China

Crude oil and natural gas supplies have been disrupted worldwide by the United States-Israel war on Iran, but one energy sector appears to be cashing in – coal.

This week, South Africa’s thermal coal producer Thungela Resources said it had doubled its half-year profits as the war has forced more countries to buy the fuel.

Although abundant and relatively cheap to produce, coal is considered one of the dirtiest fossil fuels.

Mining it causes water pollution, and burning it releases enormous amounts of carbon into the atmosphere, which contributes to global warming.

In recent months, several countries, especially in Asia, have reversed or delayed promises to scale back on coal production.

Global coal consumption was already rising in 2025 with the Eurasia region and the US using the fuel to power artificial intelligence data centres, according to the World Bank.

Here’s what we know:

Why is more coal being used?

The US-Israel war on Iran has triggered a global energy crisis. Soon after strikes on Tehran began on February 28, Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, through which about one-fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies were shipped during peacetime.

Negotiations to reopen the strait are ongoing.

Its closure has reduced oil and gas supplies and caused oil prices to soar, prompting many countries to fall back on the most readily available alternative to keep the power on – coal.

While coal prices have also risen, the fuel is still much cheaper than oil – and is more readily available.

No region has been more impacted than Asia, which largely depends on the Gulf for its energy needs. About 82 percent of oil and gas shipments through the Strait of Hormuz went to Asia in 2022, according to the US Energy Information Administration. China, India, Japan and South Korea were the top destinations.

Besides being unable to ship exports through the strait, Gulf countries caught up in the conflict have also been badly impacted by Iranian strikes. Qatar, for example, was forced to declare force majeure on its delivery contracts in March when Iranian drones hit its Ras Laffan oil facility – the world’s largest LNG complex – forcing it offline. Iran’s attacks had knocked out 17 percent of Qatar’s LNG exports by March, state officials said.

Similarly, the United Arab Emirates’s Das Island LNG terminal, Fujairah oil terminal, Ruwais Refinery Complex and other energy sites have been attacked during the conflict. Facilities in Saudi Arabia and Oman have also been hit.

Where has coal use increased?

According to an analysis by the energy data company Ember, coal output will rise globally by 1.8 percent by the end of 2026 compared with 2025 in a “worst-case” scenario.

This represents a notable uptick considering that countries are meant to be transitioning away from coal, experts said.

Since the war began, several Asian countries have announced plans to increase coal-fired electricity generation.

Japan has lifted restrictions on older, high-emission coal plants to cope with the energy shocks while South Korea has delayed the shutdown of coal-powered plants it promised to wind down by 2040.

In Bangladesh, the government at first imposed power cuts, closed universities and rationed fuel sales for vehicles before announcing it had ramped up coal-powered electricity generation.

Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam have also increased coal-powered electricity generation to preserve dwindling gas reserves.

In Pakistan, data from the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority showed that by July, electricity generated from imported coal had risen by 90 percent compared with the same period the previous year.

China and India already consume 70 percent of the world’s coal and are also major producers. In India, where electricity demand is increasing partly due to more intense heatwaves, the government plans to launch several new coal-mining projects that will see global supplies increase by 2.5 billion tonnes a year, according to the Global Energy Monitor.

Germany also said it won’t jeopardise electricity generation because of earlier climate promises it made while Italy has pushed back its coal phase-out plans from late 2025 to 2038.

Who is making a profit from coal?

Indonesia is the top coal exporter by a wide margin, followed by Australia and Russia.

In March, Jakarta reversed previous plans to curb coal production and reduce oversupply in a bid to benefit from the rising prices. Prices were set at $131.85 per tonne in July, compared with $102.20 in the previous year.

South Africa’s Thungela, meanwhile, reported doubled profits from January to June, compared with the same period of 2025, driven largely by higher production from its Ensham mines in Queensland as well as higher demand and higher prices at both Ensham and its South Africa operations.

Production at Ensham rose by 38 percent in the first half of the year – during the peak of the conflict – to 2.2 tonnes, compared with 1.6 tonnes in the previous period.

The company reported 4.80 South African rand ($0.30) in headline earnings per share – or HEPS, a primary metric of profitability used in South Africa. That’s up from 1.92 rand ($0.12) in June last year.

In a statement, Thungela said prices will likely remain high as European and Asian markets prepare for winter.

What does this mean for the drive for clean energy?

In 2021, more than 40 countries, including Indonesia and Vietnam, promised to scale back coal use at the COP26 global climate summit. India and China did not sign up, however. Last year, South Korea joined the Powering Past Coal Alliance, which helps coal-dependent economies transition away from the fuel.

However, the Middle East crisis has upset those plans largely because many countries do not have sufficient renewable energy-generating capacity to fall back on, said Nick Hedley, an energy transition analyst at South Africa-based Zero Carbon Analytics.

“For the likes of Bangladesh, it’s easy to lift coal use when global gas supplies are disrupted because the country invested heavily in coal infrastructure in recent decades, and much of that capacity has been sitting idle,” he said.

“Coal becomes cheaper than imported gas when gas prices surge. Importantly, coal still cannot compete with renewables on cost,” Hedley added.

It’s not all doom, however. Analysts noted that upticks in some places are being offset by long-term declines in coal use in places like Europe.

China’s domestic coal production also fell this year as the government tightened oversight following a deadly explosion in May at the Liushenyu coal mine, where 82 people died. Beijing has also made large investments in renewables.

In addition, the breakdown of global fossil energy supply chains could make clean alternatives more competitive and force more countries to invest in them, Hedley pointed out.

“The lesson here is that Asian countries need to speed up their shift to clean energy and electrification to safeguard themselves against future global crises,” he concluded.

By chaining bilateral naval exercises across a widening circle of partners — Russia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, and now Indonesia — Beijing is not assembling an alliance. It is manufacturing the impression that a Chinese warship’s presence near every regional flashpoint, including the waters off Taiwan, is unremarkable.

On July 29th, the Indonesian frigate KRI I Gusti Ngurah Rai wrapped up a two-day naval drill with the Russian navy in Vladivostok, part of Exercise Orruda 2026. Two weeks later, on August 12th, China’s Ministry of National Defense announced that the same ship, on its way home, would run a “passing exercise” with a Chinese frigate, the Honghe — not in Indonesian waters, not in the South China Sea, but east of Taiwan. Jakarta’s navy described it in the blandest terms available: communications drills, a resupply run, “a universal naval tradition.” Taipei was not reassured. Taiwan’s foreign ministry said it “sternly condemns” the move and complained that Beijing had “unilaterally claimed” Indonesian participation before Jakarta had said a word about where, or why, this was happening.

That gap — between Jakarta’s shrug and Taipei’s alarm — is the story. It is also a useful corrective to how most coverage of Chinese naval activity is currently framed. The default lens is bilateral and confrontational: China versus the Philippines at Second Thomas Shoal, China versus Japan around the Senkakus, China versus Taiwan in the Strait. That lens catches real events, but it misses the connective tissue between them — a growing schedule of joint drills with third parties, each one small and individually deniable as “routine,” that collectively do something the confrontational track cannot: they make China’s presence in the surrounding water look normal to everyone except the state it is actually disputing with.

Indonesia and China have their own maritime dispute: Beijing’s nine-dash line overlaps Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone around the Natuna Islands, and Chinese fishing incursions there froze bilateral naval drills between 2015 and 2021. Those “Sharp Knife” exercises resumed in 2021 and have picked up pace since 2024. That history matters, but it is not what explains this month’s drill, because this drill did not happen anywhere near Natuna. It happened off Taiwan — waters Indonesia has no claim to and, until now, no naval presence in alongside China. Indonesia is simply the newest and most sensitive addition to a list that already includes Russia (the mature anchor partnership, most recently “Joint Sea-2026” in July), Malaysia (“Peace and Friendship 2025” in the Strait of Malacca last October), Cambodia (“Golden Dragon” at the newly built Ream Naval Base logistics center last spring), Thailand (“Blue Strike” and “Falcon Strike,” the latter launched again this month), and Vietnam (a Beibu Gulf coast guard and navy patrol series now past its fortieth iteration). All of this sits alongside a separate, unilateral track — a 100-plus-vessel show of force spanning the Yellow Sea to the western Pacific last December, and routine coast guard patrols around Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal.

The claim of this piece is that these two tracks are not separate stories about Chinese assertiveness. They are one story, working in tandem: the unilateral patrols draw the lines, and the bilateral drills erase them, by training a widening circle of regional navies — and the publics who read about them — to treat a Chinese warship’s presence near contested space as routine bilateral traffic rather than a signal.

