China

June 18 (Asia Today) — China expressed strong opposition Thursday to recent U.S. extended deterrence talks with South Korea and Japan, warning that expanded nuclear cooperation could increase the risks of nuclear proliferation and conflict.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian said Beijing was “deeply concerned” about efforts by the United States and Japan to strengthen extended deterrence.

Lin was responding at a regular news briefing to a question about the Japan-U.S. Extended Deterrence Dialogue and the sixth meeting of the U.S.-South Korea Nuclear Consultative Group. Japan and the United States held their talks in Tokyo from June 8 to 9, while Seoul and Washington held their meeting in South Korea.

“Extended deterrence is a product of the Cold War,” Lin said. “Certain countries have strengthened nuclear deterrence cooperation for geopolitical purposes, increasing the risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear conflict.”

Lin said many countries had expressed serious concern and strong opposition to extended deterrence arrangements during review conferences for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

He reserved his strongest criticism for Japan, which has recently been embroiled in heightened tensions with China.

“Japan has long advocated building a world without nuclear weapons, but in reality, it has continued to increase its dependence on the so-called nuclear umbrella,” Lin said.

He accused Japanese officials of making “dangerous remarks” about potentially acquiring nuclear weapons, saying such discussions pose a serious challenge to the post-World War II international order and the global nuclear nonproliferation system.

Lin urged Japan to reflect on its conduct, fulfill its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, abide by its three non-nuclear principles and refrain from seeking nuclear weapons in any form.

His warnings to the United States and South Korea were less severe.

Lin urged Washington to abandon its “Cold War mentality,” stop what he described as provocative policies and abolish nuclear-sharing and extended deterrence arrangements.

He said the United States should take concrete action to protect regional peace and security and maintain global strategic stability.

Addressing South Korea, Lin said Beijing hoped Seoul would “act cautiously and do more things that contribute to regional stability.”

During the same briefing, Lin also criticized plans by Group of Seven leaders to reduce their dependence on China for rare earth elements and other critical minerals.

He urged the group to follow market economy principles and international trade rules and to stop using the rules of “small groups” to undermine the international economic and trade order.

China has said its export control system is consistent with international practices and intended to protect regional stability and meet its nonproliferation obligations.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260618010006688

JOINT BASE ANDREWS, Md. — President Trump on Friday showed off the new Air Force One, a formerly Qatari-owned — and much debated — jumbo jet that has been converted into the official U.S. presidential aircraft.

The new plane — gifted from the Qatari government, raising a host of legal, ethical and security questions — will take on a new look, eschewing the Kennedy-era robin’s egg blue exterior in favor of white on the top half, its underbelly navy blue with a red stripe above it.

“This plane was transformed into a flying White House at a level of luxury that nobody has ever seen before,” Trump said from inside the massive Joint Base Andrews hangar, as a couple of hundred assembled Air Force personnel looked on. He spoke after stepping off the new plane in a dramatic flourish, as his signature tune “God Bless the USA” played.

He confirmed that he would be taking the new jet to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization summit in Ankara, Turkey, next month and indicated that he would be returning to China “at some point,” presumably a reference to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit that China is hosting in November. His return from the Group of 7 summit in France this week was the last planned trip aboard the old Air Force One, he said.

“Now, when we land at airports in London and in Germany and different places, nobody tops this one, and that’s the way we have to have it for our country,” Trump said, noting that the colors and the design were to “my taste, I will say.”

He added that the new Air Force One will do a flyover during the July 4 celebrations next month.

The gift from Qatar is serving as a so-called bridge aircraft to carry the president until new planes ordered directly from Boeing arrive. That is currently slated for 2028.

The administration formally accepted a luxury Boeing 747 jet from Qatar last year to be used as the presidential airplane, despite questions about security and the ethics and legality of accepting such an expensive gift from a foreign government. Trump has claimed in the past that he would not fly around in the Qatari jet once he leaves office and said it would instead be donated to a future presidential library.

Trump on Friday said the U.S. was in a “little bit of a logjam” as it awaited the delivery of the new jets directly from Boeing, which had originally been scheduled for 2024 but have been delayed. He recalled asking the emir of Qatar for the use of one of their planes.

“See, a normal president wouldn’t do this. A normal president wants to stay away from aircraft,” Trump said Friday. “But our country has to be represented properly.”

Members of Congress and others have questioned the cost and effort that would be needed to make security modifications to an aircraft from a foreign government.

The Air Force said in a news release Friday that any plane deemed Air Force One “must meet rigorous security requirements” and that the Qatari plane “was modified under a disciplined engineering approach that prioritized these exact core capabilities above all else.” The Air Force also said “much of the previous head of state interior layout” of the plane was kept intact.

The Air Force has said in the past that security modifications to the jet would cost less than $400 million.

Trump’s efforts to reimagine the presidential airplane date back to his first administration, when he directed that an incoming fleet of new jets would adopt a color scheme that was nearly identical to that of his personal airplane. Then-President Biden reversed the decision in March 2023 as an Air Force review suggested that the darker colors could increase costs and delay delivery of the new jets, but once Trump returned to office, he returned to his desired colors for the plane.

Other government jets that carry other top administration officials will use a similar red, white and navy color scheme, the Air Force said earlier this year.

An Air Force spokesperson, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive plans, told the Associated Press that the two current planes, known as VC-25As, will not be retiring. Instead, they will remain in the fleet until the new Boeing planes, referred to as VC-25Bs, come into service, the spokesperson said.

It is unclear how the older jets will be used but the spokesperson said that both the Qatari jet as well as the VC-25As will be available for use and “the Presidential Airlift Group will select the appropriate aircraft for each mission based on operational requirements.”

Kim and Ceneta write for the Associated Press. Kim reported from Washington. AP writer Konstantin Toropin contributed to this report from Washington.

Aid cuts and poor sanitation are deepening fears that Ebola is spreading through displacement camps.

Seventeen medics have died from Ebola in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) as the death toll surpasses 200 in an outbreak tearing through a health system already weakened by years of conflict, displacement and chronic underfunding.

A senior World Health Organization (WHO) official confirmed the death toll on Friday and said that 75 healthcare workers had contracted the virus since Congolese authorities declared the outbreak on May 15 .

“The outbreak remains serious” and is “evolving so fast”, said WHO emergency director Marie Roseline Belizaire.

“It is a really high price that the system, the healthcare system, is paying, because we don’t have enough of healthcare workers in DRC,” she told reporters by video link from the outbreak epicentre in eastern DRC.

Health officials believe the rare Bundibugyo strain of Ebola had been spreading for months before the government formally announced the outbreak, leaving doctors, nurses and other medical staff exposed before they knew the virus was present.

Even now, basic protective equipment remains in short supply, with some facilities struggling to secure gloves, masks and other essentials needed to limit infection.

The DRC has one of the world’s lowest ratios of healthcare workers to population, with about 11 health workers for every 10,000 people, according to WHO data. Belizaire said China and Uganda were sending medical teams to support the response.

She added that the WHO was providing psychological support to medics who feared treating patients after seeing colleagues fall sick.

“When they are explaining to you how they live it, how they were infected … [it] can break your heart.”

Outbreak yet to reach its peak

Congolese authorities said on Thursday that the outbreak has killed 232 people and infected 896 others across 31 health zones in the country.

African Union member states have pledged nearly $1bn to respond to the emergency in eastern DRC and neighbouring Uganda, which has confirmed 19 cases and two deaths.

Health officials warn that the outbreak has not yet reached its peak.

The crisis is also raising alarm in camps for displaced people, where overcrowding, poor sanitation and resistance to testing could allow the virus to spread undetected.

At least 30 people have died since early May in Kigonze camp in Bunia in Ituri province, the epicentre of the outbreak. Camp officials described the death rate as unprecedented.

Authorities could not confirm the causes of death because patients and relatives had refused testing of both the living and the dead until Thursday, according to a camp spokesperson and aid organisation Caritas.

But witnesses and aid sources told Reuters that the dead had symptoms linked to Ebola, including headaches, fever and vomiting.

“People didn’t just die like this before,” camp spokesperson Desire Grodya Bapi told Reuters.

Kigonze is home to more than 15,000 people. The rising number of deaths there has increased fears that Ebola may be spreading among the more than five million displaced people in eastern DRC.

Aid workers say funding cuts have made the emergency more dangerous. Donors, including the United States under President Donald Trump, have reduced support for water, hygiene, and sanitation programmes, which are vital in fighting the disease spread through bodily fluids.

UN data shows funding for toilets and handwashing stations in DRC more than halved between 2024 and 2025, falling to about $38m. This year’s $80m appeal is only 21 percent funded.

DRC has hundreds of displacement camps, some housing up to 100,000 people. Ebola deaths have already been recorded in another camp in Ituri province, which accounts for more than 90 percent of nearly 900 confirmed cases.

Artificial intelligence education now starts at the age of six in China. The Ministry of Education has rolled out new guidelines to teach AI at every grade level. For President Xi Jinping, AI is a priority. Will the toddlers of today be the tech titans of the future?

This is a story from the archives. This originally aired on September 18, 2025. None of the dates, titles or other references from that time have been changed. 

In this episode: 

• Katrina Yu (@Katmyu), Al Jazeera Correspondent

Episode credits:
This episode was produced by Amy Walters, Sonia Bhagat, Sarí el-Khalili, and Tamara Khandaker, with Phillip Lanos, Spencer Cline, Melanie Marich, Kisaa Zehra, Farhan Rafid, and our host, Malika Bilal. It was edited by Kylene Kiang. 

Our sound designer is Alex Roldan. Our video editors are Hisham Abu Salah and Mohannad al-Melhem. Alexandra Locke is The Take’s executive producer. 

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China’s foreign minister says that emerging economies remain underrepresented in global governance institutions.

Presenting China’s new white paper on making global governance more equitable, minister Wang Yi argued that the role of the United Nations should be strengthened and developing countries should have a stronger voice in the world body.

In Beijing’s stated view, all countries should have an equal voice in global affairs, which means the Global South should have more representation.

China’s call comes as the world is engulfed in many armed conflicts and facing serious economic challenges.

But is Beijing now presenting itself as a leader of the Global South? And will it be able to garner enough support to play that role?

Presenter: Sami Zeidan

Guests:

Steve Tsang – Director of the SOAS China Institute

Cobus van Staden – Head of research at the China-Global South Project

Allen Carlson – Associate professor in the Government Department at Cornell University

China officially objected through its Foreign Ministry to the Japanese draft resolution to increase armaments and abandon Japan’s post-World War II commitment not to rearm its military, as approved by the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan during its general council meeting. The draft resolution proposed amending three key security documents, which are the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Medium-Range Defense Forces Enhancement Plan. It was to be submitted to the Japanese government and parliament for further discussion. Chinese authorities officially rejected and objected to the draft, deeming it a threat to their national security and their spheres of direct influence in Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Indo-Pacific region. They considered it a radical escalation of Japan’s security strategy, detrimental to Chinese national security and to the global security initiative proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Here, the revision of Japan’s three security documents, represented in the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Force Enhancement Plan, represents a strategic shift away from its post-war pacifist constitution toward more proactive and independent military policies. The nature of this shift is evident in Tokyo’s easing of restrictions on lethal weapons exports and its reorientation of its armament toward counter-offensive capabilities and missile development. Under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s administration, the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan has adopted a proactive approach, reshaping Japanese industries and institutions to address the greatest strategic challenge posed by China. The updated National Security Strategy has already fundamentally altered the country’s pacifist military doctrine by disarming the Japanese military and preventing its rearmament since World War II, a move that has drawn staunch opposition from China, which seeks to protect its own national security. The most significant amendments to the three Japanese security documents included Japan’s acknowledgment of its ability to double and enhance its counter-strike capabilities. This was achieved by allowing Japan to possess long-range missiles capable of striking enemy targets before launch. Simultaneously, Japanese authorities approved doubling defense spending, raising the military budget to 2% of GDP.

China objected to the Japanese draft resolution, which aimed to increase Japanese armament and militarize the region and global supply chains, and threatened to escalate the situation. Beijing strongly condemned these trends, describing them as new militarism. A key point of contention for China was what Chinese intelligence and military circles perceived as a warning of Japanese and foreign interference in Taiwanese affairs, as China considers Taiwan an integral part of its territory. Beijing condemned the Japanese leadership’s statement that any emergency in Taiwan is an emergency for Japan, describing a potential Chinese military intervention in Taiwan as an act of aggression. Here, Beijing rejects Japan’s new military approach, characterized by advanced military deployment. China has officially protested and taken countermeasures against Japan’s plans to deploy defensive missiles on Yonaguni Island, located only about 110 kilometers from Taiwan. China has strongly accused Japan of violating its commitments, arguing that this new Japanese military expansion violates Tokyo’s international obligations and its pacifist constitution. China has warned Japan that it will pay a heavy price if it intervenes militarily in the Taiwan Strait.

Chinese intelligence, military, security, and defense circles link Japan’s armament activities in Taiwan to American interference in Chinese affairs through its network of allies in the Asian region, such as Japan, given its close alliance with Washington. Here, Japan defends its military rearmament against China, with several of its officials sending political and security warnings to China. They argue that, given the uncertainty in Japan stemming from US policies and the fluctuating stance in Washington, Japan seeks to bolster its own capabilities and build regional alliances (with the Philippines, Australia, and NATO) to expand deterrence against Beijing and maintain regional security from a Japanese perspective. Strategic circles in Tokyo view the potential fall of Taiwan to China as a direct and existential threat to Japanese national security and vital shipping lanes, making the protection of the Taiwan Strait a fundamental component of Japan’s updated defense doctrine.

For these reasons, China’s decisive response was seen as a challenge to its national security, especially given Japan’s de facto official classification of Beijing as the greatest and most unprecedented strategic challenge to its security. This classification was further reinforced by Japanese authorities’ approval of developing military production, strengthening domestic defense industries, and easing restrictions on arms exports. This is where the dimensions of China’s official rejection and objection lie, as it is considered a violation of the pacifist principle enshrined in the Japanese military doctrine, which was internationally and regionally agreed upon after World War II for Japan’s disarmament. Beijing believes that Tokyo is abandoning its pacifist constitution and returning to a militaristic path, while Japan exaggerates the narrative of a China threat. Beijing accuses Japan of fabricating flimsy pretexts to justify its military expansion and arsenal, which threatens China’s regional security. Therefore, China warned that these Japanese steps to increase armament undermine peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and jeopardize the principles of China’s global security initiative. China also registered its objection to Japan’s exclusionary approaches to its initiative based on shared and sustainable security. Furthermore, China linked this Japanese escalation in its confrontation with China in the region to the sensitive issue of Taiwan and the close alliance between the United States and Japan, while categorically rejecting Japanese interference in Taiwan’s affairs and considering the island’s security an integral part of China’s national security.

Authors: Kung Chan and Yang Xite*

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent state visit to China, which was his first foreign trip of 2026, is a clear indication of the shifting dynamics of the bilateral relationship. Accompanied by an unprecedented delegation of 39 high-ranking officials, including five deputy prime ministers, eight ministers, the central bank governor, and energy executives, the scale resembled a partial cabinet relocation. This massive mobilization reflects Moscow’s urgency to secure an agreement on the Power of Siberia 2 natural gas pipeline, a strategic super-project stalled in commercial negotiations since 2012. Planned to span over 2,600 kilometers with an annual capacity of 50 billion cubic meters, the pipeline would traverse Mongolia to link Russian fields with Chinese markets. For Russia, finalizing this energy artery is an economic imperative to replace the European market, where Western sanctions aim to eliminate Russian pipeline gas imports by the end of 2027.

Evaluating the geopolitics of this energy relationship requires analyzing five distinct strategic dimensions.

First, Beijing has strong incentives to resist quick concessions. The negotiation deadlock is largely on pricing. Russia reportedly seeks approximately US$ 265 per thousand cubic meters to cover the high extraction and infrastructure costs of its Yamal fields in Western Siberia, whereas China targets roughly US$ 120. Unlike Russia, China commands significant leverage, boasting robust domestic pipeline networks, stable Central Asian infrastructure, and diverse liquefied natural gas imports. Given Russia’s acute financial pressure and diminishing options due to sanctions after the war in Ukraine, Beijing has the luxury of strategic patience, allowing it to wait for terms that align with market principles rather than rushing a deal under political pressure.

Second, the pipeline is less about energy revenue for Moscow and more about maintaining global geopolitical relevance. In the current international order, Russia finds itself sidelined from primary great-power management. Consequently, Putin seeks to leverage the Ukraine conflict to engage Washington while simultaneously trying to bind Russia’s economic future to China, much like it previously did with Europe. This anxiety within the China-United States-Russia triangular relationship was highlighted by the timing of the visit, which occurred just days after the U.S. President Donald Trump departed Beijing. As the war enters its fifth year and energy weaponization loses its potency in the West, shifting exports eastward has transformed from a strategic choice into a necessity for regime survival. By proposing a 30-year, multibillion-dollar pipeline network, Moscow hopes to anchor itself to the world’s largest energy consumer, ensuring it remains an indispensable player rather than a marginalized resource base.

Third, the proposed pipeline route serves as a geopolitical lever within the post-Soviet space. Passing through Mongolia, the route allows Russia to entrench its influence over Ulaanbaatar, which has recently deepened its engagement with the United States and NATO, while monitoring China’s northern energy ingress. This alignment requires Beijing to pay substantial transit fees and leaves its energy security vulnerable to the political stability of a third country. For Moscow, the project simultaneously secures the Chinese market and reinforces its traditional sphere of influence across Central Asia and Mongolia, using infrastructure to manage the economic and diplomatic trajectories of neighboring states.

Fourth, the protracted timeline works in Beijing’s favor. The longer negotiations stall, the more China’s bargaining position strengthens against an increasingly isolated Russia. While Moscow faces a liquidity crisis within its National Wealth Fund and the fiscal drain of a prolonged war, China’s energy diversification has progressed rapidly. Construction on Line D of the Central Asia-China gas pipeline is advancing alongside commitments from Turkmenistan, while maritime LNG capacity expanded by over 10 million tons recently with imports from Qatar, Australia, and the United States. Furthermore, China’s domestic shale gas production and global leadership in renewable energy insulation provide a structural ceiling on long-term natural gas demand. Middle Eastern instability in the Strait of Hormuz elevates the short-term value of overland corridors, but it ultimately reinforces Beijing’s commitment to resilience rather than a singular dependence on Moscow.

Fifth, China’s optimal energy architecture centers on the Southern Corridor, specifically what can be called the “Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Tajikistan (TUT) Corridor” framework. This network offers a direct alternative that circumvents Russian territory, extending through Xinjiang and across the Caspian Sea toward Azerbaijan and Europe. Lines A, B, and C of the Central Asia-China pipeline are already operational, and the completion of Line D will raise total capacity to 65 billion cubic meters annually. This infrastructure is backed by deepening diplomatic ties. Beijing and Dushanbe codified their strategic partnership via a friendship treaty, and China’s trade volume with the five Central Asian republics surpassed US$ 100 billion, cementing its status as their primary trading partner. A fully integrated Central Asian energy network directly erodes Russia’s traditional influence in its southern flank, creating a new economic center of gravity.

Ultimately, while Putin’s high-profile delegation sought to secure a vital economic lifeline, the unresolved pipeline agreement exposes the cold calculation of national interests underlying the partnership. For Beijing, maintaining a deliberate pace maximizes its buyers’ advantage and allows alternative supply chains to mature. The true key to Eurasian energy security lies not in a single northern pipeline, but in a diversified, networked western corridor that mitigates risk and ensures supply chain autonomy, a structural reality that will shape the continent’s geopolitical architecture for decades.

*Yang Xite, a Research Fellow at ANBOUND.

Leaders of the Group of Seven agreed to deepen cooperation on critical minerals and establish a new coordination platform aimed at reducing reliance on China for materials essential to defense, technology, electric vehicles, and renewable energy industries.

The move comes as Western economies seek to strengthen supply chain security following disruptions caused by Chinese export restrictions on rare earth related products and permanent magnets, which exposed the vulnerability of global industries dependent on a single dominant supplier.

New Targets for Supply Chain Diversification

The G7 outlined ambitious goals to reduce dependence on any single supplier outside the group and its partners. Leaders said they aim to lower reliance on one source for rare earths and permanent magnets to below 60 percent by 2030, with a longer term objective of reducing that figure to 50 percent as soon as possible.

Initial cooperation will focus on lithium and nickel, two minerals that play a crucial role in battery manufacturing and clean energy technologies. The framework is expected to expand gradually, adding several new minerals each year with particular attention on rare earth elements.

New Monitoring Platform and Investment Push

A central part of the initiative is the creation of a new platform that will coordinate policy responses, improve information sharing, and monitor potential supply disruptions.

The platform will work closely with the International Energy Agency, which will provide market analysis and early warnings about supply risks, shortages, and distortions.

G7 leaders also stressed the need for greater investment across the entire supply chain, from mining and processing to manufacturing and recycling. Development finance institutions, export credit agencies, and private investors are expected to play a larger role in funding strategic projects.

According to the summit statement, nearly 200 critical mineral projects have already been announced since the start of 2026, representing tens of billions of dollars in planned investment.

Economic Security Becomes a Strategic Priority

The initiative reflects a broader shift in Western economic policy, where critical minerals are increasingly viewed as a national security issue rather than simply a trade matter.

Rare earths, lithium, nickel, cobalt, and other strategic minerals are essential for advanced military systems, semiconductors, electric vehicles, batteries, renewable energy infrastructure, and artificial intelligence technologies.

Spend

Western governments have become increasingly concerned that geopolitical tensions could disrupt access to these resources, creating economic and security vulnerabilities.

Analysis

The G7 initiative represents one of the most coordinated attempts yet by advanced economies to reduce strategic dependence on China. While the statement avoids directly confronting Beijing, the objectives clearly target vulnerabilities that became apparent after China’s export restrictions disrupted global industries.

The challenge, however, extends beyond mining. China has spent decades building dominance across processing, refining, manufacturing, and logistics networks. Replicating those capabilities will require sustained investment, government support, and international coordination over many years.

The inclusion of measures such as joint procurement, subsidies, quotas, and price support mechanisms suggests governments are increasingly willing to intervene in markets to secure strategic resources. This marks a significant departure from the free market approach that previously dominated global trade policy.

Success will depend on whether G7 members can maintain political unity and attract sufficient private investment. If implemented effectively, the alliance could gradually reshape global critical mineral supply chains and reduce China’s leverage over key industries. If not, Western economies may continue to face supply risks despite ambitious targets and large investment commitments.

What Comes Next

The G7 is expected to begin implementing pilot programs focused on lithium and nickel while expanding cooperation with allies such as Japan and the European Union. The United States is also expected to pursue new trade and supply agreements related to critical minerals in the coming months.

Attention will now shift to whether governments can translate commitments into operational projects, increase domestic processing capacity, and build alternative supply chains quickly enough to reduce dependence on China before future disruptions occur.

With information from Reuters.

China has announced it will send a round of humanitarian aid to Lebanon and Iran and play an active role in fostering regional peace. The foreign ministry spokesman described Beijing as ‘deeply saddened’ by the humanitarian disaster.

Beijing warmly welcomes the peace agreement and memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran, considering it an important step toward de-escalating regional tensions. China supports the diplomatic path to resolving the crisis, based on a clear strategy aimed at protecting its economic and strategic interests. Beijing emphasizes that a permanent ceasefire, the protection of national sovereignty, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, and ensuring the safety of international navigation are top priorities. China contributed behind the scenes to shaping the negotiating framework and influencing Tehran to accept the agreement with the United States in order to safeguard its vital interests in the continued flow of Iranian oil. Accordingly, China officially welcomed the memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran, affirming that the agreement represents a crucial step toward de-escalating regional tensions. The Chinese diplomatic welcome focused on the key provisions of the agreement, as stated by the spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry. These provisions guarantee a comprehensive ceasefire, freedom of navigation, energy security, an end to the naval blockade, and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to global trade and energy supplies. China considers this essential for its energy and economic security. This agreement, along with the nuclear framework and negotiations, marks the conclusion of the first phase, followed by a 30-60 day negotiation period to discuss the Iranian nuclear program (uranium enrichment and the lifting of sanctions). This Chinese announcement came in support of international mediation efforts ahead of the official signing ceremony in Geneva.

The most prominent points welcomed by China in the US-Iranian agreement, according to announcements and follow-up by Chinese diplomatic channels and as included in the key provisions of the memorandum of understanding, were a cessation of military operations; an immediate and permanent ceasefire on all fronts, including the Lebanese front; freedom of navigation through a commitment to end the naval blockade and open the Strait of Hormuz to global trade and energy supplies; and the nuclear framework, with the conclusion of a phase one agreement stipulating that negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program (uranium enrichment and sanctions relief) would take place within a specified timeframe of 30 to 60 days following the signing.

China has played a pivotal, often unacknowledged, role as a diplomatic bridge between Tehran and Washington to protect its strategic and economic interests in the Middle East. The dimensions of China’s behind-the-scenes role include ensuring the flow of energy. Beijing seeks to maintain stability in the Gulf region to guarantee the uninterrupted supply of Iranian oil and to protect its interests and investments in the Belt and Road Initiative. Iran represents a crucial geographical and strategic hub in China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. To this end, Beijing has sought to leverage its strong economic ties and strategic partnership with Tehran to persuade it to make flexible concessions during critical times, while offering support to avoid military escalation. Beijing fears that the collapse of diplomatic channels could lead to a regional war that would jeopardize its extensive investments in the region.

On the other hand, Beijing seeks to counterbalance American influence. China prefers a negotiated framework between Tehran and Washington that limits American unilateral hegemony and positions itself as a responsible international player capable of peacemaking. China’s vision for diplomatic balancing between Washington and Tehran is shaped by several key strategic axes, most importantly (establishing the principle of a political settlement). Here, Beijing consistently emphasizes that dialogue is the only solution to the Iranian crisis, rejecting military escalation that harms the security of navigation and global trade. This is coupled with regional and international networking, where China supports parallel diplomatic efforts, such as Pakistani mediation. Beijing maintains continuous communication with the parties to the crisis to ensure the opening of indirect negotiation channels that prevent a full-scale confrontation and safeguard vital interests. China has maintained the flow of Iranian oil while simultaneously strengthening its extensive economic partnerships with the Gulf states, granting it unique diplomatic weight and influence that Western powers lack. Despite this notable progress, Beijing faces ongoing challenges due to US containment policies. China rejects Washington’s classification of its major technology companies as military entities and threatens retaliatory measures, making Beijing’s attempts to create a strategic balance with the United States an extremely delicate and sensitive process.

Based on the preceding understanding and analysis, we can see how successful Beijing has been in transforming escalating tensions in the Middle East into strategic gains. China has played an active mediating role by supporting diplomatic talks and the memorandum of understanding for peace between Washington and Tehran, thus positioning itself as a responsible international power seeking to establish stability and move away from unilateral hegemony.

Behind a veil of good-natured diplomacy, American adversaries are exploiting the conflict in Iran by gaining insights, strategic lessons, and geopolitical power while the United States wages feckless war against the Middle Eastern theocracy. Beyond the bombings, the blockade, and the oil prices, Russia and China keenly watch how America struggles, succeeds, and scrambles. In doing so, these adversaries are leveraging the conflict to challenge America’s readiness, aid its adversaries, and gain invaluable intel on America’s successes and failures.

The concept of observing a conflict to acquire critical intelligence on how to best conduct combat is not unique to the war in Iran. For example, in the Russo-Ukrainian War, America has gained indispensable knowledge on the most and least effective tools of 21st-century warfare, including information on the power of unmanned aerial systems. With the war in Iran, though, Russia and China are the scientists, and America is the experiment. The Middle East is now a testing ground for cutting-edge drone swarm technologies and a catalyst for how smaller powers can effectively deny their adversaries from accomplishing their objectives—a lesson that China is certainly eager to learn about for a possible conflict over Taiwan. Therefore, when America wages war against Iran, there are consequences that are crucial to recognize, and one of those consequences is that the United States is inadvertently empowering and informing its adversaries.

Maintaining its signaled commitment of multipolarity and geopolitical neutrality, China’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning commented, “…China…has been making active efforts to promote ceasefire and peace…we will continue playing an active role in restoring…tranquility to the Middle East…” Reality demonstrates that this is false. China is discreetly gaining intelligence on the U.S. military’s readiness, pacing, and warfighting strategies. Furthermore, China has directly supported Iran, providing anti-missile weaponry, building blocks for ballistic missiles, and invaluable military intelligence to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Instead of promoting peace and tranquility, these actions are designed to empower Iran and keep America locked in the struggle, weakening the country and allowing China to acquire more intelligence on U.S. readiness. Despite China’s claimed intentions, it’s clear that the nation is bolstering Iran’s strength and sustaining its defenses. Even from a domestic point of view, these actions are increasing domestic American division and the depletion of America’s defense resources. The conflict with Iran is not limited to Iran; by proxy, it’s with America’s foremost adversaries, too.

Similarly, Russia has provided critical support to Iran in the form of targeting intelligence, which Iran couldn’t have otherwise acquired. Shahed drones, assets that have proven to be exceptionally effective against western defenses, are manufactured in Russia’s Alabuga Special Economic Zone and are being provided to Iran by Russia. Contradicting these actions, a statement by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that the country “…stands ready to assist in advancing peaceful solutions grounded in international law, mutual respect, and a balanced consideration of interests.” But equipping Iran with efficacious tools of war is not a peaceful solution. Giving the nation targeting information cannot be construed as a neutral or geopolitically insignificant act. In reality, America’s adversaries are taking an active, hands-on approach to the war in Iran, indirectly but clearly aiding the nation and actively working against U.S. goals.

In response to this tacit yet significant aid to Iran, the natural response for America should be to publicly highlight the hostile actions of its adversaries. But the United States has been hesitant, if not downright unwilling, to do so. For example, Matthew Whitaker, the U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO, commented that “China certainly is not participating and is not aiding and abetting the Iranian demise…” Separately, he claimed, “There’s no indication that we can talk about publicly that the Russians are participating with the Iranians.” Public investigations, though, have proven both those assertions false. The trepidation of the United States to clearly and confidently condemn its adversaries’ belligerence in the region is an enormous blunder of strategic communications. Contrasting this, Russia and China have simultaneously and aggressively pursued campaigns of condemnation to weaken America’s global power. For example, Russia has often claimed that certain U.S. support to Ukraine may constitute an act of war; China strongly condemned recent American intervention in Venezuela as violating the international laws by which America claims to be guided. U.S. adversaries are eager and willing to strategically undermine and criticize U.S. actions, yet America is unwisely unwilling to do the same.

Russia’s and China’s cooperative aid to Iran demonstrates that the conflict is, in many senses, between world powers. A new ‘axis of resistance’ against Western liberalism is developing, and allowing American adversaries to act without denunciation is a failure of strategic communications and allows these nations to act with undeserved impunity. As the United States continues to wage war against Iran, it’s crucial to recognize that every bomb America drops, every mission American soldiers complete, and every destroyed military asset is a datapoint that U.S. adversaries will exploit. Russia’s and China’s critical support to Iran is hostile and counter to American goals; ignoring this is strategically imprudent. Beyond the explosions, America’s adversaries are watching—and acting. It’s the responsibility of the United States to expose those actions for what they really are.

Chinese media and think tanks view the United States’ hosting of the FIFA World Cup from a purely geopolitical, economic, and commercial perspective, critically assessing the infrastructure and political climate. Chinese circles see the tournament not merely as a sporting event but as a central tool for the United States to polish its image, bolster its global leadership amidst current international polarization, and advance its political agenda. This perspective is highlighted through several key points, the most important being the geopolitical dimension. Here, Chinese think tanks argue that the tournament reflects the level of competition between major powers, with Washington attempting to use hosting as a soft power tool to project its influence. However, Chinese media, in turn, emphasized the state of sharp international polarization and division, criticizing the political challenges and the wrangling that accompanied the broadcasting negotiations. Furthermore, a number of (commercial considerations) have been raised, with the tournament facing criticism from Chinese media due to its exorbitant cost and the significant time difference between North America and China, leading to a decline in Chinese public interest. This hesitation was reflected in the negotiations, as FIFA incurred financial losses after China Media Group (CMG) signed the broadcasting agreement late and at a price significantly lower than FIFA’s requested.

Regarding the (organizational and policy challenges), Chinese research and media institutions expressed reservations about the tournament’s logistical challenges, particularly the longer travel distances between host cities compared to previous editions, as well as concerns related to US immigration laws and security restrictions. Despite the absence of the Chinese national team from the tournament, China’s commercial involvement was substantial. Beijing demonstrated its active presence through Chinese commercial sponsors, such as Hisense, and sporting goods factories in eastern China, which reaped significant economic benefits from manufacturing tournament flags and souvenirs. Chinese media coverage, particularly through its official channels, was extensive. CGTN, the Chinese state broadcaster, developed comprehensive plans to broadcast and cover the matches, ensuring the event reached millions of Chinese fans across its various platforms.

Furthermore, Chinese state media and intelligence and military think tanks utilized Washington’s hosting of the FIFA World Cup to offer a number of strategic, media, and intellectual analyses regarding China’s calculations in response to American actions. Major events are often used as a primary arena for geopolitical competition between the two superpowers. Beijing’s vision can be summarized by its use of major sporting, cultural, and other events as a political tool. Beijing views Washington’s hosting of major international tournaments or events as more than just sporting or cultural occasions; it sees them as an extension of American information and decision-making strategies aimed at projecting American influence and hegemony globally. While China seeks to highlight international contradictions, Beijing has directed its media apparatus to demonstrate that Washington’s attempts to unilaterally assume leadership or project messages of unity are, in reality, met with sharp division and polarization within the international system. Here, China has attempted to counter American soft power. This media coverage of the FIFA World Cup in the United States reflects a continuous Chinese effort to neutralize Western and American soft power by focusing on structural issues in international relations, such as the absence of multipolarity, and by promoting the Chinese model as an alternative striving for a more balanced world.

In this context, Chinese media and think tanks view the United States’ hosting of the World Cup through the lens of soft power, geopolitical strategies, and trade, while sharply criticizing the infrastructure and political circumstances surrounding the tournament, particularly in the aftermath of the Iran War and a number of global geopolitical upheavals stemming from US policies. Chinese analyses focus on purely commercial interests, criticizing the exorbitant costs of broadcasting rights. Conversely, they highlight the role of leading Chinese companies in profiting from the event by providing innovative and advanced broadcasting technologies and exporting merchandise and fan supplies. However, they also offer several critical observations regarding the infrastructure and political climate. Chinese research centers express critical skepticism about the readiness of US cities, suggesting that complexities related to visa requirements and a strict security and political environment could hinder fans and undermine the freedom of movement necessary for such events.

Based on the preceding understanding and analysis, we can discern the perspective of Chinese media and research centers that the United States exploits hosting international sporting and political events as a prominent tool for employing sports to enhance American soft power, attempting to project influence to manage conflict, and solidifying its leadership of the global order. Therefore, Chinese think tanks and intelligence agencies have developed a comprehensive media and research plan to expose American polarization worldwide. Conversely, Chinese media and think tanks emphasize Washington’s failure to garner international consensus, highlighting the sharp division and widening gap between Western powers and the rising powers of the Global South. This underscores the mechanism of conflict transformation, where competition is no longer limited to the economic and military spheres but has expanded significantly to encompass soft power tools and media discourse. This reflects a picture of expanded strategic competition and its impact on international stability.

The Washington institution cut its global growth forecast by 0.4 percentage points to 2.5 percent, citing surging energy prices, inflation and borrowing costs.

The conflict in the Middle East is set to bring global economic growth to its slowest since the COVID-19 pandemic, the World Bank has warned.

In its latest Global Economic Prospects report, published on Thursday, the Washington-based institution cut its global growth forecast for 2026 to 2.5 percent from the 2.9 percent it had predicted in January, citing surging energy prices, rising inflation and higher borrowing costs.

The report highlights the significant economic costs of the conflict, which is at risk of flaring up again, as the fragile ceasefire between the United States and Iran is tested on both sides.

The analysis warns that the outlook could decline further if supply disruptions worsen. Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz – a vital passageway for oil and gas transit – in response to the hostilities launched by the US and Israel has put huge stress upon global energy and other supply chains.

The World Bank estimates that Brent crude prices — the international oil benchmark — will average $94 a barrel this year, 36 percent above last year’s average. Fertiliser prices are forecast to increase significantly this year, with knock-on effects for food prices.

Overall, the closure of the strategic waterway will help to push global inflation to 4 percent this year, a substantial increase from last year’s rate of 3.3 percent.

However, the World Bank cautions that global growth could plummet to as low as 1.3 percent this year, should energy supply disruptions worsen, with inflation pushing to 4.4 percent.

The World Bank report also cautions that developing countries are on the front line of the potential impact.

In its report, the institution has downgraded its growth forecasts for two-thirds of countries since January. Global growth is expected to improve to 2.8 percent in 2027, but will remain 0.4 percentage points below the average during the 2010s, during which the world economy was recovering from the global financial crisis.

Excluding China and India, the report worries that developing countries have made little progress towards narrowing their per capita income gap with wealthy nations over the past decade.

“Developing countries have faced a series of challenges over the last decade,” said Ajay Banga, president of the World Bank Group. “The impact differs by country, but the basic test is the same: protect people and preserve stability today, without giving up on growth and jobs tomorrow.”

The World Bank is pledging to assist any developing country experiencing the economic fallout of the Middle East conflict. The organisation says it has set aside up to $60bn to help. It added that if the conflict persists, it can increase its support to $100bn.

June 9 (Asia Today) — The U.S. Defense Department expanded its list of Chinese companies it says are linked to China’s military, adding about two dozen firms, including BYD, Alibaba, Baidu, WuXi AppTec and Unitree, according to U.S. media reports.

The annual list, known as the Section 1260H list of Chinese military companies, grew from last year as U.S. national security officials increased scrutiny of Beijing’s use of civilian technology to support military modernization.

The newly added companies span electric vehicles, e-commerce, cloud computing, artificial intelligence, biotechnology and robotics.

BYD is one of China’s leading electric vehicle makers. Alibaba operates e-commerce and cloud computing businesses, including in the United States. Baidu is active in internet search and artificial intelligence. WuXi AppTec is a major pharmaceutical and biotechnology services company, while Unitree is known for humanoid and quadruped robots.

The move shows the Trump administration is looking beyond semiconductors and AI chips as it assesses security risks tied to Chinese technology and industrial supply chains.

Chris McGuire, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and former official at the State Department and National Security Council, said the action shows Washington is increasingly attentive to security risks from Chinese products in industries beyond semiconductors and AI.

China objected to the move.

A spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy in Washington said the Defense Department was overstretching the concept of national security and creating a discriminatory list targeting Chinese companies.

The updated list drew attention because it comes as Washington and Beijing have recently appeared to ease some trade tensions.

The United States had reportedly held back some measures against Chinese companies, including sanctions, high tariffs and cyber-related actions. An earlier version of the list expected in February was withdrawn ahead of a U.S.-China summit, according to U.S. media reports.

The summit, held in Beijing last month, focused heavily on trade issues.

Still, the Pentagon continues to view China as the United States’ main military competitor.

Craig Singleton, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, said the trade atmosphere may have improved after the summit, but Washington’s basic assessment has not changed.

He said U.S. officials still believe major Chinese civilian technology companies are connected to China’s military modernization.

Companies placed on the list are barred from doing business with the U.S. military. The designation does not automatically impose broad sanctions, but it can create reputational risk, reduce access to U.S. government-related business and increase scrutiny from investors and regulators.

The commercial effect can vary by company.

SZ DJI Technology, the Chinese drone maker placed on the list in 2022, has continued to maintain a strong position in the U.S. consumer drone market despite its designation.

The latest additions show that Washington’s concerns about China’s military-civil fusion strategy are expanding from advanced chips and AI models into broader technology and manufacturing ecosystems.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260609010002864

Chinese embassy in Washington, DC, condemns designation, calling it ‘discriminatory’.

The United States has designated Chinese corporate giants Alibaba, BYD and Baidu as companies that support China’s military, expanding its blacklist to some of the country’s best-known commercial brands.

The Pentagon included the firms in an update on Monday that is likely to complicate the fragile detente under way between Washington and Beijing after years of rocky relations.

China’s embassy in Washington, DC, condemned the listing as “discriminatory” and an example of the US government “overstretching” the concept of national security.

“Chinese companies that do business overseas have been strictly observing laws and regulations of their host countries,” an embassy spokesperson said.

“The US should stop its wrong practice and create a fair, just and non-discriminatory environment for Chinese companies.”

Alibaba, BYD and Baidu did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

The Pentagon’s list of “Chinese military companies,” which is updated annually, now includes 188 firms, up from 134 in 2025.

Firms included on the list, which was created in 2021, will be barred from consideration for US defence contracts from later this month.

The Pentagon defines “Chinese military companies” as entities owned or controlled by the Chinese military, or that contribute to China’s “military civil fusion”, referring to Beijing’s strategy of melding civilian and defence-related research and innovation.

Companies must also carry out some of their operations in the US to be designated.

The expansion of the blacklist comes less than a month after US President Donald Trump met Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Beijing for a two-day summit aimed at lowering the temperature in their countries’ years-long trade war and tech rivalry.

Alibaba, Baidu, and BYD are among China’s most prominent brands, claiming the top spots in the e-commerce, internet search and electric vehicle markets, respectively.

The addition of several household brands not normally associated with the defence sector mirrors last year’s designation of tech firm Tencent, the owner of the ubiquitous messaging app WeChat.

Other additions to the list include RoboSense Technology, an AI and robotics company with headquarters in Shenzhen, and Hangzhou-based Unitree Robotics.

RoboSense Technology and Unitree Robotics did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

Dennis Wilder, a national security expert who worked on China at the CIA and the White House’s National Security Council, expressed scepticism about the feasibility of implementing such a “broad-brush” blacklist.

“Although it may make some US firms wary of engaging with the labelled entities, in fact, many US firms already have deep relationships with these entities, that they are not going to give up unless there are real penalties attached to working commercial deals with them,” Wilder told Al Jazeera.

“Sanctions that range this widely are sanctions that don’t work. Unless the US is willing to decouple from the Chinese economy altogether, these sanctions are simply performative,” Wilder said.

Taiwan has accused China of carrying out a “provocative act” after Chinese Coast Guard vessels conducted patrols in waters east of the island. The operation followed announcements by Japan and the Philippines that they would begin formal talks on maritime boundary delimitation, a move Beijing views as involving waters linked to Taiwan.

Chinese state media described the deployment as a special maritime law-enforcement operation. Taiwan responded by dispatching Coast Guard vessels, which reportedly warned the Chinese ships away from restricted waters. Defence Minister Wellington Koo characterized the patrols as both a challenge to Taiwan’s sovereignty and an example of “cognitive warfare” aimed at reshaping perceptions of territorial control.

The incident comes amid sustained Chinese military activity around Taiwan, including frequent air and naval operations. Taiwan is also monitoring the movements of the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning, which is operating in the Western Pacific near waters east of the Philippines.

Why It Matters

The patrols represent more than a routine maritime operation. They signal China’s growing willingness to extend its presence beyond the Taiwan Strait and into areas east of Taiwan that have traditionally been viewed as strategically important for the island’s defence.

The move also demonstrates Beijing’s opposition to emerging regional cooperation among U.S. partners and allies. The maritime boundary discussions between Japan and the Philippines reflect increasing efforts among regional states to clarify maritime rights and strengthen coordination in contested waters.

For Taiwan, Chinese Coast Guard activities present a complex challenge. Unlike military operations, law-enforcement patrols operate within a legal grey zone that allows Beijing to advance territorial claims without triggering a conventional military confrontation. Such actions can gradually normalize China’s presence in disputed areas while increasing pressure on Taiwan’s security apparatus.

The incident further highlights the growing integration of maritime, legal, and information-based strategies in China’s approach to territorial disputes across the Indo-Pacific.

Stakeholders

Taiwan

• Protecting maritime sovereignty and territorial claims.
• Maintaining freedom of navigation and security in eastern waters.

China

• Expanding operational presence around Taiwan.
• Reinforcing sovereignty claims through maritime law-enforcement activities.

Japan

• Engaged in maritime boundary discussions with the Philippines.
• Monitoring Chinese activities that could affect regional security.

Philippines

• Seeking greater legal clarity over maritime boundaries.
• Increasing security cooperation with regional partners.

United States

• Maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait and broader Indo-Pacific region.
• Supporting freedom of navigation and regional deterrence efforts.

Regional Security Partners

• Including Australia and other Indo-Pacific states concerned about changing maritime dynamics.

Strategic Implications

The patrols illustrate China’s increasing reliance on so-called “grey-zone” tactics, which fall below the threshold of open military conflict while steadily advancing strategic objectives. By deploying Coast Guard vessels rather than naval forces, Beijing can challenge Taiwan’s authority while reducing the risk of immediate military escalation.

The incident also reflects the expanding geographical scope of cross-strait competition. Traditionally concentrated in the Taiwan Strait, tensions are increasingly extending into the Western Pacific, where control of maritime approaches carries significant strategic value for both China and Taiwan.

Furthermore, the timing of the operation suggests that Beijing is seeking to influence regional maritime diplomacy. By responding directly to Japan-Philippines boundary discussions, China is signaling its opposition to initiatives that could strengthen legal and political frameworks contrary to its territorial claims.

The episode reinforces concerns among regional governments that maritime disputes are becoming increasingly interconnected, linking Taiwan, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea into a broader strategic contest.

What’s Next?

Several developments warrant close attention in the coming weeks:

• Taiwan is likely to increase coordination between its military and Coast Guard to strengthen maritime surveillance and response capabilities.
• China may continue deploying Coast Guard vessels east of Taiwan as part of a sustained effort to normalize its operational presence in the area.
• Japan and the Philippines are expected to proceed with maritime boundary discussions despite Beijing’s objections, potentially drawing further diplomatic responses from China.
• Increased activity by the Liaoning carrier group could provide additional indications of China’s broader military objectives in the Western Pacific.
• The United States and regional partners may intensify maritime monitoring and security cooperation to deter unilateral attempts to alter the status quo.

Future outcomes

The incident reflects a broader shift in regional security dynamics, where maritime law-enforcement operations are increasingly being used as instruments of strategic competition. Rather than relying solely on military pressure, China is employing a combination of legal, political, and operational tools to reinforce its territorial claims and shape the regional security environment.

For Taiwan, the challenge extends beyond the immediate presence of Chinese vessels. The longer-term concern lies in preventing the gradual normalization of Chinese activities in areas that Taipei considers vital to its sovereignty and security. As regional actors deepen cooperation on maritime governance and security, incidents of this nature are likely to become an increasingly important indicator of the evolving balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.

With information from Reuters.

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s meeting with North Korea’s Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang on Sunday is significant for one reason.

It’s not that they are meeting: The two men met in Beijing just a year ago when China held a massive military parade to mark 80 years since Japan surrendered unconditionally to Allied forces, bringing an end to the second world war.

What’s surprising is that Xi is travelling at all.

The Chinese leader has not travelled to Pyongyang since 2019, having steadily cut down his travel in recent years, and world leaders like US President Donald Trump and Russian leader Vladimir Putin generally come to him these days.

“We need to remember that Xi Jinping has not really travelled abroad that much,” William Yang, Crisis Group’s senior analyst for Northeast Asia, told Al Jazeera. “The growing trend is foreign leaders heading to Beijing to meet with him.

“For Xi Jinping to be the one who decides to travel to Pyongyang, it shows the level of significance that China attaches to this trip.”

Xi averaged about 14 trips a year between 2013 and 2019, but dropped to approximately six a year between 2022 and 2025, according to the Asia Society. In 2020, he made just one overseas trip, and in 2021, he made none, as China grappled with the COVID-19 pandemic.

He may be travelling now, though, amid concerns about North Korea’s relationship with Russia, Yang said.

Senior partner no more?

Traditionally, Beijing played the role of senior partner in the China-North Korea relationship, with North Korea heavily dependent on China for as much as 95 percent of its trade, according to one 2022 estimate from the National Committee on North Korea, a US-based nonprofit.

That dynamic has been changing since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, however. North Korea has provided Russia with critical weapons, artillery and manpower and is credited by observers with helping to keep Moscow’s war machine going.

South Korea’s Institute for National Security Strategy, a government-funded research institute, estimates that since 2023, Moscow has paid North Korea as much as $14.4bn for troop deployments and the export of “artillery, shells, and guided and ballistic missiles”.

The report said that North Korea may only have received between $580m and $1.5bn of that in the form of “goods”, which means there is a “significant possibility that the majority of the payment from Moscow was in the form of ‘sensitive military technology or related precision parts and materials that are difficult to observe via satellite’,” according to a translation.

Although China shares a mutual defence treaty with North Korea, it is still wary of North Korea acquiring new military technology, Yang said.

“Beijing has always been very careful about providing military assistance to North Korea because they do not see a militarily stronger North Korea as necessarily in its favour,” he said. “A North Korea that is militarily emboldened through its relationship with Russia could be a potential source of disruption to the balance of power and status quo on the Korean Peninsula.”

North Korea has already carried out eight missile launches since the start of the year, and in May unveiled a new AI-guided tactical cruise missile, according to North Korean media and the US Naval Institute.

Earlier this week, North Korean state media also released photos of Kim touring a new “weapons-grade nuclear materials” factory, which would be used to expand Pyongyang’s nuclear capability at an “exponential rate”.

Fluctuating tensions

North Korea has technically been at war with South Korea since 1950, with the conflict suspended by a 1953 armistice agreement. The two countries are divided by a 250-kilometre-long (155-mile-long) Demilitarized Zone, splitting the Korean Peninsula.

Tensions have fluctuated dramatically over the years, reaching a recent low point in 2024 when Kim abandoned the long-term goal of Korean unification.

He has largely cut off communications ever since, according to observers. On Friday, South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that it hopes that Xi’s trip will “play a constructive role in addressing issues related to the Korean Peninsula” – suggesting that Seoul may have lobbied the Chinese leader to try to smooth over relations.

South Korean Minister of Unification Chung Dong-young separately told reporters last month that he expects the two leaders to discuss a possible meeting between Kim and Trump later in the year.

Xi may also be alarmed by other security developments in East Asia, including news of a possible military-logistics ‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌support pact between South Korea and Japan, which was raised at the Shangri-La Dialogue of regional defence officials in Singapore last weekend.

While China and South Korea’s relationship fluctuates, its ties with Japan are acrimonious due to longstanding grievances dating back to Imperial Japan’s occupation of China in the 1930s and 1940s. Beijing has also objected to recent moves by Tokyo to expand its de facto military.

China strongly condemns the Israeli airstrikes and ground incursion into southern Lebanon, describing these operations as a dangerous escalation that threatens the stability of the entire region. China demands that Israel immediately cease its military operations and fully withdraw its forces from Lebanese territory, warning of the dangers of its incursions and violations of established lines. China views the fourth round of Washington talks between Lebanon and Israel and the military tensions as an extension of a broader crisis. Beijing sees this conflict as a consequence of the Gaza war, emphasizing clear principles in its intelligence and military assessment of the situation across several axes, most notably the necessity of an Israeli withdrawal and a ceasefire. Beijing calls for an immediate cessation of military operations and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory, warning that expanding ground operations will drag the region into chaos. China’s efforts in the reconstruction of Lebanon focus on providing urgent humanitarian aid packages, signing development cooperation agreements, and encouraging Chinese companies to participate in infrastructure projects and long-term investments within the framework of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. China also defended the Lebanese position in the face of Israeli escalation at the United Nations, with its representative to the Security Council emphasizing that Israel’s advance to Beaufort Castle (Qalaat Al-Shaqif) was the most serious incursion into southern Lebanon in 30 years. He called on the international community to take urgent measures before the situation in Lebanon deteriorated further, demanding respect for Lebanese sovereignty and the withdrawal of all Israeli forces from southern Lebanon.

The most prominent features of these Chinese efforts for joint cooperation with the Lebanese side and the international community in the reconstruction of Lebanon and the cessation of Israeli attacks on southern Lebanon are the provision of direct financial and development support. The Chinese and Lebanese governments signed a development cooperation agreement in Beirut worth 50 million Chinese yuan to support reconstruction and sustainable development efforts, along with the provision of urgent humanitarian aid. China delivered shipments of emergency humanitarian aid through the Port of Beirut to alleviate the economic and living burdens on the Lebanese people. Furthermore, China encouraged the participation of Chinese companies and investments in reconstruction and development efforts in Lebanon. Beijing has expressed its readiness to encourage its major companies and national institutions to participate in Lebanon’s reconstruction projects and support the development of the energy, telecommunications, and infrastructure sectors through China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Lebanon has been a partner in this Chinese initiative since joining in 2017. China aims to enhance Lebanon’s role as a pivotal hub for trade and logistics in the Middle East. In addition to sustained Chinese diplomatic efforts, China has continued its diplomatic and developmental support for Lebanon, alongside its active participation in UN peacekeeping operations in southern Lebanon.

China’s role in halting the Israeli war on Lebanon has focused on exerting diplomatic pressure through the United Nations and utilizing international platforms to call for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory, while supporting political and diplomatic solutions to prevent the conflict from escalating. China has consistently called for an end to Israeli military operations against Lebanon during UN sessions and warned that the collapse of ceasefires places the region on a more dangerous precipice. Beijing called for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from the devastated Lebanese territories, emphasizing the need to respect international resolutions, Lebanon’s sovereignty and independence, and the protection of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). China stressed the importance of ensuring that UN peacekeepers could carry out their duties freely and safely and condemned any attacks against UNIFIL personnel. China also emphasized the need to intensify humanitarian aid to the Lebanese people to address the repercussions of the war and expressed its full readiness to contribute to restoring regional stability.

Here, Chinese diplomatic and intelligence agencies affirmed that Lebanon’s sovereignty and security must not be violated, stressing that extending the authority of the Lebanese state and protecting its stability are the fundamental pillars for preventing the entire region from sliding into a comprehensive regional war. They reiterated the necessity of respecting Lebanon’s sovereignty and security, considering the stability and protection of the Lebanese state as essential to preventing a full-blown regional war. China also expressed its full support for the role of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and emphasized the need to provide guarantees for its protection and freedom of movement to carry out its mission. From an analytical perspective, Beijing believes that a political solution to the crisis must include respect for international resolutions and adherence to the two-state solution for Palestine and Israel. It also expressed concern that these negotiations might lead to regional arrangements that serve the interests of certain major powers and marginalize other parties in the region. On the other hand, China welcomes dialogue and diplomatic solutions as a means to ease tensions in the Middle East and supports efforts to restore Lebanon’s sovereignty. However, Beijing has criticized unilateral US actions in managing interconnected issues such as Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran, emphasizing the need to adhere to international resolutions and support regional stability, avoiding military interventions and the expansion of conflict.

Beijing adopts a clear strategic vision regarding the Lebanese crisis, which is summarized in its emphasis on respecting sovereignty. Chinese diplomacy strongly condemns any violations of Lebanese sovereignty and calls for an immediate halt to foreign military operations on Lebanese territory to ensure the safety of civilians. With Chinese intelligence and military agencies calling for a monopoly on weapons, a position reiterated by the Chinese Permanent Representative to the UN Security Council, China supports the Lebanese state as the sole guarantor of internal stability. This signifies Beijing’s strong support for the principle of state monopoly on weapons, considering official institutions the only guarantor of internal stability and the prevention of the country’s disintegration. China also supports the UNIFIL forces, opposing the termination of the UNIFIL mandate and demanding that it be enabled to fulfill its mission to ensure stability in southern Lebanon and contribute to regional de-escalation. Beijing emphasizes that escalation will not resolve crises, urging conflicting parties (including Washington and Tehran) to prioritize diplomacy and political negotiation to exercise restraint.