Middle East

Taiz, Yemen – Mohammed Al-Homaidi, a labourer in his 30s, has been working at the al-Makha (Mocha) port in western Yemen since its reopening in 2021.

Even though he was reliant on a daily wage, his earnings provided a decent standard of living for his family.

But things changed on August 9, when the Red Sea port was targeted by Houthi attacks that killed at least seven people.

With the conflict between the Yemeni government and Houthi forces escalating after a long-standing truce collapsed last month, finding daily work was no longer his priority, but his safety.

“It was around 12:30pm when the explosions [were heard] at the seaport, which was full of workers at the time. I couldn’t understand what was happening, and we couldn’t flee because the explosions were continuous,” Al-Homaidi told Al Jazeera. “After about an hour and a half, I ran outside the port and didn’t stop until I reached home.”

Thirty more people were injured in the barrage of Houthi drone and missile strikes that targeted the port and surrounding areas.

Houthi forces have continued to target the port and surrounding areas on a near-daily basis, resulting in dozens of deaths and injuries.

On August 11, the Houthis targeted a vessel at al-Makha port, killing three Pakistani crew members and injuring eight other seamen.

Three days later, the Houthis targeted two cargo ships at the Red Sea port, damaging the facility’s remaining infrastructure.

Due to the repeated Houthi attacks, operations were suspended last Friday to avoid putting the port’s 1,500 workers’ lives in danger.

For Al-Homaidi and other workers whose salaries were dependent on their daily labour, the port’s closure means a new struggle to put bread on the table.

“I am happy that we are safe at home today, but we are jobless now because we rely on daily wages,” Al-Homaidi said. “I don’t have any savings, and our food at home is running out. How can I provide basic needs for my family?”

Life beyond the seaport

Al-Homaidi also has experience working in al-Makha’s other major industry: fishing. But dangerous attacks around the Red Sea mean this is not an option for him and his colleagues at the port either.

Local fishermen have been ordered by local authorities not to go out to sea until further notice – but with money running low, a group of fishermen still ventured out on August 11. Their families are continuing to desperately search for them after they failed to return home.

With near-daily Houthi attacks on al-Makha, public beaches, parks, the coastal walkway and other areas have also been closed.

Families avoid going outside due to the threats of Houthi drones and missiles, and a strict nightly curfew for motorcycles is in place from 11pm to 6am.

Compounding the community’s suffering is a complete blackout of landline and mobile communications. Residents who can afford it use Starlink satellite internet. But for most Yemenis in al-Makha, there is no way to reach the outside world.

Back to square one

Abdulmalik Al-Sharabi, director of al-Makha port, confirmed to Al Jazeera that repeated Houthi attacks have forced the port to halt operations. At least six merchant vessels carrying commercial cargo have been struck since the most recent bout of violence, resulting in casualties among civilians and seamen.

“More than 1,500 port workers lost their jobs, while 16 were killed and 22 injured as a result of the Houthi attacks,” Al-Sharabi told Al Jazeera English.

Missile strikes have specifically targeted civilian infrastructure at the port and in surrounding areas, he said.

“The attacks targeted commercial and service areas, workshops, equipment, and the port pier, destroying it to the point that it ceased operations,” Al-Sharabi noted.

Operations across 30 shipping and customs clearance agencies have ground to a halt, affecting workers.

The port, which was closed between 2015 and 2021, serves as an economic lifeline for Taiz governorate as well as other Yemeni economic hubs such as Lahj, Hodeidah and Ibb. With it now closed, traders there will be forced to route imports via the port of Aden, driving up logistics costs.

“We were happy to have a seaport with such operational capacity, but today we are back to square one,” Al-Sharabi said.

No money, no food

Abdulraoof Abdullah, a fisherman in his 50s from al-Makha, has no source of income for his eight family members other than the fish he caught in the Red Sea. Due to the instability off al-Makha’s coast, he has not been out to sea since August 11.

“We are out of work now, and our homes are almost empty of food. We try to secure meals each day either by going into debt or asking friends for help,” he told Al Jazeera English.

With the port closed and food imports reduced, Abdullah said he expects prices to rise in the market, and he has no choice “but to pray to Allah.”

“We don’t have money to buy food for today, so how could we possibly have money to stockpile food?” he added.

“Most residents in Makha are fishermen, and we are currently out of work,” Abdullah said. “When we have jobs, we can buy food; otherwise, we will have to displace to another area where we can find work to support our families.”

Trading woes

Rashad, a local trader in al-Makha who preferred to be identified only by his first name, was importing goods through shipping agencies at the port since 2021. Given that his warehouses are just a few kilometres from the port, this was by far the cheapest option.

“Our goods are currently held up in Djibouti, and shipping costs have surged due to ongoing tension in the Red Sea,” Rashad told Al Jazeera. “Furthermore, we were just informed that our cargo will now be redirected to Aden, meaning we will have to pay significantly more for overland transport from Aden to al-Makha.”

With the warehouses still stocked with food from earlier orders, prices have not yet risen. But if the port remains closed, traders will be forced to increase prices on future shipments arriving via Aden.

“I am a resident of al-Makha before I am a trader. Any price increase directly impacts my family and neighbours – something I desperately want to avoid. But unless al-Makha seaport reopens soon, price hikes will be inevitable,” he added.

Although Rashad didn’t have any cargo on the ships that were recently hit in Houthi attacks, he said he feels empathy for other traders who suffered financial losses.

“Some people assume traders are financially comfortable, but we are in a state of constant worry. We track our shipments for months until they safely reach our warehouses,” he said.

“No one can imagine the devastation felt by traders who lost everything at al-Makha port. The harsh reality of this war has impacted every single Yemeni, and we are no exception.”

Tunisia has seen an uptick in protests as economic conditions in the country have deteriorated.

Hundreds of protesters have taken to the streets of Tunisia’s capital to call for the ousting of President Kais Saied and the restoration of democracy.

Protesters in Tunis said on Thursday that they reject “one-man rule” and “a slide towards dictatorship”, and urged the release of jailed opposition figures, activists and journalists.

Thursday’s protest follows a similar one on July 25, which was scheduled to coincide with the anniversary of President Saied’s 2021 dismissal of the government and suspension of parliament. He began ruling by decree later that year and dissolved parliament in 2022.

One demonstrator at Thursday’s march, activist Wissem Sghaier, said the country is “experiencing a complete collapse”, the Reuters news agency reported.

Tunisians are facing mounting economic and cost-of-living pressures, ⁠with deteriorating public services and shortages of some basic goods and medicines.

Tunisia’s inflation rate currently sits at 5.2 percent, according to the World Bank. Investment in the country has fallen precipitously, and Saied’s government has introduced a series of cost-saving measures, including halting public sector hiring and reducing imports.

Protests have broken out in several parts of the country in recent weeks over water and power cuts and environmental problems, suggesting that public anger is spreading beyond political disputes with Saied to the mounting hardships of everyday life. The country was also one of a number of North African countries to be hit by major wildfires this summer.

Rights groups, meanwhile, say that Saied has presided over a broad crackdown targeting opposition leaders, independent civil society groups, journalists and activists.

Who is Tunisian President Kais Saied?

Saied, a 68-year-old independent politician and former constitutional lawyer, was elected in 2019 in a victory that he described at the time as “like a revolution”. His campaign refused to take money and instead relied on a diverse array of Tunisian volunteers, and its messaging focused heavily on tackling corruption.

Saied was one of the legal advisers who helped draft Tunisia’s 2014 democratic constitution, though he soon spoke out against elements of the document.

Since coming to power, Saied has drawn the ire of international rights groups for a series of measures perceived as anti-democratic. That includes reforms of the judiciary that gave Saied unprecedented control over Tunisia’s courts via the creation of a new governing body with him at the head, and mass trials of political opponents.

Egypt’s response to Ethiopia’s new Nile dam plans is centred on diplomacy, international pressure and cooperation with Sudan, rather than trying to stop construction outright. However, the experience of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has exposed the limits of Cairo’s influence.

The revival of three proposed Blue Nile hydropower projects – Karadobi, Mandaya and Beko Abo – will test whether Egypt can turn more than a decade of opposition into practical leverage over how Ethiopia develops the river.

The projects have been discussed for years. A 2024 academic study drawing on Nile Basin Initiative-sponsored work listed all three among proposed Blue Nile projects and noted that Karadobi and Beko Abo were considered alternatives in one potential three-dam configuration.

What is new is Ethiopia’s reported move to advance them. In March, the country’s Water and Energy Ministry announced plans for the projects, according to subsequent reporting. Their combined generating potential has been reported at about 5,700 megawatts, although the figures and specifications could change because the projects remain at the planning stage.

The announcement came months after Ethiopia inaugurated the GERD in September 2025, despite years of objections from Egypt.

Why does Ethiopia want more dams?

For Ethiopia, developing the Blue Nile is closely tied to electricity generation, economic growth and energy security. Addis Ababa argues that expanding hydropower is essential for a country where millions of people have historically lacked reliable access to electricity.

The three projects fit into that wider strategy. However, their eventual impact on Egypt and Sudan will depend on what Ethiopia builds and how the facilities are operated.

Ezekiel Gebissa, an Ethiopian professor at Kettering University in the United States, told Al Jazeera that the consequences would depend on the scale and purpose of the projects. “Smaller dams could generate electricity for local communities without significantly reducing the volume of water reaching downstream countries,” he said, while projects linked to large-scale irrigation could have greater implications for Egypt and Sudan.

The impact will depend on various factors, including reservoir size, filling schedules, water releases and operating rules. A dam designed mainly for electricity generation would have different consequences from one linked to large-scale irrigation.

For now, the projects represent a potential new source of tension rather than proof that they will reduce the water reaching Egypt.

Why is Egypt concerned?

For Egypt, the Nile is the country’s main source of freshwater. Any major change upstream is viewed through the lens of national security.

Cairo’s concern is not Ethiopia generating electricity. It is what happens when water is stored and managed upstream, particularly during periods of drought. Egypt has therefore pushed for rules covering dam operations, drought management, water releases and information sharing.

Last September, Egypt again raised the issue at the United Nations Security Council, arguing that Ethiopia’s inauguration and operation of the GERD violated its international obligations and called for a binding agreement. Those were Egypt’s stated legal and political positions, not findings by the council.

The dispute reflects two different priorities. Ethiopia views the Blue Nile as a resource for development, while Egypt seeks guarantees over the water flows on which it depends.

What did the GERD change?

The GERD demonstrated both the reach and the limits of Egypt’s diplomatic strategy.

Ethiopia inaugurated the dam on September 9, 2025, after years of negotiations with Egypt and Sudan failed to produce the binding agreement Cairo wanted. The nearly $5bn project, funded largely by Ethiopia itself, has an installed generating capacity of about 5,150 megawatts and is now a major part of Ethiopia’s electricity system.

For Egypt, the lesson was clear: diplomatic pressure could raise international attention but could not prevent Ethiopia from completing the project.

The focus has therefore shifted. Instead of trying to stop a single dam, Cairo is now seeking a role in how existing and future projects are designed, filled and operated.

Sudan’s role

Sudan remains central to Egypt’s approach because it lies between Ethiopia and Egypt and is directly affected by developments on the Blue Nile.

However, Khartoum is not simply aligned with Cairo.

Sudan could benefit from more predictable river flows and Ethiopian electricity, while also seeking greater transparency, information sharing and safeguards around upstream projects.

Mekki Elmograbi, a Sudanese governance expert, said transparency from Ethiopia was the starting point for cooperation. “Ethiopia must share more information with Sudan and Egypt; transparency is the first step toward cooperation,” he told Al Jazeera. “Who knows whether the new projects are good or bad for Sudan if there is not enough information?”

Elmograbi said Sudan should seek cooperation with both Ethiopia and Egypt to ensure major projects do not harm its interests. But Sudan’s ability to play a larger diplomatic role is constrained by its ongoing war.

While Sudan shares some concerns with Egypt, it also has its own relationship with Ethiopia and its own priorities, including access to electricity and effective management of the river.

What leverage does Egypt have?

Egypt’s strategy has centred on diplomacy, international pressure and cooperation with Sudan, aimed at pushing Ethiopia towards greater transparency and negotiated rules.

The experience of the GERD shows that Cairo’s strongest tools are political and diplomatic rather than coercive. Egypt can raise international attention, seek support from regional partners and push for agreements on issues such as data sharing, drought management and dam operations.

The challenge is that these tools are unlikely to give Egypt the ability to stop Ethiopia from pursuing new hydropower projects or to control decisions made in Addis Ababa.

Horn of Africa analyst, Abdiwahab Sheikh, told Al Jazeera that Egypt has “meaningful but limited leverage” over Ethiopia. He said Cairo’s strongest tools are diplomacy, alliances, international law and coordination with Sudan, while economic pressure is weaker and military coercion carries significant risks.

The three Blue Nile projects will test whether Egypt can convert diplomatic pressure into practical influence. For Sheikh, the path forward lies in negotiated rules rather than confrontation.

“A practical arrangement is possible if Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan accept transparent information exchange, advance notification, adaptive dam-management rules and mechanisms for addressing droughts and downstream impacts.”

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent says Washington will impose its ‘toughest sanctions in history’ to ‘collapse’ Iran’s government, warning of consequences for countries that maintain economic ties with Tehran.

The Red Sea does not recognise political borders as maps draw them. Instead, it binds every country on its shores to a shared fate with its neighbours across the water. When the western shore of this sea is shaken, the eastern shore does not remain untouched. This is a hard geopolitical reality that Saudi Arabia has understood well through decades of dealing with crises in the Horn of Africa and Yemen as a direct extension of its own domestic security.

It is through this deep understanding of geography as a shared destiny that the agreement establishing the Saudi-Sudanese Coordination Council, signed in Riyadh on August 17, 2026, should be read. It is the institutional expression of a firmly held Saudi conviction: that the stability of a unified Sudan is indispensable to the stability of the kingdom itself, and that Sudan’s collapse or fragmentation would inevitably become a Saudi national security crisis.

Historical ties and cultural common ground

Long before strategic considerations and geopolitical crises came to the fore, Saudis viewed Sudanese people with great respect and as among those to whom they felt closest. Since the earliest times, Hijazis have shared cultural and linguistic traits with people on the other side of the Red Sea, particularly Sudanese people.

Throughout modern history, relations between the two countries have not been marked by serious crises. Indeed, they have been distinguished by a unique historical fact: the relationship has never witnessed a political crisis between the two states or their peoples, and there has always been mutual appreciation between them. This exceptional relationship, rooted in religious, cultural and social ties, has made the two countries a rare model of intra-Arab relations that has withstood all regional storms.

Saudi Arabia has stood by Sudanese people through every ordeal, including Nile floods and natural disasters, as well as the country’s crises and civil wars. This has created a fabric of human ties that goes beyond narrow political interests. It was this unique historical legacy that made Saudi mediation welcome to both sides when the war broke out, with the Jeddah platform working to ease the conflict and address the humanitarian crisis.

Saudi Arabia’s current position towards Sudan, then, is not merely the product of cold strategic or political calculations. It is the natural extension of a relationship that lived in people’s hearts before it was translated into institutions and agreements.

A framework for strategic partnership

This relationship culminated in the Saudi-Sudanese Coordination Council, whose founding agreement was signed in Riyadh on August 17, 2026, by the two countries’ foreign ministers, Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud and Mohieddin Salem. Sources say it is not merely a conventional diplomatic framework, but a comprehensive institutional platform intended to oversee 10 major strategic areas. These reflect the depth of the partnership between the two countries and their desire to move from political and humanitarian support towards a long-term strategic, economic and investment partnership.

The 10 areas covered by the council include Sudan’s reconstruction; agriculture and food security; livestock; gold and mining; the Red Sea and ports; energy and electricity; finance and banking; industry and food processing; communications and digital transformation; and tourism, real estate and services.

Taken together, these areas constitute an integrated roadmap for turning bilateral relations into a genuine development partnership, drawing on Saudi Arabia’s investment and technological capabilities and Sudan’s enormous natural and human resources.

According to the Sudanese foreign minister, the council’s priorities centre on security, defence and the economy, with the Red Sea added as an area of strategic cooperation because of its importance to both countries. This is why Sudan joined the maritime defence alliance established by Saudi Arabia on July 30, 2026. This reflects a shared understanding that security and stability are the essential preconditions for any economic development, and that Red Sea security is a shared responsibility that cannot be separated from the stability of the states along its shores.

Sudan and the wider Arab project

For more than a decade and a half, the Arab region has witnessed a wave of systematic projects of fragmentation targeting pivotal states such as Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen and Somalia. Countries that once played an active role in the regional order have been turned into open arenas of conflict managed by regional and international actors through local proxies. With its enormous resources and vital location connecting the Arab world with the African interior, Sudan has always been an ideal target for such a project of division.

When Saudi Arabia acts to support a path that preserves the unity of the Sudanese state and its national institutions, it objectively contributes to thwarting one link in this scheme targeting the Arab world as a whole. Every Arab state protected from fragmentation represents another defeat for this project, while every state that succumbs to it represents a victory that encourages its repetition. From this perspective, Sudanese stability is a collective Arab battle, and Saudi Arabia finds itself in the position of a state capable of leading that battle in defence of a collective Arab project that cannot afford to lose another link.

Sudan in the regional equation

Sudan occupies a unique position that makes it one of the region’s most important strategic keys: it is an Arab state that borders both the Red Sea and the Nile, connects the Horn of Africa with the Sahara, the Sahel and the Arab hinterland, and borders seven African and Arab countries.

This location makes Sudan a natural bridge between the Arab world and Africa, a vital maritime gateway on the Red Sea and a strategic water nexus on the Nile.

If a state in such a position fragments, it opens a geopolitical rupture whose effects extend from the Nile Basin to the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, and from the African Sahel to the Arabian Peninsula. The recent experience of Yemen has clearly demonstrated how the collapse of a state on the Red Sea can transform a vital maritime chokepoint such as Bab al-Mandeb from a safe commercial passage into an arena of direct threats to global shipping.

Saudi Arabia, which has paid a heavy price in both security and economic terms as a result of the war in Yemen, has realised that the security of waterways cannot be safeguarded merely by guarding the passages themselves, but by ensuring the stability of the states whose coastlines surround them.

Security beyond borders

In classical and contemporary strategic thought, the security of any major state is measured not only at its immediate borders, but also through its “strategic depth”: the wider geographical sphere that absorbs shocks before they reach the core. This idea, whose roots can be traced to strategic thinkers such as Nicholas Spykman and Walter Lippmann, holds that a state exists within a geopolitical environment that either acts as a buffer and absorbs crises, or transmits and amplifies them.

Given Saudi Arabia’s position as a pivotal regional power, it cannot content itself with securing its immediate borders while crises rage throughout its strategic surroundings. From this perspective, Sudan is not merely a neighbour across the sea, but one of the most important components of Saudi strategic depth. Its stability means stability along the kingdom’s western maritime frontier, control over flows of irregular migration and smuggling, and keeping at bay the spectre of a security vacuum that could be exploited by armed groups and extremist organisations.

When Riyadh invests in Sudan’s reconstruction and development through permanent institutional frameworks such as the Coordination Council, it is building a wall of stability around its strategic depth. It has understood that genuine security cannot be bought with walls alone, but is built through the prosperity of its neighbours.

A new Saudi approach to Red Sea security

The security of major waterways is not simply the product of military protection of the passage itself, but of the strength and stability of the states along its shores. A Red Sea bordered or surrounded by fragile or collapsed states, or states penetrated by irregular forces, is an insecure Red Sea regardless of the military capabilities of the major powers along its shores.

From this lesson, a more mature Saudi vision has emerged: it is not enough for the kingdom to be strong on the eastern shore. The states along the western shore and the Red Sea’s southern approaches, including Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia, must also be strong, cohesive and capable of exercising full sovereignty over their coastlines. By placing the “Red Sea” alongside security and defence among its areas of focus, the Saudi-Sudanese Coordination Council puts this philosophy into practice: strengthening Sudan’s ability to control its coastline is a direct Saudi investment in the security of the Red Sea as a whole.

The responsibility of regional power

The Saudi-Sudanese Coordination Council is an expression of a broader political philosophy embraced by Riyadh: genuine regional power does not grow stronger by isolating itself behind borders, but by assuming responsibility for the stability of its surroundings. At a time when projects of fragmentation are proliferating, supporting Sudan’s unity, strengthening Saudi strategic depth and safeguarding Red Sea security are three sides of the same coin.

When Saudi Arabia safeguards the unity of its neighbour, it safeguards the integrity of its own strategic project. When it protects the stability of the Sudanese coast, it protects the stability of its own. This is the dialectic of shared geography: neither neighbour can be secure without the other, and neither shore can be stable without the one opposite it.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Authorities were warned about dangers of hitting Mohammad Ghamira, who suffered from the rare medical condition haemophilia.

A Syrian police officer has been arrested and may be criminally prosecuted after an investigation found that he hit a detainee with a medical condition who died shortly after being released from custody.

Syria’s Interior Ministry said on Thursday that Mohammad Ghamira, 29, died after being slapped by police investigator Ahmad Jawad, who has since been detained and referred to the public prosecutor.

Ghamira, who died on Sunday, suffered from haemophilia, a rare condition that prevents blood from clotting properly, making sufferers bleed more easily and for longer periods.

The father of two was a member of the White Helmets, the civil defence organisation made up of volunteers that operated in rebel-held areas in Syria. They went on search and rescue operations and provided medical care following government attacks.

The investigation found that Ghamira had told internal security personnel about his condition, while his wife twice informed authorities about the potential danger.

Ahmad Latouf, head of the investigation committee and assistant interior minister for police affairs, confirmed that Ghamira died after suffering a brain haemorrhage believed to have been caused by the slap.

Two other police officers are also being investigated but are not currently due to be prosecuted.

Ghamira’s death has provoked widespread anger among Syrians, reminding many of the gross human rights abuses that were systematic under former President Bashar al-Assad, who was overthrown by rebels in December 2024.

New leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, has promised to usher in a new era, prioritising human rights and overseeing an inclusive government. However, human rights organisations have documented widespread abuses by government forces, particularly against minority groups.

Commenting on Ghamira’s death on Thursday, the Interior Ministry accused Jawad of violating ministerial instructions and the code of conduct, which strictly prohibit any form of humiliating or abusive treatment of detainees.

Syrian Interior Minister Anas Khattab said in a statement that the investigation results showed the ministry’s “commitment to reaching the truth and holding accountable those proven to have overstepped”.

“We rose up against the former tyrant’s regime in rejection of injustice and impunity, and therefore, building a state of law begins with our ability to hold the wrongdoer accountable, to give restitution to the victim, and not to do injustice to anyone who has not been proven responsible” for wrongdoing, he said.

Reporting from Syria’s northwestern port city of Latakia, Al Jazeera’s Heidi Pett said the Syrian government has vowed to take further action.

“There will be surveillance put into police stations and better training provided to officers but they say all of this will take time,” Pett said.

“Part of the reason it has resonated so widely is because of who Mohammad was. He was a young man, 29 years old, and he had two children and was a volunteer with the White Helmets. They were basically seen as heroes. His father joined the revolution and so he’s a figure who many people here in his community and nationally respected,” she added.

“That’s part of why there’s been so much sadness and anger and it’s also [because of] the fact that Mohammad is not the first to be mistreated in detention by the new authorities. Syrian rights organisations have documented other cases of deaths in detention.”

Ghamira was arrested last week accused of theft. He was later released and died at a hospital in Latakia on Sunday.

During a forensic examination, medical experts found no visible signs of violence or severe force, as well as no skull fractures or traumatic wounds.

Fifteen years since the uprising against Muammar Gaddafi in Libya began, and with civil strife leading to the downfall of what was once one of Africa’s wealthiest countries, several actors are seeking to end the civil war and reunite the country.

Among them are the US, which has commercial interests in Libya’s oil fields. Qatar, Egypt and Turkiye are also pushing for a return to “One Libya”, after more than a decade of fighting between two rival authorities for control of the country.

Here’s what we know:

What happened 15 years ago?

The Libyan uprising erupted during the Arab Spring, when thousands of people in the port city of Benghazi took to the streets to protest against Gaddafi’s more than four decades of absolute power.

Violence against the demonstrations pushed the protesters into an armed rebellion against Gaddafi’s rule, with a civil war starting between the two sides.

A United Nations Security Council resolution authorised an international military intervention force – led by NATO members, the United States, United Kingdom and France – to enforce a no-fly zone and ensure the protection of civilians in Libya. This bombing campaign pushed back Gaddafi’s forces from Benghazi and aided the rebels in seizing territory.

Gaddafi was eventually captured and killed in October 2011, 42 years after he first seized power in a military coup that overthrew King Idris.

How is Libya divided?

Following Gaddafi’s death, a power vacuum emerged, with multiple groups – and their allied militias – competing for power.

Control of the country is now split between two rival administrations: the UN-recognised Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli, led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dheibah, and the eastern, Tobruk-based administration backed by Khalifa Haftar and his self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA).

The GNU is recognised by the UN and other countries, and officially has authority in the capital and western Libya.

Under Gaddafi, Haftar was exiled in the US for two decades where he holds citizenship.

His forces control vast resource-rich lands in the east, including the strategic port city of Benghazi, reportedly with the backing of Russia.

The UN began formal mediation efforts in 2020 under the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). This roadmap advocates for a three-track strategy that includes unifying the two rival administrations, presidential and parliamentary elections, and hosting national dialogue meetings.

The US was a key mediator behind the scenes, and in May 2021, appointed Ambassador Richard Norlan as Special Envoy to Libya, to lead high-level talks between the two sides.

What is the US’s new plan?

Under Massad Boulous, US President Donald Trump’s African and Middle Eastern affairs adviser, and father-in-law to Tiffany Trump, Washington is intensifying efforts to reunite the country. But this can only be achieved if both sides agree to form a single government.

According to leaked details, Trump’s initiative centres on the promise that if the rival governments cooperate, the US would encourage American investment in Libya’s sizable oil fields. This comes as the Libyan Central Bank, which is attempting to finance both authorities, sounds the alarm over the dire economic situation.

While Tripoli has international legitimacy, Haftar’s forces control the oilfields and terminals.

The US is also proposing a power-sharing deal that would see Dheibah continue to lead the government while Haftar’s son and LNA army chief, 35-year-old Saddam Haftar, serves as president.

There are obvious opportunities for US energy companies and economic and political incentives for European countries in a unified and stable Libya.

They include stopping irregular migration from Libya and other North African countries to the EU.

Some criticise the US-led plan as lacking input from the Libyan people. The deal, some say, could entrench the power of political dynasties, which might be best for long-term stability in Libya.

What have the results been?

There are signs that Haftar’s camp, at least, is on board with the US plan. Saddam Haftar, whose father, Khalifa, was based in Virginia until 2011, reportedly met with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in DC in July.

Experts attribute the ongoing mediation efforts to the unified national budget of 2026, signed in April – the first in more than a decade.

However, there are still no talks or signs of a unified government forming.

What is Turkiye’s role?

Turkiye, which earlier deployed troops to support the GNU, has also made efforts to mediate between the two sides and is pushing a ‘One Libya’ policy.

Last month, Foreign Affairs Minister, Hakan Fidan, met with Saddam Haftar in Ankara. Earlier this month, Fidan travelled to both Tripoli and Benghazi for high-level talks with Dheibah and Khalifa Haftar.

What has Egypt done?

The Egyptian government has traditionally cooperated with Haftar’s Tobruk government, which is just across the border.

On Wednesday, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi met with Khalifa Haftar in Cairo and discussed unification talks.

Earlier this month, Dheibah visited Cairo, while Egyptian intelligence chief Hassan Rashad travelled to Tripoli.

What is Qatar’s stance?

Qatar has largely backed the UN mediation channels in Libya: the UNSMIL and the UN roadmap for peace.

While it has good relations with the GNU, Qatar seeks stabilisation efforts led by Libyan parties and elections.

In April, Qatar and other states welcomed the unified budget for 2026. A statement issued by Qatar, Egypt, France, Germany and several others called for all parties in Libya to follow the UN roadmap to “advance a Libyan-led political process leading to unified governance and national elections.”

It had been a lengthy and productive meeting with the chief of staff to a Republican member of Congress. We had discussed United States policy towards Israel, and the scepticism of many of the Grand Old Party members towards the relationship and the challenge they face in saying anything about it given President Donald Trump’s iron grip on it. But there was one final agenda item I needed to raise: the member’s participation in the newly created “Sharia-Free America Caucus”, a group of US representatives standing against what one founding member described as “a religion of violence, abuse of women, and ruthless political conquest. Its laws and practices have no place in American society.”

“Oh, don’t worry about that,” the staffer said, with a wave of his hand. “Muslims are just the low-hanging fruit. Really it is about Indians. And brown people in general. And the Jews, too. It won’t get in the way of putting America first. Really the only Member [of the Caucus] who believes all the bullshit about Israel is Randy Fine.”

The whipping up of Islamophobia in the US has become visible and visceral, to the extent that many in the Muslim community now look back almost wistfully to the days of George W Bush, who made a point, in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, of visiting a mosque and declaring that “Islam is peace”. Such efforts at inclusivity have almost vanished entirely from the Republican Party, replaced by an outright bigotry that has inspired a spike in anti-Muslim attacks, such as the shooting at the Islamic Center of San Diego in May that killed two worshippers and a security guard. A recent proposal by Dallas Fort Worth international airport to add unobtrusive foot-washing stations for Muslims wishing to perform wudu (and presumably anyone else with dirty feet) was swiftly abandoned in the face of condemnation by Texas Governor Greg Abbott that the installation of such stations would be unconstitutional.

Where is all this coming from? To be sure, some of it is a reflection of the politics that Trump has promoted since his very first day of presidential campaigning in 2015 to divide Americans by suggesting that the country’s White majority and its historic place atop the social hierarchy are at risk; in this context it is not only Muslims who are under attack, but all minorities, as demonstrated by his administration’s attacks on Black history or Hispanic culture. But when it comes to Islamophobia, there is a more targeted driver of the trend.

In January this year, the government of Israel hosted an anti-Semitism conference in Jerusalem. This, by itself, is rather unremarkable. But what is noteworthy is who attended: leaders from across the European far right, including representatives from Poland’s PiS, Spain’s Vox, Hungary’s Fidesz, and France’s Rassemblement National. The event was, perhaps, the largest gathering of European right-wingers to discuss anti-Semitism since the US-led umerziehung (re-education) process in post-war Germany.

But the far right are now allies, as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told them, in the fight against the “invasion of radical Islam”. Since January, Netanyahu has continued on this theme, recently warning that “the first Islamic republic with nuclear weapons will be the Islamic republic of Britain”, and campaigning for re-election under a billboard titled “Don’t let them win” that features the faces of Hezbollah and Iranian leaders alongside those of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and New York Mayor Zohran Mamdani.

Israel’s promotion of Islamophobia is not limited to Netanyahu, nor does it end at its own shores. As Israel’s own reputation has cratered, rather than examining its actions (particularly in Gaza), it has decided its salvation rests in more effective public relations and propaganda campaigns. Some of this has materialised in an effort to prop up its own reputation: “The US-Israel relationship promotes stability”, explained an automated text message that millions of other Americans and I recently received via Israeli-contracted Clock Tower X. But Israel is also going on the offensive by trying to knock down and delegitimise its critics and by rallying the right through a purposeful campaign of Islamophobia.

The strategy may have been informed by a leaked study solicited by Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs from US public relations firm Stagwell Global, which found that the most effective tactic in shifting public opinion would be to drive fear of “Radical Islam” and “Jihadism” but, in the absence of any compelling reason why the US should continue to back his country, Netanyahu has increasingly leaned into the argument that Israel is, as he claims foreign leaders have told him, the “model in the struggle against radical Islam which threatens the entire civilised world”.

This has manifested itself in Israel’s leveraging of increasingly virulent Islamophobia as part of its hasbara strategy, for instance in Canada in 2024, when an Israeli-government-funded influence operation using the name United Citizens for Canada conducted social media campaigns claiming that Muslim immigrants to the country posed a threat to society and were trying to impose Islamic law.

In many cases, Americans and Europeans have seen through such efforts. Recent primary wins for prominent Muslim congressional candidates such as Abdul El-Sayed have demonstrated a cross-communal rejection of Islamophobic rhetoric. But in other areas, Muslim communities increasingly feel under siege.

Israeli society is premised on Jewish supremacy and the pursuit of demographic homogeneity, but Western countries are increasingly diverse in both their demographics and their leadership. While the path to peace for Israel may be one that makes Israel look more like the West – a country with equality for all its people – at the core of its current propaganda campaign is the desire to make the West look more like Israel. That poses a test for Western pluralism, but even if the West fails that test, Israel should not assume that such a failure would inherently lead to an embrace of Zionism.

Fear and hatred are powerful tools, and the current Islamophobic campaign is likely to unleash further and deeper harms. But even on its primary objective, to stem the loss of support in Israel’s last bastion of Western far-right opinion, it is far from clear that it will succeed. In the meantime, Europeans and Americans would be wise to see it for what it is: a desperate foreign influence operation driven by a state that is increasingly running out of options.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

The foreign minister says in an interview that Turkish military officials had visited the airbase as part of training.

Syria has no plans to establish a Turkish military presence at the Abu al-Duhur airbase attacked by Israel earlier this week, Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani has said.

Al-Shaibani said in an interview with the US news outlet Axios on Wednesday that while Turkish military officials had visited the site as part of training and broader military cooperation, he denied any Turkish military build-up, explaining that the facility was largely empty.

“There was no intention to establish a Turkish base there, nor to establish a permanent Turkish military presence or deploy Turkish forces at the site,” al-Shaibani said, adding that he had made this clear to Israel.

On Tuesday, Israel carried out eight air strikes on the runway and storage facilities at the Abu al-Duhur base near Aleppo, state media reported, in what appeared to be Israel’s first attack on Syrian government assets since March.

No casualties were reported from the attack, which drew international condemnation.

Al-Shaibani said Israel had no legitimate justification for attacking the facility.

He said that while Syria remained open to negotiations with Israel on de-escalation, any future deal must address the security concerns of both countries, reiterating that Israeli military operations would increase regional instability.

The strikes came amid worsening security tensions between Israel and Turkiye over Syria, where both countries’ militaries are active.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Israel warned Syria ahead of the strike not to allow a Turkish presence at the base.

“Our message was very clear. Don’t. I guess they didn’t quite understand the message,” Netanyahu said on Wednesday.

On Thursday morning, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz claimed that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was “dragging Turkiye into dangerous adventures in Syria”.

“Israel will not allow any entity to threaten its security,” he said.

“It is preferable for Erdogan to continue delivering empty, delusional speeches against Israel in the Turkish parliament rather than testing Israel’s resolve to defend itself,” Katz added.

Turkiye has rejected what it called “untenable allegations” by Israel over its military position in Syria.

The Turkish defence ministry said on Thursday that Ankara would continue supporting Syria’s efforts to develop its own military capacity and infrastructure.

It said there was no military delegation at the air base hit by Israel before or during the attacks, calling for the international community to take more concrete and effective measures against Israel’s actions, which it said threatened regional peace and stability.

Turkiye, a NATO member, has emerged as one of Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s main allies and has accused Israel of trying to destabilise Syria and undermine its new administration.

It has also repeatedly called for international pressure and measures on Israel to respect Syria’s territorial integrity.

Last year, Turkiye and Israel established a line of communication to avoid any incidents in Syria.

The transfer is the first from Lebanon involving a Syrian military officer who fled after al-Assad’s government was toppled in 2024.

Lebanon has handed over a former senior Syrian army officer to Damascus to face charges related to murder and torture, the first such transfer since former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was toppled in 2024.

The transfer involved Major-General Adel Issa, a former commander of the Syrian army’s 17th Division who later led ground forces in the eastern province of Deir ez-Zur.

Syria’s Ministry of Interior confirmed his delivery into Syrian custody in a statement on Wednesday.

“Today, Syrian authorities received from the Lebanese authorities the former officer in the defunct regime army, Major-General Adel Issa,” the ministry said.

It added that a Syrian arrest warrant had accused Issa of charges including intentional homicide, facilitating a felony, killing more than two people, torture leading to death, and crimes aimed at inciting civil war and sectarian strife.

A Damascus referral judge will hear his case, which could then be sent to a criminal court for trial, the ministry added.

Issa, 67, has denied the accusations, the Reuters news agency reported, citing two people familiar with his arrest and extradition.

He was detained on August 8 after going to the Syrian embassy in Beirut to complete paperwork.

Embassy officials alerted the prosecutor’s office in Lebanon that he was wanted in Syria, and Lebanese investigators took him into custody, Reuters reported.

His transfer follows months of pressure by Damascus for Lebanon to act against former government officers, as well as security and military officials, who sought refuge in Lebanon after the Assad regime collapsed in December 2024.

President Ahmed al-Sharaa, a former rebel leader, has led the country since.

In January, Syrian authorities gave Lebanese security officials a list of more than 200 former senior officers wanted by Damascus.

Earlier this month, a Damascus court sentenced al-Assad to death in absentia on charges including murder, arbitrary detention and torture. Al-Assad lives in exile in Moscow.

An Israeli attack on a Syrian airbase has been widely condemned.

The United States envoy warns the incident could have caused a direct confrontation with Turkish forces.

So why did Israel attack the base? And what are the implications?

Presenter: Anna Burns-Francis

Guests:

Murat Yesiltas – Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA) think tank

Haid Haid – Consulting fellow with the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House

Michael Mulroy – Former US deputy assistant secretary of defence for the Middle East

Canada official condemns Israel’s ‘invasion’ of Lebanon, calls for sovereignty as aid pledged to the crisis-hit nation.

Canada’s secretary of state for international development, Randeep Sarai, visited Lebanon to announce new humanitarian aid, condemning what he called Israel’s “unlawful invasion” of Lebanon.

During his visit, Sarai stated that Beirut should govern its own space. He also announced new programmes Canada is launching to support Lebanese families affected by the conflict, raising its total assistance to Lebanon this year to more than $50m.

“Our commitment is long-term, and we’re there for Lebanon,” said Sarai, who visited shelters housing people displaced by the war and Syrian refugees during his visit.

Amid the escalation between Israel and Lebanon in March, Canada warned on March 25 that Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity “must not be violated” and strongly condemned plans by Israeli forces to occupy southern Lebanon.

As part of the US-mediated framework agreement signed in late June, “pilot zones” were designed to return small areas in southern Lebanon from Israeli forces to the Lebanese army.

In late July, the Lebanese Armed Forces accused Israel of obstructing its efforts to take over control of security in southern Lebanon.

The war has killed more than 4,000 people and has caused widespread destruction across Lebanon. The United Nations says that about 360,000 people are displaced as a result of the latest conflict.

Home to a large Lebanese diaspora, Canada has given Lebanon about $575m in assistance in the past 10 years, Sarai said.

Sarai also met Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, who promised to reinstate state authority across Lebanon and to implement reforms to fight corruption.

Israeli officials said they will not pull out of Lebanon until Hezbollah is disarmed.

A day after a suspected Israeli attack on the Abu al-Duhur airbase near Idlib, northwest Syria, US Ambassador to Turkiye Tom Barrack has suggested creating a “deconfliction mechanism” between Turkiye, Syria and Israel. Barrack called the original attack – which he, along with the Syrian government, blamed on Israel – an “unnecessary escalation”.

But despite the intervention from the US official, analysts believe the proposal may not be able to stop Israel, which has conducted regular attacks on Syria for years, and continues to occupy Syrian territory.

“It is difficult to have a deconfliction mechanism [when] only one party [is] causing conflict in the first place,” Samy Akil, a senior adviser with The Syria Report, told Al Jazeera.

Analysts and diplomatic sources say that Israel is the party holding back progress on talks and the easing of tensions with Syria, which is under a new government since the overthrow of former President Bashar al-Assad in December 2024. At the end of a more than decade-long war, Syria is now seeking better relations with the West.

“Israeli-Syrian talks are stagnating because the ball is in Israel’s court and they don’t see a need to prioritise talks with Damascus currently,” Akil said.

Turkiye and Israel trade verbal shots

Under the former al-Assad regime, Israel often attacked Iranian-aligned targets or interests in Syria – including the Iranian consulate in Damascus in April 2024 – but avoided directly attacking Syrian state targets.

That changed when al-Assad fled in the early hours of December 8, 2024. Israel attacked Syria’s military infrastructure around the country, aiming to cripple the new government’s military forces. It also threatened the post-Assad military with deploying forces south of Damascus.

And since the fall of al-Assad, Israel has also shifted focus from Iranian influence in Syria to Turkish influence in the country. The Turks backed a number of anti-Assad rebel groups, many Syrians in exile spent considerable time in Turkiye, and Ankara has sought to build strong ties with Damascus and Syria’s new President Ahmed al-Sharaa.

Analysts told Al Jazeera that Tuesday’s attack was in fact a message from Tel Aviv directed at the halls of power in Ankara.

On Tuesday evening, the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office issued a statement that seemed to confirm that suspicion, while it stopped short of claiming responsibility for the actual attack.

“Israel and Syria agreed to a status quo in security matters, which Syria was on the verge of breaching by permitting Turkish troops to deploy at an airbase near Aleppo,” the statement said.

“Israel repeatedly warned Syria that such a deployment would pose a threat to Israel’s security. Syria chose to ignore these warnings.”

Turkiye has slammed the Israeli account of events.

“The untenable allegations put forward by the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office are intended to legitimise Israel’s unlawful airstrikes targeting Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” the Republic of Turkiye’s Directorate of Communications said.

It also accused Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of pursuing “expansionist and destabilising policies in the region ahead of the elections in Israel”.

Israeli provocations in Syria

Enter US Ambassador Barrack and the idea of a deconfliction mechanism. This would act as a channel of communication between the concerned actors – Syria, Turkiye and Israel. It would be facilitated by the US, and would aim to prevent military escalations.

The strategy appears to be similar to what the US is trying to build in Lebanon between Beirut and Tel Aviv. That deal is aimed at stopping Israeli attacks on Lebanon, disarming Hezbollah, and convincing Israel to withdraw troops from southern Lebanon. However, experts say these processes have yet to show results, largely because of Israel’s military superiority and the Netanyahu government’s willingness to undermine negotiations through unilateral military actions.

For its part, the Syrian government has shown a strong willingness to find a solution with Israel, even if it has emphasised that it is not willing to agree to full normalisation.

That is despite the Israeli landgrab of Syrian territory in the Golan Heights and Jabal al-Sheikh in December 2024, and the continued deployment of checkpoints that harass and at times kidnap Syrian citizens.

Early on Wednesday morning, Israeli troops reportedly conducted a raid on Quneitra in southwestern Syria and abducted two people.

Analysts say that for any deconfliction mechanism to work, all parties must be committed to working towards the goal.

“In other words, at what point does a deconfliction mechanism provide added value when any sort of Syrian military buildup 300 kilometres [186 miles] away from Israeli borders is perceived as a threat?” Akil said, adding that Syria’s small Soviet-era air force would not “seriously pose a threat to Israel”.

Netanyahu’s re-election escalation

Galip Dalay, a senior research fellow at Chatham House, told Al Jazeera that for any mechanism to work, the US would need to apply pressure on Netanyahu’s government.

Dalay said Netanyahu, who is running for re-election in October, is likely looking for an escalation with either Lebanon or Syria – or in Palestine – after US President Donald Trump pressured Israel to back down in the war on Iran.

But earlier in August, Netanyahu explicitly rejected the Gaza disarmament plan announced by Trump, forcing it to be altered – and did not receive any public pushback from the US.

“If the US puts proper pressure on Israel, they would listen,” Dalay said. “We saw this with Iran. It was the US who made the decision, and even though Netanyahu didn’t like it, they had to go along with the decision.”

Dalay added: “The question is not only about if there is a need for a deconfliction mechanism in Syria; it is to what extent the US is willing to make it credible and functional, and if the US is willing to put pressure on Israel.”

Israeli air strikes on Gaza kill 10 Palestinians, targeting police headquarters and a refugee camp in separate attacks.

Israeli strikes have killed at least 10 Palestinians in two separate attacks targeting a Gaza City police post and Nuseirat refugee camp in central Gaza.

Hamas, which governs the Gaza Strip, condemned what it called “a new war crime”.

On Wednesday, medical sources at al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza City said they received nine Palestinian bodies following an attack on the municipal police headquarters in the centre of Gaza City. Another 15 people were wounded.

Al Jazeera’s Hani Mahmoud, reporting from Gaza City, said the bombardment occurred at a busy time near a park crowded with civilians, including children.

Victims of the Gaza City strike included a newly-appointed Gaza City police chief, the director of a women’s police force, and several officers.

Earlier in the day, a strike on Nuseirat refugee camp killed one Palestinian, medics said, increasing Wednesday’s death toll to at least 10.

The Israeli army claimed its air force struck two Hamas commanders in Nuseirat, and that it later struck a Hamas commander in the Tuffah area of Gaza City, without providing evidence of their affiliation.

In a statement, Hamas rejected Israel’s justification that the strike targeted “resistance leaders”, calling the claim “baseless and false allegations used to justify its aggression and cover up its deliberate targeting of civilian police and unarmed civilians”.

Hamas accused the Israeli government of “deliberately undermining these efforts and dangerously pushing towards reigniting the war of extermination against our people in the Gaza Strip”.

On Tuesday, Israeli strikes killed seven people – including a child – and wounded 14 others at a crowded cafe on Gaza City’s harbour. The city’s port has been turned into a displacement camp, according to Wafa news agency.

The Israeli military again claimed, without providing evidence, that it had targeted Hamas commanders in the enclave.

Diplomatic deadlock

Wednesday’s attacks occurred two days after US President Donald Trump’s son-in-law and Middle East envoy Jared Kushner visited the region to push for a Trump-backed deal to end to Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza.

Kushner’s meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu failed to break a diplomatic deadlock after Netanyahu rejected an agreement for Israel to withdraw from the Strip in exchange for Hamas disarming.

Following the meeting, Kushner reiterated “Israel’s right to defend itself”. He threatened that Hamas must disarm or the US would support Israel to “finish the job in the appropriate way”.

WASHINGTON — The only remaining U.S. aircraft carrier patrolling the Pacific departed Asia through Singapore last week en route to the Middle East, marking the latest step in a steady drawdown of American military assets across the region.

An armada of naval forces, alongside a constellation of air-defense and missile capabilities, has been removed from a theater the Trump administration said just last year would be the battleground of the coming century.

And now, President Trump’s surprise decision this week to curtail military exercises with South Korea has further fueled anxiety across Asia, where Washington’s closest allies fear violent consequences from a vacuum of American power.

Trump said his decision to withdraw U.S. participation from the annual military drills was de-escalatory, claiming they would needlessly provoke North Korea’s dictator, Kim Jong Un, with whom he has recently been in touch.

But he also blamed Seoul for its decision to not take part in his war with Iran.

“I said, ‘Would you like to give us a little hand?’ ” Trump told reporters. “He said, ‘No thanks,’ and I said, ‘Wait a minute — we have 39,000 soldiers over there, guarding you from Kim Jong Un, your next-door neighbor, and you’re not going to help us.’ ”

“That’s strange,” Trump added. “We can’t go around and protect all of these countries, especially when they’re not there to help us.”

South Korea’s president, Lee Jae Myung, responded to Trump’s last-minute decision to pull back from the drills with a degree of alarm.

“From now on, we must prepare measures with even the worst-case scenario in mind,” Lee said, “on the premise that the Middle East situation may be prolonged.”

It was the latest jolt to South Korea’s confidence in an alliance that has formed a cornerstone of Washington’s defense strategy in Asia since the end of World War II.

The Pentagon has kept its THAAD missile-defense batteries on the Korean peninsula. But in March, it moved some of the system’s radars and forward-positioned interceptors toward the Middle East, as the Iran war strained U.S. missile-defense stocks. Analysts estimate the conflict has consumed more than 40% of the Pentagon’s THAAD interceptor inventory.

The diversion was accompanied by the redeployment of dozens of combat and dry-cargo ships, mine countermeasure vessels, and guided-missile destroyers out of the region, ahead of the departure of the strike group centered on the nuclear-powered USS George Washington, which is now on its way to the Middle East.

Other U.S. allies in the region reacted swiftly to Trump’s pullback from the Korean exercises.

The Australian government said it remained “deeply concerned” with North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, while Japan’s defense minister, Shinjiro Koizumi, warned of historic stakes.

“As Japan faces the most severe and complicated security environment in the post-war era, the cooperation among Japan, the United States and South Korea is critical to the peace and stability of the region,” Koizumi said in a statement.

And Beijing has been quick to capitalize on the vacuum.

China’s Foreign Ministry mocked that the United States “has become addicted to quitting groups and scrapping treaties,” while its military began installing permanent infrastructure in Taiwan’s exclusive economic zone within days of the George Washington’s departure.

“The current international landscape has once again proven that only by ensuring the effective operation of the multilateral system can we prevent the spread of the law of the jungle,” said Mao Ning, a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, “and keep the international order from being dominated by the logic that ‘might makes right and force represents justice.’”

Speaking with journalists in the Oval Office on Monday, Trump said that his communication with Kim was “making things safer” in the region.

He did not offer details on their conversations.

“Kim Jong Un has always treated me with great respect,” Trump said, confirming that the North Korean leader had replied to his overtures.

“I understand him,” Trump added. “He understands me.”

Crude oil and natural gas supplies have been disrupted worldwide by the United States-Israel war on Iran, but one energy sector appears to be cashing in – coal.

This week, South Africa’s thermal coal producer Thungela Resources said it had doubled its half-year profits as the war has forced more countries to buy the fuel.

Although abundant and relatively cheap to produce, coal is considered one of the dirtiest fossil fuels.

Mining it causes water pollution, and burning it releases enormous amounts of carbon into the atmosphere, which contributes to global warming.

In recent months, several countries, especially in Asia, have reversed or delayed promises to scale back on coal production.

Global coal consumption was already rising in 2025 with the Eurasia region and the US using the fuel to power artificial intelligence data centres, according to the World Bank.

Here’s what we know:

Why is more coal being used?

The US-Israel war on Iran has triggered a global energy crisis. Soon after strikes on Tehran began on February 28, Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, through which about one-fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies were shipped during peacetime.

Negotiations to reopen the strait are ongoing.

Its closure has reduced oil and gas supplies and caused oil prices to soar, prompting many countries to fall back on the most readily available alternative to keep the power on – coal.

While coal prices have also risen, the fuel is still much cheaper than oil – and is more readily available.

No region has been more impacted than Asia, which largely depends on the Gulf for its energy needs. About 82 percent of oil and gas shipments through the Strait of Hormuz went to Asia in 2022, according to the US Energy Information Administration. China, India, Japan and South Korea were the top destinations.

Besides being unable to ship exports through the strait, Gulf countries caught up in the conflict have also been badly impacted by Iranian strikes. Qatar, for example, was forced to declare force majeure on its delivery contracts in March when Iranian drones hit its Ras Laffan oil facility – the world’s largest LNG complex – forcing it offline. Iran’s attacks had knocked out 17 percent of Qatar’s LNG exports by March, state officials said.

Similarly, the United Arab Emirates’s Das Island LNG terminal, Fujairah oil terminal, Ruwais Refinery Complex and other energy sites have been attacked during the conflict. Facilities in Saudi Arabia and Oman have also been hit.

Where has coal use increased?

According to an analysis by the energy data company Ember, coal output will rise globally by 1.8 percent by the end of 2026 compared with 2025 in a “worst-case” scenario.

This represents a notable uptick considering that countries are meant to be transitioning away from coal, experts said.

Since the war began, several Asian countries have announced plans to increase coal-fired electricity generation.

Japan has lifted restrictions on older, high-emission coal plants to cope with the energy shocks while South Korea has delayed the shutdown of coal-powered plants it promised to wind down by 2040.

In Bangladesh, the government at first imposed power cuts, closed universities and rationed fuel sales for vehicles before announcing it had ramped up coal-powered electricity generation.

Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam have also increased coal-powered electricity generation to preserve dwindling gas reserves.

In Pakistan, data from the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority showed that by July, electricity generated from imported coal had risen by 90 percent compared with the same period the previous year.

China and India already consume 70 percent of the world’s coal and are also major producers. In India, where electricity demand is increasing partly due to more intense heatwaves, the government plans to launch several new coal-mining projects that will see global supplies increase by 2.5 billion tonnes a year, according to the Global Energy Monitor.

Germany also said it won’t jeopardise electricity generation because of earlier climate promises it made while Italy has pushed back its coal phase-out plans from late 2025 to 2038.

Who is making a profit from coal?

Indonesia is the top coal exporter by a wide margin, followed by Australia and Russia.

In March, Jakarta reversed previous plans to curb coal production and reduce oversupply in a bid to benefit from the rising prices. Prices were set at $131.85 per tonne in July, compared with $102.20 in the previous year.

South Africa’s Thungela, meanwhile, reported doubled profits from January to June, compared with the same period of 2025, driven largely by higher production from its Ensham mines in Queensland as well as higher demand and higher prices at both Ensham and its South Africa operations.

Production at Ensham rose by 38 percent in the first half of the year – during the peak of the conflict – to 2.2 tonnes, compared with 1.6 tonnes in the previous period.

The company reported 4.80 South African rand ($0.30) in headline earnings per share – or HEPS, a primary metric of profitability used in South Africa. That’s up from 1.92 rand ($0.12) in June last year.

In a statement, Thungela said prices will likely remain high as European and Asian markets prepare for winter.

What does this mean for the drive for clean energy?

In 2021, more than 40 countries, including Indonesia and Vietnam, promised to scale back coal use at the COP26 global climate summit. India and China did not sign up, however. Last year, South Korea joined the Powering Past Coal Alliance, which helps coal-dependent economies transition away from the fuel.

However, the Middle East crisis has upset those plans largely because many countries do not have sufficient renewable energy-generating capacity to fall back on, said Nick Hedley, an energy transition analyst at South Africa-based Zero Carbon Analytics.

“For the likes of Bangladesh, it’s easy to lift coal use when global gas supplies are disrupted because the country invested heavily in coal infrastructure in recent decades, and much of that capacity has been sitting idle,” he said.

“Coal becomes cheaper than imported gas when gas prices surge. Importantly, coal still cannot compete with renewables on cost,” Hedley added.

It’s not all doom, however. Analysts noted that upticks in some places are being offset by long-term declines in coal use in places like Europe.

China’s domestic coal production also fell this year as the government tightened oversight following a deadly explosion in May at the Liushenyu coal mine, where 82 people died. Beijing has also made large investments in renewables.

In addition, the breakdown of global fossil energy supply chains could make clean alternatives more competitive and force more countries to invest in them, Hedley pointed out.

“The lesson here is that Asian countries need to speed up their shift to clean energy and electrification to safeguard themselves against future global crises,” he concluded.

Beirut, Lebanon – Not long after the fall of the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, the new government was keen to hunt down members of the former regime.

Al-Assad and his brother fled the country hours before the capital Damascus fell to the advancing armed opposition, leaving many top officials and military commanders to fend for themselves.

Many of them reportedly fled and crossed to neighbouring Lebanon where some top officials were spotted openly in capital, Beirut.

Now the Syrian government is trying to get them extradited for war crimes committed during the uprising, which began in 2011.

“We are seeking to boost the international judicial cooperation to pursue members of the former regime and extradited to Syria to complete judicial procedures and process,” judge Mustafa al-Qassem, an aide to the Syrian justice minister, said in an interview with state television.

Former officials felt they were safe in Lebanon due to their close connections with Hezbollah or their network with figures in Lebanon’s military. Some had built connections in Lebanon over the years, including during Syria’s occupation of Lebanon, which ended in 2005.

But that’s no longer the case.

Adel Issa, a former major general in al-Assad’s Syrian Army, was arrested recently in Lebanon after staff at the Syrian embassy reportedly tipped off authorities after he came in to do paperwork. A top Lebanese prosecutor announced on Tuesday that Issa would be extradited to Syria to face trial due to alleged crimes he committed during his military service.

But there are other former al-Assad regime officials who are in Lebanon and whom Syrian authorities also want returned to face justice.

Last week, al-Assad, his brother Maher and his cousin Atef Najib were all sentenced to death by a Damascus court. Bashar and Maher al-Assad were sentenced in absentia because they are in exile in Moscow, where they fled after the regime fell.

Their presence in Russia likely protects them from extradition. But the case brings to attention important issues about remaining regime figures in Lebanon and their potential extradition to Syria.

Regime officials in Lebanon

On December 8, 2024, the five-decade reign of the al-Assad regime ended when Bashar left Damascus for Moscow. As rebels entered Damascus, al-Assad fled without telling many of his top officials who then had to sort out their own escapes.

Sources with knowledge of the whereabouts of former regime members said the top figures – such as the al-Assads or the former head of the National Security Bureau Ali Mamlouk – are in Moscow or the United Arab Emirates.

However, Jamil al-Hassan, the former head of the Air Force Intelligence Directorate, is thought to be in Lebanon. Last year, media reports suggested that Syria and France have called on Lebanon to arrest and extradite al-Hassan.

Aside from him, Bassam al-Hassan, a former Republican Guard commander who was in al-Assad’s inner circle, was tracked down to a Beirut apartment by a US broadcaster last year. He had been responsible for procuring weapons and liaising with Syria’s chemical weapons programme, which the regime used against its own people.

Hezbollah’s role

Syrian and European sources intimately familiar with the details said most former regime officials still in Lebanon are now in Tripoli’s Jabal Mohsen neighbourhood or in parts of the northern region of Akkar, which borders Syria. Estimates on the number of former regime officials in Lebanon are imprecise, experts said, because many have either moved to third countries, sometimes with false passports, or have been smuggled back into Syria.

One source familiar with the issue, speaking on background because he wasn’t authorised to share information publicly, said that in the early days after the fall of the regime, former government figures set up training camps in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley. However, the source said, the camps have since been shut down by Hezbollah and the Lebanese army.

On August 4, Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem said his party was open to a meeting with Syria’s leadership. The group fought side by side with the al-Assad regime in Syria’s war and is, therefore, viewed negatively by many Syrians. But Hezbollah has said it has no desire for bad relations with Syria’s new government.

“Russia shelters the family and its fortunes while so far declining to fund a restoration [of the al-Assad regime], and Hezbollah, under disarmament pressure, needs calm with Damascus more than it needs a [battle on the] Syrian front,” Nanar Hawach, the International Crisis Group’s senior analyst on Syria, told Al Jazeera.

Syria has been under pressure from the United States to intervene in Lebanon against Hezbollah although experts believe Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and his government are aware that such a move could lead to widespread regional unrest and undermine the domestic authority they are working to establish, including from figures still in Lebanon.

For years, Syria had a paternal relationship and view towards neighbouring Lebanon. The Syrian military entered Lebanon in 1976 when Bashar’s father, Hafez al-Assad, was in power and occupied large swaths of the country until 2005 when a popular uprising pushed Bashar al-Assad to withdraw his troops.

The younger al-Assad and Syria still exerted their influence in Lebanon via local allies, including Hezbollah, until the regime’s demise in 2024. Since then, Syria’s new government under al-Sharaa has indicated a willingness to have a more balanced and egalitarian relationship with Beirut.

To date, no Syrian regime figures accused of committing atrocities have been returned from Lebanon. That’s why, with extradition approved, Issa’s case could be so groundbreaking. While they have not yet faced trial, many former regime officials are either under foreign sanctions and/or worked in key regime roles that contributed to severe crimes against the Syrian people.

Earlier this year, Syrian authorities asked Lebanese security forces to hand over more than 200 senior officers who fled to Lebanon after the fall of Bashar al-Assad, according to a Reuters agency investigation that showed how the neighbouring country was a hub for insurgent plotting.

Lebanon’s parliament has passed a law to abolish capital punishment, making it the first country in the Middle East to do so. That has contributed to the controversy over the extradition process with Syria, which does apply the death penalty.

Wadih al-Asmar, cofounder and president of the Lebanese Centre for Human Rights, said a number of the Syrian officials in Lebanon would have committed crimes during the occupation period and, therefore, the Lebanese judiciary “has a duty and obligation” to prosecute some of these figures.

Al-Asmar said his organisation has received asylum requests from Syrians afraid to return to their country but none had been military figures connected to the former regime.

But other ex-regime officials, particularly those in Europe, could have those connections. And the landmark trial in Damascus last week that sentenced the al-Assad brothers and their cousin to death could be a concern for European and other states when extraditing wanted figures to Syria.

Experts said Beirut’s desire to have a positive relationship with Damascus will likely supersede human rights concerns related to the death penalty for former regime figures. Still, al-Asmar said: “Lebanon cannot, without violating international law and its own law, send back any person to a country where he can face the death penalty.”

He added: “It’s a very complicated situation, and I believe the only way out for the Lebanese government and the Syrian government with respect to the state of law is for Syria to abolish the death penalty.”

Iran denies launching missiles at the UAE, suggesting the incident was a ‘false flag operation’.

The United Arab Emirates has imposed an indefinite trade embargo on Iran after accusing Iranian forces of firing two ballistic missiles at the country, an allegation Tehran denies.

In a statement early on Wednesday, the UAE’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the decision was made in “light of escalations that undermine peace and security in the region”.

“All trade, commercial exchanges and financial transactions with Iran have been halted until further notice,” it added.

The statement came after the UAE’s Ministry of Defence said its air defences detected two ballistic missiles launched from Iran, with one falling outside the country’s territorial waters and the other landing within them.

In a follow-up statement, the ministry said the missiles had been “targeting maritime traffic” and promised to “resolutely confront any attempt to undermine the security of the nation or maritime navigation in the region”.

Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected the accusation as “baseless”, with spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei suggesting it was a “false flag operation” amid the war launched by the United States and Israel against his country.

Baghaei warned the claim “contradicts the principle of good neighbourliness” and urged regional parties to steer clear of what he called unfounded claims against Tehran, and argued that any honest assessment of the situation must also weigh the “malicious actions” of the US and Israel.

US naval blockade

Tuesday’s attack came a day after a 60-day window for US-Iranian peace talks expired without a breakthrough in the more than five-month-old conflict.

In the war’s first six weeks, Iran targeted the UAE with retaliatory strikes more than any other Gulf country, launching more than 530 ballistic missiles, dozens of cruise missiles and over 2,200 drones at what it described as US assets. Tuesday’s strike is the first targeting the UAE since May, and comes days after Abu Dhabi accused Tehran of attacking two of its state-owned ADNOC (Abu Dhabi National Oil Company) vessels in the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran has not claimed responsibility for the ADNOC attacks.

The trade embargo comes as the US maintains a naval blockade on Iranian ports, with President Trump signalling a pivot towards economic pressure, rather than military pressure, to compel Tehran into accepting US demands.

Mark Kimmitt, a retired US general and former assistant secretary of state, told Al Jazeera the UAE’s trade embargo could hit Iran harder than anything Washington has imposed, with Dubai having quietly become Iran’s most important trading partner, edging out both China and Turkiye to supply roughly a third of everything Iran imports each year.

The UAE had suspended direct cargo shipping between the two countries in early March, just days after the war began, and resumed trade only in late June via Dubai’s Jebel Ali Port.

“I don’t think that you can overstate or understate the importance of the trade, both financial and goods trade, between Dubai and Iran,” Kimmitt said.

That reliance runs deeper than goods on ships, given Dubai’s standing as a global financial hub, which Kimmitt said has long given Iran a discreet way to move money around international sanctions, cutting off a route Tehran has long relied on for years. “In many ways, the embargo being put on by the UAE is even more significant than the embargo being put on by the United States,” he said.

The former general said he doesn’t expect other Gulf states to follow suit immediately, predicting a “wait-and-see” approach even if Iranian attacks continue.

But he said the UAE’s move is significant enough that Tehran could interpret it as bordering on an act of war, likening it to the near-total embargo the US imposed on Japan after World War II.