Venezuela

A new deal between Caracas and Washington would give US companies access to more than a fifth of Venezuela’s vast oil reserves.

But there’s opposition in Venezuela, as well as debate about whether the plan is legal.

What could the agreement mean?

Presenter: Tom McRae

Guests:

Jose Chalhoub – political risk and oil analyst

Cornelia Meyer – commodity specialist and CEO of Meyer Resources

Francisco Rodriguez – senior research fellow at the Center for Economic and Policy Research at the University of Denver, former head of the Economic and Financial Advisory of the Venezuelan National Assembly

The trajectory of the political transition that many Venezuelans await since January 3 seems to have been clarifying over the past few weeks. The first expected milestone is the reform of the Supreme Court of Justice, although it remains to be seen how many of the new magistrates will be independent and how many tied to factions of the chavista elite. The expectation is that, before the end of the year, the agenda will include a new board of rectors for the CNE and the long-awaited electoral calendar. In Panama, María Corina Machado had opened to negotiating these matters directly with Delcy Rodríguez, but the United States decided to manage the institutional opening through a small group of opposition figures, former lawmakers from Primero Justicia and Voluntad Popular in the 2015 National Assembly. The discomfort of Machado and her inner circle with this decision is no secret. The opposition leader has stated that she does not intend to stand in the way. Individuals linked to her team and party have raised doubts about the negotiation’s initial legitimacy and early progress, while other longtime opposition figures have welcomed the recent releases of political prisoners and the roadmap the US has outlined.

At Caracas Chronicles, we sat down to talk with Guillermo Aveledo Coll, a political scientist, expert in Venezuelan political history, and researcher of the ideas that have shaped its parties and conflicts. Aveledo views the unfolding dialogue favorably. He believes general elections must take place in Venezuela as soon as possible, though not without first tying up loose ends related to the broad recognition of any electoral process and the stability of future governments. He also discussed the dynamics that could emerge among political parties amid a transition, both within the anti-chavista camp and inside the chavista movement. Much like Marco Rubio in January, he made reference to the Spanish Transition. Finally, he reflected on our last transition to democracy (1958–1968) and how Rómulo Betancourt and Acción Democrática adapted to move forward in the face of adversity.

Recently, María Corina Machado used a term typical in transition frameworks. She said that the transition to democracy cannot be an elite pact made behind the people’s backs and without a popular mandate. Does the agenda unfolding between a commission of the Delcy government and the Delegated Commission of the old 2015 National Assembly fall into the category of an elite pact? You have been a defender of the legacy of the Puntofijo Pact. Is an elite pact problematic in these particular circumstances?

What we are seeing, which points embryonically toward an elite agreement, will have to be filtered through the will of the population, because the ultimate source of legitimacy in a democratic republic passes through it. The Puntofijo Pact was a concrete agreement on political rules among parties. However, had those parties lacked inherent legitimacy and a firm foothold, those rules might have overwhelmed them. In those elections, an independent candidate backed by one of the historic parties, Rear Admiral Wolfgang Larrazábal, obtained a very high percentage of the vote and came in second. So it could very well have been something that surpassed them, that swallowed them up.

Venezuela will need elections. It also needs the freedoms and guarantees for those elections to take place. Not because winning them without those guarantees is impossible, but because the opposition’s victories haven’t been recognized without them, while a government win leaves reasonable doubts regarding legitimacy. And if a fundamental actor in that social recognition, María Corina Machado, remains sidelined, there is all the more reason. But that alone does not fix the system; once an agreement on guarantees, freedoms, and institutional restructuring is reached to allow a new electoral process, we will be talking about another stage—the delicate process of Venezuela’s redemocratization.

Moving on to the US and the difference between what Marco Rubio says, for example, and what Machado says. I believe the US approach, at least initially, was to seek a more gradual path. Machado rejects gradualism, connecting with majorities desperate for improvements in their day-to-day lives. Do you view gradualism as desirable in this case, or does it bring risks?

Right now, it is not a matter of desirable or undesirable. It must be viewed carefully. What does gradualism mean in this context? If it means the indefinite postponement of elections, then I agree there should be no gradualism. Elections must happen sooner rather than later. Now, must other things happen before elections? Of course. Certain decisions are necessary. For many Venezuelans, the existing electoral institution is neither trustworthy nor advantageous; going to an election feels risky—not so much because of the voting machines or the system itself, but because of the allocation rules, which heavily favor the plurality or the majority.

“If you keep the current allocation system, there will be such complete steamrolling that a significant yet minority sector will find itself far more diminished than political reality dictates.”

They are rules of steamrolling. If you have a 5-4 distribution, the practical result becomes 6-3; if you have a 3-1, it becomes 4 or 4.5 to 1. That poses a problem because we are in a process that did not open through social pressure overthrowing the system. The system is still there, and its existence must be dealt with. Today, the system is making concessions that, propaganda aside, respond to external pressure. Saying that nothing will change and that all this is meaningless is a different matter. If, instead, gradualism means taking the necessary steps to promote those elections so the outcome is recognized and governance is secure, then it is logical. These processes tend to be gradual when they happen.

What should come first: presidential elections, legislative elections, or both at once?

The broader the possibility for popular expression, the better. It is convenient for a new government, of any political line, to have significant parliamentary support. In my view, general elections—or at least national general elections covering national jurisdiction, including overseas voting—are advisable. This would generate two branches of power: the Legislative and the Executive. If we maintain the proportions that society currently suggests, it would likely be a moment of overwhelming majority for one sector over another. Politically, that is not necessarily desirable. What do I mean? For the stability of the present and future process, there needs to be a form of representation closer to the national mindset. Today, the PSUV represents a significant minority, but a smaller one than in other historical moments. We will see how that translates in an environment of freedom, without infringement, and without pressure from the bureaucracy or the State as an employer. Perhaps the result could be different for chavismo now. But relying on polls that indicate a four-to-one or three-to-one gap, if you keep the current allocation system, there will be such complete steamrolling that a significant yet minority sector will find itself far more diminished than political reality dictates.

“It is likely that chavismo as an entity will take various forms and fragment. Is it convenient for it to disappear? I think doing so artificially is dangerous.”

That is not necessarily a good start. Democratic zeal and sectarianism in other transitions have weakened a democracy’s ability to respond and advance—which is ultimately what all democratic sectors want. I prefer a solid democracy with a significant, albeit limited, representation of chavismo over the alternative, simply because of what they represent in political life. Furthermore, remember: they could not be extracted—or rather, removed—from power as a structure. That carries weight. Does that mean I wish for an authoritarian leftist force like chavismo turned out to be at the height of its power? No. I believe there should be a force representing the political identity that chavismo is—as a cultural, political, and ideological identity that existed before fading due to its own dynamics. Who holds the broad banner of chavismo today? I do not know. The ones in Miraflores? I don’t know if they are indisputable figures within that movement, or if the discontent and dismay throughout this period generate fragmentation.

As happened in other transition experiences, the government party sometimes splits once it opens up, gets overtaken, and the opposition takes power. It is probable that chavismo as an entity will take various forms and fragment. Is it convenient for it to disappear? I think doing so artificially is dangerous. From 1945 to 1948, the majority force believed no other party was democratic. That gave us 10 years of harsh dictatorship. I prefer to see chavismo divide around democracy: some supporting the transition and others supporting an authoritarian or violent return to power, allowing us to face them within that framework.

A few years ago, there was much talk about the decline of Venezuelan opposition parties, even the idea that these parties are dead. A set of parties, to an extent heirs to the old two-party system, retain certain references and machinery. What are the challenges for these parties moving forward, beyond the known consequences of prolonged repression and State harassment? Can they grow stronger?

The dynamics will emerge naturally. Obviously, parties retain elements of historical legitimacy, identity, and roots, but a sifting process toward other options is very likely. My desire, of course, is for a party bloc to form around democracy. But then we face the issue of the primus inter pares. María Corina Machado is the leader and the most popular political figure in Venezuela’s recent history—the most individually popular since the death of Chávez. She holds a massive advantage, though that isn’t necessarily true for her party, Vente Venezuela. I don’t mean to diminish Vente’s value. That is why a bloc, agreements, and that collective notion are more suitable. Some argue this spirit broke after the start of negotiations, that the spirit of Panama was lost. I see it more as a pivot toward the direction Panama points. It is not the form the Panama Agreement indicated, but it aligns with the expectations it set. These are not completely unfamiliar actors; an abnormal arrangement is not being forced upon Venezuelan society.

Now, should the parties emerge? That will happen in due time. It took time for the Spanish Right to consolidate after Adolfo Suárez’s UCD and the dissolution of Francoist parties. Those fell into oblivion and later merged into a party representing that world sociologically, which became the People’s Party (PP). In the case of the Spanish Left, the multitude of cacophonous acronyms from the Spanish Civil War and exile sifted into the PSOE, which had the advantage of being a historic party. It didn’t acquire a new personality, but it began gathering people from other parties, both left-liberals and more heterodox leftists. Here, it could very well settle into one, two, or three major parties forming a bloc. What is the concrete difference between Voluntad Popular, Un Nuevo Tiempo, and Acción Democrática in ideological terms? Or between the other Democratic Unity parties and Vente Venezuela? “Oh, Vente is liberal-capitalist and the others are not.” Are the others not pro-market? Let’s be clear, they have been for a long time. It’s not that they are neoliberal, but they aren’t socialist in the sense of nationalizing the means of production. We should keep that in mind.

Regarding the Venezuelan Left, Chávez was the first major charismatic figure linked to that world who swallowed all leftist parties. That is the essence of PSUV. The Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD) and the Unitary Platform positioned themselves as its antithesis: “What unites all of us who hold these ideological differences? The desire for democracy.” What might happen is that a single party—new or distinct—swallows the archipelago of parties that emerged under this system. But it is very probable, as seen in other processes, that a different party system will emerge. What is desirable? That they be democratic parties. What is desirable? That extremist parties, meaning those that do not believe in elections or democracy, can operate legitimately. That would be a danger to them. In its 20-year history, PSUV has opposed pluralism and free, competitive elections; that is how it operated from power. Could it act differently from another perspective? It might, as happened with other parties in different transitions. The PP is an example.

