Middle East

Iraqi foreign minister warns of potential regional war, says Baghdad seeking to resolve disagreements with Saudi Arabia.

Iraq has evidence that external parties have been using its territory to launch attacks on neighbouring countries, its foreign minister told Al Jazeera in an exclusive interview on Saturday.

Baghdad is investigating attacks launched from Iraqi territory against Gulf states and is seeking to resolve disagreements with Saudi Arabia through dialogue, Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein said.

Saudi Arabia has accused Iran-aligned groups operating in Iraq of attacking its oil infrastructure. In September, Baghdad confirmed that drone attacks on the kingdom’s East-West pipeline originated from Iraqi territory.

Hussein told Al Jazeera that Baghdad was negotiating with Iran-aligned armed factions to bring their weapons under state control and the process must be pursued through dialogue rather than force.

He also said they were in contact with Tehran regarding the issue of weapons held by Iraqi factions.

Hussein said Washington had formally requested the closure of all but two border crossings with Iran. He said that while Iraq welcomed friendship and an alliance with Tehran, it rejected interference in its internal affairs.

Hussein also said Iraq had lost about $60bn from the suspension of oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz, but that shipments have resumed after understandings were reached with Washington and Tehran.

On the issue of combatting ISIL (ISIS), Hussein said that Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Turkiye have formed a committee to fight the group’s presence in Syria.

The full interview will air at 18:00 GMT on Sunday on Al Jazeera.

In the heart of war-ravaged Mosul, two carved lions stand as a fragile link to the city’s shattered past. Bashar, a fisherman, lost his once-grand family home during the battle to liberate the city from ISIL (ISIS) nearly 10 years ago. All that remains is a marble gate crowned with lions, which he fiercely guards.

Fakhri, a devoted collector determined to save Mosul’s heritage, becomes obsessed with acquiring the lions gate for his unofficial museum. His friend Fadil, a musician once silenced under ISIL, challenges him to see the human cost behind every artefact. As Mosul rebuilds, a quiet cultural revival reflects the resilience of a city with 8,000 years of history.

The Lions by the River Tigris is a documentary film by Zaradasht Ahmed.

Port Sudan, Sudan – After a two-and-a-half-hour journey from the village of al-Lalouba, Layla Ali arrived in Port Sudan to get help for her five-year-old son, Adam. His severe malnutrition had left his ribs visibly protruding beneath his skin.

He had begun to lose his appetite two weeks earlier and became too sick to move. The distance to the hospital and Ali’s fears about the cost of treatment stopped her from rushing Adam for medical treatment. But when his condition deteriorated further, Ali had no choice but to rush him to hospital.

“We spent five days in hospital while my son received treatment. He suffers from recurring bouts of malnutrition, but this time we brought him to hospital because I was afraid he might die,” Ali told Al Jazeera.

“When Adam became ill, he would stop eating. I used to give him the usual meals we prepared at home, mostly porridge and milk. But the doctors have now helped me understand which foods are appropriate for his age and the nutrients he needs.”

Adam’s condition reflects a wider crisis facing children across Sudan, where a civil war has continued since April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary.

The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) estimates that 825,000 children under five will suffer from severe acute malnutrition in 2026, a 7 percent increase from 2025.

In the first six months of this year, UNICEF and its partners treated 174,700 children with severe acute malnutrition nationwide. The Port Sudan Teaching Hospital has recorded 433 cases between January and August this year.

Maryam Gadalsid, a nutrition counsellor at the hospital, said the number of children admitted with malnutrition continues to rise, forcing medical staff to accommodate as many as possible.

But this has led to overcrowding, with three children to a single bed in the hospital’s 17-bed malnutrition unit, Gadalsid told Al Jazeera, increasing the risk of disease spreading among patients.

“Medical staff assess each child’s condition before providing essential supplies, including therapeutic milk and other nutritional supplies free of charge, with support from the World Health Organization (WHO) and UNICEF,” Gadalsid said. “However, intravenous fluids and medication remain a significant financial burden for many families, struggling with the economic crisis caused by the war.”

Gadalsid added that inadequate nutrition among pregnant women, driven by displacement and economic hardship, was also putting their babies at risk of poor growth and malnutrition.

An increase in the numbers of flies, which can contaminate food and water, and mosquitoes, which transmit malaria, was worrying, she said. Malnourished children, in particular, are at risk of these diseases and viruses.

“With the onset of winter, malnutrition cases increase [and] … the number of flies rises, contributing to the spread of diseases that cause malnutrition,” she said.

Displaced children face worsening malnutrition

The situation is particularly bad in western Sudan’s Darfur region, which had already faced two decades of war before the 2023 nationwide conflict broke out.

Darfur has been an epicentre of the current conflict and is currently an RSF stronghold. Fighting there, combined with hunger and disease, has created an increasingly desperate situation for millions of civilians, particularly women and children.

In North Darfur alone, there were at least 40,000 cases of malnutrition between January and May 2025, according to UNICEF, when the RSF imposed a siege on the state’s capital, el-Fasher. The city was later taken by the RSF in October, and the paramilitary group is accused of killing thousands of civilians there.

Meanwhile, in Blue Nile State, southeastern Sudan, malnutrition is also taking a growing toll on displaced children.

Sabri Adam, deputy head of the committee overseeing al-Karama 3 displacement camp, which is located in the state capital al-Damazin, told Al Jazeera that cases of malnutrition had risen from 1,800 in September to 2,116 in November, accounting for more than a quarter of the camp’s children. Of those affected, 1,760 are under the age of five.

According to Adam, al-Karama 3 is home to more than 7,600 children under the age of 10, among almost 4,000 displaced families. They had fled areas in western Blue Nile State, including al-Tadamon, Bau and Kurmuk, where military operations between the SAF and the RSF have intensified.

“These families arrived at the camp in extremely difficult humanitarian conditions, amid limited funding and humanitarian assistance from organisations, and a lack of health monitoring despite the growing needs of displaced people,” he said to Al Jazeera.

Adam said the camp received cash assistance from the Red Crescent earlier this month to support people affected by malnutrition and pregnant women. Each eligible household received 620,000 Sudanese pounds (about $60 at the parallel market rate).

The situation is unfolding as the IPC warns of a growing risk of famine across parts of Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan. Conflict, mass displacement, severe drought and inadequate humanitarian funding are driving a further deterioration in food security.

The El Nino climate phenomenon has led to reduced rainfall in Sudan during the rainy season, leading to drought that is affecting roughly half of the country.

According to the IPC, nearly two-thirds of farmland in North Darfur and roughly half in South Darfur and Kordofan states have had poor vegetation growth, threatening harvests and leaving families facing higher prices and worsening hunger.

War and poverty deepen Sudan’s malnutrition crisis

Back at the Port Sudan Teaching Hospital, Dr Ahmed Youssef, the medical director of the paediatric department, said increasing malnutrition was driven not only by the effects of war and displacement but also by limited nutrition awareness or accessibility among families, particularly in rural communities.

Many families in smaller villages across Sudan rely heavily on flour and milk as staple foods, with meat largely absent from their daily diets.

“We are working to provide families of children with malnutrition with basic nutrition education as a first step towards tackling the problem. However, we face difficulties reaching villages to deliver healthcare and raise awareness,” he told Al Jazeera.

Food contamination, particularly amid unreliable electricity supplies and a lack of refrigerators in many households, makes it difficult for families to store food safely and is also a major issue.

“Families often bring their children to hospital only when malnutrition has reached an advanced stage, either because of financial hardship and fears about treatment costs or because of limited education,” he said.

Tel Aviv-Jaffa, Israel – On election day, Lama Yassin, 31, drove to polling stations in her hometown of Arrabeh, where Palestinian citizens of Israel make up an overwhelming majority, inspired by what she was witnessing.

“You would see families coming to the polls together, grandparents and grandchildren,” she said. “It was the first time in a really long time that I felt there is hope – hope of a change.”

The overwhelming Arab turnout in the October 27 Israeli election won the Arab parties a record 19 seats in the Knesset, the Israeli parliament.

Thabet Abu Rass, an expert on Jewish-Arab relations in Israel, had predicted the Arab parties would be impossible for Gadi Eisenkot’s opposition bloc to ignore: Their seats push it past the 61-seat threshold for a ruling coalition.

Instead, Yassin and others saw Israeli channels invite “Jews to talk about Arabs and Arab voter turnout”, she recalled, with almost no Arab guests.

“The whole conversation was about how dangerous these Arab voters are.” The “most disgusting term” she saw online, however, was the repeated refrain of “election terrorism” on Channel 14, the hard-right, pro-Netanyahu station.

Within a day of the vote, Likud and figures like Itamar Ben-Gvir accused the Arab parties of stealing the election through “bribery, threats, violence, forgeries”. The accusations have continued even after the Central Elections Committee and the Israeli police said they found no sign of organised tampering.

