,” he added.

“Think about it. There’s a country that has a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons and strategic bombers. Japan has neither of such weapons, and yet Japan is labelled ‘new militarism’?”

Koizumi said Japan’s record since World War II “speaks for itself”, citing its adherence ‌to international law and commitment to the United Nations Charter alongside efforts to uphold a “free and open international order”.

In May, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs called on Asia Pacific countries to be vigilant and “jointly resist the reckless actions of Japan’s neo-militarism”.

At the Singapore forum, Chinese delegate Major General Meng Xiangqing criticised Japan.

“I deeply doubt whether a country that has not thoroughly eradicated the toxic legacy of militarism is qualified to talk extensively about defence cooperation on international occasions and whether it can win the trust of the international community, especially ⁠the Asian countries it once invaded,” he said.

Ties between Japan and China sank to ⁠their worst level in years after Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi warned in November that a hypothetical Chinese attack on Taiwan could draw a Japanese military response.

China claims Taiwan as its own territory over the objections of the island’s government.

Koizumi said transparency comes from “discussion and dialogue” and lamented that China had not sent its defence minister to the conference, but he insisted Japan remains open to engagement.

“We keep the door open,” he said, reaffirming Japan’s ⁠commitment to dialogue with China and other regional players to foster stability.

As China has been rapidly expanding and modernising its military, Japan has been reshaping its own defence policy. Last month, Takaichi’s cabinet scrapped a ban on lethal weapons exports, a major change in its post-war pacifist policy.

Japan pushes for unity

Separately on Sunday, Koizumi praised US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth for his commitment to the Asia Pacific but at the same time stressed the continued need for strong coalitions globally.

“Division weakens deterrence. Unity strengthens deterrence,” he told the conference in Singapore.

“If gaps emerge among the United States, Europe and allies and like-minded countries, forces which take it as an opportunity will surely come in,” he said.

“We must prevent such a situation. We must keep our cooperation going on. Now is the time to make our cooperation even stronger.”

US President Donald Trump has been harsh about fellow members in NATO, and the comments at the Shangri-La conference came the day after Hegseth again chided Western European allies at the forum for not devoting enough resources to defence.

China’s decision to send a largely academic delegation instead of senior defence leadership to the Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore has been described by Australia as a missed opportunity for strategic engagement at a time of rising regional tensions.

Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles said the Asia Pacific region needs greater strategic reassurance from Beijing, particularly given China’s ongoing military expansion and its growing influence across the Indo Pacific.

The Shangri La Dialogue is the region’s most prominent defence and security forum, bringing together senior ministers, military leaders, and policymakers from across the world to discuss security challenges and regional stability.

For the second consecutive year, China’s Defence Minister Dong Jun did not attend the meeting, with Beijing instead sending a delegation made up mainly of academics and military experts.

Why It Matters

The absence of senior Chinese defence officials comes at a sensitive moment for regional security dynamics.

Australia and its allies have repeatedly raised concerns about China’s rapid military buildup, which is widely regarded as the largest conventional expansion since the Second World War. Regional governments argue that this military growth has not been matched by sufficient transparency or reassurance about China’s long term intentions.

The lack of direct high level engagement at forums such as the Shangri La Dialogue limits opportunities to reduce misunderstandings, build trust, and manage rising tensions through dialogue.

For countries in the Indo Pacific, especially smaller states, the absence of senior Chinese representation can increase uncertainty about regional security and long term strategic balance.

Key Stakeholders

China

China’s approach reflects a more controlled engagement strategy in defence diplomacy, relying on lower profile participation while continuing to expand military capabilities and regional influence.

Australia

Australia views sustained dialogue as essential for regional stability, while simultaneously strengthening its alliance with the United States and deepening defence cooperation across the Indo Pacific.

United States

The United States remains a central security partner in the region and continues to position itself as a counterbalance to China’s military rise through alliances and defence agreements.

Regional Partners

Countries such as Japan, the Philippines, Malaysia, and others attending the forum are closely watching China’s engagement level as they navigate their own security concerns in a shifting regional order.

Future Outlook

If China continues limiting senior level participation in regional defence forums, diplomatic channels for managing tensions in the Indo Pacific may become more constrained. This could increase reliance on bilateral alliances and military deterrence rather than multilateral dialogue.

At the same time, ongoing military expansion by China will likely keep regional security concerns elevated, particularly among Southeast Asian and Pacific nations.

However, if future editions of the Shangri La Dialogue see higher level Chinese participation, it could open pathways for improved communication and reduced strategic mistrust.

For now, the gap between China’s military rise and its diplomatic engagement remains a key concern for regional powers seeking stability in an increasingly competitive Indo Pacific environment.

With information from Reuters.

Tensions between China and the EU have intensified in recent months, prompting the European Commission to convene most of its commissioners for a strategic rethink during an “orientation debate” on Friday.

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“China is a critical partner, and engagement and dialogue will continue,” the commission said in a readout following the debate. “At the same time the current state of the trade and investment relationship is not sustainable.”

Calling the relationship “not sustainable” may understate the depth of the rupture.

Relations have steadily deteriorated since European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen branded Beijing a “systemic rival” in a landmark 2023 speech. But tensions surged to a new level once EU policymakers finally settled their differences over the EU-US trade deal that had consumed Brussels for months, freeing the bloc to sharpen its focus on China.

Last year, according to the commission, the bloc registered a record-high €359.9 billion trade deficit with Beijing, fuelling growing calls in Brussels to better protect the EU market from cheap Chinese imports that threaten entire sectors — metals, chemicals and the car industry among them.

“We are seeing a panic attack in the last few weeks on China,” an EU official told Euronews, speaking on condition of anonymity to speak candidly. The official added that the China issue had been “overlooked for too long.”

A total of 200,000 European jobs were lost in EU industry — particularly in the energy-intensive and automotive sectors — since 2024, with a further 600,000 job losses projected this decade in carmaking alone.

