Middle East

Far-right Israeli ministers began more forcefully advocating the wholesale removal of Palestinians in Gaza last week, offering timelines and government mechanisms to conduct illegal forced expulsions while displacement, demolitions and killings continued across Gaza and the occupied West Bank.

Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz told a conference on Wednesday that removing Palestinians from Gaza is “the only solution”, saying Israel is prepared to do it “by sea, by air and by every way possible”, and that US President Donald Trump has merely “frozen” – not cancelled – his support for the idea.

Then, National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir unveiled a seven-year plan, branded “Disengagement 710”, to remove Gaza’s roughly two million residents through what he called “voluntary emigration”.

Ben-Gvir added that, if re-elected, he would establish a Migration Ministry to expel Palestinians.

The US State Department said it “does not support any plan or proposal for the forced displacement, expulsion, or mandatory transfer of the population of Gaza” – but stopped short of directly condemning Katz or Ben-Gvir.

Gaza: Rising death toll amid airstrikes

Gaza’s death toll has continued climbing through near-daily strikes. An Israeli special forces raid near Gaza City’s American hospital on Tuesday killed at least four Palestinians, including two children and a woman, ending with the capture of Moin al-Arabeed, described by Israel as the head of Hamas’s internal security. A drone strike killed a child in Jabalia refugee camp on Wednesday, the same day an attack on a tent in Khan Younis killed one person.

On Thursday, two Palestinians, including a 13-year-old, were shot dead near Beit Lahia after Israel said they had crossed into an Israeli-controlled area, while a separate drone strike killed a man near a church compound in Gaza City’s Remal neighbourhood.

Strikes continued through the week’s end: On Sunday alone, Israel attacked near a school in Gaza City, wounding several, and a separate drone strike on a car near Gaza City’s Hamid intersection killed Youssef Akila and his young daughter, Wafaa.

Before dawn on Monday, at least five more Palestinians in Gaza were killed including three-year-old Saadi Ghalia, who was killed when an artillery shell struck a school in Deir el-Balah sheltering displaced people.

By Monday, the Palestinian Ministry of Health reported that 73,658 people have been killed and 174,622 wounded since October 2023, after 160 additional deaths were certified and added to the casualty figures. Of those, more than 1,340 have been killed since the October 2025 Israeli-Hamas “ceasefire”.

The recovery of bodies has slowly continued alongside the killings.

Families in northern Gaza held funerals on Sunday for around 100 people, including 60 children, whose remains were pulled from the rubble of Gaza City’s Zeitoun neighbourhood, many of them members of the extended Malaka family.

Gaza civil defence chief Raed al-Dahshan told Al Jazeera his teams could recover an estimated 8,000 more bodies still under the rubble within 90 days if given proper heavy equipment, but warned that without it, “this work will continue for years”. Between 10,000 and 14,000 people remain missing under Gaza’s rubble.

In the strip, humanitarian conditions continue to deteriorate without sufficient aid getting in. The World Health Organization warned that water contamination in Gaza has nearly tripled since January. The Palestinian Water Authority reported all five of Gaza’s wastewater plants have shut down entirely, with roughly 55,000 cubic metres of untreated sewage discharged daily.

West Bank: Demolitions and villages under siege

Meanwhile, Israeli forces carried out demolitions this week in the West Bank. In the community of Khirbet al-Tabban in Masafer Yatta, those demolitions were absolute – demolishing all 12 homes left  70 people, including 30 children, homeless.

“It’s wiping the village off the face of the earth,” council head Nidal Younis said. Residents, he added, intend to rebuild.

Israeli forces also destroyed four water wells and several greenhouses in nearby Beit Ummar in Hebron in the occupied West Bank, causing an estimated $60,000 in losses, and demolished a home in Nahalin in Bethlehem governorate.

Around Jenin, the bulldozing of hundreds of farmers’ trees continued along the Arraba-Yabad and Jenin-Nablus roads, part of six military orders issued in August to clear vegetation from across four Jenin-area villages, according to to the Palestinian Wafa news agency.

In occupied East Jerusalem’s al-Bustan neighbourhood, community representative Fakhri Abu Diab said municipal bulldozers demolished a four-apartment building – the 60th demolition there since October 2023. On Monday morning another home was demolished in the East Jerusalem neighbourhood of Beit Hanina, according to Wafa, and authorities forced a Palestinian man in the city’s Jabal al-Mukaber area to demolish his home.

Despite all of the land and property destruction, last week’s most sustained violence centred on al-Mughayyir, northeast of Ramallah. Settlers and soldiers raided the village on the evening of Wednesday after accusing residents of stealing livestock.

Snipers took rooftop positions and opened fire as residents tried to stop settlers stealing sheep, killing Khalil Abu Alia, 16, and Mohammad Nassan, 19.

The Israeli military told the Times of Israel that troops were “securing the retrieval of livestock belonging to Israeli civilians” when a “violent riot” broke out and soldiers “fired at key instigators”. Eyewitnesses said Nasan was shot in the back.

In the days after, mourners were beaten and pepper-sprayed and their vehicle stolen, with an ambulance also attacked.

Wafa also reported late on Sunday that Israeli settlers killed Omar Tubasi, 20, and injured three people when they raided and opened fire on the village of Hajja, east of Qalqilya governorate in the occupied West Bank.

Elsewhere, settlers stormed Umm al-Khair in the South Hebron Hills on Friday, injuring a child. Soldiers who arrived declared the area a closed military zone that was enforced for Palestinians, not the settlers who remained.

In Turmus Ayya north of Ramallah, a settler wearing a T-shirt bearing the logo of the outlawed Kach movement was filmed atop a Palestinian home declaring “this land is Jewish” after US Ambassador Mike Huckabee visited the town and called settler violence “a form of terrorism”.

In Qusra, south of Nablus, a month-long siege of three homes continued, with the army initially blocking roughly 100 peace activists from delivering food and medicine. Settlers also stole water tanks and livestock in the Jordan Valley and sabotaged water lines serving a Bedouin encampment near Tayasir in the northern West Bank, according to reports and photos from local Palestinian activists.

In East Jerusalem’s Old City, Israeli police shot and killed Ibrahim al-Hendi, 33, from Beit Hanina, near Damascus Gate on Friday, claiming he had tried to stab an officer.

Oil prices are rising to nearly a six-week high amid a wave of strikes between the United States and Iran in the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly a fifth of the world’s oil supply travels during peacetime.

On Monday, Brent oil futures, the global benchmark, rose to hover around $97 a barrel — up 9 percent over the last five days and 19 percent over the last month. Monday’s market moves are approaching the highest point since July 24th, when prices topped $97.93.

US West Texas Intermediate crude similarly rose to $92.27 a barrel, up 79 cents, also a near six-week high.

In recent days, strikes escalated in the Strait of Hormuz. The US hit three Iranian oil tankers on Saturday, while Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said it had struck three tankers and three US-linked vessels in other areas.

“This is a reflection of continued conflict and exchange of fire. The supply deficits globally are persisting, and there is little end to these shortages,” Rachel Ziemba, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), told Al Jazeera.

On Monday, Saudi Aramco’s Jizan facilities were struck for the second time in the last month, according to reporting from the Financial Times that cited two people familiar with the matter.

“The fact that a Saudi refinery in Jizan was hit, possibly delaying its return to production, didn’t help,” Ziemba added.

