Middle East

The United Kingdom has announced a ban on the import of all goods produced in illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank, Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband said in Parliament on Tuesday.

It comes in response to an intensifying wave of Israeli settler pogroms and settlement expansions in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem.

The ban, set to come into effect within six to nine months, would target settlement exports such as dates, olive oil and agricultural products, with Miliband saying he did not believe “the British people want us supporting the occupation by accepting products from settlements in our shops”.

The International Court of Justice in July 2024 called Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory “unlawful”. Months later, the United Nations passed a resolution calling for an end to the Israeli occupation within a year.

Israel’s response was furious, as it announced four “counter-measures”, including banning 12 British MPs from entering Israel and closing the British consulate in Jerusalem.

After Miliband’s speech, 11 more countries: Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, shared a joint statement supporting the so-called two-state solution and announcing their own intentions to impose restrictions on trade with illegal Israeli settlements.

Spain and Ireland had already announced their own national bans earlier this year, alongside the Netherlands and Belgium.

How much do these countries trade with Israel?

Aside from Canada and the UK, the rest of the countries considering or already banning settlement goods are European Union members.

The EU is Israel’s largest trading partner, accounting for 31.7 percent of Israel’s total trade in goods in 2025 (43.3 billion euros, or $50.4bn), according to the European Commission. The EU supplied 33.1 percent of Israel’s imports (28 billion euros, or $32.6bn) and received 29.4 percent of Israel’s exports (15.3 billion euros or $17.8bn).

Israel is the EU’s 27th largest trade partner, with Ireland, the Netherlands and Germany being its biggest individual trade partners.

According to a 2026 report by Global Echo Litigation Center, a Palestinian rights legal advocacy group, roughly 5,900 shipments from Israel were headed to Europe, with more than 17 percent containing products originating from settlements.

While no specific figures for settlement trade alone are known, it is understood to be a tiny fraction of total EU-Israel trade, meaning the ban’s impact is much more symbolic than economic.

The table below shows each country’s total trade with Israel for the European countries that have banned, or are introducing bans on, illegal Israeli settlement goods.

The top five European trading partners with Israel either enforcing or set to introduce settlement bans are Ireland, the Netherlands, the UK, France and Spain.

Ireland

Ireland-Israel bilateral trade totalled $5.36bn in 2025. Ireland is Israel’s second-largest export market for goods after the United States, driven largely by tech, particularly semiconductors and integrated circuits.

The Netherlands

Netherlands-Israel bilateral trade totalled roughly $4.8bn in 2025. The Netherlands is also Israel’s largest single foreign investor, accounting for roughly two-thirds of all EU investment in the country.

United Kingdom

According to UN Comtrade, UK-Israel bilateral trade totalled $3.73bn in 2025. An Al Jazeera investigation found at least 17 companies linked to illegal Israeli settlements hold more than 2.1 billion pounds ($2.85bn) in UK public-sector contracts.

France

France-Israel bilateral trade totalled $3.62bn in 2025. A large part of France’s trade with Israel constitutes export licences for surveillance and military technologies.

Spain

Spain-Israel bilateral trade totalled $2.79bn in 2025. In September that year, Spain banned the import of goods from illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory, as well as the trade of arms.

What are Israeli settlements?

Israeli settlements are Jewish-only communities built illegally on Palestinian land.

Settlements are illegal under international law as they violate the Fourth Geneva Convention, which bans an occupying power from transferring its population to the area it occupies.

Illegal Israeli settlements continue to grow, decades after the 1993 Oslo Accords, which established limited Palestinian self-rule and were meant to lead to a permanent peace settlement.

At the time, about 270,000 settlers lived across the occupied territory. Today, that figure has more than doubled to between 600,000 and 750,000 people, about 10 percent of Israel’s Jewish population, living across some 250 illegal settlements in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem.

US military says it struck the five Iranian tankers after IRGC targeted a US warship twice in two days.

The United States has claimed attacks on five Iranian oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman and near Kharg Island after accusing Iran of launching ballistic missiles at a US warship twice in two days.

Iran responded to the attacks on Tuesday by firing missiles at US forces stationed at the Al Azraq base in Jordan. Amman said its air defences intercepted and destroyed 18 of 20 Iranian missiles, while the rest fell in open areas.

The exchange of fire comes amid escalating tensions in the Gulf, six months into the US and Israel’s war on Iran, with Tehran maintaining the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and Washington imposing a naval blockade on Iranian ports.

The hostilities briefly drove oil prices to $99.46 earlier on Tuesday.

In a statement, the US Central Command said Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had targeted a US warship twice over the past two days. The warship “successfully evaded the attempted Iranian attacks” and “no American personnel were harmed”, it said.

The Central Command said it retaliated by destroying the Iranian oil carriers, M/T Kaviz, M/T Charminar, M/T Horizon 1, and M/T Riesco in the Gulf of Oman as well as M/T Derya near Kharg Island.

“American forces directed the crews to abandon ship before the vessels were struck and rendered inoperable,” the Central Command added.

Iran’s IRIB state broadcaster confirmed the attack near Kharg Island in the Gulf, which handled some 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports before the war. It reported that the crew was evacuated and said a second tanker was hit near the southern port of Jask on the Gulf of Oman.

The IRGC also said “several” Iranian commercial ships were hit, and said it retaliated by subjecting Al Azraq base in Jordan to “fierce missile strikes”. It claimed hangars used by US fighter jets were destroyed in the ballistic missile attacks.

It went on to claim ballistic missile attacks on the US Navy DDG-119 and DDG-53 destroyers, saying “significant damage was caused to these vessels”.

The IRGC also threatened to target oil tankers in Kuwaiti and Bahraini ports, warning crews there to evacuate immediately.

“We warn all the crews of oil tankers in the Kuwaiti and Bahraini ports… to immediately abandon their vessels, whether at anchor or at the ports, because they will be targeted,” it said.

Jordan’s Armed Forces, meanwhile, said its air defences engaged 20 ballistic missiles, “successfully intercepting and destroying 18 of them”. Two missiles “fell in unpopulated areas,” it said in a statement.

The attacks did not cause any casualties and specialised teams “have begun securing the locations where debris and shrapnel fell,” it added.

Earlier, the chief of staff of Iran’s Armed Forces, Ali Abdollahi, had warned that Tehran would strike US military installations across the region if Iranian tankers were targeted.

“The US aggressor army has given Iranian oil tankers an evacuation warning to hit them, so I announce that any attack on Iranian oil tankers will result in the targeting of US bases in the region by the armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Abdollahi said on state TV.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, however, said Washington would continue to strike Iranian ships.

“Iran continues to try to hit US naval ships, and for every time they do that or try to do that, they’re going to lose tankers,” Rubio told reporters on a visit to Colombia.

Yemen’s Houthi group has carried out attacks in southern Saudi Arabia, with Riyadh saying that dozens of people have been wounded, as fighting between the Iran-aligned group and pro-Saudi forces in Yemen sharply escalates.

The Houthis on Tuesday said they targeted Saudi energy sites belonging to oil giant Aramco in southern areas, with the group’s military spokesperson calling it “a broad operation”.

Saudi authorities confirmed attacks on several facilities and installations related to the energy sector in the south of the country, vowing a firm response. Riyadh also accused the Houthis of wounding at least 73 people in the attacks.

The conflict between the Yemeni armed group and Saudi Arabia is unfolding as the Houthis are currently fighting Yemen’s Riyadh-backed internationally recognised government, which announced that it was launching counteroffensives against Houthi-held positions across several provinces on Monday.

The renewed hostilities are the most serious since a UN-brokered truce halted large-scale fighting in 2022, after eight years of a full-blown conflict that killed tens of thousands of people in one of the world’s poorest countries.

The escalation also comes as the strategic importance of Yemen’s Bab al-Mandeb Strait grows amid Iran’s effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a key passageway for global oil and gas supplies.

The Houthis have sought to advance towards the vital Red Sea shipping route, while government forces say their campaign ultimately aims to retake the Houthi-held capital, Sanaa.

So what do we know about the latest fighting, and what comes next?

How did the fighting between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis unfold?

The Houthis on Monday said Saudi Arabia launched multiple attacks on Houthi-held areas.

The group said Saudi attacks using aircraft and cruise missiles struck al-Jawf, al-Bayda, Marib and Taiz provinces.

Moreover, the Houthis accused Saudi Arabia of carrying out an air strike on a prison in al-Hazm, the capital of al-Jawf, killing seven people and injuring seven others. Riyadh did not immediately comment on the attacks.

At the same time, the Houthis claimed to have shot down Saudi reconnaissance drones over al-Jawf and al-Bayda.

Meanwhile, on Tuesday, Major-General Turki al-Malki, the Saudi spokesman for the Riyadh-led coalition in Yemen, said the Houthis carried out attacks on the Saudi cities of Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jazan and Najran, injuring at least 73 people, among them women and children.

According to a statement from Saudi Arabia’s Energy Ministry, the strikes also triggered fires at multiple oil installations and utility sites across the kingdom’s southern provinces.

Southern Saudi Arabia is home to key oil infrastructure, including the Jazan refinery, one of the kingdom’s largest, with the capacity to process 400,000 barrels of crude per day.

Shortly after, the Houthis announced that they had targeted Saudi energy infrastructure operated by oil giant Aramco in the south using drones and ballistic missiles.

The group’s military spokesman, Yahya Saree, said the attacks were retaliation for recent Saudi attacks on Houthi-controlled areas across Yemen.

Why is this escalation taking place now?

A key focus of the fighting is the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the narrow waterway connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden.

The Houthis declared a blockade against Saudi shipping in July. The Houthis have also pushed towards government-held areas near al-Makha (Mocha) and territory bordering the Bab al-Mandeb Strait amid reinforcements and counteroffensives from government forces.

The strait’s strategic importance has increased dramatically because Iran’s restrictions on the Strait of Hormuz have forced Saudi Arabia to rely more heavily on its Red Sea export route. Between March and mid-July, Saudi seaborne crude exports through Bab al-Mandeb were eight times higher than during the same period in 2025.

In 2024, about 4.1 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum products passed through the strait daily on average – about 5 percent of the global total.

Ahmed Nagi, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group, said the strait holds importance “when we look at the Houthis’ broader strategy”.

“The move towards the western coast is not only about gaining territory on the ground. It also has a maritime dimension,” he told Al Jazeera.

“The Houthis have already linked their military campaign to the Red Sea and the shipping routes around Bab al-Mandeb. So gaining more control over the … western coast could give them greater depth and allow them to sustain pressure on maritime traffic in the Red Sea. In that sense, the ground offensive and their maritime campaign are closely connected.”

The latest escalation also follows fighting that resumed in July after an Iranian aircraft attempted to land in Sanaa without Saudi authorisation, followed by strikes on Sanaa airport and Houthi retaliation.

What is happening between government forces and the Houthis?

On Sunday, Yemen’s internationally recognised government said its warplanes had struck Houthi positions in Hodeidah, Marib and al-Jawf, as fighting spread across several fronts.

On Monday, government-aligned forces stepped up their counteroffensive. They announced a ground push towards the al-Labanat mountains in al-Jawf, while also reporting rocket attacks on Yatma and “intensive battles” with Houthi fighters in the province. Government forces also claimed advances towards Dhi Na’im district in al-Bayda.

The Houthis said they had repelled the advance towards al-Labanat and inflicted casualties on government-aligned forces. Houthi official Mohammed al-Farah also claimed the group fired ballistic missiles at reinforcements in al-Jawf.

By late Monday, government-aligned forces reported carrying out further air attacks against Houthi positions west of Taiz.

Al Jazeera could not independently verify the battlefield claims by the Houthis or the Yemeni government.

Rashad al-Alimi, who heads Yemen’s Saudi-backed Presidential Leadership Council, meanwhile said on Monday that government forces had made significant gains against the Houthis, pointing to advances in al-Jawf, al-Bayda, Taiz and Hodeidah.

“Our armed forces will continue to carry out their constitutional duty until state institutions are restored and their authority extends over the entire territory of Yemen,” al-Alimi said in a statement.

Yemen’s deputy defence minister, Major-General Samir al-Sabri, said in comments aired on state television that the government had resolved to “retake Sanaa”.

Majid al-Nuzaili, a spokesperson for government-aligned forces, said the goal of the offensive was to “liberate Yemen from the grip” of the Houthis “and restore Sanaa as a capital for all Yemenis”.

What is the humanitarian situation on the ground?

The World Health Organization said on Monday that at least 728 people have been killed or wounded in Yemen since August 23, with the majority in Taiz and along the western coast.

It said an estimated 21,000 people, roughly 3,000 families, have been displaced from Taiz alone since Thursday.

Al Jazeera’s Yousef Mawry, reporting from Sanaa, said the casualty count is expected to rise.

“These casualties are said to be in the hundreds from both sides, especially as we have reports of air strikes being conducted in the governorate of al-Jawf,” he said.

The Crisis Group’s Nagi said the world was witnessing “significant deterioration in what is already a catastrophic situation”.

“We saw in the past few days a lot of displacement from areas where there has been fighting between the two sides, especially in Taiz,” he noted.

