Venezuelan

MIDVALE, Utah — Snow-covered mountains ringing a valley of wide, free-flowing roads remind Venezuelan transplants that the growing suburbs south of Salt Lake City offer what Miami can’t.

One million Venezuelans were released into the United States after crossing the Mexican border during a record immigration surge, and many shunned Miami and other longtime immigrant footholds for smaller places with less established communities — a pattern found in an exclusive Associated Press analysis of federal data from fall 2018 to summer 2025.

These cities and towns promised better jobs, cheaper homes, less traffic and higher quality of life, outweighing Florida’s allure of tropical weather and ease of getting by on Spanish alone.

Enrique Vera, 32, crossed the border in Yuma, Arizona, in 2021 and went to Miami to settle with his mother, who’d been there six years. But he found Florida untenable, he told AP — “the work, the conditions, the low pay.”

After less than two weeks there, Vera and his mother accepted a cousin’s invitation to Utah. In the southern suburbs, with massive new housing tracts and pristine shopping centers, Vera found factory work but soon quit to turn a hobby baking for co-workers into his own business. Today he employs 15 people — many, like him, asylum seekers — at a warehouse and two bakeries.

Utah — known as a relatively immigrant-friendly state despite deep Republican roots and support for President Donald Trump — became a top destination for Venezuelans crossing the border, along with parts of the Chicago, Denver, Atlanta, Dallas and Houston metro areas, AP’s data show. Venezuelans also went to smaller cities including Madison, Wisconsin; Albuquerque, New Mexico; and Savannah, Georgia.

It’s a pattern playing out across the U.S.: Some Cubans eschewed Florida and went to Louisville, Kentucky, and Odessa, Texas; Colombians chose the Boston and Denver areas; and Paterson, New Jersey, was the top pick among Peruvians.

These communities have both benefited from the influx of people and struggled to integrate their new arrivals.

Venezuelans stand out for their sheer numbers. About 8 million people, or one-fourth of the country’s population, have fled since 2014, many to the United States. About 30,000 of the 1 million released into the U.S. in AP’s data said they were going directly to Utah.

For Venezuelans in Utah, Trump’s deportation drive has instilled widespread fear

Despite the growing population here, there are few Venezuelan flags, bumper stickers or displays of patriotism on the bustling commercial strips of Midvale, an older suburb of about 40,000 people at the interchange of two highways. Signs are generally in English. The Venezuelan population has mixed in with the largely white population as new houses, malls, office parks and warehouses have gobbled up barren hillsides to meet demand for cheaper land.

President Donald Trump’s immigration crackdown instilled fear and made Venezuelans less visible since 2023, when arrivals peaked in Utah and in the United States as a whole. Everyone here seems to know someone who returned to Venezuela voluntarily because they feared being detained and deported or because they lost their work authorization.

In May 2025, Alberto Salcedo opened the parking lot of his Centro de Apoyo Familiar Church to Venezuelan food trucks. The asylum-seeking evangelical pastor dreamed of creating a vibrant gathering spot for Venezuelan immigrants. Nearly 20 vendors and 5,000 visitors came each week, he said, with trucks serving empanadas, arepas, even burgers and sushi. But that dropped down to maybe five vendors and a few hundred people. The fear of deportation is real, he said.

Restaurant owner Fidel Arrieta said it’s affected his business, too. He opened Arempa’s, his first restaurant in downtown Salt Lake City in 2019, drawing non-Latino customers and Venezuelan immigrants alike. Arempa’s — where the walls are filled with photos of Venezuelan waterfalls, an image of Mona Lisa eating an arepa and Miss Venezuela portraits — grew to five restaurants. But three closed in the last year as business slowed.

Arrieta’s wife — co-owner Sandy Arrieta — wanted to stay open. But he believes nothing will turn around while Trump’s in office.

“Until the government changes, the problems will not end,” said Fidel, 65, who immigrated in 1994.

For proof of the growing Venezuelan population, look no further than Utah’s churches

In 2001, Gregorio Rausseo immigrated to Utah, knowing no one. Fast-forward more than two decades, to 2023: Rausseo had just started as pastor at Saint Therese of the Child Jesus Church and was ready for the annual celebration of the patron saint of Zulia, an oil-rich Venezuelan state that includes Maracaibo, the country’s second-largest city. He was shocked to see more than 1,000 parishioners snake into the lobby and parking lot.

“I asked the deacon, ‘All of them are Venezuelan?’ He said … ‘They are all Maracuchos,’” a term for someone from Maracaibo.

Today, Rausseo estimates about 40% of his church’s more than 700 families are Venezuelan immigrants.

Carlos Trujillo, a 42-year-old lawyer who handles immigration cases, puts Venezuelan immigrants in three categories: those who came for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints; those who came to join family or friends; and those who came knowing no one. He has repeatedly heard variations of, “This is a place where I can bring my family and have a start.”

Trujillo — who immigrated in 2001, as an 18-year-old whose parents decided he would do better living with family closer to the Mormon church headquarters — said his firm has about 1,700 immigration cases, with staff fielding calls in a large room resembling a call center.

Many of the Venezuelans here came after COVID hit, flying to the Mexican border before January 2022, when Mexico tightened travel restrictions for Venezuelans. That prompted hundreds of thousands to walk through the Darien Gap, a jungle in Panama and Colombia, on a grueling journey through at least eight countries.

