Venezuela

Mérida, November 9, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Venezuelan government publicly reinaugurated the George Washington Plaza in El Paraíso, southwestern Caracas, alongside the US embassy on Friday.

The ceremony commemorated the 250th anniversary of the US independence. The Caracas mayor’s office restored the 2,400-square-meter plaza, originally inaugurated in 1921, while also refurbishing Washington’s statue.

Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez led the state delegation, alongside ministers and municipal authorities.

“This year marks the 191st anniversary of diplomatic relations between Venezuela and the United States,” she highlighted to the press. “This reopening of the plaza is a tribute to Washington, an independence leader, a founding father. It serves as a heartfelt homage to his leadership and historical legacy.”

Rodríguez went on to claim that Washington was a source of inspiration for Venezuelan independence leader Simón Bolívar.

“For the children present here: it is important to know your country’s history, but also to recognize the heroes from other countries,” she concluded.

The commemorative gathering began with an official wreath-laying ceremony at the reopened public square. Local schoolchildren from the El Paraíso parish gathered at the venue, waving small US flags alongside Venezuelan ones.

As part of the official program, the Caribbean nation’s Simón Bolívar Youth and Children’s Symphonic Orchestra performed the US and Venezuelan national anthems, as well as classical pieces from its repertoire.

Heading the US embassy delegation, US Chargé d’Affairs John Barrett echoed Rodríguez in framing Washington as “a leader much like Bolívar.” 

“We should view that statue of George Washington with pride,” he said. “These two figures symbolize new friendship between the United States and Venezuela. And I want to thank all Venezuelans, as well as the president, for their support.”

The US embassy’s celebrations of the 250th anniversary of independence were originally postponed by the June 24 double earthquake.

On Thursday, Barrett hosted a formal diplomatic reception for international diplomats, business sector representatives, and high-ranking Venezuelan officials such as the President of the National Assembly, Jorge Rodríguez.

“We accepted the invitation […] to celebrate the 250th anniversary of the US Declaration of Independence,” he posted on his X account. “The close cooperation between our governments serves as a tool for the prosperity of all our people.”

Since the January 3 US military strikes and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores, Washington and Caracas fast-tracked a diplomatic rapprochement that included the reopening of their respective embassies after seven years of broken ties.

The Venezuelan leaders’ friendly overtures towards the US contrast with the stances of the Maduro and Hugo Chávez governments. Both former presidents were adamant in condemning the US’ past and present role in imposing its interests at the expense of Global South countries. They also had to contend with recurring US-backed destabilization efforts, including coup attempts and economic sanctions.

Caracas’ renewed rhetoric was likewise on display at the XXX Ibero-American Summit, held on November 4-5 in Madrid, Spain. The Venezuelan delegation was led by newly appointed Foreign Minister Oliver Blanco.

“We are convinced that a more stable, more democratic, and more prosperous Venezuela, fully integrated into international markets, will contribute to the development of all of Ibero-America,” Blanco stated.

The Venezuelan official went on to tout an ongoing US-backed dialogue process with a sector of the opposition that is focused on judicial and electoral reforms, stressing that the South American country is undergoing a “democratic transformation” under the acting Rodríguez presidency.

“One significant agreement from this process is the renewal of the Supreme Court. […] We have requested technical assistance from the European Union to strengthen the rule of law and modernize our justice system,” he added.

Blanco additionally highlighted cooperation prospects and a “shared history” between Latin America and Spain. 

To mark the country’s participation in the Ibero-American Summit, state broadcaster VTV published an AI-generated spot hailing Spain’s “heritage” in Venezuela as a “cultural matrimony” and a “meeting of two worlds.” The narrative was markedly different from the discourse under Chávez and Maduro, who fiercely condemned Spanish colonialism, the genocide of native peoples, and the slave trade.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

Claudio Fermín is a university professor and veteran political leader in Venezuela. Cutting his political teeth with Acción Democrática (AD) party, he became Caracas’s first elected mayor (1990-93). He went on to become a member of the 1999 Constituent Assembly as well as a perennial presidential candidate. Within the Venezuelan opposition, he has been known for his commitment to dialogue and opposing US sanctions.

In this exclusive interview, Fermín reflects on his role in the Venezuelan opposition, the consequences of the blockade against the Caribbean nation, the US “theft” of natural resources following the January 3 attack, and the challenge of recovering sovereignty.

Going back more than two decades, what was your relationship with former President Hugo Chávez like?

Chávez had a sharp tongue that spared no one. Yet whenever he referred to me, he always did so with respect and affection. I am grateful for his generosity.

In the early years, Chavismo was not just a vast popular movement but almost a religion. Since President Chávez spoke of me with such consideration, I think that filtered down to the base as well, and grassroots Chavistas have always been very warm toward me. I have never stopped going anywhere in my life, not even to the Esquina Caliente [a Chavista spot in downtown Caracas’ Plaza Bolívar]. Chavistas or Adecos [AD supporters], I greet them all the same. I have been fortunate in that regard.

My relationship with Chávez was always one of respect and consideration. As a conciliator, what people call a moderate, someone who doesn’t get carried away by extremes, I have always demanded respect for President Chávez and have always acknowledged the positive things his government did. Sometimes journalists are surprised and ask me for an example. I talk about Misión Vivienda [the public housing program], about the people who live much better there than in the shack where they used to live. And that is just one example; I could give you 30 more Chavista achievements that I defend, just as I could give you as many things I object to.

Chavismo knows that my criticisms are honest and sincere. We have had a good relationship. I deeply regret that it is, in my view, a very closed-off movement. Beyond its record in government, from a political standpoint my criticism would be its lack of self-criticism.

What is your assessment of the Maduro government?

President Maduro faced a very difficult period, much more difficult than President Chávez’s, in my opinion. These were years of an infamous [US] blockade and terrible conspiracies. I think he was very brave when he lifted currency and price controls, and when he proposed the special economic zones, which practically amounted to a wholesale critique of the Chavista economic model.

That is very easy to propose when you are in the opposition. But to take those measures from within a Chavista government… It was very hard to survive that storm for 14 straight years. Oil revenues, which had topped $50 billion a year, fell to less than $1 billion.

In recent years you have tried to build spaces for unity within the opposition, for example in Henri Falcón’s 2018 presidential campaign. However, those attempts ended up fractured by extremist figures such as María Corina Machado. Why has it been so hard for the opposition to build a coherent alternative?

To answer that, I think a brief look back at history is useful. Chávez’s early years were a time of endless promises, when everything seemed possible and there was money to back it up. Everything was in crescendo. Chávez, besides his electric, truly mesmerizing charisma, was also a man who carried a heroic narrative.

The initial opposition to the Chávez government was class-based and bent on confrontation. The Carmonazo [the 2002 coup] and the oil lockout failed because the people saw them as alien initiatives, the exclusive project of a political class. And the honeymoon with Chávez was still ongoing. However, that period gave rise to very confrontational behavior on both sides of Venezuelan politics.

There came a point when showing the greatest aversion, the greatest hostility toward Chavismo, meant being against the system and not participating. That is how María Corina Machado and her [US-funded] NGO Súmate got started, directly or indirectly encouraging abstention. The 2018 elections and those that followed cannot be understood without this induced abstention, which ended up benefiting Chavismo. That is not to take away from Chavismo’s own strengths, such as its organizational capacity and grassroots work.

However, in 2015 there was high turnout and the opposition won a majority in the National Assembly…

The 2015 elections were a very particular moment. It was an important election, now facing Chavismo without Chávez, and the opposition, which had been completely fragmented, came together. I think it has certain parallels with Chávez’s election in 1998, when there was a desire to punish, to make someone pay, which made it possible to bring scattered groups together.

If we look back over the years at the speeches of opposition leaders, Julio Borges, Leopoldo López, Henrique Capriles, Henry Ramos Allup and so on, they spent their time insulting one another. But in 2015 they called a sort of truce and were electorally smart in running on a single ticket, avoiding fragmentation.

But it was an exceptional moment. As soon as they reached the National Assembly the squabbling started again, for instance over who would hold the presidency of the parliament. In 2019 a new fight broke out between Guaidó’s faction and the others, whom they called “alacranes” [scorpions]. Guaidó ended up losing the National Assembly in the middle of his “interim presidency,” which was nothing more than a crude coup attempt.

Although you are an opposition politician, you have firmly denounced US sanctions against Venezuela. Can you tell us a bit about the economic reality of recent years?

Starting in 2015, thanks to President Obama – whom I once admired – a defenseless country was attacked, a country where store shelves were empty and pensioners were begging to survive. It was a country terribly battered by the economic situation, mired in an endless internal conflict. And the last thing it needed was sanctions and an economic blockade.

However, we also have to look further back. Thirty to thirty-five years ago, Venezuela exported aluminum, iron, and cattle. There was at least a minimum of economic diversification. But by 2015 it was a poor, single-product economy, and on top of that a blockade fell on us, which led to the country’s total impoverishment. Sanctions are a serious attack on human rights in Venezuela. Every nation has the right to trade freely.

The intention was to starve Venezuela. I remember some despicable statements by former US Ambassador [William] Brownfield, who said it didn’t matter how many people died as long as the government fell. They had not been able to beat Chávez’s charisma, or Maduro, because of the opposition’s mistakes, so they tried to strangle the country. The blockade has been a criminal act that brought about a total collapse in investment. The impact on pensions, wages, hospitals, and the electrical grid has been terrible. And figures like María Corina Machado or Leopoldo López called for sanctions in the morning and demanded wage increases in the afternoon. That is the level of cynicism and demagoguery they reached.

The plan had the desired consequences: investment dried up, discontent grew, and the quality of life collapsed. But that did not bring down the government; the US had to do it with a military intervention on January 3.

Over the last 10 years, Venezuela only had resources thanks to trade with countries that defied the blockade, such as Russia, China, and Iran. But it was done covertly, on the high seas, through parallel channels, and all of that was fertile ground for corruption.

By the same token, we have to point out what I call administrative mistakes. For example, in the midst of that terrible blockade, how can you justify keeping more than 30 ministries and 6 vice presidencies? Those mistakes have to be pointed out and analyzed, but to me they are of a much smaller magnitude than the impact of the blockade. I am not saying this to back Maduro; one simply has to keep a sense of proportion.

Venezuela went from a blockaded economy before January 3 to one controlled by the US. What is your reading of the present context?

Venezuela has been the victim of an outrageous and barefaced theft. On the one hand, the countries that dared to open a door for Venezuela to bring in foreign currency are now off limits. The United States imposes an iron curtain and says we can only have relations with it. The self-proclaimed champion of the free world prohibits free trade, using terrorist threats against those who do not obey.

On top of that, in an act of piracy, the US seized several Venezuelan oil tankers and then took 40 million barrels that we had in storage because a naval blockade was preventing us from selling crude.

January 3 raised enormous expectations. I admit it myself: I welcome much-needed investment, the investment the blockade kept out. But I don’t want it to come at the expense of our sovereignty. Yet in these months, instead of bringing dollars in, they [the US] have taken them out, stolen them. The Financial Times reported $13 billion in the first six months of the year. They have also taken shipments of gold. The money is deposited in US accounts. Absolutely nothing has been returned.

On top of that theft, our resources are still frozen: the IMF special drawing rights, close to $5 billion, as well as the gold held hostage at the Bank of England. These are resources we badly need, in addition to what the US is taking and to its barring us from relations with certain countries.

You have also focused on the foreign debt and the announced restructuring plans. Can you tell us why this issue matters?

Indeed. A narrative had taken hold that Venezuela owed $150 billion. And overnight that became $240 billion. That is absolutely false. Venezuela does not owe that money to anyone.

Of course Venezuela has to meet its obligations. The country has not paid its foreign debt since 2017. But with the blockade, with what resources were we supposed to pay it? That is why I insist that this debt must be audited.

The debt includes bonds, but people who bought them on the cheap now expect to be paid at face value. Then there are the debts to multilateral organizations, arbitration awards, commercial debts, and so on. All of that has to be audited by professional firms, and there has to be a debt restructuring committee made up of Venezuelans.

It seems that in Venezuela we can’t do arithmetic, and it has to be Marco Rubio who appoints the firm in charge of the restructuring: Centerview Partners. This firm charges $50,000 a month plus 0.1% of the debt. In other words, the fox is guarding the henhouse. It is in its interest for the amount to be as high as possible. It is armed robbery in broad daylight.

Let’s return to January 3, a turning point in Venezuela’s recent history. How do you assess that attack and everything that followed?

The theft I was describing is a consequence of January 3, when a foreign army bombed our country. It was an unforgivable act of aggression by the United States.

They kidnapped the president after fabricating a campaign claiming he was the head of the Cartel de los Soles. Now the CIA and Southern Command have been here for months, and they haven’t investigated a single military officer for drug trafficking. Where is the Cartel de los Soles? It is a monumental lie, like Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.

What we are experiencing is a crude recolonization, by force. By force the US is taking millions of barrels of oil; by force they imposed changes to the Hydrocarbons Law and the Mining Law. Under the supposed pretext of making the sector attractive to investors and giving them security, what was actually done was to hollow out the Venezuelan state. They leave it powerless, reducing royalties and taxes to a bare minimum.

Today we have a Venezuelan state that depends on a single product. What revenue will it have if it can’t collect anything from its main industry, or from mining? What’s more, if a restructuring of this abusive debt goes ahead, how is it going to be paid? What is being done with Venezuela’s resources is monstrous.

But there is no shortage of people eager to hand the country over, from “activists” who write letters to the US chargé d’affaires asking for supplies for this or that hospital, to fake trade unionists who ask him for wage increases. I find it undignified and humiliating. Even María Corina Machado gave her Nobel Prize to Trump and still can’t get him to give her the time of day.

January 3, and everything that followed, was not an attack on Chavismo. It was an operation to seize Venezuela’s resources. We have to create consciousness against that. And Trump is not going to be there forever. It pains me to see the naivety of certain voices who think Trump is saving the country. Venezuela is living through an hour of infamy, confusion, uncertainty and shame. If we can’t unite even in the face of an aggression as serious as the one we are suffering…

Venezuela has undoubtedly been the great triumph, perhaps the only one, of Trump’s foreign policy. What is your view of Trump’s stance on Venezuela and of current relations between Caracas and Washington?

First of all, it must be said that this so-called dialogue is a mockery of the country. Trump and Rubio pulled out of their pocket, like someone finding something they had forgotten, this National Assembly whose term expired in 2020. And they forced that [defunct] parliament into talks with the current one. So we have two parliaments of “yes men” following the White House’s directives. And it is Mr. Rubio who announces what is going to happen in the country with his three-phase plan.

