Africa

Hasanat al-Rashid, 48, has lived with diabetes for 15 years, and the three-and-a-half-year civil war between Sudan’s military and the Rapid Support Forces paramilitary group has worsened her situation. Finding the treatment she needs has become a daily struggle.

When the war broke out in April 2023, she was forced to flee south from her home in Haj Yousif in Khartoum North to Umm Daw Ban in Khartoum State.

During her displacement, she went for days without medication and was forced to eat foods unsuitable for her condition, such as asida, a traditional Sudanese porridge.

She underwent operations on her foot twice when she developed complications of diabetes, including a severe infection.

She moved between hospitals in Gezira State south of Khartoum, seeking treatment in Rufaa, Wad Madani and Al-Hasahisa. When fighting spread to these areas in December 2023, she fled again, arriving in Port Sudan, a city on the Red Sea that was less affected by the war.

Her condition has worsened to the point that she now has to use insulin every day and with this comes added costs, something that forces diabetes sufferers in Sudan to choose between medicine and other essentials, such as food.

“The doses vary depending on whether my blood sugar is high or low,” she told Al Jazeera.

The war has pushed income levels in Sudan back to those last seen in the 1990s, according to the United Nations Development Programme. This means Hasanat and other diabetes sufferers are struggling to afford the medicine they need to treat the condition.

Hasanat’s doctor recommended she use an insulin pen, a device used to inject insulin under the skin. She would need one or two of the devices a month, but the cost at 70,000 Sudanese pounds ($8) is more than she can afford up front, so she opts for a vial of insulin.

This is cheaper at 17,000 Sudanese pounds ($1.80), but there is the additional cost of buying ice every day to keep the insulin cool. She spends 180,000 pounds ($20) a month on ice to preserve the medicine. But she is able to spread these costs out through the month, making the vials her only viable option even if the overall costs are higher than an insulin pen.

“It may last a month or less, but the challenge is that I don’t have a refrigerator, so I struggle to store the insulin properly,” she said.

She also needs painkillers and vitamins on a regular basis to manage complications caused by the diabetes.

The rising cost of treatment

Fatima Adam, 75, is among the patients at Port Sudan Hospital struggling to afford the medicines she needs to manage her hypertension and a thyroid condition.

She was admitted to the hospital with complications caused by high blood pressure, which has started to impact her heart. Too unwell to speak to Al Jazeera herself, her daughter, Aisha, described how the rising cost of treatment has affected her whole family.

Before the war, Fatima received medicine through the National Health Insurance Fund. She paid a quarter of the cost while the fund covered the rest. But when the war started and the economy collapsed, the medicines she needed were no longer covered by the scheme.

“My mother takes six different medicines because hypertension has affected her heart in addition to her thyroid medication. The war has made things harder because the prices of these medicines have gone up,” Aisha told Al Jazeera.

The responsibility for paying for Fatima’s treatment and supporting her and her daughter falls on her son, who works as a casual worker. With no fixed income, he goes to the market every day in search of work but sometimes returns home empty without any luck.

“Sometimes, when my brother finds work, we buy enough medicine to last a month. Other times, we have to buy smaller quantities and take the medicines intermittently,” Aisha said.

She bought a month’s supply of her mother’s medication a few days ago for 160,000 Sudanese pounds ($17.80), a substantial expense for a family whose income depends on day labour but essential to treating Fatima’s condition.

War damage

The war has caused an estimated $500m in losses to medicine stocks, infrastructure and transport fleets, dealing a major blow to Sudan’s pharmaceutical supply system, the National Medical Supplies Fund told Al Jazeera.

The National Medicines and Poisons Board estimated that only eight of the 30 pharmaceutical factories in Khartoum that shut down during the conflict have resumed operations despite the security situation in the capital recently improving.

This has increased Sudan’s reliance on imported medicines, but the subsequent depreciation of the Sudanese pound has driven up the costs of pharmaceutical procurement and production.

Hossam al-Naeem, who works as a pharmacist in Port Sudan, said customers with diabetes and hypertension require regular painkillers and vitamins to help their overall condition.

“I feel deeply saddened when I see the expressions on some patients’ faces as they ask about the prices of medicines and discover how much they have increased because of the depreciation of the Sudanese pound,” Hossam told Al Jazeera.

The currency’s collapse has created added challenges for pharmacists. Before the war, a dollar traded for roughly 600 Sudanese pounds. Now black-market currency traders are quoting rates of 9,300 pounds to the dollar, meaning higher costs for most goods in Sudan.

Sometimes Hossam incurs losses himself when he finds that the prices of drugs have risen sharply, and keeping essential medicines stocked is becoming difficult.

