Middle East

Yemen’s Houthi rebels have captured Mocha port and now threaten to control the main waterway of the Bab al-Mandeb strait. They have also attacked several cities in Saudi Arabia, wounding about 70 people, including women and children.

The repeated attacks against Saudi energy, civil, and defence facilities, combined with the maritime blockage by Iran and its Yemeni partner the Houthis, directly raise the question of the Mecca Pact’s operationalisation between Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan.

The Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia can activate the mutual defence agreement. If that happens, what could a Pakistani and Turkish intervention look like?

The answer to this question necessitates some crucial background first.

The US – the main security partner of the Gulf states – has signalled for a while now that it expects regional countries to take primary responsibility for their own defence and deterrence, with US help remaining critical but limited.

That posture is already visible on the ground. Since the start of the US-Israel war on Iran, the US has not been able to provide comprehensive defence for its regional partners. On several occasions, it has even failed to stop attacks on its own bases in the Gulf.

With US presence receding and Washington emphasising regional burden-sharing, Gulf states have had to look into a new defence architecture. In September 2025, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed their first mutual defence agreement, which expanded in August this year to include Turkiye and became the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement.

The three countries have since established a joint secretariat, with its headquarters in Riyadh, with Pakistan taking the chairmanship for an initial three-year term.

The pact remains in a gestation period. It does not publicly identify the thresholds or scenarios under which a member would move to direct military intervention. Its organisational and institutional structure, including rules of engagement, mechanisms of consultation, and collective defence and deterrence, are yet to be formally developed.

Now, back to the question of how the pact will be operational if a member state is attacked.

Earlier this week, Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif said that an unprovoked aggression against Saudi Arabia, or a spillover of the Yemen conflict into the kingdom, would make the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement operational, adding that “there should be no doubt in this.”

Asif, however, did not share specific details on what shape that operationalisation would take. Last month, Turkiye’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan clarified that the Mecca Pact would work the same way as NATO: If a member state is attacked, it must actively request and define the specific type of help it needs.

NATO’s Article 4 allows for a member to call alliance consultations and exchange of information. Article 5 requires mutual assistance from allies, but it leaves each state to decide the nature of that assistance.

In 2012, after Syria shot down a Turkish warplane, Ankara invoked Article 4 for consultation and requested specific defence assistance. Instead of demanding direct military intervention, the Turkish government explicitly asked for Patriot missile defence batteries. NATO approved the request and deployed the systems to protect Turkish airspace.

In this context, if the Mecca Pact is to be operationalised, it would have to be Saudi Arabia that defines the type of military assistance and involvement that it needs. If, for example, Riyadh makes an actual request for Pakistani direct military intervention, beyond materiel and intelligence support, Islamabad would be obliged to comply. But the request, and the scale of the response, would still likely need to be defined and agreed in a consultation meeting.

For now, none of this has been tested as Riyadh has not invoked the pact with either Pakistan or Turkiye.

In the meantime, diplomatic efforts have intensified, with Pakistani Field Marshal Asim Munir and Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud talking to Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.

Islamabad has also publicly urged Iran to rein in the Houthis from attacking Saudi Arabia and threatening the Bab al-Mandeb, and has reminded Tehran of Pakistan’s commitment to Riyadh’s defence through the pact. Ankara would likely play its own part in diplomatically restraining the Houthis and Iran.

If diplomacy fails and Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia or the Bab al-Mandeb continue, Turkiye and Pakistan would likely expand the air and technological support they already provide. Islamabad already has an air squadron of about 16 JF-17 Thunder multirole aircraft, defence systems, and thousands of troops deployed in Saudi Arabia.

But a direct military operation by Pakistani forces inside Yemen remains unlikely at the moment. Given the disastrous and lasting impacts of its participation in the Afghan war against the Soviet Union on behalf of the US, Pakistan would be far more wary of joining a war against Iran and its allies, for fear of spillover into its western border provinces’ economy, domestic security, sectarian balance, and societal harmony. Pakistani leaders would find it hard to build domestic consensus for direct attacks on the Houthis or a fight with Iran.

The likely scenario is that Pakistan would increase joint diplomatic pressure on Iran to restrain the Houthis, further augment its support for Saudi defence, and push for a multinational naval coalition to secure the Bab al-Mandeb. Adopting this restraint would still keep the essence of the Mecca Pact intact, while putting more weight behind regional de-escalation.

The new security architecture that agreements like the Mecca Pact are setting up will take years to mature. Until the mechanisms and rules of collective response develop, Pakistan’s existing bilateral defence relationships with Saudi Arabia and other Arab partners will continue to focus on defence needs.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Gaza City, Gaza Strip – For more than four hours, Hajj Rabhi al-Fairi, 79, has been standing outside his home in Gaza City with his children and neighbours waiting their turn to use a small generator.

The generator’s owner pours in the fuel, starts a timer and switches on the machine.

Each family gets a few minutes to operate a pump that pushes water up to a storage tank on the roof, before the generator moves on to the next house.

For al-Fairi and his neighbours, this is how they get water.

“We have an old water pump, but there is no electricity to run it. We have to rent a generator,” al-Fairi tells Al Jazeera.

Since the family returned to their home in October 2025, after fleeing a month earlier during Israel’s assault on their neighbourhood, the generator has become a familiar sight on the streets of Nassr.

When it arrives, residents gather around it, each carrying a jerrycan of diesel to operate the machine, which they have to pay for themselves.

“We came back and found the place a tragedy,” he says.

Their neighbourhood and home were badly damaged from years of Israeli bombing, with no municipal electricity or water supplies functioning. The family depends on an old pump – but without electricity, it cannot bring water up to the rooftop tank.

Each family needs only about seven or eight minutes to fill up their tanks, but with the number of flats in their building, the generator needs to be rented for about an hour.

The cost has also risen. Al-Rabhi says families used to pay about 80 to 90 shekels ($26-30) to rent a generator for an hour. At different times, the price has risen to about 100 or 120 shekels ($33-40) an hour, excluding the cost of diesel.

A generator on wheels

Khalil Abu Ouda, 39, takes a machine mounted on a horse-driven cart from one house to another. The generator’s metal body is covered in black soot and grease, and white smoke rises from the engine when it operates.

At each house, Abu Ouda connects long electrical cables to the water pump. The cables stretch across the street as neighbours gather around the machine to wait their turn.

“Go on, switch it on,” someone calls.

For Abu Ouda, this machine is both a service for the neighbourhood and an essential source of income for his family.

He says there are very few small, mobile generators, like his, left in working condition in Gaza. Many have broken down, while spare parts are difficult to find or too expensive to source due to Israel’s siege.

Mechanics are also expensive to hire, while fuel and engine oil are increasingly scarce and costly.

“If I could, I would lower the price as much as possible,” he says.

At the same time, demand has never been higher.

“People are under pressure and they need water. If I stayed working until morning, I would keep working,” Abu Ouda says.

To cope with the demand, he often works for 10 to 12 hours a day, putting pressure on himself and the machine.

“But this is our livelihood. There is no alternative,” he said.

When the home stops providing

With most Palestinians in Gaza having no home or losing their possessions due to Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza, they have to rent or hire items or services for the most basic household chores.

This includes washing clothes, something once done at home but now impossible to do with no power.

Earlier in the war, Abeer Ghorab, 52, used to wash everything herself. Now she gathers clothes from her tent and takes them to a nearby laundry, where they can be washed and dried in far less time and with less effort.

“When these laundries started opening, they gave us some relief,” Ghorab said.

The difference is particularly important in winter, when heavy clothes, blankets and bedding can take time to dry.

“In winter, the tracksuits are heavy. They need another day to dry,” she said. “When I bring them here, they wash and dry them for me, and I get them back clean and dry. That really helps.”

But due to a limited income, Ghorab cannot afford to use this laundry service every day.

Before the war, Ghorab had a washing machine, a refrigerator and regular electricity at home.

“Things we once took for granted have become dreams. Now we have to pay for every little thing we used to do at home.”

The loss of the household

Across Gaza, the infrastructure that once allowed families to carry out everyday tasks at home has been severely disrupted.

A recent United Nations assessment found that 91 percent of surveyed households experienced moderate-to-high water shortages in early August.

A separate damage assessment by the authority found that 107,941 of the 178,632 housing units inspected – about 60 percent – were severely damaged, destroyed or otherwise considered uninhabitable.

Water systems, electricity, sanitation and household appliances, which families relied on to manage daily life, have also been disrupted.

For families living in damaged homes, tents or makeshift shelters, everyday tasks must be paid for.

A laundry adapting to shortages

Fadi Abu Shawarb, 23, has worked at his family’s al-Hurriya laundry for six years.

Before the war, the business relied on large, 50kg (110lb) washing machines for carpets, blankets and other heavy loads. But due to the high cost of operation, these machines are far too expensive to run.

“We started replacing the 50kg machines with 25kg ones because there is not enough electricity,” Fadi says. “There are no solar panels, no reliable power, and the generators are always breaking down.”

Most of his customers are displaced families who lack electricity, water or washing machines at home.

The laundry now handles about 20 to 30 loads a day, with clothes-washing among the most in-demand services.

A load costs six shekels ($2) when the laundry can use solar power and 12 shekels ($4) when it relies on a generator.

But even that is hard for people to pay. “People’s situation is difficult,” he says.

For Ghorab, the laundry is only one of the many expenses she now has to budget for.

“I feel like I’m going through a difficult time,” she says. “I have to pay for every little thing in my day, and with how difficult things are, it’s hard to keep up with everything.”

CAIRO: An Iraqi military commander was dismissed early on Saturday ‌after ‌investigations confirmed the ‌latest drone attacks targeting Saudi Arabia originated from Iraq, according to ‌a statement ‌by Iraq’s ‌prime ‌minister’s office.

The commander led operations ‌in Maysan province in southern Iraq, according to the statement.

On Tuesday morning, 12-year-old Sundus al-Hamamdeh left her home in the Masafer Yatta village of Khirbet al-Fakhit, and went to school.

It was the third day of the new school year in the occupied West Bank.

But when the sixth-grade student at al-Fakhit Secondary School returned from her classes, the house she had left behind was gone.

Israeli forces had carried out a large-scale demolition operation in Khirbet al-Fakhit, destroying homes, livestock shelters, water infrastructure, and solar-power installations.

For al-Hamamdeh, her house was more than four walls and a roof. It was her safe space, the place she came back to every day.

For children in Masafer Yatta, south of Hebron in the occupied West Bank, the spectre of demolition is always present.

Much of Masafer Yatta lies in Area C of the West Bank, where Israel has control over planning and construction. Israeli authorities justifies the demolition orders by saying that the structures were built without permits; Palestinians, backed by the United Nations, note that such permits are nearly impossible for them to obtain.

And it’s not just their homes that are under threat, but their schools.

On August 4, Israeli forces surrounded Shaab al-Butum school, according to Bassam Jabr, the director-general of education in Masafer Yatta.

An Israeli military bulldozer then demolished two rooms used by teachers and administrators, and a storage room.

The UN independently documented the demolition of the rooms, saying Israeli authorities had cited the lack of an Israeli-issued building permit.

Things could still get worse; the main school building remains under a demolition order.

Focus of attacks

Established in 2015, the school serves about 60 students from kindergarten through 11th grade. Its remote location makes transferring students to other schools particularly difficult, Jabr said.

Education officials have appealed to Israeli courts, and called on the United Nations and foreign governments to intervene.

But the schools remain under threat. Even as the Israeli military and settlers’ pogroms against Palestinians continue across the West Bank, Masafer Yatta is especially targeted.

The remote communities there have little ability to defend themselves and conditions are harsh. In addition, the Israeli military has designated large parts of the area a military firing zone, another justification for forcing out the Palestinian population.

Masafer Yatta’s schools are a central part of the effort to keep Palestinians here – ensuring that families do not have to travel far for their children to be educated. Palestinians argue that is why the schools have been particularly targeted.

Intisar Omar Abu Sabha, an administrative director at the Masafer Yatta Directorate of Education, says schools in the communities of Zif, ar-Rifaiyah, Umm Qussa, Umm al-Kheir, Jinba, Shaab al-Butum, Khirbet al-Daba, and al-Majaz are among those facing demolition orders.

In addition to the threats to their schools, students and teachers also have to navigate road closures, checkpoints, and the presence of settlers to reach their classrooms.

Abu Sabha said schools have also faced damage and settler incursions or harassment in and around their grounds. She describes a cycle in which children risk losing both their homes and their schools.

“Imagine a student who is at school, then returns home and finds their home demolished … and comes back the next day to find their school demolished,” she said.

Yasmeen Sallaq, a Palestinian lawyer, says the threat to the Masafer Yatta schools directly undermines children’s right to education.

But Sallaq says that Israeli restrictions on movement, military raids, arrests, displacement, and attacks affecting students and education workers make that right increasingly difficult to exercise.

“We face the demolition of schools every day, making the continuation of the educational process almost impossible,” Sallaq said.

‘The only outlet’

At Zif Secondary School for Girls, headteacher Hanaa al-Salameen says about 250 students attend the school.

It first received a demolition notice in 2016. Years of legal proceedings followed, but an appeal against demolition was dismissed this year, with efforts continuing to obtain an interim injunction.

The uncertainty has already taken a toll. Some girls are experiencing fear and anxiety, while others have transferred to different schools, al-Salameen said.

“The school is not just a place for education,” she said. “This school is the students’ only outlet.”

She fears the school’s demolition could push some girls out of education altogether if alternative schools are too far away or require them to travel along unsafe roads.

At Zif, 10th-grade student Rabiha Yousef Jibril described the school’s importance.

“I am growing up in this school, and my dreams are growing with me day by day,” Jibril said, adding that while students fear its demolition, they insist they will continue to attend.

“Even if they demolish the school, we will continue to study, even under the trees,” she said. “Even if they confiscate the books, we will keep them in our hearts, as well as our minds.”

The rapid Houthi advance down Yemen’s Red Sea coast this week is an astonishing military victory, but not quite the game-changer it is being portrayed as.

The group has been able to threaten the vitally important shipping route, but they have been doing so since 2023. This new victory consolidates that control, proving that Yemen’s government is not currently in a position to defeat them.

The prior Houthi control over the northern section of Yemen’s Red Sea coastline, including the major port city of Hodeidah, has allowed the Iran-allied rebel group, for years, to first attack shipping linked to Israel and the United States – and then, in recent months, Saudi Arabian-linked vessels.

That control also damaged the global economy. Long before the US war with Iran and the transformation of the Strait of Hormuz into a tool to throttle international trade, Houthi attacks around Yemen had turned Bab al-Mandeb into a similar weapon, and led to bombing campaigns against the Houthis by the US, the United Kingdom, and Israel.

Houthi officials themselves have emphasised this, with one leading official, Abdulqader al-Murtada, saying earlier this week that the group did “not need control over Bab al-Mandeb, for the blockade [on Saudi ships] is already in place”. Al-Murtada could point Saudi ships that have avoided Bab al-Mandeb since the Houthis began attacking them in July, even before their latest progress.

However, the Houthi lightning advance makes it even easier for the group to disrupt shipping. They now have access to the Red Sea’s narrow entry point and several islands in it, allowing them to use shorter-range weapons and more easily reach vessels they want to attack and board, as well as potentially using sea mines to further restrict shipping.

Not going away

The increase in the Houthi ability to target shipping – even with the caveats outlined above – does have an impact on market sentiment. Oil prices have increased as traders price in the ability for Iran and its allies to disrupt shipping in Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb, the two maritime chokepoints of the southern Arabian Peninsula.

However, the consequences of this advance are not limited to the increased ability of the Houthis to attack shipping, but to the increasing reality that the Houthi problem on the Red Sea is not going away.

For months, after Saudi Arabia backed a Yemeni government campaign against southern Yemeni separatist forces earlier this year, the mood had shifted in the country’s anti-Houthi camp.

The perception was that the Yemeni government, led by the Presidential Leadership Council, had finally gotten its act together. President Rashad al-Alimi repeatedly spoke of a unified military chain of command, allowing the military to overcome the divisions blamed for its inability to defeat the Houthis.

Yemeni and Saudi officials had hinted at an anti-Houthi campaign all year. The Red Sea coastline was a possible location: the largely flat geography suited the government, allowing Saudi Arabia to effectively use its air power; much of the population is not made up of the Houthis’ traditional support base; and prior Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping meant that there would likely be international buy-in for such a campaign.

The seizure of the Red Sea coastline has broken all of those narratives.

The momentum the Yemeni government thought it had, even at the start of this week when it claimed advances in al-Jawf, to the east of the Houthi-controlled capital Sanaa, is now gone.

