Venezuela

Lisbon, Portugal, September 17, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Continental Resources, a firm owned by billionaire and Trump donor Harold Hamm, struck a deal on Wednesday to exploit one of Venezuela’s largest oilfields.

Under the agreement with Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA, Continental will receive a long-term concession with “100 percent working interest” for the 500 square-kilometer Ayacucho 2 block in Venezuela’s Orinoco Oil Belt. The block contains an estimated 30 billion barrels of extra-heavy crude.

“Continental was built to recognize great resource opportunities and have the conviction to pursue them,” Hamm told Fox News, vowing that the deal would take his company to an “entirely new level.”

For her part, Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez claimed that the agreement would “strengthen [Venezuelan] oil production” and “create opportunities for economic growth.”

Hamm and PDVSA Vice President Jovanny Martinez signed the contract in Houston on the sidelines of the G20 energy summit. Martínez and Oil Minister Paula Henao attended the conference to pitch investment opportunities in Venezuela’s oil and gas sector.

PDVSA had previously assigned the Ayacucho 2 block to Chinese private firm Anhui Guangda in 2025. However, no information on investments or output were publicly disclosed, while Venezuelan authorities have not justified rescinding the contract with Anhui.

US government-controlled corporation NABEP, which recently received long-term concessions to 17 major Venezuelan oilfields containing 65 billion barrels in reserves, will also take over projects formerly run by Chinese enterprises, including state-owned CNPC. Beijing has called for its investments and interests in Venezuela to be respected.

Hamm was one of the corporate executives present at the White House on January 9, when Trump announced that Washington would control Venezuela’s oil industry and called on Western majors to invest. Since the January 3 US attacks and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro, the White House has managed the South American country’s crude export revenues.

The White House has also backed Venezuelan authorities’ pro-business overhaul of the energy sector while issuing sanctions exemptions to select US-aligned corporations. Chevron, Shell, and Eni are among the companies that have signed new contracts or renegotiated existing ones in recent months.

According to Bloomberg, ExxonMobil is in advanced talks to return to the Caribbean country after a litigious past. The energy giant is negotiating rights to four major oilfields in the Orinoco Oil Belt, two of which it previously owned before they were nationalized by former President Hugo Chávez.

In the 2000s, the Texas-based corporation refused to comply with reforms implemented to assert state sovereignty over the oil industry. ExxonMobil refused compensation offers and pursued international arbitration after its assets were nationalized. The company received an arbitration award significantly below its demands. 

ExxonMobil was additionally denounced repeatedly by Caracas after it spearheaded offshore drilling projects in the territorial waters of the disputed Essequibo Strip.

On Wednesday, Venezuelan authorities likewise inked a 20-year agreement with Florida-based Denarius Holding Group, controlled by Turkish energy group Çan2 Termik. Denarius is taking over the Petrokariña project in Anzoátegui state, which contains 10 oilfields producing a variety of crude types.

Heeney Capital receives gold mine concession

In parallel to its oil opening, Venezuelan authorities have also fast-tracked reforms opening the country’s mining sector to multinational corporations.

On Wednesday, New York-based Heeney Capital and commodities trader Mercuria Energy received a 30-year concession to operate the Chocó 10 mine in Bolívar State. The project holds considerable gold deposits and was run by Rusoro Mining in the 2000s before being nationalized by the Chávez government.

Heeney and Mercuria pledged US $1 billion in initial investment in the Chocó project. The two firms had struck a previous agreement with Caracas to purchase and trade Venezuelan minerals and other commodities.

One of Heeney’s co-founders, Sean Pi, signed the deal at the presidential palace in May and praised Trump’s “leadership” in defending US access to mining resources abroad. Pi has endorsed legislative initiatives deregulating and streamlining mining projects to bolster the US supply of critical minerals.

Under the trading agreement, Heeney and Mercuria are reportedly preparing to ship 15,000 metric tons of Venezuelan aluminum to the US. The corporate partners are likewise seeking to take over VENALUM, Venezuela’s biggest aluminum smelter. Glencore, an Anglo-Swiss mining and trading multinational, is also interested in VENALUM, according to reports.

Venezuelan authorities have not commented on the negotiations for the aluminum smelter. In April, Rodríguez appointed a commission to evaluate privatization of “non-strategic” state assets.

The Trump administration has identified securing access to Venezuelan mineral riches as a key national interest and is reportedly preparing an executive order to boost US corporate participation in Venezuelan mining projects.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Philadelphia, USA.

Caracas, September 16, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuela and the United Kingdom have announced a formal decision to upgrade their diplomatic relations and to re-establish full ambassadorial representation.

London formally presented its policy shift on September 15 in a missive to Parliament through coordinated statements by Minister for Latin America Chris Elmore in the House of Commons and Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State Lord Wood of Anfield in the House of Lords.

In the statements, the cabinet members framed the “diplomatic upgrade” around supporting a “democratic transition” while pursuing pragmatic bilateral engagement with the South American country.

“Developments in Venezuela since 3 January have created an important opportunity for the international community to support the restoration of democracy,” the statement read. “Working closely with the United States and with international partners, the UK considers that this moment calls for pragmatic engagement to help advance a credible transition and to encourage further reforms.”

The communiqué added that London and Caracas “have agreed our intention to upgrade our representation to Ambassador,” emphasizing that the step aims to deepen engagement with Venezuelan authorities and enhance support for British corporate and trade interests.

The Venezuelan government welcomed London’s decision. In an official communication published on Tuesday, the government led by Acting President Delcy Rodriguez celebrated the upgrade in diplomatic status as a positive step toward normalization.

Venezuelan officials stressed that the latest decision should pave the way for the full “sovereign management of the Venezuelan people’s resources,” referencing state assets frozen in British financial institutions.

National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez and Foreign Minister Félix Plasencia flew to London and held a meeting on Tuesday with Harriet Thompson, the British Foreign Office’s Director for the Americas.

Following the discussions, Rodríguez highlighted progress in multi-sectoral talks and economic outlooks. 

“We shared Venezuela’s position regarding political and social dialogue, as well as the progress made regarding oil and gas investments, and how this will translate into significant and rapid economic growth for Venezuela,” he said in a message published on social media.

Rodríguez added that the talks aimed at promoting national peace and political reconciliation, labeling them as “good news for our country and our people.”

Bilateral relations between London and Caracas had been severed for years following former UK Prime Minister Theresa May’s decision in 2019 to follow Washington in recognizing opposition figure Juan Guaidó’s self-proclaimed “interim government.”

That policy led to a protracted legal battle over 31 tons of Venezuelan gold reserves stored in the Bank of England, with successive British governments refusing to return them to Caracas. The reserves are currently valued at over US $4 billion.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Venezuelan authorities attempted to retrieve the gold through international legal channels, offering to transfer the funds directly to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to purchase emergency medical supplies and food.

However, British courts repeatedly rejected the legal challenges from the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV), citing No. 10’s political recognition of the opposition parallel administration.

Following renewed political talks in August and September, a Venezuelan government delegation and representatives of the defunct, opposition-controlled 2015 National Assembly agreed to request the release of the UK-held gold reserves under US Treasury Department control and oversight.

According to opposition dialogue delegates, the 31 tons of gold will be transferred into a specialized US Treasury bank account and subjected to external audits by foreign accounting firms before being released.

The funds are reportedly earmarked for housing, healthcare, and infrastructure recovery in the wake of the June 24 double earthquake that left over 6,500 people dead across Venezuela.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Lisbon, Portugal.

A new burger joint in La Castellana, an affluent neighborhood in eastern Caracas. Photo: Santiago Bernal.

Any Venezuelan can tell you how unpredictable our country is. This uncertainty, almost idiosyncratic to Venezuela’s national identity, can be felt before you even arrive. You never really know what awaits you when visiting from abroad, no matter how many times you have made the trip before.

This trip, my first since Maduro was captured by US forces in January and less than two months after the deadly earthquakes that devastated parts of the country in June, was certainly unusual from the beginning.

I arrived in Valencia, a city with a small airport poorly equipped to handle the hundreds of passengers diverted from Maiquetía International Airport, the country’s largest. To reach my hometown of Mérida, I had to take a flight departing from another city, Maracay, because Valencia’s airport was too crowded with international flights to accommodate additional domestic routes. The flight departed not from a conventional commercial terminal, but from a small facility inside Venezuela’s largest Air Force base, surrounded by some of the Russian anti-aircraft equipment and fighter jets that had spectacularly failed to prevent Maduro’s extraction. The check-in process had to be done in a mall in the city, a few kilometers away from the base, to which we were transported in a small shuttle bus. The process was surprisingly efficient.

The road between El Vigía’s airport, which serves Mérida, and the city was in better condition than I expected, although the scars of decades of underinvestment remained clearly visible. In some places, sections of road that had collapsed in landslides more than two years ago were still buried under rubble.

I arrived in Caracas after a drive in a taxi equipped with a Starlink antenna, a gadget that until not too long ago could land you in prison.

As we approached Mérida, I spotted a car-carrying truck filled with brand-new Toyota models.

I could not remember the last time I had seen one of those while living in Venezuela. Maybe 15 years ago? In any case, what would be an unremarkable sight in most countries had become extremely rare in Mérida, a state whose economy depends heavily on its university and small-scale tourism, two sectors devastated by Venezuela’s decade-long economic crisis.

After arriving in Mérida, I realized that the car carrier was serving one of several car dealerships that seemed to have resurfaced across the city, all filled with new vehicles. They were also visible on the streets: hundreds of new Chinese models, alongside smaller numbers of Japanese, Korean, and American cars, were driving around Mérida for the first time I could recall in years.

This may sound banal or superficial, but Venezuela’s aging car fleet had long served as a stark reminder of the country’s economic demise. Between 2014 and 2018, car sales collapsed, reaching a historic low of just 2,000 vehicles sold nationwide in 2018. Seeing a model manufactured after the early 2010s outside Caracas had become highly unusual.

The situation has changed since 2025, when more than 38,000 cars were reportedly sold across the country. That remains a fraction of the more than 300,000 vehicles sold in pre-crisis 2007, at the height of Hugo Chávez’s oil boom, but it is enough to make a noticeable difference.

The return of (limited) consumerism

Mérida’s urban landscape has also been transformed by the hundreds of new stores that have opened across a city where economic stagnation and widespread power outages forced countless businesses to close over the past decade. The same phenomenon was evident in Caracas, where I arrived after yet another tour through Maracay’s Air Force base, and after a drive in a taxi equipped with a Starlink antenna, a gadget that until not too long ago could land you in prison and can now be purchased online through different national authorized distributors.

Beyond new cars, large sections of the city, including old Chacao in Caracas’s affluent east, appear to be undergoing an incipient but rapid process of gentrification, reminiscent in some ways of iconic European neighborhoods such as Gràcia in Barcelona, Ruzafa in Valencia (the Spanish one), or Shoreditch in London.

Chacao’s Bolívar Square is marked by a striking contrast. Its 18th-century church still bears large cracks caused by the earthquakes, while the surrounding streets are now filled with lively atmospheric restaurants and cafés that would not look out of place in Lisbon or Barcelona, and fitted with contactless payment systems charging prices that match those of many large European cities.

These businesses serve a small but very real segment of the Venezuelan population that can afford them. That group is not necessarily limited to enchufados.

This raises an obvious question: how can these businesses be profitable in a country where typical salaries remain around $220–280 a month, less than a tenth of the already meager average European salary, and where living what might be considered a relatively normal life has been estimated to cost around at least $800–1,000 a month per person?

The answer is that these businesses serve a small but very real segment of the Venezuelan population that can afford them. That group is not necessarily limited to enchufados, people who have enriched themselves through their connections to government corruption. Exact figures are difficult to establish, but managers in private companies can reportedly earn around $1,200 a month, while senior professionals in some sectors, including medicine, can make several thousand dollars a month in private practice, depending on their specialization.

The widespread adoption of Cashea, a fintech company offering consumers interest-free microcredit for everyday purchases, has also increased the purchasing power of a broader segment of the population. Cashea’s success is visible not only in Wall Street, but also in its extraordinary penetration of everyday commerce. Its recognizable yellow logo now signals that the service is accepted in businesses ranging from large clothing stores in shopping malls to small kiosks, and funerary homes.

You can even use Cashea to pay for a ride with Yummy, Venezuela’s equivalent of Uber.

These businesses still operate within a heavily dysfunctional financial system, distorted by an artificially low exchange rate and an economy constrained by high inflation and low productivity. Yet they serve a segment of the population that is slowly turning into a small, resurgent middle class. That group is helping drive growth in specific sectors, most notably real estate, which has reportedly expanded by around 30 percent in 2026.

This modest revitalization has coincided with an important reduction in street violence. Today, around 60 percent of Venezuelans report feeling safe walking at night, according to Gallup, something difficult to imagine only a few years ago. This is one factor helping explain the revival of nightlife in places such as Chacao, Caracas’ historical center and, to a lesser extent, parts of Mérida.

A similar transformation was evident in Margarita Island, a place I had not visited in almost two decades.

Most of these changes began before the US intervention in Venezuela. But they appear to have accelerated and spread in the months following Maduro’s capture.

Known as the “Pearl of the Caribbean,” Margarita’s tropical beaches, tax-free stores and fascinating history attracted large numbers of European and Latin American as well as Venezuelan tourists during the 1990s and early 2000s. Some of my own fondest childhood memories are, in fact, on the island.

That changed dramatically after 2014, as Venezuela’s political, economic, and public-service crises deepened, leaving the island in a state of abandonment.

Today, Margarita is experiencing a modest but noticeable revival in domestic and international tourism compared with the previous decade. This has been partly fueled by significant investment from domestic and international hotel chains, which now offer a wide range of accommodation, from relatively affordable all-inclusive packages to high-end luxury experiences.

After several years in which the island received mostly Russian and Polish tourists, Margarita is once again welcoming growing numbers of international visitors, particularly from Colombia, and Brazil. Many tourism operators are already looking forward to the possible return of American visitors in the short to medium term.

Less than 15 minutes from the mall in Pampatar, I also visited a community that has gone more than six months without running water.

People I spoke to said Margarita feels more alive and prosperous than it did between 2016 and 2019, the worst years of Venezuela’s crisis, even if the situation remains vastly different from the island’s golden age thirty years ago.

Cities such as Pampatar and Porlamar are experiencing a revival similar to what I saw in Mérida and Caracas, with new restaurants and stores filled with customers. In Pampatar, I visited what was probably one of the largest and most modern shopping malls I have ever seen, comparable to those in Miami or Madrid, filled with stores selling American and European brands whose prices I often found prohibitive even by European standards.

Most of these changes began before the US intervention in Venezuela. But they appear to have accelerated and spread in the months following Maduro’s capture, as the idea that something resembling a normal life might again be possible seems to be taking hold in some.

There is, however, a large elephant in the room. Improvements remain largely cosmetic and circumscribed to a small part of the population.

Far from fixed

On the other side of the Avila, the mountain that separates Caracas’ gentrified neighborhoods from the Caribbean sea, over 12,000 people who lost their homes in the earthquakes wait for solutions in dozens of temporary camps erected among the ruins of their apartments.

But the limitations of this apparent resurgence are perhaps most obvious in the dismal state of public services. Hours-long power outages were common in Mérida and Caracas throughout my stay. Less than 15 minutes from the mall in Pampatar, I also visited a community that has gone more than six months without running water. Its residents make a living largely by collecting and selling salt from the island’s salt flats, with virtually no gear, or protection from the region’s unrelenting weather. 

Businesses, hotels, and even many households have adapted to what are, in practice, nonexistent public services. Solar panels, batteries, and water tanks allow those who can afford them to maintain a large degree of independence from the State-provided services.

For most Venezuelans, however, these solutions remain unaffordable.

The same is true for healthcare and education. Both systems remain crippled by chronic underinvestment and neglect. The Venezuelan public health system remains severely understaffed and unable to provide adequate services to most of the population, while out-of-pocket health costs represent a large proportion of total health expenditure and less than 10% of the population can afford private insurance. In terms of education, despite a recent increase in school enrollment, the number of students has fallen by almost 2.8 million compared with figures reported in January 2024, as large numbers of high-school students continue to leave their studies to work.

Venezuela is far from fixed, and it will never truly be as long as chavismo remains in power. But it is certainly not the same country I left in 2019, nor the same country it was before January 3.

Many of the people I spoke to still want to leave, especially now that expectations of a quick transition to democracy have been tampered by the warm relationship of the Trump administration with Delcy Rodriguez. Others have decided that a somewhat normal life in Venezuela is once again possible and that, despite its uncertainties, it may be preferable to the immense challenge of migration in an increasingly hostile world.

Yes, these improvements are fragile, uncertain, and profoundly unequal. They exclude most of the country. But they are also an opportunity: Not only for some to live a relatively normal, easier life. But also a chance to build on whatever progress has been made and keep pushing towards the deep institutional and political reforms that only a democratically elected government can implement.

Caracas, September 16, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Former Venezuelan Industry Minister and government envoy Alex Saab pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering and illicit financial transactions after reaching a plea deal with US prosecutors in a federal court in Miami.

Appearing before the US District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Saab changed his previous “not guilty” plea, entered on July 24, during a hearing before Judge Kathleen M. Williams. “Guilty, Your Honor,” the 54-year-old businessman stated during Tuesday’s session.

In his guilty plea, Saab admitted to participating, alongside “high-ranking officials” in the Nicolás Maduro government, in an “illegal scheme” involving bribes and illicit payments linked to the CLAP subsidized food program. The money allegedly obtained through the scheme was wired through accounts located in South Florida.

In the 12-page plea agreement, Saab named Socialist Party (PSUV) lawmaker José Gregorio Vielma Mora, who was governor of Táchira state at the time, as an alleged accomplice, alongside Colombian nationals Álvaro Pulido Vargas, Emmanuel Enrique Rubio González, and Carlos Rolando Lizcano. 

However, he also referred to two other individuals as “co-defendant 1” and “co-defendant 3.” Their identities have not been publicly disclosed by US prosecutors.

Saab also agreed to “fully cooperate” with the US Department of Justice (DOJ) by providing “truthful and complete information and testimony, and producing documents, records, and other evidence” in “any trial or judicial proceeding” requested by the US government.

He likewise agreed that he would not “protect any person or entity through false information or omission,” nor falsely implicate “any person or entity.”

The Colombian-born businessman also agreed to surrender US $195 million, along with properties and assets derived from the alleged crimes, to prosecutors. The government gave him 14 days to disclose all assets related to the offenses.

Saab, who stated that he suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder and takes antidepressants every night to sleep, could face a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison, as well as a $500,000 fine.

Nevertheless, prosecutors reportedly agreed to recommend a reduced sentence if his cooperation against the other defendants in the case proves valuable. His sentencing hearing has not been scheduled but is expected to take place in January.

The DOJ warned that it “reserves the right to evaluate the nature and extent of the defendant’s cooperation,” as well as the “quality and significance” of the information provided for the relevant investigations.

The agreement does not publicly specify which investigations Saab will be required to assist with or which other Venezuelan officials the US Justice Department is targeting. With Saab having been a key figure for Caracas to circumvent US economic sanctions, analysts have speculated that he could be a witness in the case against President Nicolás Maduro.

Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores are facing charges, including drug trafficking conspiracy, after being kidnapped by US special forces on January 3.

The current case is the second criminal prosecution Saab has faced in the United States. In 2020, when traveling as a Venezuelan government envoy, he was arrested in Cape Verde during a refueling stop and subsequently extradited to the United States. He was on trial for separate money laundering accusations.

However, in December 2023, then-President Joe Biden granted Saab a pardon as part of a prisoner exchange between the United States and Venezuela. Saab returned to Caracas and joined the government as minister of industry. Following Maduro’s kidnapping, Acting President Delcy Rodríguez removed the former envoy from the cabinet in January before authorities handed him over to US agencies in May.

Venezuelan high-ranking officials claimed that Saab had committed fraud in acquiring Venezuelan citizenship and vowed to present evidence of his alleged long-term cooperation with US agencies, but no further details have been released to date.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Lisbon, Portugal.

Prosecutors said that the group worked on behalf of Russian intelligence services to carry out attacks and murders around the world.

Five people have been charged over alleged Russian intelligence-linked plots involving surveillance, recruitment and planned killings, according to an indictment unsealed by the United States Department of Justice.

Prosecutors said on Tuesday that the group worked on behalf of Russian intelligence services to carry out attacks and murders internationally, including within the US, and that all five remain at large.

The defendants were identified as Russian national Yuri Khrameev, 63, his son Kirill Khrameev, 27, Cubans Oemis Romagoza Durruthy and Yaidel Delgado Suarez, both 35, and 22-year-old Venezuelan Angel Eduardo Castro.

All five were charged with conspiring to finance terrorism, while Khrameev, Suarez and Castro face additional charges of conspiring to commit murder for hire.

At a news conference, Attorney General Todd Blanche said the plots included attempts to kill a Russian dissident believed to be living in the Washington, DC area.

Justice Department officials said the network had recruited several people in the US to carry out surveillance on Russian dissidents, targeting individuals both domestically and in Lithuania.

In one instance, a recruit was reportedly promised $40,000 to make a US-based target “disappear”. A separate recruit was allegedly offered $25,000 the previous year to kill someone in Lithuania.

Russia’s embassy in the US has not commented on the case. Moscow has consistently rejected accusations that it has orchestrated assassination operations on foreign soil, including in the US.

Caracas, September 14, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The US Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Foreign Agricultural Service announced a package of measures to boost US agricultural exports to Venezuela amid growing concerns about the South American country’s national production.

According to the USDA, the plan will facilitate Venezuelan corporations’ purchase of US food products and agricultural commodities through government-backed credit and will include the delivery of food assistance and training for Venezuelan technicians.

“The Trump administration is committed to Venezuela’s economic prosperity, and USDA is leveraging its export financing, market development programs, technical scholarships, and food assistance initiatives to address this situation,” said Under Secretary for Trade and Foreign Agricultural Affairs Luke J. Lindberg.

Lindberg added that he “looks forward to positioning US agriculture to help meet needs and build lasting trade relationships.” The US official visited Venezuela as part of an official delegation in early July.

Washington’s credit program for food exports will be provided through the reactivation of the GSM-102 guarantee program. The mechanism offers guarantees to exporters that reduce the risk for financial institutions backing the transactions in case importers fail to meet their commitments. 

The Agriculture Department also announced that it will lift restrictions to allow foreign banks to back Venezuela-related transactions.

A USDA report had already estimated that Venezuela would need to import 1.5 million metric tons of wheat during the 2026-2027 marketing year. Corn and soybeans are likewise identified as key staples to be exported to the Caribbean nation. The latest initiative 

The Trump administration also lifted restrictions under its Feed the Future Agricultural Resilience Mission Initiative and plans to include Venezuela in a regional agribusiness trade mission scheduled for early 2027.

