Venezuela

King Juan Carlos I summons party leaders after the failed 1981 coup. From left to right: Santiago Carrillo (Communist Party), Agustín Rodríguez Sahagún (Defence Minister), Adolfo Suárez (Prime Minister), Juan Carlos I, Felipe González (PSOE) and Manuel Fraga (People’s Alliance, later PP).

(“Gosh, no! Not another hyper-comparative article about two distant political conflicts…” Apologies. We’ll try to make it a fun read).

More often than not, our intellectual circles have felt tempted to look at alien historical episodes in a never-ending search for resolute answers that shed light on our present. In 2023, when Maduro flirted with attacking US-supported Guyana, some revisited the Falklands War as a sign that a serious military incursion would be a fatal mistake that would lead to the dictatorship’s downfall. Then came the road to the 2024 presidential election; many feared (rightfully, in the end) that the country would plunge into the “Nicaragua scenario” if the dictator refused to recognize his defeat. Others momentarily wondered if enough external pressure could give way to a Guatemala-style transfer of power and a weak transition government.

The days of terror seem to be behind us, yet there’s no progressive reformer like Raúl Alfonsín steering the wheel of justice. Instead, Donald Trump gave us the Pizza Hut scenario. Here, Delcy Rodríguez has become the poster girl of the MAGA international franchise. Here, too, US geopolitical ambitions and business interests at times seem to be competing with the need for free elections and a democratic regime.

Is Rodríguez our Mikhail Gorbachev, trying to open the economy and political system just enough while attempting to save the chavista State from outright collapse? What if chavismo is already dead and she’s the Yeltsin of the Caribbean, the feeble leader who will give away the country’s riches to oligarchs in an arbitrary fashion, laying the ground for a new form of autocracy?

Or might Delcy be the chavista version of Adolfo Suárez, the not-so-brilliant and obscure but highly charismatic Francoist insider? Suárez finished the job after a remarkable run, surviving a period of meagre political support, declining approval rates and a coup d’etat that could have killed him. The comparison now sounds like an insult to the Spaniard. Like Gorbachev in today’s Russia, Suárez has become a sort of mythical statesman abroad while Spanish right- and left-wing critics dispute his legacy.

There are genuine similarities between the process currently unfolding in Caracas and the outset of Spain’s democracy, as well as room for gross contrasts. While 2026 has been insane for Venezuelans, Spain exactly fifty years ago was astonishing due to the speed at which Suárez acted in unilaterally dismantling the regime from within the regime. The dictator was finally gone, and as soon as he had the chance, the new King ordered a politician without strong ideological convictions to establish a full parliamentary democracy.

Suárez took office in June 1976. The Law for Political Reform, meant to pave the way for a new democratic legislature (with the King acting as a key enforcer), was through six months later. Spain held general elections within a year. That was just the start. What followed was a sequence full of the raw materials that tend to feed these history-making episodes: secret meetings and grand bargains between rivals and strange bedfellows, journalists acting like hinges, political violence, and leaders who soon become overwhelmed by their own decisions and actions.

How the transition worked out

When scholars praise the atmosphere of consensus that defined Spain in the 1970s, they generally speak of the close cooperation between regime reformers and opposition moderates in devising broad agreements that fastened democracy, fundamental rights and regional autonomy with the recognition of the monarchy. In doing so, these figures refused to address legal and moral responsibilities for the violence left by the Civil War and four decades of military rule (more on this later).

The spirit of the Transición is best encapsulated by the political partnership between Suárez and Santiago Carrillo, leader of the Communist Party (PCE) and the most prominent figure in a scattered opposition. Much like María Corina Machado this year, Carrillo was a key veto player in the transition’s inception. Suárez had the power; democracy just couldn’t be without the legitimacy carried by Francoism’s utmost rival. The government legalized the PCE only after it abandoned Marxist-Leninist doctrine and Republican (“anti-Spain”) symbols. As Javier Cercas recounts in the brilliant Anatomy of a Moment, the duo protected each other’s backs amid hardline pressures, in a climate of growing economic hardship and political violence where ETA and Far Right violence threatened to destabilize their project.

In Spain’s first elections since 1936, Suárez won and the renewed PSOE of a young Felipe González managed to eclipse the old-looking communists. Once the new democratic parliament was settled, Suárez and representatives from major parties signed the Moncloa Pacts, then framed as a national agreement to save the economy. Parallels with Venezuela’s Puntofijo Pact are there: the political class came together on monetary policy and wage regulation; welfare and public spending; and fundamental freedoms for citizens, workers and members of the press. An amnesty for political prisoners followed. In 1978, Spanish voters overwhelmingly voted to approve a new consensus constitution.

As is only natural during these processes, the position of Suárez before Francoist remnants in the State became untenable. Time exposed the true nature of his goals: he eventually crossed all the red lines of the inmovilistas, wiping out Franco’s ultra-conservative and nationalist institutions. Far Right groups, elites, the military and even newspapers plotted to jeopardize the transition and restrain its main characters. However, much of the groundwork for political action and breakthroughs was laid by domestic and outside backers who had an unequivocal pro-democracy stance.

In the Francois legislature, King Juan Carlos appointed his personal tutor and advisor, Torcuato Fernández-Miranda, as president. In the diplomatic arena, regional leaders and international actors favored Spain’s democratization and European integration. Willy Brandt, Francois Mitterrand and even Carlos Andrés Pérez encouraged PSOE’s social-democratic turn and the rise of González. Meanwhile, Carrillo had the endorsement of fellow Eurocommunists that had broken with the Soviet Union.

However, royal and international support were neither constant nor salient enough in the Spanish case. Domestic variables and the consequences of political opening made Suárez grow weaker in 1979, and his government could have fallen apart. In Venezuela, where the level of tutelage in place is more decisive than in Spain back then, the approach of the United States remains gradual and its supervision restrictive for opposition actors. The speed of reforms also seems to be contingent on the diverse interests of the Trump administration. Unlike in Spain at this stage, elections don’t appear to be around the corner, and new policies and initiatives are either limited in scope or yet to show results.

The transition’s key omissions

When comparing the Spanish transition with the Venezuelan process, significant details reveal mistakes whose lessons should serve to prevent their repetition. The transitional justice model, the control of the security forces, and the polarization that affects public opinion after decades, are some of the aspects that can be adjusted to learn from what Spain did well. However, we must keep our eyes open regarding the issues left unresolved.

Six years after Franco’s death and following many important reforms, the Spanish government did not have control of its security apparatus. As a result, a group of Guardias Civiles led by Antonio Tejero, stormed the Congress of Deputies on February 23, 1981, taking Suárez, Carrillo and the entire government hostage while tanks occupied the city of Valencia. The coup failed, but it became clear that the nascent democracy was fragile and that military, police and political elements were able to undermine it. Just like Venezuela in the early sixties.

A change in government, even one negotiated and backed by the US, does not guarantee control over the Venezuelan armed forces. During the transition process, the loyalty of the military must be built and put to the test. There is no guarantee that Venezuela will not experience an episode like Spain’s 23-F; the only way to ensure otherwise is to include representatives of the military high command at the negotiating table from the very beginning.

Then we have the famous Pact of Forgetting. As the opposition basically got everything it wanted, la Transición did not establish any special justice mechanisms. Reconciliation was built on a pacto del olvido, an implicit agreement between regime reformers and a large part of the opposition that consisted of not judging the past, not establishing truth commissions, and adhering to a logic of equivalency between the Two Spains: the Republican Left and the Nationalist Right, the losers and the winners of the Civil War.

The “pact of forgetting” is far from what we Venezuelans aspire to. The victims of Francoism were unable to access mechanisms for reparations during the first 25 years of democracy. Later, the Ley de Memoria Histórica (Historical Memory Law, LMH) and the Ley de Memoria Democrática (Democratic Memory Law, LMD) were enacted to fill that void. The reality is that justice came too late, was biased, and failed to meet international standards on truth, memory, and non-repetition.

One only needs to take a close look at the 1977 Amnesty Law. It passed almost unanimously; its original intent was a genuine desire to bring closure. However, the same law granted amnesty to those who were politically persecuted as well as to “authorities, civil servants, and law enforcement officers” for violations against the rights of Spanish citizens. To an extent, these are the same flaws that have been criticized in the Venezuelan amnesty law enacted in January 2026.

Forgetting and silence created wounds in Spain that were not fully healed and vulnerable to political manipulation throughout this century. A 2008 study found that 55.7% of those surveyed stated that the victims of the dictatorship had not received the recognition they deserved. That sense of injustice has fueled the narrative promoted by the Spanish Left that the transition was a “deal” between elites rather than a pacted rupture with the regime.

Venezuela’s amnesty law bears the same risk and exacerbates it by ordering the destruction of records and criminal histories. Erasing the evidence that will one day be needed to reconstruct the patterns of repression is the opposite of reconciliation. The construction of memory is the only thing that can guarantee that in 2050, Venezuelans will not be having the same disputes that Spain continues to have about Franco. For our process to move toward transformation, we must establish special justice mechanisms that include both reparations and forgiveness. Without this, at best, the next generations will be prone to forgetting.

Coming to terms with post-chavismo

It’s important to make a clarification regarding our case. Today, chavismo is not a force that polarizes the country, capable of winning elections like Suárez did, but a political elite that faces widespread rejection. That does not mean it will disappear from the political landscape. On the contrary, the mere fact that chavismo continues to rule may hint that it will remain part of public life. Eventually, the heirs of chavismo could try to reframe the legacy of Chávez, “saving” him from the discredit brought on by Maduro-era atrocities. The Maduro-Flores faction and a few other figures will likely be erased from chavismo’s new narratives. They will be portrayed as a deviation from chavismo’s original ideas. They will try to bring in new faces, and perhaps Diosdado Cabello will hand over the PSUV to some new figure, such as Héctor Rodríguez and a crop of young, “converted democrats.”

Yet the suffering caused by the chavista project cannot be so easily erased from the memories of millions of Venezuelans who endured hunger, exile, repression and imprisonment.

The wounds that remain fresh among Venezuelans can be as deep as those borne by the older generations in Spain, who faced the destruction and trauma of armed conflict. Like Franco, Chávez and Maduro spent two decades trying to build a “new man” through the military and partisan occupation of public life. However, the nature of the crimes and mismanagement in 21st-century Venezuela is different from that in Francoist Spain, where thousands of dissidents were systematically persecuted and killed. Like in Cuba and the USSR, economic and social devastation has been so severe that it led to mass starvation and exodus. Our remaining task and the lesson learned from what was lacking in the Spanish transition, is to build a historical memory focused on ensuring that anything resembling that does not happen again, and that whoever wants to enter the political arena can do so according to the rules of democracy.