Trump mocks us, saying people are dancing in the streets and offering to make us the 51st state. A tremendous disrespect, and nobody raises their voice against it. Venezuela needs a strategy to denounce to the world what is happening, this imperialist colonization based on terrorist threats.

Venezuela has lost its sovereignty, and that is very serious. It is painful, but it is an undeniable fact. Venezuela has every interest in having good relations with the United States, as it has had for almost all of our history, but we cannot accept these conditions. We want investment and to trade with the whole world, but not at the cost of losing our sovereignty as a nation. Giving up sovereignty is not a necessary condition.

Having made that diagnosis, what, from your standpoint, is the way forward?

For the last 28 years I have been called a moderate, ambiguous, a “nini” [neither-nor], for defending my views. But I simply don’t agree with the fanatical positions of the extremes, and I denounce what is happening in my country today.

Ever since I started raising my voice about the seriousness of this situation, from January 3 onward, I have hardly ever been invited for an interview. There is a grave silence, and we are talking about the national interest here. Whether you are a Chavista or an Adeco, a businessperson or a street vendor, the national interest calls on all of us. If a nation cannot agree even to defend its sovereignty, it is finished. This is an existential question, not a matter of who wants to carry out Trump’s orders.

I don’t have a recipe, but we have to react. Let’s sit down and talk, look for common ground. But let’s start by admitting that we have a problem. Of course we have to sit down with the Trump administration. But with a minimum of dignity, not with this tone of capitulation, as if nothing had happened here.

I am not calling on us to confront anyone. We also have to be aware of our weaknesses. But I am calling on us to defend what is ours. Let’s build an agenda, a plan to recover our sovereignty, to explain to the United States that, while we are willing to have good relations and receive investment, we are an independent country and we will fight for that.

WASHINGTON — President Trump’s new White House chief of staff, Stephen Miller, is behind many of the administration’s signature domestic policy initiatives, especially its sweeping crackdown on immigration.

An outspoken defender of Trump’s most far-reaching goals to remake government going back to his 2016 run for president, Miller is known for his harsh language and unrelenting bombast, attracting outsize attention from supporters and critics alike. His record is likely to be scrutinized by Democrats in his powerful new role as he leads Trump’s White House through a lame-duck period after the Republican Party lost both houses of Congress in overwhelming fashion.

Here are some memorable things Miller has said through the years:

On immigration

During a surge in illegal border crossings during the Biden administration, Miller described migrants as invaders, even though many were escaping poverty and violence in their home countries.

“We are being conquered,” he told Fox News in December 2023. “We have millions of people coming in from different cultures and different ways of living and different belief systems.”

Miller also warned that “a generation from now,” people “will not know the country that they are living in. These consequences are permanent. Unless there’s massive large-scale deportations by the millions, it will be irrevocable.”

On federal agents’ killing of Alex Pretti

After federal agents shot and killed Alex Pretti during protests against the Trump administration’s immigration crackdown in January, Miller posted on social media that the 37-year-old Minneapolis resident was a “domestic terrorist” and an “assassin” who had “tried to murder federal agents.”

Later, Miller said in a statement that the federal officers in Minneapolis “may not have been following” protocol.

On Venezuela and Greenland

In January, after a U.S. military invasion captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, Miller used a lengthy post on X to decry “reverse colonization” in which he suggested that Western nations were sacrificing too much for the developing world and that such a practice “has been a long self-punishment of the places and peoples that built the modern world.”

In another post, he defended the right of the U.S. to take over Venezuela’s vast oil reserves, writing: “American sweat, ingenuity and toil created the oil industry in Venezuela. Its tyrannical expropriation was the largest recorded theft of American wealth and property. These pillaged assets were then used to fund terrorism and flood our streets with killers, mercenaries and drugs.”

He defended Trump’s assertion that the U.S. was now running Venezuela, by telling CNN’s Jake Tapper: “You can talk all you want about international niceties and everything else. But we live in a world, in the real world, Jake, that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power. These are the iron laws of the world.”

In the same interview, Miller also argued that the U.S. could seize Greenland by military force from NATO ally Denmark. “Obviously, Greenland should be part of the United States,” he said.

“Nobody’s going to fight the United States militarily over the future of Greenland,” Miller said.

On deportations

In May of 2025, Miller suggested that the Trump administration was looking for ways to expand its power to deport migrants who are in the United States illegally. To achieve that, he said, officials were “actively looking at” suspending habeas corpus — the constitutional right for people to legally challenge their detention by the government.

“The Constitution is clear — and that, of course, is the supreme law of the land — that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus can be suspended in a time of invasion,” Miller said. “So, I would say that’s an option we’re actively looking at. Look, a lot of it depends on whether the courts do the right thing or not.”

In the nearly 18 months since, the idea has not been publicly pursued by the Trump administration.

On family separation

During Trump’s first term, Miller championed a strict immigration deterrence policy that previous administrations had been hesitant to adopt: family separation. It called for routinely having federal agents separate children from their parents if families were apprehended illegally crossing the border.

Miller defended the policy to the New York Times in 2018, saying it “was a simple decision by the administration to have a zero-tolerance policy for illegal entry, period.”

“The message is that no one is exempt from immigration law,” he added.

The tactic sparked widespread outcry, and the Trump administration did not revive it in its second term. Still, Miller has helped promote mass deportation of people already living illegally in the U.S. that has divided families according to legal status.

On the Statue of Liberty

During Trump’s first term in 2017, Miller appeared in the White House briefing room to detail for reporters plans to cut back on the number of green cards issued, while prioritizing English speakers and skilled workers.

Asked if doing so might violate the spirit of the poem on the Statue of Liberty, that reads in part, “Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,” Miller responded, “I don’t want to get off into a whole thing about history here.” He then did just that.

“The poem that you’re referring to, that was added later, is not actually a part of the original Statue of Liberty,” Miller said.

On birthright citizenship

When the U.S. Supreme Court blocked Trump’s attempt to throw out birthright citizenship — which grants citizenship to any child born on U.S. soil — Miller said immigrants and their children pose an existential threat to the nation.

“This is absolutely a deep knife wound in the heart of the American republic,” he told Fox News in June. “If your ruling requires you to suicide your civilization, your reading of the Constitution is wrong.”

On vaccines

Miller is one of many members of the administration who has expressed skepticism about childhood vaccines. In August, he praised the president for signing an executive order aimed at curtailing the vaccine schedule for children.

“Millions and millions of parents feel they’ve been pressured when their children are just weeks out of the hospital to take five shots, six shots, seven shots all at once,” said Miller, a father of four, including an infant born in June. “Nobody has studied it. Nobody’s looked at it. Nobody’s thought about it.”

His comments contradict what the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has said, which is that research shows getting several vaccines simultaneously “does not cause any chronic health problems.”

On the Democratic Party

In August 2025, Miller appeared on Fox News to respond to criticism from Democrats over Trump’s deployment of the National Guard in Washington and other U.S. cities — brushing aside concerns that the presence of troops was frightening residents, while having only a questionable impact on crime.

Miller used the occasion to take aim at Democrats more broadly.

“The Democrat Party does not fight for, care about or represent American citizens,” he said. “It is an entity devoted exclusively to the defense of hardened criminals, gang bangers and illegal alien killers and terrorists.”

Miller added: “The Democrat Party is not a political party. It is a domestic extremist organization.”

Weissert and Balingit write for the Associated Press.

Caracas, November 4, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Donald Trump administration is negotiating a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Venezuela that would lay the groundwork for a potential long-term US military presence in the country, according to US officials cited by the New York Times.

According to the sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity, negotiations over the military pact are being led by the State Department under Secretary of State Marco Rubio. However, details regarding the number of troops and ground missions would be left for future discussions.

According to US officials, SOFA accords “provide a clear and predictable legal framework for US forces to work on mutually agreed activities with our security partners, such as ship visits, training, exercises, and humanitarian assistance.” 

The US currently has SOFA agreements in place with several Latin American countries, including Paraguay, Ecuador, Panama, and Trinidad and Tobago, to “address shared threats such as drug trafficking and transnational organized crime.” Washington likewise operates multiple bases in the hemisphere and recently launched the “Shield of the Americas” initiative alongside regional allies with the declared purpose of tackling transnational crime and illegal immigration.

The New York Times sources did not clarify whether Washington intends to establish military bases in Venezuela or deploy US troops at existing Venezuelan bases. One official said only that the issue remains “far in the future” in the discussions, citing Venezuela’s “poor infrastructure” and the lack of interaction between the Venezuelan and US militaries in recent decades.

The newspaper warned that the military cooperation talks could be both “significant” and “risky.” Article 13 of Venezuela’s Constitution prohibits the establishment of foreign military bases or facilities serving the military purposes of other countries.

The story comes on the heels of a reported attack involving drones and helicopters against a camp belonging to Colombia’s National Liberation Army (ELN) on Friday in Apure State, close to the two countries’ shared border. 

According to the New York Times, the operation counted on US intelligence assistance, with military personnel helping identify the camp, which was claimed to be a “hub” for drug trafficking. 

The death toll, initially reported at 19 by local NGO Fundaredes, has risen to 23. Fundaredes’ Apure coordinator Juan García said that interviews conducted with survivors and victims’ relatives indicated that the strike also killed civilians not associated with the guerrilla group.

The Times stated that it was “not clear who piloted the drones” which are typically operated by US forces. The Wall Street Journal claimed US military drones executed the attack with “cooperation” from the Venezuelan government. For its part, the acting Delcy Rodríguez government and the Venezuelan armed forces have yet to issue any public comment on the mission targeting the ELN.

The ELN is the longest active guerrilla group in Colombia, having sustained a decades-long insurgency against the Colombian state. The organization maintained an arms-length relationship with the Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro governments, operating across the vast and porous southwestern border uncontrolled by both nations and at times cooperating with Venezuelan authorities against Colombian paramilitaries and dissident FARC elements.

Since the January 3 bombing and kidnapping of Maduro, senior US military brass have visited the Caribbean country.

In June 2026, US forces carried out an airstrike on Venezuelan territory that neutralized Héctor “Niño” Guerrero, an alleged leader of the criminal organization Tren de Aragua. The operation involved CIA intelligence work, with US authorities thanking Venezuelan counterparts for cooperation. Likewise, following the June 24 double earthquake, the US Southern Command deployed around 2,000 troops in Venezuelan territory, temporarily taking control of the country’s main airport.

In May, the US military held “rapid response” military drills, flying Osprey MV-22B aircraft over Caracas and landing at the US Embassy. The exercise drew fierce protests from Venezuelan social movements.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz (D) with María Corina Machado and her aides in January 2026.

Last night’s results confirmed what had long been signaled. As of this writing, Democrats are winning the House of Representatives with at least 228 seats, and the Senate with 54. Beyond Congress, they secured a majority of governorships for the first time in 16 years.

The White House’s reaction is a preview of what the next two years will look like. This morning, they posted a photo of the president with the caption: “Notice: Trump is still your president,” an idea echoed on X by his communications director, Steven Cheung. With this message, the administration appeared to signal that Trump will continue governing by executive fiat, bypassing Congress.

For Venezuelans, the question today is: what changes with this new majority? The answer remains the same: oversight. The tools Democrats have just regained could enable them to pressure the administration into accelerating an electoral process in Venezuela.

The races behind the shift

The surprise of the night came in South Carolina, where Annie Andrews won by four points in a state Trump carried by 18 in 2024. Results in Texas (James Talarico against Ken Paxton), Ohio (Sherrod Brown), Kansas (Adam Hamilton), Iowa (Josh Turek), and Maine—where Troy Jackson defeated Susan Collins—illustrate how White House policies exacted a toll on congressional Republicans.

This pushback was not confined to Congress: Democrats took governorships in Georgia, Ohio, Iowa, Nevada, Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Arizona. In Texas, Gina Hinojosa alongside James Talarico became the first Democrats to win a statewide race in more than three decades.

Even in Florida, which remains predominantly Republican, the figures make voter discontent clear. Byron Donalds won the governorship with 50% against David Jolly’s 48.7%. In a state Trump won just two years ago by 13 points, the margins secured by Republicans last night ought to worry them.

The line that could work for Democrats is the one led by Wasserman Schultz and Garcia: accepting that what happened on January 3 cannot be undone, while demanding that priorities shift.

In Miami, margins collapsed for Republican representatives. María Elvira Salazar leads Eliott Rodríguez by roughly 1,100 votes in a district Trump won by 20 points in 2024, and every sign points toward a recount. Mario Díaz-Balart is winning by less than a point in District 26, while Carlos Giménez dropped from 64.6% to 53% in District 28. Despite a district map redrawn to favor Republicans, Democrat Jared Moskowitz won District 25.

Debbie Wasserman Schultz retained her seat, now in District 20, with 74.4% of the vote. Her campaign exemplifies the platform currently working for Democrats in South Florida: she publicly distanced herself from the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA); criticized Trump for leaving Maduro’s inner circle in charge of Venezuela; and spearheaded the legal defense of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Venezuelans. Her unyielding stance against chavismo paired with protections for the diaspora reflects both deep familiarity with the country and a roadmap for how Democrats may operate starting in January.

Translating victory into effective oversight

Over the past two years, the Republican Congress served more as Trump’s shield than as a check on his power. The president’s policies may stay the course or harden, but oversight is where the real shift occurs. Starting in January 2027, when the new Congress convenes, Democrats can leverage their victory across four fronts.

First, subpoenas. House committees will shift to Democratic hands. Robert Garcia and Gregory Meeks—previously ranking members on the Oversight and Foreign Affairs committees—will no longer be in the minority. They will have the authority to compel document production and testimony from the administration. In the Senate, the Judiciary and Foreign Relations committees will also change leadership.

Second, the budget. Unlike the past two years, Republicans must now negotiate spending bills with Democrats. This gives Democrats the leverage to condition funding on greater executive transparency.

Third, appointments. High-level officials require confirmation from a Senate Trump no longer controls. Should a Supreme Court vacancy arise, that same Senate will confirm the replacement.

Alongside Meeks, Garcia requested a copy of the agreement with Alejandro Betancourt’s firm and received only a single document. Come January, those letters can become subpoenas.

Fourth, legislation. War powers resolutions that stalled in a Republican-led Congress could now pass with both chambers under Democratic control. Immigration bills long shelved in Republican drawers might finally see progress.

Real constraints remain: most legislation requires 60 votes in the Senate, and overriding a presidential veto requires a two-thirds majority in both chambers. Trump will continue advancing policies unilaterally, but sustained pressure on information flow and budgetary purse strings can alter outcomes.