Distraught, Yassin posted an Instagram video that went viral among Palestinians, capturing the doublespeak of Israelis they so often hear:

“Eating hummus with us? ‘Brothers and friends’.

Seeking political power? ‘Terror supporters’.

Helping someone in distress? ‘Brothers and friends’.

Voting in large numbers? ‘Terror at the ballot box’.”

“When it suits you, we are brothers and friends. When it suits you, we are a symbol of coexistence. When it suits you, you go around the world boasting about our integration into Israeli society.

“But the moment we demand to have influence, to shape policy, and to take part in decision-making – suddenly, our very presence becomes a threat.”

When voting becomes ‘a danger to the state’

More than a week after the election, Jaffa’s Ajami neighbourhood offers both the history leading up to – and the fraught circumstances of – this moment that Abu Rass calls Israel’s “political crossroads”.

Faded Arabic signs on abandoned buildings hint at the Palestinian community that thrived in Ajami before 1948. On Ajami’s streets, posters of children killed during Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza hang metres away from campaign posters for Ra’am and the Joint List.

From the back office of his cluttered hardware shop, Omar Siksik, once a Tel Aviv-Jaffa city councilman who now co-chairs Kulna Yaffa, a grassroots, Arab-Jewish civic initiative in the city, weighs this moment of unprecedented representation – met by renewed delegitimisation efforts – against Ajami’s own history. It is a struggle, he says, for basic existence.

Before 1948, Jaffa had about 100,000 Palestinians. After the Nakba, fewer than 4,000 remained – with those left fenced inside Ajami under military rule. “We called it the Ajami ghetto,” explained Siksik. Born there in 1957, he grew up sharing a toilet and kitchen with newly arrived Jewish immigrants who took the homes of expelled Palestinian neighbours.

Over time, the fence surrounding Ajami was torn down, martial law ended, and the Palestinians who remained there were granted Israeli citizenship. But later, when Siksik became the head of the Rabita Association, a nonprofit for the Palestinian residents of Jaffa, he remembered “sleeping under the bulldozers” that were razing the houses of Palestinians in the area, a practice that Rabita had fought in court.

For Siksik and others, election day is the only occasion that’s different for Palestinian citizens of Israel. “This is a democratic election,” he said. “It’s the only thing where we’re equal with the Jews. The only thing.

“When we came and expressed our dissatisfaction with this government, the Arab vote became a danger to the state,” said Siksik. “It’s not normal.”

Many Palestinian citizens of Israel believe they’ve been allowed to remain out of necessity, not equality. “The bus drivers are Arabs, the doctors in the hospitals are Arabs, the construction workers are Arabs,” Siksik notes.

But even those “essential worker” roles are being stripped away. After October 7, Israel revoked tens of thousands of work permits for Palestinians from Gaza and the West Bank to enter Israel, and the essential jobs they filled are being replaced by short-term labourers brought from abroad. Yassin notes fabricated stories over the summer on Israeli social media that Arab doctors were poisoning Jewish patients at Rambam Hospital in Haifa.

“If they could give up on anything Arab, they would,” says Yassin. “It’s not because they like us [that they let us remain]… It’s not because they want to; it’s because they have to.”

Facing ‘the whole Israeli system’

Yassin herself went through that struggle for acceptance in Israeli society. After growing up in Arrabeh, she learned Hebrew so well at Ben-Gurion University that “no one knew I was an Arab any more.” She took a job at a regional council near Jerusalem, in an entirely Jewish workplace, to prove she was “fully Israeli”.

“I did not speak Arabic in public. I even voted for [left-wing Zionist party] Meretz and favoured them over Arab parties,” said Yassin. “I wanted to be ‘the good Israeli’.”

But she could never escape that sense of otherness. At the council, colleagues asked if they could call Yassin – whose first name, Lama, means “why” in Hebrew – “Yasmine” instead, because she reminded them of Jasmine from the movie Aladdin. She was Yasmine for a year and a half. “It was another demand of giving up on another part of my identity – one that defines me literally.”

And then, the Sunday after the October 7 attacks, her colleagues would not say hello back to her.

She came to realise that “shared society cannot be built over inequality.”

After becoming director of public policy at the Abraham Initiatives, which advances the rights of Palestinian citizens in Israel, Yassin testified at Knesset committee meetings regarding unchecked crime and violence affecting their communities. She describes being dismissed or silenced outright, despite prior approval to speak. “If you say one more word,” she recalled the National Security committee chairman saying, “I will ask you to leave.”

Yassin sees that derision of a Palestinian political voice carrying over into the rhetoric – and investigations – surrounding the post-election talks. In Jaffa, that wider climate was felt on November 3, when, about midnight, about 15 security officers, a few of them masked, raided the Jaffa home of Abed Abou Shehadeh, a journalist and activist, arresting him in front of his two children. Accused of having “contacts with a foreign agent”, a court has ordered him held until November 8.

The ‘loyalty test’

In the south, meanwhile, police arrested seven Bedouin men on suspicion of planning to pay people to vote for Ra’am, which calls them party activists and denies the allegations. Arab political leader Ayman Odeh now faces investigations as well by the Shin Bet intelligence service, which is run by the Netanyahu-aligned David Zini, over allegations that he received money from foreign sources to influence voter turnout. Odeh denies the allegations, calling them “political persecution”.

“We are now facing the whole Israeli system,” says Abu Rass. “I think we are facing the deep state also.”

Before the election, Abu Rass had predicted to Al Jazeera that 15 to 17 seats would have Israeli party leaders knocking on the Arab parties’ doors. But despite the Arab parties exceeding even those high expectations, that success has not yet borne such fruit.

With 67 members of the Knesset, including those from the Arab parties, recommending Eisenkot to the president to form a government, the anti-Netanyahu bloc has signalled agreement to remove Knesset speaker Amir Ohana and halt the judicial overhaul legislation. The Arab parties also plan to back a state inquiry into the October 7 security failures. But Abu Rass does not mistake this for a lasting partnership.

“[Eisenkot is] counting on us only for the coming months,” he says, “to help him stabilise his government, to pass this stage of removing the government and Netanyahu.”

And while Eisenkot campaigned on two pillars – removing Netanyahu, and mandating military service for ultra-Orthodox Haredim who largely do not serve – even Avigdor Liberman, long a fierce opponent of Haredi draft-dodging, now signals he would work with the Haredi parties to form an anti-Netanyahu government without the Arabs, who have repeatedly offered to support Eisenkot from outside the coalition to unseat Netanyahu.

Israeli President Isaac Herzog, tasked with choosing a leader to try to form a government, this week condemned “the coarseness and racist expressions that we have heard recently”. But according to Israeli media, during meetings with party leaders, he asked Ra’am leader Mansour Abbas whether he considers Hamas a terrorist organisation. “You cannot constantly put us to this test,” said Abbas, who has repeatedly condemned the October 7 attacks, according to Israeli media.

Yassin has felt and seen these loyalty tests play out before in Israel. “Even if the two million Arabs who live here … say ‘we condemn Hamas,’ the day after, we will have another loyalty test,” she says. “It’s never-ending, and whoever wants to deny our rights in this country does not really need a reason to.”

A Jewish-only coalition, she says, would mean “we went a few stairs down in the whole democracy approach, the so-called democracy in Israel.”

‘We don’t have the privilege of giving up’

Most people in working-class Ajami have swiftly come down from their election-night highs. “I am not optimistic,” said Nadia, a middle-aged woman sitting behind the counter of a clothing store. “If we raise our voice in the streets, we are arrested. If we raise our voice in the ballot, we are dismissed.”

Siksik fears: “I see catastrophic things coming here.”

But Nadia noted she would vote again if it means keeping Ben-Gvir and Smotrich out of government.

As Yassin puts it: “We don’t have the privilege of giving up. If we don’t do this work, no one will.”

After the sense of power the 19 seats gave people, she says, “it’s going to be hard to give it away.”

Sitting in a liberal Tel Aviv cafe, Yassin overheard a conversation at the adjacent table turn to Gaza and “how they killed the children” – apparently in reaction to what she had been saying.

As the opposition bloc appears to be pursuing every avenue to avoid including Arab parties in any position of power, she finds herself looking at even “liberal” Israelis differently.

“I was looking at every one of them and wondering if they would support an Arab or Arab parties being part of the coalition,” she said.

“Because if they don’t want my representatives, it also means that they don’t want me.”

Agadir, Morocco – Mustapha Harmouch moves slowly across the sand at Agadir’s Corniche, sweeping his metal detector in low, even arcs. He tunes out the surfers paddling beyond the shore, the children shrieking in the waves and the chatter of families, all his attention is on one sound: the beep that means the coil has passed over something buried beneath the sand.

For the 33-year-old content creator, that uncertainty is the whole appeal. The detector does not distinguish between treasure and rubbish, it gives the same signal whether the object below is a coin, a ring, a discarded piece of aluminium, or an old piece of fishing equipment.

“The excitement comes partly from not knowing what lies beneath the sand,” he told Al Jazeera English.

