Venezuelan

Venezuela is once again debating a renewal of its institutions, as if the problem could be solved simply by replacing the people in office. This remains the crucial question: what would have to change among those who wield power so that new rules are respected, even when doing so is inconvenient for them?

We are talking about rebuilding the State, restoring judicial independence, or recovering institutional integrity, often attributing agency to structures that, in practice, operate through human decisions. Behind every appointment, court ruling, or agreement are individuals driven by interests, convictions, fears, and power dynamics. No reform can overlook them.

When a future Supreme Court (TSJ) justice faces the uncomfortable decision of ruling against the interests of those who made their appointment possible, they will recall that the Constitution guarantees their independence; yet, they will also realize that their decision hinges on the safeguards available to them and the personal consequences of challenging those in power.

Individuals who uphold institutions

Following the fall of the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship on January 23, 1958, key political leaders realized that democratic survival required agreements that predated any constitutional framework. Rómulo Betancourt, Rafael Caldera, and Jóvito Villalba represented the parties that signed the Pact of Puntofijo in October of that year. The 1961 Constitution came later, built upon a foundation of compromises reached by former adversaries who had experienced the failure of 1945–1948. The agreements preceded the rules they were meant to uphold.

Those agreements, however, were not all-encompassing. The Communist Party was excluded from the pact, and the system of elite conciliation studied by Juan Carlos Rey ultimately revealed significant limitations regarding representation. Moreover, civilian consensus does not guarantee military obedience. In May and June 1962, the uprisings known as the Carupanazo and the Porteñazo put the Betancourt government to the test.

The 1999 Constitution already provided a Judicial Nominations Committee with civil society participation—much like the one we now expect—yet its operations ultimately became subordinate to political control. 

Democracy survived because key sectors of the Armed Forces remained loyal to the constitutional order, even though their defense of it was accompanied by restrictions and repressive measures. Institutions require individuals willing to uphold them against those seeking to tear them down.

Institutions that sustain individuals

Four decades later, Venezuela embarked on another institutional transformation. The 1999 Constitution promised to expand citizen participation and strengthen rights, yet its existence did not prevent the progressive concentration of power. In 2004, the Organic Law on the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ) expanded the court from 20 to 32 justices, facilitating political control over the body. In the presidential elections of July 28, 2024, the National Electoral Council (CNE) declared Nicolás Maduro the winner without publishing the disaggregated results backing its announcement. The electoral fraud exposed a fundamental contradiction: the body charged with guaranteeing the popular will ended up proclaiming a result contrary to the available electoral evidence.

The problem was not simply the gap between a sound Constitution and poor leaders. Over the years, relationships of dependency were built that made it possible to subordinate formally autonomous institutions. Consequently, public offices, judicial decisions, and oversight mechanisms increasingly served the preservation of a political project. The result was that an institution could retain its name, legal powers, and procedures while losing the actual capacity to constrain those in power. The rules remained, but those charged with defending them lacked the independence to do so.

US influence on the process also raises questions about the extent to which agreements reflect the priorities of the Venezuelan people.

In 2026, the debate resurfaces under different circumstances. Following Maduro’s removal on January 3, the government of Delcy Rodríguez is negotiating the renewal of the branches of government. Dinorah Figuera, president of the National Assembly elected in 2015, announced a schedule that seeks to revamp the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ) by November and complete work on the National Electoral Council (CNE) by December. These are announced political timelines that remain subject to negotiation.

But who is actually negotiating, and to whom are they accountable? US influence on the process also raises questions about the extent to which agreements reflect the priorities of the Venezuelan people. Furthermore, any given concession can be instantly interpreted on social media—by polarized audiences—as either a victory or a betrayal, thereby raising the political cost of negotiation.

The broader audience watching this process is not solely in Venezuela. Millions participate from abroad in public conversations about the country’s future and will also play a role in defending the institutions that may eventually be rebuilt. Institutional reconstruction must incorporate both the Venezuelans who remain in the country and those who have had to build their lives elsewhere. The experience of exile, diverse life paths, and political differences should not become obstacles to participating in defining our shared future. After so many years of division, the challenge also lies in recognizing ourselves as part of the same society, one in which no one is considered expendable in the effort to rebuild democracy.

Added to this is an issue that no agreement between civilians can sidestep: the continued existence of a military and security structure formed under chavismo. The conduct of those who control the weapons will be a decisive test for any new institutional order.

Society vs. institutional boundaries and agreements

The answer to the initial question (“what must change among those in power so that new rules are respected, even when doing so is inconvenient for them?”) requires concrete guarantees. For a judge to rule independently, the processes of selection and tenure must be shielded from those who expect obedience in exchange for the appointment. The 1999 Constitution already provided a Judicial Nominations Committee with civil society participation—much like the one we now expect—yet its operations ultimately became subordinate to political control. However, the 2024 election also taught us that when the CNE failed in its duty of transparency, citizens and organizations gathered and preserved the tally sheets that allowed the official results to be challenged.

Venezuelan society demonstrated that it can generate evidence and demand accountability, even when an institution fails.

Reconstruction therefore demands reforms capable of altering the incentives for those in power, guarantees for those who have suffered persecution, and oversight mechanisms that do not rely on the goodwill of those governing. Yet, it also requires a society capable of upholding those boundaries. The armed forces also need to find a place within that balance. Transparent rules for promotion and retirement, professionalization, and subordination to civilian authority could offer an alternative to personal loyalty. Their incorporation into the new order cannot imply impunity; distinguishing individual responsibilities and ensuring independent investigations will be essential to prevent inclusion from merely reproducing the privileges of the past.

The experience of the 2024 vote tallies offers a concrete possibility: transforming that capacity for civic organization into permanent oversight of the new authorities.

That capacity also depends on a democratic culture that recognizes the value of disagreement. A democracy is not built among equals, but among people who think differently yet still find reasons to reach compromises. Alterity—understood as recognizing the other in their difference—allows for the acceptance that an adversary also has the right to participate in shaping shared rules. Agreements require this disposition not only to emerge but also to endure and be revised when circumstances change.