Amid increased strikes, there’s less traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, with an average of 10 commodity ships crossing the vital chokepoint each day over the last 10 days, according to Kpler, a data analytics platform.

“Crude went back down to what the pre-war level was in early July. Then it increased again, and then it reduced again, and now it’s increasing again on this weekend’s exchange plus the Aramco attack,” Arif Gasilov, a partner at the Gasilov Group, an energy advisory firm, told Al Jazeera.

“I would say that you might eventually see an inflection point, depending on how long this keeps going on, where a ceasefire doesn’t move the market at all, maybe by just a dollar or two.”

US consumers pinched

US consumers are feeling the impact of heightened oil prices at the petrol pump. The average price for a gallon (3.78 litres) of petrol has jumped 7 cents over the course of a week, reaching $4.15 nationally on Monday, up from $4.08 this time a week ago, according to the American Automobile Association (AAA), which tracks daily petrol prices.

That’s up from $4.04 this time a month ago and $2.98 from February 28th, when the US and Israel first struck Iran, marking a 39 percent increase since the war began.

Last week, diesel prices hit all-time highs at $5.85 per gallon.

“US diesel prices have never been this high, and now the countdown starts for the trickle-down to everything consumers buy… record diesel will start funnelling down into the economy,” Patrick De Haan, head of petroleum analysis at GasBuddy, said in a post on the social media platform X.

Prices have continued to climb since, with average prices on Monday topping $5.90 per gallon.

“Markets are pricing in longer disruptions. It continues to be in product markets where the biggest disruptions lie, though, including diesel,” Ziemba added.

Those price gains are weighing on Americans, who have spent an average of $764.59 per household on fuel since the war began. That’s $418.82 more than usual, according to Brown University’s Watson School of International and Public Affairs.

Ahead of the US’s September 5-7 Labor Day weekend, the unofficial end of summer and a popular time for US travel, AAA forecasts showed a 20 percent increase in flight costs compared to the same weekend last year.

Ahead of the midterm elections, the economy is emerging as a key issue for US voters — and a potential warning sign for Republicans. Polls show voters souring on President Donald Trump’s handling of the economy, with his economic approval rating falling to a new low in a recent Financial Times poll. Just 17 percent of Americans approve of his handling of the economy.

An Economist/YouGov poll similarly found that 39 percent of Americans believe Democrats are doing a better job handling the economy, compared with 32 percent who said Republicans are.

China pressures

Southeast and East Asian markets rely more heavily on imports travelling through the Strait of Hormuz directly than the US, but Beijing has moved to insulate itself from the disruption by turning to domestic sources, including its strategic petroleum reserve (SPR).

“China has been managing this situation successfully since the beginning of the war. We know that China has many domestic resources, despite rising oil prices,” John Gong, an economics professor at the University of International Business and Economics, told Al Jazeera.

“China has been conserving its oil and gas consumption for quite some time now. China was prepared for these challenges,” Gong said.

He also stressed that China’s close relations with Russia give Beijing another source of supply, with Moscow able to provide nearly half of China’s daily oil needs.

China has also begun tapping into its SPR while reducing its reliance on imports, as Beijing accelerates a broader shift towards alternative energy sources and vehicles that require little or no oil to operate.

“We have national strategies focused on transitioning to clean energies like solar and green power,” Gong said. “When we look at the vehicles purchased in China, more than 50 percent of cars sold on the Chinese market are electric.”

Cairo, Egypt – Four days after he disappeared from the Egyptian team camp at the 2026 Under-20 World Wrestling Championships in Slovakia last month, 19-year-old wrestler Ziad Hajjaj Abu Gabal posted a message on Facebook.

“I don’t want my mother and father to be upset with me,” he wrote on August 29. “I did this so I could see myself as a man. I won’t go back to Egypt, my beloved country, until I bring it honour.

“Everything I earn in a month is 700 Egyptian pounds [$13.7], and I’m an international [athlete] … After all this pressure, there was no way I could go back.”

On August 27, another Egyptian wrestler, Mohamed al-Shami, 23, had escaped while his team transited through Rome on their way home from the Mediterranean Games in Taranto, Italy.

In his Facebook post on August 29, Al-Shami said he had come to feel like a financial burden on his family and that he wanted to start earning money for them.

“At a certain point I felt my father was exhausted, that life had become too hard for him,” he wrote. “I’m the eldest of my siblings, so someone had to make a sacrifice and take responsibility.”

While the authorities in Egypt may now try to take legal action against the two athletes, their posts drew a wave of sympathy from Egyptians on Facebook, with many saying they understood the pressures that pushed the athletes to escape from a country mired in poverty.

Indeed, Hajjaj and al-Shami are far from the first Egyptian wrestlers to flee while abroad, and the hardships they describe are widely shared across the sport in Egypt.

Debt and despair

A 27-year-old wrestler, who won several gold medals for Egypt and asked not to be named, told Al Jazeera that fellow athletes under 20 years old earn 700 Egyptian pounds ($13.7) to 800 ($15.7) Egyptian pounds a month.

Older international players reportedly receive between 5,000 pounds ($98.2) and 12,000 pounds ($235.7) a month, depending on their achievements.

“Wrestlers often go into debt to cover supplements and living costs while waiting for prize money that may or may not arrive,” he said.

Ahmed Baghdouda left for France in 2023 immediately after winning silver at the African Wrestling Championships, reportedly over low pay. Tarek Abdel Salam defected to Bulgaria in 2017 amid alleged medical neglect and later won European gold under Bulgaria’s flag. That year, Ibrahim Ghanem also chose to stay in France, subsequently winning a World Championship title for the country.

In October 2025, Mohamed Ibrahim el-Sayed – popular as Kishu and a six-time African wrestling champion, two-time U23 world champion, and bronze medallist in the 67kg category at the Tokyo 2020 Olympics – announced he had taken “the first step” towards switching his sporting allegiance to represent the United States, posting training photos from a facility with the US flag behind him.

Asked by Al Jazeera through a messaging app why wrestlers keep fleeing Egypt, Kishu blamed the wrestling federation.

“It’s the only body that can provide a suitable environment, but the opposite keeps happening,” he said from the US. “The problem isn’t just about money – it goes much deeper than that. When I retire, what am I supposed to do? God forbid I get injured – what happens to me then?”

“I would take the same decision again and again and I advise Egypt’s international players to focus on their training and acquire their rights because it’s their lives that are being wasted.”

Al Jazeera reached out to the president and the vice president of the Egyptian Wrestling Federation (EWF), as well as the president of the Egyptian National Olympic Committee (ENOC), for their comments, but none of them responded.

However, the EWF’s team psychologist Hossam Mohamed said the disappearance of players abroad is not simply down to poor financial compensation or neglect, insisting the state provides good support to wrestlers – whether through financial bonuses, training camps abroad, or accommodation and meals. He said medal bonuses can reach 5 million Egyptian pounds ($98,135) for an Olympic gold.

“The wrestling federation, compared to major sports federations, has limited resources in light of the absence of broadcasting rights and the commercial and audience revenues enjoyed by football,” he noted.

“[But the] core problem for [athletes] isn’t only what they receive during their playing years, but what awaits them after retirement or injury.”

