Venezuela

Caracas, August 30, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez has defended an oil agreement that US President Donald Trump called “the biggest in history.”

“The historic agreement with the United States will have a great impact on Venezuelans’ lives in the long term,” she said in a televised broadcast on Saturday evening. “It is useless to have oil reserves underground. They should be turned into welfare and prosperity for our country.”

The acting president pledged that the deal would lead to “education and healthcare” improvements and contribute to “energy security” in the Western Hemisphere. She reiterated gratitude to Trump and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio for the agreement.

According to Rodríguez, the joint initiative will see undisclosed private operators take over 17 oilfields for 25 years. The fields in question contain 65 billion barrels of crude, a little over 20 percent of the country’s reserves.

She added that the project had a 1.5 million barrel per day (bpd) target. With prices estimated at $65, Venezuela would collect US $19 per barrel, totaling $209 billion over the course of the agreement.

However, the price estimates stand markedly below present and projected market values, while the state’s take is likewise significantly reduced. Under previous legislation, enacted by former President Hugo Chávez, the Venezuelan state collected over $0.75 for every dollar of oil extracted in the form of royalties, taxes, and dividends from state oil company PDVSA.

Furthermore, an average of $8.4 billion in yearly revenue for 1.5 million bpd produced also amounts to a much reduced share for the Caribbean nation. In 2025, with lower market prices and Venezuela forced to sell at a discount to circumvent US sanctions, the country collected a reported $18.4 billion from an average of 941,000 bpd produced.

Unofficial sources have published the 17 oilfields in question, with nine being extra-heavy crude projects, eight of them in the Orinoco Oil Belt. The remaining eight are reportedly mature light and medium crude fields in Western Venezuela.

For his part, Trump presented the agreement as a major foreign policy victory that would boost US energy security for decades. In a social media message on Sunday, Trump claimed he would use Venezuelan oil to “fill up the Strategic National Reserves,” calling the supply “a gift from Venezuela.”

Details on the US role in the agreement have yet to be disclosed, with Trump Energy Secretary Chris Wright expected in Caracas in the coming days.

According to AP, the US government will have an ownership stake in a company receiving 100-year rights to drill in the assigned oilfields. Washington would reportedly secure 55 percent of the output and be able to purchase oil at cost.

The Wall Street Journal reported that the Trump administration plans to secure a 35 percent stake in North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP), a firm owned by Venezuelan oil mogul Alejandro Betancourt that currently operates multiple oil projects. The operation would be conducted by the Pentagon’s Office of Strategic Capital through penny warrants that minimize capital investment.

Venezuelan and US officials have stated that the deal will attract $100 billion in private sector investment. Nevertheless, there has been no information released about the private actors involved.

Since the January 3 US military strikes and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores, the Trump administration has seized control over Venezuela’s energy sector. Washington has maintained wide-reaching sanctions in place while issuing licenses for select Western corporations. The US Treasury likewise manages Venezuela’s crude sale revenues, with the amounts and timings of the disbursements to Caracas left at the White House’s discretion.

The acting Rodríguez government has pushed a pro-business overhaul of its hydrocarbon law and regulations in coordination with US officials and corporate executives. In recent months, companies such as Chevron, BP, and Shell have struck new long-term oil and natural gas deals or renegotiated existing ones.

Popular movements call for ‘anti-imperialist resistance’

The announced agreement with the Trump administration has drawn significant criticism over its lack of transparency and implications for Venezuelan sovereignty.

Economist Francisco Rodríguez questioned whether the deal would require parliamentary approval as established by the Venezuelan Constitution. He likewise called for an explanation on whether the announced revenue figures are at current prices or adjusted for inflation. “19 dollars per barrel in 2051, when the project ends, correspond to a real value of 9 dollars today,” he wrote.

Venezuelan social movements also took to the streets of Caracas on Saturday to protest against “neocolonialism and imperialist attacks.” The mobilization was organized by the Popular Anti-Imperialist Front, a coalition of grassroots collectives that has staged regular demonstrations in recent weeks.

“The Popular Anti-Imperialist Front aims to bring together revolutionary movements to resist the imperialist aggression our country is facing,” activist Fernando Berroterán told Venezuelanalysis. “We are staging protests in different communities to raise popular consciousness.”

Berroterán stated that he was “completely opposed” to the announced deal, adding that the Popular Anti-Imperialist Front would meet and establish a joint position in the coming days.

Fellow organizer Orlando Vega argued that the Venezuelan government has “stumbled” in its response following the January 3 US attacks. He urged a firmer stance, demanding the release of Maduro and Flores and a review of legislation approved “under US coercion.”

“Our call is for the people to organize pockets of resistance against imperialism and Zionism,” Vega concluded.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Philadelphia, USA.

A new deal between Caracas and Washington would give US companies access to more than a fifth of Venezuela’s vast oil reserves.

But there’s opposition in Venezuela, as well as debate about whether the plan is legal.

What could the agreement mean?

