China

BEIRUT — Iran’s economy, already strained by high inflation, years of Western sanctions and a war that has sharply reduced oil revenue, is poised for more instability as the Trump administration tries to coerce other countries into ending all financial dealings with the Islamic Republic.

A decision by the United Arab Emirates to suspend trade relations with Iran last week kick-started the White House’s latest attempt to isolate Tehran into submission. Iran entered the war with its foreign commerce concentrated among a relatively small group of countries, leaving it with fewer places to turn now.

The success of the U.S. strategy largely will hinge on China, the main buyer of Iranian oil and its top trading partner. Russia, a fellow target of sweeping U.S.-led sanctions, has a military conflict and economic crisis of its own and probably can’t offer longtime ally Iran much hard financial support.

Regional partners like Turkey, Pakistan and Iraq maintain important relationships with both Iran and the U.S., giving them reason to avoid exposure to the secondary sanctions that Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said awaited nations that did not cut economic ties with Iran.

“Those who stand with the United States will reap the rewards of our partnership,” Bessent said Monday while outlining the plan he called “Operation Economic Outcast.” “Those who tether themselves to the Iranian regime should expect to share in the isolation.”

The Emirates will be hard for Iran to replace as a conduit for foreign goods and payments

Despite Western sanctions, Iran in 2024 exchanged $125 billion worth of goods globally, according to Trade Data Monitor, a private firm. Iran is not a member of the World Trade Organization.

The bulk of its declared international trade, though, was with a handful of partners. The UAE, China and Turkey supplied nearly three-quarters of Iran’s merchandise imports. Four countries — China, Iraq, the UAE and Turkey — accounted for more than two-thirds of its non-oil exports.

On the supply side, the UAE held outsized importance. It was Iran’s biggest source of imported items and a gateway to financial channels that helped Iranian businesses make and receive international payments. Both roles kept Iran connected to the global economy.

As a reexport hub, the UAE processed shipments from foreign suppliers reluctant to deal directly with Iranian customers.

“From Iran’s perspective, the UAE can be replaced, but the Iranians are openly saying it’s not going to happen overnight,” said Alex Vatanka, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington.

China has deep economic ties to Iran but depends less on the relationship

Beijing has economic interests in the Persian Gulf beyond Iran, and so far has avoided getting drawn into the conflict the U.S. and Israel initiated. China buys the overwhelming majority of Iran’s crude through opaque trading networks that bypass sanctions.

Its manufacturing clout and stranglehold on critical mineral supplies nonetheless give Beijing more room than Iran’s other partners to resist U.S. pressure, said David Lubin, a senior research fellow at Chatham House. Aggressive action against major Chinese banks and businesses could revive trade tensions as Chinese leader Xi Jinping prepares to meet with President Trump in Washington next month.

“I don’t see China playing ball by any means,” Lubin said.

China is both Iran’s largest reported export market and a supplier of essential parts and products, according to WTO and United Nations data.

During the Obama administration, Beijing did agree to reduce energy imports from Iran, said Atlantic Council fellow Daniel Fried, a former U.S. ambassador to Poland.

“We will want the Chinese to go a lot farther than they have gone in the past,” Fried said. “But it’s a lot harder now.”

China has experience helping an ally survive sanctions: It has long been North Korea’s economic lifeline and main diplomatic backer. Experts say China has avoided fully enforcing U.N. sanctions on North Korea and sent clandestine aid to help its impoverished neighbor stay afloat.

Expanding bilateral trade would create problems for Iran’s neighbors

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, who has been his country’s lead negotiator over the last six months, was in Iraq the day of the UAE’s trade suspension. A purpose of his visit, he said, was “speeding up efforts to expand joint cooperation among all countries in the region, without foreign interference.”

The U.S. dollar’s preeminence in international trade and finance, however, means none of Iran’s trading partners would antagonize Washington lightly, Vatanka said. “We’re still at a point where if the U.S. wants to hurt you, it will matter,” he said.

Underscoring potential consequences, Turkey settled a years-long U.S. dispute in July over the role of a state-owned bank in helping Iran evade sanctions through an oil-for-gold scheme. Trump also moved to lift sanctions on its fellow NATO member stemming from Turkey’s purchase of a sophisticated Russian missile system.

“I really don’t think Turkey would like to become the next country helping Iran to evade sanctions right now,” said Riccardo Gasco, an analyst at the IstanPol think tank in Istanbul.

Iran is a vital import source for Iraq and retains influence there through allied political factions and armed groups. Baghdad has sought closer economic and security ties with Washington. Since it invaded Iraq in 2003, the U.S. has significant control over the nation’s foreign currency reserves because they are housed in the Federal Reserve Bank in New York.

Oman, a frequent intermediary between Washington and Tehran, has found its balancing act suddenly precarious. Trump threatened Oman last week over its ongoing negotiations with Iran on the future management of the Strait of Hormuz.

One easy route for goods slipping past sanctions on Iran would be ports like Gwadar near the Persian Gulf in Pakistan, said Peter Harrell, a visiting scholar at Georgetown University.

“Ship an intermodal container of drone parts to one of the ports in western Pakistan and unload it onto a truck and have it driven across the border into Iran,” he said.

While Pakistan, a key ally and economic partner of China in the region, wants to increase trade with Iran, it faces competing pressures. It is serving as a key mediator between Tehran and Washington and has deep security ties with Saudi Arabia, Iran’s longtime regional rival.

Caspian Sea trade route alternatives unlikely to grow quickly

With the Strait of Hormuz mostly blocked and Russia’s war with Ukraine endangering ships on the Black Sea, Iran has sought to develop a “road of life” on the Caspian Sea, said Nikita Smagin, an independent analyst and a former Russian state news agency correspondent in Tehran.

Russia reportedly sent drones to Iran this year, repaying Tehran’s favor after Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It also rerouted exports to Iran via Caspian Sea ports like Astrakhan. Agricultural products make up 80% of Russia and Iran’s reported trade.

“Both economies are exporting natural resources and have little to offer each other,” Smagin said.

The other countries that border the Caspian — Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan — probably won’t rush to join in, said Umud Shokri, a fellow at George Mason University.

Yet Russia and Iran are already in an “axis of the sanctioned,” said Mark Galeotti, executive director of the Mayak Intelligence firm. For decades the pair have collaborated to thwart trade restrictions, and increasing bilateral trade in both “strategic goods” and contraband like military technology, microchips and Gucci handbags could be a next step.

“Pomegranates and tomatoes only go so far,” he said.

Chehayeb and McNeil write for the Associated Press. McNeil reported from Brussels. AP writers Amir Vahdat in Tehran and Dasha Litvinova in Tallinn, Estonia, contributed to this report.

Published on
27/08/2026 – 14:10 GMT+2

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said on Thursday that if negotiations to reduce the record-high trade deficit with China did not produce a breakthrough, the EU should make use of all its trade defence mechanisms.

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Tensions have remained high between Brussels and Beijing since the talks were launched last June. Over the summer, China moved to ban Chinese firms from participating in EU antitrust probes, while the Commission has continued opening trade defence investigations into the suspected dumping of Chinese products into the European market.

“Dialogue with China remains necessary. But it must produce results. And when dialogue is not enough, we must be ready to make full use of our instruments,” von der Leyen said in remarks to Medef, the French business organisation.

The EU is facing a wave of cheap imports coming from China, which have increased by 45% in five years, the Commission’s President added, pointing out that 30 trade defence investigations have been opened over the last year – “almost three times more than the historical average”.

“We are stepping up investigations significantly,” she said.

Von der Leyen’s remarks come as the EU’s trade deficit with China reaches €1 billion a day. The Commission has set October as a deadline to reach a deal with Beijing to rebalance the trade relationship.

“China is a key economic partner. And our approach is clear and consistent: derisking without breaking ties. But being a partner does not mean accepting permanent imbalances,” von der Leyen said.

Beijing and Brussels have been on the verge of a trade war in recent months, with China threatening several times to retaliate against proposed EU regulations that could reduce market access to Chinese firms.

On Thursday, von der Leyen recalled that all EU member states now record a trade deficit with China.

In June, EU leaders gave her a mandate to act to rebalance the relationship through dialogue as well as the use and review of defence mechanisms. Among these is the EU’s so-called anti-coercion instrument, which can be triggered in case of pressure from a foreign country on the EU to change its policies.

This tool, sometimes referred to as the “trade bazooka”, allows the EU to adopt strong measures such as restrictions on access to public procurement or the removal of intellectual property rights.

However, it requires the support of a majority of the bloc’s member states. It is unclear whether this could be achieved while EU countries continue trading with China on a bilateral basis, seeking access to its market or investments from Beijing.

On August 21, the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a couple of new general licences related to Venezuela’s telecommunications sector. Both General Licenses 61 and 62 will now allow the Venezuelan Government (including but not limited to the telecom authority CONATEL and the State-owned telecom company CANTV) to acquire goods and services from and/or related to the United States and authorize them to negotiate new contracts. 

