opinion

Diplomatic sparring between Ukraine and Belarus escalated sharply on 19 June, when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky demanded that Belarus dismantle communications infrastructure allegedly used by Russia to extend the range of its strike drones. Zelensky has offered a week for such removals to take place, reportedly saying, “I am giving a week for it to be withdrawn; otherwise, we will do it ourselves.” This marks a severe deterioration in relations since Belarus allowed Russian forces to cross Ukraine’s northern border using Belarusian territory in 2022. Following Russia’s withdrawal from Ukraine’s northern regions, Belarus has not enabled further assaults from its own territory but has actively aided Russian efforts, in part, by allowing drones to operate over Belarusian territory to strike Ukrainian targets with less warning. These increased tensions follow recent statements from Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko aimed at easing tensions, stating, “If Volodymyr Oleksandrovych was offended, I apologize to him for those words… Perhaps I shouldn’t have spoken so sharply about it. But, on the other hand, he should understand, as we often say: you get what you give.” As Zelensky applies pressure to Russia’s key European ally, Lukashenko’s response may determine whether his country will begin to withdraw support or play a larger part in this war.

Belarus’ Assistance in Putin’s Invasion

Belarus has played a vital role in Russia’s aggression since 2022, remaining one of Moscow’s most important enablers throughout the war. On the opening days of the conflict, 45,000 Russian soldiers crossed into the capital region of Kyiv. Since Russia’s withdrawal from northern Ukraine, Belarus has remained a tacit supporter of the invasion, finding auxiliary ways to support its key strategic ally’s actions in Ukraine without directly becoming involved itself. While weapons transfers and diplomatic support aid Moscow’s war effort, Belarus’ most valuable contributions come from two primary sources. First, Belarus’ expansive border with Ukraine. The two countries share a border that stretches over 1,000 kilometers. The existence of a Russian ally on Ukraine’s northern border introduces the risk of another attack from this direction, requiring the dedication of over 100,000 soldiers to the defense of a region that may not become active for the duration of the war. Second, neutral airspace was made available to long-range strike drones. Without this advantageous lane of attack, Russian drones, such as the Geran-2, must spend hours loitering over Ukrainian territory, where they are exposed to interception attempts while trying to reach their targets. Additionally, and central to Zelensky’s latest ultimatum, Belarus has reportedly allowed Russia to build a network of relays along Ukraine’s border to expand the range of its strike drones, allowing greater operational reach and improved resistance to electronic warfare.

Belarusian Capabilities

Threats made without the capability to enforce them are functionally pointless, suggesting that Zelensky believes Ukraine occupies a militarily advantageous position relative to Belarus. This warrants analysis of Belarus’ military capabilities to determine whether they pose a threat to Ukraine. As of 2022, Belarus reportedly maintained an active-duty army of approximately 48,000 soldiers, with inactive trained reserves and additional supporting personnel amounting to another 300,000 people. The country fields 1,200 main battle tanks and 3,400 other armored fighting vehicles, although it is unclear how many remain in active service. Many of these vehicles are of questionable utility, with Belarus operating mainly vintage Soviet equipment and few vehicles having been modernized to contemporary standards. The Belarusian Air Force fares slightly better, fielding 48 front-line fighter aircraft, of which 16 are new Su-30SM/SM2 airframes. The war and its rapidly changing dynamics have forced Belarus to invest in the modernization of its armed forces. However, in contrast to many Western modernization programs, which frequently involve high-value equipment deals, Belarusian efforts have focused more heavily on improving infantry capabilities. Belarus currently funds several programs for procuring modern armored vehicles and has recently made new equipment purchases from Russia, including the nuclear-capable intermediate-range ballistic missile known as Oreshnik. More transformative, however, are efforts to reform the country’s mobilization system and employment of experienced Wagner mercenaries to train Belarusian soldiers in drone-centric combat techniques. This could be interpreted either as an inability to afford more comprehensive reforms or as a deliberate shift away from traditional reliance on armored formations in favor of unmanned systems. Regardless of the motivation, these programs demonstrate substantive efforts to improve the military readiness of a vital ally to Russia.

Ukrainian-Belarusian Diplomatic Efforts

Zelensky’s demand follows months of escalating tensions between Belarus and Ukraine, contrasting Belarus’ traditionally ancillary role in Ukrainian foreign relations. Due to Belarus’ refusal to participate directly in combat operations, Kyiv had little incentive to press diplomatic issues and antagonize its northern neighbor. Until the recent flare-up, it was in Ukraine’s interest to keep Belarus on the sidelines while accepting the reality of Belarusian aid and weapons transfers that benefited Russia. Relations between the two countries followed a repeated cycle of saber-rattling, military posturing, de-escalation, and periods of calm. Lukashenko has repeatedly offered his services as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine, although Kyiv has rejected these offers because of Belarus’ close ties to Moscow. Tellingly, despite Belarus aiding its aggressor, Ukraine has maintained diplomatic ties with Minsk throughout the conflict. Lukashenko further offered to open bilateral talks with Kyiv in late 2025 in an attempt to reduce rising tensions. These efforts failed to bear fruit as relations deteriorated to their lowest point since the beginning of the war in May 2026. Following the construction of additional drone launching facilities in Belarus and an increase in Russian drone strikes, Ukrainian diplomacy shifted towards the application of direct pressure. Kyiv’s announcement that it had identified more than 500 strategic Belarusian targets in the event of conflict culminated in Zelensky’s ultimatum to dismantle Russia’s drone relay network within a week. The ultimatum suggests that Ukraine is abandoning its previous strategy of managing tensions with Belarus in favor of direct pressure. It also followed the largest Ukrainian drone strike on Moscow to date. Viewed in that context, Zelensky appears to be leveraging Ukraine’s growing long-range strike capabilities while simultaneously attempting to disrupt a component of Russia’s own drone warfare infrastructure.

The Chinese strategy employs research and intelligence institutions working to foster closer ties between Iranian national security institutions and the Egyptian military, aiming to undermine the American presence in the Middle East. Prominent among these institutions are the Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University, the China Institute of International Studies, and the Center for West Asian and African Studies. These Chinese research centers, which shape China’s relations with countries in the region and the Gulf, include the Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University (SISU), which directs studies related to security and defense issues and facilitates direct dialogue between think tanks in Iran and research centers in Egypt. Another example is the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), which reports directly to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and works to engineer diplomatic plans that align Egypt’s strategic interests with the objectives of Tehran and resistance movements in the region. Chinese think tanks and intelligence agencies also rely on a number of People’s Liberation Army-backed space intelligence companies, such as MizarVision and EarthEye. These Chinese companies have provided high-resolution satellite imagery and intelligence data to support operations targeting US bases in the Gulf and the Middle East. These Chinese entities coordinate and plan operations through various mechanisms and initiatives officially launched by China, most notably the Global Security Initiative (GSI). Beijing also uses forums, such as the China-Arab Cooperation Forum, to pressure Middle Eastern and Gulf countries to withdraw foreign forces and end US hegemony in the Gulf and the Middle East. This is framed as ending direct interference in the internal affairs of countries in the region. Beijing is also seeking to establish permanent overseas bases, most prominently the Djibouti naval base in East Africa, to support its regional alliances and ensure the continuity of global supply lines for Chinese interests and investments within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative.

The relationship between Chinese military and intelligence think tanks and the Egyptian army is highlighted by their shared goal of countering American hegemony and expelling US military bases from the Gulf and the Middle East. China is strengthening its strategic cooperation with the Egyptian army as part of the Djibouti-UAE-Egypt axis, with Beijing relying on Cairo as a key launching pad to secure maritime navigation and reduce American military influence. Beijing is utilizing its strategic institutions and think tanks to provide technological and logistical support to the Egyptian army, aiming to create a regional power capable of maintaining strategic balance in the region against American hegemony and interventions. This escalating security and strategic relationship between the Egyptian and Chinese armies rests on several key pillars, most notably intelligence and military partnership. China aims to train the Egyptian military elite through Egyptian military academies and coordinate threat assessments and mutual monitoring of the military movements of the United States and its allies in the Gulf and the wider region. With the implementation of several joint exercises between the two sides, the Chinese vision crystallized in the (Civilization Eagles maneuvers), which brought together the air forces of China and Egypt. This paves the way for the transfer of military technology and the integration of Chinese systems with Egyptian defenses independent of the West, along with the localization of Chinese military industries in the heart of Cairo. China is negotiating with the Egyptian Ministry of Defense to develop local manufacturing capabilities and transfer defense technology. There are also reports of integrating Chinese systems into Egyptian systems to reduce Egypt’s dependence on American-supplied weaponry. Beijing seeks to create a counterweight to American hegemony in the Middle East and the Gulf. China sees Egypt’s refusal to host any American military bases as a cornerstone of its strategy, relying on the Egyptian and Emirati armies to guarantee regional security as an alternative to the traditional American presence in the Gulf and the Middle East.

Chinese research, military, and intelligence think tanks are working to engineer an asymmetric strategic partnership to end American hegemony in the Middle East and the Gulf. Chinese think tanks, military research centers, and intelligence agencies are operating according to a clear strategic vision aimed at building asymmetrical partnerships in the Middle East and the Arabian Gulf to reduce American influence and establish a multipolar world order. Beijing provides Tehran with technical and intelligence support to deter Washington, while simultaneously seeking to strengthen military cooperation with Egypt as a pivotal regional power. This strategy aims to diminish American influence and secure China’s vital economic interests. The Chinese strategy in the region rests on several pillars, most notably its strategy toward Iran and its technical and intelligence support for the country. China has secretly supplied Iran with advanced satellite technology from its BeiDou satellite system, bypassing Western and American GPS systems, as well as sophisticated air defense systems. This has significantly enhanced the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s ability to monitor and target American military bases in the region and the Gulf.