“I used to sell a strip of cold and flu tablets for 6,000 Sudanese pounds [70 cents]. But when I went to buy new stock, I found that the supplier’s price was also 6,000 pounds per strip. That means I made no profit, not even enough to cover the pharmacy’s operating costs,” he said.

The struggle to afford heart medication

Huda Mahmoud, 58, lives in el-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan state in south-central Sudan, where drone attacks and other violence remain a problem while the military is making advances towards the city.

Huda has lived with heart problems for more than 12 years and described the impacts of the war as being physical, financial and emotional.

“I take five different medicines. There was a time when they weren’t available, and I suffered a lot. Sometimes, I had to ask people in Wad Madani, Sennar or Port Sudan to send them to me,” she told Al Jazeera. “The medicines were extremely expensive, costing me 300,000 Sudanese pounds [$33.30] a month.”

Taking medication has become a carefully managed routine with each pill tied to a specific time of day.

“I’ve become tied to my pills: this one before eating, that one afterwards. If I forget one, my heart starts beating very fast,” she added.

In March, Huda was forced to travel from el-Obeid to Omdurman. Following her strict treatment regimen has become increasingly difficult during repeated periods of upheaval.

She has now returned home to el-Obeid, where her regular medicine is priced at 151,000 Sudanese pounds ($16.80) a month, something she can barely afford.

Her greatest fear is running out of medicine or being unable to afford her next supply, which would put her at risk of a blood clot.

“I’m afraid of becoming incapacitated. I used to be responsible for the whole household, but now I need help. I feel like I’ve become a burden on my family,” she said.

East African neighbours Ethiopia and Eritrea are once again perilously close to all-out war.

Territorial disputes have dogged their relations since Eritrea gained independence in 1993.

They fought a bitter war between 1998 and 2000. And despite a truce, they remained in a state of war for nearly 20 years.

The Jeddah accord in 2018 brought peace. But tensions have lingered.

Ethiopia accuses Eritrea of supporting rebels in its Tigray region, while Eritrea accuses landlocked Ethiopia of planning to capture one of its key Red Sea ports.

Can diplomacy end this deep-rooted conflict?

Presenter: James Bays

Guests:

Faisal Roble – Political analyst specialising in the Horn of Africa

Jervin Naidoo – Senior political analyst at Oxford Economics Africa

Matt Bryden – Strategic adviser at Sahan, a think tank focused on governance, politics and security in the Horn of Africa

For every five plates of food served around the world, roughly one ends up in the bin. That adds up to more than a billion tonnes of food a year.

Meanwhile, 645 million people, about one in 13 of the world’s population, went hungry in 2025, according to the UN.

That gap is the focus of World Food Day on October 16, the annual UN observance marking the founding of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in 1945. This year’s theme, “Innovate today, nourish tomorrow”, calls for food systems that feed more people and waste less.

In this visual explainer, Al Jazeera looks at global hunger, which countries waste the most food and simple ways to waste less at home.

Hunger is falling, slowly

Global hunger has fallen for a third year in a row, but it remains above levels seen before the COVID-19 pandemic.

According to the UN’s annual State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World report, an estimated 645 million people, or 7.8 percent of the world’s population, faced hunger in 2025. That is down from 8.1 percent in 2024 and a peak of 8.6 percent in 2022, but still about 61 million more people than in 2019.

Where are people the most hungry?

Africa has more hungry people than any other region.

In 2025, an estimated 309 million people in Africa were undernourished. That is one in five people on the continent and almost half of the world’s hungry people.

By comparison, 292 million people in Asia (6 percent of the population) and 32 million in Latin America and the Caribbean (4.8 percent) were undernourished.

The 2026 Global Hunger Index shows a similar pattern at the country level. The index scores countries out of 100, combining undernourishment with child stunting, child wasting and child mortality. Scores of 35 or more are considered “alarming”.

Hunger is classed as alarming in eight countries, seven of them in Africa. Somalia has the worst score of the 122 countries ranked, followed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad and Madagascar.

Sudan, South Sudan, Burundi and Yemen were also classed as alarming, but conflict and data gaps meant the index could not calculate their scores.

At the same time, a large share of the food the world grows never reaches a plate.

How much food is wasted every year?

Food is lost and wasted at every stage of its journey from farm to table.

According to the FAO, about 13 percent of the food produced globally is lost after harvest and before it reaches shops, spoiling in storage, during transport or in processing. Fruits and vegetables suffer the highest losses.

Food lost before it reaches shops is worth more than $400bn a year, according to the FAO.

Shops, restaurants and households then throw away almost a fifth of the food available to consumers, about 1.05 billion tonnes in 2022, according to the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). That is equivalent to 52.5 million trucks, each carrying 20 tonnes.

Households account for the most, 60 percent, followed by restaurants and other food services at 28 percent and shops at 12 percent.

