Venezuela

Caracas, September 16, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuela and the United Kingdom have announced a formal decision to upgrade their diplomatic relations and to re-establish full ambassadorial representation.

London formally presented its policy shift on September 15 in a missive to Parliament through coordinated statements by Minister for Latin America Chris Elmore in the House of Commons and Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State Lord Wood of Anfield in the House of Lords.

In the statements, the cabinet members framed the “diplomatic upgrade” around supporting a “democratic transition” while pursuing pragmatic bilateral engagement with the South American country.

“Developments in Venezuela since 3 January have created an important opportunity for the international community to support the restoration of democracy,” the statement read. “Working closely with the United States and with international partners, the UK considers that this moment calls for pragmatic engagement to help advance a credible transition and to encourage further reforms.”

The communiqué added that London and Caracas “have agreed our intention to upgrade our representation to Ambassador,” emphasizing that the step aims to deepen engagement with Venezuelan authorities and enhance support for British corporate and trade interests.

The Venezuelan government welcomed London’s decision. In an official communication published on Tuesday, the government led by Acting President Delcy Rodriguez celebrated the upgrade in diplomatic status as a positive step toward normalization.

Venezuelan officials stressed that the latest decision should pave the way for the full “sovereign management of the Venezuelan people’s resources,” referencing state assets frozen in British financial institutions.

National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez and Foreign Minister Félix Plasencia flew to London and held a meeting on Tuesday with Harriet Thompson, the British Foreign Office’s Director for the Americas.

Following the discussions, Rodríguez highlighted progress in multi-sectoral talks and economic outlooks. 

“We shared Venezuela’s position regarding political and social dialogue, as well as the progress made regarding oil and gas investments, and how this will translate into significant and rapid economic growth for Venezuela,” he said in a message published on social media.

Rodríguez added that the talks aimed at promoting national peace and political reconciliation, labeling them as “good news for our country and our people.”

Bilateral relations between London and Caracas had been severed for years following former UK Prime Minister Theresa May’s decision in 2019 to follow Washington in recognizing opposition figure Juan Guaidó’s self-proclaimed “interim government.”

That policy led to a protracted legal battle over 31 tons of Venezuelan gold reserves stored in the Bank of England, with successive British governments refusing to return them to Caracas. The reserves are currently valued at over US $4 billion.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Venezuelan authorities attempted to retrieve the gold through international legal channels, offering to transfer the funds directly to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to purchase emergency medical supplies and food.

However, British courts repeatedly rejected the legal challenges from the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV), citing No. 10’s political recognition of the opposition parallel administration.

Following renewed political talks in August and September, a Venezuelan government delegation and representatives of the defunct, opposition-controlled 2015 National Assembly agreed to request the release of the UK-held gold reserves under US Treasury Department control and oversight.

According to opposition dialogue delegates, the 31 tons of gold will be transferred into a specialized US Treasury bank account and subjected to external audits by foreign accounting firms before being released.

The funds are reportedly earmarked for housing, healthcare, and infrastructure recovery in the wake of the June 24 double earthquake that left over 6,500 people dead across Venezuela.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Lisbon, Portugal.

A new burger joint in La Castellana, an affluent neighborhood in eastern Caracas. Photo: Santiago Bernal.

Any Venezuelan can tell you how unpredictable our country is. This uncertainty, almost idiosyncratic to Venezuela’s national identity, can be felt before you even arrive. You never really know what awaits you when visiting from abroad, no matter how many times you have made the trip before.

This trip, my first since Maduro was captured by US forces in January and less than two months after the deadly earthquakes that devastated parts of the country in June, was certainly unusual from the beginning.

I arrived in Valencia, a city with a small airport poorly equipped to handle the hundreds of passengers diverted from Maiquetía International Airport, the country’s largest. To reach my hometown of Mérida, I had to take a flight departing from another city, Maracay, because Valencia’s airport was too crowded with international flights to accommodate additional domestic routes. The flight departed not from a conventional commercial terminal, but from a small facility inside Venezuela’s largest Air Force base, surrounded by some of the Russian anti-aircraft equipment and fighter jets that had spectacularly failed to prevent Maduro’s extraction. The check-in process had to be done in a mall in the city, a few kilometers away from the base, to which we were transported in a small shuttle bus. The process was surprisingly efficient.