For Venezuelans abroad, such participation requires more than just invitations to return: it demands guarantees for exercising political rights, effective mechanisms for participation, and conditions that allow their skills and capabilities to be linked to the country’s reconstruction. Within Venezuela, the experience of the 2024 vote tallies offers a concrete possibility: transforming that capacity for civic organization into permanent oversight of the new authorities, with access to public information and spaces to demand answers.

Institutional frameworks cannot remain static, either. Rules that once facilitated coexistence may require adjustments in the face of new social demands and political transformations. The contemporary challenge lies in the speed of these changes, which demands a greater capacity for understanding from those who govern and better tools for evaluating consequences from society. A democratic civic culture must allow institutions to evolve without becoming subject to the will of whoever happens to hold power at the time.

Domestic and international economic and financial sectors also need reasons to commit to this order. Legal certainty, transparent public contracts, and independent courts would allow informal influences to be replaced by relationships governed by established rules. However, such a commitment requires abandoning advantages gained through discretionary practices. An economy capable of long-term investment needs institutions that protect legitimate activity without relying on personal proximity to power.

Venezuela can overhaul its courts, appoint new electoral officials, and even draft another Constitution. None of that, on its own, will resolve the power dynamics that enabled authoritarianism. Institutions require rules that protect those who enforce them, as well as citizens capable of defending them when their own leaders seek to disregard them. Legitimacy is neither imported from Washington nor decreed from Caracas; it is built through the decisions of those who wield power and a society’s capacity to hold them accountable for those decisions.

Caracas, September 6th, 2016 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (Sebin) confirmed on Monday during an interview on state news channel Venezuela de Televisión (VTV) that authorities arrested several individuals identified as snipers set to carry out plans unexecuted during the opposition’s September 1st mobilizations.

For many, last week’s mobilizations were marked with great potential for bloodshed and guarimba violence as the political opposition has been insistent on a recall referendum happening this year despite protocols that would make anything earlier than January 2017 an unconstitutional process.

According to Sebin authorities, these individuals prepared to carry out selective assassinations on September 1st during the mobilizations. Since the targeted assassinations did not occur last week, Sebin authorities believe the individuals were ready to execute their plans Wednesday September 7th.

Sebin Director, Gustavo González López, said, “They [those arrested] had already made plans for September 7th, which indicate there are still intentions to carry out a coup.”

In total, five people were arrested in association with these plans. They include: Giovanni Vásquez, Joel José Méndez Semprún, Enrique Gerónimo González Ramírez and Manuel Alejandro González.

Additionally, Venezuelan officials reiterated that they issued arrest warrants for opposition leaders Lestor Toledo and Yorman Barillas, who are allegedly among the plan’s masterminds.

Both Toledo and Barillas are said to be in Maicao, La Guajira, Colombia. As such, the Ministry of Domestic Affairs has requested that the Colombian government repatriate them to Venezuela. González López said that the plans were designed during three meetings with former Colombian President Álavaro Uribe as well as other members of Venezuela’s National Assembly.

Uribe is notorious for founding paramilitary groups in Colombia and supporting their operations throughout the region. Venezuelan authorities have regularly linked Uribe to key opposition figures as well as ongoing attempts to destabilize Venezuelan society and overthrow the Bolivarian government.

Venezuelan authorities say that the preparative meetings took place in Maicao, as well as Mara and Maracaibo in Zulia state.

The Venezuelan military likewise detained four individuals in Páez municipality, Apure state where they found ammunition and 35 mm grenades, among other objects. Three men and one woman were detained, referred to in Venezuelan media as “guerillas”, part of a military operation of 20 soldiers under the orders of General Hermes Hernández Marcano by the Arauca River.

More details surrounding their case, including the individual’s’ identities have not yet been released.

Caracas, September 30, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Minister of Electric Energy Rolando Alcalá announced a plan to add 1,300 megawatts (MW) to the country’s electric grid amid growing protests against recurring blackouts. 

In a televised message published on Tuesday, Alcalá pledged that the electricity supply would improve in the final quarter of 2026 to mitigate outages. He explained that a unit at Planta Centro, Venezuela’s main generation complex serving the central-western region, will come online “in the coming days” and provide 600 MW to the area.

The official also announced that seven generation units with a combined capacity of 500 MW will be added to a key thermoelectric plant in Zulia state, which borders Colombia and is one of the areas hardest hit by power failures. 

The government is also reportedly working on an alternative energy plan for the state, including the Machango solar panel park, which is expected to come online next year.

The remainder of the planned generation will come from units located in other regions of the country. 

“Other units will be brought online nationwide, for a total of 1,300 megawatts during this final quarter of 2026. These will help achieve greater stability, continuity, and fewer interruptions in electricity service nationwide,” Alcalá said in a video shared by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez on social media.

“We have a clear plan to face the challenges of the National Electric System and we are executing it,” she wrote on X. “With organization, coordination, and effort we move forward to overcome this situation.”

Meanwhile, the president of the National Electric Corporation (CORPOELEC), Juan Fernández, explained that “as a complement to the thermal generation plan, major transmission projects are being carried out.” He highlighted the expansion of the Planta Centro substation with the addition of a new 400-230 kV autotransformer, equipment that recently arrived from abroad.

“This year, we have gained access to original spare parts and components from the world’s leading manufacturers,” he added, referencing agreements with US-based GE Vernova, Germany’s Siemens, and Argentina’s Impsa. The US Treasury Department has issued sanctions waivers allowing transactions with Venezuela’s electricity sector.

The latest announcements came amid near-daily protests over power outages throughout the country. Demonstrators have taken to the streets to bang pots and pans or block streets to demand that authorities answer for blackouts that can add up to 16 hours per day.

On Wednesday night, protesters from Guacara, Carabobo State, temporarily blocked the Central-Regional Highway, the main highway connecting Caracas to Western regions, after electricity was shut off for a second time in the same day. 