How to reduce food waste at home

Most food waste happens at home, which means households can make a real difference. Here are some simple steps recommended by food waste campaigners and UN agencies:

1. Plan before you shop: Check what you already have, plan meals for the week and shop with a list to avoid buying more than you need.
2. Understand date labels: “Use by” dates are about safety, but “best before” dates are about quality. Food is often still safe to eat after its “best before” date.
3. Store food properly: Keep your fridge at 5C (41F) or below, and store fruit and vegetables where they last longest. Bananas, for example, speed up the ripening of other fruit nearby.
4. Use the freezer: Bread, cooked meals, meat and many fruits and vegetables can be frozen before they go off.
5. Cook the right amount: Measuring portions, especially for rice and pasta, cuts down on leftovers that get thrown away.
6. Eat the oldest food first: Move older items to the front of the fridge and cupboard so they get used before newer ones.
7. Use leftovers and scraps: Turn leftovers into new meals, and use vegetable peels and stalks in soups and stocks.
8. Compost what you can’t eat: Composting inedible parts such as peels and eggshells keeps them out of landfills, where rotting food releases methane.

Which country wastes the most?

On average, every person in the world wastes about 132kg (291 pounds) of food a year, roughly the weight of two adults. Of that, 79kg (174 pounds) was thrown away at home.

But the amount varies widely. Hotter countries tend to waste more at home, UNEP says, possibly because of more fresh produce and less refrigeration.

The Maldives wastes the most food, with each person throwing away about 260kg (573 pounds) a year, about twice the global average. Syria, the Dominican Republic, Seychelles, Mexico and Tunisia follow, each wasting more than 210kg (463 pounds) per person, according to UN estimates.

Spain recorded some of the lowest levels, at around 39kg (86 pounds) or less per person.

What does food waste cost?

Food loss and waste costs the global economy more than $1 trillion a year, according to the UN.

To put that in perspective, what else could $1 trillion buy?

Use the + buttons to add items to your cart and see how the money would be spent across 35 categories.

Throwing food away also wastes the money, land and energy used to produce it.

About 1.4 billion hectares (3.5 billion acres) of land, or 28 percent of the world’s agricultural land, is used to grow food that is never eaten. That is an area larger than Canada.

Food loss and waste also generate an estimated 8 to 10 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions, including methane released as food rots in landfills.

Eritrea denies troop movement inside northern Ethiopia as US calls for de-escalation.

Ethiopian forces and allied fighters say they have expanded control across Tigray and entered the historic city of Aksum, as fighting in the northern region continues.

The pro-government militia, the Tigray Peace Force (TPF), also claimed on Thursday that troops from neighbouring Eritrea have retreated towards the border.

Solomon Hailemariam, spokesperson for the TPF, said Eritrean forces had sustained significant casualties during the fighting.

But Eritrea’s Information Minister Yemane Gebremeskel rejected the claims as false in comments to local media. The extent of the reported losses could not be independently verified.

The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), an independent conflict-monitoring organisation, documented Ethiopian government forces and TPF fighters entering Aksum, while rival Tigrayan fighters remained in surrounding mountainous areas.

ACLED also reported Eritrean troops withdrawing across the border through Zalambessa, following advances by Ethiopian forces and their allies into several strategic towns.

“Ethiopian troops are on one side, and Eritrean troops are on the other,” Selam, a resident of Zalambessa whose first name was changed for security reasons, told the AFP news agency on Thursday.

AFP reported that there is no fighting now, but the town has been without power or water for a week.

“We are caught in the middle and living in deep anxiety,” Salem told the news agency.

Trading accusations

ACLED also documented Ethiopian tanks and heavy weapons moving towards the Eritrean border on Tuesday, raising concerns about a possible confrontation between the neighbouring countries.

Addis Ababa has accused Eritrea, as well as Sudan and Egypt, of backing a rebel alliance of seven groups that is fighting the government of Abiy Ahmed.

Eritrea has denied accusations that its forces entered Tigray to support the armed opposition groups, accusing Ethiopia of threatening its sovereignty.

Eritrea, which fought alongside Ethiopia’s federal army in the 2020-2022 war, severed diplomatic ties with Ethiopia over the accusations earlier this month.

Khartoum and Cairo have also denied involvement in the conflict.

The TPF supports Ethiopia’s federal government in its campaign against the Tigrayan rebels linked to the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).

Ethiopian forces captured Tigray’s regional capital Mekelle earlier this month, and the TPLF confirmed that it had withdrawn from the city and moved its regional administration “temporarily” to another location. Government forces also retook the towns of Adwa and Adigrat from the TPLF without a fight. Further, there are reports of Ethiopian advances in the town of Rama, close to the border with Eritrea.