On Hajjaj and al-Shami, he said they competed in international championships, but “receiving bonuses is tied to achieving results – a player who doesn’t finish in a top position doesn’t receive a tournament bonus”, and neither was able to achieve podium finishes in recent competitions.

Gamal el-Badrawy, a former head of Egypt’s kickboxing federation, called on the Ministry of Youth and Sports to impose tighter oversight of national sporting federations and to review bonuses, allowances and health insurance.

“[Athletes] cannot be entirely absolved of responsibility, but the weak financial and administrative system is the main driver,” he told Al Jazeera.

Prosecutors investigate

Meanwhile, Egypt’s Ministry of Youth and Sports has referred Hajjaj and al-Shami to the public prosecutor, accusing them of breaking the rules governing national delegations.

The ENOC separately referred Brigadier General Ibrahim Adel – EWF secretary-general and head of the wrestling delegation at the tournament in Taranto – to its ethics committee for investigation and suspended him from his duties for allowing al-Shami to escape.

Adel refused to comment on the criticisms against the EWF, but told Al Jazeera he believed the moves against him were unfair, pointing to precautionary measures already in place before the trip: notarised undertakings signed by both the players’ guardians and the players themselves committing them to return to Egypt.

Meanwhile, fleeing athletes often leave behind distressed families.

Hajjaj’s father, Hajjaj Abu Gabal, told Al Jazeera over the phone that he was deeply worried for his son after he left the national team in Slovakia, noting that he had switched off his phone for a long time and did not respond to calls.

“I signed the notarised parental consent required for my underage son to travel,” he said, as 21 is the age of full legal adulthood in Egypt. “But no one from the wrestling federation had contacted me since the escape.”

Hajjaj, according to his father, said wrestling required expenses for food, drink, clothing and other needs, including costs related to the training period and participation in championships, and these expenses were a burden on him and the family.

“Whatever happens, he’s still my son,” the father said.

“I keep praying for him to be safe and secure, and may God compensate him for the difficult times he went through.”

This article was published in collaboration with Egab, a platform that empowers journalists from across the Global South to publish stories in international media outlets.

An Israeli air attack on Kfar Reman in southern Lebanon has killed at least 10 people, including an infant, with at least two others missing.

The attack early on Monday on the town in the Nabatieh district comes a day after at least seven people were killed and 20 others were wounded in Israeli air raids on the nearby town of Arab Salim.

The Israeli military also struck a residential area in the town of Deir al-Zahrani in southern Lebanon overnight after it issued a forced evacuation order. The army says it targeted a building near a Hezbollah facility, which it claims was used to launch an explosive drone.

Attacks continued despite a United States-brokered ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon in June.

Reporting from Kfar Reman on Monday after overnight strikes, Al Jazeera’s Zeina Khodr said “uncertainty and fear” are the prevailing feelings in southern Lebanon. “Among the dead are children, including a two-month-old infant,” she said.

“People just do not know what is next. There’s been a wave of Israeli attacks over the past 48 hours. Civilians are being killed. Residential homes are being destroyed,” she said, adding, “Recovery efforts by civil defence workers are continuing. They’ve been here throughout the night.”

Manila defence chief says Washington gave ‘definite assurances’ that its commitments to the Philippines remain.

Philippine Defence Secretary Gilberto Teodoro has warned that Beijing could view recent cuts to the joint US-South Korea military drills as an opportunity to reassert itself in the Asia Pacific.

Speaking on the sidelines of the Seoul Defense Dialogue, an annual multilateral security forum, Teodoro said that “China is very quick to exploit gaps”, when asked on Monday whether Beijing could seize on the move.

He added that Washington had given Manila “definite assurances” that the US commitments to the Philippines remained unchanged.

He also accused China of exploiting democratic systems to spread “distortive narratives”.

South Korea and the US shortened the duration of their annual joint military drills and scaled back field training exercises last month after US President Donald Trump ordered a “substantial reduction” in the annual war games.

The US-led Ulchi Freedom Shield war games ended six days earlier than originally planned.

Trump cited his “very good relationship” with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and linked the decision to Seoul’s refusal to join the US and Israel’s war on Iran at the time.

Last week, South Korea’s presidential office said it was mulling “contributions” to the US’s freedom of navigation ⁠in the Strait of Hormuz. The presidential office later clarified that nothing has been decided, as any military deployment by South Korea requires a decision by the country’s National Security Council, a resolution at a cabinet meeting, and consent from the National Assembly.

Trump said he planned to meet with Kim later this year. Kim’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, later released a statement denying any ongoing communication between the US president and her brother and maintained that Washington continues to engage in a “hostile” policy towards her country, despite the warm relationship between the two leaders.

US, South Korea and Japan hold trilateral military drills

The US, South Korea and Japan are due to hold five days of military drills in waters east and south of South Korea’s Jeju Island starting on Monday.

South Korea’s military said in a statement that the Freedom Edge exercise is defensive in nature and meant to respond to North Korean nuclear and missile threats as well as promote regional peace and stability.

North Korea has previously slammed the trilateral drill as a “reckless show of strength” that proved its adversaries’ confrontational stance. Pyongyang has also said the drill contained a US intention to lay siege to China and exert pressure on Russia.

Amid the grapevines that once provided a steady income for her family, 56-year-old Palestinian farmer Theeba al-Sabaa spends much of her day guarding her home and farmland in the occupied West Bank from settlers.

From dusk till dawn, she works on her land in the town of Beit Ummar, north of Hebron, known by locals as “Jabal Sabaa”.

Theeba is engaged in a daily battle against the encroaching settler outposts that have emerged among the rolling hills that surround her, and which block access to sections of her land.

“By God, the land has taught me patience, and to cling to my right, for as long as I have a right, I must take it and never let it go,” she told Al Jazeera.

“I will never leave it because I worked hard on it, I toil and sweat on it, so I will not leave my toil and sweat, or the toil of my children and my husband, to go to someone else.”

Weaponising livestock

Since mid-2024, when settlers established new outposts on the nearby hills, every one of Theeba’s moves has been monitored.

Settlers frequently approach the perimeter of her home and deliberately release livestock into the cultivated fields.

“They enter with their sheep into our land after we plow and fix it, grazing in it, trampling the crops, and stomping on them with their sheep, leaving nothing,” Theeba said.

“As soon as they feel any movement or anyone entering the land, you find them attacking us immediately.”

This intimidation extends to the adjacent fields, where 59-year-old Anwar Sabarneh lives with his extended family of seven brothers.

Due to the repeated settler violations, two of his brothers have been forced to abandon their land.

Sabarneh, who supports a family of 14, owns several dunams of vineyards located just 300 metres (980 feet) from his home. With aggressive settlers around, reaching them has become a dangerous ordeal.

Military complicity

Sabarneh said that the Israeli army even demands permits from Palestinians to work on their own land.

“The army came with the settlers to ask me for a permit so I can work in my home, in front of my house’s door, and on my land where I am the rightful owner,” Sabarneh said.

Farmers are also barred from building anything on their land. Sabarneh’s sheep have also been locked in a barn for over eight months due to the dangers posed by settlers.

“If they see me taking the sheep out, the settlers chase me, kidnap them, and steal them,” he said.

When Sabarneh’s children have tried to retrieve their stolen sheep, Israeli soldiers have arrested and beaten them.