A bigger influx of US farm products will place an additional strain on Venezuelan food production, with local campesinos increasingly protesting against imports from agribusiness corporations that seek to drive crop prices down.

On September 9, rice growers from Guárico and nearby states organized a “tractorazo,” blocking a major highway in Calabozo with trucks and tractors to demand that the government halt the entry of imported rice during the domestic harvest season and ensure that agroindustrial companies adhere to established prices.

Protesters complained that imports from countries where food production is subsidized, including the US, create unfair competition and risk driving Venezuelan campesinos bankrupt. The latest mobilization was sparked by the reported arrival of a shipment of 355 thousand tons of rice, more than half of the Venezuelan production in 2025. 

Rural organizations have likewise denounced the exoneration of tariffs and import taxes as another factor putting national production at a disadvantage. Venezuelan authorities, including the National Assembly and the Agriculture Ministry, have vowed to review the import issue but have offered no measures to date.

In the Calabozo protest, producers denounced that imported rice had saturated silos and storage facilities during the 2025-2026 winter-summer crop cycle, forcing them to sell below production cost or lose their crops altogether. Demonstrators demanded a $0.25-per-kilogram subsidy from the state to compensate for the losses incurred and vowed to take the protests to Caracas if they receive no response from authorities.

The September 9 “tractorazo” was the latest in a series of mobilizations in recent months in Venezuela’s main agricultural states. Rice growers have complained about high fuel and input costs and urged the government to establish and enforce fair crop prices. 

According to agriculture lobby FEDEAGRO, more than 2.2 million metric tons of white corn, yellow corn, and rice have entered the country so far in 2026, more than triple the recent combined high of 709,000 metric tons in 2023.

“We cannot continue depending on a neighbor’s pantry. That is a failure. In Venezuela, we have the land, a committed agricultural sector, and people investing in farming, but excessive imports place us at a dramatic disadvantage,” stressed FEDEAGRO President Osman Quero.

Quero stressed that foreign producers have access to credit programs, fuel and fertilizer subsidies, and better infrastructure, while Venezuelan farmers face inflation and a lack of financing programs.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Lisbon, Portugal.

Art as propaganda

Chavez’s eyes still gaze from walls across Caracas. So too do the eyes of other figures, like Maduro and independence leader Simon Bolivar. Some images are faded. Others are accompanied by slogans like “To doubt is treason”.

Forastero has worked on government projects, including under Rodriguez. But he is critical of some of the newer images. He remembers a time when he painted murals of Chavez playing with children or riding a bicycle, not slogans.

“When Chavez was alive, people painted Chavez because we loved him very much. It’s as simple as that,” he said.

In recent decades, he argues that Venezuela’s public art has fallen increasingly under government control, with murals commissioned to carry explicitly political messages.

“Muralism is a story told on a wall,” Forastero said. “What we really see on the walls now are propaganda posters. I’m a chavista, and I’m disgusted by it.”

Still, the removal of the artwork is another form of propaganda, in Forastero’s eyes. He believes the Rodriguez government is seeking to project a more “neutral” appearance to better appeal to the US.

He also accuses Rodriguez of abandoning ideals key to the chavismo movement: namely, anti-imperialism and revolution. He pointed to the US’s role in shaping Venezuelan policy.

“The United States is forcing our government to behave this way,” Forastero said.

Rafael Araujo, a Venezuelan activist, has a different view of the changing landscape.

To him, there was something “jarring” about seeing chavista figures plastered across city walls, especially the leaders who have caused the country so much pain.

During their time in power, Chavez and Maduro both faced allegations of overseeing human rights abuses, including through the violent suppression of dissent. Venezuela’s last two presidential elections have been widely denounced as illegitimate.

Known in Caracas as Senor Papagayo, Araujo has used colourful, handmade kites to protest against government violence and economic policy.

He sees the Chavez murals as a form of oppression, an ever-visible reminder of a repressive government apparatus.

His kites are a way of sending a different message. His favourite carries aloft a single word: “Freedom”.

“Freedom is what all countries need. Democracy is the most balanced system a citizen can live under,” Araujo said.

Caracas, September 11, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuela’s oil industry recovery has stagnated in recent months, notwithstanding pro-business reforms and rising global prices.

OPEC’s latest monthly report placed the Caribbean nation’s August production at 1.145 million barrels per day (bpd), up 23,000 bpd from the previous month, according to secondary sources.

Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA reported an August output of 1.201 million bpd, virtually unchanged from July. Direct and secondary measurements have differed over time due to disagreements over the inclusion of condensates and natural gas liquids.

The strong first-trimester recovery that followed Washington’s lifting of its naval blockade petered out by mid-year. Since May, output has grown by only 7 percent despite the acting Delcy Rodríguez government conducting a pro-investor overhaul of hydrocarbon legislation and signing deals with several multinational corporations.

Since the January 3 US military strikes and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro, the Trump White House has seized control over Venezuela’s energy sector. Venezuelan crude export revenues are currently deposited in a US Treasury account, an arrangement confirmed by PDVSA President Héctor Obregón, before US officials decide when and how much of the proceeds should be returned to Caracas.

Washington and Caracas recently announced a major oil deal that will further boost US access to Venezuelan hydrocarbons under favorable conditions. The acting Rodríguez government has granted long-term concessions of 17 prime oilfields, holding 65 billion barrels of proven reserves, to US-controlled NABEP, a company led by Venezuelan oil mogul Alejandro Betancourt.

The oilfields transferred to NABEP, several of which were previously run by joint ventures between PDVSA and Chinese partners, are split among extra-heavy-crude projects in the Orinoco Oil Belt and mature light- and medium-crude ones in the Lake Maracaibo basin. Production in the latter can be ramped up faster as Trump seeks to replenish the US strategic reserve.

After initially hailing the deal as “the biggest in history,” US officials have dampened expectations, lowering a US $100 billion investment pledge to “over $10 billion.” Caracas and Washington announced a 1.5 million bpd target, but NABEP disclosed to Bloomberg only a modest projected increase in the near future.

Venezuela’s loss of sovereignty over its flagship industry has prevented the country from reaping the benefits from surging global energy prices, with the Brent benchmark surpassing $100 per barrel for the first time in four months this week. The Trump administration has sought to leverage its long-term access to Venezuelan oil resources to minimize the fallout from the interrupted traffic through the Strait of Hormuz resulting from its war on Iran.

Since January, Trump officials have worked closely with the Rodríguez administration to grant decades-long energy concessions to Western corporate players and most recently local Latin American conglomerates such as Colombia’s Gilinski Group. 

On September 4, Acting President Rodríguez signed a 25-year deal granting a concession of the heavy crude Bare block to GeoPark, a company belonging to Gilinski. Previously operated by PDVSA, Bare was one of the most productive fields in the Orinoco Oil Belt, with output surpassing 100,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 2011.

At a ceremony in Caracas, Colombian banking mogul Jaime Gilinski thanked Rodríguez for the confidence in awarding a major oilfield to his conglomerate. GeoPark set an 85,000 bpd target and vowed to invest more than $300 million.

The Gilinski Group began in manufacturing before expanding into finance, purchasing multiple Colombian banks and later acquiring positions in other Latin American countries, the US, and Italy. Investigations have implicated the Gilinski Group in parallel banking and tax evasion, including being named in the 2021 Pandora Papers leak alongside other leading members of the Colombian elite. The conglomerate has also ventured into other sectors such as food and media, with Jaime Gilinski currently the richest man in Colombia according to Forbes.

Of Lithuanian-Jewish descent, the Gilinski family is additionally known for its close ties to Israel. Jaime Gilinski’s father, Isaac, served as ambassador to Tel Aviv in 2010-2013, and his sister, Tania, was recently appointed to the same post by Colombian President Abelardo de la Espriella. Jaime’s son, Gabriel, traveled to Tel Aviv in 2025, meeting Prime Minister Netanyahu and evaluating business opportunities between Israeli and Colombian firms.

Edited and with additional reporting by Lucas Koerner in Philadelphia, USA.

Venezuela’s former first lady, Cilia Flores de Maduro, has asked a judge to release her from federal detention in the United States, citing a worsening heart condition.

In an application for pre-trial release on Wednesday, her legal team asked for the court to allow Flores to await trial under home confinement in Manhattan.

It described her declining health since US military operation on January 3 that resulted in her abduction from Caracas and imprisonment in New York, as well as that of her husband, former Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro.

“Prior to the United States’ military invasion of Venezuela, Ms. Flores de Maduro was physically healthy and took no ongoing medication, other than a monthly injection to help control her mitral valve prolapse,” the legal filing said.

“Now she is prescribed four medications, maintains nitroglycerin by her side in the event of a potential heart attack, and grapples with the continued medical advice suggesting coronary exploration and surgery.”

Flores was a prominent figure in her husband’s government, serving as first lady since his inauguration in 2013.

Prior to Maduro’s first inauguration, she was also a leading member of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), the country’s dominant political movement, leading the National Assembly for more than four years.

But Maduro had long clashed with the administration of US President Donald Trump, who accused Venezuela of sending drug-traffickers into the US. Both Maduro and Flores have also faced allegations of participating in human rights abuses, including the violent suppression of political dissent.

After launching a one-day military operation to abduct Maduro and Flores, the Trump administration charged them both with drug- and weapons-related charges. They are currently awaiting trial in New York City.

But Flores’s health has been in doubt since her forced removal from Venezuela, according to her legal team.

After consulting outside medical experts, Flores’s lawyers said they believe she may have suffered a minor heart attack on July 29 while in US custody.

They also questioned whether she was receiving the appropriate medical care for her mitral valve prolapse, a condition affecting one of the heart’s valves.

Since her imprisonment, her lawyers said Flores has not received the monthly injection she needs to manage the condition.

Instead, she has reportedly been prescribed baby aspirin, a statin, diltiazem and nitroglycerin to use when she experiences chest pain.

Doctors have recommended that she undergo a cardiac procedure, which could result in additional heart operations. If she undergoes such treatment, Flores “will need adequate time to recover from any procedures in a setting conducive to restoring her health”, her lawyers said.

Thursday’s filing acknowledges that Flores does not “dispute that she has received excellent care” from medical professionals. But it argues that “a detention centre lacks the conditions needed for such a recovery”.

Her lawyers proposed moving Flores from the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn to a residence within the Manhattan federal court district, where she and Maduro are due to go on trial next June.

Under home detention, Flores would be subject to round-the-clock armed monitoring, with visits restricted to people approved by the court and federal prosecutors. Her home would also be monitored by video and her phone calls recorded, according to the filing.

Judge Alvin K Hellerstein has yet to rule on the application.

Flores, 69, and Maduro, 63, have been held in US custody since the January raid on their home in Caracas. Both have pleaded not guilty to the charges of participating in a conspiracy to traffic cocaine into the US.

Mérida, September 7, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Defense attorneys representing Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores have formally requested the dismissal of criminal charges against them in the United States, invoking head-of-state and diplomatic immunity under international law.

In a motion filed before the US District Court for the Southern District of New York on September 2, defense counsel argued that domestic courts lack jurisdiction to indict, prosecute, or detain sitting foreign leaders.

Maduro and Flores’ legal teams emphasized that international treaties and long-standing legal principles shield active heads of state and high-ranking government officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, regardless of the status of bilateral relations between countries.

Lead defense attorney Barry Pollack asserted that the Justice Department’s indictment constitutes an unprecedented overreach of foreign judicial authority. 

“Under settled international law and long-standing diplomatic practice, foreign courts cannot exercise criminal jurisdiction over a sitting head of state,” he stated in court filings.