The Indonesia case is the clearest evidence yet, because the location was Beijing’s choice, not Jakarta’s. Indonesia had no dispute-driven reason to be operating near Taiwan; its dispute with China sits in the Natuna Sea, hundreds of miles away. What Jakarta had was a frigate already at sea, returning from Russia, and a willingness to let Beijing choose the itinerary’s final leg. Global Times, writing for a domestic Chinese audience, called the drill’s timing “of great significance” — language China’s defense ministry does not use for routine port calls. The exercise also landed in the same week that Elbridge Colby, the U.S. Under Secretary of War for Policy, was in Jakarta courting Indonesia’s alignment. Chaining a Chinese passing exercise onto the tail of an Indonesian-Russian one, in waters adjacent to the most dangerous flashpoint in the region, at the exact moment Washington was making its own pitch, is not the profile of a routine bilateral courtesy call.

The strongest objection to this argument comes from analysts of Malaysia’s drills with China, who point out that Kuala Lumpur treats “Peace and Friendship” as a hedging tool it controls, not a concession Beijing extracted — the exercises are deliberately unsophisticated (humanitarian assistance, counter-piracy, no live fire), and Malaysia’s own defense establishment remains wary of Chinese assertiveness even as it participates. That is a fair description of Malaysia’s intent, and it likely holds for Cambodia and Thailand too: these governments are managing great-power competition on their own terms, not capitulating to it. But intent on the partner’s side does not determine the effect on Beijing’s side. Whatever Kuala Lumpur or Phnom Penh tell their own publics, every additional bilateral drill lowers the diplomatic and psychological cost, for Beijing, of being seen operating a warship near water someone else disputes. Indonesia’s case shows why that distinction matters: Jakarta’s intent was almost certainly routine — a frigate coming home. Beijing’s was not. It picked the coordinates.

None of this means China is close to fielding a formal coalition in the NATO sense; nothing here involves interoperability, shared command, or mutual defense. What it means is narrower and, in some ways, more useful to Beijing: a maintenance routine that makes normalization cumulative rather than a single dramatic claim to defend. Each additional partner adds one more government that has, at least once, treated a joint Chinese naval presence near contested water as unremarkable — and one more precedent for the next invitation.

The guest list is also instructive. The one claimant conspicuously absent from it is the Philippines — the country with the loudest ongoing disputes with Beijing, at Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal, and the one treaty ally the United States has directly on the South China Sea’s rim. Manila gets unilateral coercion, not invitations: coast guard patrols, water-cannon incidents, and jamming, rather than passing exercises. Every partner on the actual list — Russia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia — either has no U.S. mutual defense treaty or, like Thailand, treats its treaty commitments as dormant rather than active. That is not a coincidence; it is a selection criterion. Beijing is not inviting the states most capable of resisting the normalization effect. It is inviting the states most likely to accept it, and saving coercion for the one state structurally immune to the charm offensive.

What happens next

Base case (roughly 55 percent).  The Indonesia relationship deepens but recalibrates location. A higher-tempo revival of the Sharp Knife series continues, concentrated in Indonesian or South China Sea-adjacent waters near Natuna rather than repeated performances off Taiwan. Jakarta absorbs the diplomatic cost of this month’s episode privately — quiet reassurances to Taipei and Washington — while keeping the relationship with Beijing intact. The key assumption: the backlash from Taiwan and the attention from Washington made a second Taiwan-adjacent rerun more costly to Jakarta than its benefit to Beijing.

Downside case.  Beijing repeats the chaining tactic with a second partner within the next twelve months, most plausibly Brunei — the quietest South China Sea claimant, which in February 2025 already agreed to joint oil-and-gas development with Beijing in disputed waters it claims. A first-ever Brunei-China passing exercise, timed to overlap with a Brunei exercise involving another power and staged near a genuinely contested reef rather than international water, would confirm this is a repeatable playbook rather than an Indonesia-specific improvisation — and would be far harder for the U.S. and Japan to counter, since Brunei has never been a vocal claimant to rally around.

Upside case.  Taiwan’s public condemnation, paired with Washington’s trilateral drills with Australia and the Philippines, hardens into an explicit regional habit of naming the chaining tactic itself — not just the individual exercise — making it reputationally costly for the next candidate partner to accept the choreography. The coalition-of-drills strategy stalls not because China stops asking, but because fewer navies say yes.

The takeaway

Beijing did not build a coalition off Taiwan this month; it borrowed one, for two days, from a country with no stake in the fight. That is a cheaper and more durable tool than a formal alliance would be, and it will not show up as a single dramatic escalation — it will show up as a pattern, one passing exercise at a time.

Watch for:  whether Indonesia’s navy does it again, and where. A repeat performance near another sensitive location within the next two quarters would confirm the pattern; a retreat to home waters would suggest Jakarta drew its own line. Watch, too, whether Brunei’s navy — quiet for decades — puts to sea with a Chinese frigate for the first time following its 2025 oil-and-gas pledge in disputed waters.

The government of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz approved a landmark bill to expand the powers of the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) and the Domestic Intelligence Service (BfV) by 2027. This expansion grants them offensive and operational tools, including cyber counter-sabotage and espionage, with funding of €1.51 billion. This move has sparked significant concern among Chinese and Russian intelligence agencies regarding the radical shift in German security doctrine, stemming from the geopolitical context and the fears of Germany’s adversaries, China and Russia, regarding the ongoing hybrid warfare. The German initiative was driven by the escalating pace of gray and hybrid warfare, the most recent example being the discovery of a booby-trapped drone at Leipzig’s strategic airport. Consequently, intelligence, strategic, and security circles in Beijing and Moscow are closely monitoring this historic intelligence revolution approved by Chancellor Merz’s government on August 12, 2026.  This draft law (exceeding 700 pages) represents the most significant shift in Germany’s security doctrine since the end of World War II in 1945. From the perspective of Chinese and Russian intelligence, this shift constitutes a security revolution that ends the strict constraints imposed on Germany since World War II, transforming German intelligence agencies from mere information-gathering tools into entities capable of launching offensive and counter-sabotage operations. For these reasons, this internal German intelligence transformation is being closely monitored and analyzed in depth within intelligence and military circles in Beijing and Moscow, given its strategic dimensions and its connection to Berlin’s attempt to break free from American dependence. This move, analyzed by Chinese and Russian intelligence and military circles, is seen as a targeting of Russia and China. Although Berlin attempts to frame counterintelligence as a general effort, German officials, such as Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt, have explicitly stated that the goal is to deter Russian and Chinese sabotage operations and enable German intelligence to inflict pain on adversaries and operate on equal footing with allies like the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), rather than relying on them entirely. The German Federal Parliament (Bundestag) is expected to formally pass the bill after the summer recess, allowing these offensive powers to become fully operational in Germany by early 2027.

Military think tanks and research centers affiliated with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Russian circles alike are analyzing all the operational and political dimensions of this strategic decision in Germany, focusing on understanding the German desire to shift from a defensive doctrine to an offensive operational approach and to adopt a cyber sabotage strategy and a counter-terrorism measure called “Hack-Back.” For the first time, the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) and the Federal Intelligence Service (BfV) are granted legal authority to penetrate the information systems of adversaries and attackers and modify or delete data to prevent large-scale cyberattacks and dismantle the infrastructure of hackers. This includes German approval for field sabotage operations in situations of German defense tension, whereby the BND is permitted to carry out active sabotage operations abroad, such as disabling servers and replacing military or vital technology components with damaged ones to prevent attacks, such as in drone factories and chemical laboratories of hostile states. This has been interpreted by Chinese and Russian circles as a German crushing of the principle of separation between German domestic and foreign intelligence agencies.   According to Chinese and Russian analyses, the new German law is also generating considerable legal controversy within Germany itself, as it narrows the historical distance between intelligence agencies (those concerned only with collecting information) and the police agencies (those concerned with implementation).

Here, the Chinese intelligence reading of the German reform can be understood as the end of historical restrictions imposed on Berlin, as Beijing views the move as a reversal of the strict restrictions imposed since the end of World War II and Berlin’s shift from purely information gathering to carrying out covert operations and penetrating adversaries’ networks.  In addition to what this represents for Beijing and Moscow in terms of reducing dependence on Washington, Chinese intelligence is monitoring Germany’s attempt to build independent self-reliance capabilities to reduce intelligence dependence on the United States and its allies amid mutual strategic suspicions. Intelligence, military, political, and strategic circles in Beijing also view with caution the (militarization of German digital space). Here, the Chinese analysis considers that allowing the disruption of infrastructure and the modification and deletion of data places German agencies in the ranks of major countries with active offensive doctrines, given the reliance of German domestic and foreign intelligence agencies on the pattern of practical and technical dimensions of reform and hybrid capabilities in reforming their security and intelligence agencies, through directly confronting drones, disrupting spy servers, or tampering with components of a weapon under production without resorting to human physical violence, with the expansion of the use of artificial intelligence technologies, through expanding the use of facial recognition technologies and reducing data protection restrictions to store and analyze information for longer periods. However, at the same time, German circles are facing parliamentary challenges, given that the draft law is undergoing legislative proceedings in both houses of the German parliament (the Bundestag and the Bundesrat) amidst local human rights objections warning of the erosion of personal freedoms and the principle of separating intelligence from the police.