Ashly Estupinan, 18, walked the jungle with her grandmother. In Mexico, they used the appointment app CBP One to enter the U.S. in San Diego. Trump ended CBP One on his first day in office, two years after his predecessor, Joe Biden, started it and let more than 900,000 people come legally with two-year permits.

Estupinan, who graduated high school this spring, and her grandmother chose Utah because her uncle was there. “It’s very tranquil, very pretty, the people are very friendly,” she said.

Word of mouth and family advice brought many to Utah

Juan Gonzalez, 41, a cook at Arempa’s, walked the jungle for four days with his brother — passing corpses, he said — before eventually crossing the U.S. border in Texas. He went to Utah on the advice of a distant cousin.

“He had gone to other states, and Utah struck him as the best one,” Gonzalez said, noting he’s drawn to the state’s “strong economy.”

Many Venezuelan immigrants here work in food service — at restaurants or selling meals from their homes. Some proudly noted that a local Walmart now stocks special flour for arepas.

Others cycle through low-wage jobs: construction, nail salons, warehouse and factory work.

Gonzalo Rodriguez, 39, worked as a laborer, carpenter and office manager before rising to general manager of Fillerup Employment Services, a construction company. He said it had about 25 Venezuelans in its workforce of about 300 when he arrived in 2020. By 2022, that grew to 165.

At one point, Rodriguez said, Venezuelans camped in tents on the sidewalk at the company’s office park in suburban Sandy, waiting for work and accepting food while migrant shelters were full.

Julio Gonzalez, 33, climbed company ranks from laborer to human resources manager after crossing the border in 2021 with his wife and son, then 9, in Del Rio, Texas. A friend in Utah told him it was a good place to live. Many here agree, saying they’ve felt no pervasive racism in Utah.

It was a welcome change for Gonzalez, who said he lived in Panama for six years under anti-Venezuelan xenophobia that prompted his move to the United States.

Hector Escalona, 42, also started in construction at Fillerup, then opened a barber shop in 2022. He now has 27 barber chairs at three shops, and many employees are Venezuelan. He said he’s expanding his business even with uncertainty about his asylum case.

Others have had less financial success.

Adaya Amaya, 47, ran a catering business from her home and now operates a food truck but barely gets by. She crossed the border in 2021 with her daughter, now 9, and father, now 74. They relied at times on a food bank. She knows other Venezuelans who’ve slept in their cars.

Her father gave up his asylum claim in June to return to Maracaibo because he didn’t want to burden her.

Some wonder: Is goodwill toward immigrants cooling in Utah?

In the 2024 election, Trump — and his immigration enforcement campaign messages — won Utah by 22 points. The same year, Carlos Moreno, who won asylum after fleeing Venezuela in 2009, was elected to the Salt Lake County Council.

The state’s immigrant-friendly reputation is tied to the Utah Compact, a 2010 document signed by hundreds of local governments, businesses and civic leaders that endorses “common-sense immigration reforms that will strengthen our economy, as well as attract talent and business to our state.”

But Trujillo, the immigration attorney, said goodwill cooled during the Biden-era immigration surge and some elected leaders who were allies became more guarded in public comments.

Gov. Spencer Cox called the Venezuelan Tren de Aragua gang “a growing threat in Utah” in 2024, but few major crimes in the state have been linked to the group.

Venezuelan immigrants repeatedly told AP that a small minority of their own are their worst enemies — not just those who commit crimes but those who drink in public, play loud music and repair cars in the street. They say that while some of that behavior may be accepted in Venezuela, they must adopt local norms.

“It makes me angry,” said Joiren Rangel, who arrived in 2018 and worked at an Amazon warehouse before opening two Venezuelan restaurants, one of which closed last year. “We saw that we were in a different country and had to abide by the rules. In Venezuela, I would drive with my daughter seated on my lap. I would never do that here.”

Many here are still waiting on their asylum cases

Some asylum seekers were told to wait 10 years for an initial appointment in 2023, but the government has moved aggressively to winnow the backlog. Still, about 500,000 Venezuelans have pending cases in immigration court, more than any other nationality.

Loreana Pachano, who spent much of her childhood in Miami, has been waiting 10 years for an asylum interview. She was increasingly impatient but now wonders whether she might do better if her case remains open until after Trump leaves office.

She and her husband settled in Florida but tired of long commutes and anti-Venezuelan sentiment. They moved to Utah after a friend told her that construction wages were significantly higher. “If we had to start from scratch, how about we start from scratch somewhere else?” she remembers thinking.

Now a real estate agent, she sells houses to asylum seekers who crossed the border and has seen the impact of Trump’s policies — for example, a bank closing on a house that a Venezuelan client gave up because she lost work authorization when Trump ended Temporary Protected Status for more than 600,000 Venezuelans.

“It feels like we’re building on quicksand. We’re trying to build a future here for ourselves, for our kids,” said Pachano, who flips homes and owns trucking and construction businesses with her husband while raising their 3- and 7-year-old daughters.

“Are we going to be here by the time we reach retirement age? We don’t know. You don’t know when the rug is going to be pulled right under your feet.”