Returning to María Corina, who will likely be a central figure in the upcoming period, I wanted to discuss Rómulo Betancourt, the most prominent figure of our former transition. She once admitted he’s the best president Venezuela ever had. Betancourt both excelled at building consensus during that era and was firm in protecting his State project from extremes. Is he a useful reference point now? What lessons does Betancourt offer María Corina, and what are not lessons?

An important lesson is that he spoke with people who had sent him into exile and prison, admitting them into the new status quo. The only person directly excluded from the system was Pérez Jiménez. Of course, those individuals had also been victimized by the dictatorship, enabling new understandings. With others, Betancourt had built a wall of fire. But in general, he skillfully won over the military and business sectors—building bridges he failed to establish during his first presidency, a lesson in how radicalism can fail. I believe that is a crucial example. Acción Democrática held massive majorities, yet could not sustain its first mandate. In his second term, Betancourt did not take power with an extraordinary majority, yet he gathered more allies. Are the allies of the Unitary Platform enough to support such an administration? If tomorrow there is a National Assembly with an overwhelming majority from a pro-Machado party—whether Vente or another—and the minority or that sector is steamrolled, you will have fewer allies to govern under very difficult circumstances. You may have a non-governing minority, yes, but you will face more discontented voices outside. In that scenario, you should be striving to reconcile.

“What concerns me is that a government led by María Corina—one desired by millions of Venezuelans, including myself—could become unstable because we tried to do too much too soon.”

Of course, there is the idea that reconciliation should be with the masses rather than the elites. Fantastic—I believe that is a genuine aspiration. But one must also consider that part of these sectors belong to those parties. How do the thousands of party militants who helped execute the 2023 primaries or the 2024 voting tally collection feel? Discontent may be brewing there, which does not serve us well. Naturally, demanding total calm and moderation from María Corina—asking her to step away from her historic trajectory—is difficult. Her distrust is not entirely unfounded: major adversaries who have acknowledged her leadership in recent months and years have also acted against her. Perhaps that is why a more institutional coordination between the Unitary Platform and Vente—which I found desirable to allow greater cohesion—never materialized. That places a burden on the parties as well: how much can they demand when their representation is small?

How can an organized Venezuelan society exert influence over this juncture?

By trying to support the possibilities opening up in this scenario, even regarding the most politically committed sectors. The success of the process in Caracas depends largely on restoring, sooner rather than later, the freedoms that allow political dynamics to settle into something genuine and verifiable. It benefits Venezuelan society to lean in that direction. Society must also organize its own demands; democracy requires tolerance and pluralism, but it also requires contestation. There is significant leadership representing that, but society itself must reorganize because organization has been limited and stunted for years—with very few exceptions—by repression and constraints on civil society. Here, I would like to return to María Corina Machado.

Sure, go ahead.

I spoke of Betancourt and what that implies for her, including steadfast leadership. But there is also the need for flexibility toward the Armed Forces and awareness of that function’s demands. That said, María Corina Machado should not be afraid to be herself, to maintain her standard and vision. It has worked well for her so far, despite many problems, risks, and sacrifices. It would feel somewhat pretentious of me to tell her: “Look, María Corina, do this one way or another.” What concerns me is that a government led by her—one desired by millions of Venezuelans, including myself—could become unstable because we tried to do too much too soon.

In what areas do you see risks?

To me, the main risk is having powerful adversaries emboldened by instability and by the difficulty of building consensus around the tough decisions a new government will have to make—serious, ground-breaking decisions that will require broader support. Disregarding support and consensus as unnecessary could become a problem.

Are privatizations a concern for you, or perhaps the issue of justice?

I am concerned about the inability to make the most grave decisions. The privatization of PDVSA is largely advanced through the Hydrocarbons Law; we are heading toward a framework where PDVSA remains significantly reduced. The disarmament or political neutralization of the judiciary is already on the table, so they won’t need to drive that from scratch. But issues of redistribution, labor rights, and State restructuring—deeper discussions where initial instincts may not be fully adequate to foster understanding—could create serious challenges. I do not mean to minimize her support, but popular backing has often failed to prevent adversaries from becoming emboldened and supplanting democracy during historical transitions. And I do not want us to return to an authoritarian system.

US president says deal secures majority US control of more than 65 billion barrels of proven oil reserves in Venezuela.

The United States has struck a deal with Caracas that would give them control of some 65 billion barrels of Venezuela’s proven oil reserves, President Donald Trump has announced, while reviving the OPEC nation’s battered energy industry.

In a post on Truth Social, Trump said the “historic transaction more than doubles American oil reserves” and “will substantially lower gas prices for all Americans”.

“At my direction, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, working closely with Highly Respected Interim President of Venezuela, Delcy Rodriguez, and, through a partnership with private business, have secured majority US control of more than 65 BILLION BARRELS of proven Oil Reserves in Venezuela, at no cost to the American Taxpayer,” Trump wrote.

Venezuela’s interim President Delcy Rodriguez welcomed the deal, which is expected to bring about $209bn to the state’s treasury.

The announcement followed weeks of negotiations over an agreement that would give American companies long-term access to a group of Venezuelan oilfields and guarantee the resulting crude supply to the US.

Venezuelan officials are preparing to sign agreements next week granting new oil exploration and production rights to a number of companies, particularly US firms.

Sources previously told Reuters news agency that a lease model was under consideration, with fields potentially auctioned to US producers, but the arrangement could face legal and constitutional challenges in Venezuela, where the state retains control over core oil industry activities.

The new deal would represent a dramatic expansion of Washington’s role in Venezuela’s oil industry as the Trump administration seeks to revive the country’s production and secure more crude for US refineries. Venezuela holds the world’s largest proven oil reserves, but produces only 1.25 million barrels per day, far below its potential after years of underinvestment, mismanagement and sanctions.

Trump did not disclose the structure of the agreement, the fields or companies involved, nor how the US would exercise majority control over the reserves.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio described the agreement as a win for both countries, saying on X that it would secure stable, low-cost oil for the US and help lower petrol prices.

For Venezuela, Rubio said the deal would bring nearly $100bn in private investment, support thousands of high-paying jobs and help rebuild the country’s economy.

WASHINGTON — President Trump on Friday said the U.S. has entered an agreement with Venezuela to take control of 65 billion barrels of the South American country’s oil reserves.

Trump in a social media post announced the agreement he said was negotiated by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Venezuela’s interim President Delcy Rodríguez.

“The United States of America has just entered into an Agreement with the Country of Venezuela on, THE BIGGEST OIL DEAL IN WORLD HISTORY!” Trump wrote.

The Venezuelan government’s press office did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

The announcement of the deal comes nearly nine months after the U.S. military at Trump’s direction carried out an operation to capture Venezuela’s president Nicolás Maduro and spirit him to the United States to face federal narcoterrorism and drug trafficking charges.

Trump faces mounting pressure to address high gas prices as the war in Iran on Friday reached a six-month milestone with no conclusion in sight. The U.S. has tapped its strategic petroleum reserves, which in early August fell below 300 million barrels, down by more than 100 million barrels since the start of 2026.

The U.S.-Israel war against Iran has led to a dramatic slowdown of Gulf oil moving through the Strait of Hormuz, which about 20% of the world petroleum passed through prior to the conflict.

The average price of gas in the U.S. stood at about $4.09 a gallon on Friday, according to AAA. The average price was $3.21 at the same time last year.

Trump in his social media post Friday evening alluded to the Venezuela deal being part of a private partnership. The White House did not immediately reply to a request for comment about the private sector partners involved in the deal, and details on how the arrangement would work were not provided.

Persuading big American oil companies to return the region could face headwinds given and decades of badly damaged infrastructure.

Days after the ouster of Maduro, Trump gathered oil executives at the White House and called on them to rush back into Venezuela. Executives expressed interest in the opportunity but there was also a measure of caution given their past experience in the country.

Darren Woods, CEO of ExxonMobil, the largest U.S. oil company, said at that moment he saw the country as “un-investable.”

But Trump has insisted that his administration has brought a measure of stability to Venezuela.

He has argued that Venezuela stole U.S. oil when former Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez’s moved decades ago to nationalize hundreds of foreign-owned assets, including those owned by American oil companies.

Rodríguez, in one of her early moves after taking power, signed a law that opens the nation’s oil sector to privatization and reversed a bedrock tenet of the self-proclaimed socialist movement that had ruled the country for more than two decades.

Rubio said on X that the agreement would usher in $100 billion in private investment into Venezuela and lead to lower gas prices in the United States.

“This deal is a huge win for both the American and Venezuelan people,” Rubio posted.

Venezuela has one of the largest oil reserves in the world, with an estimated 303 billion barrels of crude oil in the ground. That’s about 17% of the world’s supply, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration.

Madhani and Binkley write for the Associated Press. Regina Garcia Cano in Caracas contributed to this report.

Venezuela’s National Assembly approved, in its first reading on Thursday, August 27, the reform of Article 65 of the Organic Law of the Supreme Court of Justice. Why is a measure like this so important for Venezuela? Because it is the first institutional and legal step taken by the interim authorities that might lead to a genuine transitional process.

On August 12, the first agreement was signed between the delegation of the interim authorities and that of the National Assembly in 2015. But that is a political document, of which the reform of Article 65 of the Organic Law of the Supreme Court of Justice would be the first true institutional implementation, a first legal step in a process that is just beginning and that, eventually, could take us to a transition.

Article 65 of the current law regulates the composition of the Nominations Committee: the body that selects citizens nominated for judgeships, from which the National Assembly chooses the judges. Currently, the Nominations Committee has 21 members: 11 members of the National Assembly and 10 members of civil society. The reform (which must be approved in its second reading in the National Assembly and then become law) would increase the number of Committee members from 21 to 23, but the most significant aspect is that these two additional members would come from civil society.

According to the political agreement of August 12, the National Assembly must appoint all 32 Justices of the Supreme Court.

In short, the reform allows for greater citizen participation in the choosing of the 32 justices, just after the agreement reached on August 12 to completely renew the country’s highest court, a key component of chavista’s hold to power during the 21st century. This shift, along with the other aspects of the August 12 agreement, could generate confidence for prestigious university professors and lawyers to apply in the upcoming process to form the new Supreme Court of Justice.