On Friday, the commission readout specified that its “overarching approach remains de-risking, not decoupling,” signalling that the bloc is still pursuing targeted efforts to reduce its dependence on China rather than sever economic ties altogether. Yet the risk of a full-scale trade war has never felt so real.

Here are five key points on how the situation has escalated to this point — and where it may be headed next :

1. Fines and regulatory pressure

During the previous legislative term, the EU passed legislation that drew Beijing’s anger — notably measures to screen foreign direct investment. And it has stepped up its fight against so-called dumping, whereby public subsidies are used to undercut competitors through exports sold below market prices in China.

The European Commission has grown increasingly assertive in countering China’s subsidy-driven approach, including by imposing duties on imports of battery electric vehicles. Several product-specific investigations are also ongoing.

Earlier this week, the Commission fined Chinese e-commerce giant Temu €200 million for selling unsafe products and opened a full-scale investigation into JD.com’s acquisition of e-commerce retailer MediaMarkt.

EU lawmakers and governments are also discussing the Industrial Accelerator Act, a legislative proposal that would impose strict conditions on investments in batteries, electric vehicles, solar panels and critical raw materials from countries controlling 40% of the global market share in a given sector.

A separate proposal — a revamped Cybersecurity Act — could push out Chinese equipment suppliers such as Huawei and ZTE from critical infrastructure.

2. A more systemic approach

To counter Chinese overcapacities, the EU agreed in April to double tariffs on steel imports that exceed EU quotas. The measure is a so-called “safeguard” — a tool backed by some of the EU’s largest economies, including France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Lithuania, which called for it to be extended to sectors beyond metals.

In a non-paper, those countries argued that safeguards were more “agile” than other EU instruments targeting cheap export products. The paper also calls for economic security to be factored into assessments of the EU’s interests when deciding on trade defence measures.

The European industry is also ramping up pressure to crack down on Chinese cheap imports calling on the Commission to use trade defence measures “more flexibly, faster, and preventively.”

A major wake-up call for EU policymakers has been the recent case of Nexperia, a Dutch-based chipmaker acquired by Chinese giant Wingtech, which was caught in the crossfire of US-China trade tensions, causing significant disruption in the automotive sector.

The Commission is now set to require sectors such as the car industry to diversify chip suppliers in certain cases, taking supply-chain risks into account in procurement decisions.

Despite these various initiatives, EU policymakers have grown wary that the current rules are too slow-moving for a fast-moving adversary. After duties were imposed on electric vehicle batteries, China’s focus simply shifted to hybrid vehicles.

Brussels is now moving towards a more systemic approach, treating trade defence as a toolbox to rebalance relations with China. One potential addition is a so-called overcapacity instrument to cap imports in specific sectors.

3. China’s threats of retaliation

In recent weeks, China has repeatedly threatened retaliation if the EU presses ahead with closing its market to Chinese goods.

Both the “Made in Europe” legislation and the Cybersecurity Act have drawn Beijing’s ire, prompting intensified lobbying of Brussels and EU member states, with warnings that implementation will trigger a response.

The Europeans are walking a tightrope, acutely aware that their decisions could spark a trade war. After the EU imposed tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles in 2024, Beijing imposed tariffs on EU pork, brandy and dairy products.

“International trade is a two-way street. There’s no forced trade. The China-EU trade relations are win-win in nature. China does not aim for trade surplus,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said at a press briefing on Thursday.

“The EU needs to put trade ties with China in perspective and honour its commitment to free trade. China will closely follow the EU’s moves and take all measures necessary to safeguard legitimate rights and interests,” Ning added.

Some argue it is already too late for the Europeans, who depend on China for key components of their supply chains — components Beijing can weaponize at will.

In 2025, China blocked exports of rare earths, which are vital for EU green technology and defence, as well as chips essential to the European car industry. Beijing can also leverage operating licences for EU companies and restrict access to its market at any time.

4. European divisions

Europe is far from united on China.

Germany, despite a troubling trade deficit with Beijing, has been slow to shift away from its cooperative approach, which prioritises securing market access for German companies in China.

Berlin did not endorse last weekend’s non-paper backed by other major EU economies. Instead, German Economy Minister Katherina Reiche repeated this week that Germany’s overriding priority is to avoid jeopardising exports to China.

Yet the economic cost of dependence on Beijing might be forcing Berlin to reconsider its stance. The German government is reportedly weighing a tougher line that would mark a significant shift in its China policy.

For years, the German industry had a relationship with the Chinese market that critics described as toxic — one that blocked any meaningful attempt to rebalance the trade deficit out of fear of losing commercial access to the vast Asian market.

Spain has emerged as the other major EU country reluctant to act against China. With relatively cheap energy costs, Spain has become attractive to foreign investors, of which Beijing accounts for a growing share.

Its position caused embarrassment for Madrid this week, after it initially appeared to support the France-led non-paper before retreating and claiming it had merely participated in discussions.

“There has been no specific political support for any ‘non-paper’,” Spanish trade minister Carlos Cuerpo said, adding that the EU should “engage” with Chinese authorities through “dialogue.”

5. What happens now?

Brussels’ reassessment of its China stance has been long in the making, rooted in decades of deepening economic dependence. But the latest acceleration was also prompted by a shift in US posture, most visibly the recent visit to Beijing by President Donald Trump.

The Commission’s orientation debate on Friday was just a first step in what could become a broader repositioning. Where that leads — given internal divisions and the threat of retaliation — remains deeply uncertain.

The conclusions of that exercise are expected to feed into a discussion on economic security at the next European Council meeting on 18-19 June. China has appeared on EU leaders’ agenda several times in recent years, only to be pushed aside by more pressing crises.

While Brussels considers adding new instruments to its policy toolbox, political will remains the key determining factor. Nowhere is that gap more stark than in the EU’s handling of the anti-coercion instrument, also known as the “trade bazooka,” which was designed to push back against economic pressure and unfair trade restrictions.

“The anti-coercive instrument was never used, even though we have been coerced quite a lot,” the EU official said. “We need tools that we are actually willing to use.”