The road between El Vigía’s airport, which serves Mérida, and the city was in better condition than I expected, although the scars of decades of underinvestment remained clearly visible. In some places, sections of road that had collapsed in landslides more than two years ago were still buried under rubble.

I arrived in Caracas after a drive in a taxi equipped with a Starlink antenna, a gadget that until not too long ago could land you in prison.

As we approached Mérida, I spotted a car-carrying truck filled with brand-new Toyota models.

I could not remember the last time I had seen one of those while living in Venezuela. Maybe 15 years ago? In any case, what would be an unremarkable sight in most countries had become extremely rare in Mérida, a state whose economy depends heavily on its university and small-scale tourism, two sectors devastated by Venezuela’s decade-long economic crisis.

After arriving in Mérida, I realized that the car carrier was serving one of several car dealerships that seemed to have resurfaced across the city, all filled with new vehicles. They were also visible on the streets: hundreds of new Chinese models, alongside smaller numbers of Japanese, Korean, and American cars, were driving around Mérida for the first time I could recall in years.

This may sound banal or superficial, but Venezuela’s aging car fleet had long served as a stark reminder of the country’s economic demise. Between 2014 and 2018, car sales collapsed, reaching a historic low of just 2,000 vehicles sold nationwide in 2018. Seeing a model manufactured after the early 2010s outside Caracas had become highly unusual.

The situation has changed since 2025, when more than 38,000 cars were reportedly sold across the country. That remains a fraction of the more than 300,000 vehicles sold in pre-crisis 2007, at the height of Hugo Chávez’s oil boom, but it is enough to make a noticeable difference.

The return of (limited) consumerism

Mérida’s urban landscape has also been transformed by the hundreds of new stores that have opened across a city where economic stagnation and widespread power outages forced countless businesses to close over the past decade. The same phenomenon was evident in Caracas, where I arrived after yet another tour through Maracay’s Air Force base, and after a drive in a taxi equipped with a Starlink antenna, a gadget that until not too long ago could land you in prison and can now be purchased online through different national authorized distributors.

Beyond new cars, large sections of the city, including old Chacao in Caracas’s affluent east, appear to be undergoing an incipient but rapid process of gentrification, reminiscent in some ways of iconic European neighborhoods such as Gràcia in Barcelona, Ruzafa in Valencia (the Spanish one), or Shoreditch in London.

Chacao’s Bolívar Square is marked by a striking contrast. Its 18th-century church still bears large cracks caused by the earthquakes, while the surrounding streets are now filled with lively atmospheric restaurants and cafés that would not look out of place in Lisbon or Barcelona, and fitted with contactless payment systems charging prices that match those of many large European cities.

These businesses serve a small but very real segment of the Venezuelan population that can afford them. That group is not necessarily limited to enchufados.

This raises an obvious question: how can these businesses be profitable in a country where typical salaries remain around $220–280 a month, less than a tenth of the already meager average European salary, and where living what might be considered a relatively normal life has been estimated to cost around at least $800–1,000 a month per person?

The answer is that these businesses serve a small but very real segment of the Venezuelan population that can afford them. That group is not necessarily limited to enchufados, people who have enriched themselves through their connections to government corruption. Exact figures are difficult to establish, but managers in private companies can reportedly earn around $1,200 a month, while senior professionals in some sectors, including medicine, can make several thousand dollars a month in private practice, depending on their specialization.

The widespread adoption of Cashea, a fintech company offering consumers interest-free microcredit for everyday purchases, has also increased the purchasing power of a broader segment of the population. Cashea’s success is visible not only in Wall Street, but also in its extraordinary penetration of everyday commerce. Its recognizable yellow logo now signals that the service is accepted in businesses ranging from large clothing stores in shopping malls to small kiosks, and funerary homes.

You can even use Cashea to pay for a ride with Yummy, Venezuela’s equivalent of Uber.

These businesses still operate within a heavily dysfunctional financial system, distorted by an artificially low exchange rate and an economy constrained by high inflation and low productivity. Yet they serve a segment of the population that is slowly turning into a small, resurgent middle class. That group is helping drive growth in specific sectors, most notably real estate, which has reportedly expanded by around 30 percent in 2026.

