Venezuela

Venezuela holds the largest proven oil reserves on earth. It has lithium. It has agriculture, a coastline three hours away from Miami, and—for the first time in a generation a political window. The reconstruction investment case is real. So is the obstacle for every actor, across every ideology, that wants Venezuelan assets to perform.

The obstacle is not the oil price. It is not the OFAC sanctions framework, which has been substantially liberalized since January 2026. It is not even the absence of functioning institutions, though that is the proximate problem every investor will encounter. The obstacle has a nucleus with name, a title, and an active intelligence apparatus. And his continued presence in power is not merely a moral affront. 

This is not a story about mismanagement. Mismanagement leaves a paper trail.

What happened across Venezuela’s infrastructure ministries between 2002 and 2012 lest almost none, deliberately. Over $150 billion in documented railway, housing, and infrastructure contracts were disbursed across that decade. The projects largely do not exist. The documentation largely does not exist. The Tinaco-Anaco railway, a $7.5 billion contract signed with China Railway Engineering Corporation, produced looted campsites and empty concrete columns. The National Railway Plan, budgeted at $150 billion, produced less than one percent of its projected track. 

One of the ministers who oversaw that disbursement period of the infrastructure that is so dire, and who preserved an influence only surpassed by Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro, today is the Interior Minister of Venezuela. He controls the national intelligence apparatus, the police, and the armed colectivos. He is Diosdado Cabello, your competing General Partner that has acted without impunity. He carries a live indictment from a New York court on narco-trafficking charges. He is sanctioned by the US Treasury. He hosts a television program that airs every Wednesday evening.

By 2011, the beneficial ownership architecture built by Venezuela’s ruling network spanned more than forty trustees across multiple jurisdictions: a parallel private equity structure embedded inside a sovereign state.

The distinction that every institutional investor must internalize is this: a mismanaged State is recoverable. A State whose productive apparatus was deliberately extracted (not ruined by incompetence but hollowed out because extraction was more profitable than production) presents a categorically different investment problem. The destruction was not the side effect of the governance model. It was the point of it. Cabello remains an icon of that governance model.

The counterparty problem

Conventional private equity rests on a foundational assumption: your counterparty has an interest in the underlying asset performing. Returns depend on it. Exit depends on it. The entire structure of an LP agreement, a term sheet, a co-investment right, all of it assumes a counterparty whose incentive is aligned with asset value.

In Venezuela, the sophisticated actor on the other side of the table for two decades was running a competing structure. One with no limited partners, no fiduciary duty, no quarterly reporting, and a sovereign intelligence apparatus for compliance. That structure had a single mandate: maximum extraction, minimum documentation, zero accountability. It executed that mandate with precision.

By 2011, the beneficial ownership architecture built by Venezuela’s ruling network spanned more than forty trustees across multiple jurisdictions. This is not a warlord’s operation. This is a parallel private equity structure embedded inside a sovereign state.

That sophistication is precisely what makes the residual presence of these networks so consequential for reconstruction capital. They did not disappear with the January 2026 transition. They repositioned. The structures that governed Venezuela’s extraction apparatus are experts at corporate layering: shell companies, nominee directors, off-channel financial instruments designed to distance beneficial owners from the assets they control.

This is the counterparty environment that reconstruction capital is walking into. Not a post-conflict landscape with residual corruption. An active, sophisticated, multi-jurisdictional extraction network that has spent 25 years perfecting its operational security

These are not improvised operations, they are multi-jurisdictional corporate architectures spanning Switzerland, Brazil, Spain, the Caribbean, and more recently Turkey and the Middle East. Each node chosen for its specific regulatory gap or enforcement lag. The $5.2 billion in gold shipped to Switzerland between 2013 and 2016, the Alex Saab procurement network running through Turkey and Cape Verde, the Zapatero indictment revealing consulting structures designed to siphon money from China, Venezuela, and Spain simultaneously these are documented examples of the same operational capability.

These networks retain the best advisors money can pay. Former heads of state, international law firms, financial intermediaries operating across jurisdictions. The Zapatero case is not the exception, it is the template. And they operate with the enforcement discipline of a cartel: strategic asset moves backed by the implicit and sometimes explicit willingness to use coercion when commercial pressure is insufficient. The SDNY indictments against senior regime figures on narco-trafficking charges are not separate from the financial architecture. They are evidence that the same command structure manages both.

This is the counterparty environment that reconstruction capital is walking into. Not a post-conflict landscape with residual corruption. An active, sophisticated, multi-jurisdictional extraction network that has spent 25 years perfecting its operational security, asset acquisitions by “patriotic”expropriations to serve their drug-logistic hubs and is now repositioning for the reconstruction window. 

Why China doesn’t actually want this

China’s position in Venezuela is widely misread as unconditional support. The reality is more commercially specific. China has over $60 billion in loan-for-oil exposure through CNPC and the China Development Bank. Those loans require one thing: barrels flowing. Barrels require functional production infrastructure. Functional production infrastructure requires institutional stability, contract enforcement, and (critically) a counterparty with an interest in assets performing.

Beijing understands this better than any outside observer because its own institutions have investigated the damage. Xi Jinping’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection placed a CITIC Group vice president under investigation for serious disciplinary violations, the same CITIC that embedded confidentiality clauses in Venezuelan housing contracts barring the Venezuelan government from accessing financial information about its own projects. An Andorran court documented $100 million in bribes paid by CAMC Engineering to Venezuelan officials. China did not need backchannel meetings to understand the corruption. Its own companies were defendants in it.

China also enforces its own code of conduct internally. The CCP’s anti-corruption apparatus, operating through the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, has a long reach, including over state enterprise executives who participated in overseas schemes that damaged China’s institutional reputation. Chinese firms implicated in Venezuelan bribery networks in Andorra for payments to PDVSA lobbyists related to Venezuela’s electricity system did not operate without consequence within their own system. Beijing does not publicize these accountability mechanisms, but they exist. The party does not tolerate reputational exposure that undermines its economic diplomacy, regardless of the geography.

Every dollar that disappears into the extraction apparatus is a dollar that does not produce the barrel that services the Chinese loans.

The Trump-Xi summit concluded in Beijing on May 15, 2026, the same day Lamargas exploded on Lake Maracaibo, a facility operated by China Concord Resources Corp under a PDVSA joint venture contract. At the moment, the US and Chinese governments are navigating toward economic stabilization and a framework for managed competition, building on their South Korea thaw. That G2 stabilization has direct implications for Venezuela: a China that is repositioning toward US capital markets, Boeing purchases, and agricultural commitments is a China with diminishing strategic incentive to backstop a Venezuelan network that embarrasses it commercially.

The Chevron model—US-anchored, internationally governed, with Chinese off-take embedded through structured contracts—is precisely the kind of framework that serves Beijing’s debt recovery needs without requiring it to defend the indefensible.

A ministry based in a kleptocracy whose financial architecture is premised on assets not performing for the state is structurally incompatible with Chinese debt recovery. Beijing is not sentimental about this. It is calculating.

China’s $50-60 billion in loan-for-oil exposure to Venezuela requires one thing above all else: barrels flowing. Barrels require functional production infrastructure. Functional production infrastructure requires institutional stability, contract enforcement, and a counterparty whose economic interest is aligned with assets performing. When the ministry overseeing oil production is the same apparatus that systematically extracted value from every sector it touched, railways that produced concrete columns and nothing else, housing programs with $76 billion in unaccounted deficits, power plants that were paid for and never built, you can see that the problem for Beijing is not political. Every dollar that disappears into the extraction apparatus is a dollar that does not produce the barrel that services the loans.

China tried to correct this internally before abandoning the effort. In 2018, Margaret Myers at the Inter-American Dialogue pointed out that Beijing “tried over the past couple of years to guide decision-making in Caracas by providing advice or by tying loans to production capacity projects in the oil sector, in order to try to help Venezuela right itself economically. That has not proven successful.”

By 2016, China stopped issuing new loans entirely. That is not a diplomatic signal. That is a credit committee decision. The same kind of decision any institutional lender makes when the counterparty’s governance structure has made repayment structurally unlikely.

The Brazilian vector

Brazil’s relationship to Venezuela’s reconstruction is complicated by a paper trail that runs through the largest corruption scandal in Latin American history. Odebrecht paid the highest figure of any country outside Brazil itself. Venezuela’s own former prosecutor general, Luisa Ortega Díaz, formally linked those payments to senior Socialist Party figures including Diosdado Cabello after being removed from office and forced to flee the country. The investigation was halted by Venezuela’s highest court. The Swiss banking system was asked to provide a list of Venezuelan recipients. Neither process was allowed to reach its conclusion.

In Brazil, the Odebrecht network reached the highest levels of political life. Federal prosecutors investigated Lula for allegedly lobbying foreign governments on Odebrecht’s behalf after leaving the presidency, and for his role in directing state development bank BNDES financing toward Odebrecht projects abroad. The contracts that linked Odebrecht to Venezuela were not arm’s-length commercial transactions. They were, by Odebrecht’s own admission in its US Department of Justice plea agreement, instruments of a coordinated bribery architecture that spanned twelve countries and operated through a dedicated internal division (the Division of Structured Operations) whose sole purpose was managing political payments.

What does not yet exist is the decision—by US institutional capital—to arrive with a governance structure that the extraction network cannot penetrate.

Brazil has significant commercial interests in Venezuela’s reconstruction, across energy, agriculture, and infrastructure. Those interests are legitimate and Brazilian private capital is a natural reconstruction partner. The complication is not Brazil. It is the specific political-commercial network that governed Brazil’s prior engagement with Venezuela. Odebrecht did not select its Venezuelan counterparties through competitive markets. Contracts were directed through political relationships — between heads of state, with BNDES as the financing instrument, and with the Odebrecht Division of Structured Operations managing the payments in between.

Political networks have institutional memory. The preferred partners that flow through certain diplomatic channels into Venezuela’s reconstruction window carry relationships forged in that prior architecture. A governance framework serious about reconstruction cannot simply exclude Odebrecht, the legal entity. It must screen for the network that Odebrecht served. That screening is structural, not political. It is the difference between Brazilian capital that competes on merit and Brazilian capital that arrives pre-selected by the same diplomatic infrastructure that enabled the extraction.

The structure that worked and the decision that remains

One Venezuelan asset survived twenty-six years of chavismo with its value intact. One. CITGO Petroleum, incorporated in Delaware, governed under US fiduciary law, with its governance architecture anchored entirely outside Venezuelan legal jurisdiction. It survived not because of political protection but because of structural protection. US law held when every Venezuelan institution around it failed. That is not a coincidence. It is the blueprint.

Venezuela sits very close to Miami. Capital will flow in. The question is whether it arrives with a governance structure equal to the threat, or whether it arrives the way it always has in captured states: trusting counterparties who already demonstrated, at extraordinary scale, that trust was the wrong instrument.

The SDNY indicted the man who sits in the Interior Ministry. The US Treasury sanctioned him. He is still in the building. Turkish construction conglomerates, Asian commodity traders, and European energy juniors are already positioning—without FCPA compliance costs, without fiduciary obligations, without LP reporting requirements. They will move faster. They will price lower. This is what happened in Iraq after 2003. It is what happened in Libya.

The architecture to do this differently exists. Human capital exists in the diaspora: eight million Venezuelans left and within them there are over a million that hold verifiable credentials embedded in US and European institutions, carrying the technical and legal knowledge to rebuild what was taken. The OFAC licensing framework exists. The proof of concept exists in CITGO’s survival. What does not yet exist is the decision—by US institutional capital—to arrive with a governance structure that the extraction network cannot penetrate. That decision is the only thing standing between reconstruction and a second extraction with better letterhead.

VENEZUELA Fury has shown off her post-honeymoon sunkissed glow as fans say she’s ‘a model in the making’.

After sunning herself on her and husband Noah Price’s lavish £30,000 honeymoon in Marbella, the newlywed, 16, is keen to flaunt her sun tan.

In a new TikTok video uploaded to her page, Venezuela can be seen posing in a strapless pink corset and matching miniskirt.

She was standing by a white wall, which really made her tan pop and stand out.

In the video, Venezuela mimed along to a song and posed for the camera while showing off her figure.

She wore her long hair down and cascading over her shoulder, with bright red lipstick on her lips and barely any eye makeup.

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Venezuela Fury shouts at husband & fumes ‘I’m trying to talk’ as she films video

STUNNING WIFE

Venezuela Fury looks incredible as she shows off outfit in her static home

The reality star, who appears in At Home With The Furys on Netflix, tagged fashion brand Ego in the comments.

Fans were quick to swoon over the stunning video, with one even urging she is a “model in the making”.

“The legs! A model in the making,” penned one person.

Another added: “The beautifulist.”

While a third said: “Omg you look like heaven.”

And a fourth swooned: “You look so pretty.”

Venezuela and her husband Noah have just returned from their £30k honeymoon and are settling into life as a married couple.

Following her lavish wedding last month, Venezuela has traded her parents’ £8million mansion on the Isle of Man for a plush static home in East Riding of Yorkshire.

Before they headed off on their romantic trip, Venezuela gave fans a tour of her and Noah’s marital home.

Along with their wedding and their expensive honeymoon, Venezuela’s parents also paid for the static home and gave her a cash lump sum.

A source previously revealed to us: “Tyson and Paris gave Venezuela and Noah a wedding present of £5million to kick-start their life, obviously, they were over the moon.

so there were some mixed feelings – but it’s up to Tyson and Paris.

“Tyson also paid for the honeymoon and got them a traditional gypsy wagon as a sentimental gift. Tyson’s got one in his front yard.”

We were also previously told: “Venezuela wants to start her married life in the traditional style of a traveller, just like her parents did.

“She has lived in luxury since she was born, but is willing to swap her home comforts to go and live in a static caravan.”

VENEZUELA Fury fumed at new husband Noah and ranted “I’m trying to talk” after he made a noisy interruption during her latest TikTok.

The Netflix star and newlywed, 16, was talking to her social media fans about how her glowing tan had started to fade when her spouse chipped in.

