Venezuelan

Caracas, October 29, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez has instructed the Foreign Ministry and the Attorney General’s Office to advance diplomatic and legal efforts to recover 31 tonnes of Venezuelan gold held by the Bank of England’s vaults for more than six years.

The freeze on the reserves, currently valued at around US $4 billion, dates back to the United Kingdom’s refusal to recognize Nicolás Maduro’s 2018 reelection. A year later, opposition leader Juan Guaidó formally asked British authorities to prevent the Venezuelan government from accessing the gold.

During a cabinet meeting on Wednesday, Rodríguez described the ongoing freeze as a theft. 

“It is a mockery, but one aimed at illegitimately appropriating Venezuela’s gold reserves. We want no more excuses. Even the irrational lawsuit pursued by opposition factions was withdrawn by the very same people who brought it,” she said.

Rodríguez added that she “will not give up” on the claim and recalled that “there is an agreement among Venezuela’s political sectors” to secure the gold’s return. 

The Venezuelan government and an opposition sector representing the defunct 2015 National Assembly have been engaged in a US-backed dialogue process. On October 21, the delegations agreed to establish a joint commission to engage with London and seek the return of the reserves. The parties announced that the funds would be destined for post-earthquake reconstruction efforts, though Rodríguez has also pledged to use it to bolster public services and the electricity grid.

The acting leader had previously written to King Charles III requesting the release of the gold. In September, London and Caracas likewise began a diplomatic rapprochement and announced plans to appoint ambassadors to their respective missions.

According to reports, the Venezuelan gold is set to be transferred to the US Federal Reserve in New York, where its sale or use as collateral for loans would be contingent on the Trump administration’s approval and subjected to foreign audits.

Wednesday’s cabinet meeting additionally saw Rodríguez announce the arrival of 41 heavy machinery units to southeast Bolívar State to strengthen the Venezuelan Mining Corporation’s (CVM) operations at the Chocó plant.

The acting president said the delivery was part of a comprehensive state plan to acquire 544 pieces of equipment, including surface and underground machinery, drilling equipment, and mobile units. 

“More than 60 percent of this purchase will have arrived before the end of the year. What does that tell us? More gold production in 2027,” she affirmed. The Venezuelan executive has pushed a pro-business overhaul of mining legislation in recent months in a bid to court foreign investment. In September, New York-based Heeney Capital and commodities trader Mercuria Energy received a 30-year concession of the Chocó 10 mine in Bolívar State.

Rodríguez also promised short-term relief from electricity outages, often lasting up to 12 hours a day in certain parts of the country. However, she criticized the recurrent protests against blackouts

“I have not seen a single megawatt added to the national electricity system, which has been battered by the blockade, as a result of burning a tire (…) Soon, you will see relief in a country that has been hit so hard by the sanctions demanded by radical sectors,” she said.

Venezuelan authorities have pledged to restore 1,300 MW of generation capacity before the end of the year to mitigate a current deficit of around 4,500 MW. The Venezuelan National Assembly is close to approving a reform that will open electrical generation, transmission, distribution, and commercialization to the private sector.

Caracas has also turned to multinational corporations in a bid to recover the electrical grid.

However, GE Vernova CEO Scott Strazik stated that the company had already selected its contractors and completed the planning work but had not begun repairs because it has yet to be paid. “This is not an environment in which we are going to act without receiving payment upfront,” he said.

Meanwhile, popular organizations and trade unions staged demonstrations in Caracas and other cities on Tuesday. Through the newly formed “Blackout Victims Committee,” activists criticized the government for prioritizing the oil industry to satisfy US interests at the expense of rationing electricity throughout the country.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

Caracas, October 27, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Trump administration has announced plans to back electoral reforms in Venezuela and push for presidential elections.

In a press briefing with international journalists on Monday, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio called Venezuela’s electoral infrastructure “designed to rig elections” and argued it must be replaced quickly to ensure a valid vote.

Rubio, who has been the Trump administration’s chief architect of US policy toward Venezuela, said talks between Acting President Delcy Rodríguez’s government and opposition sectors led by Dinorah Figuera were moving toward the appointment of a new Supreme Court (TSJ) before the end of the year, followed shortly afterward by the renewal of the National Electoral Council (CNE).

“Obviously, we need to use our influence with the interim [Venezuelan] authorities, to ensure that the process moves forward responsibly (…) Our goal is to have an election,” Rubio said. He welcomed what he described as “serious progress in that direction” and warned that “if anyone tries to derail the process, they will seriously harm Venezuela.”

In a separate press briefing, a senior State Department official added that, once both institutions have been reconstituted, the Venezuelan presidency will be declared permanently vacant, triggering a six-month constitutional deadline for presidential elections to be held “under competitive conditions.”

The anonymous official stressed that the process would also require political guarantees and regulations on access to the press. The official also defended the inclusion of pro-government sectors in a “transition,” arguing that peaceful democratic processes often require cooperation from outgoing factions, citing Spain and Portugal as precedents.

Asked about a specific election date, Rubio said the Rodríguez administration had complied with US timetables so far. 

“Are we going to wait two years [for an election]? That’s not going to happen. At best, I have two years and two months left in this position,” he added.

His remarks coincide with statements by Dinorah Figuera, who heads the opposition delegation in talks with government representatives and forecast presidential elections to take place in late 2027 or early 2028.

Meanwhile, the third round of political dialogue in Venezuela agreed to review four laws governing political participation, pluralism, and the autonomy of political organizations, including the Law on Political Parties, Public Meetings, and Demonstrations. The discussions also addressed disqualifications from holding public office and the review of legal frameworks related to political rights.

In parallel, Venezuela’s National Assembly formally launched the process to renew the 32 justices of the Supreme Court (TSJ). Applications from legal professionals seeking to join the court will be accepted from Wednesday, October 28, through Wednesday, November 11. The fourth round of dialogue is scheduled for November 11–15.