German Trade Minister Katherina Reiche is travelling to China from Tuesday to Friday as Berlin’s trade deficit with Beijing continues to deepen.

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The trip comes two days after several of the EU’s largest economies – France, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, as well as Lithuania – issued a non-paper urging the EU to crack down on Chinese overcapacity and unfair trade practices.

Berlin, however, did not endorse their call.

Germany remains the main chokepoint in the EU’s strategy towards China. While Euronews previously reported that the publication late last year of Germany’s trade deficit with Beijing marked a turning point for the EU executive, which is trying to sharpen its trade defence tools, Germany continues to favour cooperation with the Chinese.

In March, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz called for a trade agreement with Beijing. Brussels pushed back against the idea.

“There are a number of concerns and real challenges that the European Union has consistently expressed to China that we need to see them meaningfully address before we can even talk about any future agreements or anything like that,” the Commission’s deputy chief spokesperson, Olof Gill, said at the time.

Even with a record €87 billion trade deficit with China, Berlin hopes Beijing will keep its market open to German industry, despite the obstacles faced by EU businesses in China and the Asian giant’s strategy of reducing its dependence on foreign products.

Access to China’s market

The main objective of Reiche’s visit this week is to discuss potential economic cooperation. According to the German government, the strategy is to explore future opportunities for collaboration while maintaining dialogue with the Chinese leadership.

Despite a steadily growing trade deficit, China remained Germany’s most important trading partner in 2025. According to the Federal Statistical Office, bilateral trade volume reached €250 billion. Around 5,200 German companies operate in China, making the country one of the most important foreign markets for Germany’s automotive, mechanical engineering and electrical industries.

During the trip, Reiche is expected to hold political talks, attend a business forum and visit local companies. She will be accompanied by a business delegation representing around 40 companies. Discussions are also set to focus on the development of energy technologies.

“We hope the visit will help to transfer the insights gained on the ground into the political discussion in Berlin and to further develop bilateral exchange,” said Oliver Oehms, Executive Director of the German Chamber of Commerce in China.

In a survey published in May by the chamber, 51% of German companies operating in China supported policies favouring partnerships with Chinese companies, while 42% backed the “strategic” use of knowledge gained through such partnerships.

But these sectors are also increasingly under pressure, as Chinese competitors benefit from extensive state subsidies.

According to a report published in May by the EU think tank Centre for European Reform, the growing concentration of global car, machinery and chemicals production in China could weaken innovation in traditional manufacturing hubs and increase Beijing’s leverage over Berlin through the threat of supply disruptions, similar to its blockade of rare earth exports in 2025.

The report added that demand generated by Germany’s fiscal stimulus after easing its debt brake could end up boosting Chinese imports rather than supporting Berlin’s domestic industry.

German exports to China fell by 9.7% year-on-year, while imports of Chinese goods such as electronics, electric vehicles and components rose significantly by 8.8%.

“China has already eaten much of German industry’s lunch and is preparing to start on dinner,” the report said.

An eyewitness captured the moment a car fell into a river as a bridge collapsed in China. Local media says the vehicle had broken down and couldn’t reverse, and the occupants got out before floodwaters swept it away.

Western governments are pouring tens of billions of dollars into critical minerals projects as they attempt to reduce dependence on China for materials essential to clean energy, defence technology and advanced manufacturing.

But industry executives, analysts and investors are increasingly warning that poorly coordinated state-backed investment could create severe oversupply problems similar to past commodity booms that ended in market crashes.

The concerns come as countries including the United States, Australia, European Union and Japan accelerate efforts to build strategic reserves and expand production of rare earths and other critical minerals.

Governments Ramp Up Critical Minerals Spending

The United States has committed more than $20 billion toward critical minerals development through multiple financing programmes, including Project Vault, a strategic stockpiling initiative worth around $10 billion.

Australia has also allocated at least A$13 billion to support critical minerals projects and reserves through several government-backed programmes.

These investments are designed to secure supplies of metals used in electric vehicles, semiconductors, renewable energy systems, aerospace equipment and military technologies.

Particular attention has focused on rare earth elements, a group of 17 metals essential for producing powerful magnets used in advanced defence systems and high-tech manufacturing.

Although the global rare earths market was valued at only about $6.4 billion in 2024, combined Western financial commitments to rare earth projects have already exceeded that figure.

Fears Grow Over Potential Oversupply

Mining executives and analysts warn that aggressive subsidies and overlapping national strategies could eventually flood global markets with excess supply.

Brett Beatty of Resource Capital Funds said the biggest danger lies in governments pursuing independent strategies without coordination.

According to Beatty, simultaneous efforts to rapidly increase production could create volumes far beyond global demand, ultimately crushing prices and undermining the very industries governments are trying to build.

Analysts drew comparisons to historical commodity gluts, including Europe’s “butter mountains” of the 1980s, Russian aluminium oversupply and Australia’s wool crisis, where subsidies and state support distorted markets and triggered sharp price collapses.

Rare Earth Market Could Face Surplus Pressures

Consultancy Project Blue warned that several rare earth markets are already on track to move into surplus over the coming years due to expanding state-backed production.

However, analyst David Merriman said governments may still be able to avoid major imbalances if they carefully adjust subsidies, stockpiling programmes and guaranteed purchasing arrangements.

Industry leaders say current stockpiles remain relatively small, limiting immediate risks of market disruption.

Lynas Rare Earths CEO Amanda Lacaze recently said rare earth stockpiles around the world remain modest and are not yet large enough to destabilise markets.

Australian Resources Minister Madeleine King also argued that today’s critical minerals policies differ significantly from past commodity intervention failures because they are more targeted and linked to long-term industrial supply chains.

Global Coordination Emerging Among Western Allies

Concerns about duplication and oversupply are pushing Western governments toward greater policy coordination.

The Group of Seven is reportedly discussing the creation of a permanent secretariat focused on coordinating critical mineral strategies and ensuring continuity between rotating national presidencies.