Spagat writes for the Associated Press. AP reporter Aaron Kessler contributed to this report.

This is an abridged version of the original story in Spanish, the second part of the award-winning investigative journalism project Dorada Opacidad by Alianza Rebelde Investiga and Convoca. You can read the first part here.

The picture above—courtesy of Gold Reserve—shows the ground of the Siembra Minera project, which the Canadian mining company recently retook.

Delcy Rodríguez has made her moves in the barracks, where she had no major influence before January 3. Several of the appointments are linked to the mining area. She gave Rafael Prieto Martínez, who had been military chief in Bolívar, the direction of the Strategic Operational Command (CEOFANB), the highest body for planning, direction and operational strategic control of the Venezuelan forces. There were also changes in Guayana’s Strategic Comprehensive Defense Region (the REDI or military region where the Orinoco Mining Arc is located) and in Bolívar’s Comprehensive Defense Operational Zone (ZODI). Rodríguez also put in charge people she completely trusted in civilian gold-related positions. For instance, the current president of the Central Bank of Venezuela, Luis Pérez, is also head of the newly created Vice Ministry of Gold.

Gold mixes with the government and now also with the United States. On June 8, troops flooded Guasipati and Tumeremo, when a group of American investors arrived to tour several gold mines and processing plants of the Venezuelan Mining Corporation (CVM).

They weren’t doing some pleasurable sightseeing. The roads’ craters have not been repaired for years. Tin shacks and shops occupy the sidewalks. At night, some lamp posts illuminate the streets only in case there is electricity. The region was not always this chaotic. Decades ago, the hotels there were not for miners but for tourists going to or coming from La Gran Sabana, the eastern sector of the Canaima National Park. During the nineties, there were two large international mining companies that had concessions to exploit the Las Brisas-Las Cristinas axis, where the country’s most important gold reserves are located. In Las Brisas del Cuyuní, an extensive gold and copper deposit near Kilómetro 88, Canadian company Gold Reserve established a mining project to extract minerals. The deposit has estimated reserves of more than 10 million ounces of gold and 1.4 million pounds of copper. 

Canadian mining company Crystallex International Corporation operated at Las Cristinas, a site bordering Las Brisas and located near the town of Las Claritas. Its reserves are estimated at over 17 million ounces of gold.

During the nationalization process undertaken by Hugo Chávez between 2008 and 2010, both mines were expropriated. The president declared their concessions void, prompting the companies to demand multi-million dollar compensation from Venezuela through international arbitration proceedings.

Whether for theft, robbery, gunshot wounds, homicide, or acts challenging The System, punishments could range from mutilation to murder.

In their place, the chavista government allowed armed criminal “syndicates” (sindicatos) to establish themselves there and in all the mining towns of the south. These groups exercise power through violence and extortion, keeping miners in conditions of modern-day slavery.

Since at least 2012, control of the area was held by the Las Claritas Syndicate, led by AKA Juancho. He received support from the then-Governor of Bolívar, Francisco Rangel Gómez, and his Secretary of Citizen Security, Julio César Fuentes Manzulli—an Army brigadier general who also served as director of the Bolívar Police. Both men purchased gold and diamonds from Juancho to sell abroad. This relationship was exposed by Army First Lieutenant Jesús Leonardo Curvelo in a report presented to the National Assembly in 2016.

In 2015, AKA Johan Petrica, a leader of the Tren de Aragua, arrived in the area, formed an alliance with Juancho and established the local criminal organization known as The System. Petrica’s presence in Las Claritas led to speculation that AKA Niño Guerrero had taken refuge there after the Venezuelan government dismantled the Aragua Penitentiary Center (known as Tocorón prison, famous for being the original headquarters of the Tren de Aragua) in 2023. 

The entire town had witnessed the actions of The System and agreed that any transgression came at a price. Whether for theft, robbery, gunshot wounds, homicide, or acts challenging The System, punishments could range from mutilation to murder. In 2020, organizations like Human Rights Watch documented an incident where a female miner who stole 10 grams of gold from a colleague was tied to a tree and beheaded with a chainsaw; in another case, a 17-year-old who was also accused of stealing gold was made to clasp his hands as if in prayer before being shot seven times and ordered to flee for his life.

Both Trump and Delcy Rodríguez reported only the killing of Niño Guerrero, offering no word on the whereabouts of Juancho, Petrica, and their lieutenants.

Surveillance throughout the town was constant. Lookouts (known as gariteros) kept a close watch on every movement from street corners, while checkpoints were deployed along the roads leading to the mines to monitor access to the deposits. The crimes The System committed to enforce its control were often followed by actions designed to portray it as a benefactor to the town. The local health clinic was always well-stocked with medicines and supplies, boasting high-quality equipment that nearby public clinics lacked. Miners enjoyed a form of “health insurance” provided by The System, which covered the treatment of any wounds or injuries sustained during gold extraction. The System organized toy giveaways for all the children at Christmas and during the Children’s Day celebrations held every July. Mother’s Day and Father’s Day were celebrated at the Las Claritas sports court, where gifts were distributed to those being honored. “In 2025, Juancho and El Viejo handed out about 200 motorcycles on Father’s Day. Everyone who went there left with a motorcycle,” Julio remarked. 

Both Trump and Rodríguez reported only the killing of Niño Guerrero, offering no word on the whereabouts of Juancho, Petrica, and their lieutenants. Everyone in the town who was asked agreed that the armed group’s leaders had fled before the military arrived, knowing a “change of government” was imminent. Witnesses in Santa Elena de Uairén—located more than 230 kilometers south of Las Claritas—stated on Monday, June 8 (the day before the incursion), that they had spotted several members of The System, including Juancho, at the Escamoto checkpoint. That post is near the military fort of the same name, less than nine kilometers from the Venezuela-Brazil border. Those who saw them could not be certain that Niño Guerrero was among the group.

In early July, Wesley Costa de Oliveira—a commissioner with the Civil Police of Roraima state, Brazil, specifically the Unit for the Repression of Criminal Organizations (DRACO)—told this investigation that he was not surprised members of The System might be taking refuge in his country, given the weak border controls. Another official from Brazil’s Federal Police confirmed to this project that their government suspected the leaders of this organization were within its territory.

A week after the raid in Las Claritas—on June 16—police in Roraima state revealed that initial progress in “Operation Northern Route” had struck a portion of the Venezuelan criminal gang’s structure in Brazil, resulting in the arrest of 25 people across Roraima, Amazonas, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, and Paraná.

While uniformed personnel exploit their power in Las Claritas, there is still no news regarding which companies will arrive to take over the deposits. Criminal leaders continue their operations quietly in other cities.

The most prominent figure arrested was businessman Gustavo Vieira Rufino, identified as the financial manager for the TDA. He allegedly moved over 300 million reais (nearly 60 million dollars) in crypto-assets to launder capital derived from illicit activities.

Ana, a local hairdresser, recalled that El Callao was under military control during the Las Claritas-Kilometer 88 operation due to the presence of US investors visiting government recovery plants—such as El Chocó, El Perú, and the headquarters of the now-defunct Minerven. This state of affairs lasted for a week, until the foreigners departed.

In Las Claritas, while uniformed personnel exploit their power, there is still no news regarding which companies will arrive to take over the deposits. Meanwhile, in El Callao, Tumeremo, and El Dorado, criminal leaders continue their operations quietly.

Although El Callao breathes easier following the operation, for Ana, the ousting of The System offers hope that the town might return to what it was in the 1990s: a tourist stop where downtown shops sold gold jewelry at prices far lower than those found in the country’s major cities.

The interviewees’ identities have been changed for their safety. This report was supported by the Pulitzer Center.

Text and photos: Lorena Meléndez | Coordination and editing: Ronna Rísquez | General direction: Milagros Salazar | Design and infographics: ET

This is an abridged version of the original story in Spanish, the second part of award-winning investigative journalism project Dorada Opacidad. We will publish the second (and last) part of this investigation tomorrow.

When they pass through the streets of the Las Claritas–Kilómetro 88 mining corridor in Bolívar state, southern Venezuela, a thick, yellowish cloud of dust blankets them like a veil. The sound is unmistakable: a convoy of 15, 20, or 25 motorcycles riding together. Aboard are soldiers from the Orinoco Mining Arc Protection Group (GPAMO)—a unit conceived and activated in 2022 under the command of the Strategic Operational Command of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (CEOFANB) to safeguard the deposits. They had never been there before June 9, 2026, when three rockets, shot by a US aircraft, shook the area’s flimsy houses. Now, GPAMO is the law.

Although some cover their faces, Rafael knows them well. He owns one of the gold mills operating at the El Mecatico mine—one of many in an area that holds the world’s fourth-largest gold deposit, according to a 2018 certification by Canadian mining company Gold Reserve. Standing beneath the tin roof that shelters his business, he explained that he would soon have to pay the GPAMO 20 grams of gold (roughly 2,000 US dollars) in exchange for a registration form that in theory is free. He is also required to make monthly payments to remain on the site.

For Rafael and the residents of Las Claritas, everything changed on the morning of June 9, when they woke up to find the area occupied by the military. In the early hours, dozens of vehicles transported hundreds of troops from various branches of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB)—such as the Special Affairs Directorate (DAE) of the General Directorate of Military Counterintelligence (DGCIM)—who patrolled the streets alongside unidentified men dressed in black and carrying long guns. Meanwhile, a pair of military aviation Cougar helicopters flew just above the rooftops of the houses.

The objective of that mobilization was to dismantle “The System.” That was the name given to the criminal alliance between Juan Gabriel Rivas Núñez—known as “Negro Juancho”—and Yohan José Romero (nicknamed “Johan Petrica” ​​or “El Viejo”), one of the leaders of the “mega-gang” born in the Tocorón prison: the Tren de Aragua. For over a decade, this criminal alliance had dominated the territory containing one of the world’s largest gold mining complexes—Las Brisas-Las Cristinas—and had subjugated the local population through torture, mutilation, and murder.

All signs pointed to a “change of government”—a term used in the Venezuelan criminal underworld to describe one criminal group replacing another in a territory.

The residents were so terrified that they remained locked themselves in their homes for days. Rafael did not hear the explosions that rang out mid-morning in Brisas de Cuyuní, near the Kilómetro 88 mining area, because he had gone to his ore mill in the early hours of the morning without noticing the military deployment. Hours later, the military arrived in El Mecatico to destroy the warehouses and properties belonging to The System. This operation was repeated at other mines, as well as at hotels, homes, and businesses in the town.