Pollack underscored that Maduro is facing charges for acts that would have been part of his official duties and that he “vehemently denies” the US prosecutors’ allegations.

The Venezuelan leader is facing charges of “narcoterrorism,” drug trafficking conspiracy, and weapons possession offenses. Flores has been accused of the same alleged crimes except “narcoterrorism.” Maduro and Flores were kidnapped by US special forces on January 3 following military strikes in Caracas and surrounding states.

Under the established trial schedule, federal prosecutors have several weeks to respond to the immunity case and the motion to dismiss.

Subsequently, US District Judge Alvin Hellerstein is expected to evaluate written arguments and hold an evidentiary hearing on November 17 to decide whether to grant the defense’s request or proceed to trial. In the latter case, the trial would begin in June 2027.

Legal analysts have argued that the sovereign immunity case is unlikely to succeed given the US judicial system’s tradition of deferring to the executive branch on foreign policy matters. Under the “one voice” doctrine, domestic courts follow the White House and the Department of State regarding which authorities are formally recognized as representing a foreign country.

The first Trump administration refused to recognize Maduro as Venezuela’s legitimate head of state following his 2018 reelection, instead backing the self-proclaimed “interim government” headed by Juan Guaidó. In 2023, Washington transferred its recognition to the defunct, opposition-majority parliament despite its term expiring two years earlier.

In March, the Trump administration recognized Delcy Rodríguez as Venezuela’s “sole leader.” As Maduro’s vice president, Rodríguez took over as acting president in January and has overhauled the Caribbean nation’s foreign policy in the months since. Caracas has reestablished diplomatic relations with Washington and strengthened ties with its global partners, including Israel, while distancing itself from historic allies such as China, Cuba, and Iran.

In his motion to dismiss, Pollack called it “incongruous” for the White House to recognize Rodríguez but not Maduro, who appointed her as vice president.

Venezuelan officials have not commented on the latest developments in Maduro and Flores’ case. After holding multiple rallies in the weeks following the January 3 kidnapping, Venezuelan authorities have significantly scaled back the public backing for the pair.

In a June interview, Rodríguez said that Maduro remains Venezuela’s legitimate president but stopped short of demanding his liberation, instead claiming that he has the right to “demonstrate the truth” before the US justice system.

In recent weeks, the Venezuelan government, through its official communications, as well as state-owned media channels, has increasingly dropped the “acting” label, referring to Rodríguez simply as “president.”

For their part, US-based international solidarity movements have staged monthly mobilizations demanding Maduro and Flores’ immediate release, including outside the federal detention center in Brooklyn where the pair is presently detained.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

WASHINGTON — President Trump has locked in a deal to develop Venezuela’s vast oil resources, an arrangement the White House says will bring a country battered by years of economic collapse to a “place where elections are possible.”

But the agreement — backed by acting President Delcy Rodríguez, a holdover from the Nicolás Maduro government that Washington deems “illegitimate” — is raising new uncertainty about how entrenched the unelected government may become.

In January, when the U.S. military captured Maduro, Trump did not say how long a democratic transition would take but said Rodríguez was “gracious” and “essentially willing to do what we think is necessary.”

Asked by The Times on Wednesday what was stopping him from demanding Venezuela set a firm election date, Trump was blunt: “I just don’t think they are ready yet.”

“It’s very new. We took them out of a dictatorship and we’re getting along great with the government,” Trump said. But he said an election would happen “soon.”

U.S. Secretary of Energy Chris Wright walks alongside Venezuela’s interim president, Delcy Rodríguez, after a news conference on the deal to develop 17 oil fields in the country.

(Jesus Vargas / Getty Images)

Under the deal, the U.S. government is partnering with an oil producer to create a new company, North American Blue Energy Partners, to develop 17 fields with a proven potential of 65 billion barrels. NABEP will have rights to the fields for 100 years.

For many Venezuelans, the lack of urgency around elections — set against a deal that gives the United States majority control over roughly a third of the country’s oil reserves — is starting to feel like a broken promise.

“They tell us we have to wait two years, maybe more, while in the meantime they do business with a government that wasn’t elected, that was imposed on us, and that we don’t want,” Carlos Pérez, a 23-year-old automotive mechanics student, told The Times.

Antonio Marchetti, a 45-year-old plumber and electrician, said that while he sees the removal of Maduro as a “good thing,” the oil deal makes it seem as though Trump’s plans were those of a “cowboy, the invader John Wayne,” all along.

“We were expecting elections,” Marchetti said. “This pact with Trump entrenched the dictatorship that he himself declared war on. But to get rid of Maduro, he left the rest and did business with them. It disgusts me.”

A man holds a sign that reads in Spanish, “Yankee out, murderers” during a protest in Caracas on Aug. 29 against President Trump’s deal giving the United States a stake in Venezuela’s oil reserves.

(Pedro Mattey / Associated Press)

The frustrations go beyond Venezuela. In Washington, Republican lawmakers have praised the oil deal, while calling Rodríguez an “interim dictator” who cannot be trusted.

María Corina Machado, the exiled leader of the Venezuelan opposition and a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, on Thursday raised her own worries about what the oil deal means for the future of Venezuela.

In a video message, Machado stopped short of criticizing Trump’s oil deal, but acknowledged concerns about a pact negotiated with an “illegitimate” government.

“Venezuelans know that there can be no development without strong institutions and a government elected by popular vote,” she said. “That is the only real guarantee of success and stability for any large-scale investment.”

A plan in the works

Trump administration officials have characterized the deal as an economic lifeline that will eventually stabilize a country and prepare it for free and fair elections.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio said last week that the United States is facilitating talks between Venezuela’s interim government and Dinorah Figuera, an opposition figure leading Venezuela’s 2015 National Assembly, the last democratically elected legislature recognized by the United States.

Machado has been left out of those talks. They are expected to resume in mid-September.

Rubio says that for any election to be “credible,” the voting system will require an overhaul and political parties will need time to organize. Steps also must be taken to ensure the country has a free press.

Echoing Rubio’s comments, the White House said Friday that Trump wants elections held at the “right time,” but that his top priority is to bring Venezuela “back from the dead and rebuild the country after it was incompetently ruled by a nasty dictatorship.”

U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright meets with Venezuelan acting President Delcy Rodríguez at Miraflores presidential palace in Caracas on Sept. 2.

(Pedro Mattey / Ap Photo/pedro Mattey)

On Wednesday, while Energy Secretary Chris Wright visited Caracas, Rodríguez declined to set a firm date for an election, but added, “I have worked tirelessly to ensure that Venezuela is ready and prepared when the time comes for its electoral process, which will take place — have no doubt about that: There will be an electoral process.”

The open-ended approach to holding an election, however, has drawn criticism from former Trump administration officials, who argue the lack of a timeline essentially lets Rodríguez govern indefinitely.

“Here’s my fear: It makes us Delcy’s partner, and gives the president a reason to want her to remain in power,” Elliott Abrams, who served as U.S. special envoy to Venezuela during Trump’s first term, told The Times.

He contended that the White House so far appears to prefer a pliant interlocutor, and Rodríguez, he says, will do “whatever Trump tells her to do.”

If an election is to take place in Venezuela, a nine-month runway for preparation is likely to be expected, Abrams said.

People shop for produce at a market in Maracaibo, the heart of Venezuela’s oil industry. .

(Ariana Cubillos / Associated Press)

In Washington, some Republican lawmakers have continued to call for elections in Venezuela, arguing that Rodríguez cannot be trusted.

“The only way we will have a prosperous Venezuela is with the end of the murderous regime and the return of democracy,” Rep. Carlos A. Gimenez (R-Fla.) wrote on social media. He also called Rodríguez an “interim dictator.”

In an interview with NBC News’ “Meet the Press,” Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas) said he does not necessarily think elections should happen before the oil agreement is finalized, but he said they “need to proceed rapidly.”

“I believe they should proceed no later than midway through next year,” he said.

Sen. Rick Scott (R-Fla.) said he is working with Trump and Rubio to ensure “free, fair and transparent elections as soon as possible.” He did not, however, say what would constitute “soon.”

Mixed views on economic hope

In the Lake Maracaibo region, an area that would see renewed investments under the oil agreement, Junior Araujo — a 47-year-old oil worker — sees a “wonderful opportunity to be reborn.”

Araujo, the father of three, is in desperate need of a better economic outlook. He works 120 hours a week and earns only $20. For his family, food alone usually costs about $150 a week.

“We have to get creative and find new ways to make ends meet through side jobs like selling clothes and making yogurt,” he said. “That’s our real financial situation.”

Venezuelans watch oil tankers anchored in Lake Maracaibo on Sept. 4. Much of the country’s oil industry is centered in the Maracaibo region.

(Humberto Matheus/Sipa USA via Associated Press)

For Araujo, the hope for a better economy does not take away his frustrations with the government.

“We’re neither happy nor dancing here, all our benefits have been taken away from us,” he said. “Our main problem is the current government; we need to restore our institutions.”

Nazareth Lezama, a 35-year-old teacher, also sees the oil deal as an economic opportunity but remains concerned that the current government may not have negotiated the best price or conditions for Venezuela. She added this has happened in the past.

“We must be clear that this regime destroyed the oil industry,” she said, adding that Venezuelans “need elections to choose leaders based on merit.”

Marchetti, the plumber from Caracas, says the oil deal is a “100-year chain” on Venezuelans imposed by Trump. He said it has become the “last straw” for him, and he has decided to leave Venezuela and emigrate to Europe.

“With all the pain in my heart, I will leave everything behind. I have a European passport; it won’t be easy to start a life from scratch, but there is no hope left here,” he said.

He does not know where he will land yet. But he knows he needs to leave Venezuela.

“This ship is sinking,” he said.

Times staff writer Ceballos reported from Washington. Special correspondent Mogollón reported from Caracas.

Venezuelanalysis editor Ricardo Vaz joined Clash Point editor Isaac Eshetu to take stock of Venezuela and its present relationship with the United States. The discussion covers the kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and the political fallout in Caracas, US control over Venezuela’s all-important oil industry, and a marked foreign policy shift in recent months.

(Note: the interview was recorded on August 14, before the US and Venezuelan governments announced a “historic” oil deal)

Source: Clash Report

Caracas, September 3, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez and US Energy Secretary Chris Wright celebrated an oil agreement between the two countries and North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP) and a flurry of additional energy deals signed on Wednesday.

“This is a historic day in the transformation of Venezuela,” Wright said in a joint press conference at Miraflores Palace. “President [Donald] Trump has a clear mission in Venezuela: to bring peace, freedom, and prosperity to everyone.”

The US official went on to praise the “enormous deal” announced last Friday that will see NABEP, a company owned by Venezuelan businessman Alejandro Betancourt, receive long-term concessions for 17 prime oilfields in the Caribbean nation that hold 65 billion barrels of reserves.

According to the White House, the US Department of War’s Office of Strategic Capital (OSC) will acquire a 35 percent stake in NABEP through penny warrants. The US State Department will be able to purchase 20 percent of NABEP’s production at cost and hold a right of first refusal for the remaining 80 percent. 

Washington will likewise control the company’s board of directors. Wright stated that the NABEP deal is “ambitious” and predicted that Venezuelan oil production would surpass 2 million barrels per day (bpd) by the end of the decade, nearly doubling the current output of 1.1 million bpd.

For her part, Rodríguez urged Wright to convey her gratitude to Trump, the US State Department, and the Department of Energy for helping secure “a mutually beneficial, win-win agreement.”

“I trust that the binational agreement will also prove beneficial for the people of the United States,” the acting president told reporters. “Venezuela is ready to welcome these investments that will boost the country’s development.”

Rodríguez had previously stated that Venezuela is estimating US $19 of revenue per barrel extracted in the project, significantly below the government take under the 2001 Hydrocarbon Law enacted by former President Hugo Chávez. The law was overhauled with US support in January to expand benefits for foreign corporations.

Both Rodríguez and Wright faced questions about Betancourt, who has faced embezzlement and money laundering investigations in Spain and Switzerland stemming from alleged corruption in dealings with state oil company PDVSA.

NABEP has operated in the country since 2024 and was awarded the project without a prior bidding process. It is currently Venezuela’s second-largest crude producer after Chevron. Wright said the US government had negotiated the agreement carefully and would exercise strict control over the flow of funds associated with the NABEP deal.

Rodríguez, for her part, said that Betancourt is not facing any judicial proceedings in Venezuela, with a 2022 arrest warrant for corruption having been dropped one year later. Similarly, Secretary of State Marco Rubio argued in an interview that the Venezuelan mogul is not the subject of any investigation in the US.

Before the afternoon press conference, Wright attended a ceremony at the presidential palace that saw the Venezuelan government sign a number of agreements with foreign corporations.

Chevron, the largest foreign corporation operating in Venezuela, saw its joint venture with PDVSA awarded two additional extra-heavy crude fields, Carabobo-1 and Carabobo-2 South, in the Orinoco Oil Belt.

The Texas-based company announced plans to invest $7 billion in its Venezuela projects over the next five years with the goal of more than doubling the current 250,000 bpd output. Chevron CEO Mike Wirth affirmed in an interview that the “strong legal protections” and “improved terms” under the reformed Hydrocarbon Law granted the company “attractive low-cost oil growth” prospects. 

Italian company Eni also signed a contract to develop the Junín-5 block, one of the largest in the Orinoco Oil Belt. The project will migrate from a joint venture with PDVSA majority to a concession-type deal, called a Productive Participation Contract, which offers increased benefits for the private operator.

Eni CEO Claudio Descalzi was likewise present in Miraflores Palace and thanked US and Venezuelan authorities for backing foreign investments in the South American country.

Wednesday’s ceremony also saw Primavera secure a concession to exploit the medium- and heavy-crude Budare-Elotes block in eastern Venezuela. Primavera is an energy-investment vehicle created by billionaire Fred Ehrsam, a Trump supporter and co-founder of Coinbase, to enter the Venezuelan oil industry.

Additionally, Colorado-based wildcatter Aspect Energy received rights to study potential new oilfields in eastern Venezuela.

Finally, PDVSA and state electricity company CORPOELEC signed “strategic alliance” agreements with GE Vernova, an offshoot of General Electric, to upgrade and repair electrical infrastructure supporting Venezuela’s oil industry.

Following the pro-business overhaul of its energy sector, Caracas has signed new or updated agreements with multiple Western multinational corporations, including BP, Shell, and Repsol. 

Since the January 3 military strikes and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro, the Trump administration has wielded significant control over the Venezuelan oil and gas industry. The Caribbean nation’s export revenues are currently deposited in a US Treasury account before the White House decides the disbursement timings and amounts.

Washington has also kept wide-reaching sanctions in place while issuing licenses for select corporations and banning dealings with companies from Russia, China, and Iran. With NABEP set to take over five oilfields previously operated by joint ventures with Chinese firms, Beijing demanded that its “rights and interests” in Venezuela be respected.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

Mérida, September 2, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuela’s Simón Bolívar International Airport, located in Maiquetía, La Guaira State, officially resumed commercial flight operations on Tuesday through newly constructed temporary terminals.

Air connections resumed more than two months after a powerful double earthquake struck central and coastal Venezuela on June 24, causing severe structural damage to the Simón Bolívar Airport, including fractured runways.

The initial phase of renewed operations relies on four modular, temporary terminals erected in the airport’s external parking areas. Spanning more than 10,000 square meters, the temporary structures house fully functional services for ticketing, baggage drop and retrieval, security checkpoints and migration control.

Venezuelan authorities have also set up shuttle buses to take passengers from the modular gates to the aircraft on the tarmac. They have also issued operational guidelines for passengers and organized a security deployment in the airport grounds and surrounding areas.

Before official operations began, national aviation authorities executed four operational simulations to test passenger circulation routes, security protocols, luggage handling, and overall system readiness.

During an official inspection, Minister of Transportation Francisco Garcés outlined the operational milestones, technical parameters, and long-term recovery timeline for the nation’s main aviation hub.

“There is full operationality from these temporary terminals, with capacity to accommodate 720 departing and 496 arriving passengers in the international area, and 480 and 472, respectively, in the domestic sector,” Garcés stated during a media briefing. “We have made a strong effort to maintain rigorous international standards for user comfort and safety, completing this complex logistical solution in record time.”

Garcés explained that the current facilities restore approximately 25 percent of the airport’s pre-earthquake operational capacity, with projections of expanding to 40 percent within the next two months and 60 percent by the end of the year.

Meanwhile, engineering teams continue comprehensive structural repairs on the main permanent terminals, with full reconstruction scheduled for the first quarter of 2027.

On September 1, the opening day of the temporary facilities featured eight scheduled flights split equally between domestic and international routes, with the inaugural flight departing to Valera, Trujillo State.

Air carriers currently operating or scheduling their immediate return to Maiquetía include national lines Conviasa, Laser Airlines, Estelar, Avior and Venezolana, alongside international operators such as American Airlines, Iberia, and Copa Airlines.

Throughout the two-month shutdown following the June 24 seismic events, national and international air transit was diverted through smaller, regional airports across the country, including Barcelona (Anzoátegui State), Valencia (Carabobo State), and Maracaibo (Zulia State).

Alongside the reopening of Venezuela’s main air hub, the acting Delcy Rodríguez government has continued to address housing rehabilitation and structural reconstruction in damaged urban centers.

In La Guaira State, Rodríguez oversaw the formal handover of 210 fully repaired apartments in the Ana Victoria community. The rehabilitation works under the Plan Venezuela Renace allowed displaced families to return to their homes after two months in temporary shelters.

Additional structural works in La Guaira include “tetra-houses” in Catia La Mar and public infrastructure reconstruction near the El Trébol highway interchange.

Concurrently, Rodríguez announced the delivery of direct financial assistance and low-interest loans to 104 condominium boards and 1,216 individual housing units in the Chacao and Altamira areas of Eastern Caracas.

“We have begun an inspection process; I know it may take some time, but it is important because we are in a phase of changing the seismic resistance standards for construction,” she said.

Disbursed through joint public and private banking channels, individual loans can be up to US $5,000, while funding for common area repairs can reach $20,000.

These funds enable residents and homeowner associations to address structural issues on buildings categorized under yellow and red risk tags, ensuring compliance with updated seismic resistance construction standards.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

Ousted Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro has urged a United States judge to dismiss the criminal drug trafficking charges against him, arguing he should be immune from prosecution as the head of a sovereign country.

Maduro’s lawyer, Barry Pollack, made the appeal in a Manhattan district court on Wednesday.

His legal team has petitioned District Judge Alvin Hellerstein to dismiss the case, which will test the willingness of US courts to apply international law to criminal cases.

Maduro was abducted and imprisoned on January 3, after US President Donald Trump authorised a military raid in Caracas. The former Venezuelan leader, who has been held in a Brooklyn federal jail, has pleaded not guilty and is scheduled to go on trial on June 1, 2027, if his effort to dismiss the case is unsuccessful.

The principle that sitting heads of state are immune from prosecution abroad is a longstanding tenet of international law, seen as fundamental to diplomacy.

Judge Hellerstein had given Pollack a Wednesday deadline to file his motion to dismiss the case.

Pollack has argued that Hellerstein lacks jurisdiction, both because sovereign heads of state enjoy complete immunity and because the acts that Maduro is accused of would have been part of his official duties.

“This unprecedented prosecution violates the absolute immunity from criminal jurisdiction to which heads of state and foreign officials acting in their official capacities have been entitled for hundreds of years,” Pollack wrote.

Pollack added that Maduro was falsely accused and “vehemently denies” the allegations.

A spokesperson for the Manhattan US Attorney’s office, which brought the charges, did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Maduro faces uphill battle

Legal experts have told the Reuters news agency that Maduro faces an uphill battle.

Washington has not recognised Maduro as Venezuela’s president for years, due to disputed elections. Courts tend to defer to the US president and his cabinet in disputes over who is recognised as a foreign country’s leader.

US criminal cases involving heads of foreign states are extremely rare, but precedent offers little encouragement for Maduro. In 1990, a federal judge in Miami rejected former Panamanian military leader Manuel Noriega’s attempt to assert head-of-state immunity, in part because he never officially held the title of president.

The US stopped recognising Maduro in 2019, when he was inaugurated for a second time after a 2018 election that critics say was rigged. Washington also called his 2024 re-election fraudulent.

Maduro says both votes were fair and has long accused the US of seeking his ouster to gain control of the South American country’s oil wealth.

Pollack, however, wrote that Washington’s assessment that Maduro lacked legitimacy was not relevant.

“Unlike in Noriega, the Executive Branch does not dispute that Mr Maduro was Venezuela’s head of state, but instead merely claims that, after 2019, he did not occupy that position legitimately,” Pollack wrote.

Venezuela run by Maduro’s vice president

Since Maduro’s abduction, his former vice president and socialist ally, Delcy Rodriguez, has run Venezuela as its interim leader.

She has also increased cooperation with the Trump administration. Last month, the two countries reached an unprecedented deal that would see the US take over about one-fifth of Venezuela’s oil reserves.

Pollack wrote that it was “incongruous” for the US to recognise Rodriguez, who was appointed by Maduro, and not Maduro himself. He pointed to statements by Rodriguez and officials in her government, made in January and February, indicating that they still considered Maduro Venezuela’s legitimate head of state.

Rodriguez’s government has since gone silent on the matter. Some murals of Maduro in Caracas have been painted over in recent months.

Prosecutors have until October 2 to respond to Maduro’s motion to dismiss the indictment, and Hellerstein will hold a hearing on the dismissal effort on November 17.

Late last night, on September 1st, on the day the commercial terminals of Maiquetía airport went back online, US Secretary of Energy Chris Wright landed in Caracas for the second time this year. Of course, Wright didn’t fly commercial, and he was swarmed by a flurry of journalists looking for headlines on the “massive” oil deal that has invaded the news both in the US and Venezuela. 

“I think very good times are coming,” Wright told reporters upon his arrival. “As large investments flow into this country, that creates more jobs, which pushes wage pressure up, creates opportunity and prosperity for Venezuelans, and it snowballs: when you get business confidence and investment, it creates all sorts of opportunities—not just jobs, but opportunities for entrepreneurs.”

Wright arrived to give this new partnership a bit more ceremony, but also, very likely to join in the festivities of what is to be an important week for the Trump administration’s push for energy supremacy in the region and for the Venezuelan oil industry. Besides the strange deal that we’re going to unpack in this piece, this week will feature Chevron, which according to Bloomberg is about to invest $7 billion looking to double its production in the country. Also, it is expected that deals with Eni, ONCC, and Colombia´s Geopark will be signed as well. And the icing on the cake, it’s been also reported that one of the agreements with GE Verona to tackle Venezuela’s decaying power grid is close to being executed.

The clumsy communications around the announcement of the deal have generated some negative backlash from the Venezuelan public and skepticism from the same oil majors the Trump administration is trying to woo. Just a couple of hours before Secretary Wright touched ground in Venezuela, Marco Rubio had to jump on a livestream with a Venezuelan journalist in a damage control mission.

