China

July 10 (UPI) — Typhoon Bavi weakened as it moved off the Philippines on Friday but was expected to bring heavy rain to Taiwan and parts of Japan before it makes landfall in China.

Bavi, which was called Inday in the Philippines, killed at least 15 people after heavy rains caused flash floods and landslides in several villages and cities, and affected tens of thousands of people there, The BBC and The Philippine Star reported.

The typhoon on Friday brought storm surge and rain to Okinawa, Japan, and was expected Saturday to pound the north and east sides of Taiwan, potentially bringing nearly 40 inches of rain in some areas.

Once past Taiwan, the storm could make two landfalls in China, part of which is still recovering after Typhoon Maysak earlier this week.

Maysak’s havoc is linked to at least 39 deaths, though searches were underway for people reported missing.

Hundreds of flights in Japan, including Okinawa and the Sakishima Islands, were canceled on Friday and Saturday as residents braced for Bavi’s pounding rain.

Forecasters in China warned of two potential landfalls as it moves toward the north, noting that Bavi’s size — at it’s widest point, the typhoon is as wide as France — means that both its remnants and outer rain bands are likely to affect a huge swath of people and property.

Published on 09/07/2026 – 17:14 GMT+2•Updated
17:19

The European Commission launched an investigation on Thursday into Chinese Peking duck after several EU producers complained of unfairly low prices harming their industry.

ADVERTISEMENT

ADVERTISEMENT

Without disclosing their names, the Commission said that five EU producers had complained that China is unfairly subsidising domestic production via its five-year plan for agricultural modernisation.

The probe comes at a time of heightened tensions between Beijing and Brussels, as the EU seeks to shield its market from cheap Chinese imports, triggering Beijing’s ire as it aims to preserve access to the lucrative European market.

After China repeatedly threatened retaliation over several EU legislative proposals restricting access to EU public procurement and setting strict conditions on foreign investment, the two sides started negotiations last week to ease tensions.

However, the EU’s latest move targeting duck imports could disrupt the talks by hitting China’s agricultural sector for the first time.

It also said that the volume and prices of imports had a “negative impact on the quantities sold, the level of prices charged and market share held by the Union industry,” and that this had resulted in “substantial adverse effects on the overall performance” of the sector.

The Commission’s investigation could result in anti-dumping duties being imposed on Chinese producers to protect the EU market.

Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties are among the EU’s main trade defence instruments against China’s aggressive push into its market. However, EU leaders gave the Commission a mandate in June to step up efforts to reduce the EU’s €1 billion-a-day trade deficit with China. They want the EU executive, which has competence over trade policy, to review its trade defence tools and pursue a dialogue with Beijing that delivers tangible results.

EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič met his Chinese counterpart, Wang Wentao, in Brussels last Monday to kick-start negotiations aimed at restoring a level playing field and addressing trade imbalances, which Brussels said had become “unsustainable”.

The EU already imposed tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles in 2024, triggering China’s investigations and sanctions targeting EU brandy, pork and dairy products.

The EU hopes to achieve a breakthrough in negotiations with Beijing by October, when Šefčovič is due to travel to China.

July 9 (UPI) — A shoe factory caught fire Thursday morning in China, and it’s unknown how many people are dead or injured.

Chinese President Xi Jinping said there were likely “significant casualties” and ordered an investigation into the cause.

The fire broke out at noon local time Thursday in Janjiang,, a city in Fujian Province. By 5 p.m., it was mostly extinguished. Local fire teams sent 183 people and 35 vehicles to the scene, the Ministry of Emergency Management said in a statement.

Video on the state news showed flames coming from the top floor windows, The New York Times reported. At least a dozen people appeared to be stuck on the roof.

Xi told local authorities to do all they could to search for and rescue survivors, treat the injured, find the cause of the fire and “hold those responsible accountable,” according to China’s state broadcaster, CCTV.

In a statement, the emergency management officials said there were casualties but didn’t give details.

The factory was owned by Fujian Huiteng Shoes, which employed at least 155 people, The Times reported.

Published on
09/07/2026 – 13:31 GMT+2

In a draft regulation obtained by Euronews and due to be presented in September, the European Commission plans to tighten access to the EU market by allowing public authorities to exclude foreign companies that present risks of interference from public procurement.

ADVERTISEMENT

ADVERTISEMENT

The draft proposal comes amid heightened geopolitical tensions, with concerns over data leaks from sensitive public services to Beijing and Washington and as well as the weaponisation of the EU’s dependence on rare earths and technology products from China.

The draft document proposes that “public buyers shall take appropriate measures, where relevant at any stage of the procurement procedure, from planning and market consultation to contract award and execution, to ensure the protection of the security and public safety interests of the Union.”

The document adds that risks to security or public safety in a public contract may arise from firms whose “ownership, control, or financing structure” bears “risks of undue interference or influence over it,” as well as companies whose “exposure to third-country legislation […] may compel disclosure of sensitive information or interference with contract performance.”

Finally, public buyers would be allowed to introduce a European preference in public procurement, although the draft regulation would not make it compulsory.

Such provisions could confirm the EU’s protectionist shift towards a “Made in Europe” strategy, which the EU executive already proposed last March for strategic sectors such as clean technologies, the automotive industry and energy-intensive industries.

The risks of foreign interference and data transfer have become more acute in recent years, with the US and China both adopting legislation allowing them to request that companies under their jurisdiction transfer data stored in the EU.

Some European governments are already taking steps to mitigate these risks. In April, the French government ended its contract with Microsoft to protect French health data, and in June, it replaced US tech company Palantir with French company ChapsVision for the processing of sensitive information held by the the country’s domestic intelligence service, the Directorate General for Internal Security.

Over the last few years, several EU countries, including Germany, France, Italy and Denmark, have also cancelled or denied public contracts to the Chinese telecoms giant Huawei over security concerns.

The draft regulation also seeks to protect “critical infrastructure, critical supply chains, critical technologies or essential services, resilience against physical, cyber, or hybrid threats, and prevention and protection against risks of their disruption including due to harmful strategic dependencies on third-country suppliers.”

Last year, China cut off the EU from exports of rare earth minerals, which are essential for green technologies and the defence sector. It also stopped the Dutch-based Nexperia, owned by China’s Wingtech, from importing Chinese chips essential to the EU’s car industry.

About 130,000 people have been evacuated from the Guangxi region while thousands of rescuers have been deployed.

Flooding from Tropical Storm Maysak has killed 39 people in southern China, most of them after a dam breach inundated the city of Nanning.

Ding Wei, the city’s vice mayor, announced the toll at a news briefing on Thursday, up sharply from a previous count of six, after record rainfall breached reservoirs and sent torrents of water through towns and cities in the Guangxi region.

The dam breach in Nanning killed 26 people, Ding said.

About 130,000 people have been evacuated from the region, and drones and thousands of boats have been used in a huge relief and rescue operation to reach people trapped by the waters.

Heavy rain battered southern Guangxi for days, with cumulative rainfall of 10-40cm (4-16in) in some areas and more than 90cm (35in) in hard-hit areas, the national meteorological centre said.

