Venezuela

Venezuela’s interim President Delcy Rodriguez took to the stage yesterday at the United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York City to deliver a rather bland speech, in which she thanked United States President Donald Trump for resuming “diplomatic relations and cooperation” with Venezuela.

This was a different vibe, to be sure, than the one she opted for at the same venue in September 2019, when, as vice president under Nicolas Maduro, she accused the US of perpetrating “economic terrorism” that did not require the use of bombs “but rather through banks and insurance companies”.

Denouncing the global superpower’s militarisation of international relations and punishment of millions of innocent people “in order to apply regime change doctrines and steal other nations’ resources”, the Rodriguez of 2019 went on to cite Venezuelan economic losses to the tune of $130bn between 2015 and 2018 alone on account of US sanctions.

She additionally offered her opinion that the domination of the US political system by “plutocratic minorities” made the country unqualified to impose its model on other countries.

Seven years later, US plutocracy is going strong with Trump at the helm – the same Trump alongside whom a grinning Rodriguez appeared in a photograph taken in New York on Tuesday, less than nine months after he oversaw regime change in Venezuela by kidnapping Maduro.

The kidnapped president is now also in New York, albeit in jail, and is scheduled to stand trial in June 2027. This despite his attempts to remind everyone that, as a sitting head of state, his prosecution in a foreign court contravenes international law.

Then again, abducting other countries’ presidents is also pretty glaringly illegal. But Trump has made it clear that he alone is in charge of deciding what is and is not permissible on any given day.

The abduction took place on January 3, when the US military launched air attacks on Venezuela, killing some 100 people and whisking Maduro and his wife away.

He is accused of an array of misdeeds, including being the leader of the “Cartel of the Suns” – which, mind you, does not actually exist – and engaging in “conspiracy to possess machineguns and destructive devices”.

This is quite the accusation coming from the country that just used all manner of destructive devices to bomb Venezuela and kill a bunch of people.

Anyway, bald-faced hypocrisy is nothing new in the land of the “plutocratic minorities”.

Now, the waning corporate media interest in Maduro’s fate amounts to another coup for US impunity, as folks go about more or less forgetting that there is a foreign head of state sitting in a Brooklyn prison.

But Maduro’s disappearance works out well for Rodriguez, as she goes about enabling the very theft of resources she once decried.

Rodriguez took the stage at the UN the day after Trump, who used the platform to pat himself on the back for the trampling of Venezuelan sovereignty that conveniently culminated in last month’s announcement from the White House of the “biggest oil deal in world history”, securing US majority control of more than 65 billion barrels of Venezuela’s proven oil reserves.

Speaking to his international audience, Trump boasted: “To the victor belong the spoils. You’ve all heard that.”

Never mind that you’re not technically supposed to admit that you attacked a country just to get its oil. (You’re also not, in polite company, supposed to threaten to annihilate Iran – another of Trump’s UN talking points.)

Since January, the US has lifted many coercive economic measures against Venezuela (including against Rodriguez herself), easing the brutal sanctions regime that as of 2020 was estimated to have already killed 100,000 Venezuelans, according to former UN independent expert Alfred-Maurice de Zayas.

But trading sanctions for de facto colonialism isn’t a great deal, either.

Meanwhile, Trump’s continued manic bombing of vessels in the Caribbean and Pacific, which a recent UN report warned may constitute crimes against humanity, suggests the US is nowhere near to kicking its old habit of terrorism – and is all the more reason that Rodriguez might have refrained from thanking the US leader for his “cooperation”.

As Gregory Wilpert, founder of the Venezuelanalysis website and author of Changing Venezuela by Taking Power, diplomatically put it to me: “One cannot help but wonder whether Delcy Rodriguez is over-complying with Trump in some aspects of her negotiations with him.”

Noting that Rodriguez is “in a highly vulnerable position”, Wilpert ran through a few of the options she faces, such as “the possibility that the Trump administration could treat her as it treated Maduro – by attempting to kidnap her – or as it treated Iran, by targeting the country’s highest levels of government”.

Or, Wilpert said, there is always the Cuba approach, which would entail “the kind of economic siege” that is undertaken “with the aim of starving an entire country”.

In her UN address, Rodriguez promised that Venezuela would hold elections at some unspecified point in time – not that the US, for its part, really cares about democracy as long as the right people are in power.

And although it’s still too early to tell, Rodriguez might just be one of those people.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Until now, Trump has acted in Venezuela with no congressional involvement. The administration decided to work in tandem with Delcy Rodríguez, secure the oil, and run a negotiation between the old remnants of an opposition-controlled National Assembly and the regime. This framework won’t be renegotiated if the Democrats win the House of Representatives on November 3, a goal they will likely achieve. But a new Congress can exert real legislative pressure to potentially change how it moves forward.

What the Democrats have done since Maduro’s ousting

Since January, the Dems’ first efforts were two resolutions, sponsored by Tim Kaine in the Senate and Jim McGovern in the House, about war powers and who may authorize force, not about what the Venezuelan process should become. Both were supported by a few Republican leaders and failed to pass.

On February 25, Rep. Jared Moskowitz introduced the Venezuela Democratic Transition Strategy Act. It required the Secretary of State to deliver a strategy within 180 days, covering the release of political prisoners, foreign influence and assistance, followed by annual reports. Democrat Jeanne Shaheen and Republican Ted Cruz also introduced a bipartisan resolution in the Senate regarding the transition in Venezuela.

None of Trump’s numerous executive actions have required a vote, ratification, or budget allocation in the Capitol. 

The initiatives by Democratic lawmakers have not aimed to reverse what happened on January 3rd, because the US cannot backtrack from the military incursion which meant, at least, Nicolás Maduro’s removal from power. What they are seeking, however, is the establishment of a plan that will lead to free elections and, in the long term, a genuine democratic transition. What is the Democrats’ position? They have maintained a stance of recognizing Edmundo González as president-elect and María Corina Machado as the leader of the opposition.

Besides, the impact of ICE and Border Patrol going after the Venezuelan community in the US has been repeatedly underlined by voices such as Rep. Debbie Wasserman-Schultz and Rep. Darren Soto, who filed a discharge petition on March 19^th to force a vote on the Venezuela TPS Act.

What won’t change?

The broader US policy.

The oil agreement allegedly signed by the Trump administration, the company Nabep, and the Rodríguez regime is a 25-year project across 17 fields. That deal will not be undone by letters or congressional hearings. Not even Democrats attacking Trump’s dealings with Rodríguez have offered legislation to end them so far. A Democratic House will not be able to reinstate TPS without the Senate and a presidential signature.

The administration has shown it can take action on Venezuela without congressional involvement. That’s what it did with the military incursion on January 3rd, the deportations after invoking the Alien Enemies Act, the termination of TPS and the humanitarian parole, the formal recognition of Delcy Rodríguez as interim president, the lifting of sanctions on Delcy and sectors of the economy, the opening of the Venezuelan market to US companies, the removal of Venezuela from the list of countries that have failed to cooperate in combating drug trafficking, and the informal meeting with Rodríguez in New York. None of those executive actions required a vote, ratification, or budget allocation in the Capitol. 

The only formal check Congress has is the War Powers Resolution, which has already failed twice, and Trump has promised to veto it if it ever reaches his desk. Should he do so, even with a Democratic majority in Congress, at least two-thirds of the vote is required to override a presidential veto. That threshold remains very difficult to reach. 

Oversight already began

The clearest preview of what the midterm election can change came this month. Reps. Robert Garcia, Gregory Meeks and Jared Huffman, the ranking Democrats on Oversight, Foreign Affairs and Natural Resources, wrote to Secretary Rubio and Attorney General Blanche regarding the oil deal. They question why Alejandro Betancourt, who has faced investigations into alleged PDVSA money laundering, is treated as a business partner. They also say the administration has given Congress scarce details on the management of at least $13 billion in Venezuelan oil revenues.

The only thing that might change with a majority in Congress is the ability to obtain information, because those who are currently in the minority on the committees would become their chairs.

This issue is important if we expect a shift in the Legislative Oversight Committee on Venezuela. García has been the leading Democratic representative in the Oversight Committee since June 2025 and is well-positioned to chair the committee and exercise subpoena power if the Democrats win in November. Although his plans do not explicitly mention Venezuela as a priority, nor does the issue appear on the legislative agenda of Hakeem Jeffries (House Minority Leader), the agreements being negotiated and signed with Venezuela, as well as the management of oil resources, could fit perfectly with the demand for accountability and transparency that are indeed part of his priorities.

What’s happening in Florida?

We can’t talk about what we expect in November without discussing what’s happening in Florida. Although the Venezuelan vote isn’t decisive for the state, the Latino vote does carry significant weight and, in this case, naturalized US citizens or their descendants will consider immigration policies, as well as their economic impact, and abuses by ICE when they cast their vote.

The changes to electoral maps pushed by Republicans could have unexpected consequences. Moskowitz is seeking reelection and is in a competitive but winnable race. Wasserman-Schultz is in a better position in CD 20. Meanwhile, Angie Nixon, the Democratic Senate candidate, has been outspoken in her criticism of Trump’s immigration policies, demanding an end to deportations and the reinstatement of TPS.

If we want to see results regarding Venezuela that benefit Venezuelans, we have to look at the situation from an American perspective.

On the other side of the aisle, Maria Elvira Salazar’s recent announcement came as a surprise to many this week. In it, the Republican congresswoman tells Trump that his immigration control measures have gone “too far,” noting that half of the people detained by ICE in July had no criminal record. In June, she urged Trump to halt deportations to Venezuela following the earthquakes. Her actions appear to be driven more by the latest polls than by a commitment to defending immigrants’ rights.

How could a Democratic majority help the Venezuelan people?

To be honest, the only thing that might change with a majority in Congress is the ability to obtain information, because those who are currently in the minority on the committees would become their chairs. “Who negotiated the agreement? Where will the revenue go? What is the strategy behind the negotiation?” These are some of the questions that might carry more weight in the Oversight Committee or the Foreign Affairs Committee if they were headed by a Democrat rather than someone from the ruling party.

Venezuela is neither the center of the world nor a priority for the Democratic Party. One might think that it would be “easier” for chavismo to deal with the Democrats. If we want to see results regarding Venezuela that benefit Venezuelans, we have to look at the situation from an American perspective. The military intervention by the US has already happened, and if the US controls much of Venezuelan politics, that isn’t going to change because of a shift in Congress.

Americans don’t necessarily care about Venezuela’s specific situation, but they do care that the president doesn’t have “superpowers.” In my opinion, this makes it possible for Democrats to use the Venezuela issue as a mechanism for congressional oversight and to seek alliances with non-“MAGA” Republicans to place limits on Trump.

US-led anti-cartel alliance backs sanctions against crime groups after Trump urges stronger action.

United States President Donald Trump has pledged to use “unmatched military might” against drug cartels in the Western Hemisphere during a meeting of the Washington-led Shield of the Americas coalition in New York City.

In a meeting with leaders and foreign ministers from the anti-cartel alliance, Trump on Tuesday urged member countries to join the US in targeting 24 criminal organisations, which he earlier described as the “ISIS of the Western Hemisphere”.

He said he was asking “all nations in the Shield of the Americas to formally designate narco-terrorists as common threats to stability and apply crushing sanctions” against all of the groups. The meeting took place on the sidelines of the annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York City.

The coalition’s 15 governments later issued a joint statement saying they intended to impose asset freezes and visa restrictions on members and supporters of the groups and to pursue criminal charges against them.

At the top of the list are two groups that have been declared “terrorist” organisations by Washington: Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) – one of Central America’s most powerful criminal gangs – and Tren de Aragua, a Venezuelan gang that is also active in Colombia, Peru and Chile.

The list also includes major Mexican cartels, Colombian armed groups such as the National Liberation Army, Brazil’s Primeiro Comando da Capital and Comando Vermelho groups, and Peru’s Shining Path.

Al Jazeera’s Alessandro Rampietti, reporting from Bogota, Colombia, said the statement was largely symbolic for now, because each country must follow its own legal procedures.

“For example, here in Colombia, it will require a law to pass in Congress. We understand that the government here has asked Congress to move forward in drafting such a law. So while the consequences may not be immediate, this is clearly an important step towards building what the US has been trying to do in Latin America [through] this alliance,” he added.

The coalition is made up of governments closely aligned with Trump, including Argentina, Ecuador and El Salvador, whose leaders he has praised or endorsed. Colombia and Peru joined after Trump-aligned presidents took office in recent months.

Brazil and Mexico have not joined.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who also attended, praised “the emergence of strong leaders who are committed to the challenge of taking on transnational terrorism”.

The gathering was the administration’s latest effort to rally the region behind a more aggressive approach to drug trafficking. Since returning to office last year, Trump has designated cartels as foreign terrorist organisations and ordered dozens of strikes on boats in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific that US officials say were carrying narcotics bound for the US.

The strikes have killed more than 223 people, and UN experts say they violate international law and could amount to crimes against humanity.

The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy, released late last year, laid out plans for a revamped Monroe Doctrine, the 19th-century policy asserting US primacy in the hemisphere that critics associate with decades of US intervention.

Trump has also spoken of retaking the Panama Canal and annexing Greenland and Canada. On Tuesday, he signed an agreement on Greenland that stopped short of his demand that the island become US territory.

The focus on the hemisphere has raised concerns across the region.

Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, in his UN speech, bristled ⁠at the approach, warning countries in Latin America and the Caribbean of “renewed hegemonic temptations”.

“Brazil is nobody’s back yard,” Lula said.

Caracas, September 21, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) –  Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez hosted Paraguayan counterpart Santiago Peña at the Miraflores Presidential Palace in Caracas on Saturday as the two South American nations relaunch bilateral diplomatic and consular relations.

The high-level working meeting reportedly focused on establishing a shared agenda centered on trade expansion, energy cooperation, consular assistance, and joint efforts to combat transnational organized crime.

The summit concluded with a joint statement announcing the renewed bilateral relations, signed by foreign ministers Félix Plasencia and Rubén Ramírez Lezcano for Venezuela and Paraguay, respectively.

Following the signing ceremony, Rodríguez and Peña expressed optimism regarding the reestablished cooperation.

“We are working together for a more integrated Paraguay,” Peña declared in a press conference, emphasizing that the dialogue was focused on “the well-being of citizens” from both countries.

For her part, Rodríguez claimed the accord did justice to principles of sovereignty, dialogue, and South American integration in Venezuela’s foreign policy.

“Venezuela continues to advance a sovereign diplomacy of peace, rooted in mutual respect, self-determination, and constructive dialogue among our nations,” she stated. “This meeting opens a new stage of cooperation aimed at addressing shared challenges and serving the concrete interests of both our peoples.”

The Caracas meeting reversed years of political friction and diplomatic tensions between the two nations. Bilateral ties were initially severed in January 2019 under former Paraguayan President Mario Abdo Benítez, who aligned Asunción with Washington’s regime-change strategy by recognizing opposition figure Juan Guaidó’s self-proclaimed “interim government.”

Relations experienced a brief thaw in late 2023 under Peña’s incoming administration before breaking down again in January 2025. The Venezuelan government formally severed diplomatic channels after Peña supported far-right opposition candidate Edmundo González’s victory claim in the July 2024 Venezuelan presidential elections. The Paraguayan president further backed Venezuelan anti-government forces by attending María Corina Machado’s Nobel Peace Prize ceremony in December 2025.

A central point on the reopened diplomatic agenda was the resolution of a long-standing debt owed by Paraguayan state oil company Petróleos Paraguayos (Petropar) to Venezuela’s state energy company, Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA).

The financial dispute stems from fuel shipments received by Petropar under the 2004 Caracas Energy Accord, an energy integration initiative launched under President Hugo Chávez to provide favorable financing conditions for oil imports across Latin America and the Caribbean. Paraguay currently maintains an outstanding principal debt estimated at approximately US $300 million.

Addressing the issue ahead of the summit, Paraguayan Foreign Minister Rubén Ramírez Lezcano acknowledged the core obligation but highlighted technical disagreements regarding accumulated interest calculations.

“The differential of that debt is linked to interest that applies outside the commercial agreement that exists with that country,” Ramírez explained during a press conference last week, noting that the specific arbitration over interest rates remains before the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris.

The resolution of the debt has been paralyzed for years primarily due to the severing of diplomatic ties, compounded by unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States against PDVSA.

With diplomatic channels now reopened, both governments signaled their intention to structure a viable settlement mechanism outside of imperial financial restrictions.

Since the January 3 US military strikes and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro, the acting Rodríguez government has aligned its foreign policy with Washington, mending or expanding ties with US partners in Latin America and beyond while scaling back support for long-term allies such as Cuba and Iran.

Following Saturday’s summit in Caracas, Acting President Rodríguez departed Venezuela for New York City, where she will attend the 81st Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) this week.

According to Reuters, Rodríguez is slated to hold discussions on energy and mining agreements, as well as Venezuela’s ongoing debt restructuring process. 

On Monday, the Venezuelan acting president met with IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva, though no details of the talks were disclosed. Caracas has sought to unblock around $4.5 billion in IMF-issued Special Drawing Rights (SDR) for recovery efforts following the June 24 double earthquake.

Likewise on Monday, Rodríguez held talks with World Bank President Ajay Banga.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Lisbon, Portugal.

Lisbon, Portugal, September 17, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Continental Resources, a firm owned by billionaire and Trump donor Harold Hamm, struck a deal on Wednesday to exploit one of Venezuela’s largest oilfields.

Under the agreement with Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA, Continental will receive a long-term concession with “100 percent working interest” for the 500 square-kilometer Ayacucho 2 block in Venezuela’s Orinoco Oil Belt. The block contains an estimated 30 billion barrels of extra-heavy crude.

“Continental was built to recognize great resource opportunities and have the conviction to pursue them,” Hamm told Fox News, vowing that the deal would take his company to an “entirely new level.”

For her part, Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez claimed that the agreement would “strengthen [Venezuelan] oil production” and “create opportunities for economic growth.”

Hamm and PDVSA Vice President Jovanny Martinez signed the contract in Houston on the sidelines of the G20 energy summit. Martínez and Oil Minister Paula Henao attended the conference to pitch investment opportunities in Venezuela’s oil and gas sector.

PDVSA had previously assigned the Ayacucho 2 block to Chinese private firm Anhui Guangda in 2025. However, no information on investments or output were publicly disclosed, while Venezuelan authorities have not justified rescinding the contract with Anhui.

US government-controlled corporation NABEP, which recently received long-term concessions to 17 major Venezuelan oilfields containing 65 billion barrels in reserves, will also take over projects formerly run by Chinese enterprises, including state-owned CNPC. Beijing has called for its investments and interests in Venezuela to be respected.

Hamm was one of the corporate executives present at the White House on January 9, when Trump announced that Washington would control Venezuela’s oil industry and called on Western majors to invest. Since the January 3 US attacks and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro, the White House has managed the South American country’s crude export revenues.

The White House has also backed Venezuelan authorities’ pro-business overhaul of the energy sector while issuing sanctions exemptions to select US-aligned corporations. Chevron, Shell, and Eni are among the companies that have signed new contracts or renegotiated existing ones in recent months.

According to Bloomberg, ExxonMobil is in advanced talks to return to the Caribbean country after a litigious past. The energy giant is negotiating rights to four major oilfields in the Orinoco Oil Belt, two of which it previously owned before they were nationalized by former President Hugo Chávez.

In the 2000s, the Texas-based corporation refused to comply with reforms implemented to assert state sovereignty over the oil industry. ExxonMobil refused compensation offers and pursued international arbitration after its assets were nationalized. The company received an arbitration award significantly below its demands. 

ExxonMobil was additionally denounced repeatedly by Caracas after it spearheaded offshore drilling projects in the territorial waters of the disputed Essequibo Strip.

On Wednesday, Venezuelan authorities likewise inked a 20-year agreement with Florida-based Denarius Holding Group, controlled by Turkish energy group Çan2 Termik. Denarius is taking over the Petrokariña project in Anzoátegui state, which contains 10 oilfields producing a variety of crude types.

Heeney Capital receives gold mine concession

In parallel to its oil opening, Venezuelan authorities have also fast-tracked reforms opening the country’s mining sector to multinational corporations.

On Wednesday, New York-based Heeney Capital and commodities trader Mercuria Energy received a 30-year concession to operate the Chocó 10 mine in Bolívar State. The project holds considerable gold deposits and was run by Rusoro Mining in the 2000s before being nationalized by the Chávez government.

Heeney and Mercuria pledged US $1 billion in initial investment in the Chocó project. The two firms had struck a previous agreement with Caracas to purchase and trade Venezuelan minerals and other commodities.

One of Heeney’s co-founders, Sean Pi, signed the deal at the presidential palace in May and praised Trump’s “leadership” in defending US access to mining resources abroad. Pi has endorsed legislative initiatives deregulating and streamlining mining projects to bolster the US supply of critical minerals.

Under the trading agreement, Heeney and Mercuria are reportedly preparing to ship 15,000 metric tons of Venezuelan aluminum to the US. The corporate partners are likewise seeking to take over VENALUM, Venezuela’s biggest aluminum smelter. Glencore, an Anglo-Swiss mining and trading multinational, is also interested in VENALUM, according to reports.

Venezuelan authorities have not commented on the negotiations for the aluminum smelter. In April, Rodríguez appointed a commission to evaluate privatization of “non-strategic” state assets.

The Trump administration has identified securing access to Venezuelan mineral riches as a key national interest and is reportedly preparing an executive order to boost US corporate participation in Venezuelan mining projects.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Philadelphia, USA.

Caracas, September 16, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuela and the United Kingdom have announced a formal decision to upgrade their diplomatic relations and to re-establish full ambassadorial representation.

London formally presented its policy shift on September 15 in a missive to Parliament through coordinated statements by Minister for Latin America Chris Elmore in the House of Commons and Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State Lord Wood of Anfield in the House of Lords.

In the statements, the cabinet members framed the “diplomatic upgrade” around supporting a “democratic transition” while pursuing pragmatic bilateral engagement with the South American country.

“Developments in Venezuela since 3 January have created an important opportunity for the international community to support the restoration of democracy,” the statement read. “Working closely with the United States and with international partners, the UK considers that this moment calls for pragmatic engagement to help advance a credible transition and to encourage further reforms.”

The communiqué added that London and Caracas “have agreed our intention to upgrade our representation to Ambassador,” emphasizing that the step aims to deepen engagement with Venezuelan authorities and enhance support for British corporate and trade interests.

The Venezuelan government welcomed London’s decision. In an official communication published on Tuesday, the government led by Acting President Delcy Rodriguez celebrated the upgrade in diplomatic status as a positive step toward normalization.

Venezuelan officials stressed that the latest decision should pave the way for the full “sovereign management of the Venezuelan people’s resources,” referencing state assets frozen in British financial institutions.

National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez and Foreign Minister Félix Plasencia flew to London and held a meeting on Tuesday with Harriet Thompson, the British Foreign Office’s Director for the Americas.

Following the discussions, Rodríguez highlighted progress in multi-sectoral talks and economic outlooks. 

“We shared Venezuela’s position regarding political and social dialogue, as well as the progress made regarding oil and gas investments, and how this will translate into significant and rapid economic growth for Venezuela,” he said in a message published on social media.

Rodríguez added that the talks aimed at promoting national peace and political reconciliation, labeling them as “good news for our country and our people.”

Bilateral relations between London and Caracas had been severed for years following former UK Prime Minister Theresa May’s decision in 2019 to follow Washington in recognizing opposition figure Juan Guaidó’s self-proclaimed “interim government.”

That policy led to a protracted legal battle over 31 tons of Venezuelan gold reserves stored in the Bank of England, with successive British governments refusing to return them to Caracas. The reserves are currently valued at over US $4 billion.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Venezuelan authorities attempted to retrieve the gold through international legal channels, offering to transfer the funds directly to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to purchase emergency medical supplies and food.

However, British courts repeatedly rejected the legal challenges from the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV), citing No. 10’s political recognition of the opposition parallel administration.

Following renewed political talks in August and September, a Venezuelan government delegation and representatives of the defunct, opposition-controlled 2015 National Assembly agreed to request the release of the UK-held gold reserves under US Treasury Department control and oversight.

According to opposition dialogue delegates, the 31 tons of gold will be transferred into a specialized US Treasury bank account and subjected to external audits by foreign accounting firms before being released.

The funds are reportedly earmarked for housing, healthcare, and infrastructure recovery in the wake of the June 24 double earthquake that left over 6,500 people dead across Venezuela.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Lisbon, Portugal.

A new burger joint in La Castellana, an affluent neighborhood in eastern Caracas. Photo: Santiago Bernal.

Any Venezuelan can tell you how unpredictable our country is. This uncertainty, almost idiosyncratic to Venezuela’s national identity, can be felt before you even arrive. You never really know what awaits you when visiting from abroad, no matter how many times you have made the trip before.

This trip, my first since Maduro was captured by US forces in January and less than two months after the deadly earthquakes that devastated parts of the country in June, was certainly unusual from the beginning.

I arrived in Valencia, a city with a small airport poorly equipped to handle the hundreds of passengers diverted from Maiquetía International Airport, the country’s largest. To reach my hometown of Mérida, I had to take a flight departing from another city, Maracay, because Valencia’s airport was too crowded with international flights to accommodate additional domestic routes. The flight departed not from a conventional commercial terminal, but from a small facility inside Venezuela’s largest Air Force base, surrounded by some of the Russian anti-aircraft equipment and fighter jets that had spectacularly failed to prevent Maduro’s extraction. The check-in process had to be done in a mall in the city, a few kilometers away from the base, to which we were transported in a small shuttle bus. The process was surprisingly efficient.

The road between El Vigía’s airport, which serves Mérida, and the city was in better condition than I expected, although the scars of decades of underinvestment remained clearly visible. In some places, sections of road that had collapsed in landslides more than two years ago were still buried under rubble.

I arrived in Caracas after a drive in a taxi equipped with a Starlink antenna, a gadget that until not too long ago could land you in prison.

As we approached Mérida, I spotted a car-carrying truck filled with brand-new Toyota models.

I could not remember the last time I had seen one of those while living in Venezuela. Maybe 15 years ago? In any case, what would be an unremarkable sight in most countries had become extremely rare in Mérida, a state whose economy depends heavily on its university and small-scale tourism, two sectors devastated by Venezuela’s decade-long economic crisis.

After arriving in Mérida, I realized that the car carrier was serving one of several car dealerships that seemed to have resurfaced across the city, all filled with new vehicles. They were also visible on the streets: hundreds of new Chinese models, alongside smaller numbers of Japanese, Korean, and American cars, were driving around Mérida for the first time I could recall in years.

This may sound banal or superficial, but Venezuela’s aging car fleet had long served as a stark reminder of the country’s economic demise. Between 2014 and 2018, car sales collapsed, reaching a historic low of just 2,000 vehicles sold nationwide in 2018. Seeing a model manufactured after the early 2010s outside Caracas had become highly unusual.

The situation has changed since 2025, when more than 38,000 cars were reportedly sold across the country. That remains a fraction of the more than 300,000 vehicles sold in pre-crisis 2007, at the height of Hugo Chávez’s oil boom, but it is enough to make a noticeable difference.

The return of (limited) consumerism

Mérida’s urban landscape has also been transformed by the hundreds of new stores that have opened across a city where economic stagnation and widespread power outages forced countless businesses to close over the past decade. The same phenomenon was evident in Caracas, where I arrived after yet another tour through Maracay’s Air Force base, and after a drive in a taxi equipped with a Starlink antenna, a gadget that until not too long ago could land you in prison and can now be purchased online through different national authorized distributors.

Beyond new cars, large sections of the city, including old Chacao in Caracas’s affluent east, appear to be undergoing an incipient but rapid process of gentrification, reminiscent in some ways of iconic European neighborhoods such as Gràcia in Barcelona, Ruzafa in Valencia (the Spanish one), or Shoreditch in London.

Chacao’s Bolívar Square is marked by a striking contrast. Its 18th-century church still bears large cracks caused by the earthquakes, while the surrounding streets are now filled with lively atmospheric restaurants and cafés that would not look out of place in Lisbon or Barcelona, and fitted with contactless payment systems charging prices that match those of many large European cities.

These businesses serve a small but very real segment of the Venezuelan population that can afford them. That group is not necessarily limited to enchufados.

This raises an obvious question: how can these businesses be profitable in a country where typical salaries remain around $220–280 a month, less than a tenth of the already meager average European salary, and where living what might be considered a relatively normal life has been estimated to cost around at least $800–1,000 a month per person?

The answer is that these businesses serve a small but very real segment of the Venezuelan population that can afford them. That group is not necessarily limited to enchufados, people who have enriched themselves through their connections to government corruption. Exact figures are difficult to establish, but managers in private companies can reportedly earn around $1,200 a month, while senior professionals in some sectors, including medicine, can make several thousand dollars a month in private practice, depending on their specialization.

The widespread adoption of Cashea, a fintech company offering consumers interest-free microcredit for everyday purchases, has also increased the purchasing power of a broader segment of the population. Cashea’s success is visible not only in Wall Street, but also in its extraordinary penetration of everyday commerce. Its recognizable yellow logo now signals that the service is accepted in businesses ranging from large clothing stores in shopping malls to small kiosks, and funerary homes.

You can even use Cashea to pay for a ride with Yummy, Venezuela’s equivalent of Uber.

These businesses still operate within a heavily dysfunctional financial system, distorted by an artificially low exchange rate and an economy constrained by high inflation and low productivity. Yet they serve a segment of the population that is slowly turning into a small, resurgent middle class. That group is helping drive growth in specific sectors, most notably real estate, which has reportedly expanded by around 30 percent in 2026.

This modest revitalization has coincided with an important reduction in street violence. Today, around 60 percent of Venezuelans report feeling safe walking at night, according to Gallup, something difficult to imagine only a few years ago. This is one factor helping explain the revival of nightlife in places such as Chacao, Caracas’ historical center and, to a lesser extent, parts of Mérida.

A similar transformation was evident in Margarita Island, a place I had not visited in almost two decades.

Most of these changes began before the US intervention in Venezuela. But they appear to have accelerated and spread in the months following Maduro’s capture.

Known as the “Pearl of the Caribbean,” Margarita’s tropical beaches, tax-free stores and fascinating history attracted large numbers of European and Latin American as well as Venezuelan tourists during the 1990s and early 2000s. Some of my own fondest childhood memories are, in fact, on the island.

That changed dramatically after 2014, as Venezuela’s political, economic, and public-service crises deepened, leaving the island in a state of abandonment.

Today, Margarita is experiencing a modest but noticeable revival in domestic and international tourism compared with the previous decade. This has been partly fueled by significant investment from domestic and international hotel chains, which now offer a wide range of accommodation, from relatively affordable all-inclusive packages to high-end luxury experiences.

After several years in which the island received mostly Russian and Polish tourists, Margarita is once again welcoming growing numbers of international visitors, particularly from Colombia, and Brazil. Many tourism operators are already looking forward to the possible return of American visitors in the short to medium term.

Less than 15 minutes from the mall in Pampatar, I also visited a community that has gone more than six months without running water.

People I spoke to said Margarita feels more alive and prosperous than it did between 2016 and 2019, the worst years of Venezuela’s crisis, even if the situation remains vastly different from the island’s golden age thirty years ago.

Cities such as Pampatar and Porlamar are experiencing a revival similar to what I saw in Mérida and Caracas, with new restaurants and stores filled with customers. In Pampatar, I visited what was probably one of the largest and most modern shopping malls I have ever seen, comparable to those in Miami or Madrid, filled with stores selling American and European brands whose prices I often found prohibitive even by European standards.

Most of these changes began before the US intervention in Venezuela. But they appear to have accelerated and spread in the months following Maduro’s capture, as the idea that something resembling a normal life might again be possible seems to be taking hold in some.

There is, however, a large elephant in the room. Improvements remain largely cosmetic and circumscribed to a small part of the population.

Far from fixed

On the other side of the Avila, the mountain that separates Caracas’ gentrified neighborhoods from the Caribbean sea, over 12,000 people who lost their homes in the earthquakes wait for solutions in dozens of temporary camps erected among the ruins of their apartments.

But the limitations of this apparent resurgence are perhaps most obvious in the dismal state of public services. Hours-long power outages were common in Mérida and Caracas throughout my stay. Less than 15 minutes from the mall in Pampatar, I also visited a community that has gone more than six months without running water. Its residents make a living largely by collecting and selling salt from the island’s salt flats, with virtually no gear, or protection from the region’s unrelenting weather. 

Businesses, hotels, and even many households have adapted to what are, in practice, nonexistent public services. Solar panels, batteries, and water tanks allow those who can afford them to maintain a large degree of independence from the State-provided services.

For most Venezuelans, however, these solutions remain unaffordable.

The same is true for healthcare and education. Both systems remain crippled by chronic underinvestment and neglect. The Venezuelan public health system remains severely understaffed and unable to provide adequate services to most of the population, while out-of-pocket health costs represent a large proportion of total health expenditure and less than 10% of the population can afford private insurance. In terms of education, despite a recent increase in school enrollment, the number of students has fallen by almost 2.8 million compared with figures reported in January 2024, as large numbers of high-school students continue to leave their studies to work.

Venezuela is far from fixed, and it will never truly be as long as chavismo remains in power. But it is certainly not the same country I left in 2019, nor the same country it was before January 3.

Many of the people I spoke to still want to leave, especially now that expectations of a quick transition to democracy have been tampered by the warm relationship of the Trump administration with Delcy Rodriguez. Others have decided that a somewhat normal life in Venezuela is once again possible and that, despite its uncertainties, it may be preferable to the immense challenge of migration in an increasingly hostile world.

Yes, these improvements are fragile, uncertain, and profoundly unequal. They exclude most of the country. But they are also an opportunity: Not only for some to live a relatively normal, easier life. But also a chance to build on whatever progress has been made and keep pushing towards the deep institutional and political reforms that only a democratically elected government can implement.

Caracas, September 16, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Former Venezuelan Industry Minister and government envoy Alex Saab pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering and illicit financial transactions after reaching a plea deal with US prosecutors in a federal court in Miami.

Appearing before the US District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Saab changed his previous “not guilty” plea, entered on July 24, during a hearing before Judge Kathleen M. Williams. “Guilty, Your Honor,” the 54-year-old businessman stated during Tuesday’s session.

In his guilty plea, Saab admitted to participating, alongside “high-ranking officials” in the Nicolás Maduro government, in an “illegal scheme” involving bribes and illicit payments linked to the CLAP subsidized food program. The money allegedly obtained through the scheme was wired through accounts located in South Florida.

In the 12-page plea agreement, Saab named Socialist Party (PSUV) lawmaker José Gregorio Vielma Mora, who was governor of Táchira state at the time, as an alleged accomplice, alongside Colombian nationals Álvaro Pulido Vargas, Emmanuel Enrique Rubio González, and Carlos Rolando Lizcano. 

However, he also referred to two other individuals as “co-defendant 1” and “co-defendant 3.” Their identities have not been publicly disclosed by US prosecutors.

Saab also agreed to “fully cooperate” with the US Department of Justice (DOJ) by providing “truthful and complete information and testimony, and producing documents, records, and other evidence” in “any trial or judicial proceeding” requested by the US government.

He likewise agreed that he would not “protect any person or entity through false information or omission,” nor falsely implicate “any person or entity.”

The Colombian-born businessman also agreed to surrender US $195 million, along with properties and assets derived from the alleged crimes, to prosecutors. The government gave him 14 days to disclose all assets related to the offenses.

Saab, who stated that he suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder and takes antidepressants every night to sleep, could face a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison, as well as a $500,000 fine.

Nevertheless, prosecutors reportedly agreed to recommend a reduced sentence if his cooperation against the other defendants in the case proves valuable. His sentencing hearing has not been scheduled but is expected to take place in January.

The DOJ warned that it “reserves the right to evaluate the nature and extent of the defendant’s cooperation,” as well as the “quality and significance” of the information provided for the relevant investigations.

The agreement does not publicly specify which investigations Saab will be required to assist with or which other Venezuelan officials the US Justice Department is targeting. With Saab having been a key figure for Caracas to circumvent US economic sanctions, analysts have speculated that he could be a witness in the case against President Nicolás Maduro.

Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores are facing charges, including drug trafficking conspiracy, after being kidnapped by US special forces on January 3.

The current case is the second criminal prosecution Saab has faced in the United States. In 2020, when traveling as a Venezuelan government envoy, he was arrested in Cape Verde during a refueling stop and subsequently extradited to the United States. He was on trial for separate money laundering accusations.

However, in December 2023, then-President Joe Biden granted Saab a pardon as part of a prisoner exchange between the United States and Venezuela. Saab returned to Caracas and joined the government as minister of industry. Following Maduro’s kidnapping, Acting President Delcy Rodríguez removed the former envoy from the cabinet in January before authorities handed him over to US agencies in May.

Venezuelan high-ranking officials claimed that Saab had committed fraud in acquiring Venezuelan citizenship and vowed to present evidence of his alleged long-term cooperation with US agencies, but no further details have been released to date.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Lisbon, Portugal.

Prosecutors said that the group worked on behalf of Russian intelligence services to carry out attacks and murders around the world.

Five people have been charged over alleged Russian intelligence-linked plots involving surveillance, recruitment and planned killings, according to an indictment unsealed by the United States Department of Justice.

Prosecutors said on Tuesday that the group worked on behalf of Russian intelligence services to carry out attacks and murders internationally, including within the US, and that all five remain at large.

The defendants were identified as Russian national Yuri Khrameev, 63, his son Kirill Khrameev, 27, Cubans Oemis Romagoza Durruthy and Yaidel Delgado Suarez, both 35, and 22-year-old Venezuelan Angel Eduardo Castro.

All five were charged with conspiring to finance terrorism, while Khrameev, Suarez and Castro face additional charges of conspiring to commit murder for hire.

At a news conference, Attorney General Todd Blanche said the plots included attempts to kill a Russian dissident believed to be living in the Washington, DC area.

Justice Department officials said the network had recruited several people in the US to carry out surveillance on Russian dissidents, targeting individuals both domestically and in Lithuania.

In one instance, a recruit was reportedly promised $40,000 to make a US-based target “disappear”. A separate recruit was allegedly offered $25,000 the previous year to kill someone in Lithuania.

Russia’s embassy in the US has not commented on the case. Moscow has consistently rejected accusations that it has orchestrated assassination operations on foreign soil, including in the US.

Caracas, September 14, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The US Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Foreign Agricultural Service announced a package of measures to boost US agricultural exports to Venezuela amid growing concerns about the South American country’s national production.

According to the USDA, the plan will facilitate Venezuelan corporations’ purchase of US food products and agricultural commodities through government-backed credit and will include the delivery of food assistance and training for Venezuelan technicians.

“The Trump administration is committed to Venezuela’s economic prosperity, and USDA is leveraging its export financing, market development programs, technical scholarships, and food assistance initiatives to address this situation,” said Under Secretary for Trade and Foreign Agricultural Affairs Luke J. Lindberg.

Lindberg added that he “looks forward to positioning US agriculture to help meet needs and build lasting trade relationships.” The US official visited Venezuela as part of an official delegation in early July.

Washington’s credit program for food exports will be provided through the reactivation of the GSM-102 guarantee program. The mechanism offers guarantees to exporters that reduce the risk for financial institutions backing the transactions in case importers fail to meet their commitments. 

The Agriculture Department also announced that it will lift restrictions to allow foreign banks to back Venezuela-related transactions.

A USDA report had already estimated that Venezuela would need to import 1.5 million metric tons of wheat during the 2026-2027 marketing year. Corn and soybeans are likewise identified as key staples to be exported to the Caribbean nation. The latest initiative 

The Trump administration also lifted restrictions under its Feed the Future Agricultural Resilience Mission Initiative and plans to include Venezuela in a regional agribusiness trade mission scheduled for early 2027.

A bigger influx of US farm products will place an additional strain on Venezuelan food production, with local campesinos increasingly protesting against imports from agribusiness corporations that seek to drive crop prices down.

On September 9, rice growers from Guárico and nearby states organized a “tractorazo,” blocking a major highway in Calabozo with trucks and tractors to demand that the government halt the entry of imported rice during the domestic harvest season and ensure that agroindustrial companies adhere to established prices.

Protesters complained that imports from countries where food production is subsidized, including the US, create unfair competition and risk driving Venezuelan campesinos bankrupt. The latest mobilization was sparked by the reported arrival of a shipment of 355 thousand tons of rice, more than half of the Venezuelan production in 2025. 

Rural organizations have likewise denounced the exoneration of tariffs and import taxes as another factor putting national production at a disadvantage. Venezuelan authorities, including the National Assembly and the Agriculture Ministry, have vowed to review the import issue but have offered no measures to date.

In the Calabozo protest, producers denounced that imported rice had saturated silos and storage facilities during the 2025-2026 winter-summer crop cycle, forcing them to sell below production cost or lose their crops altogether. Demonstrators demanded a $0.25-per-kilogram subsidy from the state to compensate for the losses incurred and vowed to take the protests to Caracas if they receive no response from authorities.

The September 9 “tractorazo” was the latest in a series of mobilizations in recent months in Venezuela’s main agricultural states. Rice growers have complained about high fuel and input costs and urged the government to establish and enforce fair crop prices. 

According to agriculture lobby FEDEAGRO, more than 2.2 million metric tons of white corn, yellow corn, and rice have entered the country so far in 2026, more than triple the recent combined high of 709,000 metric tons in 2023.

“We cannot continue depending on a neighbor’s pantry. That is a failure. In Venezuela, we have the land, a committed agricultural sector, and people investing in farming, but excessive imports place us at a dramatic disadvantage,” stressed FEDEAGRO President Osman Quero.

Quero stressed that foreign producers have access to credit programs, fuel and fertilizer subsidies, and better infrastructure, while Venezuelan farmers face inflation and a lack of financing programs.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Lisbon, Portugal.

Art as propaganda

Chavez’s eyes still gaze from walls across Caracas. So too do the eyes of other figures, like Maduro and independence leader Simon Bolivar. Some images are faded. Others are accompanied by slogans like “To doubt is treason”.

Forastero has worked on government projects, including under Rodriguez. But he is critical of some of the newer images. He remembers a time when he painted murals of Chavez playing with children or riding a bicycle, not slogans.

“When Chavez was alive, people painted Chavez because we loved him very much. It’s as simple as that,” he said.

In recent decades, he argues that Venezuela’s public art has fallen increasingly under government control, with murals commissioned to carry explicitly political messages.

“Muralism is a story told on a wall,” Forastero said. “What we really see on the walls now are propaganda posters. I’m a chavista, and I’m disgusted by it.”

Still, the removal of the artwork is another form of propaganda, in Forastero’s eyes. He believes the Rodriguez government is seeking to project a more “neutral” appearance to better appeal to the US.

He also accuses Rodriguez of abandoning ideals key to the chavismo movement: namely, anti-imperialism and revolution. He pointed to the US’s role in shaping Venezuelan policy.

“The United States is forcing our government to behave this way,” Forastero said.

Rafael Araujo, a Venezuelan activist, has a different view of the changing landscape.

To him, there was something “jarring” about seeing chavista figures plastered across city walls, especially the leaders who have caused the country so much pain.

During their time in power, Chavez and Maduro both faced allegations of overseeing human rights abuses, including through the violent suppression of dissent. Venezuela’s last two presidential elections have been widely denounced as illegitimate.

Known in Caracas as Senor Papagayo, Araujo has used colourful, handmade kites to protest against government violence and economic policy.

He sees the Chavez murals as a form of oppression, an ever-visible reminder of a repressive government apparatus.

His kites are a way of sending a different message. His favourite carries aloft a single word: “Freedom”.

“Freedom is what all countries need. Democracy is the most balanced system a citizen can live under,” Araujo said.

Caracas, September 11, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuela’s oil industry recovery has stagnated in recent months, notwithstanding pro-business reforms and rising global prices.

OPEC’s latest monthly report placed the Caribbean nation’s August production at 1.145 million barrels per day (bpd), up 23,000 bpd from the previous month, according to secondary sources.

Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA reported an August output of 1.201 million bpd, virtually unchanged from July. Direct and secondary measurements have differed over time due to disagreements over the inclusion of condensates and natural gas liquids.

The strong first-trimester recovery that followed Washington’s lifting of its naval blockade petered out by mid-year. Since May, output has grown by only 7 percent despite the acting Delcy Rodríguez government conducting a pro-investor overhaul of hydrocarbon legislation and signing deals with several multinational corporations.

Since the January 3 US military strikes and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro, the Trump White House has seized control over Venezuela’s energy sector. Venezuelan crude export revenues are currently deposited in a US Treasury account, an arrangement confirmed by PDVSA President Héctor Obregón, before US officials decide when and how much of the proceeds should be returned to Caracas.

Washington and Caracas recently announced a major oil deal that will further boost US access to Venezuelan hydrocarbons under favorable conditions. The acting Rodríguez government has granted long-term concessions of 17 prime oilfields, holding 65 billion barrels of proven reserves, to US-controlled NABEP, a company led by Venezuelan oil mogul Alejandro Betancourt.

The oilfields transferred to NABEP, several of which were previously run by joint ventures between PDVSA and Chinese partners, are split among extra-heavy-crude projects in the Orinoco Oil Belt and mature light- and medium-crude ones in the Lake Maracaibo basin. Production in the latter can be ramped up faster as Trump seeks to replenish the US strategic reserve.

After initially hailing the deal as “the biggest in history,” US officials have dampened expectations, lowering a US $100 billion investment pledge to “over $10 billion.” Caracas and Washington announced a 1.5 million bpd target, but NABEP disclosed to Bloomberg only a modest projected increase in the near future.

Venezuela’s loss of sovereignty over its flagship industry has prevented the country from reaping the benefits from surging global energy prices, with the Brent benchmark surpassing $100 per barrel for the first time in four months this week. The Trump administration has sought to leverage its long-term access to Venezuelan oil resources to minimize the fallout from the interrupted traffic through the Strait of Hormuz resulting from its war on Iran.

Since January, Trump officials have worked closely with the Rodríguez administration to grant decades-long energy concessions to Western corporate players and most recently local Latin American conglomerates such as Colombia’s Gilinski Group. 

On September 4, Acting President Rodríguez signed a 25-year deal granting a concession of the heavy crude Bare block to GeoPark, a company belonging to Gilinski. Previously operated by PDVSA, Bare was one of the most productive fields in the Orinoco Oil Belt, with output surpassing 100,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 2011.

At a ceremony in Caracas, Colombian banking mogul Jaime Gilinski thanked Rodríguez for the confidence in awarding a major oilfield to his conglomerate. GeoPark set an 85,000 bpd target and vowed to invest more than $300 million.

The Gilinski Group began in manufacturing before expanding into finance, purchasing multiple Colombian banks and later acquiring positions in other Latin American countries, the US, and Italy. Investigations have implicated the Gilinski Group in parallel banking and tax evasion, including being named in the 2021 Pandora Papers leak alongside other leading members of the Colombian elite. The conglomerate has also ventured into other sectors such as food and media, with Jaime Gilinski currently the richest man in Colombia according to Forbes.

Of Lithuanian-Jewish descent, the Gilinski family is additionally known for its close ties to Israel. Jaime Gilinski’s father, Isaac, served as ambassador to Tel Aviv in 2010-2013, and his sister, Tania, was recently appointed to the same post by Colombian President Abelardo de la Espriella. Jaime’s son, Gabriel, traveled to Tel Aviv in 2025, meeting Prime Minister Netanyahu and evaluating business opportunities between Israeli and Colombian firms.

Edited and with additional reporting by Lucas Koerner in Philadelphia, USA.

Venezuela’s former first lady, Cilia Flores de Maduro, has asked a judge to release her from federal detention in the United States, citing a worsening heart condition.

In an application for pre-trial release on Wednesday, her legal team asked for the court to allow Flores to await trial under home confinement in Manhattan.

It described her declining health since US military operation on January 3 that resulted in her abduction from Caracas and imprisonment in New York, as well as that of her husband, former Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro.

“Prior to the United States’ military invasion of Venezuela, Ms. Flores de Maduro was physically healthy and took no ongoing medication, other than a monthly injection to help control her mitral valve prolapse,” the legal filing said.

“Now she is prescribed four medications, maintains nitroglycerin by her side in the event of a potential heart attack, and grapples with the continued medical advice suggesting coronary exploration and surgery.”

Flores was a prominent figure in her husband’s government, serving as first lady since his inauguration in 2013.

Prior to Maduro’s first inauguration, she was also a leading member of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), the country’s dominant political movement, leading the National Assembly for more than four years.

But Maduro had long clashed with the administration of US President Donald Trump, who accused Venezuela of sending drug-traffickers into the US. Both Maduro and Flores have also faced allegations of participating in human rights abuses, including the violent suppression of political dissent.

After launching a one-day military operation to abduct Maduro and Flores, the Trump administration charged them both with drug- and weapons-related charges. They are currently awaiting trial in New York City.

But Flores’s health has been in doubt since her forced removal from Venezuela, according to her legal team.

After consulting outside medical experts, Flores’s lawyers said they believe she may have suffered a minor heart attack on July 29 while in US custody.

They also questioned whether she was receiving the appropriate medical care for her mitral valve prolapse, a condition affecting one of the heart’s valves.

Since her imprisonment, her lawyers said Flores has not received the monthly injection she needs to manage the condition.

Instead, she has reportedly been prescribed baby aspirin, a statin, diltiazem and nitroglycerin to use when she experiences chest pain.

Doctors have recommended that she undergo a cardiac procedure, which could result in additional heart operations. If she undergoes such treatment, Flores “will need adequate time to recover from any procedures in a setting conducive to restoring her health”, her lawyers said.

Thursday’s filing acknowledges that Flores does not “dispute that she has received excellent care” from medical professionals. But it argues that “a detention centre lacks the conditions needed for such a recovery”.

Her lawyers proposed moving Flores from the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn to a residence within the Manhattan federal court district, where she and Maduro are due to go on trial next June.

Under home detention, Flores would be subject to round-the-clock armed monitoring, with visits restricted to people approved by the court and federal prosecutors. Her home would also be monitored by video and her phone calls recorded, according to the filing.

Judge Alvin K Hellerstein has yet to rule on the application.

Flores, 69, and Maduro, 63, have been held in US custody since the January raid on their home in Caracas. Both have pleaded not guilty to the charges of participating in a conspiracy to traffic cocaine into the US.

Mérida, September 7, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Defense attorneys representing Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores have formally requested the dismissal of criminal charges against them in the United States, invoking head-of-state and diplomatic immunity under international law.

In a motion filed before the US District Court for the Southern District of New York on September 2, defense counsel argued that domestic courts lack jurisdiction to indict, prosecute, or detain sitting foreign leaders.

Maduro and Flores’ legal teams emphasized that international treaties and long-standing legal principles shield active heads of state and high-ranking government officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, regardless of the status of bilateral relations between countries.

Lead defense attorney Barry Pollack asserted that the Justice Department’s indictment constitutes an unprecedented overreach of foreign judicial authority. 

“Under settled international law and long-standing diplomatic practice, foreign courts cannot exercise criminal jurisdiction over a sitting head of state,” he stated in court filings.

Pollack underscored that Maduro is facing charges for acts that would have been part of his official duties and that he “vehemently denies” the US prosecutors’ allegations.

The Venezuelan leader is facing charges of “narcoterrorism,” drug trafficking conspiracy, and weapons possession offenses. Flores has been accused of the same alleged crimes except “narcoterrorism.” Maduro and Flores were kidnapped by US special forces on January 3 following military strikes in Caracas and surrounding states.

Under the established trial schedule, federal prosecutors have several weeks to respond to the immunity case and the motion to dismiss.

Subsequently, US District Judge Alvin Hellerstein is expected to evaluate written arguments and hold an evidentiary hearing on November 17 to decide whether to grant the defense’s request or proceed to trial. In the latter case, the trial would begin in June 2027.

Legal analysts have argued that the sovereign immunity case is unlikely to succeed given the US judicial system’s tradition of deferring to the executive branch on foreign policy matters. Under the “one voice” doctrine, domestic courts follow the White House and the Department of State regarding which authorities are formally recognized as representing a foreign country.

The first Trump administration refused to recognize Maduro as Venezuela’s legitimate head of state following his 2018 reelection, instead backing the self-proclaimed “interim government” headed by Juan Guaidó. In 2023, Washington transferred its recognition to the defunct, opposition-majority parliament despite its term expiring two years earlier.

In March, the Trump administration recognized Delcy Rodríguez as Venezuela’s “sole leader.” As Maduro’s vice president, Rodríguez took over as acting president in January and has overhauled the Caribbean nation’s foreign policy in the months since. Caracas has reestablished diplomatic relations with Washington and strengthened ties with its global partners, including Israel, while distancing itself from historic allies such as China, Cuba, and Iran.

In his motion to dismiss, Pollack called it “incongruous” for the White House to recognize Rodríguez but not Maduro, who appointed her as vice president.

Venezuelan officials have not commented on the latest developments in Maduro and Flores’ case. After holding multiple rallies in the weeks following the January 3 kidnapping, Venezuelan authorities have significantly scaled back the public backing for the pair.

In a June interview, Rodríguez said that Maduro remains Venezuela’s legitimate president but stopped short of demanding his liberation, instead claiming that he has the right to “demonstrate the truth” before the US justice system.

In recent weeks, the Venezuelan government, through its official communications, as well as state-owned media channels, has increasingly dropped the “acting” label, referring to Rodríguez simply as “president.”

For their part, US-based international solidarity movements have staged monthly mobilizations demanding Maduro and Flores’ immediate release, including outside the federal detention center in Brooklyn where the pair is presently detained.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

WASHINGTON — President Trump has locked in a deal to develop Venezuela’s vast oil resources, an arrangement the White House says will bring a country battered by years of economic collapse to a “place where elections are possible.”

But the agreement — backed by acting President Delcy Rodríguez, a holdover from the Nicolás Maduro government that Washington deems “illegitimate” — is raising new uncertainty about how entrenched the unelected government may become.

In January, when the U.S. military captured Maduro, Trump did not say how long a democratic transition would take but said Rodríguez was “gracious” and “essentially willing to do what we think is necessary.”

Asked by The Times on Wednesday what was stopping him from demanding Venezuela set a firm election date, Trump was blunt: “I just don’t think they are ready yet.”

“It’s very new. We took them out of a dictatorship and we’re getting along great with the government,” Trump said. But he said an election would happen “soon.”

U.S. Secretary of Energy Chris Wright walks alongside Venezuela’s interim president, Delcy Rodríguez, after a news conference on the deal to develop 17 oil fields in the country.

(Jesus Vargas / Getty Images)

Under the deal, the U.S. government is partnering with an oil producer to create a new company, North American Blue Energy Partners, to develop 17 fields with a proven potential of 65 billion barrels. NABEP will have rights to the fields for 100 years.

For many Venezuelans, the lack of urgency around elections — set against a deal that gives the United States majority control over roughly a third of the country’s oil reserves — is starting to feel like a broken promise.

“They tell us we have to wait two years, maybe more, while in the meantime they do business with a government that wasn’t elected, that was imposed on us, and that we don’t want,” Carlos Pérez, a 23-year-old automotive mechanics student, told The Times.

Antonio Marchetti, a 45-year-old plumber and electrician, said that while he sees the removal of Maduro as a “good thing,” the oil deal makes it seem as though Trump’s plans were those of a “cowboy, the invader John Wayne,” all along.

“We were expecting elections,” Marchetti said. “This pact with Trump entrenched the dictatorship that he himself declared war on. But to get rid of Maduro, he left the rest and did business with them. It disgusts me.”

A man holds a sign that reads in Spanish, “Yankee out, murderers” during a protest in Caracas on Aug. 29 against President Trump’s deal giving the United States a stake in Venezuela’s oil reserves.

(Pedro Mattey / Associated Press)

The frustrations go beyond Venezuela. In Washington, Republican lawmakers have praised the oil deal, while calling Rodríguez an “interim dictator” who cannot be trusted.

María Corina Machado, the exiled leader of the Venezuelan opposition and a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, on Thursday raised her own worries about what the oil deal means for the future of Venezuela.

In a video message, Machado stopped short of criticizing Trump’s oil deal, but acknowledged concerns about a pact negotiated with an “illegitimate” government.

“Venezuelans know that there can be no development without strong institutions and a government elected by popular vote,” she said. “That is the only real guarantee of success and stability for any large-scale investment.”

A plan in the works

Trump administration officials have characterized the deal as an economic lifeline that will eventually stabilize a country and prepare it for free and fair elections.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio said last week that the United States is facilitating talks between Venezuela’s interim government and Dinorah Figuera, an opposition figure leading Venezuela’s 2015 National Assembly, the last democratically elected legislature recognized by the United States.

Machado has been left out of those talks. They are expected to resume in mid-September.

Rubio says that for any election to be “credible,” the voting system will require an overhaul and political parties will need time to organize. Steps also must be taken to ensure the country has a free press.

Echoing Rubio’s comments, the White House said Friday that Trump wants elections held at the “right time,” but that his top priority is to bring Venezuela “back from the dead and rebuild the country after it was incompetently ruled by a nasty dictatorship.”

U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright meets with Venezuelan acting President Delcy Rodríguez at Miraflores presidential palace in Caracas on Sept. 2.

(Pedro Mattey / Ap Photo/pedro Mattey)

On Wednesday, while Energy Secretary Chris Wright visited Caracas, Rodríguez declined to set a firm date for an election, but added, “I have worked tirelessly to ensure that Venezuela is ready and prepared when the time comes for its electoral process, which will take place — have no doubt about that: There will be an electoral process.”

The open-ended approach to holding an election, however, has drawn criticism from former Trump administration officials, who argue the lack of a timeline essentially lets Rodríguez govern indefinitely.

“Here’s my fear: It makes us Delcy’s partner, and gives the president a reason to want her to remain in power,” Elliott Abrams, who served as U.S. special envoy to Venezuela during Trump’s first term, told The Times.

He contended that the White House so far appears to prefer a pliant interlocutor, and Rodríguez, he says, will do “whatever Trump tells her to do.”

If an election is to take place in Venezuela, a nine-month runway for preparation is likely to be expected, Abrams said.

People shop for produce at a market in Maracaibo, the heart of Venezuela’s oil industry. .

(Ariana Cubillos / Associated Press)

In Washington, some Republican lawmakers have continued to call for elections in Venezuela, arguing that Rodríguez cannot be trusted.

“The only way we will have a prosperous Venezuela is with the end of the murderous regime and the return of democracy,” Rep. Carlos A. Gimenez (R-Fla.) wrote on social media. He also called Rodríguez an “interim dictator.”

In an interview with NBC News’ “Meet the Press,” Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas) said he does not necessarily think elections should happen before the oil agreement is finalized, but he said they “need to proceed rapidly.”

“I believe they should proceed no later than midway through next year,” he said.

Sen. Rick Scott (R-Fla.) said he is working with Trump and Rubio to ensure “free, fair and transparent elections as soon as possible.” He did not, however, say what would constitute “soon.”

Mixed views on economic hope

In the Lake Maracaibo region, an area that would see renewed investments under the oil agreement, Junior Araujo — a 47-year-old oil worker — sees a “wonderful opportunity to be reborn.”

Araujo, the father of three, is in desperate need of a better economic outlook. He works 120 hours a week and earns only $20. For his family, food alone usually costs about $150 a week.

“We have to get creative and find new ways to make ends meet through side jobs like selling clothes and making yogurt,” he said. “That’s our real financial situation.”

Venezuelans watch oil tankers anchored in Lake Maracaibo on Sept. 4. Much of the country’s oil industry is centered in the Maracaibo region.

(Humberto Matheus/Sipa USA via Associated Press)

For Araujo, the hope for a better economy does not take away his frustrations with the government.

“We’re neither happy nor dancing here, all our benefits have been taken away from us,” he said. “Our main problem is the current government; we need to restore our institutions.”

Nazareth Lezama, a 35-year-old teacher, also sees the oil deal as an economic opportunity but remains concerned that the current government may not have negotiated the best price or conditions for Venezuela. She added this has happened in the past.

“We must be clear that this regime destroyed the oil industry,” she said, adding that Venezuelans “need elections to choose leaders based on merit.”

Marchetti, the plumber from Caracas, says the oil deal is a “100-year chain” on Venezuelans imposed by Trump. He said it has become the “last straw” for him, and he has decided to leave Venezuela and emigrate to Europe.

“With all the pain in my heart, I will leave everything behind. I have a European passport; it won’t be easy to start a life from scratch, but there is no hope left here,” he said.

He does not know where he will land yet. But he knows he needs to leave Venezuela.

“This ship is sinking,” he said.

Times staff writer Ceballos reported from Washington. Special correspondent Mogollón reported from Caracas.

Venezuelanalysis editor Ricardo Vaz joined Clash Point editor Isaac Eshetu to take stock of Venezuela and its present relationship with the United States. The discussion covers the kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and the political fallout in Caracas, US control over Venezuela’s all-important oil industry, and a marked foreign policy shift in recent months.

(Note: the interview was recorded on August 14, before the US and Venezuelan governments announced a “historic” oil deal)

Source: Clash Report

Caracas, September 3, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez and US Energy Secretary Chris Wright celebrated an oil agreement between the two countries and North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP) and a flurry of additional energy deals signed on Wednesday.

“This is a historic day in the transformation of Venezuela,” Wright said in a joint press conference at Miraflores Palace. “President [Donald] Trump has a clear mission in Venezuela: to bring peace, freedom, and prosperity to everyone.”

The US official went on to praise the “enormous deal” announced last Friday that will see NABEP, a company owned by Venezuelan businessman Alejandro Betancourt, receive long-term concessions for 17 prime oilfields in the Caribbean nation that hold 65 billion barrels of reserves.

According to the White House, the US Department of War’s Office of Strategic Capital (OSC) will acquire a 35 percent stake in NABEP through penny warrants. The US State Department will be able to purchase 20 percent of NABEP’s production at cost and hold a right of first refusal for the remaining 80 percent. 

Washington will likewise control the company’s board of directors. Wright stated that the NABEP deal is “ambitious” and predicted that Venezuelan oil production would surpass 2 million barrels per day (bpd) by the end of the decade, nearly doubling the current output of 1.1 million bpd.

For her part, Rodríguez urged Wright to convey her gratitude to Trump, the US State Department, and the Department of Energy for helping secure “a mutually beneficial, win-win agreement.”

“I trust that the binational agreement will also prove beneficial for the people of the United States,” the acting president told reporters. “Venezuela is ready to welcome these investments that will boost the country’s development.”

Rodríguez had previously stated that Venezuela is estimating US $19 of revenue per barrel extracted in the project, significantly below the government take under the 2001 Hydrocarbon Law enacted by former President Hugo Chávez. The law was overhauled with US support in January to expand benefits for foreign corporations.

Both Rodríguez and Wright faced questions about Betancourt, who has faced embezzlement and money laundering investigations in Spain and Switzerland stemming from alleged corruption in dealings with state oil company PDVSA.

NABEP has operated in the country since 2024 and was awarded the project without a prior bidding process. It is currently Venezuela’s second-largest crude producer after Chevron. Wright said the US government had negotiated the agreement carefully and would exercise strict control over the flow of funds associated with the NABEP deal.

Rodríguez, for her part, said that Betancourt is not facing any judicial proceedings in Venezuela, with a 2022 arrest warrant for corruption having been dropped one year later. Similarly, Secretary of State Marco Rubio argued in an interview that the Venezuelan mogul is not the subject of any investigation in the US.

Before the afternoon press conference, Wright attended a ceremony at the presidential palace that saw the Venezuelan government sign a number of agreements with foreign corporations.

Chevron, the largest foreign corporation operating in Venezuela, saw its joint venture with PDVSA awarded two additional extra-heavy crude fields, Carabobo-1 and Carabobo-2 South, in the Orinoco Oil Belt.

The Texas-based company announced plans to invest $7 billion in its Venezuela projects over the next five years with the goal of more than doubling the current 250,000 bpd output. Chevron CEO Mike Wirth affirmed in an interview that the “strong legal protections” and “improved terms” under the reformed Hydrocarbon Law granted the company “attractive low-cost oil growth” prospects. 

Italian company Eni also signed a contract to develop the Junín-5 block, one of the largest in the Orinoco Oil Belt. The project will migrate from a joint venture with PDVSA majority to a concession-type deal, called a Productive Participation Contract, which offers increased benefits for the private operator.

Eni CEO Claudio Descalzi was likewise present in Miraflores Palace and thanked US and Venezuelan authorities for backing foreign investments in the South American country.

Wednesday’s ceremony also saw Primavera secure a concession to exploit the medium- and heavy-crude Budare-Elotes block in eastern Venezuela. Primavera is an energy-investment vehicle created by billionaire Fred Ehrsam, a Trump supporter and co-founder of Coinbase, to enter the Venezuelan oil industry.

Additionally, Colorado-based wildcatter Aspect Energy received rights to study potential new oilfields in eastern Venezuela.

Finally, PDVSA and state electricity company CORPOELEC signed “strategic alliance” agreements with GE Vernova, an offshoot of General Electric, to upgrade and repair electrical infrastructure supporting Venezuela’s oil industry.

Following the pro-business overhaul of its energy sector, Caracas has signed new or updated agreements with multiple Western multinational corporations, including BP, Shell, and Repsol. 

Since the January 3 military strikes and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro, the Trump administration has wielded significant control over the Venezuelan oil and gas industry. The Caribbean nation’s export revenues are currently deposited in a US Treasury account before the White House decides the disbursement timings and amounts.

Washington has also kept wide-reaching sanctions in place while issuing licenses for select corporations and banning dealings with companies from Russia, China, and Iran. With NABEP set to take over five oilfields previously operated by joint ventures with Chinese firms, Beijing demanded that its “rights and interests” in Venezuela be respected.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

Mérida, September 2, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuela’s Simón Bolívar International Airport, located in Maiquetía, La Guaira State, officially resumed commercial flight operations on Tuesday through newly constructed temporary terminals.

Air connections resumed more than two months after a powerful double earthquake struck central and coastal Venezuela on June 24, causing severe structural damage to the Simón Bolívar Airport, including fractured runways.

The initial phase of renewed operations relies on four modular, temporary terminals erected in the airport’s external parking areas. Spanning more than 10,000 square meters, the temporary structures house fully functional services for ticketing, baggage drop and retrieval, security checkpoints and migration control.

Venezuelan authorities have also set up shuttle buses to take passengers from the modular gates to the aircraft on the tarmac. They have also issued operational guidelines for passengers and organized a security deployment in the airport grounds and surrounding areas.

Before official operations began, national aviation authorities executed four operational simulations to test passenger circulation routes, security protocols, luggage handling, and overall system readiness.

During an official inspection, Minister of Transportation Francisco Garcés outlined the operational milestones, technical parameters, and long-term recovery timeline for the nation’s main aviation hub.

“There is full operationality from these temporary terminals, with capacity to accommodate 720 departing and 496 arriving passengers in the international area, and 480 and 472, respectively, in the domestic sector,” Garcés stated during a media briefing. “We have made a strong effort to maintain rigorous international standards for user comfort and safety, completing this complex logistical solution in record time.”

Garcés explained that the current facilities restore approximately 25 percent of the airport’s pre-earthquake operational capacity, with projections of expanding to 40 percent within the next two months and 60 percent by the end of the year.

Meanwhile, engineering teams continue comprehensive structural repairs on the main permanent terminals, with full reconstruction scheduled for the first quarter of 2027.

On September 1, the opening day of the temporary facilities featured eight scheduled flights split equally between domestic and international routes, with the inaugural flight departing to Valera, Trujillo State.

Air carriers currently operating or scheduling their immediate return to Maiquetía include national lines Conviasa, Laser Airlines, Estelar, Avior and Venezolana, alongside international operators such as American Airlines, Iberia, and Copa Airlines.

Throughout the two-month shutdown following the June 24 seismic events, national and international air transit was diverted through smaller, regional airports across the country, including Barcelona (Anzoátegui State), Valencia (Carabobo State), and Maracaibo (Zulia State).

Alongside the reopening of Venezuela’s main air hub, the acting Delcy Rodríguez government has continued to address housing rehabilitation and structural reconstruction in damaged urban centers.

In La Guaira State, Rodríguez oversaw the formal handover of 210 fully repaired apartments in the Ana Victoria community. The rehabilitation works under the Plan Venezuela Renace allowed displaced families to return to their homes after two months in temporary shelters.

Additional structural works in La Guaira include “tetra-houses” in Catia La Mar and public infrastructure reconstruction near the El Trébol highway interchange.

Concurrently, Rodríguez announced the delivery of direct financial assistance and low-interest loans to 104 condominium boards and 1,216 individual housing units in the Chacao and Altamira areas of Eastern Caracas.

“We have begun an inspection process; I know it may take some time, but it is important because we are in a phase of changing the seismic resistance standards for construction,” she said.

Disbursed through joint public and private banking channels, individual loans can be up to US $5,000, while funding for common area repairs can reach $20,000.

These funds enable residents and homeowner associations to address structural issues on buildings categorized under yellow and red risk tags, ensuring compliance with updated seismic resistance construction standards.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

Ousted Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro has urged a United States judge to dismiss the criminal drug trafficking charges against him, arguing he should be immune from prosecution as the head of a sovereign country.

Maduro’s lawyer, Barry Pollack, made the appeal in a Manhattan district court on Wednesday.

His legal team has petitioned District Judge Alvin Hellerstein to dismiss the case, which will test the willingness of US courts to apply international law to criminal cases.

Maduro was abducted and imprisoned on January 3, after US President Donald Trump authorised a military raid in Caracas. The former Venezuelan leader, who has been held in a Brooklyn federal jail, has pleaded not guilty and is scheduled to go on trial on June 1, 2027, if his effort to dismiss the case is unsuccessful.

The principle that sitting heads of state are immune from prosecution abroad is a longstanding tenet of international law, seen as fundamental to diplomacy.

Judge Hellerstein had given Pollack a Wednesday deadline to file his motion to dismiss the case.

Pollack has argued that Hellerstein lacks jurisdiction, both because sovereign heads of state enjoy complete immunity and because the acts that Maduro is accused of would have been part of his official duties.

“This unprecedented prosecution violates the absolute immunity from criminal jurisdiction to which heads of state and foreign officials acting in their official capacities have been entitled for hundreds of years,” Pollack wrote.

Pollack added that Maduro was falsely accused and “vehemently denies” the allegations.

A spokesperson for the Manhattan US Attorney’s office, which brought the charges, did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Maduro faces uphill battle

Legal experts have told the Reuters news agency that Maduro faces an uphill battle.

Washington has not recognised Maduro as Venezuela’s president for years, due to disputed elections. Courts tend to defer to the US president and his cabinet in disputes over who is recognised as a foreign country’s leader.

US criminal cases involving heads of foreign states are extremely rare, but precedent offers little encouragement for Maduro. In 1990, a federal judge in Miami rejected former Panamanian military leader Manuel Noriega’s attempt to assert head-of-state immunity, in part because he never officially held the title of president.

The US stopped recognising Maduro in 2019, when he was inaugurated for a second time after a 2018 election that critics say was rigged. Washington also called his 2024 re-election fraudulent.

Maduro says both votes were fair and has long accused the US of seeking his ouster to gain control of the South American country’s oil wealth.

Pollack, however, wrote that Washington’s assessment that Maduro lacked legitimacy was not relevant.

“Unlike in Noriega, the Executive Branch does not dispute that Mr Maduro was Venezuela’s head of state, but instead merely claims that, after 2019, he did not occupy that position legitimately,” Pollack wrote.

Venezuela run by Maduro’s vice president

Since Maduro’s abduction, his former vice president and socialist ally, Delcy Rodriguez, has run Venezuela as its interim leader.

She has also increased cooperation with the Trump administration. Last month, the two countries reached an unprecedented deal that would see the US take over about one-fifth of Venezuela’s oil reserves.

Pollack wrote that it was “incongruous” for the US to recognise Rodriguez, who was appointed by Maduro, and not Maduro himself. He pointed to statements by Rodriguez and officials in her government, made in January and February, indicating that they still considered Maduro Venezuela’s legitimate head of state.

Rodriguez’s government has since gone silent on the matter. Some murals of Maduro in Caracas have been painted over in recent months.

Prosecutors have until October 2 to respond to Maduro’s motion to dismiss the indictment, and Hellerstein will hold a hearing on the dismissal effort on November 17.

Late last night, on September 1st, on the day the commercial terminals of Maiquetía airport went back online, US Secretary of Energy Chris Wright landed in Caracas for the second time this year. Of course, Wright didn’t fly commercial, and he was swarmed by a flurry of journalists looking for headlines on the “massive” oil deal that has invaded the news both in the US and Venezuela. 

“I think very good times are coming,” Wright told reporters upon his arrival. “As large investments flow into this country, that creates more jobs, which pushes wage pressure up, creates opportunity and prosperity for Venezuelans, and it snowballs: when you get business confidence and investment, it creates all sorts of opportunities—not just jobs, but opportunities for entrepreneurs.”

Wright arrived to give this new partnership a bit more ceremony, but also, very likely to join in the festivities of what is to be an important week for the Trump administration’s push for energy supremacy in the region and for the Venezuelan oil industry. Besides the strange deal that we’re going to unpack in this piece, this week will feature Chevron, which according to Bloomberg is about to invest $7 billion looking to double its production in the country. Also, it is expected that deals with Eni, ONCC, and Colombia´s Geopark will be signed as well. And the icing on the cake, it’s been also reported that one of the agreements with GE Verona to tackle Venezuela’s decaying power grid is close to being executed.

The clumsy communications around the announcement of the deal have generated some negative backlash from the Venezuelan public and skepticism from the same oil majors the Trump administration is trying to woo. Just a couple of hours before Secretary Wright touched ground in Venezuela, Marco Rubio had to jump on a livestream with a Venezuelan journalist in a damage control mission.

The US-Nabep deal 

Those who brokered the US-Venezuela oil agreement are boasting about historical proportions, about leaving a mark for generations to come, but they took their time to explain why it is so important. Information has been coming out in a very fragmented way, heavily determined by propaganda needs from the Trump administration and the chavista regime. After vague rumors related to Mauricio Claver-Carone taking a step back as the Americans’ informal envoy, and the fall of Harry Sargeant III in Venezuela, we saw an old communication trick, which the Trump administration did not invent, setting the stage for the big news. Washington sent out a first version with catastrophic details, waiting for panic to spread, and published a second, corrected version that would make the news look better than initially perceived. Last week, the first Axios “scoop” talked about 90 billion barrels of Venezuelan oil reserves that the US would own. Now, the current version of the official announcement says it’s 65 billion barrels, so people can say “well, it’s just 65 billion barrels, it ain’t so bad.”

The White House finally published a fact sheet on Monday night disclosing more details about the involvement of the State and “War” Departments in buying the oil produced in 17 Venezuelan fields (supposedly containing about 65 billion barrels) by a private Venezuelan company. North American Blue Energy Partners, or Nabep, is the country’s second biggest crude producer led by notorious Venezuelan oligarch Alejandro Betancourt. To execute this deal, the Rodríguez government is granting a 100-year concession to a Nabep-Pentagon joint venture that looks, sounds and smells pretty unconstitutional from a Venezuelan point of view.

Francisco Monaldi: “Instead of generating more credibility and allowing investors to feel confident, the fact that this is allocated without any bidding and to an individual that has issues with justice, that could be a problem in the future.”

These are the known conditions of the deal:

• NABEP granted the Department of War’s Office of Strategic Capital a 35% equity stake in its corporate parent.
• The Department of State receives a guaranteed right to purchase 20% of NABEP’s current and future output at production costs, alongside a right of first refusal to buy the remaining 80%.
• The deal is strictly governed by US law and US court jurisdiction.
• Washington is granted veto power over board appointments. The majority of NABEP’s board of directors must be American citizens. 

The US government is trying to sell this to the American public as a way to restock US oil reserves and to cut domestic gas prices, which have a negative impact on Trump’s popularity and the prospects of Republican candidates in November’s congressional elections. In an interview in Spanish published Tuesday, Secretary of State Marco Rubio insisted that the deal was between the US and a private company, not the chavista regime, and offered this as a model the White House expects can be replicated.

The expert opinion

Francisco Monaldi, director of the Latin America Energy Program for the Baker Institute at Rice University, warned on X that Venezuela’s famous oil reserves are inflated by order of Hugo Chávez: in reality, they are about a third of the 300 billion barrels everyone quotes as the total proven reserves. So those 17 fields must have about 25 billion barrels, instead of 65 billion barrels, an unreliable figure no one should take for certain. Besides that, it would be very hard to actually extract those 25 billion barrels in 25 years, given that most fields are undeveloped. Monaldi added before PBS News that “the presence of the US government could make investors more willing to take the risk of going into Venezuela with all the issues, including the fact that this is an illegitimate government in Venezuela, and that the history of the country, of course, is not great in terms of respecting deals… The other issue is that the Strategic Petroleum Reserve typically uses light oil, and Venezuela mostly produces heavy and extra heavy oil.”

Monaldi thinks that “if it’s an opaque deal that doesn’t seem to benefit the country, then there will be a backlash eventually, and we will end up as in other parts of the world and in Venezuela itself with renegotiation at some point.” Even if the agreement with NABEP means that they can run faster than other private companies, Trump’s anxiety to get American investors to Venezuela won’t be helped by this, because “instead of generating more credibility and allowing investors to feel confident, the fact that this is allocated without any bidding and to an individual that has issues with justice, that could be a problem in the future.”

Amid the fall of Tareck El Aissami and the rise of súper ministra Delcy Rodríguez, Betancourt re-entered the Venezuelan oil scene alongside Trump-linked oil magnate Harry Sargeant.

Harvard scholar Ricardo Hausmann, a former planning minister who leads a research center on economic growth, avoided the oil economy dimension of the matter and just trashed Rubio for betraying the idea of democracy transition. On the other hand, some influential economists see opportunities. Asdrúbal Oliveros chose a middle ground between celebration and condemnation and pointed out that benefits will come as long as the country develops not only the oil fields but the institutions to create accountability. 

Betancourt: a meteoric rise and a shady trail

That Alejandro Betancourt, the CEO of NABEP, is at the center of this deal is bad news in the eyes of observers and Venezuelan journalists familiar with his trajectory.

Over the past two decades, this businessman became a symbol of the bolichico culture, a term apparently coined by investigative journalist Juan Carlos Zapata to define those scions of Venezuelan old-money families who became travel companies of Bolivarian-era corruption. Betancourt and his partners—namely his cousin Pedro Trebbau López and childhood friend Francisco Convit Guruceaga—became synonymous with the vanishing of hundreds of millions of dollars the Chávez government allocated to a newly-formed company, Derwick Associates, to fix the country’s power grid. Both Betancourt and Trebbau were in their late 20s when Derwick first emerged, and had no experience in the electricity sector.

Many things would happen between then and now. Betancourt became famous in Spain for investing in Hawkers, a Spanish sunglasses brand that got him cleaner headlines before local journalists discovered who he was. Prior to the Hawkers move, the three bolichicos created a Bahamas-based company to partner with a Gazprombank subsidiary. The resulting company, called Gazprombank Latin America Ventures, would operate a heavy-crude PDVSA project in the Lake Maracaibo region called Petrozamora. The joint venture did get to hold a steady production, but as with everything Russian, its operations were quite opaque. The Maduro regime eventually raided its offices and forced Betancourt to leave the country.

Betancourt faces probes in Spain and Switzerland. US prosecutors investigated him as an alleged co-conspirator in the $1.2 billion money-laundering scheme that targeted Convit and others, but didn’t charge the former.

Amid the fall of Tareck El Aissami and the rise of súper ministra Delcy Rodríguez, Betancourt re-entered the Venezuelan oil scene alongside Trump-linked oil magnate Harry Sargeant. Through Nabep,  Betancourt and Sargeant took control of a number of oil projects (including the Petrozamora fields) under the CPP scheme, in which private companies could hold a larger stake than the State (running counter to the country’s hydrocarbons legislation until it was changed this year). 

Betancourt seems to have a hand on both sides of Venezuela’s political conflict. That a close relative of Juan Guaidó was seen visiting Betancourt’s castle in Spain, in the company of Trump ally Rudy Giuliani, helped to cement the bad reputation of the interim government. In fact, Rubio now alleges that Betancourt was a friend of the opposition to deflect the suspicion that the tycoon is a man of the Rodríguez regime, and that the US chose Nabep because it is the biggest private company in the Venezuelan oil sector. Questioned by journalist Sergio Novelli about Betancourt’s past, the Secretary of State said that the businessman faced no charges “in our system.” 

Over the past several weeks, Betancourt reemerged as a key operative between the Trumpworld and the Rodríguez government. The Washington Post reported last week that the Trump administration lobbied Switzerland to “resolve” an ongoing money-laundering probe into Betancourt without him facing criminal charges. Despite such a level of external interference, Betancourt remains under investigation in both Spain and Switzerland. He hasn’t been charged in these countries. US prosecutors investigated Betancourt as an alleged co-conspirator in the $1.2 billion PDVSA money-laundering scheme that targeted Francisco Convit and many others, but did not charge the former. 

Distrust has grown in the Venezuelan public sphere. Before the oil agreement was announced, Cazadores de Fake News published an investigation about the network of social media accounts defending Betancourt. Hours after the White House published the fact sheet, an Axios piece tells the story of Betancourt as the global, influential businessman that promoted the Trump-backed Guaidó government and, during the events of January 3, persuaded Delcy Rodríguez to cooperate with Rubio. An Axios source even says that Maduro would still be in power had Betancourt not helped to remove him.

How Delcy is selling this

As another blackout hit Western Venezuela over the weekend, Delcy Rodríguez released a video statement saying this was about improving the future of the country. She was emphatic in thanking Trump and Rubio, and assured the nation would preserve sovereignty of the oil reserves while turning into a big energy powerhouse. Social media reacted by reproducing pre-2026 footage of her and Diosdado Cabello accusing the opposition of offering all our oil to the US. The most significant detail remains a mystery: what Delcy Rodríguez is demanding in exchange for signing and enforcing this deal.

How Venezuelan political figures are reacting

The most enigmatic reaction in the Venezuelan opposition came from María Corina Machado: she hasn’t said anything, really. A couple of days after Trump’s announcement, the opposition leader remotely attended an international conference held in Slovenia. She did not mention the reported contents of the deal or the role of Betancourt, but insisted on the potential of Venezuela as the energy hub of the Western Hemisphere in light of the Ukraine War and the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz. Machado added that a democratic government could serve as a bridge between the US, Europe and Latin America.

Leopoldo López and Julio Borges, two important opposition figures who held leadership roles in the past, also remain quiet. Their political parties are linked to a US-sponsored working group meant to reform the Venezuelan Supreme Court (TSJ) and electoral authority. López and Borges previously praised the US for its role and welcomed the progress made in August. In the deal’s factsheet, the White House says these talks resulted in significant reforms to the Venezuelan judiciary and the release of hundreds of political prisoners, which are grossly exaggerated claims. The reform to the Organic Law of the TSJ has not been approved yet, though the National Assembly sanctioned it on Tuesday night.

Edmundo González Urrutia said more, but not much against it. He stated that “Venezuela’s recovery cannot be measured only by the barrels it produces again, but by the lives that wealth allows us to rebuild.” He made no mention of Delcy, the deal’s legality, or its conditions, but wondered whether oil will improve the lives of all Venezuelans or only some this time around.  He asked what those millions of dollars could mean to a family that lost a home and is still waiting to rebuild it, to someone who arrives at a hospital to find no supplies, to a community that lives waiting to see when the water will come. González did not denounce the agreement, but reflected on the difference between financial resources reaching the country and reaching the families that need it most. 

Ruling chavismo has invoked its “loyalty to national sovereignty and the well-being of the people,” offering a list of crises the deal is supposed to solve: economic reactivation, the recovery of public services, care for those affected by the double earthquake, jobs, workers’ wages.

Juan Pablo Guanipa, a popular ally of Machado in Primero Justicia, sort of misread the animus. He called for a “calm reading” of the deal hours after it broke, arguing that Venezuela cannot develop its reserves without massive foreign capital. “If we see new jobs, more investment, more income, and a new economic upturn, this agreement will earn its backing. But if we don’t see it, little by little, popular rejection will follow.” His critique became sharper days later. From a rally in Falcón, Guanipa denounced that no government without an electoral mandate—like Delcy’s— has the standing to enter binding commitments like this. 

Henrique Capriles did better, insisting Venezuelans were entitled to defend their oil, their interest and their future: “What is the deal’s scope? Its legal basis? What do Venezuelans receive? What do they give up, and under what conditions? Questions, he noted, no one can begin to answer when the country doesn’t even have clarity on this year’s oil income.” He recognized that, although oil remains the only lever at hand to “push everything” and grow the economy, the triumvirate of the Rodríguez siblings and Diosdado Cabello are not qualified to lead that commitment, and will only coat the process with more opacity and corruption.

Diosdado Cabello is yet to say a peep, though we expect him to put some nice words together for his Con el Mazo Dando TV show tonight. PSUV, Venezuela’s ruling socialist party still under Cabello’s control, fully backed Delcy Rodríguez’s leadership in light of the oil deal. The party recalled its historical loyalty to national sovereignty and the well-being of the people, offering a list of crises the deal is supposed to solve: economic reactivation, the recovery of public services, care for those affected by the double earthquake, jobs, workers’ wages. According to them, Rodríguez was simply using “every tool possible within the constitutional framework to put our immense hydrocarbon reserves at the service of national development.” During last night’s session, the Rodríguez-controlled National Assembly passed a motion supporting the “US-Venezuela Binational Energy Agreement.”

Maduro’s son, “Nicolasito” Maduro Guerra, came out in support of the “historic” deal—as he called it, in English. He quoted an interview where his father said the State was fully open to the return of American capital to the Venezuelan oil industry. Which isn’t exactly false: before the US captured Maduro on January 3, The New York Times reported that the dictator had offered all existing oil and gold projects to US companies in exchange for being allowed to remain in power.

Rafael Ramírez, Venezuela’s oil tsar under Hugo Chávez who oversaw PDVSA’s total collapse and the embezzlement of billions of public funds, called the new deal illegitimate, unconstitutional, and a pillage (saqueo). He considered it a ploy by the Trump administration ahead of midterms, as the “Venezuelan case has become the only success to show their [voter] base,” further criticizing Delcy and US policy in an interview with El Nacional.  Among other original chavistas that broke with the Maduro regime, Chávez’s  former propagandist Andrés Izarra used a double-edged sword: “Delcy is carrying out Machado’s oil plan.” He also tweeted that the agreement was high treason for which its enforcers should be tried.

Juan Barreto, the former chavista mayor of Caracas who is trying to become a relevant opposition figure, quote-tweeted Alejandro Betancourt’s defense of the agreement (who had said that it would benefit Venezuelans and Americans alike) and took the class war route: “The true head of the transition speaks: from intervention to colony… from the stands, the traditional political class and the elites applaud, begging for a scrap… in the streets, neighborhoods, and factories, the people converse, organize, unite…Workers across the country, begin national dialogue and consultation.” Elías Jaua followed suit. The former chavista vice president and career chavista minister said Venezuela is now under the occupation of a foreign invader, calling for grassroots organizing and the recovery of national independence. In what seems to be an ongoing effort to distance himself from what remains of chavismo in power, Jaua clarified he had not spoken to any government official or PSUV leader.