Venezuela is a clear example of this new dynamic. Robert Garcia has spent the year probing the management of Venezuelan oil revenues. He has demanded accountability over more than $13 billion in proceeds and requested communications between the administration and companies including Chevron, ExxonMobil, Vitol, and Trafigura. Alongside Meeks, Garcia requested a copy of the agreement with Alejandro Betancourt’s firm and received only a single document. Come January, those letters can become subpoenas, and Salazar—who blocked Joaquín Castro’s subpoena request in September—will no longer chair the Western Hemisphere subcommittee.

Venezuela in the new dynamic between Trump and Dems

In September, I wrote that Democrats would likely take the House, that reclaiming the Senate was an uphill climb, and that Venezuela was not a party priority. The first proved accurate; the second underestimated the field. While polls anticipated Democratic gains, yesterday’s wave reshapes Venezuela’s place in the broader policy conversation.

With the White House on the defensive, Venezuela stands as one of the few accomplishments Trump can point to. Consequently, the administration will likely double down on its Venezuela policy—not out of concern for Venezuelans, but because it yields political capital. For Democrats, Venezuela exemplifies what Trump can execute without Congress, while underscoring that the diaspora does not tolerate leniency toward chavismo.

If Democrats approach Venezuela as an anchor for institutional oversight and work to make it a bipartisan cause, it will serve as one of the few issues where this new majority exercises its mandate while projecting moderation.

In other words, amid this anti-Trump wave, the reflexive impulse will be to oppose everything the president does regarding Venezuela. That would also be an error. The viable path forward for Democrats is the one charted by Wasserman Schultz and Garcia: acknowledging that the events of January 3 cannot be undone, while demanding that priorities shift—placing free elections and the release of political prisoners ahead of oil contracts.

This approach mirrors the incentives driving Republicans in Miami. Even as they supported Trump’s hardline immigration policies (only voicing reservations weeks before the election), they also urged the White House to back María Corina Machado.

If Democrats treat Venezuela as an anchor for institutional oversight and steer it toward bipartisan consensus, it will become one of the few areas where this new majority executes its constitutional duties while projecting moderation, turning Congress into a venue for governance rather than another theater in the partisan war.

State governments also act as counterweights: governors determine whether to cooperate with ICE, sign 287(g) agreements, and administer election systems. Holding a majority of statehouses, including Texas and Georgia, gives Democrats greater influence over how the 2028 presidential race is run.

A first step toward 2028

This outcome is not a blank check for Democrats. Just as yesterday’s results served as a reprimand to the governing party in the White House, failure to convert this win into tangible outcomes will leave Democrats with little leverage by 2028. To preserve their gains, they must deliver on three fronts:

First, visible results. Voters penalized the cost of living, not just the president. If the new majority limits itself to holding hearings and releasing findings, it will alienate those who voted based on economic concerns.

Second, safeguarding the coalition. The margins in Texas and Florida demonstrated that Latino voters shifted over immigration and the economy rather than an ideological realignment. Retaining the Latino vote through 2028 will require legislative momentum on immigration reform.

Third, discipline. If oversight devolves into a weekly spectacle or a bid for social media engagement, Republicans will frame it as obstruction. Limiting executive overreach is not a partisan campaign; it is a constitutional imperative. Republicans who have broken with Trump on select issues remain natural allies.

What matters is forging a shared vision among potential Democratic contenders that enables them to demand swift, free elections in Venezuela.

Throughout the campaign, Republicans routinely characterized Democrats as socialists—a narrative fueled by statements from the DSA, some of whose members went so far as to demand Maduro’s release. Yet the DSA’s actual leverage within the party remains far smaller than Republicans suggest. Its candidates expanded margins primarily in safe Democratic seats.

The decisive shift in this election occurred where centrists won over independent voters by substantial margins, such as Jon Ossoff taking 59% in Georgia or Chris Pappas winning by 14 points in New Hampshire. A sensible Venezuela policy should therefore focus on building bipartisan ground: advancing mechanisms like the Jeanne Shaheen–Ted Cruz resolution or Jared Moskowitz’s transition framework.

It is too early to settle on Democratic presidential contenders, but early discussions include Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Jon Ossoff, Kamala Harris, Pete Buttigieg, and Gavin Newsom.

Beyond Ocasio-Cortez’s consistent critique of interventionist foreign policy and former Vice President Harris’s familiarity with the Biden administration’s stance toward Caracas, none of these figures has really managed a deep portfolio on Venezuela.

Harris endorsed Machado while running against Trump, while AOC refused to recognize Maduro as the winner of the July 28, 2024 election. Among the potential candidates, AOC, Newsom, Buttigieg, and Harris have all commented—some with sharp criticism, others with calculated ambiguity—on the events of January 3.

What matters moving forward is forging a shared vision among these leaders that enables them to demand swift, free elections in Venezuela. At its core, Venezuelans are demanding a government that improves everyday life, rather than one distracting the public with opaque oil deals that benefit a narrow few.

Democrats now have an opening to help shape Venezuela’s transition. Doing so requires activating the oversight and transparency tools they have long championed, including demanding visibility into the White House negotiations that began this past August.

Mérida, November 3, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Foreign Minister Oliver Blanco held meetings with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent during a trip to Washington, DC, on Monday.

Blanco, who was appointed as the Caribbean nation’s top diplomat on October 30, is the highest-ranking Venezuelan official to be hosted by the Trump administration.

His morning summit with Rubio included a photo-op but no statements to the press. On social media, Blanco reaffirmed the acting Delcy Rodríguez government’s “commitment to continue building spaces for understanding for the benefit of Venezuela.”

“During the meeting, we discussed bilateral relations, regional challenges, cooperation, and energy security between our countries,” he wrote.

For his part, Rubio stressed the Trump administration’s “three-phase plan” for Venezuela, which comprises “stabilization, economic recovery and political reconciliation, and democratic transition.”

“[Rubio and Blanco] discussed progress in the Venezuelan-led reconciliation talks, including institutional reforms that lay the groundwork for free, fair, and credible elections,” a State Department press statement read.

The head of Venezuelan diplomacy followed up with a meeting with US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent which reportedly focused on “conditions for Venezuela’s full economic development.” Blanco added that the pair discussed Venezuela’s “access to multilateral financial bodies and bilateral economic cooperation opportunities.”

Despite reestablished diplomatic ties and significant US control over Venezuela’s economy and the oil industry, the US Treasury Department has maintained its wide-reaching sanctions program against the South American country, issuing only limited licenses granting exemptions to specific corporations.

The US Treasury Secretary congratulated Blanco on his recent appointment and claimed the White House is “committed to supporting Venezuela’s economic recovery.” 

“This Administration is committed to supporting Venezuela’s economic recovery, revitalizing critical sectors, boosting energy production, and reconnecting its financial sector to restore confidence, attract investment, and lay the groundwork for a more prosperous future,” Bessent stated on X.

The high-level Washington, DC meetings were Blanco’s first trip abroad as foreign minister. He had previously served as vice minister for Europe and North America. 

The 34-year-old foreign relations graduate hails from the ranks of the opposition Acción Democrática party and had been an outspoken critic of the Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro governments. In 2013, Blanco celebrated Chávez’s death, claiming he was in hell alongside Muammar Gaddafi and Osama Bin Laden. The tweet was recently deleted.

In 2016, Blanco was appointed head of communications for the opposition-controlled National Assembly that unsuccessfully tried to oust the Maduro government.

Since the January 3 military strikes and kidnapping of Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores, Washington and Caracas fast-tracked a diplomatic rapprochement that included the reopening of their respective embassies after seven years of broken ties.

The Trump administration has backed legislative reforms, spearheaded energy deals, endorsed a dialogue process with the Venezuelan opposition, while also reportedly engaging in military and intelligence cooperation.

After assuming his role in the foreign ministry, Blanco became one of the most visible figures in the renewed relations with the US, often accompanying US Chargé d’Affaires John Barrett on visits and meetings around the country.

Barrett was among the first to congratulate Blanco following his promotion to head Venezuela’s diplomacy, wishing him “success as we work together on the three-phase plan.”

The two held a “cordial and constructive” meeting on Friday. 

Blanco flew to Spain following his US trip to take part in the Iberoamerican Summit taking place on Wednesday and Thursday.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

This comes as leading opposition leader, Maria Corina Machado, returns to Venezuela and hints at criticism of Trump administration.

The United States has urged Venezuela to continue on a phased plan of economic recovery and political reconciliation before embarking on democratic elections.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio discussed the gradual plan during a meeting on the country’s political future with Venezuelan Minister of Foreign Affairs Oliver Blanco on Monday. The meeting comes nearly a year after US forces abducted former Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro from Caracas and brought him to the US to face drug trafficking and other charges.

Neither Rubio nor Blanco spoke to the media after the meeting, but in a readout. The State Department said in a readout that Washington had reaffirmed President Donald Trump’s “three-phase plan for Venezuela: stabilization, economic recovery and political reconciliation, and democratic transition”.

Last week, Venezuelan opposition leader Maria Corina Machado returned to her country, thanking the US president and Rubio for their support. Machado, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate who gifted her medal to Trump in 2025, said she had come to organise a movement in preparation for Venezuelan elections.

Rubio “has set out a sequence of events aimed at moving toward a democratic transition that makes clear the holding of presidential elections in 2027”, she said.

Machado is balancing an election campaign with a Trump administration that has sought to extract oil from Venezuela by striking deals with the government of interim President Delcy Rodriguez, who served as Maduro’s vice president and took over after his abduction.

In September, the Trump administration said it had struck a deal with Venezuela that would give Washington a stake in about one-fifth of the country’s oil resources.

The US said it was creating a joint venture with North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP), owned by Venezuelan businessman Alejandro Betancourt, which is the second-largest private oil operator in Venezuela, behind Chevron.

Under the deal, Caracas is giving the company 100-year rights over 17 oilfields with proven reserves of 65 billion barrels. The Pentagon will have a 35 percent stake in NABEP, and the US will be guaranteed the right to buy 20 percent of its oil output at cost, the Trump administration has said.

Shortly before Machado’s statements on Thursday, Rodriguez assured the nation that elections would be held in Venezuela “with the world as witness”, but did not specify a date.

When asked about a possible meeting with Rodriguez, Machado said she had not received any message from the interim president or from Washington.

In remarks after returning Venezuela, Machado seemed sceptical of the oil agreement with the US.

“This agreement does not reflect the levels of transparency that Venezuelan society wants,” Machado said.

In Venezuela, reality feels more and more like a puzzle. We have to look at what officials choose to say and not say, what is leaked, what remains behind the curtain, and try to weave a plausible narrative out of that.

The government’s opacity has become the norm. There are key decisions about the country’s future with little to no public explanation, contradictory statements, figures that are hard to believe or put into context. Affairs that should be debated and familiar to everyone are shrouded in uncertainty.

For years, the justification was that the US blockade forced everything to be kept secret, so that the enemy would not use that information to its advantage. Then, when corruption scandals broke out, we were told it was the price to pay for doing business under sanctions.

Fast forward to the present, and the blockade has given way to US neocolonial tutelage. But opacity has only gotten worse. Sometimes Trump officials are the ones explaining what happens in our country. The greatest example is the recent oil deal, but there is another sector plagued by these dark interests: the cement industry, which is especially important now amid the post-earthquake reconstruction needs.

A few days after the June 24 double earthquake, Acting President Delcy Rodríguez ordered an audit of Vencement, a company belonging to the Miller Holding conglomerate, whose CEO is Turkish businessman Turhan Mildon. In March 2025, the young entrepreneur reportedly received a concession to operate 10 cement plants owned by the Venezuelan state. The factories belong to the Socialist Cement Corporation, created by Chávez in 2009 after nationalizing the industry.

The concession to Mildon was greenlit by former Minister of Industry Alex Saab, who was surrendered to US agencies in May to face money laundering charges. In that case, we likewise did not have the privilege of an official explanation^[a] for why a naturalized Venezuelan-Colombian dual citizen could be “deported” to the US, contrary to the constitution.

With the announced review of cement contracts, and in line with Washington’s directive of cutting out the insiders who had privileged treatment during the Maduro government, Rodríguez unilaterally canceled the concession, alleging non-fulfilment of investment targets.

This sector has been mired in controversy due to the shortages of cement and speculation with its prices. Though production costs for a 42-kilo cement bag are around $8, scarcity or hoarding often led to prices above $35. With the official investigation, there was an order to surveil the plants, block any removal of material, and restrict Vencement personnel from doing inventory or fulfilling existing orders.

But Vencement was not Mildon’s only venture in Venezuela. In November 2025, Saab intervened in the Lamar Group, a company from Zulia State that produced and exported shrimp, which was awarded to the Turkish businessman. The official explanation was that Lamar’s former owner, José Enrique Rincón, was involved in financing an alleged coup attempt against Maduro. In parallel, the government handed Café Madrid and Fama de América, two coffee producers nationalized around 15 years ago, to Mildon as well.

According to Forbes Turkey, Miller Holding and its affiliates, particularly in Venezuela and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where Mildon also became extremely influential overnight, had $2.6 billion in profit in 2025. Nevertheless, because the companies are not publicly traded, it is hard to assess their true value. The business sector in Turkey is hardly a paragon of transparency either.

Mildon stated in the same interview that he felt “very sad” when US forces kidnapped Maduro in January, but added that he was not concerned about his businesses. “In my grandfather’s time, professional experience was key. Nowadays, it’s who you know,” the businessman said.

This prompts  multiple questions. How did Mildon get a concession for a sector as strategic as cement, not to mention his other endeavors? His representatives claimed that there were four other competitors, but government sources told the New York Times that the private businesses that receive state assets to operate under “strategic alliances” are handpicked.

Furthermore, Mildon claims Vencement is currently producing 4.5 million tons of cement per year, whereas the NYT reported that, according to data shared by government insiders, output is actually around a third of that. Maybe authorities would like to clarify?

Another obvious question is, why Mildon? Some mention his family’s ties to the Turkish government and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, with Mildon’s conglomerate receiving over a dozen important contracts in recent years. Amid US sanctions against Venezuela, risk-taking Turkish businessmen secured juicy opportunities in Venezuela. Others add that a separate advantage was Mildon getting access to inner circles thanks to his relationship with María Eugenia Ceballos, daughter of Chief Admiral and former Interior Minister Remigio Ceballos. Surely love cannot trump a fair bidding process, or can it?

It looks like it, because Mildon’s Turkish soap opera was not canceled with Maduro’s kidnapping and Saab’s handover. Mildon reportedly managed to preserve his assets in Venezuela after getting engaged and married to Alina Habba, a lawyer with close ties to Trump who worked in the Justice Department.