After months of projecting unity, Yemen’s anti-Houthi camp is once again turning on itself, trading accusations of blame for the defeat.

Saudi dilemma

The message the Houthis have for Saudi Arabia is clear: ‘Your partners in Yemen can’t defeat us.’

Therefore, the potential Houthi argument is that Saudi Arabia has to make a deal with them and agree to their terms, including Riyadh funding public sector salaries, access to income from Yemen’s oil and gas reserves, and no restrictions on flights and shipping to Houthi-controlled ports.

The Houthis have an incentive to lock in their gains and raise the cost of escalation before Saudi-backed Yemeni forces can reorganise.

Their attacks on Saudi Arabia, escalating in the past week, have been damaging, and the group is promising more if Riyadh increases its military support for the Yemeni government.

The risk of any such intervention is clearly there for Saudi Arabia. But so is the risk of inaction. The Houthis have repeatedly demanded more concessions when they were in positions of strength.

With the Yemen war unresolved, the Houthis may decide to escalate again in the future, even if a deal is agreed now.

And so, policymakers in Riyadh could determine that it makes more sense to make a concerted effort to deal with the problem head-on now, rather than allow it to fester into the future.

The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) warns that the figure is rising ‘by the hour’ as it calls for safe humanitarian access.

More than 46,000 people have been driven from their homes in Yemen in the wake of the latest escalation in fighting between Houthi rebels and government forces, according to United Nations data.

The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) warned that the figure is rising “by the hour” in a statement issued on Friday.

The UN agency called on all parties to the conflict to guarantee safe humanitarian access and protect civilians, aid workers and humanitarian assets on the ground.

“Families are being forced to flee for the second or third time in this conflict, with almost nothing left,” Amy Pope, head of the IOM, said in the statement.

The agency said many people had reportedly fled Mocha with their belongings overnight after the Iran-allied Houthi rebels captured the strategically important Red Sea port city from the internationally recognised government on Thursday.

Entire villages were said to have been abandoned in some areas of the war-torn country. The IOM urged the parties to the conflict to guarantee humanitarian access and ensure the safety of aid workers.

The statement came amid reports on Friday that the Houthis had captured a strategically located island in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and now control Yemen’s entire Red Sea coast.

‘Two new crises’

Separately on Friday, the UN also voiced concern over the Houthis seizing a key humanitarian compound and its assets in Mocha, warning that humanitarian personnel and facilities must be protected.

“The compound houses staff of UN agencies working to provide humanitarian assistance to vulnerable communities in the area,” UN deputy spokesperson Farhan Haq told reporters.

All UN personnel working at the compound had left before the seizure and were “safe and accounted for”, Haq added.

Haq stressed that humanitarian personnel, premises and assets “must be respected and protected at all times”, while calling for safe and unimpeded humanitarian access so life-saving assistance can continue reaching people in need.

Farea Al-Muslimi, a Yemen researcher at the London-based Chatham House thinktank, told Al Jazeera that deteriorating humanitarian conditions in Yemen will build on what was already one of the world’s worst crises.

“Yemen was already going through one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world,” Al-Muslimi said.

“It got terribly worse after the Houthis cracked down on aid organisations in northern Yemen. But the war continued despite the fragile truce, and what that meant was the destruction of what remained of the economy, with millions of families left without income,” he said.

Al-Muslimi warned that the latest escalation “will create two new crises”, one being further internal displacement, noting that “we’ve already seen more than 10,000 families displaced in the last week alone”, and the other being rising prices for goods inside Yemen.

“Since this is [happening in] a maritime [trade] corridor, it will, for sure, drive further violence inside Yemen, but also from outside Yemen,” Al-Muslimi added.

“The Yemeni population will continue to suffer, first and foremost, more than anyone else, inside or outside the country.”

At a time of global upheaval, one man has redrawn Turkiye’s political map. In an exclusive interview with Al Jazeera, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reflects on more than two decades in power.

His rise began in the early 1990s, when he was elected mayor of Istanbul. He founded the Justice and Development Party, or AK Party, in 2001 and has won every election since then. After three terms as prime minister, he was elected president in 2014 and remains in office to date.

Marking the 25th anniversary of the AK Party, Erdogan talks to Al Jazeera Arabic’s Ali Al Dafiri about Turkiye’s growing role in the shifting geopolitical landscape, highlighting the recent defence deal he concluded with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. He addresses the US-Israel war on Iran, advocating for open maritime navigation in the Strait of Hormuz while identifying Israel as the primary driver of the regional conflict. He also affirms Turkiye’s solid support for Syria’s new administration and his unwavering solidarity with Lebanon and Gaza. On a domestic level, Erdogan reflects on Turkiye’s sweeping economic transformation and its future, stating that European Union accession is no longer a priority.

Fenerbahce president refuses Ismail Kartal’s resignation after fans threw bottles at coach in Roma Champions League tie.

Fenerbahce coach Ismail Kartal quit his role with the Turkish club after he was targeted by a bottle thrown from the crowd during hit side’s 1-1 Champions League draw with Roma on Thursday, only for his president to reject the resignation minutes later.

The 65-year-old Kartal told a press conference he was leaving “never to ⁠return”, adding that he had taken the decision “to clear the way for the club”.

Immediately after the press conference, Fenerbahce president Aziz Yildirim told reporters that Kartal “continues in his role”.

“Some fans threw ‌a bottle at the coach’s head this evening during the game. He is upset about it,” Yildirim said.

“I just spoke to Ismail Kartal. He mentioned the bottle incident and he also complained about being under pressure.”

Asked if Kartal had told him that he would stay, Yildirim ⁠said: “There’s no need for him to ⁠say (openly) that he’d continue. I am his senior, I told him to continue and that’s it. We are a family.”

Kartal, who spent a decade at ⁠Fenerbahce as a player, coached the club in 2014-15, then on an interim basis ⁠in 2021-22 before returning for a ⁠full campaign in 2023-24. He was assistant manager at Fenerbahce the last two times the club won the Super Lig and returned for a ‌fourth managerial spell in June.

Fenerbahce have finished second in the Turkish top flight in the last five seasons and reached ‌the ‌league phase of the Champions League this season for the first time in 18 years.

Israeli attacks come a week after it said to have established operational control over the strategic ridge.

The Israeli military says it has destroyed Hezbollah’s underground infrastructure at a key site in southern Lebanon, with Israeli government officials adding that the operation consolidated its so-called security zone in the area.

In a joint statement, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defence Minister Israel Katz said on Thursday that Israeli forces would remain in the area to prevent the Iran-aligned Hezbollah militant group from re-establishing its presence and rebuilding its capabilities.

The Ali al-Taher ridge, about 15 km (10 miles) from the Israeli border, has become one of the most contested areas of the war between Israel and Hezbollah. Katz claimed last Friday that Israeli forces had driven Hezbollah fighters out of what he said was a network of tunnels ⁠⁠under the disputed highland.

Reuters reported that Hezbollah is believed to have built an underground command centre and weapons stores there in July, quoting unnamed Lebanese security sources.

Lebanon’s National News Agency said that the Israeli military carried out a powerful blast at the ridge, with tremors and the sound of the explosion felt across Nabatieh and surrounding areas in southern Lebanon.

Hezbollah has yet to respond to the recent Israeli attack.

The Israeli military said its forces had established “operational control” over the ridge, both above and below ground, before dismantling the infrastructure. The network extended for more than 2 km (just over 1 mile) and contained dozens of rockets, missiles and drones, as well as anti-tank missiles, mines and explosive devices, it said.

The military said a central command complex belonging to Hezbollah’s Badr unit was located within the underground infrastructure. The complex contained command centres, weapons storage rooms and living quarters that allowed fighters to remain underground for extended periods, it said.

Iran reportedly warned the United States last month that it would respond forcefully if Israeli attacks on the ridge continued.

Over the last weeks, Israeli strikes and ground operations around the Ali al-Taher ridge continued despite a ceasefire agreed in June, after Israel gained control of nearby Beaufort Castle and part of the higher ground overlooking much of southern Lebanon and northern Israel.

A US-brokered framework agreed after a June ceasefire — between Lebanon and Israel, without negotiating with Hezbollah — called for Israeli forces to gradually withdraw from southern Lebanon while Lebanese troops disarm Hezbollah.

The process has stalled, however, with Hezbollah refusing to give up its weapons and Israel saying it will not withdraw until the group disarms.

Since 2023, Israel has pushed into southern Lebanon and seized several strategic positions, occupying swathes of land, which it now increasingly says it needs to maintain a so-called buffer zone between Israel and Hezbollah positions in Lebanon.

After lower house approval, the bill to grant tens of thousands of Sahrawis citizenship now goes to the Spanish Senate.

Spanish lawmakers have backed legislation that would grant citizenship to tens of thousands of Western Saharans who were born when Spain ran the disputed territory now largely controlled by Morocco.

Spain’s lower house of Parliament on Thursday approved the legislation 168-31, with 145 abstentions.

The bill still requires Senate approval before becoming law.

The text grants Spanish nationality to Sahrawis born before September 29, 1977 and to their children through naturalisation, even if they never resided in Spain.

Although the exact number of beneficiaries is unknown, Sahrawi groups estimate that between 70,000 and 120,000 people could benefit from the legislation, which supporters described as addressing a “historical injustice” by colonial Spain in the Western Sahara.

Tensions with Morocco

The vote comes at a particularly sensitive time for Madrid’s historically delicate relations with Rabat due to the migration crisis in Spain’s north African territory of Ceuta, and the mass arrival of at least 70,000 migrants from Morocco in July.

Spain’s leftist government has avoided blaming Morocco – which does not recognise Spanish sovereignty over Ceuta and Spain’s other North African territory of Melilla – but the right accuses Rabat of orchestrating the surge for political motives.

Morocco claims sovereignty over Western Sahara and began asserting control over the territory after Spanish ⁠rule ended.

The Algerian-backed Polisario Front independence movement seeks recognition ⁠of an independent state called the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic.

Many Sahrawis live in refugee camps in Tindouf in western Algeria, or elsewhere abroad, while others remain in Western Sahara.

Against this backdrop, the initiative to grant Spanish nationality to Sahrawis has divided opinion in Morocco but not prompted condemnation from the government.

Moroccan media quoted Ramadan Messaoud, a member of the Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs, as saying in July that Rabat had “no problem” with Sahrawis obtaining Spanish citizenship. Others had done so “over the past few years”, noted Messaoud, who is also president of the Sahrawi Association for Human Rights.

‘Restoring’ identity

Western Sahara was a Spanish colony until 1975, when Spain relinquished its administration under agreements with Morocco and Mauritania.

Spain’s ruling Socialist Party and its junior left-wing partner Sumar, which filed the initiative, were among those who supported the bill, ‌while the opposition conservative People’s Party abstained and far-right Vox voted against it.

“With the adoption of this legislation, we are restoring – and I emphasise, restoring – the Spanish national identity card to those Sahrawis who once held it and from whom this state took it away,” said Tesh Sidi of the leftist Sumar coalition, the first woman of Sahrawi origin ⁠to serve in Spain’s Parliament.

The bill will now go to the Senate, where amendments are expected, before returning to the lower house for final approval.

The chatter among Barcelona fans this summer was all about who would be the club’s next star striker after Robert Lewandowski – the team’s top scorer for the past four seasons – left to play in the United States.

The 18-year-old Egyptian, Hamza Abdelkarim, was not an answer anyone would have given at the beginning of preseason. This time last year, he had only played a single game at senior level, and that was for Cairo giants Al Ahly.

But as Barca’s dogged pursuit of Argentinian striker Julian Alvarez from rivals Atletico Madrid ended in failure, and the club only managed to secure a 10 million euros ($11.5m) move for Gabriel Jesus on the transfer window’s deadline day on September 1, Abdelkarim emerged from obscurity to dominate headlines in Catalonia and Egypt.

Abdelkarim’s four goals in five games made him Barcelona’s top scorer during preseason. He even scored against his boyhood club, Al Ahly, in the Joan Gamper Trophy – the fixture that is used to introduce the team to the fans and inaugurate the league season – but chose not to celebrate the goal as a mark of respect.

“Hamza offers something different,” Adrian Healey, ESPN’s La Liga match commentator, told Al Jazeera.

Fans in Egypt and Barcelona have taken to calling him the Egyptian Erling Haaland on account of his physical prowess and presence in the box.

When the striker caught the eye of FC Barcelona, a low-risk, low-commitment agreement was struck in the winter transfer window with Al Ahly to bring him to Spain. A six-month loan period was cut in half due to paperwork issues, but Abdelkarim made up for lost time by scoring goals; not for the first team, or even the reserves, but the Under-19 team – netting six times in 11 games.

Abdelkarim had also impressed for Egypt at the 2025 U17 World Cup, grabbing two goals and an assist in four appearances.

Despite the lack of top-level experience, Abdelkarim had done enough to prompt Egypt national team manager Hossam Hassan to take a gamble by selecting the uncapped teenager for his World Cup 2026 squad.

The veteran Mostafa Mohammed was left at home in favour of Abdelkarim, who went on to make his debut against Brazil in a friendly and featured in four World Cup matches.

On the advice of Mohamed Salah, the striker decided not to take a vacation after the World Cup and returned to Barcelona immediately after Egypt were knocked out by Argentina in the round of 16.

“Mohamed Salah is always talking to me, and I follow everything he says. He is an example to be followed, and the success he achieved is not by accident,” he told Egypt’s OnSport after FC Barcelona lifted the Joan Gamper Trophy.

The exposure to a professional like Salah has only served to supercharge Abdelkarim’s development.

Barcelona had already seen enough and decided to make his loan move permanent in June, paying Al Ahly 1.5 million euros ($1.75m) for his services.

“I am not surprised at all in Hamza’s [emergence],” Ismail el-Hamalawy, a footballing content creator who has closely followed the young striker’s journey, told Al Jazeera, citing his World Cup performances.

“He is the striker Egypt has been missing for two decades,” el-Hamalawy told Al Jazeera.

The only other Egyptian-born player to have played in La Liga was Mido, who came through the ranks at Zamalek before leaving Egypt as a 17-year-old in 2000 and played in Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, France, Italy and England.

At the turn of the century, most Egyptians followed Mido’s progress through newspapers and local talk shows. Now, Egyptians can easily track Abdelkarim’s development in real time online.

The interest has been so profound that Barcelona signed a surprise sponsorship with EgyptAir through the 2028-29 season this week as both entities look to leverage the image of Egypt’s next great footballer for commercial gain.

The club is now scrambling to improve his contract so that a larger buyout clause can be installed. As it stands, the 18-year-old could be poached by a rival club for only 15 million euros ($17m), so the Catalan giants are looking to place a 150 million euros ($174m) buyout clause to ward off any potential suitors.

An unused substitute in the first two matches of the season, Barcelona coach Hansi Flick has repeatedly told the media that the striker’s time will come.

“He deserves to play, and he will play,” Flick said. “I see him improving day by day. He has the right attitude and mentality.”

With such little top-level experience, it could have been considered irresponsible of the club to give the youngster too much responsibility too soon.

“He will have to [be] patient, but he will get minutes,” Healey said. “[But] I am not sure the signing of [Gabriel] Jesus changes much for him, as I see [Jesus] as just a stopgap solution. Abdelkarim might have had less minutes had Alvarez signed.”

On August 31, Abdelkarim replaced Raphina in the final five minutes of Barcelona’s 5-2 win over Rayo Vallecano.

With an official debut out of the way, the striker can focus on clearing the next hurdle – scoring his first official goal for the La Liga champions.

The renewed escalation in Yemen is no longer simply a Yemeni battlefield development. For Saudi Arabia, it is becoming a direct test of national security, economic resilience and the kingdom’s ability to prevent the wider regional war from spilling further across its borders.

The latest Houthi attacks have demonstrated this clearly. Missiles and drones have hit civilian and economic sites in Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jizan and Najran, injuring dozens of civilians and causing fires and temporary disruption at energy facilities. The attacks came as fighting intensified in Yemen and around the western coast, while the Houthis continued to threaten maritime traffic in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb.

Saudi Arabia therefore faces two interconnected threats: Attacks on its territory and attempts to disrupt the maritime routes on which regional and international trade depends.

This creates a difficult strategic equation for Riyadh. Saudi Arabia has spent the past several years trying to move away from direct military involvement in Yemen and towards diplomacy, de-escalation and support for a political settlement. A return to an open-ended war would contradict that strategy and impose unnecessary political and economic costs.

But restraint cannot mean accepting repeated attacks on Saudi territory.

A different security environment

The security challenge today differs considerably from the first years of the Yemen war.

Saudi Arabia has strengthened its air and missile defences, improved coordination between its military and security institutions and accumulated considerable experience in countering drones and ballistic missiles. It is therefore much better prepared to defend its territory than it was a decade ago.

Yet the Houthi threat has also evolved.

The group possesses a combination of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and increasingly sophisticated drones. Even when most incoming weapons are intercepted, relatively inexpensive systems can impose disproportionate defensive costs and create uncertainty around airports, industrial facilities, border communities and energy infrastructure.

This means Saudi security cannot depend on interception alone. No air defence system can guarantee a perfect shield indefinitely.

The strategic objective must therefore be deterrence: Convincing the Houthis that attacks on Saudi territory will impose costs greater than any political or military benefit they expect to obtain.

This does not necessarily require returning to the large-scale military campaign of previous years. Riyadh has more options today. These include intelligence operations, strengthening Yemeni government forces, improving border security, disrupting missile and drone supply networks and, where necessary, conducting proportionate operations against facilities directly involved in attacks on Saudi Arabia.

The distinction is important. Saudi Arabia does not need to choose between doing nothing and returning to a full-scale war.

The economic front

The economic consequences are equally important.

Saudi Arabia is one of the world’s largest energy exporters, which makes attacks on its oil infrastructure internationally significant even when physical damage is limited. The latest attacks affected energy facilities and contributed to renewed concern in already nervous global oil markets.

There is an apparent paradox here: Regional instability can push oil prices higher and temporarily increase Saudi oil revenues. But higher prices caused by war should not be confused with economic benefit.

Saudi Arabia’s economic strategy under Vision 2030 depends increasingly on stability, investment, tourism, logistics, technology and the development of major projects outside the oil sector. Persistent missile and drone attacks can raise insurance and transport costs and affect perceptions of regional risk even if the kingdom’s underlying economy remains strong.

The greater strategic concern is maritime security.

Saudi Arabia occupies a strategic position between two of the world’s most important energy corridors: The Strait of Hormuz to the east and Bab al-Mandeb to the west. Disruption of both routes represents a serious challenge not only for Saudi Arabia but for the global economy.

This is why the Red Sea dimension of the Yemen conflict is particularly important. Bab al-Mandeb connects the Indian Ocean with the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. A sustained Houthi ability to threaten shipping there would increase freight and insurance costs and potentially divert vessels around Africa.

Saudi Arabia, however, possesses an important strategic advantage: Its energy infrastructure is not completely dependent on the Gulf. The kingdom can transport significant quantities of oil through its East-West pipeline to terminals on the Red Sea. This provides an alternative to Hormuz and gives Riyadh greater strategic flexibility.

That advantage does not, however, eliminate Saudi Arabia’s exposure to insecurity elsewhere in the Red Sea, including around Bab al-Mandeb.

Protecting Bab al-Mandeb should therefore be understood not simply as a Saudi or Yemeni interest but as an international economic and security requirement.

Avoiding the Houthi trap

The greatest danger for Riyadh may be political rather than purely military.

The Houthis could benefit from drawing Saudi Arabia back into an extensive war. It would allow them to portray the conflict once again as a confrontation between Yemen and an external power rather than a struggle among Yemenis over the future of their state.

Saudi Arabia should avoid this trap.

Confronting the Houthis must remain fundamentally a Yemeni responsibility. The internationally recognised Yemeni government and its forces should carry the principal burden of confronting Houthi expansion on the ground, while Saudi Arabia provides political, economic, intelligence and defensive support.

This is particularly important on the western coast. If the Houthis consolidate their military position around strategic areas overlooking the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb, the consequences will extend far beyond Yemen.

The objective should not be to retake Sanaa through another large-scale air campaign or restart an indefinite regional war. It should be to prevent the Houthis from using military force to change the regional balance, threaten neighbouring states or threaten international maritime arteries.

Diplomacy backed by deterrence

Saudi policy is therefore likely to operate on several tracks simultaneously.

First, Riyadh will continue strengthening its air and missile defences and protecting critical infrastructure. Second, it can increase support for Yemeni government forces while avoiding unnecessary direct involvement in ground combat. Third, it will seek broader regional and international cooperation to secure the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb.

At the same time, diplomatic channels should remain open.

Saudi Arabia has repeatedly demonstrated its preference for a negotiated settlement in Yemen. But negotiations are sustainable only when both sides believe that escalation carries unacceptable costs.

Diplomacy, therefore, must be backed by credible military power.

Saudi Arabia has strong incentives to prevent Yemen from becoming another permanent front in the wider regional confrontation. The kingdom’s economic transformation requires stability, while its geopolitical interests require secure borders, uninterrupted energy exports and freedom of navigation.

But the same logic that encourages restraint also places limits on it.

If attacks on Saudi cities, civilians and energy infrastructure continue, Riyadh will increasingly regard the issue not as intervention in the Yemeni civil war but as the defence of Saudi territory.

That distinction will shape what comes next.

Saudi Arabia does not need another prolonged Yemen war. Nor does Yemen. But avoiding one requires restoring deterrence while preserving the possibility of a political settlement.

The most effective Saudi strategy, therefore, is neither unlimited escalation nor passive restraint. It is calibrated pressure: Defend the kingdom, strengthen legitimate Yemeni institutions, protect the Red Sea, keep diplomatic channels open and make clear that attacks on Saudi territory will carry consequences.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

The continental games will officially open on September 19, but several team competitions will get under way earlier.

The Asian Games have begun in Japan with Qatar beating Iran in men’s basketball, the first action in the continental multisport showpiece that has more participants than the Olympics.

Qatar held off a comeback from Iran to win their Group B encounter 59-35 at the Aichi International Arena in Nagoya on Thursday.

It was the first match of a men’s basketball competition that will have medal finals on September 20, the day after the opening ceremony.

“We know we need to win at least one game so we can qualify for the next round,” said Qatar’s Michael Lewis, the United States-born player who scored a game-high 21 points.

“Feels good to get some team camaraderie back, and now we have got to keep going.”

Later in Group B, Taiwan beat Jordan 83-80.

More than 17,000 athletes and officials are expected to take part in 43 sports at the Nagoya-Aichi Games, which do not officially start until the opening ceremony on September 19 and will run until October 4.

Several events such as basketball, football, cricket, hockey and modern pentathlon will get under way before the opening ceremony.

Los Angeles 2028 Olympics qualifying spots are up for grabs in several sports at the Asian Games, which are returning to Japan for the first time since 1994.

Organisers hope the athletes will have a “unique experience” staying in accommodation ranging from a cruise liner and wooden containers to standard hotel rooms.

Officials are confident that the plan will not be affected by Japan’s typhoon season, which is usually in full swing in September-October.

Weather has already caused disruptions, with record rainfall two days ago forcing hundreds of athletes briefly to evacuate their accommodation.

Rainwater also leaked into some competition venues, with more wet weather forecast for the coming days.

Among those in action at the Games will be Philippine tennis sensation Alexandra Eala and a pair of world-class teenage talents: 15-year-old Indian cricketer Vaibhav Sooryavanshi and 13-year-old Chinese swimmer Yu Zidi.

Sanaa, Yemen – The United Nations-recognised Yemeni government and the Houthi group have been using warplanes, missiles, drones and other weapons as they engage in intense fighting on multiple fronts in the country’s north, west and central regions.

At least 194 people have been killed and 880 others wounded in the past two weeks of fighting in parts of Taiz, the western coast, al-Jawf, Marib and Dhalea, according to aid agencies.

Iran-backed Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah (supporters of God), have intensified attacks on the coastal district of al-Makha (Mocha) located on the western coast, among others, to gain a foothold in the Red Sea – a vital shipping lane.

On the other hand, government forces have been battling to expand in Taiz and boost their control of Marib, an oil-producing region in the north.

Fighting has also been raging in the al-Jawf governorate bordering Saudi Arabia and Dhalea, which connects the Houthi-controlled north to the country’s south under the internationally recognised government.

Experts say gains or losses on any of these strategically important fronts could have significant consequences for either side.

Taiz and western coast fronts

“The hills and mountainous areas of Taiz and the western coast are key targets for the Houthis, who have repeatedly attempted to advance there,” Yazeed al-Jeddawy, the research manager at the Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, said.

“The Houthis are trying to seize commanding terrains, cut supply routes between the coastal Mocha district and Taiz, and prevent government troops on the western coast from linking up with the Taiz Military Axis,” said al-Jeddawy.

In Taiz and along the western coast, al-Jeddawy says, the immediate contest is over the heights and roads connecting Taiz to al-Makha.

Situated roughly 60km (37 miles) from the Bab al-Mandeb strait, al-Makha enjoys a highly strategic position on the Red Sea. For a month now, the Houthis have launched missile and drone attacks on the city, causing massive damage to its port facilities and killing and injuring several civilians.

Recently, the group has also attempted to extend its ground operations towards al-Makha city.

“The Houthis seem intent on tightening their hold around [al-Makha] and moving closer to the Dhubab–Bab al-Mandeb area. A substantial advance would strengthen their position near the southern entrance to the Red Sea and give them greater leverage over international shipping,” he added.

Fuad Mussed, a Yemeni political analyst and author, told Al Jazeera that the strategic importance of the western coast and Taiz fronts stems from their proximity to Bab al-Mandeb, a chokepoint connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and one of the world’s most important shipping routes.

“The Houthis seek to move closer to this vital waterway to threaten maritime traffic. Such a move aims to keep the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb under the influence of Iran and use them as leverage against regional and international powers. This is a strategy Tehran has been pursuing for years,” Mussed said.

Iran has blocked the Strait of Hormuz, a global oil chokepoint, to use it as leverage in the war against the United States. It has also warned that its allies could shut shipping via Bab al-Mandeb. Iran also attacked Saudi Arabia’s pipeline used to export oil from the Red Sea.

In July, the Houthis declared a blockade against Saudi vessels transiting through the Red Sea – an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz.

Marib and al-Jawf fronts

Over the past few weeks, pro-government forces have attacked Houthi-held territories in Marib and al-Jawf, facing further retaliation from the Houthis.

Saddam al-Huraibi, a Yemeni political commentator, said the Marib front is fateful for both sides.

“Marib is a government stronghold in north Yemen. So, a Houthi expansion in Marib would threaten government presence and weaken its leverage in the north. That is why pro-government troops are ready to fight tooth and nail on this front line,” al-Huraibi told Al Jazeera.

For the Houthis, the takeover of Marib will deepen the group’s authority and step towards controlling the oil and gas infrastructure. The Iran-backed group captured vast swaths of northern Yemen, including the capital, Sanaa, in 2014, but Marib has remained in government hands since.

“Dominating Marib’s oil and gas resources has been a Houthi goal for over a decade. Without facing a crushing defeat in Marib, they would keep fighting to achieve that goal,” al-Huraibi said.

Adjacent to Marib, al-Jawf is also a hub of tense fighting between the Houthis and government forces. A government gain there would lay the groundwork for further advances, while a strong Houthi defence could undermine government forces’ morale and prompt them to retreat.

“Government-aligned forces have lately focused much of their offensive effort on al-Jawf. Government gains in al-Jawf would ease the threat to Marib while requiring the Houthis to defend a much broader area,” al-Huraibi said.

Al-Jeddawy said government gains could open routes towards the north – Saada, Amran or Houthi positions north of Marib.

The Houthis have carried out attacks in Saudi Arabia, including energy facilities in the country’s south. They have also accused Saudi Arabia of launching multiple attacks in al-Jawf, al-Bayda, Marib and Taiz provinces in support of government forces.

The Dhalea front

Fighting on the Dhalea front, a strategic gateway between Houthi-held territory and the southern governorates, has intensified in recent weeks.

Fighting there did not fully stop during the relative calm, which began in April 2022 following the UN-brokered ceasefire.

A Houthi advance there could open a route for their fighters to reach other southern territories. On the other hand, a Houthi setback would encourage government forces to push towards Ibb, controlled by the group.

“[Houthi] advances in Dhalea could expose the southern hinterland, while [government advances] could threaten Houthi positions and supply routes towards Ibb, al-Bayda and, farther north, Sanaa,” al-Jeddawy noted.

With the escalating fighting, the Houthis face pressure on several fronts, but the group has been readying for a range of scenarios, Khaled Ghorab, a pro-Houthi general, said.

“The [Houthi] Yemeni armed forces were never caught off guard by the prospect of escalation; rather, they worked to build and develop their own military capabilities based on tactical combat plans designed to counter a comprehensive, sustained attack launched simultaneously from land, sea and air,” he said.

Ghorab noted that this state of readiness enables the Houthi forces to carry out a direct response to sources of the threat – whether deep within enemy territory or at sea – targeting military bases or aircraft carriers as far as the Horn of Africa.

While the warring parties compete to seize strategic positions on several front lines, the latest escalation is also closely related to the wider regional confrontation.

“Iran has an interest in keeping Yemen and the Red Sea active as sources of leverage, while parts of the government camp believe the Houthis are under growing strain and that this is an opportunity to weaken them,” al-Jeddawy, the Sanaa-based researcher, said.

“The escalation still reflects domestic military and political aims, but its timing and direction cannot be separated from the regional war,” he told Al Jazeera.

Israeli prime minister denies claim that UAE president warned him of Hamas plans before the 2023 attacks.

Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said he will sue the Haaretz newspaper over a report that claimed he was warned of Hamas’s plans for an offensive days before the attacks of October 7, 2023.

In a statement on X on Wednesday, Netanyahu called the report “fabricated” and “false” and said he had instructed his lawyers to also sue Haaretz and the authors of the report, Shlomi Eldar and Ruth Yaval.

The report, published on Tuesday, claimed that the president of the United Arab Emirates, Mohammed bin Zayed had warned Netanyahu about a possible attack by Hamas 10 days before the events of October 7, 2023.

Palestinian fighters killed at least 1,195 people in southern Israel on that day, and took some 251 others captive. The attacks prompted Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza, in which at least 73,669 Palestinians have been killed.

The Haaretz report claimed that the UAE president, who is also known as MBZ, spoke to Netanyahu by phone and warned him of a threat from then-Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar.

According to Haaretz, Sinwar – who was angered by stalled prisoner exchange talks and Israel’s continued blockade of Gaza – had relayed the warnings to the UAE through an intermediary. He said he was preparing a “huge surprise” and told contacts to tell Israel “to expect an earthquake”, according to the report.

It said MBZ and his aides read this as a sign of an impending full-scale attack and passed the intelligence to Israel’s Shin Bet agency. But the internal security agency dismissed the threat.

MBZ then raised the warning directly with Netanyahu, who also brushed it aside, the report said.

The UAE has declined to comment on the allegations.

Its Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement on Tuesday saying that “the UAE government does not comment on media stories or speculation regarding conversations between government leaders”.

The Haaretz report comes at a time when Netanyahu is trying to secure his position as prime minister in the upcoming Knesset elections in October. Netanyahu has been trailing in the polls, facing a fierce challenge from former military chief Gadi Eisenkot.

Netanyahu on Wednesday called the Haaretz report “politically motivated” and part of the “left’s election campaign”.

He also denied its claims of a phone call with MBZ.

“The National Security Council and the Military Secretary meticulously reviewed the Prime Minister’s call log for those days—and found no trace of it whatsoever,” he said.

In a separate statement, Netanyahu also claimed that the person responsible for Haaretz’s “false report” was the Palestinian political figure, Muhammad Dahlan.

Dahlan was expelled from the Fatah party in 2011 after a power struggle with the current president of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, and lives in the UAE.

Dahlan’s representatives have rejected the claim, according to Israeli media.

Dallas, Texas – The Republican midterm convention has represented a gambit for the party: centring US President Donald Trump in the final stretch of the midterm elections, even as the first two years of his second term have cast a polarising political shadow.

That has been particularly true when it comes to the war on Iran, which Trump launched alongside Israel on February 28, and the knock-on effects on affordability in the United States, a key issue for many voters.

As Trump prepared to deliver a keynote address on Wednesday in Dallas, prices for Brent Crude, the global benchmark, rose above $100 a barrel for the first time since July, a reminder of the conflict’s continued fallout for global markets.

Nevertheless, supporters who spoke to Al Jazeera still saw the president as the man to rally Americans to vote Republican in November, as the party fights to hold onto control of the House of Representatives and Senate.

But some voiced concern – or confusion – over the impact of the war.

“This really is a Trump-a-palooza, as people have been saying,” said Carter Eisinger, a 27-year-old electrician who travelled from Fargo, North Dakota.

“I think some people say that in a derogatory way, but I think it’s very much a complimentary phrase,” he added. “The reality of it is we are in a Trump Republican Party.”

Still, Eisinger struggled to see how the war fit into Trump’s “America First” vision.

“In my opinion, I don’t really see the connection of how a war in Iran helps us here in the country,” he said. “If the Iran war is justified, I’m willing to pay the gas prices, but I haven’t seen that justification.”

He felt a similar confusion about the close relationship between the US and Israel.

“At the end of the day, I’m going to come right back to whatever is best for families, young people, anyone in America,” he said. “If it’s helping Israel in a way that helps us, then great… but it needs to help us first.”

Others were more charitable towards Trump’s approach to the Middle East, even if they saw the war on Iran as a misstep.

Bijay Dixit, a 59-year-old photographer from Houston, Texas, gave Trump high marks on his approach to immigration. He also believed Republicans were the party to steward the economy in the years ahead.

But on Iran, he said there had been a “miscalculation”, even if he agreed with the Trump administration’s position that the war was ultimately a necessary response to the totality of Iran’s actions in the 47 years since the Islamic revolution in 1979.

“Iran needed to be stopped at some point,” he said. “When I say miscalculation, what I mean is underestimation of the capacity of the IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps].”

Helen Vennett, a 65-year-old small business owner from Maryland and the chairman of her county’s Republican Party, likened the convention to a high-school pep rally.

“All of us need to have cheerleaders in our life… It just gets you fired up again. You kind of need to know that you’re not alone, that there are believers,” she added.

But while she said she broadly supported the Trump administration’s justification for the war, she acknowledged the potential political fallout.

“It’s a tough one,” she said.

Polls have regularly suggested widespread disapproval among US citizens of the war on Iran, with independents in particular expressing disapproval. Many, in turn, rank affordability as their top issue heading into the midterm vote.

A recent Reuters/Ipsos poll suggested that only a quarter of Americans think the war is worthwhile.

For its part, the Trump administration has downplayed the prospect of ending the war, focusing instead on efforts to open shipping routes in the Strait of Hormuz, over which Iran continues to assert its influence.

Speaking to reporters on Wednesday as he departed for the convention, Trump sought to temper expectations that the war would end before November’s pivotal vote.

“I think it’s going to take a little bit longer than the midterm,” he said, accusing Iran of intentionally holding out until November.

“They’re desperate to try and affect the election so that we can get a nice weak group of people in there and leave them alone and let them have their nuclear weapons,” he said.

He predicted the war would end swiftly after the final votes have been cast.

“They can’t hold out any longer,” he said.

John Russell, 55, from Rockford, Illinois, who regularly travels to Trump rallies as part of the “Front Row Joe’s” group, said he believed voters would still view the first two years of Trump’s second term as a net positive.

“It’s been a small bump with the gas going up,” he told Al Jazeera from the convention.

“But it had to be done. We can’t allow [Iran] to have a nuclear bomb,” he said, referring to one of the administration’s main justifications for the war.

Tehran has long denied seeking a nuclear weapon, with military analysts generally agreeing that destroying its nuclear programme would require a major military escalation, involving boots on the ground.

Russell predicted that the Republican Party’s bet would pay off at the polls.

“It’s going to fire up the base,” he said of the convention. “It’s going to switch some independents to vote for the Trump-backed candidates, and they will win.”

The war in Yemen is threatening to open a new front as the Iran-allied Houthi rebels are trying to advance along the Red Sea coast, through the mountain chains of Taiz province, edging closer to strategic ground that overlooks one of the world’s most vital maritime arteries.

For the internationally recognised Yemeni government, this is an offensive with global consequences.

In Wednesday’s interview with Al Jazeera, Yemen’s Ambassador to Qatar, Rajeh Badi, a former government spokesman, said that his government and its armed forces had not violated any truce since 2021.

The Houthis, he argued, are “the aggressors”. “What we are seeing now is a surprise Houthi offensive to seize strategic ground along the Red Sea, in order to allow Iran, through its Houthi proxy, to tighten its grip on maritime routes,” Badi said.

He added that the Houthis, who have advanced on al-Makha (Mocha) and al-Waziyah, and over large stretches of the mountain chain overlooking the Red Sea in Taiz province, “want commanding positions to launch more effective strikes on ships and disrupt navigation in the Red Sea”.

Badi said the Yemeni government responded by opening fronts in al-Jawf, Marib and al-Bayda, and that the consequences could extend far beyond Yemen.

“We are now facing a real threat that does not stop at Yemen’s borders,” he said. “It threatens the entire region and the world. If the Houthis manage to choke maritime traffic in the Red Sea, we will be looking at another Hormuz in these waters – with potentially even greater impact.”

The Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb “represent a vital artery for global shipping, for both energy and food supplies”, he added.

A chokepoint that belongs to the world

Bab al-Mandeb connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. To the north, the Red Sea leads to the Suez Canal, while farther east, beyond the Arabian Sea, lies another critical chokepoint, the Strait of Hormuz. This geography is what gives Yemen’s conflict consequences far beyond its borders, as Saudi Arabia is already being drawn into the confrontation.

The Houthis have targeted Saudi territory, civilian infrastructure in the kingdom’s south and Saudi-linked vessels in the Red Sea.

Major-General Turki al-Maliki, spokesman of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, said the Houthis on Wednesday attacked Saudi cities of Khamis Mushait, Abha, and Jizan with ballistic missiles and drones. He did not elaborate on any casualties as a result of the attacks.

Badi, who has spoken to the media for the first time since taking up his post, said those attacks are designed to change the nature of the war.

“By targeting Saudi territory, civilian infrastructure in the kingdom’s south, and Saudi-linked vessels in the Red Sea, the Houthis are trying to drag Saudi Arabia into their war. Their calculation is simple: they want to rebrand this conflict as a Saudi-Yemeni war,” he said.

The ambassador assessed that “every time their militias suffer heavy losses inside Yemen at the hands of the Yemeni armed forces, they respond by firing missiles and drones at civilian sites in Saudi Arabia, in an attempt to inflame Yemeni public opinion and convince the outside world that Yemen is at war with Saudi Arabia”.

The conflict, he said, is fundamentally about Yemen’s state and its future. The Yemeni people are fighting to “reclaim their state, their republic, their dignity and their stability”.

Iran’s hidden hand

Behind Yemen’s fragmented front lines, a larger regional confrontation looms, and its architect, according to Badi, is Iran.

The official said that Tehran’s relationship with the Houthis is now impossible to hide. “Iranian officials openly boast about it, and Houthi leaders proudly talk about their ‘strategic’ ties with Tehran,” he said.

The Houthis are “one of Iran’s key regional arms – just like Hezbollah in Lebanon or the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) in Iraq. Many of Tehran’s other proxies have come under pressure,” he added.

“Former Yemeni President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi used to say that if Iran gains control over Bab al-Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz, it will not need a nuclear weapon – its grip over these two chokepoints would be more powerful than any nuclear arsenal. Events have proved him right,” Badi recalled.

‘We have exhausted all peaceful avenues’

For Yemen’s government, the alternative to another war was supposed to be diplomacy.

Badi urged the world “to stand with us so we can rid ourselves of this scourge – a threat that no longer targets Yemenis alone”.

“We have exhausted all peaceful avenues. For more than 13 years, we have been engaging in dialogue rounds and signing agreements, whether inside Yemen or after the Houthis seized the capital, Sanaa,” he said.

Badi added that the Houthi rebels have effectively “buried peaceful options. Peace is simply not part of this movement’s culture or mindset. That is what ultimately forced us to take up arms”.

“The world must understand this difficult equation,” the ambassador concluded, that the Houthis are “an armed proxy, an extension of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Houthis do not represent us”.

For more than a decade, governments got used to cheap borrowing. That era may now be ending.

Government bond markets are flashing warnings around the world.

Across major economies, yields – the interest rates governments pay to borrow – are climbing to levels not seen in years and, in some cases, decades.

Investors are pricing in more risk before they’ll lend to governments already carrying heavy debt loads.

Inflation remains stubborn, geopolitical tensions are adding pressure, and central banks may have to keep interest rates higher for longer.

Those higher borrowing costs are pushing up what banks charge companies and homeowners.

British Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband has said the United Kingdom will sanction illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank, describing the move as “overdue” and necessary to “salvage” a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

He made the comments on Tuesday as 11 nations joined the UK in supporting or ⁠considering curbs on trade in goods with settlements that are a barrier to a future Palestinian state.

But analysts say the step is far from enough to drive momentum for Palestinian statehood, threatened by ever-expanding settlements in the West Bank and an increasingly hostile Israeli political environment.

Tahani Mustafa, a lecturer in international relations at King’s College London, told Al Jazeera the latest anti-settlement measures are “modest” and unlikely to have a significant impact on ambitions for Palestinian statehood.

“After three decades of breakneck settlement expansion, Palestinian territory is only being held together by its sinews,” said Mustafa. “If what remains is still territorially viable as a state, it is only barely so. Much more decisive action is needed to salvage the two-state solution and a durable lasting solution to the conflict.”

Settlements dividing Palestinian territory

More than 30 years after the Oslo Accords set out a negotiating process aimed at resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel has remained the foundation of international efforts to forge peace.

But since the Oslo process began in 1993, the number of Israeli settlers in the West Bank, including occupied East Jerusalem, has ballooned from about 260,000 to more than 700,000, according to the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics, posing a glaring roadblock to the plan.

The challenge is not just the raw number of settlers, but their geographic spread. Today, many Israeli settlements are embedded deep inside West Bank areas that would be needed for a contiguous Palestinian state, including near major Palestinian urban centres such as Nablus, Salfit and Hebron.

Israel’s recent E1 settlement plan, which would build thousands of illegal housing units between the Israeli settlement of Maale Adumim and East Jerusalem, is a case in point. The plan would effectively split the West Bank in two and fully sever it from East Jerusalem, which Palestinians seek as their future capital.

Experts have long said Israel will need to dismantle some of its West Bank settlements, as it did in the Gaza Strip in 2005, to make room for a cohesive Palestinian state. But many Israeli settlements, especially those closer to Israel’s pre-war 1967 borders, would likely need to be addressed through land swaps.

“A complete withdrawal from some of the deeply embedded settlements is highly unlikely,” so land swaps would be the only way to create some form of Palestinian “territorial integrity”, Andreas Krieg, associate professor at King’s College London, told Al Jazeera.

However, such an arrangement – under which Israeli settlements close to the pre-1967 borders would become part of Israel and some “northern Arab-Israeli communities would be integrated into a Palestinian state” – would be “highly controversial” and face blowback from multiple communities, said Krieg.

He argued that Israelis would be certain to oppose any forced withdrawal from West Bank settlements, while some “Arab-Israelis may not want to live within a Palestinian state”.

Palestinian citizens of Israel make up approximately 21 percent of Israel’s overall population but are treated as second- or third-class citizens at the institutional level. According to rights groups, several dozen Israeli laws actively discriminate against Palestinian citizens across a number of issues, including education and housing.

Israeli ‘consensus’ against Palestinian state

Beyond the physical obstacle created by settlements is the Israeli political landscape, in which the idea of a Palestinian state has become toxic.

The government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appears to be among the most hardline in Israel’s history on the issue. Netanyahu has emphatically ruled out the prospect of a Palestinian state, while his far-right Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who also oversees Israeli settlements in the West Bank, has celebrated blocking Palestinian statehood as a badge of honour.

The views of Netanyahu’s most influential domestic critics do not deviate much. His top rival in elections slated for October, former military chief Gadi Eisenkot, has promised not to allow the establishment of a Palestinian state. And Naftali Bennett, a Netanyahu rival from the far right, fervently opposes Palestinian statehood.

As for the Israeli public, a June poll by the Council for a Secure America found that only 22 percent of Jewish Israelis favour a two-state solution, while 63 percent oppose it.

“The consensus within Israel, socially and politically, does not allow for any party to make any steps towards a Palestinian state,” said Krieg.

Meanwhile, Israel’s closest ally, the United States, is unlikely to apply significant pressure over Israel’s settlement policy so long as President Donald Trump remains in office for the next two and a half years, he added.

Krieg said a “best-case scenario” is for Israel’s next elected government to reverse some of the country’s recent settlement advances.

John Strawson, professor at the University of East London, said that any new Israeli government is “unlikely to support a Palestinian state”, but that a more moderate Israeli government may at least “stop the ethnic cleansing and other moves which are aimed at making that impossible”.

“Removing Netanyahu is the first step towards a two-state solution,” said Strawson.

Two states are the ‘only alternative to violence’

If the two-state model is still alive at all, it is largely due to pressure from the international community.

More than 150 countries, including the majority of European Union nations, have recognised Palestinian statehood. And several Arab states with whom Israel seeks better ties have indicated Palestinian statehood is a precondition for normalisation with Israel.

Krieg said Tuesday’s move by the UK and the 11 other mostly European nations is an “overdue step in the right direction”, but also “shows the laziness and lack of creativity on the part of the international community to actually think outside the box in terms of a two-state solution”.

Anders Persson, a political scientist specialising in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, said that while the settlement sanctions are concerning to Israel, other previous anti-settlement measures, such as 2013 EU restrictions on funds for Israeli entities operating in occupied Palestinian territory, “changed little on the ground”.

He said the latest sanctions may be “too late” and “too limited … to save the two-state solution”.

Strawson said that while a two-state solution may “seem optimistic”, it is the only alternative to “permanent war and violence”.

Yemen’s more than a decade-long civil war has flared up once again after the Houthi rebel group launched an offensive in several locations against Saudi Arabian-backed government forces. The conflict has already spilled over beyond the country’s borders with the Houthis launching an attack on southern Saudi Arabia, targeting oil facilities and wounding dozens of people this week.

The renewed hostilities are the most serious since a United Nations-brokered truce halted large-scale fighting in 2022, after eight years of a full-blown conflict that killed tens of thousands of people in one of the world’s poorest countries.

So who is involved in this conflict? Here’s a look at the main actors:

The Houthis

The Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah (supporters of God), are an armed group controlling most parts of Yemen, including the capital, Sanaa, and some of the western and northern areas close to Saudi Arabia.

The Houthis emerged in the 1990s but rose to international prominence in 2014, when the group rebelled against Yemen’s government, forcing it to step down and causing a crippling humanitarian crisis.

The group then spent years, with Iran’s backing, fighting a military coalition led by Saudi Arabia. The two warring sides have also repeatedly tried to hold peace talks.

Seen as part of a regional alliance known as the “axis of resistance” backed by Iran, the Shia Zaidi group nevertheless has its own base, its own interests – and its own ambitions.

The Houthis have demonstrated their missile and drone capabilities during the Yemen war in attacks on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, targeting oil installations and vital infrastructure. They have also proven resilient, defying more than 10 years of bombing by the Saudi-led coalition, as well as US and British strikes in recent years.

The group has gained international prominence for its attacks on Israel and shipping in the Red Sea since the start of Israel’s genocide in Gaza in October 2023.

Saudi Arabia

Riyadh entered the Yemen war when it led a military coalition against the Houthis in March 2015, seeking to restore the government of then-President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi. Back then, Saudi Arabia and Iran were at the peak of a regional competition, both deeply distrusting each other. An Iran-supported group expanding control at the kingdom’s southern border was unacceptable, hence the military action.

This was before a China-brokered rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023 marked the beginning of a more practical and less confrontational relationship.

Presidential Leadership Council

The PLC was established in 2022 when the former president, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, formally transferred his powers to the new eight-member body.

It represents the internationally recognised government of Yemen, with a mandate to manage the country’s political, security and military affairs, and to steer negotiations towards a permanent ceasefire. It is chaired by Rashad al-Alimi, an adviser to Hadi and former interior minister with the government of the late president, Ali Abdullah Saleh.

Its membership is drawn from a mix of northern and southern politicians and military-linked leaders in a bid to unite major anti-Houthi forces under one roof.

The PLC is backed by Saudi Arabia and the alliance that Riyadh leads.

Islah party

The Yemeni Congregation for Reform, better known as Islah, is a Sunni Islamist movement with historic ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. It is a faction within the recognised PLC-led government but has long had an independent identity. Its major stronghold has long been Marib, the country’s sole gas-producing region with one of its largest oilfields.

National Resistance Forces

The National Resistance Forces is a government-aligned military faction led by Tareq Saleh, nephew of the late former President Ali Abdullah Saleh.

The force has maintained ties to Saudi Arabia and, like the Islah party, is part of the PLC. It aims for a unified Yemen, positioning itself as a counterweight to both the Houthis and southern secessionists.