Venezuela

Caracas, October 29, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez defended an ongoing plan to privatize state assets and return nationalized companies to former owners on Thursday.

“I have ordered the evaluation of non-essential state assets to be offered to the private sector or returned to their previous owners,” she said in a televised address to the nation.

“This is already in motion. The right to private property is guaranteed by our Constitution,” Rodríguez added.

In April, the acting president established a commission to evaluate the “strategic” value of state-owned companies, land, and other assets, to determine whether they should be retained, privatized, or liquidated.

Former President Hugo Chávez implemented a program of nationalizations in the 2000s to assert state control over strategic economic sectors, including electricity, telecommunications, and heavy industries.

After enacting a pro-business overhaul of hydrocarbon and mining legislation earlier this year, the Venezuelan parliament is on the verge of approving the partial privatization of the electricity sector. Foreign companies are likewise in talks to acquire the country’s largest aluminum smelter, while a consortium headed by Sunergon Oil is reportedly pushing the takeover of several industrial plants associated with the oil industry.

Business sector representative Luigi Pisella, who heads the commission, recently proposed a law enshrining multinational corporate participation in privatized public entities alongside local capital.

“I have encountered no resistance to this idea,” he stated in an interview with Banca y Negocios. “Most investors agree it is indispensable to have local partners whose experience is essential to navigate the complex Venezuelan environment.”

Pisella added that “different models of private participation” are being evaluated, but ruled out the “strategic alliances” whereby the state grants the assets in a concession-type deal while retaining ownership. The business sector spokesman argued that “no one is going to invest” without the full transfer of property.

In Thursday’s address, Acting President Rodríguez also promised that workers’ incomes would be increased quarterly next year, with the raise being at least on a par with GDP growth. 

“For 2027 we are scheduling increases to workers’ incomes in four different moments, in amounts that can never fall short of economic growth in the preceding trimesters,” she explained. 

Rodríguez did not mention adjusting the minimum wage, which has been frozen since 2022 and is currently worth around US $0.15. Instead, Venezuelan authorities have leaned on non-wage bonuses, which do not factor into vacation pay, severance, and other labor benefits in what amounts to a de facto subsidy to employers. Public sector workers currently have a monthly income floor of $240.

While Venezuela’s GDP is predicted to grow 5-10 percent in 2026, even raising non-wage bonuses by that amount falls short of inflation. Finance website Ecoanalitica estimates that prices measured in USD will end up rising 20-30 percent in 2026, meaning that an income adjustment pegged to GDP growth would amount to a loss of purchasing power.

In her message, Rodríguez went on to tout ongoing labor reform talks involving business lobbies and select trade unions. 

Private sector associations such as FEDECÁMARAS and FEDEINDUSTRIA want to slash labor costs for employers, further reducing social security contributions and eliminating the retroactive nature of severance pay and other benefits such that any future wage hike would not trigger corresponding increases.

Finally, the acting president defended recent judicial reforms and ongoing US-endorsed talks with a sector of the Venezuelan opposition that will appoint a new Supreme Court and National Electoral Council. The US State Department has claimed that new presidential elections will be held in 2027.

Rodríguez offered no specifics on an electoral timetable, stating only that “there will be elections, with a renewed electoral authority and the world as a witness.”

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Philadelphia, USA.

Nobel Peace Prize winner returns to Venezuela from exile, pressing for elections and criticising a controversial US oil deal with Caracas.

Venezuelan opposition leader Maria Corina Machado has thanked US President Donald Trump’s administration for opening the “floodgate to freedom” by abducting President Nicolas Maduro in January.

The Nobel Peace Prize laureate on Thursday also called for elections to be held in Venezuela next year, in her first public remarks since returning from more than 10 months in exile.

“Thanks to their vision, their courage, and their action on January 3, the floodgate to freedom has been opened,” Machado told a news conference in Caracas, naming Trump, his administration and Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

Rubio “has set out a sequence of events aimed at moving toward a democratic transition that makes clear the holding of presidential elections in 2027”, she said.

Machado has praised Trump before, presenting the president with her Nobel medal – a prize he feverishly coveted for himself in 2025.

A longtime activist, Machado fled Venezuela for Oslo in December to accept the Nobel Peace Prize. On Thursday, she said she had come home to “mobilise society”. US special forces veterans with an organisation called Grey Bull Rescue helped Machado escape by boat after she spent a year in hiding from Maduro’s regime.

Since Maduro’s abduction in January, the country has been ruled by his former Vice President Delcy Rodriguez.

Machado was greeted by cheering supporters as she travelled in her motorcade after she returned to Venezuela on Sunday. Rodriguez voiced distaste for the fanfare.

“The show could have been avoided – the airports are right here,” she said on state television.

When asked about a possible meeting with Rodriguez, the opposition leader said she had not received any message from her or from Washington.

Shortly before Machado’s statements on Thursday, Rodriguez assured the nation that elections would be held in Venezuela “with the world as witness” but did not specify a date.

Her return comes just weeks after a controversial US oil deal that will see Venezuela hand over 20 percent of its vast oil reserves.

“This agreement does not reflect the levels of transparency that Venezuelan society wants,” Machado said, criticising the deal.

US president seeks to underscore Latin American military operation, as Iran war causes midterm affordability threat.

United States President Donald Trump has featured a ship he said is carrying Venezuelan oil during a visit to Texas, where he will hold two rallies one after the other in the hopes of boosting Republican chances in a make-or-break Senate race.

Speaking at Corpus Christi on Tuesday on his fourth trip to the state this campaign season, Trump pointed to a ship in the distance.

“It’s got 1 million barrels of oil on it from Venezuela,” he said, adding the cargo was “thanks to our big victory in our recent war with Venezuela”.

The emphasis on the oil comes as US consumers have wrestled with high fossil fuel prices amid the US-Israel war with Iran, a key issue in the upcoming midterm elections.

“We’re celebrating the greatest oil victory in history,” Trump said.

It was not immediately clear under what pretext the oil had been shipped or whether the details Trump gave were correct. The US had received crude oil shipments from Venezuela before the US abduction of Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro on January 3, but those transfers have increased this year.

In August, the Trump administration announced a deal giving the Pentagon a 35 percent stake in North America Blue Energy Partners, a new company overseeing 65 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. The White House said in September that the first shipment from the deal would likely hit US reserves in November, although experts have cast doubt on whether the deal will have any short-term impact.

Speaking to reporters earlier in the day, Trump referred to the shipment as a “gift” from Venezuela. The country’s interim leader, Delcy Rodriguez, has not commented on the specific shipment.

At the rally, Trump also floated making Venezuela the “51st state”.

Key race

Trump’s frequent visits to Texas underscore the state’s significance for Republicans.

Trump endorsed Attorney General Ken Paxton in the Republican primary over incumbent Senator John Cornyn. The scandal-ridden Paxton now faces a punishing contest against Democrat James Talarico, a Presbyterian seminarian.

Polls have regularly shown Talarico leading Paxton, although that lead has largely remained within the margin of error. A RealClearPolitics average of polls had Talarico leading Paxton by 1.7 points.

Talarico’s victory would mark a sea change in a state that has not elected a Democrat to statewide office since 1994.

It would also represent a major rebuke to Trump, whose Republican Party is fighting to maintain its narrow control of the Senate. Democrats are widely projected to take control of the US House of Representatives in the November 3 vote.

Talarico has used the final stretch of the race to focus on years of corruption allegations against Paxton, while drawing a contrast to voters’ affordability concerns.

“Ken Paxton represents everything that’s wrong with this broken, corrupt system,” he said during an event in Houston last week.

Paxton has sought to portray Talarico as too “radical” for Texas, saying his policies would hurt a state known for its pro-business policies.

Trump and other administration officials, notably Vice President JD Vance, have regularly focused on cultural issues, distorting Talarico’s past comments on transgender rights and border security.

Speaking in Corpus Christi, Trump repeated those attacks and urged his supporters to vote as if he were on the ballot.

“If you go out, and if you all vote, we win in a landslide,” Trump said.

The Nobel laureate’s homecoming follows national protests demanding free elections.

Venezuela’s opposition leader Maria Corina Machado has successfully returned to the country after more than 10 months in exile.

Machado announced her arrival on social media on Sunday, writing, “I am here. With you.”

The current opposition leader, Edmundo Gonzalez, confirmed the news, writing on X that “our leader, my dear Maria Corina, is on Venezuelan soil”.

The Comando Con Venezuela political organisation shared footage of Machado arriving at a church in Lara, where she was greeted by supporters.

Machado first disappeared from public life after being briefly arrested in January 2025. She re-emerged last December in Norway, where she won the Nobel Peace Prize for her efforts to challenge Venezuela President Nicolas Maduro. Maduro was abducted from Caracas by the United States military in January 2026.

Venezuela’s Vice President Delcy Rodriguez has stood in as acting president since then, with the endorsement of US President Donald Trump, and has cooperated with his administration regarding reforms in the country, as well as a deal to grant the US control of over 65 billion barrels’ worth of Venezuela’s oil reserves.

Calls for elections to be held

Rodriguez’s presidency has extended far beyond the 90-day period she was authorised to serve following Maduro’s removal. But she has yet to call an election despite public demand and despite her promise to do so at the United Nations General Assembly in September. The US maintains that the country is not ready yet.

Earlier this week, thousands of Venezuelans took to the streets to call for elections in the first nationwide opposition protest in nearly two years.

Although the opposition is widely believed to have won Venezuela’s disputed 2024 elections, Trump has cast doubt on Machado’s abilities to lead, claiming in January that she “doesn’t have the support within or the respect within the country”.

Machado presented Trump with her Nobel medal when visiting him in the White House weeks later, in what she said was “a recognition for his unique commitment with our freedom”. The US leader has repeatedly voiced his desire to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize himself.

Machado has made previous unsuccessful attempts to enter Venezuela. In September, her team said she had made seven attempts in the space of a few weeks.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced on X that “the conditions allowing for the safe return of Ms. Machado to Venezuela is the direct result of the U.S. supported reconciliation talks which has already seen hundreds of political prisoners freed and hundreds of political opposition figures return from exile.”

Asked to comment about Machado’s return, Trump told reporters on Sunday, “I don’t know anything about it, but I think she’s a very nice woman.”

“She gave me her Nobel Prize, so how can I say anything else? And I hope she’s safe.”

September 2: Chris Wright, Delcy Rodríguez and Paula Henao at the contract-signing ceremony for new deals with Chevron, Eni, and GE Vernova.

The lights could come back on in Maracaibo without Venezuelans gaining the capacity to change their government. More unsettlingly, restoring power to their homes could help keep those governing them in place.

This is the possibility taking shape in Venezuela. Chavismo’s relationship with Washington has changed under the pressure of American intervention; new investment could improve services while giving both the government and its foreign partners a growing interest in preserving the arrangement that delivers those improvements.

The issue goes beyond whether chavismo has abandoned its ideology: the infrastructure sustaining its power is being rebuilt around different relationships. Democratic demands now confront a governing system whose continuity may serve interests extending well beyond Venezuela.

A different foundation for continuity

Maduro remained after July 28, 2024, but maintaining control of the State could not repair the gap between holding office and having a credible electoral mandate. When US forces captured him in January 2026, that legitimacy deficit shaped the international response. Although there were international condemnations of the operation, opposing the use of force and defending Maduro’s right to govern were different positions. Some governments rejected his claim to the presidency while still questioning the intervention. 

Nevertheless, Maduro’s removal left much of the chavista governing apparatus in place. Under Delcy Rodríguez, that apparatus faces a powerful external actor that can influence its room to manoeuvre. Pragmatism is therefore more than an ideological preference: cooperation with Washington has become a condition of political survival.

Tension arises when immediate commercial stability becomes tied to particular officeholders and agreements whose terms a democratic government might review.

For Washington, the authorities in Caracas can authorize contracts and implement agreements. For those authorities, cooperation offers resources and international acceptance. Their interests are different, but they can converge around continuity.

That convergence is acquiring a material basis. On October 17, Rodríguez announced expectations of almost $76 billion in oil investment over five years. These are anticipated investments, rather than money already spent. As contracts, payments and operations develop, however, businesses may become increasingly dependent on the officials and arrangements enabling them.

This does not make democracy incompatible with American investment. Accountable institutions could offer stronger guarantees over time. Tension arises when immediate commercial stability becomes tied to particular officeholders and agreements whose terms a democratic government might review. Political change can then appear as a risk to be postponed.

What changes behind the light switch

In my earlier article on infrastructure after the earthquakes, I argued that relationships, trust and coordination are as necessary to a response as machinery. Electricity works the same way. A power station depends on engineers, maintenance routines, payments and decisions about where resources go.

In my sociotechnical research, a cultural infrastructure framework helps distinguish three connected levels. The first is what people experience. The second is how work is organized to provide it. The third concerns who has authority, whose expertise counts and what makes their decisions acceptable or open to challenge.

During Maduro’s presidency, the drought of 2016 and the blackouts of 2019 exposed failures across all three. Households lost electricity. Behind the outages were maintenance problems, fuel shortages and the loss of experienced staff. An assessment by the Inter-American Development Bank also identified weak planning and the absence of independent regulation. Repairing machinery could not, by itself, correct the arrangements allowing the system to deteriorate.

Venezuelans may receive better electricity without gaining a meaningful say in how the system operates.

Under Delcy, the third level has changed profoundly. Washington now helps shape the conditions for reconstruction, and international suppliers offer access to equipment and expertise. The US Department of Energy describes an agreement with GE Vernova to modernize the grid and expand generation over several years.

That shift could enable changes in the second level, from procurement and contractor payments to maintenance and staffing. Those changes could eventually improve the first level, with fewer outages and more reliable services. However, Reuters reported in May that suppliers still faced uncertainty over payments, project priorities and authorizations. Announcements do not remove accumulated failures.

The important distinction is that changing who authorizes recovery does not necessarily give citizens more authority over it. The third level can be extensively reorganized between governments and companies while remaining closed to the people who depend on the service.

Whose stability, and for how long?

Electricity makes the resulting tension concrete. An oil producer needs reliable power. A household needs it too. Investment serving production could benefit both, but shared need does not ensure equal influence over which installations are repaired first or which communities wait.

If those priorities are negotiated mainly between officials and investors, Venezuelans may receive better electricity without gaining a meaningful say in how the system operates. Successful repairs could strengthen the government’s public standing while making commercial partners more invested in its continuity.

The different timescales matter. As I argued in “Venezuela Isn’t Transitioning. It’s Operating,” daily life follows immediate needs while political change moves on another timetable. A repaired installation may reduce outages before the wider network has dependable maintenance. Sustaining improvements requires organizational capacity. Establishing public accountability requires political decisions that neither repairs nor foreign investment can make automatically.

Venezuelans should not have to choose between functioning services and political rights. Nor should investors have to depend on indefinite chavista rule for contracts to be secure.

Meanwhile, every contract and operational dependency can make the emerging arrangement harder to alter. A process presented as temporary stabilization could acquire beneficiaries with reasons to prolong it. Recovery would then help rebuild the foundations of chavista power before the question of democratic authority is settled.

That is why an electoral timetable matters alongside investment commitments. US-backed talks involving Dinorah Figuera continue while María Corina Machado remains outside the process and no firm election date has been established. The practical question is whether citizens acquire enforceable rights to scrutinize and replace their government while economic arrangements are being consolidated.

Reliable electricity would be a real improvement, but Venezuelans should not have to choose between functioning services and political rights. Nor should investors have to depend on indefinite chavista rule for contracts to be secure.

Chavismo’s pragmatism is rebuilding the relationships through which it can survive. Whether that reconstruction also serves democracy depends on who can challenge its terms. The lights coming back on may show that the system works better; the decisive political test is whether Venezuelans can change the people running it.

Thousands of Venezuelans have taken to the streets in several cities to demand free elections and other political changes, in the first nationwide opposition protest in nearly two years.

US President Donald Trump and acting President Delcy Rodriguez have said there would be elections, but no date has been set for a vote to decide on a successor for Nicolas Maduro, after the former Venezuelan president was captured by US forces in a military raid in January.

Opposition leader and Nobel Peace Prize winner Maria Corina Machado, who has been outside the country for nearly a year after living in hiding following a contested 2024 election, has said elections must take place by July 2027.

Her Vente Venezuela movement organised the protest, which took place in the capital Caracas and other cities, including Valencia, Maracay, San Cristobal and Maracaibo.

“Seeing this makes me happy because I know change is possible,” said 18-year-old cosmetology student Leosmary Hernandez, as she gathered with hundreds of others in northern Maracay. “I’ve been through so many hardships, so many problems because of the dollar, and difficulties studying. I have high hopes for my country and for our next leader and president, Maria Corina.”

“I went out to protest before, when things were much tougher, and I’m even less afraid today because I want my voice to be heard,” she added.

Since January 3, the country has been led by interim President Delcy Rodriguez of the long-governing United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV).

PSUV leaders have been accused of carrying out human rights abuses against political dissidents, including arbitrary arrest, imprisonment and torture.

After the United States launched a military operation to abduct and jail former President Nicolas Maduro, the PSUV remained in power with the support of the White House.

US President Trump has backed Rodriguez’s leadership, despite her having been Maduro’s vice president.

His administration has maintained an active role in Venezuela, exerting control over its oil resources and pressuring the Rodriguez government for reforms.

Minimal security presence

Venezuela’s socialist movement, in power since 1999 under late President Hugo Chavez and then Maduro, has in the past deployed security forces against protesters, but government forces had minimal presence at protest sites on Thursday, and in many smaller cities demonstrators dispersed before dark.

The ruling Socialist Party called for its supporters to march from Caracas’ Plaza Venezuela, the same place the opposition planned to gather two hours later, to a location near the presidential palace to commemorate Breast Cancer Awareness Month.

Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello, known for his close ties to the security services, was pictured on state television attending the march, while the opposition supporters moved their protest to a nearby location.

US-backed talks continue

Talks between a faction of the opposition and the interim government, aimed at remaking the top court and the electoral council ahead of eventual elections, held their latest session this month, but changes could take significant time.

The negotiations, backed by the US, do not include Machado’s political movement, though she has said she will not stand in the way of their progress.

Machado’s proxy Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia claims to have won the 2024 election according to vote tallies by the opposition. But the government, which never released full counts, backed Maduro, as did the country’s legal and electoral institutions.

Machado has for years sought US support, aligning with hawks in the Trump team who argued that Maduro, through alleged links to drug gangs, represented a direct threat to US national security. Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, are facing drug and torture charges in the US. They have pleaded not guilty.

Caracas, October 22, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Students from the Venezuelan Experimental University of the Arts (UNEARTE) have staged multiple demonstrations in recent days to press for solutions to infrastructural and administrative issues.

Students from the UNEARTE branch in Maracay, Aragua State, blocked a major intersection on Tuesday to demand “dignified” studying conditions.

“We are staging a peaceful demonstration to demand improvements to our academic conditions,” student José Pérez told local reporters. “We do not have our own campus, and the facilities are inadequate for the artistic areas we are studying.”

Protesters held billboards and banners calling for a “dignified campus.” UNEARTE’s Maracay education programs function in different rented spaces, which students have complained are in deteriorating condition.

The Maracay demonstration followed a number of protests and sit-ins at UNEARTE’s main campus in Caracas. Students denounced that multiple university installations are shut down or in a state of disrepair. The Modest Bor center, which houses UNEARTE’s music program, has been partially closed for several years.

In addition, students decried that UNEARTE centers’ cafeterias have been shuttered for months, while many have additional grievances including inoperative bathrooms and software issues that  left many students unable to properly register for classes. 

In response to the protests, Venezuelan authorities vowed to address the concerns raised by students. UNEARTE Rector Ignacio Barreto approached students during a demonstration and promised that the registration process would start over.

The Ministry of Culture, which is responsible for UNEARTE alongside the Ministry of Higher Education, held an assembly with all university personnel and announced the creation of working groups with student representatives in several areas.

“This commission, apart from listening to the students and the authorities, should have a weekly plan that can be supervised,” Culture Minister Alejandro López told press. “Accountability before the students is key.”

López, Barreto and other officials were seen inspecting several university facilities last week. The minister pledged to address issues of running water, internet connectivity, and transportation in the near term.

UNEARTE was created by former President Hugo Chávez in 2008, bringing together several educational institutes dedicated to the arts with the aim of advancing a popular and anti-colonial pedagogical approach. It offers degrees in music, dance, film, theater, photography, and plastic arts.

The protests over UNEARTE’s disrepair and deficient conditions coincided with the Venezuelan government’s launch of the José Antonio Abreu Music University. Acting President Delcy Rodríguez headlined the inauguration ceremony earlier this month.

The new public university will have its state-of-the-art campus in the traditionally middle-class southwestern Caracas parish of El Paraíso, including three concert halls and a research center. It will also have 18 regional branches, with a maximum enrolment capacity of around 3,500 students.

Other Venezuelan universities have likewise seen student demonstrations in recent days. In the “Dr. Humberto Fernández-Morán” National Sciences University, students held a protest and an assembly on Monday over what they characterized as inadequate transportation.

The campus is located in Los Teques, some 25 kilometers outside Caracas, and was formally inaugurated in December 2024. Though the university promised to provide transportation, students have complained that the assigned buses are unreliable and have insufficient capacity.

Higher education trade unions have also been at the forefront of regular labor protests in recent months. Venezuelan working-class organizations have called for non-wage bonuses to be converted to salaries and for the restoration of collective bargaining agreements.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Philadelphia, USA.

Not too long ago, when it came to dealing with Maduro & Co., Ric Grenell was considered a key figure in Washington DC. As the US braced for Trump’s second coming, Grenell was even deemed a contender to lead the State Department. The president opted for Marco Rubio, but created a new diplomatic post exclusively for Grenell: the Special Presidential Envoy for Special Missions, which had a Special focus on Venezuela and North Korea.

Given the leeway some middlemen retain in the Trump White House, Grenell’s debut was the subject of widespread speculation about who would ultimately command the Venezuela portfolio. Days into the second Trump presidency, while Maduro secured his last inauguration with an iron fist, Grenell arrived in Miraflores to meet with the dictator and his political strategist, Jorge Rodríguez, who looked delighted. Grenell left Caracas with six US citizens Maduro had held hostage, which he framed as a resounding diplomatic victory, though many more American prisoners were still left behind. He soon reaped a reward: Trump appointed Grenell to manage the Kennedy Center, an ideal hub to sow political and financial connections through grandiose social events. The president even wanted to rename the venue after himself. Grenell—widely considered a “MAGA insider”—emerged as an ideal ally to seal Trump’s imprint on the institution. It didn’t last long.

Twenty months later, he lost the job at the Kennedy Center and currently has no place in the current arrangement between Trump and Delcy Rodríguez.

Since last week, Grenell has been embroiled in a scandal of a multimillion-dollar, international dimension, which goes back to his Kennedy Center tenure. It speaks of the network of friends and contacts he had access to when empowered vis-à-vis the chavista clique. The New York Times characterizes the unfolding saga as “bitter even for Trump-era standards.” As it stands, the episode is yet another example of the broad discretion and opacity that US officials have claimed for themselves to navigate relations between Washington and political elites in Caracas, Balkan capitals, and beyond.

The Mildons and a misplaced transaction

The saga gained attention when news broke about the wedding between Trump’s former personal lawyer Alina Habba, 42, and Turhan Mildon, an obscure Turkish investor in his 20s with ties to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Mildon started to operate in Venezuela’s construction industry when Maduro was still in power, after a seemingly lucrative experience in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Love and business drew him to Caracas, the Middle East Eye reported in September: Mildon was then in a relationship with the daughter of Remigio Ceballos, a powerful chavista military commander, while he partnered with the Venezuelan State to revive as many as 10 unproductive cement plants.

His facilitator in Caracas was no other than Alex Saab, the disgraced moneyman of Maduro who is now in US custody.

According to New York Times reporters, Mildon not only lobbied Saab for the “Vencement” deal, but also took over a once-successful shrimp exporter Maduro seized in 2024. The company’s original owner is imprisoned in Venezuela.

Regarding Mildon’s new romance, he told the MEE that he met Habba some time ago through a mutual friend, “an ambassador in the US.”

The public fallout between Habba and Grenell surfaced last week, involving allegations over political favors in exchange for a multi-million-dollar contribution that was never registered. Axios first reported that Habba stormed into the Oval Office to tell Trump that Grenell persuaded Mildon, her new husband, to wire a $17.6 million donation to the Kennedy Center last year via a third-party’s bank account. Grenell denied the allegation on the spot, challenging the Mildons to submit proof.

Caracas Chronicles reached out to Grenell’s camp for comment on these developments and any reflections on his work in Venezuela, including whether he remains in contact with government officials under Delcy. We haven’t received a response. A Venezuelan opposition source who closely monitors Alex Saab’s legal case and business dealings declined to comment at this stage.

On Monday, Axios gave us an idea of the kind of evidence that Mildon’s lawyers are handing over. Grenell reportedly texted Mildon that the transaction would secure access to US officials, maybe even the president himself, through “VIP events” at the Kennedy Center. Grenell also offered to make him “the American face down in V,” which sounds like he saw Mildon as a potential poster child for US business interests in Maduro’s Venezuela.

Axios reports that a private defence company called TXAT allegedly received the payment. The transfer would not come from Mildon’s bank account, but from an account linked to the Congolese Ministry of Finance.

While revelations pile up and the Mildons build their case before President Trump, Grenell keeps witnessing his own change of luck, which began in the second half of last year, with the US military deployment in the Caribbean, and continued with Maduro’s ousting on January 3.

A bad streak

“I understand what he [Maduro] wants. I believe we can still have a deal. I believe in diplomacy, I believe in avoiding war,” Grenell claimed on September 17, 2025, during the CPAC international conference in Asunción, Paraguay.

Grenell already looked out of the loop. It was the early days of a US military campaign a few kilometers away from Venezuela, which had the stated purpose of dismantling narco-trafficking networks in the region. Grenell had become a champion of a supposedly mutually beneficial cooperation with the chavista elite in previous months. In contrast with the likes of Rubio and Mauricio Claver-Carone, Grenell pushed for the normalization of relations between the Trump administration and the Maduro regime. He portrayed his in-person meeting with Maduro and Jorge Rodríguez as a sign of what his approach could achieve. Soon, the US began deporting Venezuelan migrants and detainees in charter flights to Maiquetía, which Grenell could publicize as proof that his plan was working.

Analysts and reporters speculated over which idea would prevail: Grenell’s pitch that working with Maduro was the safe bet, or Rubio’s insistence on revoking the Chevron license and gutting the regime of financial resources. Soon enough, a tougher sanctions regime would isolate Venezuela. Rubio and Secretary of War Pete Hegseth grabbed the spotlight. Grenell found himself sidelined, but kept insisting his approach was the right one. 

“I continue to talk to Maduro’s team,” Grenell told CBS after returning from CPAC, which featured the likes of presidents Santiago Peña and Javier Milei, and right-wing commentator Javier Negre, a Spanish media figure whose visibility in “Twitterzuela” has grown for praising Delcy Rodríguez and criticizing María Corina Machado’s camp.

Donald Trump shut Grenell down via telephone two weeks later, according to The New York Times, in the middle of an Oval Office meeting with senior military leaders. Grenell reportedly received orders to cease all communications with Maduro’s camp.

The aftermath of January 3 would further push him out. Rubio took an active role in handing instructions and often dealing directly with Delcy Rodríguez. In March, Grenell was relieved of his duties as president and executive director of the Kennedy Center. He formally retains the “Special Missions” post, but has stayed off the radar while other names (Claver-Carone, Alejandro Betancourt, Chris Wright and Jarrod Agen, to name a few) gained prominence over the Caracas dossier.

The unlucky colleagues

A string of successive scandals has also affected other Trump administration officials, who had to resign from their posts last week. Evidence available from open sources indicate two of them are close to Grenell.

The latest example is Katie Zacharia, the shortest-serving Press Secretary in the history of the White House. Following a clumsy first (and last) press briefing, Zacharia faced scrutiny over the false claim that she was an attorney. Some quick fact-checking from US media and observers found that Zacharia was neither licensed to work as counsel in the US nor that she worked as a lawyer in China, as she alleged at some point. Her LinkedIn page says she served as “general counsel” for Fix California, a non-profit that Grenell launched in 2021. The organization is focused on voter registration and advancing conservative causes in the Golden State, the liberal stronghold run by Democratic Governor Gavin Newsom—a constant target of Grenell’s attacks on social media.

Last year, Zacharia appeared twice in conservative media hailing Grenell’s work in Venezuela. On Fox News Night in February 2025, she recounted how Grenell supposedly forced Maduro to give in:

People didn’t know these hostages [American political prisoners in Venezuela] were in Venezuela. He asked Maduro: “I want these six hostages,” and he said, “Oh, I don’t have them.” And Ambassador Grenell said: “I need them, I’m gonna go back to the airplane and you’re gonna get them for me.” And the regime brought them to him…

The other disgraced ally of Grenell is Kimberly Guilfoyle, the ex-fiancée of Donald Trump Jr. (and Gavin Newsom’s ex-wife), who served as the US ambassador in Athens until last week. Guilfoye’s dismissal was actually the only news Katie Zacharia shared during her only presser.

Guilfoyle, whose fondness for parties and luxury was no secret, faced rising scrutiny in September. The Wall Street Journal reported that a Greek-American lobbyist had become a constant presence alongside her in official meetings across the Balkans, promoting energy deals with a Greek construction company. Then, the same journalists found that Guilfoyle asked a Trump donor to pay her $100,000 credit card bill just before her confirmation hearing. Despite some initial denial, the episode went on to exhaust Rubio and Trump, who forced her to resign last week.

The president also fired Paolo Zampolli last week, who served as special envoy for global partnerships. A longtime modeling agent, Zampolli is credited with introducing Donald Trump to Melania in 1998.

Public records show that Grenell has also had interests in Southeastern Europe, where association with pro-Russian autocrats and involvement in controversial deals continue to dog MAGA and Trump’s own inner circle. Having served as special envoy for Kosovo-Serbia negotiations during Trump’s first term, Grenell maintains a close relationship with Aleksandar Vučić, Serbia’s increasingly authoritarian leader, who recently resigned the presidency to run for prime minister in a bid to further entrench his power. After leaving that post, Grenell advocated for a major luxury complex in central Belgrade backed by Jared Kushner’s investment firm.

In Romania, Grenell drew scrutiny for publicly opposing proceedings against internet personalities Andrew and Tristan Tate, who face severe criminal charges including human trafficking and rape across multiple jurisdictions.

Grenell, Machado and the Rodríguez siblings

A Venezuelan opposition insider suggests Grenell’s sidelining helped put an end to media noise about the Trump administration pursuing a diplomatic and commercial understanding with Maduro in 2025. 

Grenell  first came into contact with Maduro associates in 2021, when Florida politician David Rivera and Raúl Gorrín coordinated a backchannel meeting in Mexico City between Jorge Rodríguez, Grenell and Erik Prince. Delcy’s brother offered to swap six American prisoners for Alex Saab, then in US custody for the first time. Rivera, who couldn’t make it to the encounter, faces a decade in prison for secretly lobbying on behalf of Maduro during Trump’s first term—an operation orchestrated by Delcy Rodríguez, who finally achieved an understanding with Washington this year.

Grenell was perceived as a nuisance for regime-change ambitions among many opposition figures and observers. María Corina Machado had contact with Grenell in early 2025, but the relationship soured before long. Two senior members of Machado’s team were approached for a comment on Grenell’s role and relationship with their camp. Neither has replied so far.

Grenell reportedly sought to meet the opposition leader in person while she was hiding in Venezuela. The New York Times reported that she refused to provide a list of political prisoners who Grenell could prioritize during negotiations with chavista representatives. Grenell later voiced his displeasure when Machado won the Nobel Prize instead of his boss, claiming in a tweet that the award had “died years ago.”

Now, both Machado and Grenell appear to lack Trump’s confidence. But Machado is expected to find her way back to Venezuela, one way or another, while Grenell could face disgrace, deprived from the opportunity of providing access to the investment rush “down in V.”

Nine months after the US’ January 3 military strikes and kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, the Venezuelanalysis team got together to take stock of a whirlwind of changes in Caracas’ domestic and foreign policies.

Lead editor Ricardo Vaz was joined by fellow staff members Jessica Dos Santos, Silvana Solano, and Lucas Koerner. They broke down the US’ semi-colonial regime, the gaps between the official discourse and reality, and the prospects for the different political sectors.

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Note: this episode was recorded in Spanish. See the YouTube video above for a subtitled version.

Between smiles and a handshake, Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez thanked US President Donald Trump for “supporting the country’s return to multilateral forums,” following a face-to-face meeting on September 22 that she called “historic.”

In her address before the UN General Assembly one day later, Rodríguez reiterated her gratitude to Trump while promising a “democratic transformation” of her country. The acting leader’s trip to New York, a mere nine months after the January 3 US bombings and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores, perfectly encapsulated the Venezuelan government’s international and domestic realignment with US imperialism in general and its MAGA faction in particular.

In her speech, she euphemistically called the January 3 military strikes “the outcome of the exhaustion of domestic politics and heightened confrontation with the US,” basically holding Venezuela partially responsible for the imperialist attack it suffered.

The abandonment of Maduro

Rodríguez’s trip was as symbolic for what was said as for what was left unsaid. The acting leader and her entourage heaped praise on Trump and took turns posing for pictures. Rodríguez also maintained an undignified silence when Trump, addressing the UN, gloated about the January 3 military operation and abduction of Maduro, whom he called an “outlaw dictator,” while shamelessly boasting that “to the victor belong the spoils.”

Maduro and Flores – currently detained in Brooklyn just 10 miles from UN headquarters and facing a show trial on ludicrous “narcoterrorism” charges – were not worth a single mention by Rodríguez. This stance has been backed by pro-government pundits who are increasingly dropping the “acting” label when referring to Rodríguez.

Her government has effectively undermined Maduro and Flores’ sovereign immunity argument to get their charges dismissed. US Justice Department prosecutors told the court that Caracas, via its embassy in the US, had advocated to the State Department for Rodríguez to receive head-of-state immunity in an unrelated civil lawsuit in Florida. But, Venezuelan authorities have declined to do the same vis-à-vis Maduro and Flores in what the US Justice Department called “devastating silence.”

The official indifference is even more remarkable given Flores’ documented health issues, heavily aggravated by the brutal kidnapping, which led defense attorneys to request that she be moved to house arrest during the trial. This silence contrasts with the Maduro government’s loud defense of Alex Saab, which repeatedly brought up his health issues under incarceration during the international campaign for his release.

Saab is another prime example of the Rodríguez administration’s pragmatic rapprochement with Washington. He was irregularly handed over to US agencies in May and recently pleaded guilty in a US federal court in Miami, promising to cooperate against unnamed Venezuelan officials.

An imperial satellite

The Venezuelan leadership’s diplomatic activity in New York more broadly showcased a new foreign policy direction that is now unmistakably marching to Washington’s drum.

Rodríguez held talks with International Monetary Fund and World Bank representatives, deepening reengagement with the Washington-based financial institutions that former President Hugo Chávez denounced as instruments of US imperialism and booted them out of the country. The specter of another IMF loan-and-adjustment package returns as the Rodríguez administration begins negotiations to restructure the country’s enormous and illegitimate debt.

In addition, Rodríguez held sideline meetings with US allies only, such as Netherlands PM Rob Jetten, Trinidad and Tobago PM Kamla Persad-Bissessar and Chilean President José Antonio Kast. Rodríguez also hosted Paraguayan President Santiago Peña in Caracas before flying to the US. 

The right-wing Chilean and Paraguayan administrations had firmly backed US regime change efforts in Venezuela, leading the Maduro government to sever ties. Trinidad and Tobago’s case was even more egregious, with Caracas suspending all cooperation, including in key cross-border natural gas projects, after Port of Spain endorsed Washington’s military buildup and extrajudicial boat bombings on Venezuela’s doorstep in late 2025.

Rodríguez and her team also broke with the Chavista tradition of holding meetings with global majority countries similarly under Washington’s gun, especially allies and strategic partners like Cuba, Iran, China and Russia. A customary event in Harlem, alongside Cuban officials and international solidarity movements, was scrapped as well.

The acting president’s UN address exposed how anti-imperialism and the defense of multipolarity have vanished from the official discourse. Absent was the hitherto denunciation of Washington’s criminal wars across the globe, replaced by a vague expression of solidarity with “peoples who suffer war.” Nor was there any condemnation of US economic sanctions, which remain in place against Venezuela and its former allies.

Rodríguez offered no words of support for Cuba as it faces a US blockade that gets more murderous by the day. There was no mention of Palestine either. Before January 3, Venezuelan representatives had never wasted an opportunity to reiterate support for the Palestinian cause and to expose the international community’s failure to rein in the genocidal, Western-sponsored settler colony.

In contrast, Venezuela joined the US, Israel, Ukraine, Western European countries and Latin American right-wing governments in boycotting the UN’s commemoration of the 25th anniversary of the Durban Declaration. The 2001 World Conference Against Racism marked a milestone in the ongoing struggle to end racism and colonialism, provoking the ire of the US and Israel, which have led boycotts of every one of its commemorations.

Fuel for a sputtering empire

Along with the 180-degree foreign policy shift, the Rodríguez administration has moved to restructure the economy to the benefit of a declining US hegemon reeling from its strategic defeat in the war against Iran.

With US officials’ input and supervision, Venezuelan authorities have overhauled energy and mining laws in the interest of multinational corporations, slashing taxes and royalties as well as ceding operational and commercial control. Corporate executives, often shepherded by Trump aides, have paraded through the presidential palace to sign agreements carving up Venezuela’s immense subsoil resources.

A recent oil deal with the Trump administration, which Rodríguez also hailed as “historic,” will turn over 17 prime oilfields holding more than a fifth of Venezuela’s crude reserves to a private petroleum company, NABEP, controlled by the Pentagon. Furthermore, the US State Department will be able to buy 20 percent of NABEP’s output at cost, while having a right of first refusal for the remaining 80 percent, for which a Venezuelan oil official promised a major “sales discount.” In other words, Venezuela is going to supply energy below market price to the imperial war machine.

Whatever revenue is ultimately left for Caracas is still going to be controlled by the US Treasury Department, under what Venezuelan state oil company (PDVSA) chief defended as a “state-to-state agreement.” A recent Financial Times report revealed that the White House is presently barring Venezuela from paying dividends to Russian and Chinese joint venture partners in a flagrant attempt to drive them out.

Washington’s semi-colonial control extends beyond privileged access to natural resources, including strategic minerals. A looming privatization drive and debt restructuring process are likely to further entrench Venezuelan dependence on Western monopoly capital. At the same time, the US is also looking to turn the South American country into a captive market for its heavily subsidized agricultural output. Venezuela’s imports of staples such as rice and corn have skyrocketed this year, seriously threatening national production, especially small and mid-size campesino farms supplying much of the country’s food.

(Ab)uses of history

The speed and scope of Caracas’ realignment with Washington has made it an uphill battle for those still insisting that the acting Rodríguez government is merely conducting a “tactical retreat” without straying from the Bolivarian Revolution’s strategic horizon.

One early line of argument was to invoke historical examples, such as the Brest-Litovsk treaty, to rationalize difficult concessions at gunpoint. However, the analogy grew ever more dubious with the passing months, as the Bolsheviks never renounced their anti-imperialist internationalism nor the nascent socialist state’s sovereignty over the commanding heights of the economy.

The argument that subordinating the economy to US-led capital was akin to China’s post-1978 opening up belies the reality that Venezuela does not even manage its own export revenues and must have its expenses approved by the US State Department, subject to auditing by CIA-linked firms like Deloitte.

Venezuelan government officials and unofficial spokespeople have also abused examples related to Chávez, namely his call for troops to stand down in the failed 1992 insurrection and the fact that he did not martyr himself in the 2002 coup that briefly overthrew his democratically-elected government. However, in both cases, Chávez never surrendered his core principles concerning independence and sovereignty. In 2002, he allowed himself to be taken prisoner by the putschists to avoid a bloodbath, but he did not resign and would not have sat quietly if Venezuela were turned into a US semi-colony overnight. On multiple occasions, Chávez underscored he was prepared to fight and die on the frontlines should Venezuela face an Iraq-style US invasion.

There are other historical analogies that are, unfortunately, more appropriate. Iraq after the US invasion, like Venezuela, to this day does not control its oil revenues, which are deposited in a New York Federal Reserve account. Iraq was until recently under US military occupation, hosting some two dozen bases – a possibility that Trump has recently left open for Venezuela. In past months, the US has carried out extrajudicial executions on Venezuelan soil and deployed military assets in the wake of July’s double earthquake, including temporarily taking over operations at the Simón Bolívar International Airport and La Guaira port.

Egypt under President Anwar Sadat is likewise a very instructive precedent. Sadat never renounced his predecessor Gamal Abdel Nasser, simply presenting his program as a “correction” of past mistakes. Yet he progressively dismantled the achievements of Nasserism, rolling back land reform and industrialization policies in favor of imperialist capital. Sadat also realigned Egypt from the Soviet Union to the US camp, going on to reestablish ties with Israel and abandon the Palestinian cause.

Vietnam: The forgotten analogy

Lacking justifications for the new alliance with the Trump administration, Venezuelan government officials and influencers have resorted to straw man arguments, claiming that the “international left” wanted the Venezuelan people to immolate themselves by confronting a vastly superior military foe.

The official rhetoric eclipses what was until recently Caracas’ preferred historical analogy: Vietnam. In late 2025, as the US ramped up its military buildup, Venezuelan leaders warned that Trump would face a “second Vietnam” if he dared to attack. There were months of military drills and detailed preparations across the country, consistent with Venezuela’s asymmetric doctrine of “prolonged people’s war”. 

Ultimately it is impossible to know how much resistance Venezuela could have mounted against the US onslaught because the leadership opted not to fight. US air superiority and electronic warfare notwithstanding, Venezuelan defense officials have neglected to explain why only one of Venezuela’s 5,000 Russian-made Igla-S manpads – ideal for taking down low-flying helicopters and combat aircraft – was used. Venezuela’s armed forces offered no organized resistance on that fateful morning, leaving Maduro’s Cuban security detail virtually alone to confront the invader in what reportedly still proved a fiercely heroic firefight that left 32 Cubans dead.

Though Venezuela might have been unable to avoid decapitation of its top leadership – either via capture or assassination – it could have raised the costs for the US empire to a politically unacceptable degree, potentially miring it in the sort of Iraq-style quagmire that the Trump administration most feared. 

Instead, almost overnight, the acting government seamlessly pivoted from vowing to combat imperialism by all means necessary to fawning over Trump and his underlings. Promises that not a “single drop” of Venezuelan oil would be shipped to the US in case of an attack were replaced by risible claims that supplying crude at cost to the Pentagon was Chávez’s plan all along.

Unable to present a convincing case for the domestic and foreign policy U-turns, official and unofficial government spokespeople have also lashed out at criticism from the Latin American left. Most recently, former Colombian President Gustavo Petro slammed the Rodríguez administration for giving away the nation’s oil to Trump. Caracas responded with ad hominem invectives.

At Washington’s behest, Venezuela has also halted all subsidized oil shipments to Cuba, which has added to the island’s gravest energy crisis in its history. Cuba’s Deputy Foreign Minister Carlos Fernández de Cossío recently said that Venezuela remained a “friendly” country, but added that “ally is too strong a word.”

The cost of capitulation 

The human toll of resistance, whether in sanctions-besieged Venezuela or on the battlefields of West Asia, is always immense. However, as national liberation movements have long understood, the price of capitulation is inevitably higher, especially in the medium and long term. Chávez and Maduro clearly grasped this reality, rallying the masses to withstand decades of US hybrid warfare and forging close alliances with anti-imperialist states from Cuba to Iran. 

The cost of submission, meanwhile, is being borne by the Venezuelan laboring classes, from small farmers hard hit by US agricultural dumping to the urban semi-proletariat devastated by spiraling inflation resulting from Washington’s pilfering of the nation’s export earnings. 

For its part, Venezuela’s comprador bourgeoisie, in both its traditional and emergent fractions, stands to reap fabulous rewards from the demolition of the legislative pillars of the Bolivarian Revolution – viz., hydrocarbons, mining, housing and real estate, or forthcoming axing of labor and land laws – reasserting itself as a servile intermediary for US imperialism. 

There is no better example than NABEP owner Alejandro Betancourt, an oil mogul who amassed a fortune from often-unfulfilled state contracts dating back to 2009 and was hand-picked by the Trump administration as a middleman in the 25-year agreement backstopped by the Pentagon. The White House went as far as pressuring domestic and foreign courts to drop money laundering accusations against Betancourt.

Rodríguez and her leadership faction likewise benefit from what analyst William Serafino has called the new regime of “co-government” with the Trump White House, tying their fortunes to the latter to outflank rivals and solidify the strategic alliance with local and imperialist capital. 

The current acting president is one of the architects of the post-2018 neoliberal economic package that was the fulcrum of a new governability pact with the local bourgeoisie, freezing wages and social spending in exchange for social “peace”. Indeed, as then vice president, Rodríguez reportedly brought Betancourt back to Venezuela in 2023, shuttering an investigation into his alleged corruption and key role in financing the self-proclaimed Juan Guaidó “interim presidency” during the first Trump administration. The episode is symptomatic of the Venezuelan government’s Faustian gambit to appease business sectors and maintain a modest economic recovery under crushing sanctions, but at the cost of slowly eroding its popular support base.

The Maduro administration’s concessions hollowed out the Bolivarian Revolution’s sovereign edifice but its institutional foundations remained formally intact alongside the internationalist geopolitical scaffolding binding Venezuela to the broader Axis of Resistance. The post-January 3 semi-colonial offensive has set about demolishing this structure of political-military and economic independence. While the destruction can be repaired through sustained bottom-up mobilization advancing a national popular alternative to capitulation, it will likely be the outcome of a medium- and long-term process. Nevertheless, there are growing signs of revolutionary movements and intellectuals organizing to confront the US empire and its local agents and reconquer sovereignty as the cornerstone of any future socialist construction.

What should be clear without a sliver of a doubt is that the “Rodrigato” – and the lumpen bourgeoisie it represents – has opted to pact with the Trump administration. Any revolutionary strategy to resist re-colonization must begin from concrete analysis of concrete conditions. Ignoring the acting Venezuelan leadership’s discourse and policies, pretending that there is a cunning secret plan being devised or trying to frame everything as a masterful 3D chess move, will ultimately hamper the most important task: fighting US imperialism.

Source: Sovereign Media

An alliance of Venezuelan opposition parties has reaffirmed its commitment to exiled Nobel Peace Prize laureate Maria Corina Machado as its leader.

On Sunday, members of the opposition’s Unitary Democratic Platform (PUD) agreed in a meeting in Caracas to “recognise and support the leadership of Maria Corina Machado”.

The coalition also renewed its demand for free elections in Venezuela, following a series of contested presidential votes in 2024 and 2018.

Sunday’s statement included 14 proposals for a democratic transition, including freedom for political parties, the release of all political prisoners and the safe return of those who went into exile.

The announcement also increases pressure on authorities to allow Machado’s return. She has been living in exile since leaving Venezuela last December to receive her Nobel Prize.

“The will of the Venezuelans must once again govern the destiny of our nation,” the opposition’s former presidential candidate Edmundo Gonzalez wrote on social media supporting the proposals.

“We will not accept political prisoners, persecution or a governing power that disregards the mandate of its citizens. Living in freedom and under a genuine constitutional order is a legitimate demand of our society.”

No election set

Venezuela has yet to declare a date for a new presidential vote. Since January 3, the country has been led by interim President Delcy Rodriguez of the long-governing United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV).

PSUV leaders have been accused of carrying out human rights abuses against political dissidents, including arbitrary arrest, imprisonment and torture.

Still, after the United States launched a military operation to abduct and jail former President Nicolas Maduro, the PSUV has remained in power with the support of the White House.

US President Donald Trump has backed Rodriguez’s leadership, despite her having been Maduro’s vice president.

His administration has maintained an active role in Venezuela, exerting control over its oil resources and pressuring the Rodriguez government for reforms.

But critics point out that Trump has been reluctant to push Rodriguez for new elections, opting instead for a three-phase plan that focuses first on stabilising the country and economic recovery before pursuing a political transition.

Machado, meanwhile, has told The Financial Times she would like to see Venezuela hold elections by July next year.

“The US government and the Venezuelan people all agree ⁠⁠that the only way to make ⁠⁠this sustainable and ⁠⁠a real victory is to turn Venezuela into a stable democracy,” she told the newspaper earlier this month.

A thwarted return

Venezuelan authorities blocked Machado’s repeated attempts to return to the country, according to her party, Vente Venezuela.

Machado has also reportedly attempted to petition the Trump administration for help re-entering Venezuela.

Separately, she gifted Trump her Nobel Peace Prize in January, during a visit to Washington, DC. Media reports, however, have suggested friction between the Trump administration and Machado.

In interviews with Reuters and Axios, US administration officials have anonymously expressed frustration with the opposition leader’s repeated efforts to return home, particularly after a pair of deadly earthquakes in Venezuela last July.

Axios quoted one official as calling Machado’s push “political opportunism”.

Machado, however, remains one of the most popular figures in Venezuela’s opposition.

In October 2023, Machado won the opposition coalition’s presidential primary, but in January 2024, Venezuela’s courts blocked her from running in the upcoming race.

The courts upheld a 15-year ban on her holding public office, reportedly due to her support of US sanctions against the Maduro government.

Gonzalez ultimately replaced Machado as the opposition candidate in the 2024 race. Maduro claimed victory for a third term as Venezuela’s president in that election cycle, despite widespread criticism that the vote did not meet democratic standards.

The opposition released vote tallies that appeared to show Gonzalez had won the race.

The US had recognised Gonzalez as the country’s rightful president-elect and denied the legitimacy of Maduro’s election claims.

Machado was previously removed from the National Assembly in 2014, due to her activism against the Venezuelan government.

A third round of talks between the Rodriguez government and the opposition began in Venezuela this month.

But instead of including Machado, the negotiations have involved members of the 2015 National Assembly, which was led by the opposition and dissolved under Maduro.

Still, in a statement this month, the US State Department praised the talks as aiding the Venezuelan government’s reform.

“Political reconciliation talks between the interim Venezuelan government and 2015 National Assembly representatives are producing tangible reforms in civil liberties and political rights, laying the groundwork for credible elections and a democratic transition,” the State Department said.

Mérida, October 16, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores have rejected a new indictment amid an ongoing prosecution by the US government.

I reject this document in its entirety,” Maduro told New York Judge Alvin Hellerstein in a hearing on Thursday. Similarly, Cilia Flores maintained her “absolute innocence” when asked to respond to the new charges, declaring: “I am completely innocent. I am not guilty.”

The judge entered formal not-guilty pleas on behalf of both defendants for all counts.

Maduro and Flores have been detained in Brooklyn’s Metropolitan Detention Center since being kidnapped by US special forces on January 3. 

In the Manhattan federal court, US Attorney Jamie McDonald presented the superseding indictment that introduces a “conspiracy to commit torture” charge alongside the previous charges of “narco-terrorism” and drug trafficking conspiracy, as well as weapons possession.

The accusation claims Maduro personally oversaw purported torture of prisoners and held authority over whether detainees were released or prosecuted.

“Maduro, Flores, and other high-ranking members of their inner circle used a violent system of torture and repression to maintain their power,” McDonald stated to reporters outside the courthouse.

According to the legal filing, the prosecution alleges that Maduro and Flores oversaw a violent state “apparatus of repression” spanning from the former’s election in 2013.

The document claims methods like electric shocks, asphyxiation, and simulated drowning, among others, were allegedly deployed against political dissidents, state officials suspected of disloyalty, and US citizens detained inside Venezuela.

Defense attorneys have repeatedly questioned the legitimacy of the entire prosecution, framing it as an unprecedented overreach of U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction. Maduro and Flores have consistently maintained that they are political prisoners and that their capture constituted a flagrant violation of Venezuelan sovereignty.

Legal counsel has filed pre-trial motions requesting the dismissal of the charges on grounds that Maduro and Flores, as a sitting president and legislator, respectively, possess sovereign immunity from foreign criminal prosecution.

Hellerstein recently rejected a request from Flores’ defense team that she be moved to house arrest due to severe health concerns, arguing that the first lady poses a “substantial flight risk.”

The updated indictment forced the judge to adjust the calendar of proceedings. The hearing on sovereign immunity arguments has been moved to January. The trial was pushed back two weeks and is now slated to commence on June 14, 2027, with a final pretrial conference scheduled for June 8. 

In Venezuela, National Assembly Deputy Iris Varela blasted the new charges, arguing that Maduro and Flores remain victims of a forced kidnapping orchestrated by Washington.

“I wish to publicly express, once again, my absolute and total rejection of the despicable act that the U.S. government is brazenly carrying out against our president and our congresswoman,” Varela wrote on her X account.

She further described the latest charges as “a miserable ploy [and] a grotesque maneuver” and went on to label US President Donald Trump as a “pedophile pig.”

In contrast to Varela, the Venezuelan government has made no official statement regarding the latest developments in the legal case against Maduro and Flores.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

The “biggest oil deal in history” was announced almost simultaneously by acting Venezuelan President Delcy Rodríguez and U.S. President Donald Trump on Aug. 28. However, many Venezuelans didn’t find out until the next day because massive blackouts — up to 16 hours a day and partly caused by increased oil production — kept them from scrolling the news.

At the United Nations a month later, Trump bragged that he had taken Venezuela’s “spoils,” while Rodríguez said the deal with the U.S. would contribute to resolving the energy needs of “the hemisphere and the international economy.” Venezuelans then asked: What about our energy needs and economy?

The oil deal, the legal and operational details of which are still unknown, covers the exploitation of 17 fields and 65 billion barrels, which equates to 20% of Venezuela’s total reserves — the world’s largest, at an estimated 303 billion barrels. U.S. companies will invest $100 billion in exploiting the fields, a figure which — according to Venezuelan government projections — would translate into more than $209 billion in tax revenue for Venezuela over the years of the contract.

The announcement sparked questions and criticism from different sectors of the country, with concerns about the lack of information and the impact on sovereignty. In response, Rodríguez tried to explain the deal’s benefits in a nationally televised address, noting, “How much does Venezuela receive? Based on a barrel price of $65 … revenue would reach $209.3 billion for the state. In concrete terms, this means that for every barrel produced and sold, about $19 goes to [Venezuela].”

Oil drives the Venezuelan economy. Currently, it accounts for 71% of the nation’s total exports, but now much of that revenue goes to the U.S. In the first quarter of this year, out of a total of $7.76 billion in exports, $5.5 billion came from oil activity. As the acting president’s address went on, many of us only had more doubts.

A few hours later, Venezuelan economist Francisco Rodríguez summed up some of the nation’s concerns: “Do the projected tax revenues … correspond to nominal amounts, inflation-adjusted amounts, or net present values? A nominal amount of $19 per barrel in 2051, the project’s final year, would correspond to a real value of about $9 today.”

“The $209 billion equates, over 25 years, to about $8.4 billion annually, a relatively low amount compared with the tax revenue Venezuela has collected in the past at similar production levels. The amount would be even lower if it corresponds to a nominal total.” According to Central Bank of Venezuela data, Venezuela took in a record $82.8 billion in 2008 alone from oil sales.

Contradictions

Trump later contradicted Delcy Rodríguez’s 25-year timeline, saying the deal would involve a century of concessions. Francisco Rodríguez, the economist, noted that extracting 65 billion barrels in 25 years would be impossible, due to lack of infrastructure. 

“What rights does the U.S. acquire over these resources after 25 years? Can a future Venezuelan government decide to withdraw from this deal if it doesn’t like it?” he asked.

And why wouldn’t they like it? Trump said on Truth Social that Venezuela will begin supplying the U.S. strategic oil reserve immediately through “a gift.” Nobody knows what that means exactly, but since the military intervention on Jan. 3, the revenue generated by the sale of Venezuelan oil — we don’t know how much that is either — is already “in the custody” of the U.S. Treasury.

“It doesn’t look like Venezuela will benefit broadly in the long term. It’s like being on floor minus-18 and going up to minus-10,” Venezuelan researcher Blas Regnault, who specializes in energy policy and oil governance, told Truthdig from The Hague, Netherlands.

“There could be an indirect reactivation of the economy because of the indirect jobs that may emerge in some regions. But let’s also keep in mind that the country has been 100% blockaded, suffocated, so any door that opens will bring some benefits, but this is not the benefit one would expect for a sovereign country,” he said. 

“That’s the other problem: There’s no sovereignty of any kind over the resource itself, over what’s being sold. On top of that, there’s a lot of opacity — you’re analyzing blind.”

This “opacity” is also illegal. Articles 150 and Article 187, Paragraph 9, of Venezuela’s Constitution state that contracts of national public interest with foreign states or entities require approval from the National Assembly. However, although the Assembly endorsed the announcement of the deal on Sept. 1, its president, Jorge Rodríguez, said it had not yet been “submitted” to the legislature. Then, a month later he said that “according to some legal experts, it doesn’t need to be reviewed.”

It’s clear that Venezuela is once again, as it was for much of the 20th century, a kind of “U.S. oil province,” Regnault says, “Recovering sovereignty won’t be easy because Venezuela is strategic to U.S. interests.”

“On top of that, the other side of the coin is that China has become a key player [globally]. Today the Chinese do what Saudi Arabia used to do when it cut production and pushed prices up. With this Strait of Hormuz crisis, after the naval blockade of Iran, it was discovered that China had more reserves than previously thought, and that kept the crisis from being bigger and the price from reaching $150.”

That is precisely why U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio celebrated the fact that several of the oil fields included in the deal were once “dominated by China and Russia and Iran.” At the same time, the U.S. government has decided to maintain sanctions against Venezuela, thereby preventing any new economic players. In fact, the U.S. Treasury Department, through its Office of Foreign Assets Control, updated its oil licensing policy for Venezuela in late September through Orders 46E, 48D and 49B, which benefit U.S. businesses but maintain an absolute ban on Russia, Iran, Cuba, North Korea and China.

“The [Venezuelan] government has already amended the Hydrocarbons Law to try to create more favorable conditions for investors in the oil and gas sector, but … the [U.S.’] problem isn’t domestic supply. They need to monopolize the world’s energy reserves, markets and prices in order to prevail in the rest of their economic activities,” oil expert David Paravisini explains to Truthdig from Caracas, referring to a legal reform that was passed on Jan. 29 and created the possibility of technical and operational management and direct commercialization by private companies. He believes that for Venezuela, the deal is a diplomatic “quest” to survive. 

Trump is also maintaining some of his domestic support by presenting Venezuela as the great economic and geopolitical victory of his administration, especially after the war against Iran — which was supposed to last “only a couple of weeks” — reached the six-month mark and cost more than $37.5 billion through the end of July. In fact, Trump has claimed again and again that this oil deal will lower fuel costs inside the U.S. and come “at no cost whatsoever to the American taxpayer.””

Does this mean the $100 billion investment will come from private companies? The deal also aims to exploit eight greenfield blocks, areas where crude has been identified but which have not yet been developed. But what happens if that investment does not materialize? Since Jan. 9, Trump has been trying, without success, to persuade U.S. oil companies to invest in Venezuela.

Corruption is fine if the U.S. profits

So far, the only company we’ve heard about is North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP), which was selected on Aug. 31 by the Trump administration to lead oil extraction projects in the 17 Venezuelan fields.

According to the White House, the Department of Defense will hold a 35% equity stake in NABEP and, in addition, the Barbados-registered company will grant Washington the right to buy 20% of the oil it produces at the cost of production.

NABEP, which has only operated in Venezuela for two years, was awarded the deal without a prior bidding process. The company belongs to Venezuelan businessperson Alejandro Betancourt, who was under investigation by federal prosecutors in Florida until January 2026 for allegedly laundering more than $1 billion from the state-owned Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA). The case was then closed suddenly under the orders of U.S. Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche (now the attorney general), after a decade-long investigation. He is still the subject of open investigations in Switzerland and Spain.

Betancourt comes from a middle-class family but studied at the private religious school Instituto Cumbres de Caracas, where he befriended Javier Alvarado Pardi, son of Javier Alvarado Ochoa, who later became president of Electricidad de Caracas, deputy energy minister and a PDVSA executive.

Back in 2009, Alvarado Ochoa presented Betancourt and his engineering firm, Derwick Associates, as the best solution to Venezuela’s power generation crisis. Betancourt went on to receive 12 government contracts, awarded without competitive bidding, worth a total of $5 billion, which were either never completed or were implemented improperly, according to Transparency Venezuela and the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (which is funded by the U.S. government, among other countries).

So why Betancourt? Rubio said that he is no longer under investigation by the U.S., has supported the Venezuelan opposition and he has demonstrated his ability to produce oil. In that vein, NABEP claims it produces 200,000 barrels of crude a day, just behind Chevron.

However, Victor Hugo Majano, a Venezuelan investigative journalist and director of the well-known outlet La Tabla, told Truthdig that Betancourt overbilled the Venezuelan state by billions of dollars for power plants that never worked. He cited information from Thor Halvorssen, an anti-Chavista activist and cousin of Venezuelan opposition leader Leopoldo López. With that money, Betancourt bought a Dassault Falcon private jet and the historic Alamíin Castle in Spain.

Halvorssen also says Betancourt, who is also linked to 50 companies spread across 15 countries, paid former New York prosecutor Adam S. Kaufmann to halt prosecutions; former Wall Street Journal reporters to discredit whistleblowers; and former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani to bring the U.S. Justice Department over to his side.

“Despite this, the U.S. still doesn’t attack Venezuelan corruption. They want to protect the dollar and the U.S. financial system. They are only worried about securing capital flow, money that is not controlled by the state, the [Venezuelan] government,” Majano said.

More oil for the U.S., less electricity for Venezuela

Meanwhile, Venezuelans are paying the price for both Betancourt’s alleged corruption and the oil deal. So far this year, oil production has increased by 29.9%, going from 924,000 barrels per day (bpd) in January to an average of 1.2 million bpd. The increase has been driven by the need to deliver oil to U.S. companies, and it has directly worsened the nation’s electricity crisis.

Authorities acknowledge this; Venezuela’s interior minister, Diosdado Cabello, said in May the country is seeing higher electricity demand due to the growth in oil production, which “is a very serious problem.” The Ministry of Electrical Energy also noted that demand has reached 15,625 megawatts (MW), “the highest energy consumption figure in the last eight years, an increase of 3.6% compared with the peak reported in 2025.”

However, this statement omits that Venezuela actually has a nominal installed capacity of approximately 35,000 MW, double the country’s peak demand, but stable real generation barely reaches 11,000 MW. This shortfall is a result of both U.S. sanctions and domestic corruption, which together have led to disinvestment, lack of maintenance, fuel shortages (plants designed to run on natural gas have been forced to use low-quality diesel) and transmission problems.

Where does oil production come in? Víctor Poleo, an electrical engineer and former vice minister of Energy and Mines from 1999 to 2001, told Truthdig that “the national oil industry uses up about 1,500 MW, of which about 250 MW is self-generated, but another 1,250 MW is taken from the national interconnected system. This draw is 24/7 and must be continuous in order to carry out crude extraction, transport, pumps and compressors and refining.”

Poleo, who bases his analysis on studies by fellow electrical engineer Nelson Hernández, says light, medium and heavy crudes are estimated to require between 9 kilowatt-hours and 15 kilowatt-hours per barrel to produce. For extra-heavy Orinoco crudes, the estimate is 24 kilowatt-hours per barrel. “As a result, citizens lose their quality of life so that oil can be produced.”

This deterioration is particularly notable in Zulia state, Venezuela’s so-called oil cradle, where production has risen to between 350,000 and 370,000 barrels per day of light and medium crude — far below the historic peak of 1.5 million bpd in 2004, but a figure that, for its residents, has translated into daily blackouts exceeding 12 hours.

From the Isla Dorada residential complex in northern Maracaibo, capital of Zulia, José Javier León tells Truthdig that power failures “have worsened dramatically.” In his area, outages used to last four hours but now exceed seven. 

“In many places there are double rounds, meaning the power goes out in the morning and at night, or at night and then before dawn. All the problems have gotten worse, and we don’t know the real reasons. In the suburb of Cuatricentenario, one of the most working-class areas and where the government had the most electoral support, the cuts are the worst,” he says.

León complains that residents are not alerted when the outages will happen. There is nothing like the electricity rationing schedules of the past, which would at least let them plan better. “In my area, there is no domestic gas, so we have electric stoves. Also, these are apartment buildings, where we have to turn on pumps to get water.” To make matters worse, the temperature in Zulia often reaches 39 degrees Celsius (102 Fahrenheit) because of the humidity.

In the Andes, outages add up to as many as 12 hours a day, and 16 hours in rural or border areas. From La Hechicera, an urban neighborhood in the city of Mérida, Silvana Solano tells Truthdig that the power used to go out for seven to eight hours, once a day, “but for the past two months, it goes out twice a day, the first time for seven hours and the other for around five hours, and we can’t predict the schedule. This also affects phone signals, which keeps us from communicating, making payments, etc.”

Some government institutions, including the Mérida mayor’s office, are open only from 8 a.m. to noon. Solano says she is worried that public schools, which operate until 3 p.m., will also adopt this schedule, in turn affecting parents’ working hours. Throughout September, residents of the towns of Caja Seca (Zulia state) and Nueva Bolivia (Mérida state) blocked the Pan-American Highway to protest the power outages.

To Venezuela’s north, on the famous Margarita Island, Alejandro Pérez tells Truthdig there are areas that have gone seven to eight months without water service. “Here we pay for water trucks, $50 for 10,000 liters of water, sometimes with $60 we get 13,000 liters, but you have to pay in foreign cash or at the parallel rate because the Central Bank of Venezuela exchange rate isn’t accepted here.” The black market or informal exchange rate is worth more, for those with foreign currency, than the official exchange rate.

Unlike other Caribbean islands, Margarita doesn’t have significant natural sources of fresh water. Some 90% of the area’s water comes from the mainland, crossing the sea through underwater pipelines that require gigantic pumping stations.

The contradictory rhetoric and the endless problems we face daily mean that, according to the latest AtlasIntel poll conducted for Bloomberg News, only 10% of Venezuelans believe the country will benefit from the oil pact with the U.S. — data that also aligns with the most recent study by the firm Meganálisis, the same one that after Jan. 3 said 92.2% of Venezuelans loved Trump. Emotions change, social problems persist, and without electricity, no economic improvement will be possible.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelanalysis editorial staff.

Source: Truthdig

Caracas, October 12, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – US Secretary of State Marco Rubio hosted Venezuelan opposition lead negotiator Dinorah Figuera on Friday at the State Department in Washington, DC, to express support for ongoing dialogue with the Venezuelan government.

“This is the best opportunity Venezuela has had in almost a generation,” Rubio told reporters, adding that the talks headed by Figuera are “a difficult process” but enjoy “100 percent support from the highest levels” of Donald Trump’s administration.

Rubio stressed that Washington’s goal goes beyond holding elections. “Our desire is not simply for Venezuela to have an election, but also to have a democracy with the institutions necessary to sustain long-term stability, prosperity, and freedom.” The Trump official has insisted on a three-phase plan culminating in a “political transition.”

For her part, Figuera, the president of the defunct 2015 Venezuelan National Assembly, praised the United States for opening a “path of hope for Venezuela” on January 3, when US forces bombed Caracas and abducted President Nicolás Maduro.

“We are committed to restoring the institutional framework of the public powers, the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ), and the National Electoral Council (CNE). We want to bring the country toward a process that guarantees political and civil rights and creates space for reunion and reconciliation,” she said.

The opposition leader also thanked Washington for its investments in the oil sector. “The restoration of institutions and the country’s economic progress will be two fundamental pillars for building institutions and democracy,” she added. Despite its term running out in January 2021, the opposition majority parliament elected in 2015 retained US “recognition” as Venezuela’s legitimate authority.

Both officials announced that the next round of talks is scheduled to begin on October 14. Rubio explicitly called for opposition unity: “We ask all elements of the opposition, and all sectors of society, to participate in and support this process.”

Neither Rubio nor Figuera fielded questions from reporters as they left the room, including about opposition leader María Corina Machado, who continues to insist that presidential elections must be held “as soon as possible.”

This was the first time Rubio received Figuera in Washington. Since August, she has led an opposition bloc engaged in dialogue with the acting government headed by Delcy Rodríguez, a process promoted by the United States in which the far-right Machado is not participating.

So far, government and opposition delegations have completed two rounds of negotiations in Caracas. Rubio claimed that the talks thus far have resulted in the release of hundreds of people allegedly detained for political reasons, the unblocking of several pro-opposition news websites, and progress toward amending the 2017 Law Against Hatred. The agenda for this third round includes continuing the process to renew the Supreme Court.

In this regard, opposition delegation member Juan Miguel Matheus said his team is “working to ensure that the members of the Judicial Nominations Committee are appointed and sworn in by October 15.” The committee will be responsible for evaluating candidates for the 32 Supreme Court justice positions.

Following an amendment to the Organic Law of the Supreme Court of Justice negotiated at the dialogue table, it was agreed that the Judicial Nominations Committee would have a majority of 12 civil society representatives, compared with 11 lawmakers. A total of 127 citizens applied to join the body.

Once the committee has been appointed, the process of receiving applications from candidates for the Supreme Court will begin. “We invite the best men and women in Venezuelan law to apply for positions in the TSJ’s six chambers. Venezuela needs independent, competent justices of recognized integrity,” Matheus stressed.

While some opposition sectors are demanding that a date be set for presidential elections, the delegation participating in the negotiations argues that progress in transforming the justice system is a necessary prior step.

In his press statement, Rubio added that future rounds of discussions “will address reform of the National Electoral Council.”

The Venezuelan government’s delegation has not commented on the Trump administration’s express backing for the opposition negotiators. 

The two sides agreed to demand the release of 31 tonnes of gold held by the Bank of England since 2019 to address post-earthquake reconstruction needs. The gold, worth more than US $4 billion, will reportedly be moved to the New York Federal Reserve, with its spending subject to US approval and international auditing.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

King Juan Carlos I summons party leaders after the failed 1981 coup. From left to right: Santiago Carrillo (Communist Party), Agustín Rodríguez Sahagún (Defence Minister), Adolfo Suárez (Prime Minister), Juan Carlos I, Felipe González (PSOE) and Manuel Fraga (People’s Alliance, later PP).

(“Gosh, no! Not another hyper-comparative article about two distant political conflicts…” Apologies. We’ll try to make it a fun read).

More often than not, our intellectual circles have felt tempted to look at alien historical episodes in a never-ending search for resolute answers that shed light on our present. In 2023, when Maduro flirted with attacking US-supported Guyana, some revisited the Falklands War as a sign that a serious military incursion would be a fatal mistake that would lead to the dictatorship’s downfall. Then came the road to the 2024 presidential election; many feared (rightfully, in the end) that the country would plunge into the “Nicaragua scenario” if the dictator refused to recognize his defeat. Others momentarily wondered if enough external pressure could give way to a Guatemala-style transfer of power and a weak transition government.

The days of terror seem to be behind us, yet there’s no progressive reformer like Raúl Alfonsín steering the wheel of justice. Instead, Donald Trump gave us the Pizza Hut scenario. Here, Delcy Rodríguez has become the poster girl of the MAGA international franchise. Here, too, US geopolitical ambitions and business interests at times seem to be competing with the need for free elections and a democratic regime.

Is Rodríguez our Mikhail Gorbachev, trying to open the economy and political system just enough while attempting to save the chavista State from outright collapse? What if chavismo is already dead and she’s the Yeltsin of the Caribbean, the feeble leader who will give away the country’s riches to oligarchs in an arbitrary fashion, laying the ground for a new form of autocracy?

Or might Delcy be the chavista version of Adolfo Suárez, the not-so-brilliant and obscure but highly charismatic Francoist insider? Suárez finished the job after a remarkable run, surviving a period of meagre political support, declining approval rates and a coup d’etat that could have killed him. The comparison now sounds like an insult to the Spaniard. Like Gorbachev in today’s Russia, Suárez has become a sort of mythical statesman abroad while Spanish right- and left-wing critics dispute his legacy.

There are genuine similarities between the process currently unfolding in Caracas and the outset of Spain’s democracy, as well as room for gross contrasts. While 2026 has been insane for Venezuelans, Spain exactly fifty years ago was astonishing due to the speed at which Suárez acted in unilaterally dismantling the regime from within the regime. The dictator was finally gone, and as soon as he had the chance, the new King ordered a politician without strong ideological convictions to establish a full parliamentary democracy.

Suárez took office in June 1976. The Law for Political Reform, meant to pave the way for a new democratic legislature (with the King acting as a key enforcer), was through six months later. Spain held general elections within a year. That was just the start. What followed was a sequence full of the raw materials that tend to feed these history-making episodes: secret meetings and grand bargains between rivals and strange bedfellows, journalists acting like hinges, political violence, and leaders who soon become overwhelmed by their own decisions and actions.

How the transition worked out

When scholars praise the atmosphere of consensus that defined Spain in the 1970s, they generally speak of the close cooperation between regime reformers and opposition moderates in devising broad agreements that fastened democracy, fundamental rights and regional autonomy with the recognition of the monarchy. In doing so, these figures refused to address legal and moral responsibilities for the violence left by the Civil War and four decades of military rule (more on this later).

The spirit of the Transición is best encapsulated by the political partnership between Suárez and Santiago Carrillo, leader of the Communist Party (PCE) and the most prominent figure in a scattered opposition. Much like María Corina Machado this year, Carrillo was a key veto player in the transition’s inception. Suárez had the power; democracy just couldn’t be without the legitimacy carried by Francoism’s utmost rival. The government legalized the PCE only after it abandoned Marxist-Leninist doctrine and Republican (“anti-Spain”) symbols. As Javier Cercas recounts in the brilliant Anatomy of a Moment, the duo protected each other’s backs amid hardline pressures, in a climate of growing economic hardship and political violence where ETA and Far Right violence threatened to destabilize their project.

In Spain’s first elections since 1936, Suárez won and the renewed PSOE of a young Felipe González managed to eclipse the old-looking communists. Once the new democratic parliament was settled, Suárez and representatives from major parties signed the Moncloa Pacts, then framed as a national agreement to save the economy. Parallels with Venezuela’s Puntofijo Pact are there: the political class came together on monetary policy and wage regulation; welfare and public spending; and fundamental freedoms for citizens, workers and members of the press. An amnesty for political prisoners followed. In 1978, Spanish voters overwhelmingly voted to approve a new consensus constitution.

As is only natural during these processes, the position of Suárez before Francoist remnants in the State became untenable. Time exposed the true nature of his goals: he eventually crossed all the red lines of the inmovilistas, wiping out Franco’s ultra-conservative and nationalist institutions. Far Right groups, elites, the military and even newspapers plotted to jeopardize the transition and restrain its main characters. However, much of the groundwork for political action and breakthroughs was laid by domestic and outside backers who had an unequivocal pro-democracy stance.

In the Francois legislature, King Juan Carlos appointed his personal tutor and advisor, Torcuato Fernández-Miranda, as president. In the diplomatic arena, regional leaders and international actors favored Spain’s democratization and European integration. Willy Brandt, Francois Mitterrand and even Carlos Andrés Pérez encouraged PSOE’s social-democratic turn and the rise of González. Meanwhile, Carrillo had the endorsement of fellow Eurocommunists that had broken with the Soviet Union.

However, royal and international support were neither constant nor salient enough in the Spanish case. Domestic variables and the consequences of political opening made Suárez grow weaker in 1979, and his government could have fallen apart. In Venezuela, where the level of tutelage in place is more decisive than in Spain back then, the approach of the United States remains gradual and its supervision restrictive for opposition actors. The speed of reforms also seems to be contingent on the diverse interests of the Trump administration. Unlike in Spain at this stage, elections don’t appear to be around the corner, and new policies and initiatives are either limited in scope or yet to show results.

The transition’s key omissions

When comparing the Spanish transition with the Venezuelan process, significant details reveal mistakes whose lessons should serve to prevent their repetition. The transitional justice model, the control of the security forces, and the polarization that affects public opinion after decades, are some of the aspects that can be adjusted to learn from what Spain did well. However, we must keep our eyes open regarding the issues left unresolved.

Six years after Franco’s death and following many important reforms, the Spanish government did not have control of its security apparatus. As a result, a group of Guardias Civiles led by Antonio Tejero, stormed the Congress of Deputies on February 23, 1981, taking Suárez, Carrillo and the entire government hostage while tanks occupied the city of Valencia. The coup failed, but it became clear that the nascent democracy was fragile and that military, police and political elements were able to undermine it. Just like Venezuela in the early sixties.

A change in government, even one negotiated and backed by the US, does not guarantee control over the Venezuelan armed forces. During the transition process, the loyalty of the military must be built and put to the test. There is no guarantee that Venezuela will not experience an episode like Spain’s 23-F; the only way to ensure otherwise is to include representatives of the military high command at the negotiating table from the very beginning.

Then we have the famous Pact of Forgetting. As the opposition basically got everything it wanted, la Transición did not establish any special justice mechanisms. Reconciliation was built on a pacto del olvido, an implicit agreement between regime reformers and a large part of the opposition that consisted of not judging the past, not establishing truth commissions, and adhering to a logic of equivalency between the Two Spains: the Republican Left and the Nationalist Right, the losers and the winners of the Civil War.

The “pact of forgetting” is far from what we Venezuelans aspire to. The victims of Francoism were unable to access mechanisms for reparations during the first 25 years of democracy. Later, the Ley de Memoria Histórica (Historical Memory Law, LMH) and the Ley de Memoria Democrática (Democratic Memory Law, LMD) were enacted to fill that void. The reality is that justice came too late, was biased, and failed to meet international standards on truth, memory, and non-repetition.

One only needs to take a close look at the 1977 Amnesty Law. It passed almost unanimously; its original intent was a genuine desire to bring closure. However, the same law granted amnesty to those who were politically persecuted as well as to “authorities, civil servants, and law enforcement officers” for violations against the rights of Spanish citizens. To an extent, these are the same flaws that have been criticized in the Venezuelan amnesty law enacted in January 2026.

Forgetting and silence created wounds in Spain that were not fully healed and vulnerable to political manipulation throughout this century. A 2008 study found that 55.7% of those surveyed stated that the victims of the dictatorship had not received the recognition they deserved. That sense of injustice has fueled the narrative promoted by the Spanish Left that the transition was a “deal” between elites rather than a pacted rupture with the regime.

Venezuela’s amnesty law bears the same risk and exacerbates it by ordering the destruction of records and criminal histories. Erasing the evidence that will one day be needed to reconstruct the patterns of repression is the opposite of reconciliation. The construction of memory is the only thing that can guarantee that in 2050, Venezuelans will not be having the same disputes that Spain continues to have about Franco. For our process to move toward transformation, we must establish special justice mechanisms that include both reparations and forgiveness. Without this, at best, the next generations will be prone to forgetting.

Coming to terms with post-chavismo

It’s important to make a clarification regarding our case. Today, chavismo is not a force that polarizes the country, capable of winning elections like Suárez did, but a political elite that faces widespread rejection. That does not mean it will disappear from the political landscape. On the contrary, the mere fact that chavismo continues to rule may hint that it will remain part of public life. Eventually, the heirs of chavismo could try to reframe the legacy of Chávez, “saving” him from the discredit brought on by Maduro-era atrocities. The Maduro-Flores faction and a few other figures will likely be erased from chavismo’s new narratives. They will be portrayed as a deviation from chavismo’s original ideas. They will try to bring in new faces, and perhaps Diosdado Cabello will hand over the PSUV to some new figure, such as Héctor Rodríguez and a crop of young, “converted democrats.”

Yet the suffering caused by the chavista project cannot be so easily erased from the memories of millions of Venezuelans who endured hunger, exile, repression and imprisonment.

The wounds that remain fresh among Venezuelans can be as deep as those borne by the older generations in Spain, who faced the destruction and trauma of armed conflict. Like Franco, Chávez and Maduro spent two decades trying to build a “new man” through the military and partisan occupation of public life. However, the nature of the crimes and mismanagement in 21st-century Venezuela is different from that in Francoist Spain, where thousands of dissidents were systematically persecuted and killed. Like in Cuba and the USSR, economic and social devastation has been so severe that it led to mass starvation and exodus. Our remaining task and the lesson learned from what was lacking in the Spanish transition, is to build a historical memory focused on ensuring that anything resembling that does not happen again, and that whoever wants to enter the political arena can do so according to the rules of democracy.

Bonus: Delcy vs. Suárez

Adolfo Suárez became prime minister in 1976, having emerged from the very structures of Francoism and State-owned media. He was certainly not a reformer, much less a democrat until Juan Carlos appointed him to lead the transition. Suárez eventually acted on his own volition, seeing the process through to the end. Delcy, as Maduro’s “Super Minister” and his last vice president, has been a far more prominent figure in the chavista State, and also more deeply involved with the repressive apparatus than Suárez was, as UN reports can attest). In the case of Delcy, US military intervention has pushed her to change certain policies, cool down repression and engage with a sector of the opposition, part of a strategy for political survival where her regime needs to balance Washington’s demands with avoiding chavismo’s downfall. That has nothing to do with a “democratic” conversion.

The comparison is still vague, but Venezuelan historians can re-assess if this process leads to its much-needed destination.

Timeline (optional read)

1973: A decrepit Franco steps down as PM, separating the headship of state and the presidency of government for the first time. He names his loyal right-hand man, Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, as Prime Minister, with jurist Torcuato Fernández-Miranda as Deputy PM and conservative Carlos Arias Navarro at Interior. The global oil shock strikes Spain, ending fifteen years of economic boom (the Spanish Miracle) and unleashing severe inflation. In December, ETA assassinates Carrero Blanco in Madrid. Arias Navarro succeeds him with the backing of Franco’s family.

1974: Knowing that Franco’s death was imminent, the regime starts to split between moderates and hardliners while ETA consolidates as a lethal enemy of Madrid. Arias Navarro promises freedom of association, but under pressure from hardliners, the proposal ends up being a sham. The opposition favours gradual reform away from Francoism. European leaders encourage PSOE’s social-democratic turn, appointing a young Felipe González as Secretary General. Communist Party (PCE) leader Santiago Carrillo and other exiled figures call for a peaceful, democratic rupture with the regime.

1975: Franco dies in November. King Juan Carlos I is crowned head of state and reinstates Arias Navarro as PM, maintaining an impossible cabinet of both regime hardliners and moderate reformers like Manuel Fraga. ETA and left-wing terror groups step up attacks, while public strikes and protests demand amnesty and democracy. González enters Spain; Carrillo remains abroad.

1976: Arias Navarro’s sluggish reforms cause political deadlock and social unrest. Pressured by the King, he resigns in July. Juan Carlos appoints Fernández-Miranda as President of the Cortes and Torcuato’s former pupil, Adolfo Suárez, as PM. Suárez promises elections for 1977 and skilfully passes the Law for Political Reform through the Francoist parliament, dismantling the regime from within. Suárez tries to build democratic credibility by engaging with González. The more prominent Carrillo remains sidelined, leading the Communists from clandestinity, until he forces the regime to briefly arrest and release him.

1977: Carrillo and Suárez negotiate a pact in person. Suárez legalizes trade unions and, in a risky move during Holy Week, legalizes Carrillo’s PCE. The Communists abandon its Marxist-Leninist doctrine and traditional Republican symbols. In June, Spain holds its first free general election since 1936: Suárez’s UCD wins, closely followed by the renewed PSOE of González. Major parties sign the Moncloa Pacts to stabilize the economy. An Amnesty Law releases political prisoners.

1978: Parliamentary committees draft a consensus constitution guaranteeing fundamental rights, regional autonomy, and a constitutional monarchy. In December, Spanish voters overwhelmingly approve the new Constitution in a national referendum, formally ending the Francoist State and establishing Spain as a modern parliamentary democracy. The government discovers that some security officials are plotting a coup against Suárez, including Guardia Civil Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Tejero, but the main conspirators receive minor penalties.

1979: Spain holds its first elections under the new Constitution: UCD wins again but fails to secure an absolute majority. Regional autonomy statutes pass in Catalonia and the Basque Country. Economic trouble, internal UCD infighting, and rising ETA violence create growing political instability and unrest within the military.

1980: Suárez faces worsening economic crises, mounting regional tensions, and a vote of no confidence tabled by the PSOE. Suárez survives the vote, but his authority inside the UCD collapses as cabinet ministers and faction leaders publicly break ranks, making his government increasingly untenable.

1981: Exhausted by political crisis and plots, Suárez resigns in January. During the parliamentary vote to appoint Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo as his successor on February 23, Lt. Col. Antonio Tejero leads an attempted military coup (23-F). King Juan Carlos rejects the coup on national television, securing army loyalty and saving the young democracy.

1982: Calvo-Sotelo navigates Spain into NATO despite widespread public opposition. Disintegrating from internal factionalism, the ruling UCD collapses. In the October general elections, Felipe González leads the PSOE to a historic landslide victory, marking the first peaceful transfer of power to a left-wing government and consolidating Spanish democracy.

1983: The newly inaugurated PSOE government launches major economic restructuring and industrial modernization plans to prepare Spain for European integration. Simultaneously, the State initiates decentralisation by establishing the final Autonomous Communities, completing Spain’s territorial map under the 1978 Constitution.

Caracas, October 8, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – US District Judge Alvin Hellerstein denied a request by Venezuelan First Lady Cilia Flores to be released from jail and allowed to face trial under house arrest in New York following reported health problems.

The Southern District of New York judge argued in a bail hearing on Thursday that Flores posed a “substantial flight risk” and dismissed assurances from defense attorney Mark Donnelly that she would not flee. 

“With all the money at stake and all the contacts Ms. Flores has with the Venezuelan government and the people who make it up, the risk is serious. There is no combination of conditions that would make that risk any less serious,” Hellerstein said.

In a court filing submitted in early September, Flores’ defense team requested that the 69-year-old be transferred to a private residence in New York with armed guards around the clock, an electronic monitoring bracelet, restricted visitors, and monitored phone calls.

Flores and Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro were kidnapped by US special forces on January 3. They have been detained at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn while facing “narco-terrorism,” drug trafficking conspiracy, and weapons possession charges.

Flores’ lawyers have pleaded that she requires extensive cardiac treatment and that the prison does not provide the necessary conditions for her care. Attorneys added that the Venezuelan first lady, who is also a legislator, would cover the transfer costs and offered to surrender her passport as an additional assurance of remaining in custody.

The filing describes episodes of chest pain, arrhythmia, difficulty breathing, and a weight loss of more than 24 pounds since her detention. It also claims that Flores may have suffered a mild heart attack on July 29.

A group of demonstrators gathered outside the courthouse, demanding that the Venezuelan first lady’s health concerns be addressed and protesting the “illegal” abduction and prosecution of the presidential pair.

Hellerstein’s denial of bail coincided with US Justice Department prosecutors filing a new indictment against Maduro and Flores, expanding the charges they face in the United States.

The superseding indictment, backed by US Attorney General Todd Blanche, US Attorney for the Southern District of New York Jamie McDonald, DEA Administrator Terrance C. Cole, the secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, and FBI Director Kash Patel, accuses them of conspiring to torture political opponents, military personnel, and other detainees, including three US citizens.

The prosecution’s filing alleges coercion, electric shocks, and threats against family members, among other practices. Prosecutors claim that after taking office in 2013, Maduro “oversaw a system designed to employ torture, arbitrary detention, and violence as means of repression against the political opposition.”

“As alleged in the indictment, the Maduro regime subjected American citizens to torture while held in custody of the Venezuelan government […]. Today’s charges reflect the commitment from this FBI and this Department of Justice to accountability, the rule of law, and the protection of U.S. national security,” FBI Director Kash Patel stated.

Maduro’s attorney, Barry J. Pollack, said his client denies the allegations in the new indictment and looks forward to his day in court. The updated indictment added “narco-terrorism” to the accusations against Flores.

The document also names Nicolás Maduro Guerra, the former president’s son; current Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello; former minister Ramón Rodríguez Chacín; and Héctor Guerrero Flores, alias “Niño Guerrero,” the leader of the Tren de Aragua gang, who was reported killed in a US military operation inside Venezuelan territory in June.

Last week, US prosecutors challenged Maduro’s claim to sovereign immunity, arguing the White House had not recognized him as president and that the Venezuelan government had never requested that he be granted such status. They said, however, that Caracas had pursued a similar request for Acting President Delcy Rodríguez in a separate civil lawsuit.

Hellerstein is scheduled to hear oral arguments from both sides on the immunity question on November 17. The US government has asked the court to reject motions filed by Maduro and Flores seeking dismissal of charges. If the case proceeds, the trial is scheduled to begin in June 2027.

The Venezuelan government has not commented on the latest charges against the Venezuelan president and first lady or on their legal claims to immunity.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

DEVELOPING STORYDEVELOPING STORY,

The new US charge adds to the existing drug trafficking case against Venezuela’s former president and first lady.

Former Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, were charged in the US state of New York with conspiring to commit torture in connection with allegations that they tortured political opponents to maintain their power.

The charge announced on Thursday in a Manhattan federal court adds one count of conspiracy to commit torture to the drug trafficking charges the couple already faced.

Maduro and Flores pleaded not guilty to the drug charges and have been held at Brooklyn’s Metropolitan Detention Center since their capture. Their trial is scheduled for June 1.

The charges pile on an ongoing criminal case against Maduro and Flores. A superseding indictment accuses Maduro of working with cartel groups to move cocaine through Venezuela toward the United States.

This is a developing story…

Mérida, October 6, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Venezuelan acting government is resorting to a Qatar-led financing agreement in order to regain access to multilateral loans from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).

According to specialized outlet Bitácora Económica, Qatar is preparing to establish a specialized rescue fund to settle Venezuela’s estimated US $2.5 billion debt with the IDB.

Under the proposed mechanism, the Qatari fund would immediately clear Venezuela’s overdue principal and interest payments, while issuing a new, long-term loan with favorable interest rates for the South American nation.

Venezuelan economist José Guerra claimed that Qatar will be joined by the United Arab Emirates and that the Gulf countries will back the financing initiative with their sovereign wealth funds.

The Qatari-backed initiative would reportedly allow Venezuela to address short-term liquidity constraints and access a new IDB credit line worth as much as $8 billion. The financing would be used for public infrastructure projects, including the national road network, water distribution systems, and stabilizing the national electric grid, as well as providing additional funding for state budgets.

The proposed Gulf-backed debt arrangement comes amid a broader, deliberate push by Caracas to re-establish formal relations with major US-led multilateral financial institutions.

Over recent months, high-level Venezuelan delegations have held technical and institutional meetings with representatives from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean (CAF).

In September, Acting President Delcy Rodríguez met in New York with IMF Director Kristalina Georgieva, as well as senior World Bank and IDB officials.

Caracas’ rapprochement with Western multilateral institutions has coincided with a geopolitical shift in its foreign policy since the January 3 US military strikes and kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. The Venezuelan government, headed by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, reestablished ties with Washington while also strengthening relations with US allies such as Qatar and the UAE.

Doha initially provided intermediation for US control over Venezuelan oil export revenues, with funds deposited in Qatari bank accounts. The scheme was later transferred directly to the US Treasury Department. Energy firms from Qatar and the UAE were recently announced as stakeholders in a Venezuelan offshore natural gas project as well.

Venezuela’s reengagement with Washington-based financial institutions saw the IDB officially reopen its country office in Caracas on October 2, seven years after halting operations in the Caribbean nation.

The IDB had suspended all active credit lines and disbursements to Venezuela in May 2018 following payment arrears. The relaunched local office follows the formal reinstatement of Venezuela’s voting rights in June, when the IDB Board accepted Calixto Ortega as the country’s governor at the IDB.

During an expanded session of the National Economic Council in Caracas on October 2 with IDB officials, Acting President Rodríguez emphasized the importance of access to international multilateral credit for both the public and private sectors.

“This agenda that we have been developing with the multilateral financial system is for development, for investment and financing in infrastructure and services,” she stated during the televised session. “In Venezuela, there is a very important installed industrial capacity to develop, and a boost in financing will bring us to full capacity.”

Rodríguez added that the renewed engagement aims to ensure that private companies, communal production units, and small businesses can access international loan programs to expand local production.

While direct sovereign lending to the Venezuelan government remains contingent on fully clearing arrears, the multilateral’s private-sector arm, IDB Invest, has already initiated direct financial assistance to key Venezuelan corporations and commercial banks.

Under recently approved financing structures, IDB Invest is reportedly delivering commercial-rate loans and capital support to food processing conglomerate Empresas Polar, as well as private commercial banks Banco Mercantil and Banesco.

The allocations for Banco Mercantil and Banesco are designed to strengthen liquidity and capitalization within the national banking system, while also boosting local credit lines for businesses.

Meanwhile, the funds directed to Empresas Polar are earmarked for agricultural development projects and supply-chain expansion, particularly targeting grain production in Portuguesa state, according to reports.

Unlike traditional development loans, the IDB Invest credits are extended at market interest rates, focusing directly on private-sector growth and sustainability.

The Venezuelan government’s current strategy marks a departure from the former President Hugo Chávez’s stance toward multilateral lending institutions.

In November 2008, at a Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) summit, Chávez criticized the IDB, labeling it an “instrument of political pressure” used by Washington to impose orthodox economic policies on sovereign nations.

At the time, Chávez called on Latin American governments to withdraw from both the IDB and the IMF, which he labeled as a “weapon of US imperialism,” advocating instead for regional alternatives such as the Bank of the South to replace traditional multilateral lenders.

The hum of the kidney dialysis machine that Onasis Munoz is connected to suddenly stops. The fluorescent lights overhead flicker out, and his room at a clinic in Valencia, Venezuela, is plunged into darkness.

It is not the first time a power cut has interrupted one of the three weekly sessions Munoz needs to do the work his failing kidneys can no longer do, filtering waste and excess fluid from his blood.

For years, electricity would go out every couple of days across parts of Venezuela’s Carabobo state.

But in recent months, Munoz said, the outages have grown to be daily, lasting around seven hours. The clinic’s emergency batteries have since been depleted, and its backup generator no longer works.

He explained that the frequent power failures have disrupted his treatment. His health has slumped as a result.

“I arrive home, exhausted, as if I had run a marathon,” the 34-year-old said.

But often there is no electricity there either, and recent weeks have been sweltering. “I can’t switch on the air conditioning. I cannot rest because of the heat and the mosquitoes. There’s no relief,” Munoz said.

Across Venezuela, the prolonged outages are riling locals, as the electricity supply to homes, businesses and essential services becomes unstable.

Some of the cuts are deliberate, as the government of interim President Delcy Rodriguez rations electricity.

The resulting frustration has spilled onto the streets, where demonstrators hold “cacerolazos” – a traditional form of protest that involves banging pots and pans.

Some have gone as far as blocking roadways and setting tyres on fire. The electricity crisis has also raised concerns about how the government is managing the country’s vast oil supply, a key source of income for the country.

“We are desperate. We cannot understand how a country so rich in resources can be practically left in the dark,” said Patricia Cueva, a lawyer from Maracaibo, the capital of oil-rich Zulia state.

“We cannot rest. We cannot work. Our children cry.”

Caracas, October 6, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The US Justice Department has urged New York District Judge Alvin Hellerstein to reject Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores’ sovereign immunity claims amid their ongoing legal case.

In a court filing submitted on October 2, prosecutors told the court that Maduro and Flores’ motions to dismiss their indictments “should be denied.”

The Venezuelan president and first lady, who is also a legislator, were kidnapped in Caracas by US forces on January 3. They were charged with drug trafficking conspiracy and weapons possession, with Maduro additionally facing a “narco-terrorism” accusation.

The pair’s defense teams filed motions to dismiss the case in September, arguing that their respective positions in the Venezuelan government should make them immune to criminal prosecution in a third country.

In response, the Justice Department stated that the recognition of a foreign head of state is the exclusive competency of the executive branch, and that Washington has not recognized Maduro since 2019. Historically, US courts have deferred to the White House and State Department on foreign policy matters.

However, in the ongoing case, Justice Department officials sought to bolster their argument by stating that the Venezuelan government, led by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, has declined to invoke immunity for Maduro and Flores.

“If Venezuela wished to assert its view that the defendants were entitled to immunity in this, it could have,“ the submitted document read. “The defendants’ attempt to claim the contrary is an admission that such silence is devastating to their claims.”

The prosecutors pointed to an ongoing civil lawsuit in Florida against Maduro, Rodríguez, and other defendants, where the Venezuelan government, through its US embassy, requested that the Trump administration communicate to the respective court that the acting president should “enjoy absolute immunity from judicial proceedings in foreign domestic courts.”

The State Department sent a letter in June calling on the Florida district court to “promptly dismiss the proceedings.” The White House likewise communicated to the court that all claims against Rodríguez should be “dismissed without prejudice.”

In August 2025, three US nationals who were imprisoned in Venezuela sued Maduro, Rodríguez, and several other current and former state officials. The plaintiffs claimed to have suffered “torture” and to have been used in “hostage diplomacy.” The judge issued a default ruling after Maduro and other defendants failed to show and awarded $314 million in damages to the plaintiffs.

“Venezuela did not request immunity in this case, despite every opportunity to do so. Indeed, there is no doubt that the current Venezuelan government knows how to request immunity,” the Justice Department’s recent filing continued.

Prosecutors went on to claim that the Trump administration’s foreign policy views, coupled with the Venezuelan government not explicitly invoking immunity, should outweigh the defense’s assertion that the United Nations recognized Maduro’s presidency.

Hellerstein is scheduled to hear oral arguments on the pre-trial motions to dismiss on November 17 before issuing a ruling. If the trial goes forward, it will begin on June 1, 2027.

Caracas has not commented on the latest developments in Maduro and Flores’ legal case. In recent months, Venezuelan officials have occasionally expressed hope that the two will eventually return to the country but without demanding their immediate release.

Rodríguez made no mention of Maduro and Flores’ kidnapping and prosecution during her recent trip to New York for the 81st session of the UN General Assembly. In a July interview, she claimed that Maduro has the right to “demonstrate the truth” before the US Justice system but did not call for his liberation.

The Venezuelan government is covering the pair’s legal defense costs after the US Treasury Department lifted restrictions blocking it.

In his UN speech on September 22, Trump celebrated the military operation that led to the abduction of Maduro, whom he called an “outlaw dictator.” Trump and Rodríguez met on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, with the Venezuelan leader thanking the US president for supporting “Venezuela’s reinsertion into multilateral spaces.”

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Philadelphia, USA.

William Serafino is a political scientist with a master’s degree in history. His research and analysis have focused on geopolitics. In this interview, he discusses Venezuela’s current relationship with the United States, including a major oil deal and what Donald Trump and Delcy Rodríguez seek to gain from it.

In New York, Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez thanked Trump for his support and described their bilateral meeting as “historic.” Nearly nine months after the January 3 US bombing and kidnapping of President Maduro, how would you describe the current relationship between Caracas and Washington? Which elements are short-term Trump gimmicks, and which ones will structurally define the relationship in the future?

It is difficult to find a precise definition. Many speak of a protectorate-like condition; some even go so far as to describe it as a relationship of colonial or neocolonial subjugation. Others, however, define it as a process of political, economic, and energy normalization in which the Venezuelan acting government makes tactical concessions, but without formally compromising national sovereignty. I believe the devil is in the details, not in one-size-fits-all approaches. At the level of inter-state relations, what I observe is a strategic attachment of Venezuela to the US sphere of influence and an energy realignment that operates with significant geopolitical restrictions in what concerns relations with Russia, China, and Iran.

At the governmental level, an asymmetrical alliance (favorable to Trump) has been forged in the wake of the military defeat on January 3, from which Caracas and Washington derive immediate and existential gains: Trump cherishes the sole geopolitical achievement of his second term, and Rodríguez gains relief and fresh revenue to govern after more than a decade of suffocating sanctions, within a framework defined by US interests. This reality can hardly be classified as a protectorate, in which a foreign power takes control of diplomacy, defense, and other strategic elements of the subordinate state. Could one speak of a sui generis, or “soft,” protectorate? Perhaps, but that would be an acknowledgment that the concept is not entirely effective in explaining the situation. 

The same is true of the thesis of a “retreat with full sovereignty,” which is difficult to sustain when the US is clearly shaping the portrayal of the new national political dynamic and controlling the country’s oil revenues. That is why I have ventured –at the risk of being wrong –to speak of “joint governance” or “co-government,” in which Washington and Caracas divide areas of responsibility and share the political costs of each move so that the alliance endures and each party can, albeit unequally, reap its corresponding share of the benefits.

Trump, despite his constant demeaning tone, needs the Rodríguez administration to be strong enough to lead the country in order to get what he wants; only under such conditions can he extract the oil. And she, too, needs Trump to remain in power so that the oil agreement and other commitments can move forward in the medium term. This is the only way to stay in power and hope to gain legitimacy through performance. I believe that, described in this way, we are talking neither of classic colonialism nor of uncompromised sovereignty, but of something more unique that requires developing other analytical categories.

In your articles, you have pointed out that the US-Venezuela oil deal must be analyzed beyond the announced figures. What do you consider to be the true political and geopolitical scope of this agreement, and what benefits do the various actors seek to extract from it?

I see it more as a political arrangement than a formal agreement. Its function is not legal or institutional, but political. The announcement gave Trump narrative ammunition to promise that gas prices will drop, a necessity driven by his debacle in Iran. By not having signed anything, he avoids going through Congress, sends a message to his core electorate that he is guaranteeing the country’s energy security, and reassures energy corporations to go ahead and invest in Venezuela because the relationship with Caracas is solid and unshakable. Rodríguez, on the other hand, benefits from the fact that the agreement shuts the door on María Corina Machado in Washington’s power circles and thereby helps reestablish her domestic legitimacy, promising a secure path to economic and social recovery underpinned by US investment.

I would go as far as saying that the agreement is Rodríguez’s trump card in a potential presidential campaign, where she will be able to present herself as the only political actor capable of boosting the economy, as opposed to potential rivals who lack influence in the White House and do not have a reliable plan to pull the country out of the spiral of inflation and economic frustration in which it finds itself after years of sanctions. 

Both sides stand to gain politically, and the agreement appears to be designed to avoid institutional resistance: neither is forced to face the hassle of legislative approval nor the criticism from political opponents. Since there are no specific clauses, they can more easily divert attention and focus their message on the eventual economic benefits. This level of coordination is a sign of partnership, not of one-sided imposition. If that were the case, Trump could force Rodríguez to sign a bilateral treaty in the National Assembly, and that is not what we are seeing.

You have paid special attention to the role of the Pentagon and the involvement of its Office of Strategic Capital in the structure of the agreement. Why is it so significant that the US defense establishment is a formal actor in a Venezuelan oil deal?

It seems to me that the Pentagon’s involvement serves as a coercive cover—an insurance policy backed by force—to ensure, in the medium and long term, US commercial and financial advantages in the exploitation of the oil fields included in the agreement. Let us imagine that the current government, or another one in the future, wants to modify the arrangement and secure better terms. At that point, it would not be dealing with a conventional transnational corporation, but with one controlled by the Department of War. It doesn’t take much thought to realize that negotiating under such conditions would scare anyone off: the language of business would be replaced by the language of weapons, and after January 3, no one would want to venture into this murky territory.

Furthermore, I believe that the Pentagon’s involvement sends a message to companies to invest and feel secure in the knowledge that the Department of War guarantees their investments and capital commitments in the Venezuelan energy sector. For the US, Venezuela’s oil reserves are not being treated as an economic asset, but rather as a matter of “national security.” As we well know, when that term is used, any coercive tool is fair game against a country’s sovereignty.

You have argued that the relationship between Caracas and Washington is taking on the characteristics of a negotiation marked by a profound power asymmetry. And many official spokespeople or analysts ask, “But what alternative do we have?” whenever criticism is raised about the path the government has chosen. What real ability does Venezuela have today to negotiate different terms or reject certain demands from the United States?

Right now, those capabilities are very limited, because, as I said, it’s not just a matter of US impositions, but also of calculating how to obtain tangible benefits from an asymmetrical relationship. But politics also takes place outside institutional spaces, and I believe there is much to be done there. What I’m about to say won’t, I don’t think, resolve the dilemma you’ve raised, but it could be a path toward regaining political vitality and initiative: strengthening social consensus on national sovereignty, refusing to concede the battle for historical memory regarding a century-long history of US plunder, and fostering a broad discussion on the vision for the nation’s future. These steps could help break the inertia somewhat and prepare the country for more favorable political conditions in the near future. In contrast, suggesting specific policies or positions to the current government would be irresponsible, because I’m not the one who has to deal with a Trump and his violent ego.

My message is directed at all of us who do not hold such high-stakes positions and can contribute, from our own small spheres of influence or through our individual activism, to rebuilding a patriotic consciousness that must adapt to a new reality. How many open forums are being promoted to discuss the educational model, the economic model, and the model of income distribution? Which bodies are evaluating the trajectory of the bilateral relationship with the US in order to better address it? Are these discussions conceptually limited? Perhaps these debates will not change the current situation of Trump’s disproportionate influence, but they would give us autonomy in our vision and in shaping the future. If Venezuela does not have its own vision on major national issues, there is a risk that they will end up being imposed from Washington. That would be committing the perfect crime, and I believe we must avoid it: with national unity, transcending political divisions.

In your articles and social media posts, you have criticized political elites who, historically, have lacked “imagination” beyond offering lucrative deals to the US. How did Chávez manage to break that mold? How could Venezuela return to a more sovereign path?

To be fair, Chávez broke the mold but the political and geopolitical conditions were ripe for it. The weakness of the national elites, discredited by a society weary of inequality and injustice, coincided with the US being drunk on power at the end of the Cold War. In its plans to establish itself as a unipolar superpower, Latin America did not figure as the central battleground. The inattention of an empire more concerned with reshaping West Asia, forcing China into the “rules-based order,” and eliminating the last strongholds of the socialist bloc (Tito’s Yugoslavia) in turn allowed Chávez to implement his agenda without facing a full-scale war, although he did face numerous coup attempts. 

The present conditions are different. There is a hemispheric imperial retreat underpinned by a militarized reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, which drastically raises the cost of sovereignty-oriented proposals. Still, I believe that what is most commendable about Chávez, and which can be of use in this new context, is his ability to clearly identify favorable conditions and act upon them.

I believe that anyone who considers themselves a political figure must build upon these principles to take on the new challenges of the present, developing and defending a dignified vision of the nation’s future. I believe that, rather than waiting for another Chávez to emerge, we should instead study his thought in depth and draw on the best of it to renew political practices, always interpreting the situation for what it is: changing, volatile, and full of opportunities. Chávez is a great political school, but it has been reduced to a crude tool for private interests of all kinds.