To better understand the implications of this on Venezuelan telecommunications, there’s what specialized local journalist William Peña wrote on Telecommunicaciones360 and his conclusion is that “this opens an opportunity to the country in the issue of technologic updating, now it’s up to companies to have resources in order to accelerate their innovation process”.

The reaction from CONATEL to this announcement was so enthusiastic to the point of bragging that these licences “represent the recognition of the institutional legitimacy of the Venezuelan State” and that “these mechanisms reaffirm the intention of strengthening the infrastructure.”

Its press statement also mentioned the many areas that these couple of licenses will help to improve: from telephone and high-speed Internet to subscription TV services and everything in relation to fiber optic cable networks, satellite transmission systems and submarine cable links.

The purchase of any non-US tech not explicitly banned is still subject to OFAC approval.

“Despite being the regulation authority, CONATEL is the one who disposes and provides the equipment for technical analysis of infrastructure and monitoring of the radioelectric spectrum,” Peña told Caracas Chronicles, later adding that “Many of CONATEL’s current equipment is Chinese (in origin) and the Americans do not want that.”

Which leads to the main catch that the OFAC’s licences leave clear by explicitly forbidding: “Any transaction involving a person located in the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Cuba, the People’s Republic of China, or any entity that is owned or controlled by or in a joint venture with such persons.”

The purchase of any non-US tech not explicitly banned is still subject to OFAC approval.

The same day the licenses were published, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Juan Pablo Segura, said on his X account that Chinese tech companies like Huawei, ZTE and several others “cooperate with Beijing’s intelligence services, creating risks of spying, hacking, and network shutdowns” and asked “US partners in the Americas to quickly switch to trusted suppliers to protect their people and their sovereignty”. 

A deep relationship

This also comes with challenges for CANTV, which despite being the largest company in the sector, found itself behind in comparison to private companies because of several factors, including the US-set sanctions that forced it to go with what other allies were offering.

Most of those countries mentioned were the only viable options that CANTV and other State entities were left with as a consequence of the US sanctions, and Peña notices their negative impact: “This process, with exceptions like some Chinese Huawei technologies, ended up harming the country’s advance in diverse areas, as beside the issue of language, many of the implemented solutions were not compatible with the technologies passed down and most were of very low quality regarding assets and software solutions with plenty of complications.”

This instruction from Washington to avoid China as a telecom provider was not missed by either the PRC’s embassy in DC or by Hong Kong’s major newspaper, the South China Morning Post, indicating that “the China carve-out could prove particularly consequential. Huawei and ZTE became important suppliers to Venezuela as US sanctions and compliance concerns curtailed other international companies’ ability or willingness to work with government-linked entities”.

The relationship between CANTV and Huawei was very close in matters of system infrastructure, to the point that Peña says the State telecom company has a hefty debt of 600 million dollars with Huawei. “If CANTV already paid for that technology, and has it at its disposal either in inventory or storage, then it’ll be deployed, but from now on any new acquisitions must come from the US.” Many of those issues aren’t directly addressed by OFAC’s licenses.

So important is the role of the Chinese company in CANTV operation that in 2019 there was an unfounded rumor on social media that the Maduro government was about to sell it to Huawei.

A decade later, the political ID card was rolled out, and ZTE’s personnel were working within CANTV in handling the related databases: “We don’t support the government… We are just developing our market.”

ZTE, the other company mentioned by the South China Morning Post, has its own long history not only with Cantv but with the Venezuelan government: the company had a central role in the development of what is one of chavismo’s biggest instruments of political control: the “carnet de la patria”.

A 2018 special report by Reuters mentions how it all started with a visit from a delegation from the Venezuelan Justice Ministry to the headquarters of ZTE in Shenzhen back in 2008. Then, the delegation saw a glimpse of what later became known as the “social credit system”, which started its first trials in some regions of mainland China the following year.

A decade later, the political ID card was rolled out, and ZTE’s personnel were working within CANTV in handling the related databases. This was confirmed by ZTE’s head in Venezuela at the time, Su Qingfeng: “We don’t support the government… We are just developing our market.” The deep rapport between Nicolás Maduro and Xi Jinping continued until very recently. In July 2025, the Gran Expo China-Venezuela exposition was held in Caracas, and new agreements between both governments on a diverse range of issues were signed. Six months later, things would change with Operation Absolute Resolve. The person who signed those deals on behalf of Maduro was then VP Delcy Rodríguez.

Now, the Trump administration is taking a growing interest in Latin America (thanks in part to having new allies in the region like Jose Antonio Kast in Chile or Abelardo de la Espriella in Colombia), and it’s using it to push out the influence of Beijing. Still a work in progress.

The impact on Venezuelan clients 

Going back to what these licences could mean for Venezuela’s telecommunications sector, they could bring an expansion of the improvement seen in recent years, like with our Internet service. 

Peña mentions the immediate benefit for private companies, domestic and/or foreign: “This will allow them not only to be part of these large purchases, but also for the payments to be made in an easier and more opportune manner. Back in the time of the sanctions, they couldn’t open a bank account in the US, and buying abroad was complicated, causing the costs to go up. Now they can buy again from American companies with no hassle”.

Besides, this can also help with fixing the faults and limitations found because of the June 24 quakes, like the damaged submarine cable which affected overall access for weeks. And even before OFAC’s announcement, CANTC and Liberty Networks launched a joint investment in a new Fenix underwater cable that will connect Venezuela and Curaçao, reinforcing our connectivity.

In 2022, a satellite image emerged showing unusual fighter-like ‘shapes’ with a very loosely similar appearance to the stealthy J-20 at a remote Chinese airbase. Three years later, another image appeared showing a broadly similar, but also distinctly different-looking object at a different airport in China. The mystery of these ‘airframes’ now seems to be at least partially solved with new pictures of a mock-up being used for airfield firefighting training.

Images of the aircraft fire trainer in question are now circulating on social media, but where or when they were taken is not immediately clear. Markings seen on the tarmac are different from what is present on the aprons at Lintao Air Base, where the ‘shapes’ were spotted back in 2022, as well as at Jining Qufu Airport, where the other object was spotted in 2025.

The overall design of the vaguely J-20-like aircraft fire trainer also aligns more with the object that previously appeared at Jining Qufu Airport. Both share a distinct modified diamond-like delta planform, as well as canards, and twin vertical tails. It is worth noting that the ground-level images we have now also show a cockpit configuration that is more representative of the newer J-35. Regardless, the articles seen at Lintao had differently shaped wings and longer, more slender noses.

In general, aircraft fire trainers can be anything that loosely represents a desired class of aircraft – fighter, airliner, etc – and can range from specially built systems to repurposed old aircraft hulks. Training aids of this kind are designed to offer a readily reusable way to add realism to airfield firefighting drills. They are in widespread use globally by national militaries and civilian fire departments. The shapes previously seen at Lintao could still serve some other purpose as full-scale mock-ups, or decoys, as well.

The emergence of the firefighting trainer also comes as the People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s (PLAAF) fleet of real J-20s continues to expand, something TWZ explored in detail earlier this year. The PLAAF may have some 500 J-20s in service now, with examples assigned to at least 14 operational units and three training bases, according to one estimate. There are projections that the total fleet could grow to 1,000 airframes by 2030 if production of the jets continues apace. This is inclusive of all variants, including a two-seat version that first broke cover in 2021.

The growing size of China’s fleets of J-20s, as well as other more modern fighters, can only increase demands for training, both for pilots and ground crew, as well as maintenance and sustainment requirements. Ever larger numbers of routine day-to-day sorties raise the risk of crashes and other accidents just as a matter of course.

Also, while the object spotted at Jining Qufu Airport in 2025 now seems pretty definitively to have been a firefighting trainer, a steady stream of new, real advanced aircraft designs have been emerging in China in recent years. This includes crewed and uncrewed types with a multitude of shapes and sizes, ranging from the J-36 and J-XDS next-generation fighters to various sleek combat drones to several types of pilotless flying wings. New Chinese aviation developments do have a history of emerging suddenly, as TWZ has often been the first to report.

As China’s fleets of more advanced operational aircraft continue to expand in scale and scope, we can expect to see similar growth in the infrastructure and other assets necessary to support their operations, including new aircraft fire trainers.

Special thanks to Andreas Rupprecht, an expert on Chinese aviation and contributor to this website, who goes by @RupprechtDeino on X, for bringing this to our attention.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Aug. 25 (UPI) — China is angrily pushing back against the President Donald Trump administration on new sanctions against Iran that will harm it.

China said it would defend its interests against the United States and accused the administration of disrupting the global financial order.

On Monday, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent set out plans to “sever every economic lifeline” to Iran, targeting countries that do business with the country.

China’s foreign ministry representative, Lin Jian, said China is firmly opposed to what it called “illegal unilateral sanctions” and would take “all necessary measures” to defend its rights.

“Cooperation between China and Iran has always been conducted within the framework of international law and should not be interfered with or disrupted,” Lin said.

China is the largest customer of Iranian oil.

The United States listed more than 60 brokers, companies and ships facing new sanctions. They included more than a dozen small businesses from Hong Kong and China, The New York Times reported. But larger companies in China weren’t on the list, which some have speculated means Washington was being careful not to antagonize the country.

Chinese President Xi Jinping is planning to visit the United States next month to meet with Trump and continue talks.

Iranian Economy Minister Ali Madanizadeh said Tehran was “fully prepared” for the broader sanctions, which he said would lead to “another defeat” for the United States.

“The government is and was ready and has a two-year plan to manage these events,” he told state television. “We also have our own tools and know how to play the game,” he said. He also said that Tehran had been “waiting for these plans for a long time.”

BANGKOK — Chinese artist Gao Zhen was sentenced to three years in prison on Tuesday for “infringing upon the reputation of heroes” over his satirical works of art, including statues of China’s former leader Mao Zedong.

U.S.-based Gao, who was part of an artistic duo known internationally as the Gao Brothers, was arrested while visiting family in China in August 2024. He has been in official custody since then.

He was sentenced by the Sanhei People’s Court court in northern Hebei province, according to his wife, Zhao Yaliang.

The charges against Gao relate to artistic works that China’s authorities claim insulted revolutionary figures, including a 2009 statue called Mao’s Guilt, which shows the former leader and founder of modern China as kneeling in repentance. Others include as series called Miss Mao, which shows a caricatured version of Mao with breasts and an engorged nose.

Shane Yi, a researcher at Chinese Human Rights Defenders, who has been advocating for the case, described the sentence as “a very clear case of a violation of a person’s freedom of expression.”

Yi noted that the artworks in question were created before the law Gao was sentenced with had been passed and said the artist plans to appeal the sentence.

The court did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Amnesty International criticized the court sentence which it described as a deterrent against artistic expression.

“The lengthy pre-trial detention and, ultimately, decision to convict Gao Zhen and sentence him to the maximum three-year prison term under this offense illustrate the authorities’ determination to deter others from engaging in independent artistic expression,” said Amnesty’s China Director Sarah Brooks.

“No artist should face criminal punishment for creating work that challenges official narratives or encourages critical reflection on history,” she said.

Zhao said she hopes to be reunited with her husband and be able to return to the U.S., where the family had immigrated to.

“I felt two years was my limit, and I was really disappointed and sad. I haven’t been able to catch my breath,” she said. She had prepared clothes for her husband hoping that he would be released. Chinese courts often count the time of a sentencing from the date a prisoner is taken.

The Gao Brothers, whose works addressed themes of authoritarianism and censorship, became famous in a time of relative openness in China and were exhibited both inside the country and abroad.

However, in recent years, the state’s increased its controlling grip on certain aspects of expression, especially in regards to political figures with the passage of law in 2018 that bans criticism of the nation’s heroes.

Wu writes for the Associated Press.

WASHINGTON — The United States unveiled plans Monday for new sanctions against Iran that Trump administration officials said are designed to sever Tehran from the global financial system as the nearly six-month conflict between the two countries drags on.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, who previewed the announcement last week as “economic D-Day,” described the measures as the opening of an all-out financial assault on the Iranian government and its trade partners — a group that includes China, India, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.

“To those who enable Tehran, do not discount the cost of testing Washington’s resolve,” Bessent said at a news conference. “No nation should expect to enjoy the rewards of our system while helping those who seek to destroy it.”

Bessent said it was time for world leaders to “make a decision” between “America and Iran,” adding that President Trump has already been calling foreign leaders to make specific requests ahead of the new sanctions.

But when asked whom the president had been talking to, Bessent said he would not “name names.” He also said the secondary measure would not take effect immediately, arguing that the administration is trying to give “everyone the opportunity to remedy bad behavior.”

“Why would I want to blow up the global financial system?” Bessent said when a reporter pressed him on why the sanctions weren’t immediate. “We believe that it is important to level set and give people a cure period, but they should know that that will move very quickly and that we are serious.”

The pressure campaign will build on a naval blockade and other sanctions the Trump administration has already imposed in its effort to force Tehran into a deal that ends the war on U.S. terms.

Trump’s latest economic push against Iran revives a familiar strategy from presidents of both parties, using financial leverage to pressure Tehran toward more serious negotiations over its nuclear program. Sanctions helped bring Iran to the table before a 2015 nuclear deal brokered by President Obama, but the agreement was widely criticized as weak by Republicans. After Trump withdrew from the agreement in his first term, a new “maximum pressure” campaign failed to secure a new deal.

Trump’s decision to return to a strategy of economic coercion has signaled to Iran that the fighting phase of the war is probably over, for now, with the U.S. administration choosing a path “neither of war nor of peace,” Masoud Pezeshkian, Iran’s president, said this week.

Iranian officials, who had been anticipating the move, pushed back on Washington’s strategy even before Bessent began speaking Monday.

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told Iranian state media over the weekend that the sanctions amounted to a repackaged version of decades-old American pressure tactics that Tehran has already learned to withstand. Esmail Baghaei, Iran’s foreign ministry spokesman, warned of “grave consequences” for any countries cooperating with what he said was “illegal behavior” by the United States. And Mohsen Rezaei, the secretary of Iran’s Supreme Security Council, suggested that the economic pressure could shut down oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz, a threat that would ripple through global energy markets.

That defiance underscores the central gamble of Washington’s strategy. Rather than aiming sanctions at Iran alone, Bessent’s plan to potentially squeeze major economies like China and India over their ties to Tehran could pose a diplomatic risk to the U.S.

The fallout could also reach beyond foreign diplomacy as a hit to global markets also risks compounding Trump’s troubles at home ahead of the midterm elections, as Americans grow unhappy with the economy and their support for the conflict in the Middle East plummets. The Iran sanctions also land as the administration wages a separate trade fight with Canada, adding uncertainty to global and domestic markets.

Whether Washington will be able to apply pressure on Iran’s trade partners remains an open question.

China alone shares nearly $10 billion in bilateral trade with Iran, and paid roughly $31.2 billion for unreported Iranian crude oil imports in 2025, according to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. That makes China the largest buyer of Iranian crude oil by a wide margin, accounting for more than 90% of Iran’s oil exports, according to the commission.

It is unclear whether Trump has spoken to China’s leader, Xi Jinping, about the sanctions. But the two leaders are set to meet in Washington next month, adding to the diplomatic dynamics of the moment.

Other trading partners have already made some moves.

The UAE said last week that it was suspending trade with Iran, a decision that followed accusations that Tehran had fired two ballistic missiles at the Emirates.

Afra Al Hameli, a spokesperson for the Emirati Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said in a post on Aug. 18 on X that all trade, commercial exchanges and financial transactions with Iran have been halted until further notice. She added that the Emirates was “firmly committed to safeguarding the integrity of the international financial system.”

Bessent said Monday that he expects other countries will “take similar actions as we continue our engagement.”

In an opinion article written for the Financial Times last week, Bessent has cast the new measures as the “single greatest financial offensive ever marshalled against an adversary.”

Bessent wrote that countries that “sever Iran’s remaining financial and commercial connectivity” will see their economies reinvigorated, and those who don’t will experience the end of their “lasting prosperity.”

“Any nation that serves as a financial artery of a withering regime should expect to share in its isolation,” he wrote. “To become a sanctuary for terror is to become, in the eyes of the United States, a global pariah.”

Ahead of the announcement Monday, Trump posted on Truth Social that Iran was “completely collapsing.”

Meanwhile, Iran’s central bank governor, Abdolnaser Hemmati, said the U.S. had already done all that it can against Iran and that the central bank had been shoring up its foreign currency reserves for months. Last week, he said Iran’s crude exports had “virtually stopped.”

“[The Americans] have done everything, so what else can they do?” he said in an interview with Tasnim News.

Despite his assurances that the central bank was working on preventing a devaluation of the Iranian rial, the currency has struggled to remain above a black market exchange rate of 2 million per dollar — a record low. The Central Bank rate stands at roughly 1.5 million rial to the dollar.

Though experts question the effectiveness of additional economic pressure on Tehran, Bessent’s threat to target Iran’s trading partners — especially the UAE, China and Turkey, who together comprise almost three-quarters of Iran’s foreign imports — will undoubtedly be painful for Iranians.

For example, Iran uses the UAE as a reexport hub and buffer, and receives vehicle spare parts from China, according to the Observatory for Economic Complexity. Iranian economic experts say both the agricultural and pharmaceutical sectors also rely on imports from countries such as Brazil and Turkey.

Ceballos reported from Washington and Bulos from Beirut.

A cross-party delegation lands in Beijing as Tokyo tries to defrost its worst China rift in decades.

Japanese lawmakers have travelled to Beijing in a bid to soothe strained relations between the two nations.

The delegation landed in China on Monday for talks aimed at restoring communication. The mission was undertaken after Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi issued comments on Taiwan that triggered a diplomatic dispute that has begun to weigh on economic relations.

The visit will run through Thursday and marks the first such consultations with senior Chinese Communist Party officials since ties soured late last year.

Relations plunged after Takaichi suggested in November that Japan could respond militarily if China attacked Taiwan, a self-governing island that Beijing claims as its own territory.

China is highly sensitive regarding Taiwan and considers questioning of its claim on the island a red line. In response to Takaichi’s comments, it warned its citizens against travel to Japan and tightened trade restrictions, including measures that reportedly disrupted the flow of rare earth minerals to Japanese firms, adding an economic sting to the diplomatic fallout.

Among those making the trip was Gaku Hashimoto, a member of the House of Representatives and Takaichi’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party. He was joined by other lawmakers from the opposition Komeito and Centrist Reform Alliance parties.

An official from Hashimoto’s office confirmed only that he had “departed for Beijing to stay for two days”.

Before leaving Tokyo, delegation member Shinichi Isa, a spokesperson for the Centrist Reform Alliance, told reporters: “Communication has been severed in all areas, and we are beginning to see their impact in many areas. I hope we can somehow find a clue to restart a dialogue.”

Isa, a former diplomat at the Japanese embassy in China, had already sounded the alarm over the situation this month in a post on X, writing that officials had always managed to stay in contact even during past low points but now “all channels between officials and ministries have been cut off.”

He described the current state of relations as the worst since diplomatic ties were normalised in 1972.

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said on Friday that “some people of insight from both Japan’s ruling and opposition parties” were troubled by the state of relations and hoped to help steer them back on track while calling on Tokyo to heed those voices and act to restore normal exchanges between the two countries.

Takaichi has not retracted her comment on Taiwan and is yet to respond to the concerns.

Further exchanges are planned. Former Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya is expected to lead another delegation to China in late September, which is to be followed by a group of Japanese business representatives later in the year, according to the Kyodo News agency.

US President Donald Trump’s administration has said it aims to sever “every” economic lifeline sustaining Iran in what officials have warned will be the toughest sanctions campaign ever seen.

The threat, if followed through, would mean putting China, Iran’s biggest trade partner, squarely in the crosshairs of US sanctions.

That would be a risky proposition for Washington due to the likelihood of severe blowback from Beijing – so much so that some analysts doubt that the Trump administration’s measures, set to be announced on Monday, will match its rhetoric in scope or severity.

While the Trump administration has yet to provide details about what it has dubbed “economic D-Day”, US officials have made it clear that Iran’s trade partners are in their sights.

In an op-ed in the Financial Times on Sunday, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent warned that countries fearful of breaking ties with Iran should not “discount the cost of testing Washington”.

“The president has created the conditions to leverage every agency, every authority and action many assumed we would never summon,” said Bessent, who is scheduled to unveil the sanctions in a news conference at 17:00 GMT.

Brett Erickson, a sanctions expert and managing principal of Obsidian Risk Advisors, said the Trump administration’s willingness to target China will be an indication of its resolve to mount a sustained economic offensive against Tehran.

“That is not a relationship you degrade lightly. If the United States decides to really bring China into the ring, it will be a serious indication that the United States plans to wage this economic war for a prolonged period of time,” Erickson told Al Jazeera.

“If they do not, it will be a tacit admission from the Trump administration that they do not believe economic hardship can seriously bring about a change in the Iranian position,” Erickson said.

Any US pressure campaign that excludes China would be necessarily limited in scope given the outsized importance of Beijing and Tehran’s economic ties.

China reported $9.96bn in two-way trade with Iran in 2025, a figure that does not include some $31.2bn in Iranian oil shipments, according to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission.

China’s purchases of Iranian oil have been a particularly crucial lifeline for Tehran, accounting for about 90 percent of its oil sales, according to the US Treasury Department.

Until now, the Trump administration’s Iran sanctions regime has targeted only a handful of relatively minor China-based entities.

In April, the Trump administration sanctioned Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery, one of China’s largest independent refineries, commonly known as “teapots”, over its alleged purchases of Iranian oil.

The Trump administration also imposed sanctions on four firms in Hong Kong in May, followed by measures in August targeting six China and Hong Kong-based shipping lines.

Washington has so far left Chinese financial institutions, widely viewed as a key node in Iran’s oil trade, untouched.

“Cutting off Chinese economic ties will be key to the success of any attempt to increase pressure on Iran. However, the United States won’t do it,” Jennifer Kavanagh, a senior fellow at Defense Priorities, a Washington-based foreign policy think tank, told Al Jazeera.

“If it does, China will retaliate and has the leverage to impose costs on the US,” Kavanagh said.

China has vigorously opposed US sanctions against Iran, arguing that economic pressure will not resolve the nearly six-month-long war.

In a statement on Sunday, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that Beijing remained “committed to promoting peace talks” and willing to “continue making efforts for the early restoration of peace and tranquility in the region”.

Iran, for its part, has threatened to retaliate against countries that support the US measures.

Mohsen Rezaei, the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, warned on Saturday that any country that participated in sanctions would be considered an “enemy” and that “not a drop” of oil would leave the Gulf if Iran’s neighbours joined the US campaign.

Wang Wen, dean of the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China, said Beijing would inevitably take countermeasures in response to any US sanctions and their intensity would depend on the “severity of US actions”.

“China maintains its desire to avoid conflict, but its bottom line cannot be crossed,” Wang told Al Jazeera.

For Trump, invoking Beijing’s ire would risk not only economic retaliation, but also unravelling efforts to stabilise US-China relations only weeks before the US president is due to host Chinese leader Xi Jinping at the White House.

Trump’s scheduled summit with Xi on September 24 would be their second face-to-face meeting aimed at lowering the temperature in US-China relations since Washington launched its war on Iran in late February, following Trump’s visit to Beijing in May.

Zichen Wang, deputy secretary-general of the Center for China and Globalization (CCG) think tank in Beijing, said neither Beijing nor Washington were likely to want Iran to define the upcoming summit.

“Unless the US measures become very broad or directly target major Chinese interests, both sides are likely to try to keep this dispute from overwhelming the wider agenda,” Wang told Al Jazeera.

“That said, Chinese restraint should not be read as an absence of response,” Wang said.

“Beijing has often avoided immediate rhetorical escalation, but when unilateral US actions have materially affected Chinese companies or other Chinese interests, it has shown a growing willingness to answer with practical countermeasures.”

While the Trump administration could potentially make it more challenging and expensive for China to continue its economic support of Iran, it is unlikely to be able to stop Beijing outright if it is determined to maintain ties, said Erickson of Obsidian Risk Advisors.

“US sanctions can absolutely force companies to de-risk in order to avoid exposure, but there will always be an entity willing to fill this role,” Erickson said, adding that Xi is unlikely to “merely stand by while Trump flexes the powers of American economic statecraft without flexing Beijing’s own in return”.

Though US officials have stated their intention to “collapse” Iran’s government with ramped-up sanctions, Erickson expressed doubt that the Trump administration will be able to achieve its war goals through economic pressure alone.

“Unless the Trump administration is willing to burn serious bridges and employ all remaining levers of economic warfare simultaneously, there is no reasonable assertion that can be made that it will be able to produce the victory that kinetic warfare could not,” he said.

Chinese media and intelligence are closely following the exodus of the American Central Intelligence Agency CIA personnel, particularly the months-long wait for new retirees to receive their financial entitlements. The agency is facing what it describes as an unprecedented number of retirements as the Trump administration seeks to reduce its workforce. Chinese media and intelligence perspectives on this unprecedented exodus of CIA officers align with their own. The delayed payments are a key focus, with both China and the US focusing on exploiting these developments to highlight institutional weaknesses within the American administration and the declining effectiveness of espionage against Beijing. Beijing is using the CIA exodus and delayed retirement payments to cast doubt on the efficiency of American institutions, targeting disaffected and dismissed intelligence operatives to gather information. This is achieved by promoting the idea of ​​the US administration’s collapse and attracting these affected security professionals to bolster Chinese counterintelligence capabilities.  Here, Beijing is exploiting the widespread layoffs and dismissals within the CIA and other US federal agencies, turning the affected employees into valuable assets to bolster Chinese counterintelligence capabilities. The Chinese strategy focuses on transforming these dismissed experts from defenders of US national security into offensive tools that expose Washington’s vulnerabilities.

The most prominent trends in official and semi-official Chinese commentary and analysis regarding the dismissal of CIA personnel can be summarized as follows: (Chinese mockery of the China-defeat strategy and the backfiring on the strategist). This is the same point made by Chinese media reports, such as the official Xinhua News Agency, which indicated that the Trump administration had previously announced that its restructuring and hiring freeze aimed to focus on China-defeating and the trade war. However, the actual result was the dismissal of skilled and experienced personnel within the CIA. This exposes the structural failures of the US, and Chinese media highlighted the crisis as evidence of administrative chaos within the United States. The pressure to downsize the federal government has paralyzed the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). This has left Washington unable to even pay the pensions of its retired spies on time.  Here, Chinese intelligence, military, political, strategic, and media circles seized upon this crisis to promote the idea of ​​eroding American national security and the golden opportunity it presented for counterintelligence. Chinese think tanks and intelligence agencies seized upon internal American warnings that leaving thousands of former intelligence officers without income for months made them easy targets for infiltration. Beijing interpreted this as a tacit admission of the fragility of institutional loyalty within the American system in the face of financial pressures. Beijing viewed it as evidence of American administrative disarray and a prime example of the brain drain of accumulated expertise. Chinese analyses, assessments, and evaluations focused on the fact that the deferred resignation and contract buyouts programs have prompted senior analysts and field officers within the CIA (those with extensive networks and deep knowledge of Asian affairs) to abruptly leave the service, creating an intelligence gap that will be difficult to fill in the near future.  From the Chinese perspective, this exposes the American narrative of transparency and efficiency and reinforces the idea of ​​the political manipulation of intelligence. Therefore, China is exploiting this unprecedented crisis within the CIA to bolster its ongoing narrative that US intelligence agencies have become tools in partisan political conflicts within Washington. Beijing views the mass exodus as a reflection of the professional officers’ lack of confidence in the administration’s political direction. Beijing is using this as part of a counter-propaganda strategy, with Chinese media outlets employing these facts to send messages to the international community, developing countries, and the Global South, suggesting that the United States, which seeks to impose its global security hegemony, is suffering from severe internal divisions that prevent it from managing its fundamental sovereign affairs efficiently and professionally.

Regarding the Chinese political and media exploitation of the CIA staff exodus crisis, the Chinese media machine promotes these crises as evidence of the collapse and disarray of the US federal administration model. It exploits the inability of US institutions to meet their financial obligations (to portray Washington as incapable of protecting even its most sensitive agencies). Therefore, Chinese intelligence, analytical, and strategic circles employ propaganda to highlight the fragility of job security and social stability within US decision-making circles. Furthermore, China strategically and intelligence-wise exploits this internal US crisis. Chinese intelligence agencies monitor these vulnerabilities to target former employees or those facing termination. Beijing offers inducements or clandestine channels of communication through consulting and research fronts to ensnare individuals who are psychologically and financially distressed. China also exploits the frustration resulting from delayed pensions or forced layoffs to facilitate infiltration, counter-recruitment, and the acquisition of sensitive secrets.

Chinese intelligence, such as the Ministry of State Security (MSS), operates through specific and deliberate mechanisms. The MSS, which oversees Chinese intelligence operations, exploits vulnerabilities such as fractured loyalty, financial weakness, and psychological and material incentives. Beijing focuses on federal officers and probationary personnel who have been laid off from the CIA and harbor resentment, bitterness, and a desire for revenge against their former superiors. Chinese intelligence, analytical, and strategic circles then work to support these individuals to fill the financial gap. The sudden loss of a job for a security officer with high financial obligations creates fertile ground for recruitment, as China offers substantial and enticing financial incentives to secure their loyalty. Chinese intelligence circles are also actively employing digital recruitment through front companies. These are sham consulting firms. Beijing is establishing networks of consulting companies, think tanks, and fake recruitment agencies that appear Western and 100% legitimate to target talent on LinkedIn. Through these platforms, Chinese intelligence officers target former CIA employees who are seeking employment on well-known job search platforms like LinkedIn. They use disguised accounts, sometimes employing artificial intelligence, to apply for jobs. Then begins the process of gradually extracting information. The relationship starts with requests for ordinary, non-classified (publicly available) research in exchange for lucrative financial rewards to build trust. The employee is then gradually drawn into providing sensitive information and moving to encrypted communication platforms.

Here, Chinese intelligence agencies work to feed their counterintelligence efforts with tactical information. When China succeeds in recruiting a compromised American security operative, it doesn’t just seek international secrets but focuses on acquiring high-quality information that serves its counterintelligence apparatus. The most prominent of these is uncovering the methods of operation of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Understanding American recruitment mechanisms, how spies are planted, and methods of vetting and infiltration. Identifying profiles and characteristics (profiles) to understand the psychological and behavioral traits the CIA seeks in informants, which helps China detect potential spies within its own territory or within the People’s Liberation Army early on. This also involves uncovering technical and cyber vulnerabilities by identifying the encryption tools and systems used by US agencies, thus giving Chinese counterintelligence the ability to fortify its networks and penetrate counterespionage operations.  Exploiting the absence of exit briefings, Western and American intelligence reports have revealed that some federal employees who were hastily discharged did not undergo standard exit briefings. This procedural gap left employees without direct warnings or clear reporting mechanisms should they be approached by hostile entities. Beijing exploited this as a golden opportunity to operate with minimal oversight. In response to this risk, US security agencies, such as the FBI and the National Counterintelligence and Security Center NCSC), issued heightened security alerts and shut down and blocked dozens of fake websites belonging to Chinese recruitment networks targeting discharged CIA employees.

This time last year, Antelope Reef was mostly submerged underwater and barely visible unless you were steaming past at low tide. New satellite imagery, provided to TWZ by Vantor, showcases what the People’s Republic of China (PRC) can construct after 10 months of nonstop dredging: a nearly 1,500-acre artificial island with a deep-water port, 2,000-plus-foot quay capable of berthing warships, and the beginnings of a 10,000-foot-long military-grade runway. Hardly recognizable today, Antelope Reef has become the latest, and one of the largest, man-made outposts in Beijing’s aggressive campaign to militarize and dominate the South China Sea.

The “first phase” of construction is now complete, according to a report from Reuters, following the departure of a fleet of dredgers that have been on station for months. Vantor, a spatial intelligence company, shared the images, dated August 11, with TWZ that show the results of the rapid transformation in detail, which you can view in high resolution below.

Reports surfaced in early 2026 about unusual PRC activity around the reef, which is located in the northwest part of the South China Sea, approximately 160 nautical miles (nm) south of Hainan, China, and 200 nm east of Da Nang, Vietnam. The fleet of PRC cutter-suction dredgers appeared late last year, assembling at the Zhujiang River Estuary and transiting with their Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders dark to avoid unwanted attention. Once on the scene, they began working around the clock to move sand from the seabed to create ground above.

The pace of construction and rate of change have been staggering, and show how much progress the PRC has made in its reclamation and land-building capabilities. In less than a year, the PRC dredged more than a million tons of sand to reclaim approximately 1,500 acres of land. The teardrop-shaped island is now 3.7 miles long, surrounded by seawalls and internal roads, with ongoing construction underway at three primary locations around the lagoon – which you can see marked on the graphic above. For comparison, construction of the artificial islands in the Spratly Islands, more than a decade ago, took several years.

Antelope Reef, or Lingyang Jiao to the Chinese and Đá Hải Sâm to the Vietnamese, is part of the Crescent archipelago in the Paracel Island chain. China has occupied the Paracels since 1974, but the territory is still disputed by Vietnam and Taiwan.

In the latest satellite imagery from Vantor, several notable features are discernible and were first identified by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI). On the northwest side, preparations are being made for what will likely eventually be a 10,000-foot-long, 180-foot-wide runway, similar to those built at Fiery Cross, Subi Reef, Mischief Reef, and Woody Island. The northwest edge of the island is the only area long enough to accommodate a runway capable of landing large military and commercial aircraft, and grading appears to be about halfway complete – but no concrete has been poured yet. AMTI also identified excavation for a 200-by-200-foot structure nearby, which mirrors the footprint of the large aircraft hangars at China’s other island-airfields.

On the southern part of the island, a 680-meter – roughly 2,200 feet – quay where both military and civilian ships can dock inside the lagoon is clearly visible. Reuters noted that a China Coast Guard (CCG) vessel was spotted dockside at the quay recently. The east side of the island, just below the channel entrance, hosts the only part of the base in active use, with green space areas, a helicopter pad, and parking lots, as well as buildings for administrative spaces and housing. Temporary piers are visible at each of the major points. Two concrete plants, located along the northwestern and southern edges of the lagoon, are supporting construction efforts. TWZ has not independently confirmed AMTI’s assessments.

According to PRC state media, Antelope will be used for commercial and civilian purposes – a similar tale told during construction of the other military outposts while they were being developed. It’s worth noting that in 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping stood in the Rose Garden next to then-President Barack Obama and said, “China does not intend to pursue militarization” in the South China Sea. “Relevant construction activity that China is undertaking in the Nansha Islands does not target or impact any country and there is no intention to militarize,” he claimed, using the Chinese name for the disputed Spratly Islands. Since Xi’s head fake, which epitomizes the notorious PRC “say-do” gap, Beijing has built up multiple artificial islands as military bases, and has used them to press its territorial claims and confront its neighbors across the nine-dash line, in strict defiance of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Antelope Reef sits in a key strategic location south of Sanya Port and Yulin Naval Base on Hainan Island, home to two of the three People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) aircraft carriers, CNS Shandong and CNS Fujian, as well as a significant submarine force at Longpo Naval Base. A military base there could extend PLA radar and electronic surveillance coverage, add another dispersed airfield to the PLA’s rolodex to launch sorties from and an additional port to dock ships at, and further expand China’s sweeping air defense umbrella.

The constellation of artificial islands would be instrumental in enforcing total control over the South China Sea, serving as key anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) nodes. They act as logistical and persistent surveillance nodes, among other uses, today, and the more that China has dispersed throughout the South China Sea, the greater its options are as well as the credibility of its anti-access capabilities.

“I have no doubt that this marginally benefits China in that it’ll be able to forward deploy more Coast Guard and more militia in the Paracels persistently. It will, I’m sure, facilitate more persistent aerial patrols,” Greg Poling, the senior fellow who oversees AMTI, said on the Why Should We Care About the Indo-Pacific podcast earlier this year. “But the main benefit is probably the ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance] component; the ground-based sensing you get just building stuff.”

Beijing’s land grab in the South China Sea shows no signs of slowing down, and Antelope Reef marks the latest in a decades-long string of island seizures that it can leverage during a potential dustup in the future. But whether it will eventually run out of islands to claim remains unclear. “China doesn’t have a lot left to dig,” according to Poling, “so unless China plans to seize another island, I don’t see it building anything, at least anything substantial.”

Contact the author: ian.ellis-jones@recurrent.io

Germany splits

At least two generations on both Guetinger’s maternal and paternal sides were from Babenhausen, a small Bavarian market town of about 4,000 people in the 1960s. Surrounded by a castle, it was once home to a merchant family said to have been prominent during the Middle Ages.

Guetinger’s father, Ernst, was among five siblings and the youngest of the three boys. Hans was the eldest, followed by another brother, Erich, and there was a four-year age gap between Ernst and Hans. Guetinger said this age difference played a role in his father’s and uncle’s relationship.

“My dad and uncle Hans didn’t have a very close relationship because they had grown up during wartime,” he said. “When war broke out in 1939, Uncle Hans was obliged to serve as a soldier.”

Soldiers were in short supply, so German boys aged 16 and 17 were drafted as “Flakhelfer” to work with anti-aircraft guns or man the huge lights that tracked enemy aircraft.

“My Uncle Erich was in this age range so served in this role, but my dad, being the youngest, did not have to serve,” he added.

After Nazi Germany’s defeat in 1945, the country was divided into occupation zones and then formally split into two separate countries in 1949.

Hans returned to Babenhausen, Bavaria, after the war and looked for work as a shoemaker. But jobs were scarce, and he had trouble finding work.

Amid their struggles, Hans’s homesick wife encouraged him to try finding work in the GDR, where she was from. They knew they would be welcomed, because the GDR was keen on people willing to buck the trend of those going west – roughly 2.7 million people moved to West Germany between 1949 and 1961 – for better economic and employment opportunities.

In 1958, Hans’s family moved east to Brieskow-Finkenheerd, a village near the Polish border, where Hans started working at a power station that also provided their accommodation. He was also able to indulge in his love of hunting as much as he liked.

“He was very happy hunting,” Guetinger remembered fondly. “In West Germany, you could only hunt if you owned land, but since the government owned all the land in the GDR, my uncle was told he could hunt wherever he wanted.”

Hans became so well known for his hunting abilities that when the big cadres wanted to celebrate something and eat some tasty meat like boar or wild swine, they would ask Hans to go hunting.

“The party had its own hunters, but they considered my uncle one of the best,” Guetinger said.

Meanwhile, Hans’s younger brother Ernst, back in Bavaria, became a father to Erich Guetinger in 1951.

In the 1950s, freedom of movement between the two countries remained largely unrestricted, but from the 1960s onwards, tougher measures were instituted. After that, East Germans were generally only allowed to travel to the West for urgent family matters, such as funerals or weddings.

In August 1961 – 65 years ago – the East German government began building the Berlin Wall, a 155km (96 miles) concrete structure surrounding West Berlin that effectively isolated it within GDR territory and severed the capital.

Outside Berlin, efforts to fortify the division led to the installation of new barbed wire fences, detectors, watchtowers, as well as booby-traps and extended powers for border guards to shoot and arrest escapees. Between then and 1989, when the wall came down, an estimated 75,000 people were imprisoned for trying to escape.

Guetinger says that in the early years of the division, there was barely any contact with his uncle and family.

“Eventually, we were able to start sending letters, but we shared very little in these because everybody knew the East German secret police, known as the Stasi, would carefully check the post between families, often reading our letters,” he said.

Like many families in West Germany, the Guetingers would often send Western products to their relatives in the East.

“For Christmas, we made parcels containing things we knew they would like, and which we knew it would be difficult for them to get, such as coffee and blue jeans,” Guetinger said.

“Blue jeans were particularly hot property, and my cousins liked this kind of clothing. And even though we would send parcels, there was always a chance that they wouldn’t reach them,” he explained, noting that shipments were closely monitored.

Guetinger says it is still hard to fully assess how the day-to-day disruption caused by the division impacted their family’s sense of safety and unity.

“Even if my parents had a heavy heart back then, they would rarely talk about it, so today, I have to rely on other indicators to try and understand. And one of the indicators is that my dad and his elder brother tried to visit each other as soon as it was possible for both of them.”

China is set to launch its Chang’e-7 unmanned, robotic space mission, possibly as early as Monday morning, to look for ice water in the permanently shadowed craters of the moon’s south pole.

This marks China’s seventh and most ambitious moon mission so far. Here is what we know about it.

What do we know about Chang’e-7?

The Chang’e‑7 launch window runs from Monday, August 24 to Monday, August 31, according to launch observers. That means the mission could lift off on any day in that period.

The Chang’e-7 comprises an orbiter, a lander, a rover and a hopper.

• The orbiter is the main spacecraft which will remain in the moon’s orbit, mapping the surface and taking images while the mission is under way. It will also relay data and communications between the other Chang’e‑7 components and Earth.
• The lander is the vessel that will touch down on the lunar surface, loaded with the necessary scientific instruments for lunar exploration, near the edge of the Shackleton Crater, a 21km-wide (13-mile-wide) pit close to the moon’s south pole. Lunar missions before this have never come this close to the pole.
• The rover is a small robotic vehicle which can drive around the landing site and which carries equipment to analyse the local environment, including rocks and soil.
• The hopper is a small robotic craft powered by solar energy, designed to “hop” – or fly – short distances from the surface of the moon and land again. It will be used to explore the Shackleton Crater.

How do we know there is water on the moon?

Over the past two decades, several space missions have established that there is water on the moon.

Since the 1960s, even before the first Apollo landing in 1969, scientists speculated that water could exist on the moon. However, when Apollo crews returned samples for testing in the late 1960s and early 1970s, they appeared to be dry.

Finally, in 2009, NASA deliberately crashed a rocket segment and its probe into a shadowed lunar crater to analyse the dust plume it kicked up. This provided one of the clearest direct confirmations that significant ice water does exist on the moon, building on earlier detections of water and hydrogen by probes.

In October 2020, NASA scientists announced that water on the moon is more widespread than previously known. They said water molecules had been found to be encapsulated within mineral grains on the lunar surface and speculated that more water is hidden in ice patches which are in permanent shadows.

NASA describes these permanent shadows as dark areas inside deep craters near the north and south poles of the moon where sunlight has not reached for millions or even billions of years. In 2018, prior to confirming it in 2020, NASA had detected water ice in shadowed parts of the moon through mapping.

Why is it important to find out more about the water on the moon?

Expanding knowledge about water on the moon is vital because ancient polar ice may have preserved a record of lunar volcanic activity and of water delivered by comets and asteroids to the Earth-moon system, offering clues to how our own oceans originally formed.

Additionally, if there is enough water on the moon that is realistically accessible, it could serve as a source of drinking water for crewed lunar missions, and could also help to keep equipment cool.

Hydrogen could also be extracted from moon water to provide fuel, while oxygen could be extracted to breathe, supporting onward missions to Mars or lunar mining.

Could anyone ‘own’ the water on the moon?

The 1967 United Nations Outer Space Treaty bans any nation from claiming sovereignty over the moon or owning it as territory. It does not explicitly prohibit commercial operations, but it requires private activities in space to be authorised and supervised by states and leaves key questions about resource ownership unresolved.

Which recent space missions have searched for frozen water on the moon?

In 2023, Russia’s lunar spacecraft, Luna-25, was launched to look for frozen water in the moon’s south pole. However, the Luna-25 spun out of control and crashed. The crash prevented any scientific data collection or water discovery.

Racing against the Luna-25 mission was India’s Chandrayaan-3, which also aimed to expand knowledge of lunar water ice. Chandrayaan-3 successfully landed in August 2023 and found critical new evidence of water on the surface of the moon’s south pole through soil temperature readings.

Why is exploring the moon’s south pole a challenge?

Attempted landings at the moon’s south pole have failed before because of its challenging terrain, which is full of craters and deep trenches.

The south pole is far from the equatorial region targeted by previous missions, including the crewed Apollo landings.

What is different about the Chang’e-7 mission?

The upcoming Chang’e-7 is aiming to expand knowledge about where, exactly, water is located in the craters of the moon, how deep it is, what form it is in and whether it is indeed possible to access it.

The Chang’e-7’s six-legged hopper has been designed to jump into and out of the deep, shadowed craters near the south pole that are hard for traditional rovers to reach, to look for water ice and other resources.

No previous space mission has used a dedicated hopper to jump in and out of lunar craters in this way.

Omani and Iranian foreign ministers hold a call as Washington prepares economic sanctions amid ongoing shipping disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has called for an end to the months-long war with the United States, stating that Tehran holds a position of strength as diplomatic talks remain stalled.

“It is better that we bring the war to an end now as we are in a position of power and dignity,” Pezeshkian said in a meeting with doctors on Friday. “The whole world acknowledges our victory and emphasises that America has attacked our schools, hospitals and infrastructure in violation of all regulations and is hated around the world.”

Pezeshkian – whose authority as president is ultimately subordinate to Iran’s Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei – also defended the June memorandum of understanding agreed with Washington against hardline domestic critics in parliament, who accused his administration of giving concessions to the US.

“They cannot find even a single clause in this agreement that indicates capitulation. All the commitments concern the other side,” he said.

However, days after the memorandum of understanding expired, Iran’s military leadership has warned that the country remains ready to strike back against any new threats.

“With preparedness across land, sea, air, air defence and cyberspace, Iran’s armed forces will respond to the enemy’s new threats with crushing, punishing and devastating responses,” Major-General Ali Abdollahi, chief of staff of Iran’s armed forces, was quoted as saying by Iranian media.

Strait of Hormuz

Meanwhile, Omani and Iranian foreign ministers discussed in a phone call on Friday ways to create suitable conditions for resuming dialogue and negotiations, as well as developments affecting navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, according to Oman’s state news agency.

Tehran continues to keep the key waterway partially shut while Washington persists with a naval counterblockade. Reports in US media indicate the US navy has been organising and protecting secret convoys of tankers through the southern sector of the strait, enabling between five and 10 million barrels a day of oil to be exported.

In Washington, President Donald Trump expressed scepticism over Tehran’s willingness to negotiate, telling reporters when asked if US military options with Iran were limited: “It just means that we’re seeing what happens.”

“We have total control of that entire region having to do with the Strait of Hormuz, and that means well into it, the land areas. So, they would love to make a deal, but they’re not ready to make the right deal, in my opinion,” Trump added.

He has also warned of economic consequences against any country that provides “any type of lifeline to Iran”.

The comments came as US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent warned that Washington would “collapse” the Iranian government with a sanctions campaign.

Bessent will hold a news conference at the Department of the Treasury on Monday, where he is expected to outline planned sanctions against Iran, marking a shift by the Trump administration towards economic rather than military pressure as the war nears the six-month mark.

Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has already condemned the US plan, accusing Washington of “economic terrorism” and stating that “the instigators of these sanctions are deserving of trial and punishment”.

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Lin Jian also criticised the US measures, stating that “sanctions and pressure will not help resolve the issue” and urging all parties to “take responsible measures and resolve the problem through political and diplomatic means”.

China opposes the US and Western escalation against Iran and insists on condemning the US and Israeli attacks on Iranian nuclear targets. China considers the US and Israeli military attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities a blatant violation of international law and the UN Charter. While Beijing officially adheres to nuclear non-proliferation, it will hold the US directly responsible and will oppose the imposition of new international sanctions against Iran in the UN Security Council. China will work to hold Washington accountable. Beijing believes that the US withdrawal from the nuclear agreement is the root cause of the current impasse in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) negotiations. The Chinese Foreign Ministry asserts that the policy of maximum pressure and economic sanctions against Tehran will not resolve the crisis but will only exacerbate tensions. China views Tehran’s threat to withdraw from the NPT as an understandable reaction to the maximum pressure exerted upon it, but it consistently prefers diplomatic solutions and supports maintaining the international legal framework to prevent escalation.  The Chinese stance came after Iranian parliamentarians, including Ebrahim Rezaei, asserted that withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the best response to the Trump administration’s escalation of economic warfare.

The main dimensions of the Chinese position regarding the Iranian threat to withdraw from the NPT are embodied in China’s rejection of pressure and sanctions against Iran. China maintains that the escalating US sanctions and policies against Tehran will not resolve the nuclear crisis but rather exacerbate it. Chinese intelligence, military, political, and strategic circles have adopted a strategy of legal consideration versus feasibility. Experts and observers close to Chinese circles argue that Iran’s withdrawal from the NPT is a legitimate legal right for independent states, but Beijing implicitly suggests that such a move could trigger harsher international sanctions against Tehran. Therefore, Beijing is working to (obstruct UN sanctions against Iran). China, along with Russia, has expressed its readiness to block the activation of the snapback mechanism or any harsh international sanctions against Iran in the UN Security Council to protect its interests and regional stability, while adhering to a political settlement. Beijing is calling on all parties to return to the negotiating table and maintain regional and international stability, instead of taking radical and escalatory steps that violate international treaties.

In my analysis, China will insist on referring the Iranian issue to international forums, such as the Security Council, using its veto power to condemn and block any resolutions issued against Iran. Here, China is expected to cooperate with Russia to obstruct any Western or American Security Council resolutions aimed at condemning Iran or imposing new, harsh UN sanctions. China will maintain its commitment to dialogue by continuing to call for a return to the political negotiating table, while publicly acknowledging Tehran’s previous assurances that it is not seeking to produce nuclear weapons. Here, we must understand all the strategic parameters of China’s position regarding the escalation against Iran over its nuclear program through the lens of China’s opposition to nuclear armament. Despite China’s understanding of Iran’s motives and its right to peaceful energy, it categorically rejects Tehran’s move towards acquiring a nuclear military arsenal in order to preserve the stability of the international order and prevent a regional arms race. This is coupled with the desire of relevant circles in Beijing to safeguard their interests. Therefore, Beijing will strive to avoid sliding into a direct confrontation with the West and the United States while continuing to provide Iran with as much economic and diplomatic support as possible in order to alleviate Iran’s isolation.

China supports Tehran diplomatically, emphasizing dialogue and rejecting the unilateral sanctions imposed by Washington. Despite the ongoing pressure, the likelihood of direct war remains low, as a major war of attrition is avoided. China’s position is characterized by its call for diplomatic solutions and dialogue based on mutual respect, its rejection of unilateral US economic sanctions against Iran, and its insistence that all parties address the root causes of the tension and resume the nuclear agreement. This is especially relevant given the Iranian threat to withdraw from the agreement, voiced by several members of the Iranian parliament who believe that remaining in the nuclear non-proliferation treaty is pointless under continued US pressure.  Intelligence, military, political, and strategic circles in Beijing considered the Iranian parliamentary proposal a political response to the tightened US economic sanctions against Tehran. Chinese intelligence circles are well aware that an actual Iranian withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty requires the approval of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. Should this occur—a slim possibility according to Chinese strategic assessments—it would mean the potential outbreak of a full-scale war. Therefore, strategic assessments in Beijing suggest that the potential confrontation between Washington and Tehran will likely escalate into a protracted war of attrition rather than a full-scale military clash. According to Chinese analyses, both Washington and Tehran prefer economic pressure and the prospect of open negotiations to the option of open warfare. Hence, China seeks to curb any military escalation that could threaten energy security and regional stability.

Accordingly, China supports the continuation of the diplomatic and political track to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis. It rejects pressures, escalatory policies, and economic sanctions against Tehran, while simultaneously calling for dialogue based on mutual respect and the preservation of regional stability, without supporting any sudden steps that could fuel the conflict. China’s general position stems from its rejection of sanctions. Beijing believes that the policy of maximum pressure and economic sanctions does not resolve the nuclear issue. Therefore, China consistently calls for adherence to dialogue to resolve differences through peaceful political and diplomatic means and to resume negotiations. China also provides strategic support to Iran. In this regard, China stands with Iran in the face of Western and American pressure. China is working alongside Russia to submit draft resolutions to the UN Security Council to support de-escalation, extend the agreement’s framework, address threats of withdrawal, and avoid mutual escalation. China urges all parties to avoid any unilateral steps or escalatory measures, such as triggering the snapback mechanism or mutual withdrawals from international agreements and treaties, which could lead to a loss of control.  Therefore, Beijing prefers to contain this crisis and the Iranian threats to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty through negotiating frameworks that preserve the basic structure of the non-proliferation regime, while holding the United States and European countries partly responsible due to Washington’s previous withdrawal from the same nuclear agreement that Tehran is now threatening to withdraw from.

In the last few years, lithium has emerged as one of the most crucial metals for the global electric transition.

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This is mainly due to its widespread usage in electric vehicles (EVs), through lithium-ion batteries. These provide high energy density, a lightweight structure and fast-charging capacity, along with a long cycle life, which supports modern driving range and performance.

As such, it has become key to achieving widespread, practical advancements in automotive electrification.

However, lithium continues to face vital long-term structural supply challenges, which has led to more EV producers considering other alternatives like manganese and magnesium.

Why magnesium?

Magnesium, another critical metal for electric vehicles and energy storage batteries, could potentially be a key alternative to lithium in EVs.

This is because it is cheaper, abundantly found across the world and also stores more energy. It is also considered to be safer than lithium, as it does not form the sharp spikes known as dendrites that cause lithium batteries to sometimes short or catch fire.

A magnesium battery can also hold more energy in a smaller space, which could have significant size and efficiency benefits for EV makers who want to make more compact vehicles.

It is also one of the most common elements found both in seawater and in the ground, which could help makers bypass potential supply constraints with lithium down the line.