In statements to local press, demonstrators have highlighted that high temperatures and mosquitoes make it hard to sleep without ventilators or air conditioning, leading children to fall asleep in school. They have also criticized authorities for not producing a rationing schedule, making it impossible for families and businesses to plan around outages.

In their Tuesday televised message, Venezuelan government officials stated that the country’s electricity demand has risen in recent weeks, driven by a “rebound in economic activity,” high temperatures caused by the El Niño climate phenomenon, and the twin June 24 earthquakes which “delayed plans that had been underway to repair the electrical system.”

On September 22, the Ministry of Electric Energy reported that electricity demand in Venezuela had reached a record high of 16,424 megawatts (MW), the highest level recorded in the past nine years.

Venezuela has a nominal installed generation capacity of approximately 35,000 megawatts (MW), twice the country’s peak demand. However, actual stable generation currently stands at just 12,000 MW due to a deep structural crisis resulting from US sanctions that prevented the purchase of spare parts, as well as issues of underinvestment, lack of maintenance, and corruption.

Nevertheless, authorities claimed that a proposed reform of the Organic Law of the National Electricity System and Service will allow “the integration of the public and private sectors in electricity generation, transmission, distribution, and commercialization,” with the aim of “promoting competitiveness, and attracting investment to strengthen electrical infrastructure.”

The new law was preliminarily approved by the National Assembly in June, with a second discussion and final approval yet to be scheduled.

The previous legislation, enacted in 2010 under President Hugo Chávez, exclusively reserved all activities across the electricity supply chain for the state, centralized through the state-owned CORPOELEC. The reform authorizes strategic partnerships and concession agreements with domestic and international private companies.

In defending the new law, Venezuelan officials have defended the adjustment of electricity tariffs to reflect “real costs” and secure returns for investors.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

Wilber Rafael Garces Perez has disputed the government’s account of what led to his shooting during a Doordash delivery in Austin, Texas.

A Venezuelan asylum seeker who was shot in the back by a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officer in Texas is facing a federal assault charge, after prosecutors accused him of striking the officer with his car’s side-view mirror.

Wilber Rafael Garces Perez, 28, appeared in federal court in Austin on Tuesday, where he was charged with assaulting, resisting and impeding a federal officer. He could face up to 20 years in prison if convicted.

The charge stems from a September 20 encounter that began while Garces Perez was making a DoorDash food delivery near a shopping centre in Austin, the Texas state capital.

A federal complaint filed on Monday says immigration officers noticed that Garces Perez’s car had its emergency lights flashing, and they ran a database check. They found it was registered to Garces Perez, who was subject to a final order of removal from the US.

When the officers approached, Garces Perez handed over his driver’s license through a partially opened window but did not get out of the car, the complaint says. He asked the officers to wait until his wife could arrive to retrieve the vehicle.

Court documents describe the exchange up to that point as “pleasant and not aggressive”.

About a minute later, however, court documents say Garces Perez “abruptly” closed his window and drove off, striking one of the officers in the torso with his driver’s side mirror.

That officer chased Garces Perez in his own vehicle and caught up with him a short time later. In the complaint, the officer alleges that Garces Perez then tried to drive into him, prompting him to open fire.

There is no publicly available footage showing the events described in the complaint, including the shooting.

Videos, however, have circulated online showing the shooting’s aftermath, with Garces Perez injured in his car.

The complaint relies on unreleased body-camera footage from one of the two ICE officers who stopped Garces Perez.

The second officer was not wearing a body camera, according to the affidavit. That officer says he was struck by Garces Perez’s side mirror and later shot him.

Garces Perez, however, gave federal investigators a different account of the moments immediately before he was shot.

He told investigators that, after a brief chase, a law enforcement SUV struck his car, causing it to spin around, according to the affidavit. He said the officer then opened fire, shooting him in the back.

Garces Perez has been held in a detention facility in south Texas since the shooting.

His lawyer, Kate Lincoln-Goldfinch, said on Sunday the bullet was still lodged in his body and that he has a fractured clavicle. In a social media post, Lincoln-Goldfinch explained that his supporters were worried he could develop sepsis or suffer permanent damage if he didn’t undergo surgery soon.

The Department of Homeland Security has argued, however, that Garces Perez is receiving adequate medical care.

Garces Perez’s legal team is also seeking to stop his removal from the US.

The Venezuelan national entered the US in 2024 through CBP One, an online programme expanded under former President Joe Biden to allow asylum seekers to make appointments with immigration authorities at the US-Mexico border.

Trump ended the programme on his first day back in office, accusing the app of contributing to an immigration crisis in the US. His administration has since relaunched CBP One as CBP Home, a self-deportation portal.

Lincoln-Goldfinch has said Garces Perez was legally seeking asylum in the US and had a valid work permit. She has asserted that he was ordered to be deported after missing an immigration court hearing because the notice had been sent to an old address.

Garces Perez is due back before a federal immigration judge on Wednesday for a separate hearing on whether he can remain in the country.

The case comes amid a surge in immigration enforcement during Trump’s second term, with ICE reporting more than 50,000 arrests in both July and August.

Caracas, September 28, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) –  The Venezuelan government and delegates representing a defunct, opposition-majority parliament concluded, on September 25, a second round of US-backed talks focused on political and judicial reforms.

The negotiations produced preliminary agreements focused on judicial reform and loosening administrative restrictions on several opposition-aligned news outlets.

The primary advance in the negotiations centered on a comprehensive proposal to restructure Venezuela’s Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ).

According to official statements, both delegations established a seven-person committee to review the qualifications of Supreme Court justice candidates. The two parties also agreed to create a Judicial Nominations Committee within the National Assembly to oversee the selection process for new magistrates.

This committee will oversee applications from legal scholars, public sector workers, and civil society members, subjecting applicants to rigorous constitutional criteria before submitting a final list of recommended nominees for a plenary vote in the legislative body.