Presenter: Tom McRae

Guests:

Jose Chalhoub – political risk and oil analyst

Cornelia Meyer – commodity specialist and CEO of Meyer Resources

Francisco Rodriguez – senior research fellow at the Center for Economic and Policy Research at the University of Denver, former head of the Economic and Financial Advisory of the Venezuelan National Assembly

The trajectory of the political transition that many Venezuelans await since January 3 seems to have been clarifying over the past few weeks. The first expected milestone is the reform of the Supreme Court of Justice, although it remains to be seen how many of the new magistrates will be independent and how many tied to factions of the chavista elite. The expectation is that, before the end of the year, the agenda will include a new board of rectors for the CNE and the long-awaited electoral calendar. In Panama, María Corina Machado had opened to negotiating these matters directly with Delcy Rodríguez, but the United States decided to manage the institutional opening through a small group of opposition figures, former lawmakers from Primero Justicia and Voluntad Popular in the 2015 National Assembly. The discomfort of Machado and her inner circle with this decision is no secret. The opposition leader has stated that she does not intend to stand in the way. Individuals linked to her team and party have raised doubts about the negotiation’s initial legitimacy and early progress, while other longtime opposition figures have welcomed the recent releases of political prisoners and the roadmap the US has outlined.

At Caracas Chronicles, we sat down to talk with Guillermo Aveledo Coll, a political scientist, expert in Venezuelan political history, and researcher of the ideas that have shaped its parties and conflicts. Aveledo views the unfolding dialogue favorably. He believes general elections must take place in Venezuela as soon as possible, though not without first tying up loose ends related to the broad recognition of any electoral process and the stability of future governments. He also discussed the dynamics that could emerge among political parties amid a transition, both within the anti-chavista camp and inside the chavista movement. Much like Marco Rubio in January, he made reference to the Spanish Transition. Finally, he reflected on our last transition to democracy (1958–1968) and how Rómulo Betancourt and Acción Democrática adapted to move forward in the face of adversity.

Recently, María Corina Machado used a term typical in transition frameworks. She said that the transition to democracy cannot be an elite pact made behind the people’s backs and without a popular mandate. Does the agenda unfolding between a commission of the Delcy government and the Delegated Commission of the old 2015 National Assembly fall into the category of an elite pact? You have been a defender of the legacy of the Puntofijo Pact. Is an elite pact problematic in these particular circumstances?

What we are seeing, which points embryonically toward an elite agreement, will have to be filtered through the will of the population, because the ultimate source of legitimacy in a democratic republic passes through it. The Puntofijo Pact was a concrete agreement on political rules among parties. However, had those parties lacked inherent legitimacy and a firm foothold, those rules might have overwhelmed them. In those elections, an independent candidate backed by one of the historic parties, Rear Admiral Wolfgang Larrazábal, obtained a very high percentage of the vote and came in second. So it could very well have been something that surpassed them, that swallowed them up.

Venezuela will need elections. It also needs the freedoms and guarantees for those elections to take place. Not because winning them without those guarantees is impossible, but because the opposition’s victories haven’t been recognized without them, while a government win leaves reasonable doubts regarding legitimacy. And if a fundamental actor in that social recognition, María Corina Machado, remains sidelined, there is all the more reason. But that alone does not fix the system; once an agreement on guarantees, freedoms, and institutional restructuring is reached to allow a new electoral process, we will be talking about another stage—the delicate process of Venezuela’s redemocratization.

Moving on to the US and the difference between what Marco Rubio says, for example, and what Machado says. I believe the US approach, at least initially, was to seek a more gradual path. Machado rejects gradualism, connecting with majorities desperate for improvements in their day-to-day lives. Do you view gradualism as desirable in this case, or does it bring risks?

Right now, it is not a matter of desirable or undesirable. It must be viewed carefully. What does gradualism mean in this context? If it means the indefinite postponement of elections, then I agree there should be no gradualism. Elections must happen sooner rather than later. Now, must other things happen before elections? Of course. Certain decisions are necessary. For many Venezuelans, the existing electoral institution is neither trustworthy nor advantageous; going to an election feels risky—not so much because of the voting machines or the system itself, but because of the allocation rules, which heavily favor the plurality or the majority.

“If you keep the current allocation system, there will be such complete steamrolling that a significant yet minority sector will find itself far more diminished than political reality dictates.”

They are rules of steamrolling. If you have a 5-4 distribution, the practical result becomes 6-3; if you have a 3-1, it becomes 4 or 4.5 to 1. That poses a problem because we are in a process that did not open through social pressure overthrowing the system. The system is still there, and its existence must be dealt with. Today, the system is making concessions that, propaganda aside, respond to external pressure. Saying that nothing will change and that all this is meaningless is a different matter. If, instead, gradualism means taking the necessary steps to promote those elections so the outcome is recognized and governance is secure, then it is logical. These processes tend to be gradual when they happen.

What should come first: presidential elections, legislative elections, or both at once?

The broader the possibility for popular expression, the better. It is convenient for a new government, of any political line, to have significant parliamentary support. In my view, general elections—or at least national general elections covering national jurisdiction, including overseas voting—are advisable. This would generate two branches of power: the Legislative and the Executive. If we maintain the proportions that society currently suggests, it would likely be a moment of overwhelming majority for one sector over another. Politically, that is not necessarily desirable. What do I mean? For the stability of the present and future process, there needs to be a form of representation closer to the national mindset. Today, the PSUV represents a significant minority, but a smaller one than in other historical moments. We will see how that translates in an environment of freedom, without infringement, and without pressure from the bureaucracy or the State as an employer. Perhaps the result could be different for chavismo now. But relying on polls that indicate a four-to-one or three-to-one gap, if you keep the current allocation system, there will be such complete steamrolling that a significant yet minority sector will find itself far more diminished than political reality dictates.

