China

A sweeping package of new Russian sanctions has cleared its first hurdle in the United States Congress, and, if passed, could trigger huge tariffs for countries such as India and China which continue to buy oil from Moscow.

The bill, which was advanced in the US Senate this week, has been named for the late Lindsey Graham, whose funeral was attended by world leaders including Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu earlier in the week.

Here’s what we know:

What happened in the Senate?

The “Lindsey O Graham Sanctioning Russia Act of 2026” was advanced overwhelmingly by the Senate this week in a vote of 86 to 12, meaning it can now proceed to the House of Representatives for further deliberation.

Named for the late Senator Graham, a staunch Ukraine supporter who died unexpectedly this month, the bill moved forward with the support of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who was in Washington to attend Graham’s funeral and watched the proceedings from the gallery.

“It was an honour to be present as the votes were counted – 86 senators supported the bill,” he wrote on X afterwards. “This is the first step towards implementing Lindsey [Graham]’s plans, and certainly a step towards peace. It is important that this tool works.”

After clearing the Senate, there will be a delay before the bill can move forward to the House, which is now in summer recess.

On Wednesday this week, US President Donald Trump ordered lawmakers to amend the bill to include tariffs covering Iran as well. This will likely delay the bill further if it deters Democrats from supporting it, analysts said.

David Smith, an associate professor at the University of Sydney’s US Studies Centre, told Al Jazeera: “One of the things they’re worried about is how the tariff power in relation to Iran is going to be expanded. They’re going to be ok with tariff powers on Russia but they’re worried about tariff power on countries buying Iranian oil, which means China. I think there are going to be a lot of Democrats that are going to say these powers should be limited to sanctions and not tariffs.”

Without the Iran addition, he said he would have expected the bill to pass once the House resumes given strong Democratic support for Ukraine.

“Democrats have been genuinely worried about the Trump administration abandoning Ukraine. Something like this, which is ramping the pressure up on Russia so much, I just think there will be a large critical mass of Democrats who will vote for this,” he said.

What’s in the bill?

The bill makes use of sanctions and tariffs to target Russia and cut off the economic pipeline that has kept the Ukraine war going.

Major provisions include new sanctions on Russian President Vladimir Putin as well as on more than 20 top officials and companies which work with the Russian defence industry. It also targets Russia’s “shadow fleet” of oil tankers and the network it uses to evade international sanctions on its energy exports.

The bill gives the president authority to impose sanctions by invoking the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). Under it, he would be able to apply tariffs of up to 100 percent on exports to the US from the top five purchasers of Russian energy, military equipment or countries facilitating Russian sanctions evasion.

Tariffs of up to 500 percent can also be applied to Russian imports directly into the US. The US imported $3.8bn in goods from Russia in 2025.

Which countries are likely to be targeted?

China, India and Türkiye are potential targets of the bill, as they are among the largest buyers of Russian energy, according to data compiled by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA).

China has historically responded to Trump’s tariffs with tariffs of its own on US exports. Even Pay, a director at the Beijing-based consultancy Trivium China, told Al Jazeera that the US may wait to impose tariffs as Trump is due to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping later this year.

Trump would still welcome the option, she said, after the Supreme Court struck down many of his tariffs in February.

“If passed and signed into law [which is still a big if at this point], the legislation would give Trump something he’s wanted for a while, namely, the legislature’s permission to impose high tariffs on China, alongside the small handful of other countries that import Russian oil,” Pay told Al Jazeera.

India is in a tricky position as its attempts to diversify away from Russian energy were disrupted by the shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz, according to Maia Nikoladze, a deputy director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council.

Due to the disruptions, it has also applied for and received US sanction waivers to continue buying Russian oil in the interim, Nikoladze wrote in a report this week, and it is expected to do the same in the future.

“India will face a trade-off between maintaining energy security and managing the risk of US tariffs, potentially prompting it to again seek waivers and exemptions,” Nikoladze said.

What do critics say about the bill?

Critics like Senator Maggie Hassan say the bill gives Trump too much power to impose tariffs while also potentially harming both the US taxpayer and allied countries.

Turkiye, for example, buys Russian energy but it is also a US ally and NATO member, while “major non-NATO ally” Brazil and “major security cooperation partner” Singapore both buy Russian oil products, according to CREA.

In a post on X, Hassan wrote that while she supports sanctioning Russia, she does “not think tariffs, which are paid for by American businesses and consumers, will help Ukraine win”.

The bill is also opposed by lobby groups such as the US Chamber of Commerce, which also says the true cost will be passed on to US businesses and consumers, as with past tariffs.

While many of Trump’s tariffs have already been struck down by the Supreme Court, the Russia tariffs could have more staying power because they would be imposed on a stronger legal basis, according to Smith.

That’s because it is new legislation which has been crafted using the powers of the IEEPA.

“Previously what Trump has done is to go back to old pieces of legislation and invoke from those his power to use tariffs in ways they haven’t been used before and in ways courts have subsequently found less lawful, whereas this looks like new legislation that is going to lawfully expand his tariff authority,” he told Al Jazeera.

AI Training Technique Sparks New Tech Rivalry

Model distillation, a widely used artificial intelligence training technique, has emerged as a new point of tension in the growing technology competition between the United States and China. While the method has long been accepted within AI research, concerns have intensified over whether proprietary AI capabilities can be replicated without the consent of their developers.

Leading U.S. AI companies and policymakers argue that some Chinese firms are using distillation to extract valuable capabilities from closed-source AI models, raising questions about intellectual property, technological leadership and AI security.

What Is Model Distillation?

Model distillation is a process that transfers selected capabilities from a large, powerful AI model—known as the “teacher”—to a smaller “student” model.

Instead of copying the original model’s architecture or internal parameters, the student learns by analyzing the teacher’s outputs, such as answers, computer code or generated text. The result is a lighter, more efficient model capable of performing many of the same tasks while requiring significantly fewer computing resources.

Why Is Distillation Important?

Training frontier AI models demands enormous investments in advanced chips, computing power and massive datasets.

Distillation makes AI more affordable by enabling smaller models to deliver strong performance on less expensive hardware. These compact systems can be deployed across smartphones, factories, vehicles, enterprise software and private networks, expanding AI adoption without the infrastructure costs associated with frontier models.

The technique has therefore become an important tool for both commercial AI development and national technology strategies.

Why Are Reasoning Traces Valuable?

Recent advances in AI have increased the importance of “reasoning traces”—the intermediate steps an AI model follows before producing a final answer.

Rather than simply learning correct outputs, smaller models can learn how complex problems are solved, improving their reasoning abilities.

Researchers compare this to studying detailed worked solutions instead of only reading the final answers to mathematical problems. As reasoning traces become more sophisticated, they are increasingly viewed as valuable intellectual property because they reveal how advanced AI systems approach difficult tasks.

Who Uses Model Distillation?

Distillation is widely used across the global AI industry and is not inherently controversial.

American researchers and technology companies have employed the technique in projects such as Stanford University’s Alpaca model and Microsoft’s Orca research. Chinese researchers have likewise used outputs from advanced AI systems to develop Chinese-language instruction models.

The key distinction lies between open-weight models, whose underlying parameters are publicly accessible, and closed-source models, such as OpenAI’s ChatGPT and Anthropic’s Claude, which are only accessible through proprietary platforms and APIs.

Why Has It Become a US-China Flashpoint?

The dispute centres not on distillation itself but on whether proprietary AI outputs are being systematically harvested without authorization.

U.S. AI companies argue there is a clear difference between legitimate academic research and large-scale extraction of outputs designed to replicate commercially valuable capabilities from closed-source systems.

Anthropic has accused several Chinese AI companies, including DeepSeek, Moonshot and MiniMax, of attempting to extract capabilities from its Claude models, particularly in software engineering and advanced reasoning. OpenAI has also reported detecting attempts by Chinese actors to use its systems for distillation-related purposes.

Chinese companies have not publicly accused U.S. firms of conducting similar activities involving closed-source models.

Why It Matters

The debate over model distillation reflects a broader shift in global AI competition from hardware and semiconductors to the protection of advanced algorithms and proprietary knowledge.

As AI becomes central to economic growth, military capabilities and technological leadership, governments and companies are increasingly treating model outputs, reasoning methods and training techniques as strategic assets. The controversy over distillation is therefore likely to play an increasingly important role in shaping future AI regulation, international competition and the evolving U.S.-China technology rivalry.

Analysis: AI Distillation Signals the Next Phase of the US China Technology War

The controversy surrounding model distillation marks a turning point in the global artificial intelligence race. The competition between the United States and China is no longer driven solely by access to advanced semiconductors or computing power. Instead, it is increasingly centered on protecting the knowledge embedded within frontier AI models. As reasoning capabilities become the most valuable component of modern AI, companies and governments are beginning to treat model outputs as strategic assets rather than simply products or services.

For years, Washington’s strategy focused on restricting China’s access to advanced chips and manufacturing equipment, hoping to slow Beijing’s AI progress by limiting computational resources. Model distillation challenges that strategy because it enables developers to build highly capable systems without replicating the enormous costs of training frontier models from scratch. If smaller models can absorb sophisticated reasoning from larger ones, technological leadership becomes harder to preserve through hardware controls alone.

This development is also forcing a rethinking of AI intellectual property. Unlike traditional software, where source code defines ownership, modern AI derives much of its value from learned behavior and reasoning patterns. The legal and ethical boundaries surrounding whether outputs generated by proprietary models can be used to train competing systems remain largely undefined. As governments struggle to regulate these practices, AI firms are likely to tighten access to their models, limit reasoning transparency and strengthen technical safeguards against unauthorized capability extraction.

The geopolitical implications are equally significant. AI has become a core element of economic competitiveness, military modernization and national security. Any method that accelerates another country’s ability to close the technological gap will inevitably attract government attention. The United States increasingly views the protection of advanced AI capabilities as part of its broader strategy to maintain technological leadership, while China sees affordable AI development as essential to reducing dependence on foreign technology and overcoming export restrictions.

Ultimately, the debate over model distillation illustrates that the next phase of the AI race will not be determined solely by who builds the most powerful model, but by who can best control, protect and commercialize advanced intelligence. As AI becomes a strategic national asset, disputes over knowledge transfer, model security and intellectual property are likely to become as consequential as the earlier battles over semiconductor supply chains.

With information from Reuters.

New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters is facing backlash after telling a Chinese-born MP to ‘go back to your own country’ during a parliamentary debate. The remarks drew criticism at home, while China urged New Zealand politicians not to invoke Beijing in domestic disputes.

China’s top leaders pledged on Thursday to support the country’s slowing economy by accelerating spending on already-approved infrastructure projects instead of rolling out large-scale stimulus measures. The decision came after recent economic data showed second-quarter growth slowed to 4.3%, the weakest pace in more than three years and below the government’s annual target range of 4.5% to 5.0%.

The commitment followed a meeting of the Communist Party’s Politburo, where policymakers acknowledged mounting economic challenges but signaled confidence that existing fiscal resources would be sufficient to stabilize growth through the remainder of the year.

Infrastructure Spending Takes Center Stage

Rather than introducing fresh stimulus packages, Beijing plans to speed up implementation of projects that have already been budgeted. Analysts said the government still has significant fiscal room because infrastructure spending and bond issuance progressed more slowly than planned during the first half of the year.

Economists expect much of the spending to focus on China’s “six networks” initiative, covering investments in water systems, logistics infrastructure, underground pipelines, electricity grids, telecommunications and computing power centers. State media has previously indicated that roughly $1 trillion has been allocated for these projects.

Analysts viewed the Politburo’s statement as confirmation that Beijing intends to support growth without significantly expanding its fiscal deficit.

Concerns Over Overcapacity Remain

Chinese leaders continue to avoid aggressive stimulus partly because they remain focused on tackling industrial overcapacity and encouraging local governments to maintain fiscal discipline.

The Politburo reiterated its commitment to addressing what it described as “involution competition”—a term referring to intense price wars among manufacturers competing for market share at the expense of profitability. While many economists argue that excess industrial capacity is driving these price wars, Beijing continues to reject claims that overcapacity is a structural problem.

Weak Consumer Demand Continues to Weigh on Growth

Although manufacturing exports and advances in artificial intelligence have supported parts of the economy, domestic consumption remains weak.

China’s prolonged property downturn, sluggish wage growth and a challenging labor market have reduced household confidence. Millions of workers have shifted into lower-paying gig economy jobs with limited social protections, encouraging higher savings rather than consumer spending.

This imbalance has increased China’s reliance on exports to sustain growth, raising concerns among trading partners that Chinese manufacturers are flooding global markets while domestic demand remains subdued.

Employment Support Remains a Priority

The Politburo pledged to strengthen domestic demand by expanding employment support, particularly for flexible workers and those in newer forms of employment. However, officials did not announce specific policies aimed at boosting household incomes.

Economists noted that while Beijing continues to emphasize consumption, its strategy remains focused on improving the supply of goods and services rather than directly increasing consumer purchasing power through large-scale income support or cash stimulus.

Outlook

The latest policy signals suggest Beijing is seeking to balance economic stability with long-term structural reforms. Rather than relying on broad stimulus, China’s leadership is betting that faster implementation of existing infrastructure investments and targeted employment measures will be enough to keep the economy on track while avoiding a surge in debt and further industrial overcapacity.

With information from Reuters.

Published on
30/07/2026 – 12:57 GMT+2

The European Commission is considering opening an investigation into imports of certain construction materials from several Balkan countries over suspicions that they were made using low-cost Chinese glass fibre already subject to EU anti-dumping duties, according to people familiar with the matter.

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The probe will focus on so-called open mesh fabrics, including thermal insulation systems.

The case comes as the European Commission continues to step up pressure on low-cost Chinese imports, which are contributing to the EU’s record-high €1 billion-a-day trade deficit with China. The commission launched negotiations with Beijing in June in a bid to rebalance trade ties, with hopes of securing tangible results by October.

EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič expected to travel to China in October.

At the same time, the Commission has warned that it would deploy its trade defence instruments before the deadline to counter low-cost Chinese imports, arguing that China uses unfair practices to gain access to the EU market – including strategies to circumvent EU tariffs.

Open mesh fabrics are often manufactured with Chinese glass fibre, which the Commission has accused Chinese producers of selling at unfairly low prices on the EU market, causing injury to European manufacturers. The EU has targeted glass fibre with additional duties several times in recent years, including imports from Egypt that are produced by Chinese companies.

But Chinese producers are suspected of circumventing those anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties by relying on local manufacturers in several Balkan countries to assemble open mesh fabrics using low-cost Chinese glass fibre.

The overcapacity problem

The EU produces around 1 million tonnes of melted glass annually from installations operating in eight countries, among them Germany, France and Italy.

But according to Glass Fibre Europe, which represents the glass fibre industry in Brussels, Chinese glass fibre overcapacity exceeds 100 percent of total EU market demand, raising the risk of further harm to European producers unless the EU strengthens its trade defence measures.

Over the past year, the number of cases involving alleged Chinese unfair trade practices across several industrial sectors has increased, and the Commission has been criticised for the length of its investigations.

At a summit in mid-June, EU leaders gave the Commission a mandate to review and update its trade defence instruments.

But the EU’s current trade regulation toolbox remains limited, with Commission only able to address unfair trade practices on a product-by-product basis. Additional safeguard measures – including tariffs and quotas – are also under consideration, Euronews has learned, to protect the European chemicals sector from intense Chinese competition.

The Commission was contacted for comment but did not reply.

On July 10, almost exactly a year after the Pentagon announced it was becoming the largest shareholder in MP Materials, the International Energy Agency put a number on what that deal was designed to prevent: $6.5 trillion in global downstream production now sits exposed to China’s rare-earth export curbs — restrictions currently suspended under an October 2025 truce that lapses again around October 2026. In the year between those two dates, Washington did not simply subsidize its way out of dependency on Chinese processing. It bought in: $400 million for 15 percent of MP Materials, a decade-long price floor for neodymium-praseodymium set nearly double the market rate, and a ten-year promise to buy everything a new Texas magnet plant produces. The Pentagon is now, functionally, a mining shareholder. The interesting question is not whether that has worked — MP’s private financing round attracted $1 billion from J.P. Morgan and Goldman Sachs within weeks — but what it costs to win a state-capitalist contest by becoming a state capitalist.

The stakes are structural, not cyclical. China controls roughly 70 percent of the world’s rare-earth and critical-mineral refining capacity, a chokepoint built over three decades while Western producers treated minerals as ordinary commodities rather than strategic assets. Beijing’s October 2025 tariff-war truce with Washington postponed, rather than cancelled, an expanded licensing regime that already cut U.S. yttrium imports from 333 tonnes to 17 tonnes in eight months — a squeeze aerospace manufacturers say could force production pauses. Washington’s answer has three parts: Project Vault, a $12 billion public-private stockpile signed by executive order on February 2, 2026, covering all 60 minerals on the USGS critical list; a fast-growing portfolio of direct government equity stakes in miners and processors; and a parallel push to sign allied-supply agreements with eight partners, including Australia, Japan, the UK and the UAE. Europe, meanwhile, is running a different playbook: a €3 billion RESourceEU plan, a joint-purchasing platform, and a stockpiling pilot — procurement and coordination, not ownership.

The MP Materials deal is the template, and its mechanics matter more than its headline. The Department of Defense’s July 2025 investment made it MP’s largest shareholder, attached a $150 million loan for expanding the Mountain Pass mine, and guaranteed a $110-per-kilogram floor price for NdPr oxide — a level industry analysts put at nearly double the prevailing market price — alongside a ten-year offtake covering the full output of a planned magnet facility in Fort Worth. Private capital followed the government’s signal almost immediately, which is precisely the point: Washington concluded that a guarantee was worth more to investors than a grant. That logic has since scaled. The administration has taken a $670 million stake in magnet producer Vulcan Elements, a 10 percent, $35.6 million position in Trilogy Metals, converted a renegotiated Energy Department loan into equity in Lithium Americas, and expanded the official critical-minerals list to include copper and metallurgical coal. Total direct equity commitments now exceed $1 billion, on top of Project Vault’s $12 billion stockpile.

The backlash has been immediate and specific, and it is worth taking seriously rather than waving off as sour grapes. Rival producers argue the price floor lets MP “undercut commercial bids, using federal subsidies to shield its margins,” while former White House and Pentagon officials warn the arrangement could “distort global NdPr pricing, crowd out innovation, and deter private investment in alternative supply chains” — in effect, recreating the very state-directed monopoly the policy exists to counter. That is the strongest objection, and it does not fully land: a government willing to take equity risk, rather than hand out grants, at least has an incentive to see the investment succeed and can in principle profit from the upside, which is the argument the Treasury and National Energy Dominance Council make for why this is smarter policy than Cold War-style stockpiling alone. But the objection identifies a real cost even if it doesn’t defeat the policy: an above-market, government-guaranteed price for one company makes every unsubsidized competitor in the same commodity harder to finance, which narrows rather than widens the eventual supplier base — the opposite of the diversification the strategy claims to deliver.

There is a second problem the price-floor logic obscures: capital committed is not the same as metal produced. The Center for Strategic and International Studies frames this as the difference between “distance” — how much progress has been announced — and “displacement” — how far supply chains have actually moved from their starting point. Japan’s experience with Lynas Rare Earths is the sobering comparison: fifteen years and $250 million of patient, low-drama investment before Lynas achieved the first commercial dysprosium production outside China, in 2025. Washington’s approach substitutes speed and scale for that patience, which may be the correct trade given the urgency, but it means the MP deal’s real test has not yet arrived — it arrives when the Fort Worth facility is supposed to reach full commercial output, not when Wall Street decides to match the Pentagon’s bet.

None of this is happening in a China-versus-America vacuum, either. The Democratic Republic of Congo has extended its cobalt export suspension specifically to tighten leverage over Chinese refiners, and Indonesia has repeatedly resisted pressure to loosen nickel export quotas, forcing processing onshore on its own terms. Producer states, not only the two superpowers, are now treating minerals as instruments of strategic leverage rather than commodities to be sold at whatever price clears the market. That reframes the whole contest: this is not simply Washington racing to catch Beijing, but a broader shift in which every government that sits on a mineral deposit is deciding whether to sell it or wield it.

Which is where Europe’s exposure becomes concrete. RESourceEU gives Brussels coordination and buying power, but no board seats and no offtake priority — and Chatham House’s own assessment is blunt that the UK and EU “cannot match the scale of what the US is attempting” and risk being “left behind” without equity of their own. That matters because Washington’s price floors do not stay domestic: a guaranteed $110/kg for MP’s output resets the benchmark every other buyer, including European manufacturers, has to price against, while offtake agreements tied to U.S. defense production can put European buyers behind the queue when supply tightens. The diversification Europe wants — away from dependence on Beijing — is real, but the replacement supply chain now runs increasingly through companies Washington part-owns and whose output is pre-committed to American industry first. Substituting one chokepoint for another is not the same as building a market.

What Happens Next

Base case (our estimate: roughly 55 percent probability). Washington’s equity-and-price-floor model extends to more minerals — copper and metallurgical coal are already on the list — and more companies, Project Vault’s stockpile builds through 2026–27, and the October 2025 China truce holds past its lapse date. Europe continues a purchasing-only strategy, remaining a price-taker on a benchmark increasingly set in Washington rather than Shanghai. This depends on Congress and private markets continuing to treat government equity as a credible signal rather than a fiscal liability, and on China preferring managed leverage over an open rupture.

Downside case. China allows the truce to lapse on schedule around October 2026 and resumes full licensing enforcement — already quietly restarting, according to recent customs-audit reports — before Vault-funded and MP-style projects reach meaningful output. Aerospace and defense manufacturers, already forced to ration yttrium and dysprosium at a fraction of pre-2025 volumes, face renewed production pauses in the exact window (2026–2028) when domestic capacity is still years from scale, exposing the gap between announced investment and actual tonnage.

Upside case. Government stakes prove to be a bridge rather than a permanent structure: MP, Vulcan Elements and Lithium Americas hit production targets on schedule, price floors become unnecessary as Japan’s Lynas eventually showed is possible after fifteen years of patient investment, and the eight-nation allied-supply framework matures into a genuinely plural, competitively priced market that Europe can buy into on equal terms rather than through Washington’s balance sheet.

The Pentagon’s bet on MP Materials shows that the fastest way to out-compete a state-directed rival was to become one — and by the only metric available so far, capital raised, that gamble is working. But capital raised is not resilience, and every mineral now being withheld or weaponized elsewhere, from Congolese cobalt to Indonesian nickel, shows the world’s supply chains are being redrawn along political lines everywhere, not simply rerouted away from Beijing.

Watch whether China lets its rare-earth export truce lapse on schedule around October 2026, and whether MP Materials’ Fort Worth magnet plant is producing at commercial scale when it does. If the truce holds and the plant delivers, Washington’s ownership model will keep expanding. If either fails, the U.S. will have discovered it bought a shareholding in a company, not a supply chain immune to the country it was built to out-manoeuvre.

Evidence has emerged indicating that China’s YJ-20 hypersonic anti-ship missile is now also being fielded aboard the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) Type 052D class destroyers. These warships are far more numerous than the Type 055 ‘super destroyers,’ from which the missile was previously seen being fired, as we reported at the time. The new development suggests that the PLAN intends to distribute the weapon across a much broader portion of its surface fleet rather than reserving it exclusively for its largest combatants.

A new video apparently originating from the PLAN shows the launch of a YJ-20 from the cold-launch vertical launch system (VLS) on the foredeck of an unidentified Type 052D destroyer, known in the West as the Luyang III class. After being ejected from the launcher, the missile’s solid rocket motor ignites before it accelerates rapidly away. No target engagement is shown.

Typically, the Type 052D’s VLS would be loaded with variants of the HHQ-9 surface-to-air missile, YJ-18 subsonic anti-ship cruise missile, CJ-10 land-attack cruise missile, and CY-5 anti-submarine missile.

The 7,500-ton Type 052D has 64 VLS cells, 32 forward and 32 aft. It’s unclear whether each of these is able to accommodate the big YJ-20 missile.

This compares to the Type 055’s 112-cell VLS system, which makes it the PLAN’s premier surface strike platform. However, only 10 of these ships are currently in operational service, with additional vessels still under construction. By contrast, approximately 35 Type 052D destroyers have entered PLAN service, with production continuing.

Putting the YJ-20 on the Type 052Ds would significantly expand the number of Chinese warships capable of launching hypersonic anti-ship strikes, further strengthening Beijing’s growing anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) posture across the western Pacific. On the other hand, it remains possible — although less likely — that the launch depicted is some kind of trial or experimental effort that might not lead to large-scale fielding on these hulls.

The new video follows the release of official Chinese military footage showing what the PLAN described as a “finalization test” of the YJ-20 launched from the Type 055 destroyer Wuxi, late last year. That video appeared to confirm the missile’s integration with China’s largest surface combatant, a warship design that you can read more about here.

That test from the Wuxi provided the first official acknowledgement of the ship-launched YJ-20. The missile itself had previously been unveiled publicly during China’s military parade commemorating the 80th anniversary of victory over Japan in World War II, although speculation surrounding the weapon stretches back several years before that.

A missile first observed during what appeared to be a Type 055 launch in 2022 was widely referred to as the YJ-21. Subsequent official Chinese designations now strongly suggest that weapon was actually the YJ-20, or an earlier developmental version of it.

The YJ-20 is understood to be a hypersonic anti-ship weapon employing either an aero-ballistic flight profile or potentially a boost-glide vehicle: different Chinese sources have described both concepts at various times. In either case, the missile is optimized for extremely high terminal speed combined with unpredictable maneuvering designed to defeat modern naval air defenses.

Unlike a traditional ballistic missile that follows a predictable parabolic arc, an aero-ballistic missile can execute quasi-ballistic maneuvers — including skip-glide or ‘porpoising’ trajectories — as it descends toward its target. These abrupt changes in altitude and direction make interception significantly more challenging.

Chinese state media have also described the missile as employing a conical boost-glide vehicle, which would use a rocket booster to accelerate to high altitude before gliding toward its target while conducting sustained maneuvering throughout the terminal phase.

Although many details remain murky, it is generally considered that the missile achieves speeds well above Mach 6 during cruise and may approach Mach 9 during its terminal attack. Estimated range is generally assessed at more than 620 miles.

Guidance is believed to combine satellite navigation and mid-course updates before transitioning to an active radar and/or infrared seeker during the final approach.

Weapons with these characteristics are particularly well suited to engaging high-value naval targets including aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, cruisers, and other major surface combatants. The missile likely also possesses a secondary land-attack capability against fixed targets.

With their combination of extreme speed and maneuverability, hypersonic weapons can dramatically compress an opponent’s decision-making timeline while reducing opportunities for interception, making them especially valuable against time-sensitive targets. They also require very high-end interceptors, if they can be intercepted at all.

The apparent expansion of the missile to the Type 052D is arguably an even more significant milestone than the Type 055 test itself.

For China, fielding the YJ-20 aboard both the Type 055 and the much more numerous Type 052D dramatically increases the number of PLAN hulls capable of conducting long-range hypersonic anti-ship attacks. Such a move represents another step in expanding the reach of its layered A2/AD strategy. Rather than concentrating hypersonic capability in a small number of flagship destroyers, the PLAN appears to be distributing it across a much larger force capable of operating throughout the First Island Chain and increasingly beyond it.

Clearly, a larger force of PLAN destroyers armed with hypersonic anti-ship missiles would complicate U.S. and allied naval operations across the western Pacific by increasing the number of launch platforms capable of threatening high-value warships from long stand-off ranges.

At the same time, it is unclear if the YJ-20 has formally entered full operational service. However, official test footage, public appearances during military parades, and, above all, launches from two separate destroyer classes all point toward the missile transitioning from a developmental program to a broader capability.

The development underscores two major issues for the U.S. military as it gears up to face the prospect of a potential conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific. On the one hand, the PLAN is growing at an alarming rate, and Chinese shipyards are churning out increasingly capable warship designs, not to mention submarines and other naval weapons.

The latest annual Pentagon report to Congress on China’s military, released at the end of 2025, stated that “China has the world’s leading hypersonic missile arsenal and continued to advance the development of conventional and nuclear-armed hypersonic missile technologies during the past year.”

With that in mind, the case study of the YJ-20 further underscores the fact that China is investing heavily in the development of hypersonic missiles and is now apparently scaling that capability across a larger proportion of its surface fleet, something that will have a significant effect on the regional naval balance.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

July 28 (Asia Today) — China’s successful stock market debut of its largest DRAM manufacturer has fueled expectations that the company could challenge the three global leaders in memory chips, though Chinese media acknowledged that a significant technological gap remains.

ChangXin Memory Technologies, commonly known as CXMT, became the most valuable company in China’s domestic A-share market after its shares surged 465.82% during their first day of trading on Shanghai’s technology-focused STAR Market on Monday.

The shares closed at 49 yuan ($7.24), compared with an initial public offering price of 8.66 yuan ($1.28).

The closing price gave CXMT a market capitalization of about 3.28 trillion yuan ($484.5 billion), surpassing the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, previously the country’s most valuable domestically listed company.

The shares lost some momentum Tuesday, closing at 47 yuan ($6.94). CXMT’s market value declined to about 3.14 trillion yuan ($463.8 billion), but it remained the largest company in the A-share market.

The listing followed Asia’s largest initial public offering of 2026. CXMT raised about $8.6 billion, nearly twice the amount initially sought, reflecting strong investor demand for Chinese semiconductor companies.

State media celebrates semiconductor advance

Chinese state-affiliated media described the listing as a milestone in Beijing’s drive for technological self-sufficiency.

The Global Times said the market response demonstrated growing investor confidence in China’s semiconductor industry as the country accelerates efforts to reduce its dependence on foreign technology.

The Chinese-language Global Times described memory chips as the “rice of the digital age” and said CXMT had broken the longstanding foreign dominance of large-scale DRAM production.

It said the company had built its design and manufacturing capabilities from virtually nothing over approximately a decade.

CXMT was founded in 2016 and produces DRAM chips used in smartphones, personal computers, tablets and servers. It is widely regarded as the world’s fourth-largest DRAM manufacturer after Samsung Electronics, SK hynix and Micron Technology.

China’s state media said the funds raised through the listing would be used to upgrade memory wafer production lines, expand DRAM research and development and pursue next-generation memory technologies.

Chinese analysts expressed hope that the investment could eventually weaken the dominance of Samsung Electronics, SK hynix and Micron in the global DRAM market.

CXMT’s progress has already heightened investor concern over increasing Chinese competition. Its market debut contributed to declines in several global semiconductor stocks, including shares of South Korean memory manufacturers.

Technology gap remains

Despite the celebratory tone, Chinese media cautioned that CXMT continues to trail South Korean and U.S. memory manufacturers in advanced production processes.

The company is estimated to remain two to three years behind leading foreign manufacturers in some advanced technologies and faces restrictions on access to sophisticated overseas chipmaking equipment.

CXMT’s roughly 8% share of the global DRAM market also remains well below the combined position of Samsung Electronics, SK hynix and Micron.

The memory chip industry is highly cyclical, meaning the current surge in prices and demand associated with artificial intelligence may not continue indefinitely.

Rapid capacity expansion by CXMT and other manufacturers could also increase supplies and place downward pressure on global memory prices.

Chinese state media urged investors and the semiconductor industry not to allow the listing’s success to create excessive confidence.

The debut nevertheless represents a major symbolic and financial achievement for Beijing’s semiconductor strategy. CXMT now has access to substantial capital that could accelerate research, manufacturing expansion and efforts to compete in higher-end memory products.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260728010010446

Taipei, Taiwan – China’s coastguard and civilian fleet are expanding their presence in the waters east of Taiwan, raising fears that Beijing may be rehearsing a containment strategy that would cut off the self-ruled island from outside trade and assistance.

Through June and July, China’s Maritime Safety Administration and coastguard staged multiple patrols and “special maritime law enforcement operations”, according to official government announcements.

While China regularly patrols the Taiwan Strait – the waterway with an average width of about 180km (112 miles) separating coastal China from the main island of Taiwan – this marks the first time the patrols have moved east of Taiwan in such quick succession, according to analysts.

K Tristan Tang, a nonresident fellow at the United States-based National Bureau of Asian Research, said the shift carries both strategic and symbolic weight for Taiwan.

“Beijing is signalling that it wants to extend its claimed administrative jurisdiction to Taiwan’s eastern waters, effectively surrounding Taiwan rather than only eroding Taiwan’s space in the strait,” Tang told Al Jazeera.

“Law enforcement operations” have included patrolling the area and requesting information from commercial vessels about their origin and destination, according to Taipei.

The shift east has also occurred amid a greater uptick in Chinese maritime activity around Taiwan and its outlying islands. Taiwan reported 55 sightings of Chinese coastguard and research vessel activity in June, up from 30 sightings in May.

These sightings included Chinese activity near the uninhabited Taiwan-controlled Dongsha Islands, also known as the Pratas Islands, in the South China Sea.

Beijing has said the operations are a response to talks between Japan and the Philippines to set their maritime boundaries, which infringe on “territorial sovereignty as well as its maritime rights and interests”, according to Chinese state media.

Some of the waters around southern Japan and the northern Philippines overlap with Taiwan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which extends 200 nautical miles (370km) from its coastline.

On July 4, China’s coastguard announced that law enforcement activities to the east of Taiwan would continue to “firmly safeguard China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests”.

China claims Taiwan as a province – which means it also views Taiwan’s EEZ as under its jurisdiction. It also claims large swaths of the nearby South China Sea and East China Sea, some of which are disputed by Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei.

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has previously told reporters that its activities near Taiwan are “legitimate actions to exercise China’s jurisdiction, safeguard regional stability and uphold order at sea in accordance with the law”.

The Chinese embassy in Washington, DC did not immediately respond to Al Jazeera’s request for comment.

‘Grey zone’ tactics

Ray Powell, founder and director of Sea Light, a maritime transparency project based at Stanford University, said he views the uptick in patrols as part of China’s “boa constrictor strategy that intends to squeeze Taiwan one coil at a time”.

China has pledged to annex Taiwan by peace or by force, and it employs a variety of pressure tactics, from cutting off access to international spaces such as the World Health Organization, drone and fighter jet incursions, to alleged cyberattacks, according to Taiwan’s National Security Bureau.

Known as “grey zone” tactics, these manoeuvres are designed to strain Taiwan’s limited resources and damage morale in order to convince its 23 million people that annexation is inevitable, according to Taiwanese officials.

Security analysts like Powell have warned that “law enforcement” activities could quickly escalate into a blockade or quarantine. Taiwan is particularly vulnerable to this type of pressure as an island that imports nearly all its energy supplies.

“One day we could look back at this and say this was in some ways the start of the quarantine,” he told Al Jazeera.

“Today it’s radio challenges; what is the next stage after that? When do we start to see them stop and inspect ships or reroute them? It’s not a very big step to start squeezing Taiwan on things it needs, like LNG,” Powell said.

China has already signalled that a blockade could be on the table in the future. Since 2022, Beijing has regularly staged large-scale military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, including a simulated blockade of the island during its last round of exercises in December.

While coastguard activity is more low-profile than a naval patrol, Chauluen Lin, an expert in asymmetric warfare at Taipei’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research, told Al Jazeera the fleet could be considered a “second navy”.

China’s coastguard is not a civilian police force, as it falls under the jurisdiction of the Central Military Commission as a division of the People’s Armed Police.

China’s coastguard patrols have been unusual enough to elicit a rare joint response from the United Kingdom, Germany and France, who said in late June that the “actions threaten regional stability and the freedom of navigation and safety of international shipping”.

“We reiterate our opposition to any unilateral change to the status quo, particularly by threat or use of force or coercion,” the statement said.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said last week that Washington disagrees with the expanded patrols and that they undermine regional stability.

A distracted US

William Yang, the Crisis Group’s senior analyst for Northeast Asia, told Al Jazeera that Beijing may be taking advantage of a US distracted by the war in Iran and a president who appears ambivalent towards Taiwan.

Although the US does not recognise Taiwan as a country, it has pledged to help the island defend itself. Much of this assistance has come in the form of weapons sales, training and intelligence sharing.

US President Donald Trump also cast doubt on these commitments when he said US weapons sales could be a “negotiating chip” with China following a meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in May.

“The external environment has fundamentally changed in the Indo-Pacific region, at least from their perspective, with Washington very focused and tangled up in the Middle East,” Yang said.

“At the same time, the US has no bandwidth to really look at or respond to such an expansion of Chinese maritime operations in these sensitive waters,” he added.

July 27 (UPI) — Brazil and China agreed Monday to speed up negotiations on a trade agreement between Mercosur and China as both countries seek to strengthen economic ties after new U.S. tariffs hit Brazilian exports.

Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke by telephone for more than an hour just days after the United States confirmed a 25% tariff on Brazilian exports.

Lula said on X that the two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to expanding cooperation in strategic and high-technology sectors, including artificial intelligence, satellites, critical minerals processing and fertilizer trade.

In the post, Lula highlighted the “positive results” of bilateral trade and the recent short-term visa waiver, saying the measures “will increase tourist flows and business opportunities.”

He also emphasized the need to expand cooperation in other sectors and advance negotiations on a trade agreement between Mercosur, the South American trade bloc, and China.

“I stressed that our government remains committed to diversifying markets,” Lula wrote.

The two leaders also discussed global conflicts and their impact on people’s lives, as well as global food and energy security, identifying them as key international challenges.

“While discussing the crisis in the Middle East, we agreed that restrictions on freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait have harmful effects on the global economy,” Lula said.

According to China’s state-run Xinhua News Agency, Xi rejected what he described as external interference in Brazil’s electoral process and expressed China’s willingness to support Lula’s government.

Xi said that under new global circumstances and challenges, China and Brazil, as leading members of the Global South, should uphold historical justice and the progress of civilization while playing a greater role in reforming and improving the global governance system and defending international fairness and justice.

According to Xi, China “highly values Brazil’s international standing and significant influence, supports the country in safeguarding its sovereignty and independence, opposes foreign interference and will contribute to maintaining regional and global peace and stability.”

Lula also said both leaders criticized the inability of the United Nations Security Council to respond effectively to current international crises and reaffirmed Brazil’s and China’s commitment to multilateralism. They agreed to maintain close coordination on international issues through forums, including the United Nations and the BRICS group.

The conversation comes as Lula has intensified his efforts to diversify Brazil’s trade relationships. In an article published Sunday in The Washington Post, he described the new U.S. tariffs on Brazilian goods as a “strategic mistake” and said Brazil would pursue alternative markets to expand investment and economic partnerships.

Published on
27/07/2026 – 9:03 GMT+2

CXMT’s shares surged 472% in their market debut and were trading up 462% by early afternoon in Asia, making it the most valuable company listed on a mainland Chinese exchange, with a market capitalisation of about 3.3 trillion yuan (approximately €415 billion). Even so, its market capitalisation remains below that of South Korean and US memory chipmakers Samsung Electronics, SK Hynix and Micron Technology.

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CXMT is among a growing number of chipmakers that have benefited enormously from the artificial intelligence boom. The company has also prospered as China pushes for greater self-sufficiency in advanced technologies while grappling with restricted access to cutting-edge chipmaking equipment under US-led export controls.

The company raised at least $8.6 billion (approximately €7.3 billion) in the offering, which was priced at 8.66 yuan (about €1.10) a share, in its listing on the Shanghai Stock Exchange’s Nasdaq-like STAR Market, also known as the Science and Technology Innovation Board.

It was mainland China’s second-largest initial public offering after Agricultural Bank of China’s 2010 dual listing in Shanghai and Hong Kong, which raised $22.1 billion (approximately €18.8 billion).

Founded in 2016 in the eastern city of Hefei, CXMT is one of the world’s largest makers of DRAM, or “dynamic random access” memory chips, a kind of semiconductor used in everything from AI servers to autos and consumer electronics like smartphones and personal computers.

“CXMT plays a critical role in China’s AI push, particularly in the face of US export controls,” Kyle Chan, a fellow at the Brookings Institution and an expert in China’s technology policies, said. US restrictions have also barred China from importing powerful HBM, or high-bandwidth memory chips – a type of DRAM chip.

The company’s revenue surged to 50.8 billion yuan (approximately €6.4 billion) in the first three months of 2026, up more than 700% year on year as booming demand driven by the rapid adoption of artificial intelligence fuelled growth.

Soaring use of AI has led to a global memory chip shortage, driving up prices for some computers and smartphones. One big question, Chan said, is whether CXMT could help with the broader shortage.

CXMT is seen as China’s best shot at developing its own cutting-edge HBM chips to power Chinese AI models, Chan said. But it also faces many challenges, including supply chain bottlenecks in scaling up manufacturing capacity, since its access to the world’s most best chipmaking tools is highly restricted, forcing it to depend on Chinese equipment makers.

