East

After Iranian missile and drone barrages disrupted U.S. Navy’s logistics by destroying port infrastructure and putting ships at risk, the service turned to a fleet of specially equipped commercial vessels to deliver fuel to warships away from the danger zone. These vessels proved so effective that one top Navy official said this week that he wants to see more of them pressed into service.

“Epic Fury has been a PhD course in logistics,” said Robert Hein, Director of Maritime Operations for the Navy’s Military Sealift Command (MSC), said during the Sea-Air-Space 2026 (SAS) exposition near Washington, D.C.  

“So traditionally, for 25 years, we’ve been at war in the Middle East and that war was effectively fought in the parking lot of a giant gas station,” Hein explained. “Iran has effectively shut down that gas station. So we’ve had to come up with really creative ways of, ‘how do we replenish the fleet?’”

The answer was shifting from having fleet oilers call on ports to executing at-sea replenishment of those oilers by using consolidated cargo operations (CONSOL) tankers – vessels leased by MSC that are specially equipped to offload fuel at sea. The concept isn’t new. After shifting away from using chartered ships to refuel oilers at sea in favor of conducting the transfers at port facilities, MSC reintroduced the CONSOL process in 2015, “as a way to utilize a flexible platform that allows MSC to operate worldwide in a variety of missions,” according to the Navy. Having a CONSOL tanker provide fuel to oilers means they don’t have to return to a port, reducing costs and increasing time on station to support the fleet. During a time of conflict, that can also mean less risk to the oiler, which is a critical asset that would be in very high demand.

The way the chartered tankers have been used in the Middle East during Epic Fury has taken this process to a new level.

The Navy created what Hein called a system of “tanker treadmills” at sea with “tankers cycling in and out” to replace the fixed infrastructure no longer available due to Iranian attacks.

“There are no more logistics hubs they’re going to,” Hein proffered. “All those nodes are now remaining at sea.”

In addition to the CONSOL tankers’ ability to refuel oilers at sea, “we’re putting an additional fuel delivery system on those tankers so they’ll be able to replenish destroyers and ships other than oilers,” Hein added. He did not provide details about what kind of system, however, the Navy has previously discussed developing what is called a Modular CONSOL Adapter Kit (MCAK).

“By installing it on the deck of a tanker, it can refuel other ships through the receiving ship’s fuel delivery hoses,” the Navy explained.

There are currently 15 CONSOL tankers available to the Navy worldwide. Rear Adm. Chris Stone, Director of Strategic Plans, Policy, Logistics and Warfighting Development for U.S. Transportation Command, said that’s not enough.

“If there’s one thing that I had the power to stroke a check on today, it would be to create more CONSOL tankers – those consolidated cargo replenishment at sea vessels,” he said at the same SAS panel. 

“We probably need something more than 15, because when there’s a crisis or a conflict around the world, the first thing that a geographic combatant commander asks TRANSCOM for is a CONSOL vessel, and we don’t have enough of them today without trade offs that create risk in other areas.”

“We’ve proven CONSOL capability during Operation Epic Fury,” Stone added. “We have a treadmill of vessels where one is on the front line, one is topping off, and they’re continually rotating to ensure that we’ve got support for the warfighter.”

CONSOL tankers, Stone posited, “are no longer supply ships. They’re not logistics ships. They’re force projection platforms that support our warfighters. They allow us to support the joint force and refuel them underway. It extends our operational reach and endurance, while reducing the reliance on predictable, vulnerable port visits. In less than two years, we’ve increased the capacity dramatically, and we’ll continue to do so.”

While a boon to the system, the CONSOL tankers are not without their issues. The main one being time. It takes about two hours for an oiler to refuel a destroyer, said Hein, while it takes about six hours for a tanker to get the job done.

“Unlike a quick trip to the gas pumps for a car, CONSOLing can take hours to complete,” the Navy noted in a story about the tankers. “This creates a unique set of challenges for the ships conducting the operations. CONSOLing is a dance between two ships. Each must maneuver alongside the other, and maintain a consistent speed and course. Because of their size, tanker maneuverability becomes a challenge.”

“We simply do not maneuver like the [oilers] do. They are graceful, gliding through the water,” said Capt. Michelle Laycock, Maersk Peary’s master. “There’s not a lot of ‘grace’ to a fully loaded tanker. We don’t glide, we plow through the water.”

The increased time and effort is worth it, Hein said.

“This is a capability that is needed that will help mitigate the lack of oilers right now,” Hein suggested. 

He wants to take the concept a step further.

“So while we can CONSOL for fuel, I’d like to get to a point where you CONSOL for food as well,” he stated. 

While CONSOL has provided a lifeline for vessels during Operation Epic Fury, its utility would be dramatically magnified during a war in the vast Pacific, one where ports at much farther distances would be under threat as would ships of all kinds over huge swathes of that theater. There have been consistent concerns about the size of the oiler fleet being a point of weakness for the Navy’s ability to project power in a near-peer conflict. Doubling-down on CONSOL and giving those vessels the ability to directly refuel surface combatants, carriers and amphibious warships could go a long way to buying down risk and fortifying operational planning.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

Al Jazeera’s Rory Challands reports from the EU summit in Cyprus, where the leaders of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan met with European leaders to discuss the regional crisis caused by the US-Israeli war on Iran.

As tensions ramp up amid fragile truce, US military says it ‘redirected’ 34 vessels as part of blockade on Iran’s ports.

The United States has three aircraft carriers in the Middle East for the first time in 23 years with the arrival of the USS George HW Bush, the US military has said, amid a fragile ceasefire with Iran.

The Middle East-based Central Command (CENTCOM) of the US military said on Friday that the carriers include 12 accompanying ships, more than 200 aircraft, and 15,000 soldiers.

“For the first time in decades, three aircraft carriers are operating in the Middle East at the same time,” CENTCOM said.

The last time the US amassed that amount of military assets in the region’s waters was in the lead up to the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.

The other two US aircraft carriers in the region are USS Abraham Lincoln and USS Gerald R Ford, which is the largest in the world.

The show of force signals that the US is preparing to return to fighting should the fragile ceasefire between the US, Israel and Iran unravel.

Diplomacy between the two countries has been in limbo, with Iran setting the lifting of the US naval blockade against its ports as a condition for resuming the talks.

US President Donald Trump announced extending the truce on Wednesday, but he said the naval siege would persist.

For its part, Iran has reblocked the Strait of Hormuz in response to the US blockade after declaring the waterway completely open last week when the regional ceasefire was extended to Lebanon.

Trump has not set a deadline for the extended ceasefire and suggested that he is comfortable with the status quo, which he argues is depleting the Iranian economy at a low cost for the US.

“I have all the time in the World, but Iran doesn’t,” he wrote in a social media post on Thursday.

The US president was later asked how long he would be willing to wait before receiving a proposed deal from Iran. He said: “Don’t rush me.”

Iran has described the blockade – which has seen US forces seize at least two Iranian oil ships – as an “act of war”.

Iranian forces have also captured foreign commercial ships in the Hormuz Strait, accusing them of violating maritime regulations.

With negotiations on hold, Trump has shown no signs of willingness to lift the siege in order to facilitate talks.

On Friday, the US military said it has “redirected” 34 vessels in the region. “The blockade against ships entering or exiting Iranian ports continues,” CENTCOM said.

Trump has previously threatened to destroy Iran’s civilian infrastructure, including bridges, power and water stations.

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said on Thursday that his country is awaiting the green light from Trump to return Iran to the “age of darkness”.

“Israel is prepared to renew the war against Iran. The [Israeli military] is ready in defence and offence, and the targets are marked,” Katz said, according to The Times of Israel newspaper.

Canada on Wednesday announced $5 million in funding for international efforts aimed at identifying and eliminating chemical weapons remaining in Syria, Anadolu reports.

“Today, the Honourable Anita Anand, Minister of Foreign Affairs, announced Canada’s contribution of $5 million to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) through Canada’s Weapons Threat Reduction Program,” the Global Affairs Canada said in a statement.

Noting that the OPCW will use the contribution to verify the scope of Syria’s former chemical weapons program, the readout added that the funding will also be used to investigate past uses of such weapons, and prepare for the safe destruction of remaining stockpiles, in line with the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The statement said the work is considered critical to “Syria’s long-term stability,” advancing accountability and reducing the risk to civilians of any future chemical weapons use.

“This contribution is part of Canada’s long-standing support to the OPCW to uphold the global ban on chemical weapons and strengthen international accountability,” it added.

Hezbollah MP, Hassan Fadlallah said that Hezbollah will eliminate the “yellow line” declared by Israel in southern Lebanon, stressing that “no one will be able to disarm the party.”

In an interview with Agence France-Presse, Fadlallah said: “We will topple this yellow line through resistance, through our insistence on our legitimate right to defend ourselves and our country.”

He added: “The Israeli army’s attempt to establish a buffer zone, under the guise of a front line, a yellow line, and a green line—we will break all these lines. We will not accept any of them, and we will reach our villages on the internationally recognized borders, no matter the sacrifices, no matter the cost.”

“There will be no disarmament of the resistance, and no one in Lebanon or abroad will be able to disarm it”, he added.

He said that “it is in the interest of the President of the Republic to withdraw from the path of direct negotiations with Israel,” adding that Hezbollah wants the ceasefire to continue.

“It is in the interest of Lebanon, the President of the Republic, and the government to withdraw from the path of direct negotiations and return to a national consensus on the best option for Lebanon,” he said, describing the move toward direct negotiations as “a unilateral decision on a fateful matter related to Lebanon’s future.”

He added: “We will reject and confront any attempt to impose political prices on Lebanon through concessions offered to this Israeli enemy.”

Fadlallah added he wants the ceasefire to continue, alongside efforts to ensure the withdrawal of the occupation army, the return of displaced persons to their villages, the release of prisoners, and the launch of a reconstruction program.

For the first time since at least the launch of Operation Epic Fury on Feb. 28, an Iranian-linked vessel was interdicted in the Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) region, the Pentagon confirmed to The War Zone. The boarding of the Botswana-flagged oil tanker M/T Tifani came just days after Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Dan Caine told reporters, including from The War Zone, that the U.S. would “actively pursue any Iranian-flagged vessel or any vessel attempting to provide material support to Iran” anywhere in the world. The move also follows the U.S. firing on and seizing the Iranian cargo ship Touska on Sunday in the Arabian Sea.

Meanwhile, as the clock ticks down toward the end of a fragile ceasefire between the U.S and Iran, the future of peace negotiations remains very much uncertain, which we will discuss later in this story. 

“Overnight, U.S. forces conducted a right-of-visit, maritime interdiction and boarding of the stateless sanctioned M/T Tifani without incident in the INDOPACOM area of responsibility,” the Pentagon stated Tuesday morning on X.

 “As we have made clear, we will pursue global maritime enforcement efforts to disrupt illicit networks and interdict sanctioned vessels providing material support to Iran—anywhere they operate. 

International waters are not a refuge for sanctioned vessels. The Department of War will continue to deny illicit actors and their vessels freedom of maneuver in the maritime domain.”

Video released by the Pentagon shows about two dozen armed troops boarding two MH-60S Seahawk helicopters on a U.S. Navy Expeditionary Sea Base (ESB) ship. The video then cuts to the troops repelling onto the deck of the Tifani and searching that vessel.

The Pentagon did not say where the incident took place, however, according to MarineTraffic.com, the Tifani was last located yesterday in the Indian Ocean, about halfway between Sri Lanka and Indonesia and some 2,000 miles southeast of Iran.

The Pentagon told us that “multiple agencies” played a role in seizing the ship. We have reached out for additional details.

Gregory Brew, Senior Analyst, Iran and Oil for Eurasia Group, stated on X that the Tifani departed from Iran’s Kharg Island on April 5 and that the ship appears to have continued sailing on after the boarding. We asked the Pentagon for more details about the ship’s disposition and they referred us to the White House, which sent us back to the Pentagon.

The ship was sanctioned under a 2018 executive order issued by President Donald Trump during his first term designed to counter Iranian malign activities and prevent it from obtaining a nuclear weapon.

UPDATES

The status of peace talks in Pakistan remains murky. While Vice President JD Vance and other top officials are expected to leave for the negotiations today, Iranian officials have yet to officially commit. The main sticking points remain the future of Iran’s highly enriched uranium, the Strait of Hormuz, the status of its ballistic missile inventory and support for proxies like Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis of Yemen.

“A diplomatic source in Pakistan says no diplomatic delegation from Iran has been dispatched to Islamabad ‘so far,’” the official Iranian IRNA news agency stated on Tuesday. “In response to speculations about possible negotiations in Pakistan, a diplomatic source told IRNA on Tuesday that no delegation from Iran has arrived in the Pakistani capital.”

The source clarified that “neither official nor unofficial information has been received regarding any Iranian involvement in the negotiations in Islamabad.”

In a brief phone call, Trump told CNBC host Joe Kernan he thinks the U.S. is “going to end up with a great deal” with Iran to end the war, even as he said he does not expect to extend a ceasefire due to expire on Wednesday.

“I think they have no choice,” Trump said during an interview on CNBC’s “Squawk Box,” when asked what he expected to come out of a second round of peace negotiations with Iran. “We’ve taken out their navy, we’ve taken out their air force, we’ve taken out their leaders.”

The president added that he is ready to resume the conflict if a deal with Iran does not appear in the offing.

“Well, I expect to be bombing because I think that’s a better attitude to go in with – but we’re ready to go,” Trump answered when asked if he needs at least the prospect for a signed deal either today or tomorrow.

Trump also said “I don’t want to do that,” when asked if he would extend the ceasefire beyond tomorrow if talks with Iran appear promising.

April 19 (UPI) — South Korea’s Defense Ministry said North Korea test launched multiple, short-range ballistic missiles into the East Sea, also known as the Sea of Japan, Sunday morning.

“Detailed specifications are currently under close analysis by South Korean and U.S. intelligence authorities,” officials in Seoul said in a statement, according to ABC News.

“Our military is closely monitoring North Korea’s military activities under a firm combined defense posture and maintains an overwhelming capability and readiness to respond to any provocation.”

The Japan Times said the Defense Ministry of Japan also confirmed the activity.

“North Korea’s series of actions, including the repeated launches of ballistic missiles and other weapons, threaten the peace and security of Japan, the region and the international community,” the ministry said in a statement.

Newsweek said Pyongyang has increased its ballistic missile testing and nuclear weapons development since the conflict between the United States, Israel and Iran began nearly two months ago.

Sunday’s missile launches appear to have come from Sinpho, a coastal city in North Korea where submarines capable of launching such weapons are built.

Multiple ballistic missiles fired from eastern Sinpo area in seventh such test this year.

North Korea has launched multiple ballistic missiles towards the sea off its eastern coast, according to South Korea and Japan.

The incident on Sunday marked North Korea’s seventh ⁠ballistic missile launch this year and its fourth in April.

The missiles were fired near the city of Sinpo on North Korea’s east coast at about 6:10am on Sunday (21:10 GMT, Saturday), South Korea’s military said in a statement. It added that South Korea had bolstered its surveillance posture and was closely exchanging information with the United States and Japan.

Japan’s ⁠government posted on social media that the ballistic missiles were believed to have fallen near the east coast of the Korean Peninsula. No incursion into Japan’s exclusive economic zone was confirmed.

South Korea’s presidential office said it has held an emergency security meeting, according to media reports.

Such tests violate United Nations Security Council resolutions against North Korea’s missile programme. The diplomatically isolated country rejects the UN ban and says it infringes on its sovereign right to self-defence.

The launches come as China and the US prepare for a summit in mid-May, ⁠in which Chinese President ⁠Xi Jinping and his US counterpart, Donald Trump, are expected to discuss North Korea.

North Korea has made “very serious” advances in its ability to turn out nuclear weapons, with the probable addition of a new uranium enrichment facility, ‌International Atomic Energy Agency chief Rafael Grossi said on Wednesday.

Late last month, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un said his country’s status as a nuclear-armed ‌state ‌was irreversible and that expanding a “self-defensive nuclear deterrent” was essential to national security.

The EU’s special representative for the Gulf said Saturday that any lasting solution for the Middle East must be led by countries in the region rather than imposed from outside, Anadolu reports.

Speaking at a panel during the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in southern Turkiye, Luigi Di Maio said the current crisis in the Gulf is another sign of the “further erosion of international law.”

“If we want to try to find a solution for avoiding again another crisis, like the ongoing crisis or a wider crisis, a farther spillover, we need to work all together,” he said.

Di Maio said the EU remains committed to multilateralism and international law, while stressing that Europe does not want to be “part of this war.”

At the same time, he said European countries are supporting Gulf partners in self-defense, including intercepting drones and missiles from Iran under bilateral agreements.

READ: US, Iran likely on Monday to hold 2nd round for technical talks in Islamabad: Sources

He also warned that instability in the Gulf affects the wider world, not only because of oil and gas, but also due to trade in fertilizer, helium for semiconductors and other goods moving through the Strait of Hormuz.

Di Maio said the collapse of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal showed the importance of involving regional countries in negotiations.

“Every solution for the Middle East has to be a region-led process,” he said.

He said stronger connectivity and defense cooperation can make the region more resilient to future crises, adding that “autonomy does not mean isolation.”

He praised mediation efforts by Turkiye, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, saying they had helped secure a ceasefire and could contribute to a broader agreement.

READ: French soldier killed in attack on UN peacekeepers in southern Lebanon: Macron

There is another way to read the ongoing Middle East crisis, one that makes legible what standard analysis consistently struggles to explain. It begins not with capability but with the geometry of the system through which capability must travel to produce effects. The United States and its partners possess overwhelming military superiority over Iran, and that superiority is not in question, yet the conflict has produced a pattern that defies its logic. A superpower coalition has been unable to impose coherent strategic outcomes against an adversary operating through proxies, low-cost disruption, and the systematic exploitation of global commercial vulnerabilities.

Over the past two years, we have seen multiple instances of this kind of disruption with consequential effects on the global system. Houthi drones force the rerouting of global shipping, with Red Sea cargo volumes falling by roughly 50% through early 2024 as major carriers diverted around the Cape of Good Hope, adding up to two weeks to transit times, driving freight costs sharply higher across European markets, and costing Egypt nearly $800 million per month at peak in lost Suez Canal revenue. A non-state network spanning Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Gaza has absorbed sustained air campaigns, targeted eliminations of senior commanders, and repeated ground operations without losing its capacity to generate coordinated pressure across multiple theaters simultaneously. The asymmetry seems to follow a deliberate strategic logic that raw power analysis struggles to read, precisely because the conflict operates on a surface that capability assessments were never designed to map. What this suggests is that the decisive variable is not what actors possess but whether the relationships connecting them can transmit coordinated action when the system is under strain.

When that system cannot coordinate, something important breaks down. An alliance that formally exists but faces operational friction at every decision point ceases to be an alliance in any meaningful strategic sense. A security guarantee that cannot be transmitted rapidly to the partner it is meant to protect has, in effect, already failed its primary function. It follows that the gap between what a system formally is and what it can actually do under pressure is not a secondary consideration but the surface on which this conflict is being decided. Conventional analysis, calibrated to count warheads and assess intentions, consistently leaves this gap unmapped.

Analysts know that Saudi Arabia’s OPEC production decisions have repeatedly positioned Riyadh against Washington’s economic preferences, they know that European energy dependency complicates transatlantic alignment, and they know that Iran’s proxy network extends across five countries and absorbs military pressure without fracturing. Yet what the available frameworks cannot do is convert that knowledge into a structural reading of the system. They show that these conditions exist. What they cannot show is how those conditions interact, where they compound, and what the aggregate geometry of their interaction means for whether coordinated action is possible at all.

Power analysis was built to read capability differentials between states, and it does that well. Alliance theory was built to read the conditions under which formal commitments hold or fail, and it does that too. Neither, however, was built to read the operational weight of the ties through which capability and commitment must travel to produce effects.

The instruments available are calibrated to answer questions different from those the current situation poses. Deploying them on a problem they were not designed to read produces the consistent failure to explain what is actually happening that has marked analysis of this conflict from the start.

Adjacency mapping is an instrument designed to read that gap by mapping connectivity, by which I mean their operational weight, specifically their capacity to carry coordinated action under strain. What distinguishes it from standard approaches is its unit of analysis. Rather than the actors themselves, it treats the weight of the relationships as primary. The question it asks is not who holds power but whether the ties connecting power-holders can transmit that power when the system needs them to. Two states can be formally allied, operationally integrated in name, and structurally disconnected at the same time, and nothing in standard analysis will tell you which of those conditions is actually operative until the moment of crisis reveals it.

The instrument assigns each significant relationship in the system a weight between 0 and 1, reflecting how frequently the two actors interact operationally, how reliably information moves between them, how the tie has behaved under recent stress, and how quickly it transmits pressure when the system is under strain. At the higher end of the scale, a weight at or above 0.6 indicates that coordination approaches automaticity, and the tie carries load without constant investment to maintain it. Around 0.3, friction accumulates. In this setting, decisions require deliberate effort at every juncture, slowing the system and making it susceptible to gradual degradation that never triggers a visible rupture. At or below 0.2, the tie has effectively ceased to function as a transmission pathway, leaving the actors operationally disconnected regardless of what their formal relationship nominally says.

These weights are analytical judgements calibrated against observable evidence. In other words, their value lies in making visible what experienced analysts already carry as intuition and in giving that intuition a structure precise enough to argue about. The numbers are therefore analytical judgements, not measurements. A more rigorous application would derive them from quantifiable indicators across each dimension, including military interoperability, intelligence exchange depth, crisis responsiveness, economic interdependence, and signaling consistency, averaged and weighted systematically. That work lies beyond the scope of this piece, but the architecture is designed to accommodate it.

There is a risk management dimension to this reading that is worth making explicit. Standard geopolitical risk assessment focuses on actor-level variables such as regime stability, military capability, and leadership intentions. What adjacency mapping adds is a structural layer that those assessments typically miss. A coalition whose load-bearing relationships operate in the friction zone is exposed to a category of risk that capability assessments do not capture and that becomes visible only when the system is read structurally.

What the matrix adds is the ability to see how compound weakness across multiple relationships produces cascading effects that bilateral assessment alone would struggle to predict. A system whose dominant actor holds several weak partnerships faces more than friction. As a consequence, the geometry of those weaknesses determines whether any concerted response is structurally possible at all. Aggregate capability becomes, in that light, secondary to that question.

If we apply this to the Middle East security complex, the instrument produces one possible reading. This reading differs considerably from the picture conventional analysis generates. Its value is not in the precision of the numbers but in making the system’s geometry visible enough to argue about.

The matrix below maps operational connectivity across the system’s key actors. The numbers are analytical judgements, not measurements.

The geometry they make visible is what matters here.

The matrix is intentionally non-symmetric. Where operational influence flows asymmetrically between two actors, the weights reflect that directionality.

The matrix reveals, in this light, a system whose dominant actors are connected at fundamentally different weights. And more significantly, its most important bilateral relationship is operating in the friction zone. It’s formally excluded adversary has constructed the only alternative connectivity architecture in the system. What this implies is that the geometry of the conflict runs considerably deeper than standard alliance analysis tends to suggest.

On the coalition side, the US has high adjacency with Qatar, Bahrain, Israel, and Kuwait, ties that enable rapid coordination and require little maintenance, constituting the operational backbone of what Washington can actually activate quickly.

Its relationship with Saudi Arabia, however, sits at 0.4. That number is analytically more significant than almost anything else in the matrix. Saudi Arabia remains, on most readings, the relationship on which Gulf order coherence formally depends, the anchor of the security architecture since the 1970s, and it is operating in the friction zone where every significant decision requires renegotiation from scratch rather than flowing through an established channel. Saudi Arabia’s invitation to join BRICS in August 2023, yuan-denominated oil transactions with China, and its participation in the Chinese-brokered rapprochement with Iran in March 2023 all point in the same direction. Riyadh is hedging structurally toward China and the broader non-Western order, a posture that sits uneasily alongside its formal security alignment with Washington. Taken together, these are not isolated political episodes but evidence of a tie that has been operating below the coordination threshold for years and whose weakness is, on this reading, the system’s most consequential structural vulnerability.

Through the normalization architecture, the UAE has arguably become the system’s most structurally reliable node at 0.6 with both the US and Israel, its operational integration exceeding Saudi Arabia’s despite Saudi Arabia’s formal primacy. The Abraham Accords of September 2020 established the formal foundation for that integration. The operational depth it has since generated, across intelligence sharing, defence cooperation, and coordinated positioning on Iran, has made the UAE the coalition’s most functionally connected Gulf partner. Oman holds what is perhaps the system’s most anomalous position, meaningful adjacency with both the US coalition and Iran simultaneously, a profile no other state actor in the matrix replicates. That structural position gave Oman the back-channel role it played through the early phases of the conflict, with documented precedent in the secret US-Iran nuclear negotiations that began in Muscat in 2012 and ran through 2013. As the conflict has intensified, Pakistan has assumed the primary mediation function, but Oman’s position as a quiet facilitator has not disappeared; it has simply been supplemented by a node with more direct access to both capitals at this particular moment.

Pakistan has emerged as the conflict’s primary mediation node, hosting the highest-level direct negotiations between Washington and Tehran since 1979 and brokering the April 2026 ceasefire. That role reflects a structural position the matrix makes legible: high Saudi adjacency, a functioning Iran tie, and a rehabilitated relationship with Washington that no other regional actor currently combines. China’s influence over both Pakistani and Iranian decision-making operates as an exogenous pressure that the matrix only partially captures, and Pakistan’s own domestic constraints, including its difficulty developing direct channels with the IRGC, limit how far that mediation role can ultimately reach.

Iran’s position is where the matrix becomes most analytically revealing. Across the state actors in the system, Iran’s adjacency sits at or near fragmentation, built up through sanctions, absent operational channels, and decades of adversarial signalling that have left Tehran formally isolated from the coordination architecture the United States and its partners have constructed.

And yet the only high-weight tie Iran holds is with its proxy network at 0.7. That single number may go further toward explaining the architecture of the entire campaign than any other figure in the matrix.

It is an asymmetric relationship in which Tehran’s capacity to activate and direct exceeds the reverse influence those actors exert over Iranian strategic decisions. What that single structural condition implies goes further toward explaining the architecture of Iranian pressure operations than most analyses of Iranian intentions or capabilities tend to reach. Iran is geographically central and formally excluded. It is precisely that combination, positioned to apply pressure across every theatre while bearing none of the coordination costs that formal inclusion imposes. That, from this vantage point, is what makes legible a strategy that standard analysis, focused on actors and their capabilities, cannot see.

Seen through this lens, what Iran is doing across the region is something more structurally ambitious than a military campaign. It is attempting to restructure the matrix itself. The goal appears to be less about battlefield victory than about the gradual degradation of the ties connecting the United States to its regional partners, below the threshold at which coordinated response becomes automatic, eroding the will to keep paying the price of alignment while simultaneously building alternative adjacency in the nodes where US-aligned connectivity is weakest.

The Houthi campaign against Red Sea shipping is calibrated to stay below the threshold that would compel a unified military response. It introduces friction into the economic relationships connecting European states to the Gulf system, raising the cost of alignment with Washington’s regional posture without forcing the kind of direct confrontation that would unite the coalition. Strikes on Gulf infrastructure follow the same calibration, persistent enough to signal that the US security guarantee cannot insulate its partners from costs, yet restrained enough to avoid crossing the point at which coalition fragmentation becomes irrelevant because a unified response becomes compulsory. Across Iraq and Syria, simultaneous pressure from affiliated militias prevents the concentration of attention that sustained coalition coordination requires. In each case, the instrument targets a relationship rather than a capability, specifically the weight of the ties whose degradation would restructure the system’s geometry without requiring Iran to displace the existing order directly.

The US-Saudi tie at 0.4 is the primary focus of that degradation effort. Should that threshold be breached, Saudi Arabia hedges. As hedging reduces operational interactivity the tie weakens further. The process risks becoming self-reinforcing. Iranian military superiority over any individual partner is not required to sustain it.

The same logic extends across European actors, though not uniformly. Germany’s industrial exposure to energy price volatility, France’s residual strategic autonomy instinct, and the EU’s institutional preference for de-escalation all produce different thresholds for continued alignment with Washington. Their shared energy dependency gives them asymmetric stakes in the Gulf system’s stability, but their appetite for risk diverges from Washington’s in ways that are not identical across capitals, and each time Iran forces a decision about the cost of continued alignment, that divergence fragments the coalition’s coordination surface further.

By sustaining operational ties with non-state actors across the region, Iran is constructing alternative adjacency in precisely the nodes where US-aligned connectivity is weakest. These are populations and factions that the existing regional order has excluded from the dominant coalition’s coordination architecture. Deliberately so — Iran is building in the structural gaps the system leaves open. Displacing the existing order appears unnecessary. Becoming the more reliable pole of alignment for the actors that order has failed to integrate may be sufficient. All that is required is that the order fragment sufficiently at its margins for that offer to appear credible, and the current trajectory of US-Saudi friction and European hedging is steadily moving in that direction.

The coalition’s instruments are calibrated to military threats. The system, however, is failing along a different surface entirely, or so this reading suggests. The formal architecture remains largely intact, security guarantees have not been withdrawn, Gulf states remain formally aligned, and normalisation agreements hold. And yet the operational adjacency that gives that architecture its functional weight is under sustained pressure from an actor that has correctly identified the gap between formal commitment and operational tie as the system’s primary vulnerability. That identification is outpacing the coalition’s capacity to respond.

On this reading, the surface on which the conflict appears to be decided is not the one the coalition is defending.

What adjacency mapping reveals is a story about geometry. The system’s dominant actor holds formal commitments at weights the system cannot sustain under the pressure being applied to it. Its adversary, in turn, has built the only alternative coordination architecture in the space that those weakening ties leave open. The conflict is likely to be determined by which ties the system can no longer afford to lose under sustained and calibrated pressure. The question is whether the actors currently holding those ties in the friction zone can rebuild them to the coordination threshold before the process of degradation becomes irreversible. That is a question that capability assessments are not well-positioned to answer, and one that a structural reading of the system’s connectivity at least helps to make visible.

Modern warfare has dramatically changed as we have seen from the Russia-Ukraine war, conflicts involving Gaza, India and Pakistan, and the recent US-Israeli strikes on Iran. At the centre of this shift is a surging global reliance on drone and missile technology as well as advanced air defence systems.

Turkiye, one of the largest military powers in the Middle East, is increasingly positioning itself as a major supplier in the global defence sector. Central to this effort is Roketsan, a company founded in 1988 to supply the Turkish Armed Forces, which has since evolved into the country’s primary manufacturer of missile and rocket systems.

Currently exporting to approximately 50 countries, the firm is one of the fastest-growing defence companies globally.

So how did Roketsan secure a large share of the global arms trade?

Bypassing Western embargoes

Turkiye’s defence expansion was largely accelerated by restrictions placed upon it. Western embargoes aimed at halting its military advancement meant Ankara could not acquire the necessary technical systems or components.

In 2020, the United States imposed Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) restrictions on Turkiye – a key member of the transatlantic military alliance NATO. These sanctions targeted Turkiye’s military procurement agency, its chief Ismail Demir, and three other senior officials. Washington also ejected Ankara from the F-35 stealth jet programme in July 2019.

The measures came after Ankara purchased Russia’s S-400 missile defence system, which was seen as a potential threat to NATO security. The European Union also prepared limited sanctions and discussed restricting arms exports following energy exploration disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean.

To circumvent this, the country built an integrated, domestic defence ecosystem. Today, Turkiye relies on a vast supply chain of nearly 4,000 small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) scattered across the country. As a result, the Turkish defence industry now operates with a local production rate exceeding 90 percent.

This shift has yielded significant financial returns for Ankara. In 2025, Turkiye’s defence industry reported $10bn in exports. Roketsan’s General Manager Murat Ikinci told Al Jazeera that the company currently ranks 71st among global defence firms, with ambitions to break into the top 50, then the top 20, and ultimately the top 10.

To support this expansion, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan inaugurated several large-scale facilities last week, including:

• Europe’s largest warhead facility.
• new research and development (R&D) centre housing 1,000 engineers.
• the “Kirikkale” facility dedicated to rocket fuel technology.
• new infrastructure for the mass production of ballistic and cruise missiles.

These projects represent a $1bn investment, with the company planning to inject an additional $2bn to expand mass production capabilities.

The ‘Tayfun’ and modern warfare

Roketsan’s R&D strategy – which employs 3,200 engineers and makes the company the third-largest R&D institution in Turkiye – is heavily influenced by data gathered from ongoing global conflicts.

According to Ikinci, the war in Ukraine highlighted the impact of cheap, first-person view (FPV) and kamikaze drones supported by artificial intelligence. In response, Roketsan developed air defence systems like “ALKA” and “BURC,” alongside the “CIRIT” laser-guided missile.

The regional landscape was further complicated during the US-Israel war on Iran, as cheap Iranian-designed Shahed drones – recently upgraded by Russia with “Kometa-B” anti-jamming modules – overwhelmed defences and even struck a British base in Cyprus in March 2026. During the same month, NATO air defences were forced to intercept three Iranian ballistic missiles that entered Turkish airspace.

Meanwhile, the recent conflict between Israel and Iran showcased the use of complex attacks combining ballistic missiles with “swarms” of kamikaze drones designed to overwhelm air defences. This environment makes hypersonic technology a critical asset.

This brings the Tayfun (Typhoon) project into focus. Tayfun is a developing family of long-range ballistic missiles. Its most advanced iteration, the Tayfun Block 4, is a hypersonic missile engineered to penetrate advanced air defence systems by travelling at extreme speeds.

When Al Jazeera asked for specific details regarding the Tayfun’s exact operational range, Ikinci was elusive. “We avoid mentioning its range; we just say its range is sufficient,” he noted.

Similarly, historical Western sanctions have pushed Turkiye to form new cooperation initiatives, effectively accelerating an “Eastern shift” away from Western defence dependence. Turkish drones are now being used by a growing number of countries, including by Pakistan during its war against India last May.

Based on these threat assessments, Roketsan has prioritised five key areas of production:

1. long-range ballistic and cruise missiles.
2. air defence systems, including the “Steel Dome”, Hisar-A, Hisar-O, and Siper.
3. submarine-launched cruise missiles, utilising the AKYA system to leverage Turkiye’s large submarine fleet.
4. smart micro-munitions designed specifically for armed drones.
5. long-range air-to-air missiles, a need highlighted by the brief India-Pakistan skirmish.

A strategic export model

Unlike traditional arms procurement, Turkiye is marketing its defence industry to international buyers as a strategic partnership.

“Our offer to our partners… is as follows: Let’s produce together, let’s develop technology together,” Ikinci stated.

By establishing joint facilities and R&D centres in allied nations across the Middle East, the Far East, and Europe, Turkiye is attempting to secure long-term geopolitical alliances rather than purely transactional sales. Ikinci highlighted Qatar as a prime example of this model, describing it as a benchmark for technological, military, and security cooperation in the region.

Filling the global stockpile gap

This rapid expansion comes at a critical time for the global arms trade. Ongoing wars have severely depleted the stockpiles of advanced weapon systems worldwide.

During the recent US-Israel war on Iran, Washington relied heavily on multimillion-dollar Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems to intercept cheap Iranian drones targeting US assets across Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. With growing concerns that US interceptor supplies could run low, Gulf states – which have collectively detected over 1,000 drones in their airspace – are actively seeking alternative defence technologies, creating a highly lucrative opening for Turkiye’s missile industry.

Defence analyses indicate that even military superpowers like the US will require significant time to replenish their current air defence inventories due to the complexity and massive infrastructure required to build them.

Turkish defence officials view this shortage as a strategic opening. Having localised its supply chain, Turkiye claims it can manufacture and export these highly sought-after complex systems independently.

As global demand for air defence and ballistic technologies rises, Roketsan is aggressively reinvesting its revenues into production infrastructure to expand its footprint in the international arms market.

The U.S. Navy has finally confirmed that an MQ-4C Triton surveillance drone crashed back on April 9. The circumstances that led to the loss of the uncrewed aircraft remain unknown, but the incident has now been described as a mishap. The uncrewed aircraft had vanished unexpectedly from online flight tracking sites while flying over the Persian Gulf, but where exactly where it went down is unclear.

You can read more about what was already known about the fate of the MQ-4C in our initial reporting here.

Naval Safety Command’s latest publicly available mishap summary report, which appears to have been published today, includes the following brief entry:

“9 Apr 2026 (Location Withheld – OPSEC [Operational Security]) MQ-4C crashed, no injury to personnel.”

Not surprisingly, this is categorized as a Class A mishap, which is defined as one that causes more than $2 million in damages, results in one or more individuals dying or being permanently disabled, or any combination of the above. Navy budget documents last pegged the unit price of an MQ-4C at just over $238 million. As of 2025, the Navy had 20 of these drones in service in total, with plans to acquire seven more.

TWZ reached out to the Navy and CENTCOM for comment. The Navy directed us to contact CENTCOM, and the command declined to comment.

The MQ-4C was widely assumed to have gone down last week. Right before the flow of online tracking data stopped, a huge and sudden loss of altitude, from a typical cruising altitude of around 50,000 feet down to below 10,000 feet, was recorded. At the time, the drone looked to be heading back to its base at Naval Air Station Sigonella in Italy after completing a surveillance mission over the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz.

The drone’s transponder had also been broadcasting (or “squawking”) the code 7700, which is a general declaration of an in-flight emergency, at the time. However, as TWZ noted at the time, the code, by itself, does not provide details about the nature or severity of the emergency. There were also reports that the Triton had initially squawked 7400, a different code used to declare the drone had lost its connection with controllers on the ground.

As noted, where exactly the drone went down is not clear. It was last tracked flying in international airspace over the Persian Gulf in the direction of Iran, but there is no evidence it went down in that country.

It is also unknown what steps may have been taken, or still be underway, to recover the downed MQ-4C. Each one of the drones carries a powerful active electronically scanned array (AESA) multi-mode radar, electro-optical and infrared video cameras in a turret under the nose, and electronic support measures systems for collecting electronic intelligence passively. The Navy, in cooperation with prime contractor Northrop Grumman, has also been working to upgrade the signals intelligence suites on these drones in recent years.

If an adversary could recover any of these systems largely intact, it could represent a significant intelligence loss. Though there are no indications whatsoever that the MQ-4C went down due to hostile fire, recovery of the wreckage could still be of benefit for propaganda purposes, especially for Iran in the context of the latest conflict.

Iran did shoot down a Navy RQ-4 Broad Area Maritime Surveillance-Demonstrator (BAMS-D) drone while it was flying over the Gulf of Oman in 2019, and promptly put what remained of the uncrewed aircraft on display. The BAMS-D was a precursor to the MQ-4C. The Triton is derived from the core RQ-4 Global Hawk design, but is optimized for long-duration overwater missions.

South Korean stocks rose nearly 3 percent Tuesday to inch toward the 6,000-point mark on hopes for renewed negotiations between Washington and Tehran. The local currency sharply gained against the U.S. dollar.

The benchmark Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) added 159.13 points, or 2.74 percent, to close at 5,967.75, after reaching as high as 6,026,52.

The index swerved over and under the 6,000-point mark, marking the first such move since March 3, when the index traded at 6,180.45, the first trading day after the United States and Israel carried out air strikes on Iran on Feb. 28.

Trading volume was moderate at 881.9 billion shares worth 26.7 trillion won (US$18 billion), with gainers beating losers 669 to 197.

Foreigners and institutions scooped up a net 830 billion won and 1.25 trillion won, respectively, while individuals sold a net 2.4 trillion won.

The U.S. military began a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz on Monday after a breakdown of weekend talks in Islamabad, Pakistan, between Washington and Tehran.

However, Donald Trump said Iran wants to reach a deal with the U.S., raising hopes that the two sides could return to negotiations.

“Investors anticipate a second round of peace talks between the U.S. and Iran after Trump’s comments,” said Kang Jin-hyuk, an analyst at Kyobo Securities. “The Wall Street Journal also reported that the two sides have exchanged detailed terms on uranium enrichment, raising further hopes for a deal.”

Tech and financial shares led the rally.

Tech giant Samsung Electronics rose 2.74 percent to 206,500 won and SK hynix jumped 6.06 percent to 1.1 million won ahead of its first-quarter earnings report next week.

Major banking group Hana Financial Group increased 0.67 percent to 120,800 won and Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance added 3.82 percent to 489,500 won.

Top carmaker Hyundai Motor advanced 2.72 percent to 491,500 won and major gamemaker NC climbed 3.97 percent to 248,500 won.

Leading mobile carrier SK Telecom gained 3.24 percent to 95,500 won and retail giant Shinsegae rose 1.02 percent to 346,500 won.

However, defense shares went south as industry leader Hanwha Aerospace fell 0.46 percent to 1.52 million won and LIG D&A, formerly LIG Nex1, declined 0.53 percent to 934,000 won.

The local currency was quoted at 1,481.2 won against the greenback as of 3:30 p.m., up 8.1 won from the previous session.

Bond prices, which move inversely to yields, closed higher. The yield on three-year Treasurys fell 4.3 basis points to 3.339 percent, and the return on the benchmark five-year government bonds dropped 3.5 basis points to 3.519 percent.

Copyright (c) Yonhap News Agency prohibits its content from being redistributed or reprinted without consent, and forbids the content from being learned and used by artificial intelligence systems.

April 13 (Asia Today) — Middle Eastern nations are accelerating efforts to secure missile defense systems, with growing demand for South Korean interceptors as regional threats intensify.

Countries including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar are seeking faster deliveries of South Korea’s Cheongung-II system, also known as M-SAM, following recent large-scale missile attacks linked to Iran.

Industry officials said Gulf states have made urgent inquiries to LIG Nex1 and affiliates of Hanwha Group about expediting delivery schedules.

The Cheongung-II system is produced by LIG Nex1 as the prime contractor, with Hanwha Aerospace manufacturing launchers and Hanwha Systems providing radar components.

A report by The Wall Street Journal said Gulf countries are increasingly looking beyond U.S. suppliers and viewing South Korea as a key alternative source of missile defense systems.

The United Arab Emirates signed a contract worth about $3.5 billion in 2022 for multiple Cheongung-II batteries, while Saudi Arabia reached a $3.2 billion deal in 2024, according to the report.

At the same time, Israel is ramping up production of its Arrow missile defense system as interceptor stockpiles are strained by repeated attacks.

According to Israel’s Defense Ministry, Israel Aerospace Industries has begun accelerating production to several times normal levels after facing sustained missile and drone attacks from Iran and Houthi forces in Yemen.

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said strengthening missile defense capabilities is critical to national security, as concerns grow over potential shortages of interceptor missiles.

Analysts warn the situation highlights a broader challenge for countries facing missile threats, including South Korea.

Experts say a large-scale barrage using low-cost missiles or artillery could quickly deplete high-cost interceptors, underscoring the need for larger stockpiles and more cost-effective defense systems.

A senior South Korean defense industry official said the country should expand reserves of key systems such as Cheongung-II and long-range surface-to-air missiles, while maintaining a balance between exports and domestic needs.

There are also growing calls to accelerate development of next-generation systems, including laser-based air defense technologies designed to reduce interception costs.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260413010003773

A pair of Avenger class mine-hunters homeported in Japan have been tracked sailing westward out of the Pacific Ocean in recent days. This comes as President Trump and other officials say an operation is taking shape to clear Iranian mines from the Strait of Hormuz, which will be essential to fully reopening that critical waterway. The United States has also now announced a blockade of all of Iran’s ports.

Until last year, the Navy had four Avenger class ships forward-deployed in the Middle East for exactly this mission. A trio of Independence class Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) configured for minesweeping duties subsequently took their place. However, those ships were redeployed from Bahrain ahead of the latest conflict with Iran, and two of them then emerged unexpectedly in Southeast Asia last month. While getting them out of the Persian Gulf was a prudent security measure, it remains unclear why the decision was made to send them literally to the other side of the globe amid the obvious threat of Iran mining the highly strategic Strait of Hormuz. One of them, the USS Tulsa, was also recently spotted sailing west after weeks in port in Singapore.

The Avenger class USS Chief and USS Pioneer were spotted arriving in Singapore on April 8, and they were seen leaving heading west on April 10. This represents half of the Avenger class ships still in Navy inventory, all of which are forward-deployed in Sasebo, Japan.

Online ship tracking site MarineTraffic subsequently showed both Avenger class ships heading northwest through the Strait of Malacca. There are unconfirmed reports that Chief and Pioneer arrived at Ao Makham port in Phuket, Thailand, earlier today. Their final destination is unknown, but USNI News had reported over the weekend that they had been “dispatched toward U.S. Central Command.”

USS Tulsa was also tracked sailing northwest in the Strait of Malacca on April 3, which we will come back to in a moment.

“U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) forces began setting conditions for clearing mines in the Strait of Hormuz,” the command had said in a press release on April 11. The Arleigh Burke class destroyers “USS Frank E. Peterson (DDG 121) and USS Michael Murphy (DDG 112) transited the Strait of Hormuz and operated in the Arabian Gulf as part of a broader mission to ensure the strait is fully clear of sea mines previously laid by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.”

Questions have been raised about the exact purpose of sending USS Frank E. Peterson and USS Michael Murphy through the Strait, and whether either ship actually made a full transit. Michael Murphy was tracked online sailing on the Persian Gulf side, at least briefly. Neither of the destroyers are outfitted for mine clearance missions, though they do have powerful sonars that might be able to help spot mines.

“Additional U.S. forces, including underwater drones, will join the clearance effort in the coming days,” CENTCOM’s release over the weekend added, but did not further elaborate.

“We’re also bringing in more traditional minesweepers” as part of efforts to clear the Strait of Hormuz, President Trump told Fox News yesterday. He also said several times this weekend that mine-clearing operations were already underway in some form.

U.S. President Donald J. Trump said earlier that the U.S. is now in the process of clearing the Strait of Hormuz of mines, following reports that U.S. naval vessels transited the strait this morning. According to President Trump, during Operation Epic Fury, 28 Iranian mine laying… pic.twitter.com/fQGHDAmOES

— OSINTdefender (@sentdefender) April 11, 2026

CENTCOM declined to comment when we reached out today for more details about the planned force package for the mine clearance mission. TWZ has also reached out to the Navy’s main headquarters in the Pacific for more information about the movement of the Avenger class ships.

Before the latest conflict with Iran broke out in February, the Navy had three Independence class LCSs outfitted for mine countermeasures missions – Tulsa and Santa Barbara, along with the USS Canberra – forward-deployed in Bahrain. The arrival of those ships last year was tied to the long-planned decommissioning of four Avenger class vessels that had been homeported in that Middle Eastern country for decades beforehand. It is unclear how many LCSs the Navy otherwise has that are currently configured for minessweeping missions.

As noted, Tulsa and Santa Barbara subsequently emerged in Southeast Asia, first in Malaysia and then in Singapore, last month. USS Canberra‘s location remains uncertain, but it was reported to be sailing in the Indian Ocean as of March 19.

It should also be stated that the Independence class LCS is a much more modern ship than the Avenger class. When configured for the minesweeping mission, the LCSs also bring new standoff mine countermeasures capabilities, including Common Unmanned Surface Vehicle (CUSV) drone boats and helicopter-borne systems. Still, questions continue to be raised about whether the Independence class vessels are adequate replacements for the older, but purpose-built Avengers. You can read more about this here.

CUSV®

Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS) Video

It is possible that the USS Chief and the USS Pioneer are in Southeast Asia now for exercises or other reasons. Japan-based Avenger class ships have traveled to Thailand, specifically, as well as other countries across the Pacific, to train with allied and partner forces in the past.

That being said, the movements of Chief and Pioneer in the region, as well as Tusla‘s departure from Singapore, did come right around CENTCOM’s explicit statement that more U.S. forces were heading to the Middle East to help with mine-clearing efforts. Furthermore, as already mentioned, the quartet of Avenger class ships in Japan, as well as LCSs that have been in Singapore recently, represent the bulk of vessels specifically outfitted for minesweeping duties that the Navy has available anywhere globally. Any mine-clearing operation in and around the Strait of Hormuz will include other naval vessels, as well.

As an aside, the Navy’s Lewis. B. Puller class Expeditionary Sea Base (ESB) ship USS John L. Canley, which is homeported in the U.S. Pacific territory of Saipan, was also spotted heading west past Singapore on March 23. That ship was subsequently tracked sailing in the Indian Ocean, raising questions about whether it might be headed to the Middle East, as well. None of the Navy’s three other ESBs has been observed heading toward that region recently.

USNS John L Canley and USNS Alan Shepherd passing Singapore just now heading to the Middle East

John L Canley is at Expeditionary Transfer Dock, seemingly carrying an Osprey and 3 Seahawk helicopters on top and then the Alan Shepherd is a dry Cargo vessel

Photo by me pic.twitter.com/anLsxJJDT1

— Singapore Ship Spotting (@sgshipspotting) March 23, 2026

A crisis scenario in and around the Persian Gulf, especially one involving Iran mining the Strait of Hormuz or otherwise threatening that critical waterway, was central to the Navy’s decision to acquire the ESBs in the first place. From the start, a key mission for the sea base ships has been serving, in part, as launch platforms for MH-53E Sea Dragon mine-hunting helicopters. At the same time, the Navy MH-53E fleet has dwindled in recent years to a single squadron, and the type is set to be completely retired by the end of 2027. Canley was seen with an apparent load of V-22 Osprey tiltrotors and MH-60 Seahawk helicopters on its deck as it passed by Singapore last month.

There has been talk in the past about ESBs acting as motherships for Avenger class mine-hunters. Canley be used to launch and recover uncrewed surface vessels (USV) and uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUV) as part of minesweeping and other operations, as well. In the context of the current blockade of Iranian ports, the ship could have a separate role as a valuable platform for staging visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) operations and otherwise supporting the current blockade of Iranian ports.

When it comes to the mission to clear Iranian naval mines, additional warships, as well as aircraft, will be needed just to provide critical force protection. This was already underscored by CENTCOM sending the two Arleigh Burke class destroyers through the Strait of Hormuz over the weekend. In February, before the war with Iran erupted, TWZ also called attention to the importance of force protection in these operations after A-10 Warthog ground attack aircraft conducted an exercise with the USS Santa Barbara in the Persian Gulf. A-10s have been prowling the Strait of Hormuz as part of operations against Iran.

How many naval mines Iran has actually laid, and of what types, is murky. In March, CBS News reported Iranian forces had seeded a number of Maham 3 and Maham 7 mines in and around the Strait of Hormuz. The Maham 3 is a so-called “influence mine,” designed to be triggered by the acoustic and/or magnetic signatures of a passing vessel, and that is moored in place. The Maham 7 is also an influence mine, but that sits on the seabed, and is therefore intended to be employed in shallower waters where it can still be set off by a ship sailing above. Naval analyst H. I. Sutton has more details on these and other Iranian naval mines here. Last Friday, The New York Times reported that Iran had lost track of the disposition of at least some of the mines it had laid, and that this was hampering efforts to reopen the Strait, citing unnamed U.S. officials.

Sweeping for naval mines is a slow-going and complex affair, in general, that carries significant risks even in benign environments. The dangers in case of the Strait of Hormuz are magnified now by the U.S. blockade of Iranian ports and the potential for the full resumption of hostilities with the regime in Tehran. U.S. and Iranian officials met this weekend in Pakistan following the announcement of a ceasefire last week. However, those talks ended after a day without any substantive progress toward a diplomatic resolution of the current conflict.

In the meantime, despite extensive U.S. and Israeli strikes over the past six weeks, Iran is still understood to have a significant array of capabilities, including anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles, kamikaze drones, and uncrewed explosive-laden boats, that it could also use to turn the Strait of Hormuz into a super weapons engagement zone. TWZ previously explored these threats in greater detail in the context of past discussions about U.S. warships escorting commercial ships in and out of the Persian Gulf.

More about the mission to clear Iranian naval mines, including whether Japan-based Avenger class ships will take part and if the LCSs will finally return from the Pacific Theater, should become clearer in the coming days.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Standing in front of a map of the Middle East, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu describes how six countries ‘wanted to strangle us’ but instead ‘we strangled them… and we have more to do’. Ambassadors from Israel and Lebanon are set to hold talks in Washington DC on Tuesday, but they’ve issued conflicting statements on what will be discussed.

April 10 (Asia Today) — Bank of Korea Gov. Rhee Chang-yong said Thursday that uncertainty in the Middle East is having a greater impact on South Korea’s economy than interest rate policy, calling for a cautious, wait-and-see approach.

Speaking after a monetary policy meeting, Rhee said policymakers should first assess how the Middle East situation and related negotiations unfold before making decisions on rates.

“There was little discussion about raising or lowering rates, and many members agreed to monitor the situation for now,” he said.

The central bank held its benchmark interest rate steady at 2.50%, marking a seventh consecutive freeze since July.

Markets had expected that rising oil prices linked to the Middle East conflict could push inflation higher and prompt a policy shift. Consumer prices rose 2.2% in March, up 0.2 percentage points from a month earlier, adding to upward pressure.

Rhee dismissed concerns about stagflation – a combination of slowing growth and rising prices – as unlikely if the current crisis is resolved soon.

“If the situation ends at this point, the possibility of stagflation is low,” he said, while warning that unpredictable developments could still lead to a worst-case scenario.

He highlighted potential damage to Iran’s energy infrastructure as a key variable, noting that prolonged disruptions could weigh on South Korea’s economy even after the crisis subsides.

The central bank also indicated that this year’s economic growth could fall below its February forecast of 2.0%, citing weaker sentiment and production disruptions since March despite earlier gains from exports and consumption.

Inflation, however, is expected to exceed the earlier projection of 2.2% due to higher global oil prices.

Rhee gave a generally positive assessment of the government’s supplementary budget, which relies on excess tax revenue rather than bond issuance, easing concerns about fiscal stability.

However, he expressed concern that about 5 trillion won (about $3.7 billion) of the budget is allocated to local education funding under existing rules, suggesting the need to review whether such allocations are appropriate during an economic slowdown.

On exchange rates, Rhee said the value of the Korean won should be assessed relative to the U.S. Dollar Index rather than focusing solely on the won-dollar rate, noting that short-term fluctuations can be driven by domestic supply and demand factors.

Thursday’s meeting was Rhee’s final rate-setting session before his term ends April 20.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260410010003215

THE Iran crisis is continuing to affect travel with airlines having to stop flights to the Middle East.

British Airways is scheduled to start flying back to the likes of Dubai and Doha in July – but has announced it will drop one service completely.

BA will drop its service from London Heathrow to Jeddah in Saudi Arabia permanently from April 24, 2026.

The airline had been operating a four flights a week service since November 2024.

But a shift in demand, due to the conflict in the Middle East, has led to the airline terminating the service.

However, British Airways is set to resume flying to the Middle East next month with flights to Riyadh restarting in mid-May.

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It is also scheduled to start flying to Dubai, Doha and Tel Aviv on July 1 at the earliest.

But these services will be reduced from what they were before the conflict began.

Flights to Dubai will go from three each day to one daily flight while services to Doha, Tel Aviv and Riyadh will drop from two flights to just one a day.

Flights to the city of Larnaca in Cyprus are scheduled to resume on May 22.

Meanwhile, services to Bahrain and the city of Amman in Jordan, are paused until October 25.

British Airways said: “Due to the ongoing situation in the Middle East, we have made further changes to our flying schedule to provide greater clarity for our customers.

“We’re keeping the situation under constant review and are directly in touch with affected customers to offer them a range of options.”

Due to its reduced flight schedule, BA has said it will use its freed up aircraft to head to other destinations like India and Kenya.

It will begin daily flights to Bengaluru in India and Nairobi in Africa during the summer season until late October.

It will operate a third daily service from London Heathrow to Delhi until May 31.

The airline will add its third daily flight from London Heathrow to Mumbai from May 15 to 31.

Here’s more on another major airline that has axed hundreds of flights until end of summer amid fuel cost crisis.

And one domestic airline has cancelled its London flights for rest of the season due to ongoing fuel crisis.

Israeli settlers stormed the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound in occupied East Jerusalem shortly after it reopened following 40 days of closure.

The UNIFIL announced that an investigation has concluded that three Indonesian peacekeepers were killed by a shell fired from an Israeli tank.

According to UNIFIL, analysis of the impact site and recovered shrapnel confirmed that the projectile was a 120mm shell fired from an Israeli Merkava tank, launched from the east toward the town of Taybeh.

The mission noted that it had previously provided the Israeli army with the coordinates of all its positions and facilities on 6^th March and again on 22^nd March, as part of efforts to reduce risks to its personnel.

In a related incident, UNIFIL reported that the Israeli army detained one of its peacekeepers after intercepting a logistics convoy, before releasing him less than an hour later following urgent contacts by UN command.

The mission condemned the detention as a “flagrant violation of international law,” stressing that any obstruction of peacekeeping operations breaches UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which guarantees freedom of movement for UN forces in southern Lebanon.

Separately, UNIFIL confirmed that another peacekeeper was killed on 29^th March when a shell struck a UN position near Adshit al-Qusayr, with another seriously wounded. At the time, the source of the shell was unknown, prompting the investigation.

The findings come amid ongoing Israeli aggression on Lebanon and heightened risks facing UN peacekeeping forces operating in the area.

Around 3,000 worshippers entered Al-Aqsa for the morning prayer on Thursday, after Israel lifted restrictions.

The Al-Aqsa Mosque compound in occupied East Jerusalem has reopened to Palestinian worshippers after a 40-day closure by Israel.

Video verified by Al Jazeera showed Palestinians streaming through its gates early on Thursday morning. Around 3,000 worshippers attended  morning prayers.

Access had been completely prohibited, or restricted to a few dozen faithful at Christian, Jewish and Muslim sites following the outbreak of the US-Israeli war on Iran on February 28. Israel often imposes restrictions, especially on Palestinian worshippers.

The Islamic Waqf Department in occupied Jerusalem confirmed that the doors of Al-Aqsa would be reopened to all worshippers from dawn. The Jordanian-affiliated religious authority responsible for managing the mosque did not provide further details.

Video from earlier showed volunteers and caretakers in courtyards and prayer areas preparing to receive worshippers and holding religious rites.

Israeli authorities announced the opening of the mosque and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in occupied Jerusalem on Wednesday evening.

Israeli police attributed the opening of holy sites to what it called “updated instructions from the Israeli Home Front Command”.

The statement noted intensive security reinforcements, including hundreds of police officers and border guards in the alleys of the Old City of Jerusalem and roads leading to the holy sites, aimed at “securing visitors”.

Jerusalem and its holy sites have been subjected to strict security measures and frequent closures during the regional war of the past six weeks.

The restrictions subdued Lent, Passover and Ramadan celebrations for many in some of the holiest sites for Christianity, Islam and Judaism.

Authorities also prevented Eid al-Fitr prayers at Al-Aqsa this year – the first such restriction since Israel’s occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967.

But the bans have been lifted just in time for Orthodox Christians, who celebrate Easter on Sunday, a week after Catholic and Protestants.

No let up in raids in occupied West Bank

Israeli raids have continued across the occupied West Bank.

Israeli forces detained a woman and assaulted a man during an early Thursday raid in Nablus, the Palestinian news agency Wafa reported.

The Ramallah-based Palestinian health ministry separately said Israeli forces fatally shot a Palestinian man near the village of Tayasir in the northern West Bank on Wednesday night.

The ministry said 28-year-old Alaa Khaled Mohammed Sbeih “was shot and killed” by Israeli forces, while the Israeli military said an off-duty soldier fired at a stone-thrower.

Wafa said six young men were detained in a raid on the village of Tayasir, while in Ya’bad, south of Jenin, Israeli troops stormed several homes at dawn, destroying the contents of three houses. Forces also raided the villages of Qusra and Awarta, but no arrests were reported there.

Attacks by Israeli forces across Gaza and the occupied West Bank have continued, along with Israel’s wars on Iran and Lebanon.

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) says more than 1,100 Palestinians have been killed by Israeli forces and settlers in the occupied West Bank since 2023, with at least 10,000 forcibly displaced.