On Wednesday, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio called for de-escalation in a phone call with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy, following reports of the alleged confrontation between Ethiopian and Eritrean forces.

Rubio said the region could not tolerate more conflict, according to a statement from the US Department of State.

Formula One returns to Africa for the first time in more than three decades, but DR Congo slams decision to race in Rwanda.

Formula 1 will “polish the image of an authoritarian leader” if it goes ahead with plans to hold an African Grand Prix in Rwanda, the foreign minister of neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo, Therese Kayikwamba Wagner, said Thursday.

Rwandan President Paul Kagame joined F1 Chief Executive Stefano Domenicali and FIA President Mohammed Ben Sulayem on Tuesday to announce the race. It will be held at a circuit yet to be built at Bugesera, near Rwanda’s capital Kigali, in “the early 2030s,” F1 says. The series last raced in Africa in 1993.

The DRC, the United States and UN experts accuse Rwanda of backing M23 rebels in eastern DRC. Rwanda says its security measures are intended to protect it against threats from armed groups operating across the border.

“In February 2025, I warned Stefano Domenicali and the F1 authorities that allowing Rwanda to host a Grand Prix would be morally indefensible,” Kayikwamba Wagner said in a statement. “[The DRC] welcomes Formula 1’s return to Africa, but giving Paul Kagame this platform would help polish the image of an authoritarian leader whose government has helped fuel a devastating war in our country.”

Kayikwamba Wagner said the DRC backs rival efforts from South Africa to host a race instead.

“This is also an opportunity for F1 to show its audiences and supporters what the sport truly stands for,” she added. “It should require credible, independent guarantees that no money used to host the race comes from conflict-linked minerals or the exploitation of Congolese resources.”

The DRC has previously objected to other Rwandan efforts to promote its brand through sports, especially a string of high-profile sponsorship agreements with leading European football clubs.

The US imposed sanctions on Rwanda’s military and four senior officers in March over their support for M23 rebels in eastern DRC. Rwanda rejected the sanctions as one-sided and said they misrepresented the conflict.

Lagos, Nigeria – As Israelis prepare to vote on October 27, African governments from Pretoria to Rabat are weighing what the result could mean for their own foreign and domestic policies.

The war on Gaza has exposed sharp differences across the continent, with some governments pursuing diplomatic measures against Israel while others maintain commercial and security ties.

Recent polling has shown a closely contested race between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party and the far-right coalition it leads and a bloc of Jewish-led opposition parties.

Neither is projected to win the 61 seats needed for a majority in the 120-seat Knesset, with a protracted period of coalition talks expected to follow the vote.

The next government’s approach to Gaza and the Palestinian question could influence Israel’s efforts to preserve and expand its partnerships across the continent.

Israel’s relationships across Africa are shaped by competing priorities. While the Gaza war has intensified diplomatic pressure and public opposition in many countries, security needs, commercial interests and longstanding bilateral partnerships continue to influence government decisions.

Diplomatic strain vs closer ties

Since the war began in October 2023, South Africa has emerged as one of Israel’s most vocal critics in Africa. Its government brought a case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), alleging violations of the 1948 Genocide Convention. Israel rejects the allegations. The court’s so-called provisional measures in 2024, including an order for Israel to take action to prevent acts of genocide, are not a final ruling on whether genocide has occurred.

In November 2023, South Africa’s National Assembly adopted a motion calling on the government to close the Israeli embassy and suspend diplomatic relations. The motion did not itself implement those measures, but it underscored the strength of political opposition to Israel’s military campaign.

Other African governments have taken different approaches that reflect national political priorities and foreign policy calculations rather than a single continental position.

Chad recalled its ambassador to Israel in November 2023, while some countries have maintained relations despite criticism of Israel’s military campaign in Gaza.

Morocco offers a contrasting example. It restored relations with Israel in 2020 under a US-backed arrangement linked to Washington’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. Despite public demonstrations opposing normalisation, Rabat has continued to pursue closer ties.

On September 16, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar and Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita met in New York at a trilateral summit hosted by US Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz. The three countries reaffirmed plans to upgrade diplomatic relations, elevate their respective missions to embassies and appoint ambassadors.

They also agreed to conclude investment protection and double taxation agreements by the end of this year, expand flights to include Moroccan airlines and arrange reciprocal high-level visits in the coming months. These were announced commitments, rather than confirmation that the changes had already been implemented.

For Idowu Johnson, associate professor of international relations at the University of Ibadan, the diversity of African states makes it difficult to predict a uniform response to Israel’s election.

“Africa’s heterogeneity means individual states have handled relations with Israel separately. Since the October 7, 2023 attacks, African criticism has focused on Israel’s denial of Palestinian statehood.