Harmouch bought a Tianxun TX 850 metal detector online about four years ago. What began as a hobby has since become an occasional part of the videos he posts on Stofishing, a YouTube travel and spearfishing channel with roughly 123,000 subscribers.

“It’s a nice hobby because it’s the kind of exploration where I find something and learn something new,” he said. “Each outing is a chance to encounter something I would otherwise never have known about.”

That curiosity has led him to old coins, including some associated with historical periods and places such as the Al Haouz region and Fez.

In the coastal town of Sidi Ouassay, about 65km south of Agadir, he says he found one of his rarest hauls: 14 Moroccan falus, old bronze or copper coins, in a single spot.

Some were too damaged by salt and the passage of time for their markings to be easily read, but Harmouch says the oldest dates to 1289 on the Hijri calendar.

For Harmouch, the coins’ value lies less in their price than in what they reveal about the past.

“I just collect them as a memory,” he said with a glint in his eye.

In the same area, he once found what he thought was a meteorite, only to learn it was a common, inexpensive mineral.

“Before asking, I thought I had found the best discovery,” he said, laughing at the memory.

That sense of possibility and adventure is what keeps him returning to the beaches around Agadir.

Harmouch goes detecting about four times a month, often with fellow members of the Moroccan Association for Research and Exploration Enthusiasts. He favours Taghazout and Agadir’s Corniche, where there is less rubbish for his detector to pick up.

The beaches have yielded jewellery, Moroccan coins and foreign currency, including a French 20-franc silver coin.

The possibility of finding something valuable is still part of the appeal. He once found a small gold ring in Taghazout.

“I always try to identify and return valuable lost items to their rightful owners,” Harmouch says.

Where the law draws the line

Morocco’s main legal framework for protecting historical monuments, archaeological sites, works of art and antiquities dates to Law 22-80, which regulates archaeological prospecting and the treatment of historical discoveries. The government has reiterated that unauthorised archaeological searches on land or at sea are prohibited.

Under the law, searches intended to uncover monuments or moveable objects of historic, archaeological, or anthropological importance require authorisation, while accidental discoveries are subject to reporting requirements.

If a non-archaeological activity uncovers monuments, coins, works of art, or antiquities, the discovery must be reported to authorities. The objects should not be damaged or moved, except where necessary to protect them.

Finding a modern coin lost by a holidaymaker is one thing; deliberately searching for archaeological material is another.

But on Morocco’s coastline, archaeologists say the context in which an object is found can be just as important as the object itself.

Underwater archaeologist Basma Oumaima explains why context matters: “Sometimes something as simple as a fragment of metal, a coin, or a small tool can become important because of where it was found and what was found around it”.

“That does not mean curiosity itself should be discouraged. Metal detectors themselves can actually be useful tools in archaeology when they are used as part of a proper archaeological survey, where every find is located, recorded and studied within its context”.

Harmouch says he respects the law. Members of the association carry identification, avoid private property and heritage sites and treat detecting as a hobby rather than a job. His source of income, he says, comes mainly from content creation and a fishing equipment store.

‘Every person has their luck’

For Mohamed Botaib, metal detecting has never been his main source of income. A former sports coach currently looking for work, he searches beaches, forests and mountains as a hobby.

His finds have been modest: ordinary coins, Moroccan dirhams and rings.

“Every person has their luck,” he said.

For Jalal Zegnoune, another detectorist, removing unwanted metal is one of the hobby’s practical sides. His detector has produced coins, jewellery, glasses and watches, along with less glamorous finds, including rusted sardine-can fragments, nails and lost fishing gear.

“I remove such objects from the beaches because some can be dangerous to beachgoers,” he said.

Zegnoune works full-time as a maintenance technician in Casablanca and goes metal detecting when he’s free or for limited hours in the evening.

“I also enjoy meeting other people who practise the hobby and sharing the objects they find.”

“When we look at the beach, it’s not to find treasure,” Botaib says. “It’s also our way of contributing to keeping our beaches clean. We collect pieces of metal and aluminium that we find and throw them away.”

Israeli President Isaac Herzog must decide who gets the first attempt at forming a government, after an inconclusive election left both Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his main rival, former army chief Gadi Eisenkot, short of a parliamentary majority.

Herzog has said he will task a candidate with forming a government on Sunday. Eisenkot has received the endorsement of a majority of lawmakers – but only thanks to parties representing Palestinian citizens of Israel, which won a record 19 seats in October’s election, but whom Eisenkot has ruled out bringing into government.

Here is what we know:

Who is Herzog likely to ask to form a government?

During consultations between party heads and Herzog, which ended on Thursday, 67 out of 120 Knesset members endorsed Eisenkot, while only 46 endorsed Netanyahu.

Netanyahu’s endorsements fell seven short of his bloc’s 53 seats after United Torah Judaism, one of his longtime allies, withheld endorsements over his coalition’s failure to exempt ultra-Orthodox Israelis from military service.

Herzog has not publicly committed to either side, saying that while the numbers may look clear, “mutual vetoes between the blocs and within the blocs themselves” made it hard to tell who could build a coalition.

Prior to the October 27 elections, reports emerged that the president wanted to push for a national unity government between Netanyahu and Eisenkot’s rival parties to avoid another election.

How difficult will it be to form a government?

No bloc has secured the 61 seats needed to form a majority government. Netanyahu’s right-wing and religious alliance has 53, four Jewish-led parties backing Eisenkot hold 48, and the Arab-led parties hold 19.

Eisenkot has ruled out forming a government with the Arab-led parties, which would give him a 67-seat bloc. Winning over the two ultra-Orthodox parties, United Torah Judaism and Shas, would give him exactly 61 seats.

United Torah Judaism has signalled that its support was available for the right price, but Shas endorsed Netanyahu on Wednesday.

Netanyahu, meanwhile, would need to lure an opposition party to his side. A unity government with the two men rotating as prime minister – and excluding Arab-led parties from government – is another option, but many Netanyahu rivals have ruled out serving under him.

Will Arab-led parties be part of the next government?

So far, it seems unlikely that they will.

The Arab-led parties are the Joint List, an alliance of three parties, and the United Arab List (Ra’am). They hold 11 and eight seats, respectively.

Ra’am says it is willing to join an Eisenkot-led government, while the Joint List has ruled out joining but offered to help put him in office from the outside.

Both endorsed Eisenkot during consultations with President Herzog, but he has refused to bring either into government unless they meet certain conditions, including recognising Hamas as a “terrorist organisation”.

Ra’am leader Mansour Abbas, whose party joined an anti-Netanyahu coalition in 2021 and became the first party representing Palestinians to enter government in Israel, has expressed support for disarming Hamas, but declined to label it as a “terror” group.

However, Israeli law allows Eisenkot to become prime minister with fewer than 61 seats if his proposed government wins a parliamentary confidence vote – which the two could help him secure.

Eisenkot could form a minority government in the meantime and later secure a majority by luring the two ultra-Orthodox parties by making concessions on the conscription issue.

In positions that many observers see as highlighting the second-class nature of Palestinian citizens in Israel, some of Eisenkot’s allies have opposed any reliance on Palestinian lawmakers, while Netanyahu’s Likud has threatened that cooperating with the Arab-led parties would be “dangerous to Israel”.

Senior Joint List member Ahmad Tibi told The Associated Press that rejecting a partnership would prove Israel is “an ethnocracy, not an absolute democracy for all citizens”.

What do Palestinian-led parties want from the next government?

First, an end to Netanyahu’s rule.

The Joint List said its unanimous backing for Eisenkot answered a “public demand” to stop Netanyahu and his government returning to power.

By widening Eisenkot’s lead, it said, it hoped to narrow the path to a unity government that keeps Netanyahu in office. Its support, it added, did not mean dropping its reservations about an opposition that had not shown readiness to confront Netanyahu’s approach or incitement against Palestinian citizens of Israel.

In return for outside support, Arab-led parties are seeking guarantees for Palestinian citizens, including an end to house demolitions and incitement, action against crime, and a political horizon for Palestinians.

Tibi told The AP he had no illusions that this would end Israel’s wars or bring a Palestinian state, but said a “repair government” would improve Palestinian citizens’ lives, including, potentially, by tackling violent crime in their communities.

Ra’am leader Abbas has also said ending the government of Netanyahu, and far-right figures such as Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, is a priority.

What happens if no government can be formed?

The nominee chosen by Herzog will have 28 days to form a coalition, extendable by 14 more. If they fail, another nominee will be chosen and granted 28 days.

If the second nominee fails, a parliament majority can back a third candidate, and be granted a final 14 days.

If once again no government is formed, the Knesset will be dissolved and an entirely new election called within 90 days. This would mean Netanyahu staying on as caretaker prime minister.

Nehru Jamhour, an analyst of Israeli affairs, told Al Jazeera that this drawn-out impasse was the likeliest outcome, and Netanyahu’s preferred one. He said that Netanyahu was hoping that a repeat election could weaken his rivals and depress turnout among Palestinian citizens of Israel.