This modest revitalization has coincided with an important reduction in street violence. Today, around 60 percent of Venezuelans report feeling safe walking at night, according to Gallup, something difficult to imagine only a few years ago. This is one factor helping explain the revival of nightlife in places such as Chacao, Caracas’ historical center and, to a lesser extent, parts of Mérida.

A similar transformation was evident in Margarita Island, a place I had not visited in almost two decades.

Most of these changes began before the US intervention in Venezuela. But they appear to have accelerated and spread in the months following Maduro’s capture.

Known as the “Pearl of the Caribbean,” Margarita’s tropical beaches, tax-free stores and fascinating history attracted large numbers of European and Latin American as well as Venezuelan tourists during the 1990s and early 2000s. Some of my own fondest childhood memories are, in fact, on the island.

That changed dramatically after 2014, as Venezuela’s political, economic, and public-service crises deepened, leaving the island in a state of abandonment.

Today, Margarita is experiencing a modest but noticeable revival in domestic and international tourism compared with the previous decade. This has been partly fueled by significant investment from domestic and international hotel chains, which now offer a wide range of accommodation, from relatively affordable all-inclusive packages to high-end luxury experiences.

After several years in which the island received mostly Russian and Polish tourists, Margarita is once again welcoming growing numbers of international visitors, particularly from Colombia, and Brazil. Many tourism operators are already looking forward to the possible return of American visitors in the short to medium term.

Less than 15 minutes from the mall in Pampatar, I also visited a community that has gone more than six months without running water.

People I spoke to said Margarita feels more alive and prosperous than it did between 2016 and 2019, the worst years of Venezuela’s crisis, even if the situation remains vastly different from the island’s golden age thirty years ago.

Cities such as Pampatar and Porlamar are experiencing a revival similar to what I saw in Mérida and Caracas, with new restaurants and stores filled with customers. In Pampatar, I visited what was probably one of the largest and most modern shopping malls I have ever seen, comparable to those in Miami or Madrid, filled with stores selling American and European brands whose prices I often found prohibitive even by European standards.

Most of these changes began before the US intervention in Venezuela. But they appear to have accelerated and spread in the months following Maduro’s capture, as the idea that something resembling a normal life might again be possible seems to be taking hold in some.

There is, however, a large elephant in the room. Improvements remain largely cosmetic and circumscribed to a small part of the population.

Far from fixed

On the other side of the Avila, the mountain that separates Caracas’ gentrified neighborhoods from the Caribbean sea, over 12,000 people who lost their homes in the earthquakes wait for solutions in dozens of temporary camps erected among the ruins of their apartments.

But the limitations of this apparent resurgence are perhaps most obvious in the dismal state of public services. Hours-long power outages were common in Mérida and Caracas throughout my stay. Less than 15 minutes from the mall in Pampatar, I also visited a community that has gone more than six months without running water. Its residents make a living largely by collecting and selling salt from the island’s salt flats, with virtually no gear, or protection from the region’s unrelenting weather. 

Businesses, hotels, and even many households have adapted to what are, in practice, nonexistent public services. Solar panels, batteries, and water tanks allow those who can afford them to maintain a large degree of independence from the State-provided services.

For most Venezuelans, however, these solutions remain unaffordable.

The same is true for healthcare and education. Both systems remain crippled by chronic underinvestment and neglect. The Venezuelan public health system remains severely understaffed and unable to provide adequate services to most of the population, while out-of-pocket health costs represent a large proportion of total health expenditure and less than 10% of the population can afford private insurance. In terms of education, despite a recent increase in school enrollment, the number of students has fallen by almost 2.8 million compared with figures reported in January 2024, as large numbers of high-school students continue to leave their studies to work.

Venezuela is far from fixed, and it will never truly be as long as chavismo remains in power. But it is certainly not the same country I left in 2019, nor the same country it was before January 3.

Many of the people I spoke to still want to leave, especially now that expectations of a quick transition to democracy have been tampered by the warm relationship of the Trump administration with Delcy Rodriguez. Others have decided that a somewhat normal life in Venezuela is once again possible and that, despite its uncertainties, it may be preferable to the immense challenge of migration in an increasingly hostile world.

Yes, these improvements are fragile, uncertain, and profoundly unequal. They exclude most of the country. But they are also an opportunity: Not only for some to live a relatively normal, easier life. But also a chance to build on whatever progress has been made and keep pushing towards the deep institutional and political reforms that only a democratically elected government can implement.