“The October 27 election will therefore be pivotal, as a new government’s stance on the Palestinian cause will shape how far Africa cooperates on agriculture, trade, security and technology, guided by self-determination and international law as well as bilateral interests,” Johnson said.

Israel’s relationship with the African Union (AU) also reflects these divisions. In 2021, the AU Commission chairperson accredited Israel’s representative to the organisation, prompting objections from member states.

In February 2022, the AU Assembly established a committee of heads of state and government to consult on Israel’s observer status. The dispute continued into 2023, when the AU moved to suspend Israel’s accreditation pending further consideration.

The disagreement has reflected wider divisions over Israel’s treatment of Palestinians and the organisation’s approach to the conflict.

A new Israeli government could seek to ease those tensions, but any change would depend on its policies as well as the positions of AU member states.

Security ties may outlast diplomatic tensions

Security cooperation has been a significant part of Israel’s relationships with some African governments. Israeli companies have pursued defence and security contracts involving equipment, surveillance technology and training.

But the nature and scale of those relationships vary by country and claims about particular agreements or technologies should be tied to documented cases rather than treated as evidence of a uniform Israeli security presence across the continent.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo offers a recent example of efforts to deepen cooperation. Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi visited Israel on August 31 and September 1, meeting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Isaac Herzog. Discussions covered security, defence, agriculture, infrastructure, energy and high technology. Both sides expressed a desire to strengthen their strategic partnership and expand cooperation across several sectors.

The visit followed memorandums of understanding signed on July 27. Congolese officials said the visit would review those agreements and explore further Israeli investment, including opportunities linked to the Lobito Corridor. The meetings demonstrate the potential scope of bilateral cooperation, but do not establish that a specific new security contract has been concluded.

For governments confronting armed groups, insecurity can create incentives to seek equipment, intelligence and training from foreign partners. Yet the importance of Israeli cooperation differs between countries and diplomatic tensions will not necessarily have the same effect on every security relationship.

The limits of Israel’s diplomatic outreach were also evident after it recognised Somaliland as an independent state on December 26, last year, the first country to do so. Somalia and other critics rejected the move, arguing that it undermined Somalia’s territorial integrity. The decision triggered demonstrations in Somalia and Somaliland.

Speaking to Al Jazeera this month, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud said Somalia will not accept Israeli presence in the country “under any circumstances”. He added that Israel was planning to establish a naval base in Berbera and use the city’s airport, adding that its real aim was to get closer to the Gulf states and Iran.

According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data project (ACLED), 110 demonstrations directly linked to Israel’s Somaliland recognition had been recorded by the time of its February 2026 Africa overview. Only seven supported the move, all in Somaliland; the others opposed it. The figures cover demonstrations linked to that particular decision, not all African views of Israel, and should not be treated as a continent-wide measure of public opinion.

Hossamaldeen Ibrahim, an Africa analyst at the Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute, argues that public opposition can constrain governments even when they see strategic value in maintaining ties.

“The strongest constraint, however, may come from African publics rather than governments: the Somaliland recognition drew widespread opposition, the African Union and many governments reaffirmed Somalia’s territorial integrity, and ACLED logged 110 related demonstrations, only seven in support.

“Depending on its approach, the next Israeli government could therefore either deepen strategic cooperation in Morocco, Sudan and the Red Sea, or face a legitimacy problem if it continues policies seen as tied to the Gaza war, widening the gap between state-level cooperation and public sentiment,” Ibrahim told Al Jazeera.

The Somaliland episode shows how a diplomatic move can provoke opposition when it is perceived to challenge a core principle of sovereignty.

It does not, by itself, establish that African governments will abandon security agreements with Israel. The consequences will depend on the countries involved, the terms of their cooperation and the domestic political costs of maintaining them.

Trade, agritech and the contest for influence

Trade and development cooperation offer Israel another route to maintaining relationships in Africa. Israeli firms and officials have pursued partnerships in areas including agriculture, irrigation, water management, health and technology.

Such cooperation can offer practical benefits to governments seeking investment and technical expertise, but commercial ties do not necessarily translate into public support for Israel’s policies.

Zambia illustrates Israel’s efforts to deepen bilateral engagement. Israel opened a resident embassy in Lusaka in August last year, after a 52-year absence. Agriculture, water management, health, education and technology have been identified as potential areas for closer cooperation. The move formed part of Israel’s broader effort to strengthen its engagement with African countries.

Some analysts have interpreted Israel’s renewed engagement with Zambia as an attempt to cultivate partners who could counterbalance South Africa’s influence in the region. That remains an interpretation, not an established explanation for the relationship.

Zambia has its own reasons for seeking investment and cooperation, particularly in agriculture, water management and technology; closer bilateral ties alone do not prove that countering South Africa is Israel’s objective.