Industry experts say such coordination could help prevent destructive competition between allied nations while supporting more stable investment planning.

Lessons From Congo and Indonesia

Governments outside the West have already experimented with aggressive intervention in mineral markets.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo boosted cobalt prices by introducing export quotas and stockpiling measures designed to increase mining revenues.

While the policy initially lifted prices, analysts warn prolonged restrictions could encourage manufacturers to seek alternative materials or suppliers.

Similarly, Indonesia dramatically expanded its dominance in nickel production after banning exports of raw nickel ore in 2020 to force domestic processing investment.

Indonesia’s production surged within just a few years, but authorities have since struggled with falling prices and oversupply, forcing Jakarta to tighten mining quotas and centralise export controls.

These examples highlight the difficulty governments face in balancing national industrial ambitions with long-term market stability.

Analysis

The global race for critical minerals is increasingly becoming a strategic contest shaped as much by geopolitics as by economics.

Western governments view supply chain independence as essential after years of relying heavily on China for processing capacity and rare earth production. The push is not simply about commercial competition — it is tied directly to national security, technological leadership and energy transition goals.

However, the very scale of state intervention now unfolding raises the risk of creating distorted markets. If multiple governments simultaneously subsidise production, guarantee prices and build stockpiles without coordination, supply could rapidly outpace actual industrial demand.

That scenario would likely trigger sharp price declines, weaken private investment and potentially create another boom-and-bust cycle in the mining sector.

At the same time, the market dynamics of critical minerals differ from traditional commodities. Many of these materials are essential for emerging technologies, and demand is expected to rise significantly over the next two decades as countries expand renewable energy infrastructure, battery production and semiconductor manufacturing.

This means governments are not only competing to secure supply today but also positioning themselves for future industrial dominance.

Another key challenge is that refining and processing capabilities remain heavily concentrated in China. Even if Western countries succeed in expanding mining output, they may still depend on Chinese infrastructure unless domestic processing networks are developed alongside extraction projects.

The growing emphasis on “friend-shoring” and allied supply chains reflects an attempt to address this vulnerability.

Industry experts also point to a more sustainable model emerging through byproduct extraction. Instead of building entirely new mines based purely on high prices, companies are increasingly looking to recover critical minerals from existing industrial operations, reducing the risk of uncontrolled supply growth.

Projects involving Alcoa, Sojitz and Trafigura illustrate how governments and corporations are experimenting with lower-risk approaches to expanding supply.

Ultimately, the success of Western critical minerals strategies may depend less on how much money governments spend and more on whether they can coordinate policies, manage supply carefully and build integrated processing ecosystems capable of competing with China over the long term.

With information from Reuters.

Cuba has announced the first shipment in an expected donation from China of about 60,000 tonnes of rice, as the Caribbean island contends with an ongoing humanitarian crisis.

In a series of social media posts on Sunday, Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel confirmed that the first load of 15,000 tonnes had arrived a day earlier in the port of Havana.

He also expressed “deep gratitude” to China, as well as to members of the European Parliament who denounced the pressure campaign his government faces.

Since January, the United States has increased its sanctions against Cuba, as part of a hardline turn under the second term of President Donald Trump.

“Thank you very much for the solidarity, and for the firm and unequivocal condemnation of the collective punishment to which our people are being subjected,” Diaz-Canel wrote, likening Cuba’s situation to “genocide”.

While Trump has sought to check China’s growing influence on Latin America, Cuba has increasingly relied on the Asian superpower for assistance.

Already, China has donated solar panels to Cuba to help update its ageing energy grid and transition the island away from fossil fuels. Currently, Cuba relies on imports for nearly 60 percent of its oil supply, according to the International Energy Agency.

But since the start of the year, the Trump administration has largely blocked the export of oil to Cuba.

The de facto oil blockade began shortly after January 3, when the US launched a military operation to abduct and imprison Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro.

Trump followed that operation with the announcement that no more oil or funds would be transferred from Venezuela to Cuba.

By the end of the month, he had also issued an executive order identifying Cuba as an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to the US and threatening economic penalties to any country that supplies it with oil.

Since then, only a single Russian tanker has been permitted to reach the island. Earlier this month, Energy Minister Vicente de la O Levy announced that the island had exhausted its oil supplies.

While Cuba is no stranger to power outages, the recent crisis has caused island-wide blackouts and has brought public services — including transportation and medical care — to a standstill in many areas.

But Trump has continued to impose sanctions on the island’s communist government, in an apparent effort to force regime change.

Media reports have indicated he has sought Diaz-Canel’s resignation and would be open to a situation akin to Venezuela’s, where Maduro’s government has been left largely intact, though Maduro himself has been replaced.

Trump has also repeatedly suggested he may consider a military response should Cuba fail to give in to his demands, though his administration has sent mixed messages about possible intervention on the island.

“Other presidents have looked at this for 50, 60 years, doing something, and it looks like I’ll be the one that does it,” Trump said last week from the Oval Office.

Negotiations between the two countries, however, are likely to be strained after the Trump administration unveiled a murder indictment against Cuba’s former president, Raul Castro, for the 1996 downing of two planes run by Cuban exiles.

Since the 1960s, Cuba has been under a sweeping US trade embargo that has weakened its economy.

US officials, however, have blamed the Cuban government for economic mismanagement and the oppression of its people, particularly political dissidents.

Earlier this month, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio disclosed that the Trump administration offered $100m in humanitarian aid to Cuba, on the condition it implement “meaningful reforms”.

In Sunday’s posts, however, Diaz-Canel sought to project defiance in the face of Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign.

“The ‘maximum pressure’ strategy — which some in the US morbidly trumpet — is part of a strategy intended to justify the false narrative of an impending collapse, and thereby pave the way for military intervention,” he wrote.

Diaz-Canel added that Cuba would continue to strengthen its ties with the US’s economic and political rival, China.

“The cherished bonds of friendship and cooperation that unite us grow stronger in these crucial times,” he said.

