opinion

This city is a favourite among trendy, wealthy people – but I don’t see the charm.

I have been lucky enough to see a fair amount of the world not only in my role as a travel reporter, but also in my own time. However, after spending a long weekend in this popular European city I have finally discovered a place I will never return to.

Berlin is beloved by trendy east Londoners who pretend they don’t have a double barrelled surname and a trust fund. The city is full of even trendier Berliners who pretend they don’t have any interest in being cool, whilst still trying as hard as possible to appear so.

I have visited before and found the city grey, utilitarian, dirty and ugly. At the time I had a friend living there who told me the city would “eat you alive” if you let it – and I believed him.

I spent a weekend there and over those two days I stood in human faeces whilst walking through a park, watched people urinate in the U-Bahn, saw one man vomit and another man sit in it.

I was hounded by wasps for every hour of the day, and shady characters for every hour of the night.

I didn’t get eaten alive, but by the time I flew out of the city morale was low. I spent the next seven years vowing I would never return – but a twist of circumstance saw me packing my bags last Friday to spend another long weekend in Berlin.

My friends were visiting Europe from New Zealand, and the only weekend I had free time to see them was the weekend they were in Berlin, so I decided I’d give it another go. I was hoping my initial impression of the city had been wrong, and that my return trip would show me the real side of the city

Whether real or not, the side I saw was not to my liking.

The city was still as utilitarian and grey as I remembered. We stayed in Neukölln, a trendy artistic neighbourhood with plenty of coffee shops, späti (like off-licences but with seats outside to sit and enjoy a beer) and vintage shops. These are all my favourite things, but Berlin’s version of them was tinted with the greasy pallid feeling you get after a night out that has gone on several hours too long.

My least favourite thing about Berlin however, is the wasps. In late summer, they have reached peak population and ruin the city’s outdoor spaces. Sitting outside to enjoy a brunch, coffee or a pint becomes a feat of endurance as these angry insects swarm you, fall inside your pints, try to crawl inside your nose and mouth and generally make a nuisance of themselves. It’s also illegal to kill them, as they are protected under the Wildlife Act.

Over the three days I was there I had two of them die in my beer, and four of them make my £7 donut inedible.

My Berlin weekend was not all bad. I did find an amazing coffee shop near our accommodation called Leuchtstoff Kaffeebar. The coffee was delicious – perhaps the best I’ve had since I left New Zealand two years ago, and I enjoyed a Bircher Muesli that set me up perfectly for my day of wandering the city.

The café also serves pastries, and had a very cool mezzanine that you could climb up to via a ladder.

I also visited the Jewish Museum in Kreuzberg. Admission is free, and the building is truly something to behold. It uses architecture and art installations to create a feeling of absence and highlight the huge loss felt by the community as a result of the millions murdered during the Holocaust.

A large section of the building is below ground, with multi-media installations and plenty of information about the history of Judaism and their persecution in Germany. It was a sombre afternoon, but definitely worth a visit if you are in the city,

Despite finding a few things I liked about Berlin, overall my sense of the city was that it is without whimsy. I won’t say it’s soulless – but the soul it possesses is not one I care to find out more about.

The NATO Response Force (NRF) and EU Battlegroups have demonstrated that placing multinational forces on standby does not automatically make them immediately operational. German-Dutch military integration, in contrast, has generated a different outcome since cooperation was internalized within permanent command structures, units, training, and capability planning before a crisis occurred.

Such a comparison is becoming increasingly relevant to Northeast Asia. A Taiwan contingency could absorb American military assets at the very moment when North Korea embarks upon a serious provocation towards South Korea. Continued US commitments in Europe and the Middle East could further complicate the allocation of finite resources.

Why Standby Forces Encountered Problems

The NRF was established after the 2002 Prague Summit as a rapidly deployable multinational joint force of roughly 25,000 troops. Yet the NRF was heavily dependent on the member countries assigning their respective forces to particular rotations, while these governments had the final say over whether the forces could ultimately be employed. During the Afghanistan and Iraq wars—when operational demand was high—each government had strong disincentives in introducing scarce high-readiness units and specialized enablers to NRF rotational deployment.

This created a gap between designated readiness and actual availability. Strategic transportation, logistics, specialized support units, and communication capacity could still be subject to competing national demands. Eventually, in 2024, NATO replaced the NRF with the NATO Force Model, which emphasized a substantially larger pool of high-readiness forces that is closely aligned with specific defense plans.

Meanwhile, the EU Battlegroup was faced with an even clearer problem. Although the multinational battlegroups had been maintained on rotational standby since 2007, they had never been deployed. While acknowledging that the battlegroups enhanced interoperability and military transformation, the European Parliament attributed the shortcoming largely to insufficient political will, difficulties in decision-making, implementation problems, and the financing arrangements.

What Germany and the Netherlands Did Differently

German-Dutch cooperation developed according to a different institutional logic. Although the 1st German-Netherlands Corps was created in Münster in 1995, the integration later expanded deep into both militaries’ force structures. The Dutch 11th Airmobile Brigade was incorporated into the German Division Schnelle Kräfte (DSK) in 2014, while the Dutch 43rd Mechanized Brigade was integrated into Germany’s 1st Panzer Division in 2016, and the Dutch 13th Light Armoured Brigade joined Germany’s 10th Panzer Division in 2023.

The relationship was extended below the brigade level. Germany’s Panzerbataillon 414 is operated under the Dutch 43rd Mechanized Brigade, and Dutch personnel operate Germany’s Leopard 2A6MA2 tanks while serving within the battalion. Moreover, German officers serve in Dutch command headquarters and vice versa, turning multinational command into a routine organizational reality instead of a stopgap measure that is only activated during major exercises.

Needless to say, such an arrangement does not eliminate national sovereignty. Both Germany and the Netherlands preserve the political prerogative over whether and where their forces are deployed. Meanwhile, the benefits of integration would become observable once a crisis necessitates the deployment. Staff are already well-versed in each other’s procedures, and units have repeatedly conducted joint exercises, while command and logistics relations do not need to be newly constructed during mobilization.

The distinctions were visibly observable during training. For example, approximately 7,000 German and Dutch personnel participated in the 2026 Fighter Lion—the largest military exercise conducted by the Netherlands in two decades—ten years after the Dutch 43rd Mechanized Brigade was integrated into Germany’s 1st Panzer Division. These types of exercises strengthen existing command relations rather than creating temporary interoperability for a single event.

What Japan and South Korea Can Apply

It is quite obvious that Japan and South Korea cannot replicate the German-Dutch model. Neither country has a formal mutual defense pact nor a NATO-style integrated command structure. Therefore, the directly applicable lessons are more limited. Nonetheless, selected operational relationships can and should be institutionalized before multiple simultaneous contingencies make such coordination necessary.

The practical first step could be a standing bilateral adjustment mechanism that links Japan’s Joint Operations Command (JJOC) with relevant South Korean joint headquarters. Instead of exercising command authority, the mechanism could maintain procedures for intelligence exchange, deconfliction in the air and at sea, movement of US reinforcements, logistics coordination, and the use of Japanese facilities that support a Korean contingency. This would be especially crucial when Japan has to assist US operations related to Taiwan while installations across Japan—including Yokota, Yokosuka, Sasebo, Iwakuni, and other United Nations Command (UNC)-Rear facilities—play a pivotal role in US reinforcement to the Korean Peninsula in accordance with Operational Plan (OPLAN) 5055.

Under this mechanism, small-scale functional cells could concentrate on specific missions. Missile warning would be the most obvious starting point since the United States, Japan, and South Korea have conducted North Korean missile-warning data-sharing since December 2023. Additional cells could treat maritime domain awareness (MDA), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), cyber defense, transportation, medical evacuation, and logistics.

The exchange of officers should accompany the aforementioned measures. Japanese officers could participate in South Korean command posts, while South Korean officers could join Japanese operational staff who deal with naval operations, air defense, logistics, or reinforcement coordination. The goal is to get familiar with each country’s procedures, communications, command relations, and other miscellaneous constraints before wartime pressure markedly shortens the timeframe for decision-making.

Exercise Scarcity Rather Than Ideal Conditions

The most notable changes should be related to exercise design. Trilateral exercises should not be premised on the assumption that the full inventory of United States support capabilities will always be available. A more pessimistic scenario would begin with a Taiwan scenario that is already consuming a substantial amount of US assets—including its ISR capacity, strategic transportation, and precision-guided munitions—when North Korea embarks upon a serious horizontal or vertical military escalation on the Korean Peninsula.

In this particular situation, elaborated by the Atlantic Council report, South Korean military planners should determine which missions could be conducted independently and which can be addressed bilaterally. South Korea may assume greater responsibility for ISR, missile defense, logistics, and conventional firepower on the Korean Peninsula—yet this would be affected by the tempo of wartime operational control (OPCON) transition—while Japan could take on additional maritime surveillance, ASW, sea lines of communication (SLOC) protection, base defense, and logistics. The primary aim is not to divide the Taiwan and Korean Peninsula theaters between Seoul and Tokyo but to identify how both countries could most effectively conduct missions that complement US military operations across the two regions.

Logistics should be placed at the center of these exercises. A dual contingency could impose on the Japanese government the need to support both US operations on Taiwan and USFJ reinforcement to the Korean Peninsula, which inevitably involves Japanese ports and airfields. It could cause competition for fuel, maintenance, transportation, ammunition depots, runways, and port capacity. Thus, Tokyo and Seoul should develop procedures concerning reciprocal servicing, immediate repair, medical support, transportation, and selected supplies before the bottleneck transmogrifies into wartime problems.

Functional Integration Without a Bilateral Alliance

The German-Dutch case illustrates that political authority is not necessarily the same thing as operational preparedness. A government can maintain full authority over whether its forces enter conflicts and can also prepare in advance to cooperate effectively if that decision is made. These distinctions are highly relevant to Japan and South Korea since they enable a considerable level of operational preparedness without a formal defense pact. For instance, South Korea could discuss target allocations for North Korean TELs with its Japanese counterparts in order to effectively use the finite weapons available to Japan’s enemy base strike capability and South Korea’s Kill Chain and Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR).

Naturally, the primary objective should be functional integration in fields where both governments already have overlapping interests. A large set of measures—spanning from ISR coordination to cyber defense—can be institutionalized without creating either an integrated force or an Asian version of NATO.

Both the NRF and EU Battlegroups revealed the limits of formations that remained dependent on political and operational arrangements being assembled only when crises occur. German-Dutch cooperation worked better since many of those arrangements already existed.

Given the historical baggage that Japan and South Korea carry, it would undoubtedly be a Herculean task for them to take novel steps. Nonetheless, the emerging regional security environment is rapidly narrowing down the available options.

The fourth China-Africa Peace and Security Forum was held in Beijing, China, from September 15 to 17, 2026, coinciding with the 13th Xiangshan Forum and the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and African countries. Military representatives and defense officials from the African Union and 41 African nations participated. This expansion of bilateral military relations between Beijing and African countries comes at a time when Beijing and Washington are vying for influence on the African continent, while African nations seek to diversify their partners and strengthen their security capabilities, particularly in regions facing escalating threats, such as the Horn of Africa. The fourth China-Africa Peace and Security Forum, held in Beijing, represents a pivotal milestone reflecting the growing military and defense cooperation between China and 41 African countries, along with the African Union, as Beijing seeks to solidify its security presence on the African continent.  The most prominent theme of the forum and defense cooperation was the speech by Chinese Defense Minister Admiral Dong Jun, who called for deepening strategic coordination and developing mechanisms for defense exchange and maritime security based on equality and mutual benefit, without political dictates or conditions, between China and African countries. This reflects the growing African interest in partnership with China, driven by a desire to diversify military options and avoid the pressures and conditions associated with Western and American partnerships. The China-Africa Peace and Security Forum witnessed the signing of bilateral memoranda of understanding to enhance military capabilities, training, and the exchange of expertise between China and some participating countries, such as Mauritania.

The fourth session of the China-Africa Peace and Security Forum, held in Beijing, China, witnessed a significant deepening of bilateral military cooperation between China and Africa. On the sidelines of the forum, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania and the People’s Republic of China signed two memoranda of understanding to strengthen and develop military cooperation between the two countries. This signing took place during a meeting between Mauritanian Defense Minister Hanan Ould Sidi and his Chinese counterpart, Admiral Dong Jun.  The most prominent areas of the memoranda of understanding included strengthening military and security capabilities to address challenges in the Sahel region and Africa, particularly combating terrorism and organized crime. They also focused on military education and training for African military personnel and the exchange of expertise, intelligence, and security experiences between the two sides. This move is part of a broader Chinese strategy to enhance defense partnerships with African countries (with representatives from 41 nations participating), emphasizing joint military training and coordination.

In this context, cooperation between the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and African armies is steadily increasing, encompassing training, counter-terrorism exercises, and peacekeeping operations.  The most prominent forms and areas of military cooperation between China and Africa include joint military exercises, where the Chinese army conducts joint drills with African countries, such as the Peace Unit exercises with Tanzania and Mozambique to combat terrorism on land and at sea. This cooperation also encompasses peacekeeping and assistance efforts, with China participating in numerous UN peacekeeping missions in Africa and deploying warships to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia. Simultaneously, there is an increase in military education and training programs, with Chinese military academies hosting African leaders, defense ministers, and officers to enhance professional exchanges and build long-term strategic relationships. To this end, China regularly organizes the China-Africa Peace and Security Forum to strengthen defense coordination and consultation with various countries on the continent. The objectives of the Chinese military presence in Africa include modernizing African military expertise, providing the People’s Liberation Army with field operational experience in diverse and complex security environments, and protecting Chinese interests and securing massive Chinese investments and economic projects related to the Belt and Road Initiative. With increasing practical cooperation between China and Africa, Beijing is bolstering its diplomatic and strategic influence on the African continent in the face of international competition with Washington.

China’s military presence in Africa can be summarized as achieving three major strategic objectives, such as modernizing African military expertise, providing the Chinese People’s Liberation Army with field experience, and protecting the substantial investment interests of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. These three objectives and their shared benefits can be detailed as follows:

1) Modernizing African Military Expertise:

China seeks to present itself as a reliable and alternative security partner for African countries through various modernization mechanisms, including:

– Technology Transfer and Training: By providing advanced training programs for African officers at Chinese military academies and transferring modern tactical and operational knowledge.

– Defense Infrastructure Development: By contributing to the construction of bases, logistics centers, and training facilities for African armies.

– Arms and Equipment Sales: By supplying African countries with modern weapons systems at competitive prices, such as drones, armored vehicles, and communication systems, thereby enhancing the combat effectiveness of these armies.

– Counterterrorism and Counter-Piracy: By building joint capabilities between the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and local African armies to counter unconventional security threats in conflict zones and maritime piracy areas, such as the Gulf of Aden.

2) Gaining Field Operational Experience for the PLA

The diverse and complex African security environment represents an important real-world testing ground for the Chinese military, which lacks modern field combat experience outside its borders. This benefit is achieved through:

– Testing Chinese weapons, military equipment, and armaments: By experiencing the effectiveness and quality of Chinese weapons and military equipment in harsh climatic and geographical environments (desert, tropical).

– Remote Operations Management: Developing the ability to command and control forces across vast geographical distances and testing the effectiveness of cross-border supply and logistics.

– Participation in peacekeeping forces: China’s extensive involvement in UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, such as in Mali, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic, provides Chinese officers with experience interacting with international militaries and managing complex security crises.

– Naval and operational presence: Utilizing the Chinese military base in Djibouti as a launchpad for evacuation operations, counter-piracy efforts, and protecting shipping lanes enhances the flexibility of the Chinese navy.

3) Protecting interests and securing investments under China’s Belt and Road Initiative

Africa is a key pillar of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and the military role in protecting these massive Chinese investments is complemented by:

– Securing critical infrastructure: Protecting ports, railways, mines, and energy fields financed and operated by Chinese companies against any political instability or terrorist attacks.

– Securing Maritime Routes: Ensuring the safety of vital maritime trade routes for transporting raw materials from Africa to China and Chinese goods to global markets via the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

– Protecting Chinese Communities: Providing security and rapid intervention capabilities to evacuate thousands of Chinese workers and citizens from African conflict zones when necessary.

From the preceding presentation and analysis, we understand the importance of the China-Africa Peace and Security Forum in strengthening defense exchange mechanisms, defining and deepening regional cooperation in maritime security, combating terrorism and extremism, and building defense capabilities in emerging areas to address escalating security risks on the African continent, such as the Sahel region. The Forum provides an opportunity to enhance consultation and exchange views between China and African countries on various peace and security issues and to develop prospects for cooperation between China and African countries in related fields. China-Africa cooperation encompasses military training, naval exercises and patrols, counter-terrorism, mine clearance, and securing shipping lanes, as well as the transfer of expertise and technology and the marketing of Chinese weapons.

For the last few weeks, Indonesia has been struggling to contain the land and forest fires on its territory. The disaster leads to a cross-border haze crisis affecting neighboring countries, including Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, and the Philippines. Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto’s approaches to the environmental issue arouse uncertainties about his commitment toward ASEAN cooperation and good relations with surrounding states. Prabowo’s inaction on Malaysia’s and Brunei’s plan to take the matter to the ASEAN meeting is also questionable, considering his image as a “foreign policy president.”

Recurring regional environmental crisis

The transboundary smoke caused by peatland fires mostly originates from Indonesia, specifically the islands of Sumatra and Borneo. The slash-and-burn method used to clear land is a main factor contributing to the widespread fires, with El Niño season worsening the situation. To mitigate seasonal disasters, the Indonesian government has attempted to strengthen domestic regulations, yet the problem persists. The haze is not simply an environmental issue, as it has a cross-boundary impact in various aspects of Southeast Asia. Wildlife is at risk, schools are forced to move online, people are experiencing respiratory issues, and other public activities are severely disturbed.

ASEAN member states have understood that this problem should be solved regionally for quite a long time. They have maintained coordination under the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (AATHP), which was fully ratified by all members in 2015, with Indonesia ironically being the last to ratify. However, the agreement lacks strong implementation, as the willingness of the party to act is a significant part of the treaty. This may reflect the ASEAN Way’s value of highly respecting the sovereignty of other member states.

Indonesia’s officials stated that they are committed to the AATHP. They emphasize their own actions of reporting daily updates to the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Transboundary Haze Pollution Control (ACC THPC). They also openly accept assistance from foreign countries to put out the fires. Nevertheless, President Prabowo’s reaction to seeing this issue as a regional problem is nowhere to be found. He indeed made some meaningful gestures in response to the forest fires, yet he mostly saw it from a purely domestic lens. For instance, Prabowo visited several hotspots in Riau, Sumatera, and provinces in Borneo. At a recent high-level government meeting, he also instructed the chief of the Indonesian police to enforce the laws against perpetrators of forest fires, including several corporations, and to conduct further investigations.

Is Prabowo really committed to ASEAN?

As the impact of the smoke has reached neighboring countries, an official statement or public apology from Prabowo is urgently needed. This political gesture will reassure ASEAN citizens that Indonesia is responsible for this matter and willing to cooperate with other member states. For instance, during the 2015 and 2019 Southeast Asian haze disasters, President Joko Widodo showed that he publicly regretted that the fires affected Malaysia and Singapore, and he even felt embarrassed as Indonesia was the primary source of the smoke.

Furthermore, making a formal apology is not always a sign of weakness, as it demonstrates a deep respect for the other party. Prabowo himself apologized to Vladimir Putin for not being present at the ASEAN-Russia Commemorative Summit, which he openly stated during a visit a few days ago. He may also do the same to ASEAN leaders to calm relations amid the crisis.

Despite reports that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia and relevant institutions are actively communicating with other ASEAN states, a clear statement from Prabowo is still required.

A lack of response on regional coordination may leave observers wondering, as Prabowo is known as a foreign policy president and a “de facto foreign minister.” Since the first day of his administration, he actively engaged with global leaders through overseas trips. As of June 2026, Prabowo has visited 29 countries and engaged in over 50 international engagements. This number reflects his strong interest in connecting with foreign counterparts. He also reached out to various powers and blocs, including participation at the Board of Peace (BoP) and a recent official trip to Russia.

However, Prabowo seems to ignore the reality of the current regional crisis caused by fires originating in his country. He remained silent on Brunei and Malaysia’s intention to discuss the issue at the ASEAN level. Even when the foreign public went into uproar through demonstrations at the Indonesian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur and heavy criticism on social media. His choice to focus more on the domestic side of the environmental crisis raises questions about his priority to work with ASEAN.

In the long run, Prabowo’s lack of enthusiasm for ASEAN collaboration will damage Indonesia’s long-standing image in the region and challenge the basis of the country’s foreign policy. Since 1967, Indonesia has always been taking a dominant role in the organization. No wonder the country is associated with the terms “ASEAN de facto leader” and “natural leader.” Indonesia, along with other member states, helps ASEAN to grow as one of the leading regional organizations, and conversely, the bloc strengthens Jakarta’s bebas aktif foreign policy principle. ASEAN has become a platform for Southeast Asian small and middle powers to articulate their foreign policies when engaging with external actors in the middle of great-power competition.

Despite many criticisms of ASEAN’s consensus mechanism, Prabowo still needs to maintain the commitment toward the regional bloc. To date, ASEAN continues to be relevant for Indonesia, especially during the ongoing haze crisis, as stated in Law 38 of 2008 that ASEAN is a cornerstone of Jakarta’s foreign policy.

Egypt can leverage the US-China rivalry and its strategic partnership with Beijing to bolster its national security and its position as a global logistics hub through several strategic avenues:

1) Enhancing its status as a global logistics and trade center, through:

– Developing the Suez Canal Economic Zone: Leveraging the massive Chinese investments and projects in the TEDA zone in Ain Sokhna to establish vital industries such as green hydrogen, solar panels, and electric vehicles, transforming Egypt from a mere waterway into a global manufacturing and logistics hub.

– Linking the Belt and Road Initiative with Egypt’s Vision 2030: Integrating Egyptian ports, such as East Port Said, Alexandria, and Ain Sokhna, into the Chinese maritime trade network, while maintaining a balance that allows for alternative investments in other ports and logistics corridors to expand its options and international network of allies.

– Alternative Supply Chains: Egypt offers a secure regional base for global and Chinese companies seeking to diversify their supply chains away from areas of direct conflict, leveraging its strategic location connecting three continents.

2) Enhancing National Security and Red Sea Security, through:

– Diversifying Sources of Armament and Military Technology: The partnership with China allows Egypt to acquire advanced military technology, such as drones, air defense systems, and space and satellite technology, without the stringent political conditions imposed by Washington, thus strengthening the independence of Egyptian military decision-making.

– Securing Navigation in the Red Sea and the El-Mandeb Strait: This can be achieved by utilizing the Chinese military presence in Djibouti and China’s interest in maritime security to coordinate and build a joint security umbrella protecting the Suez Canal from emerging threats, such as attacks in the Red Sea, given that the stability of this waterway is a vital shared interest for both Egypt and China.

– Balancing Political Pressures: By employing flexible diplomacy and strategic balancing, Egypt’s rapprochement with China (especially after joining the BRICS group) provides it with strong leverage in its negotiations with the United States and Western international institutions, and vice versa.

3) Egyptian Expansion and Influence in Africa via China, through:

The Joint Projects (Triangular Cooperation) by acting as a strategic gateway for Chinese investments directed towards the African continent, through the implementation of joint infrastructure projects (roads, power plants, dams) in cooperation between Egyptian and Chinese companies in the Nile Basin and Horn of Africa countries, Egypt can enhance its influence and development diplomacy.

Here, Egypt can benefit from international and Chinese competition over Africa, the Red Sea, and Ethiopia, and from its partnership with China, to strengthen its national security and its position as a logistical and commercial hub. Thus, Chinese economic influence can become a factor of stability and development for Egypt, rather than a new arena for international competition in the future.  Egypt can enhance its national security and logistical standing by leveraging its unique strategic location as a link between Africa, Asia, and Europe and by transforming international competition and its partnership with China into well-considered development opportunities. This can be achieved by studying and understanding the following strategic dimensions:

– First: Mechanisms for Egypt to Benefit from International Competition and the Chinese Partnership

– Developing Global Logistics Hubs: Continuing to expand and develop the Suez Canal Economic Zone in conjunction with Chinese investments, such as the TEDA Zone in Ain Sokhna, to transform the canal from a mere waterway into a global manufacturing and re-export hub.

– Continental Connectivity and Infrastructure: Leading regional connectivity projects in Africa, such as the Cairo-Cape Town Highway and the Lake Victoria-Mediterranean Waterway Project, and utilizing funding from China’s Belt and Road Initiative to connect African trade to the Red Sea.

– Diversifying security and military partnerships: Leveraging international competition in the Red Sea to secure navigation and combat piracy and terrorism through building flexible alliances and modernizing Egyptian naval capabilities (the Berenice naval base) without aligning completely with any single international power.

– Localizing industry and technology: Making technology transfer and the localization of industries, such as electric vehicles, renewable energy, and communications, a requirement in investment contracts with China and Western countries. This will reduce reliance on imports and bolster Egyptian economic security.

– Second: Chinese Economic Influence: Stability and Development or an Arena of Competition? Future indicators of Chinese influence in Egypt and the region point to two overlapping scenarios:

– The first scenario: A factor of stability and development, achieved by focusing on infrastructure, providing soft loans, creating local job opportunities, and supporting regional integration. This would have a positive impact on Egypt and Africa, contributing to easing conflicts stemming from poverty and offering African countries alternative financing options for developing their economies.

– The second scenario: Chinese influence within Africa as a negative factor, transforming it into a new arena of international competition. Increased Western (American and European) fears of Chinese hegemony and attempts to contain it through counter-initiatives or political pressure could turn the Red Sea region and Africa into areas of military and political polarization, forcing countries to choose between the Eastern and Western blocs.

– Third: Analyzing China’s role regarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) issue and whether Beijing can play a role in supporting stability and negotiations between Egypt and Ethiopia

On the other hand, given China’s growing relations with Ethiopia and the Nile Basin countries, its role regarding the GERD issue can be viewed positively for Egypt. Beijing can play a role in supporting stability and negotiations, even though its economic interests might make it more cautious about clashing with Ethiopia. Here, China adopts a pragmatic and cautious approach, balancing its substantial economic interests in Ethiopia with its strategic relationship with Egypt. This limits its role to quiet diplomacy and calls for negotiations without exerting direct pressure or engaging in confrontation with Addis Ababa. This can be understood through:

1) Analyzing China’s role regarding the GERD

– Technical and financial support: Chinese companies and funding have contributed directly to the infrastructure and electricity distribution stations associated with the GERD and Ethiopian projects.

– Non-interference policy: Beijing traditionally adheres to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and avoids taking public stances against Ethiopian development projects.

– Diplomatic balance: China is careful to issue joint statements with Egypt emphasizing the importance of international law and the need to avoid harming water security, but these remain diplomatic statements that fall short of exerting pressure through mediation.

2) Can Beijing support stability and negotiations between Egypt and Ethiopia?

– The capacity exists: China possesses significant economic and financial influence over Ethiopia, enabling it to exert influence if it so desired, given the scale of its investments and loans.

– The will to exert pressure is lacking: China refuses to become a serious mediator or a pressure party and prefers to distance itself from the sharp points of contention between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan.

– Maximum possible role: Beijing’s available role is limited to quiet mediation and encouraging the parties to return to regional negotiating tables without imposing binding solutions.

3) Economic interests and avoiding confrontation:

– Deep strategic partnership: For China, Ethiopia is a key gateway and the heart of Africa ​​for implementing the Belt and Road Initiative and penetrating the Horn of Africa.

– Interconnected projects: Chinese interests in Ethiopia are linked to agricultural, electricity, and railway projects that directly benefit from the dam’s energy.

Here, we conclude that major economic interests make China very wary of losing its Ethiopian ally, which keeps its position biased towards avoiding confrontation and refraining from imposing any forced settlement on it.

From this, we understand that Chinese influence holds enormous developmental potential for Africa, but it remains surrounded by the risks of geopolitical competition with other powers, most notably the United States.  Egypt’s ability to achieve diplomatic balance and rely on a policy of multiple partners is the guarantor of transforming this influence into a stabilizing factor that supports its national security.

WASHINGTON — A federal judge has ruled that a plan by the Trump administration to slash staffing at the federal agency tasked with responding to disasters by 50% was unlawful.

The opinion issued late Friday marked a victory for labor groups who had sued the agency. The labor organizations had argued that plans by the Department of Homeland Security, which was then led by Secretary Kristi Noem, violated congressional protections that were designed to safeguard the independence of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

The issue of the FEMA staffing was part of a much larger lawsuit filed by the American Federation of Government Employees and other labor groups, contesting efforts by the Trump administration to slash the federal workforce.

U.S. District Judge Susan Illston wrote in her opinion that top Homeland Security officials late last year directed FEMA’s leadership to submit a staffing plan that included a 50% staffing cut even though the agency’s own supervisors objected.

“Frankly, the FEMA staffing plan number appears as if pulled from thin air,” wrote Illston.

FEMA responded in a statement late Saturday saying that while it does not comment on personnel matters and ongoing litigation, “DHS and FEMA are ready for the 2026 hurricane season.”

“We’re ensuring workforce stability and a strong, deployable force for upcoming national events and potential disasters; making the agency leaner, faster and laser-focused on supporting state, local, tribal and territorial partners before, during and after disasters,” the statement said. “FEMA continues to maintain a roster of experienced leadership and support staff across headquarters and regional offices.”

The Department of Homeland Security did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

In the opinion, Illston wrote that it was clear that the government violated rules established after 2005’s Hurricane Katrina that put decisions on staffing levels squarely in the hands of FEMA, not the Department of Homeland Security, and that prevented Homeland Security from “substantially” reducing the “functions” of FEMA.

Illston didn’t order a specific remedy to carry out her opinion but directed the two sides to meet and decide on a course of relief.

Although FEMA has experienced terminations, the 50% staffing cuts ultimately were not carried out. In recent months, after top leadership changes at FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security, the agency has rehired some staffers who were let go.

FEMA was one of the agencies targeted for staff reductions in the federal government as part of a broad Trump administration plan to reduce the size of government. The embattled agency has been buffeted by mass staff departures, disruptions of grant programs and delays of disaster aid.

In May, a Trump-appointed FEMA Review Council submitted a final report recommending sweeping changes to how the agency supports states, tribes and territories in disaster.

The final version backed away from the recommendation to cut the FEMA workforce by 50%, which was included in a December 2025 draft reviewed by the Associated Press.

The council instead recommended the agency conduct a “strategic review” to determine “appropriate staffing levels.”

In an August report, the Government Accountability Office said it found that the departures of thousands of staff in 2025 resulted in a “loss of institutional knowledge and experienced personnel” and “exacerbated longstanding workforce challenges.”

More than 4,300 employees, or about 17% of FEMA’s workforce, separated from the agency in the 2025 budget year, with over 1,500 through voluntary reductions. The agency also made about 2,900 new hires.

The GAO recently recommended to Congress that it “consider requiring” FEMA to base “significant workforce decisions” on a more strategic planning process.

Without it, the GAO found, “FEMA cannot be assured that the agency is positioned to effectively meet its mission needs.”

Santana writes for the Associated Press.

The People’s Republic of China achieved a historic and unprecedented participation in the second edition of the El Alamein International Aerospace Exhibition (EIAS 2026), which was held at El Alamein International Airport from September 8 to 10, 2026. The Chinese participation came just days after the conclusion of the joint Egyptian-Chinese air force exercises Eagles of Civilization 2026. The significance of this Chinese military presence lay in the display of a fully integrated and realistic combat air system, not merely models. In this context, the Egyptian researcher will attempt to divide the significance of China’s participation in the El Alamein Air Show into several key areas, including:

– First: China’s prominent participation in the El Alamein International Air and Space Show in Egypt as a strategic shift in the regional arms market

Here, China’s extensive participation in the El Alamein International Air and Space Show constitutes a significant strategic shift in the regional arms market. Beijing has moved beyond the traditional approach of selling individual military components to present itself as a supplier of comprehensive and integrated air combat systems, competing with Western and American powers in the Middle East and Africa. China’s participation in the El Alamein International Air and Space Exhibition focused on several strategic axes to promote and analyze the concept of a full-suite solution. This was achieved by emphasizing that China does not simply sell aircraft but rather offers a comprehensive defense solution, encompassing attack fighters, logistics support aircraft, aerial refueling, and command and control systems, known as C4ISR.

The People’s Liberation Army of China sought to highlight China’s military and defense role and promote the Chinese model as a ready-made competitive alternative. This was done by showcasing the competitive advantages of Chinese defense industries, such as the absence of complex political conditions, rapid delivery, and comprehensive technology transfer to Middle Eastern and African markets. Furthermore, the focus was on the geopolitical depth, linking the Chinese presence in El Alamein to Beijing’s broader vision of strengthening security and economic partnerships with countries in the region.

– Second: Showcasing the most prominent Chinese aircraft platforms participating for the first time outside of China at the El Alamein exhibition

As for the most prominent Chinese aircraft platforms participating for the first time outside of China, for the first time in its history, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) showcased four of its latest operational aircraft models at an air show outside of China. The most prominent of these were

– The Chinese J-16 multirole fighter (J-16)

This air superiority and heavy ground attack fighter garnered widespread international attention.

– The Chinese YY-20A aerial refueling tanker (YY-20A)

This Chinese heavy transport aircraft provides refueling to extend the operational range of fighter jets.

– The Chinese KJ-500 airborne early warning and control aircraft (KJ-500)

This represents an airborne command and control system.

– The Chinese Z-20K military helicopter (Z-20K)

This is a multi-role helicopter designed for search and rescue and tactical operations.

Regarding the Chinese weapons and drones on display at the El Alamein International Air and Space Exhibition, the AVIC (Aerospace Industries of China) showcased its advanced defense capabilities in the outdoor exhibition area through:

– A demonstration of the Chinese Wing Loong-10B stealth drone (Wing Loong-10B):

This is a high-altitude, long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) designed for reconnaissance and precision strikes.

– A demonstration of Chinese smart munitions and missiles:

The Chinese drone was displayed surrounded by advanced air-to-air missiles, such as the PL-108 & PL-12AE. In addition to a demonstration of the Chinese anti-radar and anti-radiation missile (YJ-9ER1).

– Third: The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) showcased its capabilities through a technical display (capability integration), dividing its export-available air systems into functional groups for attack, others for support and refueling, and a third group for command and control, during China’s extensive participation in the El Alamein Air Show in Egypt.

In this context, the PLA sought to leverage China’s extensive participation in the El Alamein Air Show in Egypt as a new and strategic launchpad for China in North Africa. This included showcasing the size of the Chinese pavilion and the equipment on display, such as aerobatic aircraft and unmanned combat aerobatics. The Chinese Ministry of Defense emphasized the technical aspects of this capability integration display, highlighting the division of its export-available air systems into functional groups for attack, others for support and refueling, and a third group for command and control. As follows:

■ The offensive functional groups were represented by a display of China’s modern fighter jets and attack drones, such as the Wing Loong family.

■ As for the support and refueling functional groups, China’s strategic transport and aerial refueling aircraft, such as the Y-20, were showcased.

■ The third functional group focused on (command and control), with China displaying its early warning aircraft and airborne command centers.

– Fourth: Analyzing and understanding the strategic dimensions of China’s participation in the El Alamein International Air and Space Exhibition, aimed at attracting more interest in the Chinese aerospace sector and promoting widespread military sales of Chinese military, defense, and armament equipment

Thus, we can analyze and understand the strategic dimensions of China’s participation in the El Alamein International Air and Space Exhibition, which aimed to attract more interest in the Chinese aerospace sector and promote widespread military sales of Chinese military, defense, and armament equipment. Therefore, we find that the extensive Chinese presence at the El Alamein International Air and Space Exhibition constitutes a genuine breakthrough. Beijing did not aim to promote individual pieces but rather to demonstrate its ability to provide a comprehensive and integrated air combat system, encompassing attack, support, refueling, and command, as a competitive alternative in the Middle Eastern and African markets.

Analyzing the economic and strategic dimensions of China’s extensive participation in the El Alamein exhibition, we observe the extent to which the Chinese People’s Liberation Army focused on achieving broad military exposure for its participation during the exhibition. This included showcasing how these Chinese defense, military, and air systems can reduce operating costs for purchasing countries while ensuring their independence in defense decision-making, without imposing political conditions or prior operational restrictions, unlike many Western and American systems.

The US-China G-2 concept is both normatively exclusionary and strategically constraining. The inherent limits of a G-2 framework—hierarchy, power structure, and systematic constraints—make it a non-starter in a multipolar reality. Here, I completely agree; the concept of a G2 is unworkable and constitutes a strategic exclusion of many international actors in a multipolar world order characterized by a complex distribution of power and multiple centers of decision-making. The Structural and Political Constraints, represented in:

· Unacceptable Hierarchy: This framework attempts to impose a bipolarity that ignores the rise of major regional and international powers such as the European Union, India, and Russia.

· Lack of Methodological Flexibility: This framework fails to accommodate global issues that transcend borders and require broad collective cooperation, not just bilateral understandings.

· Conflicting Interests: The current strategic and geopolitical competition between Washington and Beijing makes it impossible to manage the international system through joint governance. The structural conflict of interests between Washington and Beijing renders joint management of the international system impossible, amidst a fierce struggle for technological leadership, economic dominance, and the reshaping of national security rules. This manifests itself in:

– First: The Roots of the Strategic Conflict

A) The Challenge to Hegemony: China seeks to reshape international rules and challenge absolute American supremacy.

B) The American Shift: Washington adopts a strategy of confrontation and containment to reduce Chinese influence and supply chains.

– Second: Arenas of International Conflict

A) Technology and Trade: The chip war, tariffs, and control over advanced technology.

B) Regional Sovereignty: The escalating competition in the South China Sea and the Taiwan issue.

Trump’s China policy has shifted from confrontation to accommodation. If we wonder how true that is, to claim that Donald Trump’s policy toward China has completely shifted from confrontation to accommodation is inaccurate. It is merely a superficial shift toward de-escalation and managing disputes through deals, while the underlying geopolitical and structural competition remains intense.

– Manifestations of De-escalation and Deals (Tactical Accommodation)

· Diplomatic Summits: A state visit to Beijing in mid-May 2026 and frequent summits with President Xi Jinping to reduce escalating tensions.

· Trade Settlements: Temporarily reducing some reciprocal tariffs and concluding major deals, such as Boeing aircraft orders and easing chip restrictions for major companies.

· Regional Crisis Management: Seeking cautious coordination or neutralizing China’s role in some global energy and shipping crises.

– Constants of Conflict and Confrontation (Ongoing Competition)

· Technological Restrictions and Economic Structure: The complex core of the conflict over intellectual property and control of advanced technology remains unresolved.

· Legal and Institutional Pressures: Reciprocal restrictions and legislation continue, with China activating its blocking statute to counter extraterritorial US sanctions.

· The Taiwan file and military strategy: Divergent major strategic interests and military deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region.

China wants to be seen on par with Washington. The Chinese gave Trump everything he wanted but nothing of substance. Taiwan was off the table at the Beijing May 2026 meet. Here, political assessments of the Beijing summit held in May 2016 vary. Some believe China successfully established itself as a rival to Washington, while others consider the results to have ranged from symbolic gains to continued ambiguity regarding issues such as Taiwan and trade deals. The summit’s dimensions and outstanding issues can be summarized as follows:

· International parity: Beijing sought to solidify its image as a major power capable of competing with and managing the power struggle with the United States.

· Taiwan’s position: Taiwan was naturally absent from the direct bilateral talks between the two leaders, amidst strong Chinese warnings to Washington about the dangers of arms sales to the island.

· Mutual gains: Opinions differed regarding the extent of concessions. Analysts believe the Trump administration did not secure any decisive, substantive commitments on certain regional issues in exchange for a temporary easing of trade tensions.

Beijing has sought to solidify its image as a major power capable of rivaling and managing the struggle for influence with the United States. It aims to establish itself as a major power on par with Washington through a variety of economic, technological, and military tools, skillfully managed through a policy of gradual retaliation and the management of international competition. This is achieved through:

– First: Economic and Technological Tools

• Rare Earth Minerals: Controlling the production of raw materials vital to advanced technologies and imposing export restrictions on them.

• Trade War: Reciprocal and gradual retaliation against US tariffs to mitigate the effects of economic pressure.

• Supply Chains: Leveraging the Belt and Road Initiative to enhance global trade routes.

– Second: Geopolitical and Diplomatic Presence

• Multipolarity: Supporting a new international order that limits unilateral US hegemony.

• Partnerships and Alliances: Expanding diplomatic and economic influence in vital regions such as Africa and Latin America.

There were some raised questions related to whether US-China friendship is bad for India and whether their infighting is bad for India too. Here, I partially agree with this view, as the interaction between Washington and Beijing presents both gains and risks for India. The conflict grants New Delhi strategic room for maneuver and security alignment with the US, but sharp conflicts or a sudden rapprochement between the two giants could exert economic and political pressure on India’s interests.

– First: Risks of US-China Conflict and Friendship for India

· Bilateral Accords Between Washington and Beijing: If the two powers reach trade agreements or strategic stability without India’s involvement, it could diminish New Delhi’s importance as a crucial ally for containing China.

· Economic and Trade Pressure: Global conflicts, tensions, and reciprocal tariffs affect the stability of markets and supply chains upon which India depends.

· Regional Military Escalation: Direct conflict increases the likelihood of India’s regional involvement due to its direct border disputes with China.

– Second: Opportunities and Gains for India from Competition

· Strengthening Strategic Partnerships: US-China competition is driving Washington and Western countries to deepen military and technological cooperation with India to counterbalance Beijing’s influence.

· The strategy of multiple independence: India benefits from competition by implementing a policy of multiple alignment, protecting its decision-making independence without being completely dependent on any party.

The interaction between Washington and Beijing presents India with both opportunities and risks, most notably strategic room for maneuver, security cooperation with the US, and potential economic pressures. In terms of gains and risks, these can be assessed as follows:

– Strategic Gains

· Role for Maneuvering: New Delhi skillfully balances its relations between the two powers.

· Security Cooperation: Stronger cooperation with the US and the Quad countries to counter China’s influence.

· Economic Gains: Global companies are seeking to relocate their factories from China to India.

– Risks and Threats

· Military Escalation: A direct confrontation could force India to choose sides.

· Sudden Rapprochement: Any major deal between the US and China could marginalize India’s regional role.

· Economic Pressures: Markets and supply chains could be affected by any trade tensions between the two giants.

Beyond the US and China, India and others are building a G Minus Two for Indo-Pacific. Here, the fundamental error in the statement lies in describing India and other countries as building a G-2 alliance with the United States and China. The G-2 concept actually refers to a potential bipolar hegemony or joint management of the world solely by Washington and Beijing, while India and other regional powers are pursuing a strategy known as G-Minus Two to expand their options for independence. This can be understood through:

– Rejection of Bipolar Hegemony:

India adopts a policy of strategic independence and rejects any bipolar system or joint US-China hegemony that diminishes the role of emerging powers.

– The G-Minus Two Strategy:

New Delhi is working with partners such as Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Australia, and Indonesia to build a network of flexible partnerships that balance influence and protect regional interests.

Here, the statement of Beyond US and China, India, and others building a G Minus Two for Indo-Pacific, accurately describes the shift of major regional powers like India towards building a network of independent strategic partnerships, moving away from the bipolar hegemony of the US and China. This is achieved through:

– Concepts of International Alliances

• The G2 concept refers to a shared global management or potential bipolar hegemony confined exclusively to Washington and Beijing.

• The G-Minus Two concept: expresses the middle power strategy of expanding its economic and defense cooperation with countries such as Australia, Japan, Indonesia, and South Korea to safeguard its strategic independence.

– Dimensions of the G-Minus Two strategy

• Diversifying partnerships: avoiding the trap of bipolar polarization between the two superpowers.

• Securing sea lanes and supply chains: building flexible regional blocs to enhance Asian stability.

Authors: Janvi Singhi and Kanav Sharma*

BRICS is moving into a more meaningful phase in its evolution. Its larger membership, considerable resources, population, and markets position it as a voice for the global south. Nevertheless, the fact that the BRICS is economically big does not guarantee that it will turn into a powerful organization. The difficult question is whether BRICS will be able to use the potential of its diversified members to create the institutions and means of collaboration that will meet the needs and interests of different countries, businesses, and banks.

This is where the next chapter of BRICS collaboration will be decided. It is definitely not in need of aspiration. The main question is not whether BRICS will develop a common geopolitical approach but whether BRICS will be able to simplify the issues of cooperation for countries with divergent economic interests and institutional capabilities.

The enlargement of BRICS has brought about both a chance and an enigma. An increased number of members boosts the economic and diplomatic power of the group, but it also entails the presence of more currencies, regulations, economic systems, and foreign policy priorities. States such as India and China may share a desire to amplify the role of developing economies while being in competition with regard to trade, technology, and geopolitics. Resource-rich countries may have their priorities with respect to the manufacturing countries. Financial centers may deal with payment integration differently from countries interested in getting more monetary independence.

The key challenge before BRICS is not about making all the members agree about everything; rather, it is about creating means for cooperation between different countries in the areas where their interests coincide.

This differentiation is essential because BRICS is frequently assessed based on scale indicators, including population, economic output, energy resource reserves, and trade. While these parameters demonstrate the affiliation, the affiliation is not the key to institutional power. BRICS is still functioning as an informal coordinating mechanism and not as a supranational institution due to the absence of an establishing treaty, budget, and secretariat. The conversion of its total economic capabilities into total actions should rely substantially on its members’ coordination. BRICS needs to change its approach, so instead of pursuing expansion, it should focus on implementation.

The issue of cross-border payments can serve as an example. The necessity to improve payment processes within BRICS may be easily explained. International transactions require correspondent banks, multiple currencies, currency exchange, and several commissions. Using local currencies and interoperable payment systems may help reduce some of these expenses and create additional ways of settlements for countries.

However, establishing a new financial structure is much more difficult than just talking about it. The real barriers are technical and institutional: interoperability between national payment systems, regulatory compatibility, foreign exchange liquidity, cybersecurity, anti-money laundering and know-your-customer norms, settlement systems, and trust among the entities participating in the payment system. A domestic payment system cannot simply be hooked up to a foreign payment system without addressing these problems. This leads us to a more practical goal for BRICS countries. Instead of concentrating on the joint BRICS currency, they should work on interoperability among national payment systems.

The example of India’s UPI-PayNow linkage to Singapore shows how this principle works. Two entirely different payment systems can be interlinked without destroying their own systems. The same gap can be figured out at the level of BRICS if all necessary regulations, settlements, and risk management conditions are fulfilled. In order to understand how this can be achieved, BRICS can refer to the examples of other countries that have already applied the same logic.

The same issue of coordination can be observed in trade and supply chains as well. BRICS countries have complementary assets such as resources in energy, agriculture, manufacturing, minerals, technology, and large markets for consumer goods. However, having complementary resources does not automatically result in integrated supply chains.

Businesses need predictable customs, standards that will fit one another, reliable logistics, availability of finance, and clarity of regulation. If countries have different certification systems, digital documents, and technical standards, the theoretical advantages of a large BRICS market will not be fully realized. Therefore, standards will probably prevail over declarations in the end.

So far BRICS has spoken about cooperation of national standard organizations and overcoming technical barriers between trade. Further work is getting cooperation of national standard organizations transferred into standards that will be in demand in real business. Common standards for digital trade documents, selected product certification, customs data, payment systems, and technical standards can connect BRICS economies without full harmonization of their economies.

This method would make it easier to justify politically. There would not be a need for members to give up their power when it comes to buying a wider range of economic policies. The only thing left is for countries with technology to agree on their particular rules where technology will help provide measurable benefits.

The same goes for agricultural projects, as the BRICS countries share similar problems in the fields of food supply, climate, water conservation, and productivity. The BRICS has started pushing for agricultural research and cooperation. So, the question is not whether the BRICS countries have recognized these areas; they already have. The larger question is whether anything can be implemented across borders.

In a situation where one country has effective technology to grow crops and another one has a good way of bringing the crops to a field, BRICS has to find a way to transfer that knowledge or have an organization that can help in that transfer. There should be a value on the moves made regardless of whether formal treaties have been produced or not. This points towards a different institutional model for BRICS: modular cooperation.

BRICS needs to develop a model that allows all members to be part of the major framework and subgroups of interested members cooperating with each other in specific areas that require deep integration. Countries interested in making payments and settlements between them could organize a coalition in charge of finding and implementing technical solutions for that. Those ready to work jointly in the field of agriculture can proceed with agricultural cooperation, while others can focus on critical minerals, logistics, AI technologies, energy, and development finance.

This model recognizes one uncomfortable truth: diversity is BRICS’ asset, but it also acts as an obstacle in its functioning. In a highly heterogeneous grouping, it is impossible to expect rapid integration in view of the differences among its members. Compliance with the needs of all BRICS states only produces long negotiations and ambitious statements that do not work. Modular cooperation, in its turn, enables countries to pursue their own policy while being part of the larger framework.

Moreover, it could also establish a more trustworthy framework for testing. A limited number of members would be given the opportunity to run an initial test of payment or trading procedures, determine any legal or technological obstacles, and welcome other participants once the system is successful. The outcome would be a lowering of the chances of running into challenges that would be involved in the launch of a full project for all members simultaneously. BRICS should also reconsider its parameters of success.

Rather than concentrating on the number of members or the quantity of agreements accepted, BRICS should focus on the outcomes of its activities. There are political benefits to this strategy as well. BRICS will find it difficult to forge sustainable alternatives simply by selling them as counters in the geopolitical confrontation with the West. Governments and businesses respond not just to geopolitical signals but also to incentives. If the BRICS mechanism is cheaper, quicker, safer, and more efficient, then the chances of adoption increase.

This point is especially important for the discussion of de-dollarization. The reduction of dependence on dollar-based systems may in itself be a rational objective for some members; however, viewing de-dollarization as a success in and of itself can overshadow the distinction between geopolitics and economic efficiency. A payment mechanism can only gain credibility if banks and companies use it to solve a problem at hand.

India’s BRICS presidency in 2026 is an excellent opportunity to work on the practical implementation of the above approach. New Delhi can focus on enhancing cooperation based on interoperability and standards, collaboration of sectors, and measurable results. Instead of trying to create a homogenous group, India can create a framework where willing participants will devise their solutions for implementation by others.

Instead of striving to make BRICS like other supranational bodies, we should acknowledge the fact that, given its diversity of membership composition and structure, it is not realistic nor necessary. BRICS differentials provide a comparative advantage of allowing a mix of countries with both different political and economic systems that nevertheless share aspirations for greater policy autonomy and a voice in international affairs.

BRICS does not need to reach consensus on every issue to become successful. What it requires is to be able to determine areas where cooperation can be beneficial economically and create institutions able to do that.

Thus, the biggest problem is not the absence of power. The problem is how to convert power into capacity and capacity into institutions. If BRICS succeeds in this task, its economic capacity will transform from empty statistics into collective power. If it does not, then enlargement might improve visibility of the group, but its effectiveness would stay at the same level.

*Kanav Sharma is a Public Policy Researcher from Jammu & Kashmir with a postgraduate degree in English Literature from the University of Jammu. His interests include public policy, governance, parliamentary and strategic affairs.

The Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) has been described as a successful solid platform since its creation. It increasingly attracts guests from widely different countries, especially leaders of China, India, Malaysia, Mongolia, and Myanmar. The leaders of Vietnam, Kazakhstan, Laos, and Thailand have visited it in various capacities. The business segment of the forum has long gone far beyond the geographical boundaries of Eurasia. Its frequent unprecedented large number of guests includes businesspeople from South America, Africa, and the Middle East. That, however, it remains open for entrepreneurial contacts with everyone whose natural interests are primarily in the trade, economic, and social spheres. This cross-platform cooperation between the structures is developing, growing deeper and creating a new agenda. The most essential feature is that the platform is guided by the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and honest dialogue, which are entirely different from those of Western-oriented structures. 

The EEF, which opened on 1st-4th September, in Russia’s Far Eastern city of Vladivostok, has become a solid platform for open and constructive dialogue among business leaders, government officials, and members of the expert community. It has also become a unique venue for discussing the strategic development of the Russian Far East and the country as a whole, while fostering and strengthening potential partnerships with counterparts, particularly from the Asia-Pacific region, in food production, infrastructure, logistics, industry, energy, and many other sectors of the economy. While recognizing the huge untapped economic potential of the region, it is also understandable that the development of the Far East largely depends on human capital, entrepreneurial efforts, and the ability of regions to create the necessary conditions for realizing the practical expectations.

On 2nd September, as part of the business program, the “Towards a Common Future: Inclusion as a Development Resource for the Far East” discussion was held with a strong focus on how to create an equal opportunity environment, develop human capital, and engage diverse groups in economic and social life. The following day, the majority of the participants in the “Inspiring Investments: A Development Strategy for Growth and Scaling” session touched on funding mechanisms for creative projects, opportunities to enter foreign markets, and collaboration between businesses, investors, development institutions, and government agencies. The key point focused on the development of the creative economy and international cooperation with Asia-Pacific countries, industry investments, the export of intellectual property and creative products, the media’s role in the development and positioning of regions in the Far East, new content formats, and training personnel for the economy of the future.

As part of the discussions at the forum, Russia and the United States continued their business dialogue, headed by Robert Agee, president and CEO of the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia (AmCham Russia), and with the participation of US representatives. It was spearheaded by the Roscongress Foundation in Russia.  Anton Kobyakov, Adviser to the President of the Russian Federation, noted, however, that there is a strong appetite on both sides for direct professional engagement. What matters most is to sustain the momentum and possibly broaden the agenda to include bilateral entrepreneurial partnership. 

“There is the need to facilitate more networking to identify specific strategic areas for cooperation,” said Robert Agee, president and CEO of the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia, and unreservedly agreed to continue their work on developing business ties and prepare for the participation of American representatives in the Russian Federation.

With many Asian and Pacific participants, explored opportunities for developing small and medium-sized enterprises. This is becoming increasingly important amid structural changes in the economy, as businesses look for new avenues for growth. The EEF made it possible not only to exchange experience but also to find concrete solutions that will help entrepreneurs adapt to changing conditions and unlock new opportunities for growth.

Developing trade, strengthening of interstate ties, and the creation of a common space for interaction among Asia-Pacific countries have assumed a new trend with Russia. The argument was logically based on Russia’s historical experience of cooperation with East Asian countries. It was further underlined that Russia and the Asia-Pacific attract politicians and entrepreneurs from around the world. In these current geopolitical circumstances, Russia needs to seek out new opportunities for development, particularly from the Asia-Pacific region, and with reference to the emerging new multipolar world. At the heart of the forum program was the search for new sources of growth and resilience for SMEs amid structural changes in the economy, from raising productivity and adopting new technologies to managing risks and adapting business models. One section of the program focused on the role of automation and artificial intelligence, changes in business processes, employees’ readiness to work with new technologies, and ways of improving productivity. 

In addition to the above, a special session was devoted to analysis where experts outlined the key economic trends across the Asia-Pacific region. As monitored, this session was set out in the analytical review entitled “Asia Trends 2026: The AI Boom, Industrial Relocation, and Geopolitical Fragmentation,” prepared ahead of the opening of the Eastern Economic Forum on 1st September. The review clearly noted, among other things, that Asia accounts for around 60% of global GDP growth and is becoming the world’s new center of trade, industry, technology, finance, and military power. Within the region, however, economic growth is highly uneven, while technology and capital are concentrated in a small group of states, making consolidation difficult. The ASEAN countries, meanwhile, face competition from Chinese manufacturers while also coming under growing geopolitical pressure from Washington. More broadly, the Asia-Pacific region is more exposed than any other to the effects of the energy crisis and to climate risks such as a super El Niño. 

According to the International Monetary Fund, Asian GDP grew by 5% in 2025, significantly ahead of global growth of 3.5%. Within the region, however, countries face a range of specific challenges, from high labor costs and insufficient industrial capacity to balance-of-payments difficulties and currency instability. These factors are driving increasingly divergent development paths among Asian economies. The region’s advanced economies, such as Japan and South Korea, posted lower growth rates, at 1.2% and 1%, respectively, in 2025. Asia’s emerging economies grew by 5.5% overall over the same period, with performance ranging from a 2% contraction in GDP in Myanmar to an 8% surge in Vietnam. 

Countries with the strongest growth prospects are attracting investment, leaving others with fewer opportunities to draw in capital. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, developing countries in Asia attracted US$644 billion in foreign direct investment in 2025. That is around 40% of the global total and more than 70% of all investment in developing countries. Capital flows are unevenly distributed: eight of the ten largest recipients of foreign direct investment among developing countries are in Asia, and together they account for around 60% of all inflows to developing economies and more than 80% of inflows to the region. 

Capital is becoming increasingly concentrated not only in a small number of countries but also in a narrow range of sectors, particularly artificial intelligence, clean energy, semiconductors, and critical minerals. In the longer term, this could deepen inequality and worsen the position of countries without a strong presence in these fields. Asia is one of the principal beneficiaries of the global AI boom. The investment cycle associated with its development has driven up demand for semiconductors, memory, servers, network equipment, and related electronics. The region occupies a central position in the global supply chain for these products. Technology exports will remain a powerful engine of economic growth in Asia, although the benefits will be distributed unevenly depending on each country’s position in the value chain.

South-East Asia’s role as an industrial center is growing as production capacity relocates there from China, which is no longer a low-cost manufacturing base. Chinese companies have begun redirecting production to Vietnam and Indonesia in particular in order to mitigate the impact of US tariffs. At the same time, China has increased its exports of industrial components and capital goods, supplying the equipment and parts needed by manufacturing centers in other countries. Exports of intermediate goods, including memory chips, other semiconductors, and industrial components, rose by 9% in 2025. Part of this represented an indirect offset to reduced shipments to the United States, as components, particularly in electronics, were used by manufacturers in other countries to produce goods that were subsequently exported to the US. A fall of roughly US$15 billion in smartphone exports, for example, was matched by a comparable increase in shipments of components, notably to India. 

In many other cases, however, the growth in exports of components and equipment was not linked to replacing sales China had lost in the US. Instead, it supported the expansion of production in third markets, especially developing ones, reinforcing China’s role as a supplier of production inputs rather than an exporter of finished goods. The result is an integrated supply chain taking shape across the region, encompassing research and development and the manufacture of high-technology components in China, assembly and packaging in an ASEAN country such as Malaysia or Vietnam, and the subsequent shipment of products to markets within the region and beyond. 

Amid the fragmentation of the global economy and trade, the development of the Eurasian space calls for resilient regional supply chains and logistical connectivity between states. Russia’s Far Eastern Federal District can play a strategically important role here. Thanks to its location, the district can serve as a resource and logistics gateway within the transport corridors linking European Russia with Asia. For a long time, infrastructure constraints held back the expansion of ties between Russia and Asian states, but the situation has begun to change with the development of the Eastern Operating Domain, which comprises the Baikal–Amur Mainline and the Trans-Siberian Railway. 

A program to modernize the Eastern Operating Domain has been under way since 2013, aimed at eliminating bottlenecks on the railways of Siberia and the Far East. Over that period, its carrying capacity has increased by 84%, reaching 180 million tonnes in 2025. The modernization is expected to raise that figure to 210 million tonnes by the end of 2030 and 270 million tonnes by the end of 2032. The development of the rail network and port infrastructure will largely determine the prospects for Eurasia and for the Asia-Pacific region in particular, as the world’s economic, financial, and trade center shifts towards the region. 

Emerging trends are reshaping the world; South-South economic partnership is seemingly becoming both the political and economic architecture. Logically, developing collaboration with Asian partners, anchoring discussions on technological leadership, and making breakthroughs in scientific fields and adopting innovative technologies are increasingly reshaping the world. Today, the role of academic institutions is to build a solid scientific and technological foundation that addresses applied industrial challenges while enhancing business efficiency, eco-friendliness, and sustainability. It is only through this synergy between science and the real economic sectors that can bring true multifaceted sovereignty. In conclusion, Asia-Pacific and Russia have to create a new model of economic and business and trade relations in the Global South.

As monitored from official reports, Russia is creating practically a new model of development of the Far East with maximally comfortable conditions for enterprises, as well as legal innovations for the investment climate in the region. Therefore, potential Asia-Pacific investors have to work on new ideas and new strategies for developing trade, agro-processing, industry, and other economic sectors in the Far Eastern region. The Eastern Economic Forum was held from September 1 to 4 on the campus of the Far Eastern Federal University. This year’s theme: “The Far East: Development for the Benefit of People.” It was the 11th EEF and organized by the Roscongress Foundation.

The drone strike that hit a gasoline tank at the Zawiya refinery in August was more than a security incident. Zawiya is Libya’s largest operating refining facility, and the National Oil Corporation warned that continued attacks could force operations to halt. In an economy still built almost entirely around hydrocarbons, a disruption at one major facility rarely stays local. It becomes a national economic risk.

Libya’s dependence on oil has generated enormous wealth, but it has also concentrated economic risk in a relatively narrow network of fields, pipelines, export terminals, and refineries. A disruption at any one of these nodes can threaten fuel supplies, production, and the state revenue that depends on them, reaching well beyond the site itself.

None of this means Libya should move away from oil, which will remain central to the economy for years. The more useful question is whether Libya can build enough productive capacity around it that the country’s economic future isn’t defined by the vulnerability of a handful of facilities. Diversification is often discussed in the abstract. In Libya, it is starting to take a more concrete shape, particularly in cement and steel, where investment is beginning to build an economic base around production, employment, infrastructure, and domestic value rather than around extraction alone.

Why cement is more than a construction material

Cement doesn’t carry the same strategic weight as oil in most conversations about Libya’s economy, but for a country rebuilding its cities and infrastructure, it arguably should. Housing, roads, and public infrastructure all depend on a steady domestic supply of building materials, and meeting that demand locally generates a different kind of value than exporting raw resources: factories, supply chains, jobs at multiple skill levels, and more of the value construction generates staying inside the national economy.

There is also an export dimension. Libya’s location and access to regional markets give a competitive cement industry real potential beyond its own borders. Suhail Abushiha, Libya’s Minister of Economy and Trade, has said the country could eventually export as much as 25 million tonnes of cement annually, a figure that indicates how far this ambition is meant to reach, even if it remains some distance from current output.

A functioning industrial sector depends on engineers, technicians, suppliers, contractors, energy, transport, finance, logistics, and maintenance, and its output in turn supports other industries and the wider construction economy. That is the multiplier effect Libya needs, not just revenue, as oil provides, but economic activity that spreads across businesses, regions, and communities. The foundations for that are already forming.

The industrial base already in place

Libya is not starting from scratch. The Libyan Cement Company in Benghazi remains one of the country’s most established industrial producers, accounting for roughly 20 percent of national cement output and supporting more than 1,000 direct jobs. Over the years, its cement has supplied major infrastructure and reconstruction projects, and its history tracks the broader shift in Libya’s private sector. In 2023 it came under the ownership of businessman Ahmed Gadalla and has since grown to become a defining industrial player in eastern Libya.

The company’s importance extends past what it produces. A major industrial operation generates demand for engineers, contractors, transportation, logistics, maintenance, and energy services, and its output feeds directly into the construction and infrastructure projects that will shape Libya’s future. Gadalla’s industrial interests go beyond cement, in fact. His involvement in the SULB steel venture, alongside Tosyalı Holding, follows the same logic of building productive capacity in sectors that support construction and long-term development.

Alongside these established players, Libya is seeing a new wave of large-scale investment. In Nalut, ALHEDAB Cement Company is developing a major project with an estimated investment of $600 million, designed to produce up to 12,000 tonnes of cement per day, one of the largest industrial projects currently under development in the country. What distinguishes the project isn’t only its scale. Around 25 percent of its capital is expected to open to public and foreign investors, with plans for a future stock market listing, which points to a shift in how large industrial projects in Libya could be financed going forward: less reliant on the state or a narrow group of private interests, and more open to broader participation.

Other producers are expanding the sector as well. Arabian Cement Company, a domestically owned producer based in Khoms, has an annual production capacity of roughly 3.3 million tonnes, and international companies including Pakistan’s Lucky Cement and Oman’s Raysut Cement have identified opportunities in the Libyan market. What matters is less any single project than the combined effect: a growing network of producers, suppliers, contractors, logistics companies, and skilled workers starts to resemble an industrial ecosystem rather than a collection of unrelated ventures.

Diversification depends on projects reinforcing each other

Libya’s economic future won’t be transformed by one factory or one investment announcement. Diversification becomes meaningful when industries start reinforcing each other: cement supports construction, construction creates demand for steel, transport, and engineering services, and new industrial facilities need energy infrastructure, maintenance, logistics, and finance in turn. Industry’s value isn’t limited to what leaves the factory. It lives in the network of activity that builds up around it, which matters for Libya in particular, since oil has financed much of the state for decades without creating a broad productive base on its own. Cement and steel fit that gap reasonably well, given that reconstruction already creates substantial domestic demand and regional markets could add export opportunities over time.

Incentives alone won’t be enough

Projects at this scale need capital, confidence, and long-term commitment. Libya has been working to strengthen the investment environment through incentives and guarantees aimed at domestic and foreign investors. Investment promotion mechanisms backed by the Public Investment Bank are meant to build investor confidence, and the investment framework has tried to encourage the transfer of foreign expertise and technology, including requirements such as health insurance for workers.

These measures matter, but they aren’t sufficient on their own. Market opportunities, natural resources, and favorable terms can draw investors in, but long-term industrial investment depends on something more basic: confidence that regulators apply the rules consistently, and that assets, workers, and supply chains can operate somewhere secure. That is where the Zawiya attack becomes relevant again.

Security, not just incentives, will determine whether this works

The refinery attack points to a challenge that goes beyond any single facility: Libya’s economic prospects can’t be separated from its security and political environment. A country can offer investment guarantees, but uncertainty erodes their value. A manufacturer weighing a multi-million-dollar factory has to account for demand and profitability, but also electricity, logistics, regulation, security, and whether operations can run consistently for years at a time. That is why economic diversification and institutional reform need to move together. Libya needs investment, but investment needs predictability just as much: clear regulations, reliable institutions, and an environment where companies can plan past the next political or security disruption.

The Zawiya attacks make that need difficult to ignore. They show how quickly insecurity can threaten assets central to the national economy, and they strengthen the case for an economy that doesn’t depend on a narrow set of sources. Diversification can’t eliminate political or security risk, but it can reduce how much of the country’s economic life hinges on a limited number of facilities.

Where this leaves Libya

The Zawiya fire is a warning about what happens when a national economy leans too heavily on a narrow group of critical assets. Libya will remain an oil producer for the foreseeable future, and hydrocarbons will continue generating a large share of national wealth. But that doesn’t mean the country’s economic future has to be defined by oil alone.

New cement plants are under development, existing producers continue to back reconstruction and employment, capital is opening to domestic and foreign investors, and international companies are moving in alongside Libyan businesses. These are early signs of a possible shift, not evidence of one already completed. Whether Libya can turn individual investments into a coherent industrial strategy will depend on more than capital and ambition. It will depend on regulatory reform, stronger institutions, security, and sustained commitment to building productive capacity, with Libya’s oil wealth funding the broader transformation rather than substituting for it.