Professor Iwebunor Okwechime, of Obafemi Awolowo University, points to the historical roots of South Africa’s position towards Israel.

“If we trace the stance South Africa took, it goes back to the apartheid era, when Israel backed the apartheid regime and refused to support the struggle against the minority government. This historical context is important for understanding South Africa-Israel relations today,” Okwechime told Al Jazeera.

For African governments, the challenge will be to balance security and commercial interests against public opposition, commitments to Palestinian rights and positions on international law. For Israel, the upcoming election will test whether a new government can ease diplomatic tensions across Africa without fundamentally changing the policies that have fuelled them.

As Okwechime told Al Jazeera, “There won’t be a radical change in sentiments regardless of the government in power”.

The G20 finance ministers and central bank governors are gathering in Bangkok, Thailand, on Thursday amid an uncertain global outlook shaped by the US-Israel war on Iran.

The meetings are being held in conjunction with the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, taking place in the Thai capital from October 12 to October 18.

Here are some of the key details about the meetings:

What are the G20, the IMF and the World Bank?

The G20 is an economic forum comprising 19 large economies, including the United States, China, the United Kingdom, Australia, Brazil, India, Japan, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, as well as the European Union and the African Union.

The grouping has an annually rotating presidency, currently held by the US.

Together, the G20 countries account for about 85 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP) and three-quarters of global trade.

The G20 was established in 1999 as a forum for finance ministers and central bank governors to address shared economic concerns in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis, before expanding into a broader forum for national leaders.

The IMF, based in Washington, DC, is an international financial institution that promotes international cooperation on monetary policy, trade and economic growth.

Its membership includes all but a handful of the world’s sovereign states, including North Korea, Cuba, the Vatican City and Monaco.

The World Bank, also based in Washington, DC, primarily serves as a provider of loans and grants to developing countries. It has 189 member countries.

The IMF and the World Bank were created at the 1944 Bretton Woods conference in the US, convened by the Allied Powers to establish the contours of the post-World War II international financial order.

Who will be attending the meetings?

Most finance ministers and central bank governors of the G20 will be in Bangkok, along with IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva and World Bank Group President Ajay Banga.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent will be a notable absence from the gatherings, as the top economic official of the world’s biggest economy and G20 chair.

US officials have cited “domestic engagements” for Bessent’s decision to skip the events, at which Washington will be represented by Deputy Secretary Francis Brooke and Undersecretary for International Affairs Erin Browne.

The G20 meeting, one of several gatherings of the group’s finance ministers each year, will help shape the agenda for the headline leaders’ summit in Miami, Florida, taking place on December 14-15.

What is on the agenda?

The economic fallout from the US-Israel war on Iran is expected to dominate discussions.

Attacks across the Middle East have upended economic activity across the region, while disruption to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz has driven a surge in energy prices worldwide.

Crude oil prices have exceeded $100 a barrel for much of the past eight months, placing a strain on government coffers and household budgets, particularly in the Gulf region and the rest of Asia.

In advance of the meeting, Australia’s Treasurer Jim Chalmers MP said he would use the discussions to call for an end to the conflicts in the Middle East and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz “because that’s what the global economy desperately needs”.

“The war in the Middle East is having a devastating economic impact and is pushing up fuel prices, inflation and interest rates around the world,” Chalmers said in a statement.

Other issues likely to feature on the agenda include the ballooning debt levels of many countries, which exceed 100 percent of GDP in the US, Canada, Japan, Italy and France.

In a speech on Wednesday, Georgieva warned that mounting debt posed a threat to the global economy and that there was no “magic” formula that would allow governments to avoid tax hikes or spending cuts.

G20 members will also bring more specific individual concerns to the table based on their economic and geopolitical priorities.

The US, for example, has repeatedly expressed concern about “global imbalances”, a veiled reference to China’s state-driven industrial model that has allowed Chinese exporters to flood overseas markets with cheap goods.

US President Donald Trump has long claimed that China’s large trade surplus, which stood at a cumulative $938bn in September, proves that international trade is stacked against US manufacturers.

In a statement addressed to the IMF on Wednesday, Bessent called for action to address mismatched trade balances.

“This especially includes strengthening its analysis and engagement on the role non-market policies and practices and exchange rates play in driving external imbalances,” Bessent said.

“Policymakers around the world are having difficult discussions about how to sustain market-based systems amid distortionary policies from some economies that skew competition and hurt employment.”

Divisions and competing interests cloud the prospects for coordination, however.

At the last meeting of G20 finance ministers in Asheville, North Carolina, US, held on August 31 and September 1, member countries failed to issue a joint communique after China objected to language to do with trade.

Nairobi, Kenya – Kenya’s response to an imported Ebola case has demonstrated its ability to mobilise a national response in the capital.

