opinion

Authors: Janvi Singhi and Kanav Sharma*

BRICS is moving into a more meaningful phase in its evolution. Its larger membership, considerable resources, population, and markets position it as a voice for the global south. Nevertheless, the fact that the BRICS is economically big does not guarantee that it will turn into a powerful organization. The difficult question is whether BRICS will be able to use the potential of its diversified members to create the institutions and means of collaboration that will meet the needs and interests of different countries, businesses, and banks.

This is where the next chapter of BRICS collaboration will be decided. It is definitely not in need of aspiration. The main question is not whether BRICS will develop a common geopolitical approach but whether BRICS will be able to simplify the issues of cooperation for countries with divergent economic interests and institutional capabilities.

The enlargement of BRICS has brought about both a chance and an enigma. An increased number of members boosts the economic and diplomatic power of the group, but it also entails the presence of more currencies, regulations, economic systems, and foreign policy priorities. States such as India and China may share a desire to amplify the role of developing economies while being in competition with regard to trade, technology, and geopolitics. Resource-rich countries may have their priorities with respect to the manufacturing countries. Financial centers may deal with payment integration differently from countries interested in getting more monetary independence.

The key challenge before BRICS is not about making all the members agree about everything; rather, it is about creating means for cooperation between different countries in the areas where their interests coincide.

This differentiation is essential because BRICS is frequently assessed based on scale indicators, including population, economic output, energy resource reserves, and trade. While these parameters demonstrate the affiliation, the affiliation is not the key to institutional power. BRICS is still functioning as an informal coordinating mechanism and not as a supranational institution due to the absence of an establishing treaty, budget, and secretariat. The conversion of its total economic capabilities into total actions should rely substantially on its members’ coordination. BRICS needs to change its approach, so instead of pursuing expansion, it should focus on implementation.

The issue of cross-border payments can serve as an example. The necessity to improve payment processes within BRICS may be easily explained. International transactions require correspondent banks, multiple currencies, currency exchange, and several commissions. Using local currencies and interoperable payment systems may help reduce some of these expenses and create additional ways of settlements for countries.

However, establishing a new financial structure is much more difficult than just talking about it. The real barriers are technical and institutional: interoperability between national payment systems, regulatory compatibility, foreign exchange liquidity, cybersecurity, anti-money laundering and know-your-customer norms, settlement systems, and trust among the entities participating in the payment system. A domestic payment system cannot simply be hooked up to a foreign payment system without addressing these problems. This leads us to a more practical goal for BRICS countries. Instead of concentrating on the joint BRICS currency, they should work on interoperability among national payment systems.

The example of India’s UPI-PayNow linkage to Singapore shows how this principle works. Two entirely different payment systems can be interlinked without destroying their own systems. The same gap can be figured out at the level of BRICS if all necessary regulations, settlements, and risk management conditions are fulfilled. In order to understand how this can be achieved, BRICS can refer to the examples of other countries that have already applied the same logic.

The same issue of coordination can be observed in trade and supply chains as well. BRICS countries have complementary assets such as resources in energy, agriculture, manufacturing, minerals, technology, and large markets for consumer goods. However, having complementary resources does not automatically result in integrated supply chains.

Businesses need predictable customs, standards that will fit one another, reliable logistics, availability of finance, and clarity of regulation. If countries have different certification systems, digital documents, and technical standards, the theoretical advantages of a large BRICS market will not be fully realized. Therefore, standards will probably prevail over declarations in the end.

So far BRICS has spoken about cooperation of national standard organizations and overcoming technical barriers between trade. Further work is getting cooperation of national standard organizations transferred into standards that will be in demand in real business. Common standards for digital trade documents, selected product certification, customs data, payment systems, and technical standards can connect BRICS economies without full harmonization of their economies.

This method would make it easier to justify politically. There would not be a need for members to give up their power when it comes to buying a wider range of economic policies. The only thing left is for countries with technology to agree on their particular rules where technology will help provide measurable benefits.

The same goes for agricultural projects, as the BRICS countries share similar problems in the fields of food supply, climate, water conservation, and productivity. The BRICS has started pushing for agricultural research and cooperation. So, the question is not whether the BRICS countries have recognized these areas; they already have. The larger question is whether anything can be implemented across borders.

In a situation where one country has effective technology to grow crops and another one has a good way of bringing the crops to a field, BRICS has to find a way to transfer that knowledge or have an organization that can help in that transfer. There should be a value on the moves made regardless of whether formal treaties have been produced or not. This points towards a different institutional model for BRICS: modular cooperation.

BRICS needs to develop a model that allows all members to be part of the major framework and subgroups of interested members cooperating with each other in specific areas that require deep integration. Countries interested in making payments and settlements between them could organize a coalition in charge of finding and implementing technical solutions for that. Those ready to work jointly in the field of agriculture can proceed with agricultural cooperation, while others can focus on critical minerals, logistics, AI technologies, energy, and development finance.

This model recognizes one uncomfortable truth: diversity is BRICS’ asset, but it also acts as an obstacle in its functioning. In a highly heterogeneous grouping, it is impossible to expect rapid integration in view of the differences among its members. Compliance with the needs of all BRICS states only produces long negotiations and ambitious statements that do not work. Modular cooperation, in its turn, enables countries to pursue their own policy while being part of the larger framework.

Moreover, it could also establish a more trustworthy framework for testing. A limited number of members would be given the opportunity to run an initial test of payment or trading procedures, determine any legal or technological obstacles, and welcome other participants once the system is successful. The outcome would be a lowering of the chances of running into challenges that would be involved in the launch of a full project for all members simultaneously. BRICS should also reconsider its parameters of success.

Rather than concentrating on the number of members or the quantity of agreements accepted, BRICS should focus on the outcomes of its activities. There are political benefits to this strategy as well. BRICS will find it difficult to forge sustainable alternatives simply by selling them as counters in the geopolitical confrontation with the West. Governments and businesses respond not just to geopolitical signals but also to incentives. If the BRICS mechanism is cheaper, quicker, safer, and more efficient, then the chances of adoption increase.

This point is especially important for the discussion of de-dollarization. The reduction of dependence on dollar-based systems may in itself be a rational objective for some members; however, viewing de-dollarization as a success in and of itself can overshadow the distinction between geopolitics and economic efficiency. A payment mechanism can only gain credibility if banks and companies use it to solve a problem at hand.

India’s BRICS presidency in 2026 is an excellent opportunity to work on the practical implementation of the above approach. New Delhi can focus on enhancing cooperation based on interoperability and standards, collaboration of sectors, and measurable results. Instead of trying to create a homogenous group, India can create a framework where willing participants will devise their solutions for implementation by others.

Instead of striving to make BRICS like other supranational bodies, we should acknowledge the fact that, given its diversity of membership composition and structure, it is not realistic nor necessary. BRICS differentials provide a comparative advantage of allowing a mix of countries with both different political and economic systems that nevertheless share aspirations for greater policy autonomy and a voice in international affairs.

BRICS does not need to reach consensus on every issue to become successful. What it requires is to be able to determine areas where cooperation can be beneficial economically and create institutions able to do that.

Thus, the biggest problem is not the absence of power. The problem is how to convert power into capacity and capacity into institutions. If BRICS succeeds in this task, its economic capacity will transform from empty statistics into collective power. If it does not, then enlargement might improve visibility of the group, but its effectiveness would stay at the same level.

*Kanav Sharma is a Public Policy Researcher from Jammu & Kashmir with a postgraduate degree in English Literature from the University of Jammu. His interests include public policy, governance, parliamentary and strategic affairs.

The Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) has been described as a successful solid platform since its creation. It increasingly attracts guests from widely different countries, especially leaders of China, India, Malaysia, Mongolia, and Myanmar. The leaders of Vietnam, Kazakhstan, Laos, and Thailand have visited it in various capacities. The business segment of the forum has long gone far beyond the geographical boundaries of Eurasia. Its frequent unprecedented large number of guests includes businesspeople from South America, Africa, and the Middle East. That, however, it remains open for entrepreneurial contacts with everyone whose natural interests are primarily in the trade, economic, and social spheres. This cross-platform cooperation between the structures is developing, growing deeper and creating a new agenda. The most essential feature is that the platform is guided by the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and honest dialogue, which are entirely different from those of Western-oriented structures. 

The EEF, which opened on 1st-4th September, in Russia’s Far Eastern city of Vladivostok, has become a solid platform for open and constructive dialogue among business leaders, government officials, and members of the expert community. It has also become a unique venue for discussing the strategic development of the Russian Far East and the country as a whole, while fostering and strengthening potential partnerships with counterparts, particularly from the Asia-Pacific region, in food production, infrastructure, logistics, industry, energy, and many other sectors of the economy. While recognizing the huge untapped economic potential of the region, it is also understandable that the development of the Far East largely depends on human capital, entrepreneurial efforts, and the ability of regions to create the necessary conditions for realizing the practical expectations.

On 2nd September, as part of the business program, the “Towards a Common Future: Inclusion as a Development Resource for the Far East” discussion was held with a strong focus on how to create an equal opportunity environment, develop human capital, and engage diverse groups in economic and social life. The following day, the majority of the participants in the “Inspiring Investments: A Development Strategy for Growth and Scaling” session touched on funding mechanisms for creative projects, opportunities to enter foreign markets, and collaboration between businesses, investors, development institutions, and government agencies. The key point focused on the development of the creative economy and international cooperation with Asia-Pacific countries, industry investments, the export of intellectual property and creative products, the media’s role in the development and positioning of regions in the Far East, new content formats, and training personnel for the economy of the future.

As part of the discussions at the forum, Russia and the United States continued their business dialogue, headed by Robert Agee, president and CEO of the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia (AmCham Russia), and with the participation of US representatives. It was spearheaded by the Roscongress Foundation in Russia.  Anton Kobyakov, Adviser to the President of the Russian Federation, noted, however, that there is a strong appetite on both sides for direct professional engagement. What matters most is to sustain the momentum and possibly broaden the agenda to include bilateral entrepreneurial partnership. 

“There is the need to facilitate more networking to identify specific strategic areas for cooperation,” said Robert Agee, president and CEO of the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia, and unreservedly agreed to continue their work on developing business ties and prepare for the participation of American representatives in the Russian Federation.

With many Asian and Pacific participants, explored opportunities for developing small and medium-sized enterprises. This is becoming increasingly important amid structural changes in the economy, as businesses look for new avenues for growth. The EEF made it possible not only to exchange experience but also to find concrete solutions that will help entrepreneurs adapt to changing conditions and unlock new opportunities for growth.