According to Counterpoint Research, a technology research firm, CXMT was the world’s fourth biggest DRAM memory chipmaker in 2025 by shipments, taking up roughly 8% of the global market. Samsung Electronics accounted for 36%, SK Hynix 29% and Micron about 24%.

In the first three months of this year CXMT accounted for approximately 9% of global shipments. By 2028, its market share is forecast by Counterpoint Research to reach about 11%. But the research firm estimated CXMT will likely need at least a 15% global market share to be competitive in the long term.

“Trade restrictions on tools are remaining as the key challenge for CXMT,” MS Hwang, a research director at Counterpoint who specialises in memory semiconductors, said. Some US lawmakers have also recently called for President Donald Trump’s administration to block American companies from buying CXMT’s memory chips over national and economic security concerns.

CXMT, among many other Chinese companies, has been designated by the Pentagon as having links to the Chinese military. Beijing has rejected such designations in most cases.

CXMT’s public share offering followed South Korean chipmaker SK Hynix’s $26.5 billion (approximately €22.5 billion) Nasdaq listing earlier this month.

Additional sources • AP

In celebration of the 99th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), established in August 1927, the PLA commemorates its founding on August 1st each year (remembering the Nanchang Uprising of 1927). This anniversary is marked amidst ongoing efforts to modernize its defense capabilities, alongside diplomatic and military endeavors to strengthen dialogue, partnerships, and the exchange of experiences with European, Asian, and international militaries. The PLA is considered the cornerstone of China’s national defense, and Chinese military leaders at all embassies and consulates worldwide organize numerous official events to mark its founding on August 1st each year. Chinese embassies and military attachés around the world, such as the Chinese Embassy in Belgium and other European countries, host official receptions to highlight the PLA’s role in maintaining global peace and stability, as well as its development capabilities and readiness. The PLA is focused on transforming into a modern, integrated military force encompassing land, sea, and air.

China’s military relations with European militaries reflect the logic of military diplomacy, as China seeks to deepen military ties with its European allies and partners within its strategy of mutual military engagement, cooperation, and learning opportunities. Here, Chinese military channels with European countries serve as avenues for dialogue and the exchange of views on regional and international security to achieve balance and stability. Beijing, through its diplomatic activities, emphasizes the importance of balanced partnerships with the European Union and its member states to provide stability and certainty to the world. In this context, Beijing’s relationship with European militaries takes on a dual character of strategic competition and mutual caution, especially given Washington’s efforts to utilize NATO to contain Chinese power. Consequently, tension has arisen between the Chinese military and NATO due to China’s rejection of NATO’s Asian expansion into its regional sphere. Beijing views NATO’s attempts to broaden its security engagement with Asia-Pacific countries as a threat to stability and incompatible with the multipolar world order, while China rejects the logic of military hegemony. The Chinese military, in its strategic literature, emphasizes its opposition to American power and hegemonic policies implemented through the NATO military alliance. China and the People’s Liberation Army also strongly reject NATO’s involvement in Asia-Pacific affairs, viewing it as interference that threatens regional and global stability and leads to confrontations between military blocs.

Herein lies the official Chinese military stance on the NATO military alliance, describing it as a relic of the Cold War that extends beyond its original geographical scope. China explicitly accuses NATO of instigating tensions and provoking confrontations in Asia. Furthermore, China warns against the militarization of the region through NATO partnerships with countries such as Japan and Australia. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) maintains that China’s defense policy aims to protect national sovereignty and regional security, viewing Western actions as attempts to contain Chinese influence and impose American hegemony. Therefore, Chinese intelligence, military, defense, and security circles reject the logic of linking Euro-Atlantic security to issues in the Indo-Pacific region.

The most significant dynamics of the Chinese military relationship with European armies are characterized by the maintenance of strategic autonomy. Some European capitals seek to avoid full involvement in the US-China conflict, preferring to preserve commercial interests and pursue self-sufficiency. This is further complicated by technological and industrial competition between European armies and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. NATO closely monitors the development of the Chinese military’s cyber capabilities and artificial intelligence, viewing them as strategic challenges impacting global supply chains. Meanwhile, China perceives NATO’s policies as subservient to US interests at the expense of European national security. NATO’s ongoing monitoring of Chinese cyber capabilities and the escalating technological competition between China, Europe, and the United States for leadership in the digital and economic future are noteworthy. These tensions manifest in mutual concerns regarding cybersecurity and global supply chains, which raise serious concerns for NATO due to the numerous strategic challenges and cyber threats they pose. Here, NATO monitors digital operations and hybrid attacks linked to Beijing-affiliated actors targeting critical infrastructure and technological security, according to NATO’s military perspective. NATO’s military strategies focus on protecting technological superiority in artificial intelligence and semiconductors to prevent any potential disruption to global supply chains.

For this reason, China’s stance toward NATO is characterized by accusations of American political dominance. Beijing believes that NATO’s expanding policies and transatlantic orientation serve the US strategic agenda at its expense and in confrontation with China, which, from the Chinese perspective, affects European security itself. China considers NATO’s increasing involvement in Asia-Pacific issues and technological confrontation not to serve Europe’s own security interests but rather to threaten international stability as a whole. Thus, China’s position on NATO is based on the accusation that it serves American hegemony and threatens security and stability in Asia and Europe. Beijing views NATO as a tool for implementing America’s strategic plans, aiming to mobilize member states of the military alliance to pursue a policy of Asian expansion in the face of China. China and the People’s Liberation Army reject NATO’s involvement in Asia-Pacific issues, arguing that NATO’s policies harm Europe’s economic and technological security. From a Chinese perspective, the alliance’s technological confrontation poses a threat to international stability and European security, with China believing that NATO’s policies ultimately undermine Europe’s own security.

Noul hit southern Guangdong province and neighbouring Hong Kong, bringing strong winds and heavy rain to the region.

Typhoon Noul has hit southern China, including Hong Kong, bringing strong winds and heavy rain to the region and prompting the evacuation of hundreds of thousands of people in Guangdong province.

China’s national weather centre said Noul made landfall on the coast of Huidong county in Huizhou, southern Guangdong province, at approximately 3:50am local time on Sunday (19:50 GMT on Saturday).

China’s official Xinhua News Agency said Noul was the strongest typhoon to make landfall in China so far this year.

Hong Kong’s Observatory said Noul, with maximum sustained winds of 110 kilometres per hour (68 miles per hour) near its centre, was moving Sunday into inland Guangdong and weakening progressively, bringing strong winds and heavy rain to parts of the region.

More than 715,000 people had been relocated for safety by early Sunday in Guangdong province, according to state-owned China National Radio. On Saturday, authorities said some 340,000 people were evacuated.

China’s National Meteorological Centre expected parts of southern Guangdong and southeastern Fujian provinces to experience heavy rain and strong winds over the weekend.

Many trees were seen uprooted in Huilai county, located on the coast of Guangdong province, state broadcaster CCTV reported.

Hong Kong’s airport authority said about 350 flights were cancelled on Sunday. At least nine people were injured across the city during the typhoon period, according to Hong Kong authorities.

As Noul approached Hong Kong, parts of a large scaffolding on a high-rise building collapsed on Saturday afternoon, local police said, although initial reports indicated there were no injuries.

Taiwan’s Central Weather Administration said Noul was bringing rainfall to parts of southern and eastern Taiwan. It was passing over waters south of Taiwan and was moving away from the island Saturday.

Earlier this month, Typhoon Bavi brought strong winds and rain to eastern China, leading to the evacuation of more than two million people. It made landfall on July 11. Another, Maysak, made landfall in southern China on July 3.

A China Coast Guard vessel has fired its water cannon at Philippine government boats near Scarborough Shoal, the latest in a series of confrontations in the disputed South China Sea.

The Philippines is hosting a meeting of foreign ministers from Southeast Asia.

They are expected to address regional security issues, including the civil war in Myanmar and the territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

But renewed fighting between the US and Iran has overshadowed the gathering.

Ministers have called for hostilities to end.

The conflict has hit Asia hard – disrupting its energy and food supplies, international commerce and raising fears of a global economic slowdown.

Will it also affect ASEAN’s efforts to tackle issues within the region?

Presenter: James Bays

Guests:

Richard Heydarian – Political Scientist and Author of Indo-Pacific: Trump, China and the New Struggle for Global Mastery

Phar Kim Ben – Professor in ASEAN studies at International Islamic Univeristy of Malaysia and former Director of Political & Security Community at ASEAN Secretariat

Don McLain Gill – Lecturer at De La Salle University and Indo-Pacific Research fellow with Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada

July 22 (UPI) — U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, in Manila on Wednesday for a meeting of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations, met with Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and his counterpart in China, Foreign Minister Wang Yi.