But a suspected case in the northeastern county of Wajir has raised a critical question: whether the country’s preparedness measures can protect communities far from major hospitals, laboratories and transport hubs.

The suspected case in Wajir tested negative, according to county officials, easing fears of wider transmission. Yet the incident highlighted the importance of local health facilities being able to recognise suspected infections, isolate patients safely and communicate reliable information to residents.

For communities near Kenya’s borders, preparedness requires more than screening travellers at airports and official crossings.

It also depends on trained health workers, appropriate protective equipment, functioning isolation facilities and clear referral procedures. Residents must know where to seek care and how to respond when health authorities raise the alarm.

Wajir’s readiness under scrutiny

Garad Saney Mohamed, communications director for Wajir county, told Al Jazeera that the county had established an isolation centre in Wajir town and formed a rapid response team to strengthen its preparedness.

He said the county was also using radio campaigns, community health promoters, school health programmes and posters to raise awareness about Ebola. A preparedness plan and budget had been put in place, he added.

However, the county did not provide details on the isolation centre’s capacity, the number of health workers trained specifically in Ebola response or the budget allocated to these efforts. Without that information, it is difficult to assess whether the county has the personnel and resources needed to manage suspected infections safely or respond to a wider outbreak.

The suspected case involved a 20-year-old man who had travelled from the Democratic Republic of the Congo through Uganda before reaching his home in Wajir on September 20. He was assessed at Habaswein Subcounty Hospital in Wajir South after presenting with a severe febrile illness.

His sample tested negative for Ebola, according to county officials. He was to remain under observation while receiving medical care.

The case prompted precautionary action, but it does not establish whether Wajir’s wider preparedness systems would be sufficient during an outbreak. That would depend on factors including the availability of protective equipment, staff trained in infection prevention and control, safe sample transport and reliable links between local facilities and designated testing laboratories.

Wajir’s proximity to Somalia, which lies 110km (70 miles) to the east, and the movement of people and goods across the border make surveillance and public communication particularly important. Screening at formal entry points remains essential, but it cannot replace the ability of local health facilities and community health workers to recognise warning signs and guide people towards appropriate care.

National screening, local challenges

Kenya’s national response intensified after an Ebola case was linked to a Kenyan travelling from the Democratic Republic of the Congo through Uganda. The patient arrived in Nairobi on October 3, was diagnosed with Bundibugyo virus of the disease and died on October 5, according to the World Health Organization (WHO). Kenya notified the WHO on October 6.

The patient had fallen ill while living in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and travelled by road to Kampala before flying to Nairobi. Laboratory tests at the National Virology Reference Laboratory and the Kenya Medical Research Institute confirmed the infection, according to the Ministry of Health.

On October 14, Kenya confirmed a second case of Bundibugyo virus disease involving a 39-year-old man who was a close family member of the first patient. He was already in quarantine and under daily monitoring when he developed symptoms, including fever, fatigue and joint pains, on October 13.

Laboratory tests confirmed the infection, and he was transferred to a designated treatment centre for supportive care. The Ministry of Health said the two cases were linked and there was no evidence of transmission in the wider community.

Authorities subsequently intensified surveillance at points of entry, contact tracing and public communication. The negative test result in Wajir underscored the importance of investigating suspected infections promptly and using laboratory testing to establish whether the virus is present.

As of October 6, Kenya had screened 652,584 travellers, tested 267 samples and trained 4,971 healthcare workers in Ebola prevention and management, according to the Ministry of Health.

By October 12, the WHO reported that more than 665,000 travellers had been screened and 127 contacts had been listed, with 94 in quarantine. Five laboratories had been designated to test for the disease, and nearly 5,000 health workers had received training.

These figures demonstrate the scale of the national response. But the number of travellers screened or health workers trained does not, on its own, establish how effectively those resources are distributed or whether individual counties can manage suspected infections.

For Wajir, the key questions concern the readiness of local facilities, the availability of trained personnel and protective equipment, and the speed with which samples can be transported for testing. The county has outlined the measures it has taken, but the available information does not provide a complete picture of its operational capacity.

Preparedness means more than the numbers

Health workers need to recognise suspected cases, follow infection-prevention protocols, collect and transport samples safely, and refer patients without exposing others. Facilities must also have appropriate protective equipment and clear procedures for managing suspected infections.

The WHO reported that Kenya’s national preparedness score rose from 66 percent in May to 82 percent in July. The assessment covered measures including surveillance, laboratory testing, isolation and treatment facilities, and trained response teams.

The improvement suggests that preparedness measures had advanced before the imported case was confirmed. However, a national score cannot establish whether every county has the equipment, staffing and referral arrangements needed to respond effectively. Assessments of local capacity are essential to identifying gaps that national figures may not reveal.

