Both the US and Iran have recently signaled progress on efforts to reach a deal to end their conflict, though their accounts of its terms differ on some issues across respective media narratives, Anadolu reports.
US President Donald Trump on Saturday said an agreement with Iran to end the war was “largely negotiated” and awaited finalization.
On Sunday morning, Iran’s semi-official Tasnim news agency also published a report on the details of a potential agreement. However, certain aspects of what has been agreed seem to diverge.
Here is a comparison of the US and Iranian versions of the deal by key issues.
Strait of Hormuz
Citing a US official, Axios said the deal that Washington and Tehran are close to signing would extend a ceasefire by 60 days, during which the Strait of Hormuz would be reopened.
During the 60-day period, the Strait of Hormuz would be opened without any tolls, and Iran would remove the mines it has placed there to ensure unrestricted maritime passage.
In return, Washington would lift its blockade on Iranian ports, added the report.
The New York Times also said it was informed by three senior Iranian officials that Tehran had agreed to a memorandum of understanding to halt fighting and reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio also said on Sunday that the agreement could, if successful, result in a “completely open” Strait of Hormuz, with no tolls or restrictions on passage.
“They don’t own it. It’s an international waterway,” Rubio told reporters of the strait, in remarks that came during his visit to India.
A report by Iran’s semi-official news agency Tasnim, however, said that the Strait of Hormuz will not fully return to its pre-war status if the agreement is reached.
Instead, the number of ships allowed to pass would be restored to pre-war levels within 30 days, the outlet added.
Tehran also demands an end to the US blockade on its ports, arguing that no changes will be made in the strait if the blockade remains in place.
For its part, the US argues that the quicker Iran removes the mines and allows shipping to resume, the sooner the blockade will be lifted.
Sanctions relief and release of frozen Iranian assets
Iran was seeking the immediate unfreezing of funds and a permanent lifting of sanctions, but the US position indicates these measures would only be granted after Iran made concrete concessions, according to the Axios report.
As part of the proposed 60-day agreement, the US is offering temporary sanctions waivers that would allow Iran to sell its oil freely. These waivers are explicitly linked to Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz, removing mines, and ending restrictions on maritime traffic. Once these steps are taken, Washington would also lift its naval blockade on Iranian ports.
Tehran, however, says no agreement will be reached unless at least a portion of the frozen Iranian assets is released immediately. Iranian media confirmed the discussion of temporary oil sanctions waivers in the latest US proposal but insisted on broader and more permanent sanctions relief.
Nuclear file
The Axios report said the draft deal includes commitments from Iran not to pursue nuclear weapons, along with provisions to negotiate a suspension of uranium enrichment and the removal of its stockpile of highly enriched uranium.
The Iranian media reports, however, indicate that Tehran has not yet accepted anything on its nuclear program.
A potential deal would involve a 60-day negotiation window on Iran’s nuclear program, according to Tasnim.
Extent of ceasefire
Both US and Iranian media reports suggest that the cessation of hostilities would mean a halt to fighting on all fronts, including Lebanon.
This was also highlighted by Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei on Saturday, when he said Tehran was prioritizing an end to hostilities across all fronts, including Lebanon.
Context
Regional tensions have escalated since the US and Israel launched strikes against Iran in February. Tehran retaliated with strikes targeting Israel, as well as US allies in the Gulf, along with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
A ceasefire took effect on April 8 through Pakistani mediation and was later extended by Trump indefinitely. Washington and Tehran also held rare direct talks in the Pakistani capital Islamabad on April 11-12, but have failed to reach an agreement.
Trump’s Saturday remarks came after Pakistani army chief Asim Munir’s visit to Tehran. The visit was the second of its kind in recent weeks, as Munir is directly involved in Islamabad’s mediation efforts.
Wall Street closed the week higher as easing Middle East tensions, softer-than-expected inflation data, and strong corporate earnings boosted investor sentiment.
Investor sentiment improved after President Donald Trump said a framework to end the conflict with Iran and restore shipping
At least 14 people were killed and several others wounded in Israeli airstrikes in southern Lebanon on Sunday amid continued violations of an ongoing ceasefire, Anadolu reports.
The Lebanese Health Ministry said 11 people were killed and nine others injured in an Israeli strike on the town of Seir al-Gharbiyeh in Nabatieh province in southern Lebanon.
A fighter jet struck the town of Bazouriyeh in the Tyre district, killing one person and injuring two others, the state news agency NNA reported.
An Israeli drone strike also killed a young man in the town of Arabsalim in Nabatieh district, the outlet said.
A house was also hit in an Israeli strike in the town of Toura in Tyre, killing a woman and injuring two people.
The Israeli attacks came despite a US-mediated ceasefire that is supposed to remain in effect until early July.
More than 3,100 people have been killed, over 9,500 injured, and 1.6 million displaced by Israeli bombardment in Lebanon since March 2 amid cross-border attacks with Hezbollah, according to Lebanese officials.
The US and Iran have agreed in principle to a deal that would reopen the Strait of Hormuz, in exchange for Tehran’s commitment to dispose of its highly enriched uranium, a US official said, according to a report by The New York Times on Sunday.
The official said that the agreement has not yet been signed and remains subject to final approval by US President Donald Trump and Iran’s Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, a process that could take several days, noting that the method for disposing of Iran’s highly enriched uranium is still being negotiated.
The proposed deal does not address Iran’s missile stockpile nor include a moratorium on uranium enrichment, the official said, adding that these issues are expected to be handled in future rounds of talks.
According to a Fox News report on Sunday, the official suggested that the US could consider “significant accommodations” on sanctions relief if Iran agrees to make similar concessions regarding its enriched uranium stockpile.
“Our plan is to deal with all of their stockpile of the enriched material,” the official said, adding that Washington sees Tehran making “serious accommodations” not previously seen in earlier negotiations, according to the report.
The official also rejected the idea of any “tolling” mechanism for the Strait of Hormuz, saying such an arrangement would not be acceptable and had not been proposed by either side, the report noted.
According to a separate CBS News report, the official said the administration views the emerging agreement as stronger than the 2015 nuclear deal reached under former US President Barack Obama, which allowed uranium enrichment up to certain levels.
As part of the agreement, the US would lift its blockade on vessels entering and leaving Iranian ports. The official said the US Central Command and Gulf partners would coordinate to ensure safe passage, stressing this should not be viewed as a toll system.
The official also said US Vice President JD Vance, Middle East Envoy Steve Witkoff, and Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner have been involved in the talks, adding that Washington is seeking to include all regional allies in the process, the report added.
Five Palestinians, including three members of the same family, were killed and five others injured in fresh Israeli attacks in the Gaza Strip on Sunday amid daily violations of an ongoing ceasefire, medical sources said.
One of the Palestinians was killed by Israeli gunfire in the center of Jabalia refugee camp in northern Gaza and his body was transferred to Al-Shifa Hospital in western Gaza City, the sources told Anadolu.
A couple and their child were also killed, and three others were wounded in an Israeli airstrike that targeted their home in the Nuseirat refugee camp in central Gaza, the sources added.
In a separate incident, the sources said a child died from injuries sustained in an Israeli strike that targeted a police headquarters in northwestern Gaza on Saturday.
In northern Gaza, a Palestinian fisherman was moderately injured after Israeli naval forces fired shells and machine-gun fire at fishing boats off the coast of Gaza City, according to the sources.
Another Palestinian was injured by shrapnel from a shell fired by Israeli forces on the beach in the Al-Sudaniya area, northwest of the enclave.
In a related development, the Israeli army carried out demolition operations targeting buildings and facilities in northern Gaza. Local sources reported hearing a large explosion resulting from the demolitions.
In Khan Younis in southern Gaza, Israeli forces also carried out similar demolition operations east of the city, accompanied by gunfire and artillery shelling near Bani Suheila roundabout, according to the local sources.
According to Gaza’s Health Ministry, over 880 people have been killed and more than 2,645 others injured in Israeli attacks since the ceasefire was announced on Oct. 10, 2025.
The agreement was meant to halt Israel’s two-year war that killed more than 72,000 people, most of them women and children, injured over 172,000 since October 2023, and caused massive destruction affecting 90% of civilian infrastructure.
Iran is ready to reassure the international community that it is not pursuing nuclear weapons or instability in the region, President Masoud Pezeshkian said on Sunday, Anadolu reports.
“Prior to the martyrdom of Ayatollah (Ali) Khamenei, Iran’s late Leader, we declared — and we reiterate now — that we are ready to assure the world we do not seek nuclear weapons,” Pezeshkian said in remarks carried by state-run news agency IRNA.
“It is rather Tel Aviv that is driving regional instability,” he said, accusing Israel of pursuing a vision of “Greater Israel.”
Iranian negotiators will never compromise on the country’s “honor and dignity,” added Pezeshkian.
His remarks came a day after US President Donald Trump on Saturday said an agreement with Iran to end the war was “largely negotiated” and awaited finalization.
Regional tensions have escalated since the US and Israel launched strikes against Iran in February. Tehran retaliated with strikes targeting Israel as well as US allies in the Gulf, along with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
A ceasefire took effect on April 8 through Pakistani mediation and was later extended by Trump indefinitely.
US President Donald Trump said Sunday that negotiations with Iran are “orderly and constructive” and vowed the blockade will remain in place until a final agreement is reached, Anadolu reports.
“The Blockade will remain in full force and effect until an agreement is reached, certified, and signed. Both sides must take their time and get it right. There can be no mistakes!,” Trump said in a post on his social media platform Truth Social.
He also said US-Iran relations are becoming “much more professional and productive,” while warning that Tehran must not develop or acquire a nuclear weapon.
Trump further thanked Middle Eastern countries for their “support and cooperation,” saying engagement would be strengthened through broader participation in the Abraham Accords, and suggested Iran could one day join the framework.
He criticized the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, calling it “one of the worst agreements ever made,” and again blamed former President Barack Obama’s administration for what he described as a flawed agreement that opened a path toward nuclear weapons development.
Trump said the current negotiations with Iran are “far better” and part of a more effective approach, insisting the ongoing process will prevent Tehran from obtaining nuclear arms.
The eruption of the Middle East war in 2026, which began with strikes led by the US and Israel against Iran under Operation Epic Fury, carries devastating consequences for recovery, development and regional stability. The assassination of senior Iranian figures, most notably Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the involvement of Hezbollah and Houthis in support of Iran, alongside Iranian attacks on neighbouring countries, further escalated the crisis. The war transformed from a military confrontation into a broader regional political, diplomatic and economic crisis.
While global attention focused on military escalation, oil markets and the Strait of Hormuz, far less attention was given to the war’s humanitarian consequences, despite the massive and irreversible impacts. The conflict has triggered new waves of displacement across an already fragile region. However, there were no meaningful strategies to protect or to facilitate aid efforts to sustain the lives of displaced people, further exacerbating the life-threatening risks facing affected populations.
The displaced of the 2026 Middle East war
The Middle East was already carrying one of the world’s largest displacement burdens before this escalation, mainly due to the Syrian, Palestinian, Afghan and Iraqi refugees and internally displaced populations. The recent war has deepened these vulnerabilities by displacing millions more across Iran and Lebanon. The speed and scale of displacement reflect the severity of the humanitarian crisis unfolding in the region, overwhelming already strained humanitarian response efforts.
In Iran, the war intensified existing economic fragility and internal tensions while placing enormous pressure on state institutions not only to govern but also to effectively respond to the displacement crisis, a critical condition to maintain stability and prevent further chaos.
The displacement of over 3.2 million people has posed a serious challenge for the Iranian authorities. It has affected over 20 provinces, while the damage of 82,000 civilian infrastructure sites, disrupted essential services and attacks on healthcare have severely undermined the living conditions of displaced people.
Although figures fail to precisely capture the devastating realities experienced by displaced populations, they reflect the scale of vulnerability facing civilians forced to flee amid insufficient aid efforts and collapse of health, shelter and education systems.
Lebanon presents an even more fragile case, already affected by protracted conflict, sectarianism, the Beirut Port explosion and economic paralysis. While it was already hosting 1.4 million Syrian refugees and around 250,000 Palestinian refugees, the war has now led to the internal displacement of 1.3 million Lebanese civilians—one in five of the total population— with children accounting for a third of those displaced. The large-scale and ongoing displacement in the country has generated enormous needs, detrimentally affecting various areas of civilian life. While over 3,000 have been killed and more than 9,000 injured, around 130,000 people remain displaced in collective shelters, experiencing extremely difficult conditions. The plight of displaced populations in Lebanon is worsened by ongoing attacks on healthcare, lack of services and the destruction of the housing sector, in addition to limited access to education, where hundreds of schools are either closed or used as collective shelters.
Humanitarianism subordinated to hard politics
Efforts have been made to address the needs of displaced communities. These include government-led actions in Iran to, for example, address psychosocial and shelter needs and the work of local organisations and international agencies in Lebanon. Yet such efforts remain far from adequate, mainly due to the absence of serious international political will to prioritise civilian protection and displacement prevention.
Instead, regional and international actors continue to prioritise deterrence, strategic alliances, military positioning and regional influence over humanitarian protection. By the end of April, the Pentagon had reportedly spent $25bn on its war on Iran, with other estimates showing greater costs—ranging between $630bn and $1 trillion—amid US President Donald Trump’s request for an additional $1.5 trillion for defence. This is evident in how the US paused a $14bn arms sale to Taiwan to ensure its military readiness to face Iran. Iran’s resilience against these attacks and the use of drones—costing tens of thousands of euros—have pushed the US to dedicate more resources to the war. The use of financial means from both sides solely for war objectives while overlooking the humanitarian responsibilities exposes the extent to which military objectives have been prioritised over humanitarian response.
Even ongoing diplomatic efforts between Washington and Tehran reveal the extent to which humanitarian concerns remain secondary and completely neglected. The peace negotiations have largely focused on issues related to hard politics. These include Iran’s nuclear programme, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s frozen assets under US sanctions, with all these elements mainly addressing the security, financial and economic implications of the war.
The absence of the displacement crisis from peace agreements and negotiations reveals the deficiencies posed by the international human rights and humanitarian regimes. They underscore a reality where human lives continue to be shaped not by principles of protection, but by the strategic interests of powerful states.
This transformed the plight of affected populations in Iran and Lebanon from a humanitarian concern into a tolerated byproduct of geopolitical strategy.
Implications for future generations: The way forward
The humanitarian consequences of this war will not end when the war ends. Long-term displacement carries profound risks for future generations in Iran and Lebanon through collapsing health systems, interrupted education, intensifying social fragmentation and deepening poverty and dependency on international aid. Thus, the failure to protect displaced populations today risks producing future instability across the region. Addressing this requires tailored humanitarian interventions, international responsibility—especially from the US and Iran as the primary conflicting states—towards affected populations and the adoption of prevention strategies in future wars.
The international community, conflicting parties and international organisations must take practical yet realistic—acknowledging the centrality of self-interest during wars between states—steps towards addressing this issue. Without international responsibility sharing and collaborative efforts, the already-fragile international humanitarian system fails to continue functioning as the primary response mechanism, especially amid the growing humanitarian funding cuts due to the occurrence of other “national priorities”. Therefore, the US and Iran, alongside the international community, must dedicate resources to lead a comprehensive emergency response to alleviate the impacts of war on affected communities. This has to begin with protection-centred diplomacy, where the plight of displaced populations is prioritised among other key areas in the peace agreements.
Equally important is the stricter implementation of international legal frameworks to protect civilian populations during armed conflicts through accountability measures for violations against civilians. The role of international organisations and UN agencies is decisive in these matters, given their expertise and international positionality—though shrinking—when it comes to humanitarian missions and peacekeeping. Such efforts must revolve around promoting, integrating and imposing the adoption of humanitarian safeguarding standards for civilians in military and political decision-making. If displacement continues to be treated as collateral damage rather than political responsibility, the Middle East will keep producing generations of displaced people, serving the interests of regional and global powers.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.
The war that Donald Trump declared won last month looks rather different from the inside of the Pentagon. The resulting stalemate has drained American military stockpiles, emboldened Iranian commanders, and left the US with far worse options than before the conflict began.
The administration’s triumphalist framing has struck a jarring note among those who have spent careers studying the Iranian military and the limits of American power projection. Declaring victory when the enemy is still standing, still armed, and still controlling the waterway you went to war over is not a strategy. It is a wish dressed up as a press release.
At the heart of the impasse are two demands that Tehran has consistently and categorically rejected. Iran will not surrender what it regards as its sovereign right to develop its uranium program, and it will not yield control of the Strait of Hormuz. Those two positions were Iran’s red lines before the fighting started. They remain Iran’s red lines now. Nothing in between has changed.
What has changed is the arithmetic of munitions. The United States entered this conflict with a military built around expensive, technologically sophisticated weapons systems, precision instruments that take years to design, years more to manufacture, and that have now been expended at a rate the American defense industrial base is poorly positioned to replenish. Iran, by contrast, relies on a dispersed network of robotic small boats, undersea mines, tactical ballistic missiles, and unmanned systems. These weapons are cheap, simple, and easy to produce at scale.
The United States essentially deployed a Ferrari into a demolition derby. The Iranians didn’t need high-end technology; they just needed a relentless volume of cheaper assets to overwhelm the defense.
Trump, for his part, has shown no appetite for nuance. “We have totally obliterated their military capacity, there’s nothing left, believe me, nothing,” he told supporters at a rally in Georgia. Pentagon planners reviewing the same battlefield data have reached a rather different conclusion.
The American strikes produced mixed results. Iran does not maintain a conventional naval fleet or a modern air force in the Western sense. Its control of the strait rests not on destroyers or fighter wings but on a distributed, resilient system of asymmetric capabilities. The Iranian systems that dispersed into the terrain absorbed the strikes and began reconstituting almost immediately. Defense analysts point out that the Iranians have adapted from what they observed, replenished their stocks, and may now be better positioned than when the conflict began.
The strategic picture is further complicated by the political pressures that shaped the original decision to go to war. Analysts describe a decision driven less by tactical opportunity than by commitments made to Israeli leadership and to influential pro-Israel donors whose support was central to Trump’s political coalition. The result was a military campaign calibrated to political timetables rather than operational logic.
Senator Tim Kaine of Virginia, a member of the Armed Services Committee, called the conduct of the conflict “a case study in how not to use military force.” Representative Thomas Massie of Kentucky, before his defeat in his primary, was more pointed: “We went in without a declaration of war, without a clear objective, without an exit strategy, and now we’re supposed to celebrate because we used up half our missile inventory and the Iranians are still there.”
The regional picture adds further complexity. Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf monarchies are acutely aware of their own exposure. A major Iranian strike on above-ground oil and desalination plants could critically impede the GCC’s government’s ability to maintain economic prosperity. The GCC states have no appetite for an escalation that leaves their vital water infrastructure in ruins. While they favor the containment of Iran, preventing a regional war is a matter of sheer survival.
The broader strategic damage extends well beyond the Gulf.
The conflict has exposed, with uncomfortable clarity, the brittleness of an American military model that prioritized theoretical sophistication over the practical demands of sustained combat. The long-overlooked vulnerability of the missile supply chain has now emerged as the primary constraint on future American options. Restoring that capacity, according to officials, will require years of industrial retooling.
Washington has come to realize that Iran acutely recognized US vulnerabilities, designing asymmetric systems specifically to deplete America’s most expensive capabilities with its cheapest assets. This is not a temporary setback; it is a structural crisis.
For now, President Trump appears caught between the political cost of acknowledging stalemate and the military risk of a second round of strikes that the Pentagon itself doubts would achieve different results. The operational pause is not a logistical necessity. The forces are forward-deployed and ready. The pause is a search for a rationale, a way to resume the fight that does not require the White House to explain why the first attempt failed.
By most accounts, the search has not yet succeeded.
The Middle East has been a difficult region to deal with in oil markets. When it comes to energy geographies, the region has proven to be a disproportionately significant part of the world’s energy resources, with export facilities traversing a handful of maritime routes and political situations that have been tense, if not outright volatile, at times. The change in 2025 and into 2026 isn’t the nature of the forces but rather the confluence of overlapping pressures: ongoing sanctions enforcement, multiple theaters of conflict, OPEC+ tensions that are more public than ever in previous years, and disruptions to shipping in the Red Sea, which now seem to have become a semi-permanent part of the shipping route landscape.
There is no background information for commodity traders, market analysts, and energy investors. It’s a real-time, constantly evolving dynamic that can make all the difference in the day-to-day performance of prices, and it’s particularly important when prices are sliding around rapidly, and the stories behind them are changing just as fast.
The Behavior of Prices and the Risk of Middle East Supplies
The area is responsible for about one-third of the world’s crude production. That should make it significant in and of itself. What makes matters worse is that export infrastructure is concentrated in a handful of terminals, pipelines, and maritime corridors where a disproportionately large share of oil is exported. The disruption of any of them (even for a moment) reduces a large supply signal to an extremely short time frame.
Traders who follow crude oil price live data are the first ones to witness this. Real-time feeds are a reflection of more than just the fundamental supply-demand elements, but the market’s real-time assessment of the value of geopolitical risk and how much it “should” be worth at any given moment. A news event, which is a minor detail in a more stable environment, can cause future prices to move $5 or more in less than an hour. The consistent and tough question – and it is a tough one – is, which events actually have physical supply implications and which ones are sentiment-driven moves that die in a session or two?
The Strait of Hormuz
About 20-21 million barrels per day of crude oil and petroleum products go through the Strait of Hormuz, which is about 20% of the world’s oil consumption. No readily available bypasses can be found that can absorb that flow at a similar cost. There are partial alternatives, including the IPSA pipeline and Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline, but they would not even come close to filling the deficit should the Hormuz be closed en masse.
It is a strait between Oman and Iran. Geography makes it so that any serious disruption in U.S.-Iran relations or of security conditions in the Gulf in general puts Hormuz back on the market’s agenda. Traders are all familiar with this: when there is a lot of Iranian tension, the futures positioning will always reflect the chokepoint risk, even if there is no incident per se.
Production Outages That Don’t Make the Front Page
The issue of the supply is something that generally doesn’t get the same kind of attention it should get, but the clearest example of this recurring issue is Libya. In recent years, internal political squabbles about how to divide up oil revenues have led to several production shutdowns that have temporarily increased the tightness of the light sweet crude grades refined by European and Asian plants. The disruptions are likely to persist when there is no political agreement, and the pattern is robust. In recent years, Iraq’s export pipeline to the North through Turkey has also been down for extended periods of time. These relatively inconspicuous disruptions can add up and impact medium-term supply dynamics, though not necessarily have the same impact as a more conspicuous incident.
Key Risk Factors Shaping Market Sentiment in 2026
The Middle East is a geopolitical risk that has many variables. It’s a combination of interwoven pressures that work in various ways and to varying effects on the length of the price impact. The issues that currently have the greatest attention of serious analysts are generally of three types:
Export infrastructure and production infrastructure are currently under physical threat to production.
Sanctions regimes and the dynamics of their enforcement.
Disruption of shipping routes and attendant disruption of the trade economics.
Everything is unique, and sometimes they are not in the same direction at the same time. That’s part of what makes the current situation more complicated than any one risk headline implies.
Active Conflict Zones and Exposure to Infrastructure
The latest example of large-scale infrastructure targeting is the 2019 attack on Saudi Aramco’s Abqaiq and Khurais facilities in the country, which was carried out using drones and missiles. The loss in output occurred temporarily, amounting to about 5.7 million bpd, the largest sudden supply shock in modern oil market history. The recovery was quicker than many expected, partly because of the operational robustness of Aramco and partly because the situation was swiftly contained diplomatically. But the event has permanently changed the way markets view the vulnerability of infrastructure in the Gulf, and that repricing has not been complete.
The Persistent Iranian Supply Question
Iran’s petroleum sales have also been sustained in the face of sanctions, largely via Asian markets out of reach to Western sanctions. A full-fledged deal between Tehran and Western governments has yet to be hammered out, as of early 2026. That has left volumes of Iranian supply in a limbo of sorts: they could be rapidly reduced by stepped-up enforcement, and they could be dramatically increased by a change in diplomatic circumstances. Both of these results can have significant price consequences, and even the uncertainty can be a factor in the market without a clear decision.
Infrastructure Concentration Risk
The concentration levels in Saudi Arabia’s export system warrant a more significant focus than is generally found outside of export specialist circles. Abqaiq processes and stabilizes a huge percentage of Saudi crude before it is shipped to export terminals, removing the sulfur from it. That kind of ‘single point of failure’ is not typical in most industrial supply chains. In the case of oil, it’s a structural aspect of the market and one that has been proven, not just thought.
OPEC+ Internal Dynamics
However, OPEC+ compliance has been quite lackluster at times, notably from Iraq and Kazakhstan, which have had a history of overproduction. This gives rise to an everlasting discrepancy between OPEC+ declarations and the actual supply data. For analysts, the bottom line is that it is important not to take production decisions at face value but to also consider the track record of implementation once a deal has been agreed on to see what the real supply impact was.
Non-State Actor Activity and Shipping Friction
Since late 2023, the Houthis have started to attack commercial shipping vessels in the Red Sea more frequently, and these attacks have persisted through 2025. What those disruptions drove home is that it’s not necessary to blow a wellhead to impact oil market economics. A round-the-Cape voyage will increase the time in transit by about ten to fourteen days, as well as the fuel costs. During periods of increased Houthi activity, insurance costs for tankers traveling in the Gulf area skyrocketed. Both impacts are not a direct factor in the crude benchmarks, but both impact the effective landed cost of Middle East barrels in destination markets.
How the Market Prices Geopolitical Risk
Knowing the difference is important, as geopolitical events do not affect oil prices in a single manner. Some effects are immediate and visible: a surge in the price of Brent futures within minutes of an incident report. Others come more slowly, via changes in freight rates, changes in the repricing of insurance, and changes in buyer behavior, which may take days or weeks to be reflected in trade flow data. The rate of these impacts varies, and so do their effects.
Then there is the issue of what the market “already” had in place whether there was an event or not. When there is a constant regional tension, there is usually some risk premium in prices. The incremental market move may therefore be less than anticipated when an event then reinforces concerns, the surprise element of the event, which is typically the one that produces the biggest market moves, is already discounted.
Risk Premium in Practice
Geopolitical risk premiums in times of heightened Middle East tension have varied from around $4 to $10 per barrel, depending on the market participants’ views on the probability of actual physical supply disruptions in the case of Brent crude, according to S&P Global Commodity Insights. That’s a fairly broad window for economic trading, and it has a tendency to close up very fast when the tension subsides and without a supply event, which is the more common scenario.
The geopolitical risk premium factors analysts may consider are:
The nearness to active conflict, producing fields, or the working export terminals.
Production capacity that would be available to make up for the loss of production elsewhere.
The availability and magnitude of the IEA’s strategic stockpiles to be tapped.
Current tanker market conditions and the viability of an alternative route.
Diplomatic messages sent by governments in the area, including the United States and other great powers
Past examples of similar events, which have had identifiable supply impacts.
It is not easy to give exact weights to these inputs. Part of the reason for the price action to seemingly be different with comparable geopolitical events can be due to different analysts forming different conclusions from the same events.
Historical Supply Disruptions and Price Responses
The following table shows some of the more significant supply events that took place in the Middle East and the approximate market impact. The trend of most entries was that the first price movement has been greater than the actual physical supply effect, at times much greater, and then it has partially retraced to a more stable situation.
Event
Year
Estimated Supply Impact
Approximate Brent Price Reaction
Abqaiq/Khurais Attacks (Saudi Arabia)
2019
~5.7 mb/d temporary loss
~15% intraday spike
Libyan Civil War Output Collapse
2011
~1.4 mb/d reduction
~$20/bbl over several weeks
U.S. Re-imposition of Iran Sanctions
2018
~1-1.5 mb/d reduction
~15% sustained over several months
Iraq-Northern Field Disruptions
2014
Partial northern output loss
~$10/bbl elevated premium
Houthi Red Sea Disruptions
2023-24
Rerouting; limited direct supply loss
Moderate – primarily freight cost impact
Iran Sanctions + Red Sea Friction
2025-26
~0.8-1.2 mb/d constrained Iranian output
Persistent $4-8/bbl risk premium in Brent
The 2025-2026 entry is a more diffuse form of market pressure than those acute events listed above. It is not one particular incident, but rather sanctions enforcement and Iranian volumes kept low and shipping activity in the Red Sea continuing to cause friction in the transport system, which has kept transport costs elevated. The World Economic Outlook from the IMF pointed out that this type of persistent supply constraint is likely to have a longer-lasting impact on medium-term price expectations than acute supply shocks, which markets have historically been able to absorb and turn around in relatively short periods of time. Thus, a slow-burning risk premium can be more ‘sticky’ than a dramatic risk premium.
Broader Market Implications
Crude oil benchmarks are not the only place where supply risk from the Middle East exists. It extends out to related markets in ways that are not always apparent when the world’s focus is on the Brent or WTI headline price.
The second-order victim is likely to be refined product markets. In times of crude supply shortages or increased uncertainty, refinery margins and regional product availability may be affected to a greater extent, and the effects on end consumers may be magnified, especially in regions where there is little local refining or a high concentration of import logistics. The energy crisis of 2022 in Europe was a prime example of how the upstream pressure to supply energy flows through the downstream more quickly than most market players would have thought.
Other segments of the market that are impacted by increased supply risks in the Middle East are:
Tanker freight rates, which can also rise sharply without reference to crude prices during times of major-scale rerouting.
In oil-dependent economies, currency markets can be affected by changes in the prices of the oil that the state supplies, which change expectations of fiscal revenue and sovereign credit risk.
LNG markets with some short-term fuel switching demand in the exposed economies as a result of regional geopolitical pressure.
In agricultural commodity markets, where there is known overlap between energy input costs and food production, processing, and transport economics
Strategic Reserve Releases (SRRs) as a Counterweight
During the IEA’s coordinated strategic reserve release in 2022, it was seen that policy tools are in place to mitigate short-term supply shocks and that they can be implemented on a material scale when political conditions are right. However, there are drawbacks to those processes. During that time, reservoir levels were lowered significantly, and a rebuild takes time. There are also doubts about the effectiveness as a deterrent because, over time, markets will factor in the possibility of a release during the next big disruption event, effectively canceling the effect of a release in advance.
Geopolitical Risk Analysis: What It Does and Doesn’t Accomplish
It’s easy to fall into the temptation, because of the amounts of money potentially involved, of viewing geopolitical risk analysis as a predictive tool. It generally lacks it there. It’s actually helpful for comprehending markets and its actions, as well as for charting structural weaknesses that are price-relevant. What it doesn’t do well is tell you when an event will happen, or how big the market’s reaction will be when it does.
Instead of getting lost in qualifications, the specific limitations should be called out:
Escalation and de-escalation are non-linear and unpredictable to a great extent. Conflict situations that appear to be intractable can be solved in a flash, and stable times can fall apart in an instant. Both directions remain silent and don’t herald themselves.
When demand for a commodity is the same, the market price may be quite different in the two market conditions. There are interactions between the geopolitical trigger and positioning, sentiment and open interest that are not modelable in advance.
Secondary effects (such as freight repricing, product supply shifts and insurance cost changes) happen at varying rates to the initial crude price move, and thus the total impact of the market is more difficult to gauge in real time.
Analytical path dependency can occur when geopolitical narratives set up a framework that later information gets filtered through, without being recognized as such.
All this does not negate the analysis. It’s about calibration and about honesty when the power of explanation runs out, and speculation sets in.
Conclusion
Middle East supply risk is not a succession of shocks that will come and go and be completely addressed but rather a structural state in global oil markets. The combination of production weight, geographic concentration of export infrastructure, and political complexity of the region always comes with a certain level of supply uncertainty as a base case. The level of that uncertainty and the extent to which that uncertainty is priced into securities on a given day are what change.
The hard part for traders, analysts, and energy investors is not recognizing that there is risk – that’s obvious. It’s gaining a good enough sense of what matters most at a given moment, what the big picture supply-demand dynamics are, and at what point a careful study of the facts begins to look like well-informed guesswork. The clear understanding of that boundary is, in fact, probably more valuable than any single analytical framework that can be applied to the boundary.
Disclaimer
This article is provided for informational and educational purposes only. It does not constitute financial advice, investment advice, or a recommendation to buy, sell, or hold any financial instrument, commodity, or derivative product. Trading in energy markets, including crude oil futures, CFDs, and related instruments, involves substantial risk of loss, including the possible loss of capital invested. Past market behavior and historical price patterns referenced in this article are not reliable indicators of future performance. Geopolitical developments described may not materialize as anticipated or may evolve in ways that differ materially from historical precedent. Readers should conduct their own independent research and consult a qualified financial professional before making any investment or trading decisions. Nothing in this article should be interpreted as a trading signal, directional market recommendation, or endorsement of any specific trading approach.
Both the US and Iran have recently signaled progress on efforts to reach a deal to end their conflict, though their accounts of its terms differ on some issues across respective media narratives, Anadolu reports.
US President Donald Trump on Saturday said an agreement with Iran to end the war was “largely negotiated” and awaited finalization.
On Sunday morning, Iran’s semi-official Tasnim news agency also published a report on the details of a potential agreement. However, certain aspects of what has been agreed seem to diverge.
Here is a comparison of the US and Iranian versions of the deal by key issues.
Strait of Hormuz
Citing a US official, Axios said the deal that Washington and Tehran are close to signing would extend a ceasefire by 60 days, during which the Strait of Hormuz would be reopened.
During the 60-day period, the Strait of Hormuz would be opened without any tolls, and Iran would remove the mines it has placed there to ensure unrestricted maritime passage.
In return, Washington would lift its blockade on Iranian ports, added the report.
The New York Times also said it was informed by three senior Iranian officials that Tehran had agreed to a memorandum of understanding to halt fighting and reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio also said on Sunday that the agreement could, if successful, result in a “completely open” Strait of Hormuz, with no tolls or restrictions on passage.
“They don’t own it. It’s an international waterway,” Rubio told reporters of the strait, in remarks that came during his visit to India.
A report by Iran’s semi-official news agency Tasnim, however, said that the Strait of Hormuz will not fully return to its pre-war status if the agreement is reached.
Instead, the number of ships allowed to pass would be restored to pre-war levels within 30 days, the outlet added.
Tehran also demands an end to the US blockade on its ports, arguing that no changes will be made in the strait if the blockade remains in place.
For its part, the US argues that the quicker Iran removes the mines and allows shipping to resume, the sooner the blockade will be lifted.
Sanctions relief and release of frozen Iranian assets
Iran was seeking the immediate unfreezing of funds and a permanent lifting of sanctions, but the US position indicates these measures would only be granted after Iran made concrete concessions, according to the Axios report.
As part of the proposed 60-day agreement, the US is offering temporary sanctions waivers that would allow Iran to sell its oil freely. These waivers are explicitly linked to Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz, removing mines, and ending restrictions on maritime traffic. Once these steps are taken, Washington would also lift its naval blockade on Iranian ports.
Tehran, however, says no agreement will be reached unless at least a portion of the frozen Iranian assets is released immediately. Iranian media confirmed the discussion of temporary oil sanctions waivers in the latest US proposal but insisted on broader and more permanent sanctions relief.
Nuclear file
The Axios report said the draft deal includes commitments from Iran not to pursue nuclear weapons, along with provisions to negotiate a suspension of uranium enrichment and the removal of its stockpile of highly enriched uranium.
The Iranian media reports, however, indicate that Tehran has not yet accepted anything on its nuclear program.
A potential deal would involve a 60-day negotiation window on Iran’s nuclear program, according to Tasnim.
Extent of ceasefire
Both US and Iranian media reports suggest that the cessation of hostilities would mean a halt to fighting on all fronts, including Lebanon.
This was also highlighted by Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei on Saturday, when he said Tehran was prioritizing an end to hostilities across all fronts, including Lebanon.
Context
Regional tensions have escalated since the US and Israel launched strikes against Iran in February. Tehran retaliated with strikes targeting Israel, as well as US allies in the Gulf, along with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
A ceasefire took effect on April 8 through Pakistani mediation and was later extended by Trump indefinitely. Washington and Tehran also held rare direct talks in the Pakistani capital Islamabad on April 11-12, but have failed to reach an agreement.
Trump’s Saturday remarks came after Pakistani army chief Asim Munir’s visit to Tehran. The visit was the second of its kind in recent weeks, as Munir is directly involved in Islamabad’s mediation efforts.
The suffocating smoke still hangs over her ruins, thick with the acrid stench of explosives powder and dust carrying the scent of betrayal and the mark of courage. Her streets, once filled with children’s laughter, became Israeli fields of slaughter. Now they echo with the names and memories of martyrs.
The mass graves, the broken concrete, and the twisted steel are not just evidence of Zionist hatred. They are witnesses to those who stood with her, and to those who failed her. Today, Gaza’s rubble holds more memories than all the nation’s libraries.
Palestine will remember
She will remember the selfless sacrifices of doctors and healthcare workers who refused to abandon their sick patients as bombs rained on their hospitals; the journalists who became the news, targeted for daring to expose the truth; the mothers who wrapped their children in the red, black, green, and white flag of a nation Israel is desperate to erase.
These are not tales of despair, but of defiance, insisting on its right to breathe life amid death.
Gaza will not forget
She will not forget the silence of Western democracies. In a tragic inversion, most European nations, shackled by the ghosts of their past, traded morality for absolution. The self-proclaimed champions of human rights offered Palestinians on the altar of yesterday’s victims to atone for Europe’s sins.
Gaza will not forget the Biden administration, which vetoed every U.N. Security Council resolution calling to end the genocide. Nor Donald Trump, who poured fuel on the fire, then demanded recognition for dousing his own flames.
This week, Arab, Muslim, and world leaders gather like moths around the American arsonist-turned-firefighter, “celebrating” the ashes of Gaza.
Palestine will remember
She will remember the people who rose for Gaza, from Yemen to Dublin, from Cape Town to London and Madrid, while Arab capitals from Cairo to Riyadh slept. Ireland and Spain led the boycott, while Arab countries from the Gulf to Jordan opened their ports and highways to provide alternative routes for Israeli goods, even as Yemen imposed a sea blockade in the Red Sea.
Gaza will not forget — nor forgive — the Arab governments that opened their ports when shipyard workers in Italy refused, delivering American weapons used to annihilate her children and destroy her hospitals.
Palestine will remember
She will remember South Africa — not an Arab or Muslim nation — that led her case before the International Court of Justice, charging Israel with genocide. A country once scarred by apartheid became the moral conscience of a world too timid to speak. In that act of solidarity, South Africa rekindled the universal truth that justice knows no borders.
Palestine will remember the Lebanese resistance that gave its leaders for Gaza’s defense; Yemen, poor in wealth but rich in dignity, whose solidarity never wavered; and Iran, steadfast against Israeli hubris. She will remember Ireland and Spain, who did not turn away when Arabs did, proving that true solidarity transcends borders, faith, and kinship, resting only on shared humanity.
She will remember the heroes of the flotillas who braved waves of hatred and siege to carry messages of compassion; the nameless volunteers who left the safety of their countries to heal the wounded and feed the hungry; the American students who turned campuses into encampments of resistance; the artists, actors, and musicians who risked careers for justice; the employees who lost their jobs protesting the complicity of Google, Microsoft, and other tech giants in Israel’s crimes.
Gaza will not forget those who betrayed her
Palestine will forever be grateful to those who dared to speak the truth when it was dangerous, who marched when it was forbidden, who grieved when it was unfashionable.
Palestine will remember. History will remember. Justice will remember.
For nearly two years, Gaza has endured a genocide so relentless it defies descriptive language. Israel’s war machine has turned hospitals into morgues, UN schools into mass graves, and refugee camps into craters. Yet Gaza refuses to die.
Each time she is bombed “back to the Stone Age,” she rises — like the phoenix — to rebuild, not only her structures but her indomitable will. In that defiance lies the occupier’s greatest fear: memory.
Israel can destroy buildings but not erase remembrance. The siege may starve Gaza’s body, but it nourishes Palestine’s collective soul.
Gaza’s children will grow up with memories no child should bear. But they will also inherit something indestructible: dignity. In every demolished home and every shattered family lives a story that refuses burial.
Gaza’s memory will not fade. For the mind, unlike stone, cannot be occupied. It is the eternal archive of a people’s resilience, passed from one generation to the next, weaving the indelible tapestry of Palestine today.
The ruins of Gaza stand not only as testimony to Israel’s genocide but to the moral collapse of those who enabled it.
Gaza will rise again, brick by brick.
But what will never be resurrected is the Israeli lie, which, for eight decades, cloaked the Zionist project in the guise of victimhood, occupying Western narratives and manufacturing consent.
Gaza will rise — and the Israeli myth will remain buried beneath her rubble, forever.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.
Both the US and Iran have recently signaled progress on efforts to reach a deal to end their conflict, though their accounts of its terms differ on some issues across respective media narratives, Anadolu reports.
US President Donald Trump on Saturday said an agreement with Iran to end the war was “largely negotiated” and awaited finalization.
On Sunday morning, Iran’s semi-official Tasnim news agency also published a report on the details of a potential agreement. However, certain aspects of what has been agreed seem to diverge.
Here is a comparison of the US and Iranian versions of the deal by key issues.
Strait of Hormuz
Citing a US official, Axios said the deal that Washington and Tehran are close to signing would extend a ceasefire by 60 days, during which the Strait of Hormuz would be reopened.
During the 60-day period, the Strait of Hormuz would be opened without any tolls, and Iran would remove the mines it has placed there to ensure unrestricted maritime passage.
In return, Washington would lift its blockade on Iranian ports, added the report.
The New York Times also said it was informed by three senior Iranian officials that Tehran had agreed to a memorandum of understanding to halt fighting and reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio also said on Sunday that the agreement could, if successful, result in a “completely open” Strait of Hormuz, with no tolls or restrictions on passage.
“They don’t own it. It’s an international waterway,” Rubio told reporters of the strait, in remarks that came during his visit to India.
A report by Iran’s semi-official news agency Tasnim, however, said that the Strait of Hormuz will not fully return to its pre-war status if the agreement is reached.
Instead, the number of ships allowed to pass would be restored to pre-war levels within 30 days, the outlet added.
Tehran also demands an end to the US blockade on its ports, arguing that no changes will be made in the strait if the blockade remains in place.
For its part, the US argues that the quicker Iran removes the mines and allows shipping to resume, the sooner the blockade will be lifted.
Sanctions relief and release of frozen Iranian assets
Iran was seeking the immediate unfreezing of funds and a permanent lifting of sanctions, but the US position indicates these measures would only be granted after Iran made concrete concessions, according to the Axios report.
As part of the proposed 60-day agreement, the US is offering temporary sanctions waivers that would allow Iran to sell its oil freely. These waivers are explicitly linked to Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz, removing mines, and ending restrictions on maritime traffic. Once these steps are taken, Washington would also lift its naval blockade on Iranian ports.
Tehran, however, says no agreement will be reached unless at least a portion of the frozen Iranian assets is released immediately. Iranian media confirmed the discussion of temporary oil sanctions waivers in the latest US proposal but insisted on broader and more permanent sanctions relief.
Nuclear file
The Axios report said the draft deal includes commitments from Iran not to pursue nuclear weapons, along with provisions to negotiate a suspension of uranium enrichment and the removal of its stockpile of highly enriched uranium.
The Iranian media reports, however, indicate that Tehran has not yet accepted anything on its nuclear program.
A potential deal would involve a 60-day negotiation window on Iran’s nuclear program, according to Tasnim.
Extent of ceasefire
Both US and Iranian media reports suggest that the cessation of hostilities would mean a halt to fighting on all fronts, including Lebanon.
This was also highlighted by Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei on Saturday, when he said Tehran was prioritizing an end to hostilities across all fronts, including Lebanon.
Context
Regional tensions have escalated since the US and Israel launched strikes against Iran in February. Tehran retaliated with strikes targeting Israel, as well as US allies in the Gulf, along with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
A ceasefire took effect on April 8 through Pakistani mediation and was later extended by Trump indefinitely. Washington and Tehran also held rare direct talks in the Pakistani capital Islamabad on April 11-12, but have failed to reach an agreement.
Trump’s Saturday remarks came after Pakistani army chief Asim Munir’s visit to Tehran. The visit was the second of its kind in recent weeks, as Munir is directly involved in Islamabad’s mediation efforts.
Both the US and Iran have recently signaled progress on efforts to reach a deal to end their conflict, though their accounts of its terms differ on some issues across respective media narratives, Anadolu reports.
US President Donald Trump on Saturday said an agreement with Iran to end the war was “largely negotiated” and awaited finalization.
On Sunday morning, Iran’s semi-official Tasnim news agency also published a report on the details of a potential agreement. However, certain aspects of what has been agreed seem to diverge.
Here is a comparison of the US and Iranian versions of the deal by key issues.
Strait of Hormuz
Citing a US official, Axios said the deal that Washington and Tehran are close to signing would extend a ceasefire by 60 days, during which the Strait of Hormuz would be reopened.
During the 60-day period, the Strait of Hormuz would be opened without any tolls, and Iran would remove the mines it has placed there to ensure unrestricted maritime passage.
In return, Washington would lift its blockade on Iranian ports, added the report.
The New York Times also said it was informed by three senior Iranian officials that Tehran had agreed to a memorandum of understanding to halt fighting and reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio also said on Sunday that the agreement could, if successful, result in a “completely open” Strait of Hormuz, with no tolls or restrictions on passage.
“They don’t own it. It’s an international waterway,” Rubio told reporters of the strait, in remarks that came during his visit to India.
A report by Iran’s semi-official news agency Tasnim, however, said that the Strait of Hormuz will not fully return to its pre-war status if the agreement is reached.
Instead, the number of ships allowed to pass would be restored to pre-war levels within 30 days, the outlet added.
Tehran also demands an end to the US blockade on its ports, arguing that no changes will be made in the strait if the blockade remains in place.
For its part, the US argues that the quicker Iran removes the mines and allows shipping to resume, the sooner the blockade will be lifted.
Sanctions relief and release of frozen Iranian assets
Iran was seeking the immediate unfreezing of funds and a permanent lifting of sanctions, but the US position indicates these measures would only be granted after Iran made concrete concessions, according to the Axios report.
As part of the proposed 60-day agreement, the US is offering temporary sanctions waivers that would allow Iran to sell its oil freely. These waivers are explicitly linked to Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz, removing mines, and ending restrictions on maritime traffic. Once these steps are taken, Washington would also lift its naval blockade on Iranian ports.
Tehran, however, says no agreement will be reached unless at least a portion of the frozen Iranian assets is released immediately. Iranian media confirmed the discussion of temporary oil sanctions waivers in the latest US proposal but insisted on broader and more permanent sanctions relief.
Nuclear file
The Axios report said the draft deal includes commitments from Iran not to pursue nuclear weapons, along with provisions to negotiate a suspension of uranium enrichment and the removal of its stockpile of highly enriched uranium.
The Iranian media reports, however, indicate that Tehran has not yet accepted anything on its nuclear program.
A potential deal would involve a 60-day negotiation window on Iran’s nuclear program, according to Tasnim.
Extent of ceasefire
Both US and Iranian media reports suggest that the cessation of hostilities would mean a halt to fighting on all fronts, including Lebanon.
This was also highlighted by Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei on Saturday, when he said Tehran was prioritizing an end to hostilities across all fronts, including Lebanon.
Context
Regional tensions have escalated since the US and Israel launched strikes against Iran in February. Tehran retaliated with strikes targeting Israel, as well as US allies in the Gulf, along with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
A ceasefire took effect on April 8 through Pakistani mediation and was later extended by Trump indefinitely. Washington and Tehran also held rare direct talks in the Pakistani capital Islamabad on April 11-12, but have failed to reach an agreement.
Trump’s Saturday remarks came after Pakistani army chief Asim Munir’s visit to Tehran. The visit was the second of its kind in recent weeks, as Munir is directly involved in Islamabad’s mediation efforts.
Both the US and Iran have recently signaled progress on efforts to reach a deal to end their conflict, though their accounts of its terms differ on some issues across respective media narratives, Anadolu reports.
US President Donald Trump on Saturday said an agreement with Iran to end the war was “largely negotiated” and awaited finalization.
On Sunday morning, Iran’s semi-official Tasnim news agency also published a report on the details of a potential agreement. However, certain aspects of what has been agreed seem to diverge.
Here is a comparison of the US and Iranian versions of the deal by key issues.
Strait of Hormuz
Citing a US official, Axios said the deal that Washington and Tehran are close to signing would extend a ceasefire by 60 days, during which the Strait of Hormuz would be reopened.
During the 60-day period, the Strait of Hormuz would be opened without any tolls, and Iran would remove the mines it has placed there to ensure unrestricted maritime passage.
In return, Washington would lift its blockade on Iranian ports, added the report.
The New York Times also said it was informed by three senior Iranian officials that Tehran had agreed to a memorandum of understanding to halt fighting and reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio also said on Sunday that the agreement could, if successful, result in a “completely open” Strait of Hormuz, with no tolls or restrictions on passage.
“They don’t own it. It’s an international waterway,” Rubio told reporters of the strait, in remarks that came during his visit to India.
A report by Iran’s semi-official news agency Tasnim, however, said that the Strait of Hormuz will not fully return to its pre-war status if the agreement is reached.
Instead, the number of ships allowed to pass would be restored to pre-war levels within 30 days, the outlet added.
Tehran also demands an end to the US blockade on its ports, arguing that no changes will be made in the strait if the blockade remains in place.
For its part, the US argues that the quicker Iran removes the mines and allows shipping to resume, the sooner the blockade will be lifted.
Sanctions relief and release of frozen Iranian assets
Iran was seeking the immediate unfreezing of funds and a permanent lifting of sanctions, but the US position indicates these measures would only be granted after Iran made concrete concessions, according to the Axios report.
As part of the proposed 60-day agreement, the US is offering temporary sanctions waivers that would allow Iran to sell its oil freely. These waivers are explicitly linked to Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz, removing mines, and ending restrictions on maritime traffic. Once these steps are taken, Washington would also lift its naval blockade on Iranian ports.
Tehran, however, says no agreement will be reached unless at least a portion of the frozen Iranian assets is released immediately. Iranian media confirmed the discussion of temporary oil sanctions waivers in the latest US proposal but insisted on broader and more permanent sanctions relief.
Nuclear file
The Axios report said the draft deal includes commitments from Iran not to pursue nuclear weapons, along with provisions to negotiate a suspension of uranium enrichment and the removal of its stockpile of highly enriched uranium.
The Iranian media reports, however, indicate that Tehran has not yet accepted anything on its nuclear program.
A potential deal would involve a 60-day negotiation window on Iran’s nuclear program, according to Tasnim.
Extent of ceasefire
Both US and Iranian media reports suggest that the cessation of hostilities would mean a halt to fighting on all fronts, including Lebanon.
This was also highlighted by Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei on Saturday, when he said Tehran was prioritizing an end to hostilities across all fronts, including Lebanon.
Context
Regional tensions have escalated since the US and Israel launched strikes against Iran in February. Tehran retaliated with strikes targeting Israel, as well as US allies in the Gulf, along with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
A ceasefire took effect on April 8 through Pakistani mediation and was later extended by Trump indefinitely. Washington and Tehran also held rare direct talks in the Pakistani capital Islamabad on April 11-12, but have failed to reach an agreement.
Trump’s Saturday remarks came after Pakistani army chief Asim Munir’s visit to Tehran. The visit was the second of its kind in recent weeks, as Munir is directly involved in Islamabad’s mediation efforts.
Both the US and Iran have recently signaled progress on efforts to reach a deal to end their conflict, though their accounts of its terms differ on some issues across respective media narratives, Anadolu reports.
US President Donald Trump on Saturday said an agreement with Iran to end the war was “largely negotiated” and awaited finalization.
On Sunday morning, Iran’s semi-official Tasnim news agency also published a report on the details of a potential agreement. However, certain aspects of what has been agreed seem to diverge.
Here is a comparison of the US and Iranian versions of the deal by key issues.
Strait of Hormuz
Citing a US official, Axios said the deal that Washington and Tehran are close to signing would extend a ceasefire by 60 days, during which the Strait of Hormuz would be reopened.
During the 60-day period, the Strait of Hormuz would be opened without any tolls, and Iran would remove the mines it has placed there to ensure unrestricted maritime passage.
In return, Washington would lift its blockade on Iranian ports, added the report.
The New York Times also said it was informed by three senior Iranian officials that Tehran had agreed to a memorandum of understanding to halt fighting and reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio also said on Sunday that the agreement could, if successful, result in a “completely open” Strait of Hormuz, with no tolls or restrictions on passage.
“They don’t own it. It’s an international waterway,” Rubio told reporters of the strait, in remarks that came during his visit to India.
A report by Iran’s semi-official news agency Tasnim, however, said that the Strait of Hormuz will not fully return to its pre-war status if the agreement is reached.
Instead, the number of ships allowed to pass would be restored to pre-war levels within 30 days, the outlet added.
Tehran also demands an end to the US blockade on its ports, arguing that no changes will be made in the strait if the blockade remains in place.
For its part, the US argues that the quicker Iran removes the mines and allows shipping to resume, the sooner the blockade will be lifted.
Sanctions relief and release of frozen Iranian assets
Iran was seeking the immediate unfreezing of funds and a permanent lifting of sanctions, but the US position indicates these measures would only be granted after Iran made concrete concessions, according to the Axios report.
As part of the proposed 60-day agreement, the US is offering temporary sanctions waivers that would allow Iran to sell its oil freely. These waivers are explicitly linked to Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz, removing mines, and ending restrictions on maritime traffic. Once these steps are taken, Washington would also lift its naval blockade on Iranian ports.
Tehran, however, says no agreement will be reached unless at least a portion of the frozen Iranian assets is released immediately. Iranian media confirmed the discussion of temporary oil sanctions waivers in the latest US proposal but insisted on broader and more permanent sanctions relief.
Nuclear file
The Axios report said the draft deal includes commitments from Iran not to pursue nuclear weapons, along with provisions to negotiate a suspension of uranium enrichment and the removal of its stockpile of highly enriched uranium.
The Iranian media reports, however, indicate that Tehran has not yet accepted anything on its nuclear program.
A potential deal would involve a 60-day negotiation window on Iran’s nuclear program, according to Tasnim.
Extent of ceasefire
Both US and Iranian media reports suggest that the cessation of hostilities would mean a halt to fighting on all fronts, including Lebanon.
This was also highlighted by Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei on Saturday, when he said Tehran was prioritizing an end to hostilities across all fronts, including Lebanon.
Context
Regional tensions have escalated since the US and Israel launched strikes against Iran in February. Tehran retaliated with strikes targeting Israel, as well as US allies in the Gulf, along with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
A ceasefire took effect on April 8 through Pakistani mediation and was later extended by Trump indefinitely. Washington and Tehran also held rare direct talks in the Pakistani capital Islamabad on April 11-12, but have failed to reach an agreement.
Trump’s Saturday remarks came after Pakistani army chief Asim Munir’s visit to Tehran. The visit was the second of its kind in recent weeks, as Munir is directly involved in Islamabad’s mediation efforts.
Both the US and Iran have recently signaled progress on efforts to reach a deal to end their conflict, though their accounts of its terms differ on some issues across respective media narratives, Anadolu reports.
US President Donald Trump on Saturday said an agreement with Iran to end the war was “largely negotiated” and awaited finalization.
On Sunday morning, Iran’s semi-official Tasnim news agency also published a report on the details of a potential agreement. However, certain aspects of what has been agreed seem to diverge.
Here is a comparison of the US and Iranian versions of the deal by key issues.
Strait of Hormuz
Citing a US official, Axios said the deal that Washington and Tehran are close to signing would extend a ceasefire by 60 days, during which the Strait of Hormuz would be reopened.
During the 60-day period, the Strait of Hormuz would be opened without any tolls, and Iran would remove the mines it has placed there to ensure unrestricted maritime passage.
In return, Washington would lift its blockade on Iranian ports, added the report.
The New York Times also said it was informed by three senior Iranian officials that Tehran had agreed to a memorandum of understanding to halt fighting and reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio also said on Sunday that the agreement could, if successful, result in a “completely open” Strait of Hormuz, with no tolls or restrictions on passage.
“They don’t own it. It’s an international waterway,” Rubio told reporters of the strait, in remarks that came during his visit to India.
A report by Iran’s semi-official news agency Tasnim, however, said that the Strait of Hormuz will not fully return to its pre-war status if the agreement is reached.
Instead, the number of ships allowed to pass would be restored to pre-war levels within 30 days, the outlet added.
Tehran also demands an end to the US blockade on its ports, arguing that no changes will be made in the strait if the blockade remains in place.
For its part, the US argues that the quicker Iran removes the mines and allows shipping to resume, the sooner the blockade will be lifted.
Sanctions relief and release of frozen Iranian assets
Iran was seeking the immediate unfreezing of funds and a permanent lifting of sanctions, but the US position indicates these measures would only be granted after Iran made concrete concessions, according to the Axios report.
As part of the proposed 60-day agreement, the US is offering temporary sanctions waivers that would allow Iran to sell its oil freely. These waivers are explicitly linked to Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz, removing mines, and ending restrictions on maritime traffic. Once these steps are taken, Washington would also lift its naval blockade on Iranian ports.
Tehran, however, says no agreement will be reached unless at least a portion of the frozen Iranian assets is released immediately. Iranian media confirmed the discussion of temporary oil sanctions waivers in the latest US proposal but insisted on broader and more permanent sanctions relief.
Nuclear file
The Axios report said the draft deal includes commitments from Iran not to pursue nuclear weapons, along with provisions to negotiate a suspension of uranium enrichment and the removal of its stockpile of highly enriched uranium.
The Iranian media reports, however, indicate that Tehran has not yet accepted anything on its nuclear program.
A potential deal would involve a 60-day negotiation window on Iran’s nuclear program, according to Tasnim.
Extent of ceasefire
Both US and Iranian media reports suggest that the cessation of hostilities would mean a halt to fighting on all fronts, including Lebanon.
This was also highlighted by Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei on Saturday, when he said Tehran was prioritizing an end to hostilities across all fronts, including Lebanon.
Context
Regional tensions have escalated since the US and Israel launched strikes against Iran in February. Tehran retaliated with strikes targeting Israel, as well as US allies in the Gulf, along with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
A ceasefire took effect on April 8 through Pakistani mediation and was later extended by Trump indefinitely. Washington and Tehran also held rare direct talks in the Pakistani capital Islamabad on April 11-12, but have failed to reach an agreement.
Trump’s Saturday remarks came after Pakistani army chief Asim Munir’s visit to Tehran. The visit was the second of its kind in recent weeks, as Munir is directly involved in Islamabad’s mediation efforts.
Both the US and Iran have recently signaled progress on efforts to reach a deal to end their conflict, though their accounts of its terms differ on some issues across respective media narratives, Anadolu reports.
US President Donald Trump on Saturday said an agreement with Iran to end the war was “largely negotiated” and awaited finalization.
On Sunday morning, Iran’s semi-official Tasnim news agency also published a report on the details of a potential agreement. However, certain aspects of what has been agreed seem to diverge.
Here is a comparison of the US and Iranian versions of the deal by key issues.
Strait of Hormuz
Citing a US official, Axios said the deal that Washington and Tehran are close to signing would extend a ceasefire by 60 days, during which the Strait of Hormuz would be reopened.
During the 60-day period, the Strait of Hormuz would be opened without any tolls, and Iran would remove the mines it has placed there to ensure unrestricted maritime passage.
In return, Washington would lift its blockade on Iranian ports, added the report.
The New York Times also said it was informed by three senior Iranian officials that Tehran had agreed to a memorandum of understanding to halt fighting and reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio also said on Sunday that the agreement could, if successful, result in a “completely open” Strait of Hormuz, with no tolls or restrictions on passage.
“They don’t own it. It’s an international waterway,” Rubio told reporters of the strait, in remarks that came during his visit to India.
A report by Iran’s semi-official news agency Tasnim, however, said that the Strait of Hormuz will not fully return to its pre-war status if the agreement is reached.
Instead, the number of ships allowed to pass would be restored to pre-war levels within 30 days, the outlet added.
Tehran also demands an end to the US blockade on its ports, arguing that no changes will be made in the strait if the blockade remains in place.
For its part, the US argues that the quicker Iran removes the mines and allows shipping to resume, the sooner the blockade will be lifted.
Sanctions relief and release of frozen Iranian assets
Iran was seeking the immediate unfreezing of funds and a permanent lifting of sanctions, but the US position indicates these measures would only be granted after Iran made concrete concessions, according to the Axios report.
As part of the proposed 60-day agreement, the US is offering temporary sanctions waivers that would allow Iran to sell its oil freely. These waivers are explicitly linked to Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz, removing mines, and ending restrictions on maritime traffic. Once these steps are taken, Washington would also lift its naval blockade on Iranian ports.
Tehran, however, says no agreement will be reached unless at least a portion of the frozen Iranian assets is released immediately. Iranian media confirmed the discussion of temporary oil sanctions waivers in the latest US proposal but insisted on broader and more permanent sanctions relief.
Nuclear file
The Axios report said the draft deal includes commitments from Iran not to pursue nuclear weapons, along with provisions to negotiate a suspension of uranium enrichment and the removal of its stockpile of highly enriched uranium.
The Iranian media reports, however, indicate that Tehran has not yet accepted anything on its nuclear program.
A potential deal would involve a 60-day negotiation window on Iran’s nuclear program, according to Tasnim.
Extent of ceasefire
Both US and Iranian media reports suggest that the cessation of hostilities would mean a halt to fighting on all fronts, including Lebanon.
This was also highlighted by Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei on Saturday, when he said Tehran was prioritizing an end to hostilities across all fronts, including Lebanon.
Context
Regional tensions have escalated since the US and Israel launched strikes against Iran in February. Tehran retaliated with strikes targeting Israel, as well as US allies in the Gulf, along with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
A ceasefire took effect on April 8 through Pakistani mediation and was later extended by Trump indefinitely. Washington and Tehran also held rare direct talks in the Pakistani capital Islamabad on April 11-12, but have failed to reach an agreement.
Trump’s Saturday remarks came after Pakistani army chief Asim Munir’s visit to Tehran. The visit was the second of its kind in recent weeks, as Munir is directly involved in Islamabad’s mediation efforts.
Both the US and Iran have recently signaled progress on efforts to reach a deal to end their conflict, though their accounts of its terms differ on some issues across respective media narratives, Anadolu reports.
US President Donald Trump on Saturday said an agreement with Iran to end the war was “largely negotiated” and awaited finalization.
On Sunday morning, Iran’s semi-official Tasnim news agency also published a report on the details of a potential agreement. However, certain aspects of what has been agreed seem to diverge.
Here is a comparison of the US and Iranian versions of the deal by key issues.
Strait of Hormuz
Citing a US official, Axios said the deal that Washington and Tehran are close to signing would extend a ceasefire by 60 days, during which the Strait of Hormuz would be reopened.
During the 60-day period, the Strait of Hormuz would be opened without any tolls, and Iran would remove the mines it has placed there to ensure unrestricted maritime passage.
In return, Washington would lift its blockade on Iranian ports, added the report.
The New York Times also said it was informed by three senior Iranian officials that Tehran had agreed to a memorandum of understanding to halt fighting and reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio also said on Sunday that the agreement could, if successful, result in a “completely open” Strait of Hormuz, with no tolls or restrictions on passage.
“They don’t own it. It’s an international waterway,” Rubio told reporters of the strait, in remarks that came during his visit to India.
A report by Iran’s semi-official news agency Tasnim, however, said that the Strait of Hormuz will not fully return to its pre-war status if the agreement is reached.
Instead, the number of ships allowed to pass would be restored to pre-war levels within 30 days, the outlet added.
Tehran also demands an end to the US blockade on its ports, arguing that no changes will be made in the strait if the blockade remains in place.
For its part, the US argues that the quicker Iran removes the mines and allows shipping to resume, the sooner the blockade will be lifted.
Sanctions relief and release of frozen Iranian assets
Iran was seeking the immediate unfreezing of funds and a permanent lifting of sanctions, but the US position indicates these measures would only be granted after Iran made concrete concessions, according to the Axios report.
As part of the proposed 60-day agreement, the US is offering temporary sanctions waivers that would allow Iran to sell its oil freely. These waivers are explicitly linked to Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz, removing mines, and ending restrictions on maritime traffic. Once these steps are taken, Washington would also lift its naval blockade on Iranian ports.
Tehran, however, says no agreement will be reached unless at least a portion of the frozen Iranian assets is released immediately. Iranian media confirmed the discussion of temporary oil sanctions waivers in the latest US proposal but insisted on broader and more permanent sanctions relief.
Nuclear file
The Axios report said the draft deal includes commitments from Iran not to pursue nuclear weapons, along with provisions to negotiate a suspension of uranium enrichment and the removal of its stockpile of highly enriched uranium.
The Iranian media reports, however, indicate that Tehran has not yet accepted anything on its nuclear program.
A potential deal would involve a 60-day negotiation window on Iran’s nuclear program, according to Tasnim.
Extent of ceasefire
Both US and Iranian media reports suggest that the cessation of hostilities would mean a halt to fighting on all fronts, including Lebanon.
This was also highlighted by Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei on Saturday, when he said Tehran was prioritizing an end to hostilities across all fronts, including Lebanon.
Context
Regional tensions have escalated since the US and Israel launched strikes against Iran in February. Tehran retaliated with strikes targeting Israel, as well as US allies in the Gulf, along with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
A ceasefire took effect on April 8 through Pakistani mediation and was later extended by Trump indefinitely. Washington and Tehran also held rare direct talks in the Pakistani capital Islamabad on April 11-12, but have failed to reach an agreement.
Trump’s Saturday remarks came after Pakistani army chief Asim Munir’s visit to Tehran. The visit was the second of its kind in recent weeks, as Munir is directly involved in Islamabad’s mediation efforts.
Both the US and Iran have recently signaled progress on efforts to reach a deal to end their conflict, though their accounts of its terms differ on some issues across respective media narratives, Anadolu reports.
US President Donald Trump on Saturday said an agreement with Iran to end the war was “largely negotiated” and awaited finalization.
On Sunday morning, Iran’s semi-official Tasnim news agency also published a report on the details of a potential agreement. However, certain aspects of what has been agreed seem to diverge.
Here is a comparison of the US and Iranian versions of the deal by key issues.
Strait of Hormuz
Citing a US official, Axios said the deal that Washington and Tehran are close to signing would extend a ceasefire by 60 days, during which the Strait of Hormuz would be reopened.
During the 60-day period, the Strait of Hormuz would be opened without any tolls, and Iran would remove the mines it has placed there to ensure unrestricted maritime passage.
In return, Washington would lift its blockade on Iranian ports, added the report.
The New York Times also said it was informed by three senior Iranian officials that Tehran had agreed to a memorandum of understanding to halt fighting and reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio also said on Sunday that the agreement could, if successful, result in a “completely open” Strait of Hormuz, with no tolls or restrictions on passage.
“They don’t own it. It’s an international waterway,” Rubio told reporters of the strait, in remarks that came during his visit to India.
A report by Iran’s semi-official news agency Tasnim, however, said that the Strait of Hormuz will not fully return to its pre-war status if the agreement is reached.
Instead, the number of ships allowed to pass would be restored to pre-war levels within 30 days, the outlet added.
Tehran also demands an end to the US blockade on its ports, arguing that no changes will be made in the strait if the blockade remains in place.
For its part, the US argues that the quicker Iran removes the mines and allows shipping to resume, the sooner the blockade will be lifted.
Sanctions relief and release of frozen Iranian assets
Iran was seeking the immediate unfreezing of funds and a permanent lifting of sanctions, but the US position indicates these measures would only be granted after Iran made concrete concessions, according to the Axios report.
As part of the proposed 60-day agreement, the US is offering temporary sanctions waivers that would allow Iran to sell its oil freely. These waivers are explicitly linked to Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz, removing mines, and ending restrictions on maritime traffic. Once these steps are taken, Washington would also lift its naval blockade on Iranian ports.
Tehran, however, says no agreement will be reached unless at least a portion of the frozen Iranian assets is released immediately. Iranian media confirmed the discussion of temporary oil sanctions waivers in the latest US proposal but insisted on broader and more permanent sanctions relief.
Nuclear file
The Axios report said the draft deal includes commitments from Iran not to pursue nuclear weapons, along with provisions to negotiate a suspension of uranium enrichment and the removal of its stockpile of highly enriched uranium.
The Iranian media reports, however, indicate that Tehran has not yet accepted anything on its nuclear program.
A potential deal would involve a 60-day negotiation window on Iran’s nuclear program, according to Tasnim.
Extent of ceasefire
Both US and Iranian media reports suggest that the cessation of hostilities would mean a halt to fighting on all fronts, including Lebanon.
This was also highlighted by Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei on Saturday, when he said Tehran was prioritizing an end to hostilities across all fronts, including Lebanon.
Context
Regional tensions have escalated since the US and Israel launched strikes against Iran in February. Tehran retaliated with strikes targeting Israel, as well as US allies in the Gulf, along with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
A ceasefire took effect on April 8 through Pakistani mediation and was later extended by Trump indefinitely. Washington and Tehran also held rare direct talks in the Pakistani capital Islamabad on April 11-12, but have failed to reach an agreement.
Trump’s Saturday remarks came after Pakistani army chief Asim Munir’s visit to Tehran. The visit was the second of its kind in recent weeks, as Munir is directly involved in Islamabad’s mediation efforts.
A mushroom farm in Jericho, an heirloom seed library, a project to introduce Kale to the Palestinian market and a local farmers’ cooperative – these small agricultural projects are the latest weapon in the fight against the Israeli occupation. They aim to tackle the policies that make Palestine dependent on the Israeli market and offer alternatives for Palestinians who find themselves forced to buy Israeli products.
After returning to Palestine for the first time in five years, Vivien Sansour noticed changes in her homeland. “All the things I had missed, like the delicious tomatoes and cheese, the things old ladies would come and sell at the front of our house, they were gone,” says Sansour. “I thought I was coming home and I found myself coming back to a place that was foreign to me where I was buying Israeli broccoli in the supermarket and that was what was available.”
In June, she officially launched Palestine’s first heirloom seed library as a way to preserve the knowledge of generations of farmers who have cultivated varieties of organic vegetables, fruits and herbs adapted for the region’s climate and soil. Due to Israeli policies and neo-liberal farming techniques, these varieties, and traditional Palestinian farming as a whole, are facing extinction. These tiny seeds, she says, have the power to stop this from happening. Anyone can borrow a packet of the library’s seeds and grow the local varieties of produce, returning seeds from the next harvest.
“The heirloom seed gives us power to resist our dominance, though our heirlooms seeds we can truly eat what we grow and stop having to be slaves to our master,” she says.
Under the Oslo Accords, around 63 per cent of agricultural land in the West Bank was designated as “Area C”, which means it fell under the control of the Israeli military. As a result, farmers whose land fell in that 63 per cent were unable to farm their land freely, as is still the case. Meanwhile, Israeli settlements in the West Bank have mushroomed, and settlement farms are able to produce a large quantity of crops at low cost using pesticides, leaving traditional farmers unable to compete. Unequal water resources allocated to Palestinians and Jewish settlers living in the same territory makes keeping up almost impossible.
According to the Israeli occupation authorities, the value of goods produced in settlements and exported to Europe amounts to approximately $300 million a year. Israel is flooding the Palestinian market with cheap Israeli products whilst simultaneously controlling the Palestinian exports and imports. Restrictions on the importation of fertilizers has cut agricultural output in the OPT by an estimated 20-33 per cent. This pressure is forcing Palestinian farmers to leave their land, with many having to work on the settlement farms that displaced them on as little as half the Israeli minimum wage, in unsafe working conditions, and without holiday or sick pay.
“Oslo has been a disaster for agriculture in Palestine,” says Sansour. Aside from the restrictions placed on farmers as a result of the agreement, it also brought foreign donations to the agricultural section, she explains. “The aid was designed in a very neo-liberal way on the production of certain items and the elimination of people – that’s the idea of agribusiness.” This sort of funding pushed farmers away from sustainable agriculture to mono-cropping (the production of one type of crop) designed for consumer export or selling to the Israeli market, using methods relying on chemicals, she says.
Sansour highlights the Paris Protocol, an annex of the Oslo Accords, which tied the Palestinian economy with the Israeli economy. This has led to a situation, she says, where the tobacco industry is renting Palestinian land for prices small-scale producers cannot compete with. “We went from producing food to producing poison,” she poignantly adds.
The same factors motivated Lamya Hussain to implement The Kale Project – Palestine, a joint venture by organisations MAAN Development Center and Refutrees to introduce kale to the Palestinian market. Two years on and two solid harvests of three types of kale and the project is looking to expand. “There are many ways Israel controls what is produced and why and how, and we want to challenge this,” says Hussain. “We are challenging the occupation through cross diversity because one of the things the Israeli occupation has done to the agricultural sector is that it’s reduced it to a few basic crops.”
“One key issue facing small-scale Palestinian producers is the challenge to work around previously negotiated economic agreements via which Israeli goods are dumped in the local market,” she explains. “To this end, there is always the risk that Israeli producers can take advantage of the rising demand for kale and flood the market with larger quantities and cheaper prices.” Hussain continues, “It’s very difficult for people like myself or for the project, and even more difficult for smaller scale farmers who are competing against not only consumer market prices and local competition, they’re actually competing with an occupied-led system in the market.”
Fareed Taamallah was one of these small scale farmers struggling to sell his produce in this system. Tired of selling his olives and olive oil in bulk to a trader who then sells it to the consumer while taking most of the profit, he co-founded Sharaka. The organisation links Palestinian farmers and consumers directly, promoting Baladi food, a word for local, seasonal and Palestinian produce.
“In Occupied Palestine, the matter of keeping the farmer in his land cultivating and producing is more important than any other place because it is not only a matter of producing, but also a matter of food sovereignty,” says Taamallah. “Sharaka is trying to tackle part of these problems and help small-scale farmers to stay in their land by helping them to market their product at good prices, and in this way support them to remain steadfast in their groves. On the other hand, we try to help the consumer to have access to the good, healthy food and not depend on the Israeli products that are found in the local market.”
For the Palestinian farming industry, the Israeli occupation has been deadly. But these agricultural efforts are seeking to change the status quo by offering Palestinians alternatives to the Israeli products that fill up their local supermarkets. As Sansour puts it, buying the produce of the occupation is like smoking; “you pay for your own poisoning”.
Images courtesy of The Kale Project – Palestine.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.
Both the US and Iran have recently signaled progress on efforts to reach a deal to end their conflict, though their accounts of its terms differ on some issues across respective media narratives, Anadolu reports.
US President Donald Trump on Saturday said an agreement with Iran to end the war was “largely negotiated” and awaited finalization.
On Sunday morning, Iran’s semi-official Tasnim news agency also published a report on the details of a potential agreement. However, certain aspects of what has been agreed seem to diverge.
Here is a comparison of the US and Iranian versions of the deal by key issues.
Strait of Hormuz
Citing a US official, Axios said the deal that Washington and Tehran are close to signing would extend a ceasefire by 60 days, during which the Strait of Hormuz would be reopened.
During the 60-day period, the Strait of Hormuz would be opened without any tolls, and Iran would remove the mines it has placed there to ensure unrestricted maritime passage.
In return, Washington would lift its blockade on Iranian ports, added the report.
The New York Times also said it was informed by three senior Iranian officials that Tehran had agreed to a memorandum of understanding to halt fighting and reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio also said on Sunday that the agreement could, if successful, result in a “completely open” Strait of Hormuz, with no tolls or restrictions on passage.
“They don’t own it. It’s an international waterway,” Rubio told reporters of the strait, in remarks that came during his visit to India.
A report by Iran’s semi-official news agency Tasnim, however, said that the Strait of Hormuz will not fully return to its pre-war status if the agreement is reached.
Instead, the number of ships allowed to pass would be restored to pre-war levels within 30 days, the outlet added.
Tehran also demands an end to the US blockade on its ports, arguing that no changes will be made in the strait if the blockade remains in place.
For its part, the US argues that the quicker Iran removes the mines and allows shipping to resume, the sooner the blockade will be lifted.
Sanctions relief and release of frozen Iranian assets
Iran was seeking the immediate unfreezing of funds and a permanent lifting of sanctions, but the US position indicates these measures would only be granted after Iran made concrete concessions, according to the Axios report.
As part of the proposed 60-day agreement, the US is offering temporary sanctions waivers that would allow Iran to sell its oil freely. These waivers are explicitly linked to Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz, removing mines, and ending restrictions on maritime traffic. Once these steps are taken, Washington would also lift its naval blockade on Iranian ports.
Tehran, however, says no agreement will be reached unless at least a portion of the frozen Iranian assets is released immediately. Iranian media confirmed the discussion of temporary oil sanctions waivers in the latest US proposal but insisted on broader and more permanent sanctions relief.
Nuclear file
The Axios report said the draft deal includes commitments from Iran not to pursue nuclear weapons, along with provisions to negotiate a suspension of uranium enrichment and the removal of its stockpile of highly enriched uranium.
The Iranian media reports, however, indicate that Tehran has not yet accepted anything on its nuclear program.
A potential deal would involve a 60-day negotiation window on Iran’s nuclear program, according to Tasnim.
Extent of ceasefire
Both US and Iranian media reports suggest that the cessation of hostilities would mean a halt to fighting on all fronts, including Lebanon.
This was also highlighted by Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei on Saturday, when he said Tehran was prioritizing an end to hostilities across all fronts, including Lebanon.
Context
Regional tensions have escalated since the US and Israel launched strikes against Iran in February. Tehran retaliated with strikes targeting Israel, as well as US allies in the Gulf, along with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
A ceasefire took effect on April 8 through Pakistani mediation and was later extended by Trump indefinitely. Washington and Tehran also held rare direct talks in the Pakistani capital Islamabad on April 11-12, but have failed to reach an agreement.
Trump’s Saturday remarks came after Pakistani army chief Asim Munir’s visit to Tehran. The visit was the second of its kind in recent weeks, as Munir is directly involved in Islamabad’s mediation efforts.