The teenage newlyweds have just returned from their £30k honeymoon and are settling into life as a married couple.

Though Noah’s love for playing live music, now the pair are back on home turf, appeared to have left her irked.

Venezuela was seen in a white top and glammed up with red lippie, speaking direct to the camera after one fan quipped: “They toned the tan down”.

The teen left her brunette locks in a poker straight style and accessorised with silver hoop earrings.

FIT FOR A KING

Win your own Venezuela Fury wedding worth a whopping £44k

STUNNING WIFE

Venezuela Fury looks incredible as she shows off outfit in her static home

She flaunted her glittering diamond ring and glam nail extensions for her clip, clearly eager to make some strong TikTok content.

The TV star told one of her online followers: “I know how pale I am, but you don’t understand how hard I work to get that colour”.

Noah can be heard in the background and he asked: “Who is that?” to which she replied: “I am making a video”.

Attempting to continue her clip, she said: “And the magazine made me look so pale”.

Noah then sat on the sofa and began to strum his guitar, prompting her to squeal: “I am trying to talk!”

She added: “Does anyone else get driven insane by a guitar?

“Go, sing!”

Noah then interjected: “Don’t delete it,” referring to the clip, and she retorted: “I’m not deleting it, I haven’t deleted it.

“Anyway I give up!

“Noah’s a great guitar player because I can’t talk,” before urging him to “sing then sing with confidence”.

Noah, mid flow, could then be heard in the background as he said: “Whose ringing my phone this time of day oh my God,” during an interruption to his performance.

Fans were quick to comment on the light-hearted lovers’ tiff.

One wrote: “Stop they obviously adore each other”.

A second posted: “You two are so cute he adores and loves you and ya picked a go one x” as a third joked: “Welcome to married life”.

A fan wrote: “That was the most chaotic video I understand with the random guitar noise tho,” as another noted: “I can see who is the boss in that house”.

One then referred to At Home With The Furys star’s role as the head of her six siblings and posted: “You being the oldest sibling has given you great patience”.

A user then quipped: “I can see who is the boss in that house”.

Following her lavish wedding earlier this month, Venezuela has traded her parents’ £8million mansion on the Isle of Man for a plush static home in East Riding of Yorkshire.

The young wife, who is the daughter of Tyson, 37, and Paris, 36, yesterday revealed her glam new wardrobe.

She also got a chance to show off her impressive tan from her luxury honeymoon.

Venezuela and Noah tied the knot on May 16, in a no expense spared wedding.

They then headed off on their lavish honeymoon to Marbella, as they continued to celebrate their marriage.

Onlookers said that the couple “couldn’t stop smiling” during their holiday.

One source told The Sun: “They looked completely smitten. Everyone in the restaurant noticed them straight away.”

Venezuela’s parents Tyson and Paris paid for their lavish honeymoon as a wedding present.

Meanwhile, before heading off on their romantic trip, Venezuela gave fans a tour of her and Noah’s marital home.

Along with their wedding and their expensive honeymoon, Venezuela’s parents also paid for the static home and gave her a cash lump sum.

A source previously revealed to us: “Tyson and Paris gave Venezuela and Noah a wedding present of £5million to kick-start their life, obviously, they were over the moon.

“Some family members thought it was a lot of money for a young couple so there were some mixed feelings – but it’s up to Tyson and Paris.

“Tyson also paid for the honeymoon and got them a traditional gypsy wagon as a sentimental gift. Tyson’s got one in his front yard.

Elías Jaua is a Venezuelan intellectual, university professor, and politician who served as vice president under Hugo Chávez in addition to several ministerial roles in the  Chávez and Maduro administrations. He currently heads the Center for the Study of Socialist Democracy (CEDES). In this exclusive interview, Jaua discusses Venezuela’s post-January 3 conjuncture, the anti-imperialist struggle to reclaim sovereignty, and the role to be played by Chavismo.

Venezuela’s reality changed on January 3 with the US strikes and kidnapping of President Maduro. How would you describe the current situation? And regarding the US, there is talk of “conditional sovereignty” and “tutelage,” while officials speak of a “cooperation agenda.” What is your take on this?

Sovereignty is a comprehensive concept. You either have it or you don’t. Sovereignty means not depending on anyone. It is the foundation of a republic. A republic means independence from others, something distinct from liberal, individual freedom. Venezuela today is a state under tutelage, overseen by the Donald Trump administration. This was officially declared by Trump and White House officials such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

This is also clearly reflected in oil production, which must be sold primarily to the US, and the proceeds from those exports do not enter directly into Venezuela’s coffers but instead into a US Treasury account. From there, the Venezuelan government will make requests and have certain amounts necessary for the country’s basic functioning disbursed. That is a complete loss of economic sovereignty. We have also seen how reforms to strategic laws, such as those governing hydrocarbons and mining, have been rushed through. Today, there is immense pressure on labor legislation, both from the Venezuelan business community and from transnational capital, which views labor laws as yet another obstacle to attracting investment.

And finally, we have seen that Venezuela’s foreign policy – which was openly supportive of Palestine, Iran, and Cuba – has been significantly toned down. This is another clear sign that Venezuela is no longer an independent state. Its status as a republic is entirely relative.

In light of all this, how do you feel the government and other national political groups should respond?

I view the decision made on January 3 not to respond to the US military attack as a responsible one, because the enemy clearly had military superiority and the capability to control the entire airspace using high-tech means. A response would have resulted in significant destruction of the country’s infrastructure and armed forces, as well as the killing of thousands of civilians. 

Now, four months later, the Venezuelan government and all political forces should clearly denounce to the international community the coercion to which we are being subjected. On the one hand, as a public denunciation, but also to have it formally recorded before international bodies such as the International Commission on Human Rights. What occurred in January were war crimes, a fact supported by United Nations rapporteurs. Next, a complaint should be filed with the International Court of Justice to restore control over national revenues to the Venezuelan state. 

One might argue that this is ineffective at the moment, that international law is irrelevant and international organizations are incapable of acting – and that is true. But the country must establish a legal precedent because these institutions still exist, and as a result they are a source of rights. These complaints set precedents so that the country can, in the future, claim the rights that have been damaged by the occupying power. 

Finally, it is important to reach out to the international community, and above all to the peoples of the world, so that they know there is a nation that refuses to be placed under tutelage and subjected to these conditions, in order to build international solidarity. An internal political stance must also be established, because this attempt to conceal the gravity of the coercion to which the country is being subjected numbs popular consciousness, undermines patriotic morale, and that is contrary to what is expected of the leadership – not only of the government, but of the entire political leadership of the nation.

But what if that triggers another US military attack?

I don’t think a repeat of the January 3 incident is imminent because it would have repercussions in the US domestic political landscape. The political cost for the Trump administration would no longer be zero, as it practically was on January 3, but there would be greater resistance, especially for attacking a country that has simply exercised its rights before international bodies to claim sovereignty over resources and political self-determination. 

Put another way, the option of not denouncing this, of not activating available mechanisms, is to accept and normalize this situation of neocolonialism, and I believe that is a very dangerous path that could even lead to Venezuela’s annexation by the US. I believe there are moments when peoples, nations, and their leaders must take a firm stand for the sake of history. Here it is no longer a matter of defending a party or a political movement, but rather the existence of a nation that was born free. We have a historic responsibility to ensure it remains that way for future generations.

US officials repeat their “three-phase plan,” which ends with a political “transition,” on a daily basis, while the extremist opposition demands immediate elections to seize power at any cost. From your perspective, what is the path forward, and what should the priorities be?

The priority is to regain independence. If we hold elections, that is with candidates for what? For governor of the colony? Anyone who truly wants to hold the presidency of the Republic of Venezuela must first raise their voice in favor of the immediate restoration of the country’s sovereign rights over its resources and revenues and the assertion of political self-determination. 

In any case, I argue that any eventual electoral process should be the result of a national agreement, renationalizing politics and not waiting for a call from the White House one day announcing that there will be elections in six months. That would be very shameful. I believe that Venezuelan political forces would be obligated, as part of that strategy to reclaim and demand the restoration of Venezuela’s sovereignty, to also commit to the international community and the Venezuelan people to seek a political, democratic, and electoral path forward.

In a recent article, you spoke of an inability to manage the internal political conflict, which paved the way for foreign intervention. Could you elaborate on this idea? How has that situation changed since January 3?

Foreign meddling began on the very first day of the Bolivarian Revolution, and there were agents that facilitated it. The first concrete example was the April 11, 2002 coup d’état, with the open participation of the US and Spanish governments, and from that point on, that interference never ceased. But there was always a degree of autonomy that allowed, especially after 2004, for the democratic resolution of the conflict through national agreements. For instance, the recall referendum that ultimately ratified Chávez’s mandate.

But starting in 2014, after the right-wing insurrectionary attempt known as “La Salida” and its failure, the US began to intervene directly by declaring Venezuela an “unusual and extraordinary threat,” and from that point on, the opposition lost any capacity to make decisions. I was a member of the dialogue delegation in the Dominican Republic in 2018 and saw how an agreement signed by everyone was overturned by a phone call from the US embassy. 

I also believe that later, over the past five years, the Venezuelan government chose to engage in dialogue with the US and bet that the conflict would be resolved directly with Washington. Therefore, everyone put all their eggs in the White House’s basket, and the decision slipped completely out of the control of the country’s internal institutions until the game came to a standstill. And indeed, at the behest of the far-right opposition, Washington intervened and attacked on January 3. That is why I say that reclaiming internal political control in order to resolve the conflict would be an act of dignity and courage on the part of the entire Venezuelan political leadership. Conflict is not going to vanish, because today the calls for a conflict-free Venezuela come alongside a set of measures that deepen it. For example, labor deregulation, social disinvestment, political exclusion, etc.

In recent years, you have analyzed and debated the direction of Chavismo amid sanctions and the implementation of orthodox macroeconomic adjustment policies. Since January 3, we have seen a drastic overhaul of key pillars of the Bolivarian project, such as the Hydrocarbons Law, and critical voices growing louder, including Mario Silva and Luis Britto García. What is the current state of Chavismo, in your opinion?

First of all, the revision and change of course regarding fundamental aspects of Chavismo’s historic program did not begin on January 3 but much earlier. It was formalized starting in 2018 with the Program for Economic Recovery, Growth, and Prosperity, aimed at halting the advance of the transition to socialism and restoring the private sector’s hegemony in managing the economy, with clear consequences for social rights and the fight against social inequality. This was also accompanied by increasingly undemocratic mechanisms, from the political leadership, to impose a change of course in economic and social policy. 

However, a fundamental core of Chavismo’s programmatic unity – the struggle for independence and national sovereignty – remained intact, and that kept Chavismo cohesive despite major differences. Today, I believe Chavismo must be situated within different spheres. There is a Chavismo within the United Socialist Party (PSUV) – no one can dispute that  – but I believe there is a broader, and much larger, Chavismo, with a cultural, political, and symbolic identity rooted in a metanarrative that exists outside the PSUV and the Great Patriotic Pole. That sector currently lacks clear leadership and organizational structure, but it retains its values. It may have circumstantial views of the situation, but essentially it continues to uphold the principles that launched this process: sovereignty, participatory and protagonist democracy, democratic pluralism, freedom, political ethics, debate, speaking the truth, and social equality. It also holds a vision of a multipolar world, in solidarity with international struggles. These were, in essence, the core tenets of Chavismo from its inception and remain relevant for a significant portion of the Venezuelan population that is Chavista or was once Chavista.

You have talked about building national unity at this juncture, but also about upholding Chávez and his legacy. Are these two paths compatible?

This is a difficult and painful reflection because the figure and the project of Hugo Chávez have been burdened with a series of deviations. Practices that run completely contrary to the principles and values he defended, and upon which he built the Chavista project. For example, the case of Víctor Hugo Quero and his mother is deeply outrageous (1). It is a truly shameful incident, yet international news outlets report, “Chavismo admits to the disappearance of a detainee,” “Mother of prisoner killed by Chavismo dies.” Is it Chavismo or just a few individuals responsible? What about the men and women who, for over 25 years, laboriously dreamed, built, and dedicated part of their lives to creating well-being and the common good in their communities, to building a national project called “Chavismo”? It is very unfair because Chavismo, as a movement, is being accused of things it did not do. Chavismo is not this or that leader; it is the men and women who gave up the only thing they had – their time, their effort – to build community, a national project, to plant crops, to learn to read and write or to teach others to read and write, to study, and so on. 

I stand by Chavismo as the men and women who dreamed, who continue to dream, and who have given their all to build a more humane society. For me, that will continue to be Chavismo. And those of us who have held leadership posts in this process must assume their responsibilities for the good and the bad. But it is unethical to blame a popular movement, a popular ideal like Chavismo, for the mistakes, deviations, and vile acts that some leaders may have committed. 

I believe that the call for national unity, to paraphrase [revolutionary communist leader Alfredo] Maneiro, will spring from the most authentic Chavismo, but will transcend it. It will converge with other currents of the left that were not Chavista, with social democratic sectors that broke away from the extremist opposition, and with people who never took a stance on the political conflict the country has experienced in recent decades. It will be the plurality of opinions, of people, of organizations, that will provide the foundation for a necessary movement, which I see as unstoppable and already feel in the streets, in this struggle to regain independence and sovereignty.

Note

(1) Victor Quero died in state custody in July 2025 but his family was not notified. His mother, Carmen Navas, continued to search for him until his death was publicly acknowledged in May 2026 after a judge denied an amnesty request. Navas passed away shortly afterward.

Caracas, May 29, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Russian government has urged Venezuelan authorities to “reject approaches” from the US and allies to transfer military equipment to Ukraine.

Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu raised the concerns during a meeting with Venezuelan Major General José Ornelas Ferreira, secretary general of the Caribbean nation’s National Defense Council, on Wednesday in Moscow. 

The Venezuelan official was a guest at the First International Security Forum, held from May 26-29 at the Russian capital with the presence of 140 top officials from over 120 countries worldwide.