The objectives of Chinese think tanks, political, strategic, military, and intelligence research centers become apparent here, as they attempt to plan a path to link Iran to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and transform Iranian military pressure into a tool for destabilizing the US bases deployed in the region and the Gulf. The convergence between China and the Egyptian military is highlighted through the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries. Beijing is inclined to strengthen military cooperation with Egypt, capitalizing on its political stability and its geographic location controlling vital maritime trade routes, and to transfer advanced Chinese military technology to Egypt. Beijing has revealed its desire to be a major supplier of equipment to the Egyptian army, such as the J-10 aircraft. This aims to increase Egypt’s strategic maneuvering room and reduce the dominance of Western weaponry.

The stability achieved by the Egyptian leadership is a fundamental pillar supporting the comprehensive strategic partnership, as Beijing seeks to secure its economic and military interests with a stable and influential regional power. Therefore, China is investing in the Belt and Road Initiative, for which the Suez Canal is a vital artery in the Middle East. Cooperation extends to the exchange and transfer of military technology, joint military manufacturing, advanced air defense systems, and the evaluation of potential acquisitions of modern Chinese fighter jets. Furthermore, joint air exercises have been conducted, with the Egyptian Armed Forces carrying out their first-ever joint air exercise, dubbed Eagles of Civilization with China, involving multi-role fighter aircraft from both countries, underscoring the deepening defense partnership between them.

In this context, China relies on the Egyptian military within the framework of its strategic and African axis to counter American influence. For China, Egypt represents its strategic gateway to the African continent and a cornerstone in its maneuvers against the US Africa Command (USAFRICOM). In addition to joint military exercises, China and Egypt have conducted joint air force drills, a clear indication of an unprecedented military rapprochement that has drawn close American scrutiny. With China’s move to transfer technology and arms deals to Cairo, it is positioning itself to support the Egyptian army with advanced air defense systems, such as the HQ-9B. This enhances Egypt’s air deterrence capabilities and forms part of strategic military deals aimed at reducing dependence on the United States and its Western allies. On the other hand, China relies on Iran as a deterrent and direct driver, exerting pressure on American bases in the region. Iran represents the spearhead of China’s brinkmanship policy against American military bases in the Gulf, Iraq, and Syria, with Tehran threatening to strike them should any regional conflict erupt. In conjunction with the economic and diplomatic alliance between Beijing and Tehran, China uses emerging alliances, such as the BRICS group and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), to establish Iran’s political foothold. It sometimes resorts to mediation policies as a tool to reduce the likelihood of a direct confrontation with Iran, which could harm its commercial interests, such as China’s sponsorship of Pakistani mediation efforts between Iran and the United States to stop the war against Iran and allow the Strait of Hormuz to be opened to global trade and navigation.

China’s major objectives in the Middle East lie in a strategy of attrition against the United States. China uses Iranian actions as a clever pressure tactic to test and deplete American military technology without direct involvement in wars of attrition, while simultaneously attempting to create a new regional order. Here, Chinese intelligence agencies coordinate networks of overlapping interests to push countries toward understandings that transcend the American security umbrella, paving the way for the future withdrawal of foreign military bases. The pillars of China’s strategy for alternative hegemony are based on asymmetric partnerships. Beijing focuses on presenting itself as a reliable economic and technological partner without political conditions or interference in internal affairs, unlike the American model based on conditionality and direct military alliances. With China’s emphasis on the economy as a gateway to security, it utilizes the Belt and Road Initiative and its massive investments in infrastructure and ports, such as the Khalifa Port in the UAE and the Port of Duqm in Oman, to solidify its strategic presence and transform economic dependence into long-term geopolitical influence. With Beijing’s use of security diplomacy and mediation, Chinese decision-making centers have adopted a common security approach and offered political mediation, such as sponsoring the Saudi-Iranian agreement, to solidify Beijing’s role as an international peacemaker and portray the United States as a destabilizing force through the militarization of the region. This is coupled with China’s technological and intelligence penetration of the region and the Gulf, where Chinese partnerships focus on transferring 5G technologies, artificial intelligence, and space cooperation with Gulf states. This grants Beijing intelligence-gathering capabilities and allows it to connect the region’s vital systems to the Chinese technological infrastructure. Chinese think tanks and intelligence agencies are planning to cautiously fill the void, as China avoids direct military confrontation with Washington in the region and prefers to capitalize on the Gulf states’ desire to diversify their partnerships and hedge against the gradual decline of American interest in the Middle East.

Accordingly, we analyze that China’s military strategy in the Middle East and Africa relies on building defense partnerships with diverse objectives. It utilizes the Egyptian army as a pivotal regional power to bolster its influence and counterbalance the American presence through advanced training cooperation while simultaneously leveraging its relationship with Iran to exert pressure on American bases, particularly in the Gulf, and secure its oil interests all within a comprehensive policy aimed at dismantling American hegemony in the region.

The 14-point Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Iran deserves cautious support, not celebration. Its most important promise is immediate and permanent cessation of military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon. That is a serious achievement if it holds. The reported US-Iran text also commits both sides to avoid threats or use of force and to respect sovereignty. But wars do not end because officials announce elegant clauses. They end when armies, proxies, navies, banks, inspectors and political leaders behave differently the next morning.

The reported Versailles signing, with President Macron nearby, gave the accord theatrical weight. The reported confirmation by Iran’s Foreign Ministry gave it visibility in Tehran. Yet the title “Islamabad” may be the most revealing symbol. It suggests that diplomacy around Iran is no longer owned by Washington and Europe alone. Pakistan, Qatar, Oman and Gulf states now matter. That is healthy. But symbolism cannot replace sequencing. A memorandum is useful only if it becomes a disciplined path toward a final settlement.

Hormuz is the pressure point

The Strait of Hormuz is the economic heart of this agreement. The International Energy Agency describes it as one of the world’s critical oil chokepoints, so restoring commercial shipping is a global necessity. The MOU’s promise of safe, toll-free passage for 60 days can calm markets, but it cannot settle maritime governance. Iran’s future talks with the Sultanate of Oman and other littoral states must produce rules on fees, inspections, de-mining, escorts and disputes. Without that, Hormuz remains a bargaining chip, not a secure passage.

The most controversial part is economic. Washington would provide waivers for Iranian oil exports, make frozen assets usable, avoid new sanctions during talks and support a reconstruction plan of at least $300 billion. This could be pragmatic statecraft or a strategic mistake. The OFAC Iran sanctions system affects banks, insurers, traders and shippers. Recent State Department sanctions show how aggressively Iranian petroleum networks had been targeted. Relief must therefore be sequenced with measurable action. If Tehran receives benefits before verification, critics will call it capitulation. If Washington delays relief after compliance, Tehran will call it bad faith.

Nuclear language cannot stay vague

Iran’s renewed pledge not to build nuclear weapons is necessary, but not enough. The decisive issue is the future of enriched material, enrichment activity and inspection access. Any final deal must put IAEA Iran monitoring at the centre. The IAEA’s NPT safeguards framework and the Non-Proliferation Treaty offer the right balance: Iran has civilian nuclear rights, but the world has a right to credible assurance that military pathways are closed. Down-blending enriched material under inspection may be a start. It cannot be the finish line.

Including Lebanon in the ceasefire is wise, but risky. The promise to protect sovereignty echoes the UN Charter. But Lebanon has long suffered from the gap between formal sovereignty and armed reality. If Hezbollah, Israel, Iran or any other actor treats Lebanon as a loophole, the ceasefire will collapse at its weakest seam. The final text must clarify what “all fronts” means, how non-state armed groups are restrained, and what happens if a party violates the ceasefire through an ally.

The final agreement must be public and enforceable

A binding UN Security Council resolution is essential, but it should not rubber-stamp ambiguity. The history of Resolution 2231, wider UN sanctions practice, IAEA reports to the Security Council, and the UN record on Iranian ballistic missiles shows why detail matters. The final agreement must define deadlines, verification triggers, consequences for breach and the exact sanctions schedule. The Guardian’s analysis and Iran International’s reporting underline the same reality: the MOU buys time, but time can be wasted.

The Islamabad MOU is not peace. It is a pause with possibilities. It should be supported because war has already proved disastrous, but it must be judged by performance: ceasefire maintained, Hormuz reopened, sanctions relief sequenced, nuclear material verified, Lebanon protected and the final deal anchored in law. Anything less would turn a promising memorandum into another diplomatic mirage.

For decades, historian’s discussion about colonialism has revolved around large armies, territorial conquests and vast empires. Yet, they often fail to focus on the fact that one of the most powerful empires did not begin with soldiers – it emerged because of corporations. The British East India Company, in 1600 started its commercial activities in the sub-continent, initially as a trading merchandise seeking profit in foreign markets. Within the period of two centuries, it acquired its own military, expanded its territorial influence, and started acting as a ruling government that ultimately blurred the difference between private capitalist enterprises and sovereign national authority. More than two hundred years later, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is the latest incarnation of that colonial legacy. Unlike previous forms of colonialism of territory and resources, this control is primarily centered around data, algorithmic decision-making systems, and automated computation. Their territories are not like land, it is the dominance over data ecosystems; their currency is not raw materials, it is ‘data’, and their empires are not built on castles, but are gigantic ‘data-centers’. Instead of emancipation for the marginalized, this technology creates new forms of dependency known as ‘digital dependency’.  