The Kenya Red Cross has also supported preparedness and public awareness efforts. Dr Paul Olale, a representative of the organisation, told Al Jazeera about a preparedness assessment. However, the basis of the separate figure attributed to the organisation was not established in the information available for this report, making it difficult to determine what it measured or whether it identified county-level weaknesses.

The organisation has highlighted the need to counter misinformation. During an outbreak, rumours can leave people uncertain about symptoms, how the virus spreads and whether they should seek medical attention.

For residents, information needs to be practical. People should know where to seek care, how to report a suspected illness and what to do while awaiting medical advice. Communication must also address stigma and reassure people that reporting a suspected illness can help protect their families and communities.

Community health promoters, local radio stations, schools and trusted community leaders can help deliver information in languages and formats residents understand. But awareness campaigns are most effective when they are consistent and backed by health services capable of responding promptly to concerns.

Wajir’s experience illustrates why Kenya’s Ebola preparedness must be measured not only by national screening figures and training totals, but also by the ability of individual counties to respond safely when a suspected case emerges.

An isolation centre, a rapid response team and public awareness campaigns are important components of an effective response. Their existence alone, however, does not establish whether facilities have adequate equipment, staff can follow established protocols or residents can access reliable information when they need it.

Kenya has demonstrated its ability to mobilise a national response, expand screening and undertake laboratory testing. The challenge is ensuring that these measures translate into effective protection beyond major transport hubs, including in remote communities where access to healthcare and timely information may be more difficult.

Dr Mary Muthoni, Kenya’s principal secretary for public health and professional standards, underscored the importance of protecting frontline staff in remarks delivered on behalf of Health Cabinet Secretary Aden Duale, according to a WHO statement released on October 12.

“No health worker in this country should be asked to attend to a suspected Ebola case without the right protective equipment.”

He ruled the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) for almost two decades.

And now, Joseph Kabila is making a comeback.

This time, he’s formed a coalition with M23 fighters in eastern DRC.

Kabila will lead the political-military alliance, which opposes the government in Kinshasa.

Many say the move will worsen the fighting in eastern DRC.

Several attempts to reach a peace agreement between government forces, rebels and armed groups in the region have so far failed.

Is this coalition likely to escalate the fighting?

Presenter: Dareen Abughaida

Guests:

Henry-Pacifique Mayala – Coordinator of the Kivu Security Tracker at the Ebuteli institute

Ovigwe Eguegu – Policy analyst at Development Reimagined, specialising in African geopolitics and great power competition

Vincent Rouget – Head of political risk for Africa at Control Risks, a global consultancy

Without a quick deal to move fertiliser through the strait, agricultural productivity would ‘significantly drop’.

A senior United Nations official has warned that parts of Asia and Africa could face a food security crisis unless Iran and the United States quickly agree on a UN-backed plan to move fertiliser through the embattled Strait of Hormuz.

UN ⁠Under-Secretary-General Jorge Moreira da Silva said on Wednesday that it was “absolutely critical” that the two countries agree to the proposal within weeks as planting season approaches. It calls for a UN-staffed coordination centre in Oman to help register vessels and oversee their safe passage in the waterway, through which a large portion of key global fertiliser inputs traditionally flow.

“If we miss that planting season, the productivity of agriculture would significantly drop and the impact on prices will significantly increase,” Moreira da Silva told Reuters on the sidelines of International Monetary Fund and World Bank meetings in Bangkok, Thailand.

Farmers operate strict crop calendars, and even slight delays could severely affect yield.

‘Negligible’ fertiliser shipments

Traffic in the Strait of Hormuz has been severely disrupted since the start of the US-Israel war on Iran, with Iran targeting vessels in the strait and the US and Iran exchanging fire in and around the waterway.

The disruption has hit global supplies of urea, the world’s most widely used nitrogen fertiliser, as well as seaborne sulphur, a key input. Before the war, roughly a third of global urea shipments and nearly half of seaborne sulphur passed through the strait.

Although some ships have been able to sail through amid the crisis, fertiliser products have made up a “very negligible” share of moving cargo, according to the Washington-based International Food Policy Research Institute.

Moreira da Silva said the UN-backed fertiliser mechanism, drawn up in March, could be activated within seven to 10 days if both Iran and the US agree.

Under the plan, UN monitors would work alongside local authorities at Gulf ports to verify cargo loading. Ships would be tracked during transit, and additional inspections could ⁠be carried out if countries raised concerns about a vessel or its cargo, said Moreira da Silva. He did not say why the US and Iran have not yet agreed.

The passage of only five vessels per day through the Strait of Hormuz could keep fertiliser supplies flowing to countries in critical need, he added.

‘Let us do our job’

The UN mechanism could work alongside negotiations for a “comprehensive deal” to restore freedom of navigