opinion

In celebration of the 99th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), established in August 1927, the PLA commemorates its founding on August 1st each year (remembering the Nanchang Uprising of 1927). This anniversary is marked amidst ongoing efforts to modernize its defense capabilities, alongside diplomatic and military endeavors to strengthen dialogue, partnerships, and the exchange of experiences with European, Asian, and international militaries. The PLA is considered the cornerstone of China’s national defense, and Chinese military leaders at all embassies and consulates worldwide organize numerous official events to mark its founding on August 1st each year. Chinese embassies and military attachés around the world, such as the Chinese Embassy in Belgium and other European countries, host official receptions to highlight the PLA’s role in maintaining global peace and stability, as well as its development capabilities and readiness. The PLA is focused on transforming into a modern, integrated military force encompassing land, sea, and air.

China’s military relations with European militaries reflect the logic of military diplomacy, as China seeks to deepen military ties with its European allies and partners within its strategy of mutual military engagement, cooperation, and learning opportunities. Here, Chinese military channels with European countries serve as avenues for dialogue and the exchange of views on regional and international security to achieve balance and stability. Beijing, through its diplomatic activities, emphasizes the importance of balanced partnerships with the European Union and its member states to provide stability and certainty to the world. In this context, Beijing’s relationship with European militaries takes on a dual character of strategic competition and mutual caution, especially given Washington’s efforts to utilize NATO to contain Chinese power. Consequently, tension has arisen between the Chinese military and NATO due to China’s rejection of NATO’s Asian expansion into its regional sphere. Beijing views NATO’s attempts to broaden its security engagement with Asia-Pacific countries as a threat to stability and incompatible with the multipolar world order, while China rejects the logic of military hegemony. The Chinese military, in its strategic literature, emphasizes its opposition to American power and hegemonic policies implemented through the NATO military alliance. China and the People’s Liberation Army also strongly reject NATO’s involvement in Asia-Pacific affairs, viewing it as interference that threatens regional and global stability and leads to confrontations between military blocs.

Herein lies the official Chinese military stance on the NATO military alliance, describing it as a relic of the Cold War that extends beyond its original geographical scope. China explicitly accuses NATO of instigating tensions and provoking confrontations in Asia. Furthermore, China warns against the militarization of the region through NATO partnerships with countries such as Japan and Australia. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) maintains that China’s defense policy aims to protect national sovereignty and regional security, viewing Western actions as attempts to contain Chinese influence and impose American hegemony. Therefore, Chinese intelligence, military, defense, and security circles reject the logic of linking Euro-Atlantic security to issues in the Indo-Pacific region.

The most significant dynamics of the Chinese military relationship with European armies are characterized by the maintenance of strategic autonomy. Some European capitals seek to avoid full involvement in the US-China conflict, preferring to preserve commercial interests and pursue self-sufficiency. This is further complicated by technological and industrial competition between European armies and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. NATO closely monitors the development of the Chinese military’s cyber capabilities and artificial intelligence, viewing them as strategic challenges impacting global supply chains. Meanwhile, China perceives NATO’s policies as subservient to US interests at the expense of European national security. NATO’s ongoing monitoring of Chinese cyber capabilities and the escalating technological competition between China, Europe, and the United States for leadership in the digital and economic future are noteworthy. These tensions manifest in mutual concerns regarding cybersecurity and global supply chains, which raise serious concerns for NATO due to the numerous strategic challenges and cyber threats they pose. Here, NATO monitors digital operations and hybrid attacks linked to Beijing-affiliated actors targeting critical infrastructure and technological security, according to NATO’s military perspective. NATO’s military strategies focus on protecting technological superiority in artificial intelligence and semiconductors to prevent any potential disruption to global supply chains.

For this reason, China’s stance toward NATO is characterized by accusations of American political dominance. Beijing believes that NATO’s expanding policies and transatlantic orientation serve the US strategic agenda at its expense and in confrontation with China, which, from the Chinese perspective, affects European security itself. China considers NATO’s increasing involvement in Asia-Pacific issues and technological confrontation not to serve Europe’s own security interests but rather to threaten international stability as a whole. Thus, China’s position on NATO is based on the accusation that it serves American hegemony and threatens security and stability in Asia and Europe. Beijing views NATO as a tool for implementing America’s strategic plans, aiming to mobilize member states of the military alliance to pursue a policy of Asian expansion in the face of China. China and the People’s Liberation Army reject NATO’s involvement in Asia-Pacific issues, arguing that NATO’s policies harm Europe’s economic and technological security. From a Chinese perspective, the alliance’s technological confrontation poses a threat to international stability and European security, with China believing that NATO’s policies ultimately undermine Europe’s own security.

The Asia Pacific’s geopolitical balance is under change. While the U.S. remains the main architect of the plan, it is Australia that is becoming the executor of the strategy in the Oceania region. Through the signing of multiple defense agreements with the small island states, Canberra is transforming itself from a middle power to a regional security player in the South Pacific region. 

Australia, being the most trusted ally of the United States and a member of the two most important defense cooperations, i.e., AUKUS and QUAD, makes it suitable to provide security to its neighbors. By signing the bilateral agreements in the defense domain, Australia, particularly, and the United States, generally, want to counter China’s rising military presence in the Pacific region. The defense deals signed with Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, and Fiji collectively demonstrate that work on a broader security plan is under process. Instead of deploying American military bases directly in these states, Washington is relying on Canberra to expand its security footprint in the South Pacific region.  

The recent signing of the Australia-Fiji agreement named “Ocean of Peace Alliance” on July 6, 2026, is the latest in the series. This agreement marks Fiji’s first mutual defense treaty and Australia’s fourth, following treaties with the United States, New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea.   Secondly, the announcement of the Pukpuk Treaty entering into force between Australia and Papua New Guinea by PM Anthony Albanese and PM Honourable James Marape MP on July 8, 2026, also showcases a mutual defense commitment. Thirdly, the signing of the Nakamal Agreement between Australia and Vanuatu in June 2026 prevented China from creating military bases in the country.

In addition to this, the new PM of the Solomon Islands, Matthew Wale, has also shown interest in reducing the country’s dependence on China. He stated that the Solomon Islands-China pact, signed in 2022, needs to be revised, which would allow China to deploy its military and police personnel. By signaling on revising the agreement, it clearly demarcates that the Solomon Islands do not want to allow their land to be used for Chinese military bases. This statement proved a silver lining for Australia’s hegemonic designs in the region, as it was fearful that the Solomon Islands would be a foothold for China in the Pacific.

The momentum and process of acquiring a broader Pacific security strategy are extending, as New Zealand PM Christopher Luxon has also shown interest in joining the recently signed Ocean of Peace Alliance. This also marks Australia’s victory in that these Pacific states are gradually turning away from China and moving towards Western allies. This also shows defense cooperation, military exercises, information sharing, and maritime cooperation. In such a case, when there is an attack on any ally in these domains, then others will come to aid and rescue.

Also, the opening of the US Embassy in the Solomon Islands back in 2023 and the agreement between another QUAD member, i.e., Japan, and the Solomon Islands also strengthen Australia’s position in the Pacific region.

Now, the bigger question here is why this change in geopolitical balance is happening and why the regional players are taking the lead despite having the hegemon, i.e., the United States. Rising interference of China by expanding its naval capabilities has drawn concerns of the states in the Oceania region. The recent firing of a long-range ballistic missile in the South Pacific region on the same day that Australia and Fiji signed the treaty sends a clear message that China will not remain quiet on these expanding relations. Although Chinese state media have stated that this firing was just a mere test using dummy warheads. But the concerns of the government officials of the Pacific countries and their rising apprehensions have clearly shown that concerns for Australia and its allies are increasing against China. This fear has enabled them to move towards a securitization strategy and maximize their security capabilities.

Along with benefits, there are various risks for Australia and partnering nations as well by entering into these defense deals. The original plan of keeping the Indo-Pacific free and open for trade for all is gradually turning into a hub of militarization. Therefore, strategic competition between China and Australia will increase more than ever before, compelling Canberra to engage in more economic and defense treaties in the broader Indo-Pacific region to maintain its central position. Additionally, small island states are also in turmoil as they are caught between China and the Western bloc.

Thus, it is clear that the US is expanding its network in the South Pacific region by making Australia a regional security player. This also sends a signal to China that its growing capabilities and tactics will not go unanswered. Moreover, Pacific Island countries are also diversifying their options by signing defense agreements and are not predominantly relying on China. These agreements also reduce the possibility of Beijing having a military presence in the Oceania region. Therefore, whether Australia’s expanding defense network succeeds or not depends on mutual trust. By not compromising the sovereignty of these states, Canberra can only become the regional security provider on its own terms.       

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently launched a public attack on the International Criminal Court (ICC), vowing to “dismantle the ICC—brick by brick.” Washington’s position is that the ICC has no authority to try officials from non-member states—such as the US itself—or their allies, and that it will not accept any international court exercising jurisdiction over American citizens without US consent. Washington therefore intends to use diplomatic pressure and sanctions to counter the Court.

If one still believes in the international community’s definition of war crimes, this looks like a political move to absolve the United States and Israel of war crimes committed in the Middle East. To that end, Washington is pressuring allies — including states that are parties to the Rome Statute — to withdraw from the ICC.

“Trump said in January, ‘I don’t need international law’ to highlight his ‘America First’ policy. He is now keeping that promise, and the ICC is just one example.”

The day before Rubio announced his intent to dismantle the ICC, fourteen countries, including the United States, publicly reaffirmed their support for the ten-year-old ruling in the South China Sea Arbitration—a decision handed down by another international arbitration body: an ad hoc Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), administered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

Ironically, of the fourteen countries, only the Philippines—the actual party to the case—has a direct stake in South China Sea rights. The other five countries with genuine interests in the South China Sea did not join this “cheerleading squad”: Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, and Indonesia. Of these, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei are, like the Philippines, “principal claimant states.”

Aside from the US and the Philippines, every other country among the fourteen marking the tenth anniversary of the ruling is an ICC member state: Australia, Canada, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, New Zealand, Romania, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom.

These 12 ICC member states have no stake whatsoever in South China Sea affairs, yet they support an international arbitration body — and are now being pressured by the United States to boycott another international arbitration body they themselves belong to. Fourteen countries are happy to use international law to pressure China, but when international law becomes inconvenient for the US and Israel, is that suddenly a different matter?

The Philippines finds itself in the most awkward position of all. Manila withdrew from the ICC in 2019, yet after Ferdinand Marcos Jr. took office as president, it allowed Interpol and Philippine airport authorities to arrest former president Rodrigo Duterte in 2025 and hand him directly over to the ICC for trial.

The real story behind this episode is domestic political rivalry within the Philippines, combined with Washington’s long-standing displeasure with Duterte. International institutions have played the role of “witch-hunt enforcer,” helping the US and Manila nail a political opponent to the cross.

In the past, the international community could invoke Rome Statute standards to brand Duterte’s “war on drugs” a crime against humanity. But what now?

The ICC cannot prosecute non-member states, but it can prosecute individuals—such as Benjamin Netanyahu. Moreover, under the Rome Statute’s territoriality principle, the Court has jurisdiction if the alleged crime occurred on the territory of a member state. In the Middle East case, Palestine is a state party. In the Philippine case, although Manila withdrew from the ICC in 2019, crimes committed before that withdrawal remain within the Court’s reach.

The reason the US can attack the ICC so freely is that other international arbitration bodies do not follow this same “detour through territoriality” to claim jurisdiction over non-member states, nor do they try individuals—they adjudicate sovereign states (or transnational corporate entities). As such, they strictly adhere to the most fundamental principle of international law: the principle of state consent.

Interestingly, the tribunal that presided over the South China Sea arbitration itself violated the principle of state consent by ruling on a case brought against China, which refused to participate. This is precisely why China has never recognized the ruling as having any legal basis. Yet the fourteen countries that support the ruling seem untroubled by this violation of a core principle of international law.

In other words, both the ICC and the ad hoc tribunal behind the South China Sea arbitration suffer from the same flaw: overreach. The ICC has been accused of an “idealism” that oversteps state sovereignty, while the South China Sea tribunal has been criticized for “procedural overreach”—under UNCLOS, an ad hoc tribunal has no authority whatsoever over land territorial sovereignty, yet the tribunal accepted the Philippines’ framing that “downgraded” what were really sovereignty and maritime-delimitation questions into a simple matter of “the legal status of islands and reefs” and used that framing to assert jurisdiction for itself.

Taiwan was an innocent bystander caught in the crossfire of the South China Sea arbitration. Itu Aba (Taiping Island), which is under the actual control of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and has both fresh water and the capacity to sustain human habitation, was nonetheless ruled to be a mere “”rock”—stripping it of any 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone.

Given that both international arbitration bodies suffer from the same problem of overreach, if one follows the US in opposing the ICC, shouldn’t one logically also oppose the South China Sea ruling? This month, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs launched an “urgent assessment” to awkwardly grapple with exactly this dilemma, since Manila has skin in both games—the Duterte case and the South China Sea ruling.

If Manila agrees to help dismantle the ICC, what happens to Duterte, still awaiting trial in The Hague? And if China then uses that same logic to reject the South China Sea ruling, what then? The other twelve member states that joined this “witch hunt” find themselves in an equally awkward spot.

Second only to the Philippines in embarrassment is Japan. Tokyo is the ICC’s largest financial backer; the Court’s current president, Tomoko Akane, is Japanese; and Japan has long been one of the ICC’s staunchest supporters. Is Tokyo now expected to help the US dismantle the ICC or to withdraw from it altogether?

Japan also finds itself in a glaring contradiction over the South China Sea ruling. If Taiwan-controlled Taiping Island—with an area of 510,000 square meters (roughly the size of 71 standard football pitches), fresh water, and the capacity to sustain habitation)—was ruled a mere “rock,” then how can Okinotorishima, an outcrop Japan claims sovereignty over that covers just 9.44 square meters (about the size of a double bed), possibly qualify as an “island”?

By that logic, Tokyo’s support for the South China Sea ruling effectively concedes that Okinotorishima has no exclusive economic zone at all — a self-inflicted contradiction that China has been quick to mock.

One could, therefore, say all fourteen countries backing the South China Sea ruling are applying a double standard, and that thirteen of them have no connection to the South China Sea whatsoever. Aside from the Philippines, the only country with any real claim to South China Sea interests is the United States — and the US holds international law in contempt, going so far as to vow to destroy an international arbitration institution outright.