Meanwhile, police clashed with protesters outside who criticized the United States’ involvement in area conflicts and blamed the Trump administration for fueling tension in the region. Some protestors held up signs that said, “U.S. out of everywhere!” and “War criminals not welcome! Ban Rubio! Ban Trump!”

Rubio spokesman Tommy Pigott said the secretary of state met with Marco “to reaffirm our ironclad alliance and our shared commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific.”

The two men confirmed that “there is no legal basis for China’s expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea” and discussed other matters, Pigott said.

Tensions between the Philippines and China have been high lately over the disputed South China Sea. On Monday, the Philippine military accused Chinese coast guard personnel of striking and injuring a Philippine sailor. China said the Philippine officers instigated the conflict.

China claims most of the South China Sea, including areas that hold the exclusive economic zones of other countries including the Philippines.

In person at the ASEAN conference, Rubio behaved politely toward his Chinese counterpart, saying he appreciated China withholding support for Iran and opposing a toll in the Strait of Hormuz. He also said the countries were taking steps to establish boards of investment and trade.

He did not mention recent claims by U.S. President Donald Trump that China interfered in the 2020 U.S. presidential election.

“Look, these are the two most powerful countries in the world,” Rubio told reporters Wednesday. “It would frankly be reckless and irresponsible for the U.S. and China not to have a relationship.”

Chinese President Xi Jinping is expected to visit the United States in September.

In contrast to his remarks Wednesday, Rubio’s words in an opinion column that the U.S. State Department placed in Philippine newspapers this week were somewhat less measured when it came to the conflict over the South China Sea.

“If those waters fall under the control of a power willing to use commerce as a geopolitical weapon, both the United States and the ASEAN states would face dire new threats to their sovereignty, security and economic futures,” he wrote.

United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio has met his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi at a gathering of southeast Asian foreign ministers, to discuss how to manage bilateral tensions ahead of a planned summit between US President Donald Trump and China’s Xi Jinping.

The meeting on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) gathering of foreign ministers in Manila on Wednesday came amid tensions over China’s conduct in the disputed South China Sea and the US war against Iran. ASEAN countries have expressed concerns about both issues at the meeting.

Relations between Washington and Beijing have also been complicated by Trump’s accusations that China meddled in US elections, allegations Beijing has dismissed as “pure fabrication”.

Rubio said the US and China have “great differences” that are likely to persist “for the foreseeable future”, but that he and Wang discussed the need to manage those disagreements to ensure Xi has a “very positive visit” to the US. Xi is expected to visit in September.

Wang said the US must “respect China’s core interests … effectively manage differences and disagreements, and address China’s legitimate concerns”, according to an official Chinese summary of their meeting. It described the talks as “pragmatic, positive and constructive”.

The two sides agreed to “make sound preparations for the next stage of high-level exchanges,” China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a statement.

‘Commerce as geopolitical weapon’

Wednesday’s meeting came two days after a confrontation between Chinese and Philippine vessels in the South China Sea left a Philippine sailor injured, leading both countries to summon each other’s ambassador.

The incident this week took place on Monday at the disputed Second Thomas Shoal. The Philippines ⁠said Chinese coastguard struck one of ⁠the Philippine navy staff on the head with a wooden baton, while China said the Philippine personnel were the first to attack and accused Philippine vessels ⁠of ramming a Chinese patrol boat.

Rubio said the altercation benefited nobody, adding that Washington had ⁠reiterated in all its meetings that it was bound by a defence treaty to stand up for Manila.

“We intend to live up to our treaty obligations, and I think we’ve done so, and will continue to do so,” he said.

Rubio’s remarks echo an opinion piece he published in Philippine media on Tuesday about Beijing’s conduct in the South China Sea. Rubio warned of “dire new threats” if those waters were to “fall under the control of a power willing to use commerce as a geopolitical weapon”.

Beijing claims sovereignty over almost the entire South China Sea via a line on its maps that cuts into the exclusive economic zones of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam, and is at the centre of long-running disputes over a multitude of islands.

Disputes between the Philippines and China have increased in recent years as Manila takes a bolder stance while pursuing closer defence ties with the US, Australia and Japan.

The US has increased military financing for the Philippines to $100mn for the 2026 fiscal year and is providing an additional $9mn to expand a coastguard pier on the island of Palawan “to enhance Philippine maritime ⁠law enforcement presence and sustain operations in the South China Sea”, the State Department said in a fact sheet.

Discussing the US relationship with ASEAN member states, Rubio said the security and prosperity of the US and southeast Asia were closely interconnected.

“I believe very much that the future and the story of the 21st century will be written in this region and by how events unfold here,” he said.

Iran ‘not serious about talks’, says Rubio

Rubio also addressed the situation with Iran in a meeting with ASEAN foreign ministers, claiming that Tehran was responsible for the latest escalation.

“The problem we’re having right now is that they’re not serious about talks,” Rubio said. “If they’re serious, we’re serious. If they’re not, then we will do what’s necessary to protect our interests, and also the interests of our allies.”

The US has carried out strikes on Iran for eleven consecutive nights, including targeting roads, bridges and power plants in recent attacks, all but shattering an interim peace deal agreed by the two sides last month.

Rubio stressed that Iran could not be allowed to control the Strait of ‌Hormuz, as it could set a dangerous precedent for other parts of the world.

The top US diplomat also confirmed he would meet on Thursday with his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov to discuss the Ukraine war, saying that Washington remained open to playing a constructive role in ending the conflict.

Proposed rules would have US regulator block the entry of swarm-capable drones, mainly from China.

The US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has moved to prohibit imports of advanced drones, mainly from China, citing mounting national security concerns over military-grade technology.

Under the proposed rules announced on Tuesday, the US regulator will block the entry of drones equipped with swarming capabilities and infrared sensors for high-resolution thermal imaging.

Meanwhile, exemptions for components produced outside China, introduced in December, have been extended until January 2028, suggesting a focus on isolating Chinese manufacturers, such as DJI and Autel Robotics.

The move comes days after US President Donald Trump accused China of interfering in the 2020 US elections. It signals a hardening of Washington’s stance against foreign-made surveillance technology, while attempting to mitigate immediate supply chain shocks for domestic users.

FCC officials said the measures were necessary to “secure the drone supply chain” and prevent sensitive data from being accessed by foreign states.

In 2022, the FCC banned telecommunications and video surveillance equipment from prominent Chinese brands, including Huawei and ZTE, citing an “unacceptable risk to national security”.

US security officials have warned that equipment from Chinese brands such as Huawei could be used to interfere with fifth-generation (5G) wireless networks and collect sensitive information.

One of the largest manufacturers of telecommunications equipment in the world, Huawei has had an embattled relationship with the US and its allies, facing some of the heaviest sanctions ever placed on a single company in the US.

In 2019, Trump signed into law the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act, which established criteria to identify communications services Washington deemed could pose a risk to national security.

The FCC’s latest move reflects a bipartisan consensus in Washington to treat foreign drone technology as an “unacceptable risk” to national infrastructure.

Southeast Asian countries are highly affected by oil supply shortages caused by the Iran war and the Strait of Hormuz closure.

Southeast Asian nations are “deeply concerned” about the impact of blockades of key maritime trade routes in the Middle East, their top diplomats have said.

Foreign ministers from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and their key ⁠partners met in the Philippines on Tuesday against a backdrop of instability due to the global impact on trade and energy supplies caused by the US-Israel war on Iran and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, as well as territorial disputes with Beijing in the South China Sea.

Southeast Asian countries have a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of $3.8 trillion but are highly exposed to supply limitations caused by the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, as they are heavily dependent on Gulf countries for their oil imports.

At the ongoing ASEAN summit in Manila, heads of state and top diplomats from the region are seeking to agree on an oil-sharing mechanism to mitigate the impact of the war on Iran.

Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthis announced a naval blockade on Saudi Arabia on Monday, opening a potential new front in the war and risking aggravating the threat to global energy supplies and trade beyond the Gulf.

“We are deeply concerned that these ‌developments severely undermine the ongoing efforts of key mediators and diminish the prospects for a peaceful resolution through dialogue and diplomacy,” ASEAN ministers said in a statement.