“It is likely that chavismo as an entity will take various forms and fragment. Is it convenient for it to disappear? I think doing so artificially is dangerous.”

That is not necessarily a good start. Democratic zeal and sectarianism in other transitions have weakened a democracy’s ability to respond and advance—which is ultimately what all democratic sectors want. I prefer a solid democracy with a significant, albeit limited, representation of chavismo over the alternative, simply because of what they represent in political life. Furthermore, remember: they could not be extracted—or rather, removed—from power as a structure. That carries weight. Does that mean I wish for an authoritarian leftist force like chavismo turned out to be at the height of its power? No. I believe there should be a force representing the political identity that chavismo is—as a cultural, political, and ideological identity that existed before fading due to its own dynamics. Who holds the broad banner of chavismo today? I do not know. The ones in Miraflores? I don’t know if they are indisputable figures within that movement, or if the discontent and dismay throughout this period generate fragmentation.

As happened in other transition experiences, the government party sometimes splits once it opens up, gets overtaken, and the opposition takes power. It is probable that chavismo as an entity will take various forms and fragment. Is it convenient for it to disappear? I think doing so artificially is dangerous. From 1945 to 1948, the majority force believed no other party was democratic. That gave us 10 years of harsh dictatorship. I prefer to see chavismo divide around democracy: some supporting the transition and others supporting an authoritarian or violent return to power, allowing us to face them within that framework.

A few years ago, there was much talk about the decline of Venezuelan opposition parties, even the idea that these parties are dead. A set of parties, to an extent heirs to the old two-party system, retain certain references and machinery. What are the challenges for these parties moving forward, beyond the known consequences of prolonged repression and State harassment? Can they grow stronger?

The dynamics will emerge naturally. Obviously, parties retain elements of historical legitimacy, identity, and roots, but a sifting process toward other options is very likely. My desire, of course, is for a party bloc to form around democracy. But then we face the issue of the primus inter pares. María Corina Machado is the leader and the most popular political figure in Venezuela’s recent history—the most individually popular since the death of Chávez. She holds a massive advantage, though that isn’t necessarily true for her party, Vente Venezuela. I don’t mean to diminish Vente’s value. That is why a bloc, agreements, and that collective notion are more suitable. Some argue this spirit broke after the start of negotiations, that the spirit of Panama was lost. I see it more as a pivot toward the direction Panama points. It is not the form the Panama Agreement indicated, but it aligns with the expectations it set. These are not completely unfamiliar actors; an abnormal arrangement is not being forced upon Venezuelan society.

Now, should the parties emerge? That will happen in due time. It took time for the Spanish Right to consolidate after Adolfo Suárez’s UCD and the dissolution of Francoist parties. Those fell into oblivion and later merged into a party representing that world sociologically, which became the People’s Party (PP). In the case of the Spanish Left, the multitude of cacophonous acronyms from the Spanish Civil War and exile sifted into the PSOE, which had the advantage of being a historic party. It didn’t acquire a new personality, but it began gathering people from other parties, both left-liberals and more heterodox leftists. Here, it could very well settle into one, two, or three major parties forming a bloc. What is the concrete difference between Voluntad Popular, Un Nuevo Tiempo, and Acción Democrática in ideological terms? Or between the other Democratic Unity parties and Vente Venezuela? “Oh, Vente is liberal-capitalist and the others are not.” Are the others not pro-market? Let’s be clear, they have been for a long time. It’s not that they are neoliberal, but they aren’t socialist in the sense of nationalizing the means of production. We should keep that in mind.

Regarding the Venezuelan Left, Chávez was the first major charismatic figure linked to that world who swallowed all leftist parties. That is the essence of PSUV. The Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD) and the Unitary Platform positioned themselves as its antithesis: “What unites all of us who hold these ideological differences? The desire for democracy.” What might happen is that a single party—new or distinct—swallows the archipelago of parties that emerged under this system. But it is very probable, as seen in other processes, that a different party system will emerge. What is desirable? That they be democratic parties. What is desirable? That extremist parties, meaning those that do not believe in elections or democracy, can operate legitimately. That would be a danger to them. In its 20-year history, PSUV has opposed pluralism and free, competitive elections; that is how it operated from power. Could it act differently from another perspective? It might, as happened with other parties in different transitions. The PP is an example.

Returning to María Corina, who will likely be a central figure in the upcoming period, I wanted to discuss Rómulo Betancourt, the most prominent figure of our former transition. She once admitted he’s the best president Venezuela ever had. Betancourt both excelled at building consensus during that era and was firm in protecting his State project from extremes. Is he a useful reference point now? What lessons does Betancourt offer María Corina, and what are not lessons?

