China

July 18 (UPI) — At least eight people are dead and 34 are missing after a massive landslide fell in Chongqing, China, Friday morning.

Rocks and soil slid down the mountain and buried more than 10 residential buildings in the suburbs of the city in Pengshui County, in central China. There were 10 people pulled from the rubble and sent to hospitals. More than 1,100 people were forced to evacuate their homes.

The landslide included 635,664 square feet of materials, officials confirmed. The largest rock is estimated to be about 105,944 square feet, Wang Chuanjun, head of Planning and Natural Resources in Pengshui County, told The Independent.

Heavy rains got in the way of rescue operations. The area got about 8 inches of rain overnight Friday and Saturday morning.

China’s National Development and Reform Commission has allocated about $4.4 million to help with restoration of infrastructure and public services to the area.

China’s mysterious next-generation combat aircraft have dominated headlines since a pair of sixth-generation designs broke cover in late 2024. But while those aircraft understandably command attention, the single most important fighter in the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is arguably the Chengdu J-20 Mighty Dragon. Not only does the J-20 offer a level of capability previously missing from the PLAAF, but it is being introduced in remarkably large numbers. This underscores China’s ability to mass produce even the most advanced weapons in its arsenal. The quantities of J-20s that are now rolling off the production line also highlight the pace of the PLAAF’s transformation and raise the question of exactly how many Mighty Dragons have already been fielded.

The appearance of new Chinese combat aircraft designs, including the J-35 medium-weight stealth fighter in both naval and land-based versions, means that the J-20 is no longer under such a high level of public scrutiny. This contrasts with the situation back in 2021, when TWZ provided a review of the program on what was then the 10th anniversary of its first flight.

At that time, we stated that the J-20 was, “without doubt, the main focus of global attention when it comes to China’s military aircraft developments. Within the People’s Republic of China, too, the jet known as the Mighty Dragon has become a totem for the country’s fast-emerging high-technology defense sector and its associated aviation industries.”

It is worth recalling that when the J-20 first appeared on the runway at Chengdu’s sprawling manufacturing plant in late 2010, the black-painted aircraft was deemed by some Western observers to be a technology demonstrator at best, not something that would end up being the country’s first stealth fighter built at scale. It is one thing to fly an impressive, hand-built experimental aircraft. It’s very much another to produce an advanced fighter reliably in large quantities, especially one that incorporates stealth technologies that are notoriously challenging to manufacture. However, after some design tweaks, the J-20’s service entry followed in late 2016, and the jet became only the third true stealthy fighter to become operational anywhere in the world.

Since then, the J-20 has continued to be improved, and new variants have emerged. Perhaps the most significant development concerning the jet has been the introduction of a domestically produced powerplant to the series-built aircraft, superseding the use of previous Russian-supplied engines. A two-seat version of the aircraft has also appeared, representing a notable novelty for a fifth-generation fighter. More advanced weapons — and more of them — and enhanced avionics have also been steadily introduced.

Most important, however, has been the increased production rate of the Chengdu jet, leading to its proliferation across the units of the PLAAF.

At the end of 2019, nearly a decade after the J-20 first appeared, Western sources estimated the number of J-20s built to be around 50, a figure that likely also included pre-production machines. At the same time, unconfirmed Chinese reports suggested a production capacity of 48 aircraft annually, but there was no publicly available evidence that that figure had been attained.

By late 2022, Western defense outlets were reporting that the PLAAF had received at least 200 J-20s, a figure based primarily on a study of construction numbers seen on the jets and equating to four production batches. At the same time, more than 240 examples of the J-16 multirole fighter aircraft, a Chinese development of the two-seat Flanker family, were said to be in service, equivalent to 11 batches. Also in production, the number of J-10Cs in service was somewhat lower, but the fleet was also bolstered by older J-10A/B versions.

In its assessment of the PLAAF modernization drive, in early 2023, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a British think tank, was somewhat more circumspect, counting a frontline fleet of at least 150 J-20s. However, the IISS noted, the fleet was projected to outnumber the U.S. Air Force’s F-22 Raptors by the end of the same year, aided by an annual production rate that “had likely doubled” within the previous three years.

As for the F-22, the U.S. Air Force currently has 185, but only 143 of the jets are combat-coded, with the rest being assigned to training and test and evaluation activities. Meanwhile, a significant portion of the overall fleet is typically down for maintenance at any given time.

A detailed analysis of the operationalized nature of the J-20 program was provided by Janes in mid-2024. This concluded that, in a period of over 11 months from July 2023, the PLAAF had inducted more than 70 J-20s, for a total of approximately 195 of the aircraft. Using satellite imagery, it was determined that, as of May 2024, the PLAAF operated 12 air brigades with J-20s, of which three brigades were fully equipped with the type. Significantly, it also confirmed that all five of the Theater Commands — joint military commands organized on a geographical basis — had inducted the J-20.

Moving forward to 2025, it appeared that the J-20 production total had rapidly reached the 300 mark.

In the fall of that year, Andreas Rupprecht, a longtime Chinese military observer and contributor to this website, identified a J-20 with a serial number that indicated it was the 300th airframe, from the 10th production batch.

Meanwhile, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), a U.K.-based think tank, assessed that, by late 2025, production rates for the J-20 had likely reached around 120 aircraft per year, and that around 300 of the aircraft were in service across at least 13 PLAAF regiments. “The total produced is likely to be higher,” RUSI explained in a report on the subject, “since a significant number of newly produced fighters will still be awaiting delivery to units.”

Based on the trend, RUSI suggested in its report earlier this year that, by 2030, around 1,000 J-20s of all versions (plus around 900 J-16s) will be in service with the PLAAF. “There is also a noticeable trend towards heavy fighters in general, with J-16s and J-20s being used to re-equip units that previously were operating not only J-11 and Su-27/30 Flanker heavy fighters, but also some J-7 light and J-8 medium fighters,” the report added.

Rupprecht told TWZ that he is confident that, as of mid-2026, around 500 J-20s had likely been delivered. This theory is reinforced by the presence of the jets with 14 frontline PLAAF units, and with another three Flight Test and Training Bases (FTTB), which operate mixed fleets. Of the 14 frontline units, four appear to have introduced the enhanced J-20A version, replacing the initial-production J-20s.

Interestingly, among American officials, there has been some downplaying of the J-20’s capabilities vis-à-vis the U.S. military.

“It’s not anything to lose a lot of sleep over,” Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) head Gen. Kenneth Wilsbach said in 2022. “Certainly, we’re watching them closely and seeing how they field and how they operate them.” Wilsbach qualified his comments by saying that the U.S. Air Force has “had a limited opportunity to assess it [the J-20], but it seems okay.”

On the other hand, other U.S. Air Force leaders have highlighted concern over the rapidly growing PLAAF, an expansion in which the J-20 is playing a major role.

“We are the smallest and oldest that we have ever been,” Air Force Brig. Gen. Doug Wickert, head of the 412th Test Wing at Edwards Air Force Base in California, said of his service during a briefing early last year. “The PLA is the largest and most modern that it has even [sic; ever] been. That is risk. That is uncertainty.”

Wickert added that he predicted that, by 2027, China would have numerical superiority of approximately 12 to one in modern fighter aircraft (including five to three in fifth-generation aircraft) in relation to U.S. assets stationed west of the international dateline.

At the same time, we don’t know how many J-20s Beijing intends to buy. As well as its continued development, much will depend on plans for the land-based J-35, which could potentially offer a cheaper alternative for some mission sets. Beyond that, there are at least two sixth-generation crewed combat aircraft designs and various collaborative combat aircraft (CCAs) and uncrewed combat air vehicles (UCAVs) that will need to be factored into the future force structure.

Undoubtedly, the J-20 has faced challenges, too, but it has matured from a prototype that some were quick to dismiss into the backbone of China’s premier air arm. Its continued evolution in terms of engines, avionics, weapons, and variants is important, but the most important development may simply be the rate at which China is able to build it.

In the same way that technologies and tactics developed alongside the J-20 will find their way into China’s next generation of combat aircraft, these will also be able to leverage the advances in production output. China has proven to be remarkably capable of punching out large numbers of advanced fighters, so these new aircraft could hit flightlines in greater quantities faster than some may expect, once they are developmentally mature enough to enter production. Moreover, Chengdu’s serial-manufacturing abilities underscore the wider degree to which China can churn out its most advanced weapons, of all kinds, which is historically a hugely challenging endeavor.

In military terms, quantity has a quality all on its own, and if current production estimates are even broadly accurate, the J-20 program has entered a phase where manufacturing capacity is just as strategically significant as the fighter’s stealth and performance.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

When Washington celebrates the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence on July 4th, the celebrations will arrive bruised. There will be the customary funding disputes, a federal commission fighting against a more partisan task force from the White House, and a public worn by years of political turmoil, all of which will turn what could have been an occasion of civic healing into another USA ‘celebration’ in the world. None of this has gone unnoticed in Beijing, given that this ‘celebration’ is being interpreted more as a diagnosis than a birthday. What is being asked throughout the commentaries from Qiushi (求是), on CCTV, in Tsinghua and Peking University, is simply put, what kind of America is turning 250?

Within the last five years, the interpretation given from both the official channels and the more informal academic channels in Beijing has varied considerably. Most importantly, these streams have been diverging for some time and therefore offer significant insight into how Beijing has been interpreting the country it has been comparing itself to for the last 20 years.

From “the East rising” to a measured retreat

Many are familiar with the upbeat version of the story. After 2020, the phrases that framed China’s worldview included “great changes, unseen in a century” (百年未有之大变局) and “the East is rising, the West is declining” (东升西降). The latter, used by Xi Jinping in remarks to senior officials in early 2021 and again in 2023, provided the slogan for the official narrative. The Covid-19 pandemic, the insurrection at the US Capitol, and a decade of US political instability seemed to provide the empirical evidence for a thesis, rooted in Chinese Marxist theory, that capitalist systems contain the principle of their own disintegration. This was rationalized and systemized after the 2008 financial crisis and has remained largely unchanged.

However, the reality is far more complicated than the slogan implies. Researchers who have traced the terminology in Chinese academic publications through the CNKI database have found that scholarly use of “the East is rising, the West is declining” (东升西降) peaked around 2021 and has subsided since then, even though the idea itself remained more prevalent than it was during the entire duration of Donald Trump’s first presidential term. In other words, the slogan was being diplomatically retracted within scholarly circles at the very moment it was most associated with official optimism. When Xi’s speech in 2023, which was published in Qiushi in January 2025, described the West’s decline, it was more a formal, official copy of a sentiment than a newly published speech.

The official rhetoric, however, did not soften. A Brookings study found a near doubling in the use of “American decline” terminology in official Chinese documents from 2025. State Security Minister Chen Yixin wrote in Qiushi in December of 2025, what could be described as a near complete inventory of the ills of the world: the usurpation of unipolar dominance gives way to economic decline and social disintegration, a domestic credit crisis and the collapse of foreign mythic structures. Around the same time, a popular phrase borrowed from gaming, the “kill line” (斩杀线) found its way to official Chinese publications. A Qiushi article from January 2026 described an America, the working class of which had been pushed (beyond the point of no return) along the path of ruin by an unrepairable (decomposing) industrial base while financial capitalism strangled the benefits. The conclusion that was drawn was that we had already entered the post-American world.

The correction of early 2026

Then the story changed once more, and the correction was from within Beijing’s own strategic community.

The consensus in Chinese policymaking following the Busan summit in October 2025, was that China had won the trade war and forced the US into a stalemate. The years of maximum pressure, they said, did not lead to the systemic concessions China had sought, but rather worsened American inflation and reduced productivity. For a few months, the optimism was high. However, by 2026, the optimism was replaced by apprehension. A series of adverse events for China, from losing equity in a German port buyout, to the Nexperia debacle, to the Iran war, led many to wonder if China’s victory was, in fact, a loss. The dominant question that the strategic community was debating was whether American power was in decline or if it was in fact, power rebounding.

What was most interesting was who took the cautious side. Both Chen Wenling and Yan Xuetong argued that the US had, and has, the military and economic capability to project power. In their view, the US had the edge, and Trump’s high stakes, risky policy decisions were based on the belief that the US had the dominant position. The gap was definitely closing, but was not yet a reality. The advice they gave was to be patient. If China was able to “manage its own affairs well,” it was likely that the US would be compelled to return to a more stable relationship.

The key observation regarding prominent intellectuals in Beijing is this. They have never been champions of the triumphalist position. Yan Xuetong has spent a great deal of time dismissing talks of “The East is rising and the West is declining” and multipolarity as delusional. His recently published book, Inflection of History (历史的拐点), which was published by CITIC Press in December of 2025, predicts a US-China bipolarity which, during the next decade, would be expected to stabilise rather than destabilise. In this scenario, over the next decade the gap in capability between the two powers would be expected to converge, although the US would retain an overall advantage. In this scenario, the US would retain overall dominance in services, cyberspace and global influence, while China would retain relative superiority in manufacturing and be dominant in the international arena. In this scenario, Yan does argue that Trump would be expected to damage American power, especially with regards to the international balance, through the closure of laboratories, the loss of researchers, and a declining international trade. However, damage to the leader of the bipolar order is not the same as the collapse of the order, and Yan is very cautious not to make confuse the two.

As China’s foremost authority on US studies, Wang Jisi (王缉思) of Peking University, has placed the greatest emphasis on the need for a clear and level-headed approach. His influential essay, titled, “Has America really declined? Chinese people should hold a sober understanding” ( 美国到底有没有衰落？中国人应有清醒认识), leads with the argument that the most important factors influencing the relationship are domestic political issues, and are not to be found in some quantifiable assessment of relative national strength, or within the confines of the Thucydides Trap. He has argued that the effects of Trump’s immigration restrictions would be more symbolic than real, and would not negatively impact the long-term potential of the US economy. Along with American scholar David Lampton, he wrote, that while both societies have convinced itself that the other is an existential threat, which is a dangerous narrative trap, similar to a noticeable shift of power.

Why AI keeps rewriting the script

If the quest for technological dominance was to be provided as a single reason for the inconsistency in the narrative, it would be the most accurate. The same confidence that characterized 2025 is the same that will characterize the sobriety of 2026. When Trump had his second inauguration in January 2025, DeepSeek had launched their R1. It disrupted the presumption of AI dominance in America and had a day effect of 200 billion on Nvidia’s valuation. For Chinese decision makers, since then, it has been electric. Carnegie researchers described it as the rediscovery of technological confidence. The effect was the realization of the theory of “The East is rising and the West is declining” (东升西降): a monumental achievement with controls on exports from a young lab in Hangzhou.

The second installment was more sobering. The launch of DeepSeek’s next model, V4, in April 2026, was received with indifference. In fact, DeepSeek’s own internal product documentation stated that V4 was between three and six months behind American models. Furthermore, V4 was reliant on domestic chips from Huawei, and was, in most assessments, dependent on American technology that was not easily replaceable. For Chinese analysts, this was not a case of falling behind, but one of the more difficult problems of maintaining the technological edge. Reshoring and tariffs told a similar story. The American industrial base, which the “kill line” (斩杀线) commentary presumed was a terminally stagnated industrial base, was the target of a renewed, aggressive, and partially successful push to bring industry back to America. A competitor with such a focus on rejuvenation and renewal is not, on the surface, a declining competitor.

The G2 Puzzle

There’s another element coming from Washington that adds to the complexity of the story of American decline. This element relates to Trump. Before the Busan meeting, Trump used the term “G2,” and several Washington officials followed suit. The decline thesis cannot account for this. If America is indeed in decline, why is it offering G2 (shared leadership) with China?

Chinese reflexive responses are interesting. The official position, as expressed in Zhou Li’s (周力) December 2025 article, is that G2 as a hegemony is incompatible with China’s commitment to a multipolar world and would alienate the Global South which China is trying to court. These scholars have found their own workarounds. Yan Xuetong and Zheng Yongnian have suggested that G2 is more a description of a scenario of existing bipolarity than a policy to adopt. Xia Liping of Tongji University has suggested that G2 be rephrased as “China-US coordination” (中美协调) instead of “China-US co-governance” (中美共治), which makes it easier for Beijing to accept peer status while not succumbing to a duopoly. The attempt to manage the terminology suggests that the US at 250 is still sufficiently powerful that its offer of co-leadership is significant, even to a China that is more confident than ever.

A mirror, not a verdict

What emerges from five years of this commentary is not a single Chinese view of America at 250 but a layered one. The loudest polemical phrase is that the US, a hegemon, is in an irreversible decline. Within a Chinese context, this serves a purpose unrelated to the US. The state media have found it convenient to juxtapose gun violence and homelessness against the backdrop of Chinese economic performance. The decline of the US economy flouts the-premise, as socialism is the ultimate victor among capitalist competition.

But that was in the loud tier. In the reserved tier, the people in Beijing who are actually relying on reading Washington have converged on a more cautious and, frankly, more accurate assessment. They have described America as a relative decline, but erratic, and still very formidable as well as technologically advanced, especially in the field of the upcoming and new challenges of competition. The assessments have consistently referred to America as “declining but dangerous,” and this phrase has proven to be the most accurate of the lot. Reality has justified the phrase. The same cannot be said of unqualified and total victory.

The inconsistency in narratives can be attributed to the fact that the accounts are serving two purposes simultaneously. They are both analysis and propaganda, and the two types of work are at odds with each other. After AI successes or trade wins, the propaganda is ahead of analysis. After the impacts of reshoring or when a Chinese model stays behind, the analysts bring it back. The occasion is provided by the anniversary, but the underlying reason is that China has not decided, and maybe cannot decide, if they think that simply waiting will work in their favour or if the gap they have slowly been closing over the past 25 years is going to be a stubborn gap.

At 250, in other words, the United States functions in Chinese discourse less as a subject to be judged than as a mirror. What Beijing sees in it, in any given month, tells you a great deal about how confident Beijing is feeling about itself

The diplomatic spat is rooted in the ongoing dispute between China and the Philippines over sovereignty in the South China Sea.

The Philippines has lodged a diplomatic protest with China over what it called the “racist depiction” of Filipinos in a series of videos published by state-backed newspaper China Daily.

The videos, which depicted Filipinos as monkeys, went “beyond political debate” and resorted to “demeaning, dehumanizing, and racist depictions of Filipinos,” the Department of Foreign Affairs said in a statement on Friday.

Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Maria Theresa Lazaro raised the issue directly with China’s ambassador to the country, while the department also lodged a formal diplomatic protest condemning the videos.

Its embassy in Beijing separately published an open letter addressed to the editor of China Daily, flagging the outlet for “breach of editorial norms and principles”, and urging the publication to “uphold dignity, respect, and truth” in public discourse.