Developing trade, strengthening of interstate ties, and the creation of a common space for interaction among Asia-Pacific countries have assumed a new trend with Russia. The argument was logically based on Russia’s historical experience of cooperation with East Asian countries. It was further underlined that Russia and the Asia-Pacific attract politicians and entrepreneurs from around the world. In these current geopolitical circumstances, Russia needs to seek out new opportunities for development, particularly from the Asia-Pacific region, and with reference to the emerging new multipolar world. At the heart of the forum program was the search for new sources of growth and resilience for SMEs amid structural changes in the economy, from raising productivity and adopting new technologies to managing risks and adapting business models. One section of the program focused on the role of automation and artificial intelligence, changes in business processes, employees’ readiness to work with new technologies, and ways of improving productivity. 

In addition to the above, a special session was devoted to analysis where experts outlined the key economic trends across the Asia-Pacific region. As monitored, this session was set out in the analytical review entitled “Asia Trends 2026: The AI Boom, Industrial Relocation, and Geopolitical Fragmentation,” prepared ahead of the opening of the Eastern Economic Forum on 1st September. The review clearly noted, among other things, that Asia accounts for around 60% of global GDP growth and is becoming the world’s new center of trade, industry, technology, finance, and military power. Within the region, however, economic growth is highly uneven, while technology and capital are concentrated in a small group of states, making consolidation difficult. The ASEAN countries, meanwhile, face competition from Chinese manufacturers while also coming under growing geopolitical pressure from Washington. More broadly, the Asia-Pacific region is more exposed than any other to the effects of the energy crisis and to climate risks such as a super El Niño. 

According to the International Monetary Fund, Asian GDP grew by 5% in 2025, significantly ahead of global growth of 3.5%. Within the region, however, countries face a range of specific challenges, from high labor costs and insufficient industrial capacity to balance-of-payments difficulties and currency instability. These factors are driving increasingly divergent development paths among Asian economies. The region’s advanced economies, such as Japan and South Korea, posted lower growth rates, at 1.2% and 1%, respectively, in 2025. Asia’s emerging economies grew by 5.5% overall over the same period, with performance ranging from a 2% contraction in GDP in Myanmar to an 8% surge in Vietnam. 

Countries with the strongest growth prospects are attracting investment, leaving others with fewer opportunities to draw in capital. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, developing countries in Asia attracted US$644 billion in foreign direct investment in 2025. That is around 40% of the global total and more than 70% of all investment in developing countries. Capital flows are unevenly distributed: eight of the ten largest recipients of foreign direct investment among developing countries are in Asia, and together they account for around 60% of all inflows to developing economies and more than 80% of inflows to the region. 

Capital is becoming increasingly concentrated not only in a small number of countries but also in a narrow range of sectors, particularly artificial intelligence, clean energy, semiconductors, and critical minerals. In the longer term, this could deepen inequality and worsen the position of countries without a strong presence in these fields. Asia is one of the principal beneficiaries of the global AI boom. The investment cycle associated with its development has driven up demand for semiconductors, memory, servers, network equipment, and related electronics. The region occupies a central position in the global supply chain for these products. Technology exports will remain a powerful engine of economic growth in Asia, although the benefits will be distributed unevenly depending on each country’s position in the value chain.

South-East Asia’s role as an industrial center is growing as production capacity relocates there from China, which is no longer a low-cost manufacturing base. Chinese companies have begun redirecting production to Vietnam and Indonesia in particular in order to mitigate the impact of US tariffs. At the same time, China has increased its exports of industrial components and capital goods, supplying the equipment and parts needed by manufacturing centers in other countries. Exports of intermediate goods, including memory chips, other semiconductors, and industrial components, rose by 9% in 2025. Part of this represented an indirect offset to reduced shipments to the United States, as components, particularly in electronics, were used by manufacturers in other countries to produce goods that were subsequently exported to the US. A fall of roughly US$15 billion in smartphone exports, for example, was matched by a comparable increase in shipments of components, notably to India. 

In many other cases, however, the growth in exports of components and equipment was not linked to replacing sales China had lost in the US. Instead, it supported the expansion of production in third markets, especially developing ones, reinforcing China’s role as a supplier of production inputs rather than an exporter of finished goods. The result is an integrated supply chain taking shape across the region, encompassing research and development and the manufacture of high-technology components in China, assembly and packaging in an ASEAN country such as Malaysia or Vietnam, and the subsequent shipment of products to markets within the region and beyond. 

Amid the fragmentation of the global economy and trade, the development of the Eurasian space calls for resilient regional supply chains and logistical connectivity between states. Russia’s Far Eastern Federal District can play a strategically important role here. Thanks to its location, the district can serve as a resource and logistics gateway within the transport corridors linking European Russia with Asia. For a long time, infrastructure constraints held back the expansion of ties between Russia and Asian states, but the situation has begun to change with the development of the Eastern Operating Domain, which comprises the Baikal–Amur Mainline and the Trans-Siberian Railway. 

A program to modernize the Eastern Operating Domain has been under way since 2013, aimed at eliminating bottlenecks on the railways of Siberia and the Far East. Over that period, its carrying capacity has increased by 84%, reaching 180 million tonnes in 2025. The modernization is expected to raise that figure to 210 million tonnes by the end of 2030 and 270 million tonnes by the end of 2032. The development of the rail network and port infrastructure will largely determine the prospects for Eurasia and for the Asia-Pacific region in particular, as the world’s economic, financial, and trade center shifts towards the region. 

Emerging trends are reshaping the world; South-South economic partnership is seemingly becoming both the political and economic architecture. Logically, developing collaboration with Asian partners, anchoring discussions on technological leadership, and making breakthroughs in scientific fields and adopting innovative technologies are increasingly reshaping the world. Today, the role of academic institutions is to build a solid scientific and technological foundation that addresses applied industrial challenges while enhancing business efficiency, eco-friendliness, and sustainability. It is only through this synergy between science and the real economic sectors that can bring true multifaceted sovereignty. In conclusion, Asia-Pacific and Russia have to create a new model of economic and business and trade relations in the Global South.

As monitored from official reports, Russia is creating practically a new model of development of the Far East with maximally comfortable conditions for enterprises, as well as legal innovations for the investment climate in the region. Therefore, potential Asia-Pacific investors have to work on new ideas and new strategies for developing trade, agro-processing, industry, and other economic sectors in the Far Eastern region. The Eastern Economic Forum was held from September 1 to 4 on the campus of the Far Eastern Federal University. This year’s theme: “The Far East: Development for the Benefit of People.” It was the 11th EEF and organized by the Roscongress Foundation.

The drone strike that hit a gasoline tank at the Zawiya refinery in August was more than a security incident. Zawiya is Libya’s largest operating refining facility, and the National Oil Corporation warned that continued attacks could force operations to halt. In an economy still built almost entirely around hydrocarbons, a disruption at one major facility rarely stays local. It becomes a national economic risk.

Libya’s dependence on oil has generated enormous wealth, but it has also concentrated economic risk in a relatively narrow network of fields, pipelines, export terminals, and refineries. A disruption at any one of these nodes can threaten fuel supplies, production, and the state revenue that depends on them, reaching well beyond the site itself.

None of this means Libya should move away from oil, which will remain central to the economy for years. The more useful question is whether Libya can build enough productive capacity around it that the country’s economic future isn’t defined by the vulnerability of a handful of facilities. Diversification is often discussed in the abstract. In Libya, it is starting to take a more concrete shape, particularly in cement and steel, where investment is beginning to build an economic base around production, employment, infrastructure, and domestic value rather than around extraction alone.

Why cement is more than a construction material

Cement doesn’t carry the same strategic weight as oil in most conversations about Libya’s economy, but for a country rebuilding its cities and infrastructure, it arguably should. Housing, roads, and public infrastructure all depend on a steady domestic supply of building materials, and meeting that demand locally generates a different kind of value than exporting raw resources: factories, supply chains, jobs at multiple skill levels, and more of the value construction generates staying inside the national economy.

There is also an export dimension. Libya’s location and access to regional markets give a competitive cement industry real potential beyond its own borders. Suhail Abushiha, Libya’s Minister of Economy and Trade, has said the country could eventually export as much as 25 million tonnes of cement annually, a figure that indicates how far this ambition is meant to reach, even if it remains some distance from current output.

A functioning industrial sector depends on engineers, technicians, suppliers, contractors, energy, transport, finance, logistics, and maintenance, and its output in turn supports other industries and the wider construction economy. That is the multiplier effect Libya needs, not just revenue, as oil provides, but economic activity that spreads across businesses, regions, and communities. The foundations for that are already forming.

The industrial base already in place

Libya is not starting from scratch. The Libyan Cement Company in Benghazi remains one of the country’s most established industrial producers, accounting for roughly 20 percent of national cement output and supporting more than 1,000 direct jobs. Over the years, its cement has supplied major infrastructure and reconstruction projects, and its history tracks the broader shift in Libya’s private sector. In 2023 it came under the ownership of businessman Ahmed Gadalla and has since grown to become a defining industrial player in eastern Libya.

The company’s importance extends past what it produces. A major industrial operation generates demand for engineers, contractors, transportation, logistics, maintenance, and energy services, and its output feeds directly into the construction and infrastructure projects that will shape Libya’s future. Gadalla’s industrial interests go beyond cement, in fact. His involvement in the SULB steel venture, alongside Tosyalı Holding, follows the same logic of building productive capacity in sectors that support construction and long-term development.

Alongside these established players, Libya is seeing a new wave of large-scale investment. In Nalut, ALHEDAB Cement Company is developing a major project with an estimated investment of $600 million, designed to produce up to 12,000 tonnes of cement per day, one of the largest industrial projects currently under development in the country. What distinguishes the project isn’t only its scale. Around 25 percent of its capital is expected to open to public and foreign investors, with plans for a future stock market listing, which points to a shift in how large industrial projects in Libya could be financed going forward: less reliant on the state or a narrow group of private interests, and more open to broader participation.

Other producers are expanding the sector as well. Arabian Cement Company, a domestically owned producer based in Khoms, has an annual production capacity of roughly 3.3 million tonnes, and international companies including Pakistan’s Lucky Cement and Oman’s Raysut Cement have identified opportunities in the Libyan market. What matters is less any single project than the combined effect: a growing network of producers, suppliers, contractors, logistics companies, and skilled workers starts to resemble an industrial ecosystem rather than a collection of unrelated ventures.

Diversification depends on projects reinforcing each other

Libya’s economic future won’t be transformed by one factory or one investment announcement. Diversification becomes meaningful when industries start reinforcing each other: cement supports construction, construction creates demand for steel, transport, and engineering services, and new industrial facilities need energy infrastructure, maintenance, logistics, and finance in turn. Industry’s value isn’t limited to what leaves the factory. It lives in the network of activity that builds up around it, which matters for Libya in particular, since oil has financed much of the state for decades without creating a broad productive base on its own. Cement and steel fit that gap reasonably well, given that reconstruction already creates substantial domestic demand and regional markets could add export opportunities over time.

Incentives alone won’t be enough

Projects at this scale need capital, confidence, and long-term commitment. Libya has been working to strengthen the investment environment through incentives and guarantees aimed at domestic and foreign investors. Investment promotion mechanisms backed by the Public Investment Bank are meant to build investor confidence, and the investment framework has tried to encourage the transfer of foreign expertise and technology, including requirements such as health insurance for workers.

These measures matter, but they aren’t sufficient on their own. Market opportunities, natural resources, and favorable terms can draw investors in, but long-term industrial investment depends on something more basic: confidence that regulators apply the rules consistently, and that assets, workers, and supply chains can operate somewhere secure. That is where the Zawiya attack becomes relevant again.

Security, not just incentives, will determine whether this works

The refinery attack points to a challenge that goes beyond any single facility: Libya’s economic prospects can’t be separated from its security and political environment. A country can offer investment guarantees, but uncertainty erodes their value. A manufacturer weighing a multi-million-dollar factory has to account for demand and profitability, but also electricity, logistics, regulation, security, and whether operations can run consistently for years at a time. That is why economic diversification and institutional reform need to move together. Libya needs investment, but investment needs predictability just as much: clear regulations, reliable institutions, and an environment where companies can plan past the next political or security disruption.

The Zawiya attacks make that need difficult to ignore. They show how quickly insecurity can threaten assets central to the national economy, and they strengthen the case for an economy that doesn’t depend on a narrow set of sources. Diversification can’t eliminate political or security risk, but it can reduce how much of the country’s economic life hinges on a limited number of facilities.

Where this leaves Libya

The Zawiya fire is a warning about what happens when a national economy leans too heavily on a narrow group of critical assets. Libya will remain an oil producer for the foreseeable future, and hydrocarbons will continue generating a large share of national wealth. But that doesn’t mean the country’s economic future has to be defined by oil alone.

New cement plants are under development, existing producers continue to back reconstruction and employment, capital is opening to domestic and foreign investors, and international companies are moving in alongside Libyan businesses. These are early signs of a possible shift, not evidence of one already completed. Whether Libya can turn individual investments into a coherent industrial strategy will depend on more than capital and ambition. It will depend on regulatory reform, stronger institutions, security, and sustained commitment to building productive capacity, with Libya’s oil wealth funding the broader transformation rather than substituting for it.

The upcoming official visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Egypt, scheduled for August 30 to September 3, 2026, coincides with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit. The visit will address economic and technological cooperation, as well as regional and international issues, and marks the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Egypt and China. The visit aims to strengthen the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries and expand Beijing’s economic and political influence in the Middle East amidst escalating regional and international tensions, while also bolstering China’s role in the Global South.

As an Egyptian academic specializing in Chinese politics and the policies of the ruling Communist Party of China, I can analyze and summarize the significance of President Xi Jinping’s visit to Cairo and his meeting with his Egyptian counterpart, President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, and its importance to China’s influence in the Middle East and the Global South through the following points:

– First: What does China hope to achieve with Xi Jinping’s visit to Egypt at this particular time?

This visit of President Xi Jinping to Cairo (the first by a Chinese president to Cairo in nearly a decade) coincides with the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. It carries several key objectives, including political and international dimensions related to Chinese coordination with Egypt on Middle Eastern issues. The visit comes at a sensitive time, as the region is experiencing tensions linked to the conflict between Iran and the United States and its repercussions on maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz and global energy markets. Beijing also seeks to strengthen its strategic balance and reaffirm its diplomatic presence as an international power that supports diplomatic solutions and cooperates with pivotal countries like Egypt to achieve stability. This follows President Xi Jinping’s participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit.  President Xi Jinping’s visit to Cairo also carries several economic and trade dimensions, such as expanding the economic partnership and capitalizing on the significant increase in trade between the two countries to deepen cooperation. Furthermore, China will support infrastructure and energy projects in Egypt by boosting Chinese investments in Cairo, including renewable energy sectors such as wind turbine manufacturing plants, transportation deals, and electric trains, in addition to extending currency swap agreements between the two central banks.

The visit also aims to discuss the technological and artificial intelligence file in China’s relations with Cairo, particularly major technological offers, most notably the offer from the Chinese company Huawei to build data and artificial intelligence centers in Egypt. This project is viewed with apprehension by intelligence, military, political, and strategic circles in Washington, which are attempting to offer Cairo alternatives from major American technology companies such as Microsoft, Nvidia, and AMD.

– Second: Does the visit carry political messages that extend beyond bilateral relations, especially regarding the Middle East and Africa?

Yes, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit carries major strategic political messages that transcend the framework of bilateral cooperation. It aims to reshape the international order and build a multipolar world, starting with the Global South. The visit also carries messages that go beyond bilateral relations, pushing for a Global South leadership role. Beijing seeks to garner African and Arab support to assert its position as a major power, offering an alternative to Western and American competition and influence. China also aims to promote multilateralism by urging countries in the region to adopt common positions that support international stability and security, moving away from the unilateral polarization of the United States. Furthermore, President Xi Jinping’s visit signals China’s desire to secure its economic interests. Chinese actions are focused on ensuring the security of maritime routes and the stability of energy and trade markets within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative. Here, President Xi’s visit to Cairo coincides with the launch of the second iteration of the massive joint air exercises, Eagles of Civilization, in August 2026 at Egyptian air bases. These exercises, which follow the first iteration in May 2025, will involve advanced fighter jets from both sides. This sends political and strategic messages to Washington and Tel Aviv about the new military partnership between Egypt and China, the diversification of arms sources, and the independence of Egyptian military and political decision-making in diversifying its partnerships.

Furthermore, the Chinese president’s visit to Cairo carries support for Egypt’s regional role in the Middle East and Africa, reaffirming the pivotal role of Egypt. Choosing Egypt as a starting point reflects Beijing’s understanding of its geopolitical importance as a key link between the Arab world and the African continent and its commitment to addressing regional repercussions. China is also demonstrating its readiness to cooperate with its African and Arab partners to contain the economic crises resulting from conflicts in the Middle East.  In addition to China’s anticipated plan to expand alliances by strengthening the integration of Chinese development projects with major economic blocs such as BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, this visit also aims to coordinate common positions on de-escalation and maintaining peace and security in the Middle East and to discuss regional conflicts, particularly in the wake of the Gaza and Iran wars.

– Third: What economic files could witness new agreements or steps between Cairo and Beijing?

Economic relations between Cairo and Beijing are increasingly moving towards signing new agreements and taking new steps focused on strengthening joint investments and supporting financial stability. The most prominent joint economic and investment files between Egypt and China are based on supporting financial partnership and currency diversification. This involves renewing and strengthening local currency swap agreements between the Central Bank of Egypt and its Chinese counterpart to facilitate trade and support monetary stability, independent of international currencies. Economic cooperation and currency swaps will be among the top economic priorities of the visit through monitoring the surge in trade and extending the local currency swap agreement to enhance economic partnership within the BRICS framework.

Furthermore, there is a shared Chinese-Egyptian desire to localize industry and technology in Cairo by attracting substantial Chinese investments in electric vehicle manufacturing, new and renewable energy sectors, and advanced technology industries. With the expansion of Chinese projects in the Suez Canal Economic Zone, through the expansion of Chinese industrial and logistical projects within the Suez Canal Corridor, a major value-added production base is being established. China is also supporting Egypt in achieving food security and agricultural development by preparing joint Egyptian-Chinese alliances targeting large-scale agricultural land reclamation projects to enhance food security. This is happening concurrently with Chinese support for infrastructure and smart cities in Egypt through cooperation in urban development projects and modern smart cities.

– Fourth: Can China strengthen Egypt’s role as a key hub for its projects in the Middle East and Africa?

Yes, China is already strengthening Egypt’s role as a key and central hub for its strategic projects in the Middle East and Africa. The pillars of Chinese strategic cooperation with Egypt are based on China’s projects and investments within the Belt and Road Initiative. China considers Egypt a strategic gateway and a vital corridor for the maritime and land Silk Road, given the Suez Canal’s role as a global trade artery.  With the diversification of Chinese partnerships and investments in the Suez Canal Economic Zone, given the concentration of major industrial projects by Chinese companies in the zone, such as the China-Egypt Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone (TEDA). China aims to access African markets through Egypt. Chinese companies utilize Egyptian land and ports as a joint manufacturing base and a launchpad for exporting products and services to markets across Africa and the Middle East. China also seeks to achieve developmental and security integration with Egypt, aligning its five-year development plans with Egypt’s Vision 2030. This is further evidenced by the development of joint military cooperation and air exercises between Egypt and China, such as the Eagles of Civilization exercises between the Egyptian and Chinese air forces, the first iteration of which took place in May 2025 and the second in August 2026.

Beijing also seeks to disseminate artificial intelligence and innovation technologies through Egypt to the African continent, the Middle East, and the Global South.  Especially since Egypt hosts a number of Chinese companies across various sectors, particularly technology, such as Huawei, Xiaomi, Oppo, ZTE, Midea, and Haier. Furthermore, a $300 million investment fund has been established with Tsinghua University in China, focusing on artificial intelligence and semiconductor design.

– Fifth: To what extent can the Egyptian-Chinese partnership affect the balance of American influence in the region?

The Egyptian-Chinese partnership significantly impacts American influence in the Middle East by diversifying China’s economic and political alliances in the region. However, it does not eliminate the strategic alliances between the United States and several countries in the region, particularly the Gulf states. The partnership between Egypt and China is based on the economic and financial dimension, including major Chinese investments in Egypt. China is pouring billions of dollars into infrastructure projects and the Suez Canal region. China also supports Egypt’s bid to join the BRICS group, led by China and Russia, to reduce its dependence on the dollar and the Western and American financial system. Furthermore, China is keen to closely integrate its Belt and Road Initiative projects with the Egyptian economy. The partnership between Egypt and China also rests on the diplomatic and strategic dimension as well as the diversification of alliances. Egypt pursues a balanced foreign policy that is not limited to a single ally.  Here, the partnership with China grants Egypt greater freedom of movement and a wider margin to maneuver, free from American political conditions and pressures, particularly in the areas of armament and military deals. This creates a delicate balance for Egypt, as it refuses to fully align itself with one power against another, maintaining its security partnership with Washington alongside its relationship with Beijing.

In this context, Beijing does not view Egypt merely as an economic partner, but rather as a strategic gateway and a pivotal pillar of its geopolitical influence in the Middle East and Africa, countering American penetration. This approach stems from China’s desire to fill the political and military vacuums resulting from the decline or fluctuation of the Western and American presence in the region. To this end, China leverages Cairo’s historical and political weight as a platform to expand its diplomatic influence and build partnerships with other countries in Africa and the Arab world. China’s support for Egypt’s membership in the BRICS bloc has provided Beijing with a strong regional ally, bolstering its vision for reshaping the global financial system into a multipolar order in the face of the United States’ unilateral hegemony in the region. This is especially significant given that Egypt represents a crucial land and sea crossroads for China’s Belt and Road Initiative via the Maritime Silk Road, considering the strategic and vital importance of the Suez Canal.

– Sixth: Does Beijing want Egypt merely as an economic partner, or does it see it as a strategic gateway for its influence in the Middle East and Africa?

Beijing views Egypt as a major strategic gateway for its influence, not just an ordinary economic partner. The relationship combines commercial interests with broad geopolitical ties. The economic dimension is based on the importance of the Suez Canal. China considers the Suez Canal a key artery for its trade with Europe and the rest of the world, and it is investing heavily to connect Egyptian ports and roads to its major commercial projects related to its Belt and Road Initiative. In addition to China’s role as a major logistics hub in the Suez Canal Economic Zone, numerous Chinese companies have established factories there to export goods. This is further compounded by Egypt’s strategic and political importance, as well as its sensitive geographical location, which is crucial to China’s interests. Egypt’s position at the crossroads of Africa, Asia, and Europe serves China’s regional influence. This coincided with China’s support for Egypt’s formal accession to the BRICS group, a move fully backed by China to bolster both countries’ political and economic weight globally.

Beijing also focuses on the growing security and military dimension of its relationship with Cairo to secure investments and international maritime routes. Chinese ambitions extend beyond simply selling goods; it seeks a greater role in protecting its interests and citizens by strengthening military cooperation with Cairo and diversifying defense partnerships with countries in the Middle East, Africa, and the Global South through Egypt. Beijing sees the growing military cooperation and arms sales to Egypt and the region as an opportunity to undermine Western and American military influence and to forge closer ties with the Egyptian army, one of the largest armies on the African continent. This is the true objective of China in transforming Egypt into a political and military hub that guarantees Beijing’s vital interests in the Middle East, Africa, and the Global South.

Accordingly, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Cairo comes at a time when Beijing seeks to strengthen its engagement in the Middle East and expand its relations with developing countries and the Global South, coinciding with escalating competition with the United States for economic and technological influence. Xi’s visit to Cairo also carries significance that transcends bilateral relations, given the ongoing repercussions of a potential US war with Iran and the instability in global energy markets. Therefore, China seeks to leverage Egypt’s pivotal role in achieving regional stability, mitigating crises, and protecting its interests in the Middle East and Africa.

Chinese media and intelligence are closely following the exodus of the American Central Intelligence Agency CIA personnel, particularly the months-long wait for new retirees to receive their financial entitlements. The agency is facing what it describes as an unprecedented number of retirements as the Trump administration seeks to reduce its workforce. Chinese media and intelligence perspectives on this unprecedented exodus of CIA officers align with their own. The delayed payments are a key focus, with both China and the US focusing on exploiting these developments to highlight institutional weaknesses within the American administration and the declining effectiveness of espionage against Beijing. Beijing is using the CIA exodus and delayed retirement payments to cast doubt on the efficiency of American institutions, targeting disaffected and dismissed intelligence operatives to gather information. This is achieved by promoting the idea of ​​the US administration’s collapse and attracting these affected security professionals to bolster Chinese counterintelligence capabilities.  Here, Beijing is exploiting the widespread layoffs and dismissals within the CIA and other US federal agencies, turning the affected employees into valuable assets to bolster Chinese counterintelligence capabilities. The Chinese strategy focuses on transforming these dismissed experts from defenders of US national security into offensive tools that expose Washington’s vulnerabilities.

The most prominent trends in official and semi-official Chinese commentary and analysis regarding the dismissal of CIA personnel can be summarized as follows: (Chinese mockery of the China-defeat strategy and the backfiring on the strategist). This is the same point made by Chinese media reports, such as the official Xinhua News Agency, which indicated that the Trump administration had previously announced that its restructuring and hiring freeze aimed to focus on China-defeating and the trade war. However, the actual result was the dismissal of skilled and experienced personnel within the CIA. This exposes the structural failures of the US, and Chinese media highlighted the crisis as evidence of administrative chaos within the United States. The pressure to downsize the federal government has paralyzed the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). This has left Washington unable to even pay the pensions of its retired spies on time.  Here, Chinese intelligence, military, political, strategic, and media circles seized upon this crisis to promote the idea of ​​eroding American national security and the golden opportunity it presented for counterintelligence. Chinese think tanks and intelligence agencies seized upon internal American warnings that leaving thousands of former intelligence officers without income for months made them easy targets for infiltration. Beijing interpreted this as a tacit admission of the fragility of institutional loyalty within the American system in the face of financial pressures. Beijing viewed it as evidence of American administrative disarray and a prime example of the brain drain of accumulated expertise. Chinese analyses, assessments, and evaluations focused on the fact that the deferred resignation and contract buyouts programs have prompted senior analysts and field officers within the CIA (those with extensive networks and deep knowledge of Asian affairs) to abruptly leave the service, creating an intelligence gap that will be difficult to fill in the near future.  From the Chinese perspective, this exposes the American narrative of transparency and efficiency and reinforces the idea of ​​the political manipulation of intelligence. Therefore, China is exploiting this unprecedented crisis within the CIA to bolster its ongoing narrative that US intelligence agencies have become tools in partisan political conflicts within Washington. Beijing views the mass exodus as a reflection of the professional officers’ lack of confidence in the administration’s political direction. Beijing is using this as part of a counter-propaganda strategy, with Chinese media outlets employing these facts to send messages to the international community, developing countries, and the Global South, suggesting that the United States, which seeks to impose its global security hegemony, is suffering from severe internal divisions that prevent it from managing its fundamental sovereign affairs efficiently and professionally.

Regarding the Chinese political and media exploitation of the CIA staff exodus crisis, the Chinese media machine promotes these crises as evidence of the collapse and disarray of the US federal administration model. It exploits the inability of US institutions to meet their financial obligations (to portray Washington as incapable of protecting even its most sensitive agencies). Therefore, Chinese intelligence, analytical, and strategic circles employ propaganda to highlight the fragility of job security and social stability within US decision-making circles. Furthermore, China strategically and intelligence-wise exploits this internal US crisis. Chinese intelligence agencies monitor these vulnerabilities to target former employees or those facing termination. Beijing offers inducements or clandestine channels of communication through consulting and research fronts to ensnare individuals who are psychologically and financially distressed. China also exploits the frustration resulting from delayed pensions or forced layoffs to facilitate infiltration, counter-recruitment, and the acquisition of sensitive secrets.

Chinese intelligence, such as the Ministry of State Security (MSS), operates through specific and deliberate mechanisms. The MSS, which oversees Chinese intelligence operations, exploits vulnerabilities such as fractured loyalty, financial weakness, and psychological and material incentives. Beijing focuses on federal officers and probationary personnel who have been laid off from the CIA and harbor resentment, bitterness, and a desire for revenge against their former superiors. Chinese intelligence, analytical, and strategic circles then work to support these individuals to fill the financial gap. The sudden loss of a job for a security officer with high financial obligations creates fertile ground for recruitment, as China offers substantial and enticing financial incentives to secure their loyalty. Chinese intelligence circles are also actively employing digital recruitment through front companies. These are sham consulting firms. Beijing is establishing networks of consulting companies, think tanks, and fake recruitment agencies that appear Western and 100% legitimate to target talent on LinkedIn. Through these platforms, Chinese intelligence officers target former CIA employees who are seeking employment on well-known job search platforms like LinkedIn. They use disguised accounts, sometimes employing artificial intelligence, to apply for jobs. Then begins the process of gradually extracting information. The relationship starts with requests for ordinary, non-classified (publicly available) research in exchange for lucrative financial rewards to build trust. The employee is then gradually drawn into providing sensitive information and moving to encrypted communication platforms.

Here, Chinese intelligence agencies work to feed their counterintelligence efforts with tactical information. When China succeeds in recruiting a compromised American security operative, it doesn’t just seek international secrets but focuses on acquiring high-quality information that serves its counterintelligence apparatus. The most prominent of these is uncovering the methods of operation of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Understanding American recruitment mechanisms, how spies are planted, and methods of vetting and infiltration. Identifying profiles and characteristics (profiles) to understand the psychological and behavioral traits the CIA seeks in informants, which helps China detect potential spies within its own territory or within the People’s Liberation Army early on. This also involves uncovering technical and cyber vulnerabilities by identifying the encryption tools and systems used by US agencies, thus giving Chinese counterintelligence the ability to fortify its networks and penetrate counterespionage operations.  Exploiting the absence of exit briefings, Western and American intelligence reports have revealed that some federal employees who were hastily discharged did not undergo standard exit briefings. This procedural gap left employees without direct warnings or clear reporting mechanisms should they be approached by hostile entities. Beijing exploited this as a golden opportunity to operate with minimal oversight. In response to this risk, US security agencies, such as the FBI and the National Counterintelligence and Security Center NCSC), issued heightened security alerts and shut down and blocked dozens of fake websites belonging to Chinese recruitment networks targeting discharged CIA employees.

China opposes the US and Western escalation against Iran and insists on condemning the US and Israeli attacks on Iranian nuclear targets. China considers the US and Israeli military attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities a blatant violation of international law and the UN Charter. While Beijing officially adheres to nuclear non-proliferation, it will hold the US directly responsible and will oppose the imposition of new international sanctions against Iran in the UN Security Council. China will work to hold Washington accountable. Beijing believes that the US withdrawal from the nuclear agreement is the root cause of the current impasse in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) negotiations. The Chinese Foreign Ministry asserts that the policy of maximum pressure and economic sanctions against Tehran will not resolve the crisis but will only exacerbate tensions. China views Tehran’s threat to withdraw from the NPT as an understandable reaction to the maximum pressure exerted upon it, but it consistently prefers diplomatic solutions and supports maintaining the international legal framework to prevent escalation.  The Chinese stance came after Iranian parliamentarians, including Ebrahim Rezaei, asserted that withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the best response to the Trump administration’s escalation of economic warfare.

The main dimensions of the Chinese position regarding the Iranian threat to withdraw from the NPT are embodied in China’s rejection of pressure and sanctions against Iran. China maintains that the escalating US sanctions and policies against Tehran will not resolve the nuclear crisis but rather exacerbate it. Chinese intelligence, military, political, and strategic circles have adopted a strategy of legal consideration versus feasibility. Experts and observers close to Chinese circles argue that Iran’s withdrawal from the NPT is a legitimate legal right for independent states, but Beijing implicitly suggests that such a move could trigger harsher international sanctions against Tehran. Therefore, Beijing is working to (obstruct UN sanctions against Iran). China, along with Russia, has expressed its readiness to block the activation of the snapback mechanism or any harsh international sanctions against Iran in the UN Security Council to protect its interests and regional stability, while adhering to a political settlement. Beijing is calling on all parties to return to the negotiating table and maintain regional and international stability, instead of taking radical and escalatory steps that violate international treaties.

In my analysis, China will insist on referring the Iranian issue to international forums, such as the Security Council, using its veto power to condemn and block any resolutions issued against Iran. Here, China is expected to cooperate with Russia to obstruct any Western or American Security Council resolutions aimed at condemning Iran or imposing new, harsh UN sanctions. China will maintain its commitment to dialogue by continuing to call for a return to the political negotiating table, while publicly acknowledging Tehran’s previous assurances that it is not seeking to produce nuclear weapons. Here, we must understand all the strategic parameters of China’s position regarding the escalation against Iran over its nuclear program through the lens of China’s opposition to nuclear armament. Despite China’s understanding of Iran’s motives and its right to peaceful energy, it categorically rejects Tehran’s move towards acquiring a nuclear military arsenal in order to preserve the stability of the international order and prevent a regional arms race. This is coupled with the desire of relevant circles in Beijing to safeguard their interests. Therefore, Beijing will strive to avoid sliding into a direct confrontation with the West and the United States while continuing to provide Iran with as much economic and diplomatic support as possible in order to alleviate Iran’s isolation.

China supports Tehran diplomatically, emphasizing dialogue and rejecting the unilateral sanctions imposed by Washington. Despite the ongoing pressure, the likelihood of direct war remains low, as a major war of attrition is avoided. China’s position is characterized by its call for diplomatic solutions and dialogue based on mutual respect, its rejection of unilateral US economic sanctions against Iran, and its insistence that all parties address the root causes of the tension and resume the nuclear agreement. This is especially relevant given the Iranian threat to withdraw from the agreement, voiced by several members of the Iranian parliament who believe that remaining in the nuclear non-proliferation treaty is pointless under continued US pressure.  Intelligence, military, political, and strategic circles in Beijing considered the Iranian parliamentary proposal a political response to the tightened US economic sanctions against Tehran. Chinese intelligence circles are well aware that an actual Iranian withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty requires the approval of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. Should this occur—a slim possibility according to Chinese strategic assessments—it would mean the potential outbreak of a full-scale war. Therefore, strategic assessments in Beijing suggest that the potential confrontation between Washington and Tehran will likely escalate into a protracted war of attrition rather than a full-scale military clash. According to Chinese analyses, both Washington and Tehran prefer economic pressure and the prospect of open negotiations to the option of open warfare. Hence, China seeks to curb any military escalation that could threaten energy security and regional stability.

Accordingly, China supports the continuation of the diplomatic and political track to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis. It rejects pressures, escalatory policies, and economic sanctions against Tehran, while simultaneously calling for dialogue based on mutual respect and the preservation of regional stability, without supporting any sudden steps that could fuel the conflict. China’s general position stems from its rejection of sanctions. Beijing believes that the policy of maximum pressure and economic sanctions does not resolve the nuclear issue. Therefore, China consistently calls for adherence to dialogue to resolve differences through peaceful political and diplomatic means and to resume negotiations. China also provides strategic support to Iran. In this regard, China stands with Iran in the face of Western and American pressure. China is working alongside Russia to submit draft resolutions to the UN Security Council to support de-escalation, extend the agreement’s framework, address threats of withdrawal, and avoid mutual escalation. China urges all parties to avoid any unilateral steps or escalatory measures, such as triggering the snapback mechanism or mutual withdrawals from international agreements and treaties, which could lead to a loss of control.  Therefore, Beijing prefers to contain this crisis and the Iranian threats to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty through negotiating frameworks that preserve the basic structure of the non-proliferation regime, while holding the United States and European countries partly responsible due to Washington’s previous withdrawal from the same nuclear agreement that Tehran is now threatening to withdraw from.

When Los Angeles Mayor Karen Bass amplified the results last week of a favorable political poll that turned out to be fake, she was inadvertently following in the footsteps of conservative Detroit singer Kid Rock.

In 2017, as Rock — real name Robert Ritchie — publicly contemplated a run for U.S. Senate is his home state of Michigan, he posted on social media the results of a poll conducted by a firm calling itself Delphi Analytica that showed him leading Democratic incumbent Debbie Stabenow.

But those results were bogus. The people behind Delphi Analytica took down their website and refused to be identified, telling a local reporter: “Thanks again and go kid rock.”

Little is known about who was responsible for a poll supposedly conducted by an outfit calling itself Median Strategies showing Bass with a wide lead in the L.A. mayoral race over Councilmember Nithya Raman.

The group told The Times on Monday that its results were also fake.

But the episode has revived questions about whether political polling can be trusted, particularly in light of several recent high-profile primary races in which the polls seemed to have gotten the results wrong.

In the Michigan Democratic primary for the U.S. Senate, a number of preelection polls showed progressive Abdul El-Sayed holding a commanding, double-digit lead over Rep. Haley Stevens (D-Mich.), but on election night, El-Sayed eked out a one-point victory.

In Wisconsin, numerous polls showed progressive state Rep. Francesca Hong leading Milwaukee County Executive David Crowley in the Democratic primary for governor. Crowley narrowly defeated Hong in the primary.

Median Strategies — the entity behind the fake Los Angeles poll — claimed on social media that it had also conducted polling in the Wisconsin Democratic gubernatorial race and that it had also gotten it wrong about Hong.

Polling in primary elections can be particularly difficult, because it can be hard to know who will actually show up on election day, said Christian Grose, a USC political science professor. Both Michigan and Wisconsin also hold open primaries, meaning that any voter can cast a ballot in a race, regardless of party affiliation, making it harder for pollsters to predict exactly who will cast a ballot on election day.

Experts say fake polls are exceedingly rare but that these recent election results highlight the differences between high- and low-quality polls and how much easier it has become to conduct less rigorous polling.

“The barriers to entry are a lot lower now than they were 20 to 30 years ago,” said Charles Franklin, a professor of law and public policy at Marquette Law School who conducts the Marquette Law School Poll.

Put simply, a poll is a series of questions asked of a sample of people in a given locality, state or country whose opinions are supposed to represent the attitudes of everyone in the coverage area of the poll. Pollsters typically weigh the responses they receive — sometimes amplifying the voices of respondents from a particular ethnic group, for example — to ensure that the results are representative of the population they are surveying.

For decades, survey respondents were typically contacted by phone.

That work was expensive, Franklin said.

“You needed a call center, you needed to hire interviewers and you needed some sort of data processing,” he said.

But now as modes of communication have changed — many people have ditched landlines and are hesitant to answer calls from unknown numbers on their cellphone — polling operations have adopted a wide variety of methods to try to contact survey respondents, including e-mail, text-messages and online surveys, which sometimes offer incentives to encourage participation.

Online polls can be conducted much more cheaply than polling using other modes of communication, but the quality can also vary widely.

Historically, most polls randomly contacted survey respondents, backed by research showing that a random sample of the population — adjusted appropriately by demographics and other factors — would give a more accurate picture of the public’s attitude on a particular question.

But not all online polling relies on a randomly selected group of respondents, and when respondents are offered an incentive — such as cash — to complete an online survey, it can lead to inaccurate results.

The Pew Research Center released a report in 2024 showing that these so-called opt-in surveys did a particularly bad job of capturing the attitudes of adults under 30 and Latino adults. Researchers at Pew, for example, asked respondents in one survey if they were licensed to operate a type of nuclear submarine. In the survey, 12% of respondents under 30 said yes. In reality, the share of people under 30 holding such a license “rounds to zero,” the report said.

While even legitimate pollsters can get election results wrong — a poll represents public opinion at the time it was taken, and that can change — experts say there are a few key things to look out for when vetting the quality of a survey.

“The more transparent a poll is — in terms of its data and methods — the more you should believe it,” said Grose, who also conducts the California Elections and Policy Poll.

Franklin said that pollsters with a track record are typically more trustworthy, as their future business and reputation relies on their accuracy.

He said that polling conducted by upstart organizations is not necessarily bad, but that the people conducting it don’t necessarily have the training or expertise of more established outfits.

Inaccurate polling can misinform voters and lead to election night surprises, but it can also have a corrosive effect on elections themselves.

“Polling can drive outcomes,” Grose said. “Favorable polls lead to more fundraising. There’s a bandwagon effect.”

The government of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz approved a landmark bill to expand the powers of the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) and the Domestic Intelligence Service (BfV) by 2027. This expansion grants them offensive and operational tools, including cyber counter-sabotage and espionage, with funding of €1.51 billion. This move has sparked significant concern among Chinese and Russian intelligence agencies regarding the radical shift in German security doctrine, stemming from the geopolitical context and the fears of Germany’s adversaries, China and Russia, regarding the ongoing hybrid warfare. The German initiative was driven by the escalating pace of gray and hybrid warfare, the most recent example being the discovery of a booby-trapped drone at Leipzig’s strategic airport. Consequently, intelligence, strategic, and security circles in Beijing and Moscow are closely monitoring this historic intelligence revolution approved by Chancellor Merz’s government on August 12, 2026.  This draft law (exceeding 700 pages) represents the most significant shift in Germany’s security doctrine since the end of World War II in 1945. From the perspective of Chinese and Russian intelligence, this shift constitutes a security revolution that ends the strict constraints imposed on Germany since World War II, transforming German intelligence agencies from mere information-gathering tools into entities capable of launching offensive and counter-sabotage operations. For these reasons, this internal German intelligence transformation is being closely monitored and analyzed in depth within intelligence and military circles in Beijing and Moscow, given its strategic dimensions and its connection to Berlin’s attempt to break free from American dependence. This move, analyzed by Chinese and Russian intelligence and military circles, is seen as a targeting of Russia and China. Although Berlin attempts to frame counterintelligence as a general effort, German officials, such as Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt, have explicitly stated that the goal is to deter Russian and Chinese sabotage operations and enable German intelligence to inflict pain on adversaries and operate on equal footing with allies like the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), rather than relying on them entirely. The German Federal Parliament (Bundestag) is expected to formally pass the bill after the summer recess, allowing these offensive powers to become fully operational in Germany by early 2027.

Military think tanks and research centers affiliated with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Russian circles alike are analyzing all the operational and political dimensions of this strategic decision in Germany, focusing on understanding the German desire to shift from a defensive doctrine to an offensive operational approach and to adopt a cyber sabotage strategy and a counter-terrorism measure called “Hack-Back.” For the first time, the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) and the Federal Intelligence Service (BfV) are granted legal authority to penetrate the information systems of adversaries and attackers and modify or delete data to prevent large-scale cyberattacks and dismantle the infrastructure of hackers. This includes German approval for field sabotage operations in situations of German defense tension, whereby the BND is permitted to carry out active sabotage operations abroad, such as disabling servers and replacing military or vital technology components with damaged ones to prevent attacks, such as in drone factories and chemical laboratories of hostile states. This has been interpreted by Chinese and Russian circles as a German crushing of the principle of separation between German domestic and foreign intelligence agencies.   According to Chinese and Russian analyses, the new German law is also generating considerable legal controversy within Germany itself, as it narrows the historical distance between intelligence agencies (those concerned only with collecting information) and the police agencies (those concerned with implementation).

Here, the Chinese intelligence reading of the German reform can be understood as the end of historical restrictions imposed on Berlin, as Beijing views the move as a reversal of the strict restrictions imposed since the end of World War II and Berlin’s shift from purely information gathering to carrying out covert operations and penetrating adversaries’ networks.  In addition to what this represents for Beijing and Moscow in terms of reducing dependence on Washington, Chinese intelligence is monitoring Germany’s attempt to build independent self-reliance capabilities to reduce intelligence dependence on the United States and its allies amid mutual strategic suspicions. Intelligence, military, political, and strategic circles in Beijing also view with caution the (militarization of German digital space). Here, the Chinese analysis considers that allowing the disruption of infrastructure and the modification and deletion of data places German agencies in the ranks of major countries with active offensive doctrines, given the reliance of German domestic and foreign intelligence agencies on the pattern of practical and technical dimensions of reform and hybrid capabilities in reforming their security and intelligence agencies, through directly confronting drones, disrupting spy servers, or tampering with components of a weapon under production without resorting to human physical violence, with the expansion of the use of artificial intelligence technologies, through expanding the use of facial recognition technologies and reducing data protection restrictions to store and analyze information for longer periods. However, at the same time, German circles are facing parliamentary challenges, given that the draft law is undergoing legislative proceedings in both houses of the German parliament (the Bundestag and the Bundesrat) amidst local human rights objections warning of the erosion of personal freedoms and the principle of separating intelligence from the police.

Here, the Russian intelligence perspective (Moscow) on the German intelligence draft law comes to the fore. Russian intelligence agencies (SVR, GRU, and FSB) view this move as a direct response to their operations and interpret it within the context of an acknowledgment of hybrid warfare. Moscow believes that Germany is now officially treating Russia as an enemy in a state of undeclared war.  The increase in the budget of Germany’s foreign intelligence agency (BND) by 26%, reaching €1.51 billion, is seen as an indication of a long-term security buildup against Russia. Moscow also viewed this as a move to neutralize cognitive denial, especially given accusations from German domestic and foreign intelligence agencies that Russia is exploiting German bureaucratic sluggishness and strict data privacy measures to carry out cyberattacks and sabotage operations. Therefore, the Russian interpretation of this German decision can be seen as a direct response from Berlin to Moscow, aimed at closing this digital and security gap between the two sides. It can be interpreted as a German intelligence strategy of reciprocity, or, according to the Russian analysis, as an attempt by Germany to encircle disinformation networks by granting German intelligence the ability to take down Russian propaganda and disinformation servers, which pose a direct threat to Russia’s soft power tools aimed at destabilizing Germany.

On the other hand, Chinese intelligence circles, primarily the Ministry of State Security (MSS), which acts as the Chinese intelligence service, analyze German law from the perspective of technological and geopolitical conflict, targeting industrial and academic espionage by China. Here, the Chinese analysis focuses on the expansion of the powers of the German domestic intelligence agency (BfV) and the use of artificial intelligence. This analysis primarily aims to track Chinese soft networks that focus on stealing advanced German technology and conducting economic espionage in order to protect German infrastructure and communications. Beijing believes that the new German laws, which compel German telecommunications companies and digital platforms to hand over data to German intelligence, are primarily intended to isolate Chinese technology and impose complete German sovereign control over cyber data in the face of China. The most sensitive aspect of Russian and Chinese analyses lies in their dual interpretation of Germany’s desire to break free from the Five Eyes framework. They see it as either an intelligence network for exchanging signals intelligence, comprising the US, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, whose decisions are guided by Washington, or as a new dilemma facing Germany in building self-reliant capabilities and ending its dependence on the United States. This latter scenario serves the interests of China and Russia, promoting multipolarity and a multipolar international world and ending the one-way street of Washington.   The German Chancellery has publicly stated that reliance on allies (specifically the US) has been a one-way street, where Germany receives information without the ability to exchange it or protect itself independently. From a Chinese and Russian intelligence perspective, this represents a new German policy of hedging against Trump’s unpredictability. Moscow and Beijing believe that the primary motivation behind the conservative Merz government’s actions is strategic skepticism regarding the reliability of the United States, particularly with Donald Trump in the White House, and Berlin’s fear of the politicization or severing of US intelligence flows. This reinforces the Chinese-Russian view that this is a technologically impossible German attempt to break free from US control and dictates.

Accordingly, assessments in Beijing and Moscow agree that Germany—despite its ambition—will not be able to completely break free from intelligence dependence on America anytime soon. The United States controls the global cloud infrastructure, internet cables, and critical cyber technologies, making German intelligence independence a costly ambition that will take years to materialize technologically. However, it does give Berlin at least greater parity in dealing with partners, which China and Russia are trying to maximize.

As the United States-Iran conflict draws renewed global attention to energy security, a quieter transformation is underway. Driven by the combined effects of El Niño and accelerating warming, the Gulf region is heating up significantly. Rising temperatures, prolonged droughts, and intense precipitation events are intensifying water scarcity and straining critical infrastructure.

For economies built on oil and gas, this environmental pressure creates complex compound risks. Unlike agriculture-based nations that face immediate crop shocks, Gulf countries confront structural vulnerabilities. Their heavy reliance on international grain markets exposes them to global price volatility, while a high dependence on energy-intensive seawater desalination ties water security directly to power consumption. Furthermore, rapid urbanization leaves critical infrastructure like power grids, ports, and data centers vulnerable to extreme weather and global supply chain disruptions.

Not surprisingly, recent adjustments to energy and water systems are no longer treated merely as environmental policies. They represent a fundamental restructuring of national development logic. In this era of extreme climate, long-term competitiveness depends less on hydrocarbon reserves and more on the upgrade of national capability systems.

Historically, the energy systems of Gulf countries focused primarily on supporting domestic growth and resource exports. Today, that strategic role has expanded to ensure the survival of modern society. Extreme heat drives up summer cooling demand and increases electricity consumption for critical infrastructure like desalination plants, transportation, and communications. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), cooling and seawater desalination will account for roughly 40% of new electricity demand in the Middle East and North Africa by 2035.

This shift has transformed how governments view energy security. If energy systems determine whether Gulf countries can operate stably, water resources dictate the ceiling for their development. Long reliant on seawater desalination to overcome natural constraints, these nations now face soaring operating costs driven by rising temperatures and extreme weather. Vulnerabilities vary across the region. Countries like Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain depend almost entirely on desalination and remain highly sensitive to energy price fluctuations. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are advancing water-saving technologies, wastewater recycling, and renewable-powered desalination to build resilience.

According to the World Bank’s Water-Energy-Food Nexus framework, Gulf countries must integrate energy supply, water management, wastewater treatment, and fiscal policy. A shock to any single component can amplify risks across the entire economy. For resource-based nations, while oil dictates the scale of wealth, water security increasingly governs the quality of development and the long-term viability of modern cities.

Faced with these structural pressures, Gulf strategies are shifting from risk mitigation to the cultivation of new global advantages. With annual global climate adaptation funding gaps remaining substantial, demand is surging for resilient infrastructure, water management, flood control, and smart agriculture. Armed with fiscal strength and large-scale engineering experience, Gulf nations are positioning themselves to capture these markets. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are deploying capital through sovereign wealth funds like the Public Investment Fund (PIF) and Mubadala into green hydrogen, smart cities, and sustainable infrastructure.

At the same time, the rapid expansion of artificial intelligence is creating new strategic demands. Global data center electricity consumption is projected to rise sharply by 2030, driven heavily by AI applications. For the Gulf, building large-scale computing centers in high-temperature environments demands robust power supplies and advanced cooling capacities. Sovereign wealth funds are increasingly utilizing their capital to back AI hubs and digital infrastructure, cementing their role in shaping future industries.

This evolution creates significant opportunities for international partnerships, particularly with China. China holds scale and industrial advantages in photovoltaics, energy storage, power grid equipment, desalination, and digital infrastructure. Meanwhile, the Gulf offers capital, markets, and robust green investment demand. As global competition extends from resource endowments to climate adaptation capabilities, Gulf nations are working to transform their resilience strategies into international competitiveness. Ultimately, the measure of a nation’s strength in the future will depend not only on the wealth beneath its soil, but on the safety, resilience, and adaptability of its development systems.

Vietnam’s sovereign AI relies heavily on open-weight models developed in the United States. However, as Washington and Beijing are moving to restrict access to these technologies, Hanoi’s bamboo diplomacy offers little protection to its AI ambitions.

In mid-July, Vietnam approved its National Digital Transformation Strategy for 2026-2030 under Decision 1266/QD-TTg, and the National Data Strategy under Decision 1308/QD-TTg. Both strategies aim for national digital sovereignty, domestic self-reliance and state-level data governance on the assumption that artificial intelligence (AI) models would remain a public good. Within days, the United States (U.S.) and China signalled their readiness to restrict access to those models.

Made in America

Vietnam’s current AI systems are modified versions of foreign tech. On the ground, Viettel, the state military telecom giant spearheading Vietnam’s AI goals, announced its VT-Super-120B-A12B Vietnamese language model had matched the accuracy of major global models of similar size. It was built by adapting Nemotron, Nvidia’s freely downloadable model family, to Vietnamese data. Viettel’s earlier model was also built on Meta’s Llama 3, trained with Nvidia tooling, and run on a cluster of 22 DGX B200 supercomputers at its Hoa Lac centre.

Moreover, VNG’s GreenNode subsidiary introduced GreenMind-Medium-14B-R1, the first open-source Vietnamese reasoning model built to run on Nvidia’s software and a single Nvidia H100 graphics chip. Meanwhile, FPT Corporation committed $200 million to build its AI factory powered by Nvidia hardware.

At the state level, Vietnam’s Ministry of Science and Technology met with senior executives from Qualcomm in Hanoi on July 17. Deputy Minister of Science and Technology Hoang Minh and Qualcomm’s Executive Vice President Durga Malladi discussed expanding cooperation in AI semiconductors, research and development, and workforce training.

While Vietnam has made its bets on the U.S. for its AI ambitions, other Southeast Asian countries are leaning towards China. Indonesia’s Indosat Ooredoo Hutchison partnered with AIonOS on DeepSeek-powered services, and Malaysia’s Communications Ministry launched a sovereign full-stack AI ecosystem running on Huawei hardware.

Outside Two Blocs

AI governance is dividing into two blocs. One bloc is the U.S.-led Pax Silica initiative, which coordinates trusted supply chains for semiconductors, critical minerals and AI infrastructure with 24 signatories. Singapore, the Philippines, India, Japan and South Korea are among them. The Philippines converted membership into commitments by agreeing in April 2026 to a 4,000-acre economic security zone in the Luzon economic corridor designated as the initiative’s first AI-native industrial hub.

The other is the Chinese-backed World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization, signed into existence in Shanghai on July 16 by 29 governments. The membership also includes Russia, Belarus, Cuba, Venezuela and most of Central Asia, alongside Vietnam’s neighbours Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar.

Membership in either bloc could offer access to supply chains, technical assistance and software distribution during a diplomatic crisis.

However, Vietnam belongs to neither group because of its long-standing bamboo diplomacy, a policy of balancing relations between Washington and Beijing without taking sides. This leaves Hanoi in an awkward position. Vietnam depends heavily on American technology, but enjoys none of the guarantees or protections of one.

Weaponising Access

Export controls on chips work because processors are physical goods, subject to customs enforcement. On May 31, the Bureau of Industry and Security extended licensing requirements to any China-parented buyer worldwide, closing loopholes in Singapore and Malaysia.

AI models do not behave the same way. Access to a closed system can be revoked instantly by flipping an application programming interface (API) key. For example, on June 12, Anthropic suspended access to its Fable and Mythos models to comply with U.S. Commerce Department export controls, restoring access only on July 1 after those controls were lifted. Such events largely explain why governments prefer AI models they can host locally.

In contrast, an open-weight model, once downloaded, cannot be recalled by any foreign regulator. Instead, global superpowers exert control by forcing major tech companies and code-sharing platforms to block downloads from specific regions or countries. They can also pressure developers to restrict future model updates to dodge penalties from Washington or Beijing.

This fight over AI access is now an open battle. On July 16, Chinese startup Moonshot AI unveiled Kimi K3, a 2.8-trillion-parameter model that independent evaluators say matches top American models at a fraction of their operating cost. On July 21, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent signalled that Washington could sanction Chinese tech firms, citing American-model watermarks found inside Chinese ones. Days later, China’s Ministry of Commerce called the investigations groundless, threatened countermeasures, and began consulting Alibaba, ByteDance and Z.ai on export controls covering model weights, training data and chip designs.

Why It Matters

For years, nations have built digital capacity cheaply and quickly by customising open-weight AI models. Kimi K3 seemed to promise that era would continue. Instead, the geopolitical fallout exposed the fragility of relying on superpower goodwill.

For Vietnam, the real threat is getting left behind. Washington or Beijing cannot delete the AI models already sitting on Vietnamese servers. What they can block is future releases. If both superpowers restrict open-weight models, Vietnam’s AI ecosystem gets stuck using today’s tools while the rest of the world moves forward. A national tech stack built on frozen updates decays one generation at a time. States that have not localised model weights face an even harsher reality. Their access relies on live connections and downloads that can vanish overnight with a new policy.

At its core, this is a problem of time. Vietnam’s bamboo diplomacy relies on having time to adapt. Trade deals and defence agreements move slowly, giving Hanoi room to bend without breaking. AI access, however, moves instantly as access disappears with a revoked key or a blocked download link.

Diplomatically, Vietnam tries to stay neutral at all costs. However, its technology does not try to do so. All of its major AI models are built on American weights, run on American chips, and improve when American companies release new ones. Vietnam acts as if it can delay picking a side, but with every new AI update or blocked release, the cost of delay becomes more expensive. In the past, diplomatic pressure moved slowly through international summits. Today, that pressure speeds up with every new model release.

What Five Years of Directives Add Up To

On August 10, 2026, Reporters Without Borders marked five years of Taliban rule with an assessment that Afghanistan has become, in the organization’s words, a prison for information. The report catalogs more than twenty national directives and a long list of provincial decrees, most delivered verbally rather than published, that have progressively stripped Afghan journalism of independence. The starkest new detail is legal rather than administrative. A Code of Criminal Procedure quietly enacted in January 2026 now punishes insulting the country’s supreme leader with thirty nine lashes and a year in prison, and insulting the wider leadership with twenty lashes and six months. Afghanistan sits at one hundred seventy fifth of one hundred eighty countries in RSF’s 2026 World Press Freedom Index, alongside North Korea, Eritrea and China, as global press freedom overall falls to its lowest point in twenty five years.

From Verbal Orders to Written Law

The Taliban’s approach to media control has moved through recognizable phases since retaking Kabul in August 2021. Eleven rules issued that September gave authorities broad power over what could be published. Restrictions escalated from there: a November 2021 ban on interviewing regime critics, a March 2022 prohibition on rebroadcasting Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, and a July 2022 declaration by supreme leader Haibatullah Akhundzada that criticizing officials contradicts Islamic law, which recast basic accountability as religious transgression. Afghanistan’s 2015 Press Law, the last formal legal protection for journalists, was repealed in April 2024. What followed was an acceleration rather than a pause. September 2024 rules banned live political programming and limited on air guests to Taliban approved voices. A July 2024 law prohibiting broadcast images of living beings has since spread to more than twenty provinces. Women have been pushed out of the profession in stages, from mandatory face covering for television presenters in 2021 to a March 2025 Kandahar order banning women’s voices from radio entirely.

The Shift From Deniable Pressure to Permanent Law

What separates the January 2026 Code of Criminal Procedure from everything that preceded it is durability. Verbal orders and provincial decrees can be denied, reversed or applied unevenly, and much of what RSF documents over the past five years was communicated exactly that way, through unpublished instructions passed down from de facto ministries rather than through any formal legislative process. A criminal code cannot be waved away the same way. The document only became public because it was leaked; the Taliban never announced it. RSF notes the code does not mention journalists specifically, but it offers them no exemption either, meaning ordinary reporting on Taliban governance now falls under the same provisions that criminalize insulting the leadership. A separate article requires citizens to report any contact with government opponents, extending the incentive to inform beyond state security services into the population at large. Legal researchers reviewing the code have also flagged provisions dividing defendants into social categories, with punishment calibrated to status rather than offense, a structure that undercuts equal treatment under law well beyond the press freedom question alone.

The scale of the resulting collapse is difficult to overstate. RSF’s country data shows forty three percent of Afghan outlets disappeared within three months of the takeover, more than two thirds of the roughly twelve thousand journalists working in the country in 2021 have left the profession, and eight in ten women journalists have stopped working entirely. Behind each of those figures sits a newsroom that no longer exists or a byline that no longer appears, the practical result of a five year campaign that RSF’s South Asia desk head has described as turning criticism itself into a legal offense.

None of this makes Afghanistan an isolated case, which is what gives the story weight beyond South Asia. RSF’s own 2026 index places Afghanistan’s collapse inside a broader global pattern: more than half the world’s countries now rate as difficult or very serious environments for journalism, the worst showing the index has recorded in a quarter century. The organization has also pointed to a specific mechanism spreading well beyond authoritarian states, in which national security and counterterrorism justifications, first normalized after the September 11 attacks, are increasingly invoked to restrict reporting on matters of public interest, a pattern RSF says now appears in established democracies as well as in regimes like Afghanistan’s. Afghanistan represents the extreme endpoint of that continuum rather than an exception to it, which is precisely why treating it as a uniquely Afghan problem understates the lesson.

The crackdown has also produced a measurable outflow with consequences well beyond Afghanistan’s borders. RSF data shows the number of countries journalists have been forced to flee from worldwide has doubled over five years, from nineteen to forty, with Afghanistan topping the list. Those journalists do not disappear once they cross a border. Pakistan and Iran, the two most common host states, have each carried out mass deportations of Afghan refugees through 2026, and independent reporting from RSF and Human Rights Watch has documented Afghan journalists, including some holding valid visas, among those detained and forcibly returned toward the same authorities they fled. Resettlement pipelines to Europe and North America have slowed at the same time, leaving exiled journalists in prolonged legal limbo in third countries with limited protection. For policymakers well outside the region, that combination turns a domestic censorship story into a live test of asylum and non return commitments.

Three Paths From Here

The most likely trajectory is continued institutionalization rather than reversal. The Taliban leadership has shown no interest in press freedom as a bargaining chip for international recognition, and the shift from verbal directive to codified criminal law suggests an intent to make current restrictions permanent rather than negotiable. This path is highly likely through the remainder of 2026 and into 2027, with enforcement of the new code expanding province by province and further directives layered on top of an already dense regulatory web.

A second, less likely path involves narrow, tactical loosening tied to international engagement. If the Taliban pursues formal recognition or unlocked aid financing, cosmetic concessions on foreign broadcasters or select outlets are possible, mirroring past patterns of selective accommodation when the leadership has wanted to project moderation to specific foreign audiences. This outcome is possible but not likely to alter the underlying legal architecture, since Akhundzada’s own framing of criticism as a religious offense forecloses any structural reform led from within the leadership itself.

A third path, already underway, is a deepening exile crisis that draws in host and resettlement states more directly than the domestic censorship story alone ever could. Continued deportations from Pakistan and Iran, combined with stalled resettlement processing in Europe and North America, raise the probability of a high profile forced return case drawing sustained international attention, potentially forcing governments to clarify protection commitments to Afghan media workers in ways they have so far avoided through case by case handling. This path is likely to intensify over the next twelve months regardless of what happens inside Afghanistan itself, since it depends as much on Pakistani and Iranian deportation policy as on any Taliban decision.

Why a Domestic Censorship Story Is Not a Domestic Story

Afghanistan’s press freedom collapse will keep being read as an isolated horror story unless it is placed against the trend line RSF itself is now drawing, in which national security framing, once confined to the world’s most repressive states, is migrating into ordinary governance practice elsewhere. The clearest near term indicator to track is enforcement, not legislation. The Code of Criminal Procedure has existed on paper since January 2026 without a confirmed public prosecution under its press relevant articles. The first documented case brought under Article 19 or Article 23 against a journalist or commentator will mark the moment Taliban media law moves from threat to precedent, and from precedent to template.

Shenzhen will host the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit (APEC) in November 2026, particularly given its reputation as China’s Silicon Valley and a global hub for artificial intelligence and embodied intelligence. The city will showcase its advanced industrial ecosystem in robotics, new vehicles, and the digital economy, aiming to connect markets and economies across the Asia-Pacific region. Shenzhen’s innovation model, designed to link China with Asia and the Pacific, is a key priority for the APEC Summit, scheduled to be held in Shenzhen this year under the theme Building an Asia-Pacific Community for Shared Prosperity. This theme focuses on integrating the Chinese economy regionally and globally through advanced technology. Therefore, Shenzhen’s focus during the APEC 2026 Summit will be on innovation, the digital economy, and showcasing new productive forces. The meetings and discussions at the APEC 2026 Summit will be concentrated in Shenzhen. The conference aims to highlight the role of innovation and advanced digital technologies; promote regional cooperation in artificial intelligence, innovation, and digital technologies; and strengthen industrial networks and cross-border supply chains for APEC economies in the semiconductor and green technology sectors. This explains why Shenzhen, China, was chosen to host the upcoming APEC conference. It serves as a living example, showcasing Shenzhen as a model of sustainable smart cities that rely on AI algorithms in the transportation, healthcare, and services sectors.

Shenzhen is at the forefront of the regional and international AI landscape, acting as a new engine for industry by integrating digital innovation to expand markets and improve production in the Asia-Pacific region. In Shenzhen, any new idea can find the necessary components within 30 minutes, leading entrepreneurs to call this speed a Shenzhen Speed. Shenzhen is a unique global model for rapid innovation and integrated supply chains, enabling entrepreneurs to transform ideas into prototypes in just 30 minutes thanks to the integration of industrial components, a phenomenon known as “Shenzhen Speed.”   Shenzhen’s innovation environment is characterized by a seamless supply chain, where markets and factories provide all the necessary hardware and electronics components in one place, supporting entrepreneurship. The city offers an incubator environment for startups and innovators from around the world. Furthermore, its regional connectivity mechanism reinforces Shenzhen’s role as a major hub for trade and technology cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.

Shenzhen, often called China’s Silicon Valley, is a leading global center for innovation, technology, and rapid industrial development. The city is spearheading the transformation into a smart city by integrating AI governance, the Internet of Things, and ultra-fast supply chains that enable the realization of technological ideas in record time. Embodied AI is a modern industrial trend in the city, alongside artificial intelligence. Shenzhen’s position is further solidified in technological innovation; Shenzhen’s rapid pace allows the city to provide the components for any new technological idea in just 30 minutes thanks to its massive supply chains. Furthermore, it serves as an incubator for major companies, housing the headquarters of China’s leading technology giants, such as Huawei, Tencent, DJI, and Wipertek. Shenzhen acts as a base for major companies, hosting thousands of large and emerging firms in artificial intelligence and robotics. The city is a natural hub for embodied intelligence, humanoid robot manufacturing, and smart factory applications powered by industrial AI models. This makes Shenzhen a true embodiment of digital urban leadership. It has been crowned a smart city thanks to its 5G infrastructure and dual digital models.

Shenzhen embodies the engine of Chinese technological excellence and its transformation from a port  From a small fishing ground to a leading global innovation hub, Shenzhen is not only driving the engines of modern technology but also, alongside its massive supply chains, is propelling industry and progress in the region through artificial intelligence and embodied intelligence. The city is renowned for its so-called Shenzhen Speed, where any new technological idea can find its components and factories in just 30 minutes. Shenzhen plays a significant role in driving innovation and connecting the Asia-Pacific. This will be reflected in the priorities of the APEC Summit in November 2026, hosted by Shenzhen, which aims to stimulate regional cooperation in artificial intelligence and innovation; address global economic challenges, slow growth, and rising trade protectionism by promoting integration and unity; and achieve sustainable development and create an environment conducive to innovation. This will be accomplished through the integration of ministerial efforts and related events to encourage innovation in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Chinese city of Shenzhen is a unique example of a rapid transformation from a small fishing village to a global hub for technology and innovation. Today, it leads advanced sectors such as artificial intelligence (AI), augmented intelligence (AI), and massive supply chains, becoming a driving force for technological excellence in China and the world. The key drivers of Shenzhen’s success lie in understanding its historical transformation from a simple fishing port to a leading global center for business, technology, and AI, as well as its ability to innovate by integrating AI algorithms across various industrial and service sectors and by developing augmented intelligence. Shenzhen is heavily investing in robotics and intelligent systems that physically interact with their environment, providing the world with the necessary supply chains to meet its technological needs. This is made possible by Shenzhen’s vast and flexible infrastructure for manufacturing and developing technological devices at breakneck speed.

  Finally, Shenzhen stands out as a pilot city in China, particularly in the areas of artificial intelligence (AI) and embodied intelligence (EQI). Shenzhen aims to become a national base for developing and implementing large-scale linguistic models (LCMs) and advanced AI and EQI products, integrating robots and intelligent systems into real-world and industrial environments, thus driving high-quality manufacturing forward. Furthermore, Shenzhen plays a key role in promoting smart governance by relying on AI-based solutions for efficient traffic management, security, and urban services.

It is a crucial time for Africa in terms of how it interacts with the rest of the world. Africa is no longer viewed as a place of humanitarian interest or of mere charity. Instead, Africa is increasingly seen as a prize, as a place that contains large populations and is a place where great and emerging powers struggle to win influence. With fifty-five states, more than one billion people, and the youngest population of any continent, Africa’s future will determine the politics of the world for decades to come. However, this potential strategic significance exists in an uneasy context of instability, dependency, and weak governance. The key question this paper seeks to address is whether Africa will remain a subject of outside influence and internal problems, or be able to turn its potential into real strategic power.

A Continent in Transition: Crisis, Change and Transformation

The transition of Africa is evident in its economic output. According to the IMF, it should come as no surprise that sub-Saharan Africa will grow at about 4.3% in 2026 and that the region will be one of the fastest growing in the world, even beating out developed nations facing the challenges of monetary tightening and shrinking populations. It is estimated that nations such as Ethiopia, Guinea, Uganda, Rwanda, and Benin will have growth rates of 7% or more because of mining, construction, industrial parks, and infrastructure spending. Africa’s aggregate nominal GDP will reach around 3.3 trillion dollars in 2026.

This data indicates true evolution; however, these very reports indicate that growth in Africa is uneven since economies relying on resources and importing oil experience worsening trade accounts and increasing cost of living. The contradiction within Africa’s transition process is that while there is economic momentum, there is also economic fragility, which means that growth indicators do not mean development per se.

Shifting Security Landscapes and the Crisis of Regional Stability

One does not have to look further than the Sahel region to see just how critical this problem of stability becomes. Military coups seized control in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger; in these regions, the Alliance of Sahel States was formed and left the Economic Community of West African States. According to the information available from Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, the level of violence in central Sahel increased dramatically from 2018 to 2024.

Humanitarian organizations working within the United Nations reported approximately nine thousand three hundred casualties in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in 2025. While the withdrawal of French troops and UN peacekeepers was not completed by an improvement of local armies, the Russia-based Africa Corps, a successor to the Wagner Group, became the main security partner of junta regimes with varied success. Extremist organizations such as Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimin and the Islamic State Sahel Province expanded their operations and started to use more often armed drones in their actions with a possibility of destabilization spreading to the countries of the Gulf of Guinea coast.

Economic Crossroads: Resources, Growth and Strategic Dependency

The development of the economy in Africa has a direct connection with the natural resources present in the continent, including the minerals used in the process of energy transition in the world such as copper, cobalt, manganese, and lithium. China has been the largest trading partner of Africa for the past sixteen years, and the expected value of the total trade between these two regions in 2025 is three hundred and forty-eight billion dollars, which is an increase by eighteen percent compared to the preceding year.

The main countries contributing to the largest share of trade include South Africa, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, and Egypt. China is involved in the continent’s economy not only in traditional sectors like natural resources but also in renewables, digitalization, and low carbon technology, as China plans to invest over fifty billion dollars in the continent by 2027 under the Beijing Action Plan. According to Boston University Global Development Policy Center, Africa’s exports to China are mostly raw material and the trade deficit with China is approximately equal to three percent of regional GDP.

Diplomatic Repositioning in an Emerging Multipolar World

The states of Africa are increasingly seeking to assert their independence in a multipolar world. With the admission of the AU to the G20 in 2023, the continent has secured a place among the major powers of the world permanently. Some of the African states have sought membership to BRICS, a power bloc which included Egypt and Ethiopia in addition to the founders and some other new members, making it another power bloc which its supporters argue is an alternative to the Western dominated groupings.

This diplomatic maneuver by the continent represents the larger strategy that the Africans follow in terms of strategic non alignment where they seek relations with all the major centers of power, including the US, China, Russia, Europe, and the Gulf countries. The Africans have used this diplomatic clout to their advantage in securing better deals on debt, trade, and security cooperation. But this diplomatic repositioning itself faces limitations because of the divide among the African states and lack of ability to capitalize on it.

Domestic Politics, Governance and the Crisis of Legitimacy

Underlying the security crossroads and the economic crossroads is a more fundamental crisis of political legitimacy. Since 2020, there have been coups across the Sahel and Central Africa as a manifestation of public discontent with corruption, poor service delivery, and the inability of the civilian government to ensure security. While military regimes in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Guinea partly justify their takeover of power by invoking issues of sovereignty and anti-colonial rhetoric – an argument that struck a chord with a lot of people while the indicators of good governance in those countries continued to decline rather than improve.

In other cases, disputed elections, the manipulation of constitutions to prolong the rule of presidents, and the constriction of civic space challenge the viability of the democratic institutions that were put in place after the opening up period of the 1990s. At the same time, a number of countries such as Ghana, Kenya, and Zambia have shown the potential for power transitions and active civil societies, which means that the crisis of legitimacy in Africa is not consistent.

External Powers and the Contest for African Influence

Today’s contest for influence in Africa is characterized by a larger and broader coalition of players than has been seen since the attainment of independence. The United States has attempted to make a comeback through efforts aimed at the development of critical minerals and infrastructure, in response to the increasing influence of China and Russia in the region, although the future of favorable trade policies like the African Growth and Opportunity Act appears to be in doubt due to changes in American trade policy.

The influence of Russia has primarily been gained through security collaboration and disinformation, rather than economic investment. Russian interests lie in forming partnerships without having to be conditional upon the governance of the partner country. Countries from the Gulf region, such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, have invested heavily in ports, agriculture, and renewable energy, especially in the Horn of Africa. The influence of Turkey has been formed in the form of business and military connections, especially in the Sahel and East Africa regions. With so many external partners involved in Africa, there is an increase in the chance that the continent becomes a battleground for great powers, rather than a partner in determining the outcome.

From Strategic Importance to Strategic Agency

The concept of strategic importance and strategic capability is essential to understand the strategic positioning of Africa at present times. Strategic importance is bestowed upon a country by external actors due to the recognition of the natural resources and markets of the region. Strategic capability on the other hand involves the setting of terms by African institutions and states rather than mere reactions to the interests of external forces.

In this regard, the African Continental Free Trade Area, which seeks to create a common market of over one point three billion people is an attempt to exercise such a strategic capability through reduction of dependency on external trade partners and increased intra-African trade which currently constitutes only a limited portion of total trade in the continent. Credibility of organizations like the African Union and Economic Community of West African States in conflict and coup mediation will determine whether African diplomacy will be conducted through collective institutions or ad hoc decisions made by individual African nations.

Now which direction will Africa take?

The geopolitical position of Africa in international politics is that of a paradoxical nature. The African continent can be characterized by both immense economic potential and security crises, both rising diplomatic power and an area of contestation between foreign forces, both a land of resilient democracy and an example of authoritarianism. The statistical information provided above gives evidence of a rising continent, despite the existing weaknesses. Whether or not Africa becomes a strategic player on its own or stays an object of contestation in the new multipolar world will depend solely on decision-making of the African continent. Whether the African continent will follow the path of development or the road of stagnation depends on how Africa will deal with the issues of governance, regional integration and economic diversification.