opinion

When Los Angeles Mayor Karen Bass amplified the results last week of a favorable political poll that turned out to be fake, she was inadvertently following in the footsteps of conservative Detroit singer Kid Rock.

In 2017, as Rock — real name Robert Ritchie — publicly contemplated a run for U.S. Senate is his home state of Michigan, he posted on social media the results of a poll conducted by a firm calling itself Delphi Analytica that showed him leading Democratic incumbent Debbie Stabenow.

But those results were bogus. The people behind Delphi Analytica took down their website and refused to be identified, telling a local reporter: “Thanks again and go kid rock.”

Little is known about who was responsible for a poll supposedly conducted by an outfit calling itself Median Strategies showing Bass with a wide lead in the L.A. mayoral race over Councilmember Nithya Raman.

The group told The Times on Monday that its results were also fake.

But the episode has revived questions about whether political polling can be trusted, particularly in light of several recent high-profile primary races in which the polls seemed to have gotten the results wrong.

In the Michigan Democratic primary for the U.S. Senate, a number of preelection polls showed progressive Abdul El-Sayed holding a commanding, double-digit lead over Rep. Haley Stevens (D-Mich.), but on election night, El-Sayed eked out a one-point victory.

In Wisconsin, numerous polls showed progressive state Rep. Francesca Hong leading Milwaukee County Executive David Crowley in the Democratic primary for governor. Crowley narrowly defeated Hong in the primary.

Median Strategies — the entity behind the fake Los Angeles poll — claimed on social media that it had also conducted polling in the Wisconsin Democratic gubernatorial race and that it had also gotten it wrong about Hong.

Polling in primary elections can be particularly difficult, because it can be hard to know who will actually show up on election day, said Christian Grose, a USC political science professor. Both Michigan and Wisconsin also hold open primaries, meaning that any voter can cast a ballot in a race, regardless of party affiliation, making it harder for pollsters to predict exactly who will cast a ballot on election day.

Experts say fake polls are exceedingly rare but that these recent election results highlight the differences between high- and low-quality polls and how much easier it has become to conduct less rigorous polling.

“The barriers to entry are a lot lower now than they were 20 to 30 years ago,” said Charles Franklin, a professor of law and public policy at Marquette Law School who conducts the Marquette Law School Poll.

Put simply, a poll is a series of questions asked of a sample of people in a given locality, state or country whose opinions are supposed to represent the attitudes of everyone in the coverage area of the poll. Pollsters typically weigh the responses they receive — sometimes amplifying the voices of respondents from a particular ethnic group, for example — to ensure that the results are representative of the population they are surveying.

For decades, survey respondents were typically contacted by phone.

That work was expensive, Franklin said.

“You needed a call center, you needed to hire interviewers and you needed some sort of data processing,” he said.

But now as modes of communication have changed — many people have ditched landlines and are hesitant to answer calls from unknown numbers on their cellphone — polling operations have adopted a wide variety of methods to try to contact survey respondents, including e-mail, text-messages and online surveys, which sometimes offer incentives to encourage participation.

Online polls can be conducted much more cheaply than polling using other modes of communication, but the quality can also vary widely.

Historically, most polls randomly contacted survey respondents, backed by research showing that a random sample of the population — adjusted appropriately by demographics and other factors — would give a more accurate picture of the public’s attitude on a particular question.

But not all online polling relies on a randomly selected group of respondents, and when respondents are offered an incentive — such as cash — to complete an online survey, it can lead to inaccurate results.

The Pew Research Center released a report in 2024 showing that these so-called opt-in surveys did a particularly bad job of capturing the attitudes of adults under 30 and Latino adults. Researchers at Pew, for example, asked respondents in one survey if they were licensed to operate a type of nuclear submarine. In the survey, 12% of respondents under 30 said yes. In reality, the share of people under 30 holding such a license “rounds to zero,” the report said.

While even legitimate pollsters can get election results wrong — a poll represents public opinion at the time it was taken, and that can change — experts say there are a few key things to look out for when vetting the quality of a survey.

“The more transparent a poll is — in terms of its data and methods — the more you should believe it,” said Grose, who also conducts the California Elections and Policy Poll.

Franklin said that pollsters with a track record are typically more trustworthy, as their future business and reputation relies on their accuracy.

He said that polling conducted by upstart organizations is not necessarily bad, but that the people conducting it don’t necessarily have the training or expertise of more established outfits.

Inaccurate polling can misinform voters and lead to election night surprises, but it can also have a corrosive effect on elections themselves.

“Polling can drive outcomes,” Grose said. “Favorable polls lead to more fundraising. There’s a bandwagon effect.”

The government of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz approved a landmark bill to expand the powers of the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) and the Domestic Intelligence Service (BfV) by 2027. This expansion grants them offensive and operational tools, including cyber counter-sabotage and espionage, with funding of €1.51 billion. This move has sparked significant concern among Chinese and Russian intelligence agencies regarding the radical shift in German security doctrine, stemming from the geopolitical context and the fears of Germany’s adversaries, China and Russia, regarding the ongoing hybrid warfare. The German initiative was driven by the escalating pace of gray and hybrid warfare, the most recent example being the discovery of a booby-trapped drone at Leipzig’s strategic airport. Consequently, intelligence, strategic, and security circles in Beijing and Moscow are closely monitoring this historic intelligence revolution approved by Chancellor Merz’s government on August 12, 2026.  This draft law (exceeding 700 pages) represents the most significant shift in Germany’s security doctrine since the end of World War II in 1945. From the perspective of Chinese and Russian intelligence, this shift constitutes a security revolution that ends the strict constraints imposed on Germany since World War II, transforming German intelligence agencies from mere information-gathering tools into entities capable of launching offensive and counter-sabotage operations. For these reasons, this internal German intelligence transformation is being closely monitored and analyzed in depth within intelligence and military circles in Beijing and Moscow, given its strategic dimensions and its connection to Berlin’s attempt to break free from American dependence. This move, analyzed by Chinese and Russian intelligence and military circles, is seen as a targeting of Russia and China. Although Berlin attempts to frame counterintelligence as a general effort, German officials, such as Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt, have explicitly stated that the goal is to deter Russian and Chinese sabotage operations and enable German intelligence to inflict pain on adversaries and operate on equal footing with allies like the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), rather than relying on them entirely. The German Federal Parliament (Bundestag) is expected to formally pass the bill after the summer recess, allowing these offensive powers to become fully operational in Germany by early 2027.

Military think tanks and research centers affiliated with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Russian circles alike are analyzing all the operational and political dimensions of this strategic decision in Germany, focusing on understanding the German desire to shift from a defensive doctrine to an offensive operational approach and to adopt a cyber sabotage strategy and a counter-terrorism measure called “Hack-Back.” For the first time, the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) and the Federal Intelligence Service (BfV) are granted legal authority to penetrate the information systems of adversaries and attackers and modify or delete data to prevent large-scale cyberattacks and dismantle the infrastructure of hackers. This includes German approval for field sabotage operations in situations of German defense tension, whereby the BND is permitted to carry out active sabotage operations abroad, such as disabling servers and replacing military or vital technology components with damaged ones to prevent attacks, such as in drone factories and chemical laboratories of hostile states. This has been interpreted by Chinese and Russian circles as a German crushing of the principle of separation between German domestic and foreign intelligence agencies.   According to Chinese and Russian analyses, the new German law is also generating considerable legal controversy within Germany itself, as it narrows the historical distance between intelligence agencies (those concerned only with collecting information) and the police agencies (those concerned with implementation).

Here, the Chinese intelligence reading of the German reform can be understood as the end of historical restrictions imposed on Berlin, as Beijing views the move as a reversal of the strict restrictions imposed since the end of World War II and Berlin’s shift from purely information gathering to carrying out covert operations and penetrating adversaries’ networks.  In addition to what this represents for Beijing and Moscow in terms of reducing dependence on Washington, Chinese intelligence is monitoring Germany’s attempt to build independent self-reliance capabilities to reduce intelligence dependence on the United States and its allies amid mutual strategic suspicions. Intelligence, military, political, and strategic circles in Beijing also view with caution the (militarization of German digital space). Here, the Chinese analysis considers that allowing the disruption of infrastructure and the modification and deletion of data places German agencies in the ranks of major countries with active offensive doctrines, given the reliance of German domestic and foreign intelligence agencies on the pattern of practical and technical dimensions of reform and hybrid capabilities in reforming their security and intelligence agencies, through directly confronting drones, disrupting spy servers, or tampering with components of a weapon under production without resorting to human physical violence, with the expansion of the use of artificial intelligence technologies, through expanding the use of facial recognition technologies and reducing data protection restrictions to store and analyze information for longer periods. However, at the same time, German circles are facing parliamentary challenges, given that the draft law is undergoing legislative proceedings in both houses of the German parliament (the Bundestag and the Bundesrat) amidst local human rights objections warning of the erosion of personal freedoms and the principle of separating intelligence from the police.

Here, the Russian intelligence perspective (Moscow) on the German intelligence draft law comes to the fore. Russian intelligence agencies (SVR, GRU, and FSB) view this move as a direct response to their operations and interpret it within the context of an acknowledgment of hybrid warfare. Moscow believes that Germany is now officially treating Russia as an enemy in a state of undeclared war.  The increase in the budget of Germany’s foreign intelligence agency (BND) by 26%, reaching €1.51 billion, is seen as an indication of a long-term security buildup against Russia. Moscow also viewed this as a move to neutralize cognitive denial, especially given accusations from German domestic and foreign intelligence agencies that Russia is exploiting German bureaucratic sluggishness and strict data privacy measures to carry out cyberattacks and sabotage operations. Therefore, the Russian interpretation of this German decision can be seen as a direct response from Berlin to Moscow, aimed at closing this digital and security gap between the two sides. It can be interpreted as a German intelligence strategy of reciprocity, or, according to the Russian analysis, as an attempt by Germany to encircle disinformation networks by granting German intelligence the ability to take down Russian propaganda and disinformation servers, which pose a direct threat to Russia’s soft power tools aimed at destabilizing Germany.

On the other hand, Chinese intelligence circles, primarily the Ministry of State Security (MSS), which acts as the Chinese intelligence service, analyze German law from the perspective of technological and geopolitical conflict, targeting industrial and academic espionage by China. Here, the Chinese analysis focuses on the expansion of the powers of the German domestic intelligence agency (BfV) and the use of artificial intelligence. This analysis primarily aims to track Chinese soft networks that focus on stealing advanced German technology and conducting economic espionage in order to protect German infrastructure and communications. Beijing believes that the new German laws, which compel German telecommunications companies and digital platforms to hand over data to German intelligence, are primarily intended to isolate Chinese technology and impose complete German sovereign control over cyber data in the face of China. The most sensitive aspect of Russian and Chinese analyses lies in their dual interpretation of Germany’s desire to break free from the Five Eyes framework. They see it as either an intelligence network for exchanging signals intelligence, comprising the US, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, whose decisions are guided by Washington, or as a new dilemma facing Germany in building self-reliant capabilities and ending its dependence on the United States. This latter scenario serves the interests of China and Russia, promoting multipolarity and a multipolar international world and ending the one-way street of Washington.   The German Chancellery has publicly stated that reliance on allies (specifically the US) has been a one-way street, where Germany receives information without the ability to exchange it or protect itself independently. From a Chinese and Russian intelligence perspective, this represents a new German policy of hedging against Trump’s unpredictability. Moscow and Beijing believe that the primary motivation behind the conservative Merz government’s actions is strategic skepticism regarding the reliability of the United States, particularly with Donald Trump in the White House, and Berlin’s fear of the politicization or severing of US intelligence flows. This reinforces the Chinese-Russian view that this is a technologically impossible German attempt to break free from US control and dictates.

Accordingly, assessments in Beijing and Moscow agree that Germany—despite its ambition—will not be able to completely break free from intelligence dependence on America anytime soon. The United States controls the global cloud infrastructure, internet cables, and critical cyber technologies, making German intelligence independence a costly ambition that will take years to materialize technologically. However, it does give Berlin at least greater parity in dealing with partners, which China and Russia are trying to maximize.

As the United States-Iran conflict draws renewed global attention to energy security, a quieter transformation is underway. Driven by the combined effects of El Niño and accelerating warming, the Gulf region is heating up significantly. Rising temperatures, prolonged droughts, and intense precipitation events are intensifying water scarcity and straining critical infrastructure.

For economies built on oil and gas, this environmental pressure creates complex compound risks. Unlike agriculture-based nations that face immediate crop shocks, Gulf countries confront structural vulnerabilities. Their heavy reliance on international grain markets exposes them to global price volatility, while a high dependence on energy-intensive seawater desalination ties water security directly to power consumption. Furthermore, rapid urbanization leaves critical infrastructure like power grids, ports, and data centers vulnerable to extreme weather and global supply chain disruptions.

Not surprisingly, recent adjustments to energy and water systems are no longer treated merely as environmental policies. They represent a fundamental restructuring of national development logic. In this era of extreme climate, long-term competitiveness depends less on hydrocarbon reserves and more on the upgrade of national capability systems.

Historically, the energy systems of Gulf countries focused primarily on supporting domestic growth and resource exports. Today, that strategic role has expanded to ensure the survival of modern society. Extreme heat drives up summer cooling demand and increases electricity consumption for critical infrastructure like desalination plants, transportation, and communications. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), cooling and seawater desalination will account for roughly 40% of new electricity demand in the Middle East and North Africa by 2035.

This shift has transformed how governments view energy security. If energy systems determine whether Gulf countries can operate stably, water resources dictate the ceiling for their development. Long reliant on seawater desalination to overcome natural constraints, these nations now face soaring operating costs driven by rising temperatures and extreme weather. Vulnerabilities vary across the region. Countries like Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain depend almost entirely on desalination and remain highly sensitive to energy price fluctuations. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are advancing water-saving technologies, wastewater recycling, and renewable-powered desalination to build resilience.

According to the World Bank’s Water-Energy-Food Nexus framework, Gulf countries must integrate energy supply, water management, wastewater treatment, and fiscal policy. A shock to any single component can amplify risks across the entire economy. For resource-based nations, while oil dictates the scale of wealth, water security increasingly governs the quality of development and the long-term viability of modern cities.

Faced with these structural pressures, Gulf strategies are shifting from risk mitigation to the cultivation of new global advantages. With annual global climate adaptation funding gaps remaining substantial, demand is surging for resilient infrastructure, water management, flood control, and smart agriculture. Armed with fiscal strength and large-scale engineering experience, Gulf nations are positioning themselves to capture these markets. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are deploying capital through sovereign wealth funds like the Public Investment Fund (PIF) and Mubadala into green hydrogen, smart cities, and sustainable infrastructure.

At the same time, the rapid expansion of artificial intelligence is creating new strategic demands. Global data center electricity consumption is projected to rise sharply by 2030, driven heavily by AI applications. For the Gulf, building large-scale computing centers in high-temperature environments demands robust power supplies and advanced cooling capacities. Sovereign wealth funds are increasingly utilizing their capital to back AI hubs and digital infrastructure, cementing their role in shaping future industries.

This evolution creates significant opportunities for international partnerships, particularly with China. China holds scale and industrial advantages in photovoltaics, energy storage, power grid equipment, desalination, and digital infrastructure. Meanwhile, the Gulf offers capital, markets, and robust green investment demand. As global competition extends from resource endowments to climate adaptation capabilities, Gulf nations are working to transform their resilience strategies into international competitiveness. Ultimately, the measure of a nation’s strength in the future will depend not only on the wealth beneath its soil, but on the safety, resilience, and adaptability of its development systems.

Vietnam’s sovereign AI relies heavily on open-weight models developed in the United States. However, as Washington and Beijing are moving to restrict access to these technologies, Hanoi’s bamboo diplomacy offers little protection to its AI ambitions.

In mid-July, Vietnam approved its National Digital Transformation Strategy for 2026-2030 under Decision 1266/QD-TTg, and the National Data Strategy under Decision 1308/QD-TTg. Both strategies aim for national digital sovereignty, domestic self-reliance and state-level data governance on the assumption that artificial intelligence (AI) models would remain a public good. Within days, the United States (U.S.) and China signalled their readiness to restrict access to those models.

Made in America

Vietnam’s current AI systems are modified versions of foreign tech. On the ground, Viettel, the state military telecom giant spearheading Vietnam’s AI goals, announced its VT-Super-120B-A12B Vietnamese language model had matched the accuracy of major global models of similar size. It was built by adapting Nemotron, Nvidia’s freely downloadable model family, to Vietnamese data. Viettel’s earlier model was also built on Meta’s Llama 3, trained with Nvidia tooling, and run on a cluster of 22 DGX B200 supercomputers at its Hoa Lac centre.

Moreover, VNG’s GreenNode subsidiary introduced GreenMind-Medium-14B-R1, the first open-source Vietnamese reasoning model built to run on Nvidia’s software and a single Nvidia H100 graphics chip. Meanwhile, FPT Corporation committed $200 million to build its AI factory powered by Nvidia hardware.

At the state level, Vietnam’s Ministry of Science and Technology met with senior executives from Qualcomm in Hanoi on July 17. Deputy Minister of Science and Technology Hoang Minh and Qualcomm’s Executive Vice President Durga Malladi discussed expanding cooperation in AI semiconductors, research and development, and workforce training.

While Vietnam has made its bets on the U.S. for its AI ambitions, other Southeast Asian countries are leaning towards China. Indonesia’s Indosat Ooredoo Hutchison partnered with AIonOS on DeepSeek-powered services, and Malaysia’s Communications Ministry launched a sovereign full-stack AI ecosystem running on Huawei hardware.

Outside Two Blocs

AI governance is dividing into two blocs. One bloc is the U.S.-led Pax Silica initiative, which coordinates trusted supply chains for semiconductors, critical minerals and AI infrastructure with 24 signatories. Singapore, the Philippines, India, Japan and South Korea are among them. The Philippines converted membership into commitments by agreeing in April 2026 to a 4,000-acre economic security zone in the Luzon economic corridor designated as the initiative’s first AI-native industrial hub.

The other is the Chinese-backed World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization, signed into existence in Shanghai on July 16 by 29 governments. The membership also includes Russia, Belarus, Cuba, Venezuela and most of Central Asia, alongside Vietnam’s neighbours Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar.

Membership in either bloc could offer access to supply chains, technical assistance and software distribution during a diplomatic crisis.

However, Vietnam belongs to neither group because of its long-standing bamboo diplomacy, a policy of balancing relations between Washington and Beijing without taking sides. This leaves Hanoi in an awkward position. Vietnam depends heavily on American technology, but enjoys none of the guarantees or protections of one.

Weaponising Access

Export controls on chips work because processors are physical goods, subject to customs enforcement. On May 31, the Bureau of Industry and Security extended licensing requirements to any China-parented buyer worldwide, closing loopholes in Singapore and Malaysia.

AI models do not behave the same way. Access to a closed system can be revoked instantly by flipping an application programming interface (API) key. For example, on June 12, Anthropic suspended access to its Fable and Mythos models to comply with U.S. Commerce Department export controls, restoring access only on July 1 after those controls were lifted. Such events largely explain why governments prefer AI models they can host locally.

In contrast, an open-weight model, once downloaded, cannot be recalled by any foreign regulator. Instead, global superpowers exert control by forcing major tech companies and code-sharing platforms to block downloads from specific regions or countries. They can also pressure developers to restrict future model updates to dodge penalties from Washington or Beijing.

This fight over AI access is now an open battle. On July 16, Chinese startup Moonshot AI unveiled Kimi K3, a 2.8-trillion-parameter model that independent evaluators say matches top American models at a fraction of their operating cost. On July 21, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent signalled that Washington could sanction Chinese tech firms, citing American-model watermarks found inside Chinese ones. Days later, China’s Ministry of Commerce called the investigations groundless, threatened countermeasures, and began consulting Alibaba, ByteDance and Z.ai on export controls covering model weights, training data and chip designs.

Why It Matters

For years, nations have built digital capacity cheaply and quickly by customising open-weight AI models. Kimi K3 seemed to promise that era would continue. Instead, the geopolitical fallout exposed the fragility of relying on superpower goodwill.

For Vietnam, the real threat is getting left behind. Washington or Beijing cannot delete the AI models already sitting on Vietnamese servers. What they can block is future releases. If both superpowers restrict open-weight models, Vietnam’s AI ecosystem gets stuck using today’s tools while the rest of the world moves forward. A national tech stack built on frozen updates decays one generation at a time. States that have not localised model weights face an even harsher reality. Their access relies on live connections and downloads that can vanish overnight with a new policy.

At its core, this is a problem of time. Vietnam’s bamboo diplomacy relies on having time to adapt. Trade deals and defence agreements move slowly, giving Hanoi room to bend without breaking. AI access, however, moves instantly as access disappears with a revoked key or a blocked download link.

Diplomatically, Vietnam tries to stay neutral at all costs. However, its technology does not try to do so. All of its major AI models are built on American weights, run on American chips, and improve when American companies release new ones. Vietnam acts as if it can delay picking a side, but with every new AI update or blocked release, the cost of delay becomes more expensive. In the past, diplomatic pressure moved slowly through international summits. Today, that pressure speeds up with every new model release.

What Five Years of Directives Add Up To

On August 10, 2026, Reporters Without Borders marked five years of Taliban rule with an assessment that Afghanistan has become, in the organization’s words, a prison for information. The report catalogs more than twenty national directives and a long list of provincial decrees, most delivered verbally rather than published, that have progressively stripped Afghan journalism of independence. The starkest new detail is legal rather than administrative. A Code of Criminal Procedure quietly enacted in January 2026 now punishes insulting the country’s supreme leader with thirty nine lashes and a year in prison, and insulting the wider leadership with twenty lashes and six months. Afghanistan sits at one hundred seventy fifth of one hundred eighty countries in RSF’s 2026 World Press Freedom Index, alongside North Korea, Eritrea and China, as global press freedom overall falls to its lowest point in twenty five years.

From Verbal Orders to Written Law

The Taliban’s approach to media control has moved through recognizable phases since retaking Kabul in August 2021. Eleven rules issued that September gave authorities broad power over what could be published. Restrictions escalated from there: a November 2021 ban on interviewing regime critics, a March 2022 prohibition on rebroadcasting Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, and a July 2022 declaration by supreme leader Haibatullah Akhundzada that criticizing officials contradicts Islamic law, which recast basic accountability as religious transgression. Afghanistan’s 2015 Press Law, the last formal legal protection for journalists, was repealed in April 2024. What followed was an acceleration rather than a pause. September 2024 rules banned live political programming and limited on air guests to Taliban approved voices. A July 2024 law prohibiting broadcast images of living beings has since spread to more than twenty provinces. Women have been pushed out of the profession in stages, from mandatory face covering for television presenters in 2021 to a March 2025 Kandahar order banning women’s voices from radio entirely.

The Shift From Deniable Pressure to Permanent Law

What separates the January 2026 Code of Criminal Procedure from everything that preceded it is durability. Verbal orders and provincial decrees can be denied, reversed or applied unevenly, and much of what RSF documents over the past five years was communicated exactly that way, through unpublished instructions passed down from de facto ministries rather than through any formal legislative process. A criminal code cannot be waved away the same way. The document only became public because it was leaked; the Taliban never announced it. RSF notes the code does not mention journalists specifically, but it offers them no exemption either, meaning ordinary reporting on Taliban governance now falls under the same provisions that criminalize insulting the leadership. A separate article requires citizens to report any contact with government opponents, extending the incentive to inform beyond state security services into the population at large. Legal researchers reviewing the code have also flagged provisions dividing defendants into social categories, with punishment calibrated to status rather than offense, a structure that undercuts equal treatment under law well beyond the press freedom question alone.

The scale of the resulting collapse is difficult to overstate. RSF’s country data shows forty three percent of Afghan outlets disappeared within three months of the takeover, more than two thirds of the roughly twelve thousand journalists working in the country in 2021 have left the profession, and eight in ten women journalists have stopped working entirely. Behind each of those figures sits a newsroom that no longer exists or a byline that no longer appears, the practical result of a five year campaign that RSF’s South Asia desk head has described as turning criticism itself into a legal offense.

None of this makes Afghanistan an isolated case, which is what gives the story weight beyond South Asia. RSF’s own 2026 index places Afghanistan’s collapse inside a broader global pattern: more than half the world’s countries now rate as difficult or very serious environments for journalism, the worst showing the index has recorded in a quarter century. The organization has also pointed to a specific mechanism spreading well beyond authoritarian states, in which national security and counterterrorism justifications, first normalized after the September 11 attacks, are increasingly invoked to restrict reporting on matters of public interest, a pattern RSF says now appears in established democracies as well as in regimes like Afghanistan’s. Afghanistan represents the extreme endpoint of that continuum rather than an exception to it, which is precisely why treating it as a uniquely Afghan problem understates the lesson.

The crackdown has also produced a measurable outflow with consequences well beyond Afghanistan’s borders. RSF data shows the number of countries journalists have been forced to flee from worldwide has doubled over five years, from nineteen to forty, with Afghanistan topping the list. Those journalists do not disappear once they cross a border. Pakistan and Iran, the two most common host states, have each carried out mass deportations of Afghan refugees through 2026, and independent reporting from RSF and Human Rights Watch has documented Afghan journalists, including some holding valid visas, among those detained and forcibly returned toward the same authorities they fled. Resettlement pipelines to Europe and North America have slowed at the same time, leaving exiled journalists in prolonged legal limbo in third countries with limited protection. For policymakers well outside the region, that combination turns a domestic censorship story into a live test of asylum and non return commitments.

Three Paths From Here

The most likely trajectory is continued institutionalization rather than reversal. The Taliban leadership has shown no interest in press freedom as a bargaining chip for international recognition, and the shift from verbal directive to codified criminal law suggests an intent to make current restrictions permanent rather than negotiable. This path is highly likely through the remainder of 2026 and into 2027, with enforcement of the new code expanding province by province and further directives layered on top of an already dense regulatory web.

A second, less likely path involves narrow, tactical loosening tied to international engagement. If the Taliban pursues formal recognition or unlocked aid financing, cosmetic concessions on foreign broadcasters or select outlets are possible, mirroring past patterns of selective accommodation when the leadership has wanted to project moderation to specific foreign audiences. This outcome is possible but not likely to alter the underlying legal architecture, since Akhundzada’s own framing of criticism as a religious offense forecloses any structural reform led from within the leadership itself.

A third path, already underway, is a deepening exile crisis that draws in host and resettlement states more directly than the domestic censorship story alone ever could. Continued deportations from Pakistan and Iran, combined with stalled resettlement processing in Europe and North America, raise the probability of a high profile forced return case drawing sustained international attention, potentially forcing governments to clarify protection commitments to Afghan media workers in ways they have so far avoided through case by case handling. This path is likely to intensify over the next twelve months regardless of what happens inside Afghanistan itself, since it depends as much on Pakistani and Iranian deportation policy as on any Taliban decision.

Why a Domestic Censorship Story Is Not a Domestic Story

Afghanistan’s press freedom collapse will keep being read as an isolated horror story unless it is placed against the trend line RSF itself is now drawing, in which national security framing, once confined to the world’s most repressive states, is migrating into ordinary governance practice elsewhere. The clearest near term indicator to track is enforcement, not legislation. The Code of Criminal Procedure has existed on paper since January 2026 without a confirmed public prosecution under its press relevant articles. The first documented case brought under Article 19 or Article 23 against a journalist or commentator will mark the moment Taliban media law moves from threat to precedent, and from precedent to template.

Shenzhen will host the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit (APEC) in November 2026, particularly given its reputation as China’s Silicon Valley and a global hub for artificial intelligence and embodied intelligence. The city will showcase its advanced industrial ecosystem in robotics, new vehicles, and the digital economy, aiming to connect markets and economies across the Asia-Pacific region. Shenzhen’s innovation model, designed to link China with Asia and the Pacific, is a key priority for the APEC Summit, scheduled to be held in Shenzhen this year under the theme Building an Asia-Pacific Community for Shared Prosperity. This theme focuses on integrating the Chinese economy regionally and globally through advanced technology. Therefore, Shenzhen’s focus during the APEC 2026 Summit will be on innovation, the digital economy, and showcasing new productive forces. The meetings and discussions at the APEC 2026 Summit will be concentrated in Shenzhen. The conference aims to highlight the role of innovation and advanced digital technologies; promote regional cooperation in artificial intelligence, innovation, and digital technologies; and strengthen industrial networks and cross-border supply chains for APEC economies in the semiconductor and green technology sectors. This explains why Shenzhen, China, was chosen to host the upcoming APEC conference. It serves as a living example, showcasing Shenzhen as a model of sustainable smart cities that rely on AI algorithms in the transportation, healthcare, and services sectors.

Shenzhen is at the forefront of the regional and international AI landscape, acting as a new engine for industry by integrating digital innovation to expand markets and improve production in the Asia-Pacific region. In Shenzhen, any new idea can find the necessary components within 30 minutes, leading entrepreneurs to call this speed a Shenzhen Speed. Shenzhen is a unique global model for rapid innovation and integrated supply chains, enabling entrepreneurs to transform ideas into prototypes in just 30 minutes thanks to the integration of industrial components, a phenomenon known as “Shenzhen Speed.”   Shenzhen’s innovation environment is characterized by a seamless supply chain, where markets and factories provide all the necessary hardware and electronics components in one place, supporting entrepreneurship. The city offers an incubator environment for startups and innovators from around the world. Furthermore, its regional connectivity mechanism reinforces Shenzhen’s role as a major hub for trade and technology cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.

Shenzhen, often called China’s Silicon Valley, is a leading global center for innovation, technology, and rapid industrial development. The city is spearheading the transformation into a smart city by integrating AI governance, the Internet of Things, and ultra-fast supply chains that enable the realization of technological ideas in record time. Embodied AI is a modern industrial trend in the city, alongside artificial intelligence. Shenzhen’s position is further solidified in technological innovation; Shenzhen’s rapid pace allows the city to provide the components for any new technological idea in just 30 minutes thanks to its massive supply chains. Furthermore, it serves as an incubator for major companies, housing the headquarters of China’s leading technology giants, such as Huawei, Tencent, DJI, and Wipertek. Shenzhen acts as a base for major companies, hosting thousands of large and emerging firms in artificial intelligence and robotics. The city is a natural hub for embodied intelligence, humanoid robot manufacturing, and smart factory applications powered by industrial AI models. This makes Shenzhen a true embodiment of digital urban leadership. It has been crowned a smart city thanks to its 5G infrastructure and dual digital models.

Shenzhen embodies the engine of Chinese technological excellence and its transformation from a port  From a small fishing ground to a leading global innovation hub, Shenzhen is not only driving the engines of modern technology but also, alongside its massive supply chains, is propelling industry and progress in the region through artificial intelligence and embodied intelligence. The city is renowned for its so-called Shenzhen Speed, where any new technological idea can find its components and factories in just 30 minutes. Shenzhen plays a significant role in driving innovation and connecting the Asia-Pacific. This will be reflected in the priorities of the APEC Summit in November 2026, hosted by Shenzhen, which aims to stimulate regional cooperation in artificial intelligence and innovation; address global economic challenges, slow growth, and rising trade protectionism by promoting integration and unity; and achieve sustainable development and create an environment conducive to innovation. This will be accomplished through the integration of ministerial efforts and related events to encourage innovation in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Chinese city of Shenzhen is a unique example of a rapid transformation from a small fishing village to a global hub for technology and innovation. Today, it leads advanced sectors such as artificial intelligence (AI), augmented intelligence (AI), and massive supply chains, becoming a driving force for technological excellence in China and the world. The key drivers of Shenzhen’s success lie in understanding its historical transformation from a simple fishing port to a leading global center for business, technology, and AI, as well as its ability to innovate by integrating AI algorithms across various industrial and service sectors and by developing augmented intelligence. Shenzhen is heavily investing in robotics and intelligent systems that physically interact with their environment, providing the world with the necessary supply chains to meet its technological needs. This is made possible by Shenzhen’s vast and flexible infrastructure for manufacturing and developing technological devices at breakneck speed.

  Finally, Shenzhen stands out as a pilot city in China, particularly in the areas of artificial intelligence (AI) and embodied intelligence (EQI). Shenzhen aims to become a national base for developing and implementing large-scale linguistic models (LCMs) and advanced AI and EQI products, integrating robots and intelligent systems into real-world and industrial environments, thus driving high-quality manufacturing forward. Furthermore, Shenzhen plays a key role in promoting smart governance by relying on AI-based solutions for efficient traffic management, security, and urban services.

It is a crucial time for Africa in terms of how it interacts with the rest of the world. Africa is no longer viewed as a place of humanitarian interest or of mere charity. Instead, Africa is increasingly seen as a prize, as a place that contains large populations and is a place where great and emerging powers struggle to win influence. With fifty-five states, more than one billion people, and the youngest population of any continent, Africa’s future will determine the politics of the world for decades to come. However, this potential strategic significance exists in an uneasy context of instability, dependency, and weak governance. The key question this paper seeks to address is whether Africa will remain a subject of outside influence and internal problems, or be able to turn its potential into real strategic power.

A Continent in Transition: Crisis, Change and Transformation

The transition of Africa is evident in its economic output. According to the IMF, it should come as no surprise that sub-Saharan Africa will grow at about 4.3% in 2026 and that the region will be one of the fastest growing in the world, even beating out developed nations facing the challenges of monetary tightening and shrinking populations. It is estimated that nations such as Ethiopia, Guinea, Uganda, Rwanda, and Benin will have growth rates of 7% or more because of mining, construction, industrial parks, and infrastructure spending. Africa’s aggregate nominal GDP will reach around 3.3 trillion dollars in 2026.

This data indicates true evolution; however, these very reports indicate that growth in Africa is uneven since economies relying on resources and importing oil experience worsening trade accounts and increasing cost of living. The contradiction within Africa’s transition process is that while there is economic momentum, there is also economic fragility, which means that growth indicators do not mean development per se.

Shifting Security Landscapes and the Crisis of Regional Stability

One does not have to look further than the Sahel region to see just how critical this problem of stability becomes. Military coups seized control in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger; in these regions, the Alliance of Sahel States was formed and left the Economic Community of West African States. According to the information available from Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, the level of violence in central Sahel increased dramatically from 2018 to 2024.

Humanitarian organizations working within the United Nations reported approximately nine thousand three hundred casualties in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in 2025. While the withdrawal of French troops and UN peacekeepers was not completed by an improvement of local armies, the Russia-based Africa Corps, a successor to the Wagner Group, became the main security partner of junta regimes with varied success. Extremist organizations such as Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimin and the Islamic State Sahel Province expanded their operations and started to use more often armed drones in their actions with a possibility of destabilization spreading to the countries of the Gulf of Guinea coast.

Economic Crossroads: Resources, Growth and Strategic Dependency

The development of the economy in Africa has a direct connection with the natural resources present in the continent, including the minerals used in the process of energy transition in the world such as copper, cobalt, manganese, and lithium. China has been the largest trading partner of Africa for the past sixteen years, and the expected value of the total trade between these two regions in 2025 is three hundred and forty-eight billion dollars, which is an increase by eighteen percent compared to the preceding year.

The main countries contributing to the largest share of trade include South Africa, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, and Egypt. China is involved in the continent’s economy not only in traditional sectors like natural resources but also in renewables, digitalization, and low carbon technology, as China plans to invest over fifty billion dollars in the continent by 2027 under the Beijing Action Plan. According to Boston University Global Development Policy Center, Africa’s exports to China are mostly raw material and the trade deficit with China is approximately equal to three percent of regional GDP.

Diplomatic Repositioning in an Emerging Multipolar World

The states of Africa are increasingly seeking to assert their independence in a multipolar world. With the admission of the AU to the G20 in 2023, the continent has secured a place among the major powers of the world permanently. Some of the African states have sought membership to BRICS, a power bloc which included Egypt and Ethiopia in addition to the founders and some other new members, making it another power bloc which its supporters argue is an alternative to the Western dominated groupings.

This diplomatic maneuver by the continent represents the larger strategy that the Africans follow in terms of strategic non alignment where they seek relations with all the major centers of power, including the US, China, Russia, Europe, and the Gulf countries. The Africans have used this diplomatic clout to their advantage in securing better deals on debt, trade, and security cooperation. But this diplomatic repositioning itself faces limitations because of the divide among the African states and lack of ability to capitalize on it.

Domestic Politics, Governance and the Crisis of Legitimacy

Underlying the security crossroads and the economic crossroads is a more fundamental crisis of political legitimacy. Since 2020, there have been coups across the Sahel and Central Africa as a manifestation of public discontent with corruption, poor service delivery, and the inability of the civilian government to ensure security. While military regimes in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Guinea partly justify their takeover of power by invoking issues of sovereignty and anti-colonial rhetoric – an argument that struck a chord with a lot of people while the indicators of good governance in those countries continued to decline rather than improve.

In other cases, disputed elections, the manipulation of constitutions to prolong the rule of presidents, and the constriction of civic space challenge the viability of the democratic institutions that were put in place after the opening up period of the 1990s. At the same time, a number of countries such as Ghana, Kenya, and Zambia have shown the potential for power transitions and active civil societies, which means that the crisis of legitimacy in Africa is not consistent.

External Powers and the Contest for African Influence

Today’s contest for influence in Africa is characterized by a larger and broader coalition of players than has been seen since the attainment of independence. The United States has attempted to make a comeback through efforts aimed at the development of critical minerals and infrastructure, in response to the increasing influence of China and Russia in the region, although the future of favorable trade policies like the African Growth and Opportunity Act appears to be in doubt due to changes in American trade policy.

The influence of Russia has primarily been gained through security collaboration and disinformation, rather than economic investment. Russian interests lie in forming partnerships without having to be conditional upon the governance of the partner country. Countries from the Gulf region, such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, have invested heavily in ports, agriculture, and renewable energy, especially in the Horn of Africa. The influence of Turkey has been formed in the form of business and military connections, especially in the Sahel and East Africa regions. With so many external partners involved in Africa, there is an increase in the chance that the continent becomes a battleground for great powers, rather than a partner in determining the outcome.

From Strategic Importance to Strategic Agency

The concept of strategic importance and strategic capability is essential to understand the strategic positioning of Africa at present times. Strategic importance is bestowed upon a country by external actors due to the recognition of the natural resources and markets of the region. Strategic capability on the other hand involves the setting of terms by African institutions and states rather than mere reactions to the interests of external forces.

In this regard, the African Continental Free Trade Area, which seeks to create a common market of over one point three billion people is an attempt to exercise such a strategic capability through reduction of dependency on external trade partners and increased intra-African trade which currently constitutes only a limited portion of total trade in the continent. Credibility of organizations like the African Union and Economic Community of West African States in conflict and coup mediation will determine whether African diplomacy will be conducted through collective institutions or ad hoc decisions made by individual African nations.

Now which direction will Africa take?

The geopolitical position of Africa in international politics is that of a paradoxical nature. The African continent can be characterized by both immense economic potential and security crises, both rising diplomatic power and an area of contestation between foreign forces, both a land of resilient democracy and an example of authoritarianism. The statistical information provided above gives evidence of a rising continent, despite the existing weaknesses. Whether or not Africa becomes a strategic player on its own or stays an object of contestation in the new multipolar world will depend solely on decision-making of the African continent. Whether the African continent will follow the path of development or the road of stagnation depends on how Africa will deal with the issues of governance, regional integration and economic diversification.

Sudan’s prolonged war is creating risks that extend well beyond its borders. The growing role of Islamist armed groups, including the Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade, could further complicate the country’s political and security landscape while creating new challenges for China’s economic and strategic interests in the Red Sea, East Africa and the Horn of Africa.

The Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade, an Islamist militia associated with the Sudanese Islamic Movement, has been one of the armed formations supporting the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) during the conflict. In September 2025, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned the brigade over its involvement in Sudan’s civil war and alleged connections to Iran. In March 2026, Washington designated the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, also known as the Sudanese Islamic Movement, as a terrorist organization and updated the brigade’s designation accordingly.

These measures have increased the international pressure on Sudanese Islamist networks and could complicate their future role within the country’s political and security institutions. For China, however, the issue is less about the ideological orientation of these groups than about the possibility that their growing influence could contribute to a broader fragmentation of Sudan’s security environment.

A security vacuum with regional consequences

The continuing conflict has already weakened Sudanese state institutions and created space for armed groups to expand their influence. The danger for Beijing is that prolonged fragmentation could transform Sudan into an environment in which local, regional and external actors compete through armed proxies.

Such a development would have consequences beyond Sudan itself. The country occupies a strategically important position on the Red Sea, while its internal conflict is increasingly interconnected with developments in neighboring states and wider regional security dynamics.

China has consistently called for a ceasefire, protection of civilians and a political settlement in Sudan. Following attacks on Port Sudan in May 2025, Beijing called for the protection of civilian facilities and civilians and urged all parties to work toward an early ceasefire and the restoration of peace and stability.

This approach reflects a broader Chinese preference for protecting its economic and diplomatic interests without becoming directly involved in Sudan’s internal conflict.

For Beijing, therefore, the emergence of increasingly autonomous armed formations represents a potential strategic problem. The greater the fragmentation of Sudan’s security institutions, the more difficult it becomes to protect infrastructure, commercial interests and Chinese nationals while maintaining a policy of non-interference.

Why the Red Sea matters to Beijing

Sudan’s Red Sea coastline gives the conflict a significance that extends far beyond the country itself.

The Red Sea is a critical maritime corridor linking Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia. Any deterioration in security along Sudan’s coast could add to the risks already affecting commercial navigation in the wider Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb area.

For China, the issue is particularly important because the country is heavily dependent on secure maritime trade routes. Instability along the Red Sea can increase shipping costs, disrupt supply chains and complicate the movement of Chinese goods between Asia, Europe and Africa.

The risks are therefore not limited to projects formally identified with the Belt and Road Initiative. They extend to China’s wider commercial, energy and logistical interests across the region.

Sudan’s instability could also affect Chinese companies operating in infrastructure, energy, mining and other sectors. The safety of Chinese workers and businesses becomes increasingly difficult to guarantee when state authority is fragmented and armed groups operate with greater autonomy.

The South Sudan connection

One of the most important dimensions of Sudan’s instability for China is its potential impact on South Sudan.

South Sudan’s economy remains heavily dependent on oil exports, while much of the country’s oil reaches international markets through infrastructure crossing Sudan. Any prolonged disruption to Sudanese territory, oil infrastructure or export facilities could therefore have consequences for South Sudan’s production and revenues.

This matters to China because Beijing has significant economic and diplomatic interests in South Sudan. China and South Sudan established a strategic partnership in 2024, and China remains one of South Sudan’s major trading partners, with crude oil constituting a major component of bilateral trade.

Consequently, instability in Sudan could create an indirect risk to China’s interests in South Sudan even without any direct Chinese involvement in the Sudanese conflict.

The relationship between the two countries also demonstrates why Beijing is unlikely to view Sudan solely through the lens of the Sudanese civil war. Developments in Sudan can affect neighboring states, energy flows, infrastructure networks and regional trade routes in which China has invested for decades.

China’s limited but expanding security footprint

China has sought to protect its interests in the region while avoiding direct military involvement in Sudan’s war.

Its military presence in Djibouti provides Beijing with an established logistical and security position around the western Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. At the same time, China’s broader commercial presence in Djibouti has continued to expand, reinforcing the country’s importance as a regional trade and logistics hub.

This does not mean that China is preparing to intervene militarily in Sudan. Rather, the existence of a Chinese military and commercial presence in the wider region gives Beijing additional capabilities for protecting its nationals, supporting maritime security and responding to emergencies if regional instability intensifies.

China’s activities in South Sudan also demonstrate a gradual expansion from purely economic engagement toward broader cooperation in areas such as security and public-sector capacity. In June 2026, for example, China handed over a Chinese-aided digital forensic laboratory to South Sudanese authorities, describing improved public-security management as important to national stability.

Beijing is therefore building relationships and capabilities that can help it protect its interests without becoming a direct party to regional conflicts.

The Islamist factor

The future role of Sudanese Islamist organizations remains an important variable.

The international designation of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood and the Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade could make it more difficult for these networks to operate openly through political or institutional channels. At the same time, pressure on an armed or ideological movement does not necessarily eliminate its influence. It can instead encourage the movement to adapt, fragment or seek alternative forms of political and social organization.

For China, this creates an additional layer of uncertainty.

Beijing has little incentive to become involved in Sudan’s ideological disputes. Its primary concern is whether political fragmentation and the proliferation of armed groups will threaten the stability required for trade, investment, energy flows and the safety of Chinese citizens.

The more Sudan’s conflict develops into a competition involving multiple armed and externally supported actors, the more difficult it becomes for China to maintain its preferred strategy of pragmatic engagement with all sides.

What China is likely to do

China’s response is likely to remain cautious and pragmatic.

Beijing is unlikely to seek a direct military role in Sudan unless its citizens, facilities or broader maritime interests face a severe and immediate threat. Instead, China is likely to continue supporting diplomatic efforts, calling for dialogue and a political settlement while maintaining relations with Sudanese institutions and neighboring countries.

China’s recent diplomatic position toward Sudan and South Sudan reinforces this approach. At the United Nations, Beijing has continued to emphasize political solutions and stability in the region, while maintaining engagement with both Sudan and South Sudan. In May 2026, China’s permanent representative to the UN warned that the continuing conflict in Sudan and instability in South Sudan were delaying the Abyei political process and called for greater attention to the security situation.

This suggests that Beijing sees the Sudanese conflict increasingly as part of a wider regional security problem rather than an isolated domestic crisis.

The central challenge for China is therefore not simply the rise of one Islamist militia. It is the possibility that Sudan’s institutional fragmentation will produce a durable security vacuum connecting the country’s internal conflict with instability in South Sudan, threats to Red Sea navigation and competition among regional and international powers.

If that happens, Sudan could become a much more serious strategic problem for Beijing.

China’s interests in the region depend on stability without requiring China itself to become responsible for providing it. The longer Sudan’s war continues, the harder that balance becomes to maintain.

Egypt has moved from rhetorical backing of Sudan’s army to active enabler of its war effort, with a covert drone hub on Egyptian soil symbolising how Cairo has tied its regional strategy to the survival of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

Since fighting erupted between the SAF and RSF in April 2023, Egypt has framed its stance as defence of Sudan’s “unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity” and of its “national institutions, particularly the Sudanese Armed Forces.” Officially, President Abdel Fattah al‑Sisi repeats pledges of “non‑interference,” presenting Egypt’s role as limited to mediation, humanitarian aid and hosting Sudanese refugees.

In practice, that line has steadily eroded. Years of joint drills, intelligence sharing and arms ties since 2019 created deep interoperability between the two militaries, well before the civil war began. Egyptian troops captured by the RSF at Merowe airbase in April 2023 were explained away as being on pre‑scheduled exercises, a narrative few regional observers accepted.

The New York Times investigation into East Oweinat in Egypt’s Western Desert crystallises this shift from backstage support to direct operational involvement. Satellite imagery, flight records and videos show a once‑civil agricultural airstrip expanded since 2018 with a second runway, new hangars and satellite links, and by 2025 hosting Turkish Akinci combat drones.

According to U.S. and European officials cited in that reporting, those drones have for at least six months flown strike missions into Sudan, hitting RSF targets up to hundreds of miles inside the country, including convoys on supply routes from Libya and Chad. The drones and their munitions match Turkish systems, but are based on Egyptian territory and shield Sudan’s military assets from RSF retaliation, blurring whether Cairo is merely hosting or also directing the campaign.

For Cairo, East Oweinat offers plausible deniability: operations are embedded in a desert reclamation project far from public scrutiny, yet close enough to Sudan’s border to project sustained air power. For Sudan’s army, it is a lifeline in a war where the RSF has excelled at capturing bases and shooting down drones; at least several Akinci units have reportedly been lost to RSF fire in recent months.

RSF statements and battlefield evidence further illuminate the depth of Egyptian support. In January 2026 the RSF published what it called “irrefutable” proof of Egypt’s direct role, citing captured Egyptian‑made ammunition, armoured vehicles and testimonies from detained SAF‑aligned commanders who described arms, training and medical support routed from Egypt.

Egypt’s wager on the SAF is rooted in hard security and regime‑survival logic. Egyptian strategists see Sudan’s collapse as an existential threat, evoking fears of refugee flows and arms smuggling on a porous southern frontier. Control of the Nile is still more fundamental: since the 2019 fall of Omar al‑Bashir, Cairo has tightened security and military coordination with Khartoum to present a united front against Ethiopia’s GERD and protect its historic water share.

There is also an ideological affinity. General Abdel Fattah al‑Burhan is a career officer with long‑standing ties to Egyptian commanders, and his military rule mirrors Sisi’s own path from barracks to presidency. Backing the SAF fits a long‑standing Egyptian instinct to side with Sudan’s regular army “whoever is in charge of it,” and more broadly to prefer strong central militaries over unruly civilian transitions in the Arab world. The SAF’s reliance upon Muslim Brotherhood–aligned militias and ideologues, including the glorification of early militant figures such as Bara Bin Malik, against the backdrop of Washington’s formal designation of key Muslim Brotherhood chapters as terrorist organisations, should be unsettling to Cairo.

Yet by 2026, Egypt’s bet looks increasingly brittle. The war has killed tens of thousands, displaced more than 14 million and pushed parts of Sudan close to famine, while neither side has secured decisive control. Burhan’s legitimacy is deeply disputed: he led the 2021 coup that derailed a fragile civilian‑military transition, and many of the forces that drove the 2018–19 uprising see him as the continuation of military dominance, not a route to elections.

Cairo’s categorical rejection of “parallel entities” and alternative governments in exile is presented as a defence of Sudanese unity, but in effect delegitimises broad civilian coalitions trying to organise outside the SAF–RSF binary. By equating Sudan’s “national institutions” with the current military leadership, Egypt narrows the field of acceptable interlocutors to a junta whose territorial control and popular backing are both eroding.

At the same time, Egypt seeks recognition as a mediator, through formats like the Quad and by hosting conferences of Sudanese civil and political actors in Cairo. That posture sits uneasily with explicit promises not to be “lax or late in supporting the legitimate Sudanese government” under Burhan, and with mounting evidence of Egyptian‑based air operations in the conflict. The covert base in the desert, and the drones that rise from its runways toward Sudanese skies, have become emblematic of a policy that claims non‑interference while in practice helping to lock Sudan into a devastating, externalised war.

I recently travelled to Sorowako, South Sulawesi, for a corporate social responsibility programme supported by Vale Indonesia. I helped local journalists use artificial intelligence ethically and responsibly in investigative reporting: reading documents, identifying inconsistencies and preparing interviews while keeping verification and editorial judgement in human hands.

Yet Sorowako made it difficult to see AI merely as a newsroom tool. The town sits within the industrial landscape powering Indonesia’s nickel ambitions. Materials processed across Sulawesi are entering global battery supply chains, while AI is moving beyond screens into machines, factories, ports and mines. Here, both transformations occupy the same geography.

Indonesia produced roughly three-fifths of the world’s mined nickel in 2024. The boom has attracted smelters, battery-material plants and billions in foreign investment. Yet how much Indonesian technological capability is emerging around it—and how much is taking root in the regions carrying the industrial and ecological burden? US Geological Survey

Responsible AI skills expand local journalists’ agency. The same principle should reach the industrial value chain. Mining regions should participate as producers of knowledge, technology and services, beyond extraction and social compensation.

The Physical-AI Window

Autonomous equipment, machine vision and robots able to act in the real world are bringing AI into factories, warehouses and difficult industrial environments.

The International Federation of Robotics recorded 542,000 industrial robot installations in 2024. Asia absorbed 74 percent; China installed 295,000 units and now operates more than two million. Goldman Sachs estimates the more speculative humanoid segment could reach US$38 billion by 2035. The projection is uncertain, but the physical-AI market is already widening. International Federation of Robotics, Goldman Sachs

China treats this frontier as industrial policy. Indonesia’s credible entry point is more practical. Mines need robotic inspection and safer hauling; their environmental monitoring also needs improvement. These are difficult operating problems—and domestic companies already need them solved. State Council Information Office of China

Nickel is a launching pad, not a guarantee of robotics demand. Many robots use none. Indonesia’s advantage lies in combining its mineral and battery base with industrial sites where new systems can be tested.

Its downstreaming strategy, however, remains highly linear: ore becomes processed nickel, then battery material, batteries and eventually electric vehicles. Horizontal downstreaming would build capabilities that spread sideways from this chain. Industrial AI developed for nickel could later serve copper or geothermal operations. Low-carbon processing and environmental technology could travel even further.

The objective is to convert temporary geological power into capability that outlives the commodity. Progress can be read through a downstreaming capability ladder: enforcement, processing, supplier formation and technological ownership. Indonesia has climbed the first two stages more decisively than many peers. The last two remain unfinished.

Different Positions on the Ladder

Canada illustrates the mature destination. In July 2026, its government backed mining projects using AI, robotics and subsurface imaging, alongside work on ecological restoration. Its mines function as testing grounds for domestic technology and exportable expertise. Government of Canada

Chile offers a more achievable Global South pathway. CORFO and the National Piloting Center help suppliers test technology under real conditions. Expande translates operational problems into industry challenges; its network has involved more than 2,500 suppliers and generated over 180 contracts. Chile has not completed the journey into higher-value manufacturing, which makes its lessons more useful for Indonesia. Expande

The Philippines shows the cost of stopping earlier. The world’s second-largest nickel producer exported 44.97 million wet metric tonnes of ore in 2024 while operating only two processing plants. Its Senate approved a phased ban on unprocessed ore exports in February 2025, but the provision was removed four months later amid concerns over mine closures, financing and insufficient domestic capacity. Argus, Reuters

Thailand shows another route onto the ladder. Without Indonesia’s nickel leverage, it used subsidies and tax incentives tied to local-production obligations. Those policies have attracted more than US$4 billion in EV investment, while Chinese brands now account for over 70 percent of EV sales. Reuters BYD’s Rayong plant—its first in Southeast Asia, opened in July 2024—anchors the emerging production cluster. Reuters Thai suppliers are entering the chain, but the transfer of deeper engineering and intellectual property is less visible. Thailand has shown that scale and supplier participation can be built quickly; technological ownership remains the harder rung.

Indonesia enforced its ore-export ban and built processing scale, although much technology and capital came from abroad. Its next test is whether enforcement produces Indonesian suppliers—and whether those suppliers eventually own technology.

MIND ID and Vale as Ecosystem Builders

MIND ID, Indonesia’s state-owned mining holding and Vale Indonesia’s largest shareholder, could orchestrate the next stage by pooling operational problems across its portfolio and financing the pilots that address them. It could then route proven solutions into procurement, allowing technology tested in nickel to travel into copper or tin. Sorowako is the natural lighthouse site. Vale Indonesia could open bounded challenges in worker safety or land rehabilitation, provide controlled access for testing and give successful suppliers a path into procurement. Vale Indonesia

The investment network is already multi-aligned. The Pomalaa project brings together Vale Indonesia, China’s Huayou and Ford from the United States. Separately, the nearly US$6 billion CATL–Antam–Indonesia Battery Corporation project links North Maluku with battery manufacturing in West Java. Indonesia is hosting production relationships that cross geopolitical blocs. Vale Indonesia, CATL

These relationships can extend from batteries towards battery-powered industrial intelligence. Indonesia’s return should be measured by whether local engineers gain ownership and the ability to sell abroad.

Connecting Sorowako to Rebana—and the World

This transition needs a spatial architecture connecting Indonesia’s nickel-producing east with Java’s manufacturing and logistics base. Sorowako is not starting from zero. Politeknik Sorowako grew from a technical academy into a vocational institution oriented towards local industrial needs. It offers a base for building capability close to the mines. Vale Indonesia

The polytechnic could anchor field engineering and testing. ITB’s Cirebon campus, within West Java’s Rebana corridor, could add advanced research and systems integration. Joint laboratories and supplier incubation would allow knowledge to move in both directions. Institut Teknologi Bandung

Patimban International Port gives Rebana an external gateway. Its container terminal currently has annual capacity of 250,000 twenty-foot equivalent units and is being expanded to 1.65 million. The port’s long-term design targets 7.5 million TEU per year; this is planned capacity, not present throughput. A regular international service launched in July 2026 now connects West Java with Singapore, Thailand and major Chinese ports. ANTARA

The emerging chain is tangible. Field capability developed in Sorowako could be refined in Cirebon, manufactured across Rebana and exported through Patimban.

This is the spatial expression of a multiplex industrial-digital ecosystem. Yet it carries an internal risk. If ecological burdens remain in Sulawesi while intellectual property and high-value firms accumulate in Java, Indonesia will reproduce a double asymmetry within its own borders. Rebana should become a scaling node without monopolising knowledge. Contracts and technical capacity must circulate back towards producing regions.

Vale’s support for Politeknik Sorowako could therefore evolve from conventional CSR into a long-term capability strategy. Skilled work and local suppliers can give communities a stake in the industry’s future, reducing resistance rooted in exclusion. None of this substitutes for environmental performance, land rights or meaningful participation.

Geopolitical Localisation

ASEAN adds a wider market. Its Economic Community Strategic Plan 2026–2030 calls for sustainable investment across the minerals value chain and stronger capacity in mining technology, research and innovation. ASEAN Economic Community Strategic Plan 2026–2030

Equipment proven under Sulawesi’s heat, dust and uneven connectivity could find buyers across the Global South. Indonesia can occupy the critical-mineral and industrial-intelligence layer of ASEAN’s AI economy.

Manufacturing in Indonesia could also help Chinese-linked firms diversify production. Factory location alone does not dissolve geopolitical concerns. US connected-vehicle rules show that governments may scrutinise who owns the software and retains remote access. Europe’s foreign-subsidy regime adds another layer of exposure. US Bureau of Industry and Security, European Commission

The defensible strategy is geopolitical localisation. Foreign production in Indonesia must create substantial domestic value and withstand scrutiny over ownership, supply chains and cybersecurity. Indonesian participation in engineering and intellectual property is central. This would make the country a bridge production node with capabilities of its own, rather than a passport factory for technology routed through its territory.

When I left Sorowako, what stayed with me was the proximity between a community learning to adapt to AI and industrial operations capable of becoming laboratories for it. The same region supplying global industries could help create safer mines and more credible environmental monitoring.

Nickel’s geopolitical leverage will not last. The durable test is what Indonesia can build before that advantage fades.

If firms and technical institutions take root in Sulawesi, then scale across Indonesia, Sorowako will have done more than supply the AI economy. It will have helped Indonesia learn how to compete within it.

The Ninth Bureau of the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) and the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) military think tanks are closely monitoring the movements of the current Egyptian Minister of Defense, Lieutenant General Ashraf Salem Zaher, and tracking the activities of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense. PLA websites are officially monitoring the activities and movements of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense, particularly the important air event for China: the El Alamein International Aerospace Exhibition (EIAS 2026), especially as the Egyptian Air Force and Ministry of Defense prepare to launch the second edition of the exhibition (EIAS 2026) at El Alamein International Airport from September 8 to 10, 2026.

As an Egyptian expert specializing primarily in Chinese politics and the policies of the ruling Communist Party of China, I can deconstruct, analyze, and evaluate the perspective of Chinese intelligence, military, defense, and security circles regarding the role and actions of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense and its minister, Lieutenant General Ashraf Salem Zaher, as follows:

– First: The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and its affiliated military research and analysis centers are closely monitoring and analyzing the activities of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense in hosting the El Alamein International Aerospace Exhibition.

This event is considered regionally significant for China, serving as a platform to connect defense and space organizations in Africa and the Middle East. This edition has garnered considerable international and Chinese interest, particularly from leading figures in the Chinese arms and defense industries, who are showcasing their latest aircraft and drones.  China’s interest in the inaugural El Alamein International Air and Space Exhibition in 2024 was marked by significant historical participation: the Chinese Air Force performed spectacular air displays, their first official air show outside of China. This first-ever air show featured Chinese aircraft performing unique aerobatic maneuvers in the skies above El Alamein, a first for China. Furthermore, the exhibition served to strengthen Chinese-Egyptian military cooperation. China’s interest in the Egyptian air show reflected the strength of bilateral military relations and the two countries’ desire to bolster their aviation and defense sectors. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and its affiliated military research and analysis centers focused on evaluating and analyzing the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s activities in hosting the El Alamein International Air and Space Exhibition. The Egyptian Air Force also announced the launch of the second edition of the exhibition, aiming to explore avenues for joint military cooperation and advanced military technologies between Egypt and China.

–             Second: The Role of the Ninth Bureau of the Chinese Ministry of State Security in Monitoring the Activities of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense to Secure Chinese Belt and Road Initiative Projects and Protect Chinese Strategic Interests

The Ninth Bureau of the Chinese Ministry of State Security (the Counter-Espionage and Infiltration Bureau) is concerned with the activities of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense in securing Chinese Belt and Road Initiative projects and protecting China’s growing strategic interests in the region from foreign intelligence penetrations. The dimensions of Chinese security and intelligence interest are focused on protecting vital waterways, particularly securing navigation in the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, which are essential maritime arteries for China’s Maritime and Military Silk Road. Furthermore, the Ninth Bureau of the Chinese Ministry of State Security seeks to secure major Chinese investments through intelligence oversight of joint Chinese logistical and economic projects, such as the Suez Canal Economic Zone and the TEDA projects. With close monitoring by Chinese intelligence circles, specifically the role of the Chinese Ninth Bureau in countering external threats, the activities of rival intelligence agencies targeting Chinese military technologies or economic presence in North Africa are being tracked and neutralized.

Therefore, think tanks affiliated with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have been paying close attention to the Egyptian defense minister’s foreign trips aimed at strengthening Egyptian military partnerships with countries around the world. This is of profound significance and military importance to China and the PLA, given its connection to China’s Belt and Road Initiative through the military cover for trade. Beijing relies on developing military coordination with Cairo and advanced arms deals, such as air defense systems, to ensure a stable regional environment that protects its long-term investments. This is achieved through a comprehensive strategic partnership between Egypt and China, transforming their cooperation from traditional trade to security and defense integration, thus guaranteeing the safe flow of global trade through Egypt. Therefore, the Chinese military has shown keen interest in tracking the movements of Egyptian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Ashraf Salem Zaher around the world, particularly his important official visit to Turkey in July 2026 and his meeting with the Turkish Defense Minister to sign a letter of intent for defense cooperation and the expansion of joint exercises. This is in addition to his on-site monitoring of the development and training of personnel at the Military Academy and other educational institutions affiliated with the Armed Forces, which intelligence and military circles in Beijing are keen to monitor closely.

– Third: The interest of Chinese military platforms and websites in covering news and activities of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense through official and semi-official military and news portals affiliated with the Chinese government that focus on defense and Middle Eastern affairs

In this context, several Chinese military platforms and websites specialize exclusively in covering news about the Egyptian Ministry of Defense or Lieutenant General Ashraf Salem Zaher individually. However, his strategic movements are also followed through official and semi-official Chinese government military and news outlets that focus on defense and Middle Eastern affairs. The most prominent of these Chinese websites and platforms include the China People’s Liberation Army Online (cn/China.81 Military Online). This is the official website of the Chinese armed forces, focusing on official meetings and joint cooperation. Also included is the website of the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, which is known as mod.gov.cn. This covers military diplomacy and protocols between Egypt and China. Additionally, there is (Xinhua Military). This is the official news arm that translates and publishes extensive reports on the restructuring of military leadership and the strategic moves of the Egyptian Minister of Defense, Ashraf Salem Zaher. And the Guancha Platform, which is militarily known as Guancha.cn. This is a leading Chinese analytical website that focuses on international military and geopolitical affairs. It analyzes Egyptian arms deals and military cooperation with regional and international powers, particularly China. Chinese media coverage of news from the Egyptian army and the El Alamein International Air and Space Exhibition in Egypt demonstrates broad strategic interest through Chinese military platforms such as the People’s Liberation Army Online (China Military Online) and the website of the Chinese Ministry of Defense. This coverage focuses on joint military cooperation, modern Egyptian military technologies, and potential areas of military cooperation between Egypt and China during the El Alamein International Air and Space Exhibition. This is especially significant given the participation of major Chinese military companies in the second edition of the exhibition, companies operating in the fields of defense, armaments, space technology, and commercial aviation. Therefore, specialized Chinese military platforms and agencies highlight displays of modern aircraft and drones, trends in military technological development in Egypt, and areas of mutual military benefit between Egypt and China.

Here, Chinese intelligence, military, political, and strategic circles, represented by the Ninth Bureau of the Chinese Ministry of State Security and all the aforementioned Chinese military sites, are monitoring all Egyptian military and field movements and activities. This includes, most notably, the movements of Lieutenant General Ashraf Salem Zaher, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Minister of Defense and Military Production (who assumed his position in February 2026). His recent intensive activities and initiatives aimed at enhancing combat readiness and strengthening Egyptian-international military cooperation, particularly with China and the People’s Liberation Army, are of particular interest. Among the most prominent movements and activities of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense, which have been the focus of analysis and evaluation by Chinese military circles, are the Egyptian defense minister’s field and diplomatic activities, including his official visit to Turkey in July 2026 at the head of a high-level Egyptian military delegation to discuss joint defense cooperation with the Turkish side. In addition to the interest, analysis, and evaluation by Chinese intelligence, military, defense, and security circles of the significance of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s invitation and reception of African defense ministers at the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s headquarters and their analysis of its connection to maintaining the security and stability of Chinese investments and opening new footholds and ports, especially in the Horn of Africa region, which is sensitive to Chinese logistical interests, relevant circles in Beijing are also monitoring the Egyptian side’s reception of the deputy prime minister and minister of defense of the Democratic Republic of Congo to discuss regional conditions and security in Africa, linking this to Chinese interests from a Chinese perspective.

– Fourth: The interest of intelligence, military, and security circles in Beijing in the recent Egyptian military activity in Africa and the significance of inviting and receiving African defense ministers at the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s headquarters, from a precise geopolitical perspective as a strategic pillar serving vital Chinese interests

Intelligence, military, and security circles in Beijing view Egypt’s recent military activity in Africa as a strategic pillar directly serving vital Chinese interests. Beijing analyzes the invitation and reception of African defense ministers at the Egyptian Ministry of Defense headquarters, headed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Minister of Defense and Military Production, Lieutenant General Ashraf Salem Zaher, from a precise geopolitical perspective that links regional security to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. This analysis considers the connection between Egyptian activity in East Africa and the Horn of Africa and Chinese logistics efforts to secure vital maritime routes for China’s interests. Beijing believes that strengthening Egyptian military influence in the sensitive Horn of Africa region acts as a safeguard for maritime traffic in the Red Sea leading to the Suez Canal, the main artery of China’s Maritime Silk Road, in addition to its importance for protecting China’s ports. Here, Chinese defense circles welcome any efforts to stabilize the Bab El-Mandeb Strait, thus protecting Beijing’s logistics base in Djibouti and opening up prospects for securing new Chinese ports and investments. These investments depend on the stability that Cairo, as a regional power center, can contribute to establishing.

– Fifth: Beijing’s interpretation of the reception of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s defense minister in Egypt to promote calm and stability in the Great Lakes and Nile Basin region, which is crucial to Chinese logistical interests.

Beijing’s interpretation of the reception of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s defense minister in Egypt is that relevant circles in Beijing followed with great interest the Egyptian side’s reception of the deputy prime minister and minister of defense of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Guy Kabombo Mwadiyamvita, to discuss regional security conditions. Chinese intelligence, military, political, and strategic circles analyze this in order to secure Chinese mining investments in the Democratic Republic of Congo, given that China has massive investments worth billions of dollars in the minerals and cobalt sector in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Beijing believes that security and stability in Congo, which Egypt supports through African Union institutions and bilateral cooperation, protects vital supply chains for Chinese technology industries from the risks posed by rebel groups. Furthermore, the Chinese Ninth Bureau and Chinese think tanks and military intelligence affiliated with the People’s Liberation Army analyze that strategic coordination in the Nile Basin region is essential for China’s interests and investments. Beijing considers the Egyptian-Congolese consensus to enhance calm and stability in the Great Lakes region and the Nile Basin, thus reducing the likelihood of armed conflicts that could threaten construction and infrastructure projects implemented by Chinese companies in those countries.

– Sixth: Chinese military circles are closely monitoring Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s meetings with leaders of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense to secure the Chinese Maritime and Military Silk Road.

In addition to closely monitoring Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s meetings with the leaders of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense, Chinese military circles are following the security situation and developments in the armed forces’ modernization plans, given the particular importance of these matters to China in safeguarding its interests. Chinese military and strategic circles are keen to follow these meetings due to Egypt’s pivotal role in the stability of the Middle East and its crucial importance to China’s economic interests and investments in the Maritime and Military Silk Road. The dimensions of Chinese interest in President al-Sisi’s role lie in his coordination with the Egyptian military establishment to protect Chinese investments and secure major infrastructure projects and the Chinese economic zone northwest of the Suez Canal. This strengthens the Chinese military partnership with Egypt, paving the way for further defense cooperation agreements, increased military partnership and joint exercises, and the diversification of Chinese arms sources for Cairo. This serves to maintain China’s regional security and to monitor the security situation and its impact on global trade and maritime navigation routes.

– Seventh: Chinese military analyses and assessments focus on monitoring and observing the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s training, military, and educational activities, such as nighttime missile firing exercises and the Badr 2026 tactical project.

Chinese military analyses and assessments focus on monitoring and observing the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s training, military, and educational activities, such as nighttime missile firing exercises. They pay particular attention to the final stage of the nighttime missile-firing exercise conducted by the Egyptian Air Defense Forces, attended by the Chief of Staff and commanders of the main branches. Chinese officials also observe the Egyptian Military Science Day, the activities of the Military Technical College’s Science Day, and the conclusion of its scientific and engineering competitions. Furthermore, Chinese circles evaluate the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s Badr 2026 tactical project, especially the main phase of the Badr tactical exercise, which involved live ammunition and was conducted by (units of the Egyptian Third Field Army). This evaluation assesses the Egyptian army’s strength in defending the security and stability of vital waterways and axes of importance to China. Chinese military analyses and assessments focus on monitoring and observing the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s training, military, and educational activities, such as nighttime missile firing exercises, and they pay particular attention to the final stage of the nighttime missile firing exercise conducted by the Egyptian Air Defense Forces, attended by the Chief of Staff and commanders of the main branches. With the Chinese interest in the Egyptian Military Science Day, the activities of the Military Technical College’s Science Day, and the conclusion of its scientific and engineering competitions, Chinese circles are also evaluating the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s tactical project (Badr 2026), particularly the main phase of the Badr tactical project, which involved live-fire exercises conducted by units of the Egyptian Third Field Army. This evaluation aims to assess the Egyptian army’s strength in defending the security and stability of vital corridors and axes of importance to China. Chinese military circles and analysts are closely following the training and educational activities of the Egyptian Armed Forces, specifically the Badr 2026 tactical project with live ammunition conducted by the Egyptian Third Field Army, night air defense firing exercises, and the scientific activities of the Military Technical College. This is all part of assessing the Egyptian army’s readiness to protect vital axes. Furthermore, relevant circles in Beijing are keen to conduct further monitoring and evaluation of Egyptian military field training activities within the framework of the Badr 2026 tactical project to accurately assess the main phase with live ammunition conducted by units of the Third Field Army in support of the Air Force and to penetrate defenses.  With the interest of Chinese military think tanks and research centers affiliated with the People’s Liberation Army in the (nighttime missile firing) exercises in Egypt, they observed the efficiency and capabilities of the Egyptian air defense forces in operating effectively at night under cover of defense and in the presence of Egyptian military leaders.

With the Chinese military circles monitoring the graduation ceremony of the Egyptian Military Academy and the graduation ceremonies of new classes of students from the Military Academy for Postgraduate and Strategic Studies and understanding and studying the impact of these events on China through the desire of Chinese intelligence, military, political, and strategic circles to develop military curricula in Egypt and Africa. This reflects the Chinese interest in Egyptian military education and scientific research and the Egyptian Military Science Day through the monitoring of the activities of the Egyptian Military Technical College’s Science Day and engineering competitions, and following the conclusion of the scientific and engineering competitions and linking them to the technological development of the combat capabilities of Egyptian military academies and institutions, and understanding what is lacking in these activities in order to fill it in the future through military educational partnerships with Egypt and its Ministry of Defense.

With close monitoring by Chinese defense and security circles of the joint Golden Eagle exercises between Egypt and Turkey, given their importance to China’s military and maritime Silk Road and to protecting Chinese interests in maintaining the security of the region and its vital waterways necessary for global supply chains. The focus and attention of think tanks affiliated with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army have also been on Egypt. The With You initiative is primarily an Egyptian military initiative concerned with coordinating the Martyrs’ Recognition Fund of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense to disburse the first phase of the presidential initiative to care for the children of martyrs and wounded veterans. Chinese circles are interested in this Egyptian presidential initiative to understand its implementation mechanism, in coordination with the Egyptian Ministries of Defense, Interior, and Social Solidarity, and in cooperation with the Central Bank of Egypt and Misr Life Insurance Company. China is seeking to understand the Egyptian system and its operational and implementation mechanisms regarding all presidential initiatives.

– Eighth: Chinese military bodies and departments are monitoring the mechanisms for developing military education in Egypt, understanding and analyzing the system for preparing and qualifying students at the Egyptian Military Academy, in order to assess Egyptian military and elite human resources and build an accurate Chinese database to understand the size and number of elites with military and technological backgrounds in Egypt.

Furthermore, Chinese military bodies and departments are monitoring the mechanisms for developing military education in Egypt and understanding and analyzing the system for preparing and qualifying students at the Egyptian Military Academy in order to share their expertise with the Egyptian military. They are also monitoring announcements of new admissions to the Military Academy and graduates of technological colleges to understand the total number of individuals with military backgrounds in Egypt, reflecting China’s future desire to transfer its expertise in military education curricula and leadership and elite training to Egypt and its military academies. An analytical reading of China’s monitoring of the Egyptian military education system reveals profound strategic dimensions that extend beyond mere routine observation for the Chinese. This Chinese interest in the Egyptian military education system can be broken down as Beijing’s focus on monitoring Egyptian military and elite human resources. By monitoring the admission requirements and announcements for the Egyptian Military Academy and Egyptian military technology colleges, Beijing aims to build a precise database and understand the size and number of elites with military and technological backgrounds in Egypt. This contributes to anticipating the future leadership structure of the Egyptian state and helps Chinese intelligence, military, defense, and security circles assess the combat and administrative efficiency of Egyptian military elites. Here, the Chinese side seeks to analyze the preparation and qualification curricula for students in Egyptian military academies to determine the development of Egyptian training doctrine and its adaptation to modern warfare and smart systems. This facilitates the evaluation of the most prominent military partner in the Middle East and Africa region. This can be considered a gateway for transferring Chinese military-diplomatic expertise to Egypt, reflecting China’s future desire to introduce its leadership and elite training methodologies. This is part of China’s persistent effort to enhance its strategic influence (soft power) in Egypt and build long-term ideological and tactical alignment between the Egyptian and Chinese militaries through sharing its advanced military doctrine.

    Accordingly, we understand the extent of Beijing’s interest in the role of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense within its strategy to strengthen the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries. This includes securing vital economic interests and maritime routes for China, such as the Suez Canal, and developing mutual military and arms cooperation with Cairo. This stems from China’s keenness to coordinate with Cairo, given its central position in global trade and regional security. This helps diversify Chinese military partnerships with the Egyptian military establishment and its Ministry of Defense, as Beijing presents itself as a reliable strategic military alternative in the Middle East.

While the United States enjoys sufficient energy resources, thanks to shale oil, the European Union does not. To assure itself of the energy supplies in the Gulf that the European Union needs, the EU should consider assisting the Gulf States in the construction and operations of the pipeline. 

Building a large-scale, completely underground oil pipeline system from the Persian/Arabian Gulf oil fields to the Mediterranean Sea is estimated to cost between $40 billion and $60 billion and would take 5 to 7 years to complete. The exact metrics depend heavily on the chosen route, political alignment across transit countries, and the required total throughput capacity. 

Breakdown of Total Costs 

Modern mega-pipeline engineering over long desert and mountain distances faces massive cost drivers: 

· Construction & Trenching ($18B – $25B): Burying multiple large-diameter (e.g., 42 to 48-inch) pipelines entirely underground requires extensive trenching, rock blasting, and specialized anti-corrosion coatings. Global benchmarks show that large-scale overland pipelines average $8 million to $12 million per mile, but full underground burial heavily drives up labor and machinery costs.

· Pumping Stations & Terminals ($8B – $12B): Moving millions of barrels of crude daily across hundreds of miles requires heavily fortified pumping stations every 60–100 miles, alongside massive new storage and loading terminals on the Mediterranean coast. 

· Geopolitical & Geotechnical Risk Premium ($7B – $10B): Multi-billion dollar  contingencies are standard to absorb project snags, material inflation, and  complex international legal/right-of-way frameworks. 

· Security Infrastructure ($5B – $10B): Given the vulnerability of cross-border energy corridors, modern estimates for Gulf bypass networks integrate specialized defensive technologies (like automated drone surveillance or surface-to-air missile defenses) to protect critical facilities. 

Construction Timeline and Stages 

· Megaprojects of this length are restricted by a sequential project lifecycle that cannot easily be accelerated simultaneously: 

· Diplomacy & Right-of-Way (Years 1–2): Securing cross-border transit legal treaties (e.g., routing through Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, or Syria/Turkey) and finalizing environmental impact assessments. 

· Material Procurement & Logistics (Years 2–3): Manufacturing and transporting millions of tons of high-grade steel line pipe and heavy industrial pumps. 

· Civil Trenching & Laying (Years 3–6): Heavy execution phase. Crews can typically lay roughly 1 to 2 miles of pipe per day per construction spread.

Multiple spreads working simultaneously across different geographic zones are required to finish within a 3-to-4-year active construction window.  · Testing & Commissioning (Year 7): Hydrostatic pressure testing of the lines to ensure underground integrity, followed by line fill and gradual commercial scale-up 

Proposed Alternative Routes 

Producers in the region actively advance or evaluate different variants of this corridor to bypass maritime chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz: 

· The Mesopotamian Corridor (Iraq/Syria route): A ~1,500 km route linking the southern oil fields of Basra to Mediterranean ports like Baniyas, Syria.  While geographically direct, it remains vulnerable to high regional instability. 

· The Trans-Arabian Upgrades: Adapting or running parallel lines to existing corridors (like the Saudi East-West Petroline, which travels 1,200 km to the Red Sea) and extending them northward to Mediterranean Sea terminals. 

How Standard Micro-Tunneling Works for Utilities: When pipeline engineers hit a mountain or an environmental zone where they cannot dig an open trench, they use Micro-Tunnel Boring Machines (MTBMs) or Horizontal Directional Drilling (HDD). These systems are highly specialized to avoid the exact problems of passenger-sized tunnels: 

· Sized to the Pipe: Unlike a 12-foot-wide transit tunnel, an MTBM is built to the exact outer diameter of the oil pipe (typically 4 to 5 feet for a 48-inch line).  This means crews excavate 90% less rock and dirt.

· Pipe-Jacking Method: Instead of laying concrete tunnel walls and then trying to slide a heavy steel pipe inside later, MTBMs use a process called “pipe jacking.” Powerful hydraulic rams at the surface push the actual steel oil pipe directly behind the drilling head as it advances into the rock. 

· No Open Voids: Because the pipeline fits perfectly into the drilled hole, there is no empty space left around it. The pipe is completely surrounded by solid rock or stabilizing grout, eliminating the risk of dangerous, explosive gas pockets building up in an open tunnel. 

The Mountain Ranges the Route Must Clear 

· To get from the Gulf fields (like Ghawar in Saudi Arabia or Basra in Iraq) to the Mediterranean, a pipeline must breach the Syrian Desert and cross a series of rugged, geologically active mountain walls running parallel to the Mediterranean coast: 

· The Jordan Rift Valley & Dead Sea Fault: Before hitting the mountains, the pipeline must drop down into one of the lowest, most seismically active valleys on Earth (falling hundreds of feet below sea level) and then immediately climb back out. 

· The Judean Hills & Golan Heights: Depending on the exact coastal terminal, the line must climb over rugged limestone ridges ranging from 3,000 to 4,000 feet high.

· The Anti-Lebanon & Mount Lebanon Ranges: If the route takes a more northern path toward Syria or Lebanon, it faces severe alpine conditions with peaks soaring between 9,000 and 10,000 feet. 

The Geopolitical Treaties Required 

Building a multi-billion dollar piece of energy infrastructure across national borders requires an intricate web of international legal frameworks. Historically, cross-border pipelines are governed by Host Government Agreements (HGAs) and Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs). 

To make a Gulf-to-Mediterranean pipeline a reality, several unprecedented breakthroughs would be needed: 

· Transit Fees and Tariffs: The countries hosting the pipeline but not producing the oil (like Jordan or Syria) must negotiate “transit fees.” These are typically paid in cents per barrel of oil that passes through their territory, providing them with billions in long-term revenue. 

To make a Gulf-to-Mediterranean pipeline a reality, several unprecedented breakthroughs would be needed: 

· Transit Fees and Tariffs: The countries hosting the pipeline but not producing the oil (like Jordan or Syria) must negotiate “transit fees.” These are typically paid in cents per barrel of oil that passes through their territory, providing them with billions in long-term revenue. 

· The “Right of Way” Guarantee: Sovereign nations must sign legally binding treaties promising that they will not shut off or seize the pipeline during diplomatic disputes. A famous historical warning is the original Trans-Arabian Pipeline (Tapline), which was repeatedly disrupted, sabotaged, and eventually shut down permanently due to border conflicts and transit fee arguments between Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. 

· The Abraham Accords Framework: If the pipeline takes the most geologically direct southern route to terminals in Israel (like Ashkelon or Haifa), it relies heavily on the long-term stability and expansion of the Abraham Accords. Saudi Arabia and Israel would need formalized economic treaties to protect a joint energy corridor from regional political shifts. 

· Joint Security Commands: Because a pipeline stretching thousands of miles across the Middle East is a prime target for non-state actors and drone strikes, treaties must establish a unified security framework. This allows military and intelligence sharing across borders to patrol the pipeline corridor with automated drone networks and satellite monitoring. 

Environmental Safeguards for Freshwater Aquifers The Jordan Valley and the surrounding mountain ridges contain critical freshwater sources, such as the Mountain Aquifer, which supply drinking water to millions of people in Israel, Palestine, and Jordan. A single major crude oil leak could seep into the porous limestone and permanently poison these non-renewable water reserves.  To mitigate this, engineers deploy an array of specialized defenses: 

· Pipe-in-Pipe Technology (Double Containment): In high-consequence water zones, crews do not use a standard single-wall pipe. They build a “pipe-in-pipe” system where the main 48-inch crude oil line sits inside a larger, secondary outer steel casing. The vacuum gap between the two pipes is monitored 24/7 for pressure changes; if the inner pipe leaks, the outer pipe captures the oil before it touches the soil. 

· Fiber-Optic Acoustic Leak Detection: Continuous fiber-optic cables are buried directly alongside the pipeline. These cables can “hear” the micro-acoustic vibrations and sudden temperature drops caused by a pinhole leak. This allows operators to pinpoint the exact location of a breach within meters in less than a minute. 

· Emergency Remote Isolation Valves: The pipeline is segmented by heavy-duty, automated shut-off valves. In flat areas, these are placed every 20 miles. In critical aquifer zones or steep mountain drops, they are placed every 1 to 2 miles. If the control center detects a pressure drop, these valves slam shut automatically via satellite command to trap the oil inside a small, isolated section, preventing millions of gallons from draining into the environment. 

Daily Revenue for Transit Countries 

· Transit countries like Jordan or Syria do not own the oil, but they make massive profits simply by letting it cross their land. These fees are negotiated as a tariff—a fixed dollar amount charged per barrel of oil moved. 

· Assuming a modern mega-pipeline with a capacity of 2 million barrels per day (bpd) and a standard international transit tariff of $0.60 to $1.20 per barrel, we can calculate the massive financial impact on a host country’s budget:

DAILY TRANSIT REVENUE ESTIMATE │ 

Pipeline Throughput Capacity │ 2,000,000 Barrels / Day 

Average transit tariff rate: $0.90 USD per barrel 

Daily Revenue Generated │ $1,800,000 USD / Day 

Annual Revenue Generated │ $657,000,000 USD / Year 

The Broader Economic Impact 

· Direct Budget Injection: For a developing economy like Jordan, an extra $650M+ per year in pure cash represents a massive boost to their national budget, easily funding large-scale public infrastructure or health programs. 

· In-Kind Energy Off-Takes: Rather than taking 100% of the payment in cash, transit treaties often allow host countries to take a portion of the payment in free crude oil. This allows them to supply their local refineries and secure cheap domestic gasoline without relying on volatile global energy imports. 

· Long-Term Economic Leverage: Hosting the pipeline transforms these non-producing nations into critical gatekeepers for global energy markets, giving them significant diplomatic leverage when negotiating trade and security deals with major global superpowers. 

Maritime Shipping Insurance & The Strait of Hormuz Bypass  The Strait of Hormuz is the world’s most sensitive maritime energy chokepoint. During periods of regional conflict, Lloyd’s of London and global marine underwriters designate

the Persian Gulf as a listed area (high-risk zone), triggering drastic shifts in shipping economics. 

· War Risk Premiums: When regional tensions spike, war risk insurance premiums for oil tankers navigating the Strait can surge from a baseline of 0.025% of the ship’s value to over 0.25% to 0.5% per voyage. For a modern $100 million Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC), this adds an extra $250,000 to $500,000 in insurance costs for a single transit. 

· Bypassing the Chokepoint: Moving oil via the underground pipeline directly to the Mediterranean entirely eliminates the need for tankers to enter the Persian Gulf. Tankers load at secure Mediterranean ports (like Ashkelon, Haifa, or Baniyas) within standard, lower-risk European maritime zones. 

· Shipping Time Savings: Loading in the Mediterranean slashes the sailing distance to European and North American refineries by roughly 3,500 to 4,500 miles compared to sailing all the way around Africa or paying steep transit fees to use the Suez Canal. This reduces freight operating costs and completely erases the risk of a regional conflict stranding a fleet inside the Gulf. 

Naval Defense Infrastructure at the Mediterranean Terminal 

Because the new Mediterranean pipeline terminal would handle up to 2 million barrels of oil per day, it becomes a high-value strategic asset. Protecting it requires a multi-layered naval defense perimeter extending miles out to sea:

· Anti-Drone & Anti-Torpedo Netting: Heavy, underwater physical barriers and sensor nets are deployed around the loading buoys and piers to catch or detonate incoming unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) or loitering aquatic explosive drones. 

· Phalanx CIWS & Missile Batteries: The onshore terminal facility integrates close-in weapon systems (CIWS) and surface-to-air missile batteries (like Iron Dome or Barak MX systems) to intercept incoming rocket, drone, or anti-ship missile strikes launched from sea or land. 

· Active Naval Patrols: Host nations deploy continuous maritime security cordons using fast attack craft, sonar-equipped corvettes, and aerial reconnaissance drones to enforce a strict 5-to-10 mile exclusion zone around the offshore loading terminals, vetting every incoming commercial vessel. 

Conclusions 

With political tensions between the United States and the European Union increasing and confidence in the United States’ foreign policy falling, Europe needs to find and secure an energy source that is not dependent on either the United States or Russia.  An agreement, both economic and political, would in the long run make Europe independent from energy sources from either country. The idea of an overland pipeline to the Mediterranean is both economically and engineeringly possible. What is needed is the political will to make it happen.

In celebration of the 99th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), established in August 1927, the PLA commemorates its founding on August 1st each year (remembering the Nanchang Uprising of 1927). This anniversary is marked amidst ongoing efforts to modernize its defense capabilities, alongside diplomatic and military endeavors to strengthen dialogue, partnerships, and the exchange of experiences with European, Asian, and international militaries. The PLA is considered the cornerstone of China’s national defense, and Chinese military leaders at all embassies and consulates worldwide organize numerous official events to mark its founding on August 1st each year. Chinese embassies and military attachés around the world, such as the Chinese Embassy in Belgium and other European countries, host official receptions to highlight the PLA’s role in maintaining global peace and stability, as well as its development capabilities and readiness. The PLA is focused on transforming into a modern, integrated military force encompassing land, sea, and air.

China’s military relations with European militaries reflect the logic of military diplomacy, as China seeks to deepen military ties with its European allies and partners within its strategy of mutual military engagement, cooperation, and learning opportunities. Here, Chinese military channels with European countries serve as avenues for dialogue and the exchange of views on regional and international security to achieve balance and stability. Beijing, through its diplomatic activities, emphasizes the importance of balanced partnerships with the European Union and its member states to provide stability and certainty to the world. In this context, Beijing’s relationship with European militaries takes on a dual character of strategic competition and mutual caution, especially given Washington’s efforts to utilize NATO to contain Chinese power. Consequently, tension has arisen between the Chinese military and NATO due to China’s rejection of NATO’s Asian expansion into its regional sphere. Beijing views NATO’s attempts to broaden its security engagement with Asia-Pacific countries as a threat to stability and incompatible with the multipolar world order, while China rejects the logic of military hegemony. The Chinese military, in its strategic literature, emphasizes its opposition to American power and hegemonic policies implemented through the NATO military alliance. China and the People’s Liberation Army also strongly reject NATO’s involvement in Asia-Pacific affairs, viewing it as interference that threatens regional and global stability and leads to confrontations between military blocs.

Herein lies the official Chinese military stance on the NATO military alliance, describing it as a relic of the Cold War that extends beyond its original geographical scope. China explicitly accuses NATO of instigating tensions and provoking confrontations in Asia. Furthermore, China warns against the militarization of the region through NATO partnerships with countries such as Japan and Australia. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) maintains that China’s defense policy aims to protect national sovereignty and regional security, viewing Western actions as attempts to contain Chinese influence and impose American hegemony. Therefore, Chinese intelligence, military, defense, and security circles reject the logic of linking Euro-Atlantic security to issues in the Indo-Pacific region.

The most significant dynamics of the Chinese military relationship with European armies are characterized by the maintenance of strategic autonomy. Some European capitals seek to avoid full involvement in the US-China conflict, preferring to preserve commercial interests and pursue self-sufficiency. This is further complicated by technological and industrial competition between European armies and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. NATO closely monitors the development of the Chinese military’s cyber capabilities and artificial intelligence, viewing them as strategic challenges impacting global supply chains. Meanwhile, China perceives NATO’s policies as subservient to US interests at the expense of European national security. NATO’s ongoing monitoring of Chinese cyber capabilities and the escalating technological competition between China, Europe, and the United States for leadership in the digital and economic future are noteworthy. These tensions manifest in mutual concerns regarding cybersecurity and global supply chains, which raise serious concerns for NATO due to the numerous strategic challenges and cyber threats they pose. Here, NATO monitors digital operations and hybrid attacks linked to Beijing-affiliated actors targeting critical infrastructure and technological security, according to NATO’s military perspective. NATO’s military strategies focus on protecting technological superiority in artificial intelligence and semiconductors to prevent any potential disruption to global supply chains.

For this reason, China’s stance toward NATO is characterized by accusations of American political dominance. Beijing believes that NATO’s expanding policies and transatlantic orientation serve the US strategic agenda at its expense and in confrontation with China, which, from the Chinese perspective, affects European security itself. China considers NATO’s increasing involvement in Asia-Pacific issues and technological confrontation not to serve Europe’s own security interests but rather to threaten international stability as a whole. Thus, China’s position on NATO is based on the accusation that it serves American hegemony and threatens security and stability in Asia and Europe. Beijing views NATO as a tool for implementing America’s strategic plans, aiming to mobilize member states of the military alliance to pursue a policy of Asian expansion in the face of China. China and the People’s Liberation Army reject NATO’s involvement in Asia-Pacific issues, arguing that NATO’s policies harm Europe’s economic and technological security. From a Chinese perspective, the alliance’s technological confrontation poses a threat to international stability and European security, with China believing that NATO’s policies ultimately undermine Europe’s own security.

The Asia Pacific’s geopolitical balance is under change. While the U.S. remains the main architect of the plan, it is Australia that is becoming the executor of the strategy in the Oceania region. Through the signing of multiple defense agreements with the small island states, Canberra is transforming itself from a middle power to a regional security player in the South Pacific region. 

Australia, being the most trusted ally of the United States and a member of the two most important defense cooperations, i.e., AUKUS and QUAD, makes it suitable to provide security to its neighbors. By signing the bilateral agreements in the defense domain, Australia, particularly, and the United States, generally, want to counter China’s rising military presence in the Pacific region. The defense deals signed with Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, and Fiji collectively demonstrate that work on a broader security plan is under process. Instead of deploying American military bases directly in these states, Washington is relying on Canberra to expand its security footprint in the South Pacific region.  

The recent signing of the Australia-Fiji agreement named “Ocean of Peace Alliance” on July 6, 2026, is the latest in the series. This agreement marks Fiji’s first mutual defense treaty and Australia’s fourth, following treaties with the United States, New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea.   Secondly, the announcement of the Pukpuk Treaty entering into force between Australia and Papua New Guinea by PM Anthony Albanese and PM Honourable James Marape MP on July 8, 2026, also showcases a mutual defense commitment. Thirdly, the signing of the Nakamal Agreement between Australia and Vanuatu in June 2026 prevented China from creating military bases in the country.

In addition to this, the new PM of the Solomon Islands, Matthew Wale, has also shown interest in reducing the country’s dependence on China. He stated that the Solomon Islands-China pact, signed in 2022, needs to be revised, which would allow China to deploy its military and police personnel. By signaling on revising the agreement, it clearly demarcates that the Solomon Islands do not want to allow their land to be used for Chinese military bases. This statement proved a silver lining for Australia’s hegemonic designs in the region, as it was fearful that the Solomon Islands would be a foothold for China in the Pacific.

The momentum and process of acquiring a broader Pacific security strategy are extending, as New Zealand PM Christopher Luxon has also shown interest in joining the recently signed Ocean of Peace Alliance. This also marks Australia’s victory in that these Pacific states are gradually turning away from China and moving towards Western allies. This also shows defense cooperation, military exercises, information sharing, and maritime cooperation. In such a case, when there is an attack on any ally in these domains, then others will come to aid and rescue.

Also, the opening of the US Embassy in the Solomon Islands back in 2023 and the agreement between another QUAD member, i.e., Japan, and the Solomon Islands also strengthen Australia’s position in the Pacific region.

Now, the bigger question here is why this change in geopolitical balance is happening and why the regional players are taking the lead despite having the hegemon, i.e., the United States. Rising interference of China by expanding its naval capabilities has drawn concerns of the states in the Oceania region. The recent firing of a long-range ballistic missile in the South Pacific region on the same day that Australia and Fiji signed the treaty sends a clear message that China will not remain quiet on these expanding relations. Although Chinese state media have stated that this firing was just a mere test using dummy warheads. But the concerns of the government officials of the Pacific countries and their rising apprehensions have clearly shown that concerns for Australia and its allies are increasing against China. This fear has enabled them to move towards a securitization strategy and maximize their security capabilities.

Along with benefits, there are various risks for Australia and partnering nations as well by entering into these defense deals. The original plan of keeping the Indo-Pacific free and open for trade for all is gradually turning into a hub of militarization. Therefore, strategic competition between China and Australia will increase more than ever before, compelling Canberra to engage in more economic and defense treaties in the broader Indo-Pacific region to maintain its central position. Additionally, small island states are also in turmoil as they are caught between China and the Western bloc.

Thus, it is clear that the US is expanding its network in the South Pacific region by making Australia a regional security player. This also sends a signal to China that its growing capabilities and tactics will not go unanswered. Moreover, Pacific Island countries are also diversifying their options by signing defense agreements and are not predominantly relying on China. These agreements also reduce the possibility of Beijing having a military presence in the Oceania region. Therefore, whether Australia’s expanding defense network succeeds or not depends on mutual trust. By not compromising the sovereignty of these states, Canberra can only become the regional security provider on its own terms.       

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently launched a public attack on the International Criminal Court (ICC), vowing to “dismantle the ICC—brick by brick.” Washington’s position is that the ICC has no authority to try officials from non-member states—such as the US itself—or their allies, and that it will not accept any international court exercising jurisdiction over American citizens without US consent. Washington therefore intends to use diplomatic pressure and sanctions to counter the Court.

If one still believes in the international community’s definition of war crimes, this looks like a political move to absolve the United States and Israel of war crimes committed in the Middle East. To that end, Washington is pressuring allies — including states that are parties to the Rome Statute — to withdraw from the ICC.

“Trump said in January, ‘I don’t need international law’ to highlight his ‘America First’ policy. He is now keeping that promise, and the ICC is just one example.”

The day before Rubio announced his intent to dismantle the ICC, fourteen countries, including the United States, publicly reaffirmed their support for the ten-year-old ruling in the South China Sea Arbitration—a decision handed down by another international arbitration body: an ad hoc Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), administered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

Ironically, of the fourteen countries, only the Philippines—the actual party to the case—has a direct stake in South China Sea rights. The other five countries with genuine interests in the South China Sea did not join this “cheerleading squad”: Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, and Indonesia. Of these, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei are, like the Philippines, “principal claimant states.”

Aside from the US and the Philippines, every other country among the fourteen marking the tenth anniversary of the ruling is an ICC member state: Australia, Canada, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, New Zealand, Romania, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom.

These 12 ICC member states have no stake whatsoever in South China Sea affairs, yet they support an international arbitration body — and are now being pressured by the United States to boycott another international arbitration body they themselves belong to. Fourteen countries are happy to use international law to pressure China, but when international law becomes inconvenient for the US and Israel, is that suddenly a different matter?

The Philippines finds itself in the most awkward position of all. Manila withdrew from the ICC in 2019, yet after Ferdinand Marcos Jr. took office as president, it allowed Interpol and Philippine airport authorities to arrest former president Rodrigo Duterte in 2025 and hand him directly over to the ICC for trial.

The real story behind this episode is domestic political rivalry within the Philippines, combined with Washington’s long-standing displeasure with Duterte. International institutions have played the role of “witch-hunt enforcer,” helping the US and Manila nail a political opponent to the cross.

In the past, the international community could invoke Rome Statute standards to brand Duterte’s “war on drugs” a crime against humanity. But what now?

The ICC cannot prosecute non-member states, but it can prosecute individuals—such as Benjamin Netanyahu. Moreover, under the Rome Statute’s territoriality principle, the Court has jurisdiction if the alleged crime occurred on the territory of a member state. In the Middle East case, Palestine is a state party. In the Philippine case, although Manila withdrew from the ICC in 2019, crimes committed before that withdrawal remain within the Court’s reach.

The reason the US can attack the ICC so freely is that other international arbitration bodies do not follow this same “detour through territoriality” to claim jurisdiction over non-member states, nor do they try individuals—they adjudicate sovereign states (or transnational corporate entities). As such, they strictly adhere to the most fundamental principle of international law: the principle of state consent.

Interestingly, the tribunal that presided over the South China Sea arbitration itself violated the principle of state consent by ruling on a case brought against China, which refused to participate. This is precisely why China has never recognized the ruling as having any legal basis. Yet the fourteen countries that support the ruling seem untroubled by this violation of a core principle of international law.

In other words, both the ICC and the ad hoc tribunal behind the South China Sea arbitration suffer from the same flaw: overreach. The ICC has been accused of an “idealism” that oversteps state sovereignty, while the South China Sea tribunal has been criticized for “procedural overreach”—under UNCLOS, an ad hoc tribunal has no authority whatsoever over land territorial sovereignty, yet the tribunal accepted the Philippines’ framing that “downgraded” what were really sovereignty and maritime-delimitation questions into a simple matter of “the legal status of islands and reefs” and used that framing to assert jurisdiction for itself.

Taiwan was an innocent bystander caught in the crossfire of the South China Sea arbitration. Itu Aba (Taiping Island), which is under the actual control of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and has both fresh water and the capacity to sustain human habitation, was nonetheless ruled to be a mere “”rock”—stripping it of any 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone.

Given that both international arbitration bodies suffer from the same problem of overreach, if one follows the US in opposing the ICC, shouldn’t one logically also oppose the South China Sea ruling? This month, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs launched an “urgent assessment” to awkwardly grapple with exactly this dilemma, since Manila has skin in both games—the Duterte case and the South China Sea ruling.

If Manila agrees to help dismantle the ICC, what happens to Duterte, still awaiting trial in The Hague? And if China then uses that same logic to reject the South China Sea ruling, what then? The other twelve member states that joined this “witch hunt” find themselves in an equally awkward spot.

Second only to the Philippines in embarrassment is Japan. Tokyo is the ICC’s largest financial backer; the Court’s current president, Tomoko Akane, is Japanese; and Japan has long been one of the ICC’s staunchest supporters. Is Tokyo now expected to help the US dismantle the ICC or to withdraw from it altogether?

Japan also finds itself in a glaring contradiction over the South China Sea ruling. If Taiwan-controlled Taiping Island—with an area of 510,000 square meters (roughly the size of 71 standard football pitches), fresh water, and the capacity to sustain habitation)—was ruled a mere “rock,” then how can Okinotorishima, an outcrop Japan claims sovereignty over that covers just 9.44 square meters (about the size of a double bed), possibly qualify as an “island”?

By that logic, Tokyo’s support for the South China Sea ruling effectively concedes that Okinotorishima has no exclusive economic zone at all — a self-inflicted contradiction that China has been quick to mock.

One could, therefore, say all fourteen countries backing the South China Sea ruling are applying a double standard, and that thirteen of them have no connection to the South China Sea whatsoever. Aside from the Philippines, the only country with any real claim to South China Sea interests is the United States — and the US holds international law in contempt, going so far as to vow to destroy an international arbitration institution outright.

This episode symbolizes the unraveling of the international order—a world reverting to the law of the jungle. The United States is dismantling the very international order it built, and the ones hurt most are precisely its own allies.

The Philippines and Japan have been given the responsibility of encircling China on the front line by the United States, but the footholds of the two countries are also being dismantled by the United States. In front of them, there is only the risk of opposing China and the weakening guarantee.

Above all, the United States has proven, by its own actions, that the so-called international order was never fair and never operated on a fixed standard — it was merely a temporary tool for an empire to rule the world. And when the tool stops being useful, it gets discarded, leaving its followers staring, embarrassed, at the tool still in their hands.

When Washington celebrates the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence on July 4th, the celebrations will arrive bruised. There will be the customary funding disputes, a federal commission fighting against a more partisan task force from the White House, and a public worn by years of political turmoil, all of which will turn what could have been an occasion of civic healing into another USA ‘celebration’ in the world. None of this has gone unnoticed in Beijing, given that this ‘celebration’ is being interpreted more as a diagnosis than a birthday. What is being asked throughout the commentaries from Qiushi (求是), on CCTV, in Tsinghua and Peking University, is simply put, what kind of America is turning 250?

Within the last five years, the interpretation given from both the official channels and the more informal academic channels in Beijing has varied considerably. Most importantly, these streams have been diverging for some time and therefore offer significant insight into how Beijing has been interpreting the country it has been comparing itself to for the last 20 years.

From “the East rising” to a measured retreat

Many are familiar with the upbeat version of the story. After 2020, the phrases that framed China’s worldview included “great changes, unseen in a century” (百年未有之大变局) and “the East is rising, the West is declining” (东升西降). The latter, used by Xi Jinping in remarks to senior officials in early 2021 and again in 2023, provided the slogan for the official narrative. The Covid-19 pandemic, the insurrection at the US Capitol, and a decade of US political instability seemed to provide the empirical evidence for a thesis, rooted in Chinese Marxist theory, that capitalist systems contain the principle of their own disintegration. This was rationalized and systemized after the 2008 financial crisis and has remained largely unchanged.

However, the reality is far more complicated than the slogan implies. Researchers who have traced the terminology in Chinese academic publications through the CNKI database have found that scholarly use of “the East is rising, the West is declining” (东升西降) peaked around 2021 and has subsided since then, even though the idea itself remained more prevalent than it was during the entire duration of Donald Trump’s first presidential term. In other words, the slogan was being diplomatically retracted within scholarly circles at the very moment it was most associated with official optimism. When Xi’s speech in 2023, which was published in Qiushi in January 2025, described the West’s decline, it was more a formal, official copy of a sentiment than a newly published speech.

The official rhetoric, however, did not soften. A Brookings study found a near doubling in the use of “American decline” terminology in official Chinese documents from 2025. State Security Minister Chen Yixin wrote in Qiushi in December of 2025, what could be described as a near complete inventory of the ills of the world: the usurpation of unipolar dominance gives way to economic decline and social disintegration, a domestic credit crisis and the collapse of foreign mythic structures. Around the same time, a popular phrase borrowed from gaming, the “kill line” (斩杀线) found its way to official Chinese publications. A Qiushi article from January 2026 described an America, the working class of which had been pushed (beyond the point of no return) along the path of ruin by an unrepairable (decomposing) industrial base while financial capitalism strangled the benefits. The conclusion that was drawn was that we had already entered the post-American world.

The correction of early 2026

Then the story changed once more, and the correction was from within Beijing’s own strategic community.

The consensus in Chinese policymaking following the Busan summit in October 2025, was that China had won the trade war and forced the US into a stalemate. The years of maximum pressure, they said, did not lead to the systemic concessions China had sought, but rather worsened American inflation and reduced productivity. For a few months, the optimism was high. However, by 2026, the optimism was replaced by apprehension. A series of adverse events for China, from losing equity in a German port buyout, to the Nexperia debacle, to the Iran war, led many to wonder if China’s victory was, in fact, a loss. The dominant question that the strategic community was debating was whether American power was in decline or if it was in fact, power rebounding.

What was most interesting was who took the cautious side. Both Chen Wenling and Yan Xuetong argued that the US had, and has, the military and economic capability to project power. In their view, the US had the edge, and Trump’s high stakes, risky policy decisions were based on the belief that the US had the dominant position. The gap was definitely closing, but was not yet a reality. The advice they gave was to be patient. If China was able to “manage its own affairs well,” it was likely that the US would be compelled to return to a more stable relationship.

The key observation regarding prominent intellectuals in Beijing is this. They have never been champions of the triumphalist position. Yan Xuetong has spent a great deal of time dismissing talks of “The East is rising and the West is declining” and multipolarity as delusional. His recently published book, Inflection of History (历史的拐点), which was published by CITIC Press in December of 2025, predicts a US-China bipolarity which, during the next decade, would be expected to stabilise rather than destabilise. In this scenario, over the next decade the gap in capability between the two powers would be expected to converge, although the US would retain an overall advantage. In this scenario, the US would retain overall dominance in services, cyberspace and global influence, while China would retain relative superiority in manufacturing and be dominant in the international arena. In this scenario, Yan does argue that Trump would be expected to damage American power, especially with regards to the international balance, through the closure of laboratories, the loss of researchers, and a declining international trade. However, damage to the leader of the bipolar order is not the same as the collapse of the order, and Yan is very cautious not to make confuse the two.

As China’s foremost authority on US studies, Wang Jisi (王缉思) of Peking University, has placed the greatest emphasis on the need for a clear and level-headed approach. His influential essay, titled, “Has America really declined? Chinese people should hold a sober understanding” ( 美国到底有没有衰落？中国人应有清醒认识), leads with the argument that the most important factors influencing the relationship are domestic political issues, and are not to be found in some quantifiable assessment of relative national strength, or within the confines of the Thucydides Trap. He has argued that the effects of Trump’s immigration restrictions would be more symbolic than real, and would not negatively impact the long-term potential of the US economy. Along with American scholar David Lampton, he wrote, that while both societies have convinced itself that the other is an existential threat, which is a dangerous narrative trap, similar to a noticeable shift of power.

Why AI keeps rewriting the script

If the quest for technological dominance was to be provided as a single reason for the inconsistency in the narrative, it would be the most accurate. The same confidence that characterized 2025 is the same that will characterize the sobriety of 2026. When Trump had his second inauguration in January 2025, DeepSeek had launched their R1. It disrupted the presumption of AI dominance in America and had a day effect of 200 billion on Nvidia’s valuation. For Chinese decision makers, since then, it has been electric. Carnegie researchers described it as the rediscovery of technological confidence. The effect was the realization of the theory of “The East is rising and the West is declining” (东升西降): a monumental achievement with controls on exports from a young lab in Hangzhou.

The second installment was more sobering. The launch of DeepSeek’s next model, V4, in April 2026, was received with indifference. In fact, DeepSeek’s own internal product documentation stated that V4 was between three and six months behind American models. Furthermore, V4 was reliant on domestic chips from Huawei, and was, in most assessments, dependent on American technology that was not easily replaceable. For Chinese analysts, this was not a case of falling behind, but one of the more difficult problems of maintaining the technological edge. Reshoring and tariffs told a similar story. The American industrial base, which the “kill line” (斩杀线) commentary presumed was a terminally stagnated industrial base, was the target of a renewed, aggressive, and partially successful push to bring industry back to America. A competitor with such a focus on rejuvenation and renewal is not, on the surface, a declining competitor.

The G2 Puzzle

There’s another element coming from Washington that adds to the complexity of the story of American decline. This element relates to Trump. Before the Busan meeting, Trump used the term “G2,” and several Washington officials followed suit. The decline thesis cannot account for this. If America is indeed in decline, why is it offering G2 (shared leadership) with China?

Chinese reflexive responses are interesting. The official position, as expressed in Zhou Li’s (周力) December 2025 article, is that G2 as a hegemony is incompatible with China’s commitment to a multipolar world and would alienate the Global South which China is trying to court. These scholars have found their own workarounds. Yan Xuetong and Zheng Yongnian have suggested that G2 is more a description of a scenario of existing bipolarity than a policy to adopt. Xia Liping of Tongji University has suggested that G2 be rephrased as “China-US coordination” (中美协调) instead of “China-US co-governance” (中美共治), which makes it easier for Beijing to accept peer status while not succumbing to a duopoly. The attempt to manage the terminology suggests that the US at 250 is still sufficiently powerful that its offer of co-leadership is significant, even to a China that is more confident than ever.

A mirror, not a verdict

What emerges from five years of this commentary is not a single Chinese view of America at 250 but a layered one. The loudest polemical phrase is that the US, a hegemon, is in an irreversible decline. Within a Chinese context, this serves a purpose unrelated to the US. The state media have found it convenient to juxtapose gun violence and homelessness against the backdrop of Chinese economic performance. The decline of the US economy flouts the-premise, as socialism is the ultimate victor among capitalist competition.

But that was in the loud tier. In the reserved tier, the people in Beijing who are actually relying on reading Washington have converged on a more cautious and, frankly, more accurate assessment. They have described America as a relative decline, but erratic, and still very formidable as well as technologically advanced, especially in the field of the upcoming and new challenges of competition. The assessments have consistently referred to America as “declining but dangerous,” and this phrase has proven to be the most accurate of the lot. Reality has justified the phrase. The same cannot be said of unqualified and total victory.

The inconsistency in narratives can be attributed to the fact that the accounts are serving two purposes simultaneously. They are both analysis and propaganda, and the two types of work are at odds with each other. After AI successes or trade wins, the propaganda is ahead of analysis. After the impacts of reshoring or when a Chinese model stays behind, the analysts bring it back. The occasion is provided by the anniversary, but the underlying reason is that China has not decided, and maybe cannot decide, if they think that simply waiting will work in their favour or if the gap they have slowly been closing over the past 25 years is going to be a stubborn gap.

At 250, in other words, the United States functions in Chinese discourse less as a subject to be judged than as a mirror. What Beijing sees in it, in any given month, tells you a great deal about how confident Beijing is feeling about itself

The greatest geopolitical and economic challenge facing the United States today is the proliferation of international Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs.) While the United States has the “sweet geopolitical spot in the world’s geography and topographic landmass,” its economic dominance is being challenged by the proliferation of international SWFs. It is true, at present, that the United States has the largest reserve of oil and mineral wealth in the world, yet with SWFs gaining traction in the world economy, the oil reserves and mineral wealth may not matter.

Those countries that have initiated SWFs as part of their economic and geopolitical life are on an upward trajectory. The United States, on the other hand, is on a downward path by not marshalling its vast mineral wealth in a comprehensive and dynamic SWF. If things continue on their present course, those countries utilizing their mineral wealth and excess cash surplus will eventually catch up and overtake the size of the US economy. This is an evolving threat to the national security of the United States and to its very polity.

The most immediate threat to the United States is the race to develop mining facilities on the Moon to harvest and transport the critical element of Helium-3 (He-3.)    He-3 is a critical element for the increasing economic demands of a modern world economy. Whoever can establish mining dominance for this critical element will become the world’s leading economic power in the world, regardless of that nation’s mineral wealth on Earth.

However, with its present economic and political strength, the United States has the means to reverse that trend if its two major political organizations can compromise on the very nature of the framework that establishes a United States SWF; this challenge is not easily dealt with.

This article discusses the legislative gridlock surrounding the creation of a United States SWF and the accelerating international competition that challenges the current United States dominance in space technology.

Commonwealth Fusion Systems (CFS) is currently constructing the SPARC at Devens, Massachusetts. CFS is constructing the SPARC to demonstrate to the world that it has solved the fusion problem. Despite some technological setbacks, CFS is on schedule to make the SPARC operational by the end of 2026, or early 2027. At the same time, CFS is currently constructing a fusion reactor (called a tokamak) in Virginia, which is scheduled to go online in the early 2030s. Critical to the ARC’s development is a shortage of the element He-3. He-3 is ignited by radio frequency and is the sparkplug that begins the plasma process, which is fusion energy, in the ARC tokamak.

The Commercial Landscape: U.S. Private Frontrunners

Terrestrial Helium-3 supply—derived primarily from nuclear stockpile maintenance—is severely capped at 22,000 to 30,000 liters annually. With surging demand for ultra-low-term quantum computer cooling, private aerospace firms are leading the transition to lunar harvesting:

• Interlune: Founded by former Blue Origin executives, the company unveiled a full-scale prototype harvester developed with Vermeer to process one hundred metric tons of regolith per hour. Backed by a $6.9 million NASA contract for its Prospect Moon payload, Interlune secured a historic $300M+ supply agreement with Finnish quantum firm Bluefors. Its first mapping payload is scheduled for an upcoming commercial lunar launch.
• Lunar Helium-3 Mining (LH3M): This firm holds five U.S. patents on a non-invasive, gas-separation architecture designed to extract solar wind volatile gases while bypassing traditional, high-wear mechanical regolith excavation.

The U.S. Sovereign Wealth Fund Gridlock

While Helium-3 is valued at roughly $20 million per kilogram, the asset cannot currently be utilized to seed an American Sovereign Wealth Fund due to severe political domestic gridlock:

• The Legislative Catch-22: The U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act explicitly protects private enterprise, granting corporations exclusive ownership over extracted space resources. To capture this value, Congress would need to enact “space-severance taxes” or equity-for-infrastructure deals—both of which face massive ideological pushbacks in a deeply divided legislature.  It should be noted that American taxpayers have invested some $1.9 trillion (adjusted for inflation) in technology developed by NASA. Since the American people invested this money, they should be entitled to a return on investment.
• The Deficit vs. Surplus Dilemma: Traditional SWFs rely on state-managed resource surpluses (e.g., Norway’s oil). The U.S. operates at a massive structural deficit. Republicans propose seeding a fund via tariffs or fossil-fuel extraction, while Democrats demand funding via corporate wealth taxes or clean-energy equity. These disputes, combined with immediate 2026 midterm election priorities, have stalled the SWF framework completely.

Global Geopolitical Competitors: State-Driven Alternatives

While the U.S. model depends heavily on the private market, international adversaries are leveraging unified state power to establish dominance over lunar resources:

• China (CNSA): China’s Chang’e lunar exploration program is systematically mapping Helium-3 concentrations. Unlike the U.S. focus on near-term quantum cooling, Beijing explicitly views lunar He-3 as a long-term strategic energy priority to fuel Earth-based Deuterium-Helium-3 nuclear fusion reactors.
• The China-Russia Coalition: Beijing and Moscow have formalized a binding industrial partnership to construct an automated nuclear reactor on the Moon’s South Pole by 2035–2036. This autonomous reactor is designed to resolve the “Lunar Night” problem, providing continuous power to massive, automated mining rovers and scientific labs under the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) framework.
• Japan (ispace): In the allied sector, Japanese lunar robotics firm ispace has partnered with European mining tech developers to pioneer its own automated, energy-efficient recovery models for lunar Helium-3.

·        Conclusion

·        The race for Helium-3 represents a critical shift from symbolic space exploration to deep-space industrial supply chains. While U.S. commercial tech is moving quickly, domestic policy gridlock risks ceding permanent, state-backed infrastructure dominance to the China-Russia ILRS coalition.

·        While the concept of using outer space resources to build national wealth is actively discussed by think tanks, Congress has separate, targeted pieces of legislation addressing artificial intelligence revenue, foreign transparency, and space resource exploration rules.

·         

·        The primary draft bills and legislative vehicles currently stalled in committee reveal how Congress is attempting to navigate these frameworks:

The American A.I. Sovereign Wealth Fund Act (S. 4825)

Introduced in June 2026 by Senate Finance Committee member Bernie Sanders (I-VT), this is the most direct legislative attempt to create a federal wealth fund.

• The Mechanism: The bill proposes imposing a specialized excise tax on systemically critical artificial intelligence models and automation infrastructure. The revenue would seed a citizen-owned national wealth fund.
• Why It’s Stalled: It is currently deadlocked in the Senate Finance Committee. The bill faces severe pushback from lawmakers who argue that taxing emerging domestic tech sectors will cause the U.S. to lose the AI race to China, preferring instead to seed a potential fund via tariffs or natural resources.

2. The Sovereign Wealth Fund Transparency Act (S. 1488)

Introduced by Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), this bill tackles the national security and foreign policy side of state-owned investment vehicles.

• The Mechanism: Rather than creating a U.S. fund, this bill forces heavy disclosure requirements, financial auditing, and security screening on foreign sovereign wealth funds operating within U.S. critical infrastructure, high-tech, and aerospace sectors.

Why It’s Stalled: Referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, it has remained stagnant due to concerns that over-regulating allied sovereign wealth funds (such as those from Gulf state allies or Singapore) could chill necessary foreign direct investment into U.S. tech startups.

3. Space Resource Extraction & Regulatory Frameworks (CRS / Commerce Committee Review)

There is currently no singular active bill trying to place federal royalties on lunar Helium-3 mining. Instead, the debate is gridlocked during budget reconciliation and agency authorizations within the House and Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committees.

• The Conflict: Congressional research reports on space resource extraction outline a widening gap in regulatory authority. NASA’s Artemis framework pushes heavily for in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) via public-private partnerships. However, some factions in Congress are pushing for strict government-owned procurement models to prevent private monopolies over lunar sites, effectively freezing long-term policy development
• Midterm Postponements: Broad commercial space bills have been repeatedly delayed because committee attention is entirely consumed by urgent federal budget reconciliation battles and defense appropriations.development.

Summary of Bill Statuses

Conclusion

Until the two major political organizations can begin to compromise for the good of the American people, the United States will eventually revert to a second-class power.

A regulatory package as a long-term political strategy

The European Union’s recent digital laws are often described as a regulatory package. The AI Act, the Data Act, and the emerging Data Union Strategy form a wide experiment in using transparency as infrastructure for the digital economy.

The underlying idea is that digital markets cannot be governed well if users, businesses, regulators, and affected individuals cannot understand how systems work, who controls data, where risks arise, and who is responsible for intervention. Therefore, transparency is becoming a condition for accountability, market access, innovation, and long-term trust that falls under what appears as a long-term strategy to regain data sovereignty.

The EU’s policy bet

The EU regulatory approach is founded on the premise that greater transparency can enhance the governability of complex digital systems. However, the mere disclosure of information does not result directly in a greater understanding of the data available; a company can disclose large amounts of technical material while leaving users no better able to assess risk, compare alternatives, or challenge decisions.

Accordingly, the success of the EU’s transparency framework should not be measured by the sheer volume of regulatory obligations it imposes. Rather, its effectiveness depends on whether those obligations generate information that is genuinely useful in practice. The relevant benchmarks are whether disclosures are meaningful, accessible, timely, and comparable, thereby enabling users and regulators to make informed decisions.

The AI Act’s goal to make AI legible

The AI Act shows the EU’s approach most clearly. Its stated purpose is to improve the functioning of the internal market, promote human-centric and trustworthy AI, protect health, safety, and fundamental rights, and support innovation (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689).

In policy terms, the AI Act tries to make AI systems legible. It assumes that AI risks should not be addressed only after harm occurs. They should be identified, documented, and managed before systems are placed on the market or deployed in sensitive settings.

This is why transparency is linked to risk. High-risk systems face more demanding documentation, monitoring, and information obligations. Lower-risk systems face lighter duties. The European Commission describes the AI Act as the first comprehensive legal framework on AI, designed to address AI risks while fostering trustworthy AI in Europe (European Commission, “Regulatory framework for AI”).

The policy logic is fundamentally pragmatic. Effective regulatory oversight depends on access to adequate information. Likewise, deployers require sufficient information to make informed decisions regarding whether and under what conditions to implement AI systems. Individuals affected by AI-assisted decisions must also have access to relevant information in order to understand how such decisions have been made and, where appropriate, to question or challenge them.

The Data Act attempts to rebalance informational power.

The Data Act uses transparency for a different purpose. Where the AI Act focuses on risk and trust, the Data Act focuses on access, fairness, and economic value. Its objective is to create harmonized rules on fair access to and use of data (Regulation (EU) 2023/2854).

The challenge is that data generated by connected products and digital services is often controlled by a small number of firms. Users may generate valuable data through their use of products but still lack practical access to it. Businesses may need data to innovate, repair products, or offer competing services but face legal, technical, or contractual barriers.

The Commission presents the Data Act as a way to address the challenges and opportunities created by data in the EU, with emphasis on fair access, user rights, and personal data protection (European Commission, “Data Act”).

In this context, transparency functions as a mechanism for redistributing information. Where users are unaware of what data is generated, how it can be accessed, or the conditions under which it may be shared, formally recognized rights of access are unlikely to translate into meaningful practical control. Effective data rights therefore depend not only on their legal recognition but also on the transparency necessary to enable individuals to exercise them.

The Data Union Strategy: From Control to Usable Data

The Data Union Strategy shows the broader direction of EU policy. The Commission frames it around increasing the availability of data for AI development, simplifying EU data rules and strengthening Europe’s position on international data flows (European Commission, “European Data Union Strategy”).

This is significant because it seems that the European Union seeks to pursue two complementary goals simultaneously. On the one hand, it aims to protect fundamental rights and mitigate the risks associated with digital technologies. On the other, it seeks to facilitate greater access to data in order to foster innovation, support the development of artificial intelligence, and enhance European competitiveness. In this way, transparency serves as the connecting principle between these objectives. In fact, by increasing the visibility of how data is collected, processed, and shared, it is intended to strengthen trust in data flows while making them more accessible and capable of supporting innovation.

Why meaningfulness matters most

Meaningfulness is the anchor test. Transparency is useful only if it reveals something that can change decisions or enable scrutiny.

In the AI context, this means information about a system’s purpose, limitations, performance, and risk profile must be specific enough to support procurement, oversight, and challenge. In the data context, it means users must receive information that helps them understand what data exists and how it can be used.

Generic compliance language is not enough. A disclosure that says a system is “risk managed” or that data is “available upon request” may be formally correct but still unhelpful. The real question is whether the information helps someone act.

Information must arrive before decisions are locked in.

Transparency is most useful when it arrives early enough to affect decisions. AI information matters most before procurement and deployment. Data-access information matters most before users become dependent on a particular product, service, or cloud provider.

Post-event transparency can still support audit and enforcement. But it is weaker as a prevention tool. A regime that informs users only after they have lost practical freedom of choice will have limited effect.

Accordingly, comparability occupies a central role in the European Union’s internal market strategy. If transparency is intended to promote competition, facilitate public procurement, and strengthen trust in cross-border digital markets, disclosures must be presented in a manner that enables users, businesses, and regulators to meaningfully compare systems, services, and contractual arrangements.

This objective is particularly relevant in the context of AI procurement, connected product ecosystems, and cloud switching, where informed comparisons are essential to reducing information asymmetries and preventing vendor lock-in. Nevertheless, pursuing comparability inevitably involves trade-offs. While standardized disclosure frameworks can improve the accessibility and consistency of information, they may also obscure sector-specific risks and contextual nuances. Consequently, a uniform template may enhance market discipline and regulatory oversight while simultaneously limiting a more nuanced understanding of the particular risks associated with individual technologies or markets.

The risk of regulatory complexity

The EU’s approach is ambitious, but it is also complex. The AI Act does not operate alone. It sits alongside the GDPR, the Data Act, the Digital Services Act, the Digital Markets Act, the Cyber Resilience Act, and sector-specific rules.

A European Parliament study notes that the AI Act interacts with other digital laws, including the GDPR, Data Act, and Cyber Resilience Act, and that this interplay creates significant regulatory complexity (European Parliament, “Interplay between the AI Act and the EU digital legislative framework”).

Secondary analysis makes a similar point. CEPS has argued that the AI Act may overlap with several horizontal and sector-specific rules, creating possible gaps, inconsistencies, and legal uncertainty (CEPS, “The AI Act and emerging EU digital acquis”).

Competitiveness and the SME problem

The burden of complexity is not shared equally. Large technology firms are better able to absorb compliance costs, hire specialists, and shape standards. Smaller firms may struggle.

Bruegel has warned that EU AI regulation risks imposing disproportionate burdens on smaller firms and may contribute to market concentration if compliance demands are not properly balanced (Bruegel, “The right balance: how to fix European Union artificial intelligence regulation”). This is a key policy tension. The EU wants trustworthy digital markets, but it also wants innovation and technological sovereignty. Transparency can support both goals, but only if it is designed in a way that smaller firms can use and implement.

From disclosure to governance

The EU’s digital strategy should be judged by a practical standard. The question is not whether Europe has created the world’s most elaborate digital rulebook. The question is whether that rulebook produces usable knowledge, enables timely intervention, supports meaningful comparison and redistributes informational power.

If it does, transparency may become genuine governance infrastructure. If it does not, the EU risks building a sophisticated compliance architecture that documents the digital economy without effectively governing it.

WASHINGTON — The world has largely viewed the U.S. more favorably than China for years, but those opinions have flipped in Beijing’s favor this year, according to a new poll by the Pew Research Center, a remarkable shift driven in part by tensions between the Trump administration and U.S. allies.

More people have favorable views of China than the U.S. in 25 out of the 36 countries and territories that were surveyed, including Canada and Mexico. The poll was conducted from February to May, a period when the United States and Israel launched a war against Iran.

In only six countries do people still see the U.S. more positively than China, according to the findings released Wednesday.

Views in 22 out of the 36 countries and territories also are more favorable of Chinese leader Xi Jinping than President Trump, including in Canada, Mexico and major European powers including France, Germany and the U.K. However, people in many of the countries have low confidence in both men.

It marks the first time in the roughly 20 years Pew has been tracking global opinions that China has been viewed more positively than the U.S., said Laura Silver, associate director of Pew’s Global Attitudes Research and one of the researchers on the study. Views of Beijing and Washington have been very similar at some points in the past but have not been significantly more favorable for China until now, she said.

The shift follows the COVID-19 pandemic becoming a distant issue and as global views of the U.S. have soured, Silver said.

“There was just an actual relationship between the outbreak of the war and the sense that the U.S. is just not contributing to peace and stability and that people have less confidence in Donald Trump,” she said.

Trump’s demands to control Greenland, the American military raid that captured Venezuela’s then-leader Nicolás Maduro, and the U.S. handling of the Israeli-Hamas war in Gaza also have led to low approval in many countries, Silver said.

“The U.S. has done a lot in terms of global engagement in recent months to years that is not being perceived positively internationally,” she said.

Aside from benefiting from the fading memory of the pandemic, China appears to have gained from comparison with the U.S., Silver said.

“By comparison, we know that China is seen to be a more reliable partner in many places. It’s more likely to be seen to contribute to global peace and stability,” the researcher said.

Notably, those in some U.S. allied countries have drastically shifted their views in recent years, such as Canada. In the new survey, only 33% of Canadians have positive views of the U.S., down from 57% in 2023. Over the same period, their favorable opinions of China rose from 14% to 44%.

Trump slapped a barrage of tariffs on Canadian goods last year, and even claimed that Canada could be the “the 51st state.”

Major European countries — including France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Sweden, the Netherlands and Italy — all have switched their opinions toward the world’s two largest economies.

People in the U.K., where about 6 in 10 held positive views of the U.S. in 2023, now view China and the U.S. similarly. Three years ago, the spread was 32 percentage points in Washington’s favor.

Of the six countries where people have more favorable views of the U.S., Israel leads the way. About 8 in 10 Israelis view the U.S. positively, compared with 19% for China.

The other five countries are Japan, India, South Korea, the Philippines and Poland. Still, even their views of the U.S. have dimmed over recent years.

The U.S. is still ahead of China when it comes to government respect for personal freedoms, though the gap is shrinking, the Pew report says.

While China’s standing has improved somewhat, the narrowed divide is “driven largely by the fact that people in nearly every country surveyed have become less likely to say the U.S. government respects its people’s personal freedoms” since 2021, when Pew last asked the question.

For the new study, Pew surveyed more than 42,000 people across 35 countries plus the West Bank and east Jerusalem, with margins of error ranging from 2.3 to 5.5 percentage points depending on the country.

Tang writes for the Associated Press. AP journalists Linley Sanders, Emily Swanson and Kevin S. Vineys contributed to this report.

The Muslim Brotherhood’s failure to penetrate Chinese society, particularly after the Arab Spring uprisings, stems from the Chinese Communist Party’s tight security grip, China’s policies of localizing religions, and the Chinese public’s rejection of transnational political ideologies. Despite the Brotherhood’s historical and organizational attempts to build ties with Muslim minorities in China, the rigid nature of the Chinese system and society has formed an impenetrable barrier to any infiltration. The fundamental contradiction between ideologies in China, such as Chinese communism as the ruling doctrine and political Islam as a totalitarian movement from which the Muslim Brotherhood emerged and China’s strict security policies aimed at integrating minorities, has led to the failure of these political ideological currents. Political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood have failed to gain a foothold in China for several structural and political reasons. The most prominent of these is the strict nature of the Chinese communist system, which prohibits any political or religious activity outside the state’s control. This is compounded by the Sinicization policies that impose absolute loyalty to Chinese culture and the Communist Party. Furthermore, the internationalist ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam clashes with Chinese nationalism. Additionally, there is a lack of popular support for such projects among Muslim minorities who follow religious traditions different from those in Arab and Islamic countries and around the world. Despite the existence of an Islamic religious group in China called Yihewani, whose name literally means brotherhood, it is a reformist movement within the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence. It originated locally in China in the 20th century, specifically in the 1930s, but it is a completely independent, traditional Hanafi school of thought with no organizational or ideological ties to the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East.

On the other hand, China harbored apprehensions about the political Islam and Muslim Brotherhood model following the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011. Research centers and decision-making bodies in Beijing closely monitored the outcomes of these uprisings, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise to power in Egypt and Tunisia. China viewed the Brotherhood’s ascent to power in some countries, such as Egypt and Tunisia, followed by their subsequent failures and the descent of some into civil war, as evidence that political Islam harbors a project to destabilize nations. This understanding led Beijing to adopt a firm, principled stance rejecting this model of political Islam entirely in order to protect its own stable development model. Consequently, China adopted a policy of strategic alliance with Egypt under President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and other Arab nationalist regimes following the events of the June 30, 2013, revolution in Egypt and the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood and its president, Mohamed Morsi. China strengthened its strategic and economic partnerships with current Arab governments, such as those in Egypt and the Gulf states. Here, China rejects interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Similarly, Arab states support the One China policy and its actions in Xinjiang. This high-level diplomatic coordination between China, Egypt, and other Arab states, following the Muslim Brotherhood’s failed rule, has led to a crackdown on any attempts to finance or subtly infiltrate the banned group through economic or educational channels within China.

Here, the Chinese state pursues a policy of institutional rejection of political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood. Chinese authorities classify any political activity with a religious basis as a direct threat to national security and territorial integrity. This has led to the banning and dismantling of any cells or attempts to establish branches of the Muslim Brotherhood. Furthermore, Muslim ethnic minorities in regions like Xinjiang (East Turkestan) face strict security and surveillance measures that prevent the formation of any opposing Islamic religious movements within China. Beijing also imposes the forced assimilation of Muslim minorities into Chinese culture and criminalizes any transnational organizational manifestations or affiliations.  With an emphasis on the dominance of communist ideology, the ruling Chinese Communist Party rejects any religious or political activity or movements that seek to assert identity above loyalty to the state and the party. This is coupled with strict Chinese security measures to combat foreign infiltration of religions, organizations, movements, and Islamic political currents within China, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood. Beijing maintains one of the world’s most stringent surveillance systems for monitoring religious and political activities. Following the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011, Chinese security agencies raised their alert levels to ensure that the contagion of color revolutions or ideological movements did not spread within its borders. China considers any foreign organization, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, a direct threat to national security and social stability. Therefore, any cells or committees attempting to engage with Chinese Muslims are banned and dismantled.

Political Islam movements have failed to penetrate Chinese society and bring about political or social changes as they have in other countries. This is due to several historical, political, cultural, and social factors imposed by the Chinese state. The most prominent of these factors are the tight security and political grip and the nature of the Chinese communist political system. China imposes a highly centralized system in which the state and the Communist Party completely control the public sphere and institutions. No independent political or ideological organization is permitted outside the umbrella of the Communist Party. Chinese authorities impose strict censorship and implement proactive security policies that prevent any political, religious, or opposition organizations or movements from existing or expanding. Furthermore, the primacy of nationalism over religion in China, where Chinese identity is primarily based on belonging to the nation and the nationality, represented by the culture of the majority Han Chinese population, makes loyalty to the state paramount. This renders the transnational ideologies adopted by political Islam movements unacceptable and severely restricted. Here, the government’s policies toward religions in China become clear. China pursues a policy of Sinicization of religions, meaning that the practice of any religious rituals must conform entirely to Chinese culture and socialism. The Chinese state follows policies of Sinicization on religions, with Chinese authorities implementing strict policies to subordinate religions to Chinese socialist culture and values. This has included systematic campaigns to prevent foreign or Middle Eastern influences on mosque style, clothing, and religious practices. China also adopts strict policies to contain any influence of political Islam and subjects religious bodies to state supervision. Beijing aims to Sinicize religions and requires their integration with the culture of the Han majority and the values ​​of the Communist Party, placing loyalty to the nation above all other affiliations.

This occurs while the Chinese state officially manages and oversees Islamic institutions, such as the Islamic Association of China, thus preventing the emergence of independent religious leaders or institutions that could adopt or disseminate the ideas of political Islam. Herein lies the role of cultural and historical diversity within China. Muslim minorities in China, such as the Hui ethnic group, have absorbed traditional Chinese culture and integrated it with their beliefs over centuries, making their communities well-integrated into the broader social fabric and resilient against external influences. Muslims have been historically integrated into China, and Islam has been part of the Chinese social fabric for over 13 centuries.  Muslim ethnic groups, such as the Hui, have successfully integrated into Chinese society and adapted to local culture. This integration has made political Islam alien to their environment due to China’s strict security measures. The Chinese government deals harshly with any religious or ethnic movements with a political character, particularly in the predominantly Muslim Xinjiang region of northwest China, under the banner of combating extremism and terrorism. Security policies and measures have been implemented to restrict any religious activity outside the official control of the Chinese state. The state adopts a dual strategy: containing practices acceptable to official state institutions while categorically rejecting any separatist or political tendencies that Beijing considers a threat to the country’s unity and stability.

Beijing manages religious pluralism through the Islamic Association of China and views any ideologies that deviate from loyalty to the state with extreme caution. The relationship between the state and Islam in China is shaped by several pillars, including national diversity. China has 56 officially recognized ethnic, religious, and national groups, with the Han Chinese constituting the vast majority at approximately 92% of the population. Regarding Muslim ethnic groups, there are 10 Muslim-majority groups in China, such as the Hui and Uyghurs, with the total number of Muslims estimated in the tens of millions. China officially adopts a policy of Sinicization, whereby Chinese authorities lead campaigns to eliminate transnational religious expressions, prohibiting religious institutions from having ties with their counterparts abroad. Religious institutions are required to adhere to the Party’s leadership and integrate their doctrines with Chinese cultural traditions. The Chinese government pursues a policy of Sinicization of Islam. The Chinese state adopts a firm strategy based on integrating Islam and its culture into the Chinese national identity (in accordance with socialism with Chinese characteristics). As we mentioned, Muslim affairs are officially managed through the Islamic Association of China, which is under the control of the ruling Communist Party. This closure of the religious sphere has thwarted the Islamic internationalism ideology promoted by the Muslim Brotherhood in Middle Eastern countries, as China confines religious teaching and practice to purely local frameworks, preventing the introduction of the writings of Sayed Qutb or Hassan Al-Banna into Chinese territory.

Therefore, we conclude that attempts by political Islamist movements, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, to infiltrate China or penetrate its Muslim communities have failed. Here we observe the cultural and ethnic differences between the Muslim minorities in China and the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is banned in Egypt and the Middle East. The main Muslim population in China is divided into two primary groups that fail to resonate with the Brotherhood’s ideology: the Hui ethnic group, a Chinese Muslim minority. The Hui are Chinese-speaking Muslims fully integrated culturally and socially into the fabric of the Chinese state. Their primary loyalty is to China, and therefore, the Arab political ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood finds no echo among them. The second group is the Uyghur ethnic group. Uyghurs reside in the Xinjiang region (East Turkestan) in northwest China. Despite the presence of nationalist and religious tendencies, Beijing has imposed extremely strict security measures (including re-education camps and biometric surveillance, which are security systems within China that use an individual’s biological characteristics, such as fingerprints, facial features, and iris scans, to verify their identity), effectively isolating the region from any activism emanating from the Middle East, particularly from the Muslim Brotherhood.

A Seoul district court on Monday sentenced former President Yoon Suk Yeol to two years in prison after finding him partially guilty of accepting illegal political funds in the form of free opinion polls from a self-proclaimed power broker.

The Seoul Central District Court convicted the jailed former president on charges of violating the Political Funds Act in a ruling that marked a departure from a separate trial where his wife was acquitted on the same charges.

Special counsel Min Joong-ki’s team earlier indicted Yoon on charges of colluding with his wife, former first lady Kim Keon Hee, and receiving 58 opinion polls worth about 270 million won (US$180,100) in total for free from the power broker, Myung Tae-kyun, between April 2021 and March 2022.

In its ruling, the court recognized that Yoon had received 14 opinion polls from Myung for free over the period, sentencing him to prison and ordering a forfeiture of 13.96 million won.

It recognized the special counsel team’s argument that Yoon had promised to support former Rep. Kim Young-sun’s nomination as a candidate for the conservative People Power Party in the parliamentary by-elections in June 2022 in exchange for the opinion polls.

“The defendant’s actions sowed distrust in politics and undermined the public trust in the development of democracy,” the court said. “A punishment commensurate with the wrongdoing is inevitable.”

The court also sentenced Myung to 18 months in prison on the charges.

The special counsel team had sought a four-year prison sentence for Yoon and a three-year term for Myung.

The ruling diverged from an appellate court’s acquittal of Yoon’s wife on charges of accepting free opinion polls from Myung in a separate trial.

In Kim’s acquittal in April, the Seoul High Court ruled the couple could not be seen as profiting off the opinion polls as Myung had provided them to other people as well. Min’s team has appealed that ruling.

After the ruling, Yoon’s lawyers vowed to appeal, saying the verdict was “difficult to understand” given the former first lady’s acquittal in her trial.

The special counsel team called the latest ruling “very meaningful,” noting the bench appeared to have closely considered the various evidence and arguments presented in its judgment.

It marked the latest conviction for Yoon, who has been standing multiple trials following his failed 2024 martial law bid. In February, Yoon was sentenced to life imprisonment for leading an insurrection through his short-lived imposition of martial law.

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