An important lesson is that he spoke with people who had sent him into exile and prison, admitting them into the new status quo. The only person directly excluded from the system was Pérez Jiménez. Of course, those individuals had also been victimized by the dictatorship, enabling new understandings. With others, Betancourt had built a wall of fire. But in general, he skillfully won over the military and business sectors—building bridges he failed to establish during his first presidency, a lesson in how radicalism can fail. I believe that is a crucial example. Acción Democrática held massive majorities, yet could not sustain its first mandate. In his second term, Betancourt did not take power with an extraordinary majority, yet he gathered more allies. Are the allies of the Unitary Platform enough to support such an administration? If tomorrow there is a National Assembly with an overwhelming majority from a pro-Machado party—whether Vente or another—and the minority or that sector is steamrolled, you will have fewer allies to govern under very difficult circumstances. You may have a non-governing minority, yes, but you will face more discontented voices outside. In that scenario, you should be striving to reconcile.

“What concerns me is that a government led by María Corina—one desired by millions of Venezuelans, including myself—could become unstable because we tried to do too much too soon.”

Of course, there is the idea that reconciliation should be with the masses rather than the elites. Fantastic—I believe that is a genuine aspiration. But one must also consider that part of these sectors belong to those parties. How do the thousands of party militants who helped execute the 2023 primaries or the 2024 voting tally collection feel? Discontent may be brewing there, which does not serve us well. Naturally, demanding total calm and moderation from María Corina—asking her to step away from her historic trajectory—is difficult. Her distrust is not entirely unfounded: major adversaries who have acknowledged her leadership in recent months and years have also acted against her. Perhaps that is why a more institutional coordination between the Unitary Platform and Vente—which I found desirable to allow greater cohesion—never materialized. That places a burden on the parties as well: how much can they demand when their representation is small?

How can an organized Venezuelan society exert influence over this juncture?

By trying to support the possibilities opening up in this scenario, even regarding the most politically committed sectors. The success of the process in Caracas depends largely on restoring, sooner rather than later, the freedoms that allow political dynamics to settle into something genuine and verifiable. It benefits Venezuelan society to lean in that direction. Society must also organize its own demands; democracy requires tolerance and pluralism, but it also requires contestation. There is significant leadership representing that, but society itself must reorganize because organization has been limited and stunted for years—with very few exceptions—by repression and constraints on civil society. Here, I would like to return to María Corina Machado.

Sure, go ahead.

I spoke of Betancourt and what that implies for her, including steadfast leadership. But there is also the need for flexibility toward the Armed Forces and awareness of that function’s demands. That said, María Corina Machado should not be afraid to be herself, to maintain her standard and vision. It has worked well for her so far, despite many problems, risks, and sacrifices. It would feel somewhat pretentious of me to tell her: “Look, María Corina, do this one way or another.” What concerns me is that a government led by her—one desired by millions of Venezuelans, including myself—could become unstable because we tried to do too much too soon.

In what areas do you see risks?

To me, the main risk is having powerful adversaries emboldened by instability and by the difficulty of building consensus around the tough decisions a new government will have to make—serious, ground-breaking decisions that will require broader support. Disregarding support and consensus as unnecessary could become a problem.

Are privatizations a concern for you, or perhaps the issue of justice?

I am concerned about the inability to make the most grave decisions. The privatization of PDVSA is largely advanced through the Hydrocarbons Law; we are heading toward a framework where PDVSA remains significantly reduced. The disarmament or political neutralization of the judiciary is already on the table, so they won’t need to drive that from scratch. But issues of redistribution, labor rights, and State restructuring—deeper discussions where initial instincts may not be fully adequate to foster understanding—could create serious challenges. I do not mean to minimize her support, but popular backing has often failed to prevent adversaries from becoming emboldened and supplanting democracy during historical transitions. And I do not want us to return to an authoritarian system.

US president says deal secures majority US control of more than 65 billion barrels of proven oil reserves in Venezuela.

The United States has struck a deal with Caracas that would give them control of some 65 billion barrels of Venezuela’s proven oil reserves, President Donald Trump has announced, while reviving the OPEC nation’s battered energy industry.

In a post on Truth Social, Trump said the “historic transaction more than doubles American oil reserves” and “will substantially lower gas prices for all Americans”.

“At my direction, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, working closely with Highly Respected Interim President of Venezuela, Delcy Rodriguez, and, through a partnership with private business, have secured majority US control of more than 65 BILLION BARRELS of proven Oil Reserves in Venezuela, at no cost to the American Taxpayer,” Trump wrote.

Venezuela’s interim President Delcy Rodriguez welcomed the deal, which is expected to bring about $209bn to the state’s treasury.

The announcement followed weeks of negotiations over an agreement that would give American companies long-term access to a group of Venezuelan oilfields and guarantee the resulting crude supply to the US.

Venezuelan officials are preparing to sign agreements next week granting new oil exploration and production rights to a number of companies, particularly US firms.

Sources previously told Reuters news agency that a lease model was under consideration, with fields potentially auctioned to US producers, but the arrangement could face legal and constitutional challenges in Venezuela, where the state retains control over core oil industry activities.

The new deal would represent a dramatic expansion of Washington’s role in Venezuela’s oil industry as the Trump administration seeks to revive the country’s production and secure more crude for US refineries. Venezuela holds the world’s largest proven oil reserves, but produces only 1.25 million barrels per day, far below its potential after years of underinvestment, mismanagement and sanctions.