A forced exodus

Repeated pogroms by settlers against Palestinian farmers reflect a broader strategy targeting agriculture across the southern West Bank.

Settlers and the Israeli troops carried out 11,074 attacks in the West Bank during the first half of 2026, according to the Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission. This includes 3,488 carried out by settlers.

Hasan Breijieh, a settlement affairs expert and director at the commission, told Al Jazeera that continuous settlement expansionism, alongside restrictions on Palestinian movement, are the primary reasons that so many Palestinians have been forced to flee their farms.

“Military gates erected at the entrances of Palestinian communities have tightened control over…  access to their orchards and vineyards,” he said.

Bypass roads, built by Israel, have also hindered “connectivity between Palestinian communities”, Breijieh said.

Under such restrictions, Palestinian farmers have faced a fourth consecutive season without being able to harvest olives, grapes, or guava. Their lands have been “neither plowed nor pruned”, and have been forcibly abandoned.

In the face of such oppression, Palestinian women like Theeba al-Sabaa have continued to play a pivotal role in protecting their land, particularly when men have been killed or detained by Israeli forces.

“They continue to maintain their leadership role in preserving the family’s agricultural legacy today,” Breijieh said. “This land was historically the primary source of livelihood for families, and a Palestinian cannot leave it voluntarily, no matter the sacrifices.”

He recalled his own grandfather, who went to his fields to bid farewell before dying. “Goodbye, vineyard,” he said to his land.

Israeli PM says money he facilitated Qatar in sending to Gaza was recommended by Israeli security agencies for humanitarian purposes.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has boasted about bombing Qatar, while dismissing domestic accusations that funds sent to Gaza were used for anything other than aid.

In an interview with Israel’s i24NEWS that he shared on social media on Saturday, Netanyahu said Qatar was a “hostile” state that did not dictate Israeli policy during its genocidal war on Gaza.

“I attacked Qatar, I also bombed it and attacked them during the war, and they attacked me,” Netanyahu boasted.

The interview comes just days before the one-year anniversary of Israel’s September 9, 2025, strike on Doha. The bombing killed five Hamas members and a Qatari security officer during a meeting to discuss the United States-backed Gaza ceasefire proposal.

Qatar, which has long served as a mediator in Middle East conflicts and beyond, has hosted Hamas’s political office since 2012, after what it says were requests from the US.

Doha condemned the strike as a “blatant violation of all international laws and norms”, with Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Majed al-Ansari calling it a “cowardly” assault.

Several countries in the region, including Iran and Pakistan, also condemned the attack, with leaders from Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia visiting Qatar shortly afterwards in a show of solidarity.

United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres called the strikes a “flagrant violation” of Qatar’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

During a meeting later that month at the White House, Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump called Qatar’s Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani to apologise for the strike.

During the i24NEWS interview, Netanyahu also defended the transfer of millions of dollars in Qatari funds to Gaza that Israel had facilitated, saying the funds were intended for humanitarian purposes and had been transferred on the recommendation of Israeli security agencies Mossad and Shin Bet.

“All this money is worth 2 percent – 2 percent of all the money that entered the Strip,” the prime minister said.

Some of Netanyahu’s detractors have alleged that the funds were used to help Hamas prepare its October 7, 2023, attack on Israel, which precipitated its genocidal war on Gaza.

Qatar denies such allegations, saying any claims that it funds Hamas are unfounded and pointing to the strict oversight governing its aid transfers.

“Today, when they [Israel] are claiming that this is the financing of Qatar to Hamas, it has no basis,” Sheikh Mohammed said during last year’s Doha Forum.

“All our aid … went to Gaza, went to the people, and was under a very transparent process that the United States is fully aware about.”

Netanyahu made the remarks weeks before Israelis head to the polls on October 27, in the country’s first general election since its war on Gaza began in 2023.

With the October vote approaching, Netanyahu faces mounting pressure at home over his government’s handling of the Gaza war, the economy and the war with Iran — all shaping up as central issues in the campaign.

Critics and analysts have long accused Netanyahu of stoking tensions with foreign states ahead of elections to rally nationalist support.

At the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Bishkek this week, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian received precisely the kind of political support he had hoped for. The SCO condemned the military attacks against Iran, described them as violations of international law and the UN Charter, reaffirmed Iranian sovereignty and territorial integrity, and called for the conflict to be resolved through political and diplomatic means.

But the organisation did not offer to defend Iran. That distinction between political solidarity and collective defence is important. It tells us something not only about the Iranian experience with the SCO, but about the international order that is emerging around it.

For years, discussions about multipolarity have often suggested that the US-led international system would gradually be challenged by an alternative bloc centred around China, Russia and organisations such as BRICS and the SCO. From the perspective of middle powers, joining both institutions seemed to fit neatly into this transformation. Integration into non-Western organisations was supposed to make them less vulnerable to Western isolation and pressure.

The US-Israeli war on Iran has made clear that none of these alternative relationships can produce a security guarantee comparable to those provided by formal military alliances. The lesson is not that multipolarity has failed middle powers. It is that the emerging multipolar order may work differently from what many expected.

Rather than replacing one alliance system with another, it is producing an increasingly dense network of overlapping partnerships in which states gain diplomatic and economic options without necessarily acquiring new security guarantees.

For middle powers, this may be one of the defining characteristics of the emerging order: more room for manoeuvre, but less certainty about who will stand beside them when their security is threatened.

Turkiye provides a particularly revealing example. It has been a member of NATO for more than seven decades and remains embedded in the Western security architecture. Yet Ankara has increasingly demonstrated that alliance membership does not require automatic political alignment with Washington. Turkiye has maintained relations with Russia despite the war in Ukraine, expanded its engagement with China and participated in the SCO as a dialogue partner. At the same time, its differences with the US and Israel over the future regional order in the Middle East have become increasingly visible.

This does not mean Turkiye is abandoning NATO or moving into a Chinese- or Russian-led bloc. Quite the opposite. Ankara’s strategy depends precisely on avoiding such a binary choice. Its NATO membership provides security benefits that the SCO could not replicate. Its relationships with Russia, China, Iran, the Gulf states and other regional actors, meanwhile, expand its diplomatic and economic options.

Brazil represents another good example. Unlike Turkiye, Brazil is not bound to the US through a formal military alliance. But it has traditionally operated within a US-dominated hemisphere where Washington has expected considerable political alignment from regional governments.

Brazil’s refusal to join the US-led Americas Counter-Cartel Coalition (ACCC), together with its positions on the Iran war and other recent international crises, reflects its reluctance to accept that regional proximity should translate into automatic strategic alignment.

Yet Brazil is not simply switching sides. Its participation in BRICS, its extensive economic relationship with China and its calls for reform of the international system coexist with important political and economic relations with the US and Europe. Brasília’s objective is not to exchange dependence on Washington for dependence on Beijing, but to preserve the ability to cooperate with both, and disagree with either.

This may be one of the most consequential opportunities that multipolarity offers middle powers. The rise of alternative centres of economic and political influence reduces the cost of saying no. For decades, weaker states often confronted a difficult choice when facing pressure from a dominant power: comply, resist and risk isolation, or seek protection from a rival bloc.

The proliferation of partners and institutions complicates that calculation. A government that disagrees with Washington may deepen relations with Beijing without becoming a Chinese ally. A state dependent on China economically may strengthen security ties with the US without fully aligning with Washington. Membership in BRICS does not prevent cooperation with Western institutions, just as membership in a US-led security framework does not necessarily preclude engagement with China or Russia.