Strategic ambiguity, the US policy of neither explicitly supporting nor opposing Taiwanese independence, has been considered effective for decades in maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait. However, the summit between Trump and Xi Jinping on May 14-15, 2026, in Beijing revealed signs that this formula’s effectiveness is beginning to be limited. China pushed the US not merely to “not support” but to actively “oppose” Taiwanese independence. The US responded by displaying an inconsistent position. Taiwan openly asserted its sovereignty. All three responses emerged within less than 24 hours, and no international forum was able to manage the contradictions.

AT His strategic ambiguity is not simply a matter of US foreign policy. It reflects deeper limitations in the global governance system in addressing unresolved sovereignty issues. At the same time, China is actively promoting an alternative world order through its Belt and Road Initiative, non-interventionist principles, and multipolarity agenda, which indirectly influence how the Taiwan issue is positioned on the international stage. Without a concrete framework for joint governance, the potential for miscalculations across the Taiwan Strait will continue to increase.

On May 16, 2026, the day after Trump left Beijing, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued an official statement. Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation. It is not under Chinese rule. This statement was not new rhetoric.

What makes this significant is the context. Trump had just called a $14 billion arms sale to Taiwan a bargaining chip in negotiations with Xi Jinping. China had just successfully pushed the US to soften its tone on Taiwan. In less than 24 hours, three main actors make statements that cannot all be true at the same time. And there is no one international institution that has the authority to decide which is more valid.

This isn’t a sudden diplomatic failure. It’s the result of a policy of strategic ambiguity that has been in place for more than five decades and is now beginning to show its limitations.

Strategic ambiguity was once effective because all parties had an incentive not to test its limits. That situation is changing. China is becoming increasingly assertive. militarily and increasingly actively shaping an alternative global order. Taiwan is becoming more assertive in claiming its political identity. The US under Trump is increasingly unpredictable. In these conditions, the ambiguity that once served as a buffer for stability has now become a source of uncertainty. The global governance system lacks adequate instruments to fill the gaps left by this increasingly outdated formula.

Starting from the background, a US strategic ambiguity towards Taiwan was born of deliberate compromise. In the Shanghai Communique (1972), Washington used the word “recognizes” China’s position that Taiwan is part of China, not “accepts.” The difference in vocabulary was no accident. It opened diplomatic normalization with Beijing without formally abandoning Taipei.

This formula was then codified through the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 and three joint US-China communiques. During the Cold War era and the two decades that followed, this formula remained relatively stable because China was not yet strong enough to challenge it militarily and Taiwan was not yet confident enough to challenge it politically. As noted by T.Y. Wang in the journal Politics and Policy, strategic ambiguity is designed not only to deter China from attacking Taiwan but also to restrain Taiwan from taking steps that Beijing might deem provocative.

But the conditions that made that formula effective have changed structurally. Taiwan’s democratization since the 1990s has produced a political identity increasingly independent of the “One China” narrative. The PLA’s military modernization has changed the cost calculations of conflict. And Trump’s return to the White House has brought a transactional approach that, as noted by the Global Taiwan Institute, exacerbates existing ambiguities with conflicting signals that are record arms sales accompanied by a striking rhetorical silence on US security commitments to Taiwan.

On the ground, this uncertainty has already resulted in a measured escalation. Military exercises: Justice Mission 2025 In December 2025, a full-scale blockade of Taiwan was simulated, with over 90 aircraft crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait in a single day. These median line violations were not an anomaly. Since 2022, they have become increasingly routine and have rarely elicited an organized response from the international community.

The most important part to understand next is about the One China Policy. The One China Policy affirms that a single label includes three irreconcilable positions. Beijing maintains that Taiwan is an unreturned province and that reunification is a non-negotiable goal. Taipei maintains that the Republic of China (ROC) is a sovereign state that predates the People’s Republic of China and that the two have never ruled each other. Washington maintains its own version, based on the Taiwan Relations Act, that recognizes Beijing’s position without explicitly endorsing it.

These three positions exist simultaneously because they have never been tested in an international forum that has the authority to decide which is more valid. Brookings Institution; he noted that this policy was originally designed for a period when China was not yet acting like a revisionist power. Now, conditions have changed, and the old formula requires a recalibration that has yet to materialize.

There’s a compelling argument here. Strategic ambiguity has also served as a deterrent to war. It prevents China from attacking because it’s unsure whether the US will intervene. It also prevents Taiwan from declaring formal independence because it’s unsure whether the US would defend it. In this logic, ambiguity is a feature, not a bug.

However, analyst Brandon K. Yoder in the European Journal of International Relations, The effectiveness of deterrence hinges on credibility, which is currently eroding. When Trump called weapons for Taiwan a “negotiating chip,” he indirectly communicated to Beijing that the US commitment was conditional. When commitments are conditional, their deterrent effect is significantly weakened.

What results is not new stability, but rather an increasingly unpredictable gray area. Each party operates based on its own assumptions about the limits that can be tested. Without governance mechanisms that explicitly clarify these limits, the risk of miscalculation continues to grow.

The Taiwan issue cannot be read in isolation from China’s broader agenda of reshaping the global order. Over the past two decades, Beijing has not only protested the existing international system but also actively developed an alternative.

The Belt and Road Initiative, which now encompasses more than 140 countries, is more than just an infrastructure project. As analyzed in China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies, BRI serves as both a governance and economic mechanism, linking infrastructure development with new standards of connectivity and cooperation that reflect the Chinese model of development without political conditions.

Beyond the BRI, China is actively pushing three major initiatives: the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Governance Initiative. They share a common thread that is strengthening the norm of sovereignty, rejecting intervention based on Western values, and promoting multipolarity as a substitute for single-party hegemony. Bruegel noted that the concept of “Community with a Shared Future for Mankind” popularized by Xi at Davos 2017 has even been included in several UN General Assembly resolutions, demonstrating how far China has succeeded in pushing its global narrative into multilateral institutions.