More than 8,000 people and about 5,700 boats have been deployed in the rescue operation, with rescuers battling strong currents and debris to reach victims.

Ding said the floodwaters are receding, but more rain is expected in certain areas in the next two days.

Crews have been deployed to clear mud and debris and disinfect several towns in hard-hit Hengzhou city, which is east of Nanning and under its jurisdiction.

Road repairs are ongoing, and electricity has been restored to more than 60,000 homes, Ding said.

Animals escape after flooding hits zoo

At least 100 animals, including alpacas, miniature pigs and zebras, escaped Guangxi province’s Guigang Zoo after the flooding damaged their enclosures.

The zoo appealed to the public Wednesday for help in finding its escaped animals.

The missing creatures include “two North American raccoons, four porcupines and thirty peacocks”, according to a statement posted by a local district’s Culture, Sports and Tourism Bureau.

The zoo said some of the escapees “may be frightened and potentially aggressive”.

“If you spot any of the animals, please keep a safe distance,” the statement said.

“Do not attempt to catch, approach or tease them, as this could be dangerous,” the zoo warned.

July 7 (Asia Today) — China said countries should not overinterpret its test launch of a submarine-launched ballistic missile into the Pacific, after the firing drew criticism from Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Pacific island nations.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said during a regular briefing Tuesday that the launch was part of regular military training by the Chinese military and was not aimed at any country or target.

Mao said China had notified Solomon Islands and other South Pacific and related countries in advance, adding that the launch complied with international law and international practice.

“China follows the path of peaceful development and a nuclear strategy of self-defense,” Mao said. She said China keeps its nuclear forces at the minimum level required for national security and that “relevant countries do not need to overinterpret this.”

China’s state-run Global Times also defended the launch in a commentary Tuesday, saying it demonstrated China’s determination and capability to firmly safeguard national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity.

The newspaper said China’s nuclear capability had reached another milestone and that the country would continue to strengthen its strategic deterrence system, including its nuclear triad.

A nuclear triad refers to a country’s ability to deliver nuclear weapons through three systems: intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and strategic bombers. Such a structure is intended to preserve the ability to retaliate after a nuclear first strike.

Chinese diplomatic sources in Beijing said China announced Monday that one of its nuclear-powered strategic submarines had successfully launched an SLBM carrying a dummy warhead into international waters in the Pacific.

China has not officially identified the missile. Experts believe it may have been the Julang-3, or JL-3, which was displayed during a military parade last year marking the 80th anniversary of victory in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression.

The JL-3 is believed to have a range of up to 12,000 kilometers, or about 7,456 miles, placing much of the Pacific, including the U.S. mainland, within reach. Analysts say the missile strengthens China’s nuclear triad strategy.

Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara said China’s military activities, combined with a lack of transparency, are a serious concern for Japan and the international community.

Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong criticized the launch as destabilizing to the region. New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters said it was not consistent with regional stability.

NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte also expressed caution, saying, “We cannot be naive.”

Solomon Islands Prime Minister Matthew Wale, who chairs the Pacific Islands Forum, said he had delivered a strong protest to China’s ambassador in that capacity. Wale said the Solomon Islands government also submitted an official protest letter to China.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260707010002704

A reservoir wall broke in Nanning in China, sending out a torrent of water after rivers swelled from the passage of a typhoon. At least four people have been killed by flooding due to Typhoon Maysak, while another 62,000 have been evacuated across the southern city, officials say. The emergency flood control response has been raised to its highest level.

President Xi Jinping has called for “all-out efforts” to rescue people affected by the floods across China. Authorities have warned that torrential rains will continue in the coming days.

July 6 (Asia Today) — China launched a strategic missile into international waters in the Pacific on Monday, prompting concern from Japan and other regional powers as a U.S. nuclear and missile expert said the weapon was likely a JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy said on social media that one strategic nuclear submarine successfully fired a submarine-launched strategic missile carrying a dummy warhead toward the Pacific at 12:01 p.m. local time.

The Chinese military said the missile landed accurately in the target sea area but did not disclose the missile type or the exact impact location.

Wang Xuemeng, a spokesperson for the Chinese navy, said the launch was part of annual military training and that relevant countries were notified in advance.

“The launch complied with international law and international practice,” Wang said. “It was not aimed at any specific country or target.”

China also launched an intercontinental ballistic missile into international waters in the Pacific in September 2024. That test was China’s first ICBM launch toward the Pacific since a Dongfeng-5 launch in 1980. Based on photos later released, analysts assessed the 2024 missile as likely a Dongfeng-31AG, a road-mobile missile capable of reaching the U.S. mainland.

Monday’s launch was China’s first Pacific-oriented strategic missile test in about one year and 10 months.

The Japanese government expressed serious concern over the launch. China notified Japan of the plan in advance and designated areas near Shionomisaki, south of Wakayama Prefecture, as possible falling zones for space debris, Japanese media reported. Japan asked China to reconsider so the launch would not threaten Japanese safety.

The Japanese government said some of the projected debris zones included Japan’s exclusive economic zone, but the missile appeared to have landed outside the zone. It also said there were no confirmed reports that the missile passed over Japanese territory or the exclusive economic zone or that aircraft or ships were damaged.

Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara, the Japanese government’s top spokesperson, said China’s military activities are a serious concern because of Beijing’s lack of transparency.

“China’s military trends lack transparency and have become a grave concern for Japan and the international community,” Kihara said.

China’s Foreign Ministry rejected international criticism, saying the launch was a routine military training activity conducted under safety standards and professional procedures.

“We hope relevant countries will not overinterpret the matter,” the ministry said.

In the United States, analysts said the missile used in the test may have been China’s newest submarine-launched ballistic missile, the JL-3.

Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, told The New York Times that the Chinese military most likely tested the JL-3.

The JL-3 is China’s third-generation submarine-launched ballistic missile. It is believed to have a range of more than 10,000 kilometers, or about 6,200 miles, putting most of the world, including the U.S. mainland, within reach.

Submarine-launched ballistic missiles are considered a key part of nuclear deterrence because they are harder to detect than land-based missiles once deployed at sea. China publicly displayed the JL-3 during a military parade in Beijing in September 2025.

Lewis said the test signals that China’s nuclear force modernization has entered a new stage.

“Historically, China has conducted fewer ICBM tests than other countries,” Lewis said. “The reason was political, but the political dynamics have changed, and they seem to be adopting an approach of testing more frequently.”

Lewis said China may conduct more frequent tests of long-range missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads in the future.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260706010002183

China has raised its purchases of oil from the Middle East in recent days, with deep discounts offered by its main supplier Saudi Arabia expected to further boost its buying, the Financial Times reported Monday.

China bought at least 26M

July 6 (Asia Today) — North Korea is using tacit support from China and Russia to harden its status as a nuclear-armed state, raising pressure on South Korea to rebuild the kind of international sanctions coordination that brought Pyongyang back to negotiations in 2018 and 2019, analysts said Monday.

North Korea has repeatedly stressed the “constant expansion and strengthening” of its nuclear forces and the “thorough exercise” of its status as a nuclear-armed state, signaling that it has no intention of returning to talks premised on denuclearization.

Diplomatic observers in Seoul say North Korea is taking advantage of a turbulent international environment to consolidate its nuclear status.

Russia, which has become a close partner of North Korea since the war in Ukraine, vetoed the renewal of the U.N. panel monitoring sanctions on North Korea in March 2024. At the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference in May, Russia also opposed including language on North Korea’s nuclear program in a consensus document, according to the report.

China, which has long maintained a formal position supporting denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, did not mention the issue during a North Korea-China summit in June.

The North Korean nuclear issue has become even more difficult to resolve as U.S. attention remains focused on the Middle East and the U.N. Security Council has become increasingly ineffective, analysts said.

Experts say South Korea should pursue denuclearization by maintaining sanctions on North Korea, strengthening its military capabilities in response to Pyongyang’s nuclear buildup and securing diplomatic means to apply pressure through China and Russia.

Kim Tae-woo, former president of the Korea Institute for National Unification, said South Korea must acquire capabilities that can offset North Korea’s growing nuclear threat.

“As North Korea’s nuclear threat grows, South Korea must secure corresponding capabilities to neutralize that threat,” Kim said. “Only when North Korea recognizes that an intensifying arms race will be harmful to both Koreas can nuclear arms control negotiations begin.”

Kim said South Korea should quickly move forward with security consultations under the Korea-U.S. joint fact sheet. He said Seoul should pursue the construction of nuclear-powered submarines, secure what he called “nuclear latent capability” and push for stronger U.S. extended deterrence.

Analysts also said Seoul should wage a more active diplomatic campaign toward China and Russia, which retain significant influence over North Korea.

They said South Korea should work to recreate the diplomatic environment of 2016 and 2017, when the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted a series of strong sanctions resolutions in response to North Korea’s nuclear tests and intercontinental ballistic missile launches.

Experts say those sanctions were the key factor that pushed North Korea into inter-Korean and U.S.-North Korea denuclearization talks in 2018 and 2019.

A former senior South Korean diplomat, who requested anonymity, said sanctions remain one of the few long-term sources of leverage over North Korea.

“Every area of North Korea except its nuclear program remains backward because of sanctions,” the former official said. “As long as sanctions are not abandoned in the long term, I believe there is still hope for North Korea’s denuclearization.”

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260707010002164

Countries raise concerns after Chinese military test-launches ballistic missile from submarine in the Pacific Ocean.

China has test-fired a missile from a nuclear submarine that landed in “designated waters” in the Pacific Ocean, state news agency Xinhua reports, drawing criticism and concerns from Japan, Australia and New Zealand.

The Chinese navy test-launched the long-range ballistic missile at 12:01pm (04:01 GMT) on Monday from one of its nuclear-powered submarines in the South Pacific, Xinhua reported.

Xinhua said the test was a “routine arrangement” of China’s annual military training and was not directed at any specific target.

Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong confirmed that China had notified the government of plans to conduct a sea-based missile test into the Pacific but said the action was “destabilising” to the region.

“Australia has been clear that this proposed test is in the context of a rapid military build-up by China, which is lacking in the transparency and reassurance as to intent that the region expects,” Wong told reporters at a news conference in the Fijian capital, Suva.

Japan’s government said it was notified of the missile launch and had urged China to reconsider.

“We expressed our grave concern over the Chinese military’s increased activity,” the government said, adding that Japan’s coastguard had been notified on Sunday by ⁠Chinese authorities about falling space debris that could fall within Japan’s exclusive economic zone.

The New Zealand government said it was informed of the planned launch within hours of it taking place.

“New Zealand considers this an unwelcome and concerning development. We, like our neighbours in other ‌Pacific countries, have no interest in China using the South Pacific as a testing site for missile capability,” Foreign Minister Winston Peters said in a statement.

Beijing’s new ethnic unity law has taken effect. It strengthens Mandarin’s position as the primary language of education, official business and public spaces across China.

The government says the law’s provisions on social cohesion and preventing separatism benefit everyone.

But activists abroad say it will further erode the rights of groups such as Uighurs and Tibetans. They are also warning against a clause that states China can take action against those who violate the law outside of the country.

Taiwan has echoed this criticism. Its government warns the law could be used to target people there who are critical of Beijing.

Presenter: Mohammed Jamjoom

Guests:

• Einar Tangen – Senior fellow, Centre for International Governance Innovation
• Zumretay Arkin – Vice president, World Uyghur Congress
• William Yang – Senior analyst for Northeast Asia, International Crisis Group

Until not so long ago Latin America had been considered a quiet region, located far from the world’s superpower main strategic confrontations, with sporadic but crucial moments that helped to shape the international order as we know it today. The Cuban Missile Crisis is the clearest example: it became the starting point for a series of agreements and treaties on nuclear and strategic security, involving both the US and the Soviet Union at first, and later extending to other actors of the international community, from Europe, Asia and Latin America, which became the first region free from nuclear weapons after the signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967, 5 years after the crisis. After this episode, the region’s relevance seemed to fade, and Latin American countries appeared condemned to a destiny of surfing between weak political cohesion internally and relatively stable economies, even as most of its governments remained closely aligned with Washington on foreign policy matters.

It was precisely during this period of perceived irrelevance that China began building its presence in the region, very gradually and over the course of a little more than two decades. Washington largely ignored this process, even as it became clear that the Asian giant was becoming the largest trading partner for several South American countries, such as Peru and Brazil, and in many cases also the main investor in their economies. This neglect was not born of ignorance: it reflected, instead, a confidence that local governments would remain compliant regardless of who was investing in them. President Trump’s first term illustrates this well. Despite isolated clashes with the governments of Mexico and Venezuela, these episodes looked minor when compared to the “tariff wars” waged against the EU and China. In fact, the only time Trump ever set foot in the region during his entire first term was in November 2018 when he attended the G20 Forum in Buenos Aires. Significantly, there was a planned short visit in Colombia after this event, but I was cancelled. This was widely read at the time as a confirmation that Latin America remained a low priority for Washington’s foreign policy agenda, more due to the expectable compliance of local governments than ignorance of the importance of the region as a resource base capable of fueling US power projection in other regions.

It was only during Trump’s second term that American foreign policy has shifted towards the Western Hemisphere, attributing strategic importance to the region and setting the objective to maintain a near-absolute dominant presence, involving both economic and military dimensions, as is stated in the latest National Security Strategy of 2025.

By the time this shift was formalized, China’s footprint in the region was already deep and country-specific. In Brazil, China had been the largest trading partner since 2009; bilateral trade hit a record $171 billion in 2025, with China accounting for 27.2% of Brazil’s total foreign trade, besides, EV plants and a still planned bi-oceanic railway linking Brazil to Peru’s Pacific coast were being negotiated as part of the Chinese investment strategy in both countries. In Argentina, China became the primary supplier of mobile network infrastructure, part of a broader Chinese push into Latin American 5G and data-center markets. And in Peru, China invested around $1.3 billion in the strategic port of Chancay, a deepwater facility that entered full operation stage in November 2024, and set a new phase for trade between China and South America, bypassing the traditional deepwater ports located in the US, like the ports of Oakland and Stockton. Reinforcing this, China pledged in May 2025, at the CELAC forum ministerial meeting in Beijing, to ramp up its regional engagement even further. These were not isolated transactions but a structural presence, one that the 2025 National Security Strategy now identifies strictly as the rival foothold it intends to dislodge.

Now, within this context in 2026 the declared shift of interests proved it wasn’t merely rhetorical. The year started with the launching of Operation Resolve, when a group of American special military forces conducted a military raid and captured President Nicolás Maduro and his wife in Caracas, transporting them to New York to face narcoterrorism charges. Trump declared that the US was now “in charge” of Venezuela until a transition takes place. This meant in practice that the US would hold control over the country’s oil exports, which during the first four months after Maduro’s capture were estimated at $8 billion, but the data on how much oil has been sold, the revenue from it and the use given to those funds remains secret. The main importers of Venezuelan oil during this period were the United States (43 percent), India (26 percent, part of the strategy to reduce Indian import of Russian oil), and Spain (8 percent). This episode, condemned by critics as a return to the old days of imperialism, set the tone for the rest of the year: a hemisphere where Washington would use military force, tariffs, and other mechanics for pressuring countries to sign economic deals where American core interests prevail.

An example of this is the new and controversial Trade and Investment agreement signed by the United States and Argentina in February of this year. According to the text, Argentina shall adapt the regulatory framework to implement US trade standards and prioritize American direct investment in the country, while the counterpart shall “try to review its tariffs” and “consider supporting investment financing”. Milei’s government has justified this as the price for ideological loyalty and continued financial support after the $20 billion credit line that helped to stabilize the local currency (peso) last year.

On the other hand, Brazil took the opposite path: rather than just seeking accommodation to this policy, the government of Lula da Silva accelerated diversification, finalizing the long-delayed EU-Mercosur agreement in January, deepening trade with China and signing a memorandum of understanding with aims for further strategic partnership with Russia. Notably, the US has implemented another mechanism of pressure here, condemning the imprisonment of former president Jair Bolsonaro and holding a meeting with his son Flavio Bolsonaro, who will participate in the presidential elections this October. This gives clear signs of indirect support for this far-right candidate, following the regional trend with Milei in Argentina and Keiko Fujimori in Peru.

Peru, meanwhile, illustrates a third pattern and an interesting case, because alignment here is imposed less by negotiation than by sheer state fragility. Amid a presidency turning over for the ninth time in a decade, the US State Department warned in February that China’s control over the Chancay megaport threatens Peru’s sovereignty, following a Peruvian court ruling that exempted the port from national oversight. Peru’s case pictures a scenario where both counterparts keep pushing for concessions and more privileges. Under the government of José María Balcázar, the ninth president in 10 years, the country has been involved in the controversial purchase of 12 F-16 jetfighters with a cost of around $3.5 billion. On April he postponed the official ceremony where this deal was supposed to be signed arguing that it would have to be the responsibility of a new president, the decision was met with pushback, both internally, with declarations from the Ministry of Defense and in the US Embassy, with ambassador Bernardo Navarro declaring “If you deal with the U.S. in bad faith and undermine U.S. interests, rest assured, I, on behalf of [President] Trump and his administration, will use every available tool to protect and promote the prosperity and security of the United States and our region.” After this, with both internal and diplomatic pressure, the deal was signed on the 17th of April.

Taken together, these cases suggest the current US approach to Latin America is not fueled by a single ideological logic, but by transactional calculations that value compliance and heavily punishes resistance, exploiting weaknesses here and there and aiming to these policy goal indifferently to whether the country in question is led by a right, left or ideologically undefined government. What seems quite clear is that the decades of quietness in Latin America have ended, not necessarily because the region has changed, many of the deep challenges for development are still present, but because the rivalry that once defined the Cuban Missile Crisis has returned, this time fought over trade tariffs, infrastructure and technology access rather than missiles.

July 2 (UPI) — The pilot of a small plane that crashed into Beijing’s tallest building was a 66-year-old man who was suffering from “chronic insomnia and anxiety” and wrote about “ending his life” in his diary, authorities said Thursday.

The man died in the June 26 crash and wounded 13 others in the 109-story Citic Tower.

The pilot was identified as Liu and was a divorced freelancer who lived alone in Beijing, the Chaoyang district government said in a statement.

“The comprehensive investigation concluded that this was a case of endangering public safety caused by personal reasons,” the statement said.

One of the injured people has been discharged from the hospital, officials said.

Liu had taken off from an airport in the Pinggu district. That day he had flown accompanied and solo flights, the Chaoyang government’s statement said.

“During his solo flight, he deviated from the designated area and lost contact with the airport, subsequently colliding with the high-rise building and dying at the scene,” the statement said.

Liu obtained his sport pilot’s license in 2021 and private pilot’s license in 2024.

The plane was a two-seat, single-engine Aurora SA60L manufactured by Chinese company Sunward Aircraft, according to Flightradar24. It’s designed for touring, aerial photography and recreational aviation.

All references to the crash, video and images were scrubbed from social media in China. The state media, whose headquarters is across the street from the tower, didn’t report anything about the crash until the following day.

Chinese authorities often attribute random acts of violence to people seeking “revenge on society,” offering little information on the exact motive.

If you or someone you know is struggling with suicidal thoughts, help is available 24/7. Call or text the 988 Suicide & Crisis Lifeline for free, confidential support. Globally, the International Association for Suicide Prevention has contact information for crisis centers around the world.

Published on
02/07/2026 – 15:24 GMT+2

European car suppliers and manufacturers are divided over Brussels’ “Made in Europe” strategy, an effort to shield the EU market from Chinese competition.

ADVERTISEMENT

ADVERTISEMENT

The EU car industry is facing fierce competition from China, threatening hundreds of thousands of jobs across the bloc. To address the issue, the EU is preparing the so-called Industrial Accelerator Act, which is designed to favour electric vehicles constructed mostly with European components in public procurement and public support schemes.

However, EU car suppliers and manufacturers disagree over the proposed law, currently under discussion by EU countries and the European Parliament, which sets a 70 percent local content threshold for electric vehicles.

According to the European Association of Automotive Suppliers (CLEPA), the Commission’s proposal is a step in the right direction. Based on a study commissioned from management consultancy Roland Berger that Euronews has seen, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles and battery-electric vehicles manufactured in Europe already contain between 80 percent and 90 percent made-in-Europe components.

Consequently, it considers the Commission’s 70 percent threshold to be achievable.

But the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA) is pushing for a different methodology, under which regulators would assess finished vehicles instead of the local content in vehicle components.

“A vehicle is far more than the sum of its parts. Its value also lies in the R&D, advanced engineering and highly skilled workforce behind it,” ACEA said in a position paper published on 1 July.

CLEPA responded that under this methodology, a finished vehicle would require only 50 percent EU-made parts and components, with the remaining 20 percent coming from R&D, design and other activities.

This 20 percentage-point dilution of the requirement for EU-made parts “could result in the loss of 350,000 jobs”, CLEPA warned, saying the Commission’s component-level approach would “safeguard the existing manufacturing base”.

“What we are looking at right now is significant competition from best-cost countries, and the dragon in the room is China,” CLEPA Secretary General Benjamin Krieger told Euronews.

“A ‘Made in Europe’ threshold that ignores where the actual parts are built is a label that ignores the European worker,” he said.

Chinese stocks advanced after fresh manufacturing data pointed to sustained factory expansion and President Xi Jinping reaffirmed his commitment to promoting high-quality economic development. The upbeat market reaction reflected growing optimism over the resilience of China’s industrial sector and the continued strength of technology and innovation-driven industries.

However, investor sentiment remains tempered by concerns over uneven economic growth, with persistent weakness in consumer confidence, the labour market and the property sector continuing to weigh on the broader recovery.

Strong factory activity boosts market confidence

China’s manufacturing sector expanded for a seventh consecutive month, marking its strongest quarterly performance since late 2020. The data reinforced expectations that industrial production remains a key pillar of economic growth despite ongoing challenges in other parts of the economy.

The stronger-than-expected factory activity provided investors with reassurance that export-oriented manufacturing and industrial output continue to support China’s recovery.

Xi reiterates commitment to high-quality growth

President Xi Jinping renewed his pledge to pursue high-quality development, signalling that Beijing remains committed to an economic strategy centred on technological innovation, industrial upgrading and sustainable long-term growth.

The remarks reinforced expectations that policymakers will continue prioritising advanced manufacturing, strategic industries and innovation rather than relying solely on traditional stimulus measures to support the economy.

Technology sectors continue to outperform

Technology-related stocks led gains as investors increased exposure to sectors expected to benefit from China’s industrial and technological ambitions. Chipmaking equipment, biotechnology and software companies posted strong advances, reflecting continued confidence in industries viewed as central to China’s long-term economic transformation.

The rally highlights investors’ preference for sectors with stronger earnings potential and policy support.

Traditional sectors show signs of broader participation

Alongside technology stocks, gains also spread to agriculture and property-related shares, suggesting investor optimism is gradually broadening beyond high-growth industries.

Although these sectors continue to face structural challenges, their recovery indicates improving market sentiment and expectations that policy support could help stabilise weaker areas of the economy.

Economic recovery remains uneven

Despite encouraging manufacturing data, investors remain cautious about China’s broader economic outlook. Consumer spending continues to be constrained by weak confidence, labour market pressures and the prolonged downturn in the property sector, creating an uneven recovery across different parts of the economy.

The divergence between strong industrial performance and softer domestic demand continues to shape investment strategies and policy expectations.

Future Outlook

Chinese markets are likely to remain supported by resilient manufacturing activity, continued policy backing for innovation and expectations of further measures to sustain economic growth. However, the durability of the rally will depend on whether improvements in industrial production translate into stronger domestic consumption and broader economic recovery.

Investors will closely monitor upcoming economic data and government policy announcements for signs that Beijing can address persistent weaknesses in the property market, employment and consumer confidence while maintaining momentum in high-value manufacturing and technology sectors.

With information from Reuters.

Published on
30/06/2026 – 12:27 GMT+2

The EU has allocated import quotas for steel to its trading partners on Tuesday in an attempt to fight growing overcapacity from foreign producers.

ADVERTISEMENT

ADVERTISEMENT

The measure comes amid rising tensions between the EU and china China, where most of the global steel surplus originates.

Seeking to shield its market from global overcapacity, EU legislators agreed last April to increase existing tariff-free steel quotas to 18.3 million tonnes per year while doubling tariffs beyond those quotas to 50 percent

The EU’s closest allies, such as the UK, Switzerland and Ukraine, are concerned that their own exports to the EU could be drastically affected by the new measures, and have heavily lobbied the European Commission in recent weeks for preferential access to the EU market.

“We are providing market participants with predictability through clear and transparent quota distribution rules, while applying a fair and objective methodology,” EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič said in a statement.

Protectionist move

The protectionist move comes as global steel overcapacity is expected to grow to 721 million tonnes by 2027, according to the OECD, a volume that could threaten jobs across the entire EU steel sector.

The EU came under even greater pressure last year when the US imposed 50 percent tariffs on steel imports, rerouting the global surplus to the European market.

“They built a wall around their market, steel was hitting that wall and was coming back to our market in greater numbers,” a senior EU official said. “That is why we introduced a safeguard measure which followed an investigation.”

The EU is also fighting unfair trade practices across the board with 80 other measures already in place, among them anti-dumping duties, most of which target cheap steel imports from China.

Pressed by its closest allies to ease the measures to their benefit, the Commission announced on Tuesday that half of the 18.3 million tonnes allowed to enter its market each year will be allocated to partners bound by free trade agreements with the bloc, including India, Switzerland and the UK.

Many of the countries that have clinched a trade deal with the EU will be allocated country-specific quotas proportionate to the volumes traded with the EU between 2022 and 2024.

A special status has also been granted to Ukraine to support the country while it remains at war and ensure a certain level of exports to the EU.

EXPLAINER

China and Sudan signed off on a waiver of $50m as Sudan’s military-led government seeks support amid Western sanctions.

China has waived loans worth $50m that it had given to Sudan, the two countries said over the weekend. The agreement comes three years into a war between Sudan’s army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) that has shrunk the country’s economy by roughly 40 percent, according to the United Nations.

The sum is small compared with what Sudan owes overall to external governments or agencies, an amount estimated at more than $56bn before the war. But the waiver lands at a moment when Khartoum has few other international lenders extending any financial support.

China’s relationship with Sudan predates the war by decades, built on oil and infrastructure interests that survived multiple changes of government in Khartoum. But the war has narrowed Sudan’s options elsewhere, as Western governments have largely held back or imposed sanctions.

Here’s why this deal is significant for Sudan and China:

What do we know about the deal?

The signed protocol in Port Sudan cancels four interest-free loans worth 344 million yuan, about $50m, with immediate effect, according to Sudan’s official news agency, SUNA.

Sudan’s Finance Minister Gibril Ibrahim welcomed the move, reportedly saying that China has continued investing in the country throughout the war while Western governments, including the United States and European Union members, have largely held back. Gibril himself was added to the US Treasury sanctions list in September 2025 for his alleged “involvement in Sudan’s brutal civil war and … connections to Iran”.

China’s charge d’affaires in Sudan, Xu Jian, reportedly said at the signing ceremony that China was ready to help rebuild what was destroyed during the war in Sudan.

What’s in it for Sudan?

Sudan’s external debt of more than $56bn before the war is expected to have ballooned since.

The $50m debt relief amounts to not even 1 percent of the total external pre-war debt. In fact, Sudan was close to a far bigger debt write-off in 2021. It was on track with the IMF and the World Bank Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative to have more than $50bn of its debt forgiven within three years. The 2021 military coup in October derailed that debt relief plan, and the process was formally suspended a year later.

Still, China’s waiver arrives at a moment of acute need for the country. The war is now in its third year. More than 1.5 million people have been killed, according to the UN, and the war has displaced about 14 million people – about a quarter of the Sudanese population. The World Health Organization says less than 14 percent of health facilities are still functioning. Jobs have vanished in many parts of the country, and the rising cost of living has made it difficult for households to survive.

The Sudanese pound has collapsed since the start of the war. It went from roughly 600 to the dollar before the war to more than 5000 to the dollar by June 2026.

What’s in it for China?

In many ways, Beijing’s decision to waive the $50m loan is in keeping with a broader approach it has taken in recent years, one that has helped cement China as Africa’s largest trading partner for 17 consecutive years.

China has provided interest-free loan forgiveness as a diplomatic gesture to multiple countries, and these decisions are recurrent announcements at Beijing’s frequent leader-level summits with African nations. This is especially true for smaller loans. Research from the Johns Hopkins China Africa Research Initiative found that China forgave at least $3.4bn of these kinds of debts across the African continent between 2000 and 2019.

By contrast, larger loans are usually commercial loans through state banks that come with interest, and waiving those is harder.

At a time when the West is largely trying to isolate Sudan’s leadership, a small loan waiver gives China outsized influence in a country that sits at the intersection of the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa.

What have China-Sudan ties been like historically?

Oil has long served as a catalyst for their relationship. From the mid-1990s on, China’s National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) poured billions of dollars into Sudanese oil fields and the pipelines carrying that crude oil to Port Sudan. This was a time when many Western companies were pushed out due to sanctions.

The relationship changed when the southern part of the country voted in favour of independence in 2011. The world’s newest country, South Sudan, left the north and took most of the country’s oil fields with it.

Chinese investment largely dried up afterwards, but Sudan still has more than $5bn of outstanding debt to China. The war has aggravated Sudan’s economic challenges. The CNPC requested a formal exit from Sudan in December 2025.

Although increasingly limited, China’s dependencies on the EU in strategic technologies have not disappeared.

ADVERTISEMENT

ADVERTISEMENT

In today’s increasingly tense geopolitical environment, closing this gap has become an urgent priority for Beijing. The country’s 15th Five-Year Plan, unveiled last March, places technological self-reliance at the heart of its industrial strategy through 2030.

In semiconductors, aerospace technologies, pharmaceuticals, automotive chips, robotics and quantum computing, European companies still supply products that remain essential to China.

As trade tensions with Beijing intensify, could these dependencies give Europe leverage? Most experts are sceptical. China’s monopoly over rare earths — essential for Europe’s green technologies and defence industry — is a far more powerful weapon that could be used in retaliation against the EU.

“China really has a choke point when it comes to minerals, but we don’t have an equivalent choke point, which is very powerful,” Tobias Gehrke, an expert at the European Council on Foreign Relations, told Euronews.

In some sectors, China may achieve self-reliance within just a few years, according to expert Sam Goodman in a report published in May for the Brussels-based Martens Centre.

Euronews examined those sectors. Here are the technologies in which China still remains dependent on the EU.

Semiconductors

In the semiconductor supply chain, the EU has a jewel : ASML, the Dutch company with the highest market valuation ever recorded by a European company, boasting a market capitalization of more than €630 billion in 2026.

The company holds a near-monopoly on extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography machines, which are essential for manufacturing advanced semiconductor chips used in artificial intelligence and electric vehicles.

China’s dependence on ASML has already been exploited by the United States and the Netherlands, which have restricted sales of the strategic technology to Beijing. But China can still buy less advanced deep ultraviolet lithography machines, a segment in which ASML holds almost 90% of the global market, according to Gehrke. In 2024, for some of those products, up to 70% of shipments went to China.

However, China is moving quickly to catch up. It now requires that 50% of equipment used in new chip production capacity be sourced domestically, Gehrke wrote in a report published in March.

“The Chinese have set a target that they want to start producing their own chips, not using ASML machines by 2028,” Goodman told Euronews. “But they’re still going to be dependent on ASML to learn.”

Maintenance and repair of installed equipment in China also account for a significant share of EU suppliers’ revenues.

In the event of EU restrictions on semiconductor exports, Gehrke forecasts “potentially large” economic damage to China, particularly if servicing were restricted, “but great spill-over risks,” as a significant share of ASML’s revenue is exposed.

Aerospace

The Comac C919 narrow-body airliner is China’s answer to the widely used passenger jets produced by U.S. manufacturer Boeing and European rival Airbus. But its supply chain remains heavily dependent on European companies.

Goodman lists several of them, including France’s Safran, which produces its engine, Germany’s Liebherr Aerospace, which supplies its cabin pressure system, and Italy’s Avio Aero, which manufactures the engine casing.

“Without the participation of these companies, China wouldn’t have a civil aviation programme,” Goodman said. “Civil aviation is very complicated to begin with, with safety standards very high; it takes a long time to get the know-how needed to do it.”

However, despite China’s dependence on European suppliers, any attempt to weaponise the supply chain could also come at a cost for Europe.

“It will hurt the bottom line of European aerospace suppliers which do very well out of China,” Goodman told Euronews. But he argues that the alternative is to “accept basically that China learn all our technology, create rivals and then destroy our market share”.

Competition between Chinese and European manufacturers is already intense.

A quiet battle is emerging over certification, with China seeking approval from the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) to allow the C919 to operate in Europe.

“This is a leverage for Europe which could politicise the process and refuse China’s aircraft certification”, Gehrke said. But Beijing is already playing the same game, slowing down the certification of new Airbus aircraft in China.

As of now, Airbus has more than 2,200 aircraft in service in mainland China, holding roughly a 55% market share.

Pharma and biotechnology

Europe still leads China in pharmaceutical patents. “In 2024, companies in Italy, Germany and France alone had double the number of pharmaceutical patents granted compared to China,” Goodman said.

The expert added that EU companies continue to dominate the vaccine market, with Germany’s Merck, France’s Sanofi and Britain’s GSK “accounting for 51 percent of global vaccine market share in 2024″.

However, according to figures from LEEM, the French pharmaceutical industry association, China’s R&D investment grew by 16.2% annually between 2020 and 2024—twice the pace of Europe—allowing it to account for more than one-third of new molecules produced by global pharmaceutical research in 2024.

Some EU companies have also established joint ventures and R&D partnerships to benefit from China’s research spending and lower manufacturing costs, including Germany’s Bayer and France’s Sanofi.

Which side benefits the most from joint ventures? “Always China,” Goodman said. “I’ve found no example of a joint venture between a Chinese company and a non-Chinese company where the non-Chinese company has benefited from technology transfer.”

When it comes to medical equipment, EU companies such as Siemens Healthineers and Philips remain global leaders in magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), although both have significantly expanded their manufacturing footprint in China.

“Local competitors are catching up rapidly,” Gehrke said, but he added that “there is still a gap in key upstream MRI components – such as superconducting magnets and image-processing software.”

Automotive chips

Chinese flagship automakers such as BYD and Chery also depend on European technologies, including chips from Germany’s Infineon, the Netherlands’ NXP and Franco-Italian STMicroelectronics.

China’s strategy is to become self-reliant in the sector, but Goodman said that the “domestic demand for EVs and the chips within them has meant that automotive companies in the PRC [People’s Republic of China] face an import substitution challenge”.

But the EU’s leadership in these niche technologies remains precarious.

“Europe is strong in mature automotive chips because they do produce power electronics sensors, but there are still very high vulnerabilities in certain parts of the supply chains, mainly in the back-end manufacturing part,” Giulia Albini from CLEPA, the European Association of Automotive Suppliers, told Euronews.

The EU depends on other regions—including China—for packaging, assembly and testing, as last year’s dispute over Dutch-based Nexperia, owned by China’s Wingtech, revealed. Following the Netherlands’ takeover of the company, China restricted chip exports to the EU.

Goodman added that the significant share of Chinese customers, as well as EU carmakers operating in China, makes it “unlikely that this leverage could be utilised”.

Robotics and quantum

Robots are China’s latest showcase of technological progress. Few will forget Chinese humanoid robots taking centre stage during televised Lunar New Year celebrations.

But Goodman said that a sizeable portion of the downstream supply chain, including the components that make the robots move, is produced by European companies, including Sweden’s Ewellix and Germany’s Rexroth.

“The leading Chinese humanoid robotic companies do not publish their supply chain for this very reason,” Goodman said.

However, he added that, in any case, the narrative of a self-sufficient Chinese humanoid robot sector “ready to take the world by storm” should be examined carefully.

When it comes to quantum computing, designed to carry out complex calculations faster than classical computers, Goodman said that China wants to keep working with Europeans to meet its industrial and commercialisation targets.

However, EU member states remain divided over the merits of partnering with China in what is regarded as the next major technological frontier after the AI boom.

“The French, the Dutch, the Germans have very rigorous export controls on materials that could be used for quantum computing by China, while the Spanish and the Italian have active projects with Chinese companies developing quantum in Europe,” Goodman said.

“Unless we have a unified approach, inevitably China is going to gain the system.”

In May 2026, just hours before President Donald Trump met President Xi Jinping, OpenAI’s Vice President of Global Affairs Chris Lehane floated the idea of a US-led global governance body for artificial intelligence that would include China as a member. The model, according to media reports, was compared to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a familiar reference for managing strategic technologies with global consequences.

One month later, at the G7 summit in Évian-les-Bains, a different tone emerged. Several influential AI executives joined leaders from advanced economies to discuss AI governance, online safety, and global security. According to Axios, Anthropic’s Dario Amodei and Google DeepMind’s Demis Hassabis leaned towards a more selective framework among democratic countries, while OpenAI’s Sam Altman used broader language, calling for an international forum to develop shared testing standards and risk assessments.

These two moments reveal something important: the meaning of “global AI governance” remains unsettled. In one setting, global means including China for legitimacy. In another, it can mean a trusted coalition designed to manage access, capability, and strategic risk. AI governance is becoming part of the architecture of global power.

Three Voices, Different Emphases

Their presence at the G7 showed how quickly AI firms have moved from building systems to helping shape the politics around them. The leaders of OpenAI, Anthropic, Google DeepMind, Mistral, Cohere, and other firms were not simply observers of geopolitics. They were part of the conversation about how technological power should be governed.

Their positions were not identical. Amodei reportedly urged democratic countries to coordinate more closely so that AI governance would not fragment. Hassabis stressed the strategic importance of frontier capability. Altman, by contrast, used more institutionally neutral language, suggesting that advanced AI should not be shaped only by the companies building the most capable systems.

Even among frontier AI developers, there is no settled imagination of global governance. Should it include all major AI powers, including strategic rivals? Should it be built around trusted coalitions? Should it prioritize safety, democratic values, geopolitical advantage, or public legitimacy?

The question became more complicated because the G7 discussions came shortly after the US government imposed export controls that forced Anthropic to suspend foreign access to its Fable 5 and Mythos 5 models. Reuters reported that the order required Anthropic to block access to the models for foreign nationals, leading the company to disable them more broadly to ensure compliance. The episode showed how frontier AI governance can move from abstract principles to abrupt restrictions. Even among democratic allies, technological solidarity has limits. When AI becomes strategic infrastructure, every country begins to think about its own room for maneuver.

The Asymmetry of “Global”

The deeper issue lies in who has the power to define the word “global” in the first place. In May, global governance could mean a US-led institution that includes China. In June, it could mean coordination among democracies to manage frontier capability and strategic access. The definition changed because the political room changed.

This reveals a double asymmetry. The first is technical: only a small number of firms can define what counts as a frontier model, how its capabilities should be tested, and who should be allowed to access it. The second is narrative: the same ecosystem also helps frame the language through which the world discusses governance.

For countries outside the frontier AI circle, they may be invited to conversations but not always to the stage where categories, thresholds, and governance priorities are first shaped. They may be asked to adopt best practices whose assumptions were formed elsewhere. They may be told that risks are global, even when preparedness remains highly unequal.

G7 outreach to partner countries such as India, Brazil, Kenya, South Korea, and Egypt is important. It recognizes that AI governance cannot remain a conversation among advanced economies alone. Yet there remains a difference between being present in a forum and helping design the architecture of the forum itself. The question is who defines the table, the agenda, the risk categories, and the meaning of global governance itself.

When the AI Frontier Moves Towards the Market

There is another reason why a broader governance imagination is necessary. Frontier AI innovation is no longer centered primarily in universities or public research institutions. It is increasingly shaped by private firms with the capital, compute, talent, data access, and infrastructure required to train and deploy the most capable models.

Stanford’s AI Index 2025 noted that nearly 90 per cent of notable AI models in 2024 came from industry, up from 60 per cent in 2023. A report prepared for the European Economic and Social Committee on generative AI and foundation models also described significant US dominance across the value chain. These findings point to a structural shift: the frontier is becoming more concentrated, more expensive, and more closely tied to corporate and geopolitical capacity.

Much of AI’s progress has come from companies willing to take risks, scale products, and build technical capability at extraordinary speed. But the center of gravity has shifted. When frontier AI is largely financed, defined, and deployed by market actors, the default imagination of AI development can tilt towards commercial viability, platform advantage, user growth, and strategic positioning.

Public interest does not disappear in such a system. It risks becoming secondary unless other actors are strong enough to bring it back into the room.

Open Future, a European digital policy organization, has warned that concentrations of power in AI can make public activities dependent on “a narrow group of monopolists.” The phrase matters because infrastructure-level dependency can weaken society’s ability to negotiate the terms of the technologies it relies on.

A Wider Public-Interest Layer

In a multiplex digital world, power does not flow only through states or markets. It also moves through universities, civil society organizations, professional associations, media, labor groups, open-source communities, public-interest technologists, and moral institutions. Together, these actors form the society layer often missing from discussions dominated by states and markets.

States define security priorities. Companies define technical possibility. Society must help test legitimacy. Who bears the risk? Who benefits from deployment? Who is excluded from design? What harms are being normalized because they are commercially convenient or geopolitically useful?

This is why Pope Leo XIV’s recent intervention on AI is politically relevant beyond its religious context. In his encyclical Magnifica Humanitas, he argues that protecting the human person in the age of AI requires renewed reflection on the common good, solidarity, social justice, and human dignity. Such interventions will not replace regulation or technical standards. They help recover a truth easily lost in frontier AI politics: governance is also about preserving the human meaning of technological progress.

The same question of authorship is beginning to appear in empirical research. Ongoing fieldwork-based research at the University of Oxford has started to examine whether countries in the Global South are developing approaches to AI governance that are neither simple copies of Western regulatory templates nor rejections of international cooperation but pragmatic syntheses shaped by local institutional capacity, regulatory sequencing, and historical experience with technology transfer. Indonesia has appeared as one of the country cases in this line of inquiry.

Governance models worth studying are not only those negotiated in Évian, Brussels, Washington, or New York. They are also being improvised, often informally, by mid-sized digital economies navigating dependency and ambition at the same time.

The United Nations’ Global Digital Compact (GDC), adopted in September 2024, offers a useful multilateral reference point. It frames digital cooperation and AI governance around inclusion, human rights, open standards, interoperability, digital public goods, and multi-stakeholder cooperation. The Compact does not resolve the power asymmetries of frontier AI by itself, but it gives societies, alongside states and firms, a language for claiming a legitimate role in digital governance.

The practical task is to strengthen public-interest evaluation: the ability to test social impact, language bias, local risks, institutional misuse, and deployment consequences in different societies. The aim is to preserve enough room for public reasoning so that the future of AI is not defined only by those with the largest models, the biggest markets, or the strongest strategic leverage.

Imagining a More Inclusive AI Governance

The lesson from the IAEA analogy and the G7 discussions is not that one model is right and the other is wrong. Both reflect real concerns. A broadly inclusive governance arrangement may be necessary for legitimacy, especially when AI risks cross borders. A trusted coalition may also be necessary when capability access raises genuine security concerns. The problem begins when either model claims to be global while leaving too many societies downstream of decisions made elsewhere.

For emerging economies, the strategic challenge is not simply to wait for a better invitation to the next summit. Participation matters, but it is not enough. Countries and societies need stronger capacity to evaluate AI systems, understand their dependencies, articulate local risks, and negotiate governance terms with greater confidence.

This is a call for a more plural architecture of governance, where states, markets, and society all have meaningful roles. The uncomfortable question is not whether AI requires international coordination. It clearly does. The harder question is whether that coordination can remain open enough for societies, not only states and companies, to shape the terms of technological power.

In the age of frontier AI, the future will not be determined only by who builds the largest models. It will also be shaped by who gets to define risk, test systems, question assumptions, and decide what counts as progress.

Every era that has tried to govern a transformative technology eventually learns the same lesson: legitimacy borrowed from power is not the same as legitimacy earned through participation. The IAEA’s own history shows that global trust is rarely built at the moment institutions are created; it is earned over time, through broader representation, credible restraint, and shared accountability. The real question for AI governance is whether it can shorten that distance by design, rather than waiting for legitimacy to arrive only after contestation.

June 26 (Asia Today) — China said Friday that it remains in close communication with South Korea over fisheries issues after President Lee Jae Myung called for stronger action against Chinese fishing boats accused of operating illegally in the Yellow Sea.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun said maintaining stable waters and an orderly fishing environment between the two countries serves their common interests.

China consistently instructs its fishermen to operate in accordance with laws and regulations while also protecting their lawful rights, Guo said at a regular news briefing in Beijing.

“China and South Korea have a relatively mature dialogue mechanism on fisheries issues and maintain close communication on related matters,” Guo said.

He did not directly address whether the Chinese vessels cited by Lee had engaged in illegal fishing.

Lee raised the issue Wednesday during a visit to the Yeonpyeong Peace Observatory, where he received a briefing on waters near the Northern Limit Line, the de facto maritime boundary between South and North Korea in the Yellow Sea.

After being told that Chinese fishing boats had moved south of the maritime line, Lee questioned why they remained there despite being observed by South Korean forces.

He also asked whether South Korea should station enforcement vessels in the area.

“We have officially confirmed that they crossed the NLL,” Lee said. “I do not think we should simply leave this unattended.”

Lee ordered officials to take firm action, saying the visible presence of the boats during daylight hours showed the seriousness of the problem.

The Chinese government’s response largely repeated its previous position, emphasizing lawful fishing, the protection of Chinese fishermen’s rights and continued consultations with South Korea.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260626010009476

China’s LineShine overtakes US-based El Capitan as most powerful supercomputer, according to the TOP500 list.

China has displaced the United States on an influential ranking of the world’s fastest supercomputers, underscoring Beijing’s growing capability to compete with the world’s leading superpower in cutting-edge technology.

China’s LineShine is the most powerful system on the planet, overtaking the US-based El Capitan, according to the biannual ranking announced in Hamburg, Germany, on Tuesday.

LineShine, located at the National Supercomputing Centre in Shenzhen, achieved a performance of 2.198 exaflops, carrying out more than 2 quintillion calculations per second – a 20 percent lead over El Capitan, according to the latest TOP500 list.

LineShine’s position marks the first time a Chinese system has topped the list since Sunway TaihuLight did so in 2017.

El Capitan, based at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, had ranked as the top-performing system since November 2024.

Frontier, hosted by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee, ranked third, followed by Aurora at the Argonne National Laboratory in Illinois and Jupiter at the Jülich Supercomputing Centre in Germany.

Other countries represented in the top 20 include the UK, Japan, South Korea, Italy, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.

Unlike other supercomputers, LineShine runs entirely on general-purpose central processing units (CPUs), which have fewer processing cores and are slower at performing complex tasks than the graphics processing units (GPUs) indispensable to running AI models, such as ChatGPT and Claude.

LineShine is the first and only system to achieve more than 2 exaflops in performance using a CPU-only design, according to the TOP500 list.

The TOP500 list has been published twice yearly since 1993, when computer scientists Erich Strohmaier and Hans Meuer first compiled statistics on supercomputers around the world in preparation for a conference on the topic.

The list ranks supercomputers’ performance using the LINPACK Benchmark, which measures the amount of time it takes to solve a dense system of linear equations.

While the TOP500 list has been influential for decades, experts consider the ranking to have become less relevant since the advent of AI.

While corporate tech giants such as Microsoft and Amazon are at the forefront of today’s advances in AI, the list is largely made up of government and academic initiatives that volunteered their participation.

In a 2015 paper, researchers at Cornell University estimated that El Capitan achieved only 22 percent of the computational performance of xAI’s Colossus supercomputing facility in Memphis, Tennessee.

China and the US are locked in a fierce battle for global supremacy in leading technologies such as AI, with Washington and Beijing rolling out a slew of tit-for-tat sanctions and export controls to blunt each other’s advances.

The 2026 AI Index Report, released in April by Stanford University, found that China had “effectively closed” the AI model performance gap with the US.

While the US produces more top-of-the-line AI models, China holds the advantage in rolling out patents and industrial robot installations, the report said.