India has made this logic almost an organising principle of its foreign policy. New Delhi participates in the Quad with the US, Japan and Australia while simultaneously belonging to both BRICS and the SCO. At Bishkek, India supported the SCO declaration defending Iranian sovereignty while Prime Minister Narendra Modi also stressed to Pezeshkian the importance of preserving freedom of navigation and commerce through the Strait of Hormuz.

The Gulf Cooperation Council member states are pursuing their own version of this diversification. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, for example, continue to depend heavily on their relationships with the US for security, while simultaneously expanding economic and diplomatic ties with China, India and other Asian powers and participating in new regional and international arrangements.

None appears eager to replace Washington with Beijing. They want relationships with both. This suggests that the most significant consequence of multipolarity for middle and smaller powers may not be the emergence of a new bloc to which they can attach themselves. It may be the declining necessity of attaching themselves exclusively to any bloc at all.

But greater autonomy comes with a cost. The same flexible arrangements that allow states to avoid choosing sides also provide fewer guarantees when crises become existential. BRICS does not have an Article 5. Neither does the SCO, which explicitly defines itself as a non-military organisation.

Strategic partnerships can provide weapons, investment, diplomatic backing and political support without obligating partners to go to war for one another.

The emerging international system is therefore unlikely to resemble a simple transition from a US-led order to a Chinese-led one, or even a confrontation between two clearly defined blocs. The older alliance system is not disappearing.

NATO remains central to European and Turkish security, while US security relationships remain indispensable across much of Asia and the Gulf. What is emerging alongside it is another layer, a more fluid landscape of overlapping institutions, selective partnerships and transactional relationships.

Multipolarity, in other words, may not require states to choose a new camp. That gives middle and smaller powers greater agency. But it also places greater responsibility for their own security upon them. The world they are entering may offer more partners, more bargaining power and more freedom to say no. What it may offer less frequently is certainty about who will say yes when they ask for protection.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Yemen’s internationally recognised government has launched a series of air attacks against Houthi positions in the country, marking a significant escalation in the conflict, with some of the country’s heaviest fighting since a fragile truce in 2022.

Government warplanes carried out at least 15 strikes on Friday against Houthi positions, gatherings and vehicles in the western provinces of Taiz and Hodeidah, according to the Yemeni military.

The air assault against Houthi positions provided support to government forces fighting a major Houthi offensive towards the Red Sea coast and the strategic Bab al-Mandeb Strait, one of the world’s most important shipping routes.

These are not the first air attacks by government aircraft since Yemen’s fragile truce began to unravel in July. On July 25, government aircraft struck Houthi missile and drone launch sites and weapons depots in Marib and al-Jawf, according to Yemeni military officials cited by the Reuters news agency.

And less than two weeks earlier, on July 13, Yemen’s internationally recognised government said its forces had struck the runway at the Houthi-held Sanaa International Airport to prevent an Iranian aircraft from landing.

However, the latest attacks mark a significant step up in the government’s use of its own air power against the Houthis, after Saudi-led coalition aircraft provided much of the aerial firepower supporting anti-Houthi forces during the most intense years of Yemen’s war.

Friday’s air campaign comes as the Iran-backed Houthis, who have been vying for control of Yemen for years, attempt to advance through western Taiz and southern Hodeidah towards al-Makha (Mocha), and territory overlooking the critical Bab al-Mandeb Strait at the opening to the Red Sea.

Control of the area could strengthen the Houthis’ position along the Red Sea, where the group has previously attacked commercial and military vessels, while threatening a key government supply route.

The fighting unfolds against a backdrop of the wider regional conflict, with the Houthis recently declaring a Red Sea maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia, while disruption to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz during the US-Israel war with Iran has raised the strategic importance of alternative routes through the Red Sea. This means any expansion of Houthi influence around Bab al-Mandeb could have consequences for shipping far beyond Yemen.

Here’s what we know.

What has happened?

Fighting erupted on Thursday as Houthi forces launched a major offensive along front lines in western Taiz and southern Hodeidah, using ballistic missiles, drones and artillery as ground forces attempted to advance towards government-held territory along the Red Sea coast.

The fighting has centred on areas west of Taiz and around al-Makha, a government-held port near the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.

A Yemeni official in Aden told the AFP news agency that the Houthis were seeking to capture hills overlooking Bab al-Mandeb and al-Makha before pushing towards the coast.

Al Jazeera’s Yousef Mawry, reporting from Sanaa, said Houthi forces had made gains in western Taiz.

“According to military officials from the internationally recognised government, the Houthis have been able to take some of those territories,” Mawry said. “In western Taiz, they’ve managed to take over a strategic military base, which is settled on top of a strategic mountain and gives the Houthis an overview of the entire area.”

Mawry said there had been particularly heavy fighting around al-Barah and Maqbanah, where a main road is used to resupply government forces stationed in Taiz and al-Makha.

More than 120 fighters have been killed since the Houthi offensive began, according to an AFP tally, making the clashes among Yemen’s deadliest in years.

Several civilians were also reported killed and others injured after a ballistic missile hit a restaurant in the al-Makha area, according to government-run Saba TV.

On Saturday, at least four civilians were killed and nine others injured in a Houthi missile strike on a crowded road in southwestern Yemen, according to Saba news agency.

The attack by the Iran-backed group on Saturday targeted a gathering of civilians along the strategic Heijah al-Abd Road, south of Taiz city, Saba said, citing local and medical sources.

What is behind the latest tensions?

The Houthis seized Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, in September 2014 and subsequently took control of much of northern and western Yemen, prompting a Saudi-led coalition of Arab countries to intervene in support of the internationally recognised government in March 2015.

A United Nations-brokered truce in April 2022 sharply reduced fighting. Although the agreement formally expired six months later, large-scale hostilities between the Houthis and Saudi-backed government forces remained relatively limited and Saudi Arabia pursued negotiations with the group.

No comprehensive peace agreement followed, however, leaving front lines largely frozen rather than ending the conflict.

That fragile status quo came under increasing pressure after the United States and Israel launched their war against Iran on February 28, but tensions escalated further in July with the government air force strike on the Houthi-held Sanaa International Airport, preventing an Iranian aircraft from landing.

What do we know about Yemen’s air force?

The modern Yemeni Air Force was created after North and South Yemen unified in 1990, bringing together two militaries equipped with both Soviet and Western aircraft.

Its fleet subsequently included MiG-21 and MiG-29 fighters, Su-22 fighter-bombers, US-made F-5 fighters and a range of helicopters and transport aircraft.

But Yemen’s armed forces fractured when the Houthis seized Sanaa and the political crisis descended into war in 2014 and 2015.

When Saudi Arabia intervened soon after, its coalition targeted airbases, air-defence systems and combat aircraft in a bid to prevent the Houthis from making use of Yemen’s air force.

That left the Saudi-led coalition – rather than the Yemeni government’s own depleted air force – providing much of the air power supporting government forces during the subsequent war.

Saudi-led coalition aircraft conducted tens of thousands of air raids between March 2015 and the 2022 truce, striking Houthi military positions and providing air support during major government ground offensives. The campaign also caused extensive civilian casualties and became one of the most controversial aspects of the war.

Between 2014 and 2022, Human Rights Watch documented dozens of apparently unlawful coalition air attacks on homes, markets, hospitals, schools, detention centres and other civilian sites.

In 2024, the US and the United Kingdom launched a new round of air attacks against Houthi positions in Yemen following strikes on Israel-linked shipping in the Red Sea. Earlier this year, the US Pentagon disclosed that US military attacks against Yemen’s Houthis killed 153 civilians in 2025 and wounded another 243. The US had previously denied its attacks had caused civilian deaths.

The conflict in Yemen has caused a huge humanitarian crisis. In 2021, the UN estimated that 377,000 people had died in Yemen since 2014, with 60 percent the result of food shortages and lack of accessible health services.

Why is the Yemeni government using its own air power now?

Previously relying on Saudi-led coalition air force power, the government’s decision to deploy its own warplanes now comes as it tries to blunt a Houthi offensive that initially made gains across several fronts in western Taiz and threatened the main road linking Taiz with the Red Sea port of al-Makha.

Mohammed al-Basha, a Yemeni American analyst and former spokesperson for Yemen’s embassy in Washington, told Al Jazeera that the Houthis had achieved “some initial gains during a surprise, multi-axis offensive across western Taiz” this week, temporarily capturing positions and threatening areas overlooking the Taiz-al-Makha corridor.

But those advances did not produce the wider breakthrough the group appears to have sought, he said.

“The front did not collapse, the Taiz-al-Makha corridor was not severed, and attempts to expand the offensive towards other strategically important positions were stopped,” al-Basha added.

Government and allied forces recovered much of the territory lost during the first day of fighting, according to al-Basha, while Houthi advances on several other axes were contained or repelled.

The government has since sent reinforcements, and the use of aircraft gives those forces another means of attacking Houthi positions and concentrations as they try to retake high ground and prevent the group from cutting the Taiz-al-Makha road.

Why have the Houthis launched this offensive now – and what happens next?

Al-Basha said Jabal Numan, overlooking the Taiz-al-Makha road, is one of the most important remaining contested areas, while a Houthi attempt to capture Jabal Dhu Ba’s, north of Hays, was repelled by National Resistance forces.

Taking such high ground could allow the Houthis to observe and threaten government supply routes, while losing it could make further advances towards al-Makha substantially more difficult.

“The first day therefore ended with a mixed battlefield picture,” he said. “The Houthis gained ground through the initial surprise and speed of their multi-axis assault, but much of that ground was subsequently recovered.”

The arrival of new government-aligned forces, coupled with air support, could make it harder for the Houthis to repeat their initial breakthrough.

“The next phase is likely to be more difficult,” al-Basha said. “Both sides are reinforcing, several positions remain contested, and control of Jabal Numan remains a key immediate objective.

“The coming hours will likely centre on attempts by anti-Houthi forces to recover the mountain, consolidate their lines and prevent another Houthi push towards the Taiz-al-Macha corridor.”

Fights between players and coaching staff broke out after the Turkish side won the Champions League playoff second leg.

Fenerbahce duo Mason Greenwood and Matteo Guendouzi have been suspended and fined for their part in the chaotic scenes after their club’s Champions League playoff second leg against Lyon.

Last month’s 2-1 victory for Fenerbahce in France meant the Turkish side progressed 3-2 on aggregate, and, after the final whistle, Greenwood and Guendouzi, who both previously played for Lyon’s bitter rivals Marseille, were involved in a brawl with players and coaching staff from both sides.

Former Arsenal midfielder Guendouzi has been suspended “for a total of four UEFA club competition matches for which he would otherwise be eligible, for insulting others present at the match, provoking spectators and for violating the basic rules of decent conduct”, UEFA announced in a decision made public on Friday evening.

Two of the matches are subject to a “one-year probationary period”, European football’s governing body added in the statement.

Guendouzi, who was also fined 50,000 euros ($58,000), was found guilty, among other things, of giving the middle finger to Lyon supporters and of provocations that led to a scuffle after the match.

His English teammate Mason Greenwood, formerly of Manchester United, received a one-match suspended ban and was fined 30,000 euros ($35,000) for “violating the basic rules of decent conduct”.

The global ratings agency has also maintained the country’s sovereign rating at AA.

Fitch Ratings has removed Qatar from “Rating Watch Negative” while maintaining its sovereign rating at AA amid the US-Israel war on Iran and the Strait of Hormuz blockade.

The global ratings agency announced the decision on Friday, citing reduced risks to the country’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities since March.

The agency, however, kept a negative outlook on the rating, citing ongoing risks surrounding the movement of gas exports through the blockaded Strait of Hormuz.

“The impact of the war on the credit profile will take longer to discern,” the agency said in a statement.

Qatar, one of the world’s largest gas exporters, continues to face export disruptions and shortages caused by damaged energy facilities during the war on Iran, which began six months ago.

Earlier this year, credit agencies S&P and Moody’s also affirmed Qatar’s ratings, noting that the country’s sizeable financial cushion helps protect it from the economic impact of the war.

US sanctions Turkish bank over alleged IRGC ties, accusing it of facilitating millions in transactions for Iran.

The United States Treasury Department has imposed sanctions on a Turkish bank and its subsidiaries over alleged ties to Iran, as Washington seeks to economically isolate Tehran.

The Treasury Department accused Golden Global Yatirim Bankasi Anonim Sirketi (Golden Global Bank) on Friday of facilitating “tens of millions of dollars’ worth of transactions for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force” and providing the Iranian government with banking access to move its funds internationally.

Washington alleged the bank “was established for the purpose of enabling Iran’s rahbar network [shadow banking system] to transfer oil revenues from China to Turkey” using gold and cash.

Golden Global Bank responded on Friday, saying it fulfilled all local and international banking compliance rules and would take legal action against the US-imposed sanctions.

There are no transactions conducted by Golden Global Bank that could substantiate the claims made by the US, the bank said in a news release.

“We will exercise all our rights of objection and legal recourse in the most effective manner and will take the necessary actions at the earliest against these allegations and the decision,” the Turkish bank added.

“Financial institutions continue to find out the hard way that we are serious about Operation Economic Outcast,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent in a statement published by the department on Friday.

The sanctions place the bank and its two subsidiaries on the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)’s Specially Designated Nationals list, cutting off access to the US financial system.

The bank said individuals and entities named in the OFAC decision “have never been and are not currently customers” of Golden Global.

US Ambassador to Turkiye Tom Barrack said on Saturday that it would be a mistake for Turkish officials “to read [the US’s] narrow measure as a judgement upon Turkiye”.

“The health of the Turkish financial system is not in question; the conduct of one institution was,” Barrack said on X.

Last week, the US took steps towards severing the UAE operations of Egypt’s second-largest bank from financial access after accusing it of processing transactions for companies linked to Iran’s shadow-banking system.

Bessent said on Tuesday on the sidelines of a G20 summit that Washington would likely announce a bank sanction this week and another next week, as it ramps up its economic campaign against Tehran.

Israeli forces bar Israeli and Palestinian activists from delivering food and medicine to homes besieged by settlers.

Israeli police have killed a Palestinian man in Jerusalem and the Israeli army has blocked humanitarian assistance from reaching an occupied West Bank village besieged by settlers for weeks.

Officers opened fire on a 33-year-old Palestinian near Damascus gate in Jerusalem on Friday. Israeli police said its border guard “neutralised” the man, claiming he was attempting to stab one of them.

The Palestinian Wafa news agency identified the man as Ibrahim al-Hendi from East Jerusalem’s Beit Hanina neighbourhood. He was pronounced dead at the scene.

Following the incident, Israeli forces deployed around Damascus Gate and the surrounding area of Jerusalem’s Old City, Palestinian sources told Al Jazeera.

Separately, the Israeli army said that it arrested Palestinians in the town of Qabatiya in the West Bank, alleging they were “planning to carry out an attack” against Israelis and security forces.

Ten other Palestinians were arrested during a 48-hour Israeli army operation in Nablus in the West Bank. The Israeli army said it seized more than “30 weapon production machines used to manufacture weapons” during the operation.

Meanwhile, Israeli settlers and soldiers carried out attacks across the occupied West Bank on Friday, Wafa reported. Settlers stormed the Khirbet al-Hamra community in the northern Jordan Valley and assaulted one resident.

Israeli settlers, accompanied by soldiers, also attacked Khalet a-Nahlah in southern Bethlehem. Israeli forces also fired tear gas and concussion grenades at a crowd of Palestinians who gathered to resist the attacks.

Blocking access to Qusra

As violence and harassment of Palestinians continues across the occupied territory, the Israeli army on Friday also prevented around 100 peace activists from delivering food and medicine to Palestinians who have been under siege in the town of Qusra for 28 days.

Since August 9, Israeli settlers have besieged three Palestinian homes in the northern occupied West Bank village, while the Israeli army has also prevented the families from entering or leaving them, claiming the area is a “closed military zone”.

“Day 28 of the blockade on Qusra. About 100 activists arrived to deliver supplies to the besieged families,” the Israeli Peace Now movement said in a post on X.

“The army blocked us at first, claiming Qusra was a ‘closed military zone.’ Then let us in but on the way back detained us for ‘violating a closed military zone’,” it added.

Qusra Mayor Abdel Azim Wadi also told the state-run Turkish Anadolu news agency that the Israeli army has been “preventing the delivery of basic necessities to three families trapped on Mount Ras al-Ain”.

US ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee told Israeli public broadcaster Kan on Friday that settler violence against Palestinians is “damaging the image of Israel as a nation and a people, warning that Israel “needs all the friends it can get” and “doesn’t need more enemies”.

Around 750,000 Israeli settlers live in 156 illegal settlements and 360 settlement outposts in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and carry out attacks aimed at forcibly displacing Palestinians, according to Palestinian figures.

Israeli attacks against villages and towns across southern Lebanon continue despite truce agreements and diplomacy.

An Israeli air strike targeting a motorcycle has killed two people in the Lebanese town of Kfar Reman, the Ministry of Public Health has said, as Israeli forces intensify attacks on southern Lebanon.

Lebanon’s state-run National News Agency (NNA) reported on Friday that the strike hit in Nabatieh near the strategic Ali al-Taher ridge, which the Israeli army said it had captured, though Hezbollah did not confirm losing it.

Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz on Friday claimed the military had cleared Hezbollah fighters embedded in tunnels under the strategic ridge, which overlooks a wide area that has become one of the most hotly contested.

Israeli raids and artillery shelling also targeted seven towns in the Tyre and Nabatieh districts, causing no casualties.

NNA said the attacks hit al-Mansouri, Majdal Zoun, Buyout al-Sayyad, Beit Lif and Srebbine in the Tyre district, as well as Zawtar al-Sharqiyah and Mayfadoun in Nabatieh.

The attacks come amid continued Israeli escalation against villages and towns across southern Lebanon despite two truce agreements – on June 4 and 26 – mediated by United States President Donald Trump’s administration.

The June 4 ceasefire was contingent on a “complete cessation” of Hezbollah fire and the evacuation of its fighters from the area south of the Litani River.

The June 26 framework agreement did not specifically call for the withdrawal of the Israeli forces and instead tied it to the disarmament of Hezbollah.

Since March 2, when the latest Israeli escalation in its war on Lebanon began, Israeli attacks have killed more than 4,000 people and injured at least 12,000 others, while forcing more than one million people from their homes, according to Lebanese authorities.

Israel has expanded its military presence across swaths of southern Lebanon since launching its new campaign against Hezbollah, which fired rockets into Israel in retaliation for US-Israeli air strikes that killed Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

On Friday, Israeli authorities separately released four Lebanese people who had been held in Israeli prisons after being detained in southern Lebanon.

They were transferred to Lebanese authorities via the International Committee of the Red Cross, a day after one Lebanese man was released as part of an agreement between the two countries.

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun praises the release and thanks US President Donald Trump for his efforts.

Four Lebanese citizens who were held in Israel have been released and handed over to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the day after a first prisoner was freed.

In a statement on Friday, Lebanon’s President Joseph Aoun thanked the United States after the Red Cross facilitated the transfer. The US has been brokering talks between Beirut and Tel Aviv aimed at ending hostilities between the neighbouring countries.

Aoun expressed his gratitude “for all the efforts exerted, particularly by the US under the leadership of President Donald Trump and by international bodies, especially the ICRC”.

The ICRC confirmed that “at the request of the relevant parties, [it] facilitated the transfer to Lebanon of five individuals released from Israeli detention”.

Associated Press and Anadolu news agency reporters said they saw a convoy of ICRC vehicles heading towards the Naqoura border crossing on Friday morning and later returning. The convoy then entered a Lebanese army barracks in Tyre.

The release follows a pledge by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Thursday that authorities would free five Lebanese prisoners.

The prisoner released on Thursday was identified as Malek Ghazi.

It was the first such handover since the outbreak of the latest Israel-Hezbollah war six months ago.

Other released prisoners include Hussein Ayash from the village of Harouf and Mohammed Juheir, a fisherman from the border town of Naqoura, AP reported.

Dozens of Lebanese citizens are believed to be held in Israeli detention centres, including civilians as well as Hezbollah members captured during fighting in southern Lebanon.

The ICRC called for its teams to be granted access to the remaining prisoners unjustly held by Israel, noting that it has not had access to detainees held in Israel since October 2023.

“Many families in Lebanon are still waiting for answers about the fate of loved ones who may be detained, deceased or otherwise unaccounted for,” it said.

Clashes between the Israeli army and Hezbollah began after Israel launched its genocidal war on Gaza in October 2023. That led to over a year of hostilities that escalated into a full-blown war in 2024.

Two years later, Lebanon was fully drawn into the conflict when the US and Israel launched a war on Iran. Hezbollah, a key ally of Iran, fired rockets into Israel in retaliation for the killing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Israel responded with air strikes and a ground invasion that have killed at least 4,300 people in Lebanon.

Lebanon began direct talks with Israel in April. Aoun’s government has vowed to fulfil the terms of the US-brokered framework agreement.

He said it would pave the way for “the full restoration of Lebanese sovereignty, without giving up an inch of our land or a single one of our people”.

As the United States and Iran exchanged attacks this week, one date was increasingly looming over the conflict.

The US midterm elections on November 3 could prove a pivotal moment in the war, as senior advisers to President Donald Trump seek to prevent the conflict from returning to all-out war before the polls when Republicans will be defending narrow majorities in both houses of Congress.