Iran has stepped up diplomatic efforts amid suggestions by United States President Donald Trump that the US could resume full-scale strikes on the Islamic republic.

The US news website Axios quoted a US official saying that US Central Command (CENTCOM) was preparing for the resumption of major military operations in Iran, and that it was just waiting on orders from Washington. On Thursday, Trump told reporters the US may have to “destroy” the rest of Iran, adding that people will “know soon enough” if he acts.

Tehran’s intensified diplomatic push comes after Iran downed two US reconnaissance drones near Qeshm island in the Strait of Hormuz, which the US struck earlier this week. Iran says it will retaliate if the US resumes larger strikes.

What diplomatic efforts is Iran engaging in?

On Thursday, Iran offered the US a new nuclear and peace proposal via Qatari mediators, to be discussed only after Washington meets Tehran’s seven demands, a senior Iranian official told Reuters. The US is examining the proposal, Reuters reported.

Iran has made meeting its seven demands a condition for reopening the Strait of Hormuz and restarting peace talks, including on its nuclear programme. The demands include the lifting of sanctions on Iran, the unfreezing of Iranian assets and the end to the US naval blockade of its ports in and around the Strait of Hormuz, among other things.

It has also stepped up ties with Russia, with its top security official, Mohsen Rezaei, travelling to Moscow for talks on Thursday. During that visit, Rezaei said: “On the issue of diplomacy, we have announced seven conditions ⁠to the Americans. As long as they do ⁠not execute our seven conditions, we will neither open the Strait of Hormuz nor have negotiations.”

Meanwhile, the US has insisted a deal on Iran’s nuclear capacity must be part of any ceasefire agreement before wider peace talks can restart.

How is Iran deepening ties with Russia?

On Thursday, Rezaei met with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin to deliver a message from Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. Iranian state media did not elaborate on ⁠the contents of the message.

Rezaei called it “an extremely important exchange” according to remarks reported by the Iranian embassy, but also did not give further details.

However, The Financial Times reported that Russia previously agreed to supply Iran with 90 helicopter-mounted launchers for precision-guided missiles, despite needing its own weapons for the Ukraine war. The newspaper cited a Russian defence manufacturer’s production schedule for 2024 and 2025, which it has examined, showing an order for helicopter-mounted launchers being assigned a code used to refer to Iran in Russian defence documents.

Relations between Russia and Iran have deepened since Moscow launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and during the US-Israeli war on Iran that saw the two countries become the most heavily sanctioned in the world. Iran has provided Shahed drones, which Russia has modified and used heavily against Ukraine.

In return, Russia has also reportedly helped Iran develop supersonic cruise missiles, sold it Verba shoulder-launched anti-air missiles and shared information with Tehran potentially relevant to nuclear weapons.

“It is indicative of Russia’s willingness to continue supplying Iran despite its own wartime demands and with far less concern about Western objections than in the past,” Nicole Grajewski, a non-resident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told the FT.

In early October, Putin said Russia was prepared to take part in mediation to bring an end to the war.

Images released by the Kremlin showed its foreign affairs adviser Yuri Ushakov and chief of the Russian military intelligence, Igor Kostyukov, attending a meeting with Iran’s security chief alongside Putin.

The meeting also strengthened Iran’s economic ties with Russia.

“During the meeting with Mr Vladimir Putin, discussions were held regarding the construction of gas pipelines from Russia to Iran,” said Rezaei, Iranian state TV reported.

He said the gas pipelines would address Iran’s gas shortages and facilitate the sale of Russian energy to neighbouring countries.

Tehran said Iran’s natural gas refineries had been hit during the most intense phase of US-Israeli strikes on Iran earlier this year, which lasted 40 days.

Separately, Russia’s Foreign Ministry advised citizens against travel to Iran “In light of the remaining risks of a new escalation around Iran”.

How is Iran negotiating with regional leaders?

During the most intense fighting of the war, Iran struck bases in Gulf countries hosting US military assets, as well as civil and energy facilities and infrastructure.

Senior Iranian officials have repeatedly warned that any state helping the US to target the Islamic republic will be a “legitimate target” should US attacks resume.

On Thursday, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi held phone calls with several Gulf leaders, including the foreign minister of the UAE, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan.

They discussed regional developments as well as diplomatic efforts for stability in the region, according to Araghchi’s Telegram channel.

Araghchi spoke with Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud about efforts to improve security and stability in the region, according to the Saudi foreign ministry.

Araghchi also discussed de-escalation efforts with the foreign ministers of Kuwait and Turkiye.

In a separate call, Araghchi talked with Qatar’s Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani about coordinating to reduce tensions, the Qatari foreign ministry said.

Sheikh Mohammed stressed support for efforts to secure freedom of maritime navigation.

In a statement, Oman’s foreign ministry said the safety of passage through the Strait of Hormuz was a main topic of discussions, in a call between Araghchi and Oman’s foreign minister.

Iran continues to tightly control shipping lanes through the strait, where several ships have been damaged in recent days. It has granted exemptions to shipping restrictions to Iraq and Qatar, in the Gulf region, as well as to India and China.

What is Trump saying?

Despite his Republican Party suffering a drubbing in this week’s US midterm elections – largely because of public anger over the war on Iran and the resulting rise in energy prices – US President Donald Trump has refused to rule out further strikes on Iran.

On Thursday, Trump told reporters at the Oval Office that he may have to “destroy the rest” of Iran.

Former Iranian diplomat Hadi Afghahi told Al Jazeera that Tehran can ease the path to a settlement if the US also shows flexibility. He argued that Trump “really does not want to go to war, because war again will cost him more”. However, the US president’s next move is unpredictable, observers say.

Afghahi cautioned that Trump “is still surrounded by a group of hawks”, including the energy and treasury secretaries.

Trump has shown willingness to engage in diplomacy, however. Qatar’s ⁠Emir ⁠Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad ⁠Al Thani discussed diplomatic ⁠efforts to ease regional tensions in a ‌phone call with Trump on Friday, according to the Qatari Emiri Diwan.

The leaders reviewed international diplomatic efforts, including the Doha-led mediation efforts to support negotiations in recent weeks, in a bid to reach “a comprehensive agreement that puts an end to the crisis”, the Diwan said in a statement.

How has Iran responded to Trump’s rhetoric?

Tehran warned it will retaliate on a wider scale than it has done so far if the US resumes the war. It has also said talks will become unfeasible.

Iranian officials said Iran has the capacity to strike further than the Gulf using weapons manufactured in Iran.

On Thursday, a spokesman for the Supreme Advisor to the Commander of the Aerospace Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps said: “In the event of a new aggression, any country or force that helps America attack Iran can be a legitimate target of the Islamic Republic.”

Iran’s state media outlet Tasnim News reported: “Our missile bases have a suitable range to target the Zionist regime and American bases,” adding “Iran’s response to the possible new aggression of the enemies will not be geographically limited.”

Iran has also previously warned that cables, data centres and artificial intelligence (AI) facilities across the Gulf region could be attacked if war with the US erupts again.

What strikes have there been in recent days?

In the run-up to the midterm elections, the US said it had conducted “defensive strikes” on Iran’s Qeshm island and Bandar Lengeh in the Strait of Hormuz.

Meanwhile, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps navy says at least seven tankers have caught fire after sailing into mines while attempting to transit through the Strait of Hormuz using “unauthorised routes” near Oman this week.

Two oil ‌tankers caught fire and were brought to a stop after hitting ⁠mines on Friday, the IRGC said. They had been trying to cross the waterway “with the support of the aggressor and terrorist American military”, the IRGC added.

Control over the Strait of Hormuz has been a main stumbling block in negotiations to end the Iran war since it began in February.

Tehran has sought to limit traffic through the strategic waterway, which normally carries about one-fifth of global oil supplies.

The US has also imposed a blockade on Iranian ports and escorted tankers through the strait.

Maritime organisations have not confirmed the latest incidents.

Ten years ago, as parts of Diyarbakir in southeast Turkiye were reduced to rubble in battles between the military and Kurdish fighters, the city’s main football club, Amedspor, became a target.

Diyarbakir is the biggest Kurdish-majority city in Turkiye, and Amedspor, then in the third tier, had become a standard bearer of Kurdish identity.

As fighting raged between the state and groups linked to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the club was hit with fines and bans on away supporters and outspoken players. Its premises were raided by antiterrorism police, and its fans, players and officials were attacked by rival supporters. In the years that followed, its survival looked uncertain.

A decade on, a peace process is under way between the government and the PKK, and Amedspor – in their first season in the top-flight after successive promotions – are second in the Super Lig after 10 games. A win at league leaders Galatasaray on Saturday would take them to the top.

“Amedspor have achieved a level of success that nobody expected,” said Vahap Coskun, an academic from Diyarbakir who has written a book about the club.