Trump did not disclose the structure of the agreement, the fields or companies involved, nor how the US would exercise majority control over the reserves.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio described the agreement as a win for both countries, saying on X that it would secure stable, low-cost oil for the US and help lower petrol prices.

For Venezuela, Rubio said the deal would bring nearly $100bn in private investment, support thousands of high-paying jobs and help rebuild the country’s economy.

WASHINGTON — President Trump on Friday said the U.S. has entered an agreement with Venezuela to take control of 65 billion barrels of the South American country’s oil reserves.

Trump in a social media post announced the agreement he said was negotiated by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Venezuela’s interim President Delcy Rodríguez.

“The United States of America has just entered into an Agreement with the Country of Venezuela on, THE BIGGEST OIL DEAL IN WORLD HISTORY!” Trump wrote.

The Venezuelan government’s press office did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

The announcement of the deal comes nearly nine months after the U.S. military at Trump’s direction carried out an operation to capture Venezuela’s president Nicolás Maduro and spirit him to the United States to face federal narcoterrorism and drug trafficking charges.

Trump faces mounting pressure to address high gas prices as the war in Iran on Friday reached a six-month milestone with no conclusion in sight. The U.S. has tapped its strategic petroleum reserves, which in early August fell below 300 million barrels, down by more than 100 million barrels since the start of 2026.

The U.S.-Israel war against Iran has led to a dramatic slowdown of Gulf oil moving through the Strait of Hormuz, which about 20% of the world petroleum passed through prior to the conflict.

The average price of gas in the U.S. stood at about $4.09 a gallon on Friday, according to AAA. The average price was $3.21 at the same time last year.

Trump in his social media post Friday evening alluded to the Venezuela deal being part of a private partnership. The White House did not immediately reply to a request for comment about the private sector partners involved in the deal, and details on how the arrangement would work were not provided.

Persuading big American oil companies to return the region could face headwinds given and decades of badly damaged infrastructure.

Days after the ouster of Maduro, Trump gathered oil executives at the White House and called on them to rush back into Venezuela. Executives expressed interest in the opportunity but there was also a measure of caution given their past experience in the country.

Darren Woods, CEO of ExxonMobil, the largest U.S. oil company, said at that moment he saw the country as “un-investable.”

But Trump has insisted that his administration has brought a measure of stability to Venezuela.

He has argued that Venezuela stole U.S. oil when former Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez’s moved decades ago to nationalize hundreds of foreign-owned assets, including those owned by American oil companies.

Rodríguez, in one of her early moves after taking power, signed a law that opens the nation’s oil sector to privatization and reversed a bedrock tenet of the self-proclaimed socialist movement that had ruled the country for more than two decades.

Rubio said on X that the agreement would usher in $100 billion in private investment into Venezuela and lead to lower gas prices in the United States.

“This deal is a huge win for both the American and Venezuelan people,” Rubio posted.

Venezuela has one of the largest oil reserves in the world, with an estimated 303 billion barrels of crude oil in the ground. That’s about 17% of the world’s supply, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration.

Madhani and Binkley write for the Associated Press. Regina Garcia Cano in Caracas contributed to this report.

Venezuela’s National Assembly approved, in its first reading on Thursday, August 27, the reform of Article 65 of the Organic Law of the Supreme Court of Justice. Why is a measure like this so important for Venezuela? Because it is the first institutional and legal step taken by the interim authorities that might lead to a genuine transitional process.

On August 12, the first agreement was signed between the delegation of the interim authorities and that of the National Assembly in 2015. But that is a political document, of which the reform of Article 65 of the Organic Law of the Supreme Court of Justice would be the first true institutional implementation, a first legal step in a process that is just beginning and that, eventually, could take us to a transition.

Article 65 of the current law regulates the composition of the Nominations Committee: the body that selects citizens nominated for judgeships, from which the National Assembly chooses the judges. Currently, the Nominations Committee has 21 members: 11 members of the National Assembly and 10 members of civil society. The reform (which must be approved in its second reading in the National Assembly and then become law) would increase the number of Committee members from 21 to 23, but the most significant aspect is that these two additional members would come from civil society.

According to the political agreement of August 12, the National Assembly must appoint all 32 Justices of the Supreme Court.

In short, the reform allows for greater citizen participation in the choosing of the 32 justices, just after the agreement reached on August 12 to completely renew the country’s highest court, a key component of chavista’s hold to power during the 21st century. This shift, along with the other aspects of the August 12 agreement, could generate confidence for prestigious university professors and lawyers to apply in the upcoming process to form the new Supreme Court of Justice.

This reform could be followed by another, also structural in nature, concerning the same Organic Law of the Supreme Court of Justice (LOTSJ) and other laws of the justice system, as announced at the end of the first round of talks between the delegations of the interim authorities and the National Assembly in 2015. Therefore, this first step could be very important for moving toward a political transition. 

Naturally, the question that arises from the previous experience of two decades of dialogue between Chavismo and the opposition is how to prevent the regime from controlling the Nominations Committee and ensure that it has a loyal majority among the 12 members of civil society that it would have if this reform is approved.

The answer is the same as it applies to this process: unlike all previous negotiations, here there is a third party that, rather than being a mediator, has the most influence—a Trump administration that theoretically benefits from a safer legal environment for foreign investment, and therefore has incentives to ensure that this reform truly becomes an opening that leads to the restoration, albeit gradual, of Venezuelan institutions.