Habba, who also possesses quite the dubious CV for all the influence she wields, got the US president to pardon Venezuelan banker Julio Herrera Velutini, who had been charged with bribery and fraud before being convicted of a campaign finance violation misdemeanor. Habba received a $50 million contract, while still working in the Justice Department, from Concord Partners, a company created by the Herrera Velutini family in Florida. This honestly looks like Olympic-level competition for lack of transparency and shady deals.

But returning to Mildon and Habba, their lavish wedding at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York featured senior Trump officials such as US Attorney General Todd Blanche, FBI Director Kash Patel, and White House attorney Will Scharf.

Apparently, Mildon’s new romance led Rodríguez to change course, declaring that the cancelation of the cement contracts had been a clerical error. On October 13, the Miller conglomerate issued a press statement clarifying that none of its agreements had been canceled.

Beyond the Turkish soap opera that has taken hold in Venezuela, we go back to the fundamental question: what conditions do private businesses need to clear before getting hold of strategic Venezuelan state companies? Who is following up on the investment, production, and fiscal commitments? What mechanisms ensure that these concessions will lead to any economic benefits apart from corporate profits? It seems like all these questions get trumped by contractors’ White House connections .

One of the characteristics of the Venezuelan political shift in recent months has been the sanctification  of private investment. Amid legislative reforms and commissions charged with determining which “non-strategic” assets should be privatized, key sectors such as electricity or the basic industries might soon be in the hands of multinational corporations.

I’m not a big believer in trickle-down economics, in this case that Venezuelans’ well-being will come once corporate profits are assured. But if on top of that, business is the outcome of the most vulgar influence trafficking, we are truly doomed. This soap opera needs a plot twist.

Jessica Dos Santos is a Venezuelan university professor, journalist and writer whose work has appeared in outlets such as RT, Épale CCS magazine and Investig’Action. She is the author of the book “Caracas en Alpargatas” (2018). She’s won the Aníbal Nazoa Journalism Prize in 2014 and received honorable mentions in the Simón Bolívar National Journalism prize in 2016 and 2018.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelanalysis editorial staff.

Caracas, October 29, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez defended an ongoing plan to privatize state assets and return nationalized companies to former owners on Thursday.

“I have ordered the evaluation of non-essential state assets to be offered to the private sector or returned to their previous owners,” she said in a televised address to the nation.

“This is already in motion. The right to private property is guaranteed by our Constitution,” Rodríguez added.

In April, the acting president established a commission to evaluate the “strategic” value of state-owned companies, land, and other assets, to determine whether they should be retained, privatized, or liquidated.

Former President Hugo Chávez implemented a program of nationalizations in the 2000s to assert state control over strategic economic sectors, including electricity, telecommunications, and heavy industries.

After enacting a pro-business overhaul of hydrocarbon and mining legislation earlier this year, the Venezuelan parliament is on the verge of approving the partial privatization of the electricity sector. Foreign companies are likewise in talks to acquire the country’s largest aluminum smelter, while a consortium headed by Sunergon Oil is reportedly pushing the takeover of several industrial plants associated with the oil industry.

Business sector representative Luigi Pisella, who heads the commission, recently proposed a law enshrining multinational corporate participation in privatized public entities alongside local capital.

“I have encountered no resistance to this idea,” he stated in an interview with Banca y Negocios. “Most investors agree it is indispensable to have local partners whose experience is essential to navigate the complex Venezuelan environment.”

Pisella added that “different models of private participation” are being evaluated, but ruled out the “strategic alliances” whereby the state grants the assets in a concession-type deal while retaining ownership. The business sector spokesman argued that “no one is going to invest” without the full transfer of property.

In Thursday’s address, Acting President Rodríguez also promised that workers’ incomes would be increased quarterly next year, with the raise being at least on a par with GDP growth. 

“For 2027 we are scheduling increases to workers’ incomes in four different moments, in amounts that can never fall short of economic growth in the preceding trimesters,” she explained. 

Rodríguez did not mention adjusting the minimum wage, which has been frozen since 2022 and is currently worth around US $0.15. Instead, Venezuelan authorities have leaned on non-wage bonuses, which do not factor into vacation pay, severance, and other labor benefits in what amounts to a de facto subsidy to employers. Public sector workers currently have a monthly income floor of $240.

While Venezuela’s GDP is predicted to grow 5-10 percent in 2026, even raising non-wage bonuses by that amount falls short of inflation. Finance website Ecoanalitica estimates that prices measured in USD will end up rising 20-30 percent in 2026, meaning that an income adjustment pegged to GDP growth would amount to a loss of purchasing power.

In her message, Rodríguez went on to tout ongoing labor reform talks involving business lobbies and select trade unions. 

Private sector associations such as FEDECÁMARAS and FEDEINDUSTRIA want to slash labor costs for employers, further reducing social security contributions and eliminating the retroactive nature of severance pay and other benefits such that any future wage hike would not trigger corresponding increases.

Finally, the acting president defended recent judicial reforms and ongoing US-endorsed talks with a sector of the Venezuelan opposition that will appoint a new Supreme Court and National Electoral Council. The US State Department has claimed that new presidential elections will be held in 2027.

Rodríguez offered no specifics on an electoral timetable, stating only that “there will be elections, with a renewed electoral authority and the world as a witness.”

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Philadelphia, USA.

Nobel Peace Prize winner returns to Venezuela from exile, pressing for elections and criticising a controversial US oil deal with Caracas.

Venezuelan opposition leader Maria Corina Machado has thanked US President Donald Trump’s administration for opening the “floodgate to freedom” by abducting President Nicolas Maduro in January.

The Nobel Peace Prize laureate on Thursday also called for elections to be held in Venezuela next year, in her first public remarks since returning from more than 10 months in exile.

“Thanks to their vision, their courage, and their action on January 3, the floodgate to freedom has been opened,” Machado told a news conference in Caracas, naming Trump, his administration and Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

Rubio “has set out a sequence of events aimed at moving toward a democratic transition that makes clear the holding of presidential elections in 2027”, she said.

Machado has praised Trump before, presenting the president with her Nobel medal – a prize he feverishly coveted for himself in 2025.

A longtime activist, Machado fled Venezuela for Oslo in December to accept the Nobel Peace Prize. On Thursday, she said she had come home to “mobilise society”. US special forces veterans with an organisation called Grey Bull Rescue helped Machado escape by boat after she spent a year in hiding from Maduro’s regime.

Since Maduro’s abduction in January, the country has been ruled by his former Vice President Delcy Rodriguez.

Machado was greeted by cheering supporters as she travelled in her motorcade after she returned to Venezuela on Sunday. Rodriguez voiced distaste for the fanfare.

“The show could have been avoided – the airports are right here,” she said on state television.

When asked about a possible meeting with Rodriguez, the opposition leader said she had not received any message from her or from Washington.

Shortly before Machado’s statements on Thursday, Rodriguez assured the nation that elections would be held in Venezuela “with the world as witness” but did not specify a date.

Her return comes just weeks after a controversial US oil deal that will see Venezuela hand over 20 percent of its vast oil reserves.

“This agreement does not reflect the levels of transparency that Venezuelan society wants,” Machado said, criticising the deal.

US president seeks to underscore Latin American military operation, as Iran war causes midterm affordability threat.

United States President Donald Trump has featured a ship he said is carrying Venezuelan oil during a visit to Texas, where he will hold two rallies one after the other in the hopes of boosting Republican chances in a make-or-break Senate race.

Speaking at Corpus Christi on Tuesday on his fourth trip to the state this campaign season, Trump pointed to a ship in the distance.

“It’s got 1 million barrels of oil on it from Venezuela,” he said, adding the cargo was “thanks to our big victory in our recent war with Venezuela”.

The emphasis on the oil comes as US consumers have wrestled with high fossil fuel prices amid the US-Israel war with Iran, a key issue in the upcoming midterm elections.

“We’re celebrating the greatest oil victory in history,” Trump said.

It was not immediately clear under what pretext the oil had been shipped or whether the details Trump gave were correct. The US had received crude oil shipments from Venezuela before the US abduction of Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro on January 3, but those transfers have increased this year.

In August, the Trump administration announced a deal giving the Pentagon a 35 percent stake in North America Blue Energy Partners, a new company overseeing 65 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. The White House said in September that the first shipment from the deal would likely hit US reserves in November, although experts have cast doubt on whether the deal will have any short-term impact.

Speaking to reporters earlier in the day, Trump referred to the shipment as a “gift” from Venezuela. The country’s interim leader, Delcy Rodriguez, has not commented on the specific shipment.

At the rally, Trump also floated making Venezuela the “51st state”.

Key race

Trump’s frequent visits to Texas underscore the state’s significance for Republicans.

Trump endorsed Attorney General Ken Paxton in the Republican primary over incumbent Senator John Cornyn. The scandal-ridden Paxton now faces a punishing contest against Democrat James Talarico, a Presbyterian seminarian.

Polls have regularly shown Talarico leading Paxton, although that lead has largely remained within the margin of error. A RealClearPolitics average of polls had Talarico leading Paxton by 1.7 points.

Talarico’s victory would mark a sea change in a state that has not elected a Democrat to statewide office since 1994.

It would also represent a major rebuke to Trump, whose Republican Party is fighting to maintain its narrow control of the Senate. Democrats are widely projected to take control of the US House of Representatives in the November 3 vote.

Talarico has used the final stretch of the race to focus on years of corruption allegations against Paxton, while drawing a contrast to voters’ affordability concerns.

“Ken Paxton represents everything that’s wrong with this broken, corrupt system,” he said during an event in Houston last week.

Paxton has sought to portray Talarico as too “radical” for Texas, saying his policies would hurt a state known for its pro-business policies.

Trump and other administration officials, notably Vice President JD Vance, have regularly focused on cultural issues, distorting Talarico’s past comments on transgender rights and border security.

Speaking in Corpus Christi, Trump repeated those attacks and urged his supporters to vote as if he were on the ballot.

“If you go out, and if you all vote, we win in a landslide,” Trump said.

The Nobel laureate’s homecoming follows national protests demanding free elections.

Venezuela’s opposition leader Maria Corina Machado has successfully returned to the country after more than 10 months in exile.

Machado announced her arrival on social media on Sunday, writing, “I am here. With you.”

The current opposition leader, Edmundo Gonzalez, confirmed the news, writing on X that “our leader, my dear Maria Corina, is on Venezuelan soil”.

The Comando Con Venezuela political organisation shared footage of Machado arriving at a church in Lara, where she was greeted by supporters.

Machado first disappeared from public life after being briefly arrested in January 2025. She re-emerged last December in Norway, where she won the Nobel Peace Prize for her efforts to challenge Venezuela President Nicolas Maduro. Maduro was abducted from Caracas by the United States military in January 2026.

Venezuela’s Vice President Delcy Rodriguez has stood in as acting president since then, with the endorsement of US President Donald Trump, and has cooperated with his administration regarding reforms in the country, as well as a deal to grant the US control of over 65 billion barrels’ worth of Venezuela’s oil reserves.

Calls for elections to be held

Rodriguez’s presidency has extended far beyond the 90-day period she was authorised to serve following Maduro’s removal. But she has yet to call an election despite public demand and despite her promise to do so at the United Nations General Assembly in September. The US maintains that the country is not ready yet.

Earlier this week, thousands of Venezuelans took to the streets to call for elections in the first nationwide opposition protest in nearly two years.

Although the opposition is widely believed to have won Venezuela’s disputed 2024 elections, Trump has cast doubt on Machado’s abilities to lead, claiming in January that she “doesn’t have the support within or the respect within the country”.

Machado presented Trump with her Nobel medal when visiting him in the White House weeks later, in what she said was “a recognition for his unique commitment with our freedom”. The US leader has repeatedly voiced his desire to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize himself.

Machado has made previous unsuccessful attempts to enter Venezuela. In September, her team said she had made seven attempts in the space of a few weeks.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced on X that “the conditions allowing for the safe return of Ms. Machado to Venezuela is the direct result of the U.S. supported reconciliation talks which has already seen hundreds of political prisoners freed and hundreds of political opposition figures return from exile.”

Asked to comment about Machado’s return, Trump told reporters on Sunday, “I don’t know anything about it, but I think she’s a very nice woman.”

“She gave me her Nobel Prize, so how can I say anything else? And I hope she’s safe.”

September 2: Chris Wright, Delcy Rodríguez and Paula Henao at the contract-signing ceremony for new deals with Chevron, Eni, and GE Vernova.

The lights could come back on in Maracaibo without Venezuelans gaining the capacity to change their government. More unsettlingly, restoring power to their homes could help keep those governing them in place.

This is the possibility taking shape in Venezuela. Chavismo’s relationship with Washington has changed under the pressure of American intervention; new investment could improve services while giving both the government and its foreign partners a growing interest in preserving the arrangement that delivers those improvements.

The issue goes beyond whether chavismo has abandoned its ideology: the infrastructure sustaining its power is being rebuilt around different relationships. Democratic demands now confront a governing system whose continuity may serve interests extending well beyond Venezuela.

A different foundation for continuity

Maduro remained after July 28, 2024, but maintaining control of the State could not repair the gap between holding office and having a credible electoral mandate. When US forces captured him in January 2026, that legitimacy deficit shaped the international response. Although there were international condemnations of the operation, opposing the use of force and defending Maduro’s right to govern were different positions. Some governments rejected his claim to the presidency while still questioning the intervention. 

Nevertheless, Maduro’s removal left much of the chavista governing apparatus in place. Under Delcy Rodríguez, that apparatus faces a powerful external actor that can influence its room to manoeuvre. Pragmatism is therefore more than an ideological preference: cooperation with Washington has become a condition of political survival.

Tension arises when immediate commercial stability becomes tied to particular officeholders and agreements whose terms a democratic government might review.

For Washington, the authorities in Caracas can authorize contracts and implement agreements. For those authorities, cooperation offers resources and international acceptance. Their interests are different, but they can converge around continuity.

That convergence is acquiring a material basis. On October 17, Rodríguez announced expectations of almost $76 billion in oil investment over five years. These are anticipated investments, rather than money already spent. As contracts, payments and operations develop, however, businesses may become increasingly dependent on the officials and arrangements enabling them.

This does not make democracy incompatible with American investment. Accountable institutions could offer stronger guarantees over time. Tension arises when immediate commercial stability becomes tied to particular officeholders and agreements whose terms a democratic government might review. Political change can then appear as a risk to be postponed.

What changes behind the light switch

In my earlier article on infrastructure after the earthquakes, I argued that relationships, trust and coordination are as necessary to a response as machinery. Electricity works the same way. A power station depends on engineers, maintenance routines, payments and decisions about where resources go.