Here, the Russian intelligence perspective (Moscow) on the German intelligence draft law comes to the fore. Russian intelligence agencies (SVR, GRU, and FSB) view this move as a direct response to their operations and interpret it within the context of an acknowledgment of hybrid warfare. Moscow believes that Germany is now officially treating Russia as an enemy in a state of undeclared war.  The increase in the budget of Germany’s foreign intelligence agency (BND) by 26%, reaching €1.51 billion, is seen as an indication of a long-term security buildup against Russia. Moscow also viewed this as a move to neutralize cognitive denial, especially given accusations from German domestic and foreign intelligence agencies that Russia is exploiting German bureaucratic sluggishness and strict data privacy measures to carry out cyberattacks and sabotage operations. Therefore, the Russian interpretation of this German decision can be seen as a direct response from Berlin to Moscow, aimed at closing this digital and security gap between the two sides. It can be interpreted as a German intelligence strategy of reciprocity, or, according to the Russian analysis, as an attempt by Germany to encircle disinformation networks by granting German intelligence the ability to take down Russian propaganda and disinformation servers, which pose a direct threat to Russia’s soft power tools aimed at destabilizing Germany.

On the other hand, Chinese intelligence circles, primarily the Ministry of State Security (MSS), which acts as the Chinese intelligence service, analyze German law from the perspective of technological and geopolitical conflict, targeting industrial and academic espionage by China. Here, the Chinese analysis focuses on the expansion of the powers of the German domestic intelligence agency (BfV) and the use of artificial intelligence. This analysis primarily aims to track Chinese soft networks that focus on stealing advanced German technology and conducting economic espionage in order to protect German infrastructure and communications. Beijing believes that the new German laws, which compel German telecommunications companies and digital platforms to hand over data to German intelligence, are primarily intended to isolate Chinese technology and impose complete German sovereign control over cyber data in the face of China. The most sensitive aspect of Russian and Chinese analyses lies in their dual interpretation of Germany’s desire to break free from the Five Eyes framework. They see it as either an intelligence network for exchanging signals intelligence, comprising the US, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, whose decisions are guided by Washington, or as a new dilemma facing Germany in building self-reliant capabilities and ending its dependence on the United States. This latter scenario serves the interests of China and Russia, promoting multipolarity and a multipolar international world and ending the one-way street of Washington.   The German Chancellery has publicly stated that reliance on allies (specifically the US) has been a one-way street, where Germany receives information without the ability to exchange it or protect itself independently. From a Chinese and Russian intelligence perspective, this represents a new German policy of hedging against Trump’s unpredictability. Moscow and Beijing believe that the primary motivation behind the conservative Merz government’s actions is strategic skepticism regarding the reliability of the United States, particularly with Donald Trump in the White House, and Berlin’s fear of the politicization or severing of US intelligence flows. This reinforces the Chinese-Russian view that this is a technologically impossible German attempt to break free from US control and dictates.

Accordingly, assessments in Beijing and Moscow agree that Germany—despite its ambition—will not be able to completely break free from intelligence dependence on America anytime soon. The United States controls the global cloud infrastructure, internet cables, and critical cyber technologies, making German intelligence independence a costly ambition that will take years to materialize technologically. However, it does give Berlin at least greater parity in dealing with partners, which China and Russia are trying to maximize.

WASHINGTON — President Trump’s war against Iran is stretching the limits of U.S. aircraft carriers and leaving the western Pacific without one of the key American warships as China shows more signs of aggression.

The USS George Washington is departing the Pacific to relieve the USS Abraham Lincoln in the Middle East, amid growing concerns about mental health and supply issues aboard the long-deployed carrier. The Lincoln has had its time at sea extended from its original May return date to support the war in Iran.

The lack of a U.S. carrier in the Pacific may be short-lived if the Navy deploys another in the next couple of months. But it shows how the open-ended operations with Iran are running some American sailors ragged, analysts say, while the Trump administration further retreats from the Asia-Pacific region and focuses on the Western Hemisphere.

“The administration says that the Pacific is supposed to be the most important behind the Western Hemisphere,” said Greg Poling, director of the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Instead, the U.S. is “doing the exact opposite” of its previously expressed goal of pulling out of the Middle East.

American allies in the Pacific are unsettled over the unpredictability of the Trump administration, Poling said, while China “is quite happy with U.S. distraction, with the frustration of U.S. allies and partners.”

China may take advantage

Beijing sees the U.S. military presence in the region as a threat to China’s rise and an obstacle to its ambition to seize Taiwan, the self-governing island it claims as its own. But the United States has argued that the Pacific region is too important economically to lose.

No one expects China to invade Taiwan just because an American aircraft carrier has left the region. But the carrier’s absence gives the Chinese another opportunity to show its strength, said Bryan Clark, a former Navy submariner who is a defense analyst at the Hudson Institute.

“They’re using this as part of the narrative to demonstrate to the Philippines, to Japan, to Indonesia and others that the U.S. is not the big dog in the western Pacific anymore,” Clark said. “They would just prefer that countries in the region decide that China is the bigger power and the U.S. is not able to guarantee their security anymore.”

China conducted naval exercises this week with Indonesia and recently has shown signs of aggression toward Japan and the Philippines, two key U.S. allies that also have territorial disputes with Beijing.

China carried out military drills this month near the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea. Both China and the Philippines have claims over the shoal. Last month, a Chinese guided-missile destroyer conducted a live-fire exercise off Japan’s southernmost island of Okinotori.

Adm. Frank Bradley, head of the U.S. Special Operations Command, has been trying to reassure regional allies of Washington’s commitment. He was in Manila on Thursday, telling his Filipino counterparts that U.S. special operations forces are ready to step up joint exercises to strengthen the countries’ alliance. He also is expected to travel to Japan.

Evan Sankey, a policy analyst at the Cato Institute who focuses on U.S. policy toward China, said aircraft carriers provide psychological assurance to U.S. allies. The absence of carriers in the region, he said, “adds to the general sense that the U.S. is distracted by events in the Middle East.”

Trump has relied on aircraft carriers for military actions

Trump has relied heavily on aircraft carriers to support his numerous military operations during his second term. The USS Gerald R. Ford returned home in mid-May after an 11-month deployment, the longest since the Vietnam War, during which it supported the U.S. fight against Iran and the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro.

The Ford had experienced a fire in a laundry space that forced the carrier to turn around and return to the Mediterranean Sea for repairs and left hundreds of sailors without places to sleep.

The USS Lincoln has been at sea 268 days as of Saturday, a record deployment without a port visit, as the Ford had. Democratic lawmakers and families of the sailors have been calling for investigations and greater visibility into conditions aboard the ship, which is preparing to return to its home port in San Diego.

Warships and their crews can handle only so much, said Robert Farley, who teaches national security and diplomacy at the University of Kentucky and often writes about aircraft carriers.

“People don’t get enough rest. It’s psychologically exhausting. And R&R is part of keeping the crew healthy,” Farley said. “Sometimes it’s framed as, ‘These people haven’t had a vacation.’ But we are dealing with well-known limits on the capacity of a crew to operate at top efficiency over time. And that just declines.”

Clark, of the Hudson Institute, said the squeeze on the nation’s aircraft carriers stems from the lack of preparation and planning for the Iran war.

“If we were going to mobilize to do this kind of conflict, and we anticipated it might go this long, we might have done some changes to the carrier schedule to make sure more would be available,” Clark said.

Clark said the Navy has 11 aircraft carriers and typically deploys two or three at a time. But it could soon deploy four if the USS Theodore Roosevelt leaves San Diego for the Middle East, allowing the Washington to return to Pacific.

But the massive warships will need maintenance, probably causing a bottleneck at the nation’s only two carrier shipyards.

“We’ll end up with a maintenance debt that needs to be paid for the next few years,” Clark said. “We’ll probably have less carrier presence than we’ve had in the previous years because carriers will be lined up to get into the shipyard.”

Role in modern warfare

Michael Swaine, a senior research fellow in the Quincy Institute’s East Asia Program, questions the future need for aircraft carriers as warfare rapidly changes.

Carriers can be more easily targeted with drones and missiles, particularly by an adversary such as China, Swaine said, while smaller ships and submarines can be as effective in striking targets as the fighter jets that launch off a carrier.