Caracas, August 26, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan opposition lawmaker Antonio Ecarri has proposed dollarizing Venezuela’s economy and abolishing the bolívar, the country’s official currency, as a way to “stop devaluation” and “protect citizens’ purchasing power.”

Ecarri, a National Assembly Deputy from Alianza del Lápiz, has hired US economist Steve Hanke as an advisor for his plan to change the national currency.

“We are working on a serious dollarization proposal to put the brakes on the infernal devaluation that is destroying people’s wages. Enough of bureaucracy financing public spending by confiscating the private property and labor of Venezuelans,” Ecarri said.

Hanke, a Johns Hopkins University academic who served in the Reagan administration, has advised countries such as Ecuador and Zimbabwe on similar initiatives. In an article for business magazine Fortune, he confirmed that he has already drafted “a bill for the Venezuelan parliament.”

According to the US economist, the transition would begin with the establishment of a fixed USD-bolívar exchange rate before converting bolívar-denominated accounts to US dollars. The Venezuelan Central Bank (BCV) would retain administrative functions but lose the ability to issue money or set interest rates.

Hanke previously revealed that he has held meetings with US Treasury and White House officials to discuss an international strategy aimed at strengthening the US currency through dollarization of foreign countries, currency boards, and other instruments.

Ecarri’s proposal drew significant criticism, with Venezuelan National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez announcing “an investigation process to establish the offenses committed” by the opposition lawmaker. Ecarri was also removed from his position as chairman of the Venezuela-US Parliamentary Friendship Group, a post he had held for just two months.

According to a published statement, the opposition deputy allegedly violated the legislature’s internal procedures as well as the constitutional provision establishing that “the monetary unit of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is the bolívar” and that the Central Bank “is the public entity that, exclusively and mandatorily, exercises monetary policy.”

Rodríguez also described the proposal during a parliamentary session as “absurd and outrageous.” Ecarri, however, defended his stance and decision to hire Hanke, whom he called “an authority in the field and a personal adviser of mine for some time.”

The opposition lawmaker argues that Venezuela is “at a key moment” to debate the adoption of a different currency. 

“The country is already de facto dollarized, but those who continue to receive their wages in bolívars that lose value every day are our teachers, nurses, workers, and pensioners,” he stressed. “The government itself has just approved a law allowing rents to be paid in foreign currency.”

Ecarri claimed that growing oil revenues would supply Venezuela with enough foreign currency to adopt the dollarization plan, which he argued “should be accompanied by a Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund to protect the value of the currency against potential external shocks in the United States.”

Since 2018, the Venezuelan government has tolerated the circulation of US dollars amid efforts to control inflation. Though the bolívar remains the official currency, businesses and retailers establish cost structures and prices using US dollars. Venezuelan authorities have also fixed monthly bonus payments, which constitute virtually the entire income for workers and pensioners, in dollars, which are then paid in bolívars using the exchange rate established daily by the BCV.

The Central Bank has continually devalued the bolívar, with the USD-bolívar exchange rate growing by more than 150 percent since the beginning of 2026. The currency depreciation is a key driver of inflation. Prices rose by 19.9 percent in July, and accumulated 12-month inflation presently stands at 576 percent.

Financial authorities have likewise been unable to control a parallel, speculation-driven exchange rate which currently stands 15-20 percent above the official one.

Despite the persistent devaluation-inflation issues, formal dollarization is opposed by most Venezuelan policy analysts, including government critics. Economist Asdrúbal Oliveros warned that dollarization would be an effective mechanism for drastically reducing inflation but “is not the best solution,” since it would be a “nearly irreversible” decision that would limit the country’s monetary policy options.

Right-wing economist José Guerra likewise considers dollarization “a straitjacket” for an oil-producing country. “Without a central bank issuing currency, an external shock will cause deflation, an inability to pay salaries and finance public spending, as happens in Ecuador. It also creates a high dependence on the US and is a one-way path,” he said.

Rodrigo Cabezas, former finance minister under President Hugo Chávez, similarly expressed his “complete opposition” to dollarization, stating that it is “unreasonable” for a country to surrender essential economic tools, losing control over foreign exchange policies and interest rates.

For his part, economist and former United Socialist Party (PSUV) legislator Tony Boza contended that Washington wants to push dollarization in Latin America to “stave off its economic downfall.” Boza went on to criticize the acting Delcy Rodríguez government and the National Assembly for subordinating economic policies and the country’s national resources to US and foreign capital interests.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

For the first time in years, Venezuela is discussing institutional change as something more concrete than an opposition demand. The talks between the two National Assemblies have embraced the problem of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ), with the electoral authority next in line. New magistrates, new CNE rectors, new elections: after decades of institutional capture, replacing the people who run these bodies is obviously necessary.

The danger is believing it will be enough.

Venezuela has spent the last quarter of century demonstrating that its democratic decline cannot be reduced to bad people occupying important offices. Chavismo did not merely place loyalists inside the State. It gradually transformed the relationships between institutions so that political power could survive electoral setbacks.

The clearest example came after 2015. When the opposition won a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly, chavismo did not accept that voters had changed the institutional balance of the country. The TSJ then progressively neutralized the newly elected Assembly. When that was no longer enough, the government created a Constituent Assembly capable of bypassing it altogether.

This adaptability matters for the transition now being negotiated.

Chavismo’s institutional principle has never really been presidentialism. It has been simpler: power should remain wherever chavismo remains.

Venezuela is extraordinarily centralized, and there is good reason to believe that no political project can govern effectively without controlling the presidency. But it would be a mistake to assume that the presidency will remain as powerful after chavismo loses it as it was while chavismo controlled the rest of the State.

A democratic president facing a chavista supermajority in the National Assembly and a hostile Supreme Court could discover rather quickly that Venezuela’s supposedly omnipotent presidency is considerably less omnipotent than advertised.

Chavismo’s institutional principle has never really been presidentialism. It has been simpler: power should remain wherever chavismo remains. That is why replacing the people at the top of Venezuela’s institutions is only the beginning of reinstitutionalization.

We have tried this before

The CNE should make us particularly cautious.

In 2021, Roberto Picón and Enrique Márquez joined an electoral board that was widely regarded as the most balanced Venezuela had seen in years. Both pushed for meaningful improvements, and international observers recognized that the new composition produced a better electoral environment than the one that preceded it. The Carter Center described the board as “less unbalanced,” while still documenting structural problems surrounding electoral competition.

The episode demonstrated the limits of solving institutional problems through personnel alone. An election is not defined solely by what five CNE rectors do on election night. It also depends on who can register to vote, which candidates can run, whether parties can organize, how public resources are used, what media can report, what security forces do, and which court ultimately resolves a dispute.

Barinas provided the almost perfect illustration. After the 2021 gubernatorial election, the TSJ intervened while the vote was still being resolved, invoked a political disqualification against the opposition candidate and ordered the election repeated. Picón and Márquez publicly dissented. The independent rectors were there. The larger machinery around them remained capable of overruling the political meaning of the vote.

A good rector can behave honorably inside a bad system. The same is true of judges.

“Non-repetition” cannot mean guaranteeing that chavismo disappears from Venezuelan politics.

Replacing the current Supreme Court with independent jurists would be an enormous democratic achievement. Even so, courts lack enforcement mechanisms for a reason, meaning that the armed forces or the police could ignore their rulings, or that, as chavismo has already done, the president du jour could resort to the military court system. But Venezuela should also be asking whether a future court should retain all the powers that chavismo accumulated and exploited through it.

Otherwise, the transition risks producing institutions that are safe only for as long as good people control them.

That is not institutional reform. It is institutional trust.

And democracies are supposed to require less of it.

Political scientist Guillermo O’Donnell made this distinction precisely when he wrote about the weakness of “horizontal accountability” in Latin American democracies. Elections determine who governs, but democracy also requires institutions capable of restraining those winners once they do. A president who receives millions of votes is still bound by courts, legislatures, and rules that do not derive their legitimacy from his personal mandate.

Venezuela inverted that principle. Institutions increasingly became instruments for preserving whoever already controlled them. Changing their occupants without changing that logic would leave the central vulnerability untouched.

What non-repetition actually means

This is where the transition needs a more demanding definition of success. “Non-repetition” cannot mean guaranteeing that chavismo disappears from Venezuelan politics.

A democratic Venezuela should permit a chavista party to reorganize, contest elections and, if voters choose it again someday, return to government. Democracy cannot mean competitive elections until the people we dislike win one.

Nor does democratic consolidation require Venezuela to eliminate every trace of authoritarian nostalgia. Spain still contains defenders of Franco. Chile still contains defenders of Pinochet. Their democratic success is not that those political traditions vanished, but that political competition became overwhelmingly organized around institutions that survived changes of government.

Nicaragua, on the other hand, demonstrates what happens when that consolidation remains incomplete.

The Sandinistas lost the 1990 election and surrendered the presidency. Daniel Ortega remained in politics, competed repeatedly, and eventually returned through elections in 2006. This democratic failure was certainly exacerbated when Nicaragua’s institutions proved unable to stop Ortega from progressively dismantling the democratic constraints that had made his return possible in the first place. Research on Nicaragua’s backsliding traces how electoral rules, courts and other institutions were gradually eroded on the road back to authoritarianism.

If judicial independence depends on always selecting virtuous magistrates, the judiciary has not been fixed.

That is the warning Venezuela should take seriously.

Non-repetition does not mean ensuring that Venezuelans never again elect someone with authoritarian instincts. It means building institutions capable of surviving when they do. And that standard has an uncomfortable implication for whoever eventually replaces chavismo.

The next democratic government should not ask only which powers it needs in order to govern. It should ask whether it would be comfortable leaving those same powers to its worst political adversary. That is the test that should apply to the new TSJ, the new CNE and eventually every institution rebuilt during the transition.

If electoral integrity depends on always appointing five excellent rectors, the electoral system has not been fixed. If judicial independence depends on always selecting virtuous magistrates, the judiciary has not been fixed. If the survival of democracy depends on trusting whoever occupies Miraflores, Venezuela has learned very little from the last twenty-five years.

The current negotiations can replace officials. They can make credible elections possible again. They can remove some of the people who converted public institutions into instruments of political control. All of that is necessary. But Venezuela’s democratic challenge will not be solved by transferring those instruments to new hands. 

The institutions being negotiated today should be designed not merely to produce the next democratic government, but to survive the next authoritarian one. Otherwise, Venezuela may succeed in changing who holds power without changing what power allows them to do.

Mérida, August 24, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) –The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued two general licenses granting specific permissions for telecommunications operations with Venezuela.

Under General License 61 (GL61), published on Friday, OFAC authorized US companies to provide “technology, software, or services for the installation, maintenance, refurbishment, repair, upgrade, operation, or support of telecommunications” to Venezuela’s state-owned telecommunications company CANTV and National Telecommunications Commission CONATEL.

According to official OFAC definitions, telecommunications services encompass fixed and mobile telephony, data transmission, internet connectivity, radio and television broadcasting, news agency feeds, satellite communications, and submarine cables.

GL61 permits specific operational activities, including payment processing, logistics, air freight, insurance, data storage, server maintenance, roaming agreements, and infrastructure leasing. However, the license specifies that Venezuelan state entities must procure new acquisitions directly from US companies or US citizens.

In addition, the Trump administration published General License 62 (GL62), authorizing negotiations for contracts in Venezuela’s telecommunications sector, though specific agreements remain contingent on a separate specific license,

Both sanctions waivers impose that any contracts be governed by the laws of a state or federal jurisdiction within the United States. Furthermore, the licenses demand that “dispute resolution proceedings relating to the contract occur in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, or Singapore.”

The Treasury licenses maintain bans on debt swaps, physical gold, or digital currencies and tokens issued by or on behalf of the Venezuelan government.

Furthermore, GL61 and GL62 maintain restrictions prohibiting “any transaction involving a person located in the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Cuba, the People’s Republic of China, or any entity that is owned or controlled by or in a joint venture with such persons”.

Since the January 3 US military strikes and kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, Washington has upheld its wide-reaching coercive economic sanctions in areas such as energy and mining,  while issuing licenses to favor US and Western corporations.

US sanctions and restrictions on Chinese technology firms present a challenge to CANTV’s recent operational landscape. For the past two decades, the Venezuelan government has forged bilateral agreements with Chinese telecom firms, including ZTE and Huawei, establishing joint projects to manufacture and deploy telecommunications equipment domestically. 

Over the last decade, CANTV has worked with Huawei and ZTE to modernize networks, expand fiber-optic infrastructure, and sustain broadband services nationwide. Venezuelan authorities have not commented on the latest US licenses and potential impact on existing agreements.

In addition, CANTV has been identified by analysts as a potential candidate for privatization. The company has recently been mired in controversy after reportedly slashing retired workers’ incomes. Retirees have staged protests in several states in recent days after a US $200 monthly bonus was arbitrarily slashed, while also demanding the restoration of basic medical insurance and health coverage guaranteed by collective bargaining agreements.

In parallel, CONATEL has launched technical and legal working sessions with representatives of SpaceX’s Starlink service to examine radio spectrum allocation, equipment homologation, and regulatory compliance under Venezuela’s Organic Telecommunications Law.

Despite Maduro previously criticizing SpaceX owner Elon Musk for destabilizing politics in Venezuela and Latin America, the acting Delcy Rodríguez government thanked the tech mogul for activating free Starlink services in the wake of the June 24 double earthquake in the Caribbean nation.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

US Southern Command says that Sunday’s strike targeted a vessel operating along established narco-trafficking routes in the Eastern Pacific.

The United States military said it struck a suspected drug-trafficking boat in the Pacific Ocean, killing two people.

In a Monday post on X, US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) said Sunday’s strike targeted a vessel operating along established narco-trafficking routes in the Eastern Pacific.

“Confirmed intelligence revealed the vessel’s active involvement in narco-trafficking,” SOUTHCOM added.

“This operation is a clear and decisive reminder that SOUTHCOM is taking the fight directly to the cartels.”

Grainy, black-and-white video accompanying the post appeared to show a boat moving through the water immediately before a large explosion.

The post stated that under the direction of SOUTHCOM Commander General Francis L. Donovan, the Joint Task Force Western Hemisphere executed a lethal kinetic strike on the low-profile vessel.

“We are committed to imposing total systemic friction on narco-terrorists — disrupting their operations, dismantling their leadership and eliminating cartel terror across the region,” Donovan was quoted as saying.

“Let me be clear, we will not permit narco-terrorists to operate with impunity in the Western Hemisphere, nor will we allow their deadly poison to reach American communities. This operation is a powerful demonstration of our lethal precision, overwhelming capability, and absolute resolve to protect the U.S. homeland.”

The US military launched Operation Southern Spear in early September, with President Donald Trump arguing that Washington is effectively at war with Latin American drug cartels.

Since then, more than 200 people have been killed in strikes across the Eastern Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea, according to a tally by the AFP news agency.

However, the Trump administration has not provided definitive evidence that the targeted vessels were involved in drug trafficking.

Legal experts and rights groups warn that the attacks could amount to extrajudicial killings.

The Pentagon’s inspector general said in May that it would review whether the military followed standard targeting procedures, though the evaluation will not examine the legal authority behind the strikes.