To determine who truly holds power along the Las Claritas-Kilómetro 88 corridor and in the southern mining towns extending as far as Guasipati, a team of reporters from the Alianza Rebelde Investiga (ARI) and Convoca toured the region as part of the investigative series Dorada Opacidad (Golden Opacity). Interviews with more than twenty sources—ranging from merchants, mill operators, police officers, and local residents to religious figures and local government officials—made it possible to map out the new criminal landscape of the Orinoco Mining Arc.

For days, information about the events was available only through social media or details gathered by journalists working remotely. The first official explanation did not come from any Venezuelan authority, but from Donald Trump. Three days after the bombings, the president stated that his country’s Southern Command had launched a “kinetic attack” to “take out”  AKA Niño Guerrero—the nickname of Héctor Rusthenford Guerrero Flores, the most prominent leader of the Tren de Aragua—with the collaboration of the Delcy Rodríguez government.

A new criminal governance

From then on, a military-imposed order took hold in Las Claritas. Rafael recounted that shortly after the town was seized, all mine workers were summoned to a meeting where a FANB captain urged them to keep working without pause, as they had to “produce as Commander Delcy Rodríguez ordered.” 

All signs pointed to a “change of government”—a term used in the Venezuelan criminal underworld to describe one criminal group replacing another in a territory, without necessarily putting an end to criminal activities.

That call for productivity came with no guarantees. The mill operator, his shoulders slumped in despair, recalled the sense of security The System had once provided: he could leave his tools outside and stay at his mill until midnight. After the military incursion, however, he had to finish his work and leave before 6:00 pm for fear of being robbed, as happened to others in the mine.

The military has displaced the armed group in the Las Claritas-Kilómetro 88 area, but shares control with criminal mafias in El Dorado and Guasipati.

Since the military took control to oust The System, extortion of merchants, gold buyers, and even random passersby had become commonplace, according to several sources on the ground consulted for this investigation. Soldiers seized sacks of gold-bearing sand left behind by members of The System in order to process them and extract the gold, recounted Óscar, speaking from a shop on the town’s main road. “A captain who extracts gold every day exchanges 5,000 or 6,000 dollars in cash, and asks a friend to convert it to USDT [a cryptocurrency] and send it to Puerto Ordaz,” he said.

According to witnesses, soldiers confiscated motorcycles and vehicles belonging to people with no ties to The System and spread fear across all the mining towns in southern Bolívar, about whether FANB would bomb all territories within the Mining Arc where armed groups operate, or the joint operation with the Americans would end in another massacre of workers by military forces. 

However, local residents confirmed that the intervention was limited to Las Claritas-Kilómetro 88. Meanwhile, in towns like El Dorado, Tumeremo, and El Callao, criminal gangs continue to reign, albeit more discreetly and without the brazen displays of the past.

Former Bolívar lawmaker Américo De Grazia claimed on social media that The System’s ringleaders had returned to their old territory, though locals dispute this. Yet De Grazia’s account is not far-fetched: locals told the ARI and Convoca team that some of The System’s bosses—including the men known as Juancho and Johan Petrica—had left Las Claritas a few days before the military incursion. Apparently, they had been tipped off and fled. They were spotted trying to lay low near the Brazilian border.

What does seem clear is that in the Las Claritas-Kilómetro 88, the military displaced the armed group, but in El Dorado and Guasipati, they share control with criminal mafias—albeit maintaining a lower profile to preserve appearances before the Venezuelan government’s new partners: American businesspeople.

The American footprint 

Five days after Maduro was taken away, Delcy Rodríguez announced a package of legislative amendments designed to appease Washington—such as a reformed mining law, whose latest version offers low taxes and numerous concessions to foreign capital that was previously unwelcome.

The new legislation, enacted in April, repealed the decree that had reserved the exploration and exploitation of gold and other strategic minerals for the State, paving the way for private and international companies to engage in these activities through concessions lasting up to 50 years.

Furthermore, it established special payments (up to 1% of gross production under the concession contract for the National Mining Fund and a royalty of up to 13% for the State), a tax of up to 6% regulated by the government, and incentives such as exemptions from the Large Assets Tax, as well as special contributions mandated by four other laws—including the Law on the Protection of Social Security Pensions—all aimed at benefiting the new companies operating in Venezuela’s mining sector.

Alongside the law’s approval, the United States also took action: in March, it issued licenses allowing American companies to purchase, transport, and resell Venezuelan gold. On September 2, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) expanded the scope of these licenses, authorizing US companies to participate in the export, sale, purchase, storage, transport, processing, and refining of minerals of Venezuelan origin, including gold. It also permitted the supply of specific goods and services for mineral operations, as well as the negotiation and execution of contracts within the mining sector.

This entire framework has enabled Rodríguez to consolidate her economic team within the government through the appointment of key officials—both civilian and military—to positions within the Mining Arc. Their key figures are positioned not only within the executive branch but also across the State-owned enterprises involved in the business, and among military personnel capable of guaranteeing gasoline supplies and mine operations.

The interviewees’ identities have been changed for their safety. This report was supported by the Pulitzer Center.