The relevance to the Taiwan issue is that the more countries accept China’s sovereignty-based, non-interference-based governance framework, the more limited the space for international mechanisms to challenge Beijing’s claims to Taiwan. China’s global governance agenda and its claims to Taiwan are not separate issues. They are part of the same project: redefining who has the right to set the rules of the game in what have traditionally been called “internal affairs.”

This also makes Trump’s and Xi’s bilateral approach a more suitable instrument for China’s interests. When the Taiwan issue is managed through negotiations between the two great powers, broader norms, such as the right to self-determination and representation of sovereign entities, are not discussed. Observer Research Foundation noted that BRI cooperation with the UN from 2015 to 2019 was more about mutual legitimacy than structural integration, and a similar pattern is seen in the way China uses multilateral forums to validate its diplomatic positions without actually committing to the process.

Trump’s and Xi’s meeting in May 2026 shows a pattern that deserves serious attention. That is, the Taiwan issue is now managed almost entirely outside the multilateral framework. There are no regional forums, no UN mechanisms, no activated joint protocols. There are just two leaders, two delegations, and an agenda far broader than just Taiwan.

Observation: Both sides reveal a glaring asymmetry. In China’s version, Taiwan is referred to as the “most important issue,” and Xi warned of potential conflict if handled incorrectly. In the US version, Taiwan is not mentioned at all. CSIS noted that the meeting resulted in a commitment to “strategic stability” without concrete instruments to realize it. The lack of crisis communication protocol. Limited incident management framework. There isn’t any commitment to refrain from provocative military exercises.

This is not simply a shortcoming of the meeting. It reflects a more systemic limitation. namely the limitations There is no sufficiently authoritative multilateral platform to address this issue. The UN Security Council is hampered by Beijing’s veto power. ASEAN adheres to the principle of non-intervention, which actually benefits China’s narrative. The G20 has no mandate to address sovereignty disputes.

The result is what could be called a governance deficit. This doesn’t mean there are no institutions, but rather that the existing ones are insufficiently effective for the situation. And it’s in this deficit that military escalation moves in to fill the space that structured diplomacy should be filling. Modern Diplomacy noted that the US approved an $11.1 billion arms package for Taiwan by 2025 while simultaneously sending ambiguous rhetorical signals, a combination that makes it difficult for both China and Taiwan to read exactly where the real line is.

The following three recommendations are not intended to resolve the Taiwan status question. Their purpose is more limited and more immediate. namely for reducing the risk of miscalculation before a minor incident escalates into an uncontrollable crisis. All three rely on existing political conditions and momentum.

First, the momentum of the Trump-Xi meeting should be used to establish a permanent, dedicated military crisis communication channel for incidents in the Taiwan Strait. The most relevant precedent is the Washington-Moscow hotline, established after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, precisely because the world had nearly come to war due to miscommunication, not intention. CNBC noted the May 2026 meeting resulted in a relatively constructive atmosphere between the two leaders. This is a rare window of opportunity and should be used for something concrete.

Second, Indonesia, as a BRICS member and ASEAN dialogue partner with a relatively balanced working relationship with Washington and Beijing, could propose a regional consultation forum focused on managing incidents in the Taiwan Strait. This would not be a forum to decide Taiwan’s status, but rather a technical mechanism for de-escalation procedures and crisis communication. ASEAN has the foundation for this through the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and Indonesia’s current position within BRICS provides added legitimacy in Beijing’s eyes.

Third, the US, China, Japan, and South Korea need to negotiate a joint commitment that no party will change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait through force. This is inspired by the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, which successfully committed European countries not to change their borders by force, despite many of their mutual distrust. The agreement did not resolve existing disputes, but it did raise the costs of escalation measurably. With Xi seeking economic stability before 2027 and Trump seeking to avoid military engagement far from the US mainland, both sides’ calculations are now more open to this type of commitment than in previous periods.

It can be concluded that strategic ambiguity is one of the most ingenious products of Cold War diplomacy. It maintained stability in the Taiwan Strait for decades, not by solving the problem, but by making all parties unsure whether testing its limits was a good idea.

The conditions that make that formula work are changing simultaneously. China is stronger and more assertive. Taiwan is more assertive in its political identity. And the US under Trump is sending signals that are more easily read as conditional than committed. These three changes are not occurring one after the other, but simultaneously, and the global governance system has not yet responded accordingly.

The Trump-Xi meeting in May 2026 is neither a turning point in the war nor a step toward a resolution. It is a reflection of the current situation: three actors with three different interpretations, no referee, and increasingly little room for error.

What’s needed isn’t a final solution on Taiwan’s status, as that won’t come anytime soon. What’s needed are concrete steps that reduce the risk of miscalculation while keeping all options open. Crisis channels, regional consultative forums, and non-escalation commitments are small steps but have clear historical precedent. The question is whether the political will for these small steps can still be found amidst the escalating rivalry.

President Xi Jinping has called on authorities nationwide to learn from the incident.

A gas explosion at a coal mine in China has killed at least 90 people.

State media Xinhua said 247 workers had been on duty underground when the blast ripped through the Liushenyu mine in Qinyuan county, Shanxi province, on Friday.

China’s coal mines are considered among the deadliest in the world due to poor safety standards, weak regulation, and corruption as companies seek to profit from the country’s rapidly expanding economy.

Rescue operations were ongoing as emergency crews continued searching for survivors of the explosion, the deadliest mining disaster reported in China in more than a decade.

The blast occurred shortly after a carbon monoxide alert was issued, with some reports claiming gas levels had exceeded safe limits.

According to state-run broadcaster CGTN, the person responsible for overseeing the mine has been arrested while authorities investigate the cause of the explosion.

President Xi Jinping has urged authorities across China to intensify efforts to prevent major accidents in the wake of Friday’s blast.

“All regions and departments must learn from the lessons of the accident, remain vigilant regarding workplace safety, thoroughly investigate, rectify all types of risks and hidden dangers, and resolutely prevent and curb the occurrence of major and serious accidents,” Xi said.

Video footage posted online from the scene showed several ambulances gathered near the mine.