In my sociotechnical research, a cultural infrastructure framework helps distinguish three connected levels. The first is what people experience. The second is how work is organized to provide it. The third concerns who has authority, whose expertise counts and what makes their decisions acceptable or open to challenge.

During Maduro’s presidency, the drought of 2016 and the blackouts of 2019 exposed failures across all three. Households lost electricity. Behind the outages were maintenance problems, fuel shortages and the loss of experienced staff. An assessment by the Inter-American Development Bank also identified weak planning and the absence of independent regulation. Repairing machinery could not, by itself, correct the arrangements allowing the system to deteriorate.

Venezuelans may receive better electricity without gaining a meaningful say in how the system operates.

Under Delcy, the third level has changed profoundly. Washington now helps shape the conditions for reconstruction, and international suppliers offer access to equipment and expertise. The US Department of Energy describes an agreement with GE Vernova to modernize the grid and expand generation over several years.

That shift could enable changes in the second level, from procurement and contractor payments to maintenance and staffing. Those changes could eventually improve the first level, with fewer outages and more reliable services. However, Reuters reported in May that suppliers still faced uncertainty over payments, project priorities and authorizations. Announcements do not remove accumulated failures.

The important distinction is that changing who authorizes recovery does not necessarily give citizens more authority over it. The third level can be extensively reorganized between governments and companies while remaining closed to the people who depend on the service.

Whose stability, and for how long?

Electricity makes the resulting tension concrete. An oil producer needs reliable power. A household needs it too. Investment serving production could benefit both, but shared need does not ensure equal influence over which installations are repaired first or which communities wait.

If those priorities are negotiated mainly between officials and investors, Venezuelans may receive better electricity without gaining a meaningful say in how the system operates. Successful repairs could strengthen the government’s public standing while making commercial partners more invested in its continuity.

The different timescales matter. As I argued in “Venezuela Isn’t Transitioning. It’s Operating,” daily life follows immediate needs while political change moves on another timetable. A repaired installation may reduce outages before the wider network has dependable maintenance. Sustaining improvements requires organizational capacity. Establishing public accountability requires political decisions that neither repairs nor foreign investment can make automatically.

Venezuelans should not have to choose between functioning services and political rights. Nor should investors have to depend on indefinite chavista rule for contracts to be secure.

Meanwhile, every contract and operational dependency can make the emerging arrangement harder to alter. A process presented as temporary stabilization could acquire beneficiaries with reasons to prolong it. Recovery would then help rebuild the foundations of chavista power before the question of democratic authority is settled.

That is why an electoral timetable matters alongside investment commitments. US-backed talks involving Dinorah Figuera continue while María Corina Machado remains outside the process and no firm election date has been established. The practical question is whether citizens acquire enforceable rights to scrutinize and replace their government while economic arrangements are being consolidated.

Reliable electricity would be a real improvement, but Venezuelans should not have to choose between functioning services and political rights. Nor should investors have to depend on indefinite chavista rule for contracts to be secure.

Chavismo’s pragmatism is rebuilding the relationships through which it can survive. Whether that reconstruction also serves democracy depends on who can challenge its terms. The lights coming back on may show that the system works better; the decisive political test is whether Venezuelans can change the people running it.

Thousands of Venezuelans have taken to the streets in several cities to demand free elections and other political changes, in the first nationwide opposition protest in nearly two years.

US President Donald Trump and acting President Delcy Rodriguez have said there would be elections, but no date has been set for a vote to decide on a successor for Nicolas Maduro, after the former Venezuelan president was captured by US forces in a military raid in January.

Opposition leader and Nobel Peace Prize winner Maria Corina Machado, who has been outside the country for nearly a year after living in hiding following a contested 2024 election, has said elections must take place by July 2027.

Her Vente Venezuela movement organised the protest, which took place in the capital Caracas and other cities, including Valencia, Maracay, San Cristobal and Maracaibo.

“Seeing this makes me happy because I know change is possible,” said 18-year-old cosmetology student Leosmary Hernandez, as she gathered with hundreds of others in northern Maracay. “I’ve been through so many hardships, so many problems because of the dollar, and difficulties studying. I have high hopes for my country and for our next leader and president, Maria Corina.”

“I went out to protest before, when things were much tougher, and I’m even less afraid today because I want my voice to be heard,” she added.

Since January 3, the country has been led by interim President Delcy Rodriguez of the long-governing United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV).

PSUV leaders have been accused of carrying out human rights abuses against political dissidents, including arbitrary arrest, imprisonment and torture.

After the United States launched a military operation to abduct and jail former President Nicolas Maduro, the PSUV remained in power with the support of the White House.

US President Trump has backed Rodriguez’s leadership, despite her having been Maduro’s vice president.

His administration has maintained an active role in Venezuela, exerting control over its oil resources and pressuring the Rodriguez government for reforms.

Minimal security presence

Venezuela’s socialist movement, in power since 1999 under late President Hugo Chavez and then Maduro, has in the past deployed security forces against protesters, but government forces had minimal presence at protest sites on Thursday, and in many smaller cities demonstrators dispersed before dark.

The ruling Socialist Party called for its supporters to march from Caracas’ Plaza Venezuela, the same place the opposition planned to gather two hours later, to a location near the presidential palace to commemorate Breast Cancer Awareness Month.

Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello, known for his close ties to the security services, was pictured on state television attending the march, while the opposition supporters moved their protest to a nearby location.

US-backed talks continue

Talks between a faction of the opposition and the interim government, aimed at remaking the top court and the electoral council ahead of eventual elections, held their latest session this month, but changes could take significant time.

The negotiations, backed by the US, do not include Machado’s political movement, though she has said she will not stand in the way of their progress.

Machado’s proxy Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia claims to have won the 2024 election according to vote tallies by the opposition. But the government, which never released full counts, backed Maduro, as did the country’s legal and electoral institutions.

Machado has for years sought US support, aligning with hawks in the Trump team who argued that Maduro, through alleged links to drug gangs, represented a direct threat to US national security. Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, are facing drug and torture charges in the US. They have pleaded not guilty.

Caracas, October 22, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Students from the Venezuelan Experimental University of the Arts (UNEARTE) have staged multiple demonstrations in recent days to press for solutions to infrastructural and administrative issues.

Students from the UNEARTE branch in Maracay, Aragua State, blocked a major intersection on Tuesday to demand “dignified” studying conditions.

“We are staging a peaceful demonstration to demand improvements to our academic conditions,” student José Pérez told local reporters. “We do not have our own campus, and the facilities are inadequate for the artistic areas we are studying.”

Protesters held billboards and banners calling for a “dignified campus.” UNEARTE’s Maracay education programs function in different rented spaces, which students have complained are in deteriorating condition.

The Maracay demonstration followed a number of protests and sit-ins at UNEARTE’s main campus in Caracas. Students denounced that multiple university installations are shut down or in a state of disrepair. The Modest Bor center, which houses UNEARTE’s music program, has been partially closed for several years.

In addition, students decried that UNEARTE centers’ cafeterias have been shuttered for months, while many have additional grievances including inoperative bathrooms and software issues that  left many students unable to properly register for classes. 

In response to the protests, Venezuelan authorities vowed to address the concerns raised by students. UNEARTE Rector Ignacio Barreto approached students during a demonstration and promised that the registration process would start over.

The Ministry of Culture, which is responsible for UNEARTE alongside the Ministry of Higher Education, held an assembly with all university personnel and announced the creation of working groups with student representatives in several areas.

“This commission, apart from listening to the students and the authorities, should have a weekly plan that can be supervised,” Culture Minister Alejandro López told press. “Accountability before the students is key.”

López, Barreto and other officials were seen inspecting several university facilities last week. The minister pledged to address issues of running water, internet connectivity, and transportation in the near term.

UNEARTE was created by former President Hugo Chávez in 2008, bringing together several educational institutes dedicated to the arts with the aim of advancing a popular and anti-colonial pedagogical approach. It offers degrees in music, dance, film, theater, photography, and plastic arts.

The protests over UNEARTE’s disrepair and deficient conditions coincided with the Venezuelan government’s launch of the José Antonio Abreu Music University. Acting President Delcy Rodríguez headlined the inauguration ceremony earlier this month.

The new public university will have its state-of-the-art campus in the traditionally middle-class southwestern Caracas parish of El Paraíso, including three concert halls and a research center. It will also have 18 regional branches, with a maximum enrolment capacity of around 3,500 students.

Other Venezuelan universities have likewise seen student demonstrations in recent days. In the “Dr. Humberto Fernández-Morán” National Sciences University, students held a protest and an assembly on Monday over what they characterized as inadequate transportation.

The campus is located in Los Teques, some 25 kilometers outside Caracas, and was formally inaugurated in December 2024. Though the university promised to provide transportation, students have complained that the assigned buses are unreliable and have insufficient capacity.

Higher education trade unions have also been at the forefront of regular labor protests in recent months. Venezuelan working-class organizations have called for non-wage bonuses to be converted to salaries and for the restoration of collective bargaining agreements.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Philadelphia, USA.

Not too long ago, when it came to dealing with Maduro & Co., Ric Grenell was considered a key figure in Washington DC. As the US braced for Trump’s second coming, Grenell was even deemed a contender to lead the State Department. The president opted for Marco Rubio, but created a new diplomatic post exclusively for Grenell: the Special Presidential Envoy for Special Missions, which had a Special focus on Venezuela and North Korea.

Given the leeway some middlemen retain in the Trump White House, Grenell’s debut was the subject of widespread speculation about who would ultimately command the Venezuela portfolio. Days into the second Trump presidency, while Maduro secured his last inauguration with an iron fist, Grenell arrived in Miraflores to meet with the dictator and his political strategist, Jorge Rodríguez, who looked delighted. Grenell left Caracas with six US citizens Maduro had held hostage, which he framed as a resounding diplomatic victory, though many more American prisoners were still left behind. He soon reaped a reward: Trump appointed Grenell to manage the Kennedy Center, an ideal hub to sow political and financial connections through grandiose social events. The president even wanted to rename the venue after himself. Grenell—widely considered a “MAGA insider”—emerged as an ideal ally to seal Trump’s imprint on the institution. It didn’t last long.

Twenty months later, he lost the job at the Kennedy Center and currently has no place in the current arrangement between Trump and Delcy Rodríguez.

Since last week, Grenell has been embroiled in a scandal of a multimillion-dollar, international dimension, which goes back to his Kennedy Center tenure. It speaks of the network of friends and contacts he had access to when empowered vis-à-vis the chavista clique. The New York Times characterizes the unfolding saga as “bitter even for Trump-era standards.” As it stands, the episode is yet another example of the broad discretion and opacity that US officials have claimed for themselves to navigate relations between Washington and political elites in Caracas, Balkan capitals, and beyond.

The Mildons and a misplaced transaction

The saga gained attention when news broke about the wedding between Trump’s former personal lawyer Alina Habba, 42, and Turhan Mildon, an obscure Turkish investor in his 20s with ties to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Mildon started to operate in Venezuela’s construction industry when Maduro was still in power, after a seemingly lucrative experience in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Love and business drew him to Caracas, the Middle East Eye reported in September: Mildon was then in a relationship with the daughter of Remigio Ceballos, a powerful chavista military commander, while he partnered with the Venezuelan State to revive as many as 10 unproductive cement plants.

His facilitator in Caracas was no other than Alex Saab, the disgraced moneyman of Maduro who is now in US custody.

According to New York Times reporters, Mildon not only lobbied Saab for the “Vencement” deal, but also took over a once-successful shrimp exporter Maduro seized in 2024. The company’s original owner is imprisoned in Venezuela.

Regarding Mildon’s new romance, he told the MEE that he met Habba some time ago through a mutual friend, “an ambassador in the US.”

The public fallout between Habba and Grenell surfaced last week, involving allegations over political favors in exchange for a multi-million-dollar contribution that was never registered. Axios first reported that Habba stormed into the Oval Office to tell Trump that Grenell persuaded Mildon, her new husband, to wire a $17.6 million donation to the Kennedy Center last year via a third-party’s bank account. Grenell denied the allegation on the spot, challenging the Mildons to submit proof.

Caracas Chronicles reached out to Grenell’s camp for comment on these developments and any reflections on his work in Venezuela, including whether he remains in contact with government officials under Delcy. We haven’t received a response. A Venezuelan opposition source who closely monitors Alex Saab’s legal case and business dealings declined to comment at this stage.

On Monday, Axios gave us an idea of the kind of evidence that Mildon’s lawyers are handing over. Grenell reportedly texted Mildon that the transaction would secure access to US officials, maybe even the president himself, through “VIP events” at the Kennedy Center. Grenell also offered to make him “the American face down in V,” which sounds like he saw Mildon as a potential poster child for US business interests in Maduro’s Venezuela.

Axios reports that a private defence company called TXAT allegedly received the payment. The transfer would not come from Mildon’s bank account, but from an account linked to the Congolese Ministry of Finance.

While revelations pile up and the Mildons build their case before President Trump, Grenell keeps witnessing his own change of luck, which began in the second half of last year, with the US military deployment in the Caribbean, and continued with Maduro’s ousting on January 3.

A bad streak

“I understand what he [Maduro] wants. I believe we can still have a deal. I believe in diplomacy, I believe in avoiding war,” Grenell claimed on September 17, 2025, during the CPAC international conference in Asunción, Paraguay.

Grenell already looked out of the loop. It was the early days of a US military campaign a few kilometers away from Venezuela, which had the stated purpose of dismantling narco-trafficking networks in the region. Grenell had become a champion of a supposedly mutually beneficial cooperation with the chavista elite in previous months. In contrast with the likes of Rubio and Mauricio Claver-Carone, Grenell pushed for the normalization of relations between the Trump administration and the Maduro regime. He portrayed his in-person meeting with Maduro and Jorge Rodríguez as a sign of what his approach could achieve. Soon, the US began deporting Venezuelan migrants and detainees in charter flights to Maiquetía, which Grenell could publicize as proof that his plan was working.

Analysts and reporters speculated over which idea would prevail: Grenell’s pitch that working with Maduro was the safe bet, or Rubio’s insistence on revoking the Chevron license and gutting the regime of financial resources. Soon enough, a tougher sanctions regime would isolate Venezuela. Rubio and Secretary of War Pete Hegseth grabbed the spotlight. Grenell found himself sidelined, but kept insisting his approach was the right one. 

“I continue to talk to Maduro’s team,” Grenell told CBS after returning from CPAC, which featured the likes of presidents Santiago Peña and Javier Milei, and right-wing commentator Javier Negre, a Spanish media figure whose visibility in “Twitterzuela” has grown for praising Delcy Rodríguez and criticizing María Corina Machado’s camp.