The push for restraint comes as Washington turns to economic pressure on Iran instead of military force. In August, the Trump administration announced its so-called “Economic D-Day”, imposing sanctions on 60 entities that it says facilitate oil revenues for trade with Iran and threatening other countries doing business with Tehran with secondary sanctions.

At the same time, the US naval blockade of Iranian ports in and around the Strait of Hormuz continues to exert pressure on Tehran’s oil exports.

Vice President JD Vance has meanwhile sought to downplay the war, which the US and Israel launched with attacks on Iran on February 28, as rising fuel prices and public opposition in the US threaten to become political liabilities for Republicans before the vote.

But there are clear limits to the restraint the Trump administration can show, with US forces continuing to strike Iran in recent days, and US leaders insist that further military action remains an option. Vance said this week that “everything that could happen is on the table,” including economic, military, diplomatic and covert pressure.

That leaves the coming two months as a particularly tricky period to navigate. Washington will want to avoid an all-out war while ratcheting up economic pressure, but Iran has its own calculations and could respond militarily anyway, potentially forcing the US into an escalation it would rather avoid before Americans go to the polls.

Here’s what we know.

Why do the midterms matter for Trump?

The midterms will determine whether the Republican Party can retain its narrow control of Congress. If the war escalates again before then, that could persuade more people to vote against the Trump administration.

Containing the fighting until November, therefore, may help prevent an already deeply unpopular war from dominating the political agenda.

A late-August Reuters/Ipsos poll suggested that just 31 percent of Americans support the war, compared with 63 percent who oppose it. Trump’s approval rating has also fallen since the outbreak of hostilities, from 40 percent to 33 percent, according to Reuters/Ipsos polling.

Observers say the Trump administration did not expect things to get to this point.

In early March, Trump insisted the war would last for “four or five weeks”. Instead, the conflict has dragged on, and unexpected consequences – including Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz causing energy prices to spike – have made it even more unpopular with US households.

US diesel prices hit a record high on Thursday, surpassing the previous peak recorded in 2022, as higher crude oil prices and refining bottlenecks drove up the cost of a fuel that underpins much of the US economy.

That is particularly damaging for a president who campaigned partly on a promise to dramatically reduce energy costs – as well as not to get involved in “unnecessary” wars.

The fallout from the war has not stopped at the petrol pump. Sustained increases in fuel and transport costs feed into the price of groceries, manufactured goods and other everyday purchases – potentially worsening inflation when Democrats are making the cost of living a defining issue for the midterm campaign.

A Politico poll conducted in August suggested that 61 percent of Americans believe the Iran war had made life more expensive for their families, four percentage points higher than a month earlier.

Can Trump keep the war contained until November?

There are signs that his administration is trying to do exactly that.

In recent weeks, Washington has intensified its campaign to economically isolate Iran, threatening severe sanctions against countries that continue trading with it while maintaining military pressure around the Strait of Hormuz.

With strikes on Iran earlier this week, Trump has also indicated he is willing to engage in sporadic attacks, while trying to keep the war from escalating back to all-out conflict.

Senior administration officials have simultaneously sought to play down the scale of the military confrontation. Asked at a White House briefing whether the Iran war would be resolved before the midterm elections, Vice President JD Vance said he “wouldn’t call it a war” and claimed there was “no active shooting right now”.

Asked when Iran would stop attacking commercial shipping, Vance said: “You would have to ask the Iranians.” He also said the conflict was having “less effect day by day” on global energy markets. The US claims it is escorting about 30 ships per night through the Strait of Hormuz – and officials claimed some 18 million barrels of oil were transported through on Tuesday this week. However, shipping data does not appear to fully support this claim.

Trying to maintain a strategy of “no war, no peace” with sporadic attacks is high-risk, analysts have warned. Negar Mortazavi, senior fellow at the Washington, DC-based Center for International Policy, told Al Jazeera this week: “Tehran will not capitulate under [economic] pressure. Both sides may believe they can control the escalation, but every new exchange increases the risk of a wider regional conflict.”

One of the US attacks this week is also believed to have hit a civilian home where a wedding was taking place in Kuhestak, southern Iran, killing at least four people, including children, and wounding dozens.

Furthermore, The Washington Post reported on Sunday that senior Army, Navy and Air Force leaders have warned Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth in a written assessment that continuing the war at its current pace is unsustainable and risks undermining US military readiness in other parts of the world.

Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the US-based Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, told Al Jazeera that this week’s attacks point to a US strategy that remains deeply unsettled.

“I think it’s quite likely that what we’re seeing right now is just complete military, strategic disarray on the American position in which the positions, the actions, the tactics, the strategies keep on getting changed,” Parsi said.

Washington had imposed sweeping economic sanctions on Iran in an apparent attempt to make further military intervention unnecessary, he noted. “Seven days later, the US is back into bombing Iran.”

The US appears to be “jumping from one position to the other”, he added.

What are Iran’s calculations?

While the most recent attacks between the US and Iran have been less intense than the heavy exchanges seen in the early weeks of the war and during the two flare-ups in July, the risk of escalation is high. And it may be in Iran’s interests for that to happen sooner rather than later.

Iran has excelled at the use of asymmetric warfare against an enemy with considerable military might – using cheap, mass-produced drones to exhaust US supplies of very expensive defensive systems, and launching attacks on US allies around the Gulf, sowing disharmony.

In particular, Tehran has demonstrated that it can severely disrupt maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, causing global economic consequences.

Continued Iranian attacks on US or regional military assets, shipping or energy infrastructure would place pressure on Washington to retaliate more strongly than via the few attacks it has carried out this week, creating the possibility of an escalatory cycle that could return the two countries to a much wider war regardless of the White House’s electoral calculations.

Furthermore, Washington’s economic strategy to isolate Tehran – an attempt to move away from open warfare – may in fact create a greater Iranian incentive to retaliate.

Parsi told Al Jazeera that Iranian officials appear to believe Trump ultimately intends to restart the war on a larger scale but is just waiting until after the midterms.

That creates a potentially dangerous calculation for Tehran, where it is better to escalate now – while Trump is at his most politically vulnerable. “The reaction of the Iranians to that might be to actually trigger the war themselves early right before the midterm elections in order to maximise the pain that will impose on the US president,” Parsi said.

What happens after November?

Reuters reported on Wednesday that senior White House officials are already considering whether to intensify military operations against Iran after the November 3 vote, although no decision has been made on returning to full-scale conflict, it reported.

A Republican victory in the midterms could give Trump greater political room for this option, particularly if the administration interprets the result as approval – or at least lack of enough disapproval – for the war despite the economic consequences for voters.

A Republican defeat presents a more complicated picture, however. On the one hand, losing one or both chambers of Congress will constrain the administration, as Congress controls government funding. Democratic control of the House or Senate would also give Trump’s opponents greater scope to hold hearings, investigate the US conduct of the war and challenge requests for additional military spending.

Conversely, with Trump no longer facing a congressional election, he may feel less pressure to contain the war, experts fear.

Parsi warned that an electoral defeat could therefore have the opposite effect to what Tehran might expect.

“I’m not so sure that it’s going to pay off necessarily for the Iranians because a Trump that is humiliated at the elections, who is faced with a Democratic [majority] House [of Representatives] and potentially a Democratic Senate, may also become a much more desperate and reckless president,” he said.