China Daily describes itself as China’s most-read English-language newspaper. It claims a combined audience of more than 470 million people. It has more than 110 million followers on Facebook, where the videos were shared.

The videos were published as part of a series marking the 10th anniversary of the 2016 South China Sea arbitral award, in which an international tribunal ruled overwhelmingly in favour of the Philippines and found that China’s sweeping claims in the South China Sea had no legal basis under international law.

Beijing has rejected the ruling and continues to assert sovereignty over most of the South China Sea, where tensions have remained high.

The dispute centres on features including the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal, both of which are claimed by China and the Philippines.

The South China Sea is estimated to have 11 billion barrels of untapped oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.

The dispute has led to repeated confrontations between Chinese coastguard vessels and Philippine ships, including collisions and the use of water cannon that Manila says have endangered its personnel and fishermen.

The Philippines has received diplomatic backing from the United States and other allies including Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom, which have repeatedly called for respect for the 2016 arbitral ruling.

In a joint statement released this month, the countries reaffirmed their support for what they described as the tribunal’s “legally binding” and “definitive” findings and warned against “unilateral actions including by force or coercion that threaten peace and stability in the region”.

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and China Daily had not publicly responded to the Philippine protest at the time of publication.

A landslide on the outskirts of the southwestern Chinese city of Chongqing has killed at least eight people and left 34 missing. 10 residential buildings have been buried, forcing more than a thousand residents to evacuate.

A very large and interesting-looking vessel is taking shape at a shipyard in southeastern China. What can be seen of it so far points strongly to it being the largest naval resupply ship anywhere in the world. A vessel like this would be valuable for supporting the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) growing blue water ambitions. It would be particularly important for enabling the PLAN’s conventionally-powered aircraft carriers, their air wings, and their escorts, to operate for sustained periods of time far from Chinese shores and friendly ports.

The ship is being built at a yard on Longxue Island, which is situated just southeast of the city of Guangzhou. A review of satellite imagery from Planet Labs indicates that it has been under construction since at least Febraury. A subsidiary of the China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) operates this facility. That firm is currently known as the CSSC Offshore and Marine Engineering Company (COMEC). It was previously called Guangzhou Shipyard International (GSI).

COMEC/GSI’s public portfolio is focused on large commercial vessels, including oil and liquid natural gas (LNG) tankers and cargo ships. It also builds specialized civilian designs, such as semi-submersible heavy lift ships and platforms designed to support offshore wind turbine construction.

In recent years, the yard has become well known for the construction of unique and unusual vessels with clear military or at least dual-purpose applications. This includes what may be a one-of-a-kind ostensibly civilian ‘research carrier,’ jack-up barges designed to connect together to support amphibious operations, and a stealthy trimaran drone ship. Soviet-designed Zubr class heavy hovercraft, which China has built examples of domestically under license, are also regularly seen there.

The ship being built on Longxue Island that is now drawing attention is approximately 885 feet (270 meters) long and is 121 feet (37 meters) across its widest (also known as the beam), based on available satellite imagery. There is a superstructure at the bow end with clear wings for a large bridge and a mast on top. There is also a separate superstructure at the stern end with exhaust stacks situated in front of it.

In May, CSSC also released a picture of the COMEC/GSI yard showing the ship from the stern as viewed from near ground level. The image, which was reportedly included in a social media post marking the change in solar terms in the traditional Chinese calendar, shows a large hangar with two at the rear of the stern superstructure. A large flight deck and hangar are also taking shape at the stern.

A Planet Labs satellite image taken on July 2, seen at the top of this story and in parts throughout, also shows two large openings on the right side of the superstructure at the stern. These might be for launching and/or recovering small boats, including lifeboats. These could also just be apertures for crew walkways or other workspaces.

However, it is what is seen in between the two superstructures that may be the most notable aspect of the ship. There are several pillar-like vertical structures positioned relatively close to both sides of the hull. This is in line with what is typically seen on naval vessels configured to conduct at-sea refueling and replenishment of other stores. The flight deck and hangar at the stern would also allow for vertical replenishment via helicopters.

“The hull form is broad and slab-sided, with a full midsection optimised for volume rather than speed alone. This is a characteristic associated with large fleet auxiliaries designed to carry fuel, dry stores, and ammunition for carrier strike groups,” according to a report on this ship from Jane’s back in April.

The ship’s design language also follows modern PLAN standards. Its layout, in broad strokes, is very similar to that of the Type 901 replenishment ship in PLAN service now. The PLAN also operates smaller Type 903 replenishment ships that have a roughly similar configuration, as well.

Overall, the new ship under construction at the COMEC/GSI yard looks very much like a Type 901, but substantially scaled up. The Type 901 is quite large already, with a length of around 787 feet (240 meters) and a beam measuring just under 102 feet (31 meters). It also said to displace some 45,000 tons with a full load. As another point of comparison, the U.S. Navy’s newest John Lewis class replenishment oilers are just under 746 feet (227.3 meters) long and have roughly a 105-foot (32.2-meter) wide beam, according to the official fact sheet.

What other, more specific features and capabilities the new ship might have remains to be seen. What kind of armament it might have, even just for localized self-defense, is unknown. The Type 901 has four 30mm H/PJ-13 Gatling-type guns in turrets to provide close-in defense.

At-sea replenishment, in general, is a critical capability for any major navy that desires to conduct sustained blue water operations without having to rely on friendly ports. Even during peacetime in the broad expanses of the Pacific, port facilities of any kind, let alone ones capable of supporting large warships, can be few and far between and under direct threat.

For the PLAN, there is the added demand for at-sea replenishment support that comes from operating a growing fleet of so-far conventionally-powered aircraft carriers. Those carriers require steady streams of gas for their air wings on top of the fuel and other support needed to keep them sailing at all.

The PLAN is also conducting more regular operations involving full carrier strike groups with conventionally-powered escorts that also need refueling and other support to keep up. During combat operations, replenishment ships also bring vital additional supplies of munitions to forward-deployed vessels.

It really cannot be overstressed how important at-sea replenishment is to modern blue water naval operations. This was underscored just earlier this year by challenges the U.S. Navy faced in keeping its conventionally-powered warships in the Middle East fueled amid Iranian attacks on friendly ports.

“So traditionally, for 25 years, we’ve been at war in the Middle East and that war was effectively fought in the parking lot of a giant gas station,” Robert Hein, Director of Maritime Operations for the U.S. Navy’s Military Sealift Command (MSC), said during the Navy League’s annual Sea-Air-Space exposition in April. “Iran has effectively shut down that gas station. So we’ve had to come up with really creative ways of, ‘how do we replenish the fleet?’”

You can read more about the “tanker treadmills” the Navy instituted in response, as well as other steps the service is taking now to bolster its at-sea replenishment capabilities and capacity, here.

Replenishments At Sea

It is worth noting here that America’s aircraft carriers are now all nuclear-powered, which eliminates their need to be refueled at sea. However, they still need gas for their air wings and other support to conduct sustained forward operations. Their escorts are all conventionally-powered, as well. As an aside, China may now be in the process of building its first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.

Other fighting in the Middle East in recent years has also rammed home the vital importance of at-sea rearming capabilities for the U.S. Navy, especially methods for reloading vertical launch system cells on warships that it currently does not possess. Last year, in the midst of operations against Yemen’s Houthis, the service acknowledged that its warships were having to leave their stations in and around the Red Sea for weeks at a time to rearm in ports.

There may be a possibility that the ship under construction at the COMEC/GSI yard could be something other than a huge new at-sea replenishment ship, but this seems extremely unlikely. As noted, the ship has an array of distinct features that are exactly what one would expect to see on a replenishment vessel, and an overall configuration in line with that of the Type 901.

The new ship’s large size, both in terms of length and width, will offer far more internal volume for fuel, munitions, spare parts, food, and everything else needed to keep a carrier strike group operating far out to sea. China has a growing number of other ships that will require blue water support, too. This includes its massive Type 076 amphibious assault ship, which is expected to carry a substantial air wing, as well as a growing number of smaller Type 075 types.

Chinese PLA Navy’s First Type 076 Amphibious Assault Ship “Sichuan” Conducts First Sea Trial

The appearance of this ship at the COMEC/GSI also comes as the PLAN continues to modernize and expand its fleets across the board, in scale and scope, with a clear eye toward more regular and sustained blue water operations. China has been investing heavily in establishing a network of naval port facilities around the Pacific and elsewhere globally to help support these activities, as well. As noted, having to rely on friendly ports is not always desirable or even possible, especially during a conflict when the countries in question may be neutral parties.

The steady flow of warships and other naval vessels, many of them very large, from shipyards across China underscores the PLAN’s broader ambitions. As TWZ regularly points out, this has created an increasingly worrisome disparity between Chinese and U.S. naval shipbuilding capacity, or lack thereof in the latter case. The U.S. government has been trying to reverse this trend, including by leveraging foreign shipbuilders, but significant challenges remain.

Satellite imagery shows significant progress on the new ship of interest at the COMEC/GSI yard since the start of this year. More insights into the design and capabilities of what is likely to be the world’s largest dedicated naval replenishment vessel should emerge as that work wraps up.

The Chinese leader called for more international cooperation in developing the technology at a conference in Shanghai.

Artificial intelligence should not be dominated by one country, Chinese President Xi Jinping has said, urging international cooperation on development at a major conference in Shanghai.

