Middle East

The chatter among Barcelona fans this summer was all about who would be the club’s next star striker after Robert Lewandowski – the team’s top scorer for the past four seasons – left to play in the United States.

The 18-year-old Egyptian, Hamza Abdelkarim, was not an answer anyone would have given at the beginning of preseason. This time last year, he had only played a single game at senior level, and that was for Cairo giants Al Ahly.

But as Barca’s dogged pursuit of Argentinian striker Julian Alvarez from rivals Atletico Madrid ended in failure, and the club only managed to secure a 10 million euros ($11.5m) move for Gabriel Jesus on the transfer window’s deadline day on September 1, Abdelkarim emerged from obscurity to dominate headlines in Catalonia and Egypt.

Abdelkarim’s four goals in five games made him Barcelona’s top scorer during preseason. He even scored against his boyhood club, Al Ahly, in the Joan Gamper Trophy – the fixture that is used to introduce the team to the fans and inaugurate the league season – but chose not to celebrate the goal as a mark of respect.

“Hamza offers something different,” Adrian Healey, ESPN’s La Liga match commentator, told Al Jazeera.

Fans in Egypt and Barcelona have taken to calling him the Egyptian Erling Haaland on account of his physical prowess and presence in the box.

When the striker caught the eye of FC Barcelona, a low-risk, low-commitment agreement was struck in the winter transfer window with Al Ahly to bring him to Spain. A six-month loan period was cut in half due to paperwork issues, but Abdelkarim made up for lost time by scoring goals; not for the first team, or even the reserves, but the Under-19 team – netting six times in 11 games.

Abdelkarim had also impressed for Egypt at the 2025 U17 World Cup, grabbing two goals and an assist in four appearances.

Despite the lack of top-level experience, Abdelkarim had done enough to prompt Egypt national team manager Hossam Hassan to take a gamble by selecting the uncapped teenager for his World Cup 2026 squad.

The veteran Mostafa Mohammed was left at home in favour of Abdelkarim, who went on to make his debut against Brazil in a friendly and featured in four World Cup matches.

On the advice of Mohamed Salah, the striker decided not to take a vacation after the World Cup and returned to Barcelona immediately after Egypt were knocked out by Argentina in the round of 16.

“Mohamed Salah is always talking to me, and I follow everything he says. He is an example to be followed, and the success he achieved is not by accident,” he told Egypt’s OnSport after FC Barcelona lifted the Joan Gamper Trophy.

The exposure to a professional like Salah has only served to supercharge Abdelkarim’s development.

Barcelona had already seen enough and decided to make his loan move permanent in June, paying Al Ahly 1.5 million euros ($1.75m) for his services.

“I am not surprised at all in Hamza’s [emergence],” Ismail el-Hamalawy, a footballing content creator who has closely followed the young striker’s journey, told Al Jazeera, citing his World Cup performances.

“He is the striker Egypt has been missing for two decades,” el-Hamalawy told Al Jazeera.

The only other Egyptian-born player to have played in La Liga was Mido, who came through the ranks at Zamalek before leaving Egypt as a 17-year-old in 2000 and played in Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, France, Italy and England.

At the turn of the century, most Egyptians followed Mido’s progress through newspapers and local talk shows. Now, Egyptians can easily track Abdelkarim’s development in real time online.

The interest has been so profound that Barcelona signed a surprise sponsorship with EgyptAir through the 2028-29 season this week as both entities look to leverage the image of Egypt’s next great footballer for commercial gain.

The club is now scrambling to improve his contract so that a larger buyout clause can be installed. As it stands, the 18-year-old could be poached by a rival club for only 15 million euros ($17m), so the Catalan giants are looking to place a 150 million euros ($174m) buyout clause to ward off any potential suitors.

An unused substitute in the first two matches of the season, Barcelona coach Hansi Flick has repeatedly told the media that the striker’s time will come.

“He deserves to play, and he will play,” Flick said. “I see him improving day by day. He has the right attitude and mentality.”

With such little top-level experience, it could have been considered irresponsible of the club to give the youngster too much responsibility too soon.

“He will have to [be] patient, but he will get minutes,” Healey said. “[But] I am not sure the signing of [Gabriel] Jesus changes much for him, as I see [Jesus] as just a stopgap solution. Abdelkarim might have had less minutes had Alvarez signed.”

On August 31, Abdelkarim replaced Raphina in the final five minutes of Barcelona’s 5-2 win over Rayo Vallecano.

With an official debut out of the way, the striker can focus on clearing the next hurdle – scoring his first official goal for the La Liga champions.

The renewed escalation in Yemen is no longer simply a Yemeni battlefield development. For Saudi Arabia, it is becoming a direct test of national security, economic resilience and the kingdom’s ability to prevent the wider regional war from spilling further across its borders.

The latest Houthi attacks have demonstrated this clearly. Missiles and drones have hit civilian and economic sites in Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jizan and Najran, injuring dozens of civilians and causing fires and temporary disruption at energy facilities. The attacks came as fighting intensified in Yemen and around the western coast, while the Houthis continued to threaten maritime traffic in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb.

Saudi Arabia therefore faces two interconnected threats: Attacks on its territory and attempts to disrupt the maritime routes on which regional and international trade depends.

This creates a difficult strategic equation for Riyadh. Saudi Arabia has spent the past several years trying to move away from direct military involvement in Yemen and towards diplomacy, de-escalation and support for a political settlement. A return to an open-ended war would contradict that strategy and impose unnecessary political and economic costs.

But restraint cannot mean accepting repeated attacks on Saudi territory.

A different security environment

The security challenge today differs considerably from the first years of the Yemen war.

Saudi Arabia has strengthened its air and missile defences, improved coordination between its military and security institutions and accumulated considerable experience in countering drones and ballistic missiles. It is therefore much better prepared to defend its territory than it was a decade ago.

Yet the Houthi threat has also evolved.

The group possesses a combination of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and increasingly sophisticated drones. Even when most incoming weapons are intercepted, relatively inexpensive systems can impose disproportionate defensive costs and create uncertainty around airports, industrial facilities, border communities and energy infrastructure.

This means Saudi security cannot depend on interception alone. No air defence system can guarantee a perfect shield indefinitely.

The strategic objective must therefore be deterrence: Convincing the Houthis that attacks on Saudi territory will impose costs greater than any political or military benefit they expect to obtain.

This does not necessarily require returning to the large-scale military campaign of previous years. Riyadh has more options today. These include intelligence operations, strengthening Yemeni government forces, improving border security, disrupting missile and drone supply networks and, where necessary, conducting proportionate operations against facilities directly involved in attacks on Saudi Arabia.

The distinction is important. Saudi Arabia does not need to choose between doing nothing and returning to a full-scale war.

The economic front

The economic consequences are equally important.

Saudi Arabia is one of the world’s largest energy exporters, which makes attacks on its oil infrastructure internationally significant even when physical damage is limited. The latest attacks affected energy facilities and contributed to renewed concern in already nervous global oil markets.

There is an apparent paradox here: Regional instability can push oil prices higher and temporarily increase Saudi oil revenues. But higher prices caused by war should not be confused with economic benefit.

Saudi Arabia’s economic strategy under Vision 2030 depends increasingly on stability, investment, tourism, logistics, technology and the development of major projects outside the oil sector. Persistent missile and drone attacks can raise insurance and transport costs and affect perceptions of regional risk even if the kingdom’s underlying economy remains strong.

The greater strategic concern is maritime security.

Saudi Arabia occupies a strategic position between two of the world’s most important energy corridors: The Strait of Hormuz to the east and Bab al-Mandeb to the west. Disruption of both routes represents a serious challenge not only for Saudi Arabia but for the global economy.

This is why the Red Sea dimension of the Yemen conflict is particularly important. Bab al-Mandeb connects the Indian Ocean with the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. A sustained Houthi ability to threaten shipping there would increase freight and insurance costs and potentially divert vessels around Africa.

Saudi Arabia, however, possesses an important strategic advantage: Its energy infrastructure is not completely dependent on the Gulf. The kingdom can transport significant quantities of oil through its East-West pipeline to terminals on the Red Sea. This provides an alternative to Hormuz and gives Riyadh greater strategic flexibility.

That advantage does not, however, eliminate Saudi Arabia’s exposure to insecurity elsewhere in the Red Sea, including around Bab al-Mandeb.

Protecting Bab al-Mandeb should therefore be understood not simply as a Saudi or Yemeni interest but as an international economic and security requirement.

Avoiding the Houthi trap

The greatest danger for Riyadh may be political rather than purely military.

The Houthis could benefit from drawing Saudi Arabia back into an extensive war. It would allow them to portray the conflict once again as a confrontation between Yemen and an external power rather than a struggle among Yemenis over the future of their state.

Saudi Arabia should avoid this trap.

Confronting the Houthis must remain fundamentally a Yemeni responsibility. The internationally recognised Yemeni government and its forces should carry the principal burden of confronting Houthi expansion on the ground, while Saudi Arabia provides political, economic, intelligence and defensive support.

This is particularly important on the western coast. If the Houthis consolidate their military position around strategic areas overlooking the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb, the consequences will extend far beyond Yemen.

The objective should not be to retake Sanaa through another large-scale air campaign or restart an indefinite regional war. It should be to prevent the Houthis from using military force to change the regional balance, threaten neighbouring states or threaten international maritime arteries.

Diplomacy backed by deterrence

Saudi policy is therefore likely to operate on several tracks simultaneously.

First, Riyadh will continue strengthening its air and missile defences and protecting critical infrastructure. Second, it can increase support for Yemeni government forces while avoiding unnecessary direct involvement in ground combat. Third, it will seek broader regional and international cooperation to secure the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb.

At the same time, diplomatic channels should remain open.

Saudi Arabia has repeatedly demonstrated its preference for a negotiated settlement in Yemen. But negotiations are sustainable only when both sides believe that escalation carries unacceptable costs.

Diplomacy, therefore, must be backed by credible military power.

Saudi Arabia has strong incentives to prevent Yemen from becoming another permanent front in the wider regional confrontation. The kingdom’s economic transformation requires stability, while its geopolitical interests require secure borders, uninterrupted energy exports and freedom of navigation.

But the same logic that encourages restraint also places limits on it.

If attacks on Saudi cities, civilians and energy infrastructure continue, Riyadh will increasingly regard the issue not as intervention in the Yemeni civil war but as the defence of Saudi territory.

That distinction will shape what comes next.

Saudi Arabia does not need another prolonged Yemen war. Nor does Yemen. But avoiding one requires restoring deterrence while preserving the possibility of a political settlement.

The most effective Saudi strategy, therefore, is neither unlimited escalation nor passive restraint. It is calibrated pressure: Defend the kingdom, strengthen legitimate Yemeni institutions, protect the Red Sea, keep diplomatic channels open and make clear that attacks on Saudi territory will carry consequences.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

The continental games will officially open on September 19, but several team competitions will get under way earlier.

The Asian Games have begun in Japan with Qatar beating Iran in men’s basketball, the first action in the continental multisport showpiece that has more participants than the Olympics.

Qatar held off a comeback from Iran to win their Group B encounter 59-35 at the Aichi International Arena in Nagoya on Thursday.

It was the first match of a men’s basketball competition that will have medal finals on September 20, the day after the opening ceremony.

“We know we need to win at least one game so we can qualify for the next round,” said Qatar’s Michael Lewis, the United States-born player who scored a game-high 21 points.

“Feels good to get some team camaraderie back, and now we have got to keep going.”

Later in Group B, Taiwan beat Jordan 83-80.

More than 17,000 athletes and officials are expected to take part in 43 sports at the Nagoya-Aichi Games, which do not officially start until the opening ceremony on September 19 and will run until October 4.

Several events such as basketball, football, cricket, hockey and modern pentathlon will get under way before the opening ceremony.

Los Angeles 2028 Olympics qualifying spots are up for grabs in several sports at the Asian Games, which are returning to Japan for the first time since 1994.

Organisers hope the athletes will have a “unique experience” staying in accommodation ranging from a cruise liner and wooden containers to standard hotel rooms.

Officials are confident that the plan will not be affected by Japan’s typhoon season, which is usually in full swing in September-October.

Weather has already caused disruptions, with record rainfall two days ago forcing hundreds of athletes briefly to evacuate their accommodation.

Rainwater also leaked into some competition venues, with more wet weather forecast for the coming days.

Among those in action at the Games will be Philippine tennis sensation Alexandra Eala and a pair of world-class teenage talents: 15-year-old Indian cricketer Vaibhav Sooryavanshi and 13-year-old Chinese swimmer Yu Zidi.

Sanaa, Yemen – The United Nations-recognised Yemeni government and the Houthi group have been using warplanes, missiles, drones and other weapons as they engage in intense fighting on multiple fronts in the country’s north, west and central regions.

At least 194 people have been killed and 880 others wounded in the past two weeks of fighting in parts of Taiz, the western coast, al-Jawf, Marib and Dhalea, according to aid agencies.

Iran-backed Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah (supporters of God), have intensified attacks on the coastal district of al-Makha (Mocha) located on the western coast, among others, to gain a foothold in the Red Sea – a vital shipping lane.

On the other hand, government forces have been battling to expand in Taiz and boost their control of Marib, an oil-producing region in the north.

Fighting has also been raging in the al-Jawf governorate bordering Saudi Arabia and Dhalea, which connects the Houthi-controlled north to the country’s south under the internationally recognised government.

Experts say gains or losses on any of these strategically important fronts could have significant consequences for either side.

Taiz and western coast fronts

“The hills and mountainous areas of Taiz and the western coast are key targets for the Houthis, who have repeatedly attempted to advance there,” Yazeed al-Jeddawy, the research manager at the Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, said.

“The Houthis are trying to seize commanding terrains, cut supply routes between the coastal Mocha district and Taiz, and prevent government troops on the western coast from linking up with the Taiz Military Axis,” said al-Jeddawy.

In Taiz and along the western coast, al-Jeddawy says, the immediate contest is over the heights and roads connecting Taiz to al-Makha.

Situated roughly 60km (37 miles) from the Bab al-Mandeb strait, al-Makha enjoys a highly strategic position on the Red Sea. For a month now, the Houthis have launched missile and drone attacks on the city, causing massive damage to its port facilities and killing and injuring several civilians.

Recently, the group has also attempted to extend its ground operations towards al-Makha city.

“The Houthis seem intent on tightening their hold around [al-Makha] and moving closer to the Dhubab–Bab al-Mandeb area. A substantial advance would strengthen their position near the southern entrance to the Red Sea and give them greater leverage over international shipping,” he added.

Fuad Mussed, a Yemeni political analyst and author, told Al Jazeera that the strategic importance of the western coast and Taiz fronts stems from their proximity to Bab al-Mandeb, a chokepoint connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and one of the world’s most important shipping routes.

“The Houthis seek to move closer to this vital waterway to threaten maritime traffic. Such a move aims to keep the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb under the influence of Iran and use them as leverage against regional and international powers. This is a strategy Tehran has been pursuing for years,” Mussed said.

Iran has blocked the Strait of Hormuz, a global oil chokepoint, to use it as leverage in the war against the United States. It has also warned that its allies could shut shipping via Bab al-Mandeb. Iran also attacked Saudi Arabia’s pipeline used to export oil from the Red Sea.

In July, the Houthis declared a blockade against Saudi vessels transiting through the Red Sea – an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz.

Marib and al-Jawf fronts

Over the past few weeks, pro-government forces have attacked Houthi-held territories in Marib and al-Jawf, facing further retaliation from the Houthis.

Saddam al-Huraibi, a Yemeni political commentator, said the Marib front is fateful for both sides.

“Marib is a government stronghold in north Yemen. So, a Houthi expansion in Marib would threaten government presence and weaken its leverage in the north. That is why pro-government troops are ready to fight tooth and nail on this front line,” al-Huraibi told Al Jazeera.

For the Houthis, the takeover of Marib will deepen the group’s authority and step towards controlling the oil and gas infrastructure. The Iran-backed group captured vast swaths of northern Yemen, including the capital, Sanaa, in 2014, but Marib has remained in government hands since.

“Dominating Marib’s oil and gas resources has been a Houthi goal for over a decade. Without facing a crushing defeat in Marib, they would keep fighting to achieve that goal,” al-Huraibi said.

Adjacent to Marib, al-Jawf is also a hub of tense fighting between the Houthis and government forces. A government gain there would lay the groundwork for further advances, while a strong Houthi defence could undermine government forces’ morale and prompt them to retreat.

“Government-aligned forces have lately focused much of their offensive effort on al-Jawf. Government gains in al-Jawf would ease the threat to Marib while requiring the Houthis to defend a much broader area,” al-Huraibi said.

Al-Jeddawy said government gains could open routes towards the north – Saada, Amran or Houthi positions north of Marib.

The Houthis have carried out attacks in Saudi Arabia, including energy facilities in the country’s south. They have also accused Saudi Arabia of launching multiple attacks in al-Jawf, al-Bayda, Marib and Taiz provinces in support of government forces.

The Dhalea front

Fighting on the Dhalea front, a strategic gateway between Houthi-held territory and the southern governorates, has intensified in recent weeks.

Fighting there did not fully stop during the relative calm, which began in April 2022 following the UN-brokered ceasefire.

A Houthi advance there could open a route for their fighters to reach other southern territories. On the other hand, a Houthi setback would encourage government forces to push towards Ibb, controlled by the group.

“[Houthi] advances in Dhalea could expose the southern hinterland, while [government advances] could threaten Houthi positions and supply routes towards Ibb, al-Bayda and, farther north, Sanaa,” al-Jeddawy noted.

With the escalating fighting, the Houthis face pressure on several fronts, but the group has been readying for a range of scenarios, Khaled Ghorab, a pro-Houthi general, said.

“The [Houthi] Yemeni armed forces were never caught off guard by the prospect of escalation; rather, they worked to build and develop their own military capabilities based on tactical combat plans designed to counter a comprehensive, sustained attack launched simultaneously from land, sea and air,” he said.

Ghorab noted that this state of readiness enables the Houthi forces to carry out a direct response to sources of the threat – whether deep within enemy territory or at sea – targeting military bases or aircraft carriers as far as the Horn of Africa.

While the warring parties compete to seize strategic positions on several front lines, the latest escalation is also closely related to the wider regional confrontation.

“Iran has an interest in keeping Yemen and the Red Sea active as sources of leverage, while parts of the government camp believe the Houthis are under growing strain and that this is an opportunity to weaken them,” al-Jeddawy, the Sanaa-based researcher, said.

“The escalation still reflects domestic military and political aims, but its timing and direction cannot be separated from the regional war,” he told Al Jazeera.

Israeli prime minister denies claim that UAE president warned him of Hamas plans before the 2023 attacks.

Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said he will sue the Haaretz newspaper over a report that claimed he was warned of Hamas’s plans for an offensive days before the attacks of October 7, 2023.

In a statement on X on Wednesday, Netanyahu called the report “fabricated” and “false” and said he had instructed his lawyers to also sue Haaretz and the authors of the report, Shlomi Eldar and Ruth Yaval.

The report, published on Tuesday, claimed that the president of the United Arab Emirates, Mohammed bin Zayed had warned Netanyahu about a possible attack by Hamas 10 days before the events of October 7, 2023.

Palestinian fighters killed at least 1,195 people in southern Israel on that day, and took some 251 others captive. The attacks prompted Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza, in which at least 73,669 Palestinians have been killed.

The Haaretz report claimed that the UAE president, who is also known as MBZ, spoke to Netanyahu by phone and warned him of a threat from then-Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar.

According to Haaretz, Sinwar – who was angered by stalled prisoner exchange talks and Israel’s continued blockade of Gaza – had relayed the warnings to the UAE through an intermediary. He said he was preparing a “huge surprise” and told contacts to tell Israel “to expect an earthquake”, according to the report.

It said MBZ and his aides read this as a sign of an impending full-scale attack and passed the intelligence to Israel’s Shin Bet agency. But the internal security agency dismissed the threat.

MBZ then raised the warning directly with Netanyahu, who also brushed it aside, the report said.

The UAE has declined to comment on the allegations.

Its Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement on Tuesday saying that “the UAE government does not comment on media stories or speculation regarding conversations between government leaders”.

The Haaretz report comes at a time when Netanyahu is trying to secure his position as prime minister in the upcoming Knesset elections in October. Netanyahu has been trailing in the polls, facing a fierce challenge from former military chief Gadi Eisenkot.

Netanyahu on Wednesday called the Haaretz report “politically motivated” and part of the “left’s election campaign”.

He also denied its claims of a phone call with MBZ.

“The National Security Council and the Military Secretary meticulously reviewed the Prime Minister’s call log for those days—and found no trace of it whatsoever,” he said.

In a separate statement, Netanyahu also claimed that the person responsible for Haaretz’s “false report” was the Palestinian political figure, Muhammad Dahlan.

Dahlan was expelled from the Fatah party in 2011 after a power struggle with the current president of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, and lives in the UAE.

Dahlan’s representatives have rejected the claim, according to Israeli media.

Dallas, Texas – The Republican midterm convention has represented a gambit for the party: centring US President Donald Trump in the final stretch of the midterm elections, even as the first two years of his second term have cast a polarising political shadow.

That has been particularly true when it comes to the war on Iran, which Trump launched alongside Israel on February 28, and the knock-on effects on affordability in the United States, a key issue for many voters.

As Trump prepared to deliver a keynote address on Wednesday in Dallas, prices for Brent Crude, the global benchmark, rose above $100 a barrel for the first time since July, a reminder of the conflict’s continued fallout for global markets.

Nevertheless, supporters who spoke to Al Jazeera still saw the president as the man to rally Americans to vote Republican in November, as the party fights to hold onto control of the House of Representatives and Senate.

But some voiced concern – or confusion – over the impact of the war.

“This really is a Trump-a-palooza, as people have been saying,” said Carter Eisinger, a 27-year-old electrician who travelled from Fargo, North Dakota.

“I think some people say that in a derogatory way, but I think it’s very much a complimentary phrase,” he added. “The reality of it is we are in a Trump Republican Party.”

Still, Eisinger struggled to see how the war fit into Trump’s “America First” vision.

“In my opinion, I don’t really see the connection of how a war in Iran helps us here in the country,” he said. “If the Iran war is justified, I’m willing to pay the gas prices, but I haven’t seen that justification.”

He felt a similar confusion about the close relationship between the US and Israel.

“At the end of the day, I’m going to come right back to whatever is best for families, young people, anyone in America,” he said. “If it’s helping Israel in a way that helps us, then great… but it needs to help us first.”

Others were more charitable towards Trump’s approach to the Middle East, even if they saw the war on Iran as a misstep.

Bijay Dixit, a 59-year-old photographer from Houston, Texas, gave Trump high marks on his approach to immigration. He also believed Republicans were the party to steward the economy in the years ahead.

But on Iran, he said there had been a “miscalculation”, even if he agreed with the Trump administration’s position that the war was ultimately a necessary response to the totality of Iran’s actions in the 47 years since the Islamic revolution in 1979.

“Iran needed to be stopped at some point,” he said. “When I say miscalculation, what I mean is underestimation of the capacity of the IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps].”

Helen Vennett, a 65-year-old small business owner from Maryland and the chairman of her county’s Republican Party, likened the convention to a high-school pep rally.

“All of us need to have cheerleaders in our life… It just gets you fired up again. You kind of need to know that you’re not alone, that there are believers,” she added.

But while she said she broadly supported the Trump administration’s justification for the war, she acknowledged the potential political fallout.

“It’s a tough one,” she said.

Polls have regularly suggested widespread disapproval among US citizens of the war on Iran, with independents in particular expressing disapproval. Many, in turn, rank affordability as their top issue heading into the midterm vote.

A recent Reuters/Ipsos poll suggested that only a quarter of Americans think the war is worthwhile.

For its part, the Trump administration has downplayed the prospect of ending the war, focusing instead on efforts to open shipping routes in the Strait of Hormuz, over which Iran continues to assert its influence.

Speaking to reporters on Wednesday as he departed for the convention, Trump sought to temper expectations that the war would end before November’s pivotal vote.

“I think it’s going to take a little bit longer than the midterm,” he said, accusing Iran of intentionally holding out until November.

“They’re desperate to try and affect the election so that we can get a nice weak group of people in there and leave them alone and let them have their nuclear weapons,” he said.

He predicted the war would end swiftly after the final votes have been cast.

“They can’t hold out any longer,” he said.

John Russell, 55, from Rockford, Illinois, who regularly travels to Trump rallies as part of the “Front Row Joe’s” group, said he believed voters would still view the first two years of Trump’s second term as a net positive.

“It’s been a small bump with the gas going up,” he told Al Jazeera from the convention.

“But it had to be done. We can’t allow [Iran] to have a nuclear bomb,” he said, referring to one of the administration’s main justifications for the war.

Tehran has long denied seeking a nuclear weapon, with military analysts generally agreeing that destroying its nuclear programme would require a major military escalation, involving boots on the ground.

Russell predicted that the Republican Party’s bet would pay off at the polls.

“It’s going to fire up the base,” he said of the convention. “It’s going to switch some independents to vote for the Trump-backed candidates, and they will win.”

The war in Yemen is threatening to open a new front as the Iran-allied Houthi rebels are trying to advance along the Red Sea coast, through the mountain chains of Taiz province, edging closer to strategic ground that overlooks one of the world’s most vital maritime arteries.

For the internationally recognised Yemeni government, this is an offensive with global consequences.

In Wednesday’s interview with Al Jazeera, Yemen’s Ambassador to Qatar, Rajeh Badi, a former government spokesman, said that his government and its armed forces had not violated any truce since 2021.

The Houthis, he argued, are “the aggressors”. “What we are seeing now is a surprise Houthi offensive to seize strategic ground along the Red Sea, in order to allow Iran, through its Houthi proxy, to tighten its grip on maritime routes,” Badi said.

He added that the Houthis, who have advanced on al-Makha (Mocha) and al-Waziyah, and over large stretches of the mountain chain overlooking the Red Sea in Taiz province, “want commanding positions to launch more effective strikes on ships and disrupt navigation in the Red Sea”.

Badi said the Yemeni government responded by opening fronts in al-Jawf, Marib and al-Bayda, and that the consequences could extend far beyond Yemen.

“We are now facing a real threat that does not stop at Yemen’s borders,” he said. “It threatens the entire region and the world. If the Houthis manage to choke maritime traffic in the Red Sea, we will be looking at another Hormuz in these waters – with potentially even greater impact.”

The Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb “represent a vital artery for global shipping, for both energy and food supplies”, he added.

A chokepoint that belongs to the world

Bab al-Mandeb connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. To the north, the Red Sea leads to the Suez Canal, while farther east, beyond the Arabian Sea, lies another critical chokepoint, the Strait of Hormuz. This geography is what gives Yemen’s conflict consequences far beyond its borders, as Saudi Arabia is already being drawn into the confrontation.

The Houthis have targeted Saudi territory, civilian infrastructure in the kingdom’s south and Saudi-linked vessels in the Red Sea.

Major-General Turki al-Maliki, spokesman of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, said the Houthis on Wednesday attacked Saudi cities of Khamis Mushait, Abha, and Jizan with ballistic missiles and drones. He did not elaborate on any casualties as a result of the attacks.

Badi, who has spoken to the media for the first time since taking up his post, said those attacks are designed to change the nature of the war.

“By targeting Saudi territory, civilian infrastructure in the kingdom’s south, and Saudi-linked vessels in the Red Sea, the Houthis are trying to drag Saudi Arabia into their war. Their calculation is simple: they want to rebrand this conflict as a Saudi-Yemeni war,” he said.

The ambassador assessed that “every time their militias suffer heavy losses inside Yemen at the hands of the Yemeni armed forces, they respond by firing missiles and drones at civilian sites in Saudi Arabia, in an attempt to inflame Yemeni public opinion and convince the outside world that Yemen is at war with Saudi Arabia”.

The conflict, he said, is fundamentally about Yemen’s state and its future. The Yemeni people are fighting to “reclaim their state, their republic, their dignity and their stability”.

Iran’s hidden hand

Behind Yemen’s fragmented front lines, a larger regional confrontation looms, and its architect, according to Badi, is Iran.

The official said that Tehran’s relationship with the Houthis is now impossible to hide. “Iranian officials openly boast about it, and Houthi leaders proudly talk about their ‘strategic’ ties with Tehran,” he said.

The Houthis are “one of Iran’s key regional arms – just like Hezbollah in Lebanon or the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) in Iraq. Many of Tehran’s other proxies have come under pressure,” he added.

“Former Yemeni President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi used to say that if Iran gains control over Bab al-Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz, it will not need a nuclear weapon – its grip over these two chokepoints would be more powerful than any nuclear arsenal. Events have proved him right,” Badi recalled.

‘We have exhausted all peaceful avenues’

For Yemen’s government, the alternative to another war was supposed to be diplomacy.

Badi urged the world “to stand with us so we can rid ourselves of this scourge – a threat that no longer targets Yemenis alone”.

“We have exhausted all peaceful avenues. For more than 13 years, we have been engaging in dialogue rounds and signing agreements, whether inside Yemen or after the Houthis seized the capital, Sanaa,” he said.

Badi added that the Houthi rebels have effectively “buried peaceful options. Peace is simply not part of this movement’s culture or mindset. That is what ultimately forced us to take up arms”.

“The world must understand this difficult equation,” the ambassador concluded, that the Houthis are “an armed proxy, an extension of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Houthis do not represent us”.

For more than a decade, governments got used to cheap borrowing. That era may now be ending.

Government bond markets are flashing warnings around the world.

Across major economies, yields – the interest rates governments pay to borrow – are climbing to levels not seen in years and, in some cases, decades.

Investors are pricing in more risk before they’ll lend to governments already carrying heavy debt loads.

Inflation remains stubborn, geopolitical tensions are adding pressure, and central banks may have to keep interest rates higher for longer.

Those higher borrowing costs are pushing up what banks charge companies and homeowners.

British Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband has said the United Kingdom will sanction illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank, describing the move as “overdue” and necessary to “salvage” a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

He made the comments on Tuesday as 11 nations joined the UK in supporting or ⁠considering curbs on trade in goods with settlements that are a barrier to a future Palestinian state.

But analysts say the step is far from enough to drive momentum for Palestinian statehood, threatened by ever-expanding settlements in the West Bank and an increasingly hostile Israeli political environment.

Tahani Mustafa, a lecturer in international relations at King’s College London, told Al Jazeera the latest anti-settlement measures are “modest” and unlikely to have a significant impact on ambitions for Palestinian statehood.

“After three decades of breakneck settlement expansion, Palestinian territory is only being held together by its sinews,” said Mustafa. “If what remains is still territorially viable as a state, it is only barely so. Much more decisive action is needed to salvage the two-state solution and a durable lasting solution to the conflict.”

Settlements dividing Palestinian territory

More than 30 years after the Oslo Accords set out a negotiating process aimed at resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel has remained the foundation of international efforts to forge peace.

But since the Oslo process began in 1993, the number of Israeli settlers in the West Bank, including occupied East Jerusalem, has ballooned from about 260,000 to more than 700,000, according to the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics, posing a glaring roadblock to the plan.

The challenge is not just the raw number of settlers, but their geographic spread. Today, many Israeli settlements are embedded deep inside West Bank areas that would be needed for a contiguous Palestinian state, including near major Palestinian urban centres such as Nablus, Salfit and Hebron.

Israel’s recent E1 settlement plan, which would build thousands of illegal housing units between the Israeli settlement of Maale Adumim and East Jerusalem, is a case in point. The plan would effectively split the West Bank in two and fully sever it from East Jerusalem, which Palestinians seek as their future capital.

Experts have long said Israel will need to dismantle some of its West Bank settlements, as it did in the Gaza Strip in 2005, to make room for a cohesive Palestinian state. But many Israeli settlements, especially those closer to Israel’s pre-war 1967 borders, would likely need to be addressed through land swaps.

“A complete withdrawal from some of the deeply embedded settlements is highly unlikely,” so land swaps would be the only way to create some form of Palestinian “territorial integrity”, Andreas Krieg, associate professor at King’s College London, told Al Jazeera.

However, such an arrangement – under which Israeli settlements close to the pre-1967 borders would become part of Israel and some “northern Arab-Israeli communities would be integrated into a Palestinian state” – would be “highly controversial” and face blowback from multiple communities, said Krieg.

He argued that Israelis would be certain to oppose any forced withdrawal from West Bank settlements, while some “Arab-Israelis may not want to live within a Palestinian state”.

Palestinian citizens of Israel make up approximately 21 percent of Israel’s overall population but are treated as second- or third-class citizens at the institutional level. According to rights groups, several dozen Israeli laws actively discriminate against Palestinian citizens across a number of issues, including education and housing.

Israeli ‘consensus’ against Palestinian state

Beyond the physical obstacle created by settlements is the Israeli political landscape, in which the idea of a Palestinian state has become toxic.

The government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appears to be among the most hardline in Israel’s history on the issue. Netanyahu has emphatically ruled out the prospect of a Palestinian state, while his far-right Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who also oversees Israeli settlements in the West Bank, has celebrated blocking Palestinian statehood as a badge of honour.

The views of Netanyahu’s most influential domestic critics do not deviate much. His top rival in elections slated for October, former military chief Gadi Eisenkot, has promised not to allow the establishment of a Palestinian state. And Naftali Bennett, a Netanyahu rival from the far right, fervently opposes Palestinian statehood.

As for the Israeli public, a June poll by the Council for a Secure America found that only 22 percent of Jewish Israelis favour a two-state solution, while 63 percent oppose it.

“The consensus within Israel, socially and politically, does not allow for any party to make any steps towards a Palestinian state,” said Krieg.

Meanwhile, Israel’s closest ally, the United States, is unlikely to apply significant pressure over Israel’s settlement policy so long as President Donald Trump remains in office for the next two and a half years, he added.

Krieg said a “best-case scenario” is for Israel’s next elected government to reverse some of the country’s recent settlement advances.

John Strawson, professor at the University of East London, said that any new Israeli government is “unlikely to support a Palestinian state”, but that a more moderate Israeli government may at least “stop the ethnic cleansing and other moves which are aimed at making that impossible”.

“Removing Netanyahu is the first step towards a two-state solution,” said Strawson.

Two states are the ‘only alternative to violence’

If the two-state model is still alive at all, it is largely due to pressure from the international community.

More than 150 countries, including the majority of European Union nations, have recognised Palestinian statehood. And several Arab states with whom Israel seeks better ties have indicated Palestinian statehood is a precondition for normalisation with Israel.

Krieg said Tuesday’s move by the UK and the 11 other mostly European nations is an “overdue step in the right direction”, but also “shows the laziness and lack of creativity on the part of the international community to actually think outside the box in terms of a two-state solution”.

Anders Persson, a political scientist specialising in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, said that while the settlement sanctions are concerning to Israel, other previous anti-settlement measures, such as 2013 EU restrictions on funds for Israeli entities operating in occupied Palestinian territory, “changed little on the ground”.

He said the latest sanctions may be “too late” and “too limited … to save the two-state solution”.

Strawson said that while a two-state solution may “seem optimistic”, it is the only alternative to “permanent war and violence”.

Yemen’s more than a decade-long civil war has flared up once again after the Houthi rebel group launched an offensive in several locations against Saudi Arabian-backed government forces. The conflict has already spilled over beyond the country’s borders with the Houthis launching an attack on southern Saudi Arabia, targeting oil facilities and wounding dozens of people this week.

The renewed hostilities are the most serious since a United Nations-brokered truce halted large-scale fighting in 2022, after eight years of a full-blown conflict that killed tens of thousands of people in one of the world’s poorest countries.

So who is involved in this conflict? Here’s a look at the main actors:

The Houthis

The Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah (supporters of God), are an armed group controlling most parts of Yemen, including the capital, Sanaa, and some of the western and northern areas close to Saudi Arabia.

The Houthis emerged in the 1990s but rose to international prominence in 2014, when the group rebelled against Yemen’s government, forcing it to step down and causing a crippling humanitarian crisis.

The group then spent years, with Iran’s backing, fighting a military coalition led by Saudi Arabia. The two warring sides have also repeatedly tried to hold peace talks.

Seen as part of a regional alliance known as the “axis of resistance” backed by Iran, the Shia Zaidi group nevertheless has its own base, its own interests – and its own ambitions.

The Houthis have demonstrated their missile and drone capabilities during the Yemen war in attacks on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, targeting oil installations and vital infrastructure. They have also proven resilient, defying more than 10 years of bombing by the Saudi-led coalition, as well as US and British strikes in recent years.

The group has gained international prominence for its attacks on Israel and shipping in the Red Sea since the start of Israel’s genocide in Gaza in October 2023.

Saudi Arabia

Riyadh entered the Yemen war when it led a military coalition against the Houthis in March 2015, seeking to restore the government of then-President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi. Back then, Saudi Arabia and Iran were at the peak of a regional competition, both deeply distrusting each other. An Iran-supported group expanding control at the kingdom’s southern border was unacceptable, hence the military action.

This was before a China-brokered rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023 marked the beginning of a more practical and less confrontational relationship.

Presidential Leadership Council

The PLC was established in 2022 when the former president, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, formally transferred his powers to the new eight-member body.

It represents the internationally recognised government of Yemen, with a mandate to manage the country’s political, security and military affairs, and to steer negotiations towards a permanent ceasefire. It is chaired by Rashad al-Alimi, an adviser to Hadi and former interior minister with the government of the late president, Ali Abdullah Saleh.

Its membership is drawn from a mix of northern and southern politicians and military-linked leaders in a bid to unite major anti-Houthi forces under one roof.

The PLC is backed by Saudi Arabia and the alliance that Riyadh leads.

Islah party

The Yemeni Congregation for Reform, better known as Islah, is a Sunni Islamist movement with historic ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. It is a faction within the recognised PLC-led government but has long had an independent identity. Its major stronghold has long been Marib, the country’s sole gas-producing region with one of its largest oilfields.

National Resistance Forces

The National Resistance Forces is a government-aligned military faction led by Tareq Saleh, nephew of the late former President Ali Abdullah Saleh.

The force has maintained ties to Saudi Arabia and, like the Islah party, is part of the PLC. It aims for a unified Yemen, positioning itself as a counterweight to both the Houthis and southern secessionists.

The United Kingdom has announced a ban on the import of all goods produced in illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank, Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband said in Parliament on Tuesday.

It comes in response to an intensifying wave of Israeli settler pogroms and settlement expansions in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem.

The ban, set to come into effect within six to nine months, would target settlement exports such as dates, olive oil and agricultural products, with Miliband saying he did not believe “the British people want us supporting the occupation by accepting products from settlements in our shops”.

The International Court of Justice in July 2024 called Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory “unlawful”. Months later, the United Nations passed a resolution calling for an end to the Israeli occupation within a year.

Israel’s response was furious, as it announced four “counter-measures”, including banning 12 British MPs from entering Israel and closing the British consulate in Jerusalem.

After Miliband’s speech, 11 more countries: Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, shared a joint statement supporting the so-called two-state solution and announcing their own intentions to impose restrictions on trade with illegal Israeli settlements.

Spain and Ireland had already announced their own national bans earlier this year, alongside the Netherlands and Belgium.

How much do these countries trade with Israel?

Aside from Canada and the UK, the rest of the countries considering or already banning settlement goods are European Union members.

The EU is Israel’s largest trading partner, accounting for 31.7 percent of Israel’s total trade in goods in 2025 (43.3 billion euros, or $50.4bn), according to the European Commission. The EU supplied 33.1 percent of Israel’s imports (28 billion euros, or $32.6bn) and received 29.4 percent of Israel’s exports (15.3 billion euros or $17.8bn).

Israel is the EU’s 27th largest trade partner, with Ireland, the Netherlands and Germany being its biggest individual trade partners.

According to a 2026 report by Global Echo Litigation Center, a Palestinian rights legal advocacy group, roughly 5,900 shipments from Israel were headed to Europe, with more than 17 percent containing products originating from settlements.

While no specific figures for settlement trade alone are known, it is understood to be a tiny fraction of total EU-Israel trade, meaning the ban’s impact is much more symbolic than economic.

The table below shows each country’s total trade with Israel for the European countries that have banned, or are introducing bans on, illegal Israeli settlement goods.

The top five European trading partners with Israel either enforcing or set to introduce settlement bans are Ireland, the Netherlands, the UK, France and Spain.

Ireland

Ireland-Israel bilateral trade totalled $5.36bn in 2025. Ireland is Israel’s second-largest export market for goods after the United States, driven largely by tech, particularly semiconductors and integrated circuits.

The Netherlands

Netherlands-Israel bilateral trade totalled roughly $4.8bn in 2025. The Netherlands is also Israel’s largest single foreign investor, accounting for roughly two-thirds of all EU investment in the country.

United Kingdom

According to UN Comtrade, UK-Israel bilateral trade totalled $3.73bn in 2025. An Al Jazeera investigation found at least 17 companies linked to illegal Israeli settlements hold more than 2.1 billion pounds ($2.85bn) in UK public-sector contracts.

France

France-Israel bilateral trade totalled $3.62bn in 2025. A large part of France’s trade with Israel constitutes export licences for surveillance and military technologies.

Spain

Spain-Israel bilateral trade totalled $2.79bn in 2025. In September that year, Spain banned the import of goods from illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory, as well as the trade of arms.

What are Israeli settlements?

Israeli settlements are Jewish-only communities built illegally on Palestinian land.

Settlements are illegal under international law as they violate the Fourth Geneva Convention, which bans an occupying power from transferring its population to the area it occupies.

Illegal Israeli settlements continue to grow, decades after the 1993 Oslo Accords, which established limited Palestinian self-rule and were meant to lead to a permanent peace settlement.

At the time, about 270,000 settlers lived across the occupied territory. Today, that figure has more than doubled to between 600,000 and 750,000 people, about 10 percent of Israel’s Jewish population, living across some 250 illegal settlements in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem.

US military says it struck the five Iranian tankers after IRGC targeted a US warship twice in two days.

The United States has claimed attacks on five Iranian oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman and near Kharg Island after accusing Iran of launching ballistic missiles at a US warship twice in two days.

Iran responded to the attacks on Tuesday by firing missiles at US forces stationed at the Al Azraq base in Jordan. Amman said its air defences intercepted and destroyed 18 of 20 Iranian missiles, while the rest fell in open areas.

The exchange of fire comes amid escalating tensions in the Gulf, six months into the US and Israel’s war on Iran, with Tehran maintaining the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and Washington imposing a naval blockade on Iranian ports.

The hostilities briefly drove oil prices to $99.46 earlier on Tuesday.

In a statement, the US Central Command said Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had targeted a US warship twice over the past two days. The warship “successfully evaded the attempted Iranian attacks” and “no American personnel were harmed”, it said.

The Central Command said it retaliated by destroying the Iranian oil carriers, M/T Kaviz, M/T Charminar, M/T Horizon 1, and M/T Riesco in the Gulf of Oman as well as M/T Derya near Kharg Island.

“American forces directed the crews to abandon ship before the vessels were struck and rendered inoperable,” the Central Command added.

Iran’s IRIB state broadcaster confirmed the attack near Kharg Island in the Gulf, which handled some 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports before the war. It reported that the crew was evacuated and said a second tanker was hit near the southern port of Jask on the Gulf of Oman.

The IRGC also said “several” Iranian commercial ships were hit, and said it retaliated by subjecting Al Azraq base in Jordan to “fierce missile strikes”. It claimed hangars used by US fighter jets were destroyed in the ballistic missile attacks.

It went on to claim ballistic missile attacks on the US Navy DDG-119 and DDG-53 destroyers, saying “significant damage was caused to these vessels”.

The IRGC also threatened to target oil tankers in Kuwaiti and Bahraini ports, warning crews there to evacuate immediately.

“We warn all the crews of oil tankers in the Kuwaiti and Bahraini ports… to immediately abandon their vessels, whether at anchor or at the ports, because they will be targeted,” it said.

Jordan’s Armed Forces, meanwhile, said its air defences engaged 20 ballistic missiles, “successfully intercepting and destroying 18 of them”. Two missiles “fell in unpopulated areas,” it said in a statement.

The attacks did not cause any casualties and specialised teams “have begun securing the locations where debris and shrapnel fell,” it added.

Earlier, the chief of staff of Iran’s Armed Forces, Ali Abdollahi, had warned that Tehran would strike US military installations across the region if Iranian tankers were targeted.

“The US aggressor army has given Iranian oil tankers an evacuation warning to hit them, so I announce that any attack on Iranian oil tankers will result in the targeting of US bases in the region by the armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Abdollahi said on state TV.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, however, said Washington would continue to strike Iranian ships.

“Iran continues to try to hit US naval ships, and for every time they do that or try to do that, they’re going to lose tankers,” Rubio told reporters on a visit to Colombia.

Yemen’s Houthi group has carried out attacks in southern Saudi Arabia, with Riyadh saying that dozens of people have been wounded, as fighting between the Iran-aligned group and pro-Saudi forces in Yemen sharply escalates.

The Houthis on Tuesday said they targeted Saudi energy sites belonging to oil giant Aramco in southern areas, with the group’s military spokesperson calling it “a broad operation”.

Saudi authorities confirmed attacks on several facilities and installations related to the energy sector in the south of the country, vowing a firm response. Riyadh also accused the Houthis of wounding at least 73 people in the attacks.

The conflict between the Yemeni armed group and Saudi Arabia is unfolding as the Houthis are currently fighting Yemen’s Riyadh-backed internationally recognised government, which announced that it was launching counteroffensives against Houthi-held positions across several provinces on Monday.

The renewed hostilities are the most serious since a UN-brokered truce halted large-scale fighting in 2022, after eight years of a full-blown conflict that killed tens of thousands of people in one of the world’s poorest countries.

The escalation also comes as the strategic importance of Yemen’s Bab al-Mandeb Strait grows amid Iran’s effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a key passageway for global oil and gas supplies.

The Houthis have sought to advance towards the vital Red Sea shipping route, while government forces say their campaign ultimately aims to retake the Houthi-held capital, Sanaa.

So what do we know about the latest fighting, and what comes next?

How did the fighting between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis unfold?

The Houthis on Monday said Saudi Arabia launched multiple attacks on Houthi-held areas.

The group said Saudi attacks using aircraft and cruise missiles struck al-Jawf, al-Bayda, Marib and Taiz provinces.

Moreover, the Houthis accused Saudi Arabia of carrying out an air strike on a prison in al-Hazm, the capital of al-Jawf, killing seven people and injuring seven others. Riyadh did not immediately comment on the attacks.

At the same time, the Houthis claimed to have shot down Saudi reconnaissance drones over al-Jawf and al-Bayda.

Meanwhile, on Tuesday, Major-General Turki al-Malki, the Saudi spokesman for the Riyadh-led coalition in Yemen, said the Houthis carried out attacks on the Saudi cities of Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jazan and Najran, injuring at least 73 people, among them women and children.

According to a statement from Saudi Arabia’s Energy Ministry, the strikes also triggered fires at multiple oil installations and utility sites across the kingdom’s southern provinces.

Southern Saudi Arabia is home to key oil infrastructure, including the Jazan refinery, one of the kingdom’s largest, with the capacity to process 400,000 barrels of crude per day.

Shortly after, the Houthis announced that they had targeted Saudi energy infrastructure operated by oil giant Aramco in the south using drones and ballistic missiles.

The group’s military spokesman, Yahya Saree, said the attacks were retaliation for recent Saudi attacks on Houthi-controlled areas across Yemen.

Why is this escalation taking place now?

A key focus of the fighting is the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the narrow waterway connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden.

The Houthis declared a blockade against Saudi shipping in July. The Houthis have also pushed towards government-held areas near al-Makha (Mocha) and territory bordering the Bab al-Mandeb Strait amid reinforcements and counteroffensives from government forces.

The strait’s strategic importance has increased dramatically because Iran’s restrictions on the Strait of Hormuz have forced Saudi Arabia to rely more heavily on its Red Sea export route. Between March and mid-July, Saudi seaborne crude exports through Bab al-Mandeb were eight times higher than during the same period in 2025.

In 2024, about 4.1 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum products passed through the strait daily on average – about 5 percent of the global total.

Ahmed Nagi, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group, said the strait holds importance “when we look at the Houthis’ broader strategy”.

“The move towards the western coast is not only about gaining territory on the ground. It also has a maritime dimension,” he told Al Jazeera.

“The Houthis have already linked their military campaign to the Red Sea and the shipping routes around Bab al-Mandeb. So gaining more control over the … western coast could give them greater depth and allow them to sustain pressure on maritime traffic in the Red Sea. In that sense, the ground offensive and their maritime campaign are closely connected.”

The latest escalation also follows fighting that resumed in July after an Iranian aircraft attempted to land in Sanaa without Saudi authorisation, followed by strikes on Sanaa airport and Houthi retaliation.

What is happening between government forces and the Houthis?

On Sunday, Yemen’s internationally recognised government said its warplanes had struck Houthi positions in Hodeidah, Marib and al-Jawf, as fighting spread across several fronts.

On Monday, government-aligned forces stepped up their counteroffensive. They announced a ground push towards the al-Labanat mountains in al-Jawf, while also reporting rocket attacks on Yatma and “intensive battles” with Houthi fighters in the province. Government forces also claimed advances towards Dhi Na’im district in al-Bayda.

The Houthis said they had repelled the advance towards al-Labanat and inflicted casualties on government-aligned forces. Houthi official Mohammed al-Farah also claimed the group fired ballistic missiles at reinforcements in al-Jawf.

By late Monday, government-aligned forces reported carrying out further air attacks against Houthi positions west of Taiz.

Al Jazeera could not independently verify the battlefield claims by the Houthis or the Yemeni government.

Rashad al-Alimi, who heads Yemen’s Saudi-backed Presidential Leadership Council, meanwhile said on Monday that government forces had made significant gains against the Houthis, pointing to advances in al-Jawf, al-Bayda, Taiz and Hodeidah.

“Our armed forces will continue to carry out their constitutional duty until state institutions are restored and their authority extends over the entire territory of Yemen,” al-Alimi said in a statement.

Yemen’s deputy defence minister, Major-General Samir al-Sabri, said in comments aired on state television that the government had resolved to “retake Sanaa”.

Majid al-Nuzaili, a spokesperson for government-aligned forces, said the goal of the offensive was to “liberate Yemen from the grip” of the Houthis “and restore Sanaa as a capital for all Yemenis”.

What is the humanitarian situation on the ground?

The World Health Organization said on Monday that at least 728 people have been killed or wounded in Yemen since August 23, with the majority in Taiz and along the western coast.

It said an estimated 21,000 people, roughly 3,000 families, have been displaced from Taiz alone since Thursday.

Al Jazeera’s Yousef Mawry, reporting from Sanaa, said the casualty count is expected to rise.

“These casualties are said to be in the hundreds from both sides, especially as we have reports of air strikes being conducted in the governorate of al-Jawf,” he said.

The Crisis Group’s Nagi said the world was witnessing “significant deterioration in what is already a catastrophic situation”.

“We saw in the past few days a lot of displacement from areas where there has been fighting between the two sides, especially in Taiz,” he noted.

“Those are the direct impacts, but there are also indirect ones. The economic situation is likely to get worse, which will put even more pressure on the humanitarian situation. Ultimately, I think it will depend on how long this round of fighting lasts. The longer the conflict continues, the greater the humanitarian impact will be.”

What’s next?

Analyst Hisham al-Omeisy said the fighting in the war-torn country was no longer simply a domestic one.

“We are way beyond the concept [of it] being domestic. It all started with the Houthis pushing to control Bab al-Mandeb and the western coast, to control the chokehold on the other side of the Arabian Peninsula, with the Iranians controlling the Strait of Hormuz,” al-Omeisy, a senior Yemen adviser at the European Institute of Peace, told Al Jazeera.

“This is definitely not domestic, especially when the Houthis have started attacking Saudi Arabia as well for the better part of the last month, and now escalating since today [Tuesday].”

Domestically, the Crisis Group’s Nagi said it was “unclear” what the outcome of this round of fighting will be, describing the situation on the ground as “very fluid”.