Donald Trump shut Grenell down via telephone two weeks later, according to The New York Times, in the middle of an Oval Office meeting with senior military leaders. Grenell reportedly received orders to cease all communications with Maduro’s camp.

The aftermath of January 3 would further push him out. Rubio took an active role in handing instructions and often dealing directly with Delcy Rodríguez. In March, Grenell was relieved of his duties as president and executive director of the Kennedy Center. He formally retains the “Special Missions” post, but has stayed off the radar while other names (Claver-Carone, Alejandro Betancourt, Chris Wright and Jarrod Agen, to name a few) gained prominence over the Caracas dossier.

The unlucky colleagues

A string of successive scandals has also affected other Trump administration officials, who had to resign from their posts last week. Evidence available from open sources indicate two of them are close to Grenell.

The latest example is Katie Zacharia, the shortest-serving Press Secretary in the history of the White House. Following a clumsy first (and last) press briefing, Zacharia faced scrutiny over the false claim that she was an attorney. Some quick fact-checking from US media and observers found that Zacharia was neither licensed to work as counsel in the US nor that she worked as a lawyer in China, as she alleged at some point. Her LinkedIn page says she served as “general counsel” for Fix California, a non-profit that Grenell launched in 2021. The organization is focused on voter registration and advancing conservative causes in the Golden State, the liberal stronghold run by Democratic Governor Gavin Newsom—a constant target of Grenell’s attacks on social media.

Last year, Zacharia appeared twice in conservative media hailing Grenell’s work in Venezuela. On Fox News Night in February 2025, she recounted how Grenell supposedly forced Maduro to give in:

People didn’t know these hostages [American political prisoners in Venezuela] were in Venezuela. He asked Maduro: “I want these six hostages,” and he said, “Oh, I don’t have them.” And Ambassador Grenell said: “I need them, I’m gonna go back to the airplane and you’re gonna get them for me.” And the regime brought them to him…

The other disgraced ally of Grenell is Kimberly Guilfoyle, the ex-fiancée of Donald Trump Jr. (and Gavin Newsom’s ex-wife), who served as the US ambassador in Athens until last week. Guilfoye’s dismissal was actually the only news Katie Zacharia shared during her only presser.

Guilfoyle, whose fondness for parties and luxury was no secret, faced rising scrutiny in September. The Wall Street Journal reported that a Greek-American lobbyist had become a constant presence alongside her in official meetings across the Balkans, promoting energy deals with a Greek construction company. Then, the same journalists found that Guilfoyle asked a Trump donor to pay her $100,000 credit card bill just before her confirmation hearing. Despite some initial denial, the episode went on to exhaust Rubio and Trump, who forced her to resign last week.

The president also fired Paolo Zampolli last week, who served as special envoy for global partnerships. A longtime modeling agent, Zampolli is credited with introducing Donald Trump to Melania in 1998.

Public records show that Grenell has also had interests in Southeastern Europe, where association with pro-Russian autocrats and involvement in controversial deals continue to dog MAGA and Trump’s own inner circle. Having served as special envoy for Kosovo-Serbia negotiations during Trump’s first term, Grenell maintains a close relationship with Aleksandar Vučić, Serbia’s increasingly authoritarian leader, who recently resigned the presidency to run for prime minister in a bid to further entrench his power. After leaving that post, Grenell advocated for a major luxury complex in central Belgrade backed by Jared Kushner’s investment firm.

In Romania, Grenell drew scrutiny for publicly opposing proceedings against internet personalities Andrew and Tristan Tate, who face severe criminal charges including human trafficking and rape across multiple jurisdictions.

Grenell, Machado and the Rodríguez siblings

A Venezuelan opposition insider suggests Grenell’s sidelining helped put an end to media noise about the Trump administration pursuing a diplomatic and commercial understanding with Maduro in 2025. 

Grenell  first came into contact with Maduro associates in 2021, when Florida politician David Rivera and Raúl Gorrín coordinated a backchannel meeting in Mexico City between Jorge Rodríguez, Grenell and Erik Prince. Delcy’s brother offered to swap six American prisoners for Alex Saab, then in US custody for the first time. Rivera, who couldn’t make it to the encounter, faces a decade in prison for secretly lobbying on behalf of Maduro during Trump’s first term—an operation orchestrated by Delcy Rodríguez, who finally achieved an understanding with Washington this year.

Grenell was perceived as a nuisance for regime-change ambitions among many opposition figures and observers. María Corina Machado had contact with Grenell in early 2025, but the relationship soured before long. Two senior members of Machado’s team were approached for a comment on Grenell’s role and relationship with their camp. Neither has replied so far.

Grenell reportedly sought to meet the opposition leader in person while she was hiding in Venezuela. The New York Times reported that she refused to provide a list of political prisoners who Grenell could prioritize during negotiations with chavista representatives. Grenell later voiced his displeasure when Machado won the Nobel Prize instead of his boss, claiming in a tweet that the award had “died years ago.”

Now, both Machado and Grenell appear to lack Trump’s confidence. But Machado is expected to find her way back to Venezuela, one way or another, while Grenell could face disgrace, deprived from the opportunity of providing access to the investment rush “down in V.”

Nine months after the US’ January 3 military strikes and kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, the Venezuelanalysis team got together to take stock of a whirlwind of changes in Caracas’ domestic and foreign policies.

Lead editor Ricardo Vaz was joined by fellow staff members Jessica Dos Santos, Silvana Solano, and Lucas Koerner. They broke down the US’ semi-colonial regime, the gaps between the official discourse and reality, and the prospects for the different political sectors.

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Note: this episode was recorded in Spanish. See the YouTube video above for a subtitled version.

Between smiles and a handshake, Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez thanked US President Donald Trump for “supporting the country’s return to multilateral forums,” following a face-to-face meeting on September 22 that she called “historic.”

In her address before the UN General Assembly one day later, Rodríguez reiterated her gratitude to Trump while promising a “democratic transformation” of her country. The acting leader’s trip to New York, a mere nine months after the January 3 US bombings and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores, perfectly encapsulated the Venezuelan government’s international and domestic realignment with US imperialism in general and its MAGA faction in particular.

In her speech, she euphemistically called the January 3 military strikes “the outcome of the exhaustion of domestic politics and heightened confrontation with the US,” basically holding Venezuela partially responsible for the imperialist attack it suffered.

The abandonment of Maduro

Rodríguez’s trip was as symbolic for what was said as for what was left unsaid. The acting leader and her entourage heaped praise on Trump and took turns posing for pictures. Rodríguez also maintained an undignified silence when Trump, addressing the UN, gloated about the January 3 military operation and abduction of Maduro, whom he called an “outlaw dictator,” while shamelessly boasting that “to the victor belong the spoils.”

Maduro and Flores – currently detained in Brooklyn just 10 miles from UN headquarters and facing a show trial on ludicrous “narcoterrorism” charges – were not worth a single mention by Rodríguez. This stance has been backed by pro-government pundits who are increasingly dropping the “acting” label when referring to Rodríguez.

Her government has effectively undermined Maduro and Flores’ sovereign immunity argument to get their charges dismissed. US Justice Department prosecutors told the court that Caracas, via its embassy in the US, had advocated to the State Department for Rodríguez to receive head-of-state immunity in an unrelated civil lawsuit in Florida. But, Venezuelan authorities have declined to do the same vis-à-vis Maduro and Flores in what the US Justice Department called “devastating silence.”

The official indifference is even more remarkable given Flores’ documented health issues, heavily aggravated by the brutal kidnapping, which led defense attorneys to request that she be moved to house arrest during the trial. This silence contrasts with the Maduro government’s loud defense of Alex Saab, which repeatedly brought up his health issues under incarceration during the international campaign for his release.

Saab is another prime example of the Rodríguez administration’s pragmatic rapprochement with Washington. He was irregularly handed over to US agencies in May and recently pleaded guilty in a US federal court in Miami, promising to cooperate against unnamed Venezuelan officials.

An imperial satellite

The Venezuelan leadership’s diplomatic activity in New York more broadly showcased a new foreign policy direction that is now unmistakably marching to Washington’s drum.

Rodríguez held talks with International Monetary Fund and World Bank representatives, deepening reengagement with the Washington-based financial institutions that former President Hugo Chávez denounced as instruments of US imperialism and booted them out of the country. The specter of another IMF loan-and-adjustment package returns as the Rodríguez administration begins negotiations to restructure the country’s enormous and illegitimate debt.

In addition, Rodríguez held sideline meetings with US allies only, such as Netherlands PM Rob Jetten, Trinidad and Tobago PM Kamla Persad-Bissessar and Chilean President José Antonio Kast. Rodríguez also hosted Paraguayan President Santiago Peña in Caracas before flying to the US. 

The right-wing Chilean and Paraguayan administrations had firmly backed US regime change efforts in Venezuela, leading the Maduro government to sever ties. Trinidad and Tobago’s case was even more egregious, with Caracas suspending all cooperation, including in key cross-border natural gas projects, after Port of Spain endorsed Washington’s military buildup and extrajudicial boat bombings on Venezuela’s doorstep in late 2025.

Rodríguez and her team also broke with the Chavista tradition of holding meetings with global majority countries similarly under Washington’s gun, especially allies and strategic partners like Cuba, Iran, China and Russia. A customary event in Harlem, alongside Cuban officials and international solidarity movements, was scrapped as well.

The acting president’s UN address exposed how anti-imperialism and the defense of multipolarity have vanished from the official discourse. Absent was the hitherto denunciation of Washington’s criminal wars across the globe, replaced by a vague expression of solidarity with “peoples who suffer war.” Nor was there any condemnation of US economic sanctions, which remain in place against Venezuela and its former allies.

Rodríguez offered no words of support for Cuba as it faces a US blockade that gets more murderous by the day. There was no mention of Palestine either. Before January 3, Venezuelan representatives had never wasted an opportunity to reiterate support for the Palestinian cause and to expose the international community’s failure to rein in the genocidal, Western-sponsored settler colony.

In contrast, Venezuela joined the US, Israel, Ukraine, Western European countries and Latin American right-wing governments in boycotting the UN’s commemoration of the 25th anniversary of the Durban Declaration. The 2001 World Conference Against Racism marked a milestone in the ongoing struggle to end racism and colonialism, provoking the ire of the US and Israel, which have led boycotts of every one of its commemorations.

Fuel for a sputtering empire

Along with the 180-degree foreign policy shift, the Rodríguez administration has moved to restructure the economy to the benefit of a declining US hegemon reeling from its strategic defeat in the war against Iran.

With US officials’ input and supervision, Venezuelan authorities have overhauled energy and mining laws in the interest of multinational corporations, slashing taxes and royalties as well as ceding operational and commercial control. Corporate executives, often shepherded by Trump aides, have paraded through the presidential palace to sign agreements carving up Venezuela’s immense subsoil resources.

A recent oil deal with the Trump administration, which Rodríguez also hailed as “historic,” will turn over 17 prime oilfields holding more than a fifth of Venezuela’s crude reserves to a private petroleum company, NABEP, controlled by the Pentagon. Furthermore, the US State Department will be able to buy 20 percent of NABEP’s output at cost, while having a right of first refusal for the remaining 80 percent, for which a Venezuelan oil official promised a major “sales discount.” In other words, Venezuela is going to supply energy below market price to the imperial war machine.

Whatever revenue is ultimately left for Caracas is still going to be controlled by the US Treasury Department, under what Venezuelan state oil company (PDVSA) chief defended as a “state-to-state agreement.” A recent Financial Times report revealed that the White House is presently barring Venezuela from paying dividends to Russian and Chinese joint venture partners in a flagrant attempt to drive them out.

Washington’s semi-colonial control extends beyond privileged access to natural resources, including strategic minerals. A looming privatization drive and debt restructuring process are likely to further entrench Venezuelan dependence on Western monopoly capital. At the same time, the US is also looking to turn the South American country into a captive market for its heavily subsidized agricultural output. Venezuela’s imports of staples such as rice and corn have skyrocketed this year, seriously threatening national production, especially small and mid-size campesino farms supplying much of the country’s food.

(Ab)uses of history

The speed and scope of Caracas’ realignment with Washington has made it an uphill battle for those still insisting that the acting Rodríguez government is merely conducting a “tactical retreat” without straying from the Bolivarian Revolution’s strategic horizon.

One early line of argument was to invoke historical examples, such as the Brest-Litovsk treaty, to rationalize difficult concessions at gunpoint. However, the analogy grew ever more dubious with the passing months, as the Bolsheviks never renounced their anti-imperialist internationalism nor the nascent socialist state’s sovereignty over the commanding heights of the economy.

The argument that subordinating the economy to US-led capital was akin to China’s post-1978 opening up belies the reality that Venezuela does not even manage its own export revenues and must have its expenses approved by the US State Department, subject to auditing by CIA-linked firms like Deloitte.

Venezuelan government officials and unofficial spokespeople have also abused examples related to Chávez, namely his call for troops to stand down in the failed 1992 insurrection and the fact that he did not martyr himself in the 2002 coup that briefly overthrew his democratically-elected government. However, in both cases, Chávez never surrendered his core principles concerning independence and sovereignty. In 2002, he allowed himself to be taken prisoner by the putschists to avoid a bloodbath, but he did not resign and would not have sat quietly if Venezuela were turned into a US semi-colony overnight. On multiple occasions, Chávez underscored he was prepared to fight and die on the frontlines should Venezuela face an Iraq-style US invasion.

There are other historical analogies that are, unfortunately, more appropriate. Iraq after the US invasion, like Venezuela, to this day does not control its oil revenues, which are deposited in a New York Federal Reserve account. Iraq was until recently under US military occupation, hosting some two dozen bases – a possibility that Trump has recently left open for Venezuela. In past months, the US has carried out extrajudicial executions on Venezuelan soil and deployed military assets in the wake of July’s double earthquake, including temporarily taking over operations at the Simón Bolívar International Airport and La Guaira port.

Egypt under President Anwar Sadat is likewise a very instructive precedent. Sadat never renounced his predecessor Gamal Abdel Nasser, simply presenting his program as a “correction” of past mistakes. Yet he progressively dismantled the achievements of Nasserism, rolling back land reform and industrialization policies in favor of imperialist capital. Sadat also realigned Egypt from the Soviet Union to the US camp, going on to reestablish ties with Israel and abandon the Palestinian cause.

Vietnam: The forgotten analogy

Lacking justifications for the new alliance with the Trump administration, Venezuelan government officials and influencers have resorted to straw man arguments, claiming that the “international left” wanted the Venezuelan people to immolate themselves by confronting a vastly superior military foe.

The official rhetoric eclipses what was until recently Caracas’ preferred historical analogy: Vietnam. In late 2025, as the US ramped up its military buildup, Venezuelan leaders warned that Trump would face a “second Vietnam” if he dared to attack. There were months of military drills and detailed preparations across the country, consistent with Venezuela’s asymmetric doctrine of “prolonged people’s war”. 

Ultimately it is impossible to know how much resistance Venezuela could have mounted against the US onslaught because the leadership opted not to fight. US air superiority and electronic warfare notwithstanding, Venezuelan defense officials have neglected to explain why only one of Venezuela’s 5,000 Russian-made Igla-S manpads – ideal for taking down low-flying helicopters and combat aircraft – was used. Venezuela’s armed forces offered no organized resistance on that fateful morning, leaving Maduro’s Cuban security detail virtually alone to confront the invader in what reportedly still proved a fiercely heroic firefight that left 32 Cubans dead.

Though Venezuela might have been unable to avoid decapitation of its top leadership – either via capture or assassination – it could have raised the costs for the US empire to a politically unacceptable degree, potentially miring it in the sort of Iraq-style quagmire that the Trump administration most feared. 

Instead, almost overnight, the acting government seamlessly pivoted from vowing to combat imperialism by all means necessary to fawning over Trump and his underlings. Promises that not a “single drop” of Venezuelan oil would be shipped to the US in case of an attack were replaced by risible claims that supplying crude at cost to the Pentagon was Chávez’s plan all along.

Unable to present a convincing case for the domestic and foreign policy U-turns, official and unofficial government spokespeople have also lashed out at criticism from the Latin American left. Most recently, former Colombian President Gustavo Petro slammed the Rodríguez administration for giving away the nation’s oil to Trump. Caracas responded with ad hominem invectives.

At Washington’s behest, Venezuela has also halted all subsidized oil shipments to Cuba, which has added to the island’s gravest energy crisis in its history. Cuba’s Deputy Foreign Minister Carlos Fernández de Cossío recently said that Venezuela remained a “friendly” country, but added that “ally is too strong a word.”

The cost of capitulation 

The human toll of resistance, whether in sanctions-besieged Venezuela or on the battlefields of West Asia, is always immense. However, as national liberation movements have long understood, the price of capitulation is inevitably higher, especially in the medium and long term. Chávez and Maduro clearly grasped this reality, rallying the masses to withstand decades of US hybrid warfare and forging close alliances with anti-imperialist states from Cuba to Iran. 

The cost of submission, meanwhile, is being borne by the Venezuelan laboring classes, from small farmers hard hit by US agricultural dumping to the urban semi-proletariat devastated by spiraling inflation resulting from Washington’s pilfering of the nation’s export earnings. 

For its part, Venezuela’s comprador bourgeoisie, in both its traditional and emergent fractions, stands to reap fabulous rewards from the demolition of the legislative pillars of the Bolivarian Revolution – viz., hydrocarbons, mining, housing and real estate, or forthcoming axing of labor and land laws – reasserting itself as a servile intermediary for US imperialism. 

There is no better example than NABEP owner Alejandro Betancourt, an oil mogul who amassed a fortune from often-unfulfilled state contracts dating back to 2009 and was hand-picked by the Trump administration as a middleman in the 25-year agreement backstopped by the Pentagon. The White House went as far as pressuring domestic and foreign courts to drop money laundering accusations against Betancourt.

Rodríguez and her leadership faction likewise benefit from what analyst William Serafino has called the new regime of “co-government” with the Trump White House, tying their fortunes to the latter to outflank rivals and solidify the strategic alliance with local and imperialist capital. 

The current acting president is one of the architects of the post-2018 neoliberal economic package that was the fulcrum of a new governability pact with the local bourgeoisie, freezing wages and social spending in exchange for social “peace”. Indeed, as then vice president, Rodríguez reportedly brought Betancourt back to Venezuela in 2023, shuttering an investigation into his alleged corruption and key role in financing the self-proclaimed Juan Guaidó “interim presidency” during the first Trump administration. The episode is symptomatic of the Venezuelan government’s Faustian gambit to appease business sectors and maintain a modest economic recovery under crushing sanctions, but at the cost of slowly eroding its popular support base.

The Maduro administration’s concessions hollowed out the Bolivarian Revolution’s sovereign edifice but its institutional foundations remained formally intact alongside the internationalist geopolitical scaffolding binding Venezuela to the broader Axis of Resistance. The post-January 3 semi-colonial offensive has set about demolishing this structure of political-military and economic independence. While the destruction can be repaired through sustained bottom-up mobilization advancing a national popular alternative to capitulation, it will likely be the outcome of a medium- and long-term process. Nevertheless, there are growing signs of revolutionary movements and intellectuals organizing to confront the US empire and its local agents and reconquer sovereignty as the cornerstone of any future socialist construction.

What should be clear without a sliver of a doubt is that the “Rodrigato” – and the lumpen bourgeoisie it represents – has opted to pact with the Trump administration. Any revolutionary strategy to resist re-colonization must begin from concrete analysis of concrete conditions. Ignoring the acting Venezuelan leadership’s discourse and policies, pretending that there is a cunning secret plan being devised or trying to frame everything as a masterful 3D chess move, will ultimately hamper the most important task: fighting US imperialism.

Source: Sovereign Media

An alliance of Venezuelan opposition parties has reaffirmed its commitment to exiled Nobel Peace Prize laureate Maria Corina Machado as its leader.

On Sunday, members of the opposition’s Unitary Democratic Platform (PUD) agreed in a meeting in Caracas to “recognise and support the leadership of Maria Corina Machado”.

The coalition also renewed its demand for free elections in Venezuela, following a series of contested presidential votes in 2024 and 2018.

Sunday’s statement included 14 proposals for a democratic transition, including freedom for political parties, the release of all political prisoners and the safe return of those who went into exile.

The announcement also increases pressure on authorities to allow Machado’s return. She has been living in exile since leaving Venezuela last December to receive her Nobel Prize.

“The will of the Venezuelans must once again govern the destiny of our nation,” the opposition’s former presidential candidate Edmundo Gonzalez wrote on social media supporting the proposals.

“We will not accept political prisoners, persecution or a governing power that disregards the mandate of its citizens. Living in freedom and under a genuine constitutional order is a legitimate demand of our society.”

No election set

Venezuela has yet to declare a date for a new presidential vote. Since January 3, the country has been led by interim President Delcy Rodriguez of the long-governing United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV).

PSUV leaders have been accused of carrying out human rights abuses against political dissidents, including arbitrary arrest, imprisonment and torture.

Still, after the United States launched a military operation to abduct and jail former President Nicolas Maduro, the PSUV has remained in power with the support of the White House.

US President Donald Trump has backed Rodriguez’s leadership, despite her having been Maduro’s vice president.

His administration has maintained an active role in Venezuela, exerting control over its oil resources and pressuring the Rodriguez government for reforms.

But critics point out that Trump has been reluctant to push Rodriguez for new elections, opting instead for a three-phase plan that focuses first on stabilising the country and economic recovery before pursuing a political transition.

Machado, meanwhile, has told The Financial Times she would like to see Venezuela hold elections by July next year.

“The US government and the Venezuelan people all agree ⁠⁠that the only way to make ⁠⁠this sustainable and ⁠⁠a real victory is to turn Venezuela into a stable democracy,” she told the newspaper earlier this month.

A thwarted return

Venezuelan authorities blocked Machado’s repeated attempts to return to the country, according to her party, Vente Venezuela.

Machado has also reportedly attempted to petition the Trump administration for help re-entering Venezuela.

Separately, she gifted Trump her Nobel Peace Prize in January, during a visit to Washington, DC. Media reports, however, have suggested friction between the Trump administration and Machado.

In interviews with Reuters and Axios, US administration officials have anonymously expressed frustration with the opposition leader’s repeated efforts to return home, particularly after a pair of deadly earthquakes in Venezuela last July.

Axios quoted one official as calling Machado’s push “political opportunism”.

Machado, however, remains one of the most popular figures in Venezuela’s opposition.

In October 2023, Machado won the opposition coalition’s presidential primary, but in January 2024, Venezuela’s courts blocked her from running in the upcoming race.

The courts upheld a 15-year ban on her holding public office, reportedly due to her support of US sanctions against the Maduro government.

Gonzalez ultimately replaced Machado as the opposition candidate in the 2024 race. Maduro claimed victory for a third term as Venezuela’s president in that election cycle, despite widespread criticism that the vote did not meet democratic standards.

The opposition released vote tallies that appeared to show Gonzalez had won the race.

The US had recognised Gonzalez as the country’s rightful president-elect and denied the legitimacy of Maduro’s election claims.

Machado was previously removed from the National Assembly in 2014, due to her activism against the Venezuelan government.

A third round of talks between the Rodriguez government and the opposition began in Venezuela this month.

But instead of including Machado, the negotiations have involved members of the 2015 National Assembly, which was led by the opposition and dissolved under Maduro.

Still, in a statement this month, the US State Department praised the talks as aiding the Venezuelan government’s reform.

“Political reconciliation talks between the interim Venezuelan government and 2015 National Assembly representatives are producing tangible reforms in civil liberties and political rights, laying the groundwork for credible elections and a democratic transition,” the State Department said.

Mérida, October 16, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores have rejected a new indictment amid an ongoing prosecution by the US government.

I reject this document in its entirety,” Maduro told New York Judge Alvin Hellerstein in a hearing on Thursday. Similarly, Cilia Flores maintained her “absolute innocence” when asked to respond to the new charges, declaring: “I am completely innocent. I am not guilty.”

The judge entered formal not-guilty pleas on behalf of both defendants for all counts.

Maduro and Flores have been detained in Brooklyn’s Metropolitan Detention Center since being kidnapped by US special forces on January 3. 

In the Manhattan federal court, US Attorney Jamie McDonald presented the superseding indictment that introduces a “conspiracy to commit torture” charge alongside the previous charges of “narco-terrorism” and drug trafficking conspiracy, as well as weapons possession.

The accusation claims Maduro personally oversaw purported torture of prisoners and held authority over whether detainees were released or prosecuted.

“Maduro, Flores, and other high-ranking members of their inner circle used a violent system of torture and repression to maintain their power,” McDonald stated to reporters outside the courthouse.

According to the legal filing, the prosecution alleges that Maduro and Flores oversaw a violent state “apparatus of repression” spanning from the former’s election in 2013.

The document claims methods like electric shocks, asphyxiation, and simulated drowning, among others, were allegedly deployed against political dissidents, state officials suspected of disloyalty, and US citizens detained inside Venezuela.

Defense attorneys have repeatedly questioned the legitimacy of the entire prosecution, framing it as an unprecedented overreach of U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction. Maduro and Flores have consistently maintained that they are political prisoners and that their capture constituted a flagrant violation of Venezuelan sovereignty.

Legal counsel has filed pre-trial motions requesting the dismissal of the charges on grounds that Maduro and Flores, as a sitting president and legislator, respectively, possess sovereign immunity from foreign criminal prosecution.

Hellerstein recently rejected a request from Flores’ defense team that she be moved to house arrest due to severe health concerns, arguing that the first lady poses a “substantial flight risk.”

The updated indictment forced the judge to adjust the calendar of proceedings. The hearing on sovereign immunity arguments has been moved to January. The trial was pushed back two weeks and is now slated to commence on June 14, 2027, with a final pretrial conference scheduled for June 8. 

In Venezuela, National Assembly Deputy Iris Varela blasted the new charges, arguing that Maduro and Flores remain victims of a forced kidnapping orchestrated by Washington.

“I wish to publicly express, once again, my absolute and total rejection of the despicable act that the U.S. government is brazenly carrying out against our president and our congresswoman,” Varela wrote on her X account.

She further described the latest charges as “a miserable ploy [and] a grotesque maneuver” and went on to label US President Donald Trump as a “pedophile pig.”

In contrast to Varela, the Venezuelan government has made no official statement regarding the latest developments in the legal case against Maduro and Flores.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

The “biggest oil deal in history” was announced almost simultaneously by acting Venezuelan President Delcy Rodríguez and U.S. President Donald Trump on Aug. 28. However, many Venezuelans didn’t find out until the next day because massive blackouts — up to 16 hours a day and partly caused by increased oil production — kept them from scrolling the news.

At the United Nations a month later, Trump bragged that he had taken Venezuela’s “spoils,” while Rodríguez said the deal with the U.S. would contribute to resolving the energy needs of “the hemisphere and the international economy.” Venezuelans then asked: What about our energy needs and economy?

The oil deal, the legal and operational details of which are still unknown, covers the exploitation of 17 fields and 65 billion barrels, which equates to 20% of Venezuela’s total reserves — the world’s largest, at an estimated 303 billion barrels. U.S. companies will invest $100 billion in exploiting the fields, a figure which — according to Venezuelan government projections — would translate into more than $209 billion in tax revenue for Venezuela over the years of the contract.

The announcement sparked questions and criticism from different sectors of the country, with concerns about the lack of information and the impact on sovereignty. In response, Rodríguez tried to explain the deal’s benefits in a nationally televised address, noting, “How much does Venezuela receive? Based on a barrel price of $65 … revenue would reach $209.3 billion for the state. In concrete terms, this means that for every barrel produced and sold, about $19 goes to [Venezuela].”

Oil drives the Venezuelan economy. Currently, it accounts for 71% of the nation’s total exports, but now much of that revenue goes to the U.S. In the first quarter of this year, out of a total of $7.76 billion in exports, $5.5 billion came from oil activity. As the acting president’s address went on, many of us only had more doubts.

A few hours later, Venezuelan economist Francisco Rodríguez summed up some of the nation’s concerns: “Do the projected tax revenues … correspond to nominal amounts, inflation-adjusted amounts, or net present values? A nominal amount of $19 per barrel in 2051, the project’s final year, would correspond to a real value of about $9 today.”

“The $209 billion equates, over 25 years, to about $8.4 billion annually, a relatively low amount compared with the tax revenue Venezuela has collected in the past at similar production levels. The amount would be even lower if it corresponds to a nominal total.” According to Central Bank of Venezuela data, Venezuela took in a record $82.8 billion in 2008 alone from oil sales.

Contradictions

Trump later contradicted Delcy Rodríguez’s 25-year timeline, saying the deal would involve a century of concessions. Francisco Rodríguez, the economist, noted that extracting 65 billion barrels in 25 years would be impossible, due to lack of infrastructure. 

“What rights does the U.S. acquire over these resources after 25 years? Can a future Venezuelan government decide to withdraw from this deal if it doesn’t like it?” he asked.