Shanxi province, where the incident occurred, is China’s main coal-mining region. More than one billion tonnes of coal were extracted there last year, almost a third of the country’s total output.

China is the world’s largest producer and consumer of coal, accounting for more than half of global consumption.

The country is also the world’s largest annual greenhouse gas emitter, while being the biggest producer of renewable energy.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa signed on Friday a revamped trade deal with Mexico as part of the EU’s efforts to expand its influence in Latin America, shortly after the Mercosur pact entered into force.

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The deal was signed at an EU–Mexico summit in Mexico, with von der Leyen and Costa joined by the country’s President Claudia Sheinbaum, amid rising geopolitical tensions and shifting global alliances following the return of US president to the White House.

The economic partnership between the two medium-sized powers reflects efforts on both sides to reduce their dependence on the US — the EU’s and Mexico’s largest trading partner—and on China, for which Mexico has become a hub for electric vehicle production.

“The EU and Mexico are committed to a close strategic partnership,” von der Leyen said, adding: “Today’s modernised Agreements set out our shared vision of the future and will deliver many benefits for both sides.”

The EU–Mexico trade deal strengthens the EU’s diversification strategy by updating a 20-year-old agreement that had already eliminated tariff barriers on bilateral trade.

Under the new deal, the EU will access new markets for products, such as agri-food (pork, dairy, cereals, fruit and pasta), pharmaceuticals and machinery.

EU tightens trade ties in Latin America

Mexico is the EU’s second-largest trading partner in Latin America and the EU is Mexico’s second-largest export market. Trade between both sides reached €86.8 billion in goods in 2025, alongside €29.7 billion in services in 2024.

The figures remain far smaller than Mexico’s trade with its neighbour, the US, which exceeded $900 billion in goods and services in 2024. But the deal comes as Mexico faces mounting pressure from a more protectionist White House.

For its part, the EU has been grappling with repeated tariff threats from Trump despite a trade deal clinched in 2025.

“At a time of growing global uncertainty, the EU and Mexico are choosing openness, partnership and ambition,” EU trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič, who was also in Mexico City, said. He pointed out that more than 43,000 European companies export to Mexico, while over 11,000 EU companies operate in the country.

On agriculture, the pact will open up new markets for Mexican products such as coffee, fruit, chocolate and agave syrup.

A total of 568 European and 26 Mexican geographical indications will also be protected, alongside the opening of public procurement markets, according to the Commission.

With this new deal, the EU also wants to signal its strengthened presence in Latin America, where China has expanded its influence.

“97% of the GDP of Latin America and the Caribbean will be covered by sophisticated preferential agreements with the European Union,” a senior EU official said, adding: “There is no other region in the world that has such a dense and connected network of agreements.”

The EU has already built new trade ties with Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay through the Mercosur trade agreement, which provisionally entered into force on 1 May and liberalises trade flows between the EU and those countries.

However, its signing has faced strong opposition from EU farmers, who fear unfair competition from Latin American imports, and ratification was suspended after MEPs challenged the agreement before the EU Court of Justice.

Brussels argues the Mexico agreement should avoid the backlash faced by Mercosur because sensitive agricultural imports remain capped through tariff quotas.

WASHINGTON — Seeking to reassure U.S. allies, a bipartisan group of senators is departing for a tour of Arctic nations. And this time they’re leaving the men behind.

From the eight senators to their staff and military liaison officers, the all-female group will pay diplomatic visits to government officials in four Arctic nations, witness the challenges for militaries in the region and visit a Norwegian archipelago so remote they will need escorts to avoid run-ins with polar bears.

“I want them to experience, first of all, the awesomeness of the Arctic,” said Republican Sen. Lisa Murkowski of Alaska, who is leading the trip alongside Democratic Sen. Jeanne Shaheen of New Hampshire, the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The trip was born out of both senators’ work to stabilize relations with U.S. allies in North America and northern Europe at a time when President Trump has taken an aggressive, go-it-alone stance in the region. Just this week, the Pentagon announced that the U.S. would pause participation on a joint board with Canada for continental defense that dates back to World War II.

Murkowski and Shaheen said that is the wrong approach in an Arctic region that has increasing strategic value and unique challenges.

“We will reassure our allies that we recognize and appreciate the importance of our allies and partners in the Arctic as in so many other areas,” Shaheen told the Associated Press, adding that she expected the group to discuss “what more we can do as members of Congress to support those relationships.”

The group is split evenly between Democrats and Republicans, with Sens. Cindy Hyde Smith, Katie Britt and Cynthia Lummis making up the Republican side, and Sens. Maggie Hassan, Kirsten Gillibrand and Catherine Cortez Masto from the Democrats. Departing Friday, they will visit Arctic or sub-Arctic regions in Canada; Greenland, which is an autonomous territory of Denmark; Svalbard, a Norwegian archipelago that is one of the northernmost inhabited areas on Earth; and Iceland.

Understanding the Arctic

Murkowski and Shaheen said they want the group to come away with a deeper understanding and appreciation for Arctic communities that are experiencing the effects of climate change, as well as the unique challenges of conducting military operations in the region.

“It’s to understand what it means to go into a remote, isolated community that has no access by road,” Murkowski said, adding that the group would see how military sites need airplane hangars because aircraft cannot be kept outside overnight in the Arctic cold.

NATO has recently tried to foster cooperation in the High North through a series of joint military exercises, especially as nations like China and Russia increase their activities there.

As climate change thins the Arctic ice, it could potentially create a northwest passage for international trade as well as reignite competition with Russia, China and other countries over access to the region’s mineral resources. The region is also host to a number of undersea cable projects that hold strategic value.

The group will also visit Indigenous communities that have lived in the region for generations and understand the environment. Murkowski said she hopes the senators come away from the trip “excited and intrigued and hopefully inspired.”

As Trump threatened to take Greenland earlier this year, Shaheen and Murkowski also teamed up to push for legislation that would prevent the U.S. from attacking any fellow NATO member. They are among the lawmakers pushing to include language in this year’s defense legislation that would prevent the Trump administration from withdrawing military commitments to NATO allies.

Shaheen said, “I also want to know if there are policy directives that we should be thinking about. And it will be great to have a strong bipartisan group there to discuss what we might want to do when we get back.”

How an all-female trip will be different

For some of the nations the group will be visiting, a high representation of women is nothing new. Iceland’s parliamentary body is comprised of roughly 46% women, one of the top ranking countries globally for female political representation.

Shaheen said that research suggests that “when women are the negotiating table, that agreements that are made have a much better chance of lasting for a longer period of time.”

She added that data show that representation of women in government leads to more stable societies, as well as investments back into their communities.

“There are very real reasons why we need to make sure that women are at the table,” she added.

Groves writes for the Associated Press.

Acting Navy Secretary Hung Cao’s remarks come as US President Donald Trump gives mixed signals on the sale.

A top United States military official has said Washington is pausing a $14bn arms sale to Taiwan to conserve munitions for its war on Iran.

Acting Navy Secretary Hung Cao provided the update to lawmakers during a Senate hearing on Thursday, a week after the weapons sale took centre stage in talks between US President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Beijing.

“Right now, we’re doing a pause in order to make sure we have the munitions we need for Epic Fury – which we have plenty,” Cao told the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense.

“But we’re just making sure we have everything, but then the foreign military sales will continue when the administration deems necessary.”

Cao said any decision to move forward with the sale – which would be the largest ever weapons transfer to Taiwan – would be made by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

The war has been paused since the US and Iran agreed to a ceasefire on April 8, but the sides have yet to reach a permanent peace deal.

The US Congress approved the weapons package for Taiwan in January, but the sale requires Trump’s sign-off to move forward.

If approved, the sale would surpass a record-breaking $11bn arms package for Taiwan approved by Trump in December.

Taiwanese Premier Cho Jung-tai told reporters on Friday that Taiwan would continue to pursue arms purchases, according to Taiwanese news outlet FTV News.

William Yang, senior analyst for northeast Asia at the Crisis Group, said in a social media post that the pause will “exacerbate anxiety and scepticism about US support in Taiwan and make it difficult for the Taiwanese government to request additional defence budget for the foreseeable future”.

Trump, who has confirmed that he discussed the arms sale with Xi, said last week in an interview with Fox News that he “may” or “may not” approve the package.

Trump has also suggested that the package could be used as a “negotiating chip” – despite a decades-old precedent against consulting with Beijing on arms sales.

China claims self-governing Taiwan as part of its territory, and objects to Washington’s ongoing but unofficial support for Taipei.

The US government does not officially recognise Taiwan but is committed to helping the island to defend itself under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, enacted shortly after Washington severed diplomatic ties with Taipei.

Trump has continued to test the status quo on Taiwan in other ways, saying earlier this week that he would consider speaking to Taiwanese President William Lai Ching-te about the arms deal.

Such a move would break with four decades of diplomatic protocol against direct talks with the Taiwanese leader and almost certainly provoke an angry response from Beijing.

Trump held a phone call with former Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen after his 2016 election win, but their talks took place before he was sworn in as president.

China’s Xi Jinping has welcomed Russian President Vladimir Putin to Beijing. The two leaders praised their strong ties, and spoke about the importance of maintaining their ‘comprehensive partnership’.

President Lai says Taiwan’s future is up to its people as the island faces Chinese and US headwinds.

Taiwanese President William Lai Ching-te said the future of Taiwan should not be decided by “foreign forces” but is instead in the hands of its 23 million citizens.

Speaking on the second anniversary of his inauguration on Wednesday, Lai said his goal as president continued to be maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait – the 180km (112-mile) waterway dividing Taiwan from China – and to prevent “external forces” from altering the island’s political status quo.

The president said he was still willing to engage with Beijing, which cut off communication with Taipei in 2016, but only through “orderly exchanges” based on the principles of “equality and dignity”.

Taiwan is a responsible member of the international community, not a “party that undermines stability”, he also said, in an apparent swipe at Beijing.

China’s Taiwan Affairs Office on Wednesday accused Lai of inciting “cross-strait confrontation” by supporting “Taiwan independence” in remarks coinciding with his anniversary.

The office’s spokesperson, Zhu Fenglian, said Lai “peddles separatist fallacies” while using a narrative of “democracy versus authoritarianism” to describe the Taiwan-China relationship.

Zhu also accused Lai of ignoring the wellbeing of the Taiwanese public to pander to “external forces attempting to ‘seek independence through foreign aid’ and ‘seek independence through force’.”

Lai has faced a tumultuous 24 months as president, with pressures from both inside and outside Taiwan, including from traditional ally the United States.

The opposition-controlled legislature cut down a signature special defence budget from $40bn to $25bn, and this week tried and failed to impeach him over a tax revenue dispute.

He has a 38 percent approval rating, according to a poll conducted earlier this month by news network TVBS, which, while low, is still better than his 32 percent approval rating during his first year in office.

His disapproval rating has also fallen from 55 percent to 44 percent.

Lai said on Wednesday that his government would take other measures to make up the shortfall in Taiwan’s defence spending.

As president, Lai has also had to contend with uncertainty from the US, Taiwan’s longstanding unofficial ally, amid growing pressure from China, which has staged five rounds of military exercises around Taiwan since his May 2024 inauguration.

US President Donald Trump said last week that US arms sales to Taiwan could be used as a “very good negotiating chip” with Beijing.

Trump’s remarks followed a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, where the Chinese leader called on Trump to take a stronger stance on Taiwan’s political status.

The US has for decades maintained a deliberately ambiguous stance on the issue.

Lai was also forced to delay a state visit to Eswatini, formerly known as Swaziland, Taiwan’s only diplomatic ally in Africa, in April when several countries denied him access to their airspace due to alleged Chinese pressure. He later made the trip through a circuitous route on board Eswatini King Mswati III’s private jet.