East

Every major war in the Middle East has left the region permanently altered in ways that nobody fully anticipated at the time. The 1948 Arab-Israeli war created a refugee crisis whose consequences are still being negotiated seventy-eight years later. The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran reorganized the entire regional security architecture around a new fault line that nobody had planned for. The 2003 US invasion of Iraq created a vacuum that Iran filled faster and more effectively than anyone in Washington had anticipated, reshaping the balance of power across the Levant in ways that took a decade to fully understand.

The 2026 Iran war belongs in that category. Not because the outcome is clear, it is not, and the ceasefire that is currently holding is fragile enough that anyone claiming certainty about what comes next is not paying close enough attention. But because the war has already crossed several thresholds that cannot be uncrossed, set several precedents that will shape behavior for years, and broken several assumptions that the regional order was quietly depending on without anyone fully acknowledging it.

Here are seven dynamics that will define the Middle East that emerges from this war, whenever the shooting finally stops for good.

1.      Iran Survives, But the Rules It Played By Are Gone

2.      The Gulf Has Been Permanently Unsettled

3.      The Normalization Project Is Frozen

4.      The US-Israel Relationship Has a New Fracture

5.      China Emerged as the Indispensable Power

6.      The Nuclear Domino Is Now Spinning

7.      The Gulf’s Self-Image Is Broken, and Rebuilding It Will Take a Generation

The video is horrifying, though it is the kind of horror now synonymous with the behavior of Israel, its military, its armed settlers, and society that has been conditioned to see the ‘other’ as subhuman.

Yet, this was not the typical viral video that emerges almost daily from occupied Palestine. The victim, this time, was not a Palestinian. She was an elderly French nun.  

On May 1, footage surfaced from Jerusalem showing a 36-year-old Israeli man running behind a French nun—a researcher at the French School of Biblical and Archaeological Research—and shoving her violently to the ground. 

In a chilling display of cruelty, the assailant did not simply hit and run. He walked away a few paces, then returned to the fallen woman to kick her repeatedly and mercilessly as she lay helpless.  

What was most astonishing was the sense of normalcy that followed. The assailant remained on the scene, conversing with another man who appeared entirely unperturbed by what should have been a devastating event in any other context. 

The video briefly imposed itself on the mainstream media scene, garnering perfunctory condemnations. Many explained the event as part of the larger landscape of Israeli violence, highlighting the ongoing genocide in Gaza as the most obvious example of this unchecked aggression.

But even the context of general violence does not fully explain why a French nun was targeted. She is not dark-skinned, she is European, she is Christian, and she holds no historical or territorial claims that would typically trigger the ‘security’ paranoia of the Zionist state. 

READ: Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem files complaint over Israeli occupiers’ encroachments on church-owned lands in West Bank

Still, the incident was anything but ‘isolated,’ despite the rush by Israeli officials to label it a ‘shameful’ exception. To the contrary, the nun was attacked specifically because she is Christian. 

This raises the question: why? 

To answer this, we must acknowledge how Palestinian Christians have been systematically written out of the history of their own land.  

Palestinian Christians are not merely present in the land; they are among the most historically rooted communities in Palestine. They are anything but ‘foreigners’ or ‘bystanders’ caught in a supposed religious conflict between Jews and Muslims. 

In fact, the Christian Arab presence in Palestine predates the Islamic era by centuries. They are the descendants of historic tribes who shaped the region’s identity long before the advent of modern political labels.  

The marginalization of Palestinian Christians is a relatively new phenomenon, deeply linked to Western colonialism. For centuries, European powers used the pretense of ‘protecting’ Christian communities to justify their own imperial interventions. 

Consequently, this framed the native Christian not as a sovereign Arab with agency, but as a ward of the West—a narrative that effectively stripped them of their indigenous status and alienated them from their own national fabric in the eyes of the world.

Zionism added a lethal layer to this erasure. It has often projected itself as a ‘protector’ of Christians to avoid raising the ire of its Western backers. 

In reality, Palestinian Christians have been subjected to the same policies of ethnic cleansing, racism, and military occupation as their Muslim brothers and sisters. How else can we explain the catastrophic dwindling of the Christian population? 

Before the 1948 Nakba, Palestinian Christians made up roughly 12% of the population. Today, that number has plummeted to a mere 1%. During the Nakba alone, tens of thousands were expelled from their homes in West Jerusalem, Haifa, and Jaffa, their properties looted and their communities dismantled.  

A quick look at the map of Jerusalem and Bethlehem today tells the story of an ongoing erasure. Jerusalem is being systematically emptied of its native population, both Christian and Muslim. Christian properties and houses of worship are restricted, and the ‘Little Town’ of Bethlehem has been swallowed by a ring of illegal settlements and an 8-meter-high Apartheid Wall that has transformed the birthplace of Christ into an open-air prison. 

Yet, despite this, we rarely hear about the struggle for survival of Palestinian Christians. Instead, the world occasionally glimpses ‘incidents’—like the common habit of Jewish extremists spitting on foreign pilgrims and clergy in Jerusalem. This behavior has become so normalized that Israeli ministers, such as Itamar Ben-Gvir, have previously defended the act as an “ancient custom” that should not be criminalized.  

The reason the Palestinian Christian story is rarely told is that it fails to factor neatly into the convenient narratives used by Western governments. They are keen on presenting the ‘conflict’ as a Jewish state fighting for its identity against a monolithic ‘Islamic’ threat. Israel is heavily invested in this same ‘Clash of Civilizations’ trope, positioning itself as the vanguard of “Western civilization” against Arab extremism.

READ: Israeli army demolishes Christian monastery, nuns’ school in southern Lebanon

But some Palestinians—Muslim and Christian alike—are, to a lesser degree, also guilty of falling into this trap. The former often frame the Palestinian resistance as an exclusively Muslim struggle; meanwhile, some Christians participate in the very discourse that led to their marginalization in the first place. 

The Gaza genocide, however, has proven this logic not only erroneous but unsustainable. Throughout the slaughter, Israel has destroyed over 800 mosques, but it has not spared the Christian sanctuaries. 

On October 19, 2023, an Israeli airstrike targeted a building within the compound of the Church of Saint Porphyrius—one of the oldest churches in the world. 

In that massacre, 18 Palestinian Christians were killed, their blood mixing with the dust of a sanctuary that had stood for 1,600 years. It was a devastating reminder that the Israeli missile does not distinguish between a mosque and a church, nor between the blood of a Muslim and a Christian. 

The story of the French nun is worth every bit of the attention it received, as is the targeting of pilgrims. But as the headlines move on, we must remember that Palestinian Christians endure a suffering that is collective and rooted in the very soil of Palestine. They are now an endangered community, and Israel is the culprit. Without them, Palestine is not the same. 

The Palestinian homeland is only whole when it is the cradle of religious coexistence, and Palestinian Christians sit at the very heart of that history, dating back two millennia. Their survival is not a ‘minority issue’—it is the survival of Palestine itself.  

OPINION: Subjects of empire: Breaking the cycle of Arab dependency on US elections

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

Last week, a prominent Saudi Sheikh, Mohammed Al-Issa, visited the Auschwitz concentration camp in Poland to commemorate the 75th anniversary of its liberation, which signalled the end of the Nazi Holocaust. Although dozens of Muslim scholars have visited the site, where about one million Jews were killed during World War Two, according to the Auschwitz Memorial Centre’s press office, Al-Issa is the most senior Muslim religious leader to do so.

Visiting Auschwitz is not a problem for a Muslim; Islam orders Muslims to reject unjustified killing of any human being, no matter what their faith is. Al-Issa is a senior ally of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS), who apparently cares little for the sanctity of human life, though, and the visit to Auschwitz has very definite political connotations beyond any Islamic context.

By sending Al-Issa to the camp, Bin Salman wanted to show his support for Israel, which exploits the Holocaust for geopolitical colonial purposes. “The Israeli government decided that it alone was permitted to mark the 75th anniversary of the Allied liberation of Auschwitz [in modern day Poland] in 1945,” wrote journalist Richard Silverstein recently when he commented on the gathering of world leaders in Jerusalem for Benjamin Netanyahu’s Holocaust event.