Bonus: Delcy vs. Suárez

Adolfo Suárez became prime minister in 1976, having emerged from the very structures of Francoism and State-owned media. He was certainly not a reformer, much less a democrat until Juan Carlos appointed him to lead the transition. Suárez eventually acted on his own volition, seeing the process through to the end. Delcy, as Maduro’s “Super Minister” and his last vice president, has been a far more prominent figure in the chavista State, and also more deeply involved with the repressive apparatus than Suárez was, as UN reports can attest). In the case of Delcy, US military intervention has pushed her to change certain policies, cool down repression and engage with a sector of the opposition, part of a strategy for political survival where her regime needs to balance Washington’s demands with avoiding chavismo’s downfall. That has nothing to do with a “democratic” conversion.

The comparison is still vague, but Venezuelan historians can re-assess if this process leads to its much-needed destination.

Timeline (optional read)

1973: A decrepit Franco steps down as PM, separating the headship of state and the presidency of government for the first time. He names his loyal right-hand man, Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, as Prime Minister, with jurist Torcuato Fernández-Miranda as Deputy PM and conservative Carlos Arias Navarro at Interior. The global oil shock strikes Spain, ending fifteen years of economic boom (the Spanish Miracle) and unleashing severe inflation. In December, ETA assassinates Carrero Blanco in Madrid. Arias Navarro succeeds him with the backing of Franco’s family.

1974: Knowing that Franco’s death was imminent, the regime starts to split between moderates and hardliners while ETA consolidates as a lethal enemy of Madrid. Arias Navarro promises freedom of association, but under pressure from hardliners, the proposal ends up being a sham. The opposition favours gradual reform away from Francoism. European leaders encourage PSOE’s social-democratic turn, appointing a young Felipe González as Secretary General. Communist Party (PCE) leader Santiago Carrillo and other exiled figures call for a peaceful, democratic rupture with the regime.

1975: Franco dies in November. King Juan Carlos I is crowned head of state and reinstates Arias Navarro as PM, maintaining an impossible cabinet of both regime hardliners and moderate reformers like Manuel Fraga. ETA and left-wing terror groups step up attacks, while public strikes and protests demand amnesty and democracy. González enters Spain; Carrillo remains abroad.

1976: Arias Navarro’s sluggish reforms cause political deadlock and social unrest. Pressured by the King, he resigns in July. Juan Carlos appoints Fernández-Miranda as President of the Cortes and Torcuato’s former pupil, Adolfo Suárez, as PM. Suárez promises elections for 1977 and skilfully passes the Law for Political Reform through the Francoist parliament, dismantling the regime from within. Suárez tries to build democratic credibility by engaging with González. The more prominent Carrillo remains sidelined, leading the Communists from clandestinity, until he forces the regime to briefly arrest and release him.

1977: Carrillo and Suárez negotiate a pact in person. Suárez legalizes trade unions and, in a risky move during Holy Week, legalizes Carrillo’s PCE. The Communists abandon its Marxist-Leninist doctrine and traditional Republican symbols. In June, Spain holds its first free general election since 1936: Suárez’s UCD wins, closely followed by the renewed PSOE of González. Major parties sign the Moncloa Pacts to stabilize the economy. An Amnesty Law releases political prisoners.

1978: Parliamentary committees draft a consensus constitution guaranteeing fundamental rights, regional autonomy, and a constitutional monarchy. In December, Spanish voters overwhelmingly approve the new Constitution in a national referendum, formally ending the Francoist State and establishing Spain as a modern parliamentary democracy. The government discovers that some security officials are plotting a coup against Suárez, including Guardia Civil Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Tejero, but the main conspirators receive minor penalties.

1979: Spain holds its first elections under the new Constitution: UCD wins again but fails to secure an absolute majority. Regional autonomy statutes pass in Catalonia and the Basque Country. Economic trouble, internal UCD infighting, and rising ETA violence create growing political instability and unrest within the military.

1980: Suárez faces worsening economic crises, mounting regional tensions, and a vote of no confidence tabled by the PSOE. Suárez survives the vote, but his authority inside the UCD collapses as cabinet ministers and faction leaders publicly break ranks, making his government increasingly untenable.

1981: Exhausted by political crisis and plots, Suárez resigns in January. During the parliamentary vote to appoint Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo as his successor on February 23, Lt. Col. Antonio Tejero leads an attempted military coup (23-F). King Juan Carlos rejects the coup on national television, securing army loyalty and saving the young democracy.

1982: Calvo-Sotelo navigates Spain into NATO despite widespread public opposition. Disintegrating from internal factionalism, the ruling UCD collapses. In the October general elections, Felipe González leads the PSOE to a historic landslide victory, marking the first peaceful transfer of power to a left-wing government and consolidating Spanish democracy.

1983: The newly inaugurated PSOE government launches major economic restructuring and industrial modernization plans to prepare Spain for European integration. Simultaneously, the State initiates decentralisation by establishing the final Autonomous Communities, completing Spain’s territorial map under the 1978 Constitution.

Caracas, October 8, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – US District Judge Alvin Hellerstein denied a request by Venezuelan First Lady Cilia Flores to be released from jail and allowed to face trial under house arrest in New York following reported health problems.

The Southern District of New York judge argued in a bail hearing on Thursday that Flores posed a “substantial flight risk” and dismissed assurances from defense attorney Mark Donnelly that she would not flee. 

“With all the money at stake and all the contacts Ms. Flores has with the Venezuelan government and the people who make it up, the risk is serious. There is no combination of conditions that would make that risk any less serious,” Hellerstein said.

In a court filing submitted in early September, Flores’ defense team requested that the 69-year-old be transferred to a private residence in New York with armed guards around the clock, an electronic monitoring bracelet, restricted visitors, and monitored phone calls.

Flores and Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro were kidnapped by US special forces on January 3. They have been detained at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn while facing “narco-terrorism,” drug trafficking conspiracy, and weapons possession charges.

Flores’ lawyers have pleaded that she requires extensive cardiac treatment and that the prison does not provide the necessary conditions for her care. Attorneys added that the Venezuelan first lady, who is also a legislator, would cover the transfer costs and offered to surrender her passport as an additional assurance of remaining in custody.

The filing describes episodes of chest pain, arrhythmia, difficulty breathing, and a weight loss of more than 24 pounds since her detention. It also claims that Flores may have suffered a mild heart attack on July 29.

A group of demonstrators gathered outside the courthouse, demanding that the Venezuelan first lady’s health concerns be addressed and protesting the “illegal” abduction and prosecution of the presidential pair.

Hellerstein’s denial of bail coincided with US Justice Department prosecutors filing a new indictment against Maduro and Flores, expanding the charges they face in the United States.

The superseding indictment, backed by US Attorney General Todd Blanche, US Attorney for the Southern District of New York Jamie McDonald, DEA Administrator Terrance C. Cole, the secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, and FBI Director Kash Patel, accuses them of conspiring to torture political opponents, military personnel, and other detainees, including three US citizens.

The prosecution’s filing alleges coercion, electric shocks, and threats against family members, among other practices. Prosecutors claim that after taking office in 2013, Maduro “oversaw a system designed to employ torture, arbitrary detention, and violence as means of repression against the political opposition.”

“As alleged in the indictment, the Maduro regime subjected American citizens to torture while held in custody of the Venezuelan government […]. Today’s charges reflect the commitment from this FBI and this Department of Justice to accountability, the rule of law, and the protection of U.S. national security,” FBI Director Kash Patel stated.

Maduro’s attorney, Barry J. Pollack, said his client denies the allegations in the new indictment and looks forward to his day in court. The updated indictment added “narco-terrorism” to the accusations against Flores.

The document also names Nicolás Maduro Guerra, the former president’s son; current Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello; former minister Ramón Rodríguez Chacín; and Héctor Guerrero Flores, alias “Niño Guerrero,” the leader of the Tren de Aragua gang, who was reported killed in a US military operation inside Venezuelan territory in June.

Last week, US prosecutors challenged Maduro’s claim to sovereign immunity, arguing the White House had not recognized him as president and that the Venezuelan government had never requested that he be granted such status. They said, however, that Caracas had pursued a similar request for Acting President Delcy Rodríguez in a separate civil lawsuit.

Hellerstein is scheduled to hear oral arguments from both sides on the immunity question on November 17. The US government has asked the court to reject motions filed by Maduro and Flores seeking dismissal of charges. If the case proceeds, the trial is scheduled to begin in June 2027.

The Venezuelan government has not commented on the latest charges against the Venezuelan president and first lady or on their legal claims to immunity.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

DEVELOPING STORYDEVELOPING STORY,

The new US charge adds to the existing drug trafficking case against Venezuela’s former president and first lady.

Former Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, were charged in the US state of New York with conspiring to commit torture in connection with allegations that they tortured political opponents to maintain their power.

The charge announced on Thursday in a Manhattan federal court adds one count of conspiracy to commit torture to the drug trafficking charges the couple already faced.

Maduro and Flores pleaded not guilty to the drug charges and have been held at Brooklyn’s Metropolitan Detention Center since their capture. Their trial is scheduled for June 1.

The charges pile on an ongoing criminal case against Maduro and Flores. A superseding indictment accuses Maduro of working with cartel groups to move cocaine through Venezuela toward the United States.

This is a developing story…

Mérida, October 6, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Venezuelan acting government is resorting to a Qatar-led financing agreement in order to regain access to multilateral loans from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).

According to specialized outlet Bitácora Económica, Qatar is preparing to establish a specialized rescue fund to settle Venezuela’s estimated US $2.5 billion debt with the IDB.

Under the proposed mechanism, the Qatari fund would immediately clear Venezuela’s overdue principal and interest payments, while issuing a new, long-term loan with favorable interest rates for the South American nation.

Venezuelan economist José Guerra claimed that Qatar will be joined by the United Arab Emirates and that the Gulf countries will back the financing initiative with their sovereign wealth funds.

The Qatari-backed initiative would reportedly allow Venezuela to address short-term liquidity constraints and access a new IDB credit line worth as much as $8 billion. The financing would be used for public infrastructure projects, including the national road network, water distribution systems, and stabilizing the national electric grid, as well as providing additional funding for state budgets.

The proposed Gulf-backed debt arrangement comes amid a broader, deliberate push by Caracas to re-establish formal relations with major US-led multilateral financial institutions.

Over recent months, high-level Venezuelan delegations have held technical and institutional meetings with representatives from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean (CAF).

In September, Acting President Delcy Rodríguez met in New York with IMF Director Kristalina Georgieva, as well as senior World Bank and IDB officials.

Caracas’ rapprochement with Western multilateral institutions has coincided with a geopolitical shift in its foreign policy since the January 3 US military strikes and kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. The Venezuelan government, headed by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, reestablished ties with Washington while also strengthening relations with US allies such as Qatar and the UAE.

Doha initially provided intermediation for US control over Venezuelan oil export revenues, with funds deposited in Qatari bank accounts. The scheme was later transferred directly to the US Treasury Department. Energy firms from Qatar and the UAE were recently announced as stakeholders in a Venezuelan offshore natural gas project as well.

Venezuela’s reengagement with Washington-based financial institutions saw the IDB officially reopen its country office in Caracas on October 2, seven years after halting operations in the Caribbean nation.

The IDB had suspended all active credit lines and disbursements to Venezuela in May 2018 following payment arrears. The relaunched local office follows the formal reinstatement of Venezuela’s voting rights in June, when the IDB Board accepted Calixto Ortega as the country’s governor at the IDB.

During an expanded session of the National Economic Council in Caracas on October 2 with IDB officials, Acting President Rodríguez emphasized the importance of access to international multilateral credit for both the public and private sectors.

“This agenda that we have been developing with the multilateral financial system is for development, for investment and financing in infrastructure and services,” she stated during the televised session. “In Venezuela, there is a very important installed industrial capacity to develop, and a boost in financing will bring us to full capacity.”

Rodríguez added that the renewed engagement aims to ensure that private companies, communal production units, and small businesses can access international loan programs to expand local production.

While direct sovereign lending to the Venezuelan government remains contingent on fully clearing arrears, the multilateral’s private-sector arm, IDB Invest, has already initiated direct financial assistance to key Venezuelan corporations and commercial banks.

Under recently approved financing structures, IDB Invest is reportedly delivering commercial-rate loans and capital support to food processing conglomerate Empresas Polar, as well as private commercial banks Banco Mercantil and Banesco.

The allocations for Banco Mercantil and Banesco are designed to strengthen liquidity and capitalization within the national banking system, while also boosting local credit lines for businesses.

Meanwhile, the funds directed to Empresas Polar are earmarked for agricultural development projects and supply-chain expansion, particularly targeting grain production in Portuguesa state, according to reports.

Unlike traditional development loans, the IDB Invest credits are extended at market interest rates, focusing directly on private-sector growth and sustainability.

The Venezuelan government’s current strategy marks a departure from the former President Hugo Chávez’s stance toward multilateral lending institutions.

In November 2008, at a Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) summit, Chávez criticized the IDB, labeling it an “instrument of political pressure” used by Washington to impose orthodox economic policies on sovereign nations.

At the time, Chávez called on Latin American governments to withdraw from both the IDB and the IMF, which he labeled as a “weapon of US imperialism,” advocating instead for regional alternatives such as the Bank of the South to replace traditional multilateral lenders.

The hum of the kidney dialysis machine that Onasis Munoz is connected to suddenly stops. The fluorescent lights overhead flicker out, and his room at a clinic in Valencia, Venezuela, is plunged into darkness.

It is not the first time a power cut has interrupted one of the three weekly sessions Munoz needs to do the work his failing kidneys can no longer do, filtering waste and excess fluid from his blood.

For years, electricity would go out every couple of days across parts of Venezuela’s Carabobo state.

But in recent months, Munoz said, the outages have grown to be daily, lasting around seven hours. The clinic’s emergency batteries have since been depleted, and its backup generator no longer works.

He explained that the frequent power failures have disrupted his treatment. His health has slumped as a result.

“I arrive home, exhausted, as if I had run a marathon,” the 34-year-old said.

But often there is no electricity there either, and recent weeks have been sweltering. “I can’t switch on the air conditioning. I cannot rest because of the heat and the mosquitoes. There’s no relief,” Munoz said.

Across Venezuela, the prolonged outages are riling locals, as the electricity supply to homes, businesses and essential services becomes unstable.

Some of the cuts are deliberate, as the government of interim President Delcy Rodriguez rations electricity.

The resulting frustration has spilled onto the streets, where demonstrators hold “cacerolazos” – a traditional form of protest that involves banging pots and pans.

Some have gone as far as blocking roadways and setting tyres on fire. The electricity crisis has also raised concerns about how the government is managing the country’s vast oil supply, a key source of income for the country.

“We are desperate. We cannot understand how a country so rich in resources can be practically left in the dark,” said Patricia Cueva, a lawyer from Maracaibo, the capital of oil-rich Zulia state.

“We cannot rest. We cannot work. Our children cry.”

Caracas, October 6, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The US Justice Department has urged New York District Judge Alvin Hellerstein to reject Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores’ sovereign immunity claims amid their ongoing legal case.

In a court filing submitted on October 2, prosecutors told the court that Maduro and Flores’ motions to dismiss their indictments “should be denied.”

The Venezuelan president and first lady, who is also a legislator, were kidnapped in Caracas by US forces on January 3. They were charged with drug trafficking conspiracy and weapons possession, with Maduro additionally facing a “narco-terrorism” accusation.

The pair’s defense teams filed motions to dismiss the case in September, arguing that their respective positions in the Venezuelan government should make them immune to criminal prosecution in a third country.

In response, the Justice Department stated that the recognition of a foreign head of state is the exclusive competency of the executive branch, and that Washington has not recognized Maduro since 2019. Historically, US courts have deferred to the White House and State Department on foreign policy matters.

However, in the ongoing case, Justice Department officials sought to bolster their argument by stating that the Venezuelan government, led by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, has declined to invoke immunity for Maduro and Flores.

“If Venezuela wished to assert its view that the defendants were entitled to immunity in this, it could have,“ the submitted document read. “The defendants’ attempt to claim the contrary is an admission that such silence is devastating to their claims.”

The prosecutors pointed to an ongoing civil lawsuit in Florida against Maduro, Rodríguez, and other defendants, where the Venezuelan government, through its US embassy, requested that the Trump administration communicate to the respective court that the acting president should “enjoy absolute immunity from judicial proceedings in foreign domestic courts.”

The State Department sent a letter in June calling on the Florida district court to “promptly dismiss the proceedings.” The White House likewise communicated to the court that all claims against Rodríguez should be “dismissed without prejudice.”

In August 2025, three US nationals who were imprisoned in Venezuela sued Maduro, Rodríguez, and several other current and former state officials. The plaintiffs claimed to have suffered “torture” and to have been used in “hostage diplomacy.” The judge issued a default ruling after Maduro and other defendants failed to show and awarded $314 million in damages to the plaintiffs.

“Venezuela did not request immunity in this case, despite every opportunity to do so. Indeed, there is no doubt that the current Venezuelan government knows how to request immunity,” the Justice Department’s recent filing continued.

Prosecutors went on to claim that the Trump administration’s foreign policy views, coupled with the Venezuelan government not explicitly invoking immunity, should outweigh the defense’s assertion that the United Nations recognized Maduro’s presidency.

Hellerstein is scheduled to hear oral arguments on the pre-trial motions to dismiss on November 17 before issuing a ruling. If the trial goes forward, it will begin on June 1, 2027.

Caracas has not commented on the latest developments in Maduro and Flores’ legal case. In recent months, Venezuelan officials have occasionally expressed hope that the two will eventually return to the country but without demanding their immediate release.

Rodríguez made no mention of Maduro and Flores’ kidnapping and prosecution during her recent trip to New York for the 81st session of the UN General Assembly. In a July interview, she claimed that Maduro has the right to “demonstrate the truth” before the US Justice system but did not call for his liberation.

The Venezuelan government is covering the pair’s legal defense costs after the US Treasury Department lifted restrictions blocking it.

In his UN speech on September 22, Trump celebrated the military operation that led to the abduction of Maduro, whom he called an “outlaw dictator.” Trump and Rodríguez met on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, with the Venezuelan leader thanking the US president for supporting “Venezuela’s reinsertion into multilateral spaces.”

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Philadelphia, USA.

William Serafino is a political scientist with a master’s degree in history. His research and analysis have focused on geopolitics. In this interview, he discusses Venezuela’s current relationship with the United States, including a major oil deal and what Donald Trump and Delcy Rodríguez seek to gain from it.

In New York, Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez thanked Trump for his support and described their bilateral meeting as “historic.” Nearly nine months after the January 3 US bombing and kidnapping of President Maduro, how would you describe the current relationship between Caracas and Washington? Which elements are short-term Trump gimmicks, and which ones will structurally define the relationship in the future?

It is difficult to find a precise definition. Many speak of a protectorate-like condition; some even go so far as to describe it as a relationship of colonial or neocolonial subjugation. Others, however, define it as a process of political, economic, and energy normalization in which the Venezuelan acting government makes tactical concessions, but without formally compromising national sovereignty. I believe the devil is in the details, not in one-size-fits-all approaches. At the level of inter-state relations, what I observe is a strategic attachment of Venezuela to the US sphere of influence and an energy realignment that operates with significant geopolitical restrictions in what concerns relations with Russia, China, and Iran.

At the governmental level, an asymmetrical alliance (favorable to Trump) has been forged in the wake of the military defeat on January 3, from which Caracas and Washington derive immediate and existential gains: Trump cherishes the sole geopolitical achievement of his second term, and Rodríguez gains relief and fresh revenue to govern after more than a decade of suffocating sanctions, within a framework defined by US interests. This reality can hardly be classified as a protectorate, in which a foreign power takes control of diplomacy, defense, and other strategic elements of the subordinate state. Could one speak of a sui generis, or “soft,” protectorate? Perhaps, but that would be an acknowledgment that the concept is not entirely effective in explaining the situation. 

The same is true of the thesis of a “retreat with full sovereignty,” which is difficult to sustain when the US is clearly shaping the portrayal of the new national political dynamic and controlling the country’s oil revenues. That is why I have ventured –at the risk of being wrong –to speak of “joint governance” or “co-government,” in which Washington and Caracas divide areas of responsibility and share the political costs of each move so that the alliance endures and each party can, albeit unequally, reap its corresponding share of the benefits.

Trump, despite his constant demeaning tone, needs the Rodríguez administration to be strong enough to lead the country in order to get what he wants; only under such conditions can he extract the oil. And she, too, needs Trump to remain in power so that the oil agreement and other commitments can move forward in the medium term. This is the only way to stay in power and hope to gain legitimacy through performance. I believe that, described in this way, we are talking neither of classic colonialism nor of uncompromised sovereignty, but of something more unique that requires developing other analytical categories.

In your articles, you have pointed out that the US-Venezuela oil deal must be analyzed beyond the announced figures. What do you consider to be the true political and geopolitical scope of this agreement, and what benefits do the various actors seek to extract from it?

I see it more as a political arrangement than a formal agreement. Its function is not legal or institutional, but political. The announcement gave Trump narrative ammunition to promise that gas prices will drop, a necessity driven by his debacle in Iran. By not having signed anything, he avoids going through Congress, sends a message to his core electorate that he is guaranteeing the country’s energy security, and reassures energy corporations to go ahead and invest in Venezuela because the relationship with Caracas is solid and unshakable. Rodríguez, on the other hand, benefits from the fact that the agreement shuts the door on María Corina Machado in Washington’s power circles and thereby helps reestablish her domestic legitimacy, promising a secure path to economic and social recovery underpinned by US investment.

I would go as far as saying that the agreement is Rodríguez’s trump card in a potential presidential campaign, where she will be able to present herself as the only political actor capable of boosting the economy, as opposed to potential rivals who lack influence in the White House and do not have a reliable plan to pull the country out of the spiral of inflation and economic frustration in which it finds itself after years of sanctions. 

Both sides stand to gain politically, and the agreement appears to be designed to avoid institutional resistance: neither is forced to face the hassle of legislative approval nor the criticism from political opponents. Since there are no specific clauses, they can more easily divert attention and focus their message on the eventual economic benefits. This level of coordination is a sign of partnership, not of one-sided imposition. If that were the case, Trump could force Rodríguez to sign a bilateral treaty in the National Assembly, and that is not what we are seeing.

You have paid special attention to the role of the Pentagon and the involvement of its Office of Strategic Capital in the structure of the agreement. Why is it so significant that the US defense establishment is a formal actor in a Venezuelan oil deal?

It seems to me that the Pentagon’s involvement serves as a coercive cover—an insurance policy backed by force—to ensure, in the medium and long term, US commercial and financial advantages in the exploitation of the oil fields included in the agreement. Let us imagine that the current government, or another one in the future, wants to modify the arrangement and secure better terms. At that point, it would not be dealing with a conventional transnational corporation, but with one controlled by the Department of War. It doesn’t take much thought to realize that negotiating under such conditions would scare anyone off: the language of business would be replaced by the language of weapons, and after January 3, no one would want to venture into this murky territory.

Furthermore, I believe that the Pentagon’s involvement sends a message to companies to invest and feel secure in the knowledge that the Department of War guarantees their investments and capital commitments in the Venezuelan energy sector. For the US, Venezuela’s oil reserves are not being treated as an economic asset, but rather as a matter of “national security.” As we well know, when that term is used, any coercive tool is fair game against a country’s sovereignty.

You have argued that the relationship between Caracas and Washington is taking on the characteristics of a negotiation marked by a profound power asymmetry. And many official spokespeople or analysts ask, “But what alternative do we have?” whenever criticism is raised about the path the government has chosen. What real ability does Venezuela have today to negotiate different terms or reject certain demands from the United States?

Right now, those capabilities are very limited, because, as I said, it’s not just a matter of US impositions, but also of calculating how to obtain tangible benefits from an asymmetrical relationship. But politics also takes place outside institutional spaces, and I believe there is much to be done there. What I’m about to say won’t, I don’t think, resolve the dilemma you’ve raised, but it could be a path toward regaining political vitality and initiative: strengthening social consensus on national sovereignty, refusing to concede the battle for historical memory regarding a century-long history of US plunder, and fostering a broad discussion on the vision for the nation’s future. These steps could help break the inertia somewhat and prepare the country for more favorable political conditions in the near future. In contrast, suggesting specific policies or positions to the current government would be irresponsible, because I’m not the one who has to deal with a Trump and his violent ego.

My message is directed at all of us who do not hold such high-stakes positions and can contribute, from our own small spheres of influence or through our individual activism, to rebuilding a patriotic consciousness that must adapt to a new reality. How many open forums are being promoted to discuss the educational model, the economic model, and the model of income distribution? Which bodies are evaluating the trajectory of the bilateral relationship with the US in order to better address it? Are these discussions conceptually limited? Perhaps these debates will not change the current situation of Trump’s disproportionate influence, but they would give us autonomy in our vision and in shaping the future. If Venezuela does not have its own vision on major national issues, there is a risk that they will end up being imposed from Washington. That would be committing the perfect crime, and I believe we must avoid it: with national unity, transcending political divisions.

In your articles and social media posts, you have criticized political elites who, historically, have lacked “imagination” beyond offering lucrative deals to the US. How did Chávez manage to break that mold? How could Venezuela return to a more sovereign path?

To be fair, Chávez broke the mold but the political and geopolitical conditions were ripe for it. The weakness of the national elites, discredited by a society weary of inequality and injustice, coincided with the US being drunk on power at the end of the Cold War. In its plans to establish itself as a unipolar superpower, Latin America did not figure as the central battleground. The inattention of an empire more concerned with reshaping West Asia, forcing China into the “rules-based order,” and eliminating the last strongholds of the socialist bloc (Tito’s Yugoslavia) in turn allowed Chávez to implement his agenda without facing a full-scale war, although he did face numerous coup attempts. 

The present conditions are different. There is a hemispheric imperial retreat underpinned by a militarized reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, which drastically raises the cost of sovereignty-oriented proposals. Still, I believe that what is most commendable about Chávez, and which can be of use in this new context, is his ability to clearly identify favorable conditions and act upon them.

I believe that anyone who considers themselves a political figure must build upon these principles to take on the new challenges of the present, developing and defending a dignified vision of the nation’s future. I believe that, rather than waiting for another Chávez to emerge, we should instead study his thought in depth and draw on the best of it to renew political practices, always interpreting the situation for what it is: changing, volatile, and full of opportunities. Chávez is a great political school, but it has been reduced to a crude tool for private interests of all kinds.

Caracas, October 1, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuela joined the United States, Israel, and allies in shunning a high-level UN meeting commemorating the 25th anniversary of the Durban Declaration.

The event took place on Monday at the UN headquarters in New York to celebrate the landmark anti-colonial and anti-racist declaration and programme of action adopted at the Durban Conference in 2001.

“48 UN Member States refused to participate in the UN’s shameful High-Level Meeting commemorating the 25th anniversary of the notorious anti-Western, antisemitic Durban Conference,” US ambassador to the UN Mike Waltz wrote on X. “We thank all Member States who joined the United States in rejecting Durban’s poisonous legacy.”

Waltz posted the flags of the 48 countries that reportedly boycotted Monday’s event. Venezuela joined Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, and Paraguay, countries with US-aligned right-wing governments, as the only Latin American countries not to take part. All African and Caribbean countries participated with the exception of South Sudan.

Israel likewise lobbied countries not to attend the event, with ambassador Danny Danon insisting that “the UN must bury Durban’s toxic legacy.”

In his opening remarks at Monday’s meeting, UN Secretary-General António Guterres called the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action a “global blueprint for racial justice and equality.”

Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez told delegates present that “intolerance and supremacist ideologies” are on the rise in Global North countries.

“The wealthiest nations, which benefited from centuries of conquest, colonization, and the transatlantic slave trade, refuse to acknowledge their historical responsibilities,” he said. “Some even opposed this Assembly’s recognition of the slave trade as a crime against humanity, the gravest in history.”

The World Conference against Racism (WCAR), held in Durban, South Africa, from August 31 to September 8, 2001, aimed to establish global strategies against racism, xenophobia, and other forms of intolerance. The US, European countries, and Israel decried draft articles condemning colonialism and the slave trade, as well as declaring Zionism as a form of racism.

Though the language was watered down and non-committal on issues such as reparations, the US and Israeli delegations withdrew from the conference in protest against the final declaration’s references to Israel and proceeded to boycott subsequent gatherings held every five years.

The Venezuelan government did not comment on its decision to join Washington and Tel Aviv in opposing the latest anti-racist meeting. 

Former President Hugo Chávez strongly endorsed the original Durban conference and its final resolution. He was likewise a firm backer of Pan-African unity and the Palestinian cause, having severed ties with Israel in 2009 and fiercely denounced the US ally for genocide. His stance was maintained by his successor Nicolás Maduro, who endorsed South Africa’s activation of the Genocide Convention against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2024. Over their quarter century in power, both administrations also forged closer diplomatic and political-cultural ties with the African continent and approved landmark anti-racial discrimination legislation. 

Back at the 20th anniversary commemoration of the Durban Declaration in 2021, then-Venezuelan Foreign Minister Félix Plasencia stated that the text’s “principles and motivations remain more relevant than ever.” Plasencia was reappointed to the post by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez in July.

Rodríguez’s latest decision to diplomatically support Washington and Tel Aviv marks another significant milestone in Caracas’ foreign policy realignment since the January 3 US military strikes and kidnapping of Maduro.

Venezuela re-launched ties with Israel, first accepting a diplomatic and military mission in the wake of the June 24 double earthquake and later announcing further “technical cooperation” and the reestablishment of consular services.

Orthodox Rabbi Isaac Cohen stated in a September interview that Venezuela and Israel are going through a “dating period” that will lead to a “marriage” in the form of a full diplomatic normalization and reopening of embassies.

Caracas further engaged with Tel Aviv by accepting a reported medicine donation from Israel that was financed by Momentum Solutions, a logistics company run by prominent Zionist entrepreneurs Walter and Stephen Arbib.

Venezuelan Health Minister Carlos Alvarado received the donated supplies on Tuesday at the Tiferet synagogue in Caracas alongside Cohen and other representatives from the Venezuelan Jewish community.

Alvarado, who posed for pictures alongside the Israeli flag, claimed that the medicines would address needs in the country’s hospitals. He offered no details on the shipment’s contents.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Philadelphia, USA.

MIAMI — A former Miami congressman and longtime friend of U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio was sentenced Friday to 10 years in prison in connection with a secret $50 million lobbying campaign on Venezuela’s behalf during the first Trump administration.

Republican David Rivera has been jailed since jurors found him guilty in May on all counts, including failing to register as a foreign agent and conspiracy to commit money laundering as part of his work for former Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro ’s government.

Rivera, 61, appeared stone-faced as Judge Melissa Damian denounced him for betraying his life’s mission, saying he would surely have been judged harshly his many friends had the millions of dollars come from the Cuban regime instead of its allies in Caracas.

“Nobody would accept that’s ok and I don’t think this is different,” the judge said. “There’s no dispute this money came from the Maduro regime.”

The seven-week trial offered a rare glimpse into Miami’s role as a crossroads for foreign influence campaigns aimed at shaping U.S. policy toward Latin America, highlighting the city’s reputation as a magnet for both anti-communist crusaders and corruption among its sizable exile population.

It included testimony from President Trump’s secretary of state, Rep. Pete Sessions of Texas and a top Washington lobbyist — all of whom testified they felt betrayed when learning of Rivera’s mammoth consulting contract with a U.S.-based affiliate of Venezuela’s state oil company, PDVSA.

Attorneys for Rivera plan to appeal and in June applied for a presidential pardon. Rivera faces additional federal charges in Washington, D.C., in a related foreign lobbying case.

Prosecutors said betrayal featured coded figures — ‘Sombrero’ and ‘Miss Clairol’

In an indictment unsealed in 2022, prosecutors alleged that Rivera was tapped by then Foreign Minister Delcy Rodríguez — now Venezuela’s acting president — to work Republican connections to get the first Trump administration to abandon its hard line and crippling sanctions on Venezuela.

As part of the charm offensive, Rivera and a co-defendant, political consultant Esther Nuhfer, sought to manipulate influential friends, including Rubio and Sessions. Their goal was to normalize relations with the new Trump administration even as the Maduro government faced sanctions over serious accusations of human rights violations.

But Rivera and Nuhfer didn’t disclose their lobbying work as required, for fear it would have ended Rivera’s political career as an anti-communist stalwart, prosecutors argued at trial.

“The United States and the public were the true victims of this fraud,” Assistant U.S. Atty. Roger Cruz said in urging a stiff sentence. “He used his position of trust — and betrayed it consistently and repeatedly.”

To hide his work, prosecutors allege, Rivera also set up an encrypted chat group called MIA — for Miami — with his main conduit to the Maduro government: Venezuelan media tycoon Raúl Gorrín, who was subsequently charged in the U.S. with bribing top Venezuelan officials.

Members of the group used playful code words to discuss their activities: Maduro was the “bus driver,” Sessions “Sombrero,” Rodríguez “The Lady in Red,” and their windfall payments “La Luz,” Spanish for “The Light,” according to copies of text messages presented to the jury. Rubio was known as “Miss Clairol,” because rubio means blond in Spanish.

Defense said only missing paperwork made the $50 million contract illegal

At Friday’s sentencing, attorneys for Rivera repeated their trial argument that the former congressman believed he was under no requirement to disclose the work. The three-month, $50 million contract with Rivera’s one-man consulting firm, they said, was focused on luring oil giant ExxonMobil back to Venezuela — commercial work that is generally exempt from the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

“David Rivera does not deserve to die in prison because he failed to file a FARA registration,” defense attorney Ed Shohat said at Friday’s hearing. “If he had filed that paper, that form, everything he did, including the $50 million contract, which totally distorted this case, is perfectly legal.”

Wholly distinct from that consulting work, they say, were Rivera’s meetings with Rubio and Sessions, which were focused on ushering in leadership in Venezuela that would be less hostile to the U.S. – not supporting Maduro in normalizing relations with the U.S.

“There’s not one word in any chat, not one document, not one thing he did to help Nicolás Maduro,” said Shohat.

Prosecutors said Rivera used the contract with the affiliate, New York-based PDV USA, as cover for illegal lobbying.

“This is a classic money laundering case,” the judge said Friday in rejecting Rivera’s motion to lower the federal guidelines range.

Where did the money go? A luxury yacht, among other things

The partners tried to hide the work — backdating documents and coming up with sham agreements, like one to justify a wire transfer of $3.75 million to a South Florida company that maintained Gorrín’s luxury yacht, prosecutors said.

The political activity included setting up meetings for Rodríguez in New York, Caracas, Washington and Dallas. As part of the effort, Rivera roped in Sessions, who later tried to broker a meeting for Rodríguez with the ExxonMobil executive who took over as CEO when Rex Tillerson became Trump’s first-term secretary of state. After a secret meeting in Caracas with Maduro, Sessions also agreed to deliver a letter from the Venezuelan president to Trump.

The outreach quickly unraveled, however. Within six months of taking office, Trump sanctioned Maduro and labeled him a “dictator,” launching a “maximum pressure” campaign to unseat the president.

And now, nearly a decade later, Rodríguez has emerged as the second Trump administration’s trusted partner after the U.S. military’s ousting of Maduro.

Rubio’s former housemate faced scandal before, but Cuban Americans support him

Before being elected to Congress in 2010, Rivera was a high-ranking Florida legislator and shared a Tallahassee home with Rubio, who eventually became the Florida House speaker.

Rivera faced earlier controversy, including allegations that he secretly funded a Democratic spoiler candidate in a 2012 congressional race. Last year, federal prosecutors dropped that case after an appeals court threw out a sizable fine imposed by a lower court. Rivera was also investigated — but never charged — for alleged campaign finance violations and a $1 million contract with a gambling company while serving in the Florida Legislature.

Despite all that, Rivera remains popular among Miami’s Cuban American establishment.

Friends of the former congressman, including the former president of Florida International University and Miami-Dade County’s supervisor of elections, packed the courtroom to show their support.

Sessions, in a letter seeking leniency that was read into the record by his chief of staff, said his former congressional colleague devoted decades to public service, much of it focused on defending liberty and democracy.

“I don’t think it’s productive for society by sending David away for a long, long time,” testified Liliana Ros, a longtime Miami GOP committee member.

Goodman writes for the Associated Press.

Caracas, September 30, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan feminist organizations protested on Monday to mark International Safe Abortion Day and demand reforms to advance sexual and reproductive rights in the Caribbean nation.

Around 100 activists gathered in Plaza Venezuela, Caracas, to debate the conditions facing working-class women and urge responses from Venezuelan authorities.

“We are here to protest against the absence of inclusive public policies,” Jackeline López, spokesperson for the Clara Zetkin Women’s Movement, told press. “Abortion remains a taboo subject for Venezuelan authorities, whose response is to criminalize it.”

López went on to stress that unsafe abortions mostly plague Venezuelan working-class women.

“The current wages do not allow women access to family planning or contraceptive methods,” she continued. “The right to decide over our bodies is a key public healthcare issue, and leaving it unattended means criminalizing poor women.”

Comunes, Pan y Rosas, and Mujeres en Lucha were some of the other grassroots movements present at the protest. “We have to abort this patriarchal system” was one of the main chants in Monday’s rally. Feminist collectives also organized smaller rallies or public discussion forums in other parts of the country.

Venezuela has one of the most draconian abortion laws in Latin America, with termination of pregnancy only allowed if a doctor determines that the woman’s life is in danger. Women who perform abortions risk six-month to two-year sentences, while doctors who facilitate the procedure face up to three years in prison.

Though the country’s Penal Code was last updated in 2005, articles governing abortion were left unchanged from their original 1915 version.

In recent years, women’s rights organizations have engaged with Venezuelan institutions, including the National Assembly and the Supreme Court, proposing the opening of public debates on sexual and reproductive rights and initiatives to reform the criminal code. However, the projects have not gained traction.

María Alejandra Reyes, an activist from Faldas-R, told Venezuelanalysis that support networks and sources of information for women in need of abortions have “grown organically” in Venezuela despite a lack of institutional progress.

The activist highlighted findings from Faldas-R’s safe abortion hotline, including that more than 50 percent of women who seek information had used some kind of contraceptive method. “This underscores that we are dealing with a public healthcare issue, not just a matter of women being ‘careless’,” she said.

“Also, nearly 40 percent of the women who reach out to us already have kids,” she added. “So they are conscious of what motherhood implies and their decision is driven mostly by the present conditions in Venezuela.”

Reyes warned that the growing influence of conservative religious groups, especially evangelical churches, stands as an obstacle to women’s rights, as well as the country’s “political instability.”

“Women’s rights are never seen as a priority because there is always something urgent going on, whether it’s a [US] economic blockade, or military strikes, or something else,” she explained. “However, we are talking about basic rights for half of the population.”

In recent years, the Venezuelan government, under President Nicolás Maduro and Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, forged close ties with Venezuelan evangelical groups, granting them a public holiday and funding programs. In March, Rodríguez administration officials additionally hosted high-profile international pentecostal pastors, including Trump ally Ramiro Peña.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Philadelphia, USA.

Wilber Rafael Garces Perez has disputed the government’s account of what led to his shooting during a Doordash delivery in Austin, Texas.

A Venezuelan asylum seeker who was shot in the back by a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officer in Texas is facing a federal assault charge, after prosecutors accused him of striking the officer with his car’s side-view mirror.

Wilber Rafael Garces Perez, 28, appeared in federal court in Austin on Tuesday, where he was charged with assaulting, resisting and impeding a federal officer. He could face up to 20 years in prison if convicted.

The charge stems from a September 20 encounter that began while Garces Perez was making a DoorDash food delivery near a shopping centre in Austin, the Texas state capital.

A federal complaint filed on Monday says immigration officers noticed that Garces Perez’s car had its emergency lights flashing, and they ran a database check. They found it was registered to Garces Perez, who was subject to a final order of removal from the US.

When the officers approached, Garces Perez handed over his driver’s license through a partially opened window but did not get out of the car, the complaint says. He asked the officers to wait until his wife could arrive to retrieve the vehicle.

Court documents describe the exchange up to that point as “pleasant and not aggressive”.

About a minute later, however, court documents say Garces Perez “abruptly” closed his window and drove off, striking one of the officers in the torso with his driver’s side mirror.

That officer chased Garces Perez in his own vehicle and caught up with him a short time later. In the complaint, the officer alleges that Garces Perez then tried to drive into him, prompting him to open fire.

There is no publicly available footage showing the events described in the complaint, including the shooting.

Videos, however, have circulated online showing the shooting’s aftermath, with Garces Perez injured in his car.

The complaint relies on unreleased body-camera footage from one of the two ICE officers who stopped Garces Perez.

The second officer was not wearing a body camera, according to the affidavit. That officer says he was struck by Garces Perez’s side mirror and later shot him.

Garces Perez, however, gave federal investigators a different account of the moments immediately before he was shot.

He told investigators that, after a brief chase, a law enforcement SUV struck his car, causing it to spin around, according to the affidavit. He said the officer then opened fire, shooting him in the back.

Garces Perez has been held in a detention facility in south Texas since the shooting.

His lawyer, Kate Lincoln-Goldfinch, said on Sunday the bullet was still lodged in his body and that he has a fractured clavicle. In a social media post, Lincoln-Goldfinch explained that his supporters were worried he could develop sepsis or suffer permanent damage if he didn’t undergo surgery soon.

The Department of Homeland Security has argued, however, that Garces Perez is receiving adequate medical care.

Garces Perez’s legal team is also seeking to stop his removal from the US.

The Venezuelan national entered the US in 2024 through CBP One, an online programme expanded under former President Joe Biden to allow asylum seekers to make appointments with immigration authorities at the US-Mexico border.

Trump ended the programme on his first day back in office, accusing the app of contributing to an immigration crisis in the US. His administration has since relaunched CBP One as CBP Home, a self-deportation portal.

Lincoln-Goldfinch has said Garces Perez was legally seeking asylum in the US and had a valid work permit. She has asserted that he was ordered to be deported after missing an immigration court hearing because the notice had been sent to an old address.

Garces Perez is due back before a federal immigration judge on Wednesday for a separate hearing on whether he can remain in the country.

The case comes amid a surge in immigration enforcement during Trump’s second term, with ICE reporting more than 50,000 arrests in both July and August.

Nobel laureate Maria Corina Machado has been living in exile, with plans to return to Venezuela spoiled multiple times.

Hundreds of supporters of Venezuela’s opposition leader Maria Corina Machado have taken to the streets to demand her safe return and presidential elections that could lead to a democratic transition in the country.

In Caracas, hundreds of activists in sky blue shirts – the colour of Machado’s Vente Venezuela party – rode motorcycles through the capital’s main avenues on Sunday, honking their horns and waving Venezuelan flags. Similar demonstrations were held in state capitals, including Valencia, Maracaibo and Merida.

“This is not a matter of parties or politics,” said Flavio Valentini, a Vente Venezuela activist in Caracas who grabbed a megaphone and addressed the crowd. “This is a movement for the people and by the people.”

Machado has been living in exile for the past nine months and has had plans to return to Venezuela spoiled multiple times. Opposition activists have accused Venezuela’s government of blocking her return, a claim the authorities deny. Machado’s party said that on Monday night, the opposition leader made three unsuccessful attempts to return.

“We hope this transition process leads us to presidential elections and consolidates a free, democratic country that will be the main ally of the United States,” said Anthony Romero, a leader for Vente Venezuela, in the nation’s capital.

The government has been widely accused of stealing elections, jailing dissidents and stifling freedom of speech. But late last week, Venezuela released more than three dozen political prisoners following a second round of talks backed by the US between the interim government and the opposition.

Machado, one of Venezuela’s most popular political leaders, was barred from running in Venezuela’s last presidential election by courts under the control of former President Nicolas Maduro. But her stand-in candidate is widely believed to have won the election with almost two-thirds of the vote.

Maduro claimed victory nevertheless and unleashed a violent crackdown against dissidents who protested the official results, forcing Machado and dozens of opposition leaders to go into hiding. Machado smuggled herself out of Venezuela last year after she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for her efforts to restore democracy in the country.

US special forces abducted Maduro from his Caracas home in January, but Machado has been unable to return to Venezuela since then.

The government is now led by Delcy Rodriguez, a Maduro ally who has opened Venezuela’s oil industry to foreign investment and is working closely with the administration of US President Donald Trump.

Rodriguez told the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on Wednesday that Venezuela would hold elections as part of a transition to “full democracy”, but did not give a date for the vote.

VENEZUELA FURY may have crashed out of the running in I’m A Celebrity . . . The Wild Frontier, but boxing champ TYSON’s teen daughter is still sitting pretty.

I can reveal the young entrepreneur aims to launch her own make-up and skincare line.

Plans are afoot for a firm called No Tomorrow, and ­Venezuela hopes to unveil the range next year as she makes the most of her growing ­profile.

She also has brilliant ­inspiration in her corner – her aunt Molly-Mae Hague.

Molly, who is engaged to Venezuela’s uncle Tommy, is now worth an estimated £20million thanks to years of hard graft in the fashion and beauty industries.

A source said: “Venezuela has just turned 17 so it’s a huge achievement to be launching her own business and she’s so excited.

“She has a top team behind her but the ideas are all hers.

“She wants to make her family proud.

“Having Molly-Mae and obviously her mum Paris as inspiration is a huge boost too.”

While details are still being worked out, it is likely that the No ­Tomorrow x Venezuela Fury range will include everything from make-up and skincare to fake tan and false eyelashes.

Venezuela celebrated her ­birthday yesterday while on ­holiday with husband Noah Price.

She earned the break after ­having a rough time ­filming Ant & Dec’s I’m A Celeb spin-off in the Canadian wilderness.

Venezuela and Noah, who ­married in May, quit just 72 hours into filming after she became unwell and started vomiting.

Viewers will be able to tune in to the new reality show when it airs next spring.

But we’ll be hearing a whole lot more from ­Venezuela before then, I’m sure.

Caracas, September 25, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) –  Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez outlined a foreign policy built on “peace” and “dialogue” in her address at the 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York on Wednesday.

Speaking before world leaders, Rodríguez insisted on peace over conflict, thanked the Trump administration for diplomatic backing, and committed to international cooperation on environmental, energy, and AI regulation. She went on to urge young Venezuelan migrants to return home and laid out a proposal for structural “democratic transformation” of the Caribbean nation. 

Opening her address, Rodríguez underscored Caracas’ rejection of warfare, linking global stability to diplomatic resolution. 

“Venezuela, which today knows what it is to lift its children out from under the rubble, extends its deepest solidarity to all peoples who suffer from war, and reaffirms that peace […] is not a naive aspiration, but the only truly human path,” she declared.

Rodríguez explicitly addressed the diplomatic rapprochement with Washington after the January 3 US military strikes and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores. She expressed thanked Trump for aiding Venezuela’s reintegration into international forums following years of heavy economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation.

“I want to thank President Donald Trump and his government for their willingness to resume the path of diplomatic and cooperative relations with Venezuela,” Rodríguez stated, referencing the recent oil deal as “one of the largest ever signed” and pledging that it will contribute to regional energy stability.

Rodríguez refrained from condemning the US attack, calling it a “difficult moment” that resulted from the “exhaustion of domestic policies and heightened confrontation with the US.” She likewise made no mention of Maduro and Flores, presently detained 10-15 miles away from the UN headquarters and facing trial for charges including drug trafficking conspiracy.

The Venezuelan acting president had conveyed similar gratitude in a face-to-face meeting with Trump on Tuesday that she labeled as “historic.”

Turning to domestic affairs in her UN address, Rodríguez spoke of the severe wave of migration triggered by past political and economic crises, and vowed to the Venezuelan youth residing abroad that there will be improved conditions for their return.

“To the young people, who have grown up seeing a fractured country and who often decided to leave seeking what they could not find here: I tell you that it is worth believing again,” the acting leader affirmed. “This is the moment to build the country that many want to return to, and not just the one that many wanted to flee.”

This message was framed as part of what Rodríguez termed a “democratic transformation for a rebirth,” which she described as an institutional, orderly, and verifiable process.

“In Venezuela, there will be elections. We have already initiated a political dialogue with sectors of the opposition that leads to a process on equal terms for all,” she noted.

Though Rodríguez did not explicitly name unilateral sanctions from Washington and its allies, she stated that the country needs to be “free from economic restrictions” and pledged to “guide Venezuela toward an era of full democracy, recognized by its people and the world.”

The acting president’s UN speech came amid a flurry of diplomatic activity in New York, including meetings with International Monetary Fund (IMF) Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva, World Bank President Ajay Banga, and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) President Ilan Goldfajn.

On the sidelines of the UN assembly, Rodríguez also held bilateral meetings with Chilean far-right president José Antonio Kast to discuss regional trade and stability, as well as with a delegation from Trinidad and Tobago, led by Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar, initiating a “new stage in bilateral relations” centered on joint offshore natural gas exploration and maritime security.

Venezuela had suspended cooperation with neighboring Port of Spain after Persad-Bissessar backed the US’ military build-up on the country’s shores in late 2025.

Rodríguez’s New York trip coincided with a second round of US-backed talks between government negotiators led by National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez and a sector of the opposition led by former deputy Dinorah Figuera.

The latest negotiations reportedly focused on electoral guarantees, freedom of expression, institutional reform, including renewing the Supreme Court, and efforts to secure the unfreezing of Venezuelan assets abroad, including gold reserves worth approximately US $4 billion. The gold held by the Bank of England is set to be transferred to the US, to be released for post-earthquake recovery efforts under White House oversight.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Lisbon, Portugal.

Venezuela’s interim President Delcy Rodriguez took to the stage yesterday at the United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York City to deliver a rather bland speech, in which she thanked United States President Donald Trump for resuming “diplomatic relations and cooperation” with Venezuela.

This was a different vibe, to be sure, than the one she opted for at the same venue in September 2019, when, as vice president under Nicolas Maduro, she accused the US of perpetrating “economic terrorism” that did not require the use of bombs “but rather through banks and insurance companies”.

Denouncing the global superpower’s militarisation of international relations and punishment of millions of innocent people “in order to apply regime change doctrines and steal other nations’ resources”, the Rodriguez of 2019 went on to cite Venezuelan economic losses to the tune of $130bn between 2015 and 2018 alone on account of US sanctions.

She additionally offered her opinion that the domination of the US political system by “plutocratic minorities” made the country unqualified to impose its model on other countries.

Seven years later, US plutocracy is going strong with Trump at the helm – the same Trump alongside whom a grinning Rodriguez appeared in a photograph taken in New York on Tuesday, less than nine months after he oversaw regime change in Venezuela by kidnapping Maduro.

The kidnapped president is now also in New York, albeit in jail, and is scheduled to stand trial in June 2027. This despite his attempts to remind everyone that, as a sitting head of state, his prosecution in a foreign court contravenes international law.

Then again, abducting other countries’ presidents is also pretty glaringly illegal. But Trump has made it clear that he alone is in charge of deciding what is and is not permissible on any given day.

The abduction took place on January 3, when the US military launched air attacks on Venezuela, killing some 100 people and whisking Maduro and his wife away.

He is accused of an array of misdeeds, including being the leader of the “Cartel of the Suns” – which, mind you, does not actually exist – and engaging in “conspiracy to possess machineguns and destructive devices”.

This is quite the accusation coming from the country that just used all manner of destructive devices to bomb Venezuela and kill a bunch of people.

Anyway, bald-faced hypocrisy is nothing new in the land of the “plutocratic minorities”.

Now, the waning corporate media interest in Maduro’s fate amounts to another coup for US impunity, as folks go about more or less forgetting that there is a foreign head of state sitting in a Brooklyn prison.

But Maduro’s disappearance works out well for Rodriguez, as she goes about enabling the very theft of resources she once decried.

Rodriguez took the stage at the UN the day after Trump, who used the platform to pat himself on the back for the trampling of Venezuelan sovereignty that conveniently culminated in last month’s announcement from the White House of the “biggest oil deal in world history”, securing US majority control of more than 65 billion barrels of Venezuela’s proven oil reserves.

Speaking to his international audience, Trump boasted: “To the victor belong the spoils. You’ve all heard that.”

Never mind that you’re not technically supposed to admit that you attacked a country just to get its oil. (You’re also not, in polite company, supposed to threaten to annihilate Iran – another of Trump’s UN talking points.)

Since January, the US has lifted many coercive economic measures against Venezuela (including against Rodriguez herself), easing the brutal sanctions regime that as of 2020 was estimated to have already killed 100,000 Venezuelans, according to former UN independent expert Alfred-Maurice de Zayas.

But trading sanctions for de facto colonialism isn’t a great deal, either.

Meanwhile, Trump’s continued manic bombing of vessels in the Caribbean and Pacific, which a recent UN report warned may constitute crimes against humanity, suggests the US is nowhere near to kicking its old habit of terrorism – and is all the more reason that Rodriguez might have refrained from thanking the US leader for his “cooperation”.

As Gregory Wilpert, founder of the Venezuelanalysis website and author of Changing Venezuela by Taking Power, diplomatically put it to me: “One cannot help but wonder whether Delcy Rodriguez is over-complying with Trump in some aspects of her negotiations with him.”

Noting that Rodriguez is “in a highly vulnerable position”, Wilpert ran through a few of the options she faces, such as “the possibility that the Trump administration could treat her as it treated Maduro – by attempting to kidnap her – or as it treated Iran, by targeting the country’s highest levels of government”.

Or, Wilpert said, there is always the Cuba approach, which would entail “the kind of economic siege” that is undertaken “with the aim of starving an entire country”.

In her UN address, Rodriguez promised that Venezuela would hold elections at some unspecified point in time – not that the US, for its part, really cares about democracy as long as the right people are in power.

And although it’s still too early to tell, Rodriguez might just be one of those people.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Until now, Trump has acted in Venezuela with no congressional involvement. The administration decided to work in tandem with Delcy Rodríguez, secure the oil, and run a negotiation between the old remnants of an opposition-controlled National Assembly and the regime. This framework won’t be renegotiated if the Democrats win the House of Representatives on November 3, a goal they will likely achieve. But a new Congress can exert real legislative pressure to potentially change how it moves forward.

What the Democrats have done since Maduro’s ousting

Since January, the Dems’ first efforts were two resolutions, sponsored by Tim Kaine in the Senate and Jim McGovern in the House, about war powers and who may authorize force, not about what the Venezuelan process should become. Both were supported by a few Republican leaders and failed to pass.

On February 25, Rep. Jared Moskowitz introduced the Venezuela Democratic Transition Strategy Act. It required the Secretary of State to deliver a strategy within 180 days, covering the release of political prisoners, foreign influence and assistance, followed by annual reports. Democrat Jeanne Shaheen and Republican Ted Cruz also introduced a bipartisan resolution in the Senate regarding the transition in Venezuela.

None of Trump’s numerous executive actions have required a vote, ratification, or budget allocation in the Capitol. 

The initiatives by Democratic lawmakers have not aimed to reverse what happened on January 3rd, because the US cannot backtrack from the military incursion which meant, at least, Nicolás Maduro’s removal from power. What they are seeking, however, is the establishment of a plan that will lead to free elections and, in the long term, a genuine democratic transition. What is the Democrats’ position? They have maintained a stance of recognizing Edmundo González as president-elect and María Corina Machado as the leader of the opposition.

Besides, the impact of ICE and Border Patrol going after the Venezuelan community in the US has been repeatedly underlined by voices such as Rep. Debbie Wasserman-Schultz and Rep. Darren Soto, who filed a discharge petition on March 19^th to force a vote on the Venezuela TPS Act.

What won’t change?

The broader US policy.

The oil agreement allegedly signed by the Trump administration, the company Nabep, and the Rodríguez regime is a 25-year project across 17 fields. That deal will not be undone by letters or congressional hearings. Not even Democrats attacking Trump’s dealings with Rodríguez have offered legislation to end them so far. A Democratic House will not be able to reinstate TPS without the Senate and a presidential signature.

The administration has shown it can take action on Venezuela without congressional involvement. That’s what it did with the military incursion on January 3rd, the deportations after invoking the Alien Enemies Act, the termination of TPS and the humanitarian parole, the formal recognition of Delcy Rodríguez as interim president, the lifting of sanctions on Delcy and sectors of the economy, the opening of the Venezuelan market to US companies, the removal of Venezuela from the list of countries that have failed to cooperate in combating drug trafficking, and the informal meeting with Rodríguez in New York. None of those executive actions required a vote, ratification, or budget allocation in the Capitol. 

The only formal check Congress has is the War Powers Resolution, which has already failed twice, and Trump has promised to veto it if it ever reaches his desk. Should he do so, even with a Democratic majority in Congress, at least two-thirds of the vote is required to override a presidential veto. That threshold remains very difficult to reach. 

Oversight already began

The clearest preview of what the midterm election can change came this month. Reps. Robert Garcia, Gregory Meeks and Jared Huffman, the ranking Democrats on Oversight, Foreign Affairs and Natural Resources, wrote to Secretary Rubio and Attorney General Blanche regarding the oil deal. They question why Alejandro Betancourt, who has faced investigations into alleged PDVSA money laundering, is treated as a business partner. They also say the administration has given Congress scarce details on the management of at least $13 billion in Venezuelan oil revenues.

The only thing that might change with a majority in Congress is the ability to obtain information, because those who are currently in the minority on the committees would become their chairs.

This issue is important if we expect a shift in the Legislative Oversight Committee on Venezuela. García has been the leading Democratic representative in the Oversight Committee since June 2025 and is well-positioned to chair the committee and exercise subpoena power if the Democrats win in November. Although his plans do not explicitly mention Venezuela as a priority, nor does the issue appear on the legislative agenda of Hakeem Jeffries (House Minority Leader), the agreements being negotiated and signed with Venezuela, as well as the management of oil resources, could fit perfectly with the demand for accountability and transparency that are indeed part of his priorities.

What’s happening in Florida?

We can’t talk about what we expect in November without discussing what’s happening in Florida. Although the Venezuelan vote isn’t decisive for the state, the Latino vote does carry significant weight and, in this case, naturalized US citizens or their descendants will consider immigration policies, as well as their economic impact, and abuses by ICE when they cast their vote.

The changes to electoral maps pushed by Republicans could have unexpected consequences. Moskowitz is seeking reelection and is in a competitive but winnable race. Wasserman-Schultz is in a better position in CD 20. Meanwhile, Angie Nixon, the Democratic Senate candidate, has been outspoken in her criticism of Trump’s immigration policies, demanding an end to deportations and the reinstatement of TPS.

If we want to see results regarding Venezuela that benefit Venezuelans, we have to look at the situation from an American perspective.

On the other side of the aisle, Maria Elvira Salazar’s recent announcement came as a surprise to many this week. In it, the Republican congresswoman tells Trump that his immigration control measures have gone “too far,” noting that half of the people detained by ICE in July had no criminal record. In June, she urged Trump to halt deportations to Venezuela following the earthquakes. Her actions appear to be driven more by the latest polls than by a commitment to defending immigrants’ rights.

How could a Democratic majority help the Venezuelan people?

To be honest, the only thing that might change with a majority in Congress is the ability to obtain information, because those who are currently in the minority on the committees would become their chairs. “Who negotiated the agreement? Where will the revenue go? What is the strategy behind the negotiation?” These are some of the questions that might carry more weight in the Oversight Committee or the Foreign Affairs Committee if they were headed by a Democrat rather than someone from the ruling party.

Venezuela is neither the center of the world nor a priority for the Democratic Party. One might think that it would be “easier” for chavismo to deal with the Democrats. If we want to see results regarding Venezuela that benefit Venezuelans, we have to look at the situation from an American perspective. The military intervention by the US has already happened, and if the US controls much of Venezuelan politics, that isn’t going to change because of a shift in Congress.

Americans don’t necessarily care about Venezuela’s specific situation, but they do care that the president doesn’t have “superpowers.” In my opinion, this makes it possible for Democrats to use the Venezuela issue as a mechanism for congressional oversight and to seek alliances with non-“MAGA” Republicans to place limits on Trump.

US-led anti-cartel alliance backs sanctions against crime groups after Trump urges stronger action.

United States President Donald Trump has pledged to use “unmatched military might” against drug cartels in the Western Hemisphere during a meeting of the Washington-led Shield of the Americas coalition in New York City.

In a meeting with leaders and foreign ministers from the anti-cartel alliance, Trump on Tuesday urged member countries to join the US in targeting 24 criminal organisations, which he earlier described as the “ISIS of the Western Hemisphere”.

He said he was asking “all nations in the Shield of the Americas to formally designate narco-terrorists as common threats to stability and apply crushing sanctions” against all of the groups. The meeting took place on the sidelines of the annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York City.

The coalition’s 15 governments later issued a joint statement saying they intended to impose asset freezes and visa restrictions on members and supporters of the groups and to pursue criminal charges against them.

At the top of the list are two groups that have been declared “terrorist” organisations by Washington: Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) – one of Central America’s most powerful criminal gangs – and Tren de Aragua, a Venezuelan gang that is also active in Colombia, Peru and Chile.

The list also includes major Mexican cartels, Colombian armed groups such as the National Liberation Army, Brazil’s Primeiro Comando da Capital and Comando Vermelho groups, and Peru’s Shining Path.

Al Jazeera’s Alessandro Rampietti, reporting from Bogota, Colombia, said the statement was largely symbolic for now, because each country must follow its own legal procedures.

“For example, here in Colombia, it will require a law to pass in Congress. We understand that the government here has asked Congress to move forward in drafting such a law. So while the consequences may not be immediate, this is clearly an important step towards building what the US has been trying to do in Latin America [through] this alliance,” he added.

The coalition is made up of governments closely aligned with Trump, including Argentina, Ecuador and El Salvador, whose leaders he has praised or endorsed. Colombia and Peru joined after Trump-aligned presidents took office in recent months.

Brazil and Mexico have not joined.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who also attended, praised “the emergence of strong leaders who are committed to the challenge of taking on transnational terrorism”.

The gathering was the administration’s latest effort to rally the region behind a more aggressive approach to drug trafficking. Since returning to office last year, Trump has designated cartels as foreign terrorist organisations and ordered dozens of strikes on boats in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific that US officials say were carrying narcotics bound for the US.

The strikes have killed more than 223 people, and UN experts say they violate international law and could amount to crimes against humanity.

The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy, released late last year, laid out plans for a revamped Monroe Doctrine, the 19th-century policy asserting US primacy in the hemisphere that critics associate with decades of US intervention.

Trump has also spoken of retaking the Panama Canal and annexing Greenland and Canada. On Tuesday, he signed an agreement on Greenland that stopped short of his demand that the island become US territory.

The focus on the hemisphere has raised concerns across the region.

Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, in his UN speech, bristled ⁠at the approach, warning countries in Latin America and the Caribbean of “renewed hegemonic temptations”.

“Brazil is nobody’s back yard,” Lula said.

Caracas, September 21, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) –  Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez hosted Paraguayan counterpart Santiago Peña at the Miraflores Presidential Palace in Caracas on Saturday as the two South American nations relaunch bilateral diplomatic and consular relations.

The high-level working meeting reportedly focused on establishing a shared agenda centered on trade expansion, energy cooperation, consular assistance, and joint efforts to combat transnational organized crime.

The summit concluded with a joint statement announcing the renewed bilateral relations, signed by foreign ministers Félix Plasencia and Rubén Ramírez Lezcano for Venezuela and Paraguay, respectively.

Following the signing ceremony, Rodríguez and Peña expressed optimism regarding the reestablished cooperation.

“We are working together for a more integrated Paraguay,” Peña declared in a press conference, emphasizing that the dialogue was focused on “the well-being of citizens” from both countries.

For her part, Rodríguez claimed the accord did justice to principles of sovereignty, dialogue, and South American integration in Venezuela’s foreign policy.

“Venezuela continues to advance a sovereign diplomacy of peace, rooted in mutual respect, self-determination, and constructive dialogue among our nations,” she stated. “This meeting opens a new stage of cooperation aimed at addressing shared challenges and serving the concrete interests of both our peoples.”

The Caracas meeting reversed years of political friction and diplomatic tensions between the two nations. Bilateral ties were initially severed in January 2019 under former Paraguayan President Mario Abdo Benítez, who aligned Asunción with Washington’s regime-change strategy by recognizing opposition figure Juan Guaidó’s self-proclaimed “interim government.”

Relations experienced a brief thaw in late 2023 under Peña’s incoming administration before breaking down again in January 2025. The Venezuelan government formally severed diplomatic channels after Peña supported far-right opposition candidate Edmundo González’s victory claim in the July 2024 Venezuelan presidential elections. The Paraguayan president further backed Venezuelan anti-government forces by attending María Corina Machado’s Nobel Peace Prize ceremony in December 2025.

A central point on the reopened diplomatic agenda was the resolution of a long-standing debt owed by Paraguayan state oil company Petróleos Paraguayos (Petropar) to Venezuela’s state energy company, Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA).

The financial dispute stems from fuel shipments received by Petropar under the 2004 Caracas Energy Accord, an energy integration initiative launched under President Hugo Chávez to provide favorable financing conditions for oil imports across Latin America and the Caribbean. Paraguay currently maintains an outstanding principal debt estimated at approximately US $300 million.

Addressing the issue ahead of the summit, Paraguayan Foreign Minister Rubén Ramírez Lezcano acknowledged the core obligation but highlighted technical disagreements regarding accumulated interest calculations.

“The differential of that debt is linked to interest that applies outside the commercial agreement that exists with that country,” Ramírez explained during a press conference last week, noting that the specific arbitration over interest rates remains before the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris.

The resolution of the debt has been paralyzed for years primarily due to the severing of diplomatic ties, compounded by unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States against PDVSA.

With diplomatic channels now reopened, both governments signaled their intention to structure a viable settlement mechanism outside of imperial financial restrictions.

Since the January 3 US military strikes and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro, the acting Rodríguez government has aligned its foreign policy with Washington, mending or expanding ties with US partners in Latin America and beyond while scaling back support for long-term allies such as Cuba and Iran.

Following Saturday’s summit in Caracas, Acting President Rodríguez departed Venezuela for New York City, where she will attend the 81st Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) this week.

According to Reuters, Rodríguez is slated to hold discussions on energy and mining agreements, as well as Venezuela’s ongoing debt restructuring process. 

On Monday, the Venezuelan acting president met with IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva, though no details of the talks were disclosed. Caracas has sought to unblock around $4.5 billion in IMF-issued Special Drawing Rights (SDR) for recovery efforts following the June 24 double earthquake.

Likewise on Monday, Rodríguez held talks with World Bank President Ajay Banga.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Lisbon, Portugal.

Lisbon, Portugal, September 17, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Continental Resources, a firm owned by billionaire and Trump donor Harold Hamm, struck a deal on Wednesday to exploit one of Venezuela’s largest oilfields.

Under the agreement with Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA, Continental will receive a long-term concession with “100 percent working interest” for the 500 square-kilometer Ayacucho 2 block in Venezuela’s Orinoco Oil Belt. The block contains an estimated 30 billion barrels of extra-heavy crude.

“Continental was built to recognize great resource opportunities and have the conviction to pursue them,” Hamm told Fox News, vowing that the deal would take his company to an “entirely new level.”

For her part, Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez claimed that the agreement would “strengthen [Venezuelan] oil production” and “create opportunities for economic growth.”

Hamm and PDVSA Vice President Jovanny Martinez signed the contract in Houston on the sidelines of the G20 energy summit. Martínez and Oil Minister Paula Henao attended the conference to pitch investment opportunities in Venezuela’s oil and gas sector.

PDVSA had previously assigned the Ayacucho 2 block to Chinese private firm Anhui Guangda in 2025. However, no information on investments or output were publicly disclosed, while Venezuelan authorities have not justified rescinding the contract with Anhui.

US government-controlled corporation NABEP, which recently received long-term concessions to 17 major Venezuelan oilfields containing 65 billion barrels in reserves, will also take over projects formerly run by Chinese enterprises, including state-owned CNPC. Beijing has called for its investments and interests in Venezuela to be respected.

Hamm was one of the corporate executives present at the White House on January 9, when Trump announced that Washington would control Venezuela’s oil industry and called on Western majors to invest. Since the January 3 US attacks and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro, the White House has managed the South American country’s crude export revenues.

The White House has also backed Venezuelan authorities’ pro-business overhaul of the energy sector while issuing sanctions exemptions to select US-aligned corporations. Chevron, Shell, and Eni are among the companies that have signed new contracts or renegotiated existing ones in recent months.

According to Bloomberg, ExxonMobil is in advanced talks to return to the Caribbean country after a litigious past. The energy giant is negotiating rights to four major oilfields in the Orinoco Oil Belt, two of which it previously owned before they were nationalized by former President Hugo Chávez.

In the 2000s, the Texas-based corporation refused to comply with reforms implemented to assert state sovereignty over the oil industry. ExxonMobil refused compensation offers and pursued international arbitration after its assets were nationalized. The company received an arbitration award significantly below its demands. 

ExxonMobil was additionally denounced repeatedly by Caracas after it spearheaded offshore drilling projects in the territorial waters of the disputed Essequibo Strip.

On Wednesday, Venezuelan authorities likewise inked a 20-year agreement with Florida-based Denarius Holding Group, controlled by Turkish energy group Çan2 Termik. Denarius is taking over the Petrokariña project in Anzoátegui state, which contains 10 oilfields producing a variety of crude types.

Heeney Capital receives gold mine concession

In parallel to its oil opening, Venezuelan authorities have also fast-tracked reforms opening the country’s mining sector to multinational corporations.

On Wednesday, New York-based Heeney Capital and commodities trader Mercuria Energy received a 30-year concession to operate the Chocó 10 mine in Bolívar State. The project holds considerable gold deposits and was run by Rusoro Mining in the 2000s before being nationalized by the Chávez government.

Heeney and Mercuria pledged US $1 billion in initial investment in the Chocó project. The two firms had struck a previous agreement with Caracas to purchase and trade Venezuelan minerals and other commodities.

One of Heeney’s co-founders, Sean Pi, signed the deal at the presidential palace in May and praised Trump’s “leadership” in defending US access to mining resources abroad. Pi has endorsed legislative initiatives deregulating and streamlining mining projects to bolster the US supply of critical minerals.

Under the trading agreement, Heeney and Mercuria are reportedly preparing to ship 15,000 metric tons of Venezuelan aluminum to the US. The corporate partners are likewise seeking to take over VENALUM, Venezuela’s biggest aluminum smelter. Glencore, an Anglo-Swiss mining and trading multinational, is also interested in VENALUM, according to reports.

Venezuelan authorities have not commented on the negotiations for the aluminum smelter. In April, Rodríguez appointed a commission to evaluate privatization of “non-strategic” state assets.

The Trump administration has identified securing access to Venezuelan mineral riches as a key national interest and is reportedly preparing an executive order to boost US corporate participation in Venezuelan mining projects.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Philadelphia, USA.