Venezuela

MIAMI — A former Miami congressman and longtime friend of U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio was convicted Friday in connection with a secret $50-million lobbying campaign on behalf of Venezuela during the first Trump administration.

Jurors found Republican David Rivera and an associate, Esther Nuhfer, guilty on all counts, including failing to register as a foreign agent with the Justice Department and conspiracy to commit money laundering as part of their work for former President Nicolás Maduro’s government.

The seven-week trial offered a rare glimpse into Miami’s role as a crossroads for foreign influence campaigns aimed at shaping U.S. policy toward Latin America, one highlighting the city’s reputation as a magnet for corruption and anti-Communist crusaders among its sizable exile population.

It included testimony from Rubio, Texas Congressman Pete Sessions and a top Washington lobbyist — all of whom testified that they were shocked to learn belatedly of Rivera’s consulting contract with a U.S.-based affiliate of Venezuela’s state oil company, PDVSA.

In an 11-count indictment unsealed in 2022, prosecutors alleged that Rivera was tapped by then Foreign Minister Delcy Rodríguez — now Venezuela’s acting president — to work Republican connections from Rivera’s time in Congress to get the first Trump administration to abandon its hard-line stance and ease crippling sanctions on Venezuela.

As part of the charm offensive, prosecutors alleged, Rivera and Nuhfer, a political consultant, manipulated influential friends, including Rubio and Sessions, like “pawns on a chess board.” The goal: to try to normalize relations with the new Trump administration at a time when the Maduro government was buffeted by serious accusations of human rights violations.

“As long as the money kept coming in, they didn’t care from where,” prosecutor Roger Cruz said of the defendants during closing arguments.

‘Massive secret’ threatened to damage Rivera’s political career

But the two held onto the “massive secret” and didn’t disclose their lobbying work as required, for fear it would have ended Rivera’s political career as an anti-Communist stalwart, Cruz said.

To hide his work, prosecutors allege, Rivera also set up an encrypted chat group called MIA — for Miami — with his main conduit to the Maduro government: Venezuelan media tycoon Raúl Gorrín, who was subsequently charged in the U.S. with bribing top Venezuelan officials.

Members of the group used playful code words to discuss their activities: Maduro was the “bus driver,” Sessions “Sombrero,” Rodríguez “The Lady in Red,” and millions of dollars “melons,” according to copies of text messages presented to the jury.

“It was all about la Luz,” Cruz said, referring to the Spanish word for light, which Rivera and others repeatedly used to discuss payments from Caracas.

Attorneys for Rivera and Nuhfer said the two acted in good faith and believed they were under no requirement to disclose their work. The three-month, $50-million contract with Rivera’s one-man consulting firm, they say, was focused exclusively on luring oil giant ExxonMobil back to Venezuela — commercial work that is generally exempt from the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

Wholly distinct from that consulting work, they say, were Rivera’s meetings with Rubio and Sessions, which occurred after the consulting contract had expired and was focused on ushering in leadership in Venezuela that would be less hostile to the U.S.

“He was working every possible angle to get Nicolás Maduro out,” defense attorney Ed Shohat said during closing arguments. “There was not a word in the chats about normalizing relations.”

Nuhfer’s attorney, David Oscar Markus, likened the government’s case to the 17th century Salem witch trials, presuming ill intent that was belied by the flimsiest of evidence.

“My client does not have a dark heart,” he said.

Exxon meetings for Rodríguez

Prosecutors said Rivera used the contract with New York-based PDV USA as cover for illegal lobbying.

Once exposed, the partners tried to hide the work — backdating documents and coming up with sham agreements like one to justify a wire transfer of $3.75 million to a South Florida company that maintained Gorrín’s luxury yacht.

The political activity included setting up meetings for Rodríguez in New York, Caracas, Washington and Dallas. As part of the effort, the two roped in Sessions, who later tried to broker a meeting for Rodríguez with the CEO of ExxonMobil that had succeeded Trump’s then-secretary of State, Rex Tillerson. After a secret meeting in Caracas with Maduro, Sessions also agreed to deliver a letter from the Venezuelan president to Trump.

The outreach quickly unraveled, however. Within six months of taking office, Trump sanctioned Maduro and labeled him a “dictator,” launching a “maximum pressure” campaign to unseat the president.

However, nearly a decade later, Rodríguez has emerged as the second Trump administration’s trusted partner after the U.S. military’s ousting of Maduro.

Before being elected to Congress in 2010, Rivera was a high-ranking Florida legislator. During that time, he shared a Tallahassee home with Rubio, who eventually became the Florida House speaker.

Rivera has previously faced controversy, including allegations that he secretly funded a Democratic spoiler candidate in a 2012 congressional race. Last year, federal prosecutors dropped the case after an appeals court threw out a sizable fine imposed by a lower court. Rivera was also investigated — but never charged — for alleged campaign finance violations and a $1-million contract with a gambling company while serving in the Florida legislature.

Goodman writes for the Associated Press.

American Airlines has resumed flights as Donald Trump moves to rebuild ties following the abduction of Nicolas Maduro.

The first direct commercial flight between the United States and Venezuela has landed in Caracas, ending a seven-year suspension imposed by the US Department of Homeland Security over security concerns.

Flight AA3599, operated by Envoy Air, a regional subsidiary of American Airlines, departed Miami at 10:11am ET (14:11 GMT) on Thursday, five minutes ahead of schedule, according to airport data.

It arrived in the Venezuelan capital roughly three hours later and was due to return to Florida later in the day. Earlier, the airline said that a second daily flight between Miami and Caracas would start on May 21.

The return of nonstop flights comes months after a dramatic shift in US-Venezuela relations, following Washington’s January operation that led to the abduction of former President Nicolas Maduro, and marks the first direct air link between the two countries since diplomatic ties were severed in 2019. For years, travellers had used indirect routes through other Latin American hubs.

Translation: “For nearly seven years, there were no direct commercial flights between the United States and Venezuela. Under President Trump, we are changing that today. Flights between Miami and Caracas have resumed,” The US State Department posted on X. 

Coffee and arepas in the aeroplane

At Miami International Airport, American Airlines marked the occasion with a small ceremony, decorating the departure gate with Venezuelan flags and balloon displays in the country’s yellow, blue and red colours.

Passengers were served coffee and arepas, a traditional Venezuelan dish, on board the flight.

Thursday’s service was operated by an Embraer E175 regional jet with a capacity for about 75 passengers.

US Transportation Secretary Sean P Duffy said the flight signalled more than the return of an air route.

“Today is about more than just another flight, it’s a critical milestone in strengthening the United States relationship with Venezuela and unleashing economic opportunity in both countries,” Duffy added.

He added that the resumption followed extensive work by the department and praised American Airlines for restoring a route he described as vital, saying more flights are expected in the coming months.

High ticket prices

Despite the celebratory mood, high ticket prices remain a key barrier, alongside strict US visa requirements that have left many potential travellers without the documentation needed to fly.

Recent searches on the airline’s website show return fares for early May starting at more than $1,200, before dropping to just more than $1,000 later in the month, suggesting prices may ease as services expand.

By comparison, flights via Bogota typically range from $390 to $900 round-trip, with Avianca among the main carriers.

American Airlines was the last US carrier operating in Venezuela before suspending flights in 2019, while Delta and United had already withdrawn in 2017 amid a deepening political crisis that drove millions to leave the country.

“Parents will be able to reconnect with children, grandparents with grandchildren, and families with the place they once called home,” Miami-Dade County Mayor Daniella Levine Cava said before the departure. “Miami-Dade is home to the largest Venezuelan community in the United States.”

Caracas, April 29, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Venezuelan government signed new energy agreements with energy conglomerates British Petroleum (BP) and Eni in separate ceremonies at Miraflores Presidential Palace.

On Wednesday, Acting President Delcy Rodríguez signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to develop the Cocuina-Manakin field, an offshore natural gas project shared between Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago.

“The return of BP [to Venezuela] is a ⁠clear sign of the future we want to chart for Venezuela and for ​international energy relations,” she said during a live broadcast. “May we have cooperation grounded in a win-win approach and ​shared benefits.”

BP was represented by its Trinidad and Tobago director David Campbell. The Cocuina-Manakin field holds an estimated 1 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas, split 34-66 between Caracas and Port of Spain.

Following Wednesday’s agreement, the London-based multinational will additionally explore opportunities in the 7.3 Tcf Loran field, which is also part of a cross-border reserve shared with Trinidad. Both Cocuina and Loran are part of Venezuela’s Deltana Platform, a largely unexplored gas deposit on the country’s eastern maritime border.

Venezuela had suspended all energy projects involving Trinidad and Tobago over its neighbor’s support for the US military escalation in the Caribbean. Following January 3, the acting Rodríguez administration reengaged with Port of Spain, while extending overtures to BP and Shell in an effort to reopen the projects.

The BP agreement came on the heels of another high-profile ceremony at Miraflores on Tuesday that saw Rodríguez extend a “special welcome” to Eni CEO Claudio Descalzi and other executives. In what she called a “milestone in the relations” between Venezuela and the Italian corporation, Rodríguez announced that Eni is planning “one of the largest investments” in the Venezuelan oil sector. 

The contract establishes conditions to relaunch the exploration of the 425 square-kilometer Junín-5 block of Venezuela’s Orinoco Oil Belt. The Junín-5 is estimated to contain 35 billion barrels of extra-heavy oil in place, though only a fraction will be recoverable.

For his part, Descalzi indicated that the signed deal created conditions to “accelerate development” of Junín-5 activities and that the company would finalize its investment plan by the end of the year.

The Junín-5 block was assigned in the late 2000s to Petrojunín, a joint venture where Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA and Eni held 60 and 40 percent of shares, respectively. Crude extraction began in 2013 but did not hit the established targets, hovering around 10,000 barrels per day (bpd) by the end of the 2010s.

The BP and Eni agreements were crafted under Venezuela’s recently overhauled Hydrocarbon Law, which introduces a series of pro-business incentives while curtailing state control over the energy sector.

Under the new law, minority partners can directly manage oilfield operations and sales, whereas in the prior framework that was PDVSA’s exclusive prerogative. Additionally, private companies can have royalties, income tax, and other fiscal contributions slashed at the government’s discretion as well as bring eventual disputes to international arbitration bodies.

In March, Eni, alongside Spain’s Repsol, inked a contract to further development of the Cardón IV offshore natural gas project. The European companies each own 50 percent stakes in the venture and recently announced plans to increase output by roughly 10 percent in the short term.

Eni, which has around 30 percent of its shares owned by the Italian state, is also a minority stakeholder in Petrosucre, a joint venture that operates the Corocoro offshore oilfield. In 2025, the ventures with Eni participation produced an average of 64,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day.

Alongside BP, Eni, and Repsol, Chevron and Shell have likewise struck new deals in recent weeks under the favorable conditions of the hydrocarbon reform. Chevron increased its stake in the Petroindependencia joint venture, while its Petropiar project with PDVSA was assigned a new drilling block in the Orinoco Belt. For its part, Shell will take over light and medium crude projects in Eastern Venezuela and several offshore natural gas initiatives. The company had also expressed interest in the Loran field.

The acting Rodríguez administration has actively courted foreign investment into the South American country’s energy and mining sectors, with leaders openly acknowledging the incorporation of “suggestions” and “recommendations” from Western conglomerates into the recent reform.

Alongside multiple delegations of corporate executives, Rodríguez has also hosted Trump officials, including Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Interior Secretary Doug Burgum, ahead of the recent hydrocarbon and mining reforms.

Last week, newly appointed US Chargé d’Affaires John Barrett stated that Washington’s goal is to “place the private sector at the center of Venezuela’s transformation” during a meeting with the Venezuelan-American Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VENAMCHAM).

Since the January 3 military strikes and kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, the Trump administration has issued multiple licenses to facilitate the return of Western conglomerates to the Venezuelan energy and mining sectors.

The licenses mandate that all royalty, tax, and dividend payments be made into accounts run by the US Treasury. Caracas and Washington recently announced the hiring of external auditors to oversee the flow of the US-controlled Venezuelan resources.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Fusagasugá, Colombia.

Note: The report was amended on Wednesday night to incorporate the BP agreement.

Caracas, April 29, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Venezuelan government signed new energy agreements with Italian conglomerate Eni in a ceremony at Miraflores Presidential Palace on Tuesday.

Acting President Delcy Rodríguez extended a “special welcome” to Eni CEO Claudio Descalzi and other executives, who were joined by Oil Minister Paula Henao and state oil company PDVSA President Héctor Obregón.

“We are witnessing a very important moment, a milestone in the relations between Eni and Venezuela,” Rodríguez affirmed, adding that Eni is planning “one of the largest investments” in the Venezuelan oil sector. 

The contract establishes conditions to relaunch the exploration of the 425 square-kilometer Junín-5 block of Venezuela’s Orinoco Oil Belt. The Junín-5 is estimated to contain 35 billion barrels of extra-heavy oil in place, though only a fraction will be recoverable.

For his part, Descalzi described the top-level ceremony as a “great honor.” He indicated that the signed deal created conditions to “accelerate development” of Junín-5 activities and that the company would finalize its investment plan by the end of the year.

The Junín-5 block was assigned in the late 2000s to Petrojunín, a joint venture where PDVSA and Eni held 60 and 40 percent of shares, respectively. Crude extraction began in 2013 but did not hit the established targets, hovering around 10,000 barrels per day (bpd) by the end of the 2010s.

The revamped agreement was crafted under Venezuela’s recently overhauled Hydrocarbon Law, which introduces a series of pro-business incentives while curtailing state control over the energy sector.

Under the new law, minority partners can directly manage oilfield operations and sales, whereas in the prior framework that was PDVSA’s exclusive prerogative. Additionally, private companies can have royalties, income tax, and other fiscal contributions slashed at the government’s discretion as well as bring eventual disputes to international arbitration bodies.

In March, Eni, alongside Spain’s Repsol, inked a contract to further development of the Cardón IV offshore natural gas project. The European companies each own 50 percent stakes in the venture and recently announced plans to increase output by roughly 10 percent in the short term.

Eni, which has around 30 percent of its shares owned by the Italian state, is also a minority stakeholder in Petrosucre, a joint venture that operates the Corocoro offshore oilfield. In 2025, the ventures with Eni participation produced an average of 64,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day.

Alongside Eni and Repsol, Chevron and Shell have likewise struck new deals in recent weeks under the favorable conditions of the hydrocarbon reform. Chevron increased its stake in the Petroindependencia joint venture, while its Petropiar project with PDVSA was assigned a new drilling block in the Orinoco Belt. For its part, Shell will take over light and medium crude projects in Eastern Venezuela and several offshore natural gas initiatives.

The acting Rodríguez administration has actively courted foreign investment into the South American country’s energy and mining sectors, with leaders openly acknowledging the incorporation of “suggestions” and “recommendations” from Western conglomerates into the recent reform.

Alongside multiple delegations of corporate executives, Rodríguez has also hosted Trump officials, including Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Interior Secretary Doug Burgum, ahead of the recent hydrocarbon and mining reforms.

Last week, newly appointed US Chargé d’Affaires John Barrett stated that Washington’s goal is to “place the private sector at the center of Venezuela’s transformation” during a meeting with the Venezuelan-American Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VENAMCHAM).

On Monday, Barrett was a keynote speaker at a Venezuelan Oil Chamber (CPV) event and hailed US “innovative investment” as the key to “turn Venezuela into a global energy hub.”

Since the January 3 military strikes and kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, the Trump administration has issued multiple licenses to facilitate the return of Western conglomerates to the Venezuelan energy and mining sectors.

The licenses mandate that all royalty, tax, and dividend payments be made into accounts run by the US Treasury. Caracas and Washington recently announced the hiring of external auditors to oversee the flow of the US-controlled Venezuelan resources.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Fusagasugá, Colombia.

Mérida, April 28, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The US government has authorized the use of Venezuelan state assets to cover the legal defense fees of President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores. 

According to reports, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a waiver to its existing sanctions against the Caribbean country.

The resolution, formalized in an April 24 letter from the US Justice Department to New York District Judge Alvin Hellerstein, removes an early hurdle in the high-profile case against Maduro and Flores. The pair was kidnapped by US Special Forces on January 3 and is facing charges including drug trafficking conspiracy.

The joint letter, signed by US Attorney Jay Clayton and several assistant prosecutors, clarifies that the amended OFAC licenses allow defense counsel to receive payments under strict parameters. 

“The amended licenses authorize defense counsel to receive payments from the government of Venezuela with funds made available after March 5, 2026,” the document read. US prosecutors further clarified that the defense cannot be funded with Venezuelan oil revenues that are currently controlled by the US Treasury, as well as Venezuelan state assets that have been frozen for years.

The issue of access to legal funding had previously been a central flashpoint in the case. Barry Pollack, Maduro’s defense attorney, had filed a motion to dismiss the case, arguing that the US government was effectively denying the defendants their constitutional right to a fair trial by blocking their ability to pay for attorneys of their choice.

At the latest hearing on March 26, Judge Hellerstein ruled out dismissing the charges but challenged the US prosecutors’ justifications for blocking Caracas’ ability to fund Maduro and Flores’ defense.

Following the issuance of the OFAC licenses, the defense has reportedly withdrawn its motions to dismiss the case, though it retains the right to refile should similar financial obstacles arise in the future. The Venezuelan government has yet to comment on this latest development in the case.

At present, no date has been scheduled for either a hearing or the commencement of the trial. The parties have submitted a request to the court for a status conference to be scheduled in approximately 60 days. The case has progressed slowly, with the prosecution pointing to the complexity of the discovery process.

At their January 5 arraignment, Maduro and Flores pleaded not guilty to charges. Despite repeated “narcoterrorism” accusations over the years, US officials have not publicly provided evidence tying Venezuelan leaders to narcotics activities. In addition, reports from specialized agencies including the US’ DEA have consistently found Venezuela to play a marginal role in global drug trafficking.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

One day Delcy Rodríguez calls for a reform to the justice system after announcing the sudden revocation of the amnesty law her brother sponsored. The other, rumors suggest she’ll reshuffle the country’s higher court without providing any indication of who the new magistrates are going to be. The central bank president she recently named prepares to disclose figures to the IMF for the first time in decades.

The public does little else than follow the news, as if things were normal. Futile debate has emerged on social media over whether the new US chief of mission in Caracas is more hawkish than his predecessor. Or if the opposition has racist tendencies because a singer (once popular in the 2000s) called Delcy an ape in the opposition’s largest rally in years.

The picture of the country in recent weeks is one of Delcy Rodríguez calling the shots with near-total freedom. She has been enjoying a clear head start over a potential presidential election, as she crisscrosses Venezuela on what amounts to an unofficial campaign tour. In Caracas, she keeps changing everything so that nothing really changes. She is intent on controlling government offices in the next four years through newly promoted loyalists and a clean inflow of petrodollars. The chavista elite has looked more confident in the meantime, touring with Delcy in sky-blue outfits, leading cartoonish chants for peace and national union as if the internal contradictions that surfaced two months ago were now less important, because the possibility of survival looks clearer.

Back in February, optimists would discuss the scope of Washington’s coercion capacity over the “caretaker” regime, the boundaries that (if crossed) would trigger a “second wave” of attacks, the disappearance of Alex Saab as a prelude of a broader purge against other “untouchables” that overtly normalized the commission of terror. Now, lunatics like Diosdado Cabello’s nephew, Alejandro Rondón, claim on social media that “the recess is about to end” the same day Delcy says the amnesty scheme ran its course and Cabello recounts an unlikely justice system crackdown.

What followed January 3^rdwas a paradigm change with positive practical consequences for society that chavismo quickly learned to manage if not reverse.

Alejandro doesn’t look like the brightest dude. He’s another chavista nepo-kid working for the other Cabello uncle that controls Venezuela’s taxing authority, Jose David, though Alejandro made a name for himself with rage-baiting tweets that celebrated Maduro’s “victory” in 2024 and claimed the opposition were terrorists who falsified the official voting records (i.e. Diosdado’s talking points during the tun-tun operation).]

But an emboldened member of the Cabello Rondón clan is a troubling sign for those who fled the country after being placed on “treason” blacklists. It also undercuts the very notions of pluralism and national reconciliation that Marco Rubio invoked three months ago when outlining his vision for Venezuela’s democratic transition before US senators. Shortly thereafter, Rondón drove the point home by publicly wishing Donald Trump well after the shooting at the White House Correspondents’ Dinner. The message seems clear: the arrangement with Team Trump is comfortable enough that, however fraught the geopolitical backdrop, they can afford to be flippant—even in public. They remain, unmistakably, the bullies in town. 

The long wait for elections (or just a calendar?)

What followed January 3^rd was a paradigm change with positive practical consequences for society that chavismo quickly learned to manage if not reverse. Allies of Maria Corina  Machado who spent the past two years jailed or hiding are back in the street, even providing testimonies about their imprisonment. The student movement has undergone a revival, liaising with human rights groups to set up carefully-controlled protests. Censorship isn’t what it used to be, so journalists have tried to take advantage of that opening. Pensioners and public workers have perhaps become the loudest actor in confronting Rodríguez, despite having to face colectivos and National Guards whenever they hit the streets.

Repression has become less intense, but the lack of a clear electoral calendar keeps the opposition on the sidelines, waiting for the arrival of Machado, which is no less paralyzing. The amnesty law passed on February 19 effectively funneled the release of political prisoners, shattering expectations of a “landmark outcome” that would speed up the process. 

Indeed, the statute’s contents make more than 180 supposed military rebels ineligible, although the release of a handful of FANB officers in recent days reinforces the idea that a law wasn’t necessary to get people out of jail. Nearly 300 civilians are still imprisoned, and we haven’t seen significant breakthroughs in the past few weeks.

According to figures from NGO Foro Penal (based on documented cases), the political prisoner population fell by 40% in the two months following the US military intervention—dropping from 863 detainees in late December to 526 by March 2. The pace has clearly slowed since then. Chavismo released 36 people between March and April, and 17 over the past 18 days (about 6% of the pre–January 3 total). The regime still resorts to sporadic arbitrary arrests and intimidation. Alexis Paparoni, an opposition figure in Mérida (and brother of Carlos Paparoni), was briefly detained while traveling and later released under precautionary measures. A similar incident occurred last weekend with a government employee in Guárico, who was detained for having a note on his desk bearing the now-infamous slur directed at Delcy.

“These prisoners are currently incarcerated because POTUShas chosen to appease and praise the perpetrators instead of supporting their victims,” Burelli recently told Senator Scott.

The White House appears satisfied with results so far. Venezuela is now subject to sweeping sanctions relief across oil, gas, minerals, and fertilizers, while OFAC has issued waivers allowing operations with public banks. Most notably, Delcy Rodríguez has been removed from the Specially Designated Nationals list—effectively unfreezing her US-based assets and clearing the way for financial dealings under American jurisdiction. 

The opposition leadership has largely stuck to its 2025 strategy of projecting trust and patience toward Donald Trump. María Corina Machado continues to argue that Trump is the head of state who has done the most to advance Venezuela’s liberation and maintains that the Rodríguez government is dismantling the Maduro-era “structures of corruption and repression.” However, she acknowledged last week that a bout of political instability cannot be ruled out. 

“The risk is that if people feel the path [toward freedom and democracy] is beginning to close, they may start to push back in a disorganized and potentially anarchic way,” she told esRadio hosts in Madrid. “That’s why a clearly defined electoral calendar is a guarantee of peace and stability. That would help people accept that this process will last a bit longer, as institutions must be strengthened and we need to take time to prepare for a truly impeccable election.”

Running out of patience

Criticism of the Trump administration’s handling in Venezuela continues to grow among groups of scholars and foreign policy observers, while opposition parties remain largely quiet and prefer to let Machado formulate their stance.

But in general, there’s a tense awareness that the waters are getting muddy. Some in journalism, and other opposition allies are starting to lose their patience.

Venezuelan journalist Sebastiana Barraez, an outspoken critic of chavismo and popular source on repression, told her audience that Venezuelan people have no guarantees about their future. Two days ago, she admitted the overthrow of Nicolás Maduro had raised hopes of a new democracy and true institutional recovery.

“It turns out none of that is happening,” Barráez said. “In Venezuela, Trump is promoting the interests of the United States. The problem is that those interests are not compatible with what we Venezuelans are looking for.”

Pedro Mario Burelli, an independent advisor for the opposition, is among the few figures to be pressing Washington over its ties with Delcy Rodríguez, calling Trump’s decision to elevate her an “incoherent strategy.” He has warned that doing business with Minerven makes the US an effective enabler of environmental crimes in Venezuela’s south. In March, he told The Atlantic that the remaining political prisoners now belong to Trump and Rubio.

“These prisoners are currently incarcerated because POTUS has chosen to appease and praise the perpetrators instead of supporting their victims. Constantly praising Delcy is disgraceful and an insult to the vast majority of Venezuelans”, Burelli told GOP Senator Rick Scott on Sunday.“Faulting her, as you and some of your colleagues do, is disingenuous. Venezuelans rightfully expect, and deserve, much more from democratically elected US officials.”

Defence lawyers had asked for case to be thrown out, claiming Maduro’s rights were violated following US abduction.

The United States has agreed to ease certain sanctions on Venezuela in order to allow the country’s government to cover the legal fees for ex-president Nicolas Maduro, who is on federal trial in New York City for drug trafficking charges after being abducted by US forces in January.

Maduro’s lawyer, Barry Pollack, had asked the Manhattan-based US District Judge Alvin Hellerstein to toss out the case in February, arguing that a prohibition on the government in Caracas paying the legal fees constituted a violation of Maduro’s legal right to the counsel of his choice.

In a court filing, US Department of Justice lawyers agreed to modify US sanctions so that the Venezuelan government could pay Maduro’s defence lawyer. They said the change makes the defence’s motion to throw out the case “moot”.

The pivot is the latest update in a closely watched trial that has raised a series of legal questions based on Maduro’s status as a former head of state and how he was taken into US custody.

Critics have condemned the proceedings as fundamentally illegitimate, pointing to the extraordinary US military operation to abduct Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, from Venezuela. Legal experts have called the raid a blatant violation of international law.

The Trump administration has maintained that the abduction was a law enforcement operation supported by the military. It has argued that Washington does not recognise Maduro as the legitimate leader of Venezuela following several contested elections.

Under the international law concept of “head of state immunity”, sitting world leaders are typically granted immunity from foreign national courts.

After being spirited to the US, Maduro and Flores pleaded not guilty and remain jailed in Brooklyn, New York. Maduro has rejected the US charges as a false pretext for seizing control of the South American country’s natural resources.

US President Donald Trump has repeatedly expressed his desire for foreign companies to access Venezuela’s vast oil reserves.

During a hearing on March 26, Judge Hellerstein did not signal that he would throw out the trial, but did question whether the sanctions preventing the Venezuelan government from covering Maduro’s legal fees were a violation of constitutional rights.

All criminal defendants in the US have constitutional rights, regardless of whether or not they are US citizens.

Prosecutors, at the time, argued that the sanctions were based on national security interests and asserted that the executive branch, rather than the judiciary, oversees foreign policy.

They further argued that Maduro and Flores could use personal funds to pay for a lawyer of their choice.

“The defendant is here, Flores is here. They present no further national security threat,” said Hellerstein.

“The right that’s implicated, paramount over other rights, is the right to constitutional counsel.”

WASHINGTON — President Trump has turned to naval blockades to pressure the governments of Venezuela, Cuba and now Iran to meet his demands, but his preferred tactic is confronting a very different reality in the Middle East than in the Caribbean.

Unlike Cuba or Venezuela, Iran choked off a crucial trade route for energy shipments, meaning the longer the standoff persists, the more the global economy will suffer. Tehran also poses a greater military threat than those two adversaries in America’s own hemisphere and requires a sustained military presence far from U.S. shores.

Iran’s leverage over the Strait of Hormuz gives it power during a shaky ceasefire because the widening economic risks, especially higher U.S. gas prices in an election year, could force the Republican president to end the blockade on Iran’s ports and coastline, experts say.

“It’s really a question now of which country, the U.S. or Iran, has a greater pain tolerance,” said Max Boot, a military historian and senior fellow for national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Iran presents ‘major differences’ from other blockades

The effectiveness of Trump’s use of the world’s most powerful navy to block the trade of Iran’s sanctioned oil and other goods is very much up for debate. But it certainly appears to be intensifying as the war grinds on.

The U.S. military on Thursday announced the seizure of another tanker associated with the smuggling of Iranian oil, a day after Iran’s paramilitary Revolutionary Guards took control of two vessels in the crucial waterway.

Trump also announced he has ordered the U.S. military to “shoot and kill” Iranian small boats laying sea mines in the strait.

But the situation in Iran is not exactly analogous to what is playing out with the U.S. operations in Venezuela and Cuba.

Some experts say Trump’s success in Venezuela probably had more to do with the U.S. military raid that captured leader Nicolás Maduro than American warships seizing sanctioned oil tankers to enforce U.S. control over the South American country.

A U.S. oil embargo on Cuba, meanwhile, has caused the island’s most severe economic crisis in decades. While U.S. and Cuban officials have met recently on the island for rare talks, the financial strangulation has failed to produce the Trump administration’s stated goal of leadership change.

“I do think that the success of the Maduro mission in Venezuela has probably emboldened the president,” said Todd Huntley, director of Georgetown University’s National Security Law Program.

That does not make the situations in Venezuela and Iran similar — geographically, militarily or politically. “There are some major differences,” said Huntley, a retired Navy captain and judge advocate general.

While the blockade against Iran has delivered a severe blow to its economy, including stopping freighters from importing various supplies, the country has still been able to move some of its sanctioned oil, ship-tracking companies say.

Iran has rejected Trump’s demands to reopen the strait, where 20% of the world’s oil normally flows, and it has been firing on ships again this week. Stalled shipments through the strait have sent gasoline prices skyrocketing far beyond the region and raised the cost of food and a wide array of other products, creating a political problem for Trump before the November’s elections.

“Blockades are usually just one tool of a mechanism used in a conflict,” said Salvatore Mercogliano, a maritime history professor at Campbell University in North Carolina. “They can be important. But it’s only one element. And I don’t think it’s going to be enough to convince the Iranians.”

Effectiveness of U.S. blockade called into question

Adm. Brad Cooper, head of U.S. Central Command, claimed last week that “no ship has evaded U.S. forces.” The command overseeing the Middle East said it has directed 31 ships to turn around or return to port as of Wednesday.

Merchant shipping groups are skeptical.

Lloyd’s List Intelligence said “a steady flow of shadow fleet traffic” has passed in and out of the Persian Gulf, including 11 tankers with Iranian cargo that have left the Gulf of Oman outside the strait since April 13.

The maritime intelligence firm Windward said this week that Iranian traffic continues to flow “via deception.”

Iranian ships have several ways to sneak through the blockade, including spoofing their location tracking data or traveling through Pakistani territorial waters, Mercogliano said. He also noted that the sheer volume of shipping traffic the military needs to screen is a challenging task.

Blockades require patience to work

The last time the U.S. mounted a blockade similar to the one focused on Iranian ships was during the Kennedy administration in the early 1960s, against Cuba, Huntley said.

“And it wasn’t even called a blockade,” he said. “We called it quarantine.”

Some naval blockades over the course of history have had an impact, such as Britain’s blockade on Germany during World War I. “But they tend to be very long-term impacts, whereas Trump is looking for short-term, quick results,” according to Boot, the military historian.

He said Trump probably saw the blockade on sanctioned oil tankers tied to Venezuela as playing a large role in the success of leadership changes in that country. But Boot said it had more to do with the U.S. ousting Maduro and the subsequent cooperation from his vice president, Delcy Rodríguez, who is now the acting president.

“There is no Delcy Rodríguez in Cuba or Iran,” Boot said. “I think his success in Venezuela led him astray, thinking that this was a template that could be replicated elsewhere. He sees it as a huge success at little cost. And, in fact, it turns out to be a unique set of circumstances.”

Finley, Klepper and Toropin write for the Associated Press.

Caracas, April 23, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez has established a commission to assess the “strategic” value of state-owned assets and their possible transfer to the private sector.

The Commission for the Evaluation of Public Assets held its first meeting on Wednesday. In a short televised message, Rodríguez said the commission had the purpose of bringing “agility and modernity” to the Venezuelan state.

The acting president announced that Venezuelan state assets would be divided into four categories: strategic ones to remain under state control, “strategic alliances” where the state retains ownership but management is turned over to the private sector in concession-type deals, “non-strategic” assets to be fully privatized; and assets to be liquidated or reincorporated elsewhere.

“The purpose of this commission is to elevate Venezuela’s productivity levels, so that the Venezuelan state can be robust and attend to the strategic aspects of the nation,” she said.

The commission includes Economic Sector Vice President Calixto Ortega, Finance Minister Anabel Pereira, Industry Minister Luis Villegas, State Solicitor Arianny Seijo, Communes Minister Ángel Prado, as well as Luis Pisella, former president of industry guild CONINDUSTRIA, representing the private sector.

Former Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez spearheaded a nationalization campaign in the 2000s to impose state control of key economic areas such as oil, electricity, telecoms, banking, and the heavy industries.

In recent years, with the economy heavily targeted by US sanctions, the Nicolás Maduro government expanded “strategic alliances” with the private sector, particularly in the Venezuelan countryside. However, campesino organizations have denounced that the private takeover of companies that formerly supplied seeds, inputs, and tractors has significantly raised costs for small-scale producers. Strategic alliances in sugar mills have also drawn complaints of companies defrauding sugar cane growers.

The Cisneros Group, one of Venezuela’s largest private sector conglomerates, has recently announced plans to raise over $1 billion in funds ahead of potential sell-offs of state assets.

Elias Ferrer Breda, financial analyst and director of Orinoco Research, told Venezuelanalysis that he foresees privatizations in basic industries such as steel and cement.

“In my view, we will see virtually all the industries that are running at low capacity and without turning profits privatized,” he predicted. “We are talking about industries like steel and cement, but also other sectors like hotels or agricultural land.”

Ferrer affirmed that state companies currently under strategic alliances, such as sugar mills or Ferrominera Orinoco, an iron-ore complex presently managed by India’s Jindal Steel, could continue under similar deals as opposed to being sold outright.

“Where investors have mostly expressed an interest is in extractive industries: oil and mining,” he added. Ferrer additionally claimed that US “strategic and business interests” are likely to pursue control over Venezuelan critical mineral reserves, which are not presently certified.

Rodríguez had unveiled the commission to evaluate state assets in an April 9 presidential address. The acting leader also set in motion efforts to reform Venezuela’s labor, tax, and pension legislation. The Venezuelan National Assembly has recently approved pro-business overhauls of the country’s hydrocarbon and mining laws.

Caracas reestablished dealings with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank on April 16. On Wednesday, Rodríguez disclosed a conversation with IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva and stated Caracas’ priority in unblocking around US $5 billion worth of Special Drawing Rights to improve public services such as electricity and water supply.

For her part, Georgieva acknowledged a “very valuable and productive call” and that the next steps include IMF “policy advice and capacity development.”

Venezuelan leaders have vowed that there are no plans to incur IMF debt. However, the Caribbean nation could soon face pressure from creditors looking to collect on a massive external debt, with unpaid loans, defaulted bonds, and international arbitration awards totaling as much as $170 billion with accrued interest.

On April 16, the so-called Venezuelan Creditor Committee held talks with US officials amid efforts to secure a license to engage in debt negotiations with Caracas. The committee includes Fidelity Management & Research Company LLC, Morgan Stanley Investment Management, Greylock Capital Management, and others.

Since the January 3 US military strikes and kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, the Trump administration has seized control of Venezuelan oil revenues while issuing licenses to grant Western corporations favorable access to the Caribbean nation’s energy and mining sectors.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Fusagasugá, Colombia.

Mérida, April 20, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Venezuelan government launched a “Great National Pilgrimage” to oppose economic sanctions on Sunday, April 19, coinciding with the 216th anniversary of the country’s declaration of independence.

The nationwide mobilization seeks to channel popular opposition to the US-led economic blockade into a sustained, nationwide movement. 

The pilgrimage was inaugurated in three Venezuelan regions, with a calendar of marches, assemblies, and cultural activities covering the remaining 21 states before a closing event in Caracas on April 30. 

In western Zulia state, Acting President Delcy Rodríguez led a rally through the streets of Maracaibo. Addressing a crowd, Rodríguez linked the historical struggle for independence to the modern-day resistance against Washington’s unilateral coercive measures.

“It is a date that marks the first cry for independence from a united people, and so, beginning with that historic date, I feel compelled to embark on this pilgrimage,” she declared to the crowd.

Venezuelan leaders have sought to highlight the impact of unilateral coercive measures on living standards and public services to push for their withdrawal.

“We want Venezuela to be free of sanctions, so that it can grow without restrictions,” Rodríguez affirmed at the Zulia rally. “I am speaking to the people of the United States, Europe, and the governments of those countries. Please stop levying sanctions against the Venezuelan people.”

In Puerto Ayacucho, Amazonas, National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez led a parallel mobilization on Sunday. He emphasized that the pilgrimage is not merely a political event but a “spiritual and national defense” of the country’s right to self-determination. The campaign’s launch in border states highlighted the disruptions to public services that are generally more acute away from the capital and surrounding areas.

The government’s initiative was also backed by sectors of the moderate opposition. Timoteo Zambrano, deputy from the Democratic Alliance, vowed that his political faction would participate in the pilgrimage.

“[Pilgrimage] is a deeply religious term that unites the world’s religions. We are witnessing a new moment to fight together against sanctions and the blockade,” he said in a press conference in Caracas on Saturday.

For his part, Acción Democrática Secretary-General Bernabé Gutiérrez claimed that Caracas must ask the Trump administration to release proceeds from oil exports “so they reach the state coffers and allow for the solution of our problems.” 

Since January, the White House has imposed control over Venezuelan crude sales, with Venezuela-owed royalties, taxes, and dividends mandated to be deposited in US Treasury-run accounts before being returned to Caracas at US officials’ discretion.

The “Great National Pilgrimage” takes place against a backdrop of nearly a decade of economic pressure from Washington. The first Trump administration launched a “maximum pressure” campaign in 2017 with the goal of triggering regime change.

US Treasury sanctions targeted multiple economic sectors, from mining to banking, and particularly targeted the oil industry, causing an estimated US $25 billion in yearly revenue losses. The blockade also effectively gridlocked Venezuela from international credit markets and saw Venezuelan foreign assets frozen and seized. 

Since the January 3 US military attacks and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro, Caracas and Washington have fast-tracked a diplomatic rapprochement. Acting President Rodríguez has struck a conciliatory tone toward the US, recently thanking Trump and US officials for their efforts in reestablishing “cooperation.”

The US Treasury Department has maintained wide-reaching sanctions in place but issued a series of general licenses in the hydrocarbon, mining, and banking sectors, allowing Western entities to deal with Venezuelan counterparts under restricted conditions.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

A Cuban Foreign Ministry official said the exchange with Washington was ‘respectful and professional’ and devoid of threats.

The Cuban government has confirmed that it held recent talks in Havana with officials from the United States, as tensions remain high between the two countries over Washington’s energy blockade of the Caribbean country.

Alejandro Garcia del Toro, deputy director general in charge of US affairs at the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said on Monday that the US delegation included assistant secretaries of state, and the Cuban delegation included representatives at the level of deputy foreign minister.

Garcia de Toro said that the US delegation did not issue any threats or deadlines as had been reported by some US media outlets.

“The entire exchange was conducted with respect and professionalism,” he said.

In comments reported by Cuba’s Communist Party newspaper Granma, Garcia del Toro emphasised that ending the three-month-old US oil blockade was “a top priority” for the Cuban government in the talks, and accused Washington of “blackmail” for threatening countries that export oil to Cuba with tariffs.

“This act of economic coercion is an unjustified punishment for the entire Cuban population,” he said.

“It is also a form of global blackmail against sovereign states, which have every right to export fuel to Cuba, in accordance with the principles of free trade,” he added.

US news outlet Axios reported on Friday that officials from US President Donald Trump’s administration held multiple meetings in Havana on April 10, including with Raul Guillermo Rodriguez Castro, grandson of former President Raul Castro. The meetings marked the first time that American diplomats had flown into Cuba since 2016 in a new diplomatic push.

According to reports, US officials laid out several conditions for negotiations with Cuba to continue, including the release of prominent political prisoners, an end to political repression, and liberalising the island’s ailing economy.

The Reuters news agency said that US proposals for Cuba also include allowing Elon Musk’s Starlink internet terminals into the country and providing compensation for Americans and US corporations for assets confiscated by Cuba after the 1959 revolution. Washington is also concerned about the influence of foreign powers on the island, a US official told the news agency.

Trump has hinted at military intervention in Cuba and warned of tariffs on any country that sells or supplies oil to Cuba. The fuel blockade has aggravated Cuba’s economic and energy crisis, leading to warnings of a humanitarian disaster.

Cubans have also braced for a possible attack following Trump’s repeated warnings that the country will be “next” after his war on Iran and the US military’s abduction of Venezuela’s President Nicolas Maduro in January.

Last week, Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel said that his country was prepared to fight if the US carried through on its threats.

The leaders of Mexico, Spain and Brazil on Saturday voiced concern over the “dramatic situation” in Cuba and urged “sincere and respectful dialogue”.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said on Monday there was no evident justification for the US to attack Cuba.

“The ability to defend oneself does not mean the right to intervene militarily in other states when their political systems do not match what others might have in mind,” he said.

April 20 (UPI) — Venezuela’s interim president, Delcy Rodríguez, said her government is talking with two major companies to address the country’s power crisis, citing recent diplomatic engagement with the United States.

“Thanks to that diplomatic dialogue, I can say we are now in direct contact with Siemens and General Electric to resolve the electricity problem in Zulia state,” Rodríguez said Sunday during a public event broadcast by state television.

She said the government decided to “open a new chapter in national political life” and in Venezuela’s international relations following a Jan. 3 U>S> military operation that captured President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores.

Analysts say Zulia, a key oil-producing region in western Venezuela, is critical to the country’s hydrocarbons industry. Persistent electricity shortages have limited efforts to boost crude production, making restoration of the power system a strategic priority for economic recovery.

Situated at the western edge of the national grid, Zulia is the last region to receive electricity transmitted from the south. Failures in the transmission network often leave it disconnected. The system in the region operates at less than 40% of installed capacity.

According to local outlet El Tequeño, both companies conducted technical missions in March to assess Venezuela’s electrical infrastructure and present rehabilitation proposals.

The inspections included hydroelectric facilities in the Bajo Caroní complex in Bolívar state, following a February visit to Caracas by U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright.

Rodríguez made the remarks at the launch of a 13-day pilgrimage she called to demand the full lifting of economic sanctions imposed on Venezuela.

“Enough sanctions against the noble Venezuelan people,” she said, addressing the governments of the United States and Europe, according to Globovisión. She added that economic freedom is a sovereign right, not a concession from foreign powers.

The mobilizations began in Zulia, Amazonas and Táchira states and were led by Rodríguez, National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez and ruling party leader Diosdado Cabello.

International sanctions have worsened Venezuela’s electricity crisis by limiting access to financing and technology needed to maintain and upgrade infrastructure.

A partial easing of U.S. sanctions on the oil and mining sectors has opened the door to talks with companies such as Siemens and General Electric to address those gaps.

Madrid, Spain – Venezuela’s opposition leader Maria Corina Machado is aligned with Spain’s main right-wing party on its economic visions, but they are divided by social issues such as abortion, analysts say.

On a visit to Spain this weekend, Machado chose to snub an invitation to meet Socialist Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez and the left-wing coalition government officials.

The Nobel Peace Prize winner said she had chosen not to meet Sanchez because he was hosting a summit of left-wing leaders from Latin America in Barcelona.

“What has transpired in the past few hours at the meeting held in Barcelona with various political leaders from different countries is proof that such a meeting was not advisable,” Machado told a meeting in Madrid on Saturday.

Instead, she held a series of meetings with leaders from the opposition conservative People’s Party (PP) and the far-right Vox party.

Machado received a rapturous welcome from Alberto Nunez Feijoo, the PP party leader and Venezuelan emigres in Madrid, on Friday.

On Saturday, the Venezuelan opposition leader met Isabel Diaz Ayuso, the populist conservative Madrid regional leader, one of Sanchez’s fiercest critics and a possible rival to Feijoo.

Ayuso presented Madrid’s gold medal to Machado, while Madrid’s Mayor Jose Luis Martinez-Almeida – also of the PP – handed her the keys to the city before a rally with Venezuelan supporters.

Machado also met Santiago Abascal, the leader of Vox, in the Spanish capital.

Feijoo praised how Machado had championed freedom even at the cost of going into hiding in Venezuela away from her family.

“Spain knows well the value of freedom; it cost us dearly to obtain it. The generations of our parents and grandparents know what it is to live without freedom. That is why we cannot look the other way,” Feijoo said.

What divides Venezuela and Spain’s opposition?

Despite the cordial welcome, there are significant differences between Machado and Feijoo, commentators said.

A liberal conservative, who has said she is an admirer of Margaret Thatcher, Machado has been dubbed Venezuela’s “Iron Lady”.

She moved from the right politically to the centre-ground during the 2024 presidential campaign to attract voters in the middle ground.

As a conservative, Machado heads a Venezuelan opposition that is split and which also contains more liberal factions.

In contrast, Feijoo heads a well-organised conservative political party, which has only recently suffered divisions after the formation of the hard-right Vox party in 2013, analysts said.

Carlos Malamud, an expert on Latin America at the Real Elcano Institute, a think tank in Madrid, said the structure of both opposition groups was different.

“Machado is the leader of a small, disorganised opposition, while Feijoo is the head of the PP, which is a well-organised national political party,” he told Al Jazeera.

Malamud said Machado did not demonstrate the traits of a would-be Venezuelan president by refusing to see Sanchez.

“If Machado wants to be the president of Venezuela next year, she needs to be prepared to meet the head of the Spanish government, whoever that may be,” he explained.

“Perhaps the Venezuelan opposition sees the Spanish Socialist Party as being allied to (former Spanish prime minister) Jose Rodriguez Zapatero.”

Zapatero has played a controversial role in acting as a mediator between Spain and the government of former Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, who was abducted by the United States in January.

Maduro faces charges of narcoterrorism, conspiracy to commit narcoterrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering and corruption, which he denies.

Machado ‘more conservative’ on social issues

Malamud said one factor which unites Machado and Feijoo is that they came from political systems which suffered from polarisation.

“Venezuelan politics is the same as Cuban politics, or like Spanish. They all suffer from the same degree of polarisation,” he added.

Ana Ayuso, an investigator in Latin American affairs at the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, said Machado shared the liberal economic theories of Feijoo, but they differed on social issues.

“She is in favour of freedom of trade and a small state, so she is quite liberal on economic affairs like Feijoo,” Ayuso told Al Jazeera.

“She is also closer to Isabel Diaz Ayuso in terms of economics, in terms of free trade and the participation of the state.”

“However, she is more conservative when it comes to social issues. Machado is against abortion, and religious affairs are important to her. She is close to the [Roman] Catholic Church. Feijoo supports the right to abortion.”

In an interview in 2024 with Spanish newspaper El Pais, Machado said she was against abortion but in favour of changing the law in Venezuela to allow abortion in cases of rape.

At present, the law in Venezuela allows abortion only when there is a risk to the life of the mother or child. Otherwise, it is illegal and can carry a jail sentence of up to two years.

“Machado does not have any similarities with Vox. Venezuela does not have a problem with immigration. Emigration is the problem,” added Ayuso.

She said the Venezuelan opposition leader had initially been a staunch supporter of US President Donald Trump, but he had shunned her in support of Delcy Rodriguez, the acting Venezuelan president.

Machado was now closer to Marco Rubio, the US secretary of state, who supported her cause within the MAGA movement, she added.

Maria Corina Machado gave Trump her Nobel Peace Prize after the US leader captured Nicolas Maduro.

Venezuela’s main opposition leader Maria Corina Machado says she has “no regrets” about giving US President Donald Trump her Nobel Peace Prize medal.

Machado, the 2025 recipient of the prestigious prize, presented the medal that accompanies the prize to Trump when she met him at the White House in January, two weeks after he ordered US special forces to seize Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro from Caracas.

Trump’s military operation to remove Maduro, who is currently detained in the US facing drug trafficking charges, is “something we Venezuelans will never forget”, she was quoted by AFP news agency as saying at a conference in Madrid on Saturday.

“There is a leader in the world, a head of state in the world, who risked the lives of his country’s citizens for Venezuela’s freedom,” she said.

Trump, who has long publicly coveted the Nobel Peace Prize, called Machado’s presentation of the medal at the time a “wonderful gesture of mutual respect”.

The Norwegian Nobel Committee, which honoured Machado for her tireless campaign to restore democratic rights in Venezuela and her struggle to achieve a peaceful transition from authoritarian rule, made clear after the handover that the prize is nontransferable and cannot be revoked, shared or transferred to others.

Machado, who had been living in hiding before leaving Venezuela in December to collect her prize in Oslo, said she was coordinating her return to the country with Washington.

US key to ‘democratic transition’

“I am speaking with the US government, and we are working in coordination, with mutual respect and understanding,” she said, adding that she believed Washington was “key to advancing a democratic transition” in Venezuela.

Trump has, however, publicly questioned Machado’s standing, calling her a “very nice woman” but saying she lacks “respect” within Venezuela. He has instead backed Maduro’s former vice president, Delcy Rodriguez, as the country’s interim leader.

Venezuela’s opposition last week called for presidential elections. Machado, who was banned from running in the disputed 2024 vote that returned Maduro to power, has not yet said whether she would stand in a future poll.

While in Spain, Machado declined a meeting with Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez, citing his hosting of a progressive leaders’ summit in Barcelona as proof the meeting was “not advisable”. Sanchez had said he was willing to meet her at any time.

This snub comes in contrast to her frequent encounters with Sanchez’s right-wing opponents.

Caracas, April 15, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued two new general licenses on Tuesday facilitating transactions with Venezuelan state institutions.

 for Venezuela on Tuesday: a commercial license (No. 56) and a financial license (No. 57), signaling a partial easing of restrictions while maintaining key controls.

General License 56 (GL56) authorizes US entities to negotiate and sign “contingent contracts” for future commercial operations in Venezuela. This allows firms to move forward with agreements, investments, or projects, though their final execution remains subject to separate OFAC approval.

The waiver maintains important restrictions, including a ban on payments in gold or cryptocurrencies, as well as prohibitions on transactions involving China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and Cuba. It likewise forbids transactions involving Venezuelan debt and does not unblock currently frozen Venezuelan assets.

For its part, General License 57 (GL57) permits a broad range of financial operations with the Venezuelan Central Bank (BCV), as well as Venezuela’s public banks: Banco de Venezuela, Banco Digital de los Trabajadores, Banco del Tesoro, and entities in which these institutions hold a 50 percent or greater stake.

The allowed transactions include opening and managing accounts, conducting US dollar transfers, issuing loans, and providing banking services. The BCV was sanctioned in April 2019, effectively isolating Venezuela from international financial circuits and increasing costs for basic transactions.

The latest sanctions waivers are expected to facilitate financial flows to the Venezuelan economy, including the transfer of Venezuelan oil revenues that are currently controlled by the Trump administration. US authorities have returned a confirmed US $500 million out of an initial deal estimated at $2 billion, while US and Venezuelan officials have confirmed the purchase of US-manufactured medicines and hospital equipment using Venezuelan funds.

Analyst Hermes Pérez warned that reincorporation into the SWIFT system and establishment of US-based accounts could take several months due to security and technological requirements. Other economists argued that GL57 could allow the Central Bank to stabilize the Venezuelan foreign exchange system.

For several years, a parallel exchange rate between the US dollar and the Venezuelan bolívar has coexisted with the official one set by the Central Bank, often with a gap above 50 percent that fueled distortions in retail activities and currency speculation.

Since the January 3 military strikes and kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, the Trump administration has issued several licenses to expand US influence in the Caribbean nation, particularly in key economic sectors such as hydrocarbons and mining.

In parallel, Venezuelan authorities have promoted several pro-business reforms, while multiple Trump officials and corporate executives have come the South American country and held meetings with the acting government led by Delcy Rodríguez.

The latest waivers coincided with the visit to Caracas of a US Department of Energy delegation led by Assistant Secretary Kyle Haustveit. Rodríguez hosted the official on Wednesday in a work meeting at the presidential palace.

During a short, televised intervention, Rodríguez argued that OFAC licenses do not provide sufficient “legal certainty” and reiterated calls for Trump to lift unilateral coercive measures against the country.

“An investor requires greater legal certainty. A license does not provide long-term legal guarantees because it is subject to temporality,” she argued. Rodríguez claimed Washington and Caracas have “enough maturity” to establish “long-term” energy cooperation ties.

“We are working very hard on changes that can attract investment, and which can build an energy cooperation agenda with the United States,” she said.

Rodríguez additionally disclosed recent meetings with representatives from ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips, stating that authorities have “taken into account recommendations” from oil majors in recent legislative overhauls. Both ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips refused to accept hydrocarbon reforms under former President Hugo Chávez in the 2000s, later securing multi-billion-dollar arbitration awards against the Caracas as compensation for the nationalization of their assets.

Haustveit and the Energy Department delegation were also present on Monday during the signing of agreements with Chevron that granted the Texas-based conglomerate an increased stake in the Petroindependencia joint venture and awarded an additional extra-heavy crude bloc for exploration to the Petropiar mixed company. Chevron owns minority stakes in both joint enterprises with Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA.

Shell, Eni and Repsol are among the other energy giants to have recently advanced in deals with the Venezuelan government under the improved conditions of the new Hydrocarbon Law.

US Chargé d’Affaires in Venezuela Laura Dogu was also present at the Chevron deal-signing ceremony and the meeting with Haustveit’s delegation. However, the White House announced Wednesday that her post will be taken over by veteran diplomat John Barrett.

Barrett, who previously served as chargé d’affaires at the US Embassy in Guatemala since January 21, 2026, was recently accused by Guatemalan President Bernardo Arévalo of interference during judicial elections for the Constitutional Court held in March.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

Police pushed back protesters in Venezuela’s capital as they demanded an increase to the minimum wage of 130 bolivars ($0.27) per month. Earlier this week, Venezuela’s interim president, Delcy Rodriguez, promised ‘a responsible increase’ in salaries by May 1, but didn’t disclose the amount.

Caracas, April 9, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez announced a series of upcoming reforms concerning Venezuela’s labor, tax, and pension frameworks during a press conference on Wednesday, April 8. 

Addressing her cabinet at Miraflores Presidential Palace, Rodríguez unveiled the creation of a commission made up of representatives from the state, business sector, active workers, and pensioners to “review labor conditions, address precariousness, and strengthen the social security system.”

Rodríguez acknowledged deficiencies in areas such as working hours, vacation benefits, and pensions, arguing that the present social security system is not sustainable due to insufficient contributions from active workers and the private sector.

The acting president disclosed an upcoming increase to workers’ incomes on May 1, but did not specify if it would come in the form of an adjusted minimum wage or non-wage bonuses. Rodríguez warned that salary adjustments must be “responsible” so that they do not trigger inflation.

Venezuelan authorities have discussed the prospect of reforming the 2012 Labor Law for several months, installing several dialogue commissions and public debates.

The existing labor law, approved by former President Hugo Chávez, prohibits unfair dismissal and outsourcing, enshrines the world’s third-longest maternity leave, guarantees the right to work for both women and people with disabilities, and extends retirement pensions to all workers, including full-time mothers and the self-employed. However, trade unions have pointed out that state institutions and the Labor Ministry have reduced their enforcement of the law in recent years.

Rodríguez’s public broadcast came hours before workers and unions staged a mobilization in Caracas demanding higher wages, improved working conditions, and the repeal of statutes that suspended several collective bargaining rights. In recent protests, workers have called for an end to the government’s bonus-based wage policy and the restoration of collective bargaining agreements.

Venezuela’s minimum wage has remained unchanged since March 2022 at 130 bolívares per month—equivalent at the time to around US $30 but presently worth approximately $0.27 at the official exchange rate.

With the economy heavily constrained by US sanctions, the Venezuelan government relied on non-wage bonuses—paid in bolívares but pegged at a fixed US dollar amount. A recent increase took the so-called Economic War Bonus, paid to public sector employees, to $150 a month. Coupled to a $40 food bonus, it brought the floor income to $190.

Public sector retirees and pensioners receive $130 and $60 Economic War bonuses, and do not access the food bonus.

For their part, business sector representatives have demanded changes to the labor law that reduce costs for employers before any adjustment to the minimum wage. Amid ongoing discussions with the International Labour Organization (ILO), private sector organizations proposed modifying Article 122 of the Labor Law, which establishes that severance payments are calculated based on the last salary earned by the worker.

Tax reform and state asset review

Rodríguez also announced the immediate convening of a National Economic Council tasked with designing a more “efficient” tax model aimed at making Venezuela “more competitive.”

“I hope that this council can produce a new tax model that can generate consensus among the different economic sectors in the country,” the Venezuelan leader stressed. 

She further enacted the Law on Streamlining and Optimization of Administrative Procedures, previously approved by the National Assembly, which seeks to modernize public administration by reducing bureaucracy and incorporating digital tools. According to Rodríguez, the law grants the executive authority to eliminate procedures, shorten timelines, and improve coordination between institutions.

In addition, she ordered the creation of a mixed commission to evaluate which state-owned assets have “strategic” importance, potentially opening some to private investment. However, she clarified that the hydrocarbons sector will remain under state control. The Cisneros group, one of Venezuela’s largest conglomerates, recently announced plans to raise funds ahead of an “expected wave of privatizations.”

The Venezuelan acting administration’s wholesale reform plans follow a recent pro-business overhaul of the Hydrocarbon Law in late January. The South American country’s National Assembly is likewise close to approving a new Mining Law with the goal of attracting foreign investment for extractive activities.

On Wednesday, Rodríguez additionally called for reforms to the country’s housing laws, claiming that there are half a million “frozen” properties presently that could be incorporated into the real estate market.

The acting president’s final announcement was a nationwide “pilgrimage” scheduled from April 19, Venezuela’s Independence Day, to May 1 to demand the lifting of US unilateral coercive measures against the Caribbean nation. While the Trump administration has issued selective and restrictive licenses to favor the participation of Western companies in the Venezuelan oil and mining sectors, wide-reaching sanctions remain in place.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

Mérida, April 8, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Energy multinational Shell is reportedly in advanced negotiations with the Venezuelan government to expand its operations in the country’s offshore natural gas fields

According to Reuters, the London-based oil and gas giant is seeking rights to exploit four major fields in Venezuelan waters near the maritime border with Trinidad and Tobago.

Shell wants to move beyond the 4.2 trillion cubic feet (tcf) Dragon field project, which it is set to develop alongside Trinidad’s National Gas Company (NGC) after receiving a 30-year license from the Venezuelan government in December 2023.

The company is currently targeting three additional fields that, together with Dragon, comprise the Mariscal Sucre project: Río Caribe, Patao, and Mejillones. The four fields represent approximately 12 tcf of reserves combined.

Shell likewise aims to accelerate operations in the 7.3 tcf Loran field, which forms part of the Loran-Manatee cross-border reservoir with Trinidad. The firm is already developing the Manatee side in Trinidadian waters, and spokespeople referred to Loran, which remains largely untapped, as an “attractive investment opportunity.” 

If the deals are finalized, Shell would gain access to a combined resource base of approximately 20 tcf of Venezuelan natural gas, with plans to process it into liquefied natural gas (LNG) in Trinidadian facilities.

Shell CEO Wael Sawan stated during the late March CERAWeek conference in Houston that the company could reach a final investment decision (FID) on at least two Venezuelan projects “before the end of this year, if afforded the right fiscal and legal frameworks.” Sawan added that there is “a long way to go” before the projects launch but that he was “encouraged” by recent progress.

A primary hurdle in the current negotiations is the status of the Río Caribe and Mejillones fields, which had partial ownership stakes previously assigned to Rosneft and then transferred to Russian state-owned Roszarubezhneft in 2020. Both fields have remained largely untouched.

In a statement to Reuters, a Shell spokesperson confirmed that the Russian part-ownership is “a problem” but expressed confidence in overcoming it.

For its part, the government of Trinidad and Tobago has maintained a supportive stance toward the integration of Venezuelan gas into its domestic infrastructure. Port of Spain possesses significant idle capacity at its Atlantic LNG facility, partly owned by Shell, due to declining domestic production in recent years.

The Trinidadian Energy Chamber recently expressed optimism that the expanded Shell projects in Venezuelan waters would “boost [Trinidadian] exports and generate much-needed foreign currency.”

However, the recent negotiations have drawn internal scrutiny. Former Energy Minister Kevin Ramnarine noted that while the deals will benefit Trinidad’s LNG exports, it effectively transitions the country into a gas importer.

The acceleration of talks for natural gas concession projects in Venezuelan waters follows the January 2026 reform of the Caribbean nation’s Organic Hydrocarbon Law. The pro-business overhaul granted private corporations significant benefits in terms of reduced fiscal responsibilities and increased control over operations and sales.

In addition to offshore natural gas ventures, Shell additionally signed agreements to take over light and medium-crude projects in the Punta de Mata Division in eastern Venezuela.

For the Dragon Project, the proposed development plan involves drilling subsea wells in Venezuelan waters and tying them to the Hibiscus platform off the north coast of Trinidad. The Loran field is expected to be linked to the Manatee platform.

Alongside Shell, BP had also previously progressed in talks to exploit the Cocuina-Manakin joint field. Both energy corporations recently received US Treasury licenses to negotiate contracts with Caracas under restricted conditions.

The Nicolás Maduro government had suspended all joint natural gas projects with Trinidad in late 2025 after the Kamla Persad-Bissessar government openly supported the Trump administration’s Caribbean military build-up ahead of the January 3 military strikes against Venezuela. Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores were kidnapped by US special forces.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

Why are many Latin American countries shutting down nonprofit organizations? Amnesty International claims it has the answer: in every case, it’s part of a drive to restrict human rights and “tear up the social fabric.”

Amnesty’s new 95-page report (in Spanish, with an English summary), criticizes governments across the political spectrum for attacking what it calls “civil society organizations.” But Amnesty ignores the history of many such organizations and therefore why governments might be justified in closing them.

Here we focus on the report’s deficiencies in relation to Nicaragua, Venezuela (two NGOs interviewed in each) and Cuba (none).

Data-light analysis supports preconceived conclusions

Amnesty’s report is strikingly thin. Unlike many other Amnesty investigations, this one provides scarce case studies or incidents, almost no statistics, few named victims or affected organizations, and little discussion of specific crackdowns. In most cases, substantive content about a particular country is assumed to apply to all countries.

Amnesty conducted interviews with only 15 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) across six countries: Nicaragua, Venezuela, Paraguay, Peru, El Salvador and Ecuador. Its analysis extended to two more, Guatemala and Cuba, where no interviews took place. Yet the six countries alone have around 40,000 NGOs between them, making Amnesty’s sample minuscule. In none of the countries did Amnesty do any direct fieldwork.

Amnesty did not consult with any government sources or individuals close to governments, resulting in a one-sided narrative. According to Amnesty, the issues “should not be interpreted as… differentiation between the countries analyzed.” Thus, countries as politically different as Ecuador and Nicaragua are painted with the same brush.

While claiming to expose the real purpose of these laws, Amnesty fails to explain their political context, despite the widespread and documented use made of NGOs by the US to destabilize countries.

The authors emailed Amnesty with our key criticisms. In a lengthy response, Mariana Marques, Amnesty’s South America Researcher & Advisor, claimed that “the report intentionally prioritizes depth and comparability [between the chosen countries].” However, this is difficult to accept given that the report’s sweeping generalizations are mechanically applied to all six.

The authors also asked Amnesty if they had considered evidence that NGOs in Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba have indeed engaged in political activities – that would very likely be illegal in Western countries such as the US? Did they consider whether allegations that NGOs provoked political violence or other criminal activities might be true? In response, Ms. Marques wrote: “The report does not adjudicate case‑by‑case allegations about individual organizations.”

Nevertheless, the report apparently identified “selective enforcement” and “sanctions” that were “disproportionate.” But how could they reach an impartial judgment on the fairness of a government’s actions without considering whether the alleged infractions might have actually occurred?

Destabilization claims go unexamined

If governments justify their laws as efforts to halt foreign-funded destabilization, surely Amnesty should ask whether such claims have merit. Here are some examples that Amnesty might have considered:

• In Cuba, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) spent $15.5 million from 2009 through 2012 running “civil society” programs aimed at secretly stirring up anti-government activism. Then in just one year (2020), the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) – a reported CIA cutout itself masquerading as an NGO even though it is largely funded by the US government – financed 40 civil-society projects in Cuba with sums up to $650,000. According to the Cuban government, these groups were directly involved in violent demonstrations that affected Cuba in July 2021.

• In Nicaragua, which suffered a major coup attempt in 2018, Global Americans reported that the NED was “laying the groundwork for insurrection” even as the violence was taking place. NED and other bodies bragged to Congress about their regime-change efforts, and the Council on Hemispheric Affairs described in detail how NGOs indoctrinated young Nicaraguans.

• In Venezuela, USAID corroborated the use of NGOs to further US regime-change activities; since 2017 it provided “more than $158 million in humanitarian aid in Venezuela” through questionably “impartial” organizations.

Well-substantiated examples of Washington’s huge investment, extending over many years, to create or infiltrate NGOs in the three countries and use them to provoke anti-government violence, were of no interest to Amnesty researchers.

Rather, the report focuses on restrictions on access to foreign funding, which allegedly have “chilling effects on legitimate human‑rights work.” Amnesty’s refusal to “map individual donors” prevents scrutiny about the purpose of Washington’s funding for NGOs, which are often framed in vague terms such as “promoting democracy” or “strengthening civic society.”

Had the researchers talked to actual NGOs doing humanitarian work, they might have heard testimony such as this one from Rita Di Matiatt with Master Mama, a Venezuelan NGO dedicated to offering support to breastfeeding mothers: “NGOs that conspire against the stability and rights of a nation or its citizens, as well as everything that does not comply with the norms and laws of a country must be held accountable.” Venezuelan National Assembly deputy Julio Chávez expressed concern about such NGO’s working “to generate destabilization.”

And, indeed, the current NED president, Damon Wilson, recently confirmed that Nicaragua, Cuba and Venezuela are his highest priorities in the region.

Comparison with other countries

Amnesty claims a “global” trend toward laws resembling Russia’s “foreign agents” legislation. However, a more relevant comparison is the US Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) which is really the model.

The US has some of the world’s strongest and most detailed regulatory powers governing NGOs. Indeed, the US typically closes around 44,000 nonprofits annually that fail to comply. This is not unusual. The Charity Commission in Britain closes around 4,000 nonprofits each year. New regulations have led to large-scale closures in India, Turkey, South Africa and elsewhere.

Washington’s foreign agents act is not unique: The Library of Congress has examples of 13 countries with similar legislation. In Britain, the government has consulted on the introduction of a “Foreign Influence Registration Scheme,” which is similar to FARA, as are regulations which apply in the European Union.

However, it does not suit Amnesty’s narrative to make comparisons with Western countries that might caste the laws in Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela in a different light.

Amnesty’s longstanding bias

Amnesty has a long history of bias against countries such as Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua. Ecuadorian-Canadian journalist Joe Emersberger documents how Amnesty minimizes the impact of US sanctions – illegal under international law – which target all three countries.

While Amnesty refused to recognize Nelson Mandella as a prisoner of conscious, because he failed to renounce violence in self-defense against the South African apartheid regime, Amnesty readily bestowed the honor on Leopoldo López, who fomented a number of violent coup attempts in Venezuela.

María Corina Machado is arguably Amnesty’s most lauded Venezuelan. Her legitimacy is based largely on her victory in an opposition primary. However, the contest was conducted by her personal NGO, Súmate, rather than the official Venezuelan electoral authority as is customary. This is relevant to NGO law, because Súmate received NED funds. Machado won that privately run primary by an incredible 92% landslide in a crowded field of eight candidates. When the runner-up, Carlos Prosperi, cried fraud, the ballots were destroyed to prevent an audit of the vote.

Camilo Mejia, a US military resistor and an Amnesty “prisoner of conscience,” published an open letter expressing his “unequivocal condemnation of Amnesty International with regards to the destabilizing role it has played in Nicaragua, my country of birth.”

Amnesty has long been accused of bias on an international scale. Journalist Alexander Rubinstein documented Amnesty’s collaboration with US and UK intelligence agencies dating back to the 1960s. Francis A. Boyle, human rights law professor and founding Amnesty board member, observed: “You will find a self-perpetuating clique of co-opted Elites who deliberately shape and direct the work of AI and AIUSA so as to either affirmatively support, or else not seriously undercut, the imperial, colonial, and genocidal policies of the United States, Britain, and Israel.”

NGOs and the “human rights industry”

Alfred de Zayas, former UN independent human rights expert, argues in The Human Rights Industry that there are few fields that are “as penetrated and corrupted by intelligence services” as NGOs. “The level of NGO interference in the internal affairs of states and their destabilizing impact on the constitutional order has become so prevalent that more and more countries have adopted… legislation to control this ‘invasion’ of foreign interests, or simply to ban them.”

While de Zayas recognizes Amnesty International when it does good work, he points out that in Latin America it ignores the struggle of sovereign nations “to shake off the yoke of US domination.” In a general comment that might apply specifically to Amnesty’s Tearing Up the Social Fabric, de Zayas condemns “entire reports… compiled from accounts of US-backed opposition groups.”

Nicaragua-based writer John Perry publishes in the London Review of Books, FAIR, CovertAction and elsewhere. Roger D. Harrisis with the Task Force on the Americas and the Venezuela Solidarity Network. Both authors are active with the Nicaragua Solidarity Coalition.

The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelanalysis editorial staff.

Caracas, April 2, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The US Treasury Department removed Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) “Specially Designated Nationals” list on Wednesday, April 1.

Rodríguez had been on the list since 2018. The sanctioned individuals are barred from any sort of economic or financial relationship with US entities and have any US-based assets frozen.

The Venezuelan acting head of state reacted to the decision with a message on her X account, calling it “a step in the direction of normalizing and strengthening relations between our countries.”

Rodríguez added that she is confident this step will lead to the lifting of all sanctions currently in place against Venezuela “in order to guarantee an effective binational cooperation agenda” that benefits both Washington and Caracas. In recent weeks, the Trump administration has issued licenses allowing Western corporations to engage with the Venezuelan energy and mining sectors, but wide-reaching coercive measures remain in place.

The US government targeted Rodríguez in September 2018, Trump’s first presidential term, alleging that the then–vice president was part of a group that contributed “to the destruction of democracy.” The same round of sanctions targeted First Lady and Deputy Cilia Flores, as well as Vladimir Padrino López and Jorge Rodríguez, who respectively served as defense and communications ministers at the time.

Delcy Rodríguez denounced the 2018 measures as “illegal” and “unjust,” arguing that they were part of an “economic blockade” that undermined her country’s right to food, health, and sovereignty.

The Venezuelan leader’s sanctions removal opens the door for direct engagement with US entities and multilateral organizations such as the IMF. Creditors have likewise expressed intentions to launch renegotiation efforts surrounding Venezuela’s sizable foreign debt.

The Trump administration’s move comes on the heels of a fast-tracked rapprochement with Washington that Rodríguez has spearheaded since the January 3 attacks and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro. Rodríguez, who took over the acting presidency, has hosted a number of high‑ranking US officials, among them Trump Energy Secretary Chris Wright.

Similarly, last week Rodríguez took part via videoconference in a business gathering in Miami organized by Saudi Arabia’s Future Investment Initiative Institute. During her address, she touted the country’s recent pro-business reforms and urged investors to come to Venezuela.

Caracas and Washington formally reestablished diplomatic ties on March 5, with the Trump administration recognizing the acting president as Venezuela’s “sole” leader days later.

Regaining control of CITGO

The lifting of coercive measures against the Venezuelan acting president raised the possibility of the Rodríguez acting government retaking control of US-based assets that had been frozen and placed under the control of the hardline opposition. According to Reuters, Venezuelan authorities are preparing to take control of the boards of directors of the US subsidiaries of state oil company PDVSA, including refiner CITGO. However, the US State Department must also sign off on the appointments.

This past March, PDVSA’s board ratified Asdrúbal Chávez, cousin of the late Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, as director of all its US subsidiaries. Nonetheless, Chávez, who was previously denied a US visa to run Houston-based CITGO, has been unable to manage the companies for more than seven years.

CITGO has been administered since 2019 by boards of directors appointed by a defunct Venezuelan opposition‑led National Assembly whose term expired in January 2021. The company, which is Venezuela’s most valuable foreign asset, underwent a long and protracted court-mandated auction to satisfy creditor demands which concluded with a winning bid from vulture fund Elliott Management.

The CITGO sale requires a US Treasury license in order to conclude. The Trump administration has not publicly disclosed whether it will greenlight or halt the ownership transfer.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

On paper, the case is easy to make. The world’s largest proven oil reserves, a sector being reopened to private capital, sanctions that are no longer absolute but conditional, negotiable. There are new laws, new guarantees, new language around arbitration and contract security. For the first time in years, there is something that looks like a framework, perhaps even a government that exercises absolute power over the country while operating under US tutelage.

And yet, the expected cash tsunami remains elusive. This is because the people who would actually have to write the checks are not asking whether the opportunity is real, but whether it will still exist by the time it matters. No amount of lobbying or PR trips can compensate for almost 30 years of arbitrary abuses. After all, Delcy Rodríguez is not the first chavista “president” to court the private sector or offer guarantees.

The problem is not political risk in the abstract. It is that the legal environment investors are being asked to trust has not meaningfully changed. Judges remain largely unchecked, and contracts are still only as strong as the political relationships behind them. The closest thing to a guarantee is not an institution, but proximity: “I know a guy, who knows a guy, who knows Delcy.”

That may be enough to get a deal signed. It is not enough to guarantee the kind of long-term, multibillion-dollar investment Delcy needs.

Retroactive illegitimacy

There is also the question of who is actually making those commitments. The current governing arrangement, even with partial recognition from Washington, remains the residue of a deeply contested and improvised system. Its authority may be tolerated, even engaged with, but it is not settled. That matters, because any agreement reached today carries the risk of being revisited tomorrow, not necessarily by a hostile regime, but by future jurists attempting to unwind the ambiguities of the present. In other words, the risk is not just expropriation, but retroactive illegitimacy.

And then there is the country itself. The initial shock of alignment with the United States has created a perception of stabilization, but that perception rests on thin ground. Discontent is not ideological, it is material. Power rationing continues to shape daily life. The bolívar remains structurally weak, its periodic stabilizations undone by recurring cycles of depreciation. For most Venezuelans, the promised improvement in living conditions, expected to follow from these inflows, has yet to materialize in any meaningful way.

What investors are being asked to underwrite, then, is not just a country in transition, but a society that has not yet felt that transition in any tangible sense. That gap matters, because it is in that gap where pressure builds.

Contingency is not change

And even if one is willing to accept all of that, there is the question few are prepared to answer directly: what happens in two years?

The current opening in Venezuela is not just tied to internal dynamics. It is deeply contingent on a specific political configuration in Washington. A different administration, with different priorities, could decide that Venezuela no longer warrants the same level of attention, resources, or political cover. The approach taken by Donald Trump has been unusually direct. There is no guarantee that what follows will resemble it.

That matters more than investors tend to admit. Because what is being built today is not a self-sustaining system, but a politically supported one.

Under those conditions, the risk is not simply policy reversal. It is systemic drift. The incentives that currently bind the government to external actors can weaken, and with them, the logic that sustains the present arrangement. That does not require a dramatic rupture. Only time.

There is a way to make sense of this, and it requires going back, not forward. In structural terms, Venezuela today resembles 2017. Not in its specifics, but in the nature of the moment. Back then, the country hovered between sustained pressure that could force an opening, and a system learning in real time how to absorb that pressure and consolidate power instead. For a time, it was not clear which way it would go.

Until it became clear that the system had adapted faster than the pressure could escalate. What looked like a moment of transition became, instead, a lesson in survival. That is the part of 2017 that tends to be forgotten, not the protests, but the outcome.

What makes the current moment difficult to read is that it carries a similar ambiguity. There is an opening, but it is partial. There is pressure, but it is uneven. There are signals that point in different directions at once. Engagement with external actors, selective liberalization, a degree of flexibility that did not exist a few years ago. But none of that resolves the underlying question.

Is this the beginning of a transition, or another iteration of adaptation?

For investors, that distinction is more than academic. It determines whether the current opening represents a structural shift, or simply a temporary configuration that will be absorbed, reworked, and eventually reversed. Venezuela has already shown that it can look like it is about to change, while in fact learning how not to. Ultimately, this question is likely to be the one that holds meaningful investment back.

Unchecked power

There is, underlying many of these conversations, a quieter assumption that rarely gets stated outright. That under the right conditions, a system like Venezuela’s can be made to work. That a centralized authority, aligned with external actors and supported by technocratic management, can deliver stability without resolving deeper political contradictions. The long-held fantasy of the benevolent strongman.

It is an attractive idea. It is also one that Venezuela has consistently disproven.

The problem is not simply that power is concentrated, but that it is unconstrained. In such a system, predictability does not come from strength, but from rules. When those rules are absent, even proximity to power stops being a reliable safeguard.

The recent arrest of Wilmer Ruperti is a reminder of that. Ruperti was not an outsider testing the limits of the system. He was deeply embedded within it. If anything, he represents the kind of relationship many investors assume can mitigate risk.

And yet, under conditions of unchecked authority, those relationships can be redefined overnight.

In practice, this often produces the opposite of what investors expect, a system where decisions are centralized but not necessarily stable, and where alliances are strong until they are not.

Under these conditions, Venezuela does not favor all investors equally. It favors those who can operate within political constraints, tolerate legal ambiguity, and adjust quickly if those constraints shift. It is less hospitable to actors whose models depend on enforceable contracts, long time horizons, and institutional continuity.

Venezuela is not uninvestable, but it is not becoming normal either.

What is taking shape is something more ambiguous. It is open enough to transact and stable enough to operate in the short term, but uncertain in ways that are harder to measure. The legal framework remains contingent, the political authority behind it is still contested, and the external backing that sustains it is, by definition, temporary.

That does not eliminate opportunity, it defines it. Under those conditions, the question is not whether Venezuela works, but for whom, for how long, and under what assumptions about continuity that may not survive the life of the investment.

In that sense, the risk is not only that things go wrong, but that the terms under which they work are never fully settled.