READ: Next up, a Saudi embassy in Jerusalem 

Bin Salman uses Al Issa for such purposes, as if to demonstrate his own Zionist credentials. For example, the head of the Makkah-based Muslim World League is leading rapprochement efforts with Evangelical Christians who are, in the US at least, firm Zionists in their backing for the state of Israel. Al-Issa has called for a Muslim-Christian-Jewish interfaith delegation to travel to Jerusalem in what would, in effect, be a Zionist troika.

Zionism is not a religion, and there are many non-Jewish Zionists who desire or support the establishment of a Jewish state in occupied Palestine. The definition of Zionism does not mention the religion of its supporters, and Israeli writer Sheri Oz, is just one author who insists that non-Jews can be Zionists.

Mohammad Bin Salman and Netanyahu – Cartoon [Tasnimnews.com/Wikipedia]

We should not be shocked, therefore, to see a Zionist Muslim leader in these trying times. It is reasonable to say that Bin Salman’s grandfather and father were Zionists, as close friends of Zionist leaders. Logic suggests that Bin Salman comes from a Zionist dynasty.

This has been evident from his close relationship with Zionists and positive approaches to the Israeli occupation and establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, calling it “[the Jews’] ancestral homeland”. This means that he has no issue with the ethnic cleansing of almost 800,000 Palestinians in 1948, during which thousands were killed and their homes demolished in order to establish the Zionist state of Israel.

“The ‘Jewish state’ claim is how Zionism has tried to mask its intrinsic Apartheid, under the veil of a supposed ‘self-determination of the Jewish people’,” wrote Israeli blogger Jonathan Ofir in Mondoweiss in 2018, “and for the Palestinians it has meant their dispossession.”

As the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Bin Salman has imprisoned dozens of Palestinians, including representatives of Hamas. In doing so he is serving Israel’s interests. Moreover, he has blamed the Palestinians for not making peace with the occupation state. Bin Salman “excoriated the Palestinians for missing key opportunities,” wrote Danial Benjamin in Moment magazine. He pointed out that the prince’s father, King Salman, has played the role of counterweight by saying that Saudi Arabia “permanently stands by Palestine and its people’s right to an independent state with occupied East Jerusalem as its capital.”

UN expert: Saudi crown prince behind hack on Amazon CEO 

Israeli journalist Barak Ravid of Israel’s Channel 13 News reported Bin Salman as saying: “In the last several decades the Palestinian leadership has missed one opportunity after the other and rejected all the peace proposals it was given. It is about time the Palestinians take the proposals and agree to come to the negotiations table or shut up and stop complaining.” This is reminiscent of the words of the late Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban, one of the Zionist founders of Israel, that the Palestinians “never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.”

Bin Salman’s Zionism is also very clear in his bold support for US President Donald Trump’s deal of the century, which achieves Zionist goals in Palestine at the expense of Palestinian rights. He participated in the Bahrain conference, the forum where the economic side of the US deal was announced, where he gave “cover to several other Arab countries to attend the event and infuriated the Palestinians.”

US President Donald Trump looks over at Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia Mohammad bin Salman al-Saud as they line up for the family photo during the opening day of Argentina G20 Leaders’ Summit 2018 at Costa Salguero on 30 November 2018 in Buenos Aires, Argentina [Daniel Jayo/Getty Images]

While discussing the issue of the current Saudi support for Israeli policies and practices in Palestine with a credible Palestinian official last week, he told me that the Palestinians had contacted the Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro to ask him not to relocate his country’s embassy to Jerusalem. “The Saudis have been putting pressure on us in order to relocate our embassy to Jerusalem,” replied the Brazilian leader. What more evidence of Mohammad Bin Salman’s Zionism do we need?

The founder of Friends of Zion Museum is American Evangelical Christian Mike Evans. He said, after visiting a number of the Gulf States, that, “The leaders [there] are more pro-Israel than a lot of Jews.” This was a specific reference to Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince, and his counterpart in the UAE, Mohammed Bin Zayed.

“All versions of Zionism lead to the same reactionary end of unbridled expansionism and continued settler colonial genocide of [the] Palestinian people,” Israeli-American writer and photographer Yoav Litvin wrote for Al Jazeera. We may well see an Israeli Embassy opened in Riyadh in the near future, and a Saudi Embassy in Tel Aviv or, more likely, Jerusalem. Is Mohammad Bin Salman a Zionist? There’s no doubt about it.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

Paris seeks to repair economic and security ties while countering rising anti-French sentiment across Africa.

French President Emmanuel Macron has started a tour of East Africa as Paris seeks to rebuild its influence on the continent after a series of setbacks, especially in its former West African colonies.

Macron began the three-country tour in Egypt on Saturday, which will also take him to Kenya and Ethiopia.

He will cohost a summit in English-speaking Kenya on Monday and Tuesday as France seeks to redefine its role in Africa, moving away from its postcolonial role towards closer cooperation.

The summit will bring together African leaders and business executives, with several agreements between French and Kenyan companies set to be signed during the visit to boost economic and commercial cooperation.

The “Africa Forward” summit will be the first in an Anglophone country attended by Macron since he took office in 2017.

The French president will wrap up his tour in Addis Ababa on Wednesday, where he will hold meetings with Ethiopian officials and take part in talks at the African Union headquarters on peace and security in Africa.

The tour is widely seen as a bid by Paris to repair economic and security ties and counter rising anti-French sentiment across parts of Africa.

Africa’s changing balance

France colonised large parts of West and Central Africa, and maintained excessive political and economic influence long after independence.

France, once widely accused of supporting unpopular leaders for strategic gain, is no longer the dominant foreign power it once was in Francophone Africa.

Across the continent, there is a growing push for more equal, win-win partnerships, tighter control over natural resources and broader alliances beyond traditional Western partners.

Sahel turning point

Anti-French sentiment has generally grown alongside political instability, military coups and rising competition from other international powers.

The sharpest rupture has come in the Sahel region, where Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have seen coups followed by rapidly deteriorating relations with France.

French forces were subsequently expelled after years of military operations against armed groups that many local governments and segments of the public viewed as ineffective.

In the vacuum, the region’s military rulers have turned to new security partners, particularly Russia, highlighting France’s declining influence in the region.

Russian influence, including through the Wagner Group and its successor networks, expanded in part by exploiting anti-French sentiment.

Can Macron succeed in reshaping France’s Africa policy?

Macron is seeking to reshape France’s Africa policy, replacing traditional influence with what he calls partnerships.

He is also pushing for deeper cultural and educational cooperation focused on entrepreneurship, climate and youth engagement.

Such efforts are seen as France’s attempt to reinvent its postcolonial relationship with African states and compete with powers like China and Russia.

Paris is, in fact, trying to shift its Africa policy; questions over its influence on the continent, however, persist.

A British lawmaker has called for economic and military isolation of Israel to bring it to “some form of negotiated settlement”, and suggested the Israeli ambassador to the UK should face expulsion, Anadolu Agency reports.

Independent MP, John McDonnell, recalled the crippling situation in the Gaza Strip that has been exacerbated during harsh winter conditions.

“We’ve witnessed over the Christmas period when we’re celebrating with our families, the scenes of children starving and freezing to death as a result of Israeli actions,” he said.

Speaking in the House of Commons on Tuesday, McDonnell said that the only solution that they have had in the past is a “total isolation of a country”, economically and militarily, to prevent them performing war crimes in the way Israel has.

“I think this Government could take a leading role in that isolation of Israel to bring it some form of negotiated settlement,” he noted.

Also touching on Israeli Ambassador to UK Tzipi Hotovely’s controversial remarks and stance, including advocating “Greater Israel”.

READ: Qatar condemns Israeli map claiming ‘historical territorial rights’ over Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria

“We have an Israeli ambassador who’s an advocate of Greater Israel, refuses to recognise the Palestinian state, defies all the UN resolutions that have been passed about how we can secure that peace, and she still remains in this country. Why aren’t we expelling the Israeli ambassador,” he asked.

Hotovely has sparked anger on multiple occasions since a Hamas attack on 7 October, 2023, with controversial remarks such as claiming there is no humanitarian crisis in Gaza and saying Israel is not bombing civilians in Gaza.

‘There is disagreement between British, Israeli governments’

In response, Hamish Falconer, Minister for the Middle East, said: “It is tempting to think that, if only we had representatives more to our tastes politically, then things would be easier.”

He added: “There is a disagreement between the British and Israeli governments about the conduct of the war in Gaza and the humanitarian implications that flow from it.”

Falconer went on to say that they will continue to make that disagreement clear through all channels, both through the Israeli ambassador and directly to the Israeli government, and will continue to talk to the Israeli government about these issues.

On Wednesday, Labour Party MP for Coventry South, Zarah Sultana, expressed support to McDonnell for expelling the Israeli ambassador.

“I agree with @johnmcdonnellMP: Expel the Israeli Ambassador NOW,” she wrote on X.

The Israeli army has continued a genocidal war on the enclave that has killed nearly 46,000 people, mostly women and children, since 7 October, 2023, despite a UN Security Council resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire.

In November 2024, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu and his former Defence Minister, Yoav Gallant, for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza.

Israel also faces a genocide case at the International Court of Justice for its war on the enclave.

READ: Human rights group calls on ICC prosecutor for investigation into PA crimes in West Bank

Pakistan announced on Friday that it had shot down 77 Israeli-made attack drones launched by India, in the latest escalation between the two sides following exchanged attacks.

This was announced by Military spokesman Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry during a press conference addressing developments in the military situation in the region, according to the local newspaper Dawn.

Chaudhry confirmed that the death toll from Indian attacks had risen to 33, while the number of injured had reached 62. He accused India of “deliberate attacks and targeting civilian areas.”

Responding to Indian allegations that Pakistani aircraft had been shot down or that Pakistan had carried out attacks inside India, Chaudhry said, “India should present the wreckage of at least one aircraft if its claims are credible.”

He revealed that the Pakistani army had not lost any of its people in the clashes between the two countries, despite the casualties among its ranks.

READ: US President Trump claims India, Pakistan have fought over Kashmir for 1,500 years

Chaudhry sent a message to India, saying, “If you enjoy our response, we will meet your requests at a time, place, and means of our choosing.”

He continued, “We are prepared for all eventualities. If they decide to continue escalation, let them know that we are the ones who will finish what they started.”

On Thursday, Indian media reported that Pakistan had carried out strikes targeting ammunition depots on the Indian side of Jammu and Kashmir. The Pakistani Foreign Ministry later denied this, asserting that allegations of attacks in the Pathankot and Srinagar areas were “baseless.”

It is worth noting that on 6 May, India launched missile strikes targeting what it described as ‘terrorist hideouts” inside Pakistani territory, in retaliation for a deadly attack on 22 April in the Pahalgam district that killed 26 people.

According to New Delhi, its strikes targeted nine militant sites, while Islamabad said the strikes hit six civilian sites, killing 33 people and wounding 62 others.

Pakistan also announced that it shot down 5 Indian warplanes during the attack, a claim that has yet to be confirmed by Indian authorities.

OPINION: The Indo-Pak war: recklessness and diversion in the service of pharaohs 

Iran has said it will only accept a fair and comprehensive agreement in ongoing negotiations with the United States, as talks continue alongside a fragile ceasefire in the Middle East conflict. Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi made the remarks following discussions with Wang Yi in Beijing.

At the same time, Donald Trump has pointed to what he described as significant progress, announcing a temporary pause in US naval operations linked to the Strait of Hormuz to support negotiations. The strait remains largely restricted, disrupting global oil flows and contributing to an ongoing energy crisis.

What does Iran mean by a comprehensive agreement
The key question is what Iran is asking for. A comprehensive agreement suggests Tehran wants more than a temporary ceasefire. It likely includes guarantees on sovereignty, relief from military pressure, and recognition of its rights under international agreements such as nuclear development for peaceful purposes.

This position indicates Iran is negotiating for long term security and political legitimacy rather than short term concessions.

What is the United States offering in response
The United States appears to be using a mix of pressure and incentives. Military actions and blockades continue, but the pause in naval escort operations signals willingness to de escalate if progress is made.

Statements from US officials show a firm stance on preventing Iran from controlling key shipping routes, while still leaving room for diplomacy. This creates a dual track approach of negotiation backed by force.

Why is the Strait of Hormuz central to the talks
The Strait of Hormuz is critical because it carries a significant share of global oil supply. Its disruption has already triggered sharp movements in energy markets and raised concerns about global economic stability.

Control over this route gives Iran strategic leverage, while reopening it safely is a priority for the United States and global markets. This makes the strait a core bargaining point in negotiations.

Implications for global markets and politics
The negotiations are directly influencing oil prices, currency markets, and investor sentiment. Even signals of progress have led to falling oil prices and improved market confidence.

Politically, the situation affects domestic dynamics in the United States, where rising energy costs are a concern ahead of elections. It also shapes regional power balances across the Middle East.

Analysis what are the possible outcomes
There are three main paths forward. First, a comprehensive agreement could stabilise the region, reopen energy routes, and reduce global economic pressure. Second, prolonged negotiations without resolution could keep markets volatile and maintain the current fragile ceasefire. Third, a breakdown in talks could lead to renewed escalation, further disrupting oil supply and increasing geopolitical risk.

The most realistic short term outcome appears to be continued negotiations with limited de escalation steps. A full agreement will likely require compromises on both security concerns and economic demands.

With information from Reuters.

WASHINGTON — Debris from the demolition of the White House East Wing that was dumped at a nearby public golf course has tested positive for lead, chromium and other toxic metals, the National Park Service said.

An interim report by a Virginia engineering firm says the toxic metals, along with PCBs, pesticides, petroleum byproducts and other chemicals were detected at levels above laboratory reporting limits in soil at the East Potomac Golf Links, a historic golf course that President Trump plans to renovate.

The park service began dumping debris from the East Wing onto the golf course in October, and more than 810,000 cubic feet of excavated soil had been transported to the site as of last month, the report by Jacobs Engineering Group Inc. said. The report was requested by the park service.

The nonprofit DC Preservation League has sued the Trump administration, arguing that the dumping was unlawful and possibly hazardous. The group also is challenging the Republican administration’s takeover of the golf course, about two miles southeast of the White House, and others in the city.

The suit is one of several legal battles challenging Trump’s extraordinary efforts to put his mark on public spaces in the nation’s capital, including renaming and shuttering the Kennedy Center and building a 250-foot-tall triumphal arch near the Lincoln Memorial.

At the end of last year, a separate group of preservationists filed a lawsuit seeking to prevent the administration from demolishing the East Wing so it could build a ballroom, a project slated to cost $400 million.

A spokesperson for the Interior Department, which oversees the park service, said in an email Tuesday that the soil removed from the White House “was tested multiple times by multiple parties, and this project passed all standards set by law.”

Although the agency does not comment on litigation, “this thorough process was followed to ensure the transfer was safe for the public,’’ the email said.

The Preservation League’s executive director, Rebecca Miller, said Tuesday that experts were still analyzing the engineering report. The group also is concerned about whether the Trump administration is complying with federal laws including the National Historic Preservation Act and the National Environmental Policy Act, she said.

Debris from the East Wing demolition is so prevalent that it causes golfers to detour around piles of it, Miller said. “If you Google you’ll see lots of photos of golfers walking past it,” she said in an interview.

The Trump administration’s plans to renovate the 105-year-old course to make it a professional-level course would permanently alter its historic character and layout, Miller said.

A federal judge told the government on Monday not to cut down more than 10 trees without first providing notice amid the legal dispute.

U.S. District Judge Ana Reyes said during a remote hearing that she wasn’t going to issue a temporary restraining order just yet, but she indicated she would take a harsh view of any major alterations made without prior notice.

Democracy Forward, a national legal organization that is co-representing the Preservation League, said in a press release that “further scrutiny will be required related to potential toxins that were dumped at East Potomac Park by the administration as part of the destruction of the East Wing of the White House.”

Test results released by the government “suggest the Defendants dumped a cocktail of contaminants — and despite indications of the refuse’s contents, they continued dumping it,” the group said.

Kevin Griess, the superintendent of the National Mall and Memorial Parks for the park service, said during Monday’s court hearing there was no immediate plan to begin tree removal but added that a safety assessment was underway.

Trump, an avid golfer, also plans on renovating a military golf course just outside Washington that has been used by past presidents going back decades.