Top Navy officials have indicated a desire to move away from a heavy reliance on carriers. Adm. Daryl Caudle, chief of naval operations, told the Associated Press in February that he wants to convince commanders to use smaller, newer ships and other assets instead of consistently turning to huge aircraft carriers.

Finley and Tang write for the Associated Press.

A United States aircraft carrier, the USS George Washington, has begun to depart the western Pacific Ocean, leaving its port in Da Nang, Vietnam, for an anticipated deployment to the Middle East.

The ship is expected to replace the USS Abraham Lincoln, which is currently participating in the US-Israeli war against Iran.

The vessel’s movement on Saturday comes amid mounting concerns about the conditions on board the USS Lincoln, sparked by reports of sailors attempting to jump overboard.

The USS Lincoln has been deployed without a port stop for more than 266 days, a record duration for the Navy. It houses about 5,000 sailors and Marines.

In the wake of reports about supply shortages and mental health strain on the ship, US President Donald Trump and acting Secretary of the Navy Hung Cao indicated that the vessel would be rotated. The Pentagon has not confirmed, however, that the USS Lincoln will be replaced by the USS Washington.

The department historically has not commented on movements of key military assets, citing security concerns.

Analysts note that the USS Washington’s departure from the Pacific leaves no US aircraft carrier in the strategically significant region, where the US has long acted as a bulwark against China’s might.

Back-and-forth over conditions

Members of the Trump administration have spent much of this week batting away reports about deteriorating conditions on the USS Lincoln.

US media outlets have carried reports not only of sailors attempting to leap from the vessel, but also of diminishing hygiene supplies and paltry food, as well as issues with plumbing and waste disposal.

Several US senators have called for more information about the conditions on board and the reason for its record-setting deployment.

Since leaving San Diego, California, last November, the USS Lincoln has been sent to support military operations in Venezuela, before leaving for the Middle East shortly thereafter.

Its deployment was supposed to end in May. But after the US and Israel launched a war against Iran in February, its mission was extended indefinitely.

The war with Iran has shown no signs so far of ending, though fighting has remained largely subdued in recent days. Talks have stalled over issues including control of the Strait of Hormuz, a strategic waterway for global trade.

Speaking to reporters on Friday, Trump downplayed concerns about the ship, saying instead the length of the aircraft carrier’s deployment was “not nearly enough”.

A day earlier, Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth said conditions on board had been “completely misrepresented”.

In a separate statement on Friday, Cao maintained the issues on board the ship were not dire, but he acknowledged “a small number of mental health cases were treated with no loss of life”.

He added that meal plans had been adjusted “when fresh resupply was unavailable”, but not a single meal had been missed.

“There is no question our young men and women have been pushed to their limits  — but they have never broken,” he said.

Still, some analysts say Iranian attacks have taken a toll on US military assets across the region, particularly a US Navy base in Bahrain. That has likely complicated typical resupply and maintenance procedures for aircraft carriers like the USS Lincoln.

Concerns about China

News of the USS Washington’s shift from the Pacific has spurred concern that its departure may further harm US deterrence against China. It was not clear if or when another carrier would be deployed to the region.

Bryan Clark, a former Navy submariner and defence analyst at the Hudson Institute, a think tank, told The Associated Press that Beijing may try to project strength in the aircraft carrier’s absence to unnerve US allies in the region.

“They’re using this as part of the narrative to demonstrate to the Philippines, to Japan, to Indonesia and others that the US is not the big dog in the western Pacific any more,” Clark said.

“They would just prefer that countries in the region decide that China is the bigger power and the US is not able to guarantee their security any more.”

Clark added he did not believe the change would in and of itself embolden China to launch an attack on Taiwan, the self-governing island it claims as its own.

Still, the shift comes as the US contends with a reported depletion in both its offensive and defensive weapon supplies as a result of the war with Iran.

Those shortages have already piqued concerns of a declining US ability to serve as deterrence against military aggression. Critics point out that a country like China, unlike Iran, has advanced military technology and a sprawling air force, which could pose a challenge to the US military.

Like the USS Lincoln, the USS Washington is a Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. It has the capability to carry more than 6,000 passengers and about 90 aircraft.

Vietnam’s sovereign AI relies heavily on open-weight models developed in the United States. However, as Washington and Beijing are moving to restrict access to these technologies, Hanoi’s bamboo diplomacy offers little protection to its AI ambitions.

In mid-July, Vietnam approved its National Digital Transformation Strategy for 2026-2030 under Decision 1266/QD-TTg, and the National Data Strategy under Decision 1308/QD-TTg. Both strategies aim for national digital sovereignty, domestic self-reliance and state-level data governance on the assumption that artificial intelligence (AI) models would remain a public good. Within days, the United States (U.S.) and China signalled their readiness to restrict access to those models.

Made in America

Vietnam’s current AI systems are modified versions of foreign tech. On the ground, Viettel, the state military telecom giant spearheading Vietnam’s AI goals, announced its VT-Super-120B-A12B Vietnamese language model had matched the accuracy of major global models of similar size. It was built by adapting Nemotron, Nvidia’s freely downloadable model family, to Vietnamese data. Viettel’s earlier model was also built on Meta’s Llama 3, trained with Nvidia tooling, and run on a cluster of 22 DGX B200 supercomputers at its Hoa Lac centre.

Moreover, VNG’s GreenNode subsidiary introduced GreenMind-Medium-14B-R1, the first open-source Vietnamese reasoning model built to run on Nvidia’s software and a single Nvidia H100 graphics chip. Meanwhile, FPT Corporation committed $200 million to build its AI factory powered by Nvidia hardware.

At the state level, Vietnam’s Ministry of Science and Technology met with senior executives from Qualcomm in Hanoi on July 17. Deputy Minister of Science and Technology Hoang Minh and Qualcomm’s Executive Vice President Durga Malladi discussed expanding cooperation in AI semiconductors, research and development, and workforce training.

While Vietnam has made its bets on the U.S. for its AI ambitions, other Southeast Asian countries are leaning towards China. Indonesia’s Indosat Ooredoo Hutchison partnered with AIonOS on DeepSeek-powered services, and Malaysia’s Communications Ministry launched a sovereign full-stack AI ecosystem running on Huawei hardware.

Outside Two Blocs

AI governance is dividing into two blocs. One bloc is the U.S.-led Pax Silica initiative, which coordinates trusted supply chains for semiconductors, critical minerals and AI infrastructure with 24 signatories. Singapore, the Philippines, India, Japan and South Korea are among them. The Philippines converted membership into commitments by agreeing in April 2026 to a 4,000-acre economic security zone in the Luzon economic corridor designated as the initiative’s first AI-native industrial hub.

The other is the Chinese-backed World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization, signed into existence in Shanghai on July 16 by 29 governments. The membership also includes Russia, Belarus, Cuba, Venezuela and most of Central Asia, alongside Vietnam’s neighbours Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar.

Membership in either bloc could offer access to supply chains, technical assistance and software distribution during a diplomatic crisis.

However, Vietnam belongs to neither group because of its long-standing bamboo diplomacy, a policy of balancing relations between Washington and Beijing without taking sides. This leaves Hanoi in an awkward position. Vietnam depends heavily on American technology, but enjoys none of the guarantees or protections of one.

Weaponising Access

Export controls on chips work because processors are physical goods, subject to customs enforcement. On May 31, the Bureau of Industry and Security extended licensing requirements to any China-parented buyer worldwide, closing loopholes in Singapore and Malaysia.

AI models do not behave the same way. Access to a closed system can be revoked instantly by flipping an application programming interface (API) key. For example, on June 12, Anthropic suspended access to its Fable and Mythos models to comply with U.S. Commerce Department export controls, restoring access only on July 1 after those controls were lifted. Such events largely explain why governments prefer AI models they can host locally.

In contrast, an open-weight model, once downloaded, cannot be recalled by any foreign regulator. Instead, global superpowers exert control by forcing major tech companies and code-sharing platforms to block downloads from specific regions or countries. They can also pressure developers to restrict future model updates to dodge penalties from Washington or Beijing.

This fight over AI access is now an open battle. On July 16, Chinese startup Moonshot AI unveiled Kimi K3, a 2.8-trillion-parameter model that independent evaluators say matches top American models at a fraction of their operating cost. On July 21, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent signalled that Washington could sanction Chinese tech firms, citing American-model watermarks found inside Chinese ones. Days later, China’s Ministry of Commerce called the investigations groundless, threatened countermeasures, and began consulting Alibaba, ByteDance and Z.ai on export controls covering model weights, training data and chip designs.