The US-Nabep deal 

Those who brokered the US-Venezuela oil agreement are boasting about historical proportions, about leaving a mark for generations to come, but they took their time to explain why it is so important. Information has been coming out in a very fragmented way, heavily determined by propaganda needs from the Trump administration and the chavista regime. After vague rumors related to Mauricio Claver-Carone taking a step back as the Americans’ informal envoy, and the fall of Harry Sargeant III in Venezuela, we saw an old communication trick, which the Trump administration did not invent, setting the stage for the big news. Washington sent out a first version with catastrophic details, waiting for panic to spread, and published a second, corrected version that would make the news look better than initially perceived. Last week, the first Axios “scoop” talked about 90 billion barrels of Venezuelan oil reserves that the US would own. Now, the current version of the official announcement says it’s 65 billion barrels, so people can say “well, it’s just 65 billion barrels, it ain’t so bad.”

The White House finally published a fact sheet on Monday night disclosing more details about the involvement of the State and “War” Departments in buying the oil produced in 17 Venezuelan fields (supposedly containing about 65 billion barrels) by a private Venezuelan company. North American Blue Energy Partners, or Nabep, is the country’s second biggest crude producer led by notorious Venezuelan oligarch Alejandro Betancourt. To execute this deal, the Rodríguez government is granting a 100-year concession to a Nabep-Pentagon joint venture that looks, sounds and smells pretty unconstitutional from a Venezuelan point of view.

Francisco Monaldi: “Instead of generating more credibility and allowing investors to feel confident, the fact that this is allocated without any bidding and to an individual that has issues with justice, that could be a problem in the future.”

These are the known conditions of the deal:

• NABEP granted the Department of War’s Office of Strategic Capital a 35% equity stake in its corporate parent.
• The Department of State receives a guaranteed right to purchase 20% of NABEP’s current and future output at production costs, alongside a right of first refusal to buy the remaining 80%.
• The deal is strictly governed by US law and US court jurisdiction.
• Washington is granted veto power over board appointments. The majority of NABEP’s board of directors must be American citizens. 

The US government is trying to sell this to the American public as a way to restock US oil reserves and to cut domestic gas prices, which have a negative impact on Trump’s popularity and the prospects of Republican candidates in November’s congressional elections. In an interview in Spanish published Tuesday, Secretary of State Marco Rubio insisted that the deal was between the US and a private company, not the chavista regime, and offered this as a model the White House expects can be replicated.

The expert opinion

Francisco Monaldi, director of the Latin America Energy Program for the Baker Institute at Rice University, warned on X that Venezuela’s famous oil reserves are inflated by order of Hugo Chávez: in reality, they are about a third of the 300 billion barrels everyone quotes as the total proven reserves. So those 17 fields must have about 25 billion barrels, instead of 65 billion barrels, an unreliable figure no one should take for certain. Besides that, it would be very hard to actually extract those 25 billion barrels in 25 years, given that most fields are undeveloped. Monaldi added before PBS News that “the presence of the US government could make investors more willing to take the risk of going into Venezuela with all the issues, including the fact that this is an illegitimate government in Venezuela, and that the history of the country, of course, is not great in terms of respecting deals… The other issue is that the Strategic Petroleum Reserve typically uses light oil, and Venezuela mostly produces heavy and extra heavy oil.”

Monaldi thinks that “if it’s an opaque deal that doesn’t seem to benefit the country, then there will be a backlash eventually, and we will end up as in other parts of the world and in Venezuela itself with renegotiation at some point.” Even if the agreement with NABEP means that they can run faster than other private companies, Trump’s anxiety to get American investors to Venezuela won’t be helped by this, because “instead of generating more credibility and allowing investors to feel confident, the fact that this is allocated without any bidding and to an individual that has issues with justice, that could be a problem in the future.”

Amid the fall of Tareck El Aissami and the rise of súper ministra Delcy Rodríguez, Betancourt re-entered the Venezuelan oil scene alongside Trump-linked oil magnate Harry Sargeant.

Harvard scholar Ricardo Hausmann, a former planning minister who leads a research center on economic growth, avoided the oil economy dimension of the matter and just trashed Rubio for betraying the idea of democracy transition. On the other hand, some influential economists see opportunities. Asdrúbal Oliveros chose a middle ground between celebration and condemnation and pointed out that benefits will come as long as the country develops not only the oil fields but the institutions to create accountability. 

Betancourt: a meteoric rise and a shady trail

That Alejandro Betancourt, the CEO of NABEP, is at the center of this deal is bad news in the eyes of observers and Venezuelan journalists familiar with his trajectory.

Over the past two decades, this businessman became a symbol of the bolichico culture, a term apparently coined by investigative journalist Juan Carlos Zapata to define those scions of Venezuelan old-money families who became travel companies of Bolivarian-era corruption. Betancourt and his partners—namely his cousin Pedro Trebbau López and childhood friend Francisco Convit Guruceaga—became synonymous with the vanishing of hundreds of millions of dollars the Chávez government allocated to a newly-formed company, Derwick Associates, to fix the country’s power grid. Both Betancourt and Trebbau were in their late 20s when Derwick first emerged, and had no experience in the electricity sector.

Many things would happen between then and now. Betancourt became famous in Spain for investing in Hawkers, a Spanish sunglasses brand that got him cleaner headlines before local journalists discovered who he was. Prior to the Hawkers move, the three bolichicos created a Bahamas-based company to partner with a Gazprombank subsidiary. The resulting company, called Gazprombank Latin America Ventures, would operate a heavy-crude PDVSA project in the Lake Maracaibo region called Petrozamora. The joint venture did get to hold a steady production, but as with everything Russian, its operations were quite opaque. The Maduro regime eventually raided its offices and forced Betancourt to leave the country.

Betancourt faces probes in Spain and Switzerland. US prosecutors investigated him as an alleged co-conspirator in the $1.2 billion money-laundering scheme that targeted Convit and others, but didn’t charge the former.

Amid the fall of Tareck El Aissami and the rise of súper ministra Delcy Rodríguez, Betancourt re-entered the Venezuelan oil scene alongside Trump-linked oil magnate Harry Sargeant. Through Nabep,  Betancourt and Sargeant took control of a number of oil projects (including the Petrozamora fields) under the CPP scheme, in which private companies could hold a larger stake than the State (running counter to the country’s hydrocarbons legislation until it was changed this year). 

Betancourt seems to have a hand on both sides of Venezuela’s political conflict. That a close relative of Juan Guaidó was seen visiting Betancourt’s castle in Spain, in the company of Trump ally Rudy Giuliani, helped to cement the bad reputation of the interim government. In fact, Rubio now alleges that Betancourt was a friend of the opposition to deflect the suspicion that the tycoon is a man of the Rodríguez regime, and that the US chose Nabep because it is the biggest private company in the Venezuelan oil sector. Questioned by journalist Sergio Novelli about Betancourt’s past, the Secretary of State said that the businessman faced no charges “in our system.” 

Over the past several weeks, Betancourt reemerged as a key operative between the Trumpworld and the Rodríguez government. The Washington Post reported last week that the Trump administration lobbied Switzerland to “resolve” an ongoing money-laundering probe into Betancourt without him facing criminal charges. Despite such a level of external interference, Betancourt remains under investigation in both Spain and Switzerland. He hasn’t been charged in these countries. US prosecutors investigated Betancourt as an alleged co-conspirator in the $1.2 billion PDVSA money-laundering scheme that targeted Francisco Convit and many others, but did not charge the former. 

Distrust has grown in the Venezuelan public sphere. Before the oil agreement was announced, Cazadores de Fake News published an investigation about the network of social media accounts defending Betancourt. Hours after the White House published the fact sheet, an Axios piece tells the story of Betancourt as the global, influential businessman that promoted the Trump-backed Guaidó government and, during the events of January 3, persuaded Delcy Rodríguez to cooperate with Rubio. An Axios source even says that Maduro would still be in power had Betancourt not helped to remove him.

How Delcy is selling this

As another blackout hit Western Venezuela over the weekend, Delcy Rodríguez released a video statement saying this was about improving the future of the country. She was emphatic in thanking Trump and Rubio, and assured the nation would preserve sovereignty of the oil reserves while turning into a big energy powerhouse. Social media reacted by reproducing pre-2026 footage of her and Diosdado Cabello accusing the opposition of offering all our oil to the US. The most significant detail remains a mystery: what Delcy Rodríguez is demanding in exchange for signing and enforcing this deal.

How Venezuelan political figures are reacting

The most enigmatic reaction in the Venezuelan opposition came from María Corina Machado: she hasn’t said anything, really. A couple of days after Trump’s announcement, the opposition leader remotely attended an international conference held in Slovenia. She did not mention the reported contents of the deal or the role of Betancourt, but insisted on the potential of Venezuela as the energy hub of the Western Hemisphere in light of the Ukraine War and the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz. Machado added that a democratic government could serve as a bridge between the US, Europe and Latin America.

Leopoldo López and Julio Borges, two important opposition figures who held leadership roles in the past, also remain quiet. Their political parties are linked to a US-sponsored working group meant to reform the Venezuelan Supreme Court (TSJ) and electoral authority. López and Borges previously praised the US for its role and welcomed the progress made in August. In the deal’s factsheet, the White House says these talks resulted in significant reforms to the Venezuelan judiciary and the release of hundreds of political prisoners, which are grossly exaggerated claims. The reform to the Organic Law of the TSJ has not been approved yet, though the National Assembly sanctioned it on Tuesday night.

Edmundo González Urrutia said more, but not much against it. He stated that “Venezuela’s recovery cannot be measured only by the barrels it produces again, but by the lives that wealth allows us to rebuild.” He made no mention of Delcy, the deal’s legality, or its conditions, but wondered whether oil will improve the lives of all Venezuelans or only some this time around.  He asked what those millions of dollars could mean to a family that lost a home and is still waiting to rebuild it, to someone who arrives at a hospital to find no supplies, to a community that lives waiting to see when the water will come. González did not denounce the agreement, but reflected on the difference between financial resources reaching the country and reaching the families that need it most. 

Ruling chavismo has invoked its “loyalty to national sovereignty and the well-being of the people,” offering a list of crises the deal is supposed to solve: economic reactivation, the recovery of public services, care for those affected by the double earthquake, jobs, workers’ wages.

Juan Pablo Guanipa, a popular ally of Machado in Primero Justicia, sort of misread the animus. He called for a “calm reading” of the deal hours after it broke, arguing that Venezuela cannot develop its reserves without massive foreign capital. “If we see new jobs, more investment, more income, and a new economic upturn, this agreement will earn its backing. But if we don’t see it, little by little, popular rejection will follow.” His critique became sharper days later. From a rally in Falcón, Guanipa denounced that no government without an electoral mandate—like Delcy’s— has the standing to enter binding commitments like this. 

Henrique Capriles did better, insisting Venezuelans were entitled to defend their oil, their interest and their future: “What is the deal’s scope? Its legal basis? What do Venezuelans receive? What do they give up, and under what conditions? Questions, he noted, no one can begin to answer when the country doesn’t even have clarity on this year’s oil income.” He recognized that, although oil remains the only lever at hand to “push everything” and grow the economy, the triumvirate of the Rodríguez siblings and Diosdado Cabello are not qualified to lead that commitment, and will only coat the process with more opacity and corruption.

Diosdado Cabello is yet to say a peep, though we expect him to put some nice words together for his Con el Mazo Dando TV show tonight. PSUV, Venezuela’s ruling socialist party still under Cabello’s control, fully backed Delcy Rodríguez’s leadership in light of the oil deal. The party recalled its historical loyalty to national sovereignty and the well-being of the people, offering a list of crises the deal is supposed to solve: economic reactivation, the recovery of public services, care for those affected by the double earthquake, jobs, workers’ wages. According to them, Rodríguez was simply using “every tool possible within the constitutional framework to put our immense hydrocarbon reserves at the service of national development.” During last night’s session, the Rodríguez-controlled National Assembly passed a motion supporting the “US-Venezuela Binational Energy Agreement.”

Maduro’s son, “Nicolasito” Maduro Guerra, came out in support of the “historic” deal—as he called it, in English. He quoted an interview where his father said the State was fully open to the return of American capital to the Venezuelan oil industry. Which isn’t exactly false: before the US captured Maduro on January 3, The New York Times reported that the dictator had offered all existing oil and gold projects to US companies in exchange for being allowed to remain in power.

Rafael Ramírez, Venezuela’s oil tsar under Hugo Chávez who oversaw PDVSA’s total collapse and the embezzlement of billions of public funds, called the new deal illegitimate, unconstitutional, and a pillage (saqueo). He considered it a ploy by the Trump administration ahead of midterms, as the “Venezuelan case has become the only success to show their [voter] base,” further criticizing Delcy and US policy in an interview with El Nacional.  Among other original chavistas that broke with the Maduro regime, Chávez’s  former propagandist Andrés Izarra used a double-edged sword: “Delcy is carrying out Machado’s oil plan.” He also tweeted that the agreement was high treason for which its enforcers should be tried.

Juan Barreto, the former chavista mayor of Caracas who is trying to become a relevant opposition figure, quote-tweeted Alejandro Betancourt’s defense of the agreement (who had said that it would benefit Venezuelans and Americans alike) and took the class war route: “The true head of the transition speaks: from intervention to colony… from the stands, the traditional political class and the elites applaud, begging for a scrap… in the streets, neighborhoods, and factories, the people converse, organize, unite…Workers across the country, begin national dialogue and consultation.” Elías Jaua followed suit. The former chavista vice president and career chavista minister said Venezuela is now under the occupation of a foreign invader, calling for grassroots organizing and the recovery of national independence. In what seems to be an ongoing effort to distance himself from what remains of chavismo in power, Jaua clarified he had not spoken to any government official or PSUV leader.

America’s second-largest oil company is preparing to deepen its presence in a country most of its rivals abandoned two decades ago.

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An unnamed US official briefed reporters and said Chevron executives would appear alongside US Energy Secretary Chris Wright in Venezuela to unveil fresh investment, which would be the first corporate move to follow the agreement that just cleared Venezuela’s National Assembly.

Wright landed in Caracas late on Tuesday after the Venezuelan vote, with the signing set for Wednesday.

Chevron is the only major American producer to have stayed in Venezuela since Hugo Chávez completed the nationalisation of the industry in 2007, a move that drove Exxon and ConocoPhillips out.

A vote and an argument about the fine print

Speaking in Spanish for an interview posted online on Tuesday, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio described the arrangement in blunt terms.

“Essentially, this is now an agreement with the US government, specifically involving the Defense Department, which holds a special account allowing it to take possession of a certain percentage of these assets,” Rubio said, adding that American backing would help the company attract the private investment needed to develop the fields.

The “vast majority” of the 17 fields had been in Chinese and Russian hands, Rubio pointed out as the White House has also cast the agreement as a reassertion of the Monroe Doctrine.

Those fields come with 100-year rights for North American Blue Energy Partners and hold 65 billion barrels. A new company will be created in which the US Department of War’s Office of Strategic Capital takes a 35% stake, with the US State Department entitled to buy 20% of output at production cost.

US citizens must form a majority of the board, and Washington holds a veto over appointments.

Venezuelan lawmakers approved the agreement by a show of hands, though some opposition members abstained, saying they had not seen the terms.

“We need and are obliged to know what is written in the fine print,” said opposition lawmaker Luis Emilio Rondón.

“Who benefits from this oil if it stays underground?” argued the National Assembly chief Jorge Rodríguez in return.

NABEP is owned by Alejandro Betancourt, who has faced investigations over alleged money laundering in Spain and Switzerland without charges being filed and has been accused of involvement in a corruption scheme at state producer PDVSA.

An unnamed US official called him a “proven operator” while conceding that geopolitics sometimes means dealing with imperfect figures.

“I’m not nominating anyone for sainthood here,” the official said. “What I am telling you is that this is a person that, in the past, has been helpful to the United States government.”

What the deal has not settled

Analysts remain sceptical that output can be revived quickly, with estimates ranging from one to ten years before new barrels reach the market. Washington is not investing money in the venture, officials say, arguing its backing alone will attract the capital needed.

US President Donald Trump suggested on Monday that others would follow Chevron.

“We have Exxon going in, we have Chevron going in. We have our big oil companies going in,” Trump stated.

However, Exxon’s position appears unchanged as a spokesman said on Tuesday that “nothing has changed” after CEO Darren Woods also called Venezuela “uninvestable” earlier this year.

For the US administration, the urgency is domestic.

US President Donald Trump just met oil executives at the White House on Tuesday as petrol prices climbed because of new US strikes on Iranian targets near the Strait of Hormuz, posting afterwards that “we are unleashing American Energy Dominance!”

Cheaper fuel is a priority before November’s midterm elections, in which Republicans could lose control of both the House and the Senate.

Additional sources • AP

Caracas, September 1, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Chinese government has called for its “legitimate rights and interests” in Venezuela to be protected following reports that joint ventures involving Chinese firms are set to be displaced by a US-backed corporation.

“China-Venezuela cooperation is protected by international law and the laws of both countries. China’s legitimate rights and interests in Venezuela must be guaranteed,” foreign ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun said in a press conference on Tuesday.

Guo added that the economic and trade relations between nations “should follow the principles of equality and mutual benefit.”

Beijing’s warning came in the wake of an announced US-Venezuela oil deal that Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez termed “historic” and US President Donald Trump called “the biggest in history.”

Under the joint plan, Washington-backed North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP) is set to receive long-term concessions to develop 17 oilfields, holding 65 billion barrels of proven crude reserves, in the Caribbean nation. The projects are split between light- and medium-crude fields in western Venezuela and extra-heavy crude ventures in the eastern Orinoco Oil Belt.

According to Reuters, five of the oilfields to be handed over to NABEP are joint initiatives with Chinese companies, including state-owned CNPC and Hong Kong-registered China Concord Petroleum. In 2025, China Concord installed a drill rig in Lake Maracaibo in what was the first major infrastructure investment in western Venezuela in many years.

Another project in the agreement is believed to be run by a joint venture between Venezuela’s state oil company PDVSA and a Russian enterprise.

NABEP is owned by Venezuelan oil mogul Alejandro Betancourt and has expanded its presence in the Venezuelan oil industry in recent years. Its current oil output is around 200,000 barrels per day (bpd). Betancourt has faced multiple international embezzlement and money laundering investigations but has never been formally charged, with US officials reportedly lobbying Swiss authorities not to bring criminal charges against the Venezuelan businessman.

In a statement posted on Monday, Betancourt said Venezuela is “blessed with an abundance of natural resources” that would be “unleash[ed] to the great benefit of both Venezuelans and Americans.”

The Trump White House published a “fact sheet” on Monday, claiming that the deal “secures US energy dominance for the next century.”

The administration stated that the Department of War’s Office of Strategic Capital (OSC) will receive a 35 percent stake in NABEP at no cost. The State Department will be given the right to purchase 20 percent of NABEP’s output at cost and hold the right of first refusal for the remaining 80 percent.

Washington will also have the final say on NABEP’s board of directors and the company will be subject to US laws and government audits. The document also pledged that the Betancourt-owned company will invest “up to $100 billion” in the oilfields.

The White House went on to explain that the concessions will conform to Venezuela’s reformed Hydrocarbon Law, which was “adopted with US support” and vastly expanded benefits for private corporations. Washington has exerted significant control over the Venezuelan oil industry since its January 3 military operation, issuing sanctions waivers for select companies while the US Treasury manages crude export revenues.

The Trump administration hailed NABEP’s takeover of oilfields previously run by Russian and Chinese companies as a triumph for the Monroe Doctrine, “ensuring American dominance in our hemisphere is never again questioned.”

The US factsheet insisted that the oil concessions will last 100 years, contradicting Rodríguez, who said the agreement is for 25 years. Venezuela’s acting president vowed that the accords would usher in a new era of “welfare and prosperity.”

According to Rodríguez, the initiative has a 1.5 million bpd target and Venezuela will collect an estimated US $19 per barrel extracted, a figure significantly below the benchmarks established under the prior hydrocarbon legislation enacted by former President Hugo Chávez.

The US-Venezuela deal has drawn widespread scrutiny over its lack of transparency and the unfavorable terms for Caracas, with popular movements rallying against “neocolonialism and imperialist attacks.”

For its part, the Venezuelan National Assembly approved a resolution on Tuesday endorsing the “binational energy accords.” The proposal was backed by the United Socialist Party (PSUV) and allies as well as some opposition deputies.

National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez, the acting president’s brother, reiterated the government’s argument that “oil underground serves no purpose” and promised that crude production will reach “levels never seen before.”

US Energy Secretary Chris Wright landed in Venezuela on Tuesday night ahead of a scheduled press conference with Acting President Rodríguez on Wednesday. The Trump official, the Venezuelan government, and NABEP are expected to formally sign agreements at the ceremony.

Alongside the White House deal, several multinational corporations, including US-based Chevron and GE Vernova, India’s state-owned ONGC, and Italy’s Eni, are expected to ink contracts with Caracas in the coming days.

Some companies are slated to update existing agreements in accordance with reformed legislation, while others are set to enter into new deals in the South American country. According to Reuters, Chevron will expand its presence in the Orinoco Oil Belt while also securing access to light crude in Monagas State.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Philadelphia, USA.

Venezuela’s National Assembly voted to back the 65-billion-barrel oil deal, despite no details being publicly released.

United States Energy Secretary Chris Wright is set to travel to Venezuela, after the South American country has approved a deal that will see the US seize effective control of a large portion of its oil reserves.

An anonymous US official told reporters that Wright will travel to Venezuela on Tuesday, as the administration of President Donald Trump presses forward with the controversial energy deal.

“First and foremost, it furthers the national interest of the United States,” the official said, adding that it is “critically important” for the US to be able to “to buy oil at cost reliably”.

Details are still emerging about the arrangement, likened by critics to deals imposed by colonial powers.

Still, the interim government of Venezuelan President Delcy Rodriguez has defended the agreement as a boon to her country’s beleaguered economy. The National Assembly, led by her brother Jorge Rodriguez, voted to back the measure on Tuesday.

“Support for the binational energy treaty between the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the United States of America … is approved,” Jorge Rodriguez said.

But even within the National Assembly, there was pushback. Some opposition lawmakers abstained from the vote and denounced the fact that the terms of the agreement have yet to be published.

“We need and are obliged to know what is written in the fine print,” lawmaker Luis Emilio Rondon said, calling for “the full and complete text of what has been agreed”.

While details about the arrangement are still emerging, the deal is slated to give the US access to 65 billion barrels of proven oil reserves in Venezuela, about one-fifth of the country’s total.

As part of the deal, the US is expected to enter into a partnership with a private company to extract fuel from 17 large Venezuelan oil fields. The lease over the oil fields will run 100 years, according to reports.

The White House confirmed on Monday that it is partnering with North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP), helmed by Venezuelan businessman Alejandro Betancourt who is a former ally of the late Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez.

The agreement would create a new company, wherein the US Defence Department would take a 35 percent ownership stake and the State Department would have the right to buy 20 percent of the oil produced at cost.

Betancourt has faced criminal investigations for alleged money laundering in Spain and Switzerland.

But a US official who spoke anonymously defended the partnership, arguing that Betancourt is not facing any criminal charges in the US.

“I’m not nominating anyone for sainthood here,” the official said. Instead, the official framed the deal as “a geopolitical opportunity to secure fields that primarily had largely been under the influence of Chinese and Russian companies”.

Asked about the possibility of democratic elections in Venezuela, the official said they were not feasible in the immediate future.

Periods of transition, the official added, “almost invariably requires you to work with elements of the existing structure, even as you are creating a new one”.

Separately, oil giant Chevron is expected to sign an agreement to expand operations in Venezuela on Wednesday.

Venezuela’s energy sector has become dilapidated, with critics blaming heavy US sanctions and government mismanagement.

While the Trump administration has pushed for greater international participation in Venezuela’s oil sector, some companies have expressed scepticism about investing there.

The 65-billion-barrel oil deal was announced on August 27 in a post on Trump’s Truth Social platform.

His administration has exercised increasing influence over Venezuela’s government, since it launched a January 3 military operation to abduct and imprison Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro.

Trump and Maduro had frequently clashed. In the wake of Maduro’s abduction, Trump backed the socialist leader’s vice president, Rodriguez, to take over Venezuela’s government, holding her up as a model of cooperation.

Late on Friday night, Donald Trump announced what he called “the biggest oil deal in world history.” Under the terms described publicly so far, the US would obtain a controlling interest in a new venture involving 17 Venezuelan oil fields containing more than 65 billion barrels of proven reserves, with an effective 55 percent share of production and preferential access to crude at cost. The Trump administration says the arrangement could mobilize around $100 billion in private investment and eventually generate more than $200 billion in Venezuelan tax revenues. Much about the deal, including its precise legal structure, remains unclear.

There is nothing inherently objectionable about American companies making money from Venezuelan oil. Venezuela desperately needs foreign capital, technology and markets. PDVSA cannot rebuild the industry on its own, and reconnecting Venezuela to the American energy system would be preferable to another generation of dependence on Russia, China or Iran. 

The problem is not that Washington wants investment. The problem is that it seems determined to make that investment possible without first solving the political and institutional problem that made Venezuela uninvestable in the first place.

Recalculating

The original expectation after Nicolás Maduro’s removal seemed straightforward enough. American oil majors would pour tens of billions of dollars into the country and restore production. Nine days after Maduro was captured, Trump gathered oil executives at the White House and invited them back to Venezuela. ExxonMobil CEO Darren Woods responded with an inconvenient assessment: under the existing legal and commercial conditions, the country remained “uninvestable.” ConocoPhillips was interested but similarly cautious. Chevron, which never fully left, has continued expanding and is now preparing another significant restructuring of its Venezuelan operations. So far, the broad stampede of supermajors Washington appeared to expect has not come.

So Washington widened the search. Delcy Rodríguez traveled to India in June to court energy investment and deepen ties with Reliance and other Indian companies, in a trip conducted with remarkably explicit American encouragement. India had once again become a major buyer of Venezuelan crude, and Asian capital offered another potential source of the money Venezuela needed.

Under the conditions we have been apprised of so far, it is difficult to imagine a future democratic Venezuelan government simply accepting an arrangement of this magnitude as a fait accompli.

At the same time came operators with a different tolerance for Venezuelan risk. Hunt Overseas Oil and Crossover Energy signed preliminary agreements to develop projects in the Orinoco Belt. Smaller American firms have explored opportunities that Exxon and Conoco have so far declined to pursue. SLB, an oilfield-services company rather than a producer, has now been brought in to reconstruct and analyze PDVSA’s degraded reservoir data, the sort of basic technical infrastructure that should tell us something about how much of an oil industry still needs to be rebuilt.

And then there are the intermediaries. Bloomberg recently reported that Alejandro Betancourt, who rose spectacularly during the Chávez years, emerged as an important facilitator for Washington’s effort to bring smaller American companies into Venezuela. His usefulness is not difficult to understand. Companies entering a market where formal institutions remain weak need people who know the terrain, the networks, the officials and the informal rules through which business actually gets done. 

Betancourt has denied past allegations of wrongdoing and has not been charged with a crime, but his return as an influential gatekeeper hardly advertises the arrival of a transparent, rules-based Venezuelan economy.

Now comes the ultimate recalculation. If investors are still reluctant to absorb Venezuelan political risk, the US government may absorb some of it itself.

Risk instead of certainty

That is what makes Friday’s announcement so revealing. Washington began the year with the proposition that political change would make Venezuela attractive to capital. Now, the Trump government appears increasingly willing to create more and more elaborate mechanisms to insulate investors from risk rather than address the conditions that make the country risky in the first place. At every stage, it has changed the investor, the financing, the intermediary or the allocation of risk. The one variable it has been remarkably reluctant to change is the Venezuelan government.

There is also the small matter of Venezuelan law.

The Constitution establishes that hydrocarbon deposits belong to the Republic and are inalienable. It also requires National Assembly approval for public-interest contracts involving foreign states, foreign official entities, or companies not domiciled in Venezuela. Delcy’s reform of the hydrocarbons law has undeniably widened the space for private operators, granting companies much greater control over production and commercialization. But nothing disclosed so far explains how an arrangement giving the US government a controlling economic position over 17 fields, reportedly with rights potentially stretching for a quarter of a century, has obtained the constitutional authorization necessary to bind Venezuela over anything resembling that period. Reuters itself notes that the legal and financial structure remains unclear and that the proposal faces constitutional questions.

Delcy’s strategy is to survive Trump himself, so that the next American administration treats her as the person guaranteeing oil production, investment contracts and political stability.

Perhaps those questions will eventually receive convincing answers. Perhaps the current National Assembly will be asked to provide whatever approvals the agreement requires. But under the conditions we have been apprised of so far, it is difficult to imagine a future democratic Venezuelan government simply accepting an arrangement of this magnitude as a fait accompli. At a minimum, it would have every reason to subject the contracts to comprehensive legal review and democratic ratification; significant portions could well have to be renegotiated.

That produces a remarkable contradiction. An agreement supposedly designed to provide investors with certainty may create its own enormous source of political risk. 

A future government could inherit century-long commitments negotiated by an unelected predecessor whose authority it contests, with the US itself financially invested in preserving those commitments. Venezuela’s first genuinely democratic administration would then begin its life choosing between endorsing decisions it never authorized or entering an immediate dispute with Washington.

There is a perfectly respectable argument for what the Trump administration is attempting. Venezuela cannot place reconstruction on hold indefinitely while it builds pristine institutions. Oil infrastructure continues to deteriorate. Investment can create jobs, revenue, and constituencies interested in stability. Delcy controls the ministries, PDVSA, much of the security apparatus and the bureaucracy; somebody has to sign the contracts today. Connecting Venezuelan economic interests to American companies could itself help pull the country away from the geopolitical networks that sustained Maduro.

But that argument confuses the need to restart the economy with the need to give an interim government the power to determine its structure for generations.

Washington could have pursued investment while limiting the duration of interim arrangements, requiring future democratic ratification for the largest commitments, creating sunset clauses, tying concessions to institutional milestones or ensuring that Venezuela’s democratic forces had genuine ownership of the framework. Democratic legitimacy is not an obstacle to investment certainty. Properly understood, it is one of its foundations.

The US seems unwilling to own the fact that no amount of financial engineering, political brokerage or well-connected intermediaries can substitute for a democratic government.

Instead, the emerging arrangement gives Delcy Rodríguez an increasingly powerful incentive to make herself indispensable. The more American capital, energy security and political prestige become attached to agreements signed under her government, the more valuable continuity becomes. Delcy’s obvious strategy is no longer merely to survive the transition. It is to survive Trump himself, so that the next American administration treats her not as the temporary caretaker Washington inherited in January but as the person guaranteeing oil production, investment contracts and political stability.

Unreliable partners

There have been meaningful changes since Maduro’s removal. More than a thousand political prisoners have reportedly been released. The government and representatives of the opposition have reached an agreement to renew the Supreme Court. But if the objective on January 3 was a genuine democratic transition, it is increasingly difficult to argue that Venezuela has moved very far from square one. Delcy still governs without democratic legitimacy. Much of the chavista State remains intact. María Corina Machado remains outside the country and outside the US-backed negotiating mechanism. Even senators from both parties in Washington have begun pressing the administration for a clearer path toward elections.

If anyone in Washington believes that another legally dubious agreement negotiated with the cronies who continue to usurp the Venezuelan State—particularly through figures like Alejandro Betancourt, now being mentioned as a facilitator for oil investment—will inspire substantially more confidence than anything Washington has tried since that glorious January 3 night, then they have learned remarkably little about the problem they inherited. Washington took responsibility for managing Venezuela’s transition that night. Eight months later, it still seems unwilling to own the central fact that no amount of financial engineering, political brokerage or well-connected intermediaries can substitute for a Venezuelan government with democratic and legal legitimacy.

There is a broader cost to that refusal. Machado is not merely another Venezuelan politician Washington happens to dislike. She is one of Latin America’s most recognizable democratic figures, with an audience extending across the region’s Right, democratic center and beyond. The administration’s repeated willingness to sideline her while embracing Rodríguez is therefore being watched outside Venezuela too.

If billions begin flowing through institutions and business networks that have never been subjected to democratic accountability, Washington may discover that it has helped recapitalize the very system it intended to replace.

It is particularly telling to see rightwing figures such as Emmanuel Rincón, Orlando Avendaño and Hermann Tertsch—voices that have spent much of the past eight months looking for the glass-half-full interpretation of Washington’s most questionable decisions—struggling to interpret the latest developments as anything other than the US installing a friendlier face atop the chavista state.

That matters for American power. The Trump administration has never pretended that its diplomacy would be delicate. Allies understand pressure, bargaining and the occasional arm-twist. But there is a difference between being a demanding partner and being an unreliable one. Latin American political leaders who have aligned themselves with Washington against authoritarian movements would be perfectly rational to study Venezuela and conclude that the US remains an excellent partner for a business transaction while being considerably less dependable as the guarantor of a political project.

Oil production can rise without democracy. Private investment can coexist with authoritarianism. Venezuela can become much more capitalist without becoming substantially more free. If billions begin flowing through institutions and business networks that have never been subjected to democratic accountability, Washington may discover that it has helped recapitalize the very system it intended to replace.

Chavismo spent a quarter century destroying the institutional ecosystem in which long-term investment could survive. Changing an oil law does not rebuild it. Removing Maduro did not rebuild it. Finding more adventurous investors will not rebuild it either.

Democratic legitimacy is not the prize Venezuela receives at the end of a successful transition. It is part of the infrastructure required for the transition to succeed.

What does the increasingly brazen US approach to Latin America mean for Venezuela, and what can Haiti’s experience tell us about what may come next?

In Episode 47 of the Venezuelanalysis Podcast, Ricardo Vaz is joined by Jacqueline Luqman of the Black Alliance for Peace and Jake Johnston of the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR).

They discuss the so-called “Donroe Doctrine,” the use of disaster and aid as tools of external control, and the parallels between Haiti’s experience after the 2010 earthquake and the current challenges facing Venezuela. They also look at how US foreign policy is connected to domestic politics, the implications of this new era for Venezuela and the wider region, and how resistance can be built over the longer term.

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