Rodríguez and other Venezuelan high-ranking officials have not commented on the State Department announcements.

The White House’s claims relating to Venezuelan reforms and elections coincided with the return of opposition leader María Corina Machado to the country on Sunday. The far-right politician had spent more than a year abroad and her supporters have called for her inclusion in the ongoing negotiations.

Asked about Machado’s return, Rubio said he had told the Rodríguez government “weeks ago” that Machado should be able to come back without obstacles. The secretary of state denied that Washington had obstructed Machado’s return, stating only that she was advised against traveling immediately after the June 24 double earthquake.

Rodríguez, for her part, said the opposition politician could have avoided the “show” of appearing at a church in Lara state before traveling 400 kilometers to Caracas at the head of a motorcade, amid chants of “freedom” and calls for immediate presidential elections.

“The airports are there. Let’s move away from the show (…) Many people who have benefited from the amnesty law and this process, which seeks peaceful coexistence, have been able to enter through the airport’s new transitional structures,” Rodríguez said.

The acting president declined to clarify which route Machado had taken to reenter Venezuela. Machado left the country in December 2024 for Oslo, where she received the Nobel Peace Prize before gifting it to Trump. She and her party maintain that the government prevented her from returning on seven previous occasions, a claim the authorities deny.

Asked whether the justice system would take action against Machado, Rodríguez replied that she hoped there would be “repentance and a change of course” from the opposition figure and that the opposition leader would be able to “contribute something to the country.” In recent years, Machado endorsed economic sanctions and a foreign military attack against Venezuela.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

US president seeks to underscore Latin American military operation, as Iran war causes midterm affordability threat.

United States President Donald Trump has featured a ship he said is carrying Venezuelan oil during a visit to Texas, where he will hold two rallies one after the other in the hopes of boosting Republican chances in a make-or-break Senate race.

Speaking at Corpus Christi on Tuesday on his fourth trip to the state this campaign season, Trump pointed to a ship in the distance.

“It’s got 1 million barrels of oil on it from Venezuela,” he said, adding the cargo was “thanks to our big victory in our recent war with Venezuela”.

The emphasis on the oil comes as US consumers have wrestled with high fossil fuel prices amid the US-Israel war with Iran, a key issue in the upcoming midterm elections.

“We’re celebrating the greatest oil victory in history,” Trump said.

It was not immediately clear under what pretext the oil had been shipped or whether the details Trump gave were correct. The US had received crude oil shipments from Venezuela before the US abduction of Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro on January 3, but those transfers have increased this year.

In August, the Trump administration announced a deal giving the Pentagon a 35 percent stake in North America Blue Energy Partners, a new company overseeing 65 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. The White House said in September that the first shipment from the deal would likely hit US reserves in November, although experts have cast doubt on whether the deal will have any short-term impact.

Speaking to reporters earlier in the day, Trump referred to the shipment as a “gift” from Venezuela. The country’s interim leader, Delcy Rodriguez, has not commented on the specific shipment.

At the rally, Trump also floated making Venezuela the “51st state”.

Key race

Trump’s frequent visits to Texas underscore the state’s significance for Republicans.

Trump endorsed Attorney General Ken Paxton in the Republican primary over incumbent Senator John Cornyn. The scandal-ridden Paxton now faces a punishing contest against Democrat James Talarico, a Presbyterian seminarian.

Polls have regularly shown Talarico leading Paxton, although that lead has largely remained within the margin of error. A RealClearPolitics average of polls had Talarico leading Paxton by 1.7 points.

Talarico’s victory would mark a sea change in a state that has not elected a Democrat to statewide office since 1994.

It would also represent a major rebuke to Trump, whose Republican Party is fighting to maintain its narrow control of the Senate. Democrats are widely projected to take control of the US House of Representatives in the November 3 vote.

Talarico has used the final stretch of the race to focus on years of corruption allegations against Paxton, while drawing a contrast to voters’ affordability concerns.

“Ken Paxton represents everything that’s wrong with this broken, corrupt system,” he said during an event in Houston last week.

Paxton has sought to portray Talarico as too “radical” for Texas, saying his policies would hurt a state known for its pro-business policies.

Trump and other administration officials, notably Vice President JD Vance, have regularly focused on cultural issues, distorting Talarico’s past comments on transgender rights and border security.

Speaking in Corpus Christi, Trump repeated those attacks and urged his supporters to vote as if he were on the ballot.

“If you go out, and if you all vote, we win in a landslide,” Trump said.

Caracas, October 24, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez announced a series of measures aimed at expanding tax collection.

In a televised broadcast on Wednesday, Rodríguez announced the immediate suspension of the mandatory use of fiscal printers. Introduced in 2018, the devices recorded every transaction and reported it in real time to the country’s National Integrated Customs and Tax Administration Service (SENIAT).

The costly equipment posed a significant barrier for entrepreneurs and small business owners, particularly in the country’s interior, where authorized suppliers are scarce.

Superintendent Román Maniglia said the decision is part of SENIAT’s technological modernization that will pave the way for the gradual introduction of digital invoicing, which will soon be available free of charge to all economic sectors. 

“We seek to lower the barriers to formalization across all sectors, particularly for the smallest businesses, entrepreneurs, and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs),” he stressed.

Rodríguez also announced a review of the registry of Special Taxpayers, known as “special contributors,” with the list reduced from 132,000 to around 44,000. These are individuals or legal entities that, because of their high income or assets, are subject to additional tax obligations.

According to the acting president, the review will add those who should have been included in this category and remove those who were classified as special taxpayers without meeting the relevant criteria.

Rodríguez said the changes are intended to improve tax services and expand revenue collection. She added that fiscal revenues rose by 27% in October, although she did not specify the basis for comparison or provide a breakdown of the amount collected. 

“We have been discussing the very low number of people who pay taxes in the country. This is a matter of fairness,” she added.

The latest announcements follow prior measures to facilitate tax collection. Earlier in October, SENIAT and banking superintendency SUDEBAN formalized an agreement to exchange information in real time in order to “strengthen revenue collection” and “facilitate the identification of potential tax discrepancies.”

The tax authority is now also interconnected with the Autonomous Service of Registries and Notaries (SAREN), the Administrative Service for Identification, Migration, and Immigration (SAIME), and the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV).

“We have a very important system for cross-referencing information which, together with a new statistical information system, will allow us to start collecting what is owed,” Rodríguez said in this week’s broadcast. She added that the fiscal revenues will be directed to the Venezuela Renace Foundation, which is responsible for repairing and rebuilding homes damaged by the twin earthquakes of June 24.

The acting government has likewise announced a tax reform to be unveiled before the end of 2026. Its stated goal is to “harmonize the tax burden” so that it supports economic growth and private-sector production. 

In parallel, the Rodríguez administration is also pushing labor reform plans alongside private sector lobbies FEDECAMARAS and FEDEINDUSTRIA. The business representatives are proposing a “Law on Labor and Social Consensus,” also referred to as the Labor Emergency Law, that will reportedly reduce labor costs for employers. 

The proposal is being discussed with select trade unions, including the government-aligned Bolivarian Socialist Workers’ Central of Venezuela (CBST).

According to reports, the draft legislation seeks “transitional and alternative solutions” to the crisis in workers’ incomes and the stagnation of the minimum wage, which has remained frozen since 2022 while authorities prioritized non-wage bonuses. The proposal would not formally overhaul the entire Organic Labor Law, Workers and Employees (LOTTT), enacted under President Hugo Chávez in 2012, but labor activists warn that it would effectively sideline some of its provisions.

The landmark 2012 legislation reinstated the retroactive calculation of social benefits and severance based on a worker’s last salary, a provision that business groups want to eliminate, while trade unions consider it a red line. Workers’ organizations have staged multiple protests in recent months, demanding that the Rodríguez administration convert non-wage bonuses into salaries and reinstate collective bargaining rights.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

Since the January 3, 2026, military strikes and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro, the Trump administration has imposed semi-colonial rule over Venezuela, forcing dramatic shifts in the country’s domestic and foreign policies.

The capstone of the new tutelary regime is an oil deal announced in late August that Trump called “the biggest in history.” The agreement turns over 17 prime oilfields, holding over 20% of the country’s reserves, to a Pentagon-controlled corporation tasked with supplying cheap fuel to the US war machine for decades to come.

After spending years manufacturing consent for US-sponsored regime change in Venezuela (e.g., FAIR.org, 6/4/21, 1/11/23, 2/12/25), having a government in Caracas subservient to Washington represented a new scenario for the corporate media. The novel conditions have raised few significant qualms for Western outlets. Tactical objections notwithstanding, there is no fundamental disagreement with the US running the affairs of a Global South country.

Not ‘stealing Venezuela’s oil’

Working hand in glove with the Trump administration, the acting Delcy Rodríguez government has overhauled Venezuela’s hydrocarbon legislation (Venezuelanalysis, 7/13/26) to offer what oil experts consider a business environment more favorable to foreign capital than at any point in the country’s history. The new oil agreement with the White House manages to go even further.

The 17 oilfields in question will be taken over by North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP), a private company in which the Pentagon’s Office of Strategic Capital (OSC) will get a 35% stake while investing nothing—and wielding veto power over its board.

Furthermore, according to the White House, the US State Department will secure 20% of NABEP’s output at cost, and have a right of first refusal over the remaining 80%. On top of this, Venezuelan officials have already suggested Washington would be given an additional “sales discount”  (Venezuelanalysis, 9/9/26).

In summary, Trump is looking to secure cheap crude supplies at a time when his disastrous Iran debacle has thrown global energy markets into upheaval. The agreement is so blatantly skewed that US Energy Secretary Chris Wright felt he needed to clarify that Washington was not “stealing Venezuela’s oil” (AFP, 9/3/26).

Nevertheless, Western media outlets were largely unfazed by such an obvious oil grab, euphemistically referring to the deal as “highly unusual” (New York Times, 8/29/26) or “remarkable” (BBC, 9/1/26), at most as “contentious” (Guardian, 9/1/26).

Corporate journalists did raise objections over the central role played by NABEP owner Alejandro Betancourt, a shady Venezuelan businessman who faced multiple money-laundering probes before the Trump administration intervened, and pressured judicial authorities at home and abroad to drop the investigations (BBC, 9/2/26; CNN, 9/4/26; New York Times, 9/4/26).

But media seemed satisfied with Trump’s state and energy secretaries Marco Rubio and Chris Wright pledging that US oversight will keep proceedings honest (Reuters, 9/2/26; New York Times, 9/4/26), despite the fact that billions in Venezuelan oil revenues, controlled by the US Treasury Department since January, are unaccounted for (Council on Foreign Relations, 6/3/26; Financial Times, 7/22/26).

Procedurally transparent plunder

Objections to the Venezuela/NABEP/Pentagon venture were mostly procedural and out of concern for appearances, not driven by any principled opposition to US imperialist predation. Faced with outright colonial plunder of Venezuela, the political and media establishment only demands “accountability” and “transparency” (New York Times, 5/5/26; Financial Times, 9/18/26).

For months, the White House has controlled Venezuelan oil export revenues, with Trump officials openly calling them “one of the largest assets ever to go on the US balance sheet,” and a source of “leverage” over Caracas. Yet Trump’s Democratic opponents have found no issue with seizing another country’s income, raising only questions about the allocation of the funds in reference to alleged corruption on the part of Caracas and Trump insiders (The Hill, 9/30/26; Washington Post, 9/17/26). This despite the fact that the Venezuelan government has to submit a “monthly budget” to access its own funds (New York Times, 1/28/26) and is subjected to US-imposed auditors (Reuters, 4/27/26).

The other source of disappointment with Trump stomping all over Venezuelan sovereignty, but prioritizing oil over regime change, is impatience for the restoration/recovery/return of “democracy” to Venezuela (Politico, 9/2/26; Guardian, 8/30/26; CBC, 9/3/26). Despite  widely acknowledgement that Trump is eroding democracy at home (New York Times, 8/20/26, 10/14/26; Guardian, 10/8/26), somehow pundits expected him to prioritize it in an oil-rich foreign country.

In the establishment’s consensus, “democracy” does not mean a political system that meaningfully reflects the Venezuelan people’s collective will, but simply one that empowers opposition figures that have been groomed for years, like far-right María Corina Machado, their undemocratic credentials notwithstanding (FAIR.org, 10/23/25).

Eager to stay in power, Rodríguez has over-complied with every US demand, going as far as adopting language about Venezuela undergoing a “democratic transformation.” Her pliancy has earned her favorable corporate media profiles that completely contrast with the demonization of Maduro.

After securing an exclusive interview, Time (7/30/26) described the acting leader as a “disciplined operator” who “advocate[s] for greater economic openness,” in contrast to the “authoritarian” Maduro, who oversaw “economic collapse.” Along the same lines, the Guardian (9/12/26) presented Rodríguez as a “a pragmatic, witty and intelligent workaholic,” unlike her “authoritarian” and “incompetent” predecessor in the presidential palace.

Nevertheless, given the broad Beltway consensus for comprehensive regime change, it is unlikely that the Rodríguez administration’s subservience to Trump will secure any leeway in determining its political path forward, free from outside meddling—especially if, as is anticipated, the GOP lawmakers most likely to be impressed by such obsequiousness lose power in the US’s upcoming midterm elections (Axios, 9/23/26; Financial Times, 10/9/26).

Please think of the corporations!

Alongside their exceptionalist expectations about “democracy,” legacy outlets also focus on those they consider the true victims of Trump’s neocolonial offensive in Venezuela: multinational oil corporations.

According to Reuters (9/1/26), the recent oil deal “raises red flags for major producers,” who fear having their reputation sullied by being “seated at the same table with Betancourt,” as well as the prospect of the US government becoming a “competitor.”

Bloomberg (8/30/26) raised concerns that the agreement “reprises [the] neocolonial past” of Venezuela’s oil industry. The warning stems not from apprehension that the Venezuelan people’s future is being determined by a foreign nation, but from fear that the US’s “out-sized power” might lead to “popular unrest.” This could create conditions for what the business mouthpiece views as a catastrophic outcome: the nationalization of foreign-owned oil assets.

“The troubled history of Venezuela’s oil offers a cautionary tale,” Bloomberg’s Kevin Crowley and Patricia Garip wrote:

The country was once dominated by US and European operators and was among the world’s largest producers. But assets owned by ExxonMobil Holdings Corps. and ConocoPhillips were seized and nationalized during political upheaval in the 2000s.

Corporate media present companies that made massive profits in Venezuela for decades as victims, because the Chávez government wanted them to comply with new laws and accept minority stakes in joint ventures.

The New York Times (9/1/26) complains that the two corporations “have spent years trying to get the country to repay them for their seized assets, with little success.” The statement conceals the fact that the Venezuelan government, when it enacted the 2007 decree imposing state majority in all Orinoco Oil Belt projects, offered to compensate ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips for their transition to minority partners, or to buy out their assets altogether. However, both corporations rejected the offers in order to pursue international arbitration. The former has already recouped most of what it was granted, while the latter will eventually collect on a significant award.

Despite the fact that Chevron, BP, Shell and other energy giants have signed deals in recent months taking advantage of the reformed hydrocarbon law (Venezuelanalysis, 9/3/26), pundits complain that ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips remain “hesitant” (CBS, 8/31/26) and need to be “lured” (Reuters, 9/1/26). Still, the Western corporations are likely to return to the country with favorable deals (Reuters, 9/16/26).

The victor and his spoils

Faced with strategic defeat in West Asia, Trump has clung to his Venezuela success, stating on multiple occasions that “to the victor belong the spoils,” in reference to the US hijacking the Venezuelan oil industry following the January 3 attacks and presidential kidnapping (Al Jazeera, 9/24/26; Guardian, 9/26/26).

Furthermore, Trump has not been shy in boasting about the US winning a “war” against Venezuela (Financial Times, 9/18/26; New York Times, 6/26/26). Corporate journalists have rarely pointed out that this stance directly contradicts the administration’s official position that the kidnapping of Maduro and Flores was a “law enforcement” operation (New York Times, 1/6/26; PBS, 1/8/26) in order to justify bypassing congressional approval.

The US president has likewise claimed to have recovered the costs of the military operation “many times over” (Al Jazeera, 3/3/26; Guardian, 6/28/26), a fact confirmed by Luigi Pisella, a business sector spokesperson with close ties to the acting Rodríguez administration (Venezuelanalysis, 8/10/26). Pisella stated that the US has retained $4.7 billion from the Venezuelan export revenues it controls to cover the costs of its military operation.

In spite of their ostensible hostility to Trump, corporate outlets have historically been complicit with his Venezuela policies, from whitewashing a deadly sanctions program (FAIR.org, 6/13/22) to endorsing a military buildup over debunked “narcoterrorism” accusations (FAIR.org, 11/19/25). The New York Times and Washington Post went as far as to withhold information in order to not jeopardize the January 3 operation (FAIR.org, 1/13/26).

Now, with a semi-colonial regime in place, the only concerns are about procedural transparency, democratic appearances and the well-being of multinational corporations. The Venezuelan people always get the short end of the stick.

Source: FAIR

Caracas, October 19, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Switzerland’s Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) has lifted “precautionary asset freezes” against Marleny Contreras, wife of Venezuelan Interior, Justice, and Peace Minister Diosdado Cabello, and United Socialist Party (PSUV) lawmaker Jorge Arreaza.

The country’s authorities stated that their inclusion on a list of sanctioned Venezuelan officials was “a mistake” after determining that neither holds assets in Swiss territory nor faces corruption accusations.

The asset freeze was imposed on January 5, two days after US forces bombed Caracas and kidnapped Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. Bern claimed the measure was intended to prevent potentially illicit assets from leaving Switzerland amid eventual legal investigations.

The legal measure remains in force until 2030 and includes a formal commitment to return to the Venezuelan people any resources proven to have been illicitly acquired. Over 40 current and former Venezuelan officials, as well as direct relatives and alleged associates, remain on the list.

Alongside the removal of Contreras and Arreaza, the Swiss government added six individuals to the register. New additions include former Venezuelan government envoy and Industry Minister Álex Saab and his business associate Álvaro Pulido. 

Pulido appeared before a Miami court on October 13 after being handed over by Venezuelan authorities to face money laundering charges. Saab was likewise surrendered to US agencies and pleaded guilty to money laundering accusations, pledging to “cooperate” with other US legal investigations.

Saab and Pulido were joined in the Swiss blacklist by José Vicente Amparan Croquer, a lawyer whom US authorities have accused of laundering money from an alleged US $1.2 billion embezzlement scheme at Venezuelan state oil company Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), and Mario Enrique Bonilla Vallera, a businessman identified as an alleged front man for Nicolás Maduro’s stepsons.

The list also includes the wife and former wife of two former deputy electricity ministers who were already on the blacklisteed: Milagros Coromoto Torres Morán, wife and business partner of Nervis Villalobos, and María Consuelo Pardi Celis, former wife of Javier Alvarado Ochoa.

The Swiss decision came two days after the US Treasury Department removed Jorge Rodríguez, president of Venezuela’s National Assembly, chief negotiator in a US-backed dialogue process with an opposition faction, and brother of Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, from its own sanctions list. Delcy Rodríguez herself was removed from the Treasury’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) list last April.

Jorge Rodríguez was first targeted on September 25, 2018, during Trump’s first term in office. Individual sanctions block any assets the person may have on US soil and bar US individuals and companies from engaging in any transactions. The measures lead to issues of overcompliance.

Spanish daily ABC’s White House correspondent David Alandete argued that the parliamentary leader’s removal from the SDN list was a reward for his “cooperation” in a “new phase of relations between Caracas and the White House.”

The move was announced on the same day that Delcy Rodríguez’s acting government and the opposition delegation led by former lawmaker Dinorah Figuera began a third round of US-endorsed talks in Caracas. The discussions are intended to address the continuation of the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ) renewal process, as well as political rights and guarantees.

Nevertheless, 254 individuals and entities remain on the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctions list. The Trump administration also maintains wide-reaching coercive measures against key Venezuelan economic sectors, including oil, mining, and banking.

Since January, Washington has issued sanctions waivers to allow select Western corporations to secure access to Venezuelan oil and mineral resources under favorable conditions. The White House has also greenlit select US companies to export and import products to and from the Caribbean nation. However, revenues from Venezuelan exports are deposited in a US Treasury account, with US officials deciding when and how much to disburse to Caracas.

Last week, the Trump administration issued General License 60A. The license authorizes humanitarian assistance transactions focused on addressing damage caused by Venezuela’s June 24 double earthquake until April 21, 2027.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

The opposition delegation, comprising members of Primero Justicia and Voluntad Popular, sits opposite its regime counterparts during the latest round of talks. Source: Jorge Rodríguez via X. 

In recent days, pressure regarding the timeline for political change has intensified, a sense of urgency that I both understand and share. To the long years of democratic struggle, we must add the dire economic and social conditions that afflict us. The urgency is real, and I share it. 

This is why this sense of urgency is shared. We all want to reach democracy without any further delay. It is in no one’s interest to postpone political change. Whether one is sitting at the negotiating table, viewing it with suspicion, or opposing it entirely, we all want the same thing: to arrive at democracy as soon as possible.

Acknowledging this common ground is essential. To suggest that this shared goal divides us is untrue and undermines future stability; it is a strategic error. Who benefits from fracturing what unites us? Who gains from destroying the common ground we have built over the years?

Therefore, I believe our differences do not lie in our shared destination, but rather in the path that circumstances have allowed us to take toward it. This reflection is precisely what gives this article its title: “It’s a transition, not a revolution.”

The revolution that never was

For years, we worked toward a “clean slate.” Paradoxically, we dreamed of a revolution. We longed for the moment when chavismo would pack up its belongings and relinquish power. Perhaps this shared expectation stemmed from our tradition of seeking radical ruptures. For many reasons, we hoped that Maduro would simply fly away. But that did not happen.

Instead, on July 28, 2024, chavismo stole the election, subjected us to repression, and clung to power. We did everything in our power to defeat them, and it was not enough. We reached the absolute limit of democratic resilience and paid the price for fighting for our country. Then came January 3, 2026. On that day, a foreign military operation took Nicolás Maduro away, but left the Rodríguez faction behind. That is how it happened, and that is how it remains.

The Trump administration did what we either could not or would not do. Time will allow us to process the weight of that reality, and I do not intend to dwell on it here. For now, I will simply point out the obvious: the United States took risks, opened the door to a new political landscape, and became the most influential actor in the power equation. To put it plainly: they paid for the party, and now they are calling the tune.

The time for this “feast of bitter pills” has arrived, and we are discovering that swallowing them is far more difficult than we had imagined.

Perhaps some reader, channeling an inner Che Guevara, might accuse me of treason. Well, my dear rebellious reader, that is not the case. Acknowledging this reality is entirely compatible with a love for our country; it does not make me a sellout. The United States removed Maduro and opened the door to a transition toward democracy. It may not be the transition we dreamed of or planned for, but it is the one that is actually possible. What followed the dictator’s capture was not a revolution, but the beginning of a transition—a process of gradual, progressive change driven by institutional reforms and political consensus.

Unlike revolutions, which seek a radical break from the previous order, transitions do not start from scratch. Instead, they identify elements from the old regime that can survive and transform them to fit within the new democratic order that is being built. It is a matter of profound change without having to destroy everything, of transforming existing institutions to place them at the service of democracy. And that is what we are working on.

A feasible transition

Given this, the practical question is how to reconcile the genuine sense of urgency—which unites us—with the timeframes required for a transition. I do not have a definitive answer to this question. However, I would like to share three tasks that could contribute to the transition.

First, we must learn to swallow bitter pills. 

For years, we were warned that, when the time came, we would face an extensive menu of pills—a metaphor for the unpopular measures, difficult concessions, and uncomfortable decisions that would inevitably come with a process of political change.

We listened, took note, and pressed on. Well, the time for this “feast of pills” has arrived, and we are discovering that swallowing them is far more difficult than we had imagined. Now, it is urgent that we learn how to do so—and, above all, that we create the conditions to ensure that every sacrifice is worth it.

I have no ready-made formulas for this task. Each person will have to find their own way to confront these contradictions, to process the inconveniences and the costs that must be borne. What is clear to me is that we must learn to do so without losing sight of the causes for which we have fought for so many years.

The nature of the political change now beginning to emerge demands a process of collective healing, one that will require both time and maturity.

Second, we must engage in civic education. 

We need to take the time to speak to the nation and explain what is unfolding. We must also be capable of putting ourselves in the shoes of others, understanding that our distrust runs deep, nurtured by decades of deception, broken promises, and accumulated frustrations.

The leadership required at this moment must be democratic and empathetic, one willing to listen, understand, engage in dialogue, and build. More than thirty years of persecution and repression have left deep wounds in our national soul. The nature of the political change now beginning to emerge demands a process of collective healing, one that will require both time and maturity.

This process will not be resolved through staged photographs or superficial gestures. I am speaking of a profound, human, and authentic effort toward recognition, acceptance, and reparation—a task that allows us to rediscover one another as a society, take ownership of our history, and regain the trust necessary to build a shared future.

Third, we must offer certainty to everyone. Venezuelans do not lack patience; what we lack is the certainty needed to navigate the tunnel that lies ahead. We are capable of enduring sacrifices, but we need to know that these efforts will be worth it. If we can see that light at the end of the tunnel, we will have reason to remain patient and perseverant.

The certainties we can offer today must be built step by step—through actions, commitments, and results

Perhaps this is the most difficult challenge of all. Transitions toward democracy are inevitably marked by uncertainty and a lack of transparency. One need only read the memoirs or listen to the testimonies of those who lived through similar experiences to recognize ourselves in their dilemmas, contradictions, fears, and hopes. There is something profoundly human in those stories that feels familiar to us.

That is why political education, the building of consensus, and the gradual restoration of democratic dynamics are so important. They serve as ways to provide guidance amidst uncertainty, rebuild trust, and give meaning to the sacrifices we are called upon to make. The certainties we can offer today must be built step by step—through actions, commitments, and results that allow Venezuelans to recognize that we are moving toward democracy.

From desirable outcomes to real possibilities

One of our greatest challenges is to accept that the revolution we wanted to bring about for so many years was not to be, and that today we are facing a transition currently in the making. Its success will depend, in large part, on our ability to understand the nature of this process, to embrace reality—with all its possibilities and limitations—and to learn how to navigate the path that has opened up before us.

We will need to do so with intelligence, patience, generosity, and a sense of historical responsibility. Above all, we must act in unity, placing Venezuela above our differences. Because, in the end, that is what it is all about: seizing the opportunity we have to build the democracy for which we have fought so hard.

Caracas, October 13, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Hundreds of Venezuelan workers took to the streets on Tuesday to demand that the acting Delcy Rodríguez government address a series of labor grievances.

The mobilization in Caracas was called by healthcare trade unions to deliver a petition at Miraflores Palace. Education and higher education unions likewise endorsed the rally, which had a turnout estimated at 2,000 people. 

Venezuelan police shepherded the march through the center of the Venezuelan capital but protesters were ultimately stopped a few blocks from the presidential palace. A commission of union representatives delivered the document, which reportedly collected over 45,000 signatures from healthcare professionals, to Venezuelan government representatives.

“It looks like the plan is to invite foreign capital by offering cheap labor,” FETRASALUD union leader Pablo Zambrano told press. “The Venezuelan workers must struggle to be fairly compensated for their work.”

Protesters echoed a longstanding demand that existing bonuses be converted into wages. The monthly minimum wage was last increased by the Venezuelan government in March 2022 and currently stands at 130 bolívars, around US $0.15. Instead, the Nicolás Maduro and Rodríguez administrations have relied on non-wage bonuses which have no impact on vacation pay, social security contributions, or severance. The income floor for public sector workers was raised to $240/month in May.

The petitions delivered on Tuesday included a demand that holiday bonuses be computed based on workers’ present incomes as opposed to the actual salary. It likewise called for the “professional responsibility bonus,” which ranges from $40 to $170 per month and is discretionally assigned to certain sectors, to be extended to retired workers, and for unions to participate in the drafting of new wage scales.

“Holiday bonuses are fundamental labor rights, and we need to have them based on the real incomes,” said Yilbert Giménez, director of the SINTRACUPEM healthcare workers’ union in Miranda state. “We are also opposed to any regressive reforms on labor matters.”

Pedro Eusse, from the CUTV labor confederation, called on workers’ organizations to unite to “defeat the plan to dismantle labor rights.”

“The government is allied with business elites whose goal is to destroy the working class’ existing social benefits and social security rights,” he told reporters. “We need a broad unity to defeat this plan.”

Labor Minister Carlos Castillo has drawn criticism in recent days over comments that he “relates to business owners” on labor costs.

“Nowadays, as I run a ministry with a significant labor weight on its shoulders and have to calculate payroll every month, I have truly started to relate to business owners,” he said during his keynote address at business association FEDECÁMARAS annual summit on Friday.

Castillo went on to say that he “understood that business owners are not an evil abstraction from ideological manuals” but rather “makers of reality who risk their capital, their mental health, and their daily effort.”

FEDECÁMARAS, the Caribbean nation’s most influential private sector lobby, has actively campaigned for labor reform reducing responsibilities for employers and eliminating the retroactive nature of social benefits and severance pay, which trade unions consider a red line.

Former FEDECÁMARAS President Jorge Roig, who currently serves as a business sector representative in a “labor dialogue” initiative mediated by the International Labor Organization (ILO), recently expressed “optimism” about securing consensus with the Venezuelan government and worker organizations.

Roig argued that the current labor conditions “are not working” and proposed the creation of a Law of Labor and Social Consensus to introduce temporary solutions adjusted to different economic sectors.

Venezuela’s historic Labor Law, approved in 2012 by former President Hugo Chávez, prohibits unfair dismissal and outsourcing, enshrines the world’s third-longest maternity leave, guarantees the right to work for both women and people with disabilities, and extends retirement pensions to all workers, including full-time mothers and the self-employed.

The ruling United Socialist Party (PSUV) also staged a march in Caracas on Tuesday afternoon. Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello claimed that Venezuelan workers are “the bulwark of peace” in the South American country.

“We have delivered a document supporting all the actions by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez and the ongoing dialogue process while also demanding the lifting of sanctions against Venezuela,” Cabello told those present.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Philadelphia, USA.

Venezuela is once again debating a renewal of its institutions, as if the problem could be solved simply by replacing the people in office. This remains the crucial question: what would have to change among those who wield power so that new rules are respected, even when doing so is inconvenient for them?

We are talking about rebuilding the State, restoring judicial independence, or recovering institutional integrity, often attributing agency to structures that, in practice, operate through human decisions. Behind every appointment, court ruling, or agreement are individuals driven by interests, convictions, fears, and power dynamics. No reform can overlook them.

When a future Supreme Court (TSJ) justice faces the uncomfortable decision of ruling against the interests of those who made their appointment possible, they will recall that the Constitution guarantees their independence; yet, they will also realize that their decision hinges on the safeguards available to them and the personal consequences of challenging those in power.

Individuals who uphold institutions

Following the fall of the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship on January 23, 1958, key political leaders realized that democratic survival required agreements that predated any constitutional framework. Rómulo Betancourt, Rafael Caldera, and Jóvito Villalba represented the parties that signed the Pact of Puntofijo in October of that year. The 1961 Constitution came later, built upon a foundation of compromises reached by former adversaries who had experienced the failure of 1945–1948. The agreements preceded the rules they were meant to uphold.

Those agreements, however, were not all-encompassing. The Communist Party was excluded from the pact, and the system of elite conciliation studied by Juan Carlos Rey ultimately revealed significant limitations regarding representation. Moreover, civilian consensus does not guarantee military obedience. In May and June 1962, the uprisings known as the Carupanazo and the Porteñazo put the Betancourt government to the test.

The 1999 Constitution already provided a Judicial Nominations Committee with civil society participation—much like the one we now expect—yet its operations ultimately became subordinate to political control. 

Democracy survived because key sectors of the Armed Forces remained loyal to the constitutional order, even though their defense of it was accompanied by restrictions and repressive measures. Institutions require individuals willing to uphold them against those seeking to tear them down.

Institutions that sustain individuals

Four decades later, Venezuela embarked on another institutional transformation. The 1999 Constitution promised to expand citizen participation and strengthen rights, yet its existence did not prevent the progressive concentration of power. In 2004, the Organic Law on the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ) expanded the court from 20 to 32 justices, facilitating political control over the body. In the presidential elections of July 28, 2024, the National Electoral Council (CNE) declared Nicolás Maduro the winner without publishing the disaggregated results backing its announcement. The electoral fraud exposed a fundamental contradiction: the body charged with guaranteeing the popular will ended up proclaiming a result contrary to the available electoral evidence.

The problem was not simply the gap between a sound Constitution and poor leaders. Over the years, relationships of dependency were built that made it possible to subordinate formally autonomous institutions. Consequently, public offices, judicial decisions, and oversight mechanisms increasingly served the preservation of a political project. The result was that an institution could retain its name, legal powers, and procedures while losing the actual capacity to constrain those in power. The rules remained, but those charged with defending them lacked the independence to do so.

US influence on the process also raises questions about the extent to which agreements reflect the priorities of the Venezuelan people.

In 2026, the debate resurfaces under different circumstances. Following Maduro’s removal on January 3, the government of Delcy Rodríguez is negotiating the renewal of the branches of government. Dinorah Figuera, president of the National Assembly elected in 2015, announced a schedule that seeks to revamp the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ) by November and complete work on the National Electoral Council (CNE) by December. These are announced political timelines that remain subject to negotiation.

But who is actually negotiating, and to whom are they accountable? US influence on the process also raises questions about the extent to which agreements reflect the priorities of the Venezuelan people. Furthermore, any given concession can be instantly interpreted on social media—by polarized audiences—as either a victory or a betrayal, thereby raising the political cost of negotiation.

The broader audience watching this process is not solely in Venezuela. Millions participate from abroad in public conversations about the country’s future and will also play a role in defending the institutions that may eventually be rebuilt. Institutional reconstruction must incorporate both the Venezuelans who remain in the country and those who have had to build their lives elsewhere. The experience of exile, diverse life paths, and political differences should not become obstacles to participating in defining our shared future. After so many years of division, the challenge also lies in recognizing ourselves as part of the same society, one in which no one is considered expendable in the effort to rebuild democracy.

Added to this is an issue that no agreement between civilians can sidestep: the continued existence of a military and security structure formed under chavismo. The conduct of those who control the weapons will be a decisive test for any new institutional order.

Society vs. institutional boundaries and agreements

The answer to the initial question (“what must change among those in power so that new rules are respected, even when doing so is inconvenient for them?”) requires concrete guarantees. For a judge to rule independently, the processes of selection and tenure must be shielded from those who expect obedience in exchange for the appointment. The 1999 Constitution already provided a Judicial Nominations Committee with civil society participation—much like the one we now expect—yet its operations ultimately became subordinate to political control. However, the 2024 election also taught us that when the CNE failed in its duty of transparency, citizens and organizations gathered and preserved the tally sheets that allowed the official results to be challenged.

Venezuelan society demonstrated that it can generate evidence and demand accountability, even when an institution fails.

Reconstruction therefore demands reforms capable of altering the incentives for those in power, guarantees for those who have suffered persecution, and oversight mechanisms that do not rely on the goodwill of those governing. Yet, it also requires a society capable of upholding those boundaries. The armed forces also need to find a place within that balance. Transparent rules for promotion and retirement, professionalization, and subordination to civilian authority could offer an alternative to personal loyalty. Their incorporation into the new order cannot imply impunity; distinguishing individual responsibilities and ensuring independent investigations will be essential to prevent inclusion from merely reproducing the privileges of the past.

The experience of the 2024 vote tallies offers a concrete possibility: transforming that capacity for civic organization into permanent oversight of the new authorities.

That capacity also depends on a democratic culture that recognizes the value of disagreement. A democracy is not built among equals, but among people who think differently yet still find reasons to reach compromises. Alterity—understood as recognizing the other in their difference—allows for the acceptance that an adversary also has the right to participate in shaping shared rules. Agreements require this disposition not only to emerge but also to endure and be revised when circumstances change.

For Venezuelans abroad, such participation requires more than just invitations to return: it demands guarantees for exercising political rights, effective mechanisms for participation, and conditions that allow their skills and capabilities to be linked to the country’s reconstruction. Within Venezuela, the experience of the 2024 vote tallies offers a concrete possibility: transforming that capacity for civic organization into permanent oversight of the new authorities, with access to public information and spaces to demand answers.

Institutional frameworks cannot remain static, either. Rules that once facilitated coexistence may require adjustments in the face of new social demands and political transformations. The contemporary challenge lies in the speed of these changes, which demands a greater capacity for understanding from those who govern and better tools for evaluating consequences from society. A democratic civic culture must allow institutions to evolve without becoming subject to the will of whoever happens to hold power at the time.

Domestic and international economic and financial sectors also need reasons to commit to this order. Legal certainty, transparent public contracts, and independent courts would allow informal influences to be replaced by relationships governed by established rules. However, such a commitment requires abandoning advantages gained through discretionary practices. An economy capable of long-term investment needs institutions that protect legitimate activity without relying on personal proximity to power.

Venezuela can overhaul its courts, appoint new electoral officials, and even draft another Constitution. None of that, on its own, will resolve the power dynamics that enabled authoritarianism. Institutions require rules that protect those who enforce them, as well as citizens capable of defending them when their own leaders seek to disregard them. Legitimacy is neither imported from Washington nor decreed from Caracas; it is built through the decisions of those who wield power and a society’s capacity to hold them accountable for those decisions.

Caracas, September 6th, 2016 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (Sebin) confirmed on Monday during an interview on state news channel Venezuela de Televisión (VTV) that authorities arrested several individuals identified as snipers set to carry out plans unexecuted during the opposition’s September 1st mobilizations.

For many, last week’s mobilizations were marked with great potential for bloodshed and guarimba violence as the political opposition has been insistent on a recall referendum happening this year despite protocols that would make anything earlier than January 2017 an unconstitutional process.

According to Sebin authorities, these individuals prepared to carry out selective assassinations on September 1st during the mobilizations. Since the targeted assassinations did not occur last week, Sebin authorities believe the individuals were ready to execute their plans Wednesday September 7th.

Sebin Director, Gustavo González López, said, “They [those arrested] had already made plans for September 7th, which indicate there are still intentions to carry out a coup.”

In total, five people were arrested in association with these plans. They include: Giovanni Vásquez, Joel José Méndez Semprún, Enrique Gerónimo González Ramírez and Manuel Alejandro González.

Additionally, Venezuelan officials reiterated that they issued arrest warrants for opposition leaders Lestor Toledo and Yorman Barillas, who are allegedly among the plan’s masterminds.

Both Toledo and Barillas are said to be in Maicao, La Guajira, Colombia. As such, the Ministry of Domestic Affairs has requested that the Colombian government repatriate them to Venezuela. González López said that the plans were designed during three meetings with former Colombian President Álavaro Uribe as well as other members of Venezuela’s National Assembly.

Uribe is notorious for founding paramilitary groups in Colombia and supporting their operations throughout the region. Venezuelan authorities have regularly linked Uribe to key opposition figures as well as ongoing attempts to destabilize Venezuelan society and overthrow the Bolivarian government.

Venezuelan authorities say that the preparative meetings took place in Maicao, as well as Mara and Maracaibo in Zulia state.

The Venezuelan military likewise detained four individuals in Páez municipality, Apure state where they found ammunition and 35 mm grenades, among other objects. Three men and one woman were detained, referred to in Venezuelan media as “guerillas”, part of a military operation of 20 soldiers under the orders of General Hermes Hernández Marcano by the Arauca River.

More details surrounding their case, including the individual’s’ identities have not yet been released.