Top diplomats from the United States, Russia and China are also attending the ASEAN summit, another reminder of how the war on Iran is reshaping international diplomacy and the global energy supply.

Reporting from Manila, Al Jazeera’s Barnaby Lo said the war has driven up oil and gas prices in Southeast Asia while also stalling manufacturing and exports, causing countries from the region to find new trade partners.

“Southeast Asia is thousands of kilometres away from the Middle East, but it has been one of the most impacted regions by the conflict because of how dependent many of its member nations are on oil from the Middle East,” Lo said.

“Take, for example, the Philippines: it’s the first country in the world to declare a state of national energy emergency, and it still is in this state, so it is fighting problems on two fronts. One on supply, the other on skyrocketing fuel prices,” Lo said. “On supply, it’s gotten oil from non-traditional partners, such as Russia and China, but on skyrocketing prices it has very little it can do because the prices here are driven by market forces.”

Other key issues to be discussed at the ASEAN summit include the civil war in Myanmar, as the bloc’s peace initiatives falter, five years after a military coup plunged the country into a conflict that has killed an estimated 100,000 people.

“Ahead of the summit, ASEAN foreign ministers held an in-person meeting – the first since 2021 – with the foreign minister of the military-backed government in Myanmar in Bangkok,” Lo reported. “This was criticised for legitimising the military junta in Myanmar.”

Top diplomats are also likely to discuss ⁠tensions in the South China Sea, with ASEAN countries and China still trying to conclude a code of conduct to ⁠prevent disputes after nearly 10 years. In advance of the summit, China and the Philippines were engaged in a feud after a confrontation between their vessels in disputed waters left a Filipino sailor injured.

The US Department of State condemned what it described as China’s “dangerous and aggressive” actions, and its “troubling pattern of provocation against lawful Philippine maritime operations”.

July 20 (UPI) — The Philippine military accused China of beating and injuring a Philippine Navy sailor with a wooden baton in the latest seaborne confrontation between the two nations over a submerged reef in the disputed South China Sea.

The incident occurred Monday morning near the BRP Sierra Madre, a derelict warship the Philippines intentionally grounded on the Second Thomas Shoal, a reef both countries lay claim to and which the Philippines calls Ayungin Shoal and China, Ren’ai Jiao.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines said in a statement that a China Coast Guard rigid-hull inflatable boat with eight people on board unlawfully approached the BRP Sierra Madre and took pictures and video of it.

While two AFP rubber boats drove it away, China Coast Guard personnel on the boat struck a Philippine Navy sailor on his head with a wooden baton. The man suffered a deep gash on his scalp, according to a picture shared online by Philippine Coast Guard spokesperson Jay Tarriela.

Video of the incident posted online by Tarriela shows some China Coast Guard members aboard a larger boat swinging long sticks down upon members of the Philippine Navy in a smaller rubber boat.

“Striking an unarmed sailor on the head with a baton — inside our own exclusive economic zone — is not law enforcement. It is unlawful aggression, plain and simple,” Tarriela said in a statement.

China has rejected the accusation, accusing the Philippines of instigating the incident.

“The Philippine personnel first launched malicious attacks on Chinese law enforcement officers using oars, long poles and other tools,” the China Coast Guard said in a statement published online by China’s Embassy in Manila.

“The Chinese side, acting in full compliance with laws and regulations, employed measures such as verbal warnings, evasive maneuvering and proportionate countermeasures to stabilize the situation on site, while exercising the utmost rationality and restraint.”

At roughly 105 nautical miles west of Palawan, the Second Thomas Shoal is well within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. The Philippines beached its Sierra Madre warship on the disputed submerged reef in 1999, which it has manned since in an effort to protect its maritime claims.

However, China lays claim to the Second Thomas Shoal and much of the South China Sea via its Nine-Dash-Line map, which has been rejected by several nations, including the United States. The Hague’s Permanent Court of Arbitration also rejected China’s sweeping maritime claims in a landmark 2016 ruling in a case brought by Manila. Beijing rejects the ruling.

Following the incident, the China Coast Guard said in a statement that it would continue to “carry out rights protection and law enforcement activities” and “firmly safeguard China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests.”

The U.S. State Department late Monday issued a statement in support of the Philippines, condemning “China’s dangerous and aggressive actions against Philippine navy personnel.”

State Department spokesperson Thomas Pigott said the United States calls on China to “immediately cease its destabilizing conduct.”

“China’s troubling pattern of provocation against lawful Philippine maritime operations undermines regional peace and stability and directly contradicts China’s repeated commitments to resolve disputes peacefully,” he said.

“We stand with our ally, the Philippines, and commend the professionalism and restraint shown by the Philippine navy personnel in this incident.”

Pigott added that the United States reaffirms the 2016 tribunal ruling as final and legally binding on both China and the Philippines.

July 19 (Asia Today) — North Korea is intensifying engagement with China and Russia as South Korea, the United States and Japan broaden their cooperation to include the overseas deployment of small modular reactors.

The diplomatic activity follows events marking the 65th anniversary of the North Korea-China Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance.

North Korea received a senior Chinese delegation for the anniversary and dispatched Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui to Russia, signaling efforts to manage relations with both of its principal partners.

The moves are widely viewed as an attempt to strengthen alignment among North Korea, China and Russia as Seoul, Washington and Tokyo expand their security and economic cooperation.

The three allies recently signed a memorandum aimed at encouraging cooperation among their civilian nuclear industries and supporting the deployment of small modular reactors in third countries.

The Korean Central News Agency said Choe left Pyongyang aboard a government aircraft Saturday at the invitation of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.

Russia’s Foreign Ministry also said Choe was making an official visit to the country.

It was Choe’s first visit to Russia in about nine months and the first major high-level exchange between the countries since the April opening of a memorial in North Korea honoring troops sent to support Russia.

Because the trip was not tied to a major anniversary or previously announced diplomatic event, analysts said Choe could be preparing for a possible visit to Russia by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly invited Kim to visit Russia during their June 2024 summit and again when the leaders attended events in China marking the anniversary of the end of World War II in Asia.

Possible subjects for Choe’s talks include a visit by Kim, recent developments in North Korea-China relations and coordination involving the Tumen River region, where the three countries share geographic and economic interests.

Park Won-gon, a professor of North Korean studies at Ewha Womans University in Seoul, said military and diplomatic accomplishments are easier for Pyongyang to demonstrate than economic achievements.

“If Chinese President Xi Jinping visits North Korea and Kim Jong Un subsequently visits Russia, North Korea could present those events as major diplomatic accomplishments,” Park said.

“Practical trilateral cooperation among North Korea, China and Russia has not progressed smoothly, but the Tumen River project could become a vehicle for cooperation among the three countries.”

China ties show signs of recovery

Relations between North Korea and China also appear to be recovering rapidly around the treaty anniversary.

Kim and Xi exchanged messages, a North Korean delegation traveled to China and Wang Huning, chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, led a Chinese party and government delegation to North Korea.

The exchanges could expand cooperation in economic affairs, science and technology, public health and culture.

Wang’s visit to the Wonsan Kalma Coastal Tourist Area was particularly notable because the resort is one of Kim’s priority development projects.

Analysts have questioned whether Russian tourists alone can generate enough demand to make the resort financially sustainable.

Wang’s visit has therefore raised the possibility that the two countries discussed bringing larger numbers of Chinese tourists to the site.

Tourism is considered an area in which China may be able to support North Korea without directly violating the main restrictions imposed by U.N. Security Council sanctions.

Oh Gyeong-seop, a senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, said attracting Chinese visitors is crucial to the resort’s prospects.

“Bringing in Chinese tourists is an issue that can avoid U.N. Security Council sanctions and is therefore critically important for North Korea,” Oh said.

“Large numbers of Chinese tourists are necessary to revitalize the Wonsan Kalma Coastal Tourist Area, so related discussions are likely to have continued.”

North Korea’s renewed engagement with China and Russia does not necessarily indicate that the three countries have established a formal trilateral alliance.

Their interests frequently differ, and analysts say much of their coordination remains bilateral.

The latest exchanges, however, demonstrate Pyongyang’s effort to strengthen diplomatic, economic and strategic ties with Beijing and Moscow while South Korea, the United States and Japan deepen their own cooperation.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

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Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260720010006651