Speaking at the close of the talks at the Meliá Hotel in Caracas, National Assembly President and head of the government delegation, Jorge Rodríguez, highlighted the consensus achieved regarding judicial reform.

“We have reached concrete agreements to strengthen our democratic institutions, starting with a transparent process to evaluate and appoint magistrates to the Supreme Court,” Rodríguez stated to reporters. “This dialogue demonstrates that through constitutional channels and mutual respect, Venezuelans can resolve their differences without foreign interference.”

Representatives from the opposition delegation similarly acknowledged the priority of reforming the judicial branch.

Dinorah Figuera, president of the faction from the defunct National Assembly elected in 2025, claimed that the ongoing negotiations are aimed at “re-institutionalizing” the country.

“If the TSJ and the CNE move forward alongside political and civil guarantees, social issues and the health sector must also be linked to this process of re-institutionalization.”

The two sides launched a dialogue process in August, with a first round of talks launching the Supreme Court overhaul as well as a joint initiative to recover Venezuelan gold reserves frozen by the Bank of England. The 31 tons of gold, valued at around US $4 billion, will reportedly be transferred to the US before being used for earthquake reconstruction efforts with oversight from US authorities.

The Trump administration has endorsed the negotiations, with the State Department calling it a “unique opportunity” for a “political transition” in Venezuela. In a press conference last week, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio affirmed that the ongoing talks will “create the groundwork and rebuild the institutions necessary in order to have free and fair elections.”

In addition to the latest judicial reforms, both delegations agreed to lift long-standing administrative sanctions against select media organizations such as El Pitazo, Efecto Cocuyo, EFE Agency, among others.

Several outlets had been subjected to legal investigations or broadcast suspensions after being accused of endorsing or broadcasting content linked to past coup attempts and violent anti-government demonstrations.

The lifting of the administrative bans is intended to restore legal broadcast licenses and digital accessibility to several platforms. Government negotiators emphasized that while media outlets are expected to operate within the bounds of national laws regarding public safety, anti-hate regulations, and constitutional order, the agreement serves as a good-faith gesture to expand freedom of expression and media pluralism in the country.

As the closing of the second round of talks, both the Venezuelan government and opposition negotiators indicated that technical commissions will continue working in the coming weeks to finalize the nomination guidelines for the TSJ magistrates and monitor the administrative implementation of the media agreements. They will begin a third round of talks in October.

Washington’s backing for the 2015 National Assembly to take part in dialogue with the government has exposed rifts among the Venezuelan opposition, particularly with a far-right sector led by María Corina Machado.

A longtime endorser of international sanctions and aggressive regime-change strategies, Machado has reportedly attempted to return to Venezuela in recent weeks after a long hiatus abroad.

According to multiple sources, the attempts to enter Venezuelan territory have been frustrated by transportation-related technical issues; in both air and sea travel attempts, the companies involved cancelled the trips due to operational problems.

Despite a long absence from Venezuela, Machado has retained support in the US political establishment. The United States Senate has scheduled an urgent committee meeting to address the political situation in Venezuela, with lawmakers explicitly placing Machado’s return to Venezuela and her political eligibility at the top of the agenda.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

The Venezuelan economy has had a modest recovery after years of contraction under US sanctions. In this interactive infographic, we break down indicators, facts, and figures to examine the recent economic trends and, most importantly, their impact on the Venezuelan people.

(Click on the crosses for more information and scroll between plots.)

(Click here to download the full infographic.)

MIDVALE, Utah — Snow-covered mountains ringing a valley of wide, free-flowing roads remind Venezuelan transplants that the growing suburbs south of Salt Lake City offer what Miami can’t.

One million Venezuelans were released into the United States after crossing the Mexican border during a record immigration surge, and many shunned Miami and other longtime immigrant footholds for smaller places with less established communities — a pattern found in an exclusive Associated Press analysis of federal data from fall 2018 to summer 2025.

These cities and towns promised better jobs, cheaper homes, less traffic and higher quality of life, outweighing Florida’s allure of tropical weather and ease of getting by on Spanish alone.

Enrique Vera, 32, crossed the border in Yuma, Arizona, in 2021 and went to Miami to settle with his mother, who’d been there six years. But he found Florida untenable, he told AP — “the work, the conditions, the low pay.”

After less than two weeks there, Vera and his mother accepted a cousin’s invitation to Utah. In the southern suburbs, with massive new housing tracts and pristine shopping centers, Vera found factory work but soon quit to turn a hobby baking for co-workers into his own business. Today he employs 15 people — many, like him, asylum seekers — at a warehouse and two bakeries.

Utah — known as a relatively immigrant-friendly state despite deep Republican roots and support for President Donald Trump — became a top destination for Venezuelans crossing the border, along with parts of the Chicago, Denver, Atlanta, Dallas and Houston metro areas, AP’s data show. Venezuelans also went to smaller cities including Madison, Wisconsin; Albuquerque, New Mexico; and Savannah, Georgia.

It’s a pattern playing out across the U.S.: Some Cubans eschewed Florida and went to Louisville, Kentucky, and Odessa, Texas; Colombians chose the Boston and Denver areas; and Paterson, New Jersey, was the top pick among Peruvians.

These communities have both benefited from the influx of people and struggled to integrate their new arrivals.

Venezuelans stand out for their sheer numbers. About 8 million people, or one-fourth of the country’s population, have fled since 2014, many to the United States. About 30,000 of the 1 million released into the U.S. in AP’s data said they were going directly to Utah.

For Venezuelans in Utah, Trump’s deportation drive has instilled widespread fear

Despite the growing population here, there are few Venezuelan flags, bumper stickers or displays of patriotism on the bustling commercial strips of Midvale, an older suburb of about 40,000 people at the interchange of two highways. Signs are generally in English. The Venezuelan population has mixed in with the largely white population as new houses, malls, office parks and warehouses have gobbled up barren hillsides to meet demand for cheaper land.

President Donald Trump’s immigration crackdown instilled fear and made Venezuelans less visible since 2023, when arrivals peaked in Utah and in the United States as a whole. Everyone here seems to know someone who returned to Venezuela voluntarily because they feared being detained and deported or because they lost their work authorization.

In May 2025, Alberto Salcedo opened the parking lot of his Centro de Apoyo Familiar Church to Venezuelan food trucks. The asylum-seeking evangelical pastor dreamed of creating a vibrant gathering spot for Venezuelan immigrants. Nearly 20 vendors and 5,000 visitors came each week, he said, with trucks serving empanadas, arepas, even burgers and sushi. But that dropped down to maybe five vendors and a few hundred people. The fear of deportation is real, he said.

Restaurant owner Fidel Arrieta said it’s affected his business, too. He opened Arempa’s, his first restaurant in downtown Salt Lake City in 2019, drawing non-Latino customers and Venezuelan immigrants alike. Arempa’s — where the walls are filled with photos of Venezuelan waterfalls, an image of Mona Lisa eating an arepa and Miss Venezuela portraits — grew to five restaurants. But three closed in the last year as business slowed.

Arrieta’s wife — co-owner Sandy Arrieta — wanted to stay open. But he believes nothing will turn around while Trump’s in office.

“Until the government changes, the problems will not end,” said Fidel, 65, who immigrated in 1994.

For proof of the growing Venezuelan population, look no further than Utah’s churches

In 2001, Gregorio Rausseo immigrated to Utah, knowing no one. Fast-forward more than two decades, to 2023: Rausseo had just started as pastor at Saint Therese of the Child Jesus Church and was ready for the annual celebration of the patron saint of Zulia, an oil-rich Venezuelan state that includes Maracaibo, the country’s second-largest city. He was shocked to see more than 1,000 parishioners snake into the lobby and parking lot.

“I asked the deacon, ‘All of them are Venezuelan?’ He said … ‘They are all Maracuchos,’” a term for someone from Maracaibo.

Today, Rausseo estimates about 40% of his church’s more than 700 families are Venezuelan immigrants.

Carlos Trujillo, a 42-year-old lawyer who handles immigration cases, puts Venezuelan immigrants in three categories: those who came for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints; those who came to join family or friends; and those who came knowing no one. He has repeatedly heard variations of, “This is a place where I can bring my family and have a start.”

Trujillo — who immigrated in 2001, as an 18-year-old whose parents decided he would do better living with family closer to the Mormon church headquarters — said his firm has about 1,700 immigration cases, with staff fielding calls in a large room resembling a call center.

Many of the Venezuelans here came after COVID hit, flying to the Mexican border before January 2022, when Mexico tightened travel restrictions for Venezuelans. That prompted hundreds of thousands to walk through the Darien Gap, a jungle in Panama and Colombia, on a grueling journey through at least eight countries.

Ashly Estupinan, 18, walked the jungle with her grandmother. In Mexico, they used the appointment app CBP One to enter the U.S. in San Diego. Trump ended CBP One on his first day in office, two years after his predecessor, Joe Biden, started it and let more than 900,000 people come legally with two-year permits.

Estupinan, who graduated high school this spring, and her grandmother chose Utah because her uncle was there. “It’s very tranquil, very pretty, the people are very friendly,” she said.

Word of mouth and family advice brought many to Utah

Juan Gonzalez, 41, a cook at Arempa’s, walked the jungle for four days with his brother — passing corpses, he said — before eventually crossing the U.S. border in Texas. He went to Utah on the advice of a distant cousin.

“He had gone to other states, and Utah struck him as the best one,” Gonzalez said, noting he’s drawn to the state’s “strong economy.”

Many Venezuelan immigrants here work in food service — at restaurants or selling meals from their homes. Some proudly noted that a local Walmart now stocks special flour for arepas.

Others cycle through low-wage jobs: construction, nail salons, warehouse and factory work.

Gonzalo Rodriguez, 39, worked as a laborer, carpenter and office manager before rising to general manager of Fillerup Employment Services, a construction company. He said it had about 25 Venezuelans in its workforce of about 300 when he arrived in 2020. By 2022, that grew to 165.

At one point, Rodriguez said, Venezuelans camped in tents on the sidewalk at the company’s office park in suburban Sandy, waiting for work and accepting food while migrant shelters were full.

Julio Gonzalez, 33, climbed company ranks from laborer to human resources manager after crossing the border in 2021 with his wife and son, then 9, in Del Rio, Texas. A friend in Utah told him it was a good place to live. Many here agree, saying they’ve felt no pervasive racism in Utah.

It was a welcome change for Gonzalez, who said he lived in Panama for six years under anti-Venezuelan xenophobia that prompted his move to the United States.

Hector Escalona, 42, also started in construction at Fillerup, then opened a barber shop in 2022. He now has 27 barber chairs at three shops, and many employees are Venezuelan. He said he’s expanding his business even with uncertainty about his asylum case.

Others have had less financial success.

Adaya Amaya, 47, ran a catering business from her home and now operates a food truck but barely gets by. She crossed the border in 2021 with her daughter, now 9, and father, now 74. They relied at times on a food bank. She knows other Venezuelans who’ve slept in their cars.

Her father gave up his asylum claim in June to return to Maracaibo because he didn’t want to burden her.

Some wonder: Is goodwill toward immigrants cooling in Utah?

In the 2024 election, Trump — and his immigration enforcement campaign messages — won Utah by 22 points. The same year, Carlos Moreno, who won asylum after fleeing Venezuela in 2009, was elected to the Salt Lake County Council.

The state’s immigrant-friendly reputation is tied to the Utah Compact, a 2010 document signed by hundreds of local governments, businesses and civic leaders that endorses “common-sense immigration reforms that will strengthen our economy, as well as attract talent and business to our state.”

But Trujillo, the immigration attorney, said goodwill cooled during the Biden-era immigration surge and some elected leaders who were allies became more guarded in public comments.