The 21^st century is witnessing a growth of an imperial empire that is built on establishing control over datasets, computational power, and algorithmic sovereignty. Where a few Chinese and American tech giants such as NVIDIA, Amazon Web Services, Google Cloud, and Microsoft Azure are controlling the digital markets through complete ownership of cloud platforms, chip production, and algorithmic intelligence. These hegemonic corporations act as imperial powers that perpetuate similar inequalities to traditional colonists, in which the global south risks becoming a resource for the tech giants. The comparison might seem like an exaggeration, but in reality AI colonialism follows similar patterns. Historically great economies were built on extraction; they extracted raw materials from peripheries, and then the industrial base at the center transformed into a worthy product, geopolitical influence, innovation, and wealth. Cotton flowed from subcontinent to Britain; rubber moved from southeast Asia to European countries, while minerals obtained from Africa were sent to imperial empires.

Today, the AI economy adopts an akin model where “data” is the vital material for digital functioning.  Millions of people from the south utilize these platforms; every search, GPS location, digital personal profile, and digital transaction becomes part of the data ecosystem that is required for its training, but their economic value is located elsewhere. It is particularly evident in African countries, where millions of people rely on these foreign platforms for information. Their data from search engines, digital databases, and social media, is then used to train the AI models, whilst the African community receives little economic benefit or no influence over how these technologies are deployed in their region. By controlling these giant data ecosystems, these tech conglomerates also gain leverage over their political, social, cultural, and economic affairs. Even though having a digital footprint is a sign of progress, when it is foreign owned or funded by external actors, it can be manipulated as imperialistic power that not only controls the data system, but also significantly affects the local traders and businesses.

Similar to east India companies, these tech corporations operate across national jurisdictions, shape economic trajectories and influence domestic governments to sustain their digital dominance. They shape information systems, and their regimes of truth. They decide which technology should be introduced in the market, at what cost, what conditions, and for whom. The east India company governed India not through military conquests but because the local leaders became dependent on the commercial and political networks controlled by the corporation. Their economic dependency paved the way for the east India company’s takeover. Today, the danger is not that the tech corporations will rule the state directly, rather it is the fear that the national governments will become so dependent that the exercises of their sovereign autonomy will be meaningless. AI colonialism is at the front, recreating the colonial dependency traps.

Another manifestation of ‘digital colonialism’ in the global south is the extraction of data through coercive bundles of consent forms. Most people from third-world countries click ‘accept all’ to install an app or to log into a website without reading its full contents. It is an illusion of ‘choice’ created by these companies, but in actuality, these people have no choice. If they ‘refuse’ to click they might lose their access to digital accounts, bank apps, or mobile services. Colonial powers used a similar tactic of ‘terra nullius’ ­to lay claim on foreign land and resources. The new digital ecosystems are now integrating modern forms of terra nullius to govern the global data and algorithmic infrastructures. In addition to controlling the databases, the new AI colonial world order exploits the cheap labor services of the global south to maximize their profits. During Venezuela’s economic crisis, the prime educated force was readily exploited as ‘cheap labor’ by the Silicon Valley. In exchange for survival income, they were exposed to precarious working conditions, pay-cuts, unstable contracts. This reflects that the AI colonialism is following the legacy of historical empires step-by-step; controlling foreign ecosystems, exploiting cheap labor, and profiting over their raw materials.

The digital hegemony in the global south extends beyond economical matrix; it is the struggle over political influence, power, and raw materials that will ultimately determine who will produce the knowledge, who controls the technology, and who profits off the wealth generated by AI ecosystems. Colonial history should not be merely viewed as the ancient past, but as a lesson to reject the ‘modern empires’. In order to do so, the global south must invest in indigenous technology companies, data systems and regulatory digital frameworks to protect the local’s data. Unless the global south acts collectively against AI colonialism, it may again serve as a colony supplying critical resources that enrich others whilst itself remains excluded from the global power centers. 

For decades, satellites have provided critical data for military activities in active and non-active combat zones. One of the most significant integration of space-based technologies emerged in missile defense systems during the Cold War. Satellite constellations provided critical data on the launch sites and trajectories of ballistic missiles. The US Defense Support Program (DSP) was the first program to launch satellite constellations to detect heat signatures of Soviet ICBMs with infrared sensors. The Soviet Union launched the first generation of early warning systems under OKO satellite constellations against US missile threats. These systems of satellite constellations allowed both the US and the USSR to maintain a close watch over each other’s strategic capabilities and allowed for much needed early warning that upheld mutual deterrence between the two powers.

Fast forward to the current era, today’s missile defense systems have shown a very limited success rate against hypersonic missiles. The tracking and interception capabilities of current missile defense systems have remained effectively limited due to speed, maneuverability, and depressed flight of hypersonic missiles. Traditional missile defense systems have been outmaneuvered by hypersonic missiles, which increases the threat level due to their capability to reach and hit targets with a high success rate. Modern hypersonic missiles can still be detected with infrared sensing during their boost phase, but Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs) are extremely difficult to track and intercept primarily due to their maneuverability. The radar-evading capabilities of HGVs affect the strategic calculus by shrinking detection and reaction time duration during crises and conflicts.

As a remedy, the US has introduced the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensors (HBTSS) to counter the threat of HGVs and Hypersonic Cruise Missiles (HCMs). The HBTSS will be a major component of the US Golden Dome missile defense project. It is a layered network of command-and-control systems, interceptors, and space-based sensors to build an advanced layer of missile defense system. What makes HBTSS different from traditional missile defense systems is the satellite constellation, which provides real-time tracking data of missiles. Traditional defense systems like Space Based Infrared System (SBIR) could detect the launch of missiles, but HBTSS can detect, track, and possibly predict the target of the missile.

Because HGVs present a unique challenge due to low flight path and maneuverability and often operate under the coverage of conventional radars, which make it difficult for traditional defense systems to detect. HBTSS relies on space-based sensors, which can detect and track continuously from space. Theoretically, it can be called a space-based missile defense system reflecting the growing strategic importance of space in the military domain. It relies on an interconnected satellite network that can work as a kill web across the globe against the threat of hypersonic missiles.

HBTSS is an emerging strategic shift as it starts a new era of space weaponization with a layer of satellites for enhanced detection and tracking. A reliable space-based tracking system bolsters a state’s capabilities to deal with the threat of hypersonic missiles with improved early warning and missile tracking systems, and reduces the threat of surprise attacks from an adversary. Although missile forces hold great impact on deterrence stability, the induction of HTBSS will question the effectiveness of missiles during crises and conflicts if a more advance missile defense system is introduced. This will provide a wider view from space with more accuracy and precision, and increase the vulnerability of missile forces of states.

Because ground-based nuclear forces are considered vulnerable, many countries have developed second-strike capabilities, particularly at sea, to preserve deterrence even after absorbing an initial attack. But the development of HBTSS undermines the survivability of a state’s missile forces with an enhanced detection and tracking system. Even though the United States and Russia continue to maintain certain crisis management and risk reduction mechanisms, including hotlines and military deconfliction channels, the suspension of New START has weakened the broader framework of strategic stability. While in conflict-prone regions like South Asia, India and Pakistan possess a more limited and less institutionalized set of confidence-building measures (CBMs), making crisis management in South Asia particularly challenging due to emerging technologies.

The peaceful use of outer space depends on the intent and actions of major powers. Sometimes measures taken for self-defense can also prompt a proportionate reaction in the form of countermeasures. The strategic impact of HBTSS on the missile forces may lead to more advance, fast, and lethal missiles for survivability. The development of HBTSS will not end the arms race, it will intensify the arms race with countermeasures.

China officially objected through its Foreign Ministry to the Japanese draft resolution to increase armaments and abandon Japan’s post-World War II commitment not to rearm its military, as approved by the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan during its general council meeting. The draft resolution proposed amending three key security documents, which are the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Medium-Range Defense Forces Enhancement Plan. It was to be submitted to the Japanese government and parliament for further discussion. Chinese authorities officially rejected and objected to the draft, deeming it a threat to their national security and their spheres of direct influence in Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Indo-Pacific region. They considered it a radical escalation of Japan’s security strategy, detrimental to Chinese national security and to the global security initiative proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Here, the revision of Japan’s three security documents, represented in the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Force Enhancement Plan, represents a strategic shift away from its post-war pacifist constitution toward more proactive and independent military policies. The nature of this shift is evident in Tokyo’s easing of restrictions on lethal weapons exports and its reorientation of its armament toward counter-offensive capabilities and missile development. Under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s administration, the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan has adopted a proactive approach, reshaping Japanese industries and institutions to address the greatest strategic challenge posed by China. The updated National Security Strategy has already fundamentally altered the country’s pacifist military doctrine by disarming the Japanese military and preventing its rearmament since World War II, a move that has drawn staunch opposition from China, which seeks to protect its own national security. The most significant amendments to the three Japanese security documents included Japan’s acknowledgment of its ability to double and enhance its counter-strike capabilities. This was achieved by allowing Japan to possess long-range missiles capable of striking enemy targets before launch. Simultaneously, Japanese authorities approved doubling defense spending, raising the military budget to 2% of GDP.