Xi also emphasised the importance of a “people-centred” approach to AI technology in his keynote address at the opening ceremony of the World Artificial Intelligence Conference on Friday.

The conference showcases the cutting-edge technology Xi hopes will soon rival that of the United States.

Chinese AI models are gaining ground on the most powerful offerings from the US, attracting global users with lower costs.

But how to govern the booming sector has become a topic of debate amid concerns over the deployment of AI in military combat and its use by hackers or criminals.

In his address, Xi spoke of China’s role in ensuring equitable access to AI capacity-building for developing countries to prevent the creation of “new historical injustices”.

To that end, he announced China’s plans to cooperate with international bodies, including from Africa, Latin America, Asia and BRICS countries, to provide AI-related opportunities.

“AI development should not be a solo performance by a single country, but a symphony of international cooperation,” Xi said. “We should jointly oppose overstretching the national security concept in the field of AI or placing one country’s security over that of others.”

‘Ensure AI is always under human control’

The US and European Union have imposed restrictions on Chinese tech imports, citing national security concerns, while recent tussles between Washington and American AI labs have raised questions about who controls access to top technology.

In May, the US Commerce Department issued a notice affirming its restrictions on shipments of semiconductors to subsidiaries of Chinese companies located outside China amid concerns about loopholes in Washington’s export control regime.

The guidance said its licensing requirements for the export of advanced AI chips applied to all businesses with headquarters or a parent company in China.

At Friday’s conference, Xi also stressed the need for a “people-centred” approach to AI with humans at the wheel.

“We should put in place laws and regulations, technological monitoring, early warning, and emergency response systems, in order to … ensure AI is always under human control,” he said.

AI has become a strategic pillar of China’s industrial policy, driven by state investment aimed at building a domestic ecosystem, from chip production to consumer use.

Daily consumption in China of “tokens” – the industry unit of AI usage – has increased a thousandfold over the past two years, according to state media citing officials.

As Al Jazeera reported earlier, China, while lagging behind the US in access to the most cutting-edge semiconductors, holds the edge in powering the huge data centres that run on AI chips.

A typical data centre can consume as much electricity as 100,000 households, while next-generation “hyperscale” facilities can gobble up as much power as two million homes, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA).

China’s access to an abundant supply of cheap electricity places it in the ideal position to meet such colossal energy demands.

It already generates more than twice as much electricity as the US, a lead that is expected to widen amid an aggressive state-led investment in the country’s energy grid.

Published on
17/07/2026 – 7:30 GMT+2

Restricting Chinese access to the EU’s market of 450 million consumers could undermine Beijing’s export-driven economy and pose a risk to the country’s political stability, German liberal MEP Engin Eroglu, chair of the European Parliament’s delegation for relations with China, told Euronews, arguing that China’s model is “flawed.”

ADVERTISEMENT

ADVERTISEMENT

His comments come as tensions between Brussels and Beijing have ramped up in recent weeks. The EU has set an October deadlinewith China last month to discuss how they can reduce their trade imbalance, after the bloc’s deficit with China reached a record €1 billion in 2026.

With low-cost Chinese imports continuing to flood the EU market, the European Commission, which is negotiating on behalf of the bloc’s 27 member states, could impose measures to restrict access to the European market before the two sides reach a breakthrough.

“If Europe were to restrict access to its market even slightly, Chinese domestic companies would be affected—especially since China’s domestic consumption is stagnating,” the MEP told Euronews.

“China’s model is flawed despite dancing robots and great fanfare,” he added, referring to China’s display of technological prowess during its latest Lunar New Year gala, when a performance by humanoid robots drew global attention.

According to him, if Chinese companies had to lay off workers because of EU’s restrictions “this could lead to political problems for the Chinese government.”

“There is high youth unemployment”

The European Commission said on Tuesday that it intends to implement “unilateral” trade defence measures to protect the EU market from the surge of Chinese imports before the October deadline.

These measures could include tariffs and quotas on Chinese imports that threaten specific sectors of European industry.

After the US began closing its market to Chinese imports through tariffs in 2025, China redirected its industrial overcapacity to the EU, putting pressure on key sectors of European industry, including steel, cars and chemicals.

However, according to Alicia Garcia Herrero, chief economist for Asia-Pacific at French corporate bank Natixis, state-backed “zombie” companies accounted for more than 12% of all registered firms in China in 2026, more than double their share in 2018.

In a report published in early June, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) also said that Chinese companies receive between three and eight times more subsidies than companies in OECD member countries.

According to Eroglu, that model is far from sustainable, undermining Beijing’s claim to global dominance as it seeks to replace the US as the world’s leading economic and political power through an aggressive trade policy.

“There is already high youth unemployment. China’s current self-confidence may not reflect the actual situation. This means that by controlling access to our market, we hold leverage over China.”

The European Commission could also impose new anti-dumping duties on Chinese products, as it has done in several cases in recent years.

The number of unfair trade practice complaints filed by EU producers is rising, and for the first time, the EU’s trade enforcement authority opened an investigation last Thursday into the agricultural sector by targeting China’s Peking duck.

“I hope we can avoid a trade conflict, but the rapid decline of European industries makes it difficult not to react,” Eroglu said.

The UK has appropriated its last working steelworks, following fears its former Chinese owners would shut it down.

Beijing has warned the United Kingdom that its nationalisation of British Steel has “severely undermined” Chinese companies’ confidence in investing in the UK.

The UK nationalised the loss-making company on Thursday in what the government said was a move taken to protect national interests.

British Steel is the only source of primary steelmaking in the UK. It supports approximately 2,700 jobs across its main steelworks in Scunthorpe and across the wider supply chain.

The company’s former owner, Jingye – which is among the 100 biggest companies in China – bought British Steel for 70 million pounds ($94m) in 2020. By 2025, Jingye said it was losing 700,000 pounds ($942,000) every day.

British Steel’s nationalisation has been in the works for more than a year.

In March 2025, Jingye carried out a consultation that concluded that the British Steel furnaces were not financially sustainable. The following month, it emerged that Jingye had cancelled orders for a key material used in the steelmaking process, stoking fears that it was planning to shut down the blast furnaces.

That month, the UK government seized operational control of British Steel from Jingye to stop that from happening. The Chinese company retained ownership, but lost operational control.

Thursday, though, saw ownership officially transfer to the UK government, which says it will appoint an independent valuer to “assess whether any compensation is payable” to Jingye.

The process has angered Beijing. The expropriation of British Steel “seriously damaged” Jingye’s legitimate rights and interests and “severely undermined” Chinese companies’ confidence in investing in the UK, China’s Ministry of Commerce said in a statement on Friday.

The UK, the ministry said, has “forcibly” taken over the company and “disregarded” Jingye’s contributions to the British economy and society.

The ministry urged the UK to fulfil obligations under the China-UK Investment Protection Agreement and said it would assist Chinese companies in protecting their rights.

WASHINGTON — The world has largely viewed the U.S. more favorably than China for years, but those opinions have flipped in Beijing’s favor this year, according to a new poll by the Pew Research Center, a remarkable shift driven in part by tensions between the Trump administration and U.S. allies.

More people have favorable views of China than the U.S. in 25 out of the 36 countries and territories that were surveyed, including Canada and Mexico. The poll was conducted from February to May, a period when the United States and Israel launched a war against Iran.

In only six countries do people still see the U.S. more positively than China, according to the findings released Wednesday.

Views in 22 out of the 36 countries and territories also are more favorable of Chinese leader Xi Jinping than President Trump, including in Canada, Mexico and major European powers including France, Germany and the U.K. However, people in many of the countries have low confidence in both men.

It marks the first time in the roughly 20 years Pew has been tracking global opinions that China has been viewed more positively than the U.S., said Laura Silver, associate director of Pew’s Global Attitudes Research and one of the researchers on the study. Views of Beijing and Washington have been very similar at some points in the past but have not been significantly more favorable for China until now, she said.

The shift follows the COVID-19 pandemic becoming a distant issue and as global views of the U.S. have soured, Silver said.

“There was just an actual relationship between the outbreak of the war and the sense that the U.S. is just not contributing to peace and stability and that people have less confidence in Donald Trump,” she said.

Trump’s demands to control Greenland, the American military raid that captured Venezuela’s then-leader Nicolás Maduro, and the U.S. handling of the Israeli-Hamas war in Gaza also have led to low approval in many countries, Silver said.

“The U.S. has done a lot in terms of global engagement in recent months to years that is not being perceived positively internationally,” she said.

Aside from benefiting from the fading memory of the pandemic, China appears to have gained from comparison with the U.S., Silver said.

“By comparison, we know that China is seen to be a more reliable partner in many places. It’s more likely to be seen to contribute to global peace and stability,” the researcher said.

Notably, those in some U.S. allied countries have drastically shifted their views in recent years, such as Canada. In the new survey, only 33% of Canadians have positive views of the U.S., down from 57% in 2023. Over the same period, their favorable opinions of China rose from 14% to 44%.

Trump slapped a barrage of tariffs on Canadian goods last year, and even claimed that Canada could be the “the 51st state.”

Major European countries — including France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Sweden, the Netherlands and Italy — all have switched their opinions toward the world’s two largest economies.

People in the U.K., where about 6 in 10 held positive views of the U.S. in 2023, now view China and the U.S. similarly. Three years ago, the spread was 32 percentage points in Washington’s favor.

Of the six countries where people have more favorable views of the U.S., Israel leads the way. About 8 in 10 Israelis view the U.S. positively, compared with 19% for China.

