China

The humans were left far behind as smartphone maker Honor’s humanoid robot shattered the men’s world record in China.

A humanoid robot competing against flesh-and-blood runners has broken the world record at a Beijing half-marathon, showcasing the rapid technological advancements achieved by Chinese makers.

Spectators lined the roads in Yizhuang in the capital’s south on Sunday to watch the machines and their human rivals race, each group in a separate lane to avoid accidents or collisions.

Some of the robots were highly agile, moving like famous runners such as Usain Bolt, while others had more basic capabilities.

The winning humanoid, equipped with an autonomous navigation system and running for Chinese smartphone maker Honor, completed the roughly 21km (13-mile) course in 50 minutes and 26 seconds, at an average speed of about 25km/h (15.5mph), according to state broadcaster CCTV.

That was far faster than the top human in Sunday’s race, while also surpassing the current men’s world record of 57:20, held by Ugandan runner Jacob Kiplimo.

The result represented spectacular progress from last year, when robot-runners fell repeatedly, and the best took more than two hours and 40 minutes to finish.

The number of humanoid entries jumped from about 20 last year to more than 100, according to organisers, a sign of the sector’s growing popularity.

‘Pretty cool’

Han Chenyu, a 25-year-old student who watched the race from behind a safety barrier, barely had time to take out her phone and snap a picture of the leading robot as it whizzed past.

She told the AFP news agency she was enthusiastic about such leaps in technology and thought the event was “pretty cool”.

But, she added, “as someone who works for a living, I’m a little worried about it sometimes. I feel like technology is advancing so fast that it might start affecting people’s jobs”, particularly with artificial intelligence (AI) growing increasingly sophisticated.

Humanoid robots have become a common sight in China in recent years, in the media as well as in public spaces.

Xie Lei, 41, who watched Sunday’s race with his family, said robots could “become part of our daily lives” within several years, potentially used for “things like housework, elderly companionship or basic caregiving” or “dangerous jobs, even firefighting”.

The humanoid half-marathon aims to encourage innovation and popularise the technologies used in creating and operating such machines.

In a sign of the industry’s strength, investment in robotics and so-called embodied AI amounted to 73.5 billion yuan ($10.8bn) in China in 2025, according to a study by a government agency.

“For thousands of years, humans have been at the top on planet Earth. But now, look at robots. Just in terms of autonomous navigation, at least in this specific sport event, they’re already starting to surpass us,” Xie said.

“On one hand, it does make you feel a little bit sad for humanity. But at the same time, technology, especially in recent years, has given us so much imagination.”

April 16 (Asia Today) — China’s economy grew 5.0% in the first quarter, exceeding expectations despite concerns over the impact of the Iran conflict, official data showed Thursday.

The National Bureau of Statistics said gross domestic product rose 5.0% from a year earlier, topping the 4.8% forecast by economists surveyed by Reuters and Bloomberg.

The stronger-than-expected growth was driven by manufacturing and exports. Industrial production rose 5.7% in March from a year earlier, while retail sales increased just 1.7%, highlighting weak consumer recovery.

High-tech industries showed particularly strong momentum. Output in the sector rose 12.5% in the first quarter, with industrial robot production up 33% and integrated circuit output increasing 24%. Manufacturing accounted for about one-third of overall economic growth.

The impact of the Iran conflict has so far been limited. Bloomberg reported that China’s efforts to bolster energy security, along with prolonged deflationary pressures, helped cushion the shock from rising oil prices. However, some effects were visible, including a 2.2% decline in refined oil production in March.

Domestic demand remains a key concern. Real per capita consumption rose just 2.6%, while wage growth slowed. The urban unemployment rate reached 5.4%, the highest level in a year.

Investment indicators were also weak. Fixed-asset investment increased 1.7% in the first three months of the year, while real estate investment fell 11.2%. Private investment declined for the first time outside the pandemic period.

Analysts said China’s economy continues to show an “imbalanced structure,” with growth driven by exports and manufacturing while domestic demand lags. Falling sales of automobiles, home appliances and furniture further point to soft consumption.

Policy responses are expected to remain measured. With growth exceeding expectations, pressure for large-scale stimulus has eased, and the government has set a relatively modest annual growth target of 4.5% to 5%.

Still, targeted fiscal support and cost-cutting measures are likely to continue to address rising energy prices and external uncertainties. Some economists also see room for monetary easing, including a possible reduction in banks’ reserve requirement ratio.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260416010005290

The smartest thing Trump can do for the United States is to adopt a “cake-sharing” strategy to cope with the arrival of a multipolar era. He wants to ensure that America still gets the largest slice of the cake, with its power base rooted in traditional energy—oil and natural gas.

This aligns well with “Cold War thinking.” From the perspective of oil reserves, the United States plus its friendly Gulf states accounts for about 55%–60% of the global total. If Venezuela—now under U.S. control—is added, the share rises to 72%–77%.

Spreading out the energy map, according to estimates by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), Greenland holds approximately 39 billion barrels of oil equivalent (combining East and West Greenland). Cuba has 4–5 billion barrels.

Nigeria, a major oil-producing country in Africa, has 37 billion barrels of oil reserves. The Trump administration has threatened military action against it under the pretext of “persecuting Christians.”

Iran’s oil reserves stand at 2,086 billion barrels, accounting for 13.3% of the global total.

The regions Trump has singled out—Iran, Venezuela, Greenland, Cuba, and Nigeria—clearly show that he is deciding how to “share the cake” with China and Russia based on the traditional energy map.

Although reserves and actual output are two different things, for Trump this is irrelevant. What he puts on the negotiating table is merely a piece of paper for “bidding”—he doesn’t need to worry about minor details.

On the other side of the negotiating table, China’s chips are new energy and critical minerals. In the area of critical minerals, Iran, Venezuela, Greenland, Cuba, and Nigeria all possess rich potential, and all have varying degrees of investment and cooperation ties with China.

One reason Trump scorns “new energy” may be that, within his limited term, competing with China in the new energy field is simply impossible. In the traditional energy domain, however, the United States holds a significant advantage.

Successfully pocketing Venezuela has encouraged Trump to take risks in Iran. Originally, Trump wanted to approach Beijing for a major deal from the position of a traditional energy hegemon, but Iran’s fierce resistance has dampened his ambitions. The United States has been outmaneuvered by Iran, and Trump has postponed his visit to China.

Iranian President Pezeshkian publicly stated: “China is now also seen by the United States as its main enemy; we are just next in line. They want to take us down first, then deal with China.” Behind this statement lies the landscape of U.S.-China competition over energy and critical minerals.

It cannot be said that Trump is unrealistic—this “cake-sharing” strategy has its own rationality. Nor can it be said that Trump has overestimated America’s military strength, because he knows very well that the United States cannot even handle the Houthis, let alone Iran. One can only say that the success of the “decapitation operation” in Venezuela has inflated his sense of luck, and Israel has exploited this psychology to successfully lure Trump into risking involvement in Iran.

The United States and Israel jointly eliminated the appeasement faction in Tehran and greatly underestimated Iran’s counterattack capability. They wanted to control oil but ended up being controlled by Iran on oil export routes. This is a complete strategic failure, and its medium- to long-term damage to the United States far exceeds the energy sector.

We don’t even need to discuss the rise and fall of petrodollars versus petroyuan—just look at the new energy sector. This round of energy crisis has greatly heightened the global urgency for new energy development, and the countries and regions most urgently in need are precisely America’s allies worldwide, including the Gulf states.

America’s allies are mostly developed countries. They have long recognized that China is a superpower in new energy. Before the Iran war, the broader Western camp was developing new energy while trying to reduce dependence on Iran. Now, however, the sense of urgency has pushed these countries to rely even more deeply on China.

These countries and regions include France, Germany, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, as well as India, Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asian nations such as Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia. They are either industrially advanced or rapidly industrializing countries that heavily depend on stable energy supplies.

In the core area of the Iran war—the Gulf states—are also actively accelerating the development of new energy industries, with the solar industry as the key focus. China is the only source capable of providing cheap, high-quality equipment and products. After the war ends, Iran may also exchange oil for the components needed for new energy development with China, achieving economic diversification like the Gulf states and reducing reliance on oil exports.

China’s solar equipment originally suffered from overcapacity; now it stands to gain relief.

What revolves around the core issues of new energy is nothing more than industrial supply chains and critical minerals. In this regard, mainland China’s industrial strength needs no emphasis. In critical minerals, the Democratic Republic of the Congo—China’s deep cooperation partner—will see half of its cobalt mines belong to Chinese enterprises. Given that Congo holds the world’s largest cobalt reserves, China will possess an indisputable “cobalt dominance.” Cobalt is a key mineral for lithium-ion batteries.