Coskun told Al Jazeera there are several factors behind the success this season; an experienced and canny coach in Besnik Hasi, and a mostly new squad of players performing above expectations, including the 24-year-old Nigerian striker Gift Orban, who has scored nine goals in 10 games so far.

Then there are the passionate, sellout crowds of more than 30,000 that have helped the side win its six home games so far.

But he also said the “softening political climate” was key as it “affects everything from the treatment Amedspor receive in away matches to the refereeing, and it allows Amedspor to compete in fairer conditions”.

Reha Ruhavioglu, director of the Kurdish Studies Center (KSC) and a former member of the club’s advisory board, told Al Jazeera Amedspor’s matches have become a “weekly barometer” of whether Turkish society and state can accept the club as part of the country “with its own colours, culture, language and identity”.

From obscurity to the Super Lig

Amedspor was formed as Melikahmet Turanspor in 1972 and later passed through various name changes and was taken over by Diyarbakir’s municipality in 1990. They spent much of their history toiling in the lower leagues.

The club gained promotion to the third tier for the first time in 2013, and the following year caused a stir after renaming themselves with the Kurdish word for Diyarbakir – “Amed” – and adopting the red, green and yellow of the Kurdish tricolour.

Expressions of Kurdish culture and language have long been suppressed in Turkiye, especially after the separatist PKK launched an armed uprising against the Turkish state in 1984. But the club were allowed to use the name Amed and their green and red colours at least, if not the full tricolour.

They were clearly on the up. In January 2015, they claimed a 2-0 victory away at Galatasaray in the Turkish Cup. In 2015-16, as conflict raged in Turkiye’s southeast, they reached the quarterfinals of the Turkish Cup, beating Super Lig sides Basaksehir and Bursaspor along the way.

In the following years, the club was bailed out by local businesses after its funding was cut by government appointees to the municipality. It continued to face significant hostility from rival fans, frequent punishment from the federation and verbal attacks from politicians.

But it was becoming increasingly popular among Kurds across the country, not only in Diyarbakir.

Research published by the KSC in March 2026 found that Amedspor’s support had quadrupled to four million among Kurdish adults in Turkiye over four years – even before the promotion to the Super Lig – and that the club had become the best supported among Kurds in the country.

Meanwhile, a new peace process between the state and the PKK had begun in late 2024, and in May 2025 the PKK formally announced its dissolution and the end of its armed struggle.

When Amedspor were promoted to the Super Lig in May, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his ultranationalist ally Devlet Bahceli congratulated the club. Erdogan later received Amedspor officials and players at the presidential palace along with those from other promoted clubs.

Bagis Erten, a sports journalist with Oksijen newspaper, said that now the political winds have shifted, the club is not being held back or excessively punished by footballing authorities.

“Especially when we talk about the football federation and referees, [Amedspor] were always treated very badly in previous years. Their penalties were not given, their red cards were not fair,” he told Al Jazeera.

“But now this system at least is not stopping them.”

‘Fragile progress’

At Amedspor’s Diyarbakir Stadium, the crowd in one stand calls out in Kurdish: “Ki ne em?” (Who are we?). Another stand thunders in response: “Kurd in em!” (We are Kurds!) At a recent game against Istanbul giants Besiktas, which Amedspor won 3-2, a tifo featured the words “EM HATIN” (We are here).

Turkish society is now encountering the Kurdish language and other expressions of Kurdish identity more regularly because of Amedspor’s promotion to the Super Lig.

There has been hostility shown by rival fans this season, with some provocatively displaying yellow body bags and images of F16s in reference to the darkest days of the conflict with the PKK.

But Ruhavioglu says that, despite incidents like this, the “barometer” is generally looking positive and that football can help to “normalise” Kurdish identity in Turkiye, as several teams and their fans have now visited the city without incident.

“When you see the bigger picture, it is going well,” he said.

Ruhavioglu says his centre’s research has also challenged some misconceptions around the club and its fans.

“Amedspor’s stands are really not homogenous,” he said, adding that while many fans support the left-wing, pro-Kurdish DEM Party, others are “close to other parties and ideologies. The Kurdish political movement is [generally] a secular movement, but many fans are praying in the stadium.”

And although the research found that a sense of Kurdishness and speaking Kurdish were strongly tied to fandom of Amedspor, he said the club should not be seen as “a national team for Kurds”, but rather more like “the representative of Kurdish identity” in Turkiye. Indeed, 61 percent of Kurds in the survey said they support the Turkish national team when it plays.

Unlike when the club was playing in the lower tiers, Amedspor now rarely features Kurdish or local players in the starting XI – it is mostly comprised of foreign players and some non-Kurdish Turks.

Coskun denied this undermines the club’s sense of Kurdishness.

“I think the fact that few of the players are Kurdish is not of vital importance to the fans, because it is the club that carries the identity, not the players,” he said. “Of course, fans would like to see many more Kurdish players in the team, but what matters most here is success.”

But Erten says the club may end up seeking to dilute its political identity to pursue footballing success or at least avoid trouble.

“Of course, it’s the symbol of Kurdish movement … [but] they are trying to convince Turkish society that it’s a good football project as well.”

Erten says attitudes towards Amedspor show how Turkiye’s state and society have become more tolerant of prominent expressions of Kurdishness on a national level, something that was unthinkable in previous decades.

“It’s progress, but it depends only on the approach of government,” he said. “It’s very fragile progress.”

Israel’s President Isaac Herzog has said he will name a candidate to form the country’s next government by Sunday, after a majority of lawmakers backed opposition leader Gadi Eisenkot over Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Herzog made the announcement on Thursday after holding marathon talks with parties elected to the 120-seat parliament, known as the Knesset.

Some 67 lawmakers endorsed Eisenkot, a former military chief, while 46 backed Netanyahu.

In televised remarks at the end of the talks, Herzog said that although the “results of the consultations may appear clear”, there were “mutual vetoes between the blocs and within the blocs themselves” that make it difficult to say who has the best chance of assembling a governing coalition.

He said he would hold “personal talks with some of the party leaders” over the Israeli weekend, which runs Friday-Saturday, and make a pick on Sunday.

Israel’s October 27 election left neither Netanyahu nor Eisenkot with a clear path to a parliamentary majority, handing Herzog the difficult task of choosing a candidate in a deeply divided country.

Netanyahu’s Likud won the most seats of any single party with 27 in the 120-seat Knesset, ⁠but his wider religious-nationalist coalition garnered only 53 in total.

Eisenkot’s alliance of four Jewish-led parties, which spans the political spectrum from centre-left to right, won 48 seats despite polls that had predicted a close race.

Two parties representing Israel’s Palestinian minority won an unprecedented 19 seats.

Eisenkot, like Netanyahu, has ruled out forming a government with the Arab-led parties. Both of those parties nonetheless recommended him, giving him the support of a comfortable majority of lawmakers.

“We want to do things that we did not do in the past in order to remove this criminal government,” Ahmad Tibi, a senior member of the Joint List, which represents an alliance of Arab parties, told The Associated Press news agency.

Eisenkot’s party, Yashar, said his 67 recommendations were the most any candidate had received since 2015, and urged Herzog to give him the mandate “as soon as possible” so he could form a national emergency government.

Separately, Netanyahu suffered a setback on Thursday when United Torah Judaism, one of the two main ultra-Orthodox parties and a longtime ally, declined to recommend any candidate.

The party broke with Netanyahu over his coalition’s failure to pass legislation exempting ultra-Orthodox men from military service, The Times of Israel reported.

Yariv Oppenheimer, a member of the Democrats, a party in Eisenkot’s alliance, told Al Jazeera that he saw “no reason” Herzog would not choose Eisenkot on Sunday.

He said United Torah Judaism had signalled that its support was available for the right price, meaning that a good enough offer from Eisenkot could give him the numbers he needed.

“It’s very clear that Netanyahu doesn’t have a chance to establish a government at all,” he added.

Once nominated by Herzog, the candidate will have 28 days to try to forge a government, with a possible 14-day extension.

Netanyahu will remain prime minister in a caretaker government until a new coalition is formed, or through another election that must be held if no ⁠candidate succeeds.

Netanyahu, at risk of losing power, has seized on an investigation by election officials into possible vote tampering to cast doubt on the results, accusing Arab-led parties of stealing the vote.

Critics accuse Netanyahu and his partners of trying to undermine the results, which he denies.

Israel’s Central Election Committee said on ‌Wednesday that the election’s integrity had not been compromised. The head of the committee, Supreme Court Justice Noam Sohlberg, has called on Israel’s elected officials to protect public trust rather than shake it.

“This is a real danger. One of the foundations of democracy is the peaceful transfer of power,” Sohlberg ‌told ‌Herzog at his residence on Wednesday. High voter turnout, including among the Arab minority, was a blessing, he said.

Netanyahu’s allies on the far-right, including National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, have called for the immediate arrest and interrogation of Arab party leaders.

Iran has exempted ships from India, China, Iraq and Qatar from its Strait of Hormuz restrictions, a senior Iranian lawmaker said on Tuesday.