“We are aware of the activity of Western emissaries who are attempting to involve Latin American countries in various arms supply schemes for the benefit of the Kyiv regime,” Shoigu said in a bilateral meeting with Ornelas. “We expect you to reject such approaches and inform us of any such Western attempts.”

Moscow and Caracas have maintained a longstanding military alliance through which Russia has provided Venezuela with a broad supply of weapons, equipment, and technical assistance for decades, forming the backbone of the Venezuelan arsenal. The cooperation dates back to the 2000s as Hugo Chávez sought to reverse the US dependence of the armed forces.

Though neither US nor Venezuelan officials have commented on weapons transfer proposals, Shoigu’s warning follows publicized efforts by Washington and allies to bolster the beleaguered Ukrainian forces in the war against Russia. Kiev’s backers procure Soviet-era equipment that could be easily integrated into the battlefield.

Apart from securing supplies from Eastern European NATO members, Washington has also turned to Latin America, offering to exchange Russian and Soviet-made hardware for newer US equipment. Brazilian and Colombian leaders rejected the proposal.

In February 2024, Ecuador canceled plans to send or exchange Soviet/Russian-origin weaponry with the US, which intended to reroute them Ukraine. Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa backtracked following Russian threats to suspend banana imports from the Andean country.

According to military analysts, Venezuela’s battlefield equipment — including T-72B1V tanks, BMP-3 infantry vehicles, Mi-17 helicopters, and 152 mm artillery systems — would be valuable on the Ukrainian battlefield and help address chronic ammunition shortages.

The recent Moscow security summit also saw Shoigu condemn the US’ “brutal armed invasion” of Venezuela on January 3 that led to the kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores.

“We strongly condemn Washington’s actions on January 3, during which the legitimate head of state, Nicolás Maduro, and his wife were captured, and dozens of Venezuelan and Cuban citizens were killed,” the former Russian defense minister stated.

Shoigu criticized the Trump administration for “violating all fundamental norms of international law” and breaking “the principles governing coexistence among nations and respect for state sovereignty.”

The Russian official went on to reaffirm the Vladimir Putin government’s “unwavering support” for Caracas and the desire to “strengthen cooperation” in order to avoid future acts of aggression.

Shoigu likewise commented on the Venezuelan government, led by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, pursuing a “new modality of relations” with the US and expressed hope that it would protect the Caribbean country’s “sovereignty and national interests.”

Following the January 3 attacks, the Trump White House has exacted major concessions from the acting Rodríguez administration, including seizing control of Venezuelan oil revenues, auditing its Central Bank, pushing pro-business legislative reforms, and securing the handover of former government envoy Alex Saab to face money laundering charges in Florida.

The growing US influence in Venezuela saw the Southern Command hold “rapid response” military exercises on May 23, with Osprey MV-22B aircraft flying over Caracas and landing near the US embassy compound. 

US officials have acknowledged a growing “collaboration” with Caracas. During a press conference on Wednesday, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth highlighted Washington’s self-declared anti-narcotics operations in the Western hemisphere and the joint work with local governments.

“Just think about the fact that our Southern Command commander landed by helicopter at the US Embassy in Caracas peacefully,” Hegseth said alongside Trump. “He was welcomed by the Venezuelans because we are now partnering with them, hopefully even in our counter-cartel missions.” 

The Trump official referred to Venezuela as “fundamental to securing our energy future and defending the homeland.”

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

“In my humble opinion, you have never known how to make coffee or Negroes. The former you leave too light, the latter too black.”

– Venezuelan poet and politician Andrés Eloy Blanco to US visitors, 1944

Contemporary racist attitudes in Venezuela have deep roots in the colonial period (sixteenth to nineteenth centuries). After independence, Venezuela constructed a national narrative that claimed to have overcome racism through miscegenation. We were (are) a “café con leche” (coffee with milk) nation, a blend in which racial differences had dissolved. But this supposed harmony concealed a persistent idea: whiteness remained the ideal, while African and Indigenous identities were seen as something to be diluted and gradually eliminated. 

This whitening process was not only biological, but also cultural and political. Paradoxically, racism in Venezuela became invisible to those who practiced it and even to those who suffered from it, masked under the pretext that “here we are all mestizos.” However, we have seen that when political conflicts intensify, the mask of mestizaje falls away and colonial prejudices resurface. 

The origin of an ideology

Although the validity of the term “race” has been questioned – on the grounds that we all belong to the human race and differ only in phenotypic traits – according to Venezuelan historian Luis Felipe Pellicer, “…if racism exists, race exists,” but only as an ideological construct of domination, and by no means as a scientific truth.

Racism emerged in Venezuela as a result of an exploitative and extractive economy that created a need for enslaved labor. Initially, this labor force consisted of Indigenous people and was later supplemented by individuals brought from the Atlantic coast of Africa. Countries such as present-day Ghana, Togo, Benin, Angola, and the Republic of the Congo were particularly affected. 

Now, the issue of slavery in Africa has deeper roots that warrant a more comprehensive examination, but in the Americas this system underwent a transformation, and what began as an economic activity ultimately established ideas that created negative associations around those subjected to slavery, thereby inventing the political and social category of “blackness.” By merging the condition of slavery with skin pigmentation into a single concept, the colonial mindset ended up stigmatizing every cultural and vital expression of these groups, considering them inferior, ugly, and despicable.

One of the characteristics of enslavement in the Americas was dehumanization and its racial justification. That is to say, here the idea of enslavement due to war or debt repayment was abandoned. The automatic association was: you are a slave because you are a Black African, and vice versa. This phenomenon created the idea that all Africans and their descendants were predestined for servitude and forced labor. 

The racist backlash

The recent incident in Madrid that saw supporters of far-right leader María Corina Machado shout slogans against Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez reflects a deep social divide. Sectors of the opposition who identify – whether phenotypically or aspirationally – with a Eurocentric worldview and the ideal of “whiteness” believe that the exercise of power by groups they associate with or perceive as people of African descent constitutes a historical affront. For decades before the Bolivarian Revolution, epithets like “monkey,” “mulatto,” “zambo,” “bembón,” and “bad hair,” among others, paraded across TV screens and in the national press with complete normality and often disguised as jokes – another mechanism for propagating Venezuelan racism. Following his government’s post-2001 radicalization of revolutionary reforms, Hugo Chávez was himself notoriously called a “monkey” and prominently caricatured as such by Venezuela’s right-wing opposition.

It is no surprise, then, that the presence of figures such as Venezuela’s current acting president transcends the issue of political ideology to constitute a rupture in “quality,” a term used in eighteenth-century Venezuela. “What is quality or race?” asks Pellicer. “It is an idea of inferiority regarding a human group that is transmitted, corporeally, through sexual reproduction.” It is an affront, then, to the natural order of things, to the pyramid of colonial society that placed peninsular Spaniards at the apex and people of African descent at the base. 

With the chant “Fuera la mona” (“Out with the monkey”), the Venezuelan far-right hurled an insult that reveals their undemocratic nature. But more importantly, these insults are not even linked to any incompetence in governance, but rather to what these groups perceive as “racial incompetence.” It is the expression of a wounded “whiteness” that uses racism as a defense mechanism against what they see as a displacement of their traditional privileges. It is, in essence, an attempt to restore a colonial order. 

Racism is a power structure. “Colonial thought,” Pellicer observes, “invents the other, whether Indigenous, mestizo, mulatto, or Black, as well as the white self … thereby establishing the ideology of race as the primary marker of inequality, beginning with the invasion of the Americas.” The struggle for honor in the colony was a struggle for differentiation and political recognition. Today, the “animalization” of non-white political leaders is the continuation of that colonial war, which is why the Madrid slur is not a simple rudeness; it is an act of historical violence. It is the voice of the eighteenth century trying to silence the twenty-first. And at this point, one must ask: what is admirable about the idea that, based on skin color, some are more or less fit to govern a country? 

The slave owner/racist does not see a person; he sees a tool, a piece of property, and for this to happen, the mind must adopt a psychopathic and callous mindset. The racist needs to strip the oppressed of their status as subjects in order to invoke a visceral fear of otherness that, if acknowledged, threatens their illusion of superiority. Choosing to be part of this ideological operation of domination today should be a source of shame, for it is the most glaring expression of a violence that heralds the end of humanity.

From Cortés to Díaz Ayuso

This exclusionary mindset is part of a transatlantic trend toward neocolonial revival that seeks to re-legitimize old hierarchies. A telling example is Spanish right-wing politician Isabel Díaz Ayuso’s recent visit to Mexico, where her proposal to celebrate the figure of Hernán Cortés serves as an ideological parallel to the “Fuera la mona” chants heard in Madrid. By attempting to portray the invasion and genocide in the Americas as a “civilizing” feat, Ayuso revives the logic of the “society of qualities”: a structure where moral and political superiority is an exclusive Hispanic and white inheritance, while Indigenous and Afro-descendant peoples are reduced to a state of barbarism remediable only through paternalistic tutelage.

This narrative is not merely a historical debate, but a contemporary validation of the racial hierarchy and justification for overthrowing processes of popular sovereignty in Latin America. Ayuso’s discourse seeks to reaffirm a “Hispanic identity” that views ethnic otherness as a threat to the values of Western civilization. In this sense, what happened in Madrid is a clear symptom of the reactionary neo-fascist wave sweeping large parts of the Global North and South.

Racist remarks

The trauma of Venezuela’s War of Independence (1810–1830) and the Federal War (1859–1863) created the need to invent a narrative in which Venezuelan society was free of conflicts and differences, and thus the persistence of racial and social tensions has been glossed over. However, it resurfaces in comments such as: “Fuera la mona”; “We need to improve the race”; “Black but refined”; “Money whitens.” 

In 1948, conservative writer Arturo Uslar Pietri responded to Rómulo Gallegos’s presidential campaign by stating: “Anyone who speaks of blacks or whites, anyone who invokes racial hatred or privileges, denies the essence of Venezuela. In Venezuela, in political and social matters, there are neither whites nor blacks, neither mestizos nor Indigenous people. There are only Venezuelans .” This argument was almost exactly the same as that put forward by María Corina Machado when asked about the event at La Puerta del Sol, stating that it had occurred because of the fissures of hatred that Chavismo introduced into its discourse over 27 years in power. 

The end of denial

As part of the commemoration of the Day of Venezuelan Afro-Descendance, established under the Hugo Chávez government in 2005 to be celebrated every May 10 [on the anniversary of the 1795 slave uprising led by José Leonardo Chirino], it is both pertinent and necessary to reflect on and understand that racism in Venezuela is a long-standing phenomenon that surfaces with particular virulence during times of political crisis. The historical association between power and whiteness, inherited from the colonial era and reinforced by twentieth-century positivist thought, remains alive in the minds of sections of society that refuse to accept the nation’s diversity, including among working-class communities through what is known as endoracism. 

Understanding the origin of this phenomenon is the first step toward dismantling it. We must move from the false harmony of “café con leche” to true decolonial justice, where a person’s “quality” is not dictated by their “whiteness.” The Madrid incident reminds us that the battle for Venezuela’s mental independence far from over.

Rosanna Álvarez holds an MSc in History of Republican Venezuela from the Central University of Venezuela (UCV). She is a researcher at the Centro de Estudios Simón Bolívar and Fundación Hugo Chávez, as well as a writer at the Libertador 8 Estrellas magazine. She is the author of Venezuela vista e imaginada. Un recorrido visual por nuestra historia and host of the Bolívar Nuestro show on Radio del Sur.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelanalysis editorial staff.

MIAMI — The Trump administration has quietly instructed federal prosecutors in Miami to avoid pursuing criminal investigations into Venezuela’s acting President Delcy Rodríguez, a longtime target of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, according to current and former U.S. law enforcement officials, in the latest sign of warming relations between the White House and the oil-rich nation.

It’s unclear whether prosecutors had implicated Rodríguez in any crimes or whether investigators were moving toward an indictment. A Justice Department spokesperson said in an email “there was never an investigation into her to shut down.”

But DEA records obtained by the Associated Press earlier this year show she consistently surfaced on the radar of federal law enforcement dating to at least 2018, though she has never been criminally charged in the U.S. like several other senior Venezuelan officials.

The directive to pause scrutiny into Rodríguez was meant to avoid upsetting the administration’s efforts to stabilize Venezuela after the capture of her predecessor, Nicolás Maduro, among other reasons, a current official said. It was not clear whether the White House, which deferred comment to the Justice Department, was involved in the decision.

“Everybody has been told to stand down,” one of the former officials said.

The former officials, who had been briefed on the development, as well as the current official all spoke to the Associated Press on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to publicly discuss internal deliberations.

Rodríguez, a U.S. attorney representing her and the Venezuelan Communications Ministry didn’t respond to requests for comment.

The move eases pressure on Rodriguez

Removing the threat of potential indictment, even temporarily, eases pressure on Rodríguez as the Trump administration seeks to work with the acting leader to stabilize Venezuela after Maduro’s ouster and open the country to U.S. investment.

President Trump praised Rodríguez as a “terrific person” shortly after the U.S. military took Maduro and his wife to New York to face federal narcotics charges. Both have pleaded not guilty.

In recent months, the U.S. has lifted sanctions against Rodríguez and recognized her as Venezuela’s sole head of state, allowing her to re-establish ties with western banks and more freely work with U.S. investors seeking to tap into the world’s largest petroleum reserves. As ties between the two governments have deepened, some have held out the Venezuelan playbook — characterized by oil blockades, indictments of top leaders and threats of military intervention — as a model to drive regime change from within as the U.S. pressures other longtime adversaries in Iran and Cuba.

Rodríguez and her brother, Jorge Rodríguez, the head of the National Assembly, were hit with U.S. sanctions during Trump’s first term for their role in undermining Venezuelan democracy and cementing Maduro’s authoritarian rule.

Rodríguez “is doing a great job,” Trump wrote on social media in early March. “The Oil is beginning to flow, and the professionalism and dedication between both Countries is a very nice thing to see!”

In recent months, Rodríguez has hosted ceremonies with a steady stream of American oilmen, some of them partaking in high-profile delegations led by U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum.

Election talk deferred amid Trump’s praise

Missing in all the mutual backslapping is any talk of elections, even as Rodríguez last month blew through a 90-day limit set by Venezuela’s high court to fill Maduro’s position on a temporary basis.

“I don’t know,” she responded in English when a visiting U.S. journalist earlier this month shouted out a question about her time frame for holding elections. “Some time.”

Sen. Jeanne Shaheen of New Hampshire, the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has demanded the administration explain its favorable treatment of Rodríguez, calling her a “central figure in Nicolás Maduro’s repressive regime.”

“Sanctions have been lifted on Ms. Rodríguez without any indication that she has taken concrete and meaningful actions to restore democratic order,” Sheehan, joined by Sen. Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts, wrote in a letter to Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of Treasury Scott Bessent last week.

Rick de la Torre, a former CIA chief of station in Caracas, said that the decision to shield Rodríguez fits well with the Trump administration’s foreign policy goals in Venezuela.

“She’s a lifelong Marxist and was a senior leader of one of the world’s most corrupt regimes but the U.S. is providing her with breathing space and carrots to lay the foundation for democracy and U.S. investment,” said de la Torre, the CEO of Tower Strategy, which advises companies on Venezuela.

“There’s a shelf life to her utility, however. At some point she will face justice,” he added.

Rodríguez has been on DEA’s radar since 2018

The DEA had amassed a detailed intelligence file on Rodríguez dating to at least 2018, and has received allegations about her ranging from drug trafficking to gold smuggling, the AP reported earlier this year. One confidential informant told the DEA in early 2021 that Rodríguez was using hotels in the Caribbean resort of Isla Margarita “as a front to launder money,” the records show.

Her name has surfaced in nearly a dozen DEA investigations — several of which remained ongoing as recently as this year — involving field offices from Paraguay and Ecuador to Phoenix and New York. She had even been linked to Maduro’s alleged bag man, Alex Saab, whom U.S. authorities first arrested in 2020 on money-laundering charges, the records show.

Rodríguez deported Saab this month as part of a purge of insider businessmen who are accused of having enriched themselves through corrupt dealings with Maduro.

It’s unclear in which Miami investigations Rodríguez’s name surfaced. Two of the former officials said Rodríguez has also come up in meetings with investigators in Tampa, Fla., tasked last year by former Atty. Gen. Pam Bondi with looking into financial crimes in Venezuela.

At the time, Rodríguez was serving as Maduro’s vice president. Justice Department policy requires the attorney general to personally approve the charging of any foreign head of state, who are normally immune from prosecution under international and U.S. law.

Halting high-profile criminal probes of foreign leaders

The pausing of the investigations into Rodríguez comes as the Trump administration has similarly tapped the brakes on ongoing federal investigations into another prominent Latin American leftist, Colombian President Gustavo Petro.

The DEA had also designated Petro a “priority target” over alleged ties to drug traffickers that had been probed for months by federal prosecutors. The New York Times reported in March that U.S. officials recently assured the Colombian government Petro does not face charges in those cases.

Duncan Levin, a former prosecutor who worked for the U.S. attorney’s office in Brooklyn, said it would be “deeply troubling” for law enforcement to be “told to stand down from a legitimate investigation for political or transactional reasons.”

“The White House cannot use criminal enforcement as a diplomatic light switch,” Levin told AP. “DOJ decisions are supposed to be based on law, evidence, policy and public safety — not on whether a foreign official is useful to the administration at a given moment.”

Goodman, Richer and Mustian write for the Associated Press. Richer reported from Washington and Mustian from New York. AP Writer Regina Garcia Cano in Mexico City contributed to this report.

Michele Spagnuolo allegedly used insider information to profit from bets on people on Google’s most-searched list.

A Google software engineer has been charged with fraud by US authorities after allegedly using insider information to win more than $1.2m in bets on the prediction market platform Polymarket.

Michele Spagnuolo, an Italian citizen residing in Switzerland, is accused of using confidential information to wager on the results of Google’s annual most-searched list, according to a criminal complaint unsealed on Wednesday.

US prosecutors accuse Spagnuolo of using an account named “AlphaRaccoon” to make trades on various markets linked to the results of Google’s 2025 Year in Search.

The total sum of the bets was approximately $2.75m, according to the complaint, filed in federal court in New York.

Among the bets, Spagnuolo successfully predicted that indie pop musician d4vd would top the list for the most-searched for person last year, hours after accessing confidential data at Google, according to prosecutors.

Spagnuolo, 36, faces charges of commodities fraud, wire fraud and money laundering.

“Today’s charges reinforce a decades-old message: corporate insiders cannot use confidential business information to turn a profit in our markets,” US Attorney for the Southern District of New York Jay Clayton said in a statement.

“Insider trading compromises the integrity of our markets, and the American people want this greed-driven conduct investigated and prosecuted,” Clayton added.

Bets on Maduro’s capture

Google said in a statement that it is working with law enforcement and that using confidential information to place bets is a serious breach of company policy.

Spagnuolo has been placed on leave, according to a Google spokesperson.

A Polymarket spokesperson said the company had worked closely with the US Attorney’s Office on the investigation and that the firm “is the only prediction platform to date whose cooperation has led to insider trading charges in the United States”.

“We are committed to maintaining accurate, fair, and transparent markets as well as enforcing our rules and working with our regulators and law enforcement,” the spokesperson added.

Last month, a US soldier was charged with using classified military information to place bets on Polymarket regarding the abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro.

Prosecutors accuse Gannon Ken Van Dyke, 38, of cashing in on the US operation against Maduro, to the tune of more than $400,000.

MOLLY-MAE Hague has hit back at trolls and said she’s been “humbled” after being mocked for her outfit at Venezuela Fury’s wedding.

The influencer, 27, attended the high profile nuptials of Venezuela, 16, and Noah Price, 19, in a black top with cutaway details, smart black trousers, heels and a slicked-back bun in her blonde tresses. 

Molly’s partner Tommy Fury, 27, the brother of boxer and father-of-the-bride Tyson Fury, 37, was working away – she did all of this single-handedly.

But some trolls took aim at Molly’s outfit and slammed her for not making an effort, while others said she shouldn’t have worn black to a wedding.

Molly, who is 37 weeks pregnant, has now responded to the criticism as she defended herself and said her attendance was very last minute.

Speaking on her latest YouTube vlog, Molly said: “We had Venezuela’s wedding two days ago now, it was touch and go whether we were going to go.

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“I got severely humbled in the comments, which to be fair I don’t know why I didn’t expect because the whole time I was saying to myself, if I do go and I haven’t given birth by then, I was like ‘I don’t care what I look like’.

“Bambi was asked to be a bridesmaid and I wanted to honour that and be there for the family and just show up because obviously if you can, that’s what you do.”

Molly said she was called out for her appearance on the day but said she wanted the spotlight to be on Venezuela and Noah, and not her.

“I did actually put a bit of thought into it, I did get that jumpsuit tailored and everything,” Molly continued.

“But the hair, I actually had my hair done in the morning, I had this gorgeous bun but I ended up taking the bun out and slicking by hair back and you can see my hair bobble and my roots.

“My hair is a different conversation at the minute, it’s grown so much to the point that I except that I have to be a brunette.

“I did have a bit of a spiral yesterday morning, I don’t know why I didn’t think that… I should have thought that there would be pictures and videos that will come out because in my head I was thinking about the wedding and obviously it’s their day and about them.

“I’m so so so glad we went because it was such a nice day and I fear that Bambi will never ever get over it.”

Molly also addressed her choice of outfit colour which divided fans.

She said: “Also, since when is it not acceptable to wear black to a wedding because I genuinely never though that guys.

“I saw the comments saying ‘I can’t believe she wore black’, I didn’t know you couldn’t wear black to a wedding.

“I know technically it’s a funeral colour but as long as it’s not white and it’s smart, but anyway I can only be described as Bambi’s chaperone for the wedding.

“There was not one part of me that thought about what I was going to look like.”

Bambi was one of 13 bridesmaids, who matched Mother of the Bride Paris Fury in the same blue hue.

In one sweet photo, Bambi is seen being held by Venezuela who Molly dubbed ‘beautiful bridey’ in the caption.

Another photo saw Bambi pucker up for a kiss with her mum, who wore ablack jumpsuit, with a floral mesh style top for the occasion.

The tot was also seen looking with awe at Venezuela and groom Noah’s incredible blue cake that was almost three times the height of her.

The cake boasted five tiers and was accompanied with an impressive blue and yellow floral display.

“WOW,” read Molly’s caption as Bambi gazed up at the towering creation.

Venezuela stunned in a lace fishtail wedding dress with elaborate sleeves and a train spanning 50ft.

Paris revealed the real reason Tommy did not attend the wedding.

Caracas, May 24, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan grassroots organizations took to the streets on Saturday to protest the US holding “rapid response” military drills in Caracas.

Dozens of activists from multiple collectives belonging to the ALBA Movimientos coalition gathered in the morning in front of the Indigenous Resistance monument in Plaza Venezuela and read a statement expressing “outrage” at the US holding an exercise in Caracas less than five months after its January 3 bombings and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores.

“As Venezuelan popular organizations, 141 days since the brutal US military attack and kidnapping of President Maduro and Deputy Cilia Flores, […] we repudiate yankee militarist imperialism and are outraged that the US is executing military exercises in our country,” the organizations expressed.

Speakers, including National Assembly deputies Rigel Sergent and Oliver Rivas, condemned the US-Israel war against Iran and the growing threats against Cuba while reiterating support for the Venezuelan government led by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez.

Also on Saturday, several leftist organizations held a rally in Chacaíto to protest the violation of the country’s sovereignty and denounce the Venezuelan government’s accommodation of US impositions.

“This exercise is extremely serious because it makes concepts like sovereignty appear hollow for younger generations,” trade unionist Adelmo Becerra told those present. “Our challenge is to maintain the idea of sovereignty alive in collective memory.”

Demonstrators painted posters reading “Yankee go home!” and chanted slogans such as “We refuse to be a US colony!” Participating organizations included the Communist Party (PCV), Corriente Comunes, and the Socialist Workers’ League (LTS).

A third rally, called by members of the ruling United Socialist Party (PSUV), took place in Plaza Bolívar, with participants shouting anti-imperialist slogans and burning posters of US President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

On Saturday morning, US forces flew two Osprey MV-22B aircraft over Caracas before landing near the embassy compound in the southeast of the capital. The tiltrotor transport aircraft took off from the USS Iwo Jima, one of the warships that participated in the January 3 attacks and where Maduro and Flores were airlifted to after being kidnapped by US special forces.

“Ensuring the military’s rapid response capability is a key component of mission readiness, both here in Venezuela and around the world,” a social media statement from the US embassy read.

US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) Commander General Francis Donovan oversaw the military drills and visited Caracas for a second time. He flew in on an Osprey alongside a marine contingent.

According to US officials, Donovan met with “senior” Venezuelan government leaders at the embassy. At the time of writing, there is no public information on which officials were present. Donovan’s previous visit in February saw him hold talks with Rodríguez, Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello, and then-Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López.

In a statement, SOUTHCOM reiterated US forces’ commitment to the Trump administration’s “three-phase plan,” which ends with a political “transition.”

For its part, the Venezuelan government did not comment on the US military drills. Caracas issued a statement on Thursday announcing that it had authorized “evacuation exercises” for eventual “medical emergencies and catastrophic events.” Foreign Minister Yván Gil read the communiqué in a video published through official social media channels.

However, amid fierce public backlash, Venezuelan authorities deleted the statement and video from all accounts. A similar incident occurred in late February when the Foreign Ministry published a statement that criticized Iran’s response to the US-Israeli aggression and then withdrew it following outcry from grassroots and solidarity movements.

On Saturday night, the Communications Ministry posted a video stressing the importance of “controlling emotions and waiting for the right moment.” Though making no reference to the US exercises, it stressed that the priority is safeguarding “the existence and the security of the state.”

Since the January strikes, the Trump White House has exacted major concessions from the acting Rodríguez administration, including taking control of Venezuelan oil revenues, auditing its Central Bank, pushing pro-business legislative reforms, and securing the handover of former diplomatic envoy Alex Saab to face money laundering charges in Florida.

Saturday’s military exercises also elicited strong anti-US reactions on social media from Chavista and opposition figures alike. Writer José Roberto Duque, a staunch government supporter, urged people to paint patriotic murals and express their repudiation of “imperialist arrogance.”

Claudio Fermín, a longtime opposition politician, expressed his “outrage” in a social media message, comparing US forces to “cats marking their territory.” Jesús “Chuo” Torrealba, former secretary-general of the opposition MUD coalition, argued that the US actions appeared to be a “demonstration of military prowess.”

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Caracas.

Inmates in Venezuela’s western Barinas prison staged a protest on the roof of the detention centre calling for the removal of the prison’s director, who reportedly oversaw guards as they shot unarmed prisoners.

More than 1,000 workers, union members and retirees marching toward downtown Caracas were blocked by riot police during a May Day demonstration. Chanting, “A bonus is not a salary,” they took to the streets in Caracas to protest the only-modest increase in the so-called comprehensive minimum wage, from the equivalent of $190 per month to $240. A short distance away, a small group of workers — convened by the Bolivarian Socialist Workers Federation of Venezuela — celebrated the raise. For the first time in over 20 years, the government had not organized a large rally. Instead, it provided a concert — a Festival for Peace — featuring dozens of international performers.

“People are really happy. They are dancing in the streets because there is a lot of money coming in through the big oil companies,” U.S. President Donald Trump said a few days later. His administration is still managing a political transition process following U.S. military attacks and the abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro earlier this year.

But even ultraright-wing polling firms such as Meganálisis suggest Trump is wrong about the mood in Venezuela. According to the firm, the proportion of Venezuelans who are “grateful” to the U.S. for its intervention has dropped from 92% in January to just 47% in April. Trump’s attempt to cast himself as the savior of Venezuela’s economy isn’t working — especially as Venezuelans say they haven’t seen any improvements since January, nor since the U.S. imposed economically devastating sanctions in 2015.

Wages are too low

Rafael Venegas, Jacques Derose and Yrma Rivero have different work situations. Venegas works in the public sector, Derose is in the private sector and Rivero is self-employed. But all three have something in common: Their income is not enough to live on.

Venegas is 70 years old and has spent 14 years teaching undergraduate and graduate courses at the Central University of Venezuela, the country’s oldest and largest higher education institution. However, his latest proof-of-employment document, seen by Truthdig, shows his salary is the equivalent of $1.37 a month. Any benefits like severance pay, end-of-year bonus and holiday pay are calculated based on that amount.

At the same time, Venegas, who survived a stroke and who is looking after his 93-year-old mother, receives — as all public sector workers do — a monthly food bonus of $40, and what is called an “economic war bonus” worth $150. The explanation is as simple as it is complex: Venezuela’s legal minimum wage has been frozen at 130 bolivars (about 27 cents) a month for four years. To bring actual take-home income closer to a living wage, workers get monthly bonuses paid in bolivars at the official exchange rate. Together, these amounts are known as the “comprehensive wage” and are only for formal workers.

Thirty kilometers away, Derose, a 27-year-old who dropped out of the university to work at a hardware store in La Guaira, receives a comprehensive wage of $200 a month, which may sometimes go up to $230 or $260 if he takes on extra work loading or moving merchandise.

Derose, who does not have children, tells Truthdig that his income goes to food, transit and paying rent for a single room. The room costs $120, while an apartment in Caracas costs at least $250 a month.

“That’s why my other two brothers, though they’re older, are still living with our parents,” he says.

Meanwhile, Rivero travels around the city cleaning apartments to support herself, as well as her son’s university studies. 

“He got into a public university, but we spend a lot on transportation and food, not to mention medical expenses. Right now, my son has severe sinusitis, and an MRI of his sinuses costs $300,” she says.

She charges $30 to $40 for each deep clean, depending on the size of the property. She tries to have at least four clients a week in order to earn around $400 a month. As the highest earner of the three, Rivero’s situation illustrates why many young people are choosing not to study but to work informally or in trades instead.

All three workers tell Truthdig they use the same strategy to get by: working multiple jobs. Venegas earns intermittent extra income by proofreading books or giving workshops, Derose works as a bricklayer some weekends and Rivero sometimes irons or cooks. They all say that no one can get by on less than $400 a month, and a family of five requires at least $1,500.

According to the Caracas-based, union-run research center Center for Documentation and Social Analysis, the basic food basket for a family of five, which includes 61 essential products, reached $703.11 in March, a 7.2% increase from February. Venezuelans must also pay for transportation or gasoline, utilities, rent or condominium fees, medicine, clothing and much more.

Thousands of workers, especially in sectors like education, healthcare and public services, share this sentiment and have been protesting in the streets of Caracas for weeks, demanding a living wage. But how would that be achieved?

“It would be difficult to have a salary — not bonuses, but a legal minimum wage — that covers basic needs. But there are no ethical or economic reasons to keep it at 27 cents,” Hermes Pérez, economist and former head of the Exchange Desk at the Central Bank of Venezuela, tells Truthdig.

He says the legal minimum wage should be at least $300, but that’s not feasible for either the public or private sector. “The resources simply aren’t there, and since wages are practically zero, raising them to that level would be very expensive. But at least $70 or $100 would be possible. Furthermore, it’s estimated that Venezuelan revenues will grow significantly in 2026 compared to last year. We received $18 billion in oil revenues alone in 2025, and that amount could rise to $33 billion,” Pérez says. Despite attempts at diversification, oil remains Venezuela’s primary source of foreign currency, and the country is dependent on oil revenue to finance public spending.

Pérez stresses that a key indicator must be addressed regardless of how much salaries increase: inflation. “According to the Central Bank, Venezuela ended 2025 with an annual inflation rate of 465%, and by March 2026 it was already at 650%. That’s enormous. In Colombia, for example, inflation is around 5%, and in Latin America, in general, it’s in the single digits,” he says.

“It’s not just the isolated [price] increase of one or two things; it’s the generalized increase across the board. Given this context, it’s very difficult for the average worker to actually perceive any economic improvement.”

Economist Asdrúbal Oliveros agrees. He believes the country will enter a phase of recovery in purchasing power this year, but a “notably slow” one, as Venezuela must first increase incomes, sustainably reduce inflation and stabilize the exchange rate.

Venezuelan government response

On April 8, acting President Delcy Rodríguez took a stance for the first time on low wages and precarious working conditions in the country. She acknowledged some of the problems and noted that there are more pensioners (5.7 million) than formally employed workers (5.3 million), a figure that reveals the extremely high rate of informality that now prevails in Venezuela.

On May 1, Rodríguez then announced a 26% income increase through the country’s bonus system. This raised the comprehensive minimum wage — which includes the official minimum wage and bonuses — from $190 to $240 per month by increasing the economic war bonus by $50. For pensioners, the war bonus increased from $58 to $70. She also announced a one-off “professional recognition” bonus for the education, health and security sectors of around $195, with the exact amount varying by job.

Organizations such as the Professors Association of the Central University of Venezuela rejected “the policy of replacing salaries with bonuses,” which they argued do not affect workers’ social security contributions and “ignore merit, experience and seniority.” The workers also demanded respect for salary scales and collective bargaining agreements. 

The acting president acknowledged that the $240 increase is “insufficient” but said it is “a responsible increase” to improve purchasing power “without generating an excessive inflationary impact.” According to the Central Bank, annual inflation in Venezuela reached 130,000% in 2018, the peak of a four-year hyperinflationary period that ended in 2021. It was then that the government decided to freeze wages and implement a bonus policy to avoid a relapse.

However, some economists also attribute the high inflation rates to the uncontrolled issuance of money by the Central Bank to finance the fiscal deficit. Unions argue that the economy will not collapse from paying off labor liabilities like wages and benefits.

“For the past four years, salaries have been frozen and increases through bonuses have been meager. So, clearly, workers’ salaries or benefits haven’t contributed to causing the current inflation rates,” Venegas says. “There are millions of us in the public sector, but benefits are only received by those who retire, resign or are dismissed — a small amount per year.” 

Venegas believes the government and business leaders are currently colluding to try to reform the Organic Law of Labor and Workers (LOTTT) in order to eliminate the country’s social benefits system. 

The LOTTT, passed by then-President Hugo Chávez in 2012, is considered a bastion of workers’ rights. Among its provisions, it prohibits unjustified dismissal and subcontracting, provides 26 weeks of maternity leave, guarantees the right to work for women and people with disabilities and extends retirement pensions to all workers, including full-time mothers and the self-employed.

Now, businesspeople have argued at the Council of the International Labour Organization for reform of the LOTTT, especially Article 104, which defines what constitutes a salary, and Article 122, which establishes the basis for calculating social benefits and severance pay. They say the current model of accumulating social benefits would be structurally unsustainable if the legal minimum wage is increased.

The U.S. decides

Amid these debates, the acting Venezuelan president has said that the economic situation of workers will improve “progressively” thanks to restored relations with the U.S. and the recovery of oil production, which — after some relaxing of sanctions — has exceeded 1.2 million barrels per day.

“In 2025, Venezuela produced a similar average number of barrels, but they were sold at a 30% to 35% discount to get around the sanctions,” sociologist and political analyst Franco Vielma said on X. These discounts acted as a key economic incentive for private buyers and intermediaries to assume the high legal and financial risk of violating the sanctions imposed by the U.S. Furthermore, the price per barrel exceeded $126 at the end of April 2026, reaching its highest level in four years due to the conflict between the United States and Iran.

Rodríguez has said the latest salary increase is backed by oil and fuel oil income. But Venezuelans still do not know how much oil revenue they are receiving, where it is deposited, what percentage the U.S. is getting or what the new agreements mean.

In January, Trump stated that the U.S. would control Venezuelan oil sales, saying Venezuela would submit monthly budgets to the White House, which would then be reviewed by auditors. Rodríguez said at the time that citizens could track every oil dollar through a new website. However, this website has not materialized. 

The United States, after attacking Venezuela four months ago and, according to the Venezuelan Anti-Blockade Observatory, having imposed 1,081 sanctions on the country since 2015, has argued that increased oil income will benefit Venezuelans. Trump asserted in January that Venezuela would experience “an unprecedented economic upswing … It will earn more money in six months than in the last 20 years.”

In this regard, the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control issued 14 licenses in April that allow for the development of the Venezuelan oil sector and the possibility of conducting banking transactions with Venezuela, although each transaction requires OFAC approval. Payments in gold or cryptocurrencies are prohibited; Venezuela cannot trade with China, Russia, Iran, North Korea or Cuba; and the country’s frozen assets will not be released. Crucially, all revenues from oil and mineral exports must be deposited into accounts controlled by the U.S. Treasury Department, which then decides when and how much to return to Venezuela from its own resources.

Although the international media has framed this as a “lifting of sanctions,” the licenses granted by the U.S. are only conditional and temporary permits that allow some oil and banking operations in Venezuela. Executive orders blocking state assets and controlling and supervising the operations of the state oil company PDVSA remain in place, limiting the legal certainty that is necessary for long-term investments.

Many Venezuelans did believe the economic situation would improve after Jan. 3. In fact, some pollsters claimed that 70% to 80% of the population then had “hope for the future.” Now, in April, according to an AtlasIntel poll, 77% of Venezuelans rate the current economic situation as “bad,” and 76% hold a negative opinion about the state of the labor market. 

According to Datanálisis, economic despair also prevails, with 55% of those surveyed identifying inflation and low wages as their main problems. These worries are followed by devaluation and failures in the electrical system.

Datanálisis also found in April that 65% of the population agrees that Venezuela’s priority should be resolving the economic crisis above any political transformation or electoral process. However, Trump hinted on May 12 that beyond the current intervention, he’s also “seriously considering” making Venezuela the 51st U.S. state, posting a map of the country with a U.S. flag. Joke, threat or a reflection of how Trump already sees Venezuela, Venezuelans have much to worry about.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelanalysis editorial staff.

Source: Truthdig

On January 3, the US bombed Venezuela’s capital region and kidnapped President Nicolás Maduro. The unprecedented attack represented the culmination of a quarter-century of imperialist hybrid war, including devastating unilateral sanctions, mercenary incursions, “color revolution”-style insurrections, media disinformation, and NGO infiltration.

The four months since have brought a flurry of developments, from renewed diplomatic ties with the US to an overhaul of key legislative pillars of the Bolivarian Revolution. Additionally, the Trump administration established semi-colonial control over Venezuelan oil revenues, with the amounts and timings of disbursements back to Caracas left entirely at US officials’ discretion. The arrangement is similar to the one Washington has forced on Iraq since the 2003 invasion.

This compromised sovereignty is a catalyst for other issues. On the one hand, it makes it tougher for the Venezuelan government to improve living standards without challenging business interests. On the other, the burden of Venezuela’s external debt might see Washington attempt to impose an IMF loan that will bury the country in debt and dependency for decades.

The holy grail of foreign investment

The acting Rodríguez government’s tenure has been marked by accelerated political and economic transformations. On the international front, Caracas has restored diplomatic ties with Washington and recently resumed dealings with the US-controlled International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank.

Domestically, Rodríguez has changed key cabinet and military posts, while pushing through the National Assembly a number of reforms with the explicit goal of making the country more attractive for private sector investment, especially from Western multinationals.

Plans to reform pension, tax, housing, and the landmark 2012 labor law are in motion. Mining and hydrocarbons have already undergone pro-business overhauls, with slashed fiscal responsibilities, decreased oversight, and disputes subjected to international arbitration. In contrast to Chávez’s reassertion of oil sovereignty, which underpinned the massive sociopolitical achievements of the Bolivarian Revolution, the reformed energy law brings back the old concession model that puts operations and sales in the hands of private corporations.

In tandem, the Trump administration has issued licenses to pave the way for Western conglomerates to return to Venezuela, and several have already struck deals under the new highly favorable conditions. The licenses maintain and even double down on US sanctions by barring dealings with China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Russia and mandating that all Venezuelan state revenues from oil and mining be deposited in US Treasury-run accounts.

The subordination to US impositions saw Venezuelan authorities extradite former diplomatic envoy and minister Alex Saab to face charges in the US with little to no explanation. The move was shocking but not out of context. In recent weeks, there has been a succession of ceremonies at Miraflores presidential palace where Trump officials get the red-carpet welcome and escort corporate executives to sign contracts under the new pro-business incentives. Far-right tech moguls, including Palantir founder Peter Thiel, are already taking advantage of Trump’s leverage to establish a lucrative foothold in the country. For his part, the US chargé d’affaires holds regular publicized meetings with Venezuelan cabinet ministers. 

Caracas’ technocratic and pragmatic approach has dovetailed with a corresponding shift in discourse. On foreign policy, the anti-imperialist rhetoric has all but vanished. As Trump unleashes a savage war against Iran and threatens to “take over” Cuba, Venezuelan leaders have refrained from condemning the escalating imperialist aggression while emphasizing their desire to build good relations with Washington. At the same time, references to Maduro have drastically decreased, as documented in a recent investigation. Domestically, the central focus has become macroeconomic stability and attracting foreign investment. Both Acting President Rodríguez and her brother, National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez, acknowledged receiving “recommendations” and “suggestions” from oil majors amid the recent hydrocarbon overhaul. 

Rodríguez and the Bolivarian leadership, under ongoing US pressure, are betting that the pro-business opening will lead to accelerated economic growth that will trickle down into improved living conditions, thus allowing the government to rebuild social legitimacy and political prospects. However, this plan faces serious roadblocks.

Rising domestic pressure

The first issue is that the acting authorities may not have a lot of time to improve the living conditions of the Venezuelan people. 

Over the previous seven years, with the economy asphyxiated by the US economic blockade, the Maduro government prioritized macroeconomic stability and reduced inflation first and foremost, through a strict monetarist policy package. While the approach, coupled with a modest oil industry recovery, did lead to slowed down inflation and modest economic growth, it came at a price of freezing wages, consumer credit, and public spending. The minimum wage, last raised in 2022, is now worth less than US $1 per month, with further increases replaced by non-wage bonuses that cheapen labor costs for employers.

Though these bonuses have increased periodically (the income floor is now $240/month for public sector workers), they are still far from covering living costs. On May 1, Rodríguez ignored growing calls for a minimum wage hike, the conversion of bonuses to wages, and the restoration of collective bargaining rights, instead doubling down on the bonus policy. With government officials announcing a labor reform soon, it is likely that the return of the minimum wage will come alongside a significant erosion of workers’ rights and employer responsibilities.

However, apart from its commitment to fiscal discipline, the Rodríguez acting government has little room to maneuver because of its lack of direct management over oil revenues. At the mercy of the Trump administration to return export earnings in the amount and timing of its choosing, Venezuelan authorities are unlikely to commit to anything that might unsettle the budget. Rodríguez herself warned that wage increases must be “responsible.”

There is a delicate balance to strike. To implement the current pro-business agenda, not to mention the US rapprochement, the government needs social peace, and only improved material conditions for the working-class majority can ensure that in the short term.

The specter of debt

It is not just the pressure for better living standards that looms large on Venezuela’s economic front. There is a growing expectation that creditors will soon reengage with Venezuelan authorities to collect on a sizable external debt: a combination of defaulted bonds, unpaid loans, and arbitration awards that, with interest accrued over years, may amount to as much as $170 billion. The Venezuelan government recently announced the launch of a debt restructuring process, while Washington issued a license allowing the hiring of financial and consulting services. 

Given the recent overtures to foreign capital, Venezuelan leaders will be hard-pressed to honor whatever commitments necessary to render the country a favorable investment climate. Nevertheless, a major chunk of this debt is illegitimate.

On the one hand, debt ballooned in the mid-2010s as Venezuela’s credit rating was unjustifiably downgraded and borrowing costs went up, as Washington slapped its first rounds of sanctions on the Caribbean country. The Maduro government made a strategic choice to prioritize debt service as the economy reeled following a collapse of global oil prices, hoping that this “discipline” would stave off a scenario where the country was shut out of financial markets. It turned out differently.

Venezuela was gradually locked out of global finance after the Trump administration’s 2017 financial sanctions. Bonds defaulted one after another and have been accruing interest ever since. And the notoriously corrupt US-backed “interim government” also played its part in running up Venezuela’s liabilities and pilfering state assets abroad.

The diverse group of bondholders and corporations owed arbitration awards is sure to receive the backing of the White House, which holds the purse of Venezuela’s export proceeds. This mechanism could be utilized to directly transfer Venezuelan state income to creditors in what would effectively amount to international wage garnishing. Given how Venezuelan bonds have risen in recent months, investors are eagerly eyeing a significant windfall.

Venezuela’s unsustainable debt burden opens the door for further US imperial predations. Even if there is an agreement to pay 50 cents on the dollar for Venezuela’s $170 billion debt for a period of 15 years, that comes to $5.6 billion a year, roughly a quarter of the present budget. It is simply unpayable.

While Caracas may be able to settle with some creditors by privatizing Venezuelan state assets, it will not amount to much. Venezuelan leaders will stress that, with the recent reforms and US opening, the economy will grow tremendously, and they will be able to honor all commitments. But creditors are not willing to wait when they can cash in now, especially given Venezuela’s weak bargaining position. The government cannot maintain a functioning country in the short term with a huge debt burden. As a result, the US might take advantage of the crisis to impose a major loan from the IMF or some lending coalition.

Sovereignty under threat

An IMF or similar loan program is more than just an agreement to lend some amount under certain repayment conditions. It is an opportunity to impose neocolonial arrangements on Global South countries. In Venezuela’s case it is even more symbolic: it would mean exacting the proverbial pound of flesh for Chávez’s revolutionary audacity to challenge US hegemony in the Western hemisphere.

An eventual long-term credit program would surely come alongside a structural adjustment package of mass privatizations, gutted social expenditure, and all-around liberalization of the economy. Given the current leverage over Venezuela, US officials may attempt to further entrench the rollback of the Caribbean nation’s sovereignty.

Between the growing domestic demands for improved living conditions and the specter of debt renegotiation, the acting Rodríguez government will find it increasingly difficult to walk the tightrope of maintaining social peace while continuing to make one concession after another to monopoly capital and the Trump White House. 

With the limits of US imperialism nakedly exposed in Iran, Trump needs a victory in Venezuela. But that victory does not entail a buoyant economic recovery with social justice, let alone the survival of a sovereign and revolutionary project. Victory for the US is a dependent country, mired in debt and underdevelopment, where Western corporations plunder natural resources and geopolitical rivals are kept at bay.

Ultimately, any long-term plan for sovereign development needs to start from the fact that US imperialism, to echo Che Guevara,  is “not to be trusted even a little bit,” much less considered a “partner” in a “cooperation agenda.” It will undoubtedly be a major hill to climb. But thankfully, even if it means starting over, the Bolivarian Revolution is not starting from scratch.

Source: Sovereign Media

First-year baseball coach Dino Flores of Fremont High teaches health, and for the entire semester, he had a freshman from Venezuela, Roiber Colmenares, sitting in class.

One day, Colmenares asked Flores a strange question.

“Hey Mr. Flores,” he said in Spanish. “Do you know how I can join the baseball team?”

“Yes I do,” Flores said.

Colemenares told him playing baseball was all he did in Venezuela.

Then Flores had Colemenares show him how to field a ground ball with an imaginary ball in class.

“That’s when I knew we had something special,” Flores said. “Just his movement you could tell he’s a baseball player.”

With Colmenares leading the way, Fremont has advanced to face Hamilton in Friday’s 2:30 p.m. Division III final at Stengel Field. The Division II final will have South East playing Roosevelt at 5:30 p.m. at East Los Angeles College.

“He’s our best hitter and best pitcher,” Flores said of the 5-foot-8, 140-pound freshman.

Fremont used to be a baseball power, having won five upper-division City titles, the last in 1963. There also was a 3A title in 1992.

“The history is well documented,” Flores said.

This is a daily look at the positive happenings in high school sports. To submit any news, please email eric.sondheimer@latimes.com.

In a Venezuela whose infrastructure has been abandoned to the past, it is easy to forget that even here the famous phrase “the future is already here, it’s just not evenly distributed” still applies. In many ways it perfectly encapsulates the contradictions of Venezuelan society, a country where running water and electricity is far from a certainty and yet adoption of payment technologies and cryptocurrencies far outpaces that of developed countries. Whatever one thinks of the usefulness and value of these technologies, we can expect even more contradictions in the coming age of AI. 

The future and AI will arrive in Venezuela, but to whose benefit? And for which purposes?

Before answering these questions I think it’s helpful to understand the technology which is AI through Jensen Huang’s analogy of a five layer cake, where Layer One is the top and Layer Five the bottom.

One – AI Applications (Claude Code, Copilot, ChatGPT, etc)

Two – AI Models (Claude-Opus, GPT5, Llama, etc)

Three – Cloud Data Center Infrastructure

Four – Chips and Computing Infrastructure

 Five – Energy

Each layer of the cake requires the one below to stand. These are complicated supply chains that allow for the incredible technology that is modern generative AI. 

In the case of Venezuela we can forget about having much to do with Layers Two and Four. These simply require too much know-how that the engineers and manufacturers in Venezuela do not have. We cannot compete with factories in Taiwan or China nor can we compete with computer and electrical engineers making millions of dollars a year in Silicon Valley. For a few decades at least.

Let’s look at how we can expect the other three to apply to Venezuela.

The first layer of the cake, even if these applications are not made in Venezuela (and most won’t be), they will not be difficult to deploy as these companies will offer (as they do now) software-as-a-service (SaaS) products whose infrastructure can run anywhere else in the world. The use of these tools requires little more than an internet connection and we can expect some level of widespread adoption, but likely not much in terms of cutting-edge innovation. 

Because of the insatiable demand from AI companies for energy and places to put their datacenters where it’ll be the most profitable, Venezuela is attractive with its much lower-cost energy in relative terms.

Before discussing more of possible AI applications in Venezuela, let’s consider layers three (cloud datacenter infrastructure) and five (energy). These are where Venezuela is more relevant than may first meet the eye.

As you can see the entire cake relies on one base: energy. Energy and its cost is the main constraint for the entire supply chain of AI and the main reason why companies like Anthropic and OpenAI remain unprofitable despite tens of billions of dollars in revenue.

Venezuela is a potential powerhouse for energy production. Not only does it have incredibly high oil reserves but also impressive hydropower, and an extremely underdeveloped solar and wind industry.

In her bid to ask for international support, opposition leader María Corina Machado has framed Venezuela’s future as an energy hub for the Americas. Because of the insatiable demand from AI companies for energy and places to put their datacenters where it’ll be the most profitable, Venezuela is attractive with its much lower-cost energy in relative terms.

If only it had a functioning grid.

The focus on fixing this enormous issue during this stabilization phase of the American plan is no accident. The world, as has been the case since it first found oil, looks to Venezuela for the energy it can provide. One could see this negatively in that Venezuelans will have to compete with large multinational AI companies for energy, but the “stability” in the political environment that these companies require could incidentally be good for Venezuelans.

Stability of governance and respect of property rights is crucial for any company looking to make hypothetical data center or energy investments since this infrastructure takes multiple years to develop, if not decades. A return to true law and order and unassailable property rights would be an undeniable boon to the economy.

What applications may we see?

Local corporations will probably use AI-powered enterprise software as many others in the world. Though the Venezuelan entrepreneurial spirit keeps surprising, it seems likely that Venezuelan businesses will be not quite at the cutting edge but still positioned to take advantage of AI. 

The area of most interest, or rather most concern, is how the government might use these tools. The Venezuelan government has laid out their first risk-based ethical code for AI, largely modeled after the EU’s AI Act. Whether or not this translates to law, remains to be seen, but they have spoken about their commitment to “humanist” AI which disavows use cases such as manipulation, mass surveillance and disinformation. These are great values to strive for, but the government’s respect for its own laws, let alone ethical codes, has been more than lacking.

AI gives tyrants around the world exactly what they want: an army of intelligent capable agents who can’t say no and don’t need to be fed or housed.

In its ability to perform thinking tasks with lightning speed in a parallelizable manner, AI is a technology which tyrants in years past must have wished they had access to. A virtual army of bureaucrats (which the Venezuelan State already has in human form) observing citizens and making small decisions, putting names on lists, logging personal connections, building political profiles as well as modeling how likely a person would be to vote a certain way or become an annoying political activist, thus saving intelligence agencies hundreds of thousands of man-hours a year. Relying less on actual humans to want to do the work of spying on their own people or even themselves.

AI agents can screen social media and the internet for any sign of online political coordination and connect that to their already centralized data systems, which could be used to target or deny access to benefits for anyone who the AI has decided is toxic to your agenda.

When you are unpopular and attempting to maintain control over a population, technology is your friend because you can leverage your human capital much further, to do what you need done without the need to grow your network of trusted people. AI gives tyrants around the world exactly what they want: an army of intelligent capable agents who can’t say no and don’t need to be fed or housed.

At the moment, Venezuela’s future hangs in the balance, leadership going forward is unclear but one thing is clear. It will not be more of the same. The only permanent thing in the world is change, and the future will arrive in Venezuela. The question is: how will it be distributed? Who will get the benefits?

As always, it will benefit those with power. The question is: who will have power?

Caracas, May 20, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Former Venezuelan Industry Minister Alex Saab appeared before a federal court in Miami on Monday and was formally charged with money laundering offenses.

The accusations are linked to alleged misappropriation of funds from Venezuelan government contracts, including the CLAP subsidized food program, which was created to support the country’s most vulnerable sectors.

Following his “deportation” from Caracas last Saturday, Saab — who was previously charged in the United States in 2021 but pardoned in 2023 by former President Joe Biden as part of a prisoner swap with Venezuela — was also accused of conspiracy to conduct financial transactions through the US financial system, as well as concealing and disguising the origin of funds.

According to US Deputy Attorney General Andrew Tysen Duva, Saab “allegedly used US banks to launder hundreds of millions of dollars stolen from a Venezuelan food program and from profits generated through the illegal sale of Venezuelan oil.”

The former minister, who also served as a diplomatic envoy for the Nicolás Maduro government, is accused of “secretly using shell companies, fraudulent invoices, falsified shipping records and other fabricated documents.”

The Department of Justice stated that “from 2019 through at least January 2026, the conspiracy expanded as US economic sanctions crippled Venezuelan exports, especially oil.” If convicted, Saab faces a maximum sentence of 20 years in federal prison. He will remain detained without bail, with the next hearing scheduled for June 24.

The Colombian-born businessman was previously arrested in mid-2020 during a refueling stop in Cape Verde at the behest of US authorities. Saab was headed to Iran to negotiate fuel and food imports at a time of acute shortages in Venezuela.

The Venezuelan government launched a massive international PR and solidarity campaign to protest Saab’s arrest and later extradition to the US. Authorities established his release as a foreign policy priority, even temporarily suspending a dialogue process with US-backed opposition factions. Saab’s legal and public defense centered on his diplomatic immunity and his role in securing imports that circumvented US sanctions.

Upon his release, Saab was appointed industry minister in October 2024. He was removed from the post by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez in January, weeks after the US military strikes and kidnapping of Maduro.

Rumors that the former government envoy had been arrested by security forces began to circulate in February, with authorities neither confirming nor denying them. Following his handover to US agencies, Venezuelan high-ranking officials have sought to distance themselves from Saab.

Rodríguez defended Saab’s handover on Monday, arguing that it was an administrative measure justified by national interests.

“Any decision taken by the national government will be made in Venezuela’s interest (…) Alex Saab is a citizen of Colombian origin, he carried out functions in Venezuela, and these are matters between the United States of America and him,” she said in a televised broadcast, adding that the upcoming prosecution is an issue “between the US and Saab.”

For his part, National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez accused Saab of maintaining “ties” with “US agencies” since 2019. “We are only learning about this now (…) All of you will soon find out what kind of relationship Saab had and still has with those agencies,” he stated during a legislative session on Tuesday.

Rodríguez — who spent three years leading negotiations aimed at securing Saab’s release — insisted that he was following instructions and that it was “not his place” to investigate Saab’s background or whether he had committed any crimes.

At the same time, Venezuelan Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello claimed that Saab had fraudulently obtained Venezuelan nationality back in 2004 and went on to “defraud” the country. 

“He is not Venezuelan, he is a citizen of Colombian origin,” Cabello affirmed in a Monday press conference. “He always presented an illegal Venezuelan ID card that has no backing from the immigration services.”

The Venezuelan leaders’ statements sparked doubts and criticism on social media, with users publishing Supreme Court resolutions affirming Saab’s Venezuelan nationality and questioning how Saab’s migratory status was not vetted before his high-level appointments.

New investigation against Maduro

Saab’s second arrest and prosecution by the US Justice Department have reportedly coincided with the launch of a new probe against Maduro. 

According to CBS News, US authorities worry that the case against the kidnapped president in New York is “weak” and ordered federal prosecutors in Florida to open a second criminal investigation against him. It is not presently known whether the goal is to tie the new probe to Saab, whom Washington has accused of serving as Maduro’s “financial operator.”

The latest investigation was reportedly opened in March and is being led by prosecutor Michael Berger, who specializes in international criminal cases. Several FBI and Homeland Security agents are likewise participating, along with the IRS’ criminal investigation division.

Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores pleaded not guilty to charges including drug trafficking conspiracy. Their trial is set to resume on June 30.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

VENEZUELA Fury may have just bagged a £5million wedding gift from her Gypsy King dad Tyson – but the teenager’s first marital home is a far cry from the millionaire lifestyle she grew up in.

The Fury dynasty toasted the teenager’s lavish wedding, which included Peter Andre performances, towering cakes, and a dress with a 50ft train, this weekend. But now, the 16-year-old bride and new husband Noah Price, 19, have moved into a £46,995 static caravan that had been sitting unsold for months – after furious buyers blasted the company’s homes as “absolute s**t”.

And in true Fury fashion, the story behind their first home together is every bit as dramatic as the wedding itself.

The young couple snapped up the two-bedroom caravan, named Manor House, exactly as it stood on the forecourt of East Yorkshire firm Carabuild – with no bespoke upgrades, luxury add-ons or personalised touches.

At 42ft long and 14ft wide, the caravan spans 588 square feet – roughly the same size as a large London studio flat.

That means Venezuela, who has spent her entire life surrounded by unimaginable luxury, is swapping Tyson and Paris Fury’s jaw-dropping £8million mansion for a static home that is 21 TIMES smaller.

Tyson’s sprawling estate stretches across 12,286 square feet, sits on historic land over 200 years old and boasts all the lavish trappings you’d expect from one of Britain’s richest sporting dynasties.

Yet now his eldest daughter is embracing traditional traveller life with husband Noah – and it seems the pair are doing it the old-fashioned way.

A source previously told The Sun: “Venezuela wants to start her married life in the traditional style of a traveller, just like her parents did.

“She has lived in luxury since she was born, but is willing to swap her home comforts to go and live in a static caravan.”

The source added: “She thinks it did her parents no harm and is looking forward to taking care of all the domestics while Noah goes out to work. Her parents approve.”

And it seems Venezuela took that traditional vision very seriously.

Because the caravan itself had been sitting unsold for months before Venezuela and Noah bought it.

Carabuild, which describes itself as a “bespoke manufacturer of luxury static caravans and lodges”, first advertised the home back in January with an asking price of £46,995.

By February, it still hadn’t shifted.

The firm posted another sales video online showing off the caravan’s “oak exterior” and “cream and gold” interior while urging potential buyers to get in touch.

Then in March came what insiders described as an increasingly desperate push to finally get rid of it.

In a social media plea, the company wrote: “Springtime offer. Be in this home for Easter. Available right now from stock. No waiting, no travelling, no stress.”

But while the videos attempted to paint a picture of luxury traveller living, furious online reviews underneath told a different story.

One furious customer blasted: “Stay well clear of this man Zane from Carabuild.

“Once he has your deposit, you never see him again.

“The homes are absolutely sh*t flat packs.”

The disgruntled reviewer continued: “Cheap made kitchen, cheapest of the cheapest, trust me, I am not joking.

“Please stay away from this company.”

Others accused the firm of poor insulation, broken radiators and “paper-thin walls”.

One scathing Google review read: “If I could give lower than one star, I would.”

Another raged: “Don’t give them a pound.”

Despite the controversy surrounding the company, Venezuela and Noah still chose the static home as the place they would begin married life together.

Carabuild proudly revealed the newlyweds had bought the home.

Sharing a video of the caravan to their Facebook page, the company wrote: “Congratulations to the new Mr and Mrs Price.

“We had the pleasure of designing and building Venezuela Fury and Noah Price’s very first marital home.”

It marks the latest chapter in what has become one of the most talked-about celebrity weddings of the year.

Venezuela – the eldest daughter of boxing superstar Tyson Fury and wife Paris – married Noah in a lavish traveller wedding on the Isle of Man earlier this month.

The wedding itself was pure Fury extravagance.

There were 20,000 flowers, a towering 12ft wedding cake, 18 bridesmaids, vintage cream wedding cars and a surprise performance from Peter Andre.

Venezuela wore a dramatic fishtail gown imported from Italy, complete with a staggering 50ft train – paired, brilliantly, with white Crocs.

Netflix cameras filmed the entire thing for the family’s hit reality series At Home With The Furys.

Tyson, emotional throughout the day, called himself a “big softie” as he walked his daughter down the aisle before later joking in his speech: “I told you – you shouldn’t have done it!”

And despite the glitz, glamour and eye-watering spending, the newlyweds appear determined to keep one foot firmly planted in traditional traveller culture.

The young couple will settle in East Yorkshire once they return from their lavish £30,000 honeymoon in Marbella – another gift paid for by Tyson and Paris.

And the honeymoon wasn’t the only present the pair received.

Tyson also gifted the newlyweds a traditional gypsy wagon as a sentimental nod to their roots.

Meanwhile, some family members were said to be stunned after Tyson and Paris reportedly handed the young couple £5million to help kickstart their married life.

“Some family members thought it was a lot of money for a young couple,” one insider told The Sun.

“But it’s up to Tyson and Paris.”

For now, though, despite the millions, the honeymoon and the reality TV cameras, Venezuela and Noah are preparing to start married life in the very caravan that buyers warned people to avoid.

VENEZUELA Fury’s new husband Noah Price has worn his wedding ring around his neck while on their lavish £30k honeymoon.

The 16-year-old daughter of ‘Gypsy King’ Tyson Fury and Paris Fury said “I do” to amateur boxer Noah Price over the weekend.

The youngsters, who got engaged at Venezuela’s 16th birthday party last September, got married in a lavish ceremony on Saturday at the Victorian Royal Chapel of St John’s in the Isle of Man.

The newlyweds are now living their best lives in Marbella, with them both showing off their lavish £30k honeymoon online with their many fans.

Boxer Noah, 19, proudly wore his wedding band on a chain around his neck in a new video as he strolled on the beach with his new wife.

The couple were dressed head-to-toe in designer looks.

MOLLY MAE-HEM

How Molly-Mae REALLY felt about her flying visit to Venezuela Fury’s wedding

CARAVAN OF LOVE

Venezuela Fury’s caravan home with husband as she leaves £8m family mansion

Venezuela rocked a chic Versace outfit while Noah rocked a Loewe T-shirt.

The couple enjoyed lunch at the Sexy Pasta restaurant and documented their sweet date.

Venezuela’s parents Tyson and Paris paid for their £30,000 honeymoon trip as a wedding present.

It comes after Venezuela’s parents Tyson and Paris gifted the newlyweds a £5million and a traditional gypsy caravan as a wedding gift.

A source revealed to us this week: “Tyson and Paris gave Venezuela and Noah a wedding present of £5million to kick-start their life, obviously, they were over the moon.

“Some family members thought it was a lot of money for a young couple so there were some mixed feelings – but it’s up to Tyson and Paris. 

“Tyson also paid for the honeymoon and got them a traditional gypsy wagon as a sentimental gift. Tyson’s got one in his front yard.

“The wedding was magical and they spent £40,000 on Venezuela’s dress alone. That’s the gypsy way – go big.”

This comes after new wife Venezuela showed off her and her husband’s new home – a stunning and very modern caravan.

The young TV star is trading her family’s £8million mansion on the Isle of Man for the plush static caravan in East Riding of Yorkshire.

Taking to TikTok before jetting to Marbella this week, Venezuela shared a video montage of her new marital home, writing underneath it: “R first ever home so proud of my Noah.”

The luxury caravan home boasted of a stunning marble bathroom with a free-standing bath with gold hardware, a cream kitchen overlooking trees and greenery, and plenty of space throughout.

The living room has a huge built-in TV cabinet with a fireplace beneath.

And the bedroom has large wardrobes and plush grey carpet throughout.

On the exterior of the property, there is a sign that says: “The Manor House”.

“I love caravans and this is like the ultimate one of luxury! Beautiful. Wish u many happy years together and hope you enjoy your new home,” said one person.

“Class. beautiful wee home to start your new life,” penned a second.

“Looks really elegant wish you every happiness in.your first home,” wrote a third.

Caracas, May 17, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Venezuelan government turned over former minister and diplomatic envoy Alex Saab to the US to face charges on Saturday.

The executive led by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez announced the “deportation of Colombian citizen Alex Saab Morán” through a statement issued by the Administrative Service for Identification, Migration, and Immigration (SAIME).

The statement said the measure was adopted “taking into consideration that [Saab] is implicated in various crimes in the United States of America, as is publicly known and widely reported.”

According to local media reports, Saab was transferred under custody from the El Helicoide detention center in Caracas to Simón Bolívar International Airport in Maiquetía, where a US government airplane was waiting for him. The operation reportedly involved agents from the FBI and the CIA, under the supervision of the US Justice and State Departments.

EFE confirmed Saab’s arrival at Opa-locka Airport in Miami-Dade County at 9:15 p.m. local time, escorted by Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) personnel. Footage of his arrival showed him placing his fingerprints on a biometric scanner upon entering the airport terminal. 

US authorities have yet to issue a public statement on Saab’s detention. The charges against Saab reportedly include criminal conspiracy, money laundering, and bribery of Venezuelan officials. According to the indictment filed in the Southern District Court of Florida, he is accused of having falsified documents and used intermediaries to facilitate international transfers of public funds.

Rumors of Saab’s detention in Caracas, allegedly at Washington’s request, began to circulate in February, with Venezuelan authorities offering no confirmation or denial on his status and whereabouts.

A Colombian-born businessman who later received Venezuelan citizenship, Saab was previously detained on US charges in 2020, during a plane refueling stop in Cape Verde while on a trip to Tehran to negotiate food and fuel imports amid shortages in Venezuela. He was charged with conspiracy to commit money laundering.

Saab’s arrest and subsequent forced departure to US soil saw the Nicolás Maduro administration launch a significant effort to denounce the “kidnapping” of a government diplomatic envoy and demand his release. The “Free Alex Saab” campaign saw Venezuelan authorities and international solidarity movements organize multiple demonstrations and digital campaigns demanding the envoy’s liberation from US custody.

In 2021, Venezuelan National Assembly President and lead negotiator Jorge Rodríguez suspended a dialogue process with the Venezuelan opposition in Mexico following what he described as “the brutal aggression against Saab’s diplomatic status,” insisting at the time that Venezuela would exhaust “all available legal and diplomatic resources” to secure his release.

The Maduro government secured Saab’s return in December 2023, with US President Joe Biden granting him a presidential pardon, as part of a prisoner exchange. Venezuelan authorities released 10 US citizens, including two former Green Berets who had taken part in a failed mercenary incursion. The Venezuelan government hailed Saab’s release as a “victory of truth and dignity.”

He was appointed president of the International Center for Productive Investment (CIIP) in January 2024 and minister of industry in October 2024. Acting President Delcy Rodríguez replaced him in both posts in January, three weeks after the US military strikes and kidnapping of President Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores.

Saab’s wife, Camilla Fabri, was likewise removed from her government responsibilities as communications vice-minister and head of the “Return to the Homeland” migrant return program.

During his prior detention, Saab’s legal team argued that the Barranquilla-born businessman had acquired Venezuelan nationality and was entitled to diplomatic immunity as a government special envoy. His Venezuelan citizenship allowed him not only to serve as minister, but also to vote in the 2024 presidential elections. Under Article 69 of Venezuela’s Constitution, Venezuelan citizens cannot be extradited.

However, the SAIME communiqué refers to Saab exclusively as a Colombian citizen, without explaining the legal procedure for his removal from the country. Likewise, the statement frames the move as a “deportation” rather than an extradition, although Saab was immediately flown to US territory. At the time of writing, there has been no judicial sentence publicly issued to approve the surrender of the former minister to US authorities.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

As far as we know, the US invading forces that attacked the country on January 3 did not plant any mines on Venezuelan soil. But, figuratively speaking, they did, because every day, here and there, a situation erupts that is clearly a consequence of the bombing and the kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores.

Some of these explosions even appear far more precise than the military operation – a term its proponents insist on using to describe it, despite the fact that it left more than a hundred people dead and caused significant material damage. In the four months that have passed since that traumatic morning, the country has witnessed what appear to be controlled demolitions at the very foundations of Venezuela’s 21st-century anti-hegemonic policy: the return of the US embassy; visits by high-ranking officials (including the head of the CIA); reintegration into the International Monetary Fund; reforms to fundamental laws; and even actions that appear motivated by a desire for symbolic humiliation, such as the removal of uranium from a historic but decommissioned nuclear reactor located on the outskirts of Caracas or Donald Trump’s alleged intention to annex Venezuela as the 51st state.

Every “mine” that explodes deepens a wound that, strictly speaking, is far from healing because it was inflicted on Venezuelan pride and hurts, above all, the Chavista base, but also people from other political camps who share a strong sense of nationalism.

Managing this systematic destruction of icons has been one of the most demanding challenges for the acting government, especially in terms of responding to its own supporters and to real internal power brokers, both within the sphere of popular power and within the military and police forces.

Peace and continuity

One of the most surprising aspects of the political period marked by the events of January 3 is that the country – which was invaded, bombed, and had its president kidnapped – has managed to maintain internal peace. Even more astonishing is that Chavismo, subjected to such a decapitation operation, has remained in power and has swiftly reestablished diplomatic and even cordial relations with the aggressor power.

This strange phenomenon was immediately exploited by internal and external opponents of the Bolivarian Revolution to disseminate accusations of treason. Those accused have responded by arguing that this was not a voluntary compromise, but rather concessions that any rational person would make in a hostage situation and under the threat of even worse attacks and reprisals.

In an unusual move, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres weighed in on this debate, voicing his suspicion that there was internal collusion in the military operation against Maduro.

A significant portion of Chavismo understands the need to reject these hypotheses and agrees that national peace is well worth the sacrifice of some of the slogans that propelled this movement to rise and remain at the pinnacle of political power.

The conflict arises when it becomes clear that, for many revolutionary activists, these slogans embody fundamental principles and values.

The controversy surrounding this issue lies dormant beneath the surface, like a geological fault line that became active following the bombing. At times, it surfaces in the form of minor tremors, through the critical attitudes of figures associated with Chavismo. The ground also trembles from the doubts and unanswered questions in the daily lives of sectors affiliated with or sympathetic to the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV).

One of the voices that has been speaking out from the ranks of the organic intelligentsia is that of Luis Britto García, who has raised objections to the reforms of the Hydrocarbons and Mining Laws, which, in his view, will allow for the unfettered plundering of Venezuela’s abundant natural resources and enable any disputes to be settled by foreign courts. He also rejects the return of the IMF, given the role that this and other multilateral organizations have played in imposing economic policies that are fundamentally anti-popular.

Britto García is unwavering in his ideological and legal objections, but he is also extremely careful not to present himself as an internal opponent of the acting president. Drawing on his immense moral authority, he has taken on the role of being the public voice for many who lack the ability or opportunity to express their views.

Meanwhile, some who clearly do not wish to be named say they have chosen to contribute through their silence, as the timing is highly inappropriate for taking sides.

Others, however, have chosen to openly dissent. Prominent among them is journalist Mario Silva, who built his career as an opinion-maker on the provocative television show La Hojilla and was later elected to the 2017 National Constituent Assembly and the 2021–2025 National Assembly. With his opposition to the oil and mining reforms as well as amnesty policies for opposition figures who participated in insurrections and riots, Silva has stirred up controversy, particularly among segments of the grassroots Chavista movement that identify with his dramatic and incisive style, which was once strongly supported by Commander Hugo Chávez.

In the vacuous yet highly topical realm of social media influencers, “dissidents” have also emerged, such as Diego Omar Suárez, “Michelo,” an Argentine YouTuber and TikToker who moved to Venezuela in 2024 and had been a key figure in the online discourse on these and other social media platforms, supporting the government of Nicolás Maduro and, in the early weeks, that of Delcy Rodríguez. However, he changed his stance to speak out against treason and collusion with the US. (1)

The Pilgrimage strategy

These disruptions have further obstructed the path of the interim government, which is grappling with a very difficult economic situation; they have become additional “landmines” along the way, forcing the government to move forward with extreme caution while navigating these threats.

One of the strategies designed to maintain popular support and mobilization has been the Pilgrimage against the blockade and the unilateral coercive measures or sanctions imposed by the US and its allies.

The Pilgrimage sought to mobilize support from the Chavista parties, which in the days immediately following January 3 had taken to the streets demanding the return of the presidential couple. That demand was redirected toward calling for a Venezuela free of economic sanctions.

Beyond giving new momentum to the Chavista camp, the mobilization sought to broaden the government’s support base by prioritizing the elimination of the blockade and sanctions.

To achieve this new consensus, the acting president has capitalized on the groundwork laid by the Amnesty Law, the Program for Peace and Democratic Coexistence, and other reconciliation initiatives, such as the one established for labor issues, which allowed her to get through May 1 by decreeing increases in bonuses without committing to meaningful wage hikes.

Fundamental in this regard has been the willingness of Chavismo to cede institutional spaces – such as the Office of the Ombudsman, the Ministry of Higher Education, several vice ministries, and several embassies – to figures from the moderate opposition. It is clear that the support obtained outside the Chavista camp has been the result of these prior concessions.

What about the opposition?

In this complex political landscape, the opposition forces appear, now more than ever, to be watching the game from the sidelines, standing around the table, while the pieces are moved by the acting government and the United States.

The moderate opposition, which participated in the 2025 parliamentary elections and entered the new National Assembly that began its term on January 5, has since January 3 wavered between capitalizing on the moment by supporting the so-called “reinstitutionalization” of the country and reverting to old obstructionist tactics that are largely ineffective given the overwhelming majority that Chavismo holds in the national legislature.

From the perspective of public opinion, everything seems to indicate that this opposition faction has failed to present itself to the country as a genuine option for change, with a platform capable of rallying the masses to follow its leaders.

At the other extreme is the faction led by María Corina Machado, clearly identified as the one that demanded (and continues to demand) most vehemently that the country be sanctioned, blockaded, and attacked militarily, based on the premise that she would automatically be called upon to head a de facto government resulting from the bombing and the kidnapping of the constitutional president.

Donald Trump’s surprising support for Delcy Rodríguez’s government has left Machado high and dry. Neither her obsequious submission to the US president nor her lobbying of the Western corporate elites has done her any good so far, as she remains relegated to the sidelines – a situation that must be particularly humiliating for her.

Under the current circumstances, Machado appears more a part of the internal US political diatribe than of the Venezuelan political scene. Following her failed efforts to secure Trump’s endorsement (to whom she gifted her Nobel Prize), she seems to be actively working with the Democrats and elements of the Deep State with the aim of inflicting a defeat on the Republican president in the midterm elections.

It seems her allegiances have shifted, creating a bizarre paradox: Venezuela’s radical opposition is betting against Trump, while Chavismo feels more secure if the president who ordered the brutal military aggression does not emerge too battered from the November contest.

It appears, then, that the “metaphorical landmines” planted by the US during its brief invasion are also exploding, one after another, on the grounds of the right and the far right.

(1) Editor’s note: this article was written before the May 16 handover of former minister and diplomatic envoy Alex Saab to US authorities.

Clodovaldo Hernández is a journalist and political analyst with experience in higher education. He won the National Journalism Prize (Opinion category) in 2002. He is the author of the books Reinventario (poetry and short stories) De genios y de figuras (journalistic profiles) and Esa larga, infinita distancia (novel).

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelan editorial staff.

Caracas, May 15, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan oil production has moved past 1 million barrels per day (bpd) for the first time in over seven years.

The latest OPEC monthly report placed the Caribbean nation’s April output at 1.031 million bpd, as measured by secondary sources. The figure increased by 46,000 bpd compared to the previous month.

For its part, state oil company PDVSA reported April’s production at 1.136 million bpd, up from 1.095 million bpd in March. Direct and secondary measurements have differed over time due to disagreements over the inclusion of natural gas liquids and condensates.

With the oil industry under crushing US coercive measures, crude production plummeted from around 1.9 million bpd when the first sanctions were levied against PDVSA. Following the US imposition of an export embargo in January 2019, output fell under 1 million bpd, hitting decades-lows around 350,000 bpd in 2020 before a steady recovery in recent years.

Since the January 3 US military strikes against Venezuela and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro, the Trump administration has imposed control over the nation’s energy sector, with revenues deposited in US Treasury-run accounts before being partially returned to Caracas at US officials’ discretion. 

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on Thursday that “for the first time in over a decade the wealth of Venezuela is benefitting the people of Venezuela,” though he did not mention the impact of US sanctions first imposed in late 2014.

While US coercive measures remain in place, the White House has issued a series of licenses allowing Western corporations to return to the Venezuelan energy sector.

BP, Chevron, Eni, Repsol, and Shell are among the companies to have struck oil and natural gas contracts with the Venezuelan government led by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez in past weeks, taking advantage of a recent pro-business legislative overhaul that slashed royalties and taxes, granted private partners increased control over operations and sales, and opened the way for disputes to be settled in international arbitration bodies.

Lesser-known companies Overseas Oil and Crossover Energy have likewise inked agreements for energy projects in the South American country. 

ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips are also evaluating prospects for a return to Venezuela, according to the Wall Street Journal. The two oil giants saw their assets nationalized by the former Hugo Chávez government in the 2000s after refusing to accept the country’s reforms asserting sovereignty over the industry. Both corporations would go on to secure compensation via international arbitration, with an award of over US $10 billion to ConocoPhillips still outstanding. 

The recent rebound in oil production coincided with an increase in US-sourced diluent imports. Exports also surged in April to 1.23 million bpd, the highest figure in over seven years. Apart from a growing number of cargoes to US refineries, Indian refiner Reliance is receiving increased shipments after securing US Treasury approval.

In contrast, two tankers reportedly headed to China and Cuba, respectively, will return their cargoes to Venezuelan ports after being intercepted by US naval forces. Prior to the January 3 operation and US control over oil exports, China had been the primary destination for Venezuelan crude. Caracas had likewise been the main supplier of oil to Cuba in the last two decades.

Venezuelan and US authorities have offered no clarity on the return of export proceeds to the South American country, with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stating that Caracas needs to submit a “budget request” before accessing its funds. The Venezuelan Central Bank’s handling of US-disbursed resources will be subjected to outside auditing, with Pentagon and CIA contractor Deloitte reportedly among the companies hired.

Despite the absence of official data on Venezuelan export revenues and the portion being returned to the country, the Rodríguez administration’s injection of foreign currency into exchange tables run by public and private banks increased in April and May. US authorities reportedly mandated that PDVSA revenues be funneled directly to private sector importers via forex auctions as opposed to having the Venezuelan Central Bank run foreign currency assignments.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Caracas.

Caracas, May 15, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Venezuelan government expressed “deep concern” on Wednesday over the “escalation of violence” in Colombia’s border region of Catatumbo.

Caracas’ reaction came one day after the Colombian Armed Forces announced the killing of seven combatants from the National Liberation Army (ELN) during a bombing operation that Colombian President Gustavo Petro said was carried out “within the framework of agreements” with Venezuela.

“Venezuela has been taken by surprise by these events and rejects any armed action that jeopardizes peace, stability, and the security of border communities,” Venezuelan Foreign Minister Yván Gil stated in an official communiqué. The statement added that Venezuelan authorities are concerned with “how this new escalation once again impacts the lives of people on both sides of the border,” causing “serious consequences” for local populations.

However, just 24 hours earlier, Petro had stated on social media that the Colombian army and air force carried out the attack against the ELN “within the framework of agreements with Bolivarian Government of Venezuela” led by acting President Delcy Rodríguez.

At the same time, Petro clarified that there is currently no peace process with the ELN, rejecting claims that the guerrilla organization resumed armed operations because of state noncompliance.

“Organizations that continue to seek total or partial control over illicit economies and reject agreements aimed at dismantling those structures are not part of any peace process,” he wrote.

Petro and Rodríguez met in Caracas on April 24, where they pledged to “combat organized crime” along the more than 2,200-kilometer shared border between the two countries. The meeting also resulted in plans for joint military coordination, intelligence-sharing mechanisms, and expanded security cooperation.

Details of the Operation

According to Colombian Armed Forces commander General Hugo López, the operation dealt a “major blow” to a unit of the Luis Enrique León Guerra Front, commanded by the guerrilla leader known as “Sucre,” which was reportedly responsible for providing security to the ELN’s Central Command and National Directorate.

The military stated that seven guerrillas were killed during the bombing operation. Nevertheless, insurgents reportedly abandoned the camps and removed the bodies of those killed, according to local outlet Blu Radio.

Colombian forces also reported discovering fortified camps, explosives, drone-launching devices, and materials used in the fabrication of anti-personnel mines.

The ELN, however, denied suffering casualties. In a video posted on Facebook, the guerrilla organization claimed that the attack “fell flat.”

“They attempted to surprise ELN guerrilla units fighting the 33rd Front, but this time they failed (…) We suffered no casualties as a result of this bombing,” the group stated. “Our forces remained active in responding to enemy aggression and continue to hold territory.”

The 33rd Front is a dissident faction of the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The group joined peace talks with the Colombian government and currently maintains a ceasefire while Temporary Location Zones are established for regrouping under Resolution 161 of May 2026. Nevertheless, it is now facing an escalating conflict with the ELN in border.

The latest attack was the third bombing operation carried out in Colombia in 2026 and the twentieth such military strike under Petro’s administration. Of those, three targeted the ELN, five targeted the Clan del Golfo, and twelve were directed against FARC dissident groups.

Colombia’s armed conflict, which has persisted for more than six decades, has intensified again in 2026 amid growing fragmentation among armed groups competing for territorial control. Despite the 2016 peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC, as well as Petro’s ongoing “total peace” initiative, forced displacement and violence against civilians have reached record levels in regions such as Catatumbo and Colombia’s Pacific coast.

The porous and extensive border has also led armed groups such as the ELN to establish a significant presence inside Venezuelan territory, controlling territories and with documented involvement in drug trafficking and mining activities.

Venezuela on different occasions attempted to facilitate peace negotiations in the Colombian conflict. Caracas hosted dialogue rounds between the Petro government and the ELN before talks broke down.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.