China objected to the Japanese draft resolution, which aimed to increase Japanese armament and militarize the region and global supply chains, and threatened to escalate the situation. Beijing strongly condemned these trends, describing them as new militarism. A key point of contention for China was what Chinese intelligence and military circles perceived as a warning of Japanese and foreign interference in Taiwanese affairs, as China considers Taiwan an integral part of its territory. Beijing condemned the Japanese leadership’s statement that any emergency in Taiwan is an emergency for Japan, describing a potential Chinese military intervention in Taiwan as an act of aggression. Here, Beijing rejects Japan’s new military approach, characterized by advanced military deployment. China has officially protested and taken countermeasures against Japan’s plans to deploy defensive missiles on Yonaguni Island, located only about 110 kilometers from Taiwan. China has strongly accused Japan of violating its commitments, arguing that this new Japanese military expansion violates Tokyo’s international obligations and its pacifist constitution. China has warned Japan that it will pay a heavy price if it intervenes militarily in the Taiwan Strait.

Chinese intelligence, military, security, and defense circles link Japan’s armament activities in Taiwan to American interference in Chinese affairs through its network of allies in the Asian region, such as Japan, given its close alliance with Washington. Here, Japan defends its military rearmament against China, with several of its officials sending political and security warnings to China. They argue that, given the uncertainty in Japan stemming from US policies and the fluctuating stance in Washington, Japan seeks to bolster its own capabilities and build regional alliances (with the Philippines, Australia, and NATO) to expand deterrence against Beijing and maintain regional security from a Japanese perspective. Strategic circles in Tokyo view the potential fall of Taiwan to China as a direct and existential threat to Japanese national security and vital shipping lanes, making the protection of the Taiwan Strait a fundamental component of Japan’s updated defense doctrine.

For these reasons, China’s decisive response was seen as a challenge to its national security, especially given Japan’s de facto official classification of Beijing as the greatest and most unprecedented strategic challenge to its security. This classification was further reinforced by Japanese authorities’ approval of developing military production, strengthening domestic defense industries, and easing restrictions on arms exports. This is where the dimensions of China’s official rejection and objection lie, as it is considered a violation of the pacifist principle enshrined in the Japanese military doctrine, which was internationally and regionally agreed upon after World War II for Japan’s disarmament. Beijing believes that Tokyo is abandoning its pacifist constitution and returning to a militaristic path, while Japan exaggerates the narrative of a China threat. Beijing accuses Japan of fabricating flimsy pretexts to justify its military expansion and arsenal, which threatens China’s regional security. Therefore, China warned that these Japanese steps to increase armament undermine peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and jeopardize the principles of China’s global security initiative. China also registered its objection to Japan’s exclusionary approaches to its initiative based on shared and sustainable security. Furthermore, China linked this Japanese escalation in its confrontation with China in the region to the sensitive issue of Taiwan and the close alliance between the United States and Japan, while categorically rejecting Japanese interference in Taiwan’s affairs and considering the island’s security an integral part of China’s national security.

Authors: Kung Chan and Yang Xite*

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent state visit to China, which was his first foreign trip of 2026, is a clear indication of the shifting dynamics of the bilateral relationship. Accompanied by an unprecedented delegation of 39 high-ranking officials, including five deputy prime ministers, eight ministers, the central bank governor, and energy executives, the scale resembled a partial cabinet relocation. This massive mobilization reflects Moscow’s urgency to secure an agreement on the Power of Siberia 2 natural gas pipeline, a strategic super-project stalled in commercial negotiations since 2012. Planned to span over 2,600 kilometers with an annual capacity of 50 billion cubic meters, the pipeline would traverse Mongolia to link Russian fields with Chinese markets. For Russia, finalizing this energy artery is an economic imperative to replace the European market, where Western sanctions aim to eliminate Russian pipeline gas imports by the end of 2027.

Evaluating the geopolitics of this energy relationship requires analyzing five distinct strategic dimensions.

First, Beijing has strong incentives to resist quick concessions. The negotiation deadlock is largely on pricing. Russia reportedly seeks approximately US$ 265 per thousand cubic meters to cover the high extraction and infrastructure costs of its Yamal fields in Western Siberia, whereas China targets roughly US$ 120. Unlike Russia, China commands significant leverage, boasting robust domestic pipeline networks, stable Central Asian infrastructure, and diverse liquefied natural gas imports. Given Russia’s acute financial pressure and diminishing options due to sanctions after the war in Ukraine, Beijing has the luxury of strategic patience, allowing it to wait for terms that align with market principles rather than rushing a deal under political pressure.

Second, the pipeline is less about energy revenue for Moscow and more about maintaining global geopolitical relevance. In the current international order, Russia finds itself sidelined from primary great-power management. Consequently, Putin seeks to leverage the Ukraine conflict to engage Washington while simultaneously trying to bind Russia’s economic future to China, much like it previously did with Europe. This anxiety within the China-United States-Russia triangular relationship was highlighted by the timing of the visit, which occurred just days after the U.S. President Donald Trump departed Beijing. As the war enters its fifth year and energy weaponization loses its potency in the West, shifting exports eastward has transformed from a strategic choice into a necessity for regime survival. By proposing a 30-year, multibillion-dollar pipeline network, Moscow hopes to anchor itself to the world’s largest energy consumer, ensuring it remains an indispensable player rather than a marginalized resource base.

Third, the proposed pipeline route serves as a geopolitical lever within the post-Soviet space. Passing through Mongolia, the route allows Russia to entrench its influence over Ulaanbaatar, which has recently deepened its engagement with the United States and NATO, while monitoring China’s northern energy ingress. This alignment requires Beijing to pay substantial transit fees and leaves its energy security vulnerable to the political stability of a third country. For Moscow, the project simultaneously secures the Chinese market and reinforces its traditional sphere of influence across Central Asia and Mongolia, using infrastructure to manage the economic and diplomatic trajectories of neighboring states.

Fourth, the protracted timeline works in Beijing’s favor. The longer negotiations stall, the more China’s bargaining position strengthens against an increasingly isolated Russia. While Moscow faces a liquidity crisis within its National Wealth Fund and the fiscal drain of a prolonged war, China’s energy diversification has progressed rapidly. Construction on Line D of the Central Asia-China gas pipeline is advancing alongside commitments from Turkmenistan, while maritime LNG capacity expanded by over 10 million tons recently with imports from Qatar, Australia, and the United States. Furthermore, China’s domestic shale gas production and global leadership in renewable energy insulation provide a structural ceiling on long-term natural gas demand. Middle Eastern instability in the Strait of Hormuz elevates the short-term value of overland corridors, but it ultimately reinforces Beijing’s commitment to resilience rather than a singular dependence on Moscow.

Fifth, China’s optimal energy architecture centers on the Southern Corridor, specifically what can be called the “Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Tajikistan (TUT) Corridor” framework. This network offers a direct alternative that circumvents Russian territory, extending through Xinjiang and across the Caspian Sea toward Azerbaijan and Europe. Lines A, B, and C of the Central Asia-China pipeline are already operational, and the completion of Line D will raise total capacity to 65 billion cubic meters annually. This infrastructure is backed by deepening diplomatic ties. Beijing and Dushanbe codified their strategic partnership via a friendship treaty, and China’s trade volume with the five Central Asian republics surpassed US$ 100 billion, cementing its status as their primary trading partner. A fully integrated Central Asian energy network directly erodes Russia’s traditional influence in its southern flank, creating a new economic center of gravity.

Ultimately, while Putin’s high-profile delegation sought to secure a vital economic lifeline, the unresolved pipeline agreement exposes the cold calculation of national interests underlying the partnership. For Beijing, maintaining a deliberate pace maximizes its buyers’ advantage and allows alternative supply chains to mature. The true key to Eurasian energy security lies not in a single northern pipeline, but in a diversified, networked western corridor that mitigates risk and ensures supply chain autonomy, a structural reality that will shape the continent’s geopolitical architecture for decades.

*Yang Xite, a Research Fellow at ANBOUND.

Beijing warmly welcomes the peace agreement and memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran, considering it an important step toward de-escalating regional tensions. China supports the diplomatic path to resolving the crisis, based on a clear strategy aimed at protecting its economic and strategic interests. Beijing emphasizes that a permanent ceasefire, the protection of national sovereignty, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, and ensuring the safety of international navigation are top priorities. China contributed behind the scenes to shaping the negotiating framework and influencing Tehran to accept the agreement with the United States in order to safeguard its vital interests in the continued flow of Iranian oil. Accordingly, China officially welcomed the memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran, affirming that the agreement represents a crucial step toward de-escalating regional tensions. The Chinese diplomatic welcome focused on the key provisions of the agreement, as stated by the spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry. These provisions guarantee a comprehensive ceasefire, freedom of navigation, energy security, an end to the naval blockade, and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to global trade and energy supplies. China considers this essential for its energy and economic security. This agreement, along with the nuclear framework and negotiations, marks the conclusion of the first phase, followed by a 30-60 day negotiation period to discuss the Iranian nuclear program (uranium enrichment and the lifting of sanctions). This Chinese announcement came in support of international mediation efforts ahead of the official signing ceremony in Geneva.