Gov. Spencer Cox called the Venezuelan Tren de Aragua gang “a growing threat in Utah” in 2024, but few major crimes in the state have been linked to the group.

Venezuelan immigrants repeatedly told AP that a small minority of their own are their worst enemies — not just those who commit crimes but those who drink in public, play loud music and repair cars in the street. They say that while some of that behavior may be accepted in Venezuela, they must adopt local norms.

“It makes me angry,” said Joiren Rangel, who arrived in 2018 and worked at an Amazon warehouse before opening two Venezuelan restaurants, one of which closed last year. “We saw that we were in a different country and had to abide by the rules. In Venezuela, I would drive with my daughter seated on my lap. I would never do that here.”

Many here are still waiting on their asylum cases

Some asylum seekers were told to wait 10 years for an initial appointment in 2023, but the government has moved aggressively to winnow the backlog. Still, about 500,000 Venezuelans have pending cases in immigration court, more than any other nationality.

Loreana Pachano, who spent much of her childhood in Miami, has been waiting 10 years for an asylum interview. She was increasingly impatient but now wonders whether she might do better if her case remains open until after Trump leaves office.

She and her husband settled in Florida but tired of long commutes and anti-Venezuelan sentiment. They moved to Utah after a friend told her that construction wages were significantly higher. “If we had to start from scratch, how about we start from scratch somewhere else?” she remembers thinking.

Now a real estate agent, she sells houses to asylum seekers who crossed the border and has seen the impact of Trump’s policies — for example, a bank closing on a house that a Venezuelan client gave up because she lost work authorization when Trump ended Temporary Protected Status for more than 600,000 Venezuelans.

“It feels like we’re building on quicksand. We’re trying to build a future here for ourselves, for our kids,” said Pachano, who flips homes and owns trucking and construction businesses with her husband while raising their 3- and 7-year-old daughters.

“Are we going to be here by the time we reach retirement age? We don’t know. You don’t know when the rug is going to be pulled right under your feet.”

Spagat writes for the Associated Press. AP reporter Aaron Kessler contributed to this report.

This is an abridged version of the original story in Spanish, the second part of the award-winning investigative journalism project Dorada Opacidad by Alianza Rebelde Investiga and Convoca. You can read the first part here.

The picture above—courtesy of Gold Reserve—shows the ground of the Siembra Minera project, which the Canadian mining company recently retook.

Delcy Rodríguez has made her moves in the barracks, where she had no major influence before January 3. Several of the appointments are linked to the mining area. She gave Rafael Prieto Martínez, who had been military chief in Bolívar, the direction of the Strategic Operational Command (CEOFANB), the highest body for planning, direction and operational strategic control of the Venezuelan forces. There were also changes in Guayana’s Strategic Comprehensive Defense Region (the REDI or military region where the Orinoco Mining Arc is located) and in Bolívar’s Comprehensive Defense Operational Zone (ZODI). Rodríguez also put in charge people she completely trusted in civilian gold-related positions. For instance, the current president of the Central Bank of Venezuela, Luis Pérez, is also head of the newly created Vice Ministry of Gold.

Gold mixes with the government and now also with the United States. On June 8, troops flooded Guasipati and Tumeremo, when a group of American investors arrived to tour several gold mines and processing plants of the Venezuelan Mining Corporation (CVM).

They weren’t doing some pleasurable sightseeing. The roads’ craters have not been repaired for years. Tin shacks and shops occupy the sidewalks. At night, some lamp posts illuminate the streets only in case there is electricity. The region was not always this chaotic. Decades ago, the hotels there were not for miners but for tourists going to or coming from La Gran Sabana, the eastern sector of the Canaima National Park. During the nineties, there were two large international mining companies that had concessions to exploit the Las Brisas-Las Cristinas axis, where the country’s most important gold reserves are located. In Las Brisas del Cuyuní, an extensive gold and copper deposit near Kilómetro 88, Canadian company Gold Reserve established a mining project to extract minerals. The deposit has estimated reserves of more than 10 million ounces of gold and 1.4 million pounds of copper. 

Canadian mining company Crystallex International Corporation operated at Las Cristinas, a site bordering Las Brisas and located near the town of Las Claritas. Its reserves are estimated at over 17 million ounces of gold.

During the nationalization process undertaken by Hugo Chávez between 2008 and 2010, both mines were expropriated. The president declared their concessions void, prompting the companies to demand multi-million dollar compensation from Venezuela through international arbitration proceedings.

Whether for theft, robbery, gunshot wounds, homicide, or acts challenging The System, punishments could range from mutilation to murder.

In their place, the chavista government allowed armed criminal “syndicates” (sindicatos) to establish themselves there and in all the mining towns of the south. These groups exercise power through violence and extortion, keeping miners in conditions of modern-day slavery.

Since at least 2012, control of the area was held by the Las Claritas Syndicate, led by AKA Juancho. He received support from the then-Governor of Bolívar, Francisco Rangel Gómez, and his Secretary of Citizen Security, Julio César Fuentes Manzulli—an Army brigadier general who also served as director of the Bolívar Police. Both men purchased gold and diamonds from Juancho to sell abroad. This relationship was exposed by Army First Lieutenant Jesús Leonardo Curvelo in a report presented to the National Assembly in 2016.

In 2015, AKA Johan Petrica, a leader of the Tren de Aragua, arrived in the area, formed an alliance with Juancho and established the local criminal organization known as The System. Petrica’s presence in Las Claritas led to speculation that AKA Niño Guerrero had taken refuge there after the Venezuelan government dismantled the Aragua Penitentiary Center (known as Tocorón prison, famous for being the original headquarters of the Tren de Aragua) in 2023. 

The entire town had witnessed the actions of The System and agreed that any transgression came at a price. Whether for theft, robbery, gunshot wounds, homicide, or acts challenging The System, punishments could range from mutilation to murder. In 2020, organizations like Human Rights Watch documented an incident where a female miner who stole 10 grams of gold from a colleague was tied to a tree and beheaded with a chainsaw; in another case, a 17-year-old who was also accused of stealing gold was made to clasp his hands as if in prayer before being shot seven times and ordered to flee for his life.

Both Trump and Delcy Rodríguez reported only the killing of Niño Guerrero, offering no word on the whereabouts of Juancho, Petrica, and their lieutenants.

Surveillance throughout the town was constant. Lookouts (known as gariteros) kept a close watch on every movement from street corners, while checkpoints were deployed along the roads leading to the mines to monitor access to the deposits. The crimes The System committed to enforce its control were often followed by actions designed to portray it as a benefactor to the town. The local health clinic was always well-stocked with medicines and supplies, boasting high-quality equipment that nearby public clinics lacked. Miners enjoyed a form of “health insurance” provided by The System, which covered the treatment of any wounds or injuries sustained during gold extraction. The System organized toy giveaways for all the children at Christmas and during the Children’s Day celebrations held every July. Mother’s Day and Father’s Day were celebrated at the Las Claritas sports court, where gifts were distributed to those being honored. “In 2025, Juancho and El Viejo handed out about 200 motorcycles on Father’s Day. Everyone who went there left with a motorcycle,” Julio remarked. 

Both Trump and Rodríguez reported only the killing of Niño Guerrero, offering no word on the whereabouts of Juancho, Petrica, and their lieutenants. Everyone in the town who was asked agreed that the armed group’s leaders had fled before the military arrived, knowing a “change of government” was imminent. Witnesses in Santa Elena de Uairén—located more than 230 kilometers south of Las Claritas—stated on Monday, June 8 (the day before the incursion), that they had spotted several members of The System, including Juancho, at the Escamoto checkpoint. That post is near the military fort of the same name, less than nine kilometers from the Venezuela-Brazil border. Those who saw them could not be certain that Niño Guerrero was among the group.

In early July, Wesley Costa de Oliveira—a commissioner with the Civil Police of Roraima state, Brazil, specifically the Unit for the Repression of Criminal Organizations (DRACO)—told this investigation that he was not surprised members of The System might be taking refuge in his country, given the weak border controls. Another official from Brazil’s Federal Police confirmed to this project that their government suspected the leaders of this organization were within its territory.

A week after the raid in Las Claritas—on June 16—police in Roraima state revealed that initial progress in “Operation Northern Route” had struck a portion of the Venezuelan criminal gang’s structure in Brazil, resulting in the arrest of 25 people across Roraima, Amazonas, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, and Paraná.

While uniformed personnel exploit their power in Las Claritas, there is still no news regarding which companies will arrive to take over the deposits. Criminal leaders continue their operations quietly in other cities.

The most prominent figure arrested was businessman Gustavo Vieira Rufino, identified as the financial manager for the TDA. He allegedly moved over 300 million reais (nearly 60 million dollars) in crypto-assets to launder capital derived from illicit activities.

Ana, a local hairdresser, recalled that El Callao was under military control during the Las Claritas-Kilometer 88 operation due to the presence of US investors visiting government recovery plants—such as El Chocó, El Perú, and the headquarters of the now-defunct Minerven. This state of affairs lasted for a week, until the foreigners departed.

In Las Claritas, while uniformed personnel exploit their power, there is still no news regarding which companies will arrive to take over the deposits. Meanwhile, in El Callao, Tumeremo, and El Dorado, criminal leaders continue their operations quietly.

Although El Callao breathes easier following the operation, for Ana, the ousting of The System offers hope that the town might return to what it was in the 1990s: a tourist stop where downtown shops sold gold jewelry at prices far lower than those found in the country’s major cities.

The interviewees’ identities have been changed for their safety. This report was supported by the Pulitzer Center.

Text and photos: Lorena Meléndez | Coordination and editing: Ronna Rísquez | General direction: Milagros Salazar | Design and infographics: ET

This is an abridged version of the original story in Spanish, the second part of award-winning investigative journalism project Dorada Opacidad. We will publish the second (and last) part of this investigation tomorrow.

When they pass through the streets of the Las Claritas–Kilómetro 88 mining corridor in Bolívar state, southern Venezuela, a thick, yellowish cloud of dust blankets them like a veil. The sound is unmistakable: a convoy of 15, 20, or 25 motorcycles riding together. Aboard are soldiers from the Orinoco Mining Arc Protection Group (GPAMO)—a unit conceived and activated in 2022 under the command of the Strategic Operational Command of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (CEOFANB) to safeguard the deposits. They had never been there before June 9, 2026, when three rockets, shot by a US aircraft, shook the area’s flimsy houses. Now, GPAMO is the law.

Although some cover their faces, Rafael knows them well. He owns one of the gold mills operating at the El Mecatico mine—one of many in an area that holds the world’s fourth-largest gold deposit, according to a 2018 certification by Canadian mining company Gold Reserve. Standing beneath the tin roof that shelters his business, he explained that he would soon have to pay the GPAMO 20 grams of gold (roughly 2,000 US dollars) in exchange for a registration form that in theory is free. He is also required to make monthly payments to remain on the site.

For Rafael and the residents of Las Claritas, everything changed on the morning of June 9, when they woke up to find the area occupied by the military. In the early hours, dozens of vehicles transported hundreds of troops from various branches of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB)—such as the Special Affairs Directorate (DAE) of the General Directorate of Military Counterintelligence (DGCIM)—who patrolled the streets alongside unidentified men dressed in black and carrying long guns. Meanwhile, a pair of military aviation Cougar helicopters flew just above the rooftops of the houses.

The objective of that mobilization was to dismantle “The System.” That was the name given to the criminal alliance between Juan Gabriel Rivas Núñez—known as “Negro Juancho”—and Yohan José Romero (nicknamed “Johan Petrica” ​​or “El Viejo”), one of the leaders of the “mega-gang” born in the Tocorón prison: the Tren de Aragua. For over a decade, this criminal alliance had dominated the territory containing one of the world’s largest gold mining complexes—Las Brisas-Las Cristinas—and had subjugated the local population through torture, mutilation, and murder.

All signs pointed to a “change of government”—a term used in the Venezuelan criminal underworld to describe one criminal group replacing another in a territory.

The residents were so terrified that they remained locked themselves in their homes for days. Rafael did not hear the explosions that rang out mid-morning in Brisas de Cuyuní, near the Kilómetro 88 mining area, because he had gone to his ore mill in the early hours of the morning without noticing the military deployment. Hours later, the military arrived in El Mecatico to destroy the warehouses and properties belonging to The System. This operation was repeated at other mines, as well as at hotels, homes, and businesses in the town.

To determine who truly holds power along the Las Claritas-Kilómetro 88 corridor and in the southern mining towns extending as far as Guasipati, a team of reporters from the Alianza Rebelde Investiga (ARI) and Convoca toured the region as part of the investigative series Dorada Opacidad (Golden Opacity). Interviews with more than twenty sources—ranging from merchants, mill operators, police officers, and local residents to religious figures and local government officials—made it possible to map out the new criminal landscape of the Orinoco Mining Arc.

For days, information about the events was available only through social media or details gathered by journalists working remotely. The first official explanation did not come from any Venezuelan authority, but from Donald Trump. Three days after the bombings, the president stated that his country’s Southern Command had launched a “kinetic attack” to “take out”  AKA Niño Guerrero—the nickname of Héctor Rusthenford Guerrero Flores, the most prominent leader of the Tren de Aragua—with the collaboration of the Delcy Rodríguez government.

A new criminal governance

From then on, a military-imposed order took hold in Las Claritas. Rafael recounted that shortly after the town was seized, all mine workers were summoned to a meeting where a FANB captain urged them to keep working without pause, as they had to “produce as Commander Delcy Rodríguez ordered.” 

All signs pointed to a “change of government”—a term used in the Venezuelan criminal underworld to describe one criminal group replacing another in a territory, without necessarily putting an end to criminal activities.

That call for productivity came with no guarantees. The mill operator, his shoulders slumped in despair, recalled the sense of security The System had once provided: he could leave his tools outside and stay at his mill until midnight. After the military incursion, however, he had to finish his work and leave before 6:00 pm for fear of being robbed, as happened to others in the mine.

The military has displaced the armed group in the Las Claritas-Kilómetro 88 area, but shares control with criminal mafias in El Dorado and Guasipati.

Since the military took control to oust The System, extortion of merchants, gold buyers, and even random passersby had become commonplace, according to several sources on the ground consulted for this investigation. Soldiers seized sacks of gold-bearing sand left behind by members of The System in order to process them and extract the gold, recounted Óscar, speaking from a shop on the town’s main road. “A captain who extracts gold every day exchanges 5,000 or 6,000 dollars in cash, and asks a friend to convert it to USDT [a cryptocurrency] and send it to Puerto Ordaz,” he said.

According to witnesses, soldiers confiscated motorcycles and vehicles belonging to people with no ties to The System and spread fear across all the mining towns in southern Bolívar, about whether FANB would bomb all territories within the Mining Arc where armed groups operate, or the joint operation with the Americans would end in another massacre of workers by military forces. 

However, local residents confirmed that the intervention was limited to Las Claritas-Kilómetro 88. Meanwhile, in towns like El Dorado, Tumeremo, and El Callao, criminal gangs continue to reign, albeit more discreetly and without the brazen displays of the past.

Former Bolívar lawmaker Américo De Grazia claimed on social media that The System’s ringleaders had returned to their old territory, though locals dispute this. Yet De Grazia’s account is not far-fetched: locals told the ARI and Convoca team that some of The System’s bosses—including the men known as Juancho and Johan Petrica—had left Las Claritas a few days before the military incursion. Apparently, they had been tipped off and fled. They were spotted trying to lay low near the Brazilian border.

What does seem clear is that in the Las Claritas-Kilómetro 88, the military displaced the armed group, but in El Dorado and Guasipati, they share control with criminal mafias—albeit maintaining a lower profile to preserve appearances before the Venezuelan government’s new partners: American businesspeople.

The American footprint 

Five days after Maduro was taken away, Delcy Rodríguez announced a package of legislative amendments designed to appease Washington—such as a reformed mining law, whose latest version offers low taxes and numerous concessions to foreign capital that was previously unwelcome.

The new legislation, enacted in April, repealed the decree that had reserved the exploration and exploitation of gold and other strategic minerals for the State, paving the way for private and international companies to engage in these activities through concessions lasting up to 50 years.

Furthermore, it established special payments (up to 1% of gross production under the concession contract for the National Mining Fund and a royalty of up to 13% for the State), a tax of up to 6% regulated by the government, and incentives such as exemptions from the Large Assets Tax, as well as special contributions mandated by four other laws—including the Law on the Protection of Social Security Pensions—all aimed at benefiting the new companies operating in Venezuela’s mining sector.

Alongside the law’s approval, the United States also took action: in March, it issued licenses allowing American companies to purchase, transport, and resell Venezuelan gold. On September 2, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) expanded the scope of these licenses, authorizing US companies to participate in the export, sale, purchase, storage, transport, processing, and refining of minerals of Venezuelan origin, including gold. It also permitted the supply of specific goods and services for mineral operations, as well as the negotiation and execution of contracts within the mining sector.

This entire framework has enabled Rodríguez to consolidate her economic team within the government through the appointment of key officials—both civilian and military—to positions within the Mining Arc. Their key figures are positioned not only within the executive branch but also across the State-owned enterprises involved in the business, and among military personnel capable of guaranteeing gasoline supplies and mine operations.

The interviewees’ identities have been changed for their safety. This report was supported by the Pulitzer Center.

Text and photos: Lorena Meléndez | Coordination and editing: Ronna Rísquez | General direction: Milagros Salazar | Design and infographics: ET