Text and photos: Lorena Meléndez | Coordination and editing: Ronna Rísquez | General direction: Milagros Salazar | Design and infographics: ET

Caracas, September 10, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez presided over the signing of a memorandum of understanding between the Ministry of Ecosocialism and India’s Greens Zoological Rescue and Rehabilitation Centre (GZRRC) to “modernize and strengthen” Venezuela’s network of zoos, bioparks, and wildlife conservation centers.

GZRRC is the operating entity of the global conservation initiative Vantara, based in the Indian state of Gujarat.

According to the Venezuelan leader, Greens will provide “technical assistance, training, and technology to raise the standards for the management and protection of Venezuela’s biodiversity.” 

“Our professionals will be able to attend courses in India,” she added during the televised event on Saturday, September 5.

Rodríguez noted that Venezuela has 16 zoos and aquariums, 12 breeding centers, and four rescue centers. She also announced that the agreement involves “incorporating an aquarium, a wildlife conservation center, a veterinary center, and a wildlife hospital into the master plan for the recovery of La Guaira State” in the wake of the June 24 double earthquake.

The initiative with Vantara, which has a five-year time frame, also includes exchange programs for veterinarians, biologists, and other professionals involved in wildlife management and conservation.

Days earlier, Venezuela enacted the Law Approving the Framework Agreement for the Establishment of the International Big Cat Alliance (IBCA), which will focus on protecting seven feline species considered among the planet’s most representative. Venezuela is home to six of the world’s most important feline species, accounting for 14 percent of global feline biodiversity.

The legislation stems from a proposal put forward by India in 2023, which currently has the backing of 13 member states and applications for membership from more than 25 others.

During the recent ceremony, Rodríguez thanked Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Ambassador P.K. Ashok Babu, Vantara, and the wealthy Ambani family for “all their support.”

Venezuela’s Acting President held a four-day visit to India in June to offer investment and trade opportunities to major Indian companies, including the Tata Group, Amul, and Reliance. The latter has been a major importer of Venezuelan crude in recent months.

Vantara is backed by Reliance Industries, a major conglomerate owned by the Ambani family, with a major presence in multiple economic sectors, including energy, telecommunications, financial services, and retail. Its wildlife rescue center is located within the Jamnagar refining complex in Gujarat, the largest in the world. The facility, which covers approximately 3,500 acres, is managed by businessman Anant Ambani, the youngest son of India’s richest man, Mukesh Ambani.

Despite Vantara’s declared wildlife conservation mission and philanthropic endeavors, the company has faced controversy in recent years.

Various environmental groups and international organizations have accused it of operating as “a large-scale private zoo,” managing wildlife as commodities around the world, and taking advantage of loopholes in international regulations that seek to ensure that the trade in wild animals and plants does not threaten their survival.

In 2024, India’s Supreme Court appointed a panel of retired judges to investigate the alleged illegal acquisition of animals by Vantara, particularly elephants, as well as possible violations of wildlife regulations and money laundering allegations. The court ultimately dismissed the complaint filed by the Karanartham Viramah Foundation.

However, criticism that Vantara is breeding exotic animals for trade, as well as environmental concerns over setting up a wildlife sanctuary in the vicinity of an oil refinery, have persisted.

Venezuela had dealings with the Indian group before the latest memorandum of understanding. A joint investigation by Süddeutsche Zeitung and Venezuelan outlet Armando.info claimed that at least 39,000 wild animals from all over the world had been transferred to Vantara’s facilities by the end of 2024. 

The identified transfers included over 5,000 animals from Venezuela, among them members of protected species such as the Orinoco crocodile, harpy eagle, lowland tapir, giant anteater, jaguars, and spider monkeys.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

WASHINGTON — Federal prosecutors have charged a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement officer with lying to investigators about the events leading up to the shooting of a Venezuelan man during the Minneapolis immigration crackdown earlier this year, a person familiar with the matter told the Associated Press.

The person was not authorized to publicly discuss the investigation and spoke on condition of anonymity. The person said Christian Castro, the officer who authorities say shot Julio Cesar Sosa-Celis in the leg in January, has been charged with making false statements to federal investigators.

The federal charges, which remain under seal, follow Castro’s release from jail last week after Texas’ governor refused to immediately sign an extradition warrant to hand him over to Minnesota authorities, who have charged him separately with assault and false reporting of a crime related to the same shooting.

Federal authorities had initially accused Sosa-Celis and another man of beating an officer with a broom handle and a snow shovel during the confrontation. But federal prosecutors dropped charges against the men after video evidence showed the officers may have lied about the encounter, and officials opened an investigation.

Earlier this week, a federal prosecutor working on the case told lawyers for Sosa-Celis and other victims that Justice Department officials blocked the prosecutor’s push to bring a more serious civil rights charge against the officer for the shooting, ProPublica reported.

But the person familiar with the investigation disputed the prosecutor’s characterization, saying the civil rights probe is continuing and there has been no final decision on whether to bring additional charges. The prosecutor, Matthew Evans, was fired on Thursday and is now under investigation for alleged obstruction of a grand jury probe, the person said.

An automatic email response from Evans’ Justice Department account said he was on leave. Other attempts to reach him were not immediately successful.

Castro was initially arrested in May in the Minnesota case, and he was held in custody in Brownsville, Texas, a city bordering Mexico, while Minnesota officials sought his extradition. But Texas Gov. Greg Abbott refused to immediately sign off, citing continuing investigations of fraud in government social service programs in Minnesota, which Trump used to justify his immigration crackdown there.

Minnesota officials had sought to stop the sheriff in Cameron County, Texas, from releasing Castro, out of fear that he would flee to Mexico. According to a lawsuit filed by Minnesota, Castro had a conversation with a woman, while he was incarcerated, where he spoke about marrying her and buying a house in Mexico after his release.

But Castro was released a week ago after a federal judge refused to order Texas to extradite him.

The Department of Homeland Security previously called Minnesota’s prosecution of Castro “unlawful and nothing more than a political stunt,” saying only federal authorities have jurisdiction in the case.

Castro was suspended from ICE without pay in February while federal authorities conducted the investigation.

“The men and women of ICE are entrusted with upholding the rule of law and are held to the highest standards of professionalism, integrity, and ethical conduct,” ICE’s acting director at the time, Todd Lyons, said then. “Violations of this sacred sworn oath will not be tolerated. ICE remains fully committed to transparency, accountability, and the fair enforcement of our nation’s immigration laws.”

Minnesota officials alleged that Castro, 52, fired through the front door of a home and shot Sosa-Celis in the thigh.

Castro and another officer had chased a different man, Alfredo Alejandro Aljorna, to the Minneapolis apartment duplex where he and Sosa-Celis lived. Minnesota prosecutors said the officer then falsely accused Sosa-Celis and another man of attacking an ICE officer with a broom handle and a snow shovel.

Attorneys for Sosa-Celis and Aljorna, who Minnesota officials have said were legally in the U.S., didn’t immediately respond to emails Thursday from the Associated Press.

Richer writes for the Associated Press.

Aug. 30 (UPI) — U.S. President Donald Trump on Sunday said the crude oil from Venezuela will be used to “fill up” the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve.

“One of the things I am going to do with the Venezuelan Oil is fill up the Strategic National Reserves which, because of Sleepy Joe Biden, has been virtually emptied,” Trump wrote. The “topping out” process will begin very shortly, and is a Gift from Venezuela to the People of the United States.”

Trump’s remarks came after he announced late Friday on social media that the South American country’s oil reserves will fall under “majority U.S. control” under a deal negotiated by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, and acting Venezuelan President Delcy Rodriguez.

“The United States of America has just entered into an Agreement with the Country of Venezuela on, THE BIGGEST OIL DEAL IN WORLD HISTORY!” Trump wrote.

In a televised address Saturday, Rodriguez said the “historic” deal with the U.S. to deliver 65 billion barrels of oil over 25 years will allow Venezuela to develop its oil industry. She added that the country’s “ownership and sovereignty” of its resources will be preserved.

The SPR held 289.7 million barrels as of Aug. 21, nearly a 44-year law, according to government data. The Biden and Trump administrations each drew down from the reserves after supply disruptions, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the US-Israel war with Iran. The SPR level stood at nearly 395 million barrels at the end of the Biden administration in January 2025.

Aug. 28 (UPI) — President Donald Trump on Friday said his administration had reached a deal with Venezuela to secure a stake in more than 65 billion barrels of the country’s oil reserves.

In an evening social media post, Trump called the move “the biggest oil deal in world history,” and said it would come at no cost to American taxpayers.

“This Historic Transaction MORE THAN DOUBLES American Oil Reserves, greatly increases our Oil Supply, and will substantially lower Gas Prices for all Americans, long into the future, while helping to continue to set Venezuela on a course toward Tremendous Success and Great Prosperity,” the president wrote on Truth Social.

Trump has been eyeing oil reserves in Venezuela since he ordered the military in January to seize former President Nicolas Maduro.

The president said his administration and Venezuela’s interim president, Delcy Rodriguez, reached the deal in a partnership with private businesses.

Inventory of the United States’ strategic oil reserve hit a four-decade low this month, following supply disruption caused by the war with Iran, CNBC reported.

Venezuela has the world’s largest proven crude oil reserves.

The United States could take over as many as 17 oil fields in the South American country, though many lack any infrastructure and could cost billions to develop, the Washington Post reported.

“I think oil companies in the end will be pretty hesitant,” Francisco Monaldi, director of the Latin American Energy Program at Rice University, told the newspaper.

State Secretary Marco Rubio, who was involved in the negotiations, said the deal would bring $100 billion in private investment to Venezuela.

“This deal is a huge win for both the American and Venezuelan people,” Rubio said in a statement on X. “It demonstrates how President Trump’s bold foreign policy is driving America First wins: securing stable reserves and low-cost oil in our Hemisphere and lowering gas prices here at home.”

On August 21, the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a couple of new general licences related to Venezuela’s telecommunications sector. Both General Licenses 61 and 62 will now allow the Venezuelan Government (including but not limited to the telecom authority CONATEL and the State-owned telecom company CANTV) to acquire goods and services from and/or related to the United States and authorize them to negotiate new contracts. 

To better understand the implications of this on Venezuelan telecommunications, there’s what specialized local journalist William Peña wrote on Telecommunicaciones360 and his conclusion is that “this opens an opportunity to the country in the issue of technologic updating, now it’s up to companies to have resources in order to accelerate their innovation process”.