The most prominent points welcomed by China in the US-Iranian agreement, according to announcements and follow-up by Chinese diplomatic channels and as included in the key provisions of the memorandum of understanding, were a cessation of military operations; an immediate and permanent ceasefire on all fronts, including the Lebanese front; freedom of navigation through a commitment to end the naval blockade and open the Strait of Hormuz to global trade and energy supplies; and the nuclear framework, with the conclusion of a phase one agreement stipulating that negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program (uranium enrichment and sanctions relief) would take place within a specified timeframe of 30 to 60 days following the signing.

China has played a pivotal, often unacknowledged, role as a diplomatic bridge between Tehran and Washington to protect its strategic and economic interests in the Middle East. The dimensions of China’s behind-the-scenes role include ensuring the flow of energy. Beijing seeks to maintain stability in the Gulf region to guarantee the uninterrupted supply of Iranian oil and to protect its interests and investments in the Belt and Road Initiative. Iran represents a crucial geographical and strategic hub in China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. To this end, Beijing has sought to leverage its strong economic ties and strategic partnership with Tehran to persuade it to make flexible concessions during critical times, while offering support to avoid military escalation. Beijing fears that the collapse of diplomatic channels could lead to a regional war that would jeopardize its extensive investments in the region.

On the other hand, Beijing seeks to counterbalance American influence. China prefers a negotiated framework between Tehran and Washington that limits American unilateral hegemony and positions itself as a responsible international player capable of peacemaking. China’s vision for diplomatic balancing between Washington and Tehran is shaped by several key strategic axes, most importantly (establishing the principle of a political settlement). Here, Beijing consistently emphasizes that dialogue is the only solution to the Iranian crisis, rejecting military escalation that harms the security of navigation and global trade. This is coupled with regional and international networking, where China supports parallel diplomatic efforts, such as Pakistani mediation. Beijing maintains continuous communication with the parties to the crisis to ensure the opening of indirect negotiation channels that prevent a full-scale confrontation and safeguard vital interests. China has maintained the flow of Iranian oil while simultaneously strengthening its extensive economic partnerships with the Gulf states, granting it unique diplomatic weight and influence that Western powers lack. Despite this notable progress, Beijing faces ongoing challenges due to US containment policies. China rejects Washington’s classification of its major technology companies as military entities and threatens retaliatory measures, making Beijing’s attempts to create a strategic balance with the United States an extremely delicate and sensitive process.

Based on the preceding understanding and analysis, we can see how successful Beijing has been in transforming escalating tensions in the Middle East into strategic gains. China has played an active mediating role by supporting diplomatic talks and the memorandum of understanding for peace between Washington and Tehran, thus positioning itself as a responsible international power seeking to establish stability and move away from unilateral hegemony.

Behind a veil of good-natured diplomacy, American adversaries are exploiting the conflict in Iran by gaining insights, strategic lessons, and geopolitical power while the United States wages feckless war against the Middle Eastern theocracy. Beyond the bombings, the blockade, and the oil prices, Russia and China keenly watch how America struggles, succeeds, and scrambles. In doing so, these adversaries are leveraging the conflict to challenge America’s readiness, aid its adversaries, and gain invaluable intel on America’s successes and failures.

The concept of observing a conflict to acquire critical intelligence on how to best conduct combat is not unique to the war in Iran. For example, in the Russo-Ukrainian War, America has gained indispensable knowledge on the most and least effective tools of 21st-century warfare, including information on the power of unmanned aerial systems. With the war in Iran, though, Russia and China are the scientists, and America is the experiment. The Middle East is now a testing ground for cutting-edge drone swarm technologies and a catalyst for how smaller powers can effectively deny their adversaries from accomplishing their objectives—a lesson that China is certainly eager to learn about for a possible conflict over Taiwan. Therefore, when America wages war against Iran, there are consequences that are crucial to recognize, and one of those consequences is that the United States is inadvertently empowering and informing its adversaries.

Maintaining its signaled commitment of multipolarity and geopolitical neutrality, China’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning commented, “…China…has been making active efforts to promote ceasefire and peace…we will continue playing an active role in restoring…tranquility to the Middle East…” Reality demonstrates that this is false. China is discreetly gaining intelligence on the U.S. military’s readiness, pacing, and warfighting strategies. Furthermore, China has directly supported Iran, providing anti-missile weaponry, building blocks for ballistic missiles, and invaluable military intelligence to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Instead of promoting peace and tranquility, these actions are designed to empower Iran and keep America locked in the struggle, weakening the country and allowing China to acquire more intelligence on U.S. readiness. Despite China’s claimed intentions, it’s clear that the nation is bolstering Iran’s strength and sustaining its defenses. Even from a domestic point of view, these actions are increasing domestic American division and the depletion of America’s defense resources. The conflict with Iran is not limited to Iran; by proxy, it’s with America’s foremost adversaries, too.

Similarly, Russia has provided critical support to Iran in the form of targeting intelligence, which Iran couldn’t have otherwise acquired. Shahed drones, assets that have proven to be exceptionally effective against western defenses, are manufactured in Russia’s Alabuga Special Economic Zone and are being provided to Iran by Russia. Contradicting these actions, a statement by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that the country “…stands ready to assist in advancing peaceful solutions grounded in international law, mutual respect, and a balanced consideration of interests.” But equipping Iran with efficacious tools of war is not a peaceful solution. Giving the nation targeting information cannot be construed as a neutral or geopolitically insignificant act. In reality, America’s adversaries are taking an active, hands-on approach to the war in Iran, indirectly but clearly aiding the nation and actively working against U.S. goals.

In response to this tacit yet significant aid to Iran, the natural response for America should be to publicly highlight the hostile actions of its adversaries. But the United States has been hesitant, if not downright unwilling, to do so. For example, Matthew Whitaker, the U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO, commented that “China certainly is not participating and is not aiding and abetting the Iranian demise…” Separately, he claimed, “There’s no indication that we can talk about publicly that the Russians are participating with the Iranians.” Public investigations, though, have proven both those assertions false. The trepidation of the United States to clearly and confidently condemn its adversaries’ belligerence in the region is an enormous blunder of strategic communications. Contrasting this, Russia and China have simultaneously and aggressively pursued campaigns of condemnation to weaken America’s global power. For example, Russia has often claimed that certain U.S. support to Ukraine may constitute an act of war; China strongly condemned recent American intervention in Venezuela as violating the international laws by which America claims to be guided. U.S. adversaries are eager and willing to strategically undermine and criticize U.S. actions, yet America is unwisely unwilling to do the same.

Russia’s and China’s cooperative aid to Iran demonstrates that the conflict is, in many senses, between world powers. A new ‘axis of resistance’ against Western liberalism is developing, and allowing American adversaries to act without denunciation is a failure of strategic communications and allows these nations to act with undeserved impunity. As the United States continues to wage war against Iran, it’s crucial to recognize that every bomb America drops, every mission American soldiers complete, and every destroyed military asset is a datapoint that U.S. adversaries will exploit. Russia’s and China’s critical support to Iran is hostile and counter to American goals; ignoring this is strategically imprudent. Beyond the explosions, America’s adversaries are watching—and acting. It’s the responsibility of the United States to expose those actions for what they really are.

With its recent Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Delhi, the Quad has again shown it remains active, defying widespread rumours of collapse.

While the Japanese and Australian foreign ministers highlighted their countries’ strong relations with India and the Quad’s central role in shaping the Indo-Pacific security architecture, Marco Rubio’s four-day visit to India was the most noteworthy aspect, as he repeatedly emphasized the significance of Indo-US relations.

Speculations about the Quad’s potential dissolution, reminiscent of developments in the 2000s, were fuelled by the postponement of the leaders’ summit, President Trump’s apparent lack of interest, and a more conciliatory approach toward China. Even so, the meeting reaffirmed the US’s ongoing engagement in the region and its support for the Quad.

The Quad’s momentum currently faces its principal challenge not from India’s or the US’s relations with Australia and Japan, but from a complicated Indo-US relationship.

Two factors show why India-US relations are central to the Quad’s minilateral framework.

Over the past year, India has faced unprecedented criticism from the US administration, particularly from President Trump, who has been critical of India on trade and security fronts. Issues such as tariff disputes, H-1B visa restrictions affecting Indian professionals, deepening US relations with the Pakistan Army, and increased US involvement in Bangladesh and Nepal have contributed to growing distrust about the US’s willingness to cooperate with India and promote stability in the Indo-Pacific.

In response to several contentious statements by President Trump directed at India, Rubio’s visit served as a diplomatic effort to restore bilateral relations. His repeated emphasis on India’s role as a strategic partner signalled a commitment to improving ties. While a single visit cannot resolve all tensions from the past year, it reassures India and reduces the risk of further deterioration.

The Quad Foreign Ministers’ meeting became feasible only after India and the US undertook concerted efforts to revive bilateral relations. Notable examples include India’s invitation to the US to attend the AI Impact Summit in February 2026, ongoing trade agreement negotiations, and the US decision to invite India to the Pax Silica initiative. The meeting occurred only after a certain level of normalization had been achieved. Even so, a leaders’ summit is unlikely unless President Trump and Prime Minister Modi demonstrate a clear commitment to advancing India-US relations.

Second, without proactive American engagement, Japan, Australia, and India may develop their own trilateral regional strategies, perhaps with some Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore. However, the impact of such an alternative would be limited and localized. Japan could take a greater role in sustaining and rebuilding regional economic frameworks, replicating the Trans-Pacific Partnership experiment. Still, due to constitutional and capacity constraints, Tokyo is unlikely to replace Washington as the region’s primary security guarantor soon.