In addition, graphite and tantalum are also dominated by China. Tantalum is a critical metal for capacitors, which are essential for stabilizing wind and solar power generation. Graphite is the anode material for lithium-ion batteries and an indispensable mineral for renewable energy storage systems and solar panel production.

Currently, renewable energy plus nuclear power accounts for 40% of global electricity generation, while fossil fuels still account for 60%. However, when looking at the global share of “capacity” (installed capacity) for renewable energy plus nuclear, it has already reached about 55%. Among this, renewable energy accounts for 49.4% and nuclear for about 5%.

“Capacity” refers to installed capacity—in plain terms, the theoretical maximum power generation. The actual global generation share of renewable energy is about 32%. The gap between theoretical and actual values exists because renewable energy generation is less stable than fossil fuels. Adding nuclear’s actual generation share (about 8%), the actual generation share of so-called low-carbon energy reaches 40% globally.

There is no doubt that the oil crisis will inevitably trigger a “green energy surge.” Looking ahead five years, the actual generation share of green energy will exceed 50%. Assuming nuclear can grow to 10% of actual generation and renewables grow by 8%, China’s additional revenue from the global renewable energy business in the next five years could reach the level of hundreds of billions of dollars.

From this perspective, China—which strongly supported green energy development from the very beginning of the climate agenda—did so not so much for carbon reduction as for industrial preparation in the name of energy security. Expanding the global new energy business is merely an added value.

Of course, the key technologies for manufacturing new energy equipment may be even more important than critical minerals. Last November, China imposed export controls on certain lithium batteries, key cathode and anode materials, and their manufacturing equipment and technologies. Given that China controls about 96% of global anode material production capacity and 85% of cathode material capacity, the impact of these export controls is enormous.

On April 15, according to Reuters, China has held preliminary consultations with solar panel production equipment suppliers and is considering restricting exports of the most advanced technologies and equipment to the United States. If true, Beijing is raising the stakes in new energy, waiting for Trump to come to the negotiating table in May.

Admittedly, Trump has no intention of developing new energy. However, considering that the Democrats may return to the White House in three years, Beijing is now blocking America’s path to new energy development, essentially laying the groundwork for U.S.-China competition three years from now.

If Trump’s energy strategy map on the table also included a new energy layer, he should realize that the setback in the Iran war has allowed the new energy domain to encroach upon the traditional energy domain, enabling China to expand its energy power without firing a single shot. As for critical minerals, the United States has made no outstanding progress—at least nothing sufficient for Trump to boast about.

Now, the “cake” being pushed in front of Xi Jinping is getting bigger and bigger. On the surface, Beijing has gained it effortlessly, but today’s harvest is mainly due to strategic 布局 made one step ahead. These layouts are often “low-profit” but highly effective investments, and new energy is merely one of them.

In an uncertain world, those who provide “certainty” win. Therefore, the winner of the Iran war is China—even if Beijing is extremely reluctant to admit it.

China has taken a firm stance against the Israeli escalation in Lebanon, strongly warning against the region becoming a second Gaza and considering the events a blatant violation of Lebanese sovereignty and international law. The most prominent features of the Chinese response up to April 2026 to this Israeli military escalation in southern Lebanon included condemning the targeting of civilians and emphasizing the protection of Lebanese sovereignty while rejecting Israeli violations aimed at destroying the infrastructure of southern Lebanon. The Chinese Foreign Ministry condemned the extensive Israeli raids targeting towns in southern Lebanon, stressing that Lebanon’s sovereignty and security are a red line that must not be crossed. China also emphasized the protection of Lebanese civilians, with Beijing unequivocally affirming that the protection of civilians and civilian objects in armed conflicts is a legal obligation and expressing its shock at the scale of casualties and destruction inflicted on southern villages and towns.

China’s position is based on a comprehensive vision linking the stability of southern Lebanon to a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. Beijing believes that addressing the root causes of the conflict is the only way to prevent its spread throughout the Middle East. While condemning the destruction of Lebanese infrastructure and civilian areas, China’s Foreign Ministry denounced the Israeli airstrikes that killed hundreds of civilians and destroyed civilian infrastructure and property. Beijing categorically rejects any actions that lead to the destruction of infrastructure, considering them a violation of international law. China has consistently emphasized that Lebanon’s sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity are a red line that must not be crossed. Beijing has also declared its opposition to the Israeli ground incursion into southern Lebanon, warning that such actions exacerbate regional tensions. China has called for diplomatic solutions, urging all parties, especially Israel, to exercise maximum restraint and return to the path of political and diplomatic settlement, asserting that continued violence will not bring security to any party. China condemned the attacks targeting UNIFIL peacekeeping forces in southern Lebanon, stressing the need to ensure the safety of UN peacekeepers.

In this context, China deliberately directed veiled criticism at Washington regarding Israeli violations in southern Lebanon. China believes that the failure to contain the escalation in southern Lebanon is partly due to the military and political support provided to Israel by external powers, a clear reference to the United States, which hinders efforts to de-escalate the situation. Simultaneously, China warned of a second Gaza in southern Lebanon. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi explicitly cautioned against a repeat of the Gaza tragedy in Lebanon, emphasizing that violence cannot replace right and justice. China is pressing in international forums, particularly the Security Council, for an immediate and permanent cessation of Israeli hostilities, warning against the region sliding into a full-scale war. This stance reflects China’s desire to bolster its role as a peacemaker in the Middle East and to rival American influence by adhering to political solutions and international law.

Here, China sharply criticized the American role in the Israeli war against southern Lebanon and its recent escalation in April 2026, arguing that Washington contributes to undermining regional stability through its military and political support for Israel. Beijing considered the military operations supported or participated in by the United States to be a flagrant violation of international law and the principles of national sovereignty. While warning against the militarization of the region, China criticized the expansion of the American military presence, describing it as irresponsible and warning that such steps exacerbate tensions rather than de-escalate them. Beijing believes that Washington’s approach to the international order reflects the values ​​of the law of the jungle and fuels chaos and instability in the Middle East. While criticizing the US for its double standards, China, through its Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning, condemned the continued Israeli strikes on towns and villages in southern Lebanon despite ongoing efforts to de-escalate the situation. She emphasized that Lebanon’s sovereignty and security must not be violated.

China called on Israel to immediately withdraw from southern Lebanon, warning against a repeat of the Gaza scenario. Chinese President Xi Jinping issued direct warnings demanding the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, cautioning that continued military operations could lead to a humanitarian catastrophe similar to what occurred in the Gaza Strip. He also called for an end to the Israeli escalation in southern Lebanon. China maintains that violence does not solve problems but rather exacerbates crises, urging maximum restraint to de-escalate the volatile regional situation. Chinese President Xi Jinping called for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory, asserting that their current military presence violates Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. President Xi explicitly warned against allowing southern Lebanon to become another Gaza, pointing to the risk of a widespread humanitarian catastrophe and the destruction of civilian infrastructure.

To halt the cycle of violence and armed conflict in southern Lebanon, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed a four-point peace initiative to bolster stability in the Middle East. This initiative includes a call for a multilateral peace conference under the auspices of the United Nations, the re-establishment of the border along the Blue Line between southern Lebanon and Israel, and a reaffirmation of China’s rejection of any violation of Lebanese sovereignty. The Chinese Foreign Ministry has repeatedly emphasized, most notably on April 9, 2026, that Lebanon’s sovereignty and security are a (red line) that must not be crossed. These Chinese moves position Beijing as an active diplomatic alternative in the region at a time of escalating international tensions between major powers and ongoing regional conflicts. China has begun diplomatic efforts by proposing several peace initiatives to halt the cycle of armed conflict in southern Lebanon. The most prominent of these is the call for a multilateral peace conference. Beijing proposed hosting an international peace conference aimed at stabilizing the region and reinforcing the border along the Blue Line separating Israel and Lebanon, under the auspices of the United Nations. China holds Israel fully responsible, considering the ongoing fighting in Gaza to be the root cause of the instability in the Middle East. Therefore, China called on the international community, particularly the major powers, to play a constructive role in achieving a comprehensive and lasting ceasefire in southern Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. China has also supported the UNIFIL peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon, strongly condemning any attacks on UNIFIL forces as violations of UN Security Council Resolution 1701. Here, China used its influence in the UN Security Council and international forums to emphasize that any military operations outside the framework of the United Nations violate its Charter. It described the Israeli strikes on towns and villages in southern Lebanon as unauthorized actions.

Based on the preceding analysis, we understand the accuracy of China’s linking of the tensions in southern Lebanon to the war in Gaza. China called for restraint to prevent the conflict from spreading regionally, based on its principles of supporting sovereign states like Lebanon and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. China also called for a return to the diplomatic track to halt the cycle of violent armed conflict in southern Lebanon perpetrated by Israel. China condemned the extensive Israeli strikes, stressing that Lebanon’s sovereignty and security must not be violated. It emphasized the need to protect Lebanese civilians and civilian infrastructure during Israeli military operations and called for de-escalation and immediate steps to calm the situation and prevent further escalation of the conflict in southern Lebanon.

Published on
14/04/2026 – 15:39 GMT+2

Viktor Orbán has positioned Hungary as a European centre for Chinese electric vehicle manufacturers, while disregarding the EU’s tariffs on them.

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Now his political successor, Péter Magyar, appears less inclined to reverse that policy in a radical way.

At a press conference on Monday following a landslide victory against Orbán, Magyar praised China as “one of the most important, largest, and strongest countries in the world.”

“I am very happy to travel to Beijing, and we are very happy to welcome Chinese leaders here in Hungary,” he added.

Magyar also said he would “review” Chinese investments in Hungary – particularly on electric vehicles – but “not with the aim of shutting them down or preventing them from happening.”

In recent years, Hungary was eager to attract Beijing’s largeness, with BYD building its first European passenger EV factory in Szeged in 2024 and major firms such as CATL, NIO and EVE Energy investing heavily in the country.

But that open-door policy has increasingly clashed with the EU’s push to tighten scrutiny of Chinese investments, as China floods Europe with low-cost imports and as many as 600,000 job losses are projected in the EU in the bloc’s auto sector this decade amid intensifying competition from Chinese manufacturers.

Magyar will also have to deal with concerns over alleged forced labour involving Chinese workers at Hungarian plants of EV giant BYD, as well as a recent European Commission probe into unfair subsidies at the same site. Those developments have tarnished the company’s reputation and raised concerns over Beijing’s investments.

Driving more value from investment in Hungary

At his press conference on Monday, the leader of Hungary’s Tisza party did not enter details. But he made clear that Hungary would align its policy more closely with Brussels.

“Rather, the goal is to ensure that those projects comply with European Union and Hungarian environmental regulations, health procedures, and labour safety standards, and contribute to the performance of the Hungarian national economy,” Magyar added.

He also appeared determine to distance himself from Orbán’s wariness of a recent European Commission proposal on “Made in Europe,” which targets China.

The draft law, currently discussed by EU governments and MEPs, would impose stricter conditions on foreign direct investment above €100 million in sectors such as batteries, electric vehicles, solar panels and critical raw materials.

Under the proposal, investors from countries holding 40% of global market share in a given sector would be required to hire at least 50% of EU workers. Additional conditions could include foreign ownership caps below 49%, joint ventures with European partners and technology transfers.

“What we do not want — and will not accept — is for foreign companies to come, receive significant Hungarian state support, employ very few Hungarians, create little to no added value for the Hungarian economy, and at the same time endanger the quality of Hungary’s land, air, and water,” Magyar added, signalling his intention to align policy more closely with Brussels.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has arrived in Beijing as the United States blocks the Strait of Hormuz, through which China imports about a third of its oil supplies.

Lavrov received a red-carpet welcome on Tuesday, according to photos shared by Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Beijing and Moscow have condemned the US and Israel over their war on Iran, with China also being economically affected by the energy crisis it has caused.

China, a big importer of Iranian oil, also slammed a recently imposed US scheme to blockade vessels entering or departing Iranian ports and coastal areas, including in the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.

“The Strait of Hormuz is an important international trade route for goods and energy, and maintaining its security, stability, and unimpeded flow is in the common interest of the international community,” China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Guo Jiakun said on Monday.

Lavrov speaks to Araghchi

Al Jazeera’s Alan Fisher, reporting from Washington, DC, said the US’s goal is to choke Iran off by blocking everything coming in and out of Iranian ports.

“What the US hopes is that there’ll be pressure on Iran from some of its main business partners, including China,” he said, adding that Beijing imports about a third of its oil from Iran. “The United States is hoping that pressure on China will mean China putting pressure on Iran and forcing Iran to get back to the negotiating table.”

On Monday, Lavrov held a telephone conversation with his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi.

The top Russian diplomat told  Araghchi it was important to guard against any resumption of hostilities in the Middle East, and said Russia stood ready to help with a settlement, according to a statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry.

“S Lavrov emphasised the importance of preventing a recurrence of armed confrontation and once again confirmed Russia’s unwavering readiness to assist in resolving the crisis, which has no military solution,” the ministry said.

It added Araghchi related to Lavrov details of US-Iran talks in Pakistan at the weekend, which failed to reach a breakthrough.

Beijing and Moscow are close economic and political partners, and the relationship has deepened further since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Wang also held a call with Lavrov on April 5, when they agreed that Beijing and Moscow would work together to de-escalate tensions in the Middle East.

Diplomacy traffic in Beijing

China welcomed a string of leaders of countries that have been affected by the war and its economic fallout this week, including Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez and United Arab Emirates President Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, also known as MBZ.

Chinese President Xi Jinping met MBZ and Sanchez on Tuesday morning, and Vietnamese President To Lam is expected in China for a four-day trip.

“I think what this really speaks to is that many people around the world have been surprised that China has not played a more active role in the Iran war, given it has such strong ties with Tehran, including as Iran’s largest trading partner and buyer of crude oil,” Al Jazeera’s Katrina Yu, reporting from Beijing, said.

“But what China has been doing, besides calling for restraint and more negotiation, is taking advantage of this moment to really look at states that may be a little disenchanted with the US or looking to diversify from reliance on Washington,” Yu said.

“China has presented itself as the opposite of Washington – a reliable, stable and predictable partner. For many states, that message really appeals.”

Trump’s threats after ‘fabricated’ reports

Trump, who is scheduled to visit Beijing next month for talks with Xi, said on Sunday he would hit China’s goods with a 50 percent tariff if it provided military assistance to Tehran.

His comments came the same day CNN reported that US intelligence indicated China was preparing to deliver new air defence systems to Iran within the next few weeks, quoting three people familiar with the assessments.

On Tuesday, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Guo said those reports were “completely fabricated”.

“If the US insists on using this as an excuse to impose additional tariffs on China, China will definitely take resolute countermeasures,” he said.

Vice Foreign Minister Sun Weidong’s sudden dismissal comes amid a wave of removals amid anticorruption campaign.

Senior Chinese diplomat Sun Weidong has been dismissed from his post as vice minister of foreign affairs, in the latest case of a high-ranking official being removed from office by Beijing.

The Ministry of Human Resources announced the news in a brief post on its website on Tuesday, citing a decision of the State Council, the highest body of state power in China.

The post did not say why or when Sun had been dismissed, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website shows his last public engagements were meetings with the ambassadors of Brunei and Malaysia to China on March 13.

Two days earlier, Sun had met Pakistan’s ambassador to China to discuss bilateral cooperation, according to a post on diplomat Khalil Hashmi’s X account.

Dismissals of this kind in the Chinese government usually indicate high-level disciplinary action and are often followed by news of an investigation.

Sun’s dismissal notice included the removal of another official, An Lusheng, from his post as deputy director of the National Railway Administration.

Since coming to power in 2012, President Xi Jinping has carried out a wide-ranging anticorruption campaign targeting “tigers and flies”, meaning high- and low-ranking officials.

Last year, China investigated more than one million corruption cases and disciplined 938,000 people, according to its Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and National Supervisory Commission.

The list of cases involving disciplinary action included 69 provincial or ministerial-level officials, 4,155 bureau-level officials, 35,000 county-level officials, and 125,000 township-level officials, according to the commission’s year-end report.

Senior Chinese military officials have also been caught up in Xi’s anticorruption campaign sweeps.

The Philippines has raised alarm after discovering cyanide on Chinese vessels operating near a disputed atoll in the South China Sea, intensifying tensions in an already volatile region.

Officials say laboratory tests confirmed the presence of the toxic substance in materials seized during naval operations at Second Thomas Shoal, known in the Philippines as Ayungin Shoal.

The area is a longstanding flashpoint between Philippines and China, with both sides asserting competing claims.

Why the Allegation Matters

Philippine authorities are framing the discovery as more than an environmental violation. According to security officials, the use of cyanide could damage marine ecosystems, kill fish stocks, and weaken the reef structure beneath a grounded Philippine naval vessel stationed at the shoal.

That ship plays a critical role in maintaining Manila’s territorial claim, meaning any environmental damage could also have strategic consequences.

Officials have gone as far as calling it an act of sabotage.

Rising Tensions at Sea

The accusation comes against a backdrop of repeated confrontations in the area. Manila has previously accused Beijing of interfering with resupply missions to its troops stationed on the grounded vessel, including a violent 2024 incident that injured a Filipino sailor.

China has consistently denied such allegations, instead accusing the Philippines of encroaching on its territory.

Despite recent diplomatic talks aimed at reducing friction, incidents at sea continue to test fragile understandings between the two sides.

The Bigger Dispute

The South China Sea remains one of the world’s most contested regions. China claims nearly the entire waterway, overlapping with claims from several Southeast Asian nations.

A 2016 international tribunal ruling rejected Beijing’s sweeping claims under international law, but China does not recognize the decision.

With more than $3 trillion in global trade passing through these waters each year, even localized tensions carry global significance.

Implications: Environment Meets Geopolitics

This incident adds a new dimension to the dispute by linking environmental harm with strategic rivalry.

If proven, the use of cyanide could:

• Escalate diplomatic tensions between Manila and Beijing
• Draw wider international attention to environmental practices in contested waters
• Further complicate already fragile cooperation efforts in the region

It also underscores how control over maritime territory is not just about military presence, but also about sustaining the ecosystems that support it.

Analysis: A Dangerous New Phase

The allegation signals a shift in how disputes in the South China Sea are unfolding. Beyond naval standoffs and legal arguments, there is now a growing risk of indirect tactics that target resources and infrastructure.

Whether intentional or not, the incident deepens mistrust and makes de-escalation more difficult.

The cyanide discovery is more than an environmental concern. It is a geopolitical flashpoint that could further inflame one of the world’s most sensitive maritime disputes.

As tensions persist, even seemingly small incidents have the potential to ripple far beyond the waters where they occur.

With information from Reuters.

A global race to develop artificial intelligence-powered weapons is intensifying, with the United States, China and Russia pushing to gain an advantage in next-generation warfare, the New York Times reported Sunday.

Recent military displays and intelligence assessments suggest China may

WASHINGTON — President Trump responded to the collapse of high-stakes negotiations with Iran by escalating the conflict on Sunday, ordering a full blockade of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz — a risky move that could drive global oil prices higher and provoke confrontation with a far more formidable adversary.

No country relies more heavily on the strait than China, which receives nearly half of its oil imports through the international waterway. In recent days, Beijing has warned that access to its shipping lanes “must be guaranteed.”

Trump administration officials believe the blockade could compel China to pressure Tehran into making further concessions, following Beijing’s crucial role earlier this month in convincing Iran to accept an initial ceasefire.

But the decision by U.S. diplomats to tie negotiations over the status of the strait to those over the fate of Iran’s nuclear program — a matter of torturous diplomacy for the last quarter-century — could make it harder to secure a breakthrough.

In the meantime, a full blockade of the strait could force China to become more directly involved in a conflict that is already heightening tensions with Washington.

On Saturday, reports that Beijing could be preparing to send advanced missile and air defense systems to Iran prompted anger from the White House.

“If China does that, China is gonna have big problems,” Trump told reporters.

It is a high-stakes moment in the world’s most important bilateral relationship, ahead of a closely watched summit between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing next month that both sides had hoped would help stabilize relations.

The United States and Iran agreed to a two-week ceasefire in the war on Tuesday — on the condition that Iran would allow full freedom of navigation through the strait, a vital commercial artery that was treated for decades as an open, international waterway.

Marathon negotiations in Islamabad, Pakistan, over the weekend between senior U.S. and Iranian officials failed to secure a long-term agreement.

Vice President JD Vance said the central sticking point was Iran’s insistence on maintaining its nuclear program. But Tehran also signaled that shipping through the strait would not return to prewar conditions, pledging to control traffic and impose transit tolls — a scenario that could result in permanently higher global oil prices, a political nightmare for the Trump administration entering the midterm elections.

Trump’s threat to completely shut down traffic through the strait on Sunday may also lead to a temporary spike in oil prices, with experts warning the market could experience barrels costing $150 or more if a blockade persists.

Describing his plans to Fox News on Sunday, Trump said there would be no exceptions to the U.S. blockade for Tehran’s “friends.” Throughout the war, Chinese-bound vessels were granted special passage by Iranian authorities.

“We’re putting on a complete blockade. We’re not going to let Iran make money on selling oil to people that they like and not people that they don’t like, or whatever,” Trump said.

“It won’t be a percentage,” he added. “It won’t be a friend of yours, like a country that’s an ally or a country that’s your friend. It’s all or nothing.”

Trump also wrote on social media that he had ordered the Navy to “seek and interdict every vessel in International Waters that has paid a toll to Iran” — and to “blow to hell” any Iranian assets that open fire on ships.

Beijing did not immediately respond to the proposal. But it has walked a fine line over six weeks of war in the region, describing open waters in the strait as of global interest, while avoiding any condemnation of Iran’s assertion of control.

China’s main energy trading partners in the gulf — Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait — have all advocated for a return to the status quo ante for the passage, pressing allies to reject Iranian control as the new normal.

“Keeping the area safe and stable and ensuring unimpeded passage serves the common interest of the international community,” a Chinese official said last week.

“We hope that all sides can work together,” the official added, “for the early resumption of normal traffic at the strait.”

The European Union and the United States are nearing a strategic agreement to coordinate the production and supply of critical minerals, according to reports.

The move reflects growing concern in Western capitals over the dominance of China in global supply chains for key resources such as rare earth elements, which are essential for modern technologies including electric vehicles, semiconductors, and defence systems.

What the Deal Involves

The proposed agreement is expected to take the form of a non binding memorandum of understanding, covering the entire lifecycle of critical minerals

Exploration and extraction
Processing and refining
Recycling and recovery

It also includes potential financial mechanisms such as minimum price guarantees designed to support non Chinese suppliers and reduce market volatility.

Beyond production, the deal emphasises coordination on standards, investment strategies, and joint projects, signalling a comprehensive approach rather than a narrow trade arrangement.

Strategic Motivation

At the heart of the initiative is a shared objective to reduce reliance on China’s mineral supply chains.

China currently dominates several stages of the critical minerals ecosystem, particularly processing and refining. This has given Beijing significant leverage over industries that underpin the global energy transition and advanced manufacturing.

For both the EU and the US, securing alternative sources is increasingly seen as a matter of economic security as well as geopolitical strategy.

Supply Chain Vulnerability

Recent global disruptions have exposed the fragility of supply chains, especially for materials concentrated in a small number of countries.

Critical minerals are particularly sensitive because their production is capital intensive, geographically concentrated, and difficult to scale quickly.

By coordinating efforts, the EU and US aim to build resilience against potential supply shocks, including those that could arise from geopolitical tensions or export restrictions.

Economic and Industrial Implications

The deal could reshape global competition in several ways

It may accelerate investment in mining and processing projects outside China
It could create new incentives for private sector participation through price stabilisation mechanisms
It may encourage the development of recycling industries to reduce dependence on raw extraction

At the same time, such measures could alter market dynamics, potentially leading to higher costs in the short term as new supply chains are developed.

Diplomatic and Trade Dimensions

The agreement also reflects a broader trend of economic alignment between the EU and the US on strategic industries.

Discussions between EU Trade Commissioner Maros Sefcovic and US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer have signalled a willingness to deepen cooperation not only on minerals but also on tariffs and trade standards.

This coordination could strengthen transatlantic ties while also reshaping global trade patterns, particularly in sectors tied to clean energy and high technology.

Implications

The emerging deal highlights several key shifts

A move toward resource security as a central pillar of economic policy
Increasing alignment between Western economies in response to strategic competition
Growing importance of supply chain resilience in global trade

It also underscores how access to raw materials is becoming as geopolitically significant as access to markets.

Analysis

The EU US critical minerals initiative reflects a structural shift in global economic strategy, where control over supply chains is increasingly viewed through the lens of national security.

Rather than relying on open global markets, major economies are moving toward coordinated frameworks that prioritise trusted partners and reduce exposure to geopolitical rivals.

China’s dominance in critical minerals has effectively transformed these resources into strategic assets, prompting a response that blends industrial policy with geopolitical alignment. The inclusion of mechanisms such as price guarantees suggests a willingness to intervene directly in markets to achieve strategic goals.

At the same time, the non binding nature of the agreement indicates a cautious approach, balancing ambition with flexibility. This allows both sides to advance cooperation without committing to rigid structures that could face political or economic resistance.

The broader implication is the gradual fragmentation of global supply chains into competing blocs. As countries prioritise security and resilience over efficiency, the global economy may become less integrated but more strategically segmented, with critical minerals at the centre of this transformation.

With information from Reuters.

Taipei, Taiwan – Opposition leader Cheng Li-wun and Chinese President Xi Jinping have met in Beijing, where both leaders stated their opposition to Taiwan independence and expressed a desire for a “peaceful” resolution to the long-running dispute over the island’s future.

They posed for photos at the Great Hall of the People and exchanged public remarks, in addition to holding their closed-door meeting.

Cheng is the highest-ranking Taiwanese leader to meet Xi since President Ma Ying-jeou talked with the Chinese leader in Singapore in 2015. They met again in China two years ago when Ma was a private citizen.

Both Cheng and Ma are members of the Kuomintang, the conservative-leaning Taiwanese political party that advocates for greater engagement with China by Taiwan’s self-ruled democratic government.

During her public remarks, Cheng stressed that Chinese and Taiwanese leaders should work to “transcend political confrontation and mutual hostility”.

“Through the unremitting efforts of our two parties, we hope the Taiwan Strait will no longer become a potential flashpoint of conflict, nor a chessboard for external powers,” Cheng said, according to an English translation.

“Instead, it should become a strait that connects family ties, civilisation and hope – a symbol of peace jointly safeguarded by Chinese people on both sides,” she said.

Cheng’s remarks were sprinkled with well-known Chinese Communist Party talking points, praising its success in eradicating absolute poverty to its goal of achieving the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”

“During their open-door meeting, Xi also emphasised Taiwan and China’s shared history and culture, stating that “people of all ethnic groups, including Taiwanese compatriots,” had “jointly written the glorious history of China.”

“All sons and daughters of China share the same Chinese roots and the same Chinese spirit. This originates from blood ties and is deeply embedded in our history – it cannot be forgotten and cannot be erased,” Xi said.

He added that together with the KMT and other members of Taiwanese society, Beijing was ready to “work for peace” across the Taiwan Strait.

Both leaders said they oppose “foreign meddling” in Taiwan-China relations – a reference to US interference – while Cheng suggested that she would slow Taiwan’s military build up, according to Wen-ti Sung, a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub.

“She talked about the ‘institutional arrangement for war prevention,’ which was a euphemism for saying that under her leadership, the KMT would not be seeking a defence and deterrence-oriented approach to war prevention,” he told Al Jazeera.

The message, in short, was that “Taiwan ought to slow down on defence buildup and buying US arms,” Sung said.

Taiwan’s military expansion has been a hotly debated issue in the legislature, where the KMT has for months blocked a $40bn special budget to acquire US weapons. The opposition party alleges that the defence bill is too large and too vague. It offered a smaller $12bn alternative instead.

Writing on Facebook ahead of the meeting, Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) wrote that the KMT continues to “deliberately avoid cross-party negotiations” while delaying approval of the special defence budget.

Lai said that his government also supports peace, but not “unrealistic fantasies”. Despite promises of peace from Xi, China has steadily ramped up its military presence in the waters and airspace around Taiwan in recent years. Since 2022, China’s armed forces have had six rounds of multi-day live-fire military drills in the Taiwan Strait, the 180-kilometre wide waterway dividing Taiwan from mainland Asia.

“History tells us that compromising with authoritarian regimes only sacrifices sovereignty and democracy; it will not bring freedom, nor will it bring peace,” Lai wrote on Facebook.

China accuses the ruling DPP’s leadership of pushing a “separatist” agenda. The DPP advocates for a distinct Taiwanese identity and, over the past decade, has tried to raise Taiwan’s profile on the world stage — which has provoked anger in Beijing.

The Chinese leadership cut off formal contact with Taipei shortly after the DPP came to power in 2016, although it continues to communicate through different groups, including the KMT.

That is partly why Cheng’s trip to China has been viewed with scepticism in some corners of Taiwan, particularly among the ruling DPP.

Speaking to reporters after the meeting, Cheng sidestepped questions of whether she supported Taiwanese and Chinese unification, but said her main goal was to seek “reconciliation” based on shared history and culture.

However, the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party have not always got along.

They fought a bloody civil war from the 1920s to the 1940s during China’s republican era, only pausing to fight the Japanese during the Second World War.

The KMT-led Republic of China government later retreated to Taiwan, a former Japanese colony, in the late 1940s, vowing to one day return to China. The conflict was never fully resolved. The CCP continues to claim Taiwan as a province, and remains committed to annexing it one day, peacefully or by force.

Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council – which sets Taiwan’s policy towards China – said this week that Cheng’s talking point that Taiwan and China are “one family” mischaracterises Taiwan’s sovereignty dispute as an internal disagreement rather than one between two governments.

While still formally known as the Republic of China, Taiwan has undergone a cultural and political sea change since democratisation in the 1990s, accompanied by a rise in Taiwanese nationalism.

In 2025, a national identity survey by the National Chengchi University in Taiwan found that 62 per cent of respondents identified as “Taiwanese”, up from 17.6 per cent in 1992, the first year of the survey.

The percentage of respondents who identify as “Taiwanese and Chinese” has fallen from 46.4 per cent to 31.7 per cent over the same period, while respondents identifying as “Chinese” fell from 25.5 to 2.5 per cent.

The Strait of Hormuz, which links the Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, has held global attention since Israel and the US began their war on Iran in February.

Until fighting began, the narrow channel, through which 20 per cent of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies are shipped from Gulf producers in peacetime, remained toll-free and safe for vessels. The strait is shared by Iran and Oman and does not fall into the category of international waters.

After the US and Israel began strikes, Iran retaliated by attacking “enemy” merchant ships in the strait, effectively halting passage for all, stranding shipping, and creating one of the worst-ever global energy distribution crises.

Tehran continued to refuse to re-open the strait to all traffic at the start of this week, despite US President Donald Trump’s threats to bomb Iran’s power plants and bridges if it did not relent. Trump backed away from his threat on Tuesday night when a two-week ceasefire, brokered by Pakistan, was declared.

That followed a 10-point peace proposal from Iran that Trump described as a “workable” basis on which to negotiate a permanent end to hostilities.

As part of the truce, Tehran has now issued official terms it says will guide its control of the Strait going forward. The US has not directly acknowledged the terms ahead of talks set to begin in Islamabad on Friday. However, analysts say Tehran’s continued control will be unpopular with Washington, as well as other countries.

During the crisis, only a few ships from specific countries deemed friendly to Iran and those which pay a toll have been granted safe passage. At least two tolls for ships are believed to have been paid in Chinese yuan, in what appears to be a strategy to weaken the US dollar, but also to avoid US sanctions. China, which buys 80 percent of Iran’s oil, already pays Tehran in yuan.

Here’s what we know about how shipments will work from now on:

Who is controlling the strait now?

On Tuesday, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi said Iran would grant safe passage through the strait during the ceasefire in “coordination with Iran’s Armed Forces and with due consideration of technical limitations”.

On Wednesday, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) released a map of the strait showing a safe route for ships to follow. The map appears to direct ships further north towards the Iranian coast and away from the traditional route closer to the coast of Oman.

In a statement, the IRGC said all vessels must use the new map for navigation due to “the likelihood of the presence of various types of anti-ship mines in the main traffic zone”.

It is unclear whether Iran is collecting toll fees during the ceasefire period.

However, Trump said on Tuesday the US would be “helping with the traffic buildup” in the strait and that the US army would be “hanging around” as the negotiations go on.

The Strait will be “OPEN & SAFE” he posted on his Truth Social media site on Thursday, adding that US troops would not leave the area, and threatening to resume attacks if the talks don’t go well.

It’s not known to what extent US troops are directing what happens in the strait now.

Delhi-based maritime analyst C Uday Bhaskar told Al Jazeera that there is a lot of “uncertainty” about who can sail through the strait, and that only between three and five ships have transited since the war was paused.

How does Iran’s 10-point plan affect the Strait?

Among Tehran’s main demands listed on its 10-point plan are that the US and Israel permanently cease all attacks on Iran and its allies – particularly Lebanon – lift all sanctions, and allow Iran to retain control over Hormuz. The plan has not been fully published but is understood to be a starting point for talks.

Iranian media say Iran is considering a plan to charge up to $2m per vessel to be shared with Oman on the opposite side of the strait. Other reports suggest Iran could charge $1 per barrel of oil being shipped.

Revenues raised would be used to rebuild military and civilian infrastructure damaged by US-Israeli strikes, Tehran said.

Oman has rejected the idea. Transport minister Said Al-Maawali said on Wednesday that the Omanis previously “signed all international maritime transport agreements” which bar taking fees.

What does international law say about tolls on shipping?

Critics of Iran’s plan to charge tolls say it violates international law guiding safe maritime passage, and should not be part of a final ceasefire agreement.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) says levies cannot be charged on ships sailing through international straits or territorial seas.

The law allows coastal states to collect fees for services rendered, such as navigation assistance or port use, but not for passage itself.

Neither the US nor Iran has ratified that particular convention, however.

Even if they had, there could be ways to get around this law anyway. Analyst Bhaskar told Al Jazeera that if Iran instead charged fees to de-mine the strait and make it safe for passage again, that could be allowable under maritime laws.

There is no precedent in recent history of countries officially taxing passage through international straits or waterways.

In October 2024, a United Nations Security Council report alleged that the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen were collecting “illegal fees” from shipping companies to allow vessels to pass through the Red Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, where it was targeting ships linked to Israel during the Gaza war.

Last week, a top adviser to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei suggested the Houthis could shut the Bab al-Mandeb shipping route again in light of the war on Iran.

How might countries react to a Hormuz toll?

Tolls for passage through the Strait of Hormuz would likely most affect oil and gas-producing countries in the Gulf, but ripple effects will spread to others as well, as the current supply shocks have shown.

Gulf countries, which issued statements calling for the reopening of the passage and praising the ceasefire on Wednesday, would also face a continuing degree of uncertainty, analysts say, as Iran could again disrupt flows in the future.

Before the ceasefire was announced, Bahrain had already proposed a resolution at the UN Security Council calling on member states to coordinate and jointly reopen the passage by “all necessary means”. It was backed by Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Jordan. On April 7, 11 of 15 UNSC members voted in favour of that resolution.

But Russia and China vetoed the resolution, saying it was biased against Iran and did not address the initial strikes on Iran by the US and Israel.

Beyond the region, observers say the US is unlikely to accept indefinite toll demands by Iran as part of the negotiations expected to begin on Friday.

A toll to pass through the Strait of Hormuz “is not going to go down well with President Trump and his expectations that the strait should be open for everyone”, Amin Saikal, a professor at the Australian National University, said.

Other major powers have also voiced opposition. Ahead of the ceasefire, Britain had begun discussions with 40 other countries to find a way to reopen the strait.

Practical realities in the strait might see a different scenario play out with ship owners losing millions each day their vessels remain stranded seeking to get them out quickly and undamaged experts say. They are more likely to comply with Iran, at least for now.

“If I were the owner of a VLCC [very large crude carrier] which weighs about 300,000 tonnes, whose value could be a quarter billion dollars…I would believe the Iranians if they said we have laid mines,” Bhaskar said.

A total 11 out of 15 members supported the resolution, which was already watered down to evade vetoes.

Russia and China have vetoed a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution aimed at protecting commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.

The draft text, on which a vote was held on Tuesday, was proposed by Bahrain. Eleven of the 15 members of the UNSC voted in favour, and two abstained. However, Russia and China said that the measure was biased against Iran.

Under the resolution, affected states would have been asked to “coordinate efforts, defensive in nature, commensurate to the circumstances, to contribute ‌‌to ‌‌ensuring the safety and security of navigation across the Strait of Hormuz”.

Shipping through the narrow waterway, through which a fifth of global oil and gas shipments previously passed, has effectively come to a standstill after Tehran threatened to attack vessels in response to the war launched against Iran by the United States and Israel on February 28.

The blockade has sent fuel prices soaring across much of the world and led some countries, particularly in Asia, to introduce restrictions on consumption and ration supplies.

A deadline set by US President Donald Trump for Iran to reopen the water passage or else face even worse bombardment is set to expire later on Tuesday, after he repeatedly issued – and delayed – similar threats.

The US ambassador to the United Nations, Mike Waltz, condemned the Russian and Chinese vetoes, saying they marked “a new low”, as Iran’s shutting of the strait was preventing medical aid and supplies from reaching humanitarian crises in the Congo, Sudan and Gaza.

“No one should tolerate that. They are holding the global economy at gunpoint. But today, Russia and China did tolerate it.”

France deplored the vetoes. “The aim was to encourage strictly, purely defensive measures to provide the security and safety for the strait without spiralling towards escalation,” its UN ambassador, Jerome Bonnafont, said.

Russia and ⁠⁠China said the resolution was biased against Iran.

China’s UN envoy Fu Cong said adopting such a draft when the US was threatening the survival of a civilisation would have sent the wrong message.

Russia’s ⁠⁠UN ambassador, Vasily Nebenzya, said Russia and China were proposing an alternative resolution on the ⁠⁠situation in the Middle East, including maritime security.

Iran’s UN ambassador, Amir Saeid Iravani, praised the Chinese and Russian moves, saying “Their action today prevented the Security Council from being misused to legitimise aggression.”

The wording of the resolution had been the subject of behind-the-scenes negotiations for days.

An earlier version of the document had explicitly referred to Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which grants the UNSC the authority to take measures ranging from sanctions to the use of military force.

But after China’s opposition, Bahrain had significantly weakened its draft, dropping any authorisation of the use of force.

An explicit reference to binding enforcement, included in an earlier draft, was also left out.

Kabul’s foreign minister expresses hope that minor interpretations will not hinder progress.

Afghanistan has said that peace talks with Pakistan being held in China have been “useful”.

The comment was issued by the foreign ministry in Kabul amid talks aimed at halting cross-border fighting between the two neighbours, which were launched last week following an invitation by China.

The peace process in the western Chinese city of Urumqi is an effort to stop the conflict that began in February, which has seen hundreds killed and perturbed Beijing, which is sensitive to the violence close to its western regions.

Pakistan, which declared it was in “open war” with its neighbour, has carried out air strikes inside Afghanistan, including in the capital, Kabul.

The United Nations’ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Afghanistan posted on X on Tuesday that the conflict had displaced 94,000 people overall, while 100,000 people in two Afghan districts near the border have been completely cut off by the fighting since February.

The conflict has alarmed the international community, particularly as the area is one where other armed groups, including al-Qaeda and the ISIL (ISIS) group, still have a presence.

Foreign Ministry Deputy Spokesman Zia Ahmad Takal said Afghanistan’s acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi met China’s ambassador to Afghanistan on Tuesday, and thanked Beijing for arranging and hosting the talks, while also crediting Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates for their mediation efforts.

“Noting that constructive discussions have taken place so far, FM Muttaqi expressed hope that minor interpretations would not hinder the progress of the negotiations,” Takal wrote.

Separately, Muttaqi said that “useful discussions have taken place”.

There have been few official statements regarding the discussions since they began on April 1 between mid-level delegations from the two sides.

Accusations

Even as the talks have been taking place, Afghanistan has accused Pakistan of carrying out shelling across its border on several occasions, killing and wounding civilians.

Pakistan has not commented. Islamabad often accuses Afghanistan of providing a safe haven to armed groups that carry out attacks, especially the Pakistan Taliban, known as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan or TTP.

The group is separate from but allied with the Afghan Taliban, which took over Afghanistan in 2021 following the chaotic withdrawal of US-led troops. Kabul denies the charge.

The recent fighting, the most severe between the two neighbours, began after Pakistan carried out air strikes aimed at such groups. Afghanistan then launched cross-border attacks in response.

The clashes disrupted a ceasefire brokered by Qatar in October, after earlier fighting had killed dozens of soldiers, civilians, and suspected fighters.

On March 17, a Pakistani air strike hit a drug-treatment centre in Kabul, which Afghan officials claimed killed more than 400 people.

Pakistan denied it had targeted civilians, saying its strikes were against military facilities.

Hip-hop star J. Cole is taking his basketball dreams overseas — again.

When ESPN reported Wednesday that the two-time Grammy winner has signed to play for the Nanjing Monkey Kings in the Chinese Basketball Assn., it might have sounded like an April Fool’s Day prank.

But it’s no joke. Cole’s longtime manager and business partner Ibrahim Hamad reposted the ESPN report on X and wrote that basketball “is still Life for my boy, even at 41.”

Videos and photos posted on social media, some of which were reposted by Hamad, show Cole at a Monkey Kings game wearing team gear and warming up with the other players. The “Work Out” rapper reportedly did not play in the game. One video shows Cole autographing an album for an excited fan.

Cole posted a video to the Chinese social media site Douyin saying he was in China and “excited” to be there.

Born Jermaine Lamarr Cole, the multiplatinum artist played basketball at Terry Sanford High in North Carolina and tried out for the hoops team at St. John’s as a walk-on while attending the university on an academic scholarship. Throughout his music career, Cole has incorporated basketball images and references into his lyrics, performances and cover art.

This will be Cole’s third stint as a professional basketball player. In 2021, the 6-foot-3 guard played three games for Rwanda’s Patriots Basketball Club of the Basketball Africa League, averaging 1.7 points and 1.7 rebounds in about 15 minutes a game.

The following year, he played five games for the Scarborough Shooting Stars of the Canadian Elite Basketball League, averaging 2.4 points and less than one rebound and assist in about 10 minutes a game.

On a recent episode of “Talk with Flee,” Cole spoke with fellow rapper Cam’ron about his lifelong “love and passion for basketball” even though he’s never been the best player on the court at any given time. He said playing professionally overseas has been “like me trying to scratch a last itch.”

“Like, yo, let me see if I could do this,” Cole said. “Could I train and be able to go play professional? Because these teams and these leagues are looking at it like, you know what, he not a—. He could come be on the court, and he could give our league some publicity.”

Cole mentioned the upcoming opportunity to play for Nanjing.

“I’m looking at the clock like, boy, I’m getting older. Like, this might be my last shot,” Cole, whose “The Fall-Off” album dropped Feb. 6 and tour starts July 10, said. “So I’m going to keep my word to them and show up and play in a couple games, although I know I’m not in the best of shape because of the album. But I’m going to go out there and have fun with it.”

After the China tie, Team Whyte, who are ranked in the world’s top five but are making their debut at this level, continue the round-robin against Norway (02:00). They conclude it with matches against the Swiss and Czech Republic on Thursday, with the tie with Switzerland available to watch on the BBC Sport website and app.

Whyte – along with Robin Brydone, Euan Kyle and Craig Waddell – are representing Scotland after world top-ranked rink Team Mouat elected not to compete after their silver medal at the Olympics in Cortina earlier this year.

The top six progress, with the top two going straight into the semi-finals and the other four teams competing to join them.

“We have two tough games [on Wednesday] in China and Norway,” said Whyte.

“Both teams seem to be playing quite well, so if we can try to come out firing and put in some good performances then that would be great to allow in the last stage to maybe get us two more wins and hopefully secure us the semi-final spot.

“However, there are a lot of teams around that area that could easily also get that semi-final spot, so there a lot of big games still to be played, but we are feeling positive.”

As Epic Fury grinds into a second month, the Air Force continues to rely heavily on its fleet of aerial refueling tankers, the majority of which are over 60 years old, to gas up aircraft attacking Iran and those still pouring into the Middle East. The strain on the force has been exacerbated by the loss of a KC-135 Stratotanker and damage to another after a collision over Iraq and several more tankers being destroyed and damaged on the ground by Iranian long-range weapons. Meanwhile, given this large commitment of aircraft and personnel, there are questions about how the U.S. tanker fleet can respond to a fight in the Pacific should one break out tonight. To get a better sense of that, we spoke to retired Air Force Col. Troy Pananon, who flew tankers and commanded a tanker wing.

In the second installment of our two-hour, wide-ranging exclusive interview – the first centering on Epic Fury’s strain on the force – Pananon offers insights into whether there are enough tankers and crews to sustain combat in two theaters more than 4,000 miles apart, the challenges of flying long distance over contested airspace and what, if any, countermeasures tankers should be given to survive.

Some of the questions and answers have been lightly edited for clarity. 

Q: Given the heavy use of aerial refueling for Epic Fury, how concerned are you about the ability to fuel a fight in the Pacific, if one should break out tonight or in the near term?

A: There is a high demand on the tanker community. We retired the KC-10s, so that is a void that can’t be filled as quickly as we would like. But the tanker force is robust, and even though we have a contingency of aircraft in the Middle East region and parts of Europe, we still have tankers that are all over the world, to include the Pacific. Kadena has its own wing of tankers there. And so the ability for our tanker fleet to pivot or to surge and scale to another region – there is not another military out there that can do it – but it puts that demand on the total force.

I think that we could do it, sure, but it would put a significant strain if we were trying to operate in two different parts of the globe, especially if it was involving major combat operations. And not to mention, there’s an element of protecting the homeland as well. Tankers are required to do that too. So you can’t just say, ‘Oh well, we’ll deplete the entire force and focus abroad.’ There’s an element required to support homeland operations as well.

Q: Does the need to do all those missions at once worry you?

A: At my level, when I was at the tactical level or the operational level, I always felt that we were adequately supported. There was certainly a stressor involved with trying to manage all that. But whenever there was a concern, you always would go up to your higher headquarters, and say, ‘Hey, here’s the current situation. We don’t need help now, or we do need help, and this is how you can help.’

It was their ability to resource those needs that really made my job easier and made the jobs of those who worked with me easier, knowing that they had support from above. But it’s not an unlimited resource. It’d be hard for me to say what would be required if we needed to pivot, or if we needed to support two operations in different parts of the world. But I would say that we were certainly capable of doing it. 

I just don’t know the duration of that, and unfortunately we always tend to think of these things in short-term snippets. But there are long-lasting impacts to things where high operations tempo means higher strain on the resources, higher strain on the aircraft.

Looking at the long view, if you have to increase your operational tempo on a particular platform versus what you had planned for that, it is going to put a strain on the acquisition process. It’s going to put a strain on the supply system. All these things, they do have an impact, not only in the short, but in the long-view as well.

Q: Considering how long it took to build up forces in the Middle East, how concerned are you about being able to fly long distances to protect Taiwan from attack by China? Can the current fleet sustain a major conflict with China, where fighters will need to fly thousands of miles on each sortie just to get to the effective fighting range?

A: I can’t completely comment on this for various reasons. There are certainly war plans in place. There have been studies that have taken place that are certainly higher classification levels, and we can’t discuss in this session or in public, right? It’s been looked at. I would say that there are plans in place that would prove that we could support operations in the Pacific region.

Is it complex? Yes. Does it require certain things to be successful? Yes, There are certain dominoes that need to fall into place in support of an operation like that. 

Q: But from a tanker pilot and wing commander perspective, what are the challenges of flying over these long distances through a very robust Chinese anti-aircraft, area denial environment?

A: I like to use the term, it’s a young man’s or woman’s game. It’s fatigue that is the enemy here, because when you have to operate at these distances and for the duration that is involved, it is certainly a physical stressor. Often, we’re operating in multiple time zones, and we’re not probably getting adequate rest, and that’s a cumulative effect, as you are asked to operate for these long durations. 

I’ve been on a cruise where we operated for 24 hours straight, and to do that over a sustained length of time – I don’t know that you can do it. In order to do that, it means you need more personnel. And so where an operation might be successful with – and I’ll just use easy numbers here – with 100 personnel that don’t have to range like you would in the Pacific or in Europe or even in the Middle East, depending on basing. Well, you’re probably going to need maybe twice as many to operate in the Pacific, because of the human element. You don’t want personnel to be fatigued to the point where they are not operating in a safe manner, and so you need to give them the appropriate rest. 

It goes all the way down the line, from air traffic control to ground personnel to maintenance to logistics. You need more personnel to support that effort at the distances and the range that you’re talking about. And the Pacific is a challenge, and it would require more personnel to just operate the aircraft, let alone the logistics tail required to support those aircraft. It is a significant challenge. And I’ve certainly endured operations where you bring in multiple energy drinks or keep the coffee brewing for long periods of time.

Q: What about the addition of robust Chinese air defenses into that equation? How much additional concern does that raise?

A: Tanker aircraft are not inherently survivable from enemy aircraft or missiles. There are upgrades or updates that could help in certain ways. The [AN/AAQ-24(V)N Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasure] LAIRCM is one of those technologies that would certainly help some of those aircraft. But, again, that means that we’ve got to stay out of harm’s way. Typically, we’ve got to set our tanker orbits up further away from the enemy’s reach and their engagement zone. 

It is a team effort, right. The role of our strike aircraft and joint partners to eliminate that threat is probably more important than our ability to add protection to these aircraft. I think they go hand in hand. It would be nice for tankers to have protective measures in place to make sure that they are survivable if we need them to operate in a contested environment, but in their current state, I would be definitely worried about pushing tankers closer to that engagement zone, because they don’t have the survivability or protections that maybe even aircraft like the F-22 or F-35 might have. 

We don’t have chaff or flares. We don’t have other measures that would protect our fleet, and so I think it’s the role of the warfighting commander to protect those assets and to ensure that they’re operating in a safe zone. And if they’re moved closer to that Weapon Engagement Zone, then they have the ability to retrograde or the connectivity and communication ability to ensure that those tankers can move back or retrograde away from the threat. There are some technology solutions out there, but I don’t know if that’s the sole solution. It is a comprehensive solution that is required to kind of go after that challenge.

Q: How difficult is to get, say, an F-35 into effective combat range and to fuel them up outside of the Chinese Weapons Engagement Zone?

A: It’s layers, right? In order for those aircraft to move into those high threat areas, it will probably require preparation of that environment. I think there are other elements of our military that would go to great lengths to create lanes or passageways to allow those aircraft to move closer to wherever they’re trying to get to their objective. 

The preparation of the environment that’s required probably is not the F-35 – the shorter range aircraft. There are other elements that would be used to prepare certain areas to allow our aircraft to move closer. There are other aircraft that would probably be capable of penetrating those air defenses and eliminating some of those threats.

Q: Which aircraft?

A: You have highly capable B-2A Spirit bombers and maybe in the future, B-21 Raider aircraft. There’s other non-manned platforms that I would assume could be used to help eliminate some of the threat, but not all of it.

The Chinese have a very, very robust air defense environment and system of systems in place. But I think that we as a military certainly have capabilities that could give us moments of opportunity. And I think once we find an opportunity, our trained airmen and joint force can leverage that. I don’t think that we want to go toe-to-toe right now. I don’t think we ever want to go toe-to-toe with an adversary like China. I hope that we don’t have to do that, but I know that our joint force is preparing for that if it ever happens.

Q: What about giving tankers self defenses? We have heard about everything from just better situational awareness to providing electronic warfare pods to having their own collaborative combat aircraft (CCAs) to putting mini-interceptors under their wings capable of taking down incoming threats. What is the best avenue for making the current tankers we have more survivable? 

A: Prevention is the best cure here. Not putting them in harm’s way would be the best way for them to survive. But I think it would be certainly comforting to know that they have onboard systems or bolt-on systems that would help them at least have a chance against some of these threats. There are certainly a lot of opportunities out there. I’ve heard of efforts where you would outfit certain aircraft with certain defensive measures. 

If you got into a situation and we needed to do it, I think the KC-46 Pegasus is a great platform to utilize for this, because it has so much advanced avionics architecture already on board. Trying to do it on the KC-135? That is because you’re trying to answer a scale problem. We don’t have enough KC-46s and we need more. And I know that they’re trying to procure more and and they’re coming, but they’re not to the scale that we have with the KC-135. And so the problem with trying to work with that is that now we’ve got an older airframe, and we’re trying to bolt on new technology that may or may not be compatible, and so we’re gonna have to upgrade other elements on board the aircraft, just to make sure that it can work.

We have an old aircraft. We have some things that have been updated, like the avionics have been updated. But is it the same technological advancement as what is going to be required to bolt on to protect that particular aircraft? Well, no, because it probably – from a data infrastructure set – is not going to operate at the same speed. It’s not going to operate in a similar fashion. There’s some latency that gets introduced if you’re trying to onboard new technology with older technology.

Q: What about adding electronic warfare pods, CCAs or mini interceptors?

A:  I think nothing is off the table. I think those are fantastic ideas, and I know that there are people that have probably experimented or modeled to and then probably proven that it’s a successful option. But you have to resource it. We have a lot of mouths to feed here – it’s not a limitless pot, and there’s the research and development and then product production of that. 

It doesn’t happen overnight and with every new technology that is offered to the warfighter, it is a challenge to make sure that all the personnel are trained and learn how to leverage these resources, not just individually, but collectively, as a team, as an organization, to really harness that and make sure that anything that’s introduced is successful.

You can’t just say, ‘Oh, well, look, I got this bright, shiny object. I’m just going to bolt it onto this aircraft, and everything is going to be working beautifully.’ No, there’s a whole host of problems that creates because you don’t have personnel that are all collectively trained, that have all operated with it, that have all that is integrated with it, that ensures that when you add this to that platform, that it is operating the way it was designed or intended to be operated. You can’t just snap your fingers and think that it’s gonna work right away.

Q: As a flight commander, would you like to have been able to have air-to-air interceptors under the wings of your tanker?

A: The one thing about airmen, and I would say Air Force in general, is that we tend to like new technologies. We’re not afraid of technology in general. We embrace it. The people that we attract into our service are people that embrace technology, that are innovative themselves. So, yeah, sure if I could roll back time, and that technology was introduced to me, I’d be first in awe. And two, I’d say, ‘Okay, well, how can we make this work? How can I integrate? How can I be able to leverage that and exceed expectations, and ensure that we meet the potential for that new technology?’ 

Q: There’s been a great deal of discussion about the importance of improving communications connectivity on the tanker fleet. We’ve already talked a little about it. Why is connectivity an issue? And what’s your advice to improve it?

A: Connectivity provides us situational awareness, and that situational awareness improves our ability to operate. It’s a team effort, and in order to do things collectively as a team, we have to be connected. And then the challenge is deciding, well, how should we connect? What sole-source platform should we be all collectively using because it does us no good to be connected as an Air Force, but not be able to talk to a Marine Corps or Navy, or Army or a coalition partner. 

And so the challenge is not only do we need to find the right technological solution, we have to ensure that it is able to integrate and communicate harmoniously with all our other partners, because it is not just an Air Force by itself, game. It is a joint force coalition game in terms of what we’re doing right now and what we’ll do in the future. 

I know that it’s a huge discussion about, okay, what platform do we use? How do we get it to our airmen right away? How do we make sure that it can integrate with the joint force? And then, ok, now we’ve got the solution. Where’s the money, right? There are so many elements to ensure that we can do this at scale and at speed. I trust that our leadership has been advocating with Congress and with other elements of the administration to get this in place. I don’t know how long it’ll take, but it certainly will help from a situational awareness perspective.

Q: Is there any particular system that you think would help improve situational awareness?

A: I think there are some age-old systems that have been in place. Link 16 architecture comes to mind. There are probably other modern solutions out there, but I don’t want to say that ‘this is the right system,’ because I’m not in the position to really argue for that. There are some systems out there that help, that are already in place, that would help us immensely, if we were to have that particular system across all platforms, right where the AOC [air operations center] can talk directly to the tanker element, who is also receiving data from other elements in the air, whether it be fighter aircraft, bomber aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft, and then, feeding that through our platform – maybe a KC-46 – back to the AOC, instantaneously. I know there are efforts out there to enhance that pipeline, but it’s not my place to say one system’s better than the other.

I just know that’s the panacea. That’s where you have to get to. You have to get to where the shooter is, all the way back to where the decisions are being made, and harness that data and then allow that data to help inform a decision, so that now you can give that decision over to the activity that’s operating. And so this constant cycle, and they use the term OODA loop, right? This constant cycle of observe, orient, decide, act – it’s got to happen faster than the enemy cycle for us to be successful. Connecting those points with technology can help us do that faster.

Q: You’re in the aircraft, you’ve got a receiver coming up. You don’t necessarily know where everything is. How does it help a pilot and the crew to have better connectivity?

A: Let me just put a hypothesis out there as an example. Say we have a receiver that was coming up, and they’ve got a really good understanding of where the threat rings are, what enemy positions are, where our friendly forces are, and that’s all in a data packet on board their aircraft. And if you don’t have a secure connection over the air, but you do have a secure connection once you’re connected with the boom, that data packet can then be uploaded to our aircraft and then displayed for our airmen to see, right? Because now, it’s like that whole moving map idea, like you may have a navigation system in your car that says, ‘hey, where’s the nearest gas station?’ and then it pops up and it tells you where the nearest gas stations are.

Same thing can be said if you’re operating a tanker aircraft, and now you get a data packet that gives you the full display of what the battlefield looks like in front of you. You now know, okay, here’s where I want to go, and here’s where I don’t want to go. So, if the technologies in place or are available now, it’s just a matter of connecting the dots. And this is a huge situational awareness improvement, if we can get to the point where the tanker crew on board has the ability to see exactly what is taking place, where the threats are, where the green zones are, where it’s safe to operate. And if they can do this in a secure manner that’s impenetrable by enemy forces, that is where we need to get to.

In our next installment, Pananon talks about drone incursions, the challenges of creating a new tanker fleet and whether single-pilot operations are a good idea.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

South Korea will remove the “China (Taiwan)” label from its e-arrival system, a foreign ministry official said Tuesday, after Taiwan changed South Korea’s name in its immigration system from “Korea” to “Korea (South)” in protest.

Seoul plans to remove the “last point of departure” and “next destination” fields from e-arrival cards, where the island nation had been listed as “China (Taiwan),” the official told reporters. It will remain listed as Taiwan in the country and region field.

“We have reviewed the matter and are moving forward with plans to remove the ‘last point of departure’ and ‘next destination’ fields from the electronic arrival card,” he said.

The official said the paper arrival cards already do not include those fields, and that the move is part of efforts to streamline the system, improve convenience for visitors from Taiwan, and align the paper and electronic arrival formats.

The Ministry of Justice is handling the matter in line with relevant procedures, the official said.

Seoul’s decision came after Taiwan called for a “correction” in its labeling as “China (Taiwan)” on e-arrivals, saying it has changed South Korea’s name in its immigration system from “Korea” to “Korea (South)” in a reciprocal measure.

Taipei had warned that it would take further corresponding steps if it sees no positive action from Seoul by the end of this month.

Taiwan’s foreign ministry said Tuesday that it has learned Seoul was under an “internal administrative and technical review” to update its e-arrival card system. It said Taiwan will temporarily suspend its own change to the e-entry registration.

Seoul noted that the decision was not made in response to Taiwan’s stated March 31 deadline for possible additional measures over the labeling, but was intended to address the issue in a way that promotes practical, unofficial cooperation with Taiwan.

Taiwan is also reportedly expected to take reciprocal steps to restore “Korea” in its foreign residents’ certificates.

Seoul’s decision to remove the two fields will be applied to all countries.

South Korea severed official diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 1992, when it established formal relations with mainland China. Since then, the two sides have maintained practical ties in an unofficial manner.

China considers Taiwan, self-governed since it broke away from the mainland in 1949, as part of its territory that must be reunified by force if necessary, and it has strongly objected to any country that challenges this stance.

“We maintain necessary communication with China on matters of mutual interest,” the Seoul official added.

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