“But what we are seeing is that the government seems to be in a stronger position than at any time before, and it sees this round of fighting as an opportunity to consolidate its position and gain more territory from the Houthis,” he added, while warning that this did not mean the Houthis were weak.

“It’s true that the Houthis are fighting in Taiz, and they were the ones who launched the offensive against government forces there and made some gains. But on other fronts, in al-Jawf, al-Bayda, Marib and elsewhere, government forces have advanced and gained several key areas, while the Houthis have been on the defensive.”

On whether there will be a winner in this conflict, al-Omeisy said that in the long term, he expects a negotiated settlement.

“Look at the history of Yemen … we always inevitably reach some sort of a deal, so it’s not going to be a winner-takes-all,” he said.

“I don’t imagine there’s going to be a push to regain the capital [Sanaa], for instance. It’s going to be a bloodbath if they [government-aligned forces] do that.”

“There’s going to be a humbling of the Houthi forces. There’s going to be losses. But eventually, you will need a political deal,” al-Omeisy added.

According to Saudi political analyst Khaled Batarfi, the Houthi strikes will trigger a response but not a prolonged war.

“This is an escalation, of course,” Batarfi told Al Jazeera. In past attacks, Saudi Arabia tried “to not get engaged in a civil war, keep its distance and not to respond to attacks. But now this is too much [of an escalation],” he said.

“The coalition will have a say on that. This is a civil war inside Yemen, and it affects us as one of the parties. And so any response … in the same way [will be] an eye for an eye. But I don’t see a prolonged war – not with Iran and not with the Houthis.”

Tehran has threatened “serious consequences” for South Korea if it interferes in the US-Israel war on Iran.

The warning comes amid reports that Seoul is mulling contributing to the US naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz passage, which has hampered Iran’s oil exports.

In a statement posted on X on Monday, Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei said Iran and South Korea had more than 64 years of diplomatic relations based on mutual respect and that Tehran values that friendship.

However, if South Korea joins the United States in its military actions against Iran at a time when the country is defending itself from what he called US aggression and “war crimes against women and children”, then there will be consequences, he warned.

Baghaei threatened that Iran would regard any military presence or participation in operations by another country in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz “would inevitably be regarded as direct support for the aggressor and would have serious consequences”.

“No sovereign and responsible country should succumb to US pressure and intimidation and become complicit in acts of aggression and horrific crimes against the great Iranian nation,” he added.

Seoul did not respond directly, but a Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement on Monday said it is communicating with the international community over the situation in the passageway.

Here’s what we know about how South Korea is getting roped in:

Why is South Korea involved?

Seoul, a close ally of Washington, has been under pressure from US President Donald Trump.

The issues began in mid-August, when Trump revealed in an interview, and later online, that he had spoken to South Korean President Lee Jae Myung and asked that Seoul give “a little hand” in the war on Iran.

According to media reports, the two leaders had spoken over the phone on May 17.

Seoul said, “No, thanks!”, according to Trump’s message on social media.

However, as South Korea now knows, saying no to Trump has repercussions.

On August 16, Trump announced that the US would significantly scale back joint military drills it holds annually with South Korea – the evening before they were scheduled to begin.

The Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) exercises are meant to sharpen Seoul’s readiness in case of a North Korean attack. They usually last for more than 11 days but were reduced to five.

In a post on his Truth Social site, Trump claimed the drills were “costly” and that they send a “hostile” signal to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, with whom he is trying to build a relationship. South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun said in parliament there was no warning from the US.

Trump also questioned why South Korea would refuse his request when thousands of US soldiers are stationed on the Korean Peninsula.

The US also cancelled another military exercise scheduled for September, although South Korea’s military revealed it received a notification much earlier in June, with Washington citing constraints due to the war on Iran.

How has South Korea responded?

President Lee, a liberal who pushes for a dialled-down defence posture, has opted to negotiate. His office earlier released statements saying it hopes for “meaningful dialogue” with Trump.

South Korea’s Yonhap news agency reported on Monday that Washington has, however, “ratcheted up pressure” on Seoul.

On Friday, a South Korean presidential official told Yonhap that Seoul could consider a military contribution to international measures seeking to free up navigation in the passageway as long as it does not affect the country’s defence readiness.

South Korea is looking at various options, the official said, including possible cooperation with France, the United Kingdom and other allies on sending noncombat and search-and-rescue forces.

The South Korean military has also started reviewing assets and troops that could be deployed, including maritime patrol aircraft, explosive ordnance disposal teams and unmanned mine detection and clearing systems, he added.

Such a move would be unpopular. The opposition has spoken out against a possible deployment, as have some within Lee’s ruling Democratic Party. Many South Koreans have also protested against the US-Israel war on Iran.

What is the history of US-South Korea relations?

South Korea became one of the US’s closest allies after Washington backed Seoul against Pyongyang in the Korean War of 1950.

The US supported Seoul’s economic and military growth in the years after. Under a treaty, some 29,000 US soldiers have been stationed permanently on the Korean Peninsula since the end of the war. Seoul has also relied on US defence might to deter nuclear-armed North Korea.

In return, South Korea supported several US wars, including the Iraq War, and is designated an important non-NATO ally.

In 2025, however, Washington imposed a 25 percent tariff on the country, testing relations. Seoul opted to negotiate rather than retaliate, leading the US to lower tariffs to 15 percent.

Many South Koreans were also alarmed after hundreds of South Koreans were arrested in Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) raids on a Hyundai plant in Georgia in September 2025.

Last October, Trump travelled to Seoul in a historic state visit, and earlier this year, President Lee visited the US. Lee is also trying to resume dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang.

How is South Korea being affected by the US-Israel war on Iran?

South Korea is facing an economic crisis. The country relies on the Gulf supplies via the Strait of Hormuz for 60 to 70 percent of crude imports, meaning supply is being severely hit. The war has led to soaring inflation, causing the Korean won to fall to a 17-year low.

Seoul therefore has an interest in freeing up the strait. However, under Korean law, the government will require parliament’s approval before a military deployment, although some governing party members could oppose it.

New fuel pricing targets consumption above 110 litres monthly, doubling costs to 100,000 riyals per litre.

Iran has raised petrol prices for motorists again as the government struggles to manage declining revenues and sustain a costly subsidy regime.

The price of petrol will remain the same for the first 60 litres (16 gallons), state media reported, but there will be a higher price bracket for the next 50 litres (13 gallons). Prices will double from 50,000 riyals to 100,000 riyals ($0.07) per litre (0.3 gallons) for motorists who consume more than 110 litres (29 gallons) a month.

Iran has some of the lowest petrol prices in the world, but due to ongoing economic difficulties amid the war with the US, including punishing sanctions and a siege on Iranian ports by US forces, Iranian officials have for months considered adjusting fuel subsidies to make up for lost revenues.

“If we consume it properly, we can manage with the amount of gasoline we produce in the country,” Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, speaker of the Iranian parliament, said in a TV address earlier this month. “What is clear is that we need to save gasoline in our consumption. Of course, part of the responsibility for this high consumption does not lie with our people; it lies with our industry.”

Iran depends on oil exports for about 90 per cent of its budget, but these have declined from about 4 million barrels per day (bpd) to about 2.2 million bpd in August. The country is also consuming more oil than it produces domestically.

In a sign of the energy crisis, videos circulating on social media reportedly show long queues at petrol stations in Tehran.

It is the second time petrol prices have increased since December, with concerns about further increases prompting unrest.

Huge antigovernment protests in 2019 started after anger over fuel price increases. Iranians are already feeling the impact of a downturn in economic activity, high inflation, and a drop in the value of the rial.