This episode symbolizes the unraveling of the international order—a world reverting to the law of the jungle. The United States is dismantling the very international order it built, and the ones hurt most are precisely its own allies.

The Philippines and Japan have been given the responsibility of encircling China on the front line by the United States, but the footholds of the two countries are also being dismantled by the United States. In front of them, there is only the risk of opposing China and the weakening guarantee.

Above all, the United States has proven, by its own actions, that the so-called international order was never fair and never operated on a fixed standard — it was merely a temporary tool for an empire to rule the world. And when the tool stops being useful, it gets discarded, leaving its followers staring, embarrassed, at the tool still in their hands.

When Washington celebrates the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence on July 4th, the celebrations will arrive bruised. There will be the customary funding disputes, a federal commission fighting against a more partisan task force from the White House, and a public worn by years of political turmoil, all of which will turn what could have been an occasion of civic healing into another USA ‘celebration’ in the world. None of this has gone unnoticed in Beijing, given that this ‘celebration’ is being interpreted more as a diagnosis than a birthday. What is being asked throughout the commentaries from Qiushi (求是), on CCTV, in Tsinghua and Peking University, is simply put, what kind of America is turning 250?

Within the last five years, the interpretation given from both the official channels and the more informal academic channels in Beijing has varied considerably. Most importantly, these streams have been diverging for some time and therefore offer significant insight into how Beijing has been interpreting the country it has been comparing itself to for the last 20 years.

From “the East rising” to a measured retreat

Many are familiar with the upbeat version of the story. After 2020, the phrases that framed China’s worldview included “great changes, unseen in a century” (百年未有之大变局) and “the East is rising, the West is declining” (东升西降). The latter, used by Xi Jinping in remarks to senior officials in early 2021 and again in 2023, provided the slogan for the official narrative. The Covid-19 pandemic, the insurrection at the US Capitol, and a decade of US political instability seemed to provide the empirical evidence for a thesis, rooted in Chinese Marxist theory, that capitalist systems contain the principle of their own disintegration. This was rationalized and systemized after the 2008 financial crisis and has remained largely unchanged.

However, the reality is far more complicated than the slogan implies. Researchers who have traced the terminology in Chinese academic publications through the CNKI database have found that scholarly use of “the East is rising, the West is declining” (东升西降) peaked around 2021 and has subsided since then, even though the idea itself remained more prevalent than it was during the entire duration of Donald Trump’s first presidential term. In other words, the slogan was being diplomatically retracted within scholarly circles at the very moment it was most associated with official optimism. When Xi’s speech in 2023, which was published in Qiushi in January 2025, described the West’s decline, it was more a formal, official copy of a sentiment than a newly published speech.

The official rhetoric, however, did not soften. A Brookings study found a near doubling in the use of “American decline” terminology in official Chinese documents from 2025. State Security Minister Chen Yixin wrote in Qiushi in December of 2025, what could be described as a near complete inventory of the ills of the world: the usurpation of unipolar dominance gives way to economic decline and social disintegration, a domestic credit crisis and the collapse of foreign mythic structures. Around the same time, a popular phrase borrowed from gaming, the “kill line” (斩杀线) found its way to official Chinese publications. A Qiushi article from January 2026 described an America, the working class of which had been pushed (beyond the point of no return) along the path of ruin by an unrepairable (decomposing) industrial base while financial capitalism strangled the benefits. The conclusion that was drawn was that we had already entered the post-American world.

The correction of early 2026

Then the story changed once more, and the correction was from within Beijing’s own strategic community.

The consensus in Chinese policymaking following the Busan summit in October 2025, was that China had won the trade war and forced the US into a stalemate. The years of maximum pressure, they said, did not lead to the systemic concessions China had sought, but rather worsened American inflation and reduced productivity. For a few months, the optimism was high. However, by 2026, the optimism was replaced by apprehension. A series of adverse events for China, from losing equity in a German port buyout, to the Nexperia debacle, to the Iran war, led many to wonder if China’s victory was, in fact, a loss. The dominant question that the strategic community was debating was whether American power was in decline or if it was in fact, power rebounding.

What was most interesting was who took the cautious side. Both Chen Wenling and Yan Xuetong argued that the US had, and has, the military and economic capability to project power. In their view, the US had the edge, and Trump’s high stakes, risky policy decisions were based on the belief that the US had the dominant position. The gap was definitely closing, but was not yet a reality. The advice they gave was to be patient. If China was able to “manage its own affairs well,” it was likely that the US would be compelled to return to a more stable relationship.

The key observation regarding prominent intellectuals in Beijing is this. They have never been champions of the triumphalist position. Yan Xuetong has spent a great deal of time dismissing talks of “The East is rising and the West is declining” and multipolarity as delusional. His recently published book, Inflection of History (历史的拐点), which was published by CITIC Press in December of 2025, predicts a US-China bipolarity which, during the next decade, would be expected to stabilise rather than destabilise. In this scenario, over the next decade the gap in capability between the two powers would be expected to converge, although the US would retain an overall advantage. In this scenario, the US would retain overall dominance in services, cyberspace and global influence, while China would retain relative superiority in manufacturing and be dominant in the international arena. In this scenario, Yan does argue that Trump would be expected to damage American power, especially with regards to the international balance, through the closure of laboratories, the loss of researchers, and a declining international trade. However, damage to the leader of the bipolar order is not the same as the collapse of the order, and Yan is very cautious not to make confuse the two.

As China’s foremost authority on US studies, Wang Jisi (王缉思) of Peking University, has placed the greatest emphasis on the need for a clear and level-headed approach. His influential essay, titled, “Has America really declined? Chinese people should hold a sober understanding” ( 美国到底有没有衰落？中国人应有清醒认识), leads with the argument that the most important factors influencing the relationship are domestic political issues, and are not to be found in some quantifiable assessment of relative national strength, or within the confines of the Thucydides Trap. He has argued that the effects of Trump’s immigration restrictions would be more symbolic than real, and would not negatively impact the long-term potential of the US economy. Along with American scholar David Lampton, he wrote, that while both societies have convinced itself that the other is an existential threat, which is a dangerous narrative trap, similar to a noticeable shift of power.

Why AI keeps rewriting the script

If the quest for technological dominance was to be provided as a single reason for the inconsistency in the narrative, it would be the most accurate. The same confidence that characterized 2025 is the same that will characterize the sobriety of 2026. When Trump had his second inauguration in January 2025, DeepSeek had launched their R1. It disrupted the presumption of AI dominance in America and had a day effect of 200 billion on Nvidia’s valuation. For Chinese decision makers, since then, it has been electric. Carnegie researchers described it as the rediscovery of technological confidence. The effect was the realization of the theory of “The East is rising and the West is declining” (东升西降): a monumental achievement with controls on exports from a young lab in Hangzhou.

The second installment was more sobering. The launch of DeepSeek’s next model, V4, in April 2026, was received with indifference. In fact, DeepSeek’s own internal product documentation stated that V4 was between three and six months behind American models. Furthermore, V4 was reliant on domestic chips from Huawei, and was, in most assessments, dependent on American technology that was not easily replaceable. For Chinese analysts, this was not a case of falling behind, but one of the more difficult problems of maintaining the technological edge. Reshoring and tariffs told a similar story. The American industrial base, which the “kill line” (斩杀线) commentary presumed was a terminally stagnated industrial base, was the target of a renewed, aggressive, and partially successful push to bring industry back to America. A competitor with such a focus on rejuvenation and renewal is not, on the surface, a declining competitor.

The G2 Puzzle

There’s another element coming from Washington that adds to the complexity of the story of American decline. This element relates to Trump. Before the Busan meeting, Trump used the term “G2,” and several Washington officials followed suit. The decline thesis cannot account for this. If America is indeed in decline, why is it offering G2 (shared leadership) with China?

Chinese reflexive responses are interesting. The official position, as expressed in Zhou Li’s (周力) December 2025 article, is that G2 as a hegemony is incompatible with China’s commitment to a multipolar world and would alienate the Global South which China is trying to court. These scholars have found their own workarounds. Yan Xuetong and Zheng Yongnian have suggested that G2 is more a description of a scenario of existing bipolarity than a policy to adopt. Xia Liping of Tongji University has suggested that G2 be rephrased as “China-US coordination” (中美协调) instead of “China-US co-governance” (中美共治), which makes it easier for Beijing to accept peer status while not succumbing to a duopoly. The attempt to manage the terminology suggests that the US at 250 is still sufficiently powerful that its offer of co-leadership is significant, even to a China that is more confident than ever.

A mirror, not a verdict

What emerges from five years of this commentary is not a single Chinese view of America at 250 but a layered one. The loudest polemical phrase is that the US, a hegemon, is in an irreversible decline. Within a Chinese context, this serves a purpose unrelated to the US. The state media have found it convenient to juxtapose gun violence and homelessness against the backdrop of Chinese economic performance. The decline of the US economy flouts the-premise, as socialism is the ultimate victor among capitalist competition.

But that was in the loud tier. In the reserved tier, the people in Beijing who are actually relying on reading Washington have converged on a more cautious and, frankly, more accurate assessment. They have described America as a relative decline, but erratic, and still very formidable as well as technologically advanced, especially in the field of the upcoming and new challenges of competition. The assessments have consistently referred to America as “declining but dangerous,” and this phrase has proven to be the most accurate of the lot. Reality has justified the phrase. The same cannot be said of unqualified and total victory.

The inconsistency in narratives can be attributed to the fact that the accounts are serving two purposes simultaneously. They are both analysis and propaganda, and the two types of work are at odds with each other. After AI successes or trade wins, the propaganda is ahead of analysis. After the impacts of reshoring or when a Chinese model stays behind, the analysts bring it back. The occasion is provided by the anniversary, but the underlying reason is that China has not decided, and maybe cannot decide, if they think that simply waiting will work in their favour or if the gap they have slowly been closing over the past 25 years is going to be a stubborn gap.

At 250, in other words, the United States functions in Chinese discourse less as a subject to be judged than as a mirror. What Beijing sees in it, in any given month, tells you a great deal about how confident Beijing is feeling about itself

The greatest geopolitical and economic challenge facing the United States today is the proliferation of international Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs.) While the United States has the “sweet geopolitical spot in the world’s geography and topographic landmass,” its economic dominance is being challenged by the proliferation of international SWFs. It is true, at present, that the United States has the largest reserve of oil and mineral wealth in the world, yet with SWFs gaining traction in the world economy, the oil reserves and mineral wealth may not matter.

Those countries that have initiated SWFs as part of their economic and geopolitical life are on an upward trajectory. The United States, on the other hand, is on a downward path by not marshalling its vast mineral wealth in a comprehensive and dynamic SWF. If things continue on their present course, those countries utilizing their mineral wealth and excess cash surplus will eventually catch up and overtake the size of the US economy. This is an evolving threat to the national security of the United States and to its very polity.

The most immediate threat to the United States is the race to develop mining facilities on the Moon to harvest and transport the critical element of Helium-3 (He-3.)    He-3 is a critical element for the increasing economic demands of a modern world economy. Whoever can establish mining dominance for this critical element will become the world’s leading economic power in the world, regardless of that nation’s mineral wealth on Earth.

However, with its present economic and political strength, the United States has the means to reverse that trend if its two major political organizations can compromise on the very nature of the framework that establishes a United States SWF; this challenge is not easily dealt with.

This article discusses the legislative gridlock surrounding the creation of a United States SWF and the accelerating international competition that challenges the current United States dominance in space technology.

Commonwealth Fusion Systems (CFS) is currently constructing the SPARC at Devens, Massachusetts. CFS is constructing the SPARC to demonstrate to the world that it has solved the fusion problem. Despite some technological setbacks, CFS is on schedule to make the SPARC operational by the end of 2026, or early 2027. At the same time, CFS is currently constructing a fusion reactor (called a tokamak) in Virginia, which is scheduled to go online in the early 2030s. Critical to the ARC’s development is a shortage of the element He-3. He-3 is ignited by radio frequency and is the sparkplug that begins the plasma process, which is fusion energy, in the ARC tokamak.

The Commercial Landscape: U.S. Private Frontrunners

Terrestrial Helium-3 supply—derived primarily from nuclear stockpile maintenance—is severely capped at 22,000 to 30,000 liters annually. With surging demand for ultra-low-term quantum computer cooling, private aerospace firms are leading the transition to lunar harvesting:

• Interlune: Founded by former Blue Origin executives, the company unveiled a full-scale prototype harvester developed with Vermeer to process one hundred metric tons of regolith per hour. Backed by a $6.9 million NASA contract for its Prospect Moon payload, Interlune secured a historic $300M+ supply agreement with Finnish quantum firm Bluefors. Its first mapping payload is scheduled for an upcoming commercial lunar launch.
• Lunar Helium-3 Mining (LH3M): This firm holds five U.S. patents on a non-invasive, gas-separation architecture designed to extract solar wind volatile gases while bypassing traditional, high-wear mechanical regolith excavation.

The U.S. Sovereign Wealth Fund Gridlock

While Helium-3 is valued at roughly $20 million per kilogram, the asset cannot currently be utilized to seed an American Sovereign Wealth Fund due to severe political domestic gridlock:

• The Legislative Catch-22: The U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act explicitly protects private enterprise, granting corporations exclusive ownership over extracted space resources. To capture this value, Congress would need to enact “space-severance taxes” or equity-for-infrastructure deals—both of which face massive ideological pushbacks in a deeply divided legislature.  It should be noted that American taxpayers have invested some $1.9 trillion (adjusted for inflation) in technology developed by NASA. Since the American people invested this money, they should be entitled to a return on investment.
• The Deficit vs. Surplus Dilemma: Traditional SWFs rely on state-managed resource surpluses (e.g., Norway’s oil). The U.S. operates at a massive structural deficit. Republicans propose seeding a fund via tariffs or fossil-fuel extraction, while Democrats demand funding via corporate wealth taxes or clean-energy equity. These disputes, combined with immediate 2026 midterm election priorities, have stalled the SWF framework completely.

Global Geopolitical Competitors: State-Driven Alternatives

While the U.S. model depends heavily on the private market, international adversaries are leveraging unified state power to establish dominance over lunar resources:

• China (CNSA): China’s Chang’e lunar exploration program is systematically mapping Helium-3 concentrations. Unlike the U.S. focus on near-term quantum cooling, Beijing explicitly views lunar He-3 as a long-term strategic energy priority to fuel Earth-based Deuterium-Helium-3 nuclear fusion reactors.
• The China-Russia Coalition: Beijing and Moscow have formalized a binding industrial partnership to construct an automated nuclear reactor on the Moon’s South Pole by 2035–2036. This autonomous reactor is designed to resolve the “Lunar Night” problem, providing continuous power to massive, automated mining rovers and scientific labs under the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) framework.
• Japan (ispace): In the allied sector, Japanese lunar robotics firm ispace has partnered with European mining tech developers to pioneer its own automated, energy-efficient recovery models for lunar Helium-3.

·        Conclusion

·        The race for Helium-3 represents a critical shift from symbolic space exploration to deep-space industrial supply chains. While U.S. commercial tech is moving quickly, domestic policy gridlock risks ceding permanent, state-backed infrastructure dominance to the China-Russia ILRS coalition.

·        While the concept of using outer space resources to build national wealth is actively discussed by think tanks, Congress has separate, targeted pieces of legislation addressing artificial intelligence revenue, foreign transparency, and space resource exploration rules.

·         

·        The primary draft bills and legislative vehicles currently stalled in committee reveal how Congress is attempting to navigate these frameworks:

The American A.I. Sovereign Wealth Fund Act (S. 4825)

Introduced in June 2026 by Senate Finance Committee member Bernie Sanders (I-VT), this is the most direct legislative attempt to create a federal wealth fund.

• The Mechanism: The bill proposes imposing a specialized excise tax on systemically critical artificial intelligence models and automation infrastructure. The revenue would seed a citizen-owned national wealth fund.
• Why It’s Stalled: It is currently deadlocked in the Senate Finance Committee. The bill faces severe pushback from lawmakers who argue that taxing emerging domestic tech sectors will cause the U.S. to lose the AI race to China, preferring instead to seed a potential fund via tariffs or natural resources.

2. The Sovereign Wealth Fund Transparency Act (S. 1488)

Introduced by Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), this bill tackles the national security and foreign policy side of state-owned investment vehicles.

• The Mechanism: Rather than creating a U.S. fund, this bill forces heavy disclosure requirements, financial auditing, and security screening on foreign sovereign wealth funds operating within U.S. critical infrastructure, high-tech, and aerospace sectors.

Why It’s Stalled: Referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, it has remained stagnant due to concerns that over-regulating allied sovereign wealth funds (such as those from Gulf state allies or Singapore) could chill necessary foreign direct investment into U.S. tech startups.

3. Space Resource Extraction & Regulatory Frameworks (CRS / Commerce Committee Review)

There is currently no singular active bill trying to place federal royalties on lunar Helium-3 mining. Instead, the debate is gridlocked during budget reconciliation and agency authorizations within the House and Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committees.

• The Conflict: Congressional research reports on space resource extraction outline a widening gap in regulatory authority. NASA’s Artemis framework pushes heavily for in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) via public-private partnerships. However, some factions in Congress are pushing for strict government-owned procurement models to prevent private monopolies over lunar sites, effectively freezing long-term policy development
• Midterm Postponements: Broad commercial space bills have been repeatedly delayed because committee attention is entirely consumed by urgent federal budget reconciliation battles and defense appropriations.development.

Summary of Bill Statuses

Conclusion

Until the two major political organizations can begin to compromise for the good of the American people, the United States will eventually revert to a second-class power.

A regulatory package as a long-term political strategy

The European Union’s recent digital laws are often described as a regulatory package. The AI Act, the Data Act, and the emerging Data Union Strategy form a wide experiment in using transparency as infrastructure for the digital economy.

The underlying idea is that digital markets cannot be governed well if users, businesses, regulators, and affected individuals cannot understand how systems work, who controls data, where risks arise, and who is responsible for intervention. Therefore, transparency is becoming a condition for accountability, market access, innovation, and long-term trust that falls under what appears as a long-term strategy to regain data sovereignty.

The EU’s policy bet

The EU regulatory approach is founded on the premise that greater transparency can enhance the governability of complex digital systems. However, the mere disclosure of information does not result directly in a greater understanding of the data available; a company can disclose large amounts of technical material while leaving users no better able to assess risk, compare alternatives, or challenge decisions.

Accordingly, the success of the EU’s transparency framework should not be measured by the sheer volume of regulatory obligations it imposes. Rather, its effectiveness depends on whether those obligations generate information that is genuinely useful in practice. The relevant benchmarks are whether disclosures are meaningful, accessible, timely, and comparable, thereby enabling users and regulators to make informed decisions.

The AI Act’s goal to make AI legible

The AI Act shows the EU’s approach most clearly. Its stated purpose is to improve the functioning of the internal market, promote human-centric and trustworthy AI, protect health, safety, and fundamental rights, and support innovation (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689).

In policy terms, the AI Act tries to make AI systems legible. It assumes that AI risks should not be addressed only after harm occurs. They should be identified, documented, and managed before systems are placed on the market or deployed in sensitive settings.

This is why transparency is linked to risk. High-risk systems face more demanding documentation, monitoring, and information obligations. Lower-risk systems face lighter duties. The European Commission describes the AI Act as the first comprehensive legal framework on AI, designed to address AI risks while fostering trustworthy AI in Europe (European Commission, “Regulatory framework for AI”).

The policy logic is fundamentally pragmatic. Effective regulatory oversight depends on access to adequate information. Likewise, deployers require sufficient information to make informed decisions regarding whether and under what conditions to implement AI systems. Individuals affected by AI-assisted decisions must also have access to relevant information in order to understand how such decisions have been made and, where appropriate, to question or challenge them.

The Data Act attempts to rebalance informational power.

The Data Act uses transparency for a different purpose. Where the AI Act focuses on risk and trust, the Data Act focuses on access, fairness, and economic value. Its objective is to create harmonized rules on fair access to and use of data (Regulation (EU) 2023/2854).

The challenge is that data generated by connected products and digital services is often controlled by a small number of firms. Users may generate valuable data through their use of products but still lack practical access to it. Businesses may need data to innovate, repair products, or offer competing services but face legal, technical, or contractual barriers.

The Commission presents the Data Act as a way to address the challenges and opportunities created by data in the EU, with emphasis on fair access, user rights, and personal data protection (European Commission, “Data Act”).

In this context, transparency functions as a mechanism for redistributing information. Where users are unaware of what data is generated, how it can be accessed, or the conditions under which it may be shared, formally recognized rights of access are unlikely to translate into meaningful practical control. Effective data rights therefore depend not only on their legal recognition but also on the transparency necessary to enable individuals to exercise them.

The Data Union Strategy: From Control to Usable Data

The Data Union Strategy shows the broader direction of EU policy. The Commission frames it around increasing the availability of data for AI development, simplifying EU data rules and strengthening Europe’s position on international data flows (European Commission, “European Data Union Strategy”).

This is significant because it seems that the European Union seeks to pursue two complementary goals simultaneously. On the one hand, it aims to protect fundamental rights and mitigate the risks associated with digital technologies. On the other, it seeks to facilitate greater access to data in order to foster innovation, support the development of artificial intelligence, and enhance European competitiveness. In this way, transparency serves as the connecting principle between these objectives. In fact, by increasing the visibility of how data is collected, processed, and shared, it is intended to strengthen trust in data flows while making them more accessible and capable of supporting innovation.

Why meaningfulness matters most

Meaningfulness is the anchor test. Transparency is useful only if it reveals something that can change decisions or enable scrutiny.

In the AI context, this means information about a system’s purpose, limitations, performance, and risk profile must be specific enough to support procurement, oversight, and challenge. In the data context, it means users must receive information that helps them understand what data exists and how it can be used.

Generic compliance language is not enough. A disclosure that says a system is “risk managed” or that data is “available upon request” may be formally correct but still unhelpful. The real question is whether the information helps someone act.

Information must arrive before decisions are locked in.

Transparency is most useful when it arrives early enough to affect decisions. AI information matters most before procurement and deployment. Data-access information matters most before users become dependent on a particular product, service, or cloud provider.

Post-event transparency can still support audit and enforcement. But it is weaker as a prevention tool. A regime that informs users only after they have lost practical freedom of choice will have limited effect.

Accordingly, comparability occupies a central role in the European Union’s internal market strategy. If transparency is intended to promote competition, facilitate public procurement, and strengthen trust in cross-border digital markets, disclosures must be presented in a manner that enables users, businesses, and regulators to meaningfully compare systems, services, and contractual arrangements.

This objective is particularly relevant in the context of AI procurement, connected product ecosystems, and cloud switching, where informed comparisons are essential to reducing information asymmetries and preventing vendor lock-in. Nevertheless, pursuing comparability inevitably involves trade-offs. While standardized disclosure frameworks can improve the accessibility and consistency of information, they may also obscure sector-specific risks and contextual nuances. Consequently, a uniform template may enhance market discipline and regulatory oversight while simultaneously limiting a more nuanced understanding of the particular risks associated with individual technologies or markets.

The risk of regulatory complexity

The EU’s approach is ambitious, but it is also complex. The AI Act does not operate alone. It sits alongside the GDPR, the Data Act, the Digital Services Act, the Digital Markets Act, the Cyber Resilience Act, and sector-specific rules.

A European Parliament study notes that the AI Act interacts with other digital laws, including the GDPR, Data Act, and Cyber Resilience Act, and that this interplay creates significant regulatory complexity (European Parliament, “Interplay between the AI Act and the EU digital legislative framework”).

Secondary analysis makes a similar point. CEPS has argued that the AI Act may overlap with several horizontal and sector-specific rules, creating possible gaps, inconsistencies, and legal uncertainty (CEPS, “The AI Act and emerging EU digital acquis”).

Competitiveness and the SME problem

The burden of complexity is not shared equally. Large technology firms are better able to absorb compliance costs, hire specialists, and shape standards. Smaller firms may struggle.

Bruegel has warned that EU AI regulation risks imposing disproportionate burdens on smaller firms and may contribute to market concentration if compliance demands are not properly balanced (Bruegel, “The right balance: how to fix European Union artificial intelligence regulation”). This is a key policy tension. The EU wants trustworthy digital markets, but it also wants innovation and technological sovereignty. Transparency can support both goals, but only if it is designed in a way that smaller firms can use and implement.

From disclosure to governance

The EU’s digital strategy should be judged by a practical standard. The question is not whether Europe has created the world’s most elaborate digital rulebook. The question is whether that rulebook produces usable knowledge, enables timely intervention, supports meaningful comparison and redistributes informational power.

If it does, transparency may become genuine governance infrastructure. If it does not, the EU risks building a sophisticated compliance architecture that documents the digital economy without effectively governing it.

WASHINGTON — The world has largely viewed the U.S. more favorably than China for years, but those opinions have flipped in Beijing’s favor this year, according to a new poll by the Pew Research Center, a remarkable shift driven in part by tensions between the Trump administration and U.S. allies.

More people have favorable views of China than the U.S. in 25 out of the 36 countries and territories that were surveyed, including Canada and Mexico. The poll was conducted from February to May, a period when the United States and Israel launched a war against Iran.

In only six countries do people still see the U.S. more positively than China, according to the findings released Wednesday.

Views in 22 out of the 36 countries and territories also are more favorable of Chinese leader Xi Jinping than President Trump, including in Canada, Mexico and major European powers including France, Germany and the U.K. However, people in many of the countries have low confidence in both men.

It marks the first time in the roughly 20 years Pew has been tracking global opinions that China has been viewed more positively than the U.S., said Laura Silver, associate director of Pew’s Global Attitudes Research and one of the researchers on the study. Views of Beijing and Washington have been very similar at some points in the past but have not been significantly more favorable for China until now, she said.

The shift follows the COVID-19 pandemic becoming a distant issue and as global views of the U.S. have soured, Silver said.

“There was just an actual relationship between the outbreak of the war and the sense that the U.S. is just not contributing to peace and stability and that people have less confidence in Donald Trump,” she said.

Trump’s demands to control Greenland, the American military raid that captured Venezuela’s then-leader Nicolás Maduro, and the U.S. handling of the Israeli-Hamas war in Gaza also have led to low approval in many countries, Silver said.

“The U.S. has done a lot in terms of global engagement in recent months to years that is not being perceived positively internationally,” she said.

Aside from benefiting from the fading memory of the pandemic, China appears to have gained from comparison with the U.S., Silver said.

“By comparison, we know that China is seen to be a more reliable partner in many places. It’s more likely to be seen to contribute to global peace and stability,” the researcher said.

Notably, those in some U.S. allied countries have drastically shifted their views in recent years, such as Canada. In the new survey, only 33% of Canadians have positive views of the U.S., down from 57% in 2023. Over the same period, their favorable opinions of China rose from 14% to 44%.

Trump slapped a barrage of tariffs on Canadian goods last year, and even claimed that Canada could be the “the 51st state.”

Major European countries — including France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Sweden, the Netherlands and Italy — all have switched their opinions toward the world’s two largest economies.

People in the U.K., where about 6 in 10 held positive views of the U.S. in 2023, now view China and the U.S. similarly. Three years ago, the spread was 32 percentage points in Washington’s favor.

Of the six countries where people have more favorable views of the U.S., Israel leads the way. About 8 in 10 Israelis view the U.S. positively, compared with 19% for China.

The other five countries are Japan, India, South Korea, the Philippines and Poland. Still, even their views of the U.S. have dimmed over recent years.

The U.S. is still ahead of China when it comes to government respect for personal freedoms, though the gap is shrinking, the Pew report says.

While China’s standing has improved somewhat, the narrowed divide is “driven largely by the fact that people in nearly every country surveyed have become less likely to say the U.S. government respects its people’s personal freedoms” since 2021, when Pew last asked the question.

For the new study, Pew surveyed more than 42,000 people across 35 countries plus the West Bank and east Jerusalem, with margins of error ranging from 2.3 to 5.5 percentage points depending on the country.

Tang writes for the Associated Press. AP journalists Linley Sanders, Emily Swanson and Kevin S. Vineys contributed to this report.

The Muslim Brotherhood’s failure to penetrate Chinese society, particularly after the Arab Spring uprisings, stems from the Chinese Communist Party’s tight security grip, China’s policies of localizing religions, and the Chinese public’s rejection of transnational political ideologies. Despite the Brotherhood’s historical and organizational attempts to build ties with Muslim minorities in China, the rigid nature of the Chinese system and society has formed an impenetrable barrier to any infiltration. The fundamental contradiction between ideologies in China, such as Chinese communism as the ruling doctrine and political Islam as a totalitarian movement from which the Muslim Brotherhood emerged and China’s strict security policies aimed at integrating minorities, has led to the failure of these political ideological currents. Political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood have failed to gain a foothold in China for several structural and political reasons. The most prominent of these is the strict nature of the Chinese communist system, which prohibits any political or religious activity outside the state’s control. This is compounded by the Sinicization policies that impose absolute loyalty to Chinese culture and the Communist Party. Furthermore, the internationalist ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam clashes with Chinese nationalism. Additionally, there is a lack of popular support for such projects among Muslim minorities who follow religious traditions different from those in Arab and Islamic countries and around the world. Despite the existence of an Islamic religious group in China called Yihewani, whose name literally means brotherhood, it is a reformist movement within the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence. It originated locally in China in the 20th century, specifically in the 1930s, but it is a completely independent, traditional Hanafi school of thought with no organizational or ideological ties to the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East.

On the other hand, China harbored apprehensions about the political Islam and Muslim Brotherhood model following the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011. Research centers and decision-making bodies in Beijing closely monitored the outcomes of these uprisings, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise to power in Egypt and Tunisia. China viewed the Brotherhood’s ascent to power in some countries, such as Egypt and Tunisia, followed by their subsequent failures and the descent of some into civil war, as evidence that political Islam harbors a project to destabilize nations. This understanding led Beijing to adopt a firm, principled stance rejecting this model of political Islam entirely in order to protect its own stable development model. Consequently, China adopted a policy of strategic alliance with Egypt under President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and other Arab nationalist regimes following the events of the June 30, 2013, revolution in Egypt and the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood and its president, Mohamed Morsi. China strengthened its strategic and economic partnerships with current Arab governments, such as those in Egypt and the Gulf states. Here, China rejects interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Similarly, Arab states support the One China policy and its actions in Xinjiang. This high-level diplomatic coordination between China, Egypt, and other Arab states, following the Muslim Brotherhood’s failed rule, has led to a crackdown on any attempts to finance or subtly infiltrate the banned group through economic or educational channels within China.

Here, the Chinese state pursues a policy of institutional rejection of political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood. Chinese authorities classify any political activity with a religious basis as a direct threat to national security and territorial integrity. This has led to the banning and dismantling of any cells or attempts to establish branches of the Muslim Brotherhood. Furthermore, Muslim ethnic minorities in regions like Xinjiang (East Turkestan) face strict security and surveillance measures that prevent the formation of any opposing Islamic religious movements within China. Beijing also imposes the forced assimilation of Muslim minorities into Chinese culture and criminalizes any transnational organizational manifestations or affiliations.  With an emphasis on the dominance of communist ideology, the ruling Chinese Communist Party rejects any religious or political activity or movements that seek to assert identity above loyalty to the state and the party. This is coupled with strict Chinese security measures to combat foreign infiltration of religions, organizations, movements, and Islamic political currents within China, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood. Beijing maintains one of the world’s most stringent surveillance systems for monitoring religious and political activities. Following the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011, Chinese security agencies raised their alert levels to ensure that the contagion of color revolutions or ideological movements did not spread within its borders. China considers any foreign organization, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, a direct threat to national security and social stability. Therefore, any cells or committees attempting to engage with Chinese Muslims are banned and dismantled.

Political Islam movements have failed to penetrate Chinese society and bring about political or social changes as they have in other countries. This is due to several historical, political, cultural, and social factors imposed by the Chinese state. The most prominent of these factors are the tight security and political grip and the nature of the Chinese communist political system. China imposes a highly centralized system in which the state and the Communist Party completely control the public sphere and institutions. No independent political or ideological organization is permitted outside the umbrella of the Communist Party. Chinese authorities impose strict censorship and implement proactive security policies that prevent any political, religious, or opposition organizations or movements from existing or expanding. Furthermore, the primacy of nationalism over religion in China, where Chinese identity is primarily based on belonging to the nation and the nationality, represented by the culture of the majority Han Chinese population, makes loyalty to the state paramount. This renders the transnational ideologies adopted by political Islam movements unacceptable and severely restricted. Here, the government’s policies toward religions in China become clear. China pursues a policy of Sinicization of religions, meaning that the practice of any religious rituals must conform entirely to Chinese culture and socialism. The Chinese state follows policies of Sinicization on religions, with Chinese authorities implementing strict policies to subordinate religions to Chinese socialist culture and values. This has included systematic campaigns to prevent foreign or Middle Eastern influences on mosque style, clothing, and religious practices. China also adopts strict policies to contain any influence of political Islam and subjects religious bodies to state supervision. Beijing aims to Sinicize religions and requires their integration with the culture of the Han majority and the values ​​of the Communist Party, placing loyalty to the nation above all other affiliations.

This occurs while the Chinese state officially manages and oversees Islamic institutions, such as the Islamic Association of China, thus preventing the emergence of independent religious leaders or institutions that could adopt or disseminate the ideas of political Islam. Herein lies the role of cultural and historical diversity within China. Muslim minorities in China, such as the Hui ethnic group, have absorbed traditional Chinese culture and integrated it with their beliefs over centuries, making their communities well-integrated into the broader social fabric and resilient against external influences. Muslims have been historically integrated into China, and Islam has been part of the Chinese social fabric for over 13 centuries.  Muslim ethnic groups, such as the Hui, have successfully integrated into Chinese society and adapted to local culture. This integration has made political Islam alien to their environment due to China’s strict security measures. The Chinese government deals harshly with any religious or ethnic movements with a political character, particularly in the predominantly Muslim Xinjiang region of northwest China, under the banner of combating extremism and terrorism. Security policies and measures have been implemented to restrict any religious activity outside the official control of the Chinese state. The state adopts a dual strategy: containing practices acceptable to official state institutions while categorically rejecting any separatist or political tendencies that Beijing considers a threat to the country’s unity and stability.

Beijing manages religious pluralism through the Islamic Association of China and views any ideologies that deviate from loyalty to the state with extreme caution. The relationship between the state and Islam in China is shaped by several pillars, including national diversity. China has 56 officially recognized ethnic, religious, and national groups, with the Han Chinese constituting the vast majority at approximately 92% of the population. Regarding Muslim ethnic groups, there are 10 Muslim-majority groups in China, such as the Hui and Uyghurs, with the total number of Muslims estimated in the tens of millions. China officially adopts a policy of Sinicization, whereby Chinese authorities lead campaigns to eliminate transnational religious expressions, prohibiting religious institutions from having ties with their counterparts abroad. Religious institutions are required to adhere to the Party’s leadership and integrate their doctrines with Chinese cultural traditions. The Chinese government pursues a policy of Sinicization of Islam. The Chinese state adopts a firm strategy based on integrating Islam and its culture into the Chinese national identity (in accordance with socialism with Chinese characteristics). As we mentioned, Muslim affairs are officially managed through the Islamic Association of China, which is under the control of the ruling Communist Party. This closure of the religious sphere has thwarted the Islamic internationalism ideology promoted by the Muslim Brotherhood in Middle Eastern countries, as China confines religious teaching and practice to purely local frameworks, preventing the introduction of the writings of Sayed Qutb or Hassan Al-Banna into Chinese territory.

Therefore, we conclude that attempts by political Islamist movements, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, to infiltrate China or penetrate its Muslim communities have failed. Here we observe the cultural and ethnic differences between the Muslim minorities in China and the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is banned in Egypt and the Middle East. The main Muslim population in China is divided into two primary groups that fail to resonate with the Brotherhood’s ideology: the Hui ethnic group, a Chinese Muslim minority. The Hui are Chinese-speaking Muslims fully integrated culturally and socially into the fabric of the Chinese state. Their primary loyalty is to China, and therefore, the Arab political ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood finds no echo among them. The second group is the Uyghur ethnic group. Uyghurs reside in the Xinjiang region (East Turkestan) in northwest China. Despite the presence of nationalist and religious tendencies, Beijing has imposed extremely strict security measures (including re-education camps and biometric surveillance, which are security systems within China that use an individual’s biological characteristics, such as fingerprints, facial features, and iris scans, to verify their identity), effectively isolating the region from any activism emanating from the Middle East, particularly from the Muslim Brotherhood.

A Seoul district court on Monday sentenced former President Yoon Suk Yeol to two years in prison after finding him partially guilty of accepting illegal political funds in the form of free opinion polls from a self-proclaimed power broker.

The Seoul Central District Court convicted the jailed former president on charges of violating the Political Funds Act in a ruling that marked a departure from a separate trial where his wife was acquitted on the same charges.

Special counsel Min Joong-ki’s team earlier indicted Yoon on charges of colluding with his wife, former first lady Kim Keon Hee, and receiving 58 opinion polls worth about 270 million won (US$180,100) in total for free from the power broker, Myung Tae-kyun, between April 2021 and March 2022.

In its ruling, the court recognized that Yoon had received 14 opinion polls from Myung for free over the period, sentencing him to prison and ordering a forfeiture of 13.96 million won.

It recognized the special counsel team’s argument that Yoon had promised to support former Rep. Kim Young-sun’s nomination as a candidate for the conservative People Power Party in the parliamentary by-elections in June 2022 in exchange for the opinion polls.

“The defendant’s actions sowed distrust in politics and undermined the public trust in the development of democracy,” the court said. “A punishment commensurate with the wrongdoing is inevitable.”

The court also sentenced Myung to 18 months in prison on the charges.

The special counsel team had sought a four-year prison sentence for Yoon and a three-year term for Myung.

The ruling diverged from an appellate court’s acquittal of Yoon’s wife on charges of accepting free opinion polls from Myung in a separate trial.

In Kim’s acquittal in April, the Seoul High Court ruled the couple could not be seen as profiting off the opinion polls as Myung had provided them to other people as well. Min’s team has appealed that ruling.

After the ruling, Yoon’s lawyers vowed to appeal, saying the verdict was “difficult to understand” given the former first lady’s acquittal in her trial.

The special counsel team called the latest ruling “very meaningful,” noting the bench appeared to have closely considered the various evidence and arguments presented in its judgment.

It marked the latest conviction for Yoon, who has been standing multiple trials following his failed 2024 martial law bid. In February, Yoon was sentenced to life imprisonment for leading an insurrection through his short-lived imposition of martial law.

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A well-known Russian city, Nizhny Novgorod, is incredibly famous for its place on the energy map as the location for the largest energy production and refinery for both local consumption and for exports to Europe. But the energy history has suddenly changed in early July 2026, primarily due to unexpected attacks by Ukrainian drones. The Ukrainian drone attacks, described in official reports, have left an indelible devastating mark on Lukoil-Nizhegorodnefteorgsitez (Norsi), considered the largest oil refinery of the Lukoil corporation in Kstovo (Nizhny Novgorod region), and had to suspend its routine refinery operations.

Reuters reported this serious military-related incident on July 3, citing two sources in Russia’s oil industry. According to The Moscow Times, a reputable foreign media outlet, the drone attack damaged the plant’s main primary processing unit, AVT-6, which provided 53% of the Norsi refinery’s capacity. Another unit, AVT-5, which accounts for 25% of the plant’s capacity, was disabled by a drone on June 24. As of July 2, Norsi (Russia’s fourth largest oil refinery and the second largest gasoline producer) stopped selling wholesale quantities of gasoline and diesel fuel on the St. Petersburg Commodity and Raw Materials Exchange.

As The Moscow Times reports, Norsi, which has an annual capacity to process 15 million tons of oil and produce 5 million tons of gasoline, became the fifth Russian refinery to halt production since the beginning of June. Gazprom Neft’s Moscow refinery ceased refining on June 16, with repairs, according to Reuters sources, potentially lasting until 2027. Tatneft’s Taneco refinery in Nizhnekamsk has been idled since June 12; the Kuibyshev refinery, since June 10; and the Volgograd refinery, since June 1.

Moreover, the authorities of the aggressor country will likely be unable to increase the capacity of Russian oil refineries damaged by BP-LA strikes in the coming month, local Russian media Kommersant reported. According to its source, refining volumes in July will “at best” remain at June levels, and only if there are no further attacks at the refineries.

Ukrainian Defense Forces attacked the Kstovo oil refinery on May 18 and 20, 2026. As a result of the repeated attacks, the AVT-6 primary oil refining unit was damaged, after which the refinery suspended operations.

On July 2, Sergei Sternenko, advisor to Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, reported that drones had again attacked the Kstovsky refinery of Lukoil-Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez, and a major fire had broken out at the plant. Later that same day, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine confirmed that the strike on the Kstovsky Oil Refinery was carried out by the Defense Forces, as a result of which the AVT-6 primary oil refinery unit was damaged. Ukrainian officers noted that this oil refinery is one of the largest in Russia and has a design capacity of about 17 million tons of oil per year.

Reports also circulated this early July that Russia has turned to fuel imports from India after Ukrainian strikes disrupted its refineries, a rare reversal for one of the world’s biggest fuel exporters that could bring African oil giants into focus if Moscow widens its search for alternative suppliers. The reports further indicated Russia to likely seek imports from Belarus, with which it has a strategic partnership, and both formed the Russia-Belarus Union. Moscow and Minsk have been working together productively in all areas, coordinating their efforts in countering external threats and coordinating challenges through various institutions of the Russia-Belarus Union.

But for African oil producers, such as Algeria, Angola, Libya, Nigeria, and Egypt, Russia’s fuel crisis could open a new window for countries with active refineries, as global markets seek more secure supplies after US-Iran tensions and disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz reshaped fuel trade. That possibility has gained attention because Russia is now turning to foreign imports to ease domestic shortages.

Meanwhile, Russia has not traditionally depended on African crude oil, but its worsening fuel shortages could make Africa’s oil producers and refiners more strategically important as Moscow seeks supply through direct purchases or alternative refinery routes, while sanctions pressure complicates access to Venezuela and Iranian oil networks.

India is the fourth-largest oil refiner in the world. Indian Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas Hardeep Singh Puri said at a press conference held on July 2 that India was ready to support Russia with oil and gas supply. “We could potentially supply fuel to Russia if needed,” the minister said, explaining it depends on how the situation develops. 

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak told TASS that Russia had sufficient fuel reserves to supply the domestic market, but the stir around the situation with gasoline had led to a demand increase of approximately 20-30%. However, he added, “the system’s logistics connections are currently being restructured to meet needs,” and this will take some time. He also stated that he could restrict exporting diesel to manufacturers “to further fill the domestic market.”

As Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated on June 30, if Russia can reach cost-effective deals to import fuel, that could help stabilize the market. However, Peskov added that the Kremlin will not disclose which countries it is in contact with regarding possible fuel imports.

In the meantime, Russia has taken a few steps to control the situation. The government has already reduced the mandatory sales of gasoline on the exchange trading from 15% to 10% of the volume. The Kremlin’s presidential decree has been signed, aimed at stabilizing the domestic petroleum product market. Interfax sources explained that the gasoline volumes freed up by the measure would be used to supply agricultural producers and socially significant consumers. While Russia makes no request for fuel from Kazakhstan, Orenburg processing plants are receiving 28% of usual gas from Kazakhstan. In addition, Bashkortostan’s oil refineries are boosting output, owing to unprecedented emergency demand of fuel, and this is stabilizing the situational challenge.

Ukrainian drones have attacked many cities, including Tver, Tula, Smolensk, Kaluga, Belgorod, Bryansk, Kursk, Rostov, Krasnodar, and Moscow regions, as well as the republic of Crimea and the Sea of Azov and the Black Seas.

The Iranians have come out on top after the conflict. They have demonstrated themselves as a pure and united nation by not dividing into small factions during the recent militarily confrontation with the United States and Israel. The Americans and Israelis were seemed to be launching a shock and awe strategy against the Iranians to overwhelm them and easily bring down their regime. 

However, they were unable to accomplish their task, resulting in social pressure from within the United States, as 61% people were not in favor of launching a war of choice against Iran while the escalation concluded in huge financial setbacks for both the U.S and Israel.

According to John Kiriakou – the former CIA officer, Trump was told by the Israeli Prime Minister that they could easily topple the regime of Iran due to prevailing social unrest at that time. But the Iranians remained intact and united, rallying behind their government. This shattered Americans and Israelis ambitions.

On the day Americans and Israelis launched an unprovoked aggression against Tehran, Iran imposed a closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which made Iran to maintain upper hand throughout the confrontation and sustain its position against the enemy.

Strait of Hormuz was open before 28^th February, but during the war it was observed that the United States presented its closure as a cause of war, whereas it was obviously a consequence of the war. In addition to this context, Tehran laid a lot of mines in the waters of the Strait of Hormuz to hinder the flow of maritime trade across the strait.

From the beginning, the Iranians adopted a military strategy called Mosaic Defense, in which they decentralized their defense system, dividing their military into 31 factions which were able to take any decision on spot without asking from the central command of Tehran. This gave their military to take sudden military decisions and hit military targets as per their choice. This strategy significantly helped the Iranians hold the upper hand in the conflict, maintain their position, and stand firm against their enemy.  

The Iranians also pursued the strategy of asymmetric warfare, attacking with cheap Shahed-136 drones and using different types of missiles to overwhelm the enemy. They used drones of worth around  20000 to 50000 $ while the Americans and Israelis were using expensive defensive equipment of worth 1 million to 4million dollars.

Iran fought Americans forces using a strategy called horizontal warfare, broadening the conflict across the Middle East by attacking Americans bases in the region and making the region increasingly vulnerable and unstable for the other countries there. This helped Iran consolidate their hard power in the region.

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) eliminated the most expensive radars of the US situated in different countries of the region. They blew up AN/FPS-132 and AN/TPY-2 Radar systems of the US in Qatar and Jordan respectively. 

Along with that, they decimated American 5^th fleet headquarter in Bahrain, which held 75% of the US military power in the region, resulting in heavy losses for Washington. Furthermore, Iran inflicted pain on more than dozen American bases in the Middle East. 

It was seemed that Tehran converted this war into a war of attrition by slowly weakening the Americans over time. They were fully prepared for this protracted war but it did not go in favor of the United States, as Washington was unable to afford a protracted war at lot. 

Therefore, President Trump was increasingly perceived as pursuing a deal with Tehran over time, emphasizing that a deal was in progress and would be reached soon.  As a result, president trump had to sign a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Tehran on 17^th June 27, 2026 to save the world economy from another Great Depression.

The extent which Washington achieved its objectives remain open to debate. These goals included the overthrow of the regime, the de-weaponization of Iran, and the weakening of the country’s strategic potential.  

According to the U.S political scientist Robert Pape, Iran has emerged as the fourth center of power, following the US, China, and Russia. It was obvious that Iran had been preparing for possible military misadventure by the U.S and Israel since 1979. 

One of the crucial steps that Iran took after the Islamic revolution was the creation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) parallel to its national army. Consequently, it had huge leverage over the US and Israel during overall confrontation.

Moreover, this military confrontation between the U.S and Iran gave huge advantage to Tehran, making its position stronger in the regional politics and globally. Resultantly, Tehran has achieved what it had been unable to gain over the last 47 years. It successfully gained the removal of sanctions, the release of its $24B frozen assets, dominance over the Strait of Hormuz, and recognition as a regional power. Apart from that, it still retains its regional proxies and ballistic missile program. 

While the Americans and Israelis miscalculated the war, assuming that they could win a quick and decisive victory by decapitating the regime. For that they orchestrated a plan to quickly topple the regime through a shock-and-awe campaign and they wanted to place people on the top that were subservient to them. However, the Iranian military emerged as a key deterrent against the adversary and made the pursuit of Washington’s objectives complicated.

The unification ministry said Friday it views growing calls to refer to North Korea by its official name as part of a broader effort to build public consensus on the issue.

“The ministry is paying attention to religious leaders’ call for the two Koreas to use each other’s official names,” deputy spokesperson Chang Yoon-jeong said at a regular briefing.

“Since their announcement, we have also noted support from various sectors of society, and we will continue listening to these voices going forward,” she added.

The Korean Council of Religious Leaders said the previous day that genuine peace begins with “acknowledging each other as they are,” urging both South and North Korea to refer to each other using their official names, respectively, the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

“Respecting each other’s name is the first step” toward peaceful coexistence, the group said.

Kang Chang-il, vice chair of the Peaceful Unification Advisory Council, a presidential advisory body on unification, echoed the call.

“I would first like to express my deep appreciation for the senior religious leaders who said peace begins with respecting each other’s name,” Kang said Thursday.

South Korea currently uses “North Korea” rather than its official name, “Joson” in Korean, as Seoul does not recognize its ties with North Korea as state-to-state relations under the 1991 inter-Korean Basic Agreement.

The debate has gained momentum in recent months, with senior officials, including Unification Minister Chung Dong-young, raising the need for Seoul to call North Korea by its official name to achieve peaceful coexistence.

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Until not so long ago Latin America had been considered a quiet region, located far from the world’s superpower main strategic confrontations, with sporadic but crucial moments that helped to shape the international order as we know it today. The Cuban Missile Crisis is the clearest example: it became the starting point for a series of agreements and treaties on nuclear and strategic security, involving both the US and the Soviet Union at first, and later extending to other actors of the international community, from Europe, Asia and Latin America, which became the first region free from nuclear weapons after the signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967, 5 years after the crisis. After this episode, the region’s relevance seemed to fade, and Latin American countries appeared condemned to a destiny of surfing between weak political cohesion internally and relatively stable economies, even as most of its governments remained closely aligned with Washington on foreign policy matters.

It was precisely during this period of perceived irrelevance that China began building its presence in the region, very gradually and over the course of a little more than two decades. Washington largely ignored this process, even as it became clear that the Asian giant was becoming the largest trading partner for several South American countries, such as Peru and Brazil, and in many cases also the main investor in their economies. This neglect was not born of ignorance: it reflected, instead, a confidence that local governments would remain compliant regardless of who was investing in them. President Trump’s first term illustrates this well. Despite isolated clashes with the governments of Mexico and Venezuela, these episodes looked minor when compared to the “tariff wars” waged against the EU and China. In fact, the only time Trump ever set foot in the region during his entire first term was in November 2018 when he attended the G20 Forum in Buenos Aires. Significantly, there was a planned short visit in Colombia after this event, but I was cancelled. This was widely read at the time as a confirmation that Latin America remained a low priority for Washington’s foreign policy agenda, more due to the expectable compliance of local governments than ignorance of the importance of the region as a resource base capable of fueling US power projection in other regions.

It was only during Trump’s second term that American foreign policy has shifted towards the Western Hemisphere, attributing strategic importance to the region and setting the objective to maintain a near-absolute dominant presence, involving both economic and military dimensions, as is stated in the latest National Security Strategy of 2025.

By the time this shift was formalized, China’s footprint in the region was already deep and country-specific. In Brazil, China had been the largest trading partner since 2009; bilateral trade hit a record $171 billion in 2025, with China accounting for 27.2% of Brazil’s total foreign trade, besides, EV plants and a still planned bi-oceanic railway linking Brazil to Peru’s Pacific coast were being negotiated as part of the Chinese investment strategy in both countries. In Argentina, China became the primary supplier of mobile network infrastructure, part of a broader Chinese push into Latin American 5G and data-center markets. And in Peru, China invested around $1.3 billion in the strategic port of Chancay, a deepwater facility that entered full operation stage in November 2024, and set a new phase for trade between China and South America, bypassing the traditional deepwater ports located in the US, like the ports of Oakland and Stockton. Reinforcing this, China pledged in May 2025, at the CELAC forum ministerial meeting in Beijing, to ramp up its regional engagement even further. These were not isolated transactions but a structural presence, one that the 2025 National Security Strategy now identifies strictly as the rival foothold it intends to dislodge.

Now, within this context in 2026 the declared shift of interests proved it wasn’t merely rhetorical. The year started with the launching of Operation Resolve, when a group of American special military forces conducted a military raid and captured President Nicolás Maduro and his wife in Caracas, transporting them to New York to face narcoterrorism charges. Trump declared that the US was now “in charge” of Venezuela until a transition takes place. This meant in practice that the US would hold control over the country’s oil exports, which during the first four months after Maduro’s capture were estimated at $8 billion, but the data on how much oil has been sold, the revenue from it and the use given to those funds remains secret. The main importers of Venezuelan oil during this period were the United States (43 percent), India (26 percent, part of the strategy to reduce Indian import of Russian oil), and Spain (8 percent). This episode, condemned by critics as a return to the old days of imperialism, set the tone for the rest of the year: a hemisphere where Washington would use military force, tariffs, and other mechanics for pressuring countries to sign economic deals where American core interests prevail.

An example of this is the new and controversial Trade and Investment agreement signed by the United States and Argentina in February of this year. According to the text, Argentina shall adapt the regulatory framework to implement US trade standards and prioritize American direct investment in the country, while the counterpart shall “try to review its tariffs” and “consider supporting investment financing”. Milei’s government has justified this as the price for ideological loyalty and continued financial support after the $20 billion credit line that helped to stabilize the local currency (peso) last year.

On the other hand, Brazil took the opposite path: rather than just seeking accommodation to this policy, the government of Lula da Silva accelerated diversification, finalizing the long-delayed EU-Mercosur agreement in January, deepening trade with China and signing a memorandum of understanding with aims for further strategic partnership with Russia. Notably, the US has implemented another mechanism of pressure here, condemning the imprisonment of former president Jair Bolsonaro and holding a meeting with his son Flavio Bolsonaro, who will participate in the presidential elections this October. This gives clear signs of indirect support for this far-right candidate, following the regional trend with Milei in Argentina and Keiko Fujimori in Peru.

Peru, meanwhile, illustrates a third pattern and an interesting case, because alignment here is imposed less by negotiation than by sheer state fragility. Amid a presidency turning over for the ninth time in a decade, the US State Department warned in February that China’s control over the Chancay megaport threatens Peru’s sovereignty, following a Peruvian court ruling that exempted the port from national oversight. Peru’s case pictures a scenario where both counterparts keep pushing for concessions and more privileges. Under the government of José María Balcázar, the ninth president in 10 years, the country has been involved in the controversial purchase of 12 F-16 jetfighters with a cost of around $3.5 billion. On April he postponed the official ceremony where this deal was supposed to be signed arguing that it would have to be the responsibility of a new president, the decision was met with pushback, both internally, with declarations from the Ministry of Defense and in the US Embassy, with ambassador Bernardo Navarro declaring “If you deal with the U.S. in bad faith and undermine U.S. interests, rest assured, I, on behalf of [President] Trump and his administration, will use every available tool to protect and promote the prosperity and security of the United States and our region.” After this, with both internal and diplomatic pressure, the deal was signed on the 17th of April.

Taken together, these cases suggest the current US approach to Latin America is not fueled by a single ideological logic, but by transactional calculations that value compliance and heavily punishes resistance, exploiting weaknesses here and there and aiming to these policy goal indifferently to whether the country in question is led by a right, left or ideologically undefined government. What seems quite clear is that the decades of quietness in Latin America have ended, not necessarily because the region has changed, many of the deep challenges for development are still present, but because the rivalry that once defined the Cuban Missile Crisis has returned, this time fought over trade tariffs, infrastructure and technology access rather than missiles.

The international order is falling apart, happening visibly, rapidly, and in ways that no longer surprise even the most committed defenders of the post-1945 liberal framework. The United Nations Security Council has not been able to do anything about the problems in Gaza and Ukraine. The group of countries known as BRICS is getting bigger. Now has nine members. Some countries in the Gulf are thinking about using a currency to price oil instead of using the US dollar. All of these things are putting a lot of pressure on the system that the United States has been in charge of.

Many people in the Global South think this is a thing. They do not think the United States has been fair in the way it has enforced the rules. They think the United States has only looked out for its interests and the interests of its friends. This is not a thing to say. The United States has been inconsistent in the way it has applied the rules about weapons, sanctions, and international crime.

The problem is that just because the old system is falling apart, it does not mean that something better will take its place. The question is not whether the United States is losing its power because it is clear that this is happening. The question is what will happen next. Will the new system be fair, more stable, and better at dealing with global problems?

The Architecture of Decline

The truth is that the United States has been losing its power for a time, but this has happened much faster since 2022. When Russia invaded Ukraine, it showed that big countries can still go to war with each other. It also showed that the United States and its friends cannot stop this from happening. The war in Ukraine has led to the use of financial sanctions in history, with over $300 billion in Russian assets being frozen.

This has made other countries want to reduce their dependence on the US dollar. They are afraid that if they rely much on the United States, they will be vulnerable to its power. According to International Monetary Fund estimates, the group of countries known as BRICS has expanded to include Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Ethiopia, and Egypt. This group now accounts for over 40 percent of the economy. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has also gotten bigger. Now includes Pakistan, India, and Iran in addition to Russia and China. This organization is now the regional security group in the world. These changes are not just symbolic; they show a shift in where power is concentrated in the world.

New Poles, Old Problems

The problem with a world is that it does not necessarily mean that things will be more fair or more stable. In the century Europe had a multipolar system, but it still had many wars. The same thing happened in the 20th century. Just because there are powerful countries does not mean that they will behave in a certain way.

The problem with a world is that it does not necessarily mean that things will be more fair or more stable. In the century Europe had a multipolar system, but it still had many wars. The same thing happened in the 20th century. Just because there are powerful countries does not mean that they will behave in a certain way.

The Institutional Vacuum

The biggest risk of the situation is that the international institutions that we have will become useless. The United Nations Security Council has not been able to do anything about the security crises of the past few years. The World Trade Organization is also not working properly.

When powerful countries use these institutions for their purposes, it undermines their legitimacy. This is a problem because it means that smaller countries will suffer the most. The rules of law are only useful if they are applied equally to everyone.

The Global South’s Strategic Dilemma

For countries in the Global South, the transition to a world is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it gives them space to maneuver and more access to financing for infrastructure projects. On the other hand, it also means that they will have to navigate a more complex and uncertain world.

The best way forward is to try to shape the transition to a world in a way that preserves the international institutions that we have. This means reforming the United Nations Security Council to make it more representative of the world. It also means strengthening the courts and the World Trade Organization.

Towards a Legitimate Multipolarity

This will not be easy. It is necessary. If we do not do this, we risk creating a world where might makes right. There is no shared set of rules to govern the behavior of states. This would be a disaster for everyone, for the smallest and weakest countries.

The multipolar world may signal the end of the order, but it does not have to mean the end of order itself. We have to work to create a system that is fairer, more stable, and more just.

In May 2026, just hours before President Donald Trump met President Xi Jinping, OpenAI’s Vice President of Global Affairs Chris Lehane floated the idea of a US-led global governance body for artificial intelligence that would include China as a member. The model, according to media reports, was compared to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a familiar reference for managing strategic technologies with global consequences.

One month later, at the G7 summit in Évian-les-Bains, a different tone emerged. Several influential AI executives joined leaders from advanced economies to discuss AI governance, online safety, and global security. According to Axios, Anthropic’s Dario Amodei and Google DeepMind’s Demis Hassabis leaned towards a more selective framework among democratic countries, while OpenAI’s Sam Altman used broader language, calling for an international forum to develop shared testing standards and risk assessments.

These two moments reveal something important: the meaning of “global AI governance” remains unsettled. In one setting, global means including China for legitimacy. In another, it can mean a trusted coalition designed to manage access, capability, and strategic risk. AI governance is becoming part of the architecture of global power.

Three Voices, Different Emphases

Their presence at the G7 showed how quickly AI firms have moved from building systems to helping shape the politics around them. The leaders of OpenAI, Anthropic, Google DeepMind, Mistral, Cohere, and other firms were not simply observers of geopolitics. They were part of the conversation about how technological power should be governed.

Their positions were not identical. Amodei reportedly urged democratic countries to coordinate more closely so that AI governance would not fragment. Hassabis stressed the strategic importance of frontier capability. Altman, by contrast, used more institutionally neutral language, suggesting that advanced AI should not be shaped only by the companies building the most capable systems.

Even among frontier AI developers, there is no settled imagination of global governance. Should it include all major AI powers, including strategic rivals? Should it be built around trusted coalitions? Should it prioritize safety, democratic values, geopolitical advantage, or public legitimacy?

The question became more complicated because the G7 discussions came shortly after the US government imposed export controls that forced Anthropic to suspend foreign access to its Fable 5 and Mythos 5 models. Reuters reported that the order required Anthropic to block access to the models for foreign nationals, leading the company to disable them more broadly to ensure compliance. The episode showed how frontier AI governance can move from abstract principles to abrupt restrictions. Even among democratic allies, technological solidarity has limits. When AI becomes strategic infrastructure, every country begins to think about its own room for maneuver.

The Asymmetry of “Global”

The deeper issue lies in who has the power to define the word “global” in the first place. In May, global governance could mean a US-led institution that includes China. In June, it could mean coordination among democracies to manage frontier capability and strategic access. The definition changed because the political room changed.

This reveals a double asymmetry. The first is technical: only a small number of firms can define what counts as a frontier model, how its capabilities should be tested, and who should be allowed to access it. The second is narrative: the same ecosystem also helps frame the language through which the world discusses governance.

For countries outside the frontier AI circle, they may be invited to conversations but not always to the stage where categories, thresholds, and governance priorities are first shaped. They may be asked to adopt best practices whose assumptions were formed elsewhere. They may be told that risks are global, even when preparedness remains highly unequal.

G7 outreach to partner countries such as India, Brazil, Kenya, South Korea, and Egypt is important. It recognizes that AI governance cannot remain a conversation among advanced economies alone. Yet there remains a difference between being present in a forum and helping design the architecture of the forum itself. The question is who defines the table, the agenda, the risk categories, and the meaning of global governance itself.

When the AI Frontier Moves Towards the Market

There is another reason why a broader governance imagination is necessary. Frontier AI innovation is no longer centered primarily in universities or public research institutions. It is increasingly shaped by private firms with the capital, compute, talent, data access, and infrastructure required to train and deploy the most capable models.

Stanford’s AI Index 2025 noted that nearly 90 per cent of notable AI models in 2024 came from industry, up from 60 per cent in 2023. A report prepared for the European Economic and Social Committee on generative AI and foundation models also described significant US dominance across the value chain. These findings point to a structural shift: the frontier is becoming more concentrated, more expensive, and more closely tied to corporate and geopolitical capacity.

Much of AI’s progress has come from companies willing to take risks, scale products, and build technical capability at extraordinary speed. But the center of gravity has shifted. When frontier AI is largely financed, defined, and deployed by market actors, the default imagination of AI development can tilt towards commercial viability, platform advantage, user growth, and strategic positioning.

Public interest does not disappear in such a system. It risks becoming secondary unless other actors are strong enough to bring it back into the room.

Open Future, a European digital policy organization, has warned that concentrations of power in AI can make public activities dependent on “a narrow group of monopolists.” The phrase matters because infrastructure-level dependency can weaken society’s ability to negotiate the terms of the technologies it relies on.

A Wider Public-Interest Layer

In a multiplex digital world, power does not flow only through states or markets. It also moves through universities, civil society organizations, professional associations, media, labor groups, open-source communities, public-interest technologists, and moral institutions. Together, these actors form the society layer often missing from discussions dominated by states and markets.

States define security priorities. Companies define technical possibility. Society must help test legitimacy. Who bears the risk? Who benefits from deployment? Who is excluded from design? What harms are being normalized because they are commercially convenient or geopolitically useful?

This is why Pope Leo XIV’s recent intervention on AI is politically relevant beyond its religious context. In his encyclical Magnifica Humanitas, he argues that protecting the human person in the age of AI requires renewed reflection on the common good, solidarity, social justice, and human dignity. Such interventions will not replace regulation or technical standards. They help recover a truth easily lost in frontier AI politics: governance is also about preserving the human meaning of technological progress.

The same question of authorship is beginning to appear in empirical research. Ongoing fieldwork-based research at the University of Oxford has started to examine whether countries in the Global South are developing approaches to AI governance that are neither simple copies of Western regulatory templates nor rejections of international cooperation but pragmatic syntheses shaped by local institutional capacity, regulatory sequencing, and historical experience with technology transfer. Indonesia has appeared as one of the country cases in this line of inquiry.

Governance models worth studying are not only those negotiated in Évian, Brussels, Washington, or New York. They are also being improvised, often informally, by mid-sized digital economies navigating dependency and ambition at the same time.

The United Nations’ Global Digital Compact (GDC), adopted in September 2024, offers a useful multilateral reference point. It frames digital cooperation and AI governance around inclusion, human rights, open standards, interoperability, digital public goods, and multi-stakeholder cooperation. The Compact does not resolve the power asymmetries of frontier AI by itself, but it gives societies, alongside states and firms, a language for claiming a legitimate role in digital governance.

The practical task is to strengthen public-interest evaluation: the ability to test social impact, language bias, local risks, institutional misuse, and deployment consequences in different societies. The aim is to preserve enough room for public reasoning so that the future of AI is not defined only by those with the largest models, the biggest markets, or the strongest strategic leverage.

Imagining a More Inclusive AI Governance

The lesson from the IAEA analogy and the G7 discussions is not that one model is right and the other is wrong. Both reflect real concerns. A broadly inclusive governance arrangement may be necessary for legitimacy, especially when AI risks cross borders. A trusted coalition may also be necessary when capability access raises genuine security concerns. The problem begins when either model claims to be global while leaving too many societies downstream of decisions made elsewhere.

For emerging economies, the strategic challenge is not simply to wait for a better invitation to the next summit. Participation matters, but it is not enough. Countries and societies need stronger capacity to evaluate AI systems, understand their dependencies, articulate local risks, and negotiate governance terms with greater confidence.

This is a call for a more plural architecture of governance, where states, markets, and society all have meaningful roles. The uncomfortable question is not whether AI requires international coordination. It clearly does. The harder question is whether that coordination can remain open enough for societies, not only states and companies, to shape the terms of technological power.

In the age of frontier AI, the future will not be determined only by who builds the largest models. It will also be shaped by who gets to define risk, test systems, question assumptions, and decide what counts as progress.

Every era that has tried to govern a transformative technology eventually learns the same lesson: legitimacy borrowed from power is not the same as legitimacy earned through participation. The IAEA’s own history shows that global trust is rarely built at the moment institutions are created; it is earned over time, through broader representation, credible restraint, and shared accountability. The real question for AI governance is whether it can shorten that distance by design, rather than waiting for legitimacy to arrive only after contestation.

Artificial intelligence is increasingly being used in the military for planning and operations as a decision support tool at multiple stages. The US’s use of Anthropic’s Claude model against Iran marks a significant moment in the history of warfare. Integrated via Palantir’s Maven Smart System, AI-supported intelligence analysis, target identification, and operational simulations enabled planners to process information faster than human capabilities. While analysts have framed this as an “AI war,” the more significant shift lies in the growing influence of algorithmic systems in shaping military decision-making architectures.

Admiral Brad Cooper, who led Operation Epic Fury, said that AI systems processed massive amounts of intelligence and surveillance data, allowing commanders to gain insights within seconds. This is part of a wider movement to shift more complex intelligence tasks to algorithmic systems, raising questions about transparency, oversight, and reliance on algorithmic assessments.

This is also observed in other conflict zones, but in different operational roles. In Gaza, Israel’s Lavender system, developed by Unit 8200, assisted in the targeting of 37,000 suspected individuals, based on reported affiliations, using AI. Structural strikes and real-time tracking were made possible through the use of additional tools like “The Gospel” and “Where’s Daddy?” These systems reduced human review into quick, seconds-long “stamp of approval” decisions, moving targeting to machine-driven validation. In Ukraine, AI tools were used to assist in drone operations and battlefield analysis by training datasets. Initial programs, like Project Maven, relied on manually labeling 150,000 images. Currently, the Brave1 has enabled over 100 defense-tech firms to train combat AI on millions of annotated images from ongoing missions to improve these AI models.

The modern battlefield produces unprecedented volumes of data from interwoven sensor networks, drones, satellite imagery, and localized communications streams. This information comes at high speed and volume, which can overload the human brain. AI is being used to deal with this information overload, but there are concerns about the accuracy of AI-driven assessments and how much human oversight might be required to rely on AI. Military officials emphasize that humans have the final authority, but systematic integration poses challenges to oversight quality. The other predicament is automation bias, a psychological phenomenon in which a human operator, particularly under pressure or high stress, is likely to rely on the system’s recommendations. Therefore, striking a balance between speed and responsibility, ethical judgment, and accountability in the use of force is a key challenge.

Another area of concern pertains to legal and ethical issues. International humanitarian law is based on the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution. With the growing use of AI in military operations, it becomes more difficult to apply these principles, thereby making accountability and scrutiny more difficult. The International Committee of the Red Cross has warned that, when algorithmic systems provide input for analysis, targeting, or operational planning, it is hard to assign responsibility for any errors. Even with humans “in the loop,” the black-box nature of machine learning limits transparency and complicates legal review. It is not just a theoretical problem; it has been seen in practice. In the early US campaign against Iran, an AI-assisted missile struck a girls’ school near an IRGC compound, killing 120 children, likely due to a classification error. Anthropic’s CEO’s admission of limited awareness over Claude’s use in the strike highlights a broader issue. AI developers are fully aware of the risks associated with delegating autonomous functions to AI, yet they continue to promote its adoption. As AI assumes greater decision-making roles, concerns over misidentification and the possibility of AI acting against human directives are often overshadowed by narratives emphasizing its benefits.

For Pakistan, these developments are neither distant nor theoretical. In a region where crises can escalate quickly, AI-enabled decision support offers advantages but also carries risks. It improves situational awareness and accelerates analysis but compresses decision time, limits verification, and heightens the risk of miscalculation. Considering both, Pakistan is accelerating efforts to build AI capacity and strengthen its supporting infrastructure. At the policy level, this translates to a recognition that successful adoption is not just about adopting algorithms but about enhancing data governance, institutional maturity, and a skilled workforce capable of embedding AI into decision-making processes. Thus, Pakistan’s approach remains focused on leveraging AI to bolster human judgment in intelligence fusion, surveillance, logistics, and cyber defense.

There is a clear lesson from the academic literature and initial operational experience: algorithmic systems are transforming military information processing. However, as their role in decision-making grows, they also entail bias, error propagation, lack of transparency, and overreliance on machine-generated recommendations. AI, therefore, must be used as a support system, with humans retaining final decision-making responsibility. This requires investment in training, auditability, and institutional safeguards to ensure that human decision-makers are meaningfully engaged, rather than merely present in form. The future of warfare will likely be defined not by machines acting alone, but by humans making increasingly time-pressured decisions shaped by machine-generated insights. The central strategic challenge is not whether to adopt algorithmic tools, but how to ensure that their speed never outpaces sound judgment.

When Morocco reached the semi-finals of the 2022 FIFA World Cup, the achievement immediately transcended the boundaries of sport. It was the first time an African and Arab national team had reached that stage of the tournament. Yet what drew the greatest attention from international observers was not simply the result itself, but the way it confirmed changes that had already been unfolding elsewhere.

Football rarely exists in isolation. The fortunes of a national team often reflect deeper developments in governance, investment, youth development, and a country’s capacity to pursue long-term objectives. Morocco’s World Cup campaign brought into focus the broader transformation of a nation whose international profile has steadily expanded through diplomacy, infrastructure development, strategic investment, and regional cooperation.

That distinction matters. The World Cup did not create a new geopolitical reality for Morocco; it revealed one that had already taken shape. For several weeks, hundreds of millions of viewers encountered a Morocco that differed from the image long associated with the Kingdom. To many, Morocco had primarily been known as a tourist destination, a close European partner, or a North African state. Qatar 2022 introduced another image: a country capable of competing with football’s traditional powers, rallying a global diaspora, and projecting ambitions that extend well beyond its immediate neighborhood.

The scale of that exposure helps explain why the tournament proved so consequential. The 2022 FIFA World Cup reached an estimated audience of more than five billion people across television and digital platforms, giving Morocco a level of global visibility that few international events could ever provide.

This evolution reflects broader changes in the international system. Throughout much of the twentieth century, a state’s influence was measured primarily through military capabilities, economic strength, and diplomatic reach. While these pillars remain essential, they cannot fully explain how a country’s international image is shaped. In an era shaped by digital communication and instantaneous information flows, the ability to capture global attention, generate narratives, and engage international audiences has become another source of influence.

Football occupies a unique position within that landscape. No other sport crosses cultural, linguistic, and geographic boundaries with comparable ease. A World Cup captures the attention of governments, businesses, media organizations, and public opinion all at once. For several weeks, it places a country under a level of global scrutiny that no public diplomacy campaign could realistically achieve.

Morocco benefited from that exposure in remarkable fashion. Victories over Belgium, Spain, and Portugal naturally attracted worldwide attention. Yet the significance of Morocco’s campaign also lay in what it revealed about the Kingdom’s distinctive position at the intersection of multiple geopolitical spaces. Throughout the tournament, the Atlas Lions received support far beyond their domestic fan base. Celebrations unfolded across cities in Africa, the Arab world, and Europe. Those scenes illustrated something analysts had long observed but rarely witnessed so vividly: Morocco simultaneously belongs to several geopolitical spheres.

The team’s appeal was not built on sporting success alone. It also rested on a moral and ethical capital that substantially strengthened its international standing. Across much of the Global South, Morocco came to embody the possibility that a nation operating outside football’s traditional centers of power could challenge the established hierarchy without abandoning values deeply rooted in its own identity. Images of players embracing their mothers after victories, the importance given to family, and the respect shown toward opponents throughout the tournament resonated in ways that athletic performance alone rarely achieves.

Competitiveness, humility, and attachment to deeply held values combined to create a powerful sense of identification. That helps explain why Morocco inspired support far beyond its own borders.

Looking back, the 2022 World Cup stands out as a genuine turning point. It did not, by itself, redefine Morocco’s place in the world. What it did accomplish was introducing much of international public opinion to a modern Morocco—confident in its identity, proud of its history, and already engaged in a far-reaching process of transformation.

When Performance Becomes an International Language

Morocco’s 1–1 draw with Brazil at the 2026 FIFA World Cup lends itself to a reading that reaches well beyond football. For decades, African national teams were largely viewed through the prism of isolated upsets against the sport’s established powers. Morocco now appears to have moved beyond that perception. Consistent results over several years have established the image of a team capable of competing regularly with the world’s elite.

This evolution reflects a broader pattern often found in international affairs. A country’s status rarely changes because of a single success. It changes when success ceases to be viewed as exceptional. The result against Brazil therefore says less about an unexpected sporting achievement than about Morocco’s growing place within world football’s established hierarchy.

The real shift is not that Morocco earned a result against Brazil. It is that such a result has become part of normal expectations.

The Foundations of Influence

Morocco’s growing stature on the football field is also the product of sustained investment in talent development. The Mohammed VI Football Academy has become one of the clearest expressions of that long-term strategy. With some of Africa’s most advanced training facilities, an integrated sports medicine center, and highly qualified coaching staff, the academy has helped build a generation of players capable of competing in the world’s leading leagues. The objective has never been limited to short-term success. It has been to establish the conditions for Moroccan football to remain competitive over time.

The success of this development model now extends well beyond the senior national team. Morocco won its first FIFA U-20 World Cup by defeating Argentina 2–0 in the final of the 2025 tournament in Chile. This dynamic illustrates the depth of the country’s football structure and suggests that recent achievements are part of a broader trajectory rather than an isolated cycle. The ability to produce successive generations of highly competitive players has become one of the defining features of Moroccan football.

Few countries possess the ability to inspire such diverse audiences. Morocco’s history, geography, and human ties connect it simultaneously to Africa, Europe, the Arab world, the Mediterranean basin, and, increasingly, the Atlantic community. Football has made that distinctive position visible in a way that few other instruments could.

A broader picture also emerges. Morocco’s achievements on the pitch have encouraged many foreign observers to look beyond football and discover a country they previously understood only in part. Behind the national team stands a state investing heavily in modern infrastructure, expanding its international partnerships, and strengthening its role across Africa while deepening its engagement throughout the Mediterranean.

Football has become one of the clearest expressions of that broader trajectory. It has drawn international attention to developments that were already reshaping the country.

It likewise strengthens one of Morocco’s most effective sources of soft power. Without replacing diplomacy, economic policy, or cultural outreach, football helps shape how the Kingdom is perceived abroad. Sporting success, world-class infrastructure, the organization of international competitions, and the presence of Moroccan players in Europe’s leading clubs all enhance the country’s visibility among audiences that may have little direct interest in political or economic affairs. Football has therefore become another instrument through which Morocco projects influence beyond its borders.

In today’s international environment, influence is measured not only by the ability to deter, but also by the capacity to inspire, attract, and unite. A successful national team can sometimes do more to strengthen a country’s international standing than demonstrations of hard power that no one hopes to witness.

Football, however, does not operate in a strategic vacuum. Its impact forms part of a broader national trajectory in which diplomacy, economic policy, institutional reform, and international partnerships reinforce one another.

Morocco’s return to the African Union in 2017, the expansion of its economic engagement across Sub-Saharan Africa, the implementation of major strategic infrastructure projects, and the consolidation of its diplomatic position on several regional issues all reflect a broader transformation whose significance extends far beyond sport.

The same pattern is evident in Morocco’s ability to organize major sporting events. The Africa Cup of Nations confirmed the results of years of investment in stadiums, transportation networks, and supporting infrastructure. Tournament management, logistical coordination, hospitality, and operational efficiency demonstrated capabilities already visible in other sectors of national development. The experience further strengthened Morocco’s credibility within international sporting institutions while reinforcing its reputation as a country capable of hosting events of global significance.

From Recognition to Projection

Against this backdrop, the decision to award the 2030 FIFA World Cup jointly to Morocco, Spain, and Portugal carries particular importance. Beyond its symbolic value, the decision reflects confidence in Morocco’s organizational capacity and in the institutional ecosystem that has been developed over many years.

In addition, the tournament carries a broader civilizational meaning. Its Moroccan, Spanish, and Portuguese framework creates a new narrative connecting Africa, Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Atlantic. For Morocco, this configuration reinforces the image of a country located at the intersection of these spaces and capable of transforming geography, history, and culture into instruments of dialogue, visibility, and influence.

Hosting one of the world’s most watched events requires more than modern stadiums. It demands political stability, efficient institutions, and the ability to coordinate complex operations over an extended period.

For that reason, the 2030 World Cup represents far more than another sporting milestone.  It will serve as a large-scale test of credibility as well. For several weeks, Morocco will be observed by billions of viewers, thousands of businesses, and hundreds of official delegations. Few international events offer such an opportunity to showcase a country’s transformation before a truly global audience.

Morocco’s experience reflects another broader international trend. An increasing number of states now use major sporting events to support their integration into global political and economic networks. China’s Olympic Games, Qatar’s hosting of the 2022 FIFA World Cup, and Saudi Arabia’s expanding sports strategy all illustrate this evolution. Sport has become a platform through which countries project national ambition and shape how they are perceived abroad.

Morocco’s trajectory nevertheless stands apart. Unlike countries whose sporting influence depends primarily on financial resources, Morocco benefits from a combination of history, geography, and culture that allows it to engage multiple regions simultaneously. Few countries occupy such a position. At a time when the international system is increasingly fragmented by geopolitical rivalries, economic competition, and identity politics, that characteristic has acquired growing strategic value.

Football ultimately raises a broader question about the changing nature of power itself. For decades, influence was measured largely through military capabilities, economic resources, and demographic weight. Those factors remain fundamental, yet they cannot fully account for how countries are perceived today. The emerging international landscape increasingly rewards countries able to connect regions, facilitate exchanges, and build relationships across political, economic, and cultural divides.

From that standpoint, Morocco’s evolution may signal the emergence of what could be described as a connective power. Unlike traditional middle powers, a connective power derives its influence less from the resources it controls than from its ability to connect regions, facilitate exchanges, and create strategic interfaces between political, economic, and cultural spaces. Its comparative advantage lies not in domination, but in connectivity.

Football represents only one expression of that broader transformation. Infrastructure development, Atlantic initiatives, expanding African economic partnerships, growing human mobility, and the country’s capacity to host major international events all reinforce the same strategic trajectory. Taken together, they point toward a distinctive role for Morocco within the emerging international order.

Football, then, accompanies a much deeper national transformation. It reflects Morocco’s gradual evolution from a respected regional partner into a country whose initiatives and ambitions increasingly attract attention well beyond its immediate neighborhood. The Kingdom’s Atlantic vision, its expanding role across Africa, continuing investment in infrastructure, and ability to host major international gatherings all belong to the same strategic narrative.

The geopolitical importance of football lies precisely in its ability to make visible changes that often develop far from public attention. Sporting achievements can reveal broader shifts in economic development, diplomatic influence, and a country’s strategic positioning.

For Morocco, football has become one of the clearest mirrors of a broader national ambition. It is neither the source nor the principal driver of the Kingdom’s rise. Rather, it provides one of its most visible expressions. As Morocco strengthens its position between Africa, Europe, and the Atlantic, football continues to reflect changes that extend well beyond the sporting arena.

Behind the achievements of the Atlas Lions lies a Royal Vision that places human development at the center of national progress while pursuing a broader ambition: establishing Morocco as a connective power capable of linking Africa, Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Atlantic.

Football did not transform Morocco’s place in the world. It simply made that transformation impossible to ignore.

Egypt’s foreign ministry used carefully calibrated language on Monday to restate a familiar position: unwavering support for Sudan’s “unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity” and for its “national institutions, particularly the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).” Framed as a rejection of “parallel entities” seeking to form an alternative government in exile, the statement is another sign that Cairo is tying its Sudan policy ever more tightly to General Abdel Fattah al‑Burhan and the SAF as the country’s civil war grinds into yet another year.

Behind the diplomatic phrasing lies a blunt political choice. Since the outbreak of fighting between the SAF and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in April 2023, Egypt has emerged as one of the army’s main regional backers, both politically and—according to multiple reports—quietly in security terms. Egyptian officials insist they are defending Sudanese state institutions against militia fragmentation and external meddling, a message they repeat in multilateral forums and joint communiqués with Burhan’s Transitional Sovereignty Council.

From Cairo, the stakes in Sudan are seen as existential rather than abstract. Egyptian analysts routinely describe the stability of their southern neighbour as a vital national security concern, citing fears of refugee flows, arms smuggling and jihadist safe havens along the porous border. Control of the Nile is an even deeper driver: since the 2019 fall of Omar al‑Bashir, Egypt has intensified security and military coordination with Khartoum to counter Ethiopia’s upstream Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and preserve its historic water share.

There is also a clear regime‑security affinity, however misguided that affinity might be. Burhan, a career officer who trained in Cairo and maintains close ties with Egyptian generals, represents a familiar authoritarian model for President Abdel Fattah el‑Sisi, himself a former general who came to power after a coup in 2013. Supporting the SAF fits Egypt’s long‑standing pattern of siding with Sudan’s army “whoever is in charge of it,” and buttresses Cairo’s broader preference for strong central militaries over messy civilian transitions across the region.

Officially, Egypt insists it is not a party to Sudan’s war. Sisi has repeatedly pledged “non‑interference,” and Cairo frames its role as limited to mediation, humanitarian aid, and hosting millions of Sudanese fleeing the conflict. Egyptian troops captured by the RSF at Merowe airbase in April 2023 were described as participants in pre‑scheduled joint exercises, not combat operations, a spin that few international observers bought.

The line between deterrent presence and de facto involvement has become increasingly blurred. Analysts note years of intensifying joint drills, intelligence cooperation and arms ties between the two militaries since 2019. Think‑tanks and regional media have reported unconfirmed Egyptian airstrikes on RSF positions and possible targeting of gold‑mining camps in northern Sudan, amid allegations by RSF leaders that Cairo is providing drones and tactical support to the SAF—claims Egypt denies. The pattern points towards at the very least a protective security umbrella for Burhan’s forces, far beyond the strict neutrality Cairo proclaims.

Yet in Burhan Egypt is backing a very risky partner. By hinging its Sudan strategy almost entirely on the SAF and Burhan’s sovereignty council, Egypt is betting on a man and an institution that look increasingly incapable of reunifying the country. The war has left tens of thousands dead, displaced over 14 million people, and pushed parts of Sudan towards famine, with the army losing and regaining territory in a grinding stalemate against the RSF. Burhan’s own legitimacy is deeply contested: he led the 2021 coup that derailed a fragile civilian‑military power‑sharing agreement, and his government is widely seen by pro‑democracy groups as a continuation of military dominance rather than a path to elections.

Cairo’s categorical rejection of “parallel governments” sounds like a defence of state unity, but in practice it risks delegitimising genuine civilian coalitions seeking to organise outside the SAF‑RSF binary. By equating Sudan’s “national institutions” with the existing military leadership, Egypt narrows the political horizon and sidelines the broad civilian forces that led the 2018–2019 uprising—precisely the actors most likely to provide a sustainable, inclusive settlement. If the SAF continues to fragment on the battlefield or loses further territorial control, Cairo may find that its red lines have locked it into defending a shrinking power centre with dwindling popular backing.

There is also a long‑term reputational cost. Egypt positions itself as a mediator through formats such as the “Quad”, and hosts conferences of Sudanese civil and political actors in Cairo. But as long as its public diplomacy is tethered to explicit promises that it “will not be lax or late in supporting the legitimate Sudanese government” under Burhan, that positioning is scarcely credible. On the contrary, Egypt has decisively and actively allied itself to Sudan’s military junta.

Authors: Dr Soumyodeep Deb & Aung Kyaw*

Myanmar’s president Min Aung Hlaing is currently on a 5-day state visit to India on the invitation of Indian prime minister Narendra Modi. This is his first foreign visit after the recent election where he was elected as the new president of Myanmar. However, the elections that brought him to power were not democratic in nature. Therefore, “Min Aung Hlaing is not Myanmar’s legitimate president,” as noted by Mercy Chriesty Barends, a member of the Indonesian Parliament and chairperson of the ASEAN Parliamentarian on Human Rights. He oversaw a campaign of widespread crimes against his own people after masterminding a bloody coup that toppled a democratically elected government. As a result, APHR has asked India to condemn Min Aung’s government as undemocratic and illegal. Thus, the question of why India, which claims to be the largest democracy in the world, is dealing with an undemocratic administration that is accused of violating its own citizens’ human rights emerges.

The idea of democracy and human right violation had been India’s central position during the 1988 military coup in Myanmar. The Indian government had cut ties with the then military junta. India’s idealistic position had sidetracked India-Myanmar relations and led China to occupy the strategic sphere in India’s immediate neighborhood. Chinese investment and trade with Myanmar grew exponentially with the junta purchasing military hardware worth $1 billion from Beijing in 1989 one of the largest weapons deals in Myanmar’s history. This had led China to exert its influence on Myanmar. For Beijing the geo-strategic location of Myanmar having access to the Indian Ocean was of strategic interest. Enhancement of Chinese influence in Myanmar had a security implication for India as China used Myanmar to train major northeastern Indian insurgent groups like NSCN, ULFA etc. Thus, India’s rupturing of relationship with Myanmar after 1989 on idealistic grounds led China to exploit major gain at India’s immediate neighborhood.

This had led India to recalibrate its strategy towards Myanmar post the 2021 coup when India took a more pragmatic stand. The Indian ministry of external affairs had categorically pointed that any development in Myanmar has implications for India so India’s policy must serve its strategic interest. Therefore, we have seen India engaging both the military junta and the ethnic armed groups trying to balance its ties with both the parties. Since the coup India has been providing steady military assistant to the junta in form of military hardware and spares. It has also engaged the various ethnic armed groups by sending officials across the border and by inviting some of the groups to New Delhi for a conference. This makes it very evident that rather than maintaining the moral superiority of democracy, India is striving to further its strategic interests. The support to the rebel groups like the Arakan Army (AA) which controls a major part of strategic Rakhine state. After seizing control of majority of the state the Arakan Army pushed the initiative to have dialogue with the military junta. The AA had always held the ambition of having greater strategic autonomy in the Rakhine state. Thus, India’s engagement with the AA by sending government officials over to Myanmar signals that it wants to have strategic relation with the AA as that would enhance its influence and uphold India’s economic and trade ambitions. 

For India, the geographical location of Myanmar holds a great strategic significance. It shares a 1,693 kms of border and is seen as India’s gateway to the ASEAN. This had led India to invest heavily on major infrastructure projects in Myanmar. The Kaladan Multimodal Transit Corridor and Sittwe Port are two of India’s largest projects in Rakhine and Chin state of Myanmar. This project is seen to give India’s landlocked northeastern states access to Myanmar’s Sittwe port. This project is also seen as a counter to China’s Kyaukphyu Port at the Rakhine state. This has made the relation with Arakan Army of geo-strategic importance. The other major project that India is working on is to physically connect itself ASEAN via the India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway. This project would give India land access to the two ASEAN states which can further be expanded to other nations like Vietnam. Although the projects are currently stalled due to the civil war, India is working with both the ethnic armed groups and the government to safeguard and fast-track the projects.

Thus, the recent visit of Min Aung Hlaing to India shows that India has chosen pragmatism over idealism. New Delhi has kept itself away from the nature of democracy in Myanmar and is trying to engage based on strategic interest. During the press briefing the Indian foreign sectary had pointed that India’s engagement with Myanmar is not based on Myanmar’s internal political arrangement. India does not want to disengage based on internal political dynamics as history has shown that other powers which has no interest in democracy would eventually take the advantage. This statement although has not mentioned China but was directed towards it. Therefore, the visit led to the signing of various agreements and MOUs between both the states. Myanmar has also reiterated that it won’t allow its territory to be used against anti-India activities. The recent advancement by the Myanmar Army is further leading it to consolidate its power and capture grounds. With the new conscript law, it can funnel additional troops to keep its advancement. Further being supported by Russia, China and India the firepower of the junta is superior to the rebel forces. This has also led India to recalibrate its Myanmar policy by engaging the current powerful junta and strategic rebel forces like the AA in Rakhine state.

Therefore, it can be argued that the growing India-China competition has made India move its Myanmar strategy towards pragmatism from idealism. Unlike in 1988 when India lost its strategic foothold to China in Myanmar due to its idealistic stand, the situation has now altered as the competition grows. But as a democracy, India must tread carefully on this fine line and bring up important issues of human rights and democracy in Myanmar.

Bio: Aung Kyaw is a recent graduate from Lingnan University majoring in Global Development and Sustainability and minor in Sociology. His research interests are politics of southeast asia, peace and conflict studies, social development, social issues in southeast asia. kyawkyawaung@ln.hk

As Africa navigates the challenges posed by the U.S.-Iran crisis, creating worldwide economic instability, the 52nd Ordinary Session of the Permanent Representatives’ Committee (PRC) called for consistent commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes through dialogue and diplomacy. The 49th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council and the 8th Mid-Year Coordination Meeting (MYCM) between the AU, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and Regional Mechanisms (RMs), scheduled to take place on 27 June 2026 in El Alamein, Egypt.

Chairperson of the AU Commission, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, has acknowledged that the multifaceted challenges currently facing the continent, including geopolitical tensions affecting global supply chains, macroeconomic instability, delays in fertilizer imports, ongoing conflicts, and health emergencies such as the recent Ebola outbreak. He noted that external factors, including the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, continue to disrupt continental plans.

Despite these difficulties, the AUC chairperson affirmed the commission’s commitment to redoubling its efforts, implementing contingency plans, and reinforcing fiscal discipline. He stated that the 2027 budget would be an austerity budget, while underscoring the imperative to continue the post-SACA (Skills Assessment and Competence Audit) trajectory. He revealed that the AU currently operates with only 30% of its required staffing levels and approximately 25% of its global budget, including programs funded by statutory contributions.

That, however, Youssouf appealed to Member States for enhanced solidarity and material support, emphasizing that achieving the objectives of Agenda 2063 demands greater involvement and commitment. He reassured the Permanent Representatives’ Committee that the Commission is developing scenarios to address human and financial resource gaps and remains ready to work collaboratively with Member States to identify appropriate solutions.

He concluded by reaffirming the Commission’s dedication to strict budgetary discipline and its unwavering support to Member States. “The African Union should have the necessary human and financial resources to attain the objectives of Agenda 2063. I am aware of the difficulties that our member states are facing. The Commission is ready to find, together with you, the appropriate solutions to take up these challenges together,” said Mahmoud Ali Youssouf.

Ambassador Willy Nyamitwe, Chairperson of the PRC and Ambassador of the Republic of Burundi to Ethiopia, delivered a compelling address calling for unity, self-reflection, and action. He expressed gratitude to Member States for entrusting Burundi with steering the continental organization this year. Ambassador Nyamitwe highlighted the profound technological transformations reshaping economies and the rising expectations of African citizens.

Ambassador Nyamitwe cautioned against national positions that may unintentionally undermine continental unity, urging ambassadors to ensure that their decisions tangibly improve the lives of ordinary Africans. He stated that unity is not merely a virtue but a weapon and that history will judge not speeches but the courage to acknowledge mistakes and strengthen collective institutions. He called on the PRC to choose solidarity over division and vision over hesitation. “History will remember whether we strengthened the institutions entrusted to us. It will remember whether we chose solidarity over division and vision over hesitation. I have every confidence that this committee, the PRC, possesses the wisdom, the experience, and the determination required to meet these expectations. Together, let us continue building an African Union that is stronger, more effective, and more responsive to the aspirations of our peoples,” concluded Ambassador Willy Nyamitwe.

The official meeting was attended by Selma Malika Haddadi, Deputy Chairperson of the AU Commission, along with AU Commissioners, representatives of AU organs, and senior officials. The PRC will deliberate on reports from its Sub-Committees, the AU Commission, and other AU organs and specialized agencies. The Committee will subsequently adopt its report and the draft decisions for the 49th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council, scheduled for 24-25 June 2026 in El Alamein, Egypt.

Diplomatic sparring between Ukraine and Belarus escalated sharply on 19 June, when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky demanded that Belarus dismantle communications infrastructure allegedly used by Russia to extend the range of its strike drones. Zelensky has offered a week for such removals to take place, reportedly saying, “I am giving a week for it to be withdrawn; otherwise, we will do it ourselves.” This marks a severe deterioration in relations since Belarus allowed Russian forces to cross Ukraine’s northern border using Belarusian territory in 2022. Following Russia’s withdrawal from Ukraine’s northern regions, Belarus has not enabled further assaults from its own territory but has actively aided Russian efforts, in part, by allowing drones to operate over Belarusian territory to strike Ukrainian targets with less warning. These increased tensions follow recent statements from Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko aimed at easing tensions, stating, “If Volodymyr Oleksandrovych was offended, I apologize to him for those words… Perhaps I shouldn’t have spoken so sharply about it. But, on the other hand, he should understand, as we often say: you get what you give.” As Zelensky applies pressure to Russia’s key European ally, Lukashenko’s response may determine whether his country will begin to withdraw support or play a larger part in this war.

Belarus’ Assistance in Putin’s Invasion

Belarus has played a vital role in Russia’s aggression since 2022, remaining one of Moscow’s most important enablers throughout the war. On the opening days of the conflict, 45,000 Russian soldiers crossed into the capital region of Kyiv. Since Russia’s withdrawal from northern Ukraine, Belarus has remained a tacit supporter of the invasion, finding auxiliary ways to support its key strategic ally’s actions in Ukraine without directly becoming involved itself. While weapons transfers and diplomatic support aid Moscow’s war effort, Belarus’ most valuable contributions come from two primary sources. First, Belarus’ expansive border with Ukraine. The two countries share a border that stretches over 1,000 kilometers. The existence of a Russian ally on Ukraine’s northern border introduces the risk of another attack from this direction, requiring the dedication of over 100,000 soldiers to the defense of a region that may not become active for the duration of the war. Second, neutral airspace was made available to long-range strike drones. Without this advantageous lane of attack, Russian drones, such as the Geran-2, must spend hours loitering over Ukrainian territory, where they are exposed to interception attempts while trying to reach their targets. Additionally, and central to Zelensky’s latest ultimatum, Belarus has reportedly allowed Russia to build a network of relays along Ukraine’s border to expand the range of its strike drones, allowing greater operational reach and improved resistance to electronic warfare.

Belarusian Capabilities

Threats made without the capability to enforce them are functionally pointless, suggesting that Zelensky believes Ukraine occupies a militarily advantageous position relative to Belarus. This warrants analysis of Belarus’ military capabilities to determine whether they pose a threat to Ukraine. As of 2022, Belarus reportedly maintained an active-duty army of approximately 48,000 soldiers, with inactive trained reserves and additional supporting personnel amounting to another 300,000 people. The country fields 1,200 main battle tanks and 3,400 other armored fighting vehicles, although it is unclear how many remain in active service. Many of these vehicles are of questionable utility, with Belarus operating mainly vintage Soviet equipment and few vehicles having been modernized to contemporary standards. The Belarusian Air Force fares slightly better, fielding 48 front-line fighter aircraft, of which 16 are new Su-30SM/SM2 airframes. The war and its rapidly changing dynamics have forced Belarus to invest in the modernization of its armed forces. However, in contrast to many Western modernization programs, which frequently involve high-value equipment deals, Belarusian efforts have focused more heavily on improving infantry capabilities. Belarus currently funds several programs for procuring modern armored vehicles and has recently made new equipment purchases from Russia, including the nuclear-capable intermediate-range ballistic missile known as Oreshnik. More transformative, however, are efforts to reform the country’s mobilization system and employment of experienced Wagner mercenaries to train Belarusian soldiers in drone-centric combat techniques. This could be interpreted either as an inability to afford more comprehensive reforms or as a deliberate shift away from traditional reliance on armored formations in favor of unmanned systems. Regardless of the motivation, these programs demonstrate substantive efforts to improve the military readiness of a vital ally to Russia.

Ukrainian-Belarusian Diplomatic Efforts

Zelensky’s demand follows months of escalating tensions between Belarus and Ukraine, contrasting Belarus’ traditionally ancillary role in Ukrainian foreign relations. Due to Belarus’ refusal to participate directly in combat operations, Kyiv had little incentive to press diplomatic issues and antagonize its northern neighbor. Until the recent flare-up, it was in Ukraine’s interest to keep Belarus on the sidelines while accepting the reality of Belarusian aid and weapons transfers that benefited Russia. Relations between the two countries followed a repeated cycle of saber-rattling, military posturing, de-escalation, and periods of calm. Lukashenko has repeatedly offered his services as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine, although Kyiv has rejected these offers because of Belarus’ close ties to Moscow. Tellingly, despite Belarus aiding its aggressor, Ukraine has maintained diplomatic ties with Minsk throughout the conflict. Lukashenko further offered to open bilateral talks with Kyiv in late 2025 in an attempt to reduce rising tensions. These efforts failed to bear fruit as relations deteriorated to their lowest point since the beginning of the war in May 2026. Following the construction of additional drone launching facilities in Belarus and an increase in Russian drone strikes, Ukrainian diplomacy shifted towards the application of direct pressure. Kyiv’s announcement that it had identified more than 500 strategic Belarusian targets in the event of conflict culminated in Zelensky’s ultimatum to dismantle Russia’s drone relay network within a week. The ultimatum suggests that Ukraine is abandoning its previous strategy of managing tensions with Belarus in favor of direct pressure. It also followed the largest Ukrainian drone strike on Moscow to date. Viewed in that context, Zelensky appears to be leveraging Ukraine’s growing long-range strike capabilities while simultaneously attempting to disrupt a component of Russia’s own drone warfare infrastructure.