Magnesium ions also carry double the charge of lithium ions, at a +2 charge, which can help support a higher volumetric capacity, enabling more compact, energy-dense power storage for both EVs and other devices.

China produces the overwhelming majority of the world’s magnesium, accounting for around 87% to 95% of the world’s primary magnesium in 2025, coming up to anywhere between 830,000 and 950,000 metric tons, according to Visual Capitalist’s Elements.

This is mainly from extensive dolomite reserves, with the largest magnesium reserves being in the Liaoning province.

The second top producer of magnesium is Israel, which extracts the metal mainly from the Dead Sea. Russia and Brazil are other major producers, with some key magnesium reserves being located in Satka and Brumado.

Manganese is also emerging as a support to lithium batteries, rather than fully replacing them. This is due to manganese batteries having a much lower energy density and not being easily rechargeable hundreds of times. They also provide lower voltage.

As such, they work well to support lithium systems in hybrid setups but fail under heavy power demands.

Why lithium supplies are fickle

One of the biggest challenges facing lithium supply is slow project timelines. This is because opening a new lithium mine takes an average of 16 to 18 years, from initial discovery to first production. This is mainly due to complex permitting rules, exploration rights and financing issues in many regions of the world.

Hard rock mining also produces significant waste and brine extraction consumes vast amounts of water in the arid regions lithium is usually found in. This leads to more scrutiny from local communities and environmental groups as well.

Similarly, due to lithium prices having crashed recently, following previous oversupply, mining investment and exploration budgets have now reduced somewhat. This significantly threatens the pipeline for future production and the global green transition.

The majority of lithium is also concentrated in Australia and South America’s “Lithium Triangle,” whereas China controls a significant portion of the refining capacity required to make battery-grade material.

Magnesium batteries?

Currently, most magnesium batteries still in the testing phase by entities like the University of Waterloo.

However, some major automakers are increasingly developing and experimenting with magnesium-rich or manganese-doped alternatives like Lithium Manganese-Rich or LMFP cells or long-term magnesium chemistry.

MG (SAIC Motor) has recently deployed new Lithium-Manganese-Oxide (LMO) semi-solid-state SolidCore battery tech in models like the MG4 EV Urban, which is scheduled to hit UK and European markets by the end of 2026.

General Motors and LG Energy Solution are currently aiming for a 2028 commerical launch for advanced lithium manganese-rich (LMR) battery cells. These use high manganese content to decrease costs and raise energy density for future electric trucks and SUVs.

Similarly, Toyota has also funded long-term dedicated research into replacing standard lithium chemistry with high-capacity magnesium alternatives. However, it is still unclear when commercial vehicles could be using this technology, as researchers are still awaiting further electrolyte stabilisation.

Great Wall Motor also uses semi-solid magnesium casting technology to reduce component weight, while Tesla integrated selective magnesium alloy components inot the Model 3 and Model Y.

Why magnesium batteries are not as widespread yet

While magnesium batteries are seeing more interest as potential alternatives to lithium now, significant challenges remain before they can be mass-adopted yet.

One of the biggest drawbacks of magnesium is slow ion movement, which means that magnesium particles move more slowly inside the battery materials.

This causes very slow charging times and weak power during fast acceleration, along with poor cold-weather performance. These factors could make it much harder for magnesium batteries to match fast-charging and high-power lithium EV batteries.

Finding a liquid, solid or electrolyte that lets magnesium move easily without breaking down is hard too, currently, as electrolytes that successfully move magnesium ions efficiently end up corroding the internal battery components.

Similarly, finding a cathode material that can withstand insertion and removal of magnesium ions without breaking down remains incredibly complex.

Taiwan Warns Chinese Vessel to Leave Sensitive Waters

Taiwan’s coast guard said on Friday it had warned off and shadowed a Chinese research vessel operating in sensitive waters west of the island, marking the third time the ship has appeared near Taiwan since May.

The vessel, the Tongji, was spotted late Thursday about 24.9 nautical miles northwest of Taiwan’s Penghu islands, which sit in the Taiwan Strait and host important Taiwanese military facilities.

Taiwan views the repeated presence of Chinese vessels near the island as part of a broader campaign of maritime pressure by Beijing.

Coast Guard Monitors Tongji as It Moves South

Taiwan said the Tongji was not seen deploying or towing scientific equipment during its latest appearance.

The coast guard dispatched a patrol vessel to sail alongside the Chinese ship and issued what it described as strong warnings for it to leave the area.

By Friday morning, the Tongji had moved to around 28 nautical miles west-southwest of Liuqiu island in southern Taiwan, continuing southeast through the Taiwan Strait.

Taiwan’s coast guard said it would continue proactively deploying vessels to respond to Chinese ships and protect the country’s waters.

China’s Taiwan Affairs Office had not immediately responded to a Reuters request for comment.

Why Is the Research Ship Significant?

The Tongji was commissioned only last year and has appeared near Taiwan several times since May.

Taiwan previously reported seeing the vessel lowering ropes into the water, raising concerns that it could have been conducting scientific or survey operations without authorisation.

Chinese state media describes the ship as capable of operating in all weather conditions and carrying remotely operated vehicles, laboratories and unmanned systems.

The latest incident is therefore significant because the vessel’s presence comes amid wider concerns in Taipei over Chinese maritime activity around the island.

Taiwan Sees a Broader Grey-Zone Strategy

Taiwan has increasingly described the activities of Chinese coast guard and other vessels around the island as grey-zone pressure.

Rather than directly launching military action, such operations can create persistent pressure through patrols, maritime activity and the repeated presence of Chinese state vessels in disputed or sensitive areas.

Taiwan argues that these activities can gradually create an impression of Chinese jurisdiction while testing Taipei’s ability to monitor and respond to incursions.

The research vessel’s repeated appearances add another dimension to that pressure because scientific and survey activity can have potential strategic value even when a vessel is not openly conducting military operations.

Chinese Military Activity Continues Around Taiwan

The latest maritime encounter comes against the backdrop of China’s almost daily military activity around Taiwan.

Beijing considers Taiwan part of China and rejects the Taiwanese government’s claims to sovereignty. Taiwan’s government rejects Beijing’s sovereignty claims and maintains control over the island.

This has produced an increasingly competitive environment in which military aircraft, naval vessels, coast guard ships and other Chinese platforms regularly operate around Taiwan.

Analysis: Why the Tongji Matters Beyond Scientific Research

The immediate incident does not appear to represent a direct military confrontation. Taiwan said the Tongji was not observed deploying equipment, and the coast guard’s response consisted primarily of monitoring and warnings.

But the repeated appearance of the same vessel is strategically significant.

Research ships can perform legitimate scientific functions, but their ability to operate sophisticated equipment and collect information in strategically important waters means their activities can also have implications for maritime surveillance and future military operations.

For Taiwan, the challenge is therefore to distinguish between legitimate research and activity that could contribute to China’s broader strategic objectives without unnecessarily escalating tensions.

The incident also illustrates the evolving nature of cross-Strait competition. China does not need to launch a military attack to increase pressure on Taiwan; persistent maritime activity can gradually test Taiwan’s responses, expand China’s presence and challenge Taipei’s control over the surrounding waters.

As Chinese vessels continue appearing near Taiwan, incidents involving research ships, coast guard vessels and military platforms are likely to become an increasingly important part of the island’s security challenge.

With information from Reuters.

The government has announced investments of about 2.3 billion reais ($444.2m) to bolster its artificial intelligence ecosystem.

Brazil will invest about 2.3bn reais ($444.2m) to bolster its artificial intelligence ecosystem, splitting projects between United States and Chinese tech firms in a strategic move that underscores its efforts to balance ties with both superpowers.

Just more than half the total, 1.3bn reais ($251m), will fund a supercomputing infrastructure project in Rio de Janeiro developed in partnership with China’s Huawei Technologies and iFlytek, President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva‘s government said on Thursday.

The infrastructure will be used primarily to develop large language models for general and sector-specific applications, it said.

Separately, about 1 billion reais ($193.1m) will be allocated through a tender for a supercomputer that Brazil expects to rank among the world’s 10 most powerful AI processing machines.

The machine will be installed in the northeastern state of Rio Grande do Norte, chosen for its energy potential. Lula attended an announcement ceremony in the state on Thursday.

The Reuters news agency quoted unnamed government officials as saying they expect US chipmaker Nvidia to win the tender. Science and Technology Minister Luciana Santos told the Folha de S Paulo newspaper last week that she anticipated the company would be the supplier.

“The strategy is not to depend on a single company, technology or country,” Lula’s administration said in a statement, adding that the investments are aimed at strengthening national sovereignty over data.

China, a leading player in AI, has expanded its role as Brazil’s largest trading partner. The US, meanwhile, remains the biggest source of foreign direct investment in Latin America’s largest economy despite losing market share in trade and recently imposing additional tariffs on Brazilian goods.

The investments will be funded by the National Fund for Scientific and Technological Development (FNDCT) through phased disbursements. The government expects the supercomputer to begin operating by the end of next year, while the cooperation agreement with the Chinese companies is scheduled to start in July 2027.