The other five countries are Japan, India, South Korea, the Philippines and Poland. Still, even their views of the U.S. have dimmed over recent years.

The U.S. is still ahead of China when it comes to government respect for personal freedoms, though the gap is shrinking, the Pew report says.

While China’s standing has improved somewhat, the narrowed divide is “driven largely by the fact that people in nearly every country surveyed have become less likely to say the U.S. government respects its people’s personal freedoms” since 2021, when Pew last asked the question.

For the new study, Pew surveyed more than 42,000 people across 35 countries plus the West Bank and east Jerusalem, with margins of error ranging from 2.3 to 5.5 percentage points depending on the country.

Tang writes for the Associated Press. AP journalists Linley Sanders, Emily Swanson and Kevin S. Vineys contributed to this report.

The Muslim Brotherhood’s failure to penetrate Chinese society, particularly after the Arab Spring uprisings, stems from the Chinese Communist Party’s tight security grip, China’s policies of localizing religions, and the Chinese public’s rejection of transnational political ideologies. Despite the Brotherhood’s historical and organizational attempts to build ties with Muslim minorities in China, the rigid nature of the Chinese system and society has formed an impenetrable barrier to any infiltration. The fundamental contradiction between ideologies in China, such as Chinese communism as the ruling doctrine and political Islam as a totalitarian movement from which the Muslim Brotherhood emerged and China’s strict security policies aimed at integrating minorities, has led to the failure of these political ideological currents. Political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood have failed to gain a foothold in China for several structural and political reasons. The most prominent of these is the strict nature of the Chinese communist system, which prohibits any political or religious activity outside the state’s control. This is compounded by the Sinicization policies that impose absolute loyalty to Chinese culture and the Communist Party. Furthermore, the internationalist ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam clashes with Chinese nationalism. Additionally, there is a lack of popular support for such projects among Muslim minorities who follow religious traditions different from those in Arab and Islamic countries and around the world. Despite the existence of an Islamic religious group in China called Yihewani, whose name literally means brotherhood, it is a reformist movement within the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence. It originated locally in China in the 20th century, specifically in the 1930s, but it is a completely independent, traditional Hanafi school of thought with no organizational or ideological ties to the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East.

On the other hand, China harbored apprehensions about the political Islam and Muslim Brotherhood model following the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011. Research centers and decision-making bodies in Beijing closely monitored the outcomes of these uprisings, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise to power in Egypt and Tunisia. China viewed the Brotherhood’s ascent to power in some countries, such as Egypt and Tunisia, followed by their subsequent failures and the descent of some into civil war, as evidence that political Islam harbors a project to destabilize nations. This understanding led Beijing to adopt a firm, principled stance rejecting this model of political Islam entirely in order to protect its own stable development model. Consequently, China adopted a policy of strategic alliance with Egypt under President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and other Arab nationalist regimes following the events of the June 30, 2013, revolution in Egypt and the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood and its president, Mohamed Morsi. China strengthened its strategic and economic partnerships with current Arab governments, such as those in Egypt and the Gulf states. Here, China rejects interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Similarly, Arab states support the One China policy and its actions in Xinjiang. This high-level diplomatic coordination between China, Egypt, and other Arab states, following the Muslim Brotherhood’s failed rule, has led to a crackdown on any attempts to finance or subtly infiltrate the banned group through economic or educational channels within China.

Here, the Chinese state pursues a policy of institutional rejection of political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood. Chinese authorities classify any political activity with a religious basis as a direct threat to national security and territorial integrity. This has led to the banning and dismantling of any cells or attempts to establish branches of the Muslim Brotherhood. Furthermore, Muslim ethnic minorities in regions like Xinjiang (East Turkestan) face strict security and surveillance measures that prevent the formation of any opposing Islamic religious movements within China. Beijing also imposes the forced assimilation of Muslim minorities into Chinese culture and criminalizes any transnational organizational manifestations or affiliations.  With an emphasis on the dominance of communist ideology, the ruling Chinese Communist Party rejects any religious or political activity or movements that seek to assert identity above loyalty to the state and the party. This is coupled with strict Chinese security measures to combat foreign infiltration of religions, organizations, movements, and Islamic political currents within China, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood. Beijing maintains one of the world’s most stringent surveillance systems for monitoring religious and political activities. Following the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011, Chinese security agencies raised their alert levels to ensure that the contagion of color revolutions or ideological movements did not spread within its borders. China considers any foreign organization, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, a direct threat to national security and social stability. Therefore, any cells or committees attempting to engage with Chinese Muslims are banned and dismantled.

Political Islam movements have failed to penetrate Chinese society and bring about political or social changes as they have in other countries. This is due to several historical, political, cultural, and social factors imposed by the Chinese state. The most prominent of these factors are the tight security and political grip and the nature of the Chinese communist political system. China imposes a highly centralized system in which the state and the Communist Party completely control the public sphere and institutions. No independent political or ideological organization is permitted outside the umbrella of the Communist Party. Chinese authorities impose strict censorship and implement proactive security policies that prevent any political, religious, or opposition organizations or movements from existing or expanding. Furthermore, the primacy of nationalism over religion in China, where Chinese identity is primarily based on belonging to the nation and the nationality, represented by the culture of the majority Han Chinese population, makes loyalty to the state paramount. This renders the transnational ideologies adopted by political Islam movements unacceptable and severely restricted. Here, the government’s policies toward religions in China become clear. China pursues a policy of Sinicization of religions, meaning that the practice of any religious rituals must conform entirely to Chinese culture and socialism. The Chinese state follows policies of Sinicization on religions, with Chinese authorities implementing strict policies to subordinate religions to Chinese socialist culture and values. This has included systematic campaigns to prevent foreign or Middle Eastern influences on mosque style, clothing, and religious practices. China also adopts strict policies to contain any influence of political Islam and subjects religious bodies to state supervision. Beijing aims to Sinicize religions and requires their integration with the culture of the Han majority and the values ​​of the Communist Party, placing loyalty to the nation above all other affiliations.

This occurs while the Chinese state officially manages and oversees Islamic institutions, such as the Islamic Association of China, thus preventing the emergence of independent religious leaders or institutions that could adopt or disseminate the ideas of political Islam. Herein lies the role of cultural and historical diversity within China. Muslim minorities in China, such as the Hui ethnic group, have absorbed traditional Chinese culture and integrated it with their beliefs over centuries, making their communities well-integrated into the broader social fabric and resilient against external influences. Muslims have been historically integrated into China, and Islam has been part of the Chinese social fabric for over 13 centuries.  Muslim ethnic groups, such as the Hui, have successfully integrated into Chinese society and adapted to local culture. This integration has made political Islam alien to their environment due to China’s strict security measures. The Chinese government deals harshly with any religious or ethnic movements with a political character, particularly in the predominantly Muslim Xinjiang region of northwest China, under the banner of combating extremism and terrorism. Security policies and measures have been implemented to restrict any religious activity outside the official control of the Chinese state. The state adopts a dual strategy: containing practices acceptable to official state institutions while categorically rejecting any separatist or political tendencies that Beijing considers a threat to the country’s unity and stability.

Beijing manages religious pluralism through the Islamic Association of China and views any ideologies that deviate from loyalty to the state with extreme caution. The relationship between the state and Islam in China is shaped by several pillars, including national diversity. China has 56 officially recognized ethnic, religious, and national groups, with the Han Chinese constituting the vast majority at approximately 92% of the population. Regarding Muslim ethnic groups, there are 10 Muslim-majority groups in China, such as the Hui and Uyghurs, with the total number of Muslims estimated in the tens of millions. China officially adopts a policy of Sinicization, whereby Chinese authorities lead campaigns to eliminate transnational religious expressions, prohibiting religious institutions from having ties with their counterparts abroad. Religious institutions are required to adhere to the Party’s leadership and integrate their doctrines with Chinese cultural traditions. The Chinese government pursues a policy of Sinicization of Islam. The Chinese state adopts a firm strategy based on integrating Islam and its culture into the Chinese national identity (in accordance with socialism with Chinese characteristics). As we mentioned, Muslim affairs are officially managed through the Islamic Association of China, which is under the control of the ruling Communist Party. This closure of the religious sphere has thwarted the Islamic internationalism ideology promoted by the Muslim Brotherhood in Middle Eastern countries, as China confines religious teaching and practice to purely local frameworks, preventing the introduction of the writings of Sayed Qutb or Hassan Al-Banna into Chinese territory.

Therefore, we conclude that attempts by political Islamist movements, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, to infiltrate China or penetrate its Muslim communities have failed. Here we observe the cultural and ethnic differences between the Muslim minorities in China and the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is banned in Egypt and the Middle East. The main Muslim population in China is divided into two primary groups that fail to resonate with the Brotherhood’s ideology: the Hui ethnic group, a Chinese Muslim minority. The Hui are Chinese-speaking Muslims fully integrated culturally and socially into the fabric of the Chinese state. Their primary loyalty is to China, and therefore, the Arab political ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood finds no echo among them. The second group is the Uyghur ethnic group. Uyghurs reside in the Xinjiang region (East Turkestan) in northwest China. Despite the presence of nationalist and religious tendencies, Beijing has imposed extremely strict security measures (including re-education camps and biometric surveillance, which are security systems within China that use an individual’s biological characteristics, such as fingerprints, facial features, and iris scans, to verify their identity), effectively isolating the region from any activism emanating from the Middle East, particularly from the Muslim Brotherhood.

United States President Donald Trump is scheduled to address a defence summit at the US Army War College on Wednesday, where he is expected to laud US investments in its armed forces that he has argued have helped add a new edge to history’s most powerful military.

But his speech comes at a time when the US’s war on Iran has significantly depleted the US military’s weapons stockpile.

The summit, which will be held in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, comes as the US has re-ignited attacks on Iran in the past week, and as Trump has threatened to continue a war that, according to recent US polls, is highly unpopular among Americans facing high costs of living.

The US has expended half of at least four of its most critical munitions since its war on Iran began on February 28, and has racked up billions of dollars in weapons expenses, analysis shows.

Replenishing low stockpiles could take anywhere between several months and several years. Analysts warn that a shrinking arsenal could put the US in a less formidable position in a potential future conflict – particularly against China.

Here’s what we know about the US weapons inventory:

What’s happening with the US-Iran war?

Following an April ceasefire between the US and Iran, and the subsequent signing of a memorandum of understanding in June, the conflict kicked off again after the US Central Command launched heavy waves of attacks on Iran’s military sites last Wednesday, saying it was aiming to degrade Tehran’s military capabilities. Huge, hourlong attacks have continued for four nights since Sunday, including on railway tracks and bridges.

Both sides traded low-intensity attacks throughout the ceasefire period. However, the US escalated air attacks last week after Iran fired on three commercial ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz – because those vessels had used a shipping route not approved by Tehran.

Each blames the other for violating the ceasefire, and at last week’s NATO leaders’ summit, Trump declared the pact with Iran over, although he said American negotiators could continue talks. Washington has also reinstated a naval blockade on Iran-linked ships trying to transit the waterway and has re-imposed sanctions on Iran.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has responded with retaliatory attacks on US military assets in Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and Kuwait.

More than a dozen people have been killed in Iran since the new wave of US attacks, including civilians.

“We’re going to knock out all their power plants. We’re going to knock out all their bridges unless they get to the table and negotiate,” Trump threatened in a Fox News interview that aired on Tuesday.

Attacking civilian infrastructure is a violation of international law.

Does the US have enough weapons to keep attacking Iran?

Washington’s supplies are running low but have not reached a critical level, according to analysis of the US weapons inventory by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington-based think tank.

In the 39 days of conflict between the start of the US-Iran war in February and the ceasefire in April, the US hit more than 13,000 targets, focusing mainly on using seven of its most powerful missiles and air defence systems: Tomahawk missiles, Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSM), Precision Strike Missiles (PrSM), Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), Standard Missile-6 (SM-6), Terminal High Altitude Area Defenses (THAAD) and Patriots.

For at least four of the munitions, Washington likely expended more than half of its available stockpiles, although many lower-grade alternatives are still in stock, according to CSIS. Government data on weapons inventory is classified.

Here’s how the munitions were used:

• Tomahawks – The US had about 3,000 of the long-range missiles that are fired from sea at ground targets. It likely used up more than 1,000 in the war on Iran.
• JASSM – About 4,000 of these stealthy, air-launched long-range missiles were in the US inventory before the war. About 1,100 were used in the war on Iran.
• PrSM – Supplies of the newly delivered, ground-launched long-range missiles were already low to start with, with deliveries since 2023 amounting to a total of 90. An estimated 40-70 were used in the war. One US military official claimed that the “entire” inventory had been expended.
• SM- 3 – The most expensive weapon per unit at $28m, these ship-launched ballistic missile interceptors numbered about 410 before the war. The US has used between 130 and 250 of these in the war on Iran.
• SM-6 – Also ship-launched, this missile is mainly used to intercept aircraft and cruise missiles. The US had about 1,160 stockpiled. An estimated 190- 370 have been expended in the Iran war.
• THAAD – The US had about 360 of the costly anti-ballistic missile systems by April, and between 190 and 290 were used in the war. The US has a total of 8 THAAD units or “batteries” consisting of launchers, interceptors, and radar systems.
• Patriot – An estimated 2,330 Patriots were in stock before the war, but between 1,060 and 1,430 have been expended. Some older versions may also likely be available – about 400 of them.

What does this mean?

Analysts from CSIS say that while the US may have enough to continue hitting Iran in the near-term war, it has reduced its stockpiles so significantly that it may not have enough for potential future wars, especially against a formidable rival like China.

Replenishing high-capability and costly weapons like the ones the US has used in Iran will likely take several years.

Trump and senior administration officials have publicly maintained that the US has an “unlimited” supply of weapons as the US-Iran war has raged on.

However, in March, Trump said administration officials met with the heads of US manufacturers, including Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon, BAE Systems, Honeywell Aerospace, L3Harris Missile Solutions, and Northrop Grumman. He said all promised to “quadruple” production and that increased manufacturing was already under way.

Subsequently, in June, Trump signed the Defense Production Act, an executive order compelling US weapons manufacturers to speed up production, citing existing conditions “which may pose a direct threat to the national defense or its preparedness programs”.

An order compelling private actors to ramp up production likely reflects timeline concerns within the Pentagon, analysts note.

In the short term, Washington is also unlikely to meet demands from its allies, and may not have the capacity to supply the THAADs and Patriots that Ukraine says are crucial in its war against Russia.

Already, supply orders have hit road bumps. Japan’s order of 400 Tomahawks from Raytheon was meant to be delivered between 2025 and 2027, but US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said in May that two more years could be added to the schedule.

Meanwhile, Switzerland began negotiations with France, Israel and South Korea in June to buy another missile defence system after its 2022 order from Lockheed Martin and Raytheon continued to face delays.

How long will replenishing weapons take?

Hegseth said in May that it could take “months and years” to replenish the supplies, based on the weapons system.

Analysts reckon it could take the US between one and four years to get its most exquisite munitions stockpiles back to pre-Iran war levels, even as Trump has boasted that new weapons plants are being built around the US and production is being ramped up.

Trump’s administration is set to buy large amounts of advanced munitions in its proposed $1.5 trillion 2027 defence budget – a 44 percent increase from 2026’s defence budget.

According to CSIS, estimated timelines to replenish the seven critical munitions, based on existing production facilities, are:

• Tomahawk: Between 4- 5 years (207 will be delivered in 2026, while 785 have been requested for 2027).
• JASSM: 1 year (821 to be delivered in 2026 and 821 requested for 2027).
• PrSM:  8 months (70 to be delivered in 2026 and 1,134 requested for 2027).
• SM- 3:  3 years ( 52 to be delivered in 2026 and 214 requested for 2027).
• SM-6:  3 years (125 to be delivered in 2026, and 540 requested for 2027).
• THAAD: 3 to 3.5 years (92 to be delivered in 2026, and 857 requested for 2027).
• Patriot: 3 years (172 to be delivered in 2026, and 3202 requested for 2027).

China said on Tuesday it does not seek a “sphere of influence” in the Pacific, as Foreign Minister Wang Yi defended Beijing’s growing engagement with Pacific island nations following criticism over a recent missile test in the South Pacific.

The remarks came during talks in Beijing with Solomon Islands Foreign Minister Rick Houenipwela, as regional tensions continue to intensify amid strategic competition between China and Western allies.

China Rejects Geopolitical Motives

Wang Yi said China’s cooperation with Pacific island nations is based on mutual respect and shared development rather than geopolitical ambitions.

He stressed that Beijing’s partnerships come without political conditions and are not imposed on other countries. Wang also said Pacific island states are independent and sovereign nations that should not be treated as any country’s “backyard” or be subject to outside interference.

China reaffirmed its willingness to expand cooperation with the Solomon Islands in areas including green energy, healthcare, and climate change.

Missile Test Sparks Regional Concerns

The meeting followed China’s recent test launch of a missile carrying a dummy warhead from a nuclear powered submarine into the South Pacific.

The test drew criticism from several regional governments, including the Solomon Islands, which questioned both the timing and the message sent by the launch.

Solomon Islands Prime Minister Matthew Wale described China as “a good friend” but said the missile test was “not something a friend does,” while reaffirming his country’s commitment to strengthening ties with Australia.

The launch also coincided with the signing of a new mutual defense agreement between Fiji and Australia, highlighting growing security cooperation among Pacific nations.

Pacific Becomes Strategic Battleground

The Pacific has become an increasingly important arena for geopolitical competition as China expands its diplomatic, economic, and security engagement across the region.

Meanwhile, Australia, the United States, New Zealand, and other partners have stepped up investment, defense cooperation, and development assistance in an effort to maintain their influence among Pacific island countries.

Many Pacific governments continue to pursue a balanced foreign policy, seeking economic cooperation with multiple partners while avoiding alignment with any single major power.

Why This Matters

China’s latest comments underscore the growing diplomatic contest for influence in the Pacific, where infrastructure investment, security partnerships, and climate cooperation have become central to regional politics. The region’s strategic location and maritime significance make it increasingly important in broader competition between China and Western allies.

Future Outlook

China is expected to continue expanding economic and development cooperation with Pacific island nations, particularly in renewable energy, healthcare, and infrastructure. At the same time, Australia and its partners are likely to deepen security and development initiatives across the region. As strategic competition intensifies, Pacific governments will continue balancing relationships with competing powers while seeking investment and support that align with their national priorities.

With information from Reuters.

Published on
14/07/2026 – 13:50 GMT+2

Deputy Director-General for Trade at the European Commission Denis Redonnet told MEPs on Tuesday that the EU will step up measures against Chinese imports before the October deadline it set to protect the bloc’s market from Chinese overcapacity.

ADVERTISEMENT

ADVERTISEMENT

The warning comes as Brussels started negotiations with Beijing last month to reduce its record-high €1 billion-a-day trade deficit with China, setting an October deadline for the two sides to make significant progress.

However, tensions remain high between the two trading partners, as Beijing has repeatedly threatened retaliation if the EU adopts measures closing its market to Chinese exports.

“Dialogue alone will not suffice,” Redonnet told EU lawmakers, adding that the EU needs to decide how “to protect and preserve the European industrial base.”

“We need to look at what the Chinese do. It is more than likely that we’ll have unilateral protection measures adopted atthe European Union level. So we’ll be taking various measures in parallel.”

The EU is fighting low-cost Chinese imports flooding its market and threatening its manufacturing industry in key sectors such as steel, chemicals, machine tools and electronics.

“What can we do ahead of that October deadline? We’ll look at a number of sectors, we’ll try to start rebalancing and rein in the export levels,” Redonnet said.

Quotas and tariffs to protect EU industries

To defend its steel industry, the EU doubled tariffs on certain steel imports on 1 July and reduced quotas for the sector. Similar safeguard measures could be used in other industries in the coming weeks, the senior EU official said.

He added, however, that safeguards require the backing of a majority of member states and that not all EU countries share the same interests. Some have factories directly threatened by Chinese competition, while others have industries that rely on cheap Chinese products.

“If we had to defend European manufacturing in two to three member states, we would need the backing of a majority of all member states. And those other member states may be focused on users’ interests rather than producers’ interests,” he said.

In parallel, to rebalance the situation among EU member states, the Commission is working on a solidarity mechanism to compensate those most affected by a surge in Chinese imports.

The EU executive also plans to defend the EU market product by product as China heavily subsidises its exports to the EU prompting the Commission to resort to anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties.

Last Thursday, it launched an anti-dumping probe into Chinese Peking duck producers.

Reviewing and adjusting trade defence tools is part of the mandate EU leaders gave the Commission in mid-June, asking the EU executive to engage with China while keeping all options on the table to defend the EU market.

Based on the words of President Trump, America is well on the way to becoming a “global superpower in manufacturing” — indeed, as he declared in a Father’s Day social media post, we are already experiencing the “BEST ECONOMY EVER.” (Capitalization’s his.)

Here’s what the government’s own statistics tell us: Manufacturing investment has crashed during his watch, with construction spending in the manufacturing sector down 26.4% from Trump’s inauguration through May, to $174.8 billion. That’s the lowest figure since February 2023, when the economy was in the midst of a post-pandemic recovery.

White House spokesman Kush Desai told me by email that “the last two jobs reports” showed manufacturing job growth. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported a seasonally-adjusted decline of 2,000 manufacturing workers in May and a gain of 3,000 in June. But the June 2026 figure was 38,000 jobs, or about 0.3% below the level in June 2025, and 75,000 or about 0.6% below the level in January 2025, when Trump took office.

Desai said that “thanks to President Trump’s proven agenda of tariffs, deregulation, and tax cuts, American manufacturing will continue to rebound.”

There’s little mystery about what has come between Trump’s ambition and the real world. To a large extent it’s Trump’s economic program, particularly his tariff policies and, more recently, his war with Iran. Those have injected a level of uncertainty for corporate managements pondering whether to spend money on expansion that they haven’t had to confront in years.

The tariffs and the war have driven up manufacturers’ costs for raw materials and overseas shipping. The general economic atmosphere doesn’t help. U.S. gross domestic product growth came in at a 2.1% annualized rate in the first quarter of this year, but the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta expects it to have fallen to 1.3% in the second quarter ended June 30.

Meanwhile, the University of Michigan consumer confidence index reached 44.8 in May, its lowest level ever (though it improved to 49.5 in June). Wages have been rising modestly, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, but those gains have been eaten up by higher prices, especially for gasoline and food.

To put things another way, the actual figures show the U.S. economy to be sputtering, and the “vibe economy” as measured by consumer confidence is doing even worse.

Now that Trump’s second term is about to reach its 18-month mark, let’s unpack the factors causing the discrepancy between his ambitions and claims, and the reality.

Trump declared economic victory just as his term was starting. On March 20, 2025, he proclaimed a “manufacturing renaissance” in the U.S. That was based on what he said were “trillions of dollars in new investments” he had “already secured in tech-based manufacturing.”

A White House statement said “the list of manufacturing wins is endless.” The provided list was a roster of announcements, not groundbreakings, much less completed ventures.

Business executives quite properly have taken these pledges with mounds of salt. “Announcements are what people say they’re going to do, but dollars spent is what’s actually happening,” Didi Caldwell, chief executive of a firm that helps companies find factory sites, told the Financial Times. “From where we’re standing, we are not seeing signs of a manufacturing renaissance in the U.S.”

Indeed, at least some of these announcements have had the flavor of performative efforts to satisfy Trump’s amour propre and extract government concessions.

For example, Apple Chief Executive Tim Cook appeared with Trump at the White House in August to announce a $600-billion U.S. spending plan to take place over four years. That was a $100-billion increase over its previously-announced program.

More to the point, however, it incorporated spending with suppliers that Apple had been working with for years. Mentioned in the news announcement was a commitment to buy cover glass for iPhones from Corning. But Corning has been supplying that glass since the first iPhone appeared in 2007. In any case, the announcement appeared to secure a commitment from Trump to exempt Apple from tariffs imposed on imported chips.

Apple’s announcement Wednesday that it will spend $30 billion to buy chips from Broadcom was similarly ambiguous. The announcement didn’t provide details about the terms of the commitment or the timing of its expenditures. I asked Apple for details and whether the deal was related to a desire to remain in Trump’s favor, but didn’t hear back.

A similar phenomenon occurred during Trump’s first term; Trump had built much of his 2016 presidential campaign on a promise to increase manufacturing jobs in the United States. He blamed shrinkage in the manufacturing sector on trade agreements such as NAFTA and the policies of the Chinese, and took credit when an American manufacturer agreed to create or save jobs in the United States.

As I reported in 2019, many of those arrangements turned out to be exaggerated or bogus, or predated Trump’s claim. Some disappeared as soon as public attention turned elsewhere, or were outweighed by job cuts made elsewhere by the same companies.

Trump’s tariffs appear to have had a direct effect on manufacturing employment in the U.S. Since Trump’s inauguration, the manufacturing sector has shed about 75,000 jobs, or 0.6%. After April 2, 2025, when he announced global “liberation day” tariffs supposedly as a response to years of unfair treatment of American exports, the decline picked up pace, with a shrinkage of 68,000 manufacturing jobs.

The Supreme Court invalidated those tariffs in February, but others are still in place, including tariffs on imported steel and aluminum and on goods from China. Nor has he ceased threatening partners with trade wars. As recently as Tuesday, he said he would cut off all trade with Spain because of that country’s disagreement with him over its defense spending and its criticism of his Iran war.

As it happens, Spain is one of the few countries with which the U.S. has a trade surplus. That means that any cutoff, which trade experts think will be unlikely, would come at a cost to the U.S.

One might have hoped that Trump had learned a lesson from his first-term trade war with China. That conflict provoked a sharp contraction in the manufacturing economy, with the Institute for Supply Management’s purchasing managers index falling to 49.1 by mid-2019. (A reading below 50 signifies contraction.)

The ISM index began to recover toward the end of Trump’s term but fell again during the pandemic. Lately it has been falling again, to 53.3 in June from 54 in May.

The Iran war is another deadweight on domestic manufacturing. That’s partially the consequence of blockages of the Strait of Hormuz, the crucial thoroughfare not only for middle eastern oil, but also for such industrial inputs as fertilizer and aluminum. Cement, concrete, olive oil and spices are also among commodities produced in the region that use the strait as an outlet to reach the outside world.

Uncertainties in the region, tensions between the U.S. and China, and heightened concerns over the safety of shipping overall have driven up shipping costs between the far east and the U.S. The price of shipping a benchmark 40-foot container from China to the West Coast has nearly quadrupled to $6,687 now from about $1,700 just before the Iran war began, according to an index maintained by the cargo firm Freightos — even though shipping prices typically decline during this time of year.

There can be little doubt that the U.S. would benefit from an industrial policy — if it’s coherent. China supplanted America as the world’s leading exporter of manufactured goods in 2010, and the gap has only widened since then. China’s dominance may be hard to reverse, as it’s built on lower labor costs and transport infrastructure that enjoys focused government investment.

Tariffs could be a component of a new industrial policy, but Trump’s tariffs aren’t rationally geared to protecting domestic industries that need protection. They’re expressions of his whims, and as such they’re totally ineffective. If there are government investment policies targeting industries that need assistance, they’re not apparent to economists or industrialists.

Trump can talk as much as he likes about a golden age for U.S. manufacturing, but from his first term through this one, it’s nothing but talk. And talk, of course, is cheap.

Though it has weakened to a severe tropical storm, it still presents a risk because of the huge volume of moisture within its rain bands.

The storm is expected to gradually diminish in its intensity as it moves north-west.

On Sunday morning, the centre of the typhoon reached Hangzhou City in Zhejiang province, Chinese state media reported.

Forecasters said the typhoon would move to eastern Anhui on Monday, and to the northern Yellow Sea from the Shandong Peninsula on Tuesday.

More than 1.7 million people were evacuated in Zhejiang and thousands more in neighbouring provinces, state media said. Schools, work and outdoor activities have been suspended in Zhejiang, while 400 flights and dozens of train services have been cancelled.

The city of Wenzhou, home to around 10 million people, is close to the path of the storm, with authorities evacuating hundreds of thousands of residents.

“We could hear roof tiles and tree branches falling,” Li Liangxing, a resident of the city told Reuters, adding “of course we were scared.”

Beijing had ordered the evacuation of 100,000 people to “avoid risk”, officials said.

Bavi began as a super typhoon, battering Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands last Monday with wind speeds of 290km/h (180mph).

As it made its way through the Pacific, weakening to 144 km/h winds, it struck the Sakishima islands, part of Japan’s Ryukyu island chain between the country’s main islands and Taiwan. At least five people were injured and thousands were without power.

Taiwan itself did not receive a direct hit but thousands of people were forced to leave their homes and there was a danger of landslides after heavy rain. Neither country has reported any deaths.

Taiwanese authorities had warned that Bavi could bring up to 1m (39 inches) of rainfall.

Dozens of flights have been cancelled while schools have suspended classes across the region. Supermarket shelves have been wiped clean as residents stock up on supplies.

Parts of southern China are still reeling from the devastation brought by Typhoon Maysak earlier this week.

Maysak left at least 39 people dead and killed large numbers of livestock, resulting in massive agriculture loss. It also spurred two rare tornadoes in the central Hubei province.

Typhoon Bavi brought heavy rain and powerful winds to Japan’s southern islands while skirting Taiwan, where rough seas, fallen trees and localized damage were reported.

Despite the storm, residents in Keelung ventured out to markets as Bavi weakened while tracking toward China’s east coast, where landfall is expected on Sunday.

China’s successful submarine-launched ballistic missile test into the southern Pacific this week was more than a routine military exercise. It provided Beijing with a rare opportunity to validate one of the most sensitive aspects of its nuclear deterrent its ability to command, communicate with and potentially deploy nuclear-armed submarines while remaining undetected.

The test, carried out on Monday, involved a ballistic missile launched from a strategic nuclear-powered submarine and has drawn close scrutiny from regional governments and defence analysts. While Chinese officials described it as a standard military drill conducted in accordance with international law, experts say it marks another step in China’s effort to build a more credible and survivable nuclear force.

Why submarine missile tests matter

Unlike land-based nuclear missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) are designed to ensure a country can retaliate even if its territory comes under nuclear attack. This “second-strike capability” forms one of the central pillars of nuclear deterrence.

Analysts say the test was not solely about assessing missile performance. It also allowed Chinese military leaders to evaluate the complex command-and-control systems needed to operate nuclear submarines while they remain hidden beneath the ocean.

Maintaining secure communications with submarines without revealing their position is among the most technically demanding aspects of any nuclear arsenal.

Collin Koh, a security expert at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, said Beijing would likely have been evaluating communications, operational procedures and submarine performance alongside the missile itself.

A key part of China’s nuclear modernization

Regional defence experts believe the missile was launched from one of China’s Type-094 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), although Beijing has not officially identified the vessel.

China has steadily expanded its nuclear capabilities over the past decade, developing what military planners describe as a complete “nuclear triad”—the ability to launch nuclear weapons from land, sea and air.

The submarine component is viewed as increasingly important because it offers a survivable retaliatory force if China’s land-based missile sites were destroyed during a conflict.

According to previous U.S. defence assessments, China has already begun near-continuous deterrence patrols using its SSBN fleet, joining the United States, Russia, Britain and France in maintaining an at-sea nuclear capability.

Challenges remain

Despite the progress, experts note that China’s submarine force still faces significant operational hurdles.

To threaten the continental United States with its most advanced JL-3 submarine-launched missile, Chinese submarines would likely need to leave the relative protection of the South China Sea and enter the wider Pacific Ocean, where they could be tracked by U.S. and allied anti-submarine forces.

Military analysts say American and allied navies closely monitor Chinese submarines using surveillance aircraft, underwater sensor networks and naval patrols.

China is also developing a quieter next-generation ballistic missile submarine that could improve its ability to operate undetected.

Regional reaction

The launch prompted criticism from several regional governments.

The United States said China had provided only limited advance notification before the launch and expressed concern over Beijing’s rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal. Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Taiwan also voiced concern following the test.

China rejected the criticism, insisting the exercise complied with international law and was intended solely to safeguard national security and strategic stability.

Beijing has repeatedly argued that its nuclear modernization remains defensive and consistent with its longstanding policy of not being the first to use nuclear weapons.

Analysis: A signal beyond the missile

The importance of this test extends beyond the missile itself. It demonstrates Beijing’s growing confidence in the sea-based leg of its nuclear deterrent, an area traditionally dominated by the United States and Russia.

The exercise also reflects China’s broader military modernization strategy under President Xi Jinping, which prioritizes survivable nuclear forces capable of guaranteeing retaliation under any scenario. Even if operational challenges remain—particularly the ability of Chinese submarines to evade increasingly sophisticated Western tracking systems—the test suggests China is moving closer to a fully credible second-strike capability.

Strategically, the launch sends multiple messages. Domestically, it showcases advances in China’s military technology. Regionally, it reinforces Beijing’s determination to protect its security interests. Internationally, it signals that China’s nuclear forces are becoming more sophisticated, mobile and resilient, adding another layer of complexity to strategic competition with the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific.

With information from Reuters.

July 10 (UPI) — Typhoon Bavi weakened as it moved off the Philippines on Friday but was expected to bring heavy rain to Taiwan and parts of Japan before it makes landfall in China.

Bavi, which was called Inday in the Philippines, killed at least 15 people after heavy rains caused flash floods and landslides in several villages and cities, and affected tens of thousands of people there, The BBC and The Philippine Star reported.

The typhoon on Friday brought storm surge and rain to Okinawa, Japan, and was expected Saturday to pound the north and east sides of Taiwan, potentially bringing nearly 40 inches of rain in some areas.

Once past Taiwan, the storm could make two landfalls in China, part of which is still recovering after Typhoon Maysak earlier this week.

Maysak’s havoc is linked to at least 39 deaths, though searches were underway for people reported missing.

Hundreds of flights in Japan, including Okinawa and the Sakishima Islands, were canceled on Friday and Saturday as residents braced for Bavi’s pounding rain.

Forecasters in China warned of two potential landfalls as it moves toward the north, noting that Bavi’s size — at it’s widest point, the typhoon is as wide as France — means that both its remnants and outer rain bands are likely to affect a huge swath of people and property.

Published on 09/07/2026 – 17:14 GMT+2•Updated
17:19

The European Commission launched an investigation on Thursday into Chinese Peking duck after several EU producers complained of unfairly low prices harming their industry.

ADVERTISEMENT

ADVERTISEMENT

Without disclosing their names, the Commission said that five EU producers had complained that China is unfairly subsidising domestic production via its five-year plan for agricultural modernisation.

The probe comes at a time of heightened tensions between Beijing and Brussels, as the EU seeks to shield its market from cheap Chinese imports, triggering Beijing’s ire as it aims to preserve access to the lucrative European market.

After China repeatedly threatened retaliation over several EU legislative proposals restricting access to EU public procurement and setting strict conditions on foreign investment, the two sides started negotiations last week to ease tensions.

However, the EU’s latest move targeting duck imports could disrupt the talks by hitting China’s agricultural sector for the first time.

It also said that the volume and prices of imports had a “negative impact on the quantities sold, the level of prices charged and market share held by the Union industry,” and that this had resulted in “substantial adverse effects on the overall performance” of the sector.

The Commission’s investigation could result in anti-dumping duties being imposed on Chinese producers to protect the EU market.

Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties are among the EU’s main trade defence instruments against China’s aggressive push into its market. However, EU leaders gave the Commission a mandate in June to step up efforts to reduce the EU’s €1 billion-a-day trade deficit with China. They want the EU executive, which has competence over trade policy, to review its trade defence tools and pursue a dialogue with Beijing that delivers tangible results.

EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič met his Chinese counterpart, Wang Wentao, in Brussels last Monday to kick-start negotiations aimed at restoring a level playing field and addressing trade imbalances, which Brussels said had become “unsustainable”.

The EU already imposed tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles in 2024, triggering China’s investigations and sanctions targeting EU brandy, pork and dairy products.

The EU hopes to achieve a breakthrough in negotiations with Beijing by October, when Šefčovič is due to travel to China.

July 9 (UPI) — A shoe factory caught fire Thursday morning in China, and it’s unknown how many people are dead or injured.

Chinese President Xi Jinping said there were likely “significant casualties” and ordered an investigation into the cause.

The fire broke out at noon local time Thursday in Janjiang,, a city in Fujian Province. By 5 p.m., it was mostly extinguished. Local fire teams sent 183 people and 35 vehicles to the scene, the Ministry of Emergency Management said in a statement.

Video on the state news showed flames coming from the top floor windows, The New York Times reported. At least a dozen people appeared to be stuck on the roof.

Xi told local authorities to do all they could to search for and rescue survivors, treat the injured, find the cause of the fire and “hold those responsible accountable,” according to China’s state broadcaster, CCTV.

In a statement, the emergency management officials said there were casualties but didn’t give details.

The factory was owned by Fujian Huiteng Shoes, which employed at least 155 people, The Times reported.