And why wouldn’t they like it? Trump said on Truth Social that Venezuela will begin supplying the U.S. strategic oil reserve immediately through “a gift.” Nobody knows what that means exactly, but since the military intervention on Jan. 3, the revenue generated by the sale of Venezuelan oil — we don’t know how much that is either — is already “in the custody” of the U.S. Treasury.

“It doesn’t look like Venezuela will benefit broadly in the long term. It’s like being on floor minus-18 and going up to minus-10,” Venezuelan researcher Blas Regnault, who specializes in energy policy and oil governance, told Truthdig from The Hague, Netherlands.

“There could be an indirect reactivation of the economy because of the indirect jobs that may emerge in some regions. But let’s also keep in mind that the country has been 100% blockaded, suffocated, so any door that opens will bring some benefits, but this is not the benefit one would expect for a sovereign country,” he said. 

“That’s the other problem: There’s no sovereignty of any kind over the resource itself, over what’s being sold. On top of that, there’s a lot of opacity — you’re analyzing blind.”

This “opacity” is also illegal. Articles 150 and Article 187, Paragraph 9, of Venezuela’s Constitution state that contracts of national public interest with foreign states or entities require approval from the National Assembly. However, although the Assembly endorsed the announcement of the deal on Sept. 1, its president, Jorge Rodríguez, said it had not yet been “submitted” to the legislature. Then, a month later he said that “according to some legal experts, it doesn’t need to be reviewed.”

It’s clear that Venezuela is once again, as it was for much of the 20th century, a kind of “U.S. oil province,” Regnault says, “Recovering sovereignty won’t be easy because Venezuela is strategic to U.S. interests.”

“On top of that, the other side of the coin is that China has become a key player [globally]. Today the Chinese do what Saudi Arabia used to do when it cut production and pushed prices up. With this Strait of Hormuz crisis, after the naval blockade of Iran, it was discovered that China had more reserves than previously thought, and that kept the crisis from being bigger and the price from reaching $150.”

That is precisely why U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio celebrated the fact that several of the oil fields included in the deal were once “dominated by China and Russia and Iran.” At the same time, the U.S. government has decided to maintain sanctions against Venezuela, thereby preventing any new economic players. In fact, the U.S. Treasury Department, through its Office of Foreign Assets Control, updated its oil licensing policy for Venezuela in late September through Orders 46E, 48D and 49B, which benefit U.S. businesses but maintain an absolute ban on Russia, Iran, Cuba, North Korea and China.

“The [Venezuelan] government has already amended the Hydrocarbons Law to try to create more favorable conditions for investors in the oil and gas sector, but … the [U.S.’] problem isn’t domestic supply. They need to monopolize the world’s energy reserves, markets and prices in order to prevail in the rest of their economic activities,” oil expert David Paravisini explains to Truthdig from Caracas, referring to a legal reform that was passed on Jan. 29 and created the possibility of technical and operational management and direct commercialization by private companies. He believes that for Venezuela, the deal is a diplomatic “quest” to survive. 

Trump is also maintaining some of his domestic support by presenting Venezuela as the great economic and geopolitical victory of his administration, especially after the war against Iran — which was supposed to last “only a couple of weeks” — reached the six-month mark and cost more than $37.5 billion through the end of July. In fact, Trump has claimed again and again that this oil deal will lower fuel costs inside the U.S. and come “at no cost whatsoever to the American taxpayer.””

Does this mean the $100 billion investment will come from private companies? The deal also aims to exploit eight greenfield blocks, areas where crude has been identified but which have not yet been developed. But what happens if that investment does not materialize? Since Jan. 9, Trump has been trying, without success, to persuade U.S. oil companies to invest in Venezuela.

Corruption is fine if the U.S. profits

So far, the only company we’ve heard about is North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP), which was selected on Aug. 31 by the Trump administration to lead oil extraction projects in the 17 Venezuelan fields.

According to the White House, the Department of Defense will hold a 35% equity stake in NABEP and, in addition, the Barbados-registered company will grant Washington the right to buy 20% of the oil it produces at the cost of production.

NABEP, which has only operated in Venezuela for two years, was awarded the deal without a prior bidding process. The company belongs to Venezuelan businessperson Alejandro Betancourt, who was under investigation by federal prosecutors in Florida until January 2026 for allegedly laundering more than $1 billion from the state-owned Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA). The case was then closed suddenly under the orders of U.S. Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche (now the attorney general), after a decade-long investigation. He is still the subject of open investigations in Switzerland and Spain.

Betancourt comes from a middle-class family but studied at the private religious school Instituto Cumbres de Caracas, where he befriended Javier Alvarado Pardi, son of Javier Alvarado Ochoa, who later became president of Electricidad de Caracas, deputy energy minister and a PDVSA executive.

Back in 2009, Alvarado Ochoa presented Betancourt and his engineering firm, Derwick Associates, as the best solution to Venezuela’s power generation crisis. Betancourt went on to receive 12 government contracts, awarded without competitive bidding, worth a total of $5 billion, which were either never completed or were implemented improperly, according to Transparency Venezuela and the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (which is funded by the U.S. government, among other countries).

So why Betancourt? Rubio said that he is no longer under investigation by the U.S., has supported the Venezuelan opposition and he has demonstrated his ability to produce oil. In that vein, NABEP claims it produces 200,000 barrels of crude a day, just behind Chevron.

However, Victor Hugo Majano, a Venezuelan investigative journalist and director of the well-known outlet La Tabla, told Truthdig that Betancourt overbilled the Venezuelan state by billions of dollars for power plants that never worked. He cited information from Thor Halvorssen, an anti-Chavista activist and cousin of Venezuelan opposition leader Leopoldo López. With that money, Betancourt bought a Dassault Falcon private jet and the historic Alamíin Castle in Spain.

Halvorssen also says Betancourt, who is also linked to 50 companies spread across 15 countries, paid former New York prosecutor Adam S. Kaufmann to halt prosecutions; former Wall Street Journal reporters to discredit whistleblowers; and former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani to bring the U.S. Justice Department over to his side.

“Despite this, the U.S. still doesn’t attack Venezuelan corruption. They want to protect the dollar and the U.S. financial system. They are only worried about securing capital flow, money that is not controlled by the state, the [Venezuelan] government,” Majano said.

More oil for the U.S., less electricity for Venezuela

Meanwhile, Venezuelans are paying the price for both Betancourt’s alleged corruption and the oil deal. So far this year, oil production has increased by 29.9%, going from 924,000 barrels per day (bpd) in January to an average of 1.2 million bpd. The increase has been driven by the need to deliver oil to U.S. companies, and it has directly worsened the nation’s electricity crisis.

Authorities acknowledge this; Venezuela’s interior minister, Diosdado Cabello, said in May the country is seeing higher electricity demand due to the growth in oil production, which “is a very serious problem.” The Ministry of Electrical Energy also noted that demand has reached 15,625 megawatts (MW), “the highest energy consumption figure in the last eight years, an increase of 3.6% compared with the peak reported in 2025.”

However, this statement omits that Venezuela actually has a nominal installed capacity of approximately 35,000 MW, double the country’s peak demand, but stable real generation barely reaches 11,000 MW. This shortfall is a result of both U.S. sanctions and domestic corruption, which together have led to disinvestment, lack of maintenance, fuel shortages (plants designed to run on natural gas have been forced to use low-quality diesel) and transmission problems.

Where does oil production come in? Víctor Poleo, an electrical engineer and former vice minister of Energy and Mines from 1999 to 2001, told Truthdig that “the national oil industry uses up about 1,500 MW, of which about 250 MW is self-generated, but another 1,250 MW is taken from the national interconnected system. This draw is 24/7 and must be continuous in order to carry out crude extraction, transport, pumps and compressors and refining.”

Poleo, who bases his analysis on studies by fellow electrical engineer Nelson Hernández, says light, medium and heavy crudes are estimated to require between 9 kilowatt-hours and 15 kilowatt-hours per barrel to produce. For extra-heavy Orinoco crudes, the estimate is 24 kilowatt-hours per barrel. “As a result, citizens lose their quality of life so that oil can be produced.”

This deterioration is particularly notable in Zulia state, Venezuela’s so-called oil cradle, where production has risen to between 350,000 and 370,000 barrels per day of light and medium crude — far below the historic peak of 1.5 million bpd in 2004, but a figure that, for its residents, has translated into daily blackouts exceeding 12 hours.

From the Isla Dorada residential complex in northern Maracaibo, capital of Zulia, José Javier León tells Truthdig that power failures “have worsened dramatically.” In his area, outages used to last four hours but now exceed seven. 

“In many places there are double rounds, meaning the power goes out in the morning and at night, or at night and then before dawn. All the problems have gotten worse, and we don’t know the real reasons. In the suburb of Cuatricentenario, one of the most working-class areas and where the government had the most electoral support, the cuts are the worst,” he says.

León complains that residents are not alerted when the outages will happen. There is nothing like the electricity rationing schedules of the past, which would at least let them plan better. “In my area, there is no domestic gas, so we have electric stoves. Also, these are apartment buildings, where we have to turn on pumps to get water.” To make matters worse, the temperature in Zulia often reaches 39 degrees Celsius (102 Fahrenheit) because of the humidity.

In the Andes, outages add up to as many as 12 hours a day, and 16 hours in rural or border areas. From La Hechicera, an urban neighborhood in the city of Mérida, Silvana Solano tells Truthdig that the power used to go out for seven to eight hours, once a day, “but for the past two months, it goes out twice a day, the first time for seven hours and the other for around five hours, and we can’t predict the schedule. This also affects phone signals, which keeps us from communicating, making payments, etc.”

Some government institutions, including the Mérida mayor’s office, are open only from 8 a.m. to noon. Solano says she is worried that public schools, which operate until 3 p.m., will also adopt this schedule, in turn affecting parents’ working hours. Throughout September, residents of the towns of Caja Seca (Zulia state) and Nueva Bolivia (Mérida state) blocked the Pan-American Highway to protest the power outages.

To Venezuela’s north, on the famous Margarita Island, Alejandro Pérez tells Truthdig there are areas that have gone seven to eight months without water service. “Here we pay for water trucks, $50 for 10,000 liters of water, sometimes with $60 we get 13,000 liters, but you have to pay in foreign cash or at the parallel rate because the Central Bank of Venezuela exchange rate isn’t accepted here.” The black market or informal exchange rate is worth more, for those with foreign currency, than the official exchange rate.

Unlike other Caribbean islands, Margarita doesn’t have significant natural sources of fresh water. Some 90% of the area’s water comes from the mainland, crossing the sea through underwater pipelines that require gigantic pumping stations.

The contradictory rhetoric and the endless problems we face daily mean that, according to the latest AtlasIntel poll conducted for Bloomberg News, only 10% of Venezuelans believe the country will benefit from the oil pact with the U.S. — data that also aligns with the most recent study by the firm Meganálisis, the same one that after Jan. 3 said 92.2% of Venezuelans loved Trump. Emotions change, social problems persist, and without electricity, no economic improvement will be possible.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelanalysis editorial staff.

Source: Truthdig

Caracas, October 12, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – US Secretary of State Marco Rubio hosted Venezuelan opposition lead negotiator Dinorah Figuera on Friday at the State Department in Washington, DC, to express support for ongoing dialogue with the Venezuelan government.

“This is the best opportunity Venezuela has had in almost a generation,” Rubio told reporters, adding that the talks headed by Figuera are “a difficult process” but enjoy “100 percent support from the highest levels” of Donald Trump’s administration.

Rubio stressed that Washington’s goal goes beyond holding elections. “Our desire is not simply for Venezuela to have an election, but also to have a democracy with the institutions necessary to sustain long-term stability, prosperity, and freedom.” The Trump official has insisted on a three-phase plan culminating in a “political transition.”

For her part, Figuera, the president of the defunct 2015 Venezuelan National Assembly, praised the United States for opening a “path of hope for Venezuela” on January 3, when US forces bombed Caracas and abducted President Nicolás Maduro.

“We are committed to restoring the institutional framework of the public powers, the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ), and the National Electoral Council (CNE). We want to bring the country toward a process that guarantees political and civil rights and creates space for reunion and reconciliation,” she said.

The opposition leader also thanked Washington for its investments in the oil sector. “The restoration of institutions and the country’s economic progress will be two fundamental pillars for building institutions and democracy,” she added. Despite its term running out in January 2021, the opposition majority parliament elected in 2015 retained US “recognition” as Venezuela’s legitimate authority.

Both officials announced that the next round of talks is scheduled to begin on October 14. Rubio explicitly called for opposition unity: “We ask all elements of the opposition, and all sectors of society, to participate in and support this process.”

Neither Rubio nor Figuera fielded questions from reporters as they left the room, including about opposition leader María Corina Machado, who continues to insist that presidential elections must be held “as soon as possible.”

This was the first time Rubio received Figuera in Washington. Since August, she has led an opposition bloc engaged in dialogue with the acting government headed by Delcy Rodríguez, a process promoted by the United States in which the far-right Machado is not participating.

So far, government and opposition delegations have completed two rounds of negotiations in Caracas. Rubio claimed that the talks thus far have resulted in the release of hundreds of people allegedly detained for political reasons, the unblocking of several pro-opposition news websites, and progress toward amending the 2017 Law Against Hatred. The agenda for this third round includes continuing the process to renew the Supreme Court.

In this regard, opposition delegation member Juan Miguel Matheus said his team is “working to ensure that the members of the Judicial Nominations Committee are appointed and sworn in by October 15.” The committee will be responsible for evaluating candidates for the 32 Supreme Court justice positions.

Following an amendment to the Organic Law of the Supreme Court of Justice negotiated at the dialogue table, it was agreed that the Judicial Nominations Committee would have a majority of 12 civil society representatives, compared with 11 lawmakers. A total of 127 citizens applied to join the body.

Once the committee has been appointed, the process of receiving applications from candidates for the Supreme Court will begin. “We invite the best men and women in Venezuelan law to apply for positions in the TSJ’s six chambers. Venezuela needs independent, competent justices of recognized integrity,” Matheus stressed.

While some opposition sectors are demanding that a date be set for presidential elections, the delegation participating in the negotiations argues that progress in transforming the justice system is a necessary prior step.

In his press statement, Rubio added that future rounds of discussions “will address reform of the National Electoral Council.”

The Venezuelan government’s delegation has not commented on the Trump administration’s express backing for the opposition negotiators. 

The two sides agreed to demand the release of 31 tonnes of gold held by the Bank of England since 2019 to address post-earthquake reconstruction needs. The gold, worth more than US $4 billion, will reportedly be moved to the New York Federal Reserve, with its spending subject to US approval and international auditing.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.