“Ships from these countries pass freely, and the Americans do not intercept them either,” Amir Hayat Moqaddam, deputy chairman of the Iranian parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, told the Iranian Students’ News Agency (ISNA).

Iran effectively shut the strait early in the US-Israel war on Iran, which began on February 28, and the United States reimposed a naval blockade on Iran’s southern ports in July.

So why have these four countries been granted passage through the critical strait, and can their ships really sail freely while the blockade remains in place?

What does Iran get in return for letting ships pass?

It will receive medicine from India and political backing from China, according to Hayat Moqaddam. Iran already receives diplomatic support from Qatar, which is leading mediation efforts to end the US-Israel war on Iran.

Hayat Moqaddam said Tehran will also collect transit fees from Indian and Chinese ships, while Qatari vessels pass free. He did not say whether Iraqi ships will pay a toll.

“Whatever the lawmaker says is the rationale – the big question is if it works and, if yes, to what extent?” Rouzbeh Parsi, an Iran analyst and affiliated researcher at Lund University’s Department of History and Human Rights Studies, told Al Jazeera.

“Iran has been under sanctions for a very long time, so bartering and quid pro quos in trade are nothing new,” he said. The difference now, he added, is that “it’s about poking holes in an embargo and getting crucial goods/services in and out”.

Nader Hashemi, an associate professor of Middle East politics at Georgetown University, said that “most likely Iran is charging a transit fee or a percentage of the cargo value to allow those ships to go through without being harassed”.

“It’s a clever move by Tehran for several reasons,” Wolfgang Pusztai, a security and defence analyst and Austria’s former defence attache to Libya, told Al Jazeera.

“If successful, this move will generate significant revenue for Iran, as China is by far the largest purchaser of Iranian crude oil, buying nearly 90 percent of Iran’s total oil exports,” he said.

By including Qatar, with its many liquefied natural gas (LNG) buyers, and India, Iran is also “trying to undermine acceptance” of Washington’s strategy in the conflict, especially as it charges Qatar no tolls, he added.

Why does it matter to these four countries?

All four are highly dependent on the Strait of Hormuz for exports.

Of the 10.23 million barrels a day of Gulf crude that passed through the strait in October, about 42 percent went to China and 13 percent to India, Muyu Xu, a senior crude oil analyst at the analytics firm Kpler, told Al Jazeera.

“China is the country most able to cross US interests. The question is whether Beijing considers it worth the potential political cost,” Parsi said.

Asia is particularly reliant on Gulf oil and gas usually shipped out via Hormuz. Countries there have much to offer in return for allowing ships to pass.

“For India, the shutdown of oil from the Gulf has been a great loss – and it is a big producer of the pharmaceuticals that Iran cannot manufacture itself,” he said.

Qatar, which is mediating between Washington and Tehran, shipped no LNG through the strait in August, but managed 1.8 million tonnes in October, Xu said.

Its crude transits fell over the same period, from 517,000 barrels a day to 193,000, while Iraq’s rose from 1.69 million to 2.65 million.

Kpler has been unable to trace the origin of up to two million barrels a day of Middle Eastern crude, so both countries’ flows may be higher, Xu said.

“India and Qatar have closer relationships with DC they need to maintain – while both of them also feel let down by Trump,” Parsi said, adding, “For Qatar, maintaining a relationship with Iran is also vital since it’s an unavoidable neighbour.”

“So for all of them, there are upsides for these exemptions from Iranian restrictions but also political dangers,” he said.

Is this announcement new?

Not entirely.

Iran began letting some vessels from countries it considers friendly pass within weeks of the war starting. And in April, its military command said “brotherly” Iraq was exempt.

With the Iraqi exemption, Iran “probably intends to support the economic recovery” of its western neighbour, a fellow Shia-majority country, Pusztai said.

Will ships be able to get past the US blockade?

That depends on Washington.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) has said the blockade applies to “all vessels of all nations entering or leaving coastal areas or ports in Iran”, while vessels avoiding Iranian ports are not affected.

It has also said humanitarian shipments, including “food and medical supplies essential for the survival of the civilian populations”, can pass after inspection.

But Hayat Moqaddam did not appear to limit the exemptions to ships trading with other Gulf states, Pusztai noted. “If this is really the case, this would also have a significant impact on the other Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia,” he said.

“This could make the continuation of the American naval blockade more difficult and less effective, assuming Washington accepts this Iranian move,” he said. The main change, he added, is that the exemption “would also cover Chinese/Indian ships from/to Iran”, if the US accepts it.

It is also unclear whether “ships of these countries” means the flag a vessel flies, its owner, its operator or some other link, Pusztai said.

Ending the blockade is one of Tehran’s demands before it will commit to broader peace talks with the US, which will include discussions about Iran’s nuclear programme. Qatar-mediated talks currently centre on an Iranian proposal to reopen the strait if the US meets seven conditions, including this and lifting sanctions.

“It seems to be that Iran tries to separate the questions of free passage through the Strait of Hormuz and oil exports from the nuclear question,” Pusztai said, adding, “The American reaction will show if this is successful.”

Will this make a difference to oil markets?

Not much, for now.

“I think they make only limited difference at present,” Chris Beauchamp, chief market analyst at IG Group, told Al Jazeera.

“Markets are back to pricing in a peace deal, but if conflict flares up at full tilt, then Iranian commanders may not have time to distinguish their targets,” he said, adding: “At present, the focus remains squarely on the prospects of a broader deal.”

An exemption has not guaranteed safety. On October 30, the Qatari LNG carrier Al Mayeda was struck by “unidentified objects” in the Gulf, said its owner, Qatar Gas Transport Company.

More than 120 commercial ships have been hit in the region since the war began, with October being the worst month, according to data from the International Maritime Organization and United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations.

Call comes as Iraq’s foreign minister urges armed groups not to join any Iranian retaliation, warning it would be disastrous for Iraq.

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi has told the United States that Baghdad will not let its territory be used to attack neighbouring countries, as his foreign minister warned that a new war on Iran would be a “disaster” for Iraq.

Al-Zaidi spoke to US President Donald Trump over the phone on Thursday, according to his office, as diplomatic efforts intensify to avert renewed US attacks on Iran.

The two men “discussed the evolving situation in the region, security developments, and prospects for the next phase”, al-Zaidi’s office said.

The prime minister reaffirmed Iraq’s call “for respect for the sovereignty of states and for Iraqi territory not to be used as a launching point for attacks against neighbouring countries”, it added.

He also stressed the need for diplomacy and dialogue to safeguard the region’s security and stability, it said.

Iraq, which neighbours Iran, has struggled to maintain a balancing act between US and Iranian interests since Trump launched the war on Iran in February.

Since taking office in May, al-Zaidi has prioritised the disarmament of all fighter groups in the country, including several powerful pro-Iran groups that have launched attacks in support of Iran across the region during the war.

Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein told Dijlah TV on Thursday that the potential of renewed US military attacks against Iran is “not a secret” and warned Iraqi armed groups against joining in any Iranian retaliation.

“Pushing Iraqi society into the war will lead to a disaster,” he said. “We are not prepared for war. Neither Iraqi society nor the armed forces are prepared for war.”

Hussein said Iraq had been turned into a battlefield after the US struck Iran, with the country coming under attack from both the US and Iran, as well as from armed groups inside Iraq.

“We are not part of any axis, and we do not want to let the Iraqi arena be turned into a battlefield,” he said. “We have good relations with the US and with our neighbour Iran… We need a clear policy that we are not a part of the war, and we do not want to be a part of the war.”

Since the war began, Iraq has lost more than $60bn in oil revenues, as about 90 percent of its oil exports normally pass through the Strait of Hormuz and were largely cut off when Tehran closed the waterway.

Oil accounts for about 90 percent of Iraq’s federal budget.

Since then, Iraq has been one of the few countries that have been granted exemption by Iran to pass freely through the Strait of Hormuz.

Parliament’s approval lays the groundwork for further Turkish involvement in Saudi Arabia’s conflict with the Houthis.

Turkiye’s parliament has ratified a defence pact with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan that includes a collective defence clause, committing NATO’s second-largest military to the group’s aid in case of attack.

The ratification on Thursday comes as Riyadh continues to face attacks by Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthis.

Turkiye first signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement in August and sent it to parliament for ratification last month.

Article 1 of a bill approving the pact was adopted by the Turkish parliament on Wednesday.

But afterwards, Deputy Parliament Speaker Celal Adan adjourned the session until Thursday afternoon, the Anadolu news agency reported.

After parliament returned to session, lawmakers continued to debate the other articles in the pact.

The agreement ultimately passed with 279 votes in favour and 119 against, with 398 of the chamber’s 592 lawmakers taking part in the vote.

The pact contains 16 articles, according to a document submitted to the Turkish parliament, seen by the Reuters news agency.

In Article 1 of the accord, the signatories shall use “all necessary means” to eliminate threats to one another’s territorial integrity. Article 1 can be invoked in case of an attack on any member state.

Once the first article is invoked, the document lays out provisions for what follows.

“In the event one of the parties is subjected to an armed attack or military aggression by another country or group of countries, the parties shall immediately provide assistance to the party under attack, utilising the full range of mutual assistance measures available to them,” says Article 2 of the pact.

This key clause mirrors Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the document that established the NATO military alliance. NATO’s Article 5 establishes that an attack on one member is treated as an attack on all.

Given that Turkiye is a member of both NATO and the Mecca pact, critics have raised questions about whether the country’s government might face a conflict of interest in allocating its military resources.

Turkish officials, however, have dismissed such concerns as unfounded.

Other articles in the Mecca pact concern a mutual agreement to increase defence industry cooperation and military coordination, with the aim of deterring threats.

Those articles, in part, commit member states to conducting joint training, pursuing technological innovation and sharing logistics and intelligence resources.

The draft approved by Turkish lawmakers commits member countries to the pact for 10 years, after which point they may withdraw.

It also leaves open the possibility of other countries joining, with the approval of the pact’s existing members. Syria’s government has already expressed interest.

Despite Thursday’s parliamentary ratification, it is not a foregone conclusion that Turkish troops would be deployed to Saudi Arabia amid the Houthi attacks.

Experts say any Turkish troop deployment would also require other legislative processes.

Turkiye’s Defence Minister Yasar Guler said in October that the scope of potential support for Saudi Arabia would be determined after ratification.

“We absolutely do not foresee entering into any conflict with the Houthis,” Turkish media reported Guler as saying. Instead, Turkish support “would be to strengthen deterrence”.

Tensions between Saudi Arabia and Yemen had abated somewhat following a 2022 ceasefire. But the Houthis have escalated their attacks on Saudi Arabia in recent months, notably launching a series of deadly strikes on King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh.

The region also remains embroiled in the US-Israel war on Iran, which has contributed to cross-border tensions.

On Thursday, Saudi Arabia announced it had intercepted a drone in the region of Medina. Riyadh has accused the Houthis several times of targeting Mecca and Medina, two holy cities in Islam, an accusation the Iran-backed group systematically rejects.

Iranian forces say five oil tankers and a tugboat have caught fire in several incidents in the Strait of Hormuz.

At least five tankers have been damaged in the Strait of Hormuz, Iranian forces said, making clear that shipping would remain in peril as long as the United States and Israel’s war on the country is unresolved.

Since the war on Iran began in late February, Tehran has severely restricted traffic through the strategic waterway, which normally carries about one-fifth of global oil consumption.

“Last night … a large oil tanker attempting to pass through the illegal passageway south of the Strait of Hormuz suffered a fire after striking a mine and was brought to a halt,” Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) told the Fars news agency on Thursday.

“Another supertanker was halted by a massive fire while exiting the eastern Strait of Hormuz. A tugboat that had approached the supertanker to extinguish the fire also caught fire,” the IRGC added.

The Iranian army later said three more tankers were hit by naval mines and caught fire.

“Early this morning, a violating oil tanker – navigating through an unsafe area east of the Strait of Hormuz – caught fire and came to a halt after striking a naval mine,” the army said, according to the official IRNA news agency.

“Today at around noon, two more oil tankers struck naval mines and caught fire in the unsafe waters east of the Strait of Hormuz,” said another army statement carried by IRNA.

Separately, the British military said a tanker was struck by two projectiles off Qatar’s coast.

The vessel was hit about 50 nautical miles (about 93 kilometres) north of Qatar’s ⁠Madinat ash-Shamal on Wednesday at 23:20 GMT, the ⁠United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) agency said on Thursday.

UKMTO did not identify the tanker or which country’s flag it was sailing under. There was no immediate claim of responsibility for the attack.

In an incident last week, a Qatari tanker was hit by “unidentified objects” while sailing in the Gulf.

The liquefied natural gas (LNG) carrier Al Mayeda was hit on October 30, the Qatar Gas Transport Company (Nakilat) said on Sunday.

No crew members were injured, and there ‌was no environmental impact, the company said, adding that the vessel remained ‌safe and ‌operational while the impact was being assessed.

Attacks on tankers in the Gulf are still running close to a record pace.

UKMTO said in a report last month that it was “struggling to accurately report” the true number of attacks as the majority of ships now refuse to report them.

Qatar has stepped up mediation efforts to resume talks on ending the war in recent days.

Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ spokesperson said on Tuesday that ⁠both sides were reviewing proposals ⁠put forward by mediators, with talks continuing.

But unnamed Pentagon officials and military commanders told The New York Times on Wednesday that thousands of US air and naval forces on more than a dozen ships and at bases around the Middle East and in the US are poised to resume major combat operations against Iran on President Donald Trump’s orders.

Iranian government and military leaders, however, have warned of repercussions if the US or Israel pursue further military action.

On Wednesday, Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei said there should not be “even the slightest inclination towards submission” to the US, which he said would remain hostile towards Iran no matter which party was in power.

IRGC Ground Force commander Brigadier General Mohammad Karami said on Wednesday that the continuation of “hostile and brutal actions by Iran’s enemies” would lead to “further Iranian victories and greater national pride”, while accelerating the expulsion of foreign powers from the region and the collapse of Israel.

Hours after results confirmed that the Republican Party had lost control of both the Senate and the House of Representatives in the United States Congress in the midterm elections this week, senior Republicans were hand-wringing over what had gone so badly wrong and whether a major course correction would now be required.

As once-Republican strongholds like Texas fell to the enemy, US Vice President JD Vance took to X to declare that the “real reason we lost is obvious to almost everyone”.

“The reason we lost is the war. The president himself said so last night. If you’d like to argue it was worth it, that losing the Senate for the next 6 years was worth it, then do so. Argue it was a worthwhile cost to pay. Agree or disagree, that’s at least honest,” Vance said.

Former Trump voters had switched sides, he said, over the Iran war and the US ties to Israel.

The elephant in the room was no more.

“I remain hopeful about our country. To the people who are pissed off and want to say, ‘I told you so’: you’re right, you did tell us so. Take that energy into electing Republicans who share your worldview,” he wrote.

A poisoned chalice

Just days after the US and Israel launched strikes across Iran on February 28, Tehran effectively closed the critical Strait of Hormuz, which once transited roughly 25 percent of the world’s seaborne oil trade, triggering a massive spike in oil prices and a major global energy crisis. The price of Brent crude – the global benchmark – hit $120 in March and April and has hovered around $115 in recent weeks.

On Thursday morning, oil prices dropped to $93.82 a barrel on expectations that Republican Party losses would reduce the likelihood of US President Donald Trump renewing strikes on Iran following weeks of speculation.

But as consumers in the US struggle with sky-high petrol and diesel prices – not to mention the soaring cost of food, which has also been impacted by Trump’s trade tariffs – the midterms have forced a leadership rethink as the Trump brand appears increasingly toxic.

While no Republicans have declared their intention to run for the 2028 presidential election, some in the party are believed to be eyeing it now.

Andrew Payne, from the Chatham House think tank, told Al Jazeera that any Republican wanting to take on the 2028 election will now need to “distance themselves from the more unpopular aspects of Trump’s record”. That means the Iran war, the greatest poisoned chalice of them all.

“That, I think, is why Vance came out so clearly in blaming the war. It is evident to those who have been watching closely that he has always been the voice of scepticism behind the scenes, and he now needs to make that difference of opinion clear to the average voter. But doing so will be really hard while Trump is still in office and, presumably, wants to play an active role as kingmaker,” Payne said.

Unpopular, but not as unpopular as Trump

The most obvious pick and frontrunner for the Republican 2028 nomination is currently Vance, who is known to have ambitions to take over from Trump.

Regarded as an anti-US interventionist, Vance, while publicly supporting Trump’s Iran war, has also been privately urging him and others to end the conflict, according to the US news outlet Axios.

Last week, Vance sent a letter to the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Mohsen Rezaei, proposing a meeting between US and Iranian officials soon in a bid to prevent further escalation. By contrast, this week Trump said the war would only come to an end “when I want it to”.

This move, coupled with his post on X on Wednesday night, is increasingly being seen as Vance putting as much distance as he can between himself and the war.

Throwing off the Trump touch may be trickier than he thinks, however, according to one Vance ally close to the White House who spoke to Politico on Wednesday. While it is “possible for him [Vance] to modestly differentiate himself” from Trump, the source said, there is no way to completely delink himself.

“He’s still Trump’s vice president. This is still a Trump administration war. They’re still both unpopular. He’s not as unpopular as Trump but he’s unpopular,” the anonymous source said.

According to Tuesday polling from The New York Times on who is ahead in a theoretical Republican presidential primary, Vance is at 40 percent. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio follows at 21 percent, alongside Donald Trump Jr, also at 21 percent.

Rubio has yet to comment on the Republican wipeout. Still, like Vance, he is allied with Trump’s administration, which may make a presidential bid challenging.

Any potential candidate now faces a choice between two routes, Payne said. One is to “re-energise the [Make America Great Again or MAGA] movement, which I expect will be difficult, because Trump did it through sheer force of personality that is hard to replicate”.

“The second route is to keep as much of the base on board as possible while appealing to the traditional conservative groups who have drifted from the party over the past decade, thereby expanding the coalition. If he runs, I would think Marco Rubio has a better shot at doing that,” Payne said.

‘Blue tsunami’

There are other potential candidates to consider.

A former frontrunner for the 2016 presidential election, which saw Trump secure his first administration, Ted Cruz is now Texas’s only statewide Republican lawmaker.

In a post on X after the results, Cruz wrote: “2026 was not simply a blue wave; it was a blue tsunami. It was an a** kicking”.

“Food is too high, gas is too high, diesel is too high, insurance is too high, life is too high. Tariffs have made everything too expensive, and the Iran war has dragged on too long. It should have been brief, decisive, and over,” Cruz wrote.

“Understandably, people were pissed off, and elected Republicans didn’t do enough to address their very real pain. So, what do we do now? We need to listen and respond. We need to champion economic policies that make a real difference in working people’s lives, and we need to deal with the consequences.”

In September, the Wall Street Journal reported that Cruz was testing the waters for the 2028 nomination. But as one of the early cheerleaders for the Iran war, Cruz will struggle to disassociate himself from it, other than to criticise the manner of its execution.

As the blame game continues, the Republican Florida governor, Ron DeSantis, described the results of the midterms as “close to an extinction-level event” for the party.

“If the Republican Party doesn’t have Texas as an anchor, then we are not going to be viable nationally going forward,” he said.

“We’re in a very volatile political era, things shift quickly, and the leaders just got to recognise that.”

DeSantis’s time as governor ends in January after two terms, but speculation has grown about whether he also wants to throw his hat into the ring for the US presidential nomination as the playing field remains wide open.

Iran’s new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, is exercising power without appearing in public or allowing his voice to be heard. Since succeeding his father in March, he has governed through written statements and decrees, while reports of his meetings with senior officials offer a glimpse into how he exercises power.

The meetings announced in May and August appeared intended primarily to reassure Iranians that their new leader was alive and exercising authority. But a series of four meetings announced within 11 days in October, involving the heads of Iran’s parliament, judiciary and national security establishment, as well as senior military commanders, suggests something more: a new system of decision-making taking shape.

The meetings come as Tehran weighs its options between negotiations and renewed confrontation with the United States and Israel. They also invite comparisons with the consultations that preceded the 2015 nuclear agreement. The question is whether Iran’s new leadership is preparing for a similarly consequential decision, and whether this system is capable of making one.

The new Khameneism

For nearly 37 years, Ali Khamenei’s rule rested on his direct personal presence: speeches setting red lines, public meetings with commanders, political elites and ordinary Iranians. His son came to power in different circumstances. Injured in the February 28 strike that killed his father, he was advised, according to sources close to him quoted by Reuters, not to appear or release audio recordings for fear of being tracked.

His rule has taken shape through decrees rebuilding institutions, decisions channelled through a narrow circle of trusted officials, and the testimony of others in place of personal appearances.

The October meetings followed appointments to replace military and security commanders killed in the war. In August, Khamenei appointed his military adviser, Mohsen Rezaei, as his representative on the Supreme National Security Council; Rezaei later became its secretary. Six military appointments followed, including Ali Abdollahi as chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, Ahmad Vahidi as commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Ali Azmaei as IRGC Navy commander. Abdollahi was also instructed to complete the merger of the General Staff with Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters.

The sequence of Khamenei’s reported meetings is revealing. Those announced in May with President Masoud Pezeshkian and Abdollahi, then head of Khatam al-Anbiya, and another with Pezeshkian announced in August, served chiefly to reassure Iranians that the new leader was alive and exercising his duties. October’s meetings appear to have constituted a systematic round of consultations reaching from constitutional institutions to the armed forces.

At his first reported meeting with the military leadership he had reconstituted, announced on October 31, Abdollahi, army commander Amir Hatami and Vahidi reportedly briefed Khamenei on military readiness in the Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz and the Sea of Oman.

Iran thus appears to be moving from reconstruction to operation: activating a decision-making system rather than merely establishing the leader’s presence.

These consultations unfolded alongside intensive mediation, with each stage of internal consultation following an external diplomatic development.

On October 20, Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, carried a Qatari-Pakistani compromise proposal to Tehran. According to Arab media reports, it envisaged unannounced inspections of nuclear facilities in exchange for Iran receiving the interest on its frozen funds in Qatar. Khamenei’s meeting with Mohammed Bagher Ghalibaf, Iran’s chief negotiator, was announced the following day.

On October 26, Munir returned with Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman Al Saud and Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin. Their discussions produced an understanding that regional security was the responsibility of the region’s own states. Rezaei also announced that Tehran had sent Washington a proposal concerning the Strait of Hormuz with a seven-day deadline. Khamenei’s meeting with Rezaei, who had received a letter from US Vice President JD Vance, was announced the next day.

On October 30, Qatari mediators held 12 hours of talks in Tehran, coordinated with the White House, after US envoy Tom Barrack suggested an initial understanding was close. Khamenei’s meeting with military commanders was announced the following day.

This timing suggests that internal consultation has become the other side of external mediation.

The statements from these meetings carry two parallel, not contradictory, messages. In the meeting with Rezaei, Khamenei insisted on Iran’s conditions for ending the war, escaping the debilitating state of “neither war nor peace” and managing the Strait of Hormuz. In his instructions to the commanders, he demanded immediate retaliation against any threat without geographical limits, an expanded list of US and Israeli targets, and emphasised that Iran would decide when any renewed confrontation ended.

Repeated appeals for unity suggest an awareness of competing views within the political elite over war and negotiations.

Yet the meetings appear to have defined the upper and lower limits of Iran’s choices, rather than settled on a particular course: at one end, rejecting an intolerable continuation of “neither war nor peace”; at the other, preparing to widen the war if attacks resume. Between these limits lie a settlement on Iranian terms, pursued through Ghalibaf, Rezaei and the mediators, or continued mutual pressure while strengthening the domestic front.

The gap remains wide. Washington wants nuclear concessions before negotiations resume; Tehran first wants the naval blockade lifted, frozen assets released and oil exports restored.

Significantly, Khamenei spoke of conditions “set by the country’s officials”, not by himself. The wording distributes responsibility among institutions and preserves room for him to embrace or disown an eventual outcome.

The comparison with 2015

There are echoes here of the lengthy consultations before the nuclear agreement of July 14, 2015.

A secret channel in Muscat opened with Ali Khamenei’s approval. On September 17, 2013, he spoke to IRGC commanders of “heroic flexibility”, reassuring the military before negotiations. In June 2015, he set out his red lines, and in October he issued a letter of conditional approval. Responsibility for the nuclear file passed from the Supreme National Security Council to the Foreign Ministry under Mohammad Javad Zarif, a sign that the political decision had been made.

The resemblance is clear: a supreme leader establishes red lines, delegates negotiations to trusted figures and brings the military into the process before a major shift.

The differences are deeper. The earlier process lasted around two years under sanctions, not war. Today’s consultations were compressed into 11 days amid armed confrontation, a naval blockade and the approaching November 3 US midterm elections.

Ali Khamenei spoke in his own voice; his son speaks through written statements. Diplomats led the earlier negotiations; now two figures with IRGC backgrounds, Ghalibaf and Rezaei, play central roles. Where the earlier backchannel ran through Oman, today mediation involves Qatar and the countries of the Mecca Agreement, signed on August 7.

Above all, “heroic flexibility” was presented to commanders as preparation for an agreement. Today, conditions for a settlement sit alongside an expanded list of military targets.

The deficit of trust has also deepened. If the legacy of 1979 shaped Washington’s view of Tehran, and the US withdrawal from the nuclear agreement in 2018 shaped Tehran’s view of Washington, the wars of June 2025 and February 2026 have added a layer of mistrust that no technical agreement can easily overcome.

The consultations thus resemble those of 2013 in form but not function. Then, they prepared the ground for negotiations; now, they prepare for a choice between negotiation and escalation.

The seven reported meetings suggest that the new Khameneism may be more than an attempt to fill a leadership vacuum. Its decision-making machinery appears to be in place and functioning, even though the supreme leader’s presence can be established only through others.

Yet every announcement intended to dispel doubts produces more of them, without photographs or details of exactly when and where the meetings took place. The legitimacy of decisions remains partly dependent on the legitimacy of the leader’s presence.

Can this system, with its new commanders and parallel messages of compromise and deterrence, make a decision as consequential as the one taken in 2015, when war has raised the political cost of flexibility beyond what a leader who has yet to appear publicly may be able to bear?

The father saw and was seen; the son makes his presence felt through endorsements and influence from behind protective barriers.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.