In its statement, the Interior Department said it is “committed to continuing the relationships we have built with the local golf communities to ensure these courses are safe, beautiful, open, affordable, enjoyable, accessible, and world-class for people living in and visiting the greatest capital city in the world.”

Daly and Fields write for the Associated Press.

The Palestinian National Popular Action Committee have today issued a press statement strongly condemning the Israeli abduction of activists Saif Abu Khashk and Thiago Ávila in international waters near the island of Crete. “This act of maritime piracy,” the Committee said, “is part of a continuing pattern of violations of all international norms and laws.”  The statement said Israel’s cross-border lawlessness comes as no surprise from an occupation that systematically disregards international law. “We hold all those complicit in these crimes, including those who remain silent, fully responsible.” 

It added; “While we hold the occupation fully accountable for the safety of Saif and Thiago, we urgently call on the Governments of Spain and Brazil to intervene immediately to secure their safety and ensure their prompt release.”

The Committee expressed its appreciation and esteem to the two activists, Saif and Thiago, as well as to all participants in the “Sumud Flotilla” who confronted the occupation’s arrogance and piracy with their unarmed presence and firm determination. “These sacrifices reaffirm that the struggle for freedom and justice will continue,” it concluded.

READ: Israeli court extends detention of 2 Gaza-bound flotilla volunteers

US President Donald Trump on Thursday sharply criticized The New York Times and CNN over their coverage of the US-Israeli war on Iran, describing CNN as “stupid” and claiming the newspaper’s reporting was “seditious,” Anadolu reports.

Trump said he had “militarily decapitated” Iran, speaking to reporters at an Oval Office event where he signed an executive order aimed at expanding workers’ access to retirement savings, while also criticizing Democratic efforts to limit his war powers.

“And every day, I read about how well they’re doing militarily,” he said. “They’ve got nothing left, they’re done. And yet I read in The New York Times, I see on stupid CNN — which I only watch because you have to watch a little bit of the enemy.”

READ: Pentagon says Iran still has part of naval fleet despite Trump claims

Trump also said coverage by the two outlets implied that Iran is “winning the war,” criticizing their reporting on the war.

“If you read The New York Times — it’s actually seditious, in my opinion,” he said. “You read some of these columnists, but it all starts with the top. It’s a terrible thing.”

He said he did not “care, and everybody knows the facts. We are decimating the country.”

Earlier, the New York Times editorial board suggested that the US military is “losing its edge” in the Iran war, arguing that tactical gains have not translated into overall victory and may weaken Washington’s position.

READ: American journalist Tucker Carlson feels ‘betrayed,’ criticizes Trump on Iran war: Report

UN experts said Wednesday that reconstruction in the Gaza Strip cannot succeed without ending Israel’s occupation and ensuring rebuilding efforts are rooted in human rights and Palestinian self-determination, Anadolu reports.

“The occupation must end, and the dispossession and discrimination against Palestinians must stop if rebuilding is to have any real chance of success,” the experts said in a statement.

Citing the Gaza Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment, they said more than 371,000 housing units have been destroyed or damaged, 1.9 million people displaced, and over 60% of the population remains homeless, with reconstruction needs estimated at more than $71 billion.

“The data confirms a pattern of structural discrimination that reconstruction efforts must urgently correct rather than reproduce,” they said, warning that women, persons with disabilities and older people face disproportionate hardship.

The experts said reconstruction must be inclusive, participatory, transparent and accountable, with Palestinians shaping decisions in line with their right to self-determination under international law.

READ: Former US official accuses Israel of genocide in Gaza, says Washington is complicit

They raised questions about governance of the process, saying the assessment does not address who would oversee reconstruction or whether the proposed “Board of Peace” by US President Donald Trump is consistent with international law.

The experts are also concerned that the assessment does not sufficiently embed human rights principles, warning that an emphasis on financial needs and infrastructure could reduce housing to mere shelter provision rather than ensuring dignity, security and long-term sustainability.

They said reconstruction could become “a race for profits” without safeguards protecting vulnerable groups.

“Reconstruction is not only about rebuilding structures – it is about restoring rights, dignity and equality,” they said.

They urged states and donors to place human rights at the center of Gaza’s reconstruction, warning failure to do so “risks entrenching injustice and prolonging the suffering of Palestinians for generations.”

READ: Israeli court extends detention of Gaza hospital director Abu Safiya ‘without charges’

After Iranian missile and drone barrages disrupted U.S. Navy’s logistics by destroying port infrastructure and putting ships at risk, the service turned to a fleet of specially equipped commercial vessels to deliver fuel to warships away from the danger zone. These vessels proved so effective that one top Navy official said this week that he wants to see more of them pressed into service.

“Epic Fury has been a PhD course in logistics,” said Robert Hein, Director of Maritime Operations for the Navy’s Military Sealift Command (MSC), said during the Sea-Air-Space 2026 (SAS) exposition near Washington, D.C.  

“So traditionally, for 25 years, we’ve been at war in the Middle East and that war was effectively fought in the parking lot of a giant gas station,” Hein explained. “Iran has effectively shut down that gas station. So we’ve had to come up with really creative ways of, ‘how do we replenish the fleet?’”

The answer was shifting from having fleet oilers call on ports to executing at-sea replenishment of those oilers by using consolidated cargo operations (CONSOL) tankers – vessels leased by MSC that are specially equipped to offload fuel at sea. The concept isn’t new. After shifting away from using chartered ships to refuel oilers at sea in favor of conducting the transfers at port facilities, MSC reintroduced the CONSOL process in 2015, “as a way to utilize a flexible platform that allows MSC to operate worldwide in a variety of missions,” according to the Navy. Having a CONSOL tanker provide fuel to oilers means they don’t have to return to a port, reducing costs and increasing time on station to support the fleet. During a time of conflict, that can also mean less risk to the oiler, which is a critical asset that would be in very high demand.

The way the chartered tankers have been used in the Middle East during Epic Fury has taken this process to a new level.

The Navy created what Hein called a system of “tanker treadmills” at sea with “tankers cycling in and out” to replace the fixed infrastructure no longer available due to Iranian attacks.

“There are no more logistics hubs they’re going to,” Hein proffered. “All those nodes are now remaining at sea.”

In addition to the CONSOL tankers’ ability to refuel oilers at sea, “we’re putting an additional fuel delivery system on those tankers so they’ll be able to replenish destroyers and ships other than oilers,” Hein added. He did not provide details about what kind of system, however, the Navy has previously discussed developing what is called a Modular CONSOL Adapter Kit (MCAK).

“By installing it on the deck of a tanker, it can refuel other ships through the receiving ship’s fuel delivery hoses,” the Navy explained.

There are currently 15 CONSOL tankers available to the Navy worldwide. Rear Adm. Chris Stone, Director of Strategic Plans, Policy, Logistics and Warfighting Development for U.S. Transportation Command, said that’s not enough.

“If there’s one thing that I had the power to stroke a check on today, it would be to create more CONSOL tankers – those consolidated cargo replenishment at sea vessels,” he said at the same SAS panel. 

“We probably need something more than 15, because when there’s a crisis or a conflict around the world, the first thing that a geographic combatant commander asks TRANSCOM for is a CONSOL vessel, and we don’t have enough of them today without trade offs that create risk in other areas.”

“We’ve proven CONSOL capability during Operation Epic Fury,” Stone added. “We have a treadmill of vessels where one is on the front line, one is topping off, and they’re continually rotating to ensure that we’ve got support for the warfighter.”

CONSOL tankers, Stone posited, “are no longer supply ships. They’re not logistics ships. They’re force projection platforms that support our warfighters. They allow us to support the joint force and refuel them underway. It extends our operational reach and endurance, while reducing the reliance on predictable, vulnerable port visits. In less than two years, we’ve increased the capacity dramatically, and we’ll continue to do so.”

While a boon to the system, the CONSOL tankers are not without their issues. The main one being time. It takes about two hours for an oiler to refuel a destroyer, said Hein, while it takes about six hours for a tanker to get the job done.

“Unlike a quick trip to the gas pumps for a car, CONSOLing can take hours to complete,” the Navy noted in a story about the tankers. “This creates a unique set of challenges for the ships conducting the operations. CONSOLing is a dance between two ships. Each must maneuver alongside the other, and maintain a consistent speed and course. Because of their size, tanker maneuverability becomes a challenge.”

“We simply do not maneuver like the [oilers] do. They are graceful, gliding through the water,” said Capt. Michelle Laycock, Maersk Peary’s master. “There’s not a lot of ‘grace’ to a fully loaded tanker. We don’t glide, we plow through the water.”

The increased time and effort is worth it, Hein said.

“This is a capability that is needed that will help mitigate the lack of oilers right now,” Hein suggested. 

He wants to take the concept a step further.

“So while we can CONSOL for fuel, I’d like to get to a point where you CONSOL for food as well,” he stated. 

While CONSOL has provided a lifeline for vessels during Operation Epic Fury, its utility would be dramatically magnified during a war in the vast Pacific, one where ports at much farther distances would be under threat as would ships of all kinds over huge swathes of that theater. There have been consistent concerns about the size of the oiler fleet being a point of weakness for the Navy’s ability to project power in a near-peer conflict. Doubling-down on CONSOL and giving those vessels the ability to directly refuel surface combatants, carriers and amphibious warships could go a long way to buying down risk and fortifying operational planning.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

Al Jazeera’s Rory Challands reports from the EU summit in Cyprus, where the leaders of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan met with European leaders to discuss the regional crisis caused by the US-Israeli war on Iran.

As tensions ramp up amid fragile truce, US military says it ‘redirected’ 34 vessels as part of blockade on Iran’s ports.

The United States has three aircraft carriers in the Middle East for the first time in 23 years with the arrival of the USS George HW Bush, the US military has said, amid a fragile ceasefire with Iran.

The Middle East-based Central Command (CENTCOM) of the US military said on Friday that the carriers include 12 accompanying ships, more than 200 aircraft, and 15,000 soldiers.

“For the first time in decades, three aircraft carriers are operating in the Middle East at the same time,” CENTCOM said.

The last time the US amassed that amount of military assets in the region’s waters was in the lead up to the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.

The other two US aircraft carriers in the region are USS Abraham Lincoln and USS Gerald R Ford, which is the largest in the world.

The show of force signals that the US is preparing to return to fighting should the fragile ceasefire between the US, Israel and Iran unravel.

Diplomacy between the two countries has been in limbo, with Iran setting the lifting of the US naval blockade against its ports as a condition for resuming the talks.

US President Donald Trump announced extending the truce on Wednesday, but he said the naval siege would persist.

For its part, Iran has reblocked the Strait of Hormuz in response to the US blockade after declaring the waterway completely open last week when the regional ceasefire was extended to Lebanon.

Trump has not set a deadline for the extended ceasefire and suggested that he is comfortable with the status quo, which he argues is depleting the Iranian economy at a low cost for the US.

“I have all the time in the World, but Iran doesn’t,” he wrote in a social media post on Thursday.

The US president was later asked how long he would be willing to wait before receiving a proposed deal from Iran. He said: “Don’t rush me.”

Iran has described the blockade – which has seen US forces seize at least two Iranian oil ships – as an “act of war”.

Iranian forces have also captured foreign commercial ships in the Hormuz Strait, accusing them of violating maritime regulations.

With negotiations on hold, Trump has shown no signs of willingness to lift the siege in order to facilitate talks.

On Friday, the US military said it has “redirected” 34 vessels in the region. “The blockade against ships entering or exiting Iranian ports continues,” CENTCOM said.

Trump has previously threatened to destroy Iran’s civilian infrastructure, including bridges, power and water stations.

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said on Thursday that his country is awaiting the green light from Trump to return Iran to the “age of darkness”.

“Israel is prepared to renew the war against Iran. The [Israeli military] is ready in defence and offence, and the targets are marked,” Katz said, according to The Times of Israel newspaper.

Canada on Wednesday announced $5 million in funding for international efforts aimed at identifying and eliminating chemical weapons remaining in Syria, Anadolu reports.

“Today, the Honourable Anita Anand, Minister of Foreign Affairs, announced Canada’s contribution of $5 million to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) through Canada’s Weapons Threat Reduction Program,” the Global Affairs Canada said in a statement.

Noting that the OPCW will use the contribution to verify the scope of Syria’s former chemical weapons program, the readout added that the funding will also be used to investigate past uses of such weapons, and prepare for the safe destruction of remaining stockpiles, in line with the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The statement said the work is considered critical to “Syria’s long-term stability,” advancing accountability and reducing the risk to civilians of any future chemical weapons use.

“This contribution is part of Canada’s long-standing support to the OPCW to uphold the global ban on chemical weapons and strengthen international accountability,” it added.

Hezbollah MP, Hassan Fadlallah said that Hezbollah will eliminate the “yellow line” declared by Israel in southern Lebanon, stressing that “no one will be able to disarm the party.”

In an interview with Agence France-Presse, Fadlallah said: “We will topple this yellow line through resistance, through our insistence on our legitimate right to defend ourselves and our country.”

He added: “The Israeli army’s attempt to establish a buffer zone, under the guise of a front line, a yellow line, and a green line—we will break all these lines. We will not accept any of them, and we will reach our villages on the internationally recognized borders, no matter the sacrifices, no matter the cost.”

“There will be no disarmament of the resistance, and no one in Lebanon or abroad will be able to disarm it”, he added.

He said that “it is in the interest of the President of the Republic to withdraw from the path of direct negotiations with Israel,” adding that Hezbollah wants the ceasefire to continue.

“It is in the interest of Lebanon, the President of the Republic, and the government to withdraw from the path of direct negotiations and return to a national consensus on the best option for Lebanon,” he said, describing the move toward direct negotiations as “a unilateral decision on a fateful matter related to Lebanon’s future.”

He added: “We will reject and confront any attempt to impose political prices on Lebanon through concessions offered to this Israeli enemy.”

Fadlallah added he wants the ceasefire to continue, alongside efforts to ensure the withdrawal of the occupation army, the return of displaced persons to their villages, the release of prisoners, and the launch of a reconstruction program.

For the first time since at least the launch of Operation Epic Fury on Feb. 28, an Iranian-linked vessel was interdicted in the Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) region, the Pentagon confirmed to The War Zone. The boarding of the Botswana-flagged oil tanker M/T Tifani came just days after Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Dan Caine told reporters, including from The War Zone, that the U.S. would “actively pursue any Iranian-flagged vessel or any vessel attempting to provide material support to Iran” anywhere in the world. The move also follows the U.S. firing on and seizing the Iranian cargo ship Touska on Sunday in the Arabian Sea.

Meanwhile, as the clock ticks down toward the end of a fragile ceasefire between the U.S and Iran, the future of peace negotiations remains very much uncertain, which we will discuss later in this story. 

“Overnight, U.S. forces conducted a right-of-visit, maritime interdiction and boarding of the stateless sanctioned M/T Tifani without incident in the INDOPACOM area of responsibility,” the Pentagon stated Tuesday morning on X.

 “As we have made clear, we will pursue global maritime enforcement efforts to disrupt illicit networks and interdict sanctioned vessels providing material support to Iran—anywhere they operate. 

International waters are not a refuge for sanctioned vessels. The Department of War will continue to deny illicit actors and their vessels freedom of maneuver in the maritime domain.”

Video released by the Pentagon shows about two dozen armed troops boarding two MH-60S Seahawk helicopters on a U.S. Navy Expeditionary Sea Base (ESB) ship. The video then cuts to the troops repelling onto the deck of the Tifani and searching that vessel.

The Pentagon did not say where the incident took place, however, according to MarineTraffic.com, the Tifani was last located yesterday in the Indian Ocean, about halfway between Sri Lanka and Indonesia and some 2,000 miles southeast of Iran.

The Pentagon told us that “multiple agencies” played a role in seizing the ship. We have reached out for additional details.

Gregory Brew, Senior Analyst, Iran and Oil for Eurasia Group, stated on X that the Tifani departed from Iran’s Kharg Island on April 5 and that the ship appears to have continued sailing on after the boarding. We asked the Pentagon for more details about the ship’s disposition and they referred us to the White House, which sent us back to the Pentagon.

The ship was sanctioned under a 2018 executive order issued by President Donald Trump during his first term designed to counter Iranian malign activities and prevent it from obtaining a nuclear weapon.

UPDATES

The status of peace talks in Pakistan remains murky. While Vice President JD Vance and other top officials are expected to leave for the negotiations today, Iranian officials have yet to officially commit. The main sticking points remain the future of Iran’s highly enriched uranium, the Strait of Hormuz, the status of its ballistic missile inventory and support for proxies like Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis of Yemen.

“A diplomatic source in Pakistan says no diplomatic delegation from Iran has been dispatched to Islamabad ‘so far,’” the official Iranian IRNA news agency stated on Tuesday. “In response to speculations about possible negotiations in Pakistan, a diplomatic source told IRNA on Tuesday that no delegation from Iran has arrived in the Pakistani capital.”

The source clarified that “neither official nor unofficial information has been received regarding any Iranian involvement in the negotiations in Islamabad.”

In a brief phone call, Trump told CNBC host Joe Kernan he thinks the U.S. is “going to end up with a great deal” with Iran to end the war, even as he said he does not expect to extend a ceasefire due to expire on Wednesday.

“I think they have no choice,” Trump said during an interview on CNBC’s “Squawk Box,” when asked what he expected to come out of a second round of peace negotiations with Iran. “We’ve taken out their navy, we’ve taken out their air force, we’ve taken out their leaders.”

The president added that he is ready to resume the conflict if a deal with Iran does not appear in the offing.

“Well, I expect to be bombing because I think that’s a better attitude to go in with – but we’re ready to go,” Trump answered when asked if he needs at least the prospect for a signed deal either today or tomorrow.

Trump also said “I don’t want to do that,” when asked if he would extend the ceasefire beyond tomorrow if talks with Iran appear promising.

April 19 (UPI) — South Korea’s Defense Ministry said North Korea test launched multiple, short-range ballistic missiles into the East Sea, also known as the Sea of Japan, Sunday morning.

“Detailed specifications are currently under close analysis by South Korean and U.S. intelligence authorities,” officials in Seoul said in a statement, according to ABC News.

“Our military is closely monitoring North Korea’s military activities under a firm combined defense posture and maintains an overwhelming capability and readiness to respond to any provocation.”

The Japan Times said the Defense Ministry of Japan also confirmed the activity.

“North Korea’s series of actions, including the repeated launches of ballistic missiles and other weapons, threaten the peace and security of Japan, the region and the international community,” the ministry said in a statement.

Newsweek said Pyongyang has increased its ballistic missile testing and nuclear weapons development since the conflict between the United States, Israel and Iran began nearly two months ago.

Sunday’s missile launches appear to have come from Sinpho, a coastal city in North Korea where submarines capable of launching such weapons are built.

Multiple ballistic missiles fired from eastern Sinpo area in seventh such test this year.

North Korea has launched multiple ballistic missiles towards the sea off its eastern coast, according to South Korea and Japan.

The incident on Sunday marked North Korea’s seventh ⁠ballistic missile launch this year and its fourth in April.

The missiles were fired near the city of Sinpo on North Korea’s east coast at about 6:10am on Sunday (21:10 GMT, Saturday), South Korea’s military said in a statement. It added that South Korea had bolstered its surveillance posture and was closely exchanging information with the United States and Japan.

Japan’s ⁠government posted on social media that the ballistic missiles were believed to have fallen near the east coast of the Korean Peninsula. No incursion into Japan’s exclusive economic zone was confirmed.

South Korea’s presidential office said it has held an emergency security meeting, according to media reports.

Such tests violate United Nations Security Council resolutions against North Korea’s missile programme. The diplomatically isolated country rejects the UN ban and says it infringes on its sovereign right to self-defence.

The launches come as China and the US prepare for a summit in mid-May, ⁠in which Chinese President ⁠Xi Jinping and his US counterpart, Donald Trump, are expected to discuss North Korea.

North Korea has made “very serious” advances in its ability to turn out nuclear weapons, with the probable addition of a new uranium enrichment facility, ‌International Atomic Energy Agency chief Rafael Grossi said on Wednesday.

Late last month, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un said his country’s status as a nuclear-armed ‌state ‌was irreversible and that expanding a “self-defensive nuclear deterrent” was essential to national security.

The EU’s special representative for the Gulf said Saturday that any lasting solution for the Middle East must be led by countries in the region rather than imposed from outside, Anadolu reports.

Speaking at a panel during the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in southern Turkiye, Luigi Di Maio said the current crisis in the Gulf is another sign of the “further erosion of international law.”

“If we want to try to find a solution for avoiding again another crisis, like the ongoing crisis or a wider crisis, a farther spillover, we need to work all together,” he said.

Di Maio said the EU remains committed to multilateralism and international law, while stressing that Europe does not want to be “part of this war.”

At the same time, he said European countries are supporting Gulf partners in self-defense, including intercepting drones and missiles from Iran under bilateral agreements.

READ: US, Iran likely on Monday to hold 2nd round for technical talks in Islamabad: Sources

He also warned that instability in the Gulf affects the wider world, not only because of oil and gas, but also due to trade in fertilizer, helium for semiconductors and other goods moving through the Strait of Hormuz.

Di Maio said the collapse of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal showed the importance of involving regional countries in negotiations.

“Every solution for the Middle East has to be a region-led process,” he said.

He said stronger connectivity and defense cooperation can make the region more resilient to future crises, adding that “autonomy does not mean isolation.”

He praised mediation efforts by Turkiye, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, saying they had helped secure a ceasefire and could contribute to a broader agreement.

READ: French soldier killed in attack on UN peacekeepers in southern Lebanon: Macron

There is another way to read the ongoing Middle East crisis, one that makes legible what standard analysis consistently struggles to explain. It begins not with capability but with the geometry of the system through which capability must travel to produce effects. The United States and its partners possess overwhelming military superiority over Iran, and that superiority is not in question, yet the conflict has produced a pattern that defies its logic. A superpower coalition has been unable to impose coherent strategic outcomes against an adversary operating through proxies, low-cost disruption, and the systematic exploitation of global commercial vulnerabilities.

Over the past two years, we have seen multiple instances of this kind of disruption with consequential effects on the global system. Houthi drones force the rerouting of global shipping, with Red Sea cargo volumes falling by roughly 50% through early 2024 as major carriers diverted around the Cape of Good Hope, adding up to two weeks to transit times, driving freight costs sharply higher across European markets, and costing Egypt nearly $800 million per month at peak in lost Suez Canal revenue. A non-state network spanning Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Gaza has absorbed sustained air campaigns, targeted eliminations of senior commanders, and repeated ground operations without losing its capacity to generate coordinated pressure across multiple theaters simultaneously. The asymmetry seems to follow a deliberate strategic logic that raw power analysis struggles to read, precisely because the conflict operates on a surface that capability assessments were never designed to map. What this suggests is that the decisive variable is not what actors possess but whether the relationships connecting them can transmit coordinated action when the system is under strain.

When that system cannot coordinate, something important breaks down. An alliance that formally exists but faces operational friction at every decision point ceases to be an alliance in any meaningful strategic sense. A security guarantee that cannot be transmitted rapidly to the partner it is meant to protect has, in effect, already failed its primary function. It follows that the gap between what a system formally is and what it can actually do under pressure is not a secondary consideration but the surface on which this conflict is being decided. Conventional analysis, calibrated to count warheads and assess intentions, consistently leaves this gap unmapped.

Analysts know that Saudi Arabia’s OPEC production decisions have repeatedly positioned Riyadh against Washington’s economic preferences, they know that European energy dependency complicates transatlantic alignment, and they know that Iran’s proxy network extends across five countries and absorbs military pressure without fracturing. Yet what the available frameworks cannot do is convert that knowledge into a structural reading of the system. They show that these conditions exist. What they cannot show is how those conditions interact, where they compound, and what the aggregate geometry of their interaction means for whether coordinated action is possible at all.

Power analysis was built to read capability differentials between states, and it does that well. Alliance theory was built to read the conditions under which formal commitments hold or fail, and it does that too. Neither, however, was built to read the operational weight of the ties through which capability and commitment must travel to produce effects.

The instruments available are calibrated to answer questions different from those the current situation poses. Deploying them on a problem they were not designed to read produces the consistent failure to explain what is actually happening that has marked analysis of this conflict from the start.

Adjacency mapping is an instrument designed to read that gap by mapping connectivity, by which I mean their operational weight, specifically their capacity to carry coordinated action under strain. What distinguishes it from standard approaches is its unit of analysis. Rather than the actors themselves, it treats the weight of the relationships as primary. The question it asks is not who holds power but whether the ties connecting power-holders can transmit that power when the system needs them to. Two states can be formally allied, operationally integrated in name, and structurally disconnected at the same time, and nothing in standard analysis will tell you which of those conditions is actually operative until the moment of crisis reveals it.

The instrument assigns each significant relationship in the system a weight between 0 and 1, reflecting how frequently the two actors interact operationally, how reliably information moves between them, how the tie has behaved under recent stress, and how quickly it transmits pressure when the system is under strain. At the higher end of the scale, a weight at or above 0.6 indicates that coordination approaches automaticity, and the tie carries load without constant investment to maintain it. Around 0.3, friction accumulates. In this setting, decisions require deliberate effort at every juncture, slowing the system and making it susceptible to gradual degradation that never triggers a visible rupture. At or below 0.2, the tie has effectively ceased to function as a transmission pathway, leaving the actors operationally disconnected regardless of what their formal relationship nominally says.

These weights are analytical judgements calibrated against observable evidence. In other words, their value lies in making visible what experienced analysts already carry as intuition and in giving that intuition a structure precise enough to argue about. The numbers are therefore analytical judgements, not measurements. A more rigorous application would derive them from quantifiable indicators across each dimension, including military interoperability, intelligence exchange depth, crisis responsiveness, economic interdependence, and signaling consistency, averaged and weighted systematically. That work lies beyond the scope of this piece, but the architecture is designed to accommodate it.

There is a risk management dimension to this reading that is worth making explicit. Standard geopolitical risk assessment focuses on actor-level variables such as regime stability, military capability, and leadership intentions. What adjacency mapping adds is a structural layer that those assessments typically miss. A coalition whose load-bearing relationships operate in the friction zone is exposed to a category of risk that capability assessments do not capture and that becomes visible only when the system is read structurally.

What the matrix adds is the ability to see how compound weakness across multiple relationships produces cascading effects that bilateral assessment alone would struggle to predict. A system whose dominant actor holds several weak partnerships faces more than friction. As a consequence, the geometry of those weaknesses determines whether any concerted response is structurally possible at all. Aggregate capability becomes, in that light, secondary to that question.

If we apply this to the Middle East security complex, the instrument produces one possible reading. This reading differs considerably from the picture conventional analysis generates. Its value is not in the precision of the numbers but in making the system’s geometry visible enough to argue about.

The matrix below maps operational connectivity across the system’s key actors. The numbers are analytical judgements, not measurements.

The geometry they make visible is what matters here.

The matrix is intentionally non-symmetric. Where operational influence flows asymmetrically between two actors, the weights reflect that directionality.

The matrix reveals, in this light, a system whose dominant actors are connected at fundamentally different weights. And more significantly, its most important bilateral relationship is operating in the friction zone. It’s formally excluded adversary has constructed the only alternative connectivity architecture in the system. What this implies is that the geometry of the conflict runs considerably deeper than standard alliance analysis tends to suggest.

On the coalition side, the US has high adjacency with Qatar, Bahrain, Israel, and Kuwait, ties that enable rapid coordination and require little maintenance, constituting the operational backbone of what Washington can actually activate quickly.

Its relationship with Saudi Arabia, however, sits at 0.4. That number is analytically more significant than almost anything else in the matrix. Saudi Arabia remains, on most readings, the relationship on which Gulf order coherence formally depends, the anchor of the security architecture since the 1970s, and it is operating in the friction zone where every significant decision requires renegotiation from scratch rather than flowing through an established channel. Saudi Arabia’s invitation to join BRICS in August 2023, yuan-denominated oil transactions with China, and its participation in the Chinese-brokered rapprochement with Iran in March 2023 all point in the same direction. Riyadh is hedging structurally toward China and the broader non-Western order, a posture that sits uneasily alongside its formal security alignment with Washington. Taken together, these are not isolated political episodes but evidence of a tie that has been operating below the coordination threshold for years and whose weakness is, on this reading, the system’s most consequential structural vulnerability.

Through the normalization architecture, the UAE has arguably become the system’s most structurally reliable node at 0.6 with both the US and Israel, its operational integration exceeding Saudi Arabia’s despite Saudi Arabia’s formal primacy. The Abraham Accords of September 2020 established the formal foundation for that integration. The operational depth it has since generated, across intelligence sharing, defence cooperation, and coordinated positioning on Iran, has made the UAE the coalition’s most functionally connected Gulf partner. Oman holds what is perhaps the system’s most anomalous position, meaningful adjacency with both the US coalition and Iran simultaneously, a profile no other state actor in the matrix replicates. That structural position gave Oman the back-channel role it played through the early phases of the conflict, with documented precedent in the secret US-Iran nuclear negotiations that began in Muscat in 2012 and ran through 2013. As the conflict has intensified, Pakistan has assumed the primary mediation function, but Oman’s position as a quiet facilitator has not disappeared; it has simply been supplemented by a node with more direct access to both capitals at this particular moment.

Pakistan has emerged as the conflict’s primary mediation node, hosting the highest-level direct negotiations between Washington and Tehran since 1979 and brokering the April 2026 ceasefire. That role reflects a structural position the matrix makes legible: high Saudi adjacency, a functioning Iran tie, and a rehabilitated relationship with Washington that no other regional actor currently combines. China’s influence over both Pakistani and Iranian decision-making operates as an exogenous pressure that the matrix only partially captures, and Pakistan’s own domestic constraints, including its difficulty developing direct channels with the IRGC, limit how far that mediation role can ultimately reach.

Iran’s position is where the matrix becomes most analytically revealing. Across the state actors in the system, Iran’s adjacency sits at or near fragmentation, built up through sanctions, absent operational channels, and decades of adversarial signalling that have left Tehran formally isolated from the coordination architecture the United States and its partners have constructed.

And yet the only high-weight tie Iran holds is with its proxy network at 0.7. That single number may go further toward explaining the architecture of the entire campaign than any other figure in the matrix.

It is an asymmetric relationship in which Tehran’s capacity to activate and direct exceeds the reverse influence those actors exert over Iranian strategic decisions. What that single structural condition implies goes further toward explaining the architecture of Iranian pressure operations than most analyses of Iranian intentions or capabilities tend to reach. Iran is geographically central and formally excluded. It is precisely that combination, positioned to apply pressure across every theatre while bearing none of the coordination costs that formal inclusion imposes. That, from this vantage point, is what makes legible a strategy that standard analysis, focused on actors and their capabilities, cannot see.

Seen through this lens, what Iran is doing across the region is something more structurally ambitious than a military campaign. It is attempting to restructure the matrix itself. The goal appears to be less about battlefield victory than about the gradual degradation of the ties connecting the United States to its regional partners, below the threshold at which coordinated response becomes automatic, eroding the will to keep paying the price of alignment while simultaneously building alternative adjacency in the nodes where US-aligned connectivity is weakest.

The Houthi campaign against Red Sea shipping is calibrated to stay below the threshold that would compel a unified military response. It introduces friction into the economic relationships connecting European states to the Gulf system, raising the cost of alignment with Washington’s regional posture without forcing the kind of direct confrontation that would unite the coalition. Strikes on Gulf infrastructure follow the same calibration, persistent enough to signal that the US security guarantee cannot insulate its partners from costs, yet restrained enough to avoid crossing the point at which coalition fragmentation becomes irrelevant because a unified response becomes compulsory. Across Iraq and Syria, simultaneous pressure from affiliated militias prevents the concentration of attention that sustained coalition coordination requires. In each case, the instrument targets a relationship rather than a capability, specifically the weight of the ties whose degradation would restructure the system’s geometry without requiring Iran to displace the existing order directly.

The US-Saudi tie at 0.4 is the primary focus of that degradation effort. Should that threshold be breached, Saudi Arabia hedges. As hedging reduces operational interactivity the tie weakens further. The process risks becoming self-reinforcing. Iranian military superiority over any individual partner is not required to sustain it.

The same logic extends across European actors, though not uniformly. Germany’s industrial exposure to energy price volatility, France’s residual strategic autonomy instinct, and the EU’s institutional preference for de-escalation all produce different thresholds for continued alignment with Washington. Their shared energy dependency gives them asymmetric stakes in the Gulf system’s stability, but their appetite for risk diverges from Washington’s in ways that are not identical across capitals, and each time Iran forces a decision about the cost of continued alignment, that divergence fragments the coalition’s coordination surface further.

By sustaining operational ties with non-state actors across the region, Iran is constructing alternative adjacency in precisely the nodes where US-aligned connectivity is weakest. These are populations and factions that the existing regional order has excluded from the dominant coalition’s coordination architecture. Deliberately so — Iran is building in the structural gaps the system leaves open. Displacing the existing order appears unnecessary. Becoming the more reliable pole of alignment for the actors that order has failed to integrate may be sufficient. All that is required is that the order fragment sufficiently at its margins for that offer to appear credible, and the current trajectory of US-Saudi friction and European hedging is steadily moving in that direction.

The coalition’s instruments are calibrated to military threats. The system, however, is failing along a different surface entirely, or so this reading suggests. The formal architecture remains largely intact, security guarantees have not been withdrawn, Gulf states remain formally aligned, and normalisation agreements hold. And yet the operational adjacency that gives that architecture its functional weight is under sustained pressure from an actor that has correctly identified the gap between formal commitment and operational tie as the system’s primary vulnerability. That identification is outpacing the coalition’s capacity to respond.

On this reading, the surface on which the conflict appears to be decided is not the one the coalition is defending.

What adjacency mapping reveals is a story about geometry. The system’s dominant actor holds formal commitments at weights the system cannot sustain under the pressure being applied to it. Its adversary, in turn, has built the only alternative coordination architecture in the space that those weakening ties leave open. The conflict is likely to be determined by which ties the system can no longer afford to lose under sustained and calibrated pressure. The question is whether the actors currently holding those ties in the friction zone can rebuild them to the coordination threshold before the process of degradation becomes irreversible. That is a question that capability assessments are not well-positioned to answer, and one that a structural reading of the system’s connectivity at least helps to make visible.

Modern warfare has dramatically changed as we have seen from the Russia-Ukraine war, conflicts involving Gaza, India and Pakistan, and the recent US-Israeli strikes on Iran. At the centre of this shift is a surging global reliance on drone and missile technology as well as advanced air defence systems.

Turkiye, one of the largest military powers in the Middle East, is increasingly positioning itself as a major supplier in the global defence sector. Central to this effort is Roketsan, a company founded in 1988 to supply the Turkish Armed Forces, which has since evolved into the country’s primary manufacturer of missile and rocket systems.

Currently exporting to approximately 50 countries, the firm is one of the fastest-growing defence companies globally.

So how did Roketsan secure a large share of the global arms trade?

Bypassing Western embargoes

Turkiye’s defence expansion was largely accelerated by restrictions placed upon it. Western embargoes aimed at halting its military advancement meant Ankara could not acquire the necessary technical systems or components.

In 2020, the United States imposed Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) restrictions on Turkiye – a key member of the transatlantic military alliance NATO. These sanctions targeted Turkiye’s military procurement agency, its chief Ismail Demir, and three other senior officials. Washington also ejected Ankara from the F-35 stealth jet programme in July 2019.

The measures came after Ankara purchased Russia’s S-400 missile defence system, which was seen as a potential threat to NATO security. The European Union also prepared limited sanctions and discussed restricting arms exports following energy exploration disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean.

To circumvent this, the country built an integrated, domestic defence ecosystem. Today, Turkiye relies on a vast supply chain of nearly 4,000 small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) scattered across the country. As a result, the Turkish defence industry now operates with a local production rate exceeding 90 percent.

This shift has yielded significant financial returns for Ankara. In 2025, Turkiye’s defence industry reported $10bn in exports. Roketsan’s General Manager Murat Ikinci told Al Jazeera that the company currently ranks 71st among global defence firms, with ambitions to break into the top 50, then the top 20, and ultimately the top 10.

To support this expansion, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan inaugurated several large-scale facilities last week, including:

• Europe’s largest warhead facility.
• new research and development (R&D) centre housing 1,000 engineers.
• the “Kirikkale” facility dedicated to rocket fuel technology.
• new infrastructure for the mass production of ballistic and cruise missiles.

These projects represent a $1bn investment, with the company planning to inject an additional $2bn to expand mass production capabilities.

The ‘Tayfun’ and modern warfare

Roketsan’s R&D strategy – which employs 3,200 engineers and makes the company the third-largest R&D institution in Turkiye – is heavily influenced by data gathered from ongoing global conflicts.

According to Ikinci, the war in Ukraine highlighted the impact of cheap, first-person view (FPV) and kamikaze drones supported by artificial intelligence. In response, Roketsan developed air defence systems like “ALKA” and “BURC,” alongside the “CIRIT” laser-guided missile.

The regional landscape was further complicated during the US-Israel war on Iran, as cheap Iranian-designed Shahed drones – recently upgraded by Russia with “Kometa-B” anti-jamming modules – overwhelmed defences and even struck a British base in Cyprus in March 2026. During the same month, NATO air defences were forced to intercept three Iranian ballistic missiles that entered Turkish airspace.

Meanwhile, the recent conflict between Israel and Iran showcased the use of complex attacks combining ballistic missiles with “swarms” of kamikaze drones designed to overwhelm air defences. This environment makes hypersonic technology a critical asset.

This brings the Tayfun (Typhoon) project into focus. Tayfun is a developing family of long-range ballistic missiles. Its most advanced iteration, the Tayfun Block 4, is a hypersonic missile engineered to penetrate advanced air defence systems by travelling at extreme speeds.

When Al Jazeera asked for specific details regarding the Tayfun’s exact operational range, Ikinci was elusive. “We avoid mentioning its range; we just say its range is sufficient,” he noted.

Similarly, historical Western sanctions have pushed Turkiye to form new cooperation initiatives, effectively accelerating an “Eastern shift” away from Western defence dependence. Turkish drones are now being used by a growing number of countries, including by Pakistan during its war against India last May.

Based on these threat assessments, Roketsan has prioritised five key areas of production:

1. long-range ballistic and cruise missiles.
2. air defence systems, including the “Steel Dome”, Hisar-A, Hisar-O, and Siper.
3. submarine-launched cruise missiles, utilising the AKYA system to leverage Turkiye’s large submarine fleet.
4. smart micro-munitions designed specifically for armed drones.
5. long-range air-to-air missiles, a need highlighted by the brief India-Pakistan skirmish.

A strategic export model

Unlike traditional arms procurement, Turkiye is marketing its defence industry to international buyers as a strategic partnership.

“Our offer to our partners… is as follows: Let’s produce together, let’s develop technology together,” Ikinci stated.

By establishing joint facilities and R&D centres in allied nations across the Middle East, the Far East, and Europe, Turkiye is attempting to secure long-term geopolitical alliances rather than purely transactional sales. Ikinci highlighted Qatar as a prime example of this model, describing it as a benchmark for technological, military, and security cooperation in the region.

Filling the global stockpile gap

This rapid expansion comes at a critical time for the global arms trade. Ongoing wars have severely depleted the stockpiles of advanced weapon systems worldwide.

During the recent US-Israel war on Iran, Washington relied heavily on multimillion-dollar Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems to intercept cheap Iranian drones targeting US assets across Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. With growing concerns that US interceptor supplies could run low, Gulf states – which have collectively detected over 1,000 drones in their airspace – are actively seeking alternative defence technologies, creating a highly lucrative opening for Turkiye’s missile industry.

Defence analyses indicate that even military superpowers like the US will require significant time to replenish their current air defence inventories due to the complexity and massive infrastructure required to build them.

Turkish defence officials view this shortage as a strategic opening. Having localised its supply chain, Turkiye claims it can manufacture and export these highly sought-after complex systems independently.

As global demand for air defence and ballistic technologies rises, Roketsan is aggressively reinvesting its revenues into production infrastructure to expand its footprint in the international arms market.