Why It Matters

For years, nations have built digital capacity cheaply and quickly by customising open-weight AI models. Kimi K3 seemed to promise that era would continue. Instead, the geopolitical fallout exposed the fragility of relying on superpower goodwill.

For Vietnam, the real threat is getting left behind. Washington or Beijing cannot delete the AI models already sitting on Vietnamese servers. What they can block is future releases. If both superpowers restrict open-weight models, Vietnam’s AI ecosystem gets stuck using today’s tools while the rest of the world moves forward. A national tech stack built on frozen updates decays one generation at a time. States that have not localised model weights face an even harsher reality. Their access relies on live connections and downloads that can vanish overnight with a new policy.

At its core, this is a problem of time. Vietnam’s bamboo diplomacy relies on having time to adapt. Trade deals and defence agreements move slowly, giving Hanoi room to bend without breaking. AI access, however, moves instantly as access disappears with a revoked key or a blocked download link.

Diplomatically, Vietnam tries to stay neutral at all costs. However, its technology does not try to do so. All of its major AI models are built on American weights, run on American chips, and improve when American companies release new ones. Vietnam acts as if it can delay picking a side, but with every new AI update or blocked release, the cost of delay becomes more expensive. In the past, diplomatic pressure moved slowly through international summits. Today, that pressure speeds up with every new model release.

The White House said in a report on Thursday that more than 40 countries have helped China sidestep US tariffs by routing exports through nations that face lower American import duties.

The countries named include Canada, India, Mexico, Japan and South Korea, which the White House said had helped China evade tens of billions of dollars in tariffs.

White House trade adviser Peter Navarro said it had cost “American jobs and billions in revenue”.

A spokesperson for the Chinese embassy in Washington said in response to BBC queries that “trade wars have no winners” and that it opposes the US’ tariff measures and the use of state power to target China’s companies.

The spokesperson added that “any unilateral actions or agreements concerning transshipped goods must not target or harm the interests of third parties.”

The BBC has contacted the US embassies of Canada, India, Mexico, Japan, South Korea and other trading partners listed in the report for comment.

The report follows a wave of sanctions between the US and China and comes weeks before President Donald Trump will meet Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Washington.

According to government and private sector estimates quoted by the White House, between $30bn (£22.2bn) and roughly $300bn in goods have been moved from countries with higher tariff through those with lower rates.

The process is known as transshipping, which refers to the practice of transferring cargo through another country while en route to a final destination.

The US accused China of “taking advantage” of the practice by moving goods through nations that have lower duties.

China has used third countries as a stopover and has repackaged goods to hide their real origin to obtain lower tariffs, said the White House in its report, describing the process as “fraud cloaked in paperwork”.

“What has changed in today’s Great Transshipment Scam is not merely the speed and scale of this modern form of smuggling, but the breadth, depth, and sophistication of the global Shadow Transshipment Network through which China’s tariff evasion now moves,” the White House wrote.

The US has deployed artificial intelligence (AI) tools to catch transshipment efforts, it added.

The report is expected to add to key sticking points between the sides as Trump and Xi prepare to meet in the US in September.

Despite a pause in most tariffs following talks in May 2025, Washington and Beijing have continued to exchange sanctions, including restrictions on humanoid robots shipped to the US and tighter Chinese curbs on drone exports.

In April 2025, Trump unveiled sweeping levies on dozens of US trading partners based on a long-held belief that tariffs will help boost American jobs and the economy.

Those sanctions have since been struck down by the US Supreme Court, but Trump has repeatedly introduced new tariffs using alternative legal levers to continue his signature policy.

The Royal Australian Air Force’s (RAAF) recently delivered and extremely capable MC-55A Peregrine airborne intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare (AISREW) aircraft has begun its first overseas deployment. Publicly available flight tracking data shows that the aircraft has been operating out of Clark Air Base in the Philippines, from where it has ventured out into the highly strategic and tense South China Sea on several occasions.

Flight tracking data from Flightradar24 indicates that MC-55 serial A51-004 flew from its home base at RAAF Base Edinburgh in South Australia to Clark, close to the Philippine capital Manila, on July 28. Data compiled by Australian Defense Magazine reveals seven missions flown out of Clark between July 30 and August 7.

With missions typically lasting between four and nine hours, the MC-55 primarily flew in or close to Philippine airspace near Mindoro and Palawan islands. However, on four occasions, according to available data, it flew further west into the South China Sea. For those parts of the mission, its transponder was switched off for periods of between three and four hours.

The Australian Defense Forces (ADF) told Australian Defense Magazine that the deployment is part of its longstanding engagements in the Indo-Pacific region but provided no further operational details.

Based on the length of time that the MC-55 ‘went dark’ on flight tracking aggregators, its areas of interest could have included various disputed reefs and other features in the South China Sea, including the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal.

China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam all claim the Spratly Islands, which are largely uninhabited but may have significant reserves of natural resources around them. The Spratly Islands are home to a significant Chinese military presence, most notably in the form of artificial islands featuring long runways and aircraft hangars, among other infrastructure. They are also heavily defended with missiles, radar stations, and more.

Both China and the Philippines also lay claim to the Scarborough Shoal (known as Huangyan Island in China), which is little more than 100 miles from the Philippines and 500 miles from China.

Overall, China’s sovereignty claims over the South China Sea, including islands, other features and adjacent waters, are the most sweeping and have led to high tensions with competing claimants.

China routinely backs up its expansive claims with naval patrols, in the air and at sea.

Meanwhile, the United States says it does not take sides in these disputes but sends warships and military aircraft close to the disputed islands as part of its ‘freedom of navigation’ operations.

The same kinds of operations are also conducted by the ADF, with the RAAF responsible for missions into the South China Sea. These have previously been flown from Clark Air Base, as well as from Butterworth in Malaysia and out of Singapore. The RAAF uses the P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft for these missions, and previously also the AP-3C (EW) Orion.

The specially equipped AP-3C (EW), the secretive electronic warfare version of the RAAF Orion, was formerly flown by No. 10 Squadron, which is now responsible for the MC-55 fleet at RAAF Edinburgh.

Since we reported on the arrival of the first MC-55 at Edinburgh in January of this year, a second and third aircraft have been delivered to Australia, arriving at the same base in March and in June. The fourth aircraft is still to be delivered.

As we have described in depth previously, the MC-55 — based on a highly modified version of the Gulfstream G550 business jet — is equipped with a variety of sensors to combine electronic warfare (EW), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions in a single airframe. These capabilities would be in extreme need during any kind of crisis in the Indo-Pacific region.

The aircraft can also serve as a networking relay and data-fusion platform, linking together other aircraft as well as surface combatants and ground forces. TWZ has previously confirmed that the MC-55 incorporates technology ported directly over from the RC-135 Rivet Joint, as you can read about here. In the past, we have also speculated that the jet is likely outfitted with active electronically scanned arrays (AESA), which would be used for standoff electronic attacks, as well as intelligence-gathering. 

In the context of missions in the South China Sea, the MC-55 is a highly capable passive intelligence-collection platform, bringing a major boost to the ADF as it seeks to keep tabs on the growing Chinese military threat in the Indo-Pacific region.

The aircraft’s ISR capabilities mean it will be well-suited to surveilling Chinese military expansion and monitoring Beijing’s activities, which have already seen a number of incidents involving the ADF and Chinese military assets. As well as operating from the Philippines, and potentially from Malaysia and Singapore, the RAAF plans to deploy the MC-55 to the Cocos Islands, deep in the Indian Ocean, approximately midway between Australia and Sri Lanka.

With the first appearance of the MC-55 at Clark Air Base, Australia appears to be moving from relying primarily on the P-8A for South China Sea maritime surveillance toward having a dedicated, highly specialised airborne SIGINT/EW capability operating alongside it. This will give the ADF and its partners a much better picture of Chinese radar, communications, air defense and naval activity.

The first overseas deployment of the MC-55 — among the most advanced surveillance and electronic attack platforms in the world — marks a significant expansion of Australia’s ability to monitor and understand Chinese military activity in the South China Sea, strengthening the ADF’s intelligence and electronic warfare reach across the Indo-Pacific.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Shenzhen will host the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit (APEC) in November 2026, particularly given its reputation as China’s Silicon Valley and a global hub for artificial intelligence and embodied intelligence. The city will showcase its advanced industrial ecosystem in robotics, new vehicles, and the digital economy, aiming to connect markets and economies across the Asia-Pacific region. Shenzhen’s innovation model, designed to link China with Asia and the Pacific, is a key priority for the APEC Summit, scheduled to be held in Shenzhen this year under the theme Building an Asia-Pacific Community for Shared Prosperity. This theme focuses on integrating the Chinese economy regionally and globally through advanced technology. Therefore, Shenzhen’s focus during the APEC 2026 Summit will be on innovation, the digital economy, and showcasing new productive forces. The meetings and discussions at the APEC 2026 Summit will be concentrated in Shenzhen. The conference aims to highlight the role of innovation and advanced digital technologies; promote regional cooperation in artificial intelligence, innovation, and digital technologies; and strengthen industrial networks and cross-border supply chains for APEC economies in the semiconductor and green technology sectors. This explains why Shenzhen, China, was chosen to host the upcoming APEC conference. It serves as a living example, showcasing Shenzhen as a model of sustainable smart cities that rely on AI algorithms in the transportation, healthcare, and services sectors.