This reform could be followed by another, also structural in nature, concerning the same Organic Law of the Supreme Court of Justice (LOTSJ) and other laws of the justice system, as announced at the end of the first round of talks between the delegations of the interim authorities and the National Assembly in 2015. Therefore, this first step could be very important for moving toward a political transition. 

Naturally, the question that arises from the previous experience of two decades of dialogue between Chavismo and the opposition is how to prevent the regime from controlling the Nominations Committee and ensure that it has a loyal majority among the 12 members of civil society that it would have if this reform is approved.

The answer is the same as it applies to this process: unlike all previous negotiations, here there is a third party that, rather than being a mediator, has the most influence—a Trump administration that theoretically benefits from a safer legal environment for foreign investment, and therefore has incentives to ensure that this reform truly becomes an opening that leads to the restoration, albeit gradual, of Venezuelan institutions.

Caracas, August 26, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan opposition lawmaker Antonio Ecarri has proposed dollarizing Venezuela’s economy and abolishing the bolívar, the country’s official currency, as a way to “stop devaluation” and “protect citizens’ purchasing power.”

Ecarri, a National Assembly Deputy from Alianza del Lápiz, has hired US economist Steve Hanke as an advisor for his plan to change the national currency.

“We are working on a serious dollarization proposal to put the brakes on the infernal devaluation that is destroying people’s wages. Enough of bureaucracy financing public spending by confiscating the private property and labor of Venezuelans,” Ecarri said.

Hanke, a Johns Hopkins University academic who served in the Reagan administration, has advised countries such as Ecuador and Zimbabwe on similar initiatives. In an article for business magazine Fortune, he confirmed that he has already drafted “a bill for the Venezuelan parliament.”

According to the US economist, the transition would begin with the establishment of a fixed USD-bolívar exchange rate before converting bolívar-denominated accounts to US dollars. The Venezuelan Central Bank (BCV) would retain administrative functions but lose the ability to issue money or set interest rates.

Hanke previously revealed that he has held meetings with US Treasury and White House officials to discuss an international strategy aimed at strengthening the US currency through dollarization of foreign countries, currency boards, and other instruments.

Ecarri’s proposal drew significant criticism, with Venezuelan National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez announcing “an investigation process to establish the offenses committed” by the opposition lawmaker. Ecarri was also removed from his position as chairman of the Venezuela-US Parliamentary Friendship Group, a post he had held for just two months.

According to a published statement, the opposition deputy allegedly violated the legislature’s internal procedures as well as the constitutional provision establishing that “the monetary unit of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is the bolívar” and that the Central Bank “is the public entity that, exclusively and mandatorily, exercises monetary policy.”

Rodríguez also described the proposal during a parliamentary session as “absurd and outrageous.” Ecarri, however, defended his stance and decision to hire Hanke, whom he called “an authority in the field and a personal adviser of mine for some time.”

The opposition lawmaker argues that Venezuela is “at a key moment” to debate the adoption of a different currency. 

“The country is already de facto dollarized, but those who continue to receive their wages in bolívars that lose value every day are our teachers, nurses, workers, and pensioners,” he stressed. “The government itself has just approved a law allowing rents to be paid in foreign currency.”

Ecarri claimed that growing oil revenues would supply Venezuela with enough foreign currency to adopt the dollarization plan, which he argued “should be accompanied by a Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund to protect the value of the currency against potential external shocks in the United States.”

Since 2018, the Venezuelan government has tolerated the circulation of US dollars amid efforts to control inflation. Though the bolívar remains the official currency, businesses and retailers establish cost structures and prices using US dollars. Venezuelan authorities have also fixed monthly bonus payments, which constitute virtually the entire income for workers and pensioners, in dollars, which are then paid in bolívars using the exchange rate established daily by the BCV.

The Central Bank has continually devalued the bolívar, with the USD-bolívar exchange rate growing by more than 150 percent since the beginning of 2026. The currency depreciation is a key driver of inflation. Prices rose by 19.9 percent in July, and accumulated 12-month inflation presently stands at 576 percent.

Financial authorities have likewise been unable to control a parallel, speculation-driven exchange rate which currently stands 15-20 percent above the official one.

Despite the persistent devaluation-inflation issues, formal dollarization is opposed by most Venezuelan policy analysts, including government critics. Economist Asdrúbal Oliveros warned that dollarization would be an effective mechanism for drastically reducing inflation but “is not the best solution,” since it would be a “nearly irreversible” decision that would limit the country’s monetary policy options.

Right-wing economist José Guerra likewise considers dollarization “a straitjacket” for an oil-producing country. “Without a central bank issuing currency, an external shock will cause deflation, an inability to pay salaries and finance public spending, as happens in Ecuador. It also creates a high dependence on the US and is a one-way path,” he said.

Rodrigo Cabezas, former finance minister under President Hugo Chávez, similarly expressed his “complete opposition” to dollarization, stating that it is “unreasonable” for a country to surrender essential economic tools, losing control over foreign exchange policies and interest rates.

For his part, economist and former United Socialist Party (PSUV) legislator Tony Boza contended that Washington wants to push dollarization in Latin America to “stave off its economic downfall.” Boza went on to criticize the acting Delcy Rodríguez government and the National Assembly for subordinating economic policies and the country’s national resources to US and foreign capital interests.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

For the first time in years, Venezuela is discussing institutional change as something more concrete than an opposition demand. The talks between the two National Assemblies have embraced the problem of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ), with the electoral authority next in line. New magistrates, new CNE rectors, new elections: after decades of institutional capture, replacing the people who run these bodies is obviously necessary.

The danger is believing it will be enough.

Venezuela has spent the last quarter of century demonstrating that its democratic decline cannot be reduced to bad people occupying important offices. Chavismo did not merely place loyalists inside the State. It gradually transformed the relationships between institutions so that political power could survive electoral setbacks.

The clearest example came after 2015. When the opposition won a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly, chavismo did not accept that voters had changed the institutional balance of the country. The TSJ then progressively neutralized the newly elected Assembly. When that was no longer enough, the government created a Constituent Assembly capable of bypassing it altogether.

This adaptability matters for the transition now being negotiated.

Chavismo’s institutional principle has never really been presidentialism. It has been simpler: power should remain wherever chavismo remains.

Venezuela is extraordinarily centralized, and there is good reason to believe that no political project can govern effectively without controlling the presidency. But it would be a mistake to assume that the presidency will remain as powerful after chavismo loses it as it was while chavismo controlled the rest of the State.

A democratic president facing a chavista supermajority in the National Assembly and a hostile Supreme Court could discover rather quickly that Venezuela’s supposedly omnipotent presidency is considerably less omnipotent than advertised.

Chavismo’s institutional principle has never really been presidentialism. It has been simpler: power should remain wherever chavismo remains. That is why replacing the people at the top of Venezuela’s institutions is only the beginning of reinstitutionalization.

We have tried this before

The CNE should make us particularly cautious.

In 2021, Roberto Picón and Enrique Márquez joined an electoral board that was widely regarded as the most balanced Venezuela had seen in years. Both pushed for meaningful improvements, and international observers recognized that the new composition produced a better electoral environment than the one that preceded it. The Carter Center described the board as “less unbalanced,” while still documenting structural problems surrounding electoral competition.

The episode demonstrated the limits of solving institutional problems through personnel alone. An election is not defined solely by what five CNE rectors do on election night. It also depends on who can register to vote, which candidates can run, whether parties can organize, how public resources are used, what media can report, what security forces do, and which court ultimately resolves a dispute.

Barinas provided the almost perfect illustration. After the 2021 gubernatorial election, the TSJ intervened while the vote was still being resolved, invoked a political disqualification against the opposition candidate and ordered the election repeated. Picón and Márquez publicly dissented. The independent rectors were there. The larger machinery around them remained capable of overruling the political meaning of the vote.

A good rector can behave honorably inside a bad system. The same is true of judges.

“Non-repetition” cannot mean guaranteeing that chavismo disappears from Venezuelan politics.

Replacing the current Supreme Court with independent jurists would be an enormous democratic achievement. Even so, courts lack enforcement mechanisms for a reason, meaning that the armed forces or the police could ignore their rulings, or that, as chavismo has already done, the president du jour could resort to the military court system. But Venezuela should also be asking whether a future court should retain all the powers that chavismo accumulated and exploited through it.

Otherwise, the transition risks producing institutions that are safe only for as long as good people control them.

That is not institutional reform. It is institutional trust.

And democracies are supposed to require less of it.

Political scientist Guillermo O’Donnell made this distinction precisely when he wrote about the weakness of “horizontal accountability” in Latin American democracies. Elections determine who governs, but democracy also requires institutions capable of restraining those winners once they do. A president who receives millions of votes is still bound by courts, legislatures, and rules that do not derive their legitimacy from his personal mandate.

Venezuela inverted that principle. Institutions increasingly became instruments for preserving whoever already controlled them. Changing their occupants without changing that logic would leave the central vulnerability untouched.

What non-repetition actually means

This is where the transition needs a more demanding definition of success. “Non-repetition” cannot mean guaranteeing that chavismo disappears from Venezuelan politics.

A democratic Venezuela should permit a chavista party to reorganize, contest elections and, if voters choose it again someday, return to government. Democracy cannot mean competitive elections until the people we dislike win one.

Nor does democratic consolidation require Venezuela to eliminate every trace of authoritarian nostalgia. Spain still contains defenders of Franco. Chile still contains defenders of Pinochet. Their democratic success is not that those political traditions vanished, but that political competition became overwhelmingly organized around institutions that survived changes of government.

Nicaragua, on the other hand, demonstrates what happens when that consolidation remains incomplete.

The Sandinistas lost the 1990 election and surrendered the presidency. Daniel Ortega remained in politics, competed repeatedly, and eventually returned through elections in 2006. This democratic failure was certainly exacerbated when Nicaragua’s institutions proved unable to stop Ortega from progressively dismantling the democratic constraints that had made his return possible in the first place. Research on Nicaragua’s backsliding traces how electoral rules, courts and other institutions were gradually eroded on the road back to authoritarianism.

If judicial independence depends on always selecting virtuous magistrates, the judiciary has not been fixed.

That is the warning Venezuela should take seriously.

Non-repetition does not mean ensuring that Venezuelans never again elect someone with authoritarian instincts. It means building institutions capable of surviving when they do. And that standard has an uncomfortable implication for whoever eventually replaces chavismo.

The next democratic government should not ask only which powers it needs in order to govern. It should ask whether it would be comfortable leaving those same powers to its worst political adversary. That is the test that should apply to the new TSJ, the new CNE and eventually every institution rebuilt during the transition.

If electoral integrity depends on always appointing five excellent rectors, the electoral system has not been fixed. If judicial independence depends on always selecting virtuous magistrates, the judiciary has not been fixed. If the survival of democracy depends on trusting whoever occupies Miraflores, Venezuela has learned very little from the last twenty-five years.

The current negotiations can replace officials. They can make credible elections possible again. They can remove some of the people who converted public institutions into instruments of political control. All of that is necessary. But Venezuela’s democratic challenge will not be solved by transferring those instruments to new hands. 

The institutions being negotiated today should be designed not merely to produce the next democratic government, but to survive the next authoritarian one. Otherwise, Venezuela may succeed in changing who holds power without changing what power allows them to do.

Mérida, August 24, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) –The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued two general licenses granting specific permissions for telecommunications operations with Venezuela.

Under General License 61 (GL61), published on Friday, OFAC authorized US companies to provide “technology, software, or services for the installation, maintenance, refurbishment, repair, upgrade, operation, or support of telecommunications” to Venezuela’s state-owned telecommunications company CANTV and National Telecommunications Commission CONATEL.

According to official OFAC definitions, telecommunications services encompass fixed and mobile telephony, data transmission, internet connectivity, radio and television broadcasting, news agency feeds, satellite communications, and submarine cables.

GL61 permits specific operational activities, including payment processing, logistics, air freight, insurance, data storage, server maintenance, roaming agreements, and infrastructure leasing. However, the license specifies that Venezuelan state entities must procure new acquisitions directly from US companies or US citizens.

In addition, the Trump administration published General License 62 (GL62), authorizing negotiations for contracts in Venezuela’s telecommunications sector, though specific agreements remain contingent on a separate specific license,

Both sanctions waivers impose that any contracts be governed by the laws of a state or federal jurisdiction within the United States. Furthermore, the licenses demand that “dispute resolution proceedings relating to the contract occur in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, or Singapore.”

The Treasury licenses maintain bans on debt swaps, physical gold, or digital currencies and tokens issued by or on behalf of the Venezuelan government.

Furthermore, GL61 and GL62 maintain restrictions prohibiting “any transaction involving a person located in the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Cuba, the People’s Republic of China, or any entity that is owned or controlled by or in a joint venture with such persons”.

Since the January 3 US military strikes and kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, Washington has upheld its wide-reaching coercive economic sanctions in areas such as energy and mining,  while issuing licenses to favor US and Western corporations.

US sanctions and restrictions on Chinese technology firms present a challenge to CANTV’s recent operational landscape. For the past two decades, the Venezuelan government has forged bilateral agreements with Chinese telecom firms, including ZTE and Huawei, establishing joint projects to manufacture and deploy telecommunications equipment domestically. 

Over the last decade, CANTV has worked with Huawei and ZTE to modernize networks, expand fiber-optic infrastructure, and sustain broadband services nationwide. Venezuelan authorities have not commented on the latest US licenses and potential impact on existing agreements.

In addition, CANTV has been identified by analysts as a potential candidate for privatization. The company has recently been mired in controversy after reportedly slashing retired workers’ incomes. Retirees have staged protests in several states in recent days after a US $200 monthly bonus was arbitrarily slashed, while also demanding the restoration of basic medical insurance and health coverage guaranteed by collective bargaining agreements.

In parallel, CONATEL has launched technical and legal working sessions with representatives of SpaceX’s Starlink service to examine radio spectrum allocation, equipment homologation, and regulatory compliance under Venezuela’s Organic Telecommunications Law.

Despite Maduro previously criticizing SpaceX owner Elon Musk for destabilizing politics in Venezuela and Latin America, the acting Delcy Rodríguez government thanked the tech mogul for activating free Starlink services in the wake of the June 24 double earthquake in the Caribbean nation.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

US Southern Command says that Sunday’s strike targeted a vessel operating along established narco-trafficking routes in the Eastern Pacific.

The United States military said it struck a suspected drug-trafficking boat in the Pacific Ocean, killing two people.

In a Monday post on X, US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) said Sunday’s strike targeted a vessel operating along established narco-trafficking routes in the Eastern Pacific.

“Confirmed intelligence revealed the vessel’s active involvement in narco-trafficking,” SOUTHCOM added.

“This operation is a clear and decisive reminder that SOUTHCOM is taking the fight directly to the cartels.”

Grainy, black-and-white video accompanying the post appeared to show a boat moving through the water immediately before a large explosion.

The post stated that under the direction of SOUTHCOM Commander General Francis L. Donovan, the Joint Task Force Western Hemisphere executed a lethal kinetic strike on the low-profile vessel.

“We are committed to imposing total systemic friction on narco-terrorists — disrupting their operations, dismantling their leadership and eliminating cartel terror across the region,” Donovan was quoted as saying.

“Let me be clear, we will not permit narco-terrorists to operate with impunity in the Western Hemisphere, nor will we allow their deadly poison to reach American communities. This operation is a powerful demonstration of our lethal precision, overwhelming capability, and absolute resolve to protect the U.S. homeland.”

The US military launched Operation Southern Spear in early September, with President Donald Trump arguing that Washington is effectively at war with Latin American drug cartels.

Since then, more than 200 people have been killed in strikes across the Eastern Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea, according to a tally by the AFP news agency.

However, the Trump administration has not provided definitive evidence that the targeted vessels were involved in drug trafficking.

Legal experts and rights groups warn that the attacks could amount to extrajudicial killings.

The Pentagon’s inspector general said in May that it would review whether the military followed standard targeting procedures, though the evaluation will not examine the legal authority behind the strikes.

Caracas, August 20, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Venezuelan government has signed agreements with Texas-based Hunt Oil and SLB amid ongoing efforts to court foreign oil firms.

Venezuelan Oil Minister Paula Henao finalized the deals on Tuesday on behalf of Acting President Delcy Rodríguez.

Hunt Oil, originally founded by far-right tycoon H.L. Hunt in the 1930s, signed “Productive Participation Contracts,” which are concession-type deals, to operate the mature Caro and Carisito oilfields in eastern Venezuela. The two projects, belonging to the Oriente branch of state oil company PDVSA, produce light crude and natural gas.

CEO Hunter L. Hunt said in a statement that his firm “wants to play a constructive role in revitalizing and growing Venezuela’s oil and gas production.” Hunt Oil previously leveraged its close ties to the George W. Bush administration to secure energy contracts in Iraqi Kurdistan following the 2003 US invasion.

For its part, SLB, formerly Schlumberger, inked deals focused on reservoir studies and provision of services. SLB is the world’s largest oilfield services provider. According to Reuters, the multinational will work to reactivate 15 oil rigs in the Caribbean nation, with only two onshore rigs presently active.

Crossover Energy, a company created in 2022 with no prior energy track record, is also reportedly close to finalizing agreements to run Venezuelan oilfields, having acquired an operating firm in eastern Venezuela. Crossover Energy had signed a memorandum of understanding with the acting Rodríguez administration in May.

The Colorado-based firm showed no verifiable commercial registration, public website, or operating history before its agreement with the Venezuelan government. Crossover CEO Eric McCrady previously ran Sundance Energy Inc., which filed for bankruptcy in 2021 with over $250 million in debt, before being sold and liquidated in 2022. 

Henao traveled to Houston alongside PDVSA executives to participate in an event titled “Empowering Venezuela: Energy, Investment & Opportunity” on Tuesday as part of the August 17-20 International Meeting for Applied Geoscience and Energy (IMAGE). She was joined by US Energy Undersecretary Kyle Haustveit.

According to Venezuelan state broadcaster VTV, Henao presented “investment opportunities” while also detailing “the benefits of recent reforms and joint work with the US Department of Energy.” The Venezuelan minister went on to hold meetings with US officials to “consolidate the cooperation agenda.”

In parallel, ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL), the overseas arm of India’s state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), recently secured a US Treasury waiver to resume its activities in Venezuela. 

“Now we have full freedom to work on the Venezuela project because earlier we were restricting our operations there because of the sanction-related risks,” ONGC executive Anupam Agarwal said in a press conference last week.

OVL owns 40 and 11 percent respective stakes in the San Cristóbal and Carabobo-1 extra-heavy crude ventures in the Orinoco Oil Belt. Agarwal stated that the company was in talks with Venezuelan authorities to renegotiate agreements and assume operational control of the projects.

Furthermore, ONGC is also looking to collect around US $500 million in overdue dividends that state oil company PDVSA was unable to pay due to US sanctions.

Hunt Oil, SLB, and OVL have followed energy majors such as Shell, Chevron, and Repsol in taking advantage of Venezuela’s pro-business overhaul of the energy sector. A reformed Hydrocarbon Law slashed royalties and taxes, turned over control of operations and sales to private corporations, and subjected disputes to international arbitration bodies.

In addition to securing a favorable environment for Western corporations, the Trump administration has also seized control of Venezuelan oil revenues, which are deposited in a US Treasury account before US officials decide when and how much should be returned to Caracas. The White House is also reportedly deducting the costs of its January 3 military operation against Venezuela from the export earnings.

According to Bloomberg, BP received a US Treasury license to join Vitol and Trafigura in lifting and re-selling Venezuelan crude. A BP tanker loaded fuel oil headed for Houston on Tuesday. The intermediary companies secure cargoes at below-market rates and deposit the proceeds into a designated US Treasury account before rerouting them to final customers for a profit.

The London-based multinational is likewise moving forward in multiple offshore natural gas projects in Venezuelan waters. BP, alongside Qatar’s UCC and the UAE’s XRG, is set to develop the second phase of the Loran Field. It will also explore the Cocuina-Manakin Field alongside Trinidad and Tobago’s NGC. The Venezuelan state holds no stake in either project, with the owed royalties and taxes also significantly reduced under the reformed legislation and likewise to be deposited in the US Treasury account.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Philadelphia.

Reflect. Think about yourself, about those around you, and you will reach the same conclusion as I have. Since the signing of the disastrous economic adjustment package with the International Monetary Fund in February 1989, Venezuela has never experienced such a unanimous feeling of bewilderment, contained anger, and repulsion at others deciding for us.

In October 2025, a Hinterlaces survey had 83% of respondents state that they would be willing to confront a foreign military invasion. The attack came [on January 3], we were denied the possibility of resistance, and now we face an invisible invasion. An insolent foreign presence that barely appears on screen, but tramples us, crushing the executive, legislative, judicial, and moral attributes of sovereignty one after the other, stealing over $13 billion worth of oil from us in just half a year, resources that no one knows where they have gone, and remodeling our country so that the plundering can continue indefinitely.

Along with the looting, a shroud of opacity has fallen over Venezuela, relegating everything that matters to mystery, except for occasional voices that infiltrate informal media. María Alejandra Díaz Marín warns us from Colombia about the attempt to remove all constitutional limits that hinder the looting. Mario Silva contrasts what politicians used to say and what they say now. Ramsés Reyes confesses that he “spits blood.” José Sant Roz proclaims in Ensartaos: “I tremble with indignation when I hear people say ‘Iran is not Venezuela,’ ‘Cuba is not Venezuela.’”

Comparisons are odious, but more odious is avoiding them to escape self-criticism.

For my part, I preach that anger is a more valuable natural resource than the oil and gold that the US is plundering from us, because anger is infinitely renewable and more fruitful than resignation. I admire all the countries that have shaken off the yokes of empires. I appreciate those who reproach us for apparently having stopped doing the same. I do not even invoke the sacred wrath of the [1813] Decree of War to the Death, which liberated what are now six countries. The assertion that Venezuela is not like this or that country reiterates that freedom and sovereignty do not fall from the sky nor are automatically defended. They are conquered through the extreme pedagogy of the unbearable.

Venezuela is not Iran. Nothing could be truer. Since 1941, Iran had been living under the dictatorship of Shah Reza Pahlavi. The nationalist Majlis movement succeeded in having Mohammed Mossadegh appointed as prime minister in 1951, and he nationalized the oil industry. The hegemonic countries blockaded the Iranian state from selling oil. In 1953, the CIA and MI6 incited street demonstrations, a military coup ousted Mossadegh, and Shah Reza Pahlavi was installed as a dictator, handing over oil to Europeans and yankees and presiding over a repressive autocracy. Only in 1979, after an endless 37 years of fierce monarchical dictatorship and the continuous theft of oil by foreign powers, did waves of Iranians depose the puppet and confirm that autonomy is not gifted: it is defended. They took their affirmation of cultural identity to the extreme. They faced the selective assassination of their scientists and leaders until they became impregnable. They won wars against neighboring Iraq, instigated and armed by the United States, and now against the US Empire itself. They divided their defensive system into “mosaics” capable of continuing to resist when others would have fallen. We are not like the admirable Iranians. But they teach us a rough path to become like them.

We are not like the Cubans. When José Martí arrived in Caracas in 1881 and first visited the statue of Simón Bolívar, it had already been 57 years since we had gained independence and formed what are now six countries. The Liberator included in the Panama Congress of 1826 the goal of the emancipation of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Hispaniola, and planned to achieve it with an expedition that domestic secessionism thwarted. The Apostle [Martí] and Cuba still had to endure a bitter lesson. For Martí, death in his first battle. For his homeland, the humiliation of an independence interfered with by the US invasion of 1898, and a sovereignty tarnished by the Platt Amendment. And still remaining was the bitter record of 60 years of dictatorships and corruption covered up by the United States, until Commander Fidel Castro arrived and put a stop to it. Martí never felt humiliated because in his time Cuba was not like Venezuela. He sacrificed his fragile existence in the Promethean attempt to overcome it, and his legacy pierces our conscience like red-hot iron.

China is not like Venezuela. Starting from 1848, it was attacked by England amid the Opium Wars. Through the Infamous Treaties, Western powers filled it with military bases and puppet governments. Starting in 1931, the Japanese invaded Manchuria; the rest of the world threatened, blockaded, or ignored China. Only after a bitter century of humiliations could the country, in 1948, resume the arduous path that led it to becoming the world’s leading power.

No, Venezuela is not Algeria, or Vietnam, or Korea, or Afghanistan, or India, or Pakistan, or Somalia, or Yemen. Venezuela preceded them. In 1810, we had a foolish homeland that had to learn to stand on its feet, and in 1825 it taught the world lessons. Today we must understand, along with so many admirable nations, that there is no independence greater than that which is conquered, nor sovereignty greater than that which is defended.

Once again, the current metropolis [the US] is losing its hegemony. Its bases are demolished, its mercenaries put to flight. Its Congress denies funds for its reckless aggressions, its energy sources slip away, its fraudulent unbacked currency vanishes, emerging powers surpass it in economy, social advantages, science, culture, and defense. The path diverges between the road to extinction and that of Utopia.

What Venezuela needs to relearn is to be like Venezuela.

Translated by Orinoco Tribune. Minor edits by Venezuelanalysis.

Source: Luis Britto García blog

VENEZUELA Fury has recalled how she got thrown to the ground by husband Noah Price after a painful accident.

The 16-year-old daughter of Paris Fury and Tyson Fury has spoken about the accident that was caused by £10 heels.

She recalled how her husband pulled her to the ground after her heels broke.

Speaking in her latest TikTok upload, Venezuela said: “Story time! So guys, this is what happened at Luke Combs.

“So, walked around London all day in these £10 shoes. I thought they were so jazzy. Amazing. Right, walked around them all day.

“Went to walk out the concert, walking down the steps and I can feel… I thought it was like the… you know the end of a heel, the little spongy bit that stops it from being like scrapy?

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“I don’t know. I thought that was like digging in because I could feel something like pressing up and then when I step it was loose.

“And I looked and my full heel was just wobbling off,” she recalled.

“So, Noah’s tried to like put it back on and he pulled my foot from underneath me.

“I fell, flying up the floor outside of Wembley Stadium as we were waiting for the taxi,” she added, recalling the fall.

“Then, I see two girls on the kerb next to me waiting for their taxi. They had cowboy boots on. So I looked to them. Do you want to swap shoes with me, love?” she added.

“Thank God for this woman, you know. She really was lovely and I felt bad for her after.

“So, I’ve kidded her up. Oh, these shoes, they’re the best shoes in the world. They’re so expensive.

“It’s just me heel snapped. You can go and trade them in. Right, that’s what I’m telling her. And she’s gone like, oh, I don’t really want to trade you.

“Yeah, you will, love. You will. You’ll love it, love. So, I’ve kidded her up.

“I’ve got these shoes on. They’ve crippled me in blisters. But I made sure I got myself to the Coyote Ugly Bar in the end up. Because I don’t think they would have let me in with no shoes on.

“Anyways, I wouldn’t advise going to that either because it was only full of old men.

“And that’s my story time,” she concluded.

Fans were quick to react to her TikTok video, with many flocking to the comments.

“We’ve all been there with the heel,” said one person.

“You’re actually so funny I can’t,” penned a second.

While another said: “Oh Noah.”

Published on
14/08/2026 – 10:54 GMT+2

BP is going back into Venezuela.

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The agreement signed in Caracas on Thursday gives the company operatorship of Loran phase two, an offshore gas project holding more than four trillion cubic feet of proven gas resources, with Abu Dhabi’s XRG, Qatar’s UCC Oil and Gas Holding taking equal stakes beside it.

It is the clearest signal yet that the opening of Venezuela’s energy industry to foreign capital, underway since Maduro’s removal, is gathering pace.

All three companies will hold equal working interests, with BP as operator, and the licence remains subject to regulatory approvals.

PDVSA Gas, the state producer’s gas arm, transferred part of its interest to XRG, the international investment vehicle of Abu Dhabi’s ADNOC. For both XRG and UCC, a unit of the Qatari conglomerate of the same name, this marks a first entry into Venezuela.

The field itself is shared as Loran forms the Venezuelan portion of the Loran-Manatee accumulation, which straddles the maritime boundary with Trinidad and Tobago and holds roughly 10 trillion cubic feet of recoverable gas in total.

Shell won the licence for the first phase in June and is separately developing Manatee on the Trinidadian side, where first gas is expected next year.

BP says both Venezuelan phases will now be developed in parallel and signed a further memorandum of understanding covering exploration at the Carúpano East Block.

The agreements were concluded during a visit to Caracas by CEO Meg O’Neill and David Campbell, BP’s senior vice president for Latin America and the Caribbean.

A sector reopened under US pressure

The licences are the product of a bargain struck with Washington.

After Maduro was seized by US forces in January, interim president Delcy Rodríguez rewrote the country’s energy law at the Trump administration’s urging, opening the world’s largest proven oil reserves to foreign firms.

In return, the US relaxed sanctions that had frozen most Western investment, including the licences it revoked from BP, Shell and Chevron in 2025.

Eni, Repsol and Shell have all signed since.

The awards process stalled after the earthquakes of 24 June, which killed more than 6,300 people, and resumed only on Thursday, when the three Loran permits were issued and the agreements signed.

“I have a special interest in gas to promote national development,” Rodríguez said at the ceremony, which was broadcast on state television.

BP is not a newcomer as it held a licence for the Cocuina field from 2024, before Washington withdrew its permission to use it.

Mérida, August 11, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuela concluded a successful performance at the XXV Central American and Caribbean Games in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic.

The Caribbean nation’s delegation finished fourth in the overall medal table, securing 216 medals: 49 gold, 70 silver, and 97 bronze, finishing just two gold medals behind third-place Cuba. Mexico topped the standings with 407 medals, followed by Colombia with 266 medals. The competition lasted from July 24 to August 8 and featured athletes from 37 countries.

The Venezuelan athletes, with a mix of veterans and up-and-coming talents, enjoyed success across multiple disciplines. Olympic medallists Julio Mayora and Keydomar Vallenilla dominated their respective 73kg and 96kg weightlifting divisions, while 19-year-old phenom Mauricio Loaiza earned a breakthrough gold medal in the 110kg division. Venezuela racked up 11 weightlifting gold medals.

In aquatic events, open-water swimmer Paola Pérez successfully defended her regional title by taking gold in the 10-kilometer individual race, while swimmers María Yegres and Manuel Díaz won the 400-meter freestyle and 100-meter butterfly, respectively.

Combat sports also delivered critical victories. Venezuelan judokas Anriquelis Barrios and Karen León delivered dominant performances to secure two of the team’s three judo golds.

In women’s boxing, Omailyn Alcalá, Krisandy Ríos, and Maryelis Iriza achieved a historic three-gold sweep. Venezuelan fencers likewise maintained their regional dominance, winning their fifth consecutive title in men’s sabre and second in women’s epee, bolstered by gold in women’s foil by Anabella Acurero.

Rodolfo Monacelli secured first place in bowling, and chess grandmasters Vicmary Pérez and Félix Ynojosa captured top honors in their respective individual events. 19-year-old pole vaulter Ricardo Montes de Oca continued his promising career by soaring to victory in track and field.

Venezuela also achieved a gold medal in modern pentathlon, and surfer Rafael “Nono” Pereira edged out fellow countryman José Joaquín López in an all-Venezuelan shortboard surfing final at Encuentro Beach.

A major highlight of the South American nation’s performance came on the pitch, where Venezuela’s under-20 soccer team captured the gold medal by defeating a heavily favored Mexican squad in the final. The victory marked Venezuela’s third ever gold medal in men’s soccer at the Central American and Caribbean Games.

Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez issued an official statement praising the national team’s performance at the games.

“The medals won reflect the strength, discipline, passion, and love for this land. My recognition goes to every athlete and coach who gave their all; they fought and dreamed to bring great joy to our people,” she said. 

Following the strong performance, the country’s best in eight years, Venezuela is set to host the XXVI Central American and Caribbean Games in 2030. Sports Minister Franklin Cardillo announced that Venezuela’s candidacy was officially ratified during the closing ceremony in Santo Domingo.

Cardillo affirmed that Venezuelan authorities and regional athletic federations are already coordinating logistics to prepare world-class facilities and host a successful edition of the Games in 2030. Venezuelan athletes will next represent the national tricolor flag at the upcoming South American Games in Argentina starting on September 12.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

Caracas, August 11, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Venezuelan government led by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez is advancing diplomatic normalization with Israel after 17 years of severed relations.

In statements published on Tuesday, the Venezuelan and Israeli foreign ministries announced that, following “high-level talks,” the two countries would continue “bilateral technical cooperation” amid “recovery efforts” related to the June 24 double earthquake in the Caribbean nation.

“The two countries have also agreed to establish a coordination mechanism to provide consular services to their citizens residing in the other country,” the communiqués read.

Caracas additionally underlined that the ties between Israel and the Venezuelan Jewish community “constitute an important and historic friendship bridge between both countries.”

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar hailed the renewal of consular relations as “good news.” He added that the decision was agreed to in “conversations” with Venezuelan counterpart Félix Plasencia, creating “an official coordination channel” for the first time since 2009.

The announcement also followed a meeting Sunday between Plasencia and Orthodox Rabbi Isaac Cohen in which the latter formally requested that Venezuela reestablish diplomatic ties with Israel.

According to the Foreign Ministry, Cohen delivered a letter addressed to Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, arguing that normalizing relations with Tel Aviv is necessary to “tend to the needs of the Jewish community” in Venezuela.

Venezuela’s top diplomat thanked Cohen, on behalf of the Rodríguez administration and the Venezuelan people, for Israeli “assistance” following the June 24 double earthquake.

Cohen, a rabbi from the Venezuelan Jewish Association (AIV), was reportedly one of the intermediaries for the arrival of an Israeli diplomatic and military mission one week after the earthquake. The delegation included IDF officers and weapons contractors, while several Tel Aviv-aligned organizations likewise deployed on-the-ground teams.

Rodríguez held multiple meetings with the Israeli team, praising its members as “highly trained and professional” and thanking them for their work. IDF spokesman Roni Kaplan stated that the Israeli team had created a “dashboard” for Venezuelan authorities to evaluate damaged buildings, while Brigadier General Elad Edri was pictured presenting a “Project for Future Reconstruction” slideshow.

The Israeli mission has sparked growing protests, with Venezuelan popular movements reaffirming support for Palestine, condemning the genocide in Gaza and Lebanon, and burning Israeli flags.

Following the latest decision to deepen the engagement with Tel Aviv, the Venezuelan Movement in Solidarity with Palestine Al Awda issued a statement rejecting “normalization with the genocidal state of Israel.”

“We reject the use of ‘cooperation’ rhetoric to cover for barbarism and apartheid. Diplomacy cannot be used to whitewash crimes against humanity,” the text read.

Similarly, the International Platform in Solidarity with the Palestinian Cause argued that it was “unacceptable and unjustifiable” to strengthen relations “with a government formally accused of genocide.”

“We warn that reestablishing ties with [Israel] amounts to validating its crimes, in Palestine and all over the world, and becoming complicit before history,” its communiqué stated.

Former President Hugo Chávez severed ties with Israel in 2009, fiercely denouncing the US ally for genocide and demonstrating unwavering support for the Palestinian cause. His stance was maintained by Maduro, who endorsed South Africa’s activation of the Genocide Convention against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2024.

Following the January 3 US military strikes and kidnapping of Maduro, Rodríguez fast-tracked a diplomatic rapprochement with Washington alongside a broader radical shift in Caracas’ geopolitical alignment. 

Apart from re-engagement with Israel, the Venezuelan government is also reestablishing ties with far-right US allies in Latin America, including Chile, Peru, and the Dominican Republic, while distancing itself from historic partners in Havana and Tehran. During the recent US-Israel war against Iran, Caracas offered no backing for Tehran, instead voicing “solidarity” with US Gulf allies such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

[Updated on August 11]

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Philadelphia, USA.

Aug. 11 (UPI) — Israel recorded two diplomatic advances in Latin America, as Colombia became the second country in the world to recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights and Venezuela agreed to restore consular services with Israel for the first time since diplomatic relations were severed in 2009.

Colombia’s Foreign Ministry announced Monday its recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, a strategic plateau along the border between Israel and Syria, saying the decision was in response to “persistent regional instability in the Middle East” and the territory’s strategic importance to Israel’s security.

“Colombia recognizes that Israel’s continued control and sovereignty over the Golan Heights constitutes an essential component of its national defense,” the Colombian Foreign Ministry said.

The decision makes Colombia the second country in the world, after the United States, to recognize Israeli sovereignty over the territory. The United States did so in 2019 during President Donald Trump‘s first term.

Israel captured most of the Golan Heights from Syria during the 1967 Six-Day War and extended its laws, jurisdiction and administration over the territory in 1981. The United Nations does not recognize that move and considers the Golan occupied Syrian territory.

U.N. Security Council Resolution 497 declared Israel’s decision “null and void and without international legal effect.”

Syria condemned Colombia’s recognition, saying it violates Syrian sovereignty and international resolutions concerning the territory. The Syrian Foreign Ministry said the Golan is an “integral and indivisible part” of Syria and called on Colombia to reconsider its decision.

The Arab League, Saudi Arabia and Egypt also rejected the move and reaffirmed Syria’s sovereignty over the territory.

Colombia’s decision comes amid a broader shift in relations with Israel under President Abelardo de la Espriella. His government also announced plans to relocate the Colombian Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, reversing policies adopted under Gustavo Petro, who severed diplomatic relations with Israel in May 2024 in response to the war in Gaza.

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar described Colombia’s recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights as a “historic” decision, according to Israel’s Foreign Ministry.

Separately, Israel and Venezuela announced Tuesday that they had agreed to establish a coordination mechanism to provide consular services to their citizens, creating the first official link between the two countries since Caracas severed diplomatic relations with Israel 17 years ago.

The agreement, announced in a joint statement released by Israel’s Foreign Ministry, does not amount to the full restoration of diplomatic relations or include the reopening of embassies.

The two countries also agreed to continue bilateral technical cooperation that began after Israel sent humanitarian assistance to Venezuela following the magnitude-7.2 and 7.5 earthquakes that struck the country June 24.

An Israeli delegation composed of Foreign Ministry and Israel Defense Forces personnel traveled to Venezuela after the earthquakes and worked with Venezuelan authorities and emergency teams on disaster response, recovery and humanitarian assistance.

The rapprochement also comes amid efforts by Venezuela’s Jewish community to promote the normalization of relations.

Venezuela’s Foreign Ministry said Isaac Cohen, chief rabbi of the Venezuelan Israelite Association, delivered a letter to President Delcy Rodríguez asking her to consider restoring diplomatic relations with Israel.

Venezuelan Foreign Minister Félix Plasencia said the request was intended to “address the needs of the Jewish community in our country.”

In their joint statement, Israel and Venezuela highlighted the relationship between Israel and Venezuela’s Jewish community, describing it as an “important bridge of historic friendship” between the two countries.

Venezuela severed diplomatic relations with Israel in January 2009 under then-President Hugo Chávez amid the Israeli military offensive in Gaza.

Salzburg, Austria — “Optimism doesn’t mean pretending everything is fine,” the Belarusian flutist and political activist Maria Kalesnikava said in this year’s Salzburg Festival keynote address. “It means deciding to step up and act, even in the face of uncertainty.”

Picture-perfect, Mozart-drunk Salzburg can’t pretend everything is fine. Temperatures are rising and normally rainy Salzburg now worries about water shortage and the environmental ravage of over-tourism. The artistically and culturally exceptional six-week Salzburg Festival, which began mid-July with a two-week Ouverture Spirituelle this year titled “miserere” (mercy), is facing its own political and administrative turmoil and uncertainty.

Salzburg’s worries are our worries; its triumphs can be ours as well. Los Angeles and the Salzburg Festival have been cultural and political soulmates for close to a century, beginning when playwright, director and filmmaker Max Reinhardt, who co-founded the Salzburg Festival in 1920, found mercy in L.A. as refuge from the Nazis.

Reinhardt’s star-studded 1934 music-theater production of “Midsummer Night’s Dream” at the Hollywood Bowl offered a template for spectacle in the young amphitheater, and the Los Angeles Philharmonic’s participation crucially reinforced a young orchestra’s early venturesome ambition following an avant-garde Bowl season the previous summer that nearly bankrupted the Bowl. Over the next decade this Salzburger’s influence on Hollywood dramaturgy would become legend.

L.A. has reciprocated by sending our visionaries to Salzburg, where director Peter Sellars and conductor Esa-Pekka Salonen, for instance, have been given the license and means to inspire a reinvention of musical and theatrical thinking. L.A. arts patrons Betty Freeman and Richard Colburn provided important support for Salzburg during their lifetimes that included commissioning new work.

Gustavo Dudamel conducts Strauss’ ‘Alpine Symphony’ with the Vienna Philharmonic at the Grosses Festspielhaus in Salzburg Aug. 25, 2024.

(Marco Borrelli / Salzburg Festival)

Gustavo Dudamel, L.A. Phil’s optimist these 17 seasons, has long been a Salzburg regular as well, and he arrived last week just in time to take up Kalesnikava’s challenge. Her proclamation of optimism comes on the heels of her having been released in December from a brutal Belarusian prison for supporting an opposition candidate running against the country’s authoritarian leader.

In Dudamel’s case, his life has been turned around by the recent earthquakes that devastated Venezuela just two weeks after his last concerts in Walt Disney Concert Hall as L.A. Phil music and artistic director. His activities this summer now revolve around partnering with the United Nations Development Program to gather global support for Venezuela’s recovery, which is estimated at $6.7 billion.

Although little noted, Dudamel’s buoyant World Cup halftime appearance with 20 members of the Simón Bolívar Symphony Orchestra and 20 from the New York Philharmonic was as a FIFA fundraiser supporting children affected by global crises, in this case earthquake relief in Venezuela. Dudamel has further turned his last Hollywood Bowl program as L.A. Phil music director into a benefit on Aug. 23.

Prophetically, Dudamel had months ago been invited to close this summer’s Ouverture Spirituelle by leading the Vienna Philharmonic in Mahler’s Second Symphony, known as the “Resurrection.” One way to think about Mahler’s extravagant 90-minute exercise in his search for life’s meaning is as an exercise in attaining optimism in the face of tragedy.

“Rise again, yes, you shall rise again,” Mahler extols in a final ecstatic climax, and it is with the “Resurrection,” which includes chorus and a pair of vocal soloists, that Dudamel began his “Gracias Gustavo” L.A. Phil season last fall. Raising roof, the message was clear: optimism is the native language of Walt Disney Concert Hall.

In Salzburg, where Dudamel’s two Vienna Philharmonic performances were dedicated to the people of Venezuela, those lines took on obvious new meaning. Earlier in the day, Dudamel gave a public talk with a lively German journalist, Marco Frei, in which he described himself as a “resurrectionist” in more ways than one.

The symphony has been a been a musical and spiritual guide for him since his boyhood. He became so excited about a new sense of freedom he feels in the second movement that he leaned back in his chair and kicked his white sneakers in the air.

After the talk, I walked with Dudamel back to his hotel as he displayed a different, more solemn passion describing the toll the earthquakes have taken on El Sistema, the Venezuelan youth program that has been behind his educational activism in L.A.

“At least 140 members of the El Sistema staff and educators were killed or are unaccounted for,” Dudamel said, and that’s not counting what may have happened to a great many children and their families. But remarkably, Dudamel noted, in places where few structures remain, the nucleos (the small El Sistema community schools) are surprisingly still standing. They have become centers for food, aid and shelter.

In Salzburg, Dudamel indulged the Vienna Philharmonic’s incomparable lushness, those plush strings, glowing winds, golden brass, voluminous timpani. The symphony received mixed reviews, with critics complaining of a lack of transparency, argument and depth. Had they been in Disney Hall, they would have had it all.

But here Dudamel became more simply an architect of awe, unfazed by Mahlerian uncertainty as he worked his way to an inevitable cosmic grandeur unfazed by uncertainty. An enthralled audience left opening its collective wallets. Ushers stood at all the exits of Great Festival Hall with baskets for donations for Venezuela. I did not see a single member of the audience leave without throwing in a bill or several.

Dudamel’s “Resurrection” might also be read as a message from L.A. to Salzburg. In the spring the festival board dismissed its artistic director of the past decade, Markus Hinterhäuser, saying there is a difference in vision. Hinterhäuser’s penetrating and uncompromising vision is what has made the modern festival matter. Hinterhäuser has implied political meddling.

It is a huge festival, with more than 200 performances. Last year’s audience exceeded 200,000, with visitors from 88 countries. The arts as a vehicle for coming together can be cliché. In Salzburg, sharing becomes essence, not the kind of narcissism that appears to be adopted by our upcoming LA28 cultural Olympiad, in which Angelenos are invited to submit entrees that show off our goods rather than a cultural exchange.

Over 100 artists have protested Hinterhäuser’s removal, including two Nobel Prize laureates. Hinterhäuser is also an insightful pianist, and he joined baritone Matthias Goerne in a chilling performance of Schubert’s existential song cycle, “Winterreise.” Hinterhäuser got thunderous ovations.

Salzburg’s future is anyone’s guess, but even with Hinterhäuser on the sidelines, this summer is still his festival, meaningful as ever.

A new production of “Carmen” could not be darker, nor more brilliant. It is the latest project of conductor Teodor Currentzis, who has worked extensively with Peter Sellars in Salzburg and elsewhere, and who brings electricity to every moment with his Utopia Orchestra and Choir. Argentine choreographer Gabriela Carrizo makes her debut directing opera and utilizes her alarmingly vibrant Belgian dance company, Peeping Tom. Performing in a vast empty space, two gripping singers — Asmik Grigorian plays an understated Carmen as a survivor in a hostile society, while Jonathan Teltelman’s Don José is unable to cope with that society — turn Bizet’s opera into revelatory existential theater in which survival is toleration.

A scene on the moon in director Yuval Sharon’s magical new production of Janacek’s neglected opera “The Excursions of Mr. Broucek to the Moon and the 15th Century” at the Bregenz Festival.

(Daniel Ammann / Bregenz Festival)

Something similar happens in “Faust, Part 1,” in which the actors spend the entire four hours in a new production by German director Ulrich Rasche walking against the direction of of a revolving disc. To remain in front of the audience, they must remain in motion. They’re dressed in modern business attire, but as they bare their souls, they bare their torsos as they step against forces that prevent progress. The backdrop is brightly illumined screens that hurt your eyes.

This, however, can serve as a reminder of a “Faust” staged by Reinhardt at the Pilgrimage Theater (now John Anson Ford Theater) when it was designed to look like the gates of ancient Jerusalem in 1935. Practically all of Hollywood celebrity showed up for what was the theatrical event of the season.

I asked Lukas Crepaz, who directs the Salzburg Festival’s administrative and business operations, whether it would be possible and whether there still is time for the Salzburg and L.A. to collaboration on an opera production. He said yes, if funding could be found. In fact, the L.A. Phil will mount in February “One Morning Turns Into an Eternity,” a Salonen/Sellars essay in intensity from Salzburg last summer.

Another option: The Bregenz Festival, also in Austria, has just staged a new production by Yuval Sharon of Janacek’s little-known opera, “The Excursions of Mr. Broucek to the Moon and the 15th Century.”

Sharon — who was responsible for the fabulous excursions of his L.A. experimental company, the Industry — supplies his characteristic wit, imagination and insight into a hard-to-please opera about a beer-besotted philistine landlord, who comes to no good in his drunken dreams of going to the moon and back in history, as he does as an angry old man stumbling home from the bar or sitting watching TV (Sharon’s invention).

L.A. optimism may matter more to Austria this summer than it does to L.A. We have two years to step up and act, even in the face of uncertainty.

Caracas, August 7, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Venezuelan government and a faction of the opposition formally began a fresh US-backed dialogue initiative on Thursday that is expected to renew the country’s judicial and electoral bodies.

After a plenary session, the two sides announced a methodology for the upcoming talks, and the ratification of the agenda that will guide daily discussions through August 12.

“On that day, the continuation of the plenary will be evaluated, taking into consideration the progress of the work and the results achieved,” stated a joint communiqué issued after the two sides held an in-person meeting at La Carlota Air Base in Caracas.

The government delegation led by National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez and the opposition faction headed by Dinorah Figuera, head of the defunct 2015 parliament, signed a set of negotiating principles based on good faith and the pursuit of benefits for the country, including political, peaceful, democratic, and constitutional solutions. The principles also include mutual recognition and respect, political equality, and parity between the parties.

The sides further agreed to produce verifiable commitments, the protection of the human and political rights of “all forces,” and to “promptly inform the entire country of the progress achieved in these conversations.”

Neither delegation spoke to the press after the initial talks. The government delegation, apart from Rodríguez, features Higher Education Minister Ana María Sanjuán, National Assembly First Vice President Pedro Infante, and lawmakers América Pérez, Génesis Garvett, and Jorge Arreaza. On the opposition side, accompanying Figuera are former lawmakers Marco Aurelio Quiñones, Ramón López, Jorge Millán, Juan Miguel Matheus, and Sergio Vergara. 

Thursday’s meeting followed a preliminary conference call on August 1 between Rodríguez and Figuera, who arrived in Venezuela on Wednesday, having been based in Spain for over eight years.

Upon her arrival, the opposition figure reiterated that the negotiations would lead to the appointment of a new “credible and trustworthy” National Electoral Council (CNE) by November and a “re-institutionalized” Supreme Court (TSJ) before the end of 2026.

The National Assembly had already begun discussions on reforming the TSJ. Lawmakers approved legislation reducing the number of justices on the Full Chamber from 32 to 20. However, a parliamentary process to appoint new justices was subsequently suspended. According to the Venezuelan Constitution, the appointment of electoral and judicial authorities is the exclusive competency of the legislature.

The two negotiating parties held a second session on Friday afternoon at the 5-star Meliá Hotel in Caracas, but offered no public updates.

The Trump administration welcomed the talks, describing them as a “unique opportunity” for reconciliation and “transition” in Venezuela.

“We applaud the efforts to address the urgent needs of those affected by the June 24 earthquakes, expand political freedoms, and advance a more stable and prosperous future for the Venezuelan people,” the State Department affirmed in a statement.

The communiqué added that Washington would remain committed to supporting the “Venezuela-led process,” while emphasizing the White House’s “three-phase plan” which culminates with a “political transition.”

The US-endorsed dialogue comes seven months after a military operation that saw US forces bomb Caracas and kidnap President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores. In the months since, the Trump administration has wielded considerable influence over Venezuelan affairs, with US officials having input on legislative reforms and the US Treasury Department controlling Venezuelan export revenues.

The negotiations have caused tensions among different opposition factions, with far-right sectors criticizing the exclusion of María Corina Machado.

In a recent interview, Machado stated that she was not involved in the “design, construction, and functioning” of the dialogue, but vowed not to obstruct agreements that represent concrete advances toward a “democratic transition.”

In a statement, the Machado-led Unitary Democratic Platform (PUD) expressed its expectation that the dialogue will yield an “appropriate presidential electoral timetable” and pledged to assess the process based on “concrete achievements,” including the “release of political prisoners” and “electoral guarantees for all actors.”

In contrast, grassroots Chavista organizations have rejected the dialogue and denounced US “interference.” During a demonstration on August 1, the Popular Anti-Imperialist Front warned that the process was intended to place “US puppets” in the justice system and electoral authority, and subsequently organize “unconstitutional” elections.

Washington does not have a single policy toward Venezuela. On the contrary, since January 3, it has shown two distinct tracks that, for now, avoid colliding. The first is executed by the White House—a pragmatic, gradual strategy willing to bring opposition figures beyond María Corina Machado and Edmundo González to the negotiating table. The second has been maintained by Congress since the removal of Nicolás Maduro, most recently taking the form of a bipartisan Senate resolution that insists both remain the legitimate leaders of the opposition. The real question here is not which of these two faces will prevail, but why it serves US interests for both to exist simultaneously.

The past week showed how the board is functioning. On August 1, Jorge Rodríguez and Dinorah Figuera initiated dialogue over the phone between Delcy Rodríguez’s “government” and the remnants of the 2015 National Assembly, with the Trump administration acting as sponsor. Four days later, the Senate resolution reaffirmed González as president-elect, aligned with the administration’s stated goal of free elections while recognizing the electoral illegitimacy of Delcy Rodríguez. Caught between these two approaches, Marco Rubio asked Venezuelans for patience (“months, not years”) regarding elections, while Democratic Representative Jonathan Jackson (who had traveled to Caracas in July with the House delegation) revealed that even within Congress, there is no single consensus on what the US should be doing in Venezuela. Still, the simple fact that a Democrat secured permission to travel with the delegation speaks volumes.

Two paths, one destination?

For the White House, Venezuela has ceased to be—if it ever fully was—a matter of democratic principles, morphing instead into an equation of stabilization: energy, migration, and hemispheric security. Secretary Rubio’s three phases lay this out frankly: economic stabilization, recovery and reconciliation, and transition. This sequence shifts US priorities from democratic ideals to transactional metrics.

The IMF mission making headway in Caracas, Energy Secretary Chris Wright’s focus on the oil sector, and Rubio’s comparisons to transitions that took “nearly three and a half years” in countries like Paraguay and Spain confirm that the White House is prepared to manage Venezuela’s political timeline in a gradual, controlled manner, avoiding disruptions that could impact oil prices. Congress, on the other hand, bears no such executive burden. It can afford to speak the language of principles because it doesn’t have to sit down and negotiate barrels or deadlines.

Shielding that stance in a bipartisan manner is, at its core, a way to ensure US tutelage over Venezuela survives beyond Trump.

The Trump administration excluded Machado and Edmundo González from the process launched on August 1, a fact both publicly confirmed while clarifying that they would not stand in its way. Their seats at the table were filled by Dinorah Figuera and a delegation from the 2015 National Assembly. While this group does not answer directly to Machado’s party, it comprises members of Primero Justicia and Voluntad Popular, two parties that have consistently backed Machado and González throughout.

Meanwhile, the Senate resolution does the exact opposite: it explicitly names Machado and González as the legitimate leaders, describing Delcy Rodríguez as someone lacking an electoral mandate who would be unlikely to win a free election. It is a text that leaves no room for the ambiguity the White House grants itself.

Why this shift in signal? My first response would be that Congress—and particularly the Foreign Affairs committees in both chambers—operates under an institutional incentive distinct from Trump’s: surviving electoral cycles and administrative turnover. A resolution that anchors the recognition of legitimacy to Machado and González does not depend on who occupies the White House in 2029. Shielding that stance in a bipartisan manner is, at its core, a way to ensure US tutelage over Venezuela survives beyond Trump, even if the next occupant of the Oval Office chooses to change course.

Who are the players and what are their interests?

On the congressional chessboard, it is worth examining who the key players are—a crucial detail with the November midterm elections fast approaching.

In the Senate, the Foreign Relations Committee is chaired by Jim Risch (R), with Jeanne Shaheen (D) as ranking member. The Western Hemisphere Subcommittee is chaired by John Curtis (R) alongside Tim Kaine (D). Here lies the first key detail: Shaheen, the prominent Democratic voice who co-led the August 4 resolution with Ted Cruz (R), announced she will not seek reelection in 2026. She is retiring from Congress, but leaving this text as a legacy, which deprives Trump of a critical Democratic counterpart willing to apply public pressure.

Committee Chair Risch is on the ballot this November, while John Cornyn (a Republican who has been critical of Trump) is retiring, allowing him to adopt a harder line on foreign policy even when it diverges from the administration’s stance. Cruz, by contrast, does not face voters again until 2030, insulating him from immediate electoral pressures—making it no coincidence that he is leading the toughest resolution against the Delcy regime.

In the House, the Foreign Affairs Committee consists of over fifty members. It is chaired by Brian Mast (R), who led the July delegation to Caracas, with Gregory Meeks (D) as ranking member. The Western Hemisphere Subcommittee (which has served as the key House venue shaping the tone toward Venezuela) is chaired by María Elvira Salazar (R) with Joaquín Castro (D) as ranking member, alongside 13 other members (six Republicans and five Democrats).

A Congress with more elected Democrats, or with Republicans who survived tough races where voters demanded tangible results, will push harder to ensure the process unfolding in Venezuela moves beyond rhetoric.

All thirteen members are seeking reelection in 2026, meaning their moves leading up to November could either preserve Republican control of the committee or shift its leadership to the Democrats. Another detail worth noting is that Michael Lawler (R)—representing one of three Republican districts won by Kamala Harris in 2024—flirted for months with a run for New York governor before deciding in July to stay in his House seat to avoid risking the Republican majority. It is the same logic that kept Castro from running for the Senate in Texas. In a Congress where every seat matters, even figures with national ambitions end up staying put.

Another factor connecting the midterms directly to the Venezuelan community—particularly those in South Florida—is the special election in November to fill the remainder of the Senate term left vacant by Marco Rubio when he became Secretary of State. Given Florida’s demographic makeup, that seat cannot afford to be detached from US policy toward Venezuela. Furthermore, the seat will be up for election again in 2028, requiring anyone competing for it to keep their stance on Venezuela front and center.

Analyzing these congressional actors reveals that the pursuit of bipartisanship on Venezuela—a staple of foreign policy since 2014—appears to be a mechanism for institutionalizing US tutelage, regardless of who occupies the Oval Office. What could change (and likely will after November) is the execution. A Congress with more elected Democrats, or with Republicans who survived tough races where voters demanded tangible results, will push harder to ensure the process unfolding in Venezuela moves beyond rhetoric into a concrete transition.

What this means for Venezuelans

Amid all these tensions are the Venezuelan people, and this is where the gap between Washington and Caracas becomes most uncomfortable. The August 1 dialogue addresses earthquake relief, democratic strengthening, and political guarantees: a modest agenda compared to the demands set by the Senate. Meanwhile, real money is flowing into Venezuela through the IMF mission, energy cooperation, and the capital accompanying the “economic stabilization” phase Rubio outlined. Here, despite its strong resolutions, Congress exercises little actual oversight over how negotiations are conducted or where that money goes, as foreign policy decisions and economic licenses ultimately rest with the Executive branch.

Rather than leaving all these levers to executive discretion, Congress could take a far more active role.

This is why symbolic resolutions fall short. If Congress wants its recognition of Machado and González to be more than a gesture, it possesses concrete tools it has yet to fully deploy, such as: (i) conditioning any sanction relief or oil license on mandatory reporting regarding the destination of funds entering Venezuela; (ii) requiring the State Department to brief Congress periodically on the status of the August 1 dialogue; and (iii) tying the approval of new economic licenses to verifiable negotiation milestones, such as the release of political prisoners, the appointment of Supreme Court (TSJ) magistrates or new National Electoral Council (CNE) rectors, and ultimately the publication of an electoral timetable.

Rather than leaving all these levers to executive discretion, Congress could take a far more active role. None of this requires Congress to act as a negotiator—only to stop being a passive spectator in a process funded partly through money within its jurisdiction. For Venezuelans who have waited more than two decades for a genuine transition, the question is not just whether Machado and González remain recognized by the United States, but whether anyone in Washington will be held accountable for what is being negotiated in their name.

Both sides of this coin prompt us to ask: To what extent is the “transition” an act in which Venezuelans actually hold decision-making power? How far do US interests truly align with improvements for the Venezuelan people? Are we willing to prioritize institutional strength over the leadership of the moment? There will be as many answers as there are Venezuelans. What we can say for certain is that in this process, the United States is playing a role far beyond that of a mere “watchdog.” It is actively building an “institutional” tutelage.