Caracas, September 16, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Former Venezuelan Industry Minister and government envoy Alex Saab pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering and illicit financial transactions after reaching a plea deal with US prosecutors in a federal court in Miami.

Appearing before the US District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Saab changed his previous “not guilty” plea, entered on July 24, during a hearing before Judge Kathleen M. Williams. “Guilty, Your Honor,” the 54-year-old businessman stated during Tuesday’s session.

In his guilty plea, Saab admitted to participating, alongside “high-ranking officials” in the Nicolás Maduro government, in an “illegal scheme” involving bribes and illicit payments linked to the CLAP subsidized food program. The money allegedly obtained through the scheme was wired through accounts located in South Florida.

In the 12-page plea agreement, Saab named Socialist Party (PSUV) lawmaker José Gregorio Vielma Mora, who was governor of Táchira state at the time, as an alleged accomplice, alongside Colombian nationals Álvaro Pulido Vargas, Emmanuel Enrique Rubio González, and Carlos Rolando Lizcano. 

However, he also referred to two other individuals as “co-defendant 1” and “co-defendant 3.” Their identities have not been publicly disclosed by US prosecutors.

Saab also agreed to “fully cooperate” with the US Department of Justice (DOJ) by providing “truthful and complete information and testimony, and producing documents, records, and other evidence” in “any trial or judicial proceeding” requested by the US government.

He likewise agreed that he would not “protect any person or entity through false information or omission,” nor falsely implicate “any person or entity.”

The Colombian-born businessman also agreed to surrender US $195 million, along with properties and assets derived from the alleged crimes, to prosecutors. The government gave him 14 days to disclose all assets related to the offenses.

Saab, who stated that he suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder and takes antidepressants every night to sleep, could face a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison, as well as a $500,000 fine.

Nevertheless, prosecutors reportedly agreed to recommend a reduced sentence if his cooperation against the other defendants in the case proves valuable. His sentencing hearing has not been scheduled but is expected to take place in January.

The DOJ warned that it “reserves the right to evaluate the nature and extent of the defendant’s cooperation,” as well as the “quality and significance” of the information provided for the relevant investigations.

The agreement does not publicly specify which investigations Saab will be required to assist with or which other Venezuelan officials the US Justice Department is targeting. With Saab having been a key figure for Caracas to circumvent US economic sanctions, analysts have speculated that he could be a witness in the case against President Nicolás Maduro.

Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores are facing charges, including drug trafficking conspiracy, after being kidnapped by US special forces on January 3.

The current case is the second criminal prosecution Saab has faced in the United States. In 2020, when traveling as a Venezuelan government envoy, he was arrested in Cape Verde during a refueling stop and subsequently extradited to the United States. He was on trial for separate money laundering accusations.

However, in December 2023, then-President Joe Biden granted Saab a pardon as part of a prisoner exchange between the United States and Venezuela. Saab returned to Caracas and joined the government as minister of industry. Following Maduro’s kidnapping, Acting President Delcy Rodríguez removed the former envoy from the cabinet in January before authorities handed him over to US agencies in May.

Venezuelan high-ranking officials claimed that Saab had committed fraud in acquiring Venezuelan citizenship and vowed to present evidence of his alleged long-term cooperation with US agencies, but no further details have been released to date.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Lisbon, Portugal.

Prosecutors said that the group worked on behalf of Russian intelligence services to carry out attacks and murders around the world.

Five people have been charged over alleged Russian intelligence-linked plots involving surveillance, recruitment and planned killings, according to an indictment unsealed by the United States Department of Justice.

Prosecutors said on Tuesday that the group worked on behalf of Russian intelligence services to carry out attacks and murders internationally, including within the US, and that all five remain at large.

The defendants were identified as Russian national Yuri Khrameev, 63, his son Kirill Khrameev, 27, Cubans Oemis Romagoza Durruthy and Yaidel Delgado Suarez, both 35, and 22-year-old Venezuelan Angel Eduardo Castro.

All five were charged with conspiring to finance terrorism, while Khrameev, Suarez and Castro face additional charges of conspiring to commit murder for hire.

At a news conference, Attorney General Todd Blanche said the plots included attempts to kill a Russian dissident believed to be living in the Washington, DC area.

Justice Department officials said the network had recruited several people in the US to carry out surveillance on Russian dissidents, targeting individuals both domestically and in Lithuania.

In one instance, a recruit was reportedly promised $40,000 to make a US-based target “disappear”. A separate recruit was allegedly offered $25,000 the previous year to kill someone in Lithuania.

Russia’s embassy in the US has not commented on the case. Moscow has consistently rejected accusations that it has orchestrated assassination operations on foreign soil, including in the US.

Caracas, September 14, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The US Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Foreign Agricultural Service announced a package of measures to boost US agricultural exports to Venezuela amid growing concerns about the South American country’s national production.

According to the USDA, the plan will facilitate Venezuelan corporations’ purchase of US food products and agricultural commodities through government-backed credit and will include the delivery of food assistance and training for Venezuelan technicians.

“The Trump administration is committed to Venezuela’s economic prosperity, and USDA is leveraging its export financing, market development programs, technical scholarships, and food assistance initiatives to address this situation,” said Under Secretary for Trade and Foreign Agricultural Affairs Luke J. Lindberg.

Lindberg added that he “looks forward to positioning US agriculture to help meet needs and build lasting trade relationships.” The US official visited Venezuela as part of an official delegation in early July.

Washington’s credit program for food exports will be provided through the reactivation of the GSM-102 guarantee program. The mechanism offers guarantees to exporters that reduce the risk for financial institutions backing the transactions in case importers fail to meet their commitments. 

The Agriculture Department also announced that it will lift restrictions to allow foreign banks to back Venezuela-related transactions.

A USDA report had already estimated that Venezuela would need to import 1.5 million metric tons of wheat during the 2026-2027 marketing year. Corn and soybeans are likewise identified as key staples to be exported to the Caribbean nation. The latest initiative 

The Trump administration also lifted restrictions under its Feed the Future Agricultural Resilience Mission Initiative and plans to include Venezuela in a regional agribusiness trade mission scheduled for early 2027.

A bigger influx of US farm products will place an additional strain on Venezuelan food production, with local campesinos increasingly protesting against imports from agribusiness corporations that seek to drive crop prices down.

On September 9, rice growers from Guárico and nearby states organized a “tractorazo,” blocking a major highway in Calabozo with trucks and tractors to demand that the government halt the entry of imported rice during the domestic harvest season and ensure that agroindustrial companies adhere to established prices.

Protesters complained that imports from countries where food production is subsidized, including the US, create unfair competition and risk driving Venezuelan campesinos bankrupt. The latest mobilization was sparked by the reported arrival of a shipment of 355 thousand tons of rice, more than half of the Venezuelan production in 2025. 

Rural organizations have likewise denounced the exoneration of tariffs and import taxes as another factor putting national production at a disadvantage. Venezuelan authorities, including the National Assembly and the Agriculture Ministry, have vowed to review the import issue but have offered no measures to date.

In the Calabozo protest, producers denounced that imported rice had saturated silos and storage facilities during the 2025-2026 winter-summer crop cycle, forcing them to sell below production cost or lose their crops altogether. Demonstrators demanded a $0.25-per-kilogram subsidy from the state to compensate for the losses incurred and vowed to take the protests to Caracas if they receive no response from authorities.

The September 9 “tractorazo” was the latest in a series of mobilizations in recent months in Venezuela’s main agricultural states. Rice growers have complained about high fuel and input costs and urged the government to establish and enforce fair crop prices. 

According to agriculture lobby FEDEAGRO, more than 2.2 million metric tons of white corn, yellow corn, and rice have entered the country so far in 2026, more than triple the recent combined high of 709,000 metric tons in 2023.

“We cannot continue depending on a neighbor’s pantry. That is a failure. In Venezuela, we have the land, a committed agricultural sector, and people investing in farming, but excessive imports place us at a dramatic disadvantage,” stressed FEDEAGRO President Osman Quero.

Quero stressed that foreign producers have access to credit programs, fuel and fertilizer subsidies, and better infrastructure, while Venezuelan farmers face inflation and a lack of financing programs.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Lisbon, Portugal.

Art as propaganda

Chavez’s eyes still gaze from walls across Caracas. So too do the eyes of other figures, like Maduro and independence leader Simon Bolivar. Some images are faded. Others are accompanied by slogans like “To doubt is treason”.

Forastero has worked on government projects, including under Rodriguez. But he is critical of some of the newer images. He remembers a time when he painted murals of Chavez playing with children or riding a bicycle, not slogans.

“When Chavez was alive, people painted Chavez because we loved him very much. It’s as simple as that,” he said.

In recent decades, he argues that Venezuela’s public art has fallen increasingly under government control, with murals commissioned to carry explicitly political messages.

“Muralism is a story told on a wall,” Forastero said. “What we really see on the walls now are propaganda posters. I’m a chavista, and I’m disgusted by it.”

Still, the removal of the artwork is another form of propaganda, in Forastero’s eyes. He believes the Rodriguez government is seeking to project a more “neutral” appearance to better appeal to the US.

He also accuses Rodriguez of abandoning ideals key to the chavismo movement: namely, anti-imperialism and revolution. He pointed to the US’s role in shaping Venezuelan policy.

“The United States is forcing our government to behave this way,” Forastero said.

Rafael Araujo, a Venezuelan activist, has a different view of the changing landscape.

To him, there was something “jarring” about seeing chavista figures plastered across city walls, especially the leaders who have caused the country so much pain.

During their time in power, Chavez and Maduro both faced allegations of overseeing human rights abuses, including through the violent suppression of dissent. Venezuela’s last two presidential elections have been widely denounced as illegitimate.

Known in Caracas as Senor Papagayo, Araujo has used colourful, handmade kites to protest against government violence and economic policy.

He sees the Chavez murals as a form of oppression, an ever-visible reminder of a repressive government apparatus.

His kites are a way of sending a different message. His favourite carries aloft a single word: “Freedom”.

“Freedom is what all countries need. Democracy is the most balanced system a citizen can live under,” Araujo said.

Caracas, September 11, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuela’s oil industry recovery has stagnated in recent months, notwithstanding pro-business reforms and rising global prices.

OPEC’s latest monthly report placed the Caribbean nation’s August production at 1.145 million barrels per day (bpd), up 23,000 bpd from the previous month, according to secondary sources.

Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA reported an August output of 1.201 million bpd, virtually unchanged from July. Direct and secondary measurements have differed over time due to disagreements over the inclusion of condensates and natural gas liquids.

The strong first-trimester recovery that followed Washington’s lifting of its naval blockade petered out by mid-year. Since May, output has grown by only 7 percent despite the acting Delcy Rodríguez government conducting a pro-investor overhaul of hydrocarbon legislation and signing deals with several multinational corporations.

Since the January 3 US military strikes and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro, the Trump White House has seized control over Venezuela’s energy sector. Venezuelan crude export revenues are currently deposited in a US Treasury account, an arrangement confirmed by PDVSA President Héctor Obregón, before US officials decide when and how much of the proceeds should be returned to Caracas.

Washington and Caracas recently announced a major oil deal that will further boost US access to Venezuelan hydrocarbons under favorable conditions. The acting Rodríguez government has granted long-term concessions of 17 prime oilfields, holding 65 billion barrels of proven reserves, to US-controlled NABEP, a company led by Venezuelan oil mogul Alejandro Betancourt.

The oilfields transferred to NABEP, several of which were previously run by joint ventures between PDVSA and Chinese partners, are split among extra-heavy-crude projects in the Orinoco Oil Belt and mature light- and medium-crude ones in the Lake Maracaibo basin. Production in the latter can be ramped up faster as Trump seeks to replenish the US strategic reserve.

After initially hailing the deal as “the biggest in history,” US officials have dampened expectations, lowering a US $100 billion investment pledge to “over $10 billion.” Caracas and Washington announced a 1.5 million bpd target, but NABEP disclosed to Bloomberg only a modest projected increase in the near future.

Venezuela’s loss of sovereignty over its flagship industry has prevented the country from reaping the benefits from surging global energy prices, with the Brent benchmark surpassing $100 per barrel for the first time in four months this week. The Trump administration has sought to leverage its long-term access to Venezuelan oil resources to minimize the fallout from the interrupted traffic through the Strait of Hormuz resulting from its war on Iran.

Since January, Trump officials have worked closely with the Rodríguez administration to grant decades-long energy concessions to Western corporate players and most recently local Latin American conglomerates such as Colombia’s Gilinski Group. 

On September 4, Acting President Rodríguez signed a 25-year deal granting a concession of the heavy crude Bare block to GeoPark, a company belonging to Gilinski. Previously operated by PDVSA, Bare was one of the most productive fields in the Orinoco Oil Belt, with output surpassing 100,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 2011.

At a ceremony in Caracas, Colombian banking mogul Jaime Gilinski thanked Rodríguez for the confidence in awarding a major oilfield to his conglomerate. GeoPark set an 85,000 bpd target and vowed to invest more than $300 million.

The Gilinski Group began in manufacturing before expanding into finance, purchasing multiple Colombian banks and later acquiring positions in other Latin American countries, the US, and Italy. Investigations have implicated the Gilinski Group in parallel banking and tax evasion, including being named in the 2021 Pandora Papers leak alongside other leading members of the Colombian elite. The conglomerate has also ventured into other sectors such as food and media, with Jaime Gilinski currently the richest man in Colombia according to Forbes.

Of Lithuanian-Jewish descent, the Gilinski family is additionally known for its close ties to Israel. Jaime Gilinski’s father, Isaac, served as ambassador to Tel Aviv in 2010-2013, and his sister, Tania, was recently appointed to the same post by Colombian President Abelardo de la Espriella. Jaime’s son, Gabriel, traveled to Tel Aviv in 2025, meeting Prime Minister Netanyahu and evaluating business opportunities between Israeli and Colombian firms.

Edited and with additional reporting by Lucas Koerner in Philadelphia, USA.

Venezuela’s former first lady, Cilia Flores de Maduro, has asked a judge to release her from federal detention in the United States, citing a worsening heart condition.

In an application for pre-trial release on Wednesday, her legal team asked for the court to allow Flores to await trial under home confinement in Manhattan.

It described her declining health since US military operation on January 3 that resulted in her abduction from Caracas and imprisonment in New York, as well as that of her husband, former Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro.

“Prior to the United States’ military invasion of Venezuela, Ms. Flores de Maduro was physically healthy and took no ongoing medication, other than a monthly injection to help control her mitral valve prolapse,” the legal filing said.

“Now she is prescribed four medications, maintains nitroglycerin by her side in the event of a potential heart attack, and grapples with the continued medical advice suggesting coronary exploration and surgery.”

Flores was a prominent figure in her husband’s government, serving as first lady since his inauguration in 2013.

Prior to Maduro’s first inauguration, she was also a leading member of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), the country’s dominant political movement, leading the National Assembly for more than four years.

But Maduro had long clashed with the administration of US President Donald Trump, who accused Venezuela of sending drug-traffickers into the US. Both Maduro and Flores have also faced allegations of participating in human rights abuses, including the violent suppression of political dissent.

After launching a one-day military operation to abduct Maduro and Flores, the Trump administration charged them both with drug- and weapons-related charges. They are currently awaiting trial in New York City.

But Flores’s health has been in doubt since her forced removal from Venezuela, according to her legal team.

After consulting outside medical experts, Flores’s lawyers said they believe she may have suffered a minor heart attack on July 29 while in US custody.

They also questioned whether she was receiving the appropriate medical care for her mitral valve prolapse, a condition affecting one of the heart’s valves.

Since her imprisonment, her lawyers said Flores has not received the monthly injection she needs to manage the condition.

Instead, she has reportedly been prescribed baby aspirin, a statin, diltiazem and nitroglycerin to use when she experiences chest pain.

Doctors have recommended that she undergo a cardiac procedure, which could result in additional heart operations. If she undergoes such treatment, Flores “will need adequate time to recover from any procedures in a setting conducive to restoring her health”, her lawyers said.

Thursday’s filing acknowledges that Flores does not “dispute that she has received excellent care” from medical professionals. But it argues that “a detention centre lacks the conditions needed for such a recovery”.

Her lawyers proposed moving Flores from the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn to a residence within the Manhattan federal court district, where she and Maduro are due to go on trial next June.

Under home detention, Flores would be subject to round-the-clock armed monitoring, with visits restricted to people approved by the court and federal prosecutors. Her home would also be monitored by video and her phone calls recorded, according to the filing.

Judge Alvin K Hellerstein has yet to rule on the application.

Flores, 69, and Maduro, 63, have been held in US custody since the January raid on their home in Caracas. Both have pleaded not guilty to the charges of participating in a conspiracy to traffic cocaine into the US.