Shenzhen is at the forefront of the regional and international AI landscape, acting as a new engine for industry by integrating digital innovation to expand markets and improve production in the Asia-Pacific region. In Shenzhen, any new idea can find the necessary components within 30 minutes, leading entrepreneurs to call this speed a Shenzhen Speed. Shenzhen is a unique global model for rapid innovation and integrated supply chains, enabling entrepreneurs to transform ideas into prototypes in just 30 minutes thanks to the integration of industrial components, a phenomenon known as “Shenzhen Speed.”   Shenzhen’s innovation environment is characterized by a seamless supply chain, where markets and factories provide all the necessary hardware and electronics components in one place, supporting entrepreneurship. The city offers an incubator environment for startups and innovators from around the world. Furthermore, its regional connectivity mechanism reinforces Shenzhen’s role as a major hub for trade and technology cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.

Shenzhen, often called China’s Silicon Valley, is a leading global center for innovation, technology, and rapid industrial development. The city is spearheading the transformation into a smart city by integrating AI governance, the Internet of Things, and ultra-fast supply chains that enable the realization of technological ideas in record time. Embodied AI is a modern industrial trend in the city, alongside artificial intelligence. Shenzhen’s position is further solidified in technological innovation; Shenzhen’s rapid pace allows the city to provide the components for any new technological idea in just 30 minutes thanks to its massive supply chains. Furthermore, it serves as an incubator for major companies, housing the headquarters of China’s leading technology giants, such as Huawei, Tencent, DJI, and Wipertek. Shenzhen acts as a base for major companies, hosting thousands of large and emerging firms in artificial intelligence and robotics. The city is a natural hub for embodied intelligence, humanoid robot manufacturing, and smart factory applications powered by industrial AI models. This makes Shenzhen a true embodiment of digital urban leadership. It has been crowned a smart city thanks to its 5G infrastructure and dual digital models.

Shenzhen embodies the engine of Chinese technological excellence and its transformation from a port  From a small fishing ground to a leading global innovation hub, Shenzhen is not only driving the engines of modern technology but also, alongside its massive supply chains, is propelling industry and progress in the region through artificial intelligence and embodied intelligence. The city is renowned for its so-called Shenzhen Speed, where any new technological idea can find its components and factories in just 30 minutes. Shenzhen plays a significant role in driving innovation and connecting the Asia-Pacific. This will be reflected in the priorities of the APEC Summit in November 2026, hosted by Shenzhen, which aims to stimulate regional cooperation in artificial intelligence and innovation; address global economic challenges, slow growth, and rising trade protectionism by promoting integration and unity; and achieve sustainable development and create an environment conducive to innovation. This will be accomplished through the integration of ministerial efforts and related events to encourage innovation in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Chinese city of Shenzhen is a unique example of a rapid transformation from a small fishing village to a global hub for technology and innovation. Today, it leads advanced sectors such as artificial intelligence (AI), augmented intelligence (AI), and massive supply chains, becoming a driving force for technological excellence in China and the world. The key drivers of Shenzhen’s success lie in understanding its historical transformation from a simple fishing port to a leading global center for business, technology, and AI, as well as its ability to innovate by integrating AI algorithms across various industrial and service sectors and by developing augmented intelligence. Shenzhen is heavily investing in robotics and intelligent systems that physically interact with their environment, providing the world with the necessary supply chains to meet its technological needs. This is made possible by Shenzhen’s vast and flexible infrastructure for manufacturing and developing technological devices at breakneck speed.

  Finally, Shenzhen stands out as a pilot city in China, particularly in the areas of artificial intelligence (AI) and embodied intelligence (EQI). Shenzhen aims to become a national base for developing and implementing large-scale linguistic models (LCMs) and advanced AI and EQI products, integrating robots and intelligent systems into real-world and industrial environments, thus driving high-quality manufacturing forward. Furthermore, Shenzhen plays a key role in promoting smart governance by relying on AI-based solutions for efficient traffic management, security, and urban services.

Zhang Anda shocked world number three Zhao Xintong with a thrilling 6-5 victory by potting a respotted black ball in round one of the China Open.

Zhang, who was down 3-0 in frames, fought back to eventually lead 5-4.

However, last year’s world champion Zhao forced a deciding frame that ended in dramatic fashion.

Zhang, ranked 19th in the world, was in control at 57-0 up, but Zhao fought back to lead with both players on the black.

The black was eventually potted by Zhang to force a respot – used as a tie-breaker when a frame ends with the scores level – with the 34-year-old prevailing.

He will now face England’s Chris Wakelin.

World number five John Higgins also lost in the first round after he was defeated 6-4 by 2015 world champion Stuart Bingham.

We all know the classic Seven Wonders of the World, but Lonely Planet has now revealed its most ‘Secret Wonders of the World’.

From bright thermal spas to haunting bell towers and oddly-named villages, these are nine of the most incredible spots either natural and manmade.

Pamukkale-Hierapolis, Turkey

When it comes to natural wonders, one of those highlighted by Lonely Planet is Pamukkale-Hierapolis in southwestern Turkey.

The striking thermal springs have white rocks with bright turquoise water and waterfalls.

Visitors can actually swim in part of Pamukkale in the man-made Cleopatra Pool.

In some parts you can walk through or even wade through the water.

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Zhangye Danxia National Geopark, China

Another colourful spot is Zhangye Danxia National Geopark in Gansu, China.

The mountainous site is full of bright colours from green to pink and orange that has formed over millions of years.

Around the geopark are dedicated paths and platforms so you can see the mountains in all their glory.

One of the best times to visit is during the wet season between May and September – the combination of rain and the sunrise or sunset make the colours more vivid.

Beehive Huts, Ireland

One secret wonder is much closer to the UK as it’s found on the south-west coast of Ireland.

Beehive Huts, or clochán, date back to the 8th century, thought to once be used to store grain or shelter against storms.

Lots are easy to visit with many on the Dingle Peninsula with views across the coastline.

Some of the most easily accessible are the Fahan Beehive Huts which cost around €3 (£2.56) to enter.

Campanile de Curon, Italy

Another is Campanile de Curon, a bell tower in the middle of a lake in Italy.

It’s actually on the site of a sunken village which was flooded when three lakes merged into one.

It submerged the village of Curon Venosta leaving only the bell tower to be seen.

In the winter when the lake freezes over, it’s possible to walk over to it.

Chiricahua National Monument, USA

The Chiricahua National Monument is an enormous site made up of towers of balanced rocks.

Across 12,000 acres, the protected area in Arizona is known as a ‘wonderland of rocks’.

The area is open to visitors who want to explore its creeks, volcanic formations, and grottoes.

Most head to see Big Balanced Rock which, as the name suggest, s is a large rock that is perched on a narrow pedestal in a way that doesn’t look possible.

Chicken, Alaska

Found deep in Alaska is a former gold rush village called Chicken – and it even has a huge chicken Mr. Eggee as the mascot.

The village got its name back in the 1900s when workers could not agree on the spelling of ptarmigan, a bird found in the local area.

Instead, they settled on chicken, and now the village even holds a Chickenstock music festival with live folk music and plenty do the chicken dance.

The village is accessible between April and September as in winter its connecting highway closes due to extreme weather like heavy snow.

Völklinger Hütte, Germany

Some of the man-made secret wonders include the Völklinger Ironworks, in Germany, which looks more like something from a steampunk film.

Found in the south-west of the country, these are the world’s only fully preserved ironworks from what was considered the “Golden Age” of the iron and steel industry.

It’s no longer in use and is actually a museum and gallery space with entry from €17 (£14.52).

There are regular exhibitions and tours of the ironworks too.

Quinta da Regaleira Wells, Portugal

Just a few hours away from the UK in Sintra, Portugal is Quinta da Regaleira Wells.

The well is made up of two staircases across nine levels, they are found beneath the UNESCO-protected Quinta da Regaleira.

Unlike traditional wells, these don’t hold any water but were rather used for secret Masonic ceremonies.

For anyone heading to Lisbon, it’s a 35-minute drive away – you need to buy a ticket and can either do a guided or self-guided tour of the site.

Moray, Peru

Another man-made secret wonder is Moray in Peru which are deep carved circles with steps – essentially like an amphitheatre.

It’s in the Sacred Valley region around 11,500 feet above sea level.

It was built by the Inca Empire between the 15th and early 16th centuries believed to be used to experiment with agriculture at the time.

For those who want to visit, you have to buy a tourist ticket which covers 16 historical sites across Cusco and the Sacred Valley.

For the full 385 Secret Wonders of the World check out the book at shop.lonelyplanet.com.

China’s test of a nuclear-capable missile into the Pacific has exposed the growing divisions among Pacific island nations over the increasing militarisation of a region they have sought to preserve as an “Ocean of Peace”.

The July launch, China’s first known ballistic-missile test into the Pacific since September 2024, took place just hours after Fiji and Australia signed a major defence treaty, marking Fiji’s first formal alliance. The timing highlighted the increasingly complex security environment in a region where China, the United States and their allies are competing for influence.

More than a month after the test, Pacific Islands foreign ministers were unable to agree on a collective statement condemning Beijing’s missile launch, despite individual leaders expressing concern about the growing military presence in the region.

Papua New Guinea Foreign Minister Justin Tkatchenko described the test as “totally inappropriate”, while stressing that China remained a close friend and ally of Papua New Guinea. He said Beijing had provided advance notice of the launch but had not given details about where the missile would land.

China defended the test, saying it had been conducted safely and urging countries not to over-interpret the launch.

Growing Military Activity in the Pacific

The missile test came after a year of increasingly visible military activity across the Pacific, a region that has become a major arena of strategic competition between the United States and China.

Chinese naval deployments and live-fire exercises in the Tasman Sea have coincided with U.S.-allied military exercises around Guam and Hawaii. Warship visits and expanding security partnerships have also increased across the region.

The United States retains a substantial military presence in the Pacific, including in Hawaii, Guam and the Marshall Islands.

For Pacific island governments, the growing military presence creates an increasingly difficult choice. Security partnerships can provide valuable capabilities for surveillance, disaster response, policing and training, but they can also increase the possibility that Pacific territory and waters become incorporated into wider strategic competition.

Tuvalu permanent foreign secretary Pasuna Tuaga expressed concern about the broader militarisation of the region, including security arrangements such as the AUKUS partnership between Australia, Britain and the United States.

Pacific Nations United in Principle but Divided in Practice

Pacific leaders endorsed the Ocean of Peace Declaration in September 2025, committing themselves to protecting the region and strengthening international peace and security.

The initiative reflected a long-standing desire among Pacific states to ensure that their security agenda is not dictated by larger external powers.

The defence agreement between Australia and Fiji, known as the Ocean of Peace Alliance, emerged from this broader regional framework.

But the growing number of security partnerships has created an inherent contradiction. Pacific governments want greater security capabilities while simultaneously opposing the militarisation of their region.

Australia and other partners argue that defence cooperation can strengthen regional resilience. Critics, however, fear that expanding bilateral arrangements could eventually leave Pacific nations with less influence over how their territory, waters and infrastructure are used.

Solomon Islands Foreign Minister Rick Houenipwela said the regional agenda must remain “conceived by the Pacific, shaped by the Pacific and only by the Pacific.”

Yet the failure to produce a unified response to China’s missile test demonstrated just how difficult that principle is to implement.

China Divides Regional Consensus

The disagreement over the missile test reflects the different political and economic interests of Pacific island nations.

Kiribati and Nauru, which have deepened their relations with Beijing after switching diplomatic recognition from Taiwan, did not support the wording of the proposed statement, according to an official familiar with the discussions.

New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters blamed foreign influence for the failure to reach consensus, although he did not identify a particular country.

The disagreement demonstrates that Pacific nations do not share a uniform approach toward China.

Some governments see Beijing as an important economic and diplomatic partner, while others are increasingly concerned about its military activities and the strategic implications of its expanding regional presence.

At the same time, many Pacific governments remain wary of becoming closely aligned with either China or the Western powers.

The Security Dilemma Facing the Pacific

The central problem for Pacific nations is the tension between security and strategic autonomy.

Countries require surveillance capabilities, military training, disaster-response mechanisms and other security resources. Defence partnerships can provide those capabilities.

But greater reliance on external powers can also make it more difficult for Pacific governments to maintain an independent regional agenda.

Fiji Foreign Minister Sakiasi Ditoka acknowledged this tension, saying countries wanted to be free from “war-making paraphernalia” while also recognising that some security capabilities helped keep them safe.

Fiji’s participation for the first time in U.S.-led RIMPAC military exercises further illustrates this balancing act.

The country is simultaneously promoting the idea of an Ocean of Peace while becoming more involved in established regional security structures.

Analysis: The Pacific Is Becoming a Strategic Battleground

The significance of China’s missile test goes beyond the launch itself. It has exposed the growing gap between the Pacific’s aspiration to remain an “Ocean of Peace” and the strategic realities surrounding it.

The region is increasingly being shaped by competing security partnerships, military exercises and the expanding strategic presence of major powers. China is becoming more active militarily, while the United States, Australia and their partners are strengthening their own defence relationships.

For Pacific island states, the challenge is therefore not simply whether to oppose China’s military activities. It is how to respond to them without allowing the Pacific’s security agenda to become dominated by great-power rivalry.

The failure to agree on a common statement is particularly significant because regional unity is one of the Pacific’s strongest tools for maintaining its diplomatic autonomy. When governments cannot agree on how to respond to a major security development, external powers gain greater room to shape the regional agenda.

At the same time, completely rejecting security partnerships would leave many Pacific states without capabilities they consider increasingly necessary. The result is a difficult balancing act: accepting enough external security assistance to address genuine threats while preventing those partnerships from transforming the region into a military theatre.

China’s missile test therefore exposes a deeper strategic dilemma. The more Pacific states seek security through external alliances, the greater the risk that the region becomes militarised; yet the more they reject those partnerships, the harder it may become to respond to an increasingly competitive security environment.

The upcoming Pacific Islands Forum leaders’ meeting in Palau is likely to bring these questions back to the centre of regional diplomacy. The key issue will be whether Pacific nations can establish a collective security approach that protects their interests without allowing the strategic competition between China and Western powers to define the future of the region.

With information from Reuters.

Typhoon Dolphin struck eastern China, including Shanghai, with winds up to 150 km/h, prompting more than one million people to evacuate their homes. The storm disrupted flights and transport while bringing heavy rain, flooding and the risk of landslides across the region.

Aug. 9 (UPI) — Typhoon Dolphin roared into eastern China Sunday at Force 13 speeds of 85 miles per hour, producing extreme downpours and prompting the cancelation of hundreds of flights, official media reported.

Dolphin made two landings in densely populated eastern China, with the first coming at 5:30 p.m. local time at Yuhuan in Taizhou City, Zhejiang Province, according to the official Xinhua news agency.

The second landfall came at Yueqing City in Zhejiang a bit more than an hour later.

China’s National Meteorological Center issued alerts to local authorities in the region to be guard on against extreme downpours.

Forecasters warned that heavy to torrential rain is expected until Tuesday in most parts of Zhejiang, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Anhui and northern and central-eastern Hubei provinces.

Some local rain totals could reach as high as 12.5 inches in eastern Zhejiang and the mountainous regions of southern Anhui, they predicted, with as much as 3.1 inches falling in as little as an hour.

Meanwhile, 388 inbound and outbound flights were canceled Sunday at Hangzhou Xiaoshan International Airport in Hangzhou City, the capital of Zhejiang Province.

Typhoon Dolphin is expected to weaken into a tropical storm as it moves northwestward through Zhejiang, Taiwan’s Central Weather Administration said Sunday.

The storm passed north of the island but its wake prompted sea warnings in the area as maritime officials announced the suspension of sea traffic on Monday.

Despite dodging a direct hit, Dolphin produced strong winds and heavy rains in northern Taiwan, causing scattered damage, the Central News Agency reported.

Six people were injured and hundreds of incidents of fallen trees were reported in Taipei as a result of the typhoon.

World number one Judd Trump lost to Thailand’s Noppon Saengkham, while Shaun Murphy set a new scoring record and Ronnie O’Sullivan made a winning start to his campaign on day two of the China Open.

Trump could lose his world number one ranking before the end of the month after a 6-3 loss to Saengkham, ranked 45th in the world.

In round two, the Thai player will face seven-time world champion O’Sullivan, who made a century break and four further breaks over 60 as he recovered from losing the opening two frames to beat Wales’ Jackson Page 6-2.

The China Open is the first main ranking tournament of the 2026-27 season and former world champion Murphy made some snooker history in his 6-0 victory over fellow Englishman Matthew Selt.

Murphy, who lost 18-17 in the World Championship final to China’s Wu Yize in May, made breaks of 18, 61, 132, 103, 139, 113 and 41 in frame six, before playing safe for a record total of 607 unanswered points before Selt potted a ball.

His tally surpassed the previous record of 556, set by O’Sullivan during a 6-0 win over Ricky Walden at the 2014 Masters.

Murphy, who turns 44 on Monday, told the World Snooker Tour (WST) website: “I can’t believe it, I’m over the moon.

“I knew I was close – at the interval I didn’t want to go looking on any websites to check what the record was. If you find yourself in the bubble and in the flow, you just want to stay in it.

“It was a delight to play for a great crowd out there and put on a good show. I haven’t set that many records throughout my career and I am sure someone will go out and beat this one at some stage. But to be part of snooker history in this way is a great thrill.”

As well as setting a new record for most points without reply, Murphy also equalled the record for the most consecutive centuries with four, something he has now done twice. Northern Ireland’s Mark Allen and Australia’s Neil Robertson are the others to have achieved that feat.

Murphy’s incredible day could have got better in frame five as he was on course for a maximum 147, only for the run to end at 113 as he missed the 15th black.

Sudan’s prolonged war is creating risks that extend well beyond its borders. The growing role of Islamist armed groups, including the Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade, could further complicate the country’s political and security landscape while creating new challenges for China’s economic and strategic interests in the Red Sea, East Africa and the Horn of Africa.

The Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade, an Islamist militia associated with the Sudanese Islamic Movement, has been one of the armed formations supporting the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) during the conflict. In September 2025, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned the brigade over its involvement in Sudan’s civil war and alleged connections to Iran. In March 2026, Washington designated the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, also known as the Sudanese Islamic Movement, as a terrorist organization and updated the brigade’s designation accordingly.

These measures have increased the international pressure on Sudanese Islamist networks and could complicate their future role within the country’s political and security institutions. For China, however, the issue is less about the ideological orientation of these groups than about the possibility that their growing influence could contribute to a broader fragmentation of Sudan’s security environment.

A security vacuum with regional consequences

The continuing conflict has already weakened Sudanese state institutions and created space for armed groups to expand their influence. The danger for Beijing is that prolonged fragmentation could transform Sudan into an environment in which local, regional and external actors compete through armed proxies.

Such a development would have consequences beyond Sudan itself. The country occupies a strategically important position on the Red Sea, while its internal conflict is increasingly interconnected with developments in neighboring states and wider regional security dynamics.

China has consistently called for a ceasefire, protection of civilians and a political settlement in Sudan. Following attacks on Port Sudan in May 2025, Beijing called for the protection of civilian facilities and civilians and urged all parties to work toward an early ceasefire and the restoration of peace and stability.

This approach reflects a broader Chinese preference for protecting its economic and diplomatic interests without becoming directly involved in Sudan’s internal conflict.

For Beijing, therefore, the emergence of increasingly autonomous armed formations represents a potential strategic problem. The greater the fragmentation of Sudan’s security institutions, the more difficult it becomes to protect infrastructure, commercial interests and Chinese nationals while maintaining a policy of non-interference.

Why the Red Sea matters to Beijing

Sudan’s Red Sea coastline gives the conflict a significance that extends far beyond the country itself.

The Red Sea is a critical maritime corridor linking Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia. Any deterioration in security along Sudan’s coast could add to the risks already affecting commercial navigation in the wider Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb area.

For China, the issue is particularly important because the country is heavily dependent on secure maritime trade routes. Instability along the Red Sea can increase shipping costs, disrupt supply chains and complicate the movement of Chinese goods between Asia, Europe and Africa.

The risks are therefore not limited to projects formally identified with the Belt and Road Initiative. They extend to China’s wider commercial, energy and logistical interests across the region.

Sudan’s instability could also affect Chinese companies operating in infrastructure, energy, mining and other sectors. The safety of Chinese workers and businesses becomes increasingly difficult to guarantee when state authority is fragmented and armed groups operate with greater autonomy.

The South Sudan connection

One of the most important dimensions of Sudan’s instability for China is its potential impact on South Sudan.

South Sudan’s economy remains heavily dependent on oil exports, while much of the country’s oil reaches international markets through infrastructure crossing Sudan. Any prolonged disruption to Sudanese territory, oil infrastructure or export facilities could therefore have consequences for South Sudan’s production and revenues.

This matters to China because Beijing has significant economic and diplomatic interests in South Sudan. China and South Sudan established a strategic partnership in 2024, and China remains one of South Sudan’s major trading partners, with crude oil constituting a major component of bilateral trade.

Consequently, instability in Sudan could create an indirect risk to China’s interests in South Sudan even without any direct Chinese involvement in the Sudanese conflict.

The relationship between the two countries also demonstrates why Beijing is unlikely to view Sudan solely through the lens of the Sudanese civil war. Developments in Sudan can affect neighboring states, energy flows, infrastructure networks and regional trade routes in which China has invested for decades.

China’s limited but expanding security footprint

China has sought to protect its interests in the region while avoiding direct military involvement in Sudan’s war.

Its military presence in Djibouti provides Beijing with an established logistical and security position around the western Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. At the same time, China’s broader commercial presence in Djibouti has continued to expand, reinforcing the country’s importance as a regional trade and logistics hub.

This does not mean that China is preparing to intervene militarily in Sudan. Rather, the existence of a Chinese military and commercial presence in the wider region gives Beijing additional capabilities for protecting its nationals, supporting maritime security and responding to emergencies if regional instability intensifies.

China’s activities in South Sudan also demonstrate a gradual expansion from purely economic engagement toward broader cooperation in areas such as security and public-sector capacity. In June 2026, for example, China handed over a Chinese-aided digital forensic laboratory to South Sudanese authorities, describing improved public-security management as important to national stability.

Beijing is therefore building relationships and capabilities that can help it protect its interests without becoming a direct party to regional conflicts.

The Islamist factor

The future role of Sudanese Islamist organizations remains an important variable.

The international designation of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood and the Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade could make it more difficult for these networks to operate openly through political or institutional channels. At the same time, pressure on an armed or ideological movement does not necessarily eliminate its influence. It can instead encourage the movement to adapt, fragment or seek alternative forms of political and social organization.

For China, this creates an additional layer of uncertainty.

Beijing has little incentive to become involved in Sudan’s ideological disputes. Its primary concern is whether political fragmentation and the proliferation of armed groups will threaten the stability required for trade, investment, energy flows and the safety of Chinese citizens.

The more Sudan’s conflict develops into a competition involving multiple armed and externally supported actors, the more difficult it becomes for China to maintain its preferred strategy of pragmatic engagement with all sides.

What China is likely to do

China’s response is likely to remain cautious and pragmatic.

Beijing is unlikely to seek a direct military role in Sudan unless its citizens, facilities or broader maritime interests face a severe and immediate threat. Instead, China is likely to continue supporting diplomatic efforts, calling for dialogue and a political settlement while maintaining relations with Sudanese institutions and neighboring countries.

China’s recent diplomatic position toward Sudan and South Sudan reinforces this approach. At the United Nations, Beijing has continued to emphasize political solutions and stability in the region, while maintaining engagement with both Sudan and South Sudan. In May 2026, China’s permanent representative to the UN warned that the continuing conflict in Sudan and instability in South Sudan were delaying the Abyei political process and called for greater attention to the security situation.

This suggests that Beijing sees the Sudanese conflict increasingly as part of a wider regional security problem rather than an isolated domestic crisis.

The central challenge for China is therefore not simply the rise of one Islamist militia. It is the possibility that Sudan’s institutional fragmentation will produce a durable security vacuum connecting the country’s internal conflict with instability in South Sudan, threats to Red Sea navigation and competition among regional and international powers.

If that happens, Sudan could become a much more serious strategic problem for Beijing.

China’s interests in the region depend on stability without requiring China itself to become responsible for providing it. The longer Sudan’s war continues, the harder that balance becomes to maintain.

The US Senate approved its strongest move against Russia under Trump, advancing sanctions that could impose tariffs on major buyers including India and China.

“Our main goal is to empower robots’ brains.”

China has launched its first robot school, where a number of humanoid robots are trained before transitioning into the workforce.

Humanoid robots are no longer a laboratory experiment; they are a growing market. Morgan Stanley estimates it could hit $5 trillion by 2050, with more than a billion humanoids in use worldwide.

However, much of the global robot supply chain runs through China. It produces robot components at a scale and a price its competitors struggle to match.

The United States has banned imports of foreign-made humanoid robots, citing national security. It has also blocked power inverters used in data centres and solar energy systems. The move is seen as part of a broader effort to protect US industry and limit China’s technological rise.