“Those are the direct impacts, but there are also indirect ones. The economic situation is likely to get worse, which will put even more pressure on the humanitarian situation. Ultimately, I think it will depend on how long this round of fighting lasts. The longer the conflict continues, the greater the humanitarian impact will be.”

What’s next?

Analyst Hisham al-Omeisy said the fighting in the war-torn country was no longer simply a domestic one.

“We are way beyond the concept [of it] being domestic. It all started with the Houthis pushing to control Bab al-Mandeb and the western coast, to control the chokehold on the other side of the Arabian Peninsula, with the Iranians controlling the Strait of Hormuz,” al-Omeisy, a senior Yemen adviser at the European Institute of Peace, told Al Jazeera.

“This is definitely not domestic, especially when the Houthis have started attacking Saudi Arabia as well for the better part of the last month, and now escalating since today [Tuesday].”

Domestically, the Crisis Group’s Nagi said it was “unclear” what the outcome of this round of fighting will be, describing the situation on the ground as “very fluid”.

“But what we are seeing is that the government seems to be in a stronger position than at any time before, and it sees this round of fighting as an opportunity to consolidate its position and gain more territory from the Houthis,” he added, while warning that this did not mean the Houthis were weak.

“It’s true that the Houthis are fighting in Taiz, and they were the ones who launched the offensive against government forces there and made some gains. But on other fronts, in al-Jawf, al-Bayda, Marib and elsewhere, government forces have advanced and gained several key areas, while the Houthis have been on the defensive.”

On whether there will be a winner in this conflict, al-Omeisy said that in the long term, he expects a negotiated settlement.

“Look at the history of Yemen … we always inevitably reach some sort of a deal, so it’s not going to be a winner-takes-all,” he said.

“I don’t imagine there’s going to be a push to regain the capital [Sanaa], for instance. It’s going to be a bloodbath if they [government-aligned forces] do that.”

“There’s going to be a humbling of the Houthi forces. There’s going to be losses. But eventually, you will need a political deal,” al-Omeisy added.

According to Saudi political analyst Khaled Batarfi, the Houthi strikes will trigger a response but not a prolonged war.

“This is an escalation, of course,” Batarfi told Al Jazeera. In past attacks, Saudi Arabia tried “to not get engaged in a civil war, keep its distance and not to respond to attacks. But now this is too much [of an escalation],” he said.

“The coalition will have a say on that. This is a civil war inside Yemen, and it affects us as one of the parties. And so any response … in the same way [will be] an eye for an eye. But I don’t see a prolonged war – not with Iran and not with the Houthis.”

Tehran has threatened “serious consequences” for South Korea if it interferes in the US-Israel war on Iran.

The warning comes amid reports that Seoul is mulling contributing to the US naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz passage, which has hampered Iran’s oil exports.

In a statement posted on X on Monday, Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei said Iran and South Korea had more than 64 years of diplomatic relations based on mutual respect and that Tehran values that friendship.

However, if South Korea joins the United States in its military actions against Iran at a time when the country is defending itself from what he called US aggression and “war crimes against women and children”, then there will be consequences, he warned.

Baghaei threatened that Iran would regard any military presence or participation in operations by another country in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz “would inevitably be regarded as direct support for the aggressor and would have serious consequences”.

“No sovereign and responsible country should succumb to US pressure and intimidation and become complicit in acts of aggression and horrific crimes against the great Iranian nation,” he added.

Seoul did not respond directly, but a Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement on Monday said it is communicating with the international community over the situation in the passageway.

Here’s what we know about how South Korea is getting roped in:

Why is South Korea involved?

Seoul, a close ally of Washington, has been under pressure from US President Donald Trump.

The issues began in mid-August, when Trump revealed in an interview, and later online, that he had spoken to South Korean President Lee Jae Myung and asked that Seoul give “a little hand” in the war on Iran.

According to media reports, the two leaders had spoken over the phone on May 17.

Seoul said, “No, thanks!”, according to Trump’s message on social media.

However, as South Korea now knows, saying no to Trump has repercussions.

On August 16, Trump announced that the US would significantly scale back joint military drills it holds annually with South Korea – the evening before they were scheduled to begin.

The Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) exercises are meant to sharpen Seoul’s readiness in case of a North Korean attack. They usually last for more than 11 days but were reduced to five.

In a post on his Truth Social site, Trump claimed the drills were “costly” and that they send a “hostile” signal to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, with whom he is trying to build a relationship. South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun said in parliament there was no warning from the US.

Trump also questioned why South Korea would refuse his request when thousands of US soldiers are stationed on the Korean Peninsula.

The US also cancelled another military exercise scheduled for September, although South Korea’s military revealed it received a notification much earlier in June, with Washington citing constraints due to the war on Iran.

How has South Korea responded?

President Lee, a liberal who pushes for a dialled-down defence posture, has opted to negotiate. His office earlier released statements saying it hopes for “meaningful dialogue” with Trump.

South Korea’s Yonhap news agency reported on Monday that Washington has, however, “ratcheted up pressure” on Seoul.

On Friday, a South Korean presidential official told Yonhap that Seoul could consider a military contribution to international measures seeking to free up navigation in the passageway as long as it does not affect the country’s defence readiness.

South Korea is looking at various options, the official said, including possible cooperation with France, the United Kingdom and other allies on sending noncombat and search-and-rescue forces.

The South Korean military has also started reviewing assets and troops that could be deployed, including maritime patrol aircraft, explosive ordnance disposal teams and unmanned mine detection and clearing systems, he added.

Such a move would be unpopular. The opposition has spoken out against a possible deployment, as have some within Lee’s ruling Democratic Party. Many South Koreans have also protested against the US-Israel war on Iran.

What is the history of US-South Korea relations?

South Korea became one of the US’s closest allies after Washington backed Seoul against Pyongyang in the Korean War of 1950.

The US supported Seoul’s economic and military growth in the years after. Under a treaty, some 29,000 US soldiers have been stationed permanently on the Korean Peninsula since the end of the war. Seoul has also relied on US defence might to deter nuclear-armed North Korea.

In return, South Korea supported several US wars, including the Iraq War, and is designated an important non-NATO ally.

In 2025, however, Washington imposed a 25 percent tariff on the country, testing relations. Seoul opted to negotiate rather than retaliate, leading the US to lower tariffs to 15 percent.

Many South Koreans were also alarmed after hundreds of South Koreans were arrested in Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) raids on a Hyundai plant in Georgia in September 2025.

Last October, Trump travelled to Seoul in a historic state visit, and earlier this year, President Lee visited the US. Lee is also trying to resume dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang.

How is South Korea being affected by the US-Israel war on Iran?

South Korea is facing an economic crisis. The country relies on the Gulf supplies via the Strait of Hormuz for 60 to 70 percent of crude imports, meaning supply is being severely hit. The war has led to soaring inflation, causing the Korean won to fall to a 17-year low.

Seoul therefore has an interest in freeing up the strait. However, under Korean law, the government will require parliament’s approval before a military deployment, although some governing party members could oppose it.

New fuel pricing targets consumption above 110 litres monthly, doubling costs to 100,000 riyals per litre.

Iran has raised petrol prices for motorists again as the government struggles to manage declining revenues and sustain a costly subsidy regime.

The price of petrol will remain the same for the first 60 litres (16 gallons), state media reported, but there will be a higher price bracket for the next 50 litres (13 gallons). Prices will double from 50,000 riyals to 100,000 riyals ($0.07) per litre (0.3 gallons) for motorists who consume more than 110 litres (29 gallons) a month.

Iran has some of the lowest petrol prices in the world, but due to ongoing economic difficulties amid the war with the US, including punishing sanctions and a siege on Iranian ports by US forces, Iranian officials have for months considered adjusting fuel subsidies to make up for lost revenues.

“If we consume it properly, we can manage with the amount of gasoline we produce in the country,” Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, speaker of the Iranian parliament, said in a TV address earlier this month. “What is clear is that we need to save gasoline in our consumption. Of course, part of the responsibility for this high consumption does not lie with our people; it lies with our industry.”

Iran depends on oil exports for about 90 per cent of its budget, but these have declined from about 4 million barrels per day (bpd) to about 2.2 million bpd in August. The country is also consuming more oil than it produces domestically.

In a sign of the energy crisis, videos circulating on social media reportedly show long queues at petrol stations in Tehran.

It is the second time petrol prices have increased since December, with concerns about further increases prompting unrest.

Huge antigovernment protests in 2019 started after anger over fuel price increases. Iranians are already feeling the impact of a downturn in economic activity, high inflation, and a drop in the value of the rial.

Far-right Israeli ministers began more forcefully advocating the wholesale removal of Palestinians in Gaza last week, offering timelines and government mechanisms to conduct illegal forced expulsions while displacement, demolitions and killings continued across Gaza and the occupied West Bank.

Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz told a conference on Wednesday that removing Palestinians from Gaza is “the only solution”, saying Israel is prepared to do it “by sea, by air and by every way possible”, and that US President Donald Trump has merely “frozen” – not cancelled – his support for the idea.

Then, National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir unveiled a seven-year plan, branded “Disengagement 710”, to remove Gaza’s roughly two million residents through what he called “voluntary emigration”.

Ben-Gvir added that, if re-elected, he would establish a Migration Ministry to expel Palestinians.

The US State Department said it “does not support any plan or proposal for the forced displacement, expulsion, or mandatory transfer of the population of Gaza” – but stopped short of directly condemning Katz or Ben-Gvir.

Gaza: Rising death toll amid airstrikes

Gaza’s death toll has continued climbing through near-daily strikes. An Israeli special forces raid near Gaza City’s American hospital on Tuesday killed at least four Palestinians, including two children and a woman, ending with the capture of Moin al-Arabeed, described by Israel as the head of Hamas’s internal security. A drone strike killed a child in Jabalia refugee camp on Wednesday, the same day an attack on a tent in Khan Younis killed one person.

On Thursday, two Palestinians, including a 13-year-old, were shot dead near Beit Lahia after Israel said they had crossed into an Israeli-controlled area, while a separate drone strike killed a man near a church compound in Gaza City’s Remal neighbourhood.

Strikes continued through the week’s end: On Sunday alone, Israel attacked near a school in Gaza City, wounding several, and a separate drone strike on a car near Gaza City’s Hamid intersection killed Youssef Akila and his young daughter, Wafaa.

Before dawn on Monday, at least five more Palestinians in Gaza were killed including three-year-old Saadi Ghalia, who was killed when an artillery shell struck a school in Deir el-Balah sheltering displaced people.

By Monday, the Palestinian Ministry of Health reported that 73,658 people have been killed and 174,622 wounded since October 2023, after 160 additional deaths were certified and added to the casualty figures. Of those, more than 1,340 have been killed since the October 2025 Israeli-Hamas “ceasefire”.

The recovery of bodies has slowly continued alongside the killings.

Families in northern Gaza held funerals on Sunday for around 100 people, including 60 children, whose remains were pulled from the rubble of Gaza City’s Zeitoun neighbourhood, many of them members of the extended Malaka family.

Gaza civil defence chief Raed al-Dahshan told Al Jazeera his teams could recover an estimated 8,000 more bodies still under the rubble within 90 days if given proper heavy equipment, but warned that without it, “this work will continue for years”. Between 10,000 and 14,000 people remain missing under Gaza’s rubble.

In the strip, humanitarian conditions continue to deteriorate without sufficient aid getting in. The World Health Organization warned that water contamination in Gaza has nearly tripled since January. The Palestinian Water Authority reported all five of Gaza’s wastewater plants have shut down entirely, with roughly 55,000 cubic metres of untreated sewage discharged daily.

West Bank: Demolitions and villages under siege

Meanwhile, Israeli forces carried out demolitions this week in the West Bank. In the community of Khirbet al-Tabban in Masafer Yatta, those demolitions were absolute – demolishing all 12 homes left  70 people, including 30 children, homeless.

“It’s wiping the village off the face of the earth,” council head Nidal Younis said. Residents, he added, intend to rebuild.

Israeli forces also destroyed four water wells and several greenhouses in nearby Beit Ummar in Hebron in the occupied West Bank, causing an estimated $60,000 in losses, and demolished a home in Nahalin in Bethlehem governorate.

Around Jenin, the bulldozing of hundreds of farmers’ trees continued along the Arraba-Yabad and Jenin-Nablus roads, part of six military orders issued in August to clear vegetation from across four Jenin-area villages, according to to the Palestinian Wafa news agency.

In occupied East Jerusalem’s al-Bustan neighbourhood, community representative Fakhri Abu Diab said municipal bulldozers demolished a four-apartment building – the 60th demolition there since October 2023. On Monday morning another home was demolished in the East Jerusalem neighbourhood of Beit Hanina, according to Wafa, and authorities forced a Palestinian man in the city’s Jabal al-Mukaber area to demolish his home.

Despite all of the land and property destruction, last week’s most sustained violence centred on al-Mughayyir, northeast of Ramallah. Settlers and soldiers raided the village on the evening of Wednesday after accusing residents of stealing livestock.

Snipers took rooftop positions and opened fire as residents tried to stop settlers stealing sheep, killing Khalil Abu Alia, 16, and Mohammad Nassan, 19.

The Israeli military told the Times of Israel that troops were “securing the retrieval of livestock belonging to Israeli civilians” when a “violent riot” broke out and soldiers “fired at key instigators”. Eyewitnesses said Nasan was shot in the back.

In the days after, mourners were beaten and pepper-sprayed and their vehicle stolen, with an ambulance also attacked.

Wafa also reported late on Sunday that Israeli settlers killed Omar Tubasi, 20, and injured three people when they raided and opened fire on the village of Hajja, east of Qalqilya governorate in the occupied West Bank.

Elsewhere, settlers stormed Umm al-Khair in the South Hebron Hills on Friday, injuring a child. Soldiers who arrived declared the area a closed military zone that was enforced for Palestinians, not the settlers who remained.

In Turmus Ayya north of Ramallah, a settler wearing a T-shirt bearing the logo of the outlawed Kach movement was filmed atop a Palestinian home declaring “this land is Jewish” after US Ambassador Mike Huckabee visited the town and called settler violence “a form of terrorism”.

In Qusra, south of Nablus, a month-long siege of three homes continued, with the army initially blocking roughly 100 peace activists from delivering food and medicine. Settlers also stole water tanks and livestock in the Jordan Valley and sabotaged water lines serving a Bedouin encampment near Tayasir in the northern West Bank, according to reports and photos from local Palestinian activists.

In East Jerusalem’s Old City, Israeli police shot and killed Ibrahim al-Hendi, 33, from Beit Hanina, near Damascus Gate on Friday, claiming he had tried to stab an officer.

Oil prices are rising to nearly a six-week high amid a wave of strikes between the United States and Iran in the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly a fifth of the world’s oil supply travels during peacetime.

On Monday, Brent oil futures, the global benchmark, rose to hover around $97 a barrel — up 9 percent over the last five days and 19 percent over the last month. Monday’s market moves are approaching the highest point since July 24th, when prices topped $97.93.

US West Texas Intermediate crude similarly rose to $92.27 a barrel, up 79 cents, also a near six-week high.

In recent days, strikes escalated in the Strait of Hormuz. The US hit three Iranian oil tankers on Saturday, while Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said it had struck three tankers and three US-linked vessels in other areas.

“This is a reflection of continued conflict and exchange of fire. The supply deficits globally are persisting, and there is little end to these shortages,” Rachel Ziemba, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), told Al Jazeera.

On Monday, Saudi Aramco’s Jizan facilities were struck for the second time in the last month, according to reporting from the Financial Times that cited two people familiar with the matter.

“The fact that a Saudi refinery in Jizan was hit, possibly delaying its return to production, didn’t help,” Ziemba added.

Amid increased strikes, there’s less traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, with an average of 10 commodity ships crossing the vital chokepoint each day over the last 10 days, according to Kpler, a data analytics platform.

“Crude went back down to what the pre-war level was in early July. Then it increased again, and then it reduced again, and now it’s increasing again on this weekend’s exchange plus the Aramco attack,” Arif Gasilov, a partner at the Gasilov Group, an energy advisory firm, told Al Jazeera.

“I would say that you might eventually see an inflection point, depending on how long this keeps going on, where a ceasefire doesn’t move the market at all, maybe by just a dollar or two.”

US consumers pinched

US consumers are feeling the impact of heightened oil prices at the petrol pump. The average price for a gallon (3.78 litres) of petrol has jumped 7 cents over the course of a week, reaching $4.15 nationally on Monday, up from $4.08 this time a week ago, according to the American Automobile Association (AAA), which tracks daily petrol prices.

That’s up from $4.04 this time a month ago and $2.98 from February 28th, when the US and Israel first struck Iran, marking a 39 percent increase since the war began.

Last week, diesel prices hit all-time highs at $5.85 per gallon.

“US diesel prices have never been this high, and now the countdown starts for the trickle-down to everything consumers buy… record diesel will start funnelling down into the economy,” Patrick De Haan, head of petroleum analysis at GasBuddy, said in a post on the social media platform X.

Prices have continued to climb since, with average prices on Monday topping $5.90 per gallon.

“Markets are pricing in longer disruptions. It continues to be in product markets where the biggest disruptions lie, though, including diesel,” Ziemba added.

Those price gains are weighing on Americans, who have spent an average of $764.59 per household on fuel since the war began. That’s $418.82 more than usual, according to Brown University’s Watson School of International and Public Affairs.

Ahead of the US’s September 5-7 Labor Day weekend, the unofficial end of summer and a popular time for US travel, AAA forecasts showed a 20 percent increase in flight costs compared to the same weekend last year.

Ahead of the midterm elections, the economy is emerging as a key issue for US voters — and a potential warning sign for Republicans. Polls show voters souring on President Donald Trump’s handling of the economy, with his economic approval rating falling to a new low in a recent Financial Times poll. Just 17 percent of Americans approve of his handling of the economy.

An Economist/YouGov poll similarly found that 39 percent of Americans believe Democrats are doing a better job handling the economy, compared with 32 percent who said Republicans are.

China pressures

Southeast and East Asian markets rely more heavily on imports travelling through the Strait of Hormuz directly than the US, but Beijing has moved to insulate itself from the disruption by turning to domestic sources, including its strategic petroleum reserve (SPR).

“China has been managing this situation successfully since the beginning of the war. We know that China has many domestic resources, despite rising oil prices,” John Gong, an economics professor at the University of International Business and Economics, told Al Jazeera.

“China has been conserving its oil and gas consumption for quite some time now. China was prepared for these challenges,” Gong said.

He also stressed that China’s close relations with Russia give Beijing another source of supply, with Moscow able to provide nearly half of China’s daily oil needs.

China has also begun tapping into its SPR while reducing its reliance on imports, as Beijing accelerates a broader shift towards alternative energy sources and vehicles that require little or no oil to operate.

“We have national strategies focused on transitioning to clean energies like solar and green power,” Gong said. “When we look at the vehicles purchased in China, more than 50 percent of cars sold on the Chinese market are electric.”

Cairo, Egypt – Four days after he disappeared from the Egyptian team camp at the 2026 Under-20 World Wrestling Championships in Slovakia last month, 19-year-old wrestler Ziad Hajjaj Abu Gabal posted a message on Facebook.

“I don’t want my mother and father to be upset with me,” he wrote on August 29. “I did this so I could see myself as a man. I won’t go back to Egypt, my beloved country, until I bring it honour.

“Everything I earn in a month is 700 Egyptian pounds [$13.7], and I’m an international [athlete] … After all this pressure, there was no way I could go back.”

On August 27, another Egyptian wrestler, Mohamed al-Shami, 23, had escaped while his team transited through Rome on their way home from the Mediterranean Games in Taranto, Italy.

In his Facebook post on August 29, Al-Shami said he had come to feel like a financial burden on his family and that he wanted to start earning money for them.

“At a certain point I felt my father was exhausted, that life had become too hard for him,” he wrote. “I’m the eldest of my siblings, so someone had to make a sacrifice and take responsibility.”

While the authorities in Egypt may now try to take legal action against the two athletes, their posts drew a wave of sympathy from Egyptians on Facebook, with many saying they understood the pressures that pushed the athletes to escape from a country mired in poverty.

Indeed, Hajjaj and al-Shami are far from the first Egyptian wrestlers to flee while abroad, and the hardships they describe are widely shared across the sport in Egypt.

Debt and despair

A 27-year-old wrestler, who won several gold medals for Egypt and asked not to be named, told Al Jazeera that fellow athletes under 20 years old earn 700 Egyptian pounds ($13.7) to 800 ($15.7) Egyptian pounds a month.

Older international players reportedly receive between 5,000 pounds ($98.2) and 12,000 pounds ($235.7) a month, depending on their achievements.

“Wrestlers often go into debt to cover supplements and living costs while waiting for prize money that may or may not arrive,” he said.

Ahmed Baghdouda left for France in 2023 immediately after winning silver at the African Wrestling Championships, reportedly over low pay. Tarek Abdel Salam defected to Bulgaria in 2017 amid alleged medical neglect and later won European gold under Bulgaria’s flag. That year, Ibrahim Ghanem also chose to stay in France, subsequently winning a World Championship title for the country.

In October 2025, Mohamed Ibrahim el-Sayed – popular as Kishu and a six-time African wrestling champion, two-time U23 world champion, and bronze medallist in the 67kg category at the Tokyo 2020 Olympics – announced he had taken “the first step” towards switching his sporting allegiance to represent the United States, posting training photos from a facility with the US flag behind him.

Asked by Al Jazeera through a messaging app why wrestlers keep fleeing Egypt, Kishu blamed the wrestling federation.

“It’s the only body that can provide a suitable environment, but the opposite keeps happening,” he said from the US. “The problem isn’t just about money – it goes much deeper than that. When I retire, what am I supposed to do? God forbid I get injured – what happens to me then?”

“I would take the same decision again and again and I advise Egypt’s international players to focus on their training and acquire their rights because it’s their lives that are being wasted.”

Al Jazeera reached out to the president and the vice president of the Egyptian Wrestling Federation (EWF), as well as the president of the Egyptian National Olympic Committee (ENOC), for their comments, but none of them responded.

However, the EWF’s team psychologist Hossam Mohamed said the disappearance of players abroad is not simply down to poor financial compensation or neglect, insisting the state provides good support to wrestlers – whether through financial bonuses, training camps abroad, or accommodation and meals. He said medal bonuses can reach 5 million Egyptian pounds ($98,135) for an Olympic gold.

“The wrestling federation, compared to major sports federations, has limited resources in light of the absence of broadcasting rights and the commercial and audience revenues enjoyed by football,” he noted.

“[But the] core problem for [athletes] isn’t only what they receive during their playing years, but what awaits them after retirement or injury.”

On Hajjaj and al-Shami, he said they competed in international championships, but “receiving bonuses is tied to achieving results – a player who doesn’t finish in a top position doesn’t receive a tournament bonus”, and neither was able to achieve podium finishes in recent competitions.

Gamal el-Badrawy, a former head of Egypt’s kickboxing federation, called on the Ministry of Youth and Sports to impose tighter oversight of national sporting federations and to review bonuses, allowances and health insurance.

“[Athletes] cannot be entirely absolved of responsibility, but the weak financial and administrative system is the main driver,” he told Al Jazeera.

Prosecutors investigate

Meanwhile, Egypt’s Ministry of Youth and Sports has referred Hajjaj and al-Shami to the public prosecutor, accusing them of breaking the rules governing national delegations.

The ENOC separately referred Brigadier General Ibrahim Adel – EWF secretary-general and head of the wrestling delegation at the tournament in Taranto – to its ethics committee for investigation and suspended him from his duties for allowing al-Shami to escape.

Adel refused to comment on the criticisms against the EWF, but told Al Jazeera he believed the moves against him were unfair, pointing to precautionary measures already in place before the trip: notarised undertakings signed by both the players’ guardians and the players themselves committing them to return to Egypt.

Meanwhile, fleeing athletes often leave behind distressed families.

Hajjaj’s father, Hajjaj Abu Gabal, told Al Jazeera over the phone that he was deeply worried for his son after he left the national team in Slovakia, noting that he had switched off his phone for a long time and did not respond to calls.

“I signed the notarised parental consent required for my underage son to travel,” he said, as 21 is the age of full legal adulthood in Egypt. “But no one from the wrestling federation had contacted me since the escape.”

Hajjaj, according to his father, said wrestling required expenses for food, drink, clothing and other needs, including costs related to the training period and participation in championships, and these expenses were a burden on him and the family.

“Whatever happens, he’s still my son,” the father said.

“I keep praying for him to be safe and secure, and may God compensate him for the difficult times he went through.”

This article was published in collaboration with Egab, a platform that empowers journalists from across the Global South to publish stories in international media outlets.

An Israeli air attack on Kfar Reman in southern Lebanon has killed at least 10 people, including an infant, with at least two others missing.

The attack early on Monday on the town in the Nabatieh district comes a day after at least seven people were killed and 20 others were wounded in Israeli air raids on the nearby town of Arab Salim.

The Israeli military also struck a residential area in the town of Deir al-Zahrani in southern Lebanon overnight after it issued a forced evacuation order. The army says it targeted a building near a Hezbollah facility, which it claims was used to launch an explosive drone.

Attacks continued despite a United States-brokered ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon in June.

Reporting from Kfar Reman on Monday after overnight strikes, Al Jazeera’s Zeina Khodr said “uncertainty and fear” are the prevailing feelings in southern Lebanon. “Among the dead are children, including a two-month-old infant,” she said.

“People just do not know what is next. There’s been a wave of Israeli attacks over the past 48 hours. Civilians are being killed. Residential homes are being destroyed,” she said, adding, “Recovery efforts by civil defence workers are continuing. They’ve been here throughout the night.”

Manila defence chief says Washington gave ‘definite assurances’ that its commitments to the Philippines remain.

Philippine Defence Secretary Gilberto Teodoro has warned that Beijing could view recent cuts to the joint US-South Korea military drills as an opportunity to reassert itself in the Asia Pacific.

Speaking on the sidelines of the Seoul Defense Dialogue, an annual multilateral security forum, Teodoro said that “China is very quick to exploit gaps”, when asked on Monday whether Beijing could seize on the move.

He added that Washington had given Manila “definite assurances” that the US commitments to the Philippines remained unchanged.

He also accused China of exploiting democratic systems to spread “distortive narratives”.

South Korea and the US shortened the duration of their annual joint military drills and scaled back field training exercises last month after US President Donald Trump ordered a “substantial reduction” in the annual war games.

The US-led Ulchi Freedom Shield war games ended six days earlier than originally planned.

Trump cited his “very good relationship” with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and linked the decision to Seoul’s refusal to join the US and Israel’s war on Iran at the time.

Last week, South Korea’s presidential office said it was mulling “contributions” to the US’s freedom of navigation ⁠in the Strait of Hormuz. The presidential office later clarified that nothing has been decided, as any military deployment by South Korea requires a decision by the country’s National Security Council, a resolution at a cabinet meeting, and consent from the National Assembly.

Trump said he planned to meet with Kim later this year. Kim’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, later released a statement denying any ongoing communication between the US president and her brother and maintained that Washington continues to engage in a “hostile” policy towards her country, despite the warm relationship between the two leaders.

US, South Korea and Japan hold trilateral military drills

The US, South Korea and Japan are due to hold five days of military drills in waters east and south of South Korea’s Jeju Island starting on Monday.

South Korea’s military said in a statement that the Freedom Edge exercise is defensive in nature and meant to respond to North Korean nuclear and missile threats as well as promote regional peace and stability.

North Korea has previously slammed the trilateral drill as a “reckless show of strength” that proved its adversaries’ confrontational stance. Pyongyang has also said the drill contained a US intention to lay siege to China and exert pressure on Russia.

Amid the grapevines that once provided a steady income for her family, 56-year-old Palestinian farmer Theeba al-Sabaa spends much of her day guarding her home and farmland in the occupied West Bank from settlers.

From dusk till dawn, she works on her land in the town of Beit Ummar, north of Hebron, known by locals as “Jabal Sabaa”.

Theeba is engaged in a daily battle against the encroaching settler outposts that have emerged among the rolling hills that surround her, and which block access to sections of her land.

“By God, the land has taught me patience, and to cling to my right, for as long as I have a right, I must take it and never let it go,” she told Al Jazeera.

“I will never leave it because I worked hard on it, I toil and sweat on it, so I will not leave my toil and sweat, or the toil of my children and my husband, to go to someone else.”

Weaponising livestock

Since mid-2024, when settlers established new outposts on the nearby hills, every one of Theeba’s moves has been monitored.

Settlers frequently approach the perimeter of her home and deliberately release livestock into the cultivated fields.

“They enter with their sheep into our land after we plow and fix it, grazing in it, trampling the crops, and stomping on them with their sheep, leaving nothing,” Theeba said.

“As soon as they feel any movement or anyone entering the land, you find them attacking us immediately.”

This intimidation extends to the adjacent fields, where 59-year-old Anwar Sabarneh lives with his extended family of seven brothers.

Due to the repeated settler violations, two of his brothers have been forced to abandon their land.

Sabarneh, who supports a family of 14, owns several dunams of vineyards located just 300 metres (980 feet) from his home. With aggressive settlers around, reaching them has become a dangerous ordeal.

Military complicity

Sabarneh said that the Israeli army even demands permits from Palestinians to work on their own land.

“The army came with the settlers to ask me for a permit so I can work in my home, in front of my house’s door, and on my land where I am the rightful owner,” Sabarneh said.

Farmers are also barred from building anything on their land. Sabarneh’s sheep have also been locked in a barn for over eight months due to the dangers posed by settlers.

“If they see me taking the sheep out, the settlers chase me, kidnap them, and steal them,” he said.

When Sabarneh’s children have tried to retrieve their stolen sheep, Israeli soldiers have arrested and beaten them.

A forced exodus

Repeated pogroms by settlers against Palestinian farmers reflect a broader strategy targeting agriculture across the southern West Bank.

Settlers and the Israeli troops carried out 11,074 attacks in the West Bank during the first half of 2026, according to the Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission. This includes 3,488 carried out by settlers.

Hasan Breijieh, a settlement affairs expert and director at the commission, told Al Jazeera that continuous settlement expansionism, alongside restrictions on Palestinian movement, are the primary reasons that so many Palestinians have been forced to flee their farms.

“Military gates erected at the entrances of Palestinian communities have tightened control over…  access to their orchards and vineyards,” he said.

Bypass roads, built by Israel, have also hindered “connectivity between Palestinian communities”, Breijieh said.

Under such restrictions, Palestinian farmers have faced a fourth consecutive season without being able to harvest olives, grapes, or guava. Their lands have been “neither plowed nor pruned”, and have been forcibly abandoned.

In the face of such oppression, Palestinian women like Theeba al-Sabaa have continued to play a pivotal role in protecting their land, particularly when men have been killed or detained by Israeli forces.

“They continue to maintain their leadership role in preserving the family’s agricultural legacy today,” Breijieh said. “This land was historically the primary source of livelihood for families, and a Palestinian cannot leave it voluntarily, no matter the sacrifices.”

He recalled his own grandfather, who went to his fields to bid farewell before dying. “Goodbye, vineyard,” he said to his land.

Israeli PM says money he facilitated Qatar in sending to Gaza was recommended by Israeli security agencies for humanitarian purposes.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has boasted about bombing Qatar, while dismissing domestic accusations that funds sent to Gaza were used for anything other than aid.

In an interview with Israel’s i24NEWS that he shared on social media on Saturday, Netanyahu said Qatar was a “hostile” state that did not dictate Israeli policy during its genocidal war on Gaza.

“I attacked Qatar, I also bombed it and attacked them during the war, and they attacked me,” Netanyahu boasted.

The interview comes just days before the one-year anniversary of Israel’s September 9, 2025, strike on Doha. The bombing killed five Hamas members and a Qatari security officer during a meeting to discuss the United States-backed Gaza ceasefire proposal.

Qatar, which has long served as a mediator in Middle East conflicts and beyond, has hosted Hamas’s political office since 2012, after what it says were requests from the US.

Doha condemned the strike as a “blatant violation of all international laws and norms”, with Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Majed al-Ansari calling it a “cowardly” assault.

Several countries in the region, including Iran and Pakistan, also condemned the attack, with leaders from Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia visiting Qatar shortly afterwards in a show of solidarity.

United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres called the strikes a “flagrant violation” of Qatar’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

During a meeting later that month at the White House, Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump called Qatar’s Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani to apologise for the strike.

During the i24NEWS interview, Netanyahu also defended the transfer of millions of dollars in Qatari funds to Gaza that Israel had facilitated, saying the funds were intended for humanitarian purposes and had been transferred on the recommendation of Israeli security agencies Mossad and Shin Bet.

“All this money is worth 2 percent – 2 percent of all the money that entered the Strip,” the prime minister said.

Some of Netanyahu’s detractors have alleged that the funds were used to help Hamas prepare its October 7, 2023, attack on Israel, which precipitated its genocidal war on Gaza.

Qatar denies such allegations, saying any claims that it funds Hamas are unfounded and pointing to the strict oversight governing its aid transfers.

“Today, when they [Israel] are claiming that this is the financing of Qatar to Hamas, it has no basis,” Sheikh Mohammed said during last year’s Doha Forum.

“All our aid … went to Gaza, went to the people, and was under a very transparent process that the United States is fully aware about.”

Netanyahu made the remarks weeks before Israelis head to the polls on October 27, in the country’s first general election since its war on Gaza began in 2023.

With the October vote approaching, Netanyahu faces mounting pressure at home over his government’s handling of the Gaza war, the economy and the war with Iran — all shaping up as central issues in the campaign.

Critics and analysts have long accused Netanyahu of stoking tensions with foreign states ahead of elections to rally nationalist support.

At the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Bishkek this week, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian received precisely the kind of political support he had hoped for. The SCO condemned the military attacks against Iran, described them as violations of international law and the UN Charter, reaffirmed Iranian sovereignty and territorial integrity, and called for the conflict to be resolved through political and diplomatic means.

But the organisation did not offer to defend Iran. That distinction between political solidarity and collective defence is important. It tells us something not only about the Iranian experience with the SCO, but about the international order that is emerging around it.

For years, discussions about multipolarity have often suggested that the US-led international system would gradually be challenged by an alternative bloc centred around China, Russia and organisations such as BRICS and the SCO. From the perspective of middle powers, joining both institutions seemed to fit neatly into this transformation. Integration into non-Western organisations was supposed to make them less vulnerable to Western isolation and pressure.

The US-Israeli war on Iran has made clear that none of these alternative relationships can produce a security guarantee comparable to those provided by formal military alliances. The lesson is not that multipolarity has failed middle powers. It is that the emerging multipolar order may work differently from what many expected.

Rather than replacing one alliance system with another, it is producing an increasingly dense network of overlapping partnerships in which states gain diplomatic and economic options without necessarily acquiring new security guarantees.

For middle powers, this may be one of the defining characteristics of the emerging order: more room for manoeuvre, but less certainty about who will stand beside them when their security is threatened.

Turkiye provides a particularly revealing example. It has been a member of NATO for more than seven decades and remains embedded in the Western security architecture. Yet Ankara has increasingly demonstrated that alliance membership does not require automatic political alignment with Washington. Turkiye has maintained relations with Russia despite the war in Ukraine, expanded its engagement with China and participated in the SCO as a dialogue partner. At the same time, its differences with the US and Israel over the future regional order in the Middle East have become increasingly visible.

This does not mean Turkiye is abandoning NATO or moving into a Chinese- or Russian-led bloc. Quite the opposite. Ankara’s strategy depends precisely on avoiding such a binary choice. Its NATO membership provides security benefits that the SCO could not replicate. Its relationships with Russia, China, Iran, the Gulf states and other regional actors, meanwhile, expand its diplomatic and economic options.

Brazil represents another good example. Unlike Turkiye, Brazil is not bound to the US through a formal military alliance. But it has traditionally operated within a US-dominated hemisphere where Washington has expected considerable political alignment from regional governments.

Brazil’s refusal to join the US-led Americas Counter-Cartel Coalition (ACCC), together with its positions on the Iran war and other recent international crises, reflects its reluctance to accept that regional proximity should translate into automatic strategic alignment.

Yet Brazil is not simply switching sides. Its participation in BRICS, its extensive economic relationship with China and its calls for reform of the international system coexist with important political and economic relations with the US and Europe. Brasília’s objective is not to exchange dependence on Washington for dependence on Beijing, but to preserve the ability to cooperate with both, and disagree with either.

This may be one of the most consequential opportunities that multipolarity offers middle powers. The rise of alternative centres of economic and political influence reduces the cost of saying no. For decades, weaker states often confronted a difficult choice when facing pressure from a dominant power: comply, resist and risk isolation, or seek protection from a rival bloc.

The proliferation of partners and institutions complicates that calculation. A government that disagrees with Washington may deepen relations with Beijing without becoming a Chinese ally. A state dependent on China economically may strengthen security ties with the US without fully aligning with Washington. Membership in BRICS does not prevent cooperation with Western institutions, just as membership in a US-led security framework does not necessarily preclude engagement with China or Russia.

India has made this logic almost an organising principle of its foreign policy. New Delhi participates in the Quad with the US, Japan and Australia while simultaneously belonging to both BRICS and the SCO. At Bishkek, India supported the SCO declaration defending Iranian sovereignty while Prime Minister Narendra Modi also stressed to Pezeshkian the importance of preserving freedom of navigation and commerce through the Strait of Hormuz.

The Gulf Cooperation Council member states are pursuing their own version of this diversification. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, for example, continue to depend heavily on their relationships with the US for security, while simultaneously expanding economic and diplomatic ties with China, India and other Asian powers and participating in new regional and international arrangements.

None appears eager to replace Washington with Beijing. They want relationships with both. This suggests that the most significant consequence of multipolarity for middle and smaller powers may not be the emergence of a new bloc to which they can attach themselves. It may be the declining necessity of attaching themselves exclusively to any bloc at all.

But greater autonomy comes with a cost. The same flexible arrangements that allow states to avoid choosing sides also provide fewer guarantees when crises become existential. BRICS does not have an Article 5. Neither does the SCO, which explicitly defines itself as a non-military organisation.

Strategic partnerships can provide weapons, investment, diplomatic backing and political support without obligating partners to go to war for one another.

The emerging international system is therefore unlikely to resemble a simple transition from a US-led order to a Chinese-led one, or even a confrontation between two clearly defined blocs. The older alliance system is not disappearing.

NATO remains central to European and Turkish security, while US security relationships remain indispensable across much of Asia and the Gulf. What is emerging alongside it is another layer, a more fluid landscape of overlapping institutions, selective partnerships and transactional relationships.

Multipolarity, in other words, may not require states to choose a new camp. That gives middle and smaller powers greater agency. But it also places greater responsibility for their own security upon them. The world they are entering may offer more partners, more bargaining power and more freedom to say no. What it may offer less frequently is certainty about who will say yes when they ask for protection.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.