Although the Quad’s resilience is maintained by the agency and commitment of Australia, India, and Japan rather than by exclusive US leadership, strong US involvement in the Indo-Pacific security mechanism will remain a cornerstone of the Indo-Pacific architecture.

China’s persistent assertive behaviour remains the central factor. It continues to employ coercive tactics and expand its influence in regions critical to the US and its partners, so the original motivations for revitalizing the Quad remain relevant. Although the US approach to China is evolving, the fundamental dynamics of US-China relations remain unchanged. In the long term, Washington will require frameworks such as the Quad to maintain stability in the Indo-Pacific and prevent the erosion of its strategic influence. Consequently, the Quad is likely to remain central to regional strategy, with India as a key partner.

The US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau’s statement that the US is not going to make the same mistakes with India that it made with China 20 years ago must not guide Indo-US relations. The US needs India as much as India needs the US, and unlike China, India-US relations rest on shared values – democracy, freedom of speech, multiculturalism, and a common vision of maintaining a rules-based liberal international order. Both countries require mutually beneficial cooperation to advance their strategic objectives. Other Quad members and Indo-Pacific stakeholders also depend on collaboration between Washington and New Delhi to maintain strategic equilibrium and preserve the bloc’s cohesion.

The US regards India as a responsible stakeholder and a regional counterweight to China, especially after the limited outcomes of President Trump’s recent visit to China. Conversely, India depends on the US for advanced technology, strategic investments, and long-term defense needs. This mutual dependence makes both countries indispensable to each other, and significant short-term trade diversification is unlikely. Even if achieved, it would likely harm both parties.

The US must strengthen its engagement in the Indo-Pacific by leveraging the Quad and its member states to develop an effective regional strategy. Closer strategic coordination among Quad partners, particularly with India, is essential to this effort.

By June 2026, the cracks inside the GOP weren’t hidden anymore. On May 19, the Senate voted 50–47 to push forward a bipartisan war powers resolution that would limit President Donald Trump’s ability to keep military ops going against Iran. Four Republican senators crossed the aisle and voted with Democrats. Then on June 3, the House went even further with a 215–208 vote—four House Republicans joined Democrats in a pretty blunt pushback against Trump’s leadership.

At first it looked like just another fight over war powers and Congress doing its job. But it feels like something bigger: the start of a real tug-of-war over what the Republican Party is going to be once Trump isn’t the center of everything.

For almost ten years now, Republican politics has been all about Trump. You rose if you stood with him, and you got sidelined if you didn’t. Loyalty often counted more than old-school conservative ideas, passing bills, or sticking to principles. But every party eventually has to answer the tough question that personality-driven movements hate: what happens when the big guy starts looking more like a problem than a winner? That question is getting harder for Republicans to dodge.

Trump didn’t just take over the party in 2016 — he remade it. The old Republican worldview of strong alliances, free trade, and steady leadership shifted toward a more populist, Trump-centered style.

It worked for a while. He won elections, fired up voters who felt ignored, and built a super-loyal base. As long as the wins kept coming, most Republicans went along. Parties get tested in the tough times, though — not the good ones. And the Iran conflict is turning into exactly that kind of test.

A lot of Republicans who backed Trump’s rise never thought they’d end up defending another big Middle East war. Trump made “no more endless wars” one of his best lines—slamming both parties for the messes in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Now the fighting with Iran has dragged on for months. Costs are adding up, gas prices sting at the pump, and nobody’s really clear on what “winning” would even mean. That’s created real quiet discomfort inside the party. The senators and reps who voted to rein in Trump’s war powers weren’t just talking procedure. They were signaling that blind loyalty isn’t automatic anymore.

Parties talk a lot about ideology, but when things get serious, survival often wins out. Some Republicans are starting to put distance between themselves and Trump — not because they hate everything he stands for, but because they don’t want their own careers sinking with one person. There’s a real difference between backing conservative policies and handing the whole party over to a single leader. More of them seem to be waking up to that.

What’s interesting is that the pushback is coming from inside the tent. Democrats opposing Trump is old news. When Republicans do it, it hits different. Senators like Rand Paul, Susan Collins, Lisa Murkowski, and Bill Cassidy broke ranks on the Senate vote. In the House, guys like Thomas Massie, Brian Fitzpatrick, Tom Barrett, and Warren Davidson did the same. These are still small numbers. But big shifts often start small.

The bigger story might be that some Republicans are finally imagining a future without Trump dominating every headline. A younger crop is coming up—they agree with him on immigration, trade, and culture wars, but they don’t want the party to be defined only by personal loyalty to him forever. They want a Republican Party that can keep going after he’s gone—Trumpism as one important piece, not the whole thing.

History shows parties sometimes tie themselves too tightly to charismatic leaders. Sometimes it revitalizes them. Sometimes it drags them down.

Right now, some inside the GOP worry Trump might be moving from asset to liability—especially with the Iran war dragging on and polarization getting worse. Trump is still the biggest force in the party with a rock-solid base. But power and lasting control aren’t the same.

These congressional votes show that at least some Republicans are already looking ahead to the next chapter. They see the risks of hitching the whole party’s future to one man. Whether they’re right or wrong, time will tell. But the conversation inside the party has clearly moved past just Iran or war powers. It’s now about whether the Republican Party still belongs to Trump — or whether it can finally start belonging to itself again.

Chinese media and think tanks view the United States’ hosting of the FIFA World Cup from a purely geopolitical, economic, and commercial perspective, critically assessing the infrastructure and political climate. Chinese circles see the tournament not merely as a sporting event but as a central tool for the United States to polish its image, bolster its global leadership amidst current international polarization, and advance its political agenda. This perspective is highlighted through several key points, the most important being the geopolitical dimension. Here, Chinese think tanks argue that the tournament reflects the level of competition between major powers, with Washington attempting to use hosting as a soft power tool to project its influence. However, Chinese media, in turn, emphasized the state of sharp international polarization and division, criticizing the political challenges and the wrangling that accompanied the broadcasting negotiations. Furthermore, a number of (commercial considerations) have been raised, with the tournament facing criticism from Chinese media due to its exorbitant cost and the significant time difference between North America and China, leading to a decline in Chinese public interest. This hesitation was reflected in the negotiations, as FIFA incurred financial losses after China Media Group (CMG) signed the broadcasting agreement late and at a price significantly lower than FIFA’s requested.

Regarding the (organizational and policy challenges), Chinese research and media institutions expressed reservations about the tournament’s logistical challenges, particularly the longer travel distances between host cities compared to previous editions, as well as concerns related to US immigration laws and security restrictions. Despite the absence of the Chinese national team from the tournament, China’s commercial involvement was substantial. Beijing demonstrated its active presence through Chinese commercial sponsors, such as Hisense, and sporting goods factories in eastern China, which reaped significant economic benefits from manufacturing tournament flags and souvenirs. Chinese media coverage, particularly through its official channels, was extensive. CGTN, the Chinese state broadcaster, developed comprehensive plans to broadcast and cover the matches, ensuring the event reached millions of Chinese fans across its various platforms.

Furthermore, Chinese state media and intelligence and military think tanks utilized Washington’s hosting of the FIFA World Cup to offer a number of strategic, media, and intellectual analyses regarding China’s calculations in response to American actions. Major events are often used as a primary arena for geopolitical competition between the two superpowers. Beijing’s vision can be summarized by its use of major sporting, cultural, and other events as a political tool. Beijing views Washington’s hosting of major international tournaments or events as more than just sporting or cultural occasions; it sees them as an extension of American information and decision-making strategies aimed at projecting American influence and hegemony globally. While China seeks to highlight international contradictions, Beijing has directed its media apparatus to demonstrate that Washington’s attempts to unilaterally assume leadership or project messages of unity are, in reality, met with sharp division and polarization within the international system. Here, China has attempted to counter American soft power. This media coverage of the FIFA World Cup in the United States reflects a continuous Chinese effort to neutralize Western and American soft power by focusing on structural issues in international relations, such as the absence of multipolarity, and by promoting the Chinese model as an alternative striving for a more balanced world.

In this context, Chinese media and think tanks view the United States’ hosting of the World Cup through the lens of soft power, geopolitical strategies, and trade, while sharply criticizing the infrastructure and political circumstances surrounding the tournament, particularly in the aftermath of the Iran War and a number of global geopolitical upheavals stemming from US policies. Chinese analyses focus on purely commercial interests, criticizing the exorbitant costs of broadcasting rights. Conversely, they highlight the role of leading Chinese companies in profiting from the event by providing innovative and advanced broadcasting technologies and exporting merchandise and fan supplies. However, they also offer several critical observations regarding the infrastructure and political climate. Chinese research centers express critical skepticism about the readiness of US cities, suggesting that complexities related to visa requirements and a strict security and political environment could hinder fans and undermine the freedom of movement necessary for such events.

Based on the preceding understanding and analysis, we can discern the perspective of Chinese media and research centers that the United States exploits hosting international sporting and political events as a prominent tool for employing sports to enhance American soft power, attempting to project influence to manage conflict, and solidifying its leadership of the global order. Therefore, Chinese think tanks and intelligence agencies have developed a comprehensive media and research plan to expose American polarization worldwide. Conversely, Chinese media and think tanks emphasize Washington’s failure to garner international consensus, highlighting the sharp division and widening gap between Western powers and the rising powers of the Global South. This underscores the mechanism of conflict transformation, where competition is no longer limited to the economic and military spheres but has expanded significantly to encompass soft power tools and media discourse. This reflects a picture of expanded strategic competition and its impact on international stability.

China strongly condemns the Israeli airstrikes and ground incursion into southern Lebanon, describing these operations as a dangerous escalation that threatens the stability of the entire region. China demands that Israel immediately cease its military operations and fully withdraw its forces from Lebanese territory, warning of the dangers of its incursions and violations of established lines. China views the fourth round of Washington talks between Lebanon and Israel and the military tensions as an extension of a broader crisis. Beijing sees this conflict as a consequence of the Gaza war, emphasizing clear principles in its intelligence and military assessment of the situation across several axes, most notably the necessity of an Israeli withdrawal and a ceasefire. Beijing calls for an immediate cessation of military operations and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory, warning that expanding ground operations will drag the region into chaos. China’s efforts in the reconstruction of Lebanon focus on providing urgent humanitarian aid packages, signing development cooperation agreements, and encouraging Chinese companies to participate in infrastructure projects and long-term investments within the framework of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. China also defended the Lebanese position in the face of Israeli escalation at the United Nations, with its representative to the Security Council emphasizing that Israel’s advance to Beaufort Castle (Qalaat Al-Shaqif) was the most serious incursion into southern Lebanon in 30 years. He called on the international community to take urgent measures before the situation in Lebanon deteriorated further, demanding respect for Lebanese sovereignty and the withdrawal of all Israeli forces from southern Lebanon.

The most prominent features of these Chinese efforts for joint cooperation with the Lebanese side and the international community in the reconstruction of Lebanon and the cessation of Israeli attacks on southern Lebanon are the provision of direct financial and development support. The Chinese and Lebanese governments signed a development cooperation agreement in Beirut worth 50 million Chinese yuan to support reconstruction and sustainable development efforts, along with the provision of urgent humanitarian aid. China delivered shipments of emergency humanitarian aid through the Port of Beirut to alleviate the economic and living burdens on the Lebanese people. Furthermore, China encouraged the participation of Chinese companies and investments in reconstruction and development efforts in Lebanon. Beijing has expressed its readiness to encourage its major companies and national institutions to participate in Lebanon’s reconstruction projects and support the development of the energy, telecommunications, and infrastructure sectors through China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Lebanon has been a partner in this Chinese initiative since joining in 2017. China aims to enhance Lebanon’s role as a pivotal hub for trade and logistics in the Middle East. In addition to sustained Chinese diplomatic efforts, China has continued its diplomatic and developmental support for Lebanon, alongside its active participation in UN peacekeeping operations in southern Lebanon.

China’s role in halting the Israeli war on Lebanon has focused on exerting diplomatic pressure through the United Nations and utilizing international platforms to call for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory, while supporting political and diplomatic solutions to prevent the conflict from escalating. China has consistently called for an end to Israeli military operations against Lebanon during UN sessions and warned that the collapse of ceasefires places the region on a more dangerous precipice. Beijing called for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from the devastated Lebanese territories, emphasizing the need to respect international resolutions, Lebanon’s sovereignty and independence, and the protection of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). China stressed the importance of ensuring that UN peacekeepers could carry out their duties freely and safely and condemned any attacks against UNIFIL personnel. China also emphasized the need to intensify humanitarian aid to the Lebanese people to address the repercussions of the war and expressed its full readiness to contribute to restoring regional stability.

Here, Chinese diplomatic and intelligence agencies affirmed that Lebanon’s sovereignty and security must not be violated, stressing that extending the authority of the Lebanese state and protecting its stability are the fundamental pillars for preventing the entire region from sliding into a comprehensive regional war. They reiterated the necessity of respecting Lebanon’s sovereignty and security, considering the stability and protection of the Lebanese state as essential to preventing a full-blown regional war. China also expressed its full support for the role of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and emphasized the need to provide guarantees for its protection and freedom of movement to carry out its mission. From an analytical perspective, Beijing believes that a political solution to the crisis must include respect for international resolutions and adherence to the two-state solution for Palestine and Israel. It also expressed concern that these negotiations might lead to regional arrangements that serve the interests of certain major powers and marginalize other parties in the region. On the other hand, China welcomes dialogue and diplomatic solutions as a means to ease tensions in the Middle East and supports efforts to restore Lebanon’s sovereignty. However, Beijing has criticized unilateral US actions in managing interconnected issues such as Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran, emphasizing the need to adhere to international resolutions and support regional stability, avoiding military interventions and the expansion of conflict.

Beijing adopts a clear strategic vision regarding the Lebanese crisis, which is summarized in its emphasis on respecting sovereignty. Chinese diplomacy strongly condemns any violations of Lebanese sovereignty and calls for an immediate halt to foreign military operations on Lebanese territory to ensure the safety of civilians. With Chinese intelligence and military agencies calling for a monopoly on weapons, a position reiterated by the Chinese Permanent Representative to the UN Security Council, China supports the Lebanese state as the sole guarantor of internal stability. This signifies Beijing’s strong support for the principle of state monopoly on weapons, considering official institutions the only guarantor of internal stability and the prevention of the country’s disintegration. China also supports the UNIFIL forces, opposing the termination of the UNIFIL mandate and demanding that it be enabled to fulfill its mission to ensure stability in southern Lebanon and contribute to regional de-escalation. Beijing emphasizes that escalation will not resolve crises, urging conflicting parties (including Washington and Tehran) to prioritize diplomacy and political negotiation to exercise restraint.

Since the public launch of large-language models like ChatGPT and OpenAI in 2020, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is gaining ground across a variety of private and public areas,  the prospect of not only facilitating mundane tasks but also revolutionising labor markets, research, medicine and militaries.  

The gilded age of AI

But as the presence of AI is becoming an increasingly normalized part of everyday life, from summarizing texts, fact-checking a statement or composing an email, it is easy to overlook the more nefarious purposes of surveillance, discrimination and persecution for which AI can be used at the state level. This is an increasingly pertinent issue, with the surge of state-based AI surveillance—such as ’safe cities,’ facial recognition, and smart policing—since 2018, extending to at least 75 of the 175 countries with available data. While this trend is present on all continents, there are regional disparities in application, with AI surveillance present in almost 70% of the surveyed African states, over 50% of South East Asian states, and just under 40% of European countries use AI for surveillance. Thus, AI surveillance is not limited to authoritarian states; according to one report, 51% of liberal democracies use AI for surveillance purposes. How, then, is AI being used for surveillance in China, the Middle East, US, and Europe? 

China—a spearhead for surveillance

China dominates the AI surveillance sector, with companies like ZTE and Huawei present in over 63 countries, vastly outnumbering the US. This presence is especially noticeable in Africa and Asia, where the use of Chinese surveillance technology correlates closely with  participation in the cross-continental Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. In particular, China has been exporting its ‘safe city’ model, which has already been domestically implemented in cities like Beijing as part of its social credit system, to Saudi Arabia, Uganda, and Thailand as well as European cities like Valenciennes, which in 2017 was gifted safe city technology by Huawei. This model connects an extensive network of facial recognition cameras and police body cameras into intelligent command centers using algorithms to predict crime.

Individual freedom versus national security

While states are justifying these measures by reference to crime reduction and national security, organisations are warning about the implications of AI surveillance for privacy, systemic discrimination civil rights and democratic freedoms as AI allows for cost efficient surveillance at an unprecedented spatial and temporal scale. For example, China has domestically implemented large scale AI surveillance encompassing over 600 million cameras, coupled with large language models for minority languages to sharpen its surveillance of the communication of its Tibetan, Uyghur, Korean, and Mongolian minorities. In the Xinjiang province, the Chinese state has created an Integrated Joint Operations Platform, which employs an extensive network of CCTV cameras, facial recognition devices, and or WiFi surveillance devices to suppress political dissent among the province’s Uyghur minority. Such Chinese technology has reportedly also been exported to Saudi Arabia and Iran for similar purposes of suppressing political dissent, and to enhance the precision of drone air strikes in Ukraine and the Middle East.

AI surveillance beyond autocracies

However, the West is not immune to these developments. The US government recently found itself in a legal dispute with AI company Anthropic after the company refused to allow the government to use its ground breaking AI model Claude for domestic surveillance without built-in restraints. The US government claimed that this jeopardised national security by preventing the state from identifying espionage. In addition, US President Trump has issued various executive orders to increase the adoption of AI by federal agencies over state regulations. Indeed, the US already uses surveillance technology deployed by Israel on the occupied West Bank, to stem migration on the Mexican border. Moreover, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) admitted in March 2026 that federal agencies are buying personal data from data brokers, including location data collected by private companies, in order to track citizens.

Europe: between security, migration and regulation

Meanwhile, the European Union (EU) is exploring Automated Border Crossing technologies. The intelligent system iBorderCtrl is currently being piloted in Greece, Hungary and Latvia  applies AI lie detectors to immigrants, with immigrants found lying being automatically detained for further questioning. This system has been criticised by human rights activists and academics as a scientifically weak and potentially discriminatory practice. Thus, even though AI is more regulated in Europe than elsewhere in the world, with the EU AI Act of 2024 restricting large scale usage from sensitive areas through, the risk of questionable AI use in the name of national security remains salient.