The reaction from CONATEL to this announcement was so enthusiastic to the point of bragging that these licences “represent the recognition of the institutional legitimacy of the Venezuelan State” and that “these mechanisms reaffirm the intention of strengthening the infrastructure.”

Its press statement also mentioned the many areas that these couple of licenses will help to improve: from telephone and high-speed Internet to subscription TV services and everything in relation to fiber optic cable networks, satellite transmission systems and submarine cable links.

The purchase of any non-US tech not explicitly banned is still subject to OFAC approval.

“Despite being the regulation authority, CONATEL is the one who disposes and provides the equipment for technical analysis of infrastructure and monitoring of the radioelectric spectrum,” Peña told Caracas Chronicles, later adding that “Many of CONATEL’s current equipment is Chinese (in origin) and the Americans do not want that.”

Which leads to the main catch that the OFAC’s licences leave clear by explicitly forbidding: “Any transaction involving a person located in the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Cuba, the People’s Republic of China, or any entity that is owned or controlled by or in a joint venture with such persons.”

The purchase of any non-US tech not explicitly banned is still subject to OFAC approval.

The same day the licenses were published, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Juan Pablo Segura, said on his X account that Chinese tech companies like Huawei, ZTE and several others “cooperate with Beijing’s intelligence services, creating risks of spying, hacking, and network shutdowns” and asked “US partners in the Americas to quickly switch to trusted suppliers to protect their people and their sovereignty”. 

A deep relationship

This also comes with challenges for CANTV, which despite being the largest company in the sector, found itself behind in comparison to private companies because of several factors, including the US-set sanctions that forced it to go with what other allies were offering.

Most of those countries mentioned were the only viable options that CANTV and other State entities were left with as a consequence of the US sanctions, and Peña notices their negative impact: “This process, with exceptions like some Chinese Huawei technologies, ended up harming the country’s advance in diverse areas, as beside the issue of language, many of the implemented solutions were not compatible with the technologies passed down and most were of very low quality regarding assets and software solutions with plenty of complications.”

This instruction from Washington to avoid China as a telecom provider was not missed by either the PRC’s embassy in DC or by Hong Kong’s major newspaper, the South China Morning Post, indicating that “the China carve-out could prove particularly consequential. Huawei and ZTE became important suppliers to Venezuela as US sanctions and compliance concerns curtailed other international companies’ ability or willingness to work with government-linked entities”.

The relationship between CANTV and Huawei was very close in matters of system infrastructure, to the point that Peña says the State telecom company has a hefty debt of 600 million dollars with Huawei. “If CANTV already paid for that technology, and has it at its disposal either in inventory or storage, then it’ll be deployed, but from now on any new acquisitions must come from the US.” Many of those issues aren’t directly addressed by OFAC’s licenses.

So important is the role of the Chinese company in CANTV operation that in 2019 there was an unfounded rumor on social media that the Maduro government was about to sell it to Huawei.

A decade later, the political ID card was rolled out, and ZTE’s personnel were working within CANTV in handling the related databases: “We don’t support the government… We are just developing our market.”

ZTE, the other company mentioned by the South China Morning Post, has its own long history not only with Cantv but with the Venezuelan government: the company had a central role in the development of what is one of chavismo’s biggest instruments of political control: the “carnet de la patria”.

A 2018 special report by Reuters mentions how it all started with a visit from a delegation from the Venezuelan Justice Ministry to the headquarters of ZTE in Shenzhen back in 2008. Then, the delegation saw a glimpse of what later became known as the “social credit system”, which started its first trials in some regions of mainland China the following year.

A decade later, the political ID card was rolled out, and ZTE’s personnel were working within CANTV in handling the related databases. This was confirmed by ZTE’s head in Venezuela at the time, Su Qingfeng: “We don’t support the government… We are just developing our market.” The deep rapport between Nicolás Maduro and Xi Jinping continued until very recently. In July 2025, the Gran Expo China-Venezuela exposition was held in Caracas, and new agreements between both governments on a diverse range of issues were signed. Six months later, things would change with Operation Absolute Resolve. The person who signed those deals on behalf of Maduro was then VP Delcy Rodríguez.

Now, the Trump administration is taking a growing interest in Latin America (thanks in part to having new allies in the region like Jose Antonio Kast in Chile or Abelardo de la Espriella in Colombia), and it’s using it to push out the influence of Beijing. Still a work in progress.

The impact on Venezuelan clients 

Going back to what these licences could mean for Venezuela’s telecommunications sector, they could bring an expansion of the improvement seen in recent years, like with our Internet service. 

Peña mentions the immediate benefit for private companies, domestic and/or foreign: “This will allow them not only to be part of these large purchases, but also for the payments to be made in an easier and more opportune manner. Back in the time of the sanctions, they couldn’t open a bank account in the US, and buying abroad was complicated, causing the costs to go up. Now they can buy again from American companies with no hassle”.

Besides, this can also help with fixing the faults and limitations found because of the June 24 quakes, like the damaged submarine cable which affected overall access for weeks. And even before OFAC’s announcement, CANTC and Liberty Networks launched a joint investment in a new Fenix underwater cable that will connect Venezuela and Curaçao, reinforcing our connectivity.