Indeed, several member states are stretching the AI Act’s limitations on large-scale surveillance. For example, Luxembourg has since 2025 pursued plans of expanding its use of Trojan spyware from state security and terrorist threats to encompass a broader range of crimes, such as child exploitation, currency counterfeiting and human trafficking. Similarly, the government of Ireland is seeking to expand the powers of the police and Defense Forces to intercept conversations on encrypted platforms like WhatsApp, and iMessage, and other social media platforms. Meanwhile, the Czech Republic was forced to end its use of facial recognition at Prague Airport after six months as it was found to violate the EU AI Act. Likewise, Hungary authorized the police to use real-time facial recognition to identify participants in LGBTQ+ parades in April last year, in violation of the AI Act.

Digital emancipation or authoritarianism?

Thus, it appears that national and international regulation has been lagging behind the rapid tech innovation of recent years. As with any innovation, AI is a neutral tool—but it can be used in ways good or bad depending on the decisions of power-holders. Thus, the application of AI calls for increased scrutiny, accountability and implementation to safeguard the benefits and prospects of improvement it holds out from being hijacked by nefarious purposes undermining democracy and human rights.

Authors: Marin Mae Ekstrom and Wilder Alejandro Sánchez*

The Organization of Turkic States (OTS) recently held a summit focused on “Artificial Intelligence and Digital Development.” While the May 15 meeting itself did not offer any groundbreaking resolutions, all five heads of the OTS member states participated and reaffirmed their commitment to greater cooperation and integration. This summit was just one example in a series of events that demonstrate growing unity and collaboration among the Turkic states.

How far integration will go between Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Türkiye, and Uzbekistan is debatable. There are several regional initiatives that are bringing these countries, as well as other states across the Caucasus and Central Asia, together, including connectivity projects such as the Middle Corridor and the Uzbek-Kyrgyz-Chinese railway, as well as agencies such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union.

However, to secure the success of most multilateral initiatives, bilateral relations between participating members must be consolidated. When ties between two countries are stabilized and routinely strengthened, a bilateral friendship serves as a building block for expanding to additional actors and ensuring constant, reliable dialogue and collaboration among all involved players.

Türkiye, the leader of the Turkic world in terms of population, economic strength, and growing global geopolitical influence, is leveraging shared Turkic heritage to deepen and cement engagement with other OTS members. Uzbekistan is a natural and important partner: as the most populous Central Asian state, it is the second-largest majority-Turkic state in terms of both language and population. The landlocked nation has the third-largest economy in the Turkic world and is rapidly developing economically and expanding its membership in international initiatives.

This commentary will thus provide an analysis of Ankara-Tashkent relations. However, while statements by presidents & joint economic and investment projects are important parts of this geopolitical puzzle, the true sign of integration between two nations often occurs at the cultural level.

BILATERAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Bilateral relations between Türkiye and Uzbekistan are particularly dynamic. It is noteworthy that high-level meetings occur quite regularly: Presidents Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Türkiye and Shavkat Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan met in Ankara on January 29, as part of the 4th meeting of the Joint Strategic Planning Group (JSPG). The two leaders signed several agreements, including the “Decision on Cooperation Mechanisms for Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Relations between the Republic of Türkiye and the Republic of Uzbekistan,” an agreement on health cooperation, a memorandum of understanding for the development of international transport corridors, and a memorandum of understanding for promoting cooperation in mining.

The two countries celebrated 34 years of diplomatic relations, and the Turkish state-run news agency Anadolu marked the occasion with a March op-ed; the essay described bilateral relations as evolving into a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” The Uzbek presidency has utilized the same wording to describe the current level of bilateral relations.

Trade between Türkiye and Uzbekistan has nearly tripled over the past decade, rising from USD$1.2 billion in 2016 to over USD$3 billion in 2025. Short and long-term trade targets amount to USD$5 billion and USD$10 billion, respectively. Türkiye is the fourth-largest trading partner of Uzbekistan, accounting for 3.7% of Uzbekistan’s foreign trade. Uzbekistan is not as high a trade priority for Turkiye: even in Central Asia, which is not Turkiye’s primary trade area, Kazakhstan is a larger overall partner. Although neither country is pursuing top trading status with the other, trade and engagement remain high priorities for both Ankara and Tashkent. The evidence clearly displayed that both nations have taken major strides to consolidate both political and economic engagement.

THE CULTURAL FACTOR

From a cultural standpoint, Türkiye has swiftly gained soft power traction in Uzbekistan. Turkish TV series and movies enjoy immense popularity in Uzbekistan: the appeal of Turkish media, coupled with expanded transit options between the two countries, has inspired a tourism boom to Türkiye. From January to October 2025, over 230 thousand Uzbek nationals traveled to Türkiye for various reasons, a 16.3% increase compared to the same period in 2024.

Conversely, Uzbek influence in Türkiye is also increasing. Turkish tourism to Uzbekistan is also rising: between January and April 2025, around 49,400 Turkish citizens visited Uzbekistan for tourism, a 57.4% increase compared to the same time period in 2024. Turkish businesses are also investing in Uzbekistan’s tourism sector: Turkish partners support 12 hotels and over 100 joint restaurants, and in 2025-2026, Turkish investors pledged to help finance 11 additional hotel projects.

Language is another area of soft power, as Turkish is one of the top five most popular foreign languages to learn in Uzbekistan. Factors, including the popularity of Turkish media, academic study, and career opportunities, have bolstered its appeal. Although the study of Uzbek in Türkiye is not as widespread, the linguistic overlap between the two makes it relatively easy for a native Turkish speaker to learn Uzbek and vice versa, making it a less daunting endeavor than the study of other languages.

Cultural relations and people-to-people diplomacy are sometimes overlooked in grand analyses of international relations, as analysts and scholars often focus on presidential summits, trade agreements, investment, or joint military initiatives. However, people-to-people relations, as well as cultural and public diplomacy, are important tools in a country’s toolkit for strengthening grassroots ties.

Generally speaking, the OTS and its member governments support initiatives to promote people-to-people relations and to continue developing a common Turkic identity. During the recent OTS summit, the five leaders reaffirmed their determination to deepen cooperation in digital transformation, innovation, artificial intelligence, connectivity, and sustainable economic development. More broadly, they highlighted their shared commitment to further deepening solidarity, mutual trust, and strategic cooperation within the Turkic World in line with the objectives of the “Turkic World Vision-2040.”

Specifically, the heads of state “laid a time capsule to officially launch the construction of the Center of the Turkic Civilization.” This Center has been described by regional officials as “a groundbreaking architectural complex that will utilize AI, VR, and holography to immerse visitors in the rich philosophy and history of the Turkic World.” Moreover, during the January meeting between Erdoğan and Mirziyoyev, the two heads of state signed a Cultural Cooperation Plan for 2026-2027. Thus, a key strategy for encouraging Turkish-Uzbek bilateral ties is to highlight their commonalities within the wider Turkic cultural and linguistic sphere.

DISCUSSION/CONCLUSIONS

Tashkent-Ankara relations are generally strong, but additional factors complicate their full level of engagement. Although Ankara is very much interested in increasing connectivity with Central Asia via the Middle Corridor and engaging with the Turkic world, those are not its primary objectives. Issues like the Russo-Ukrainian War & the Black Sea; the recent conflict between Iran against the United States and Israel, as well as the related spillover across neighboring Lebanon and Syria; and even the upcoming elections in Armenia, are all arguably higher priorities for Ankara. Domestically, Türkiye is facing its own obstacles, as Erdoğan maintains a tight grip on power while the Turkish economy remains plagued by rising inflation and currency depreciation.

Similarly, Tashkent wants to improve connectivity with Türkiye via the Middle Corridor, but it also wants to increase trade and investment with China and attract investment and partnerships from the Gulf States and India. A good example of this diversification of partnerships is Tashkent’s new airport, to be built via investments and partnerships with Saudi Arabia, Japan, and South Korea. Meanwhile, Moscow remains committed to maintaining its historical influence across Eurasia (President Mirziyoyev visited Moscow for the May celebrations of the Great Patriotic War, one of the few leaders to do so), while the current US administration is focused on transactional diplomacy to secure access to critical minerals and rare earth elements that Uzbekistan has in abundance.

Ankara’s engagement in recent years with Central Asia via the OTS, the Middle Corridor, and bilateral interactions has attracted widespread academic and scholarly interest. However, there is a predictable focus on diplomatic, security, and trade & investment analyses; for example, a 2024 analysis on Tashkent-Ankara relations published by the Central Asia Caucasus Institute did not mention tourism, cultural diplomacy, or education (apart from military education).

That said, the frequently overlooked factors of cultural and public diplomacy will likely be critical to promoting long-term, successful cooperation between Türkiye and Uzbekistan: Turkish pop culture has had a strong influence in Uzbekistan, tourism is growing, and Turkish language study is increasingly popular there. population to learn Turkish. While Uzbekistan’s cultural and language appeal does not hold the same sway in Türkiye, the country is nonetheless growing in terms of global soft power appeal indicators. Uzbekistan’s rebranding as a globally-oriented and dynamic society steeped in rich Islamic and historical heritage -for example, by leveraging the legacy of legendary cities such as Bukhara, Samarqand, and Khiva- echoes the Kemalist model of a Türkiye embracing both modernity and its Ottoman historical legacy. Thus, framing the contemporary Uzbek national narrative as parallel to the Turkish one could help bolster its appeal in Türkiye and strengthen the sense of collective identity in the broader Turkic cultural space.

*Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is president of Second Floor Strategies, a consulting firm in Washington, D.C. He is also a non-resident fellow at Cfive, a think tank headquartered in Astana, Kazakhstan.

The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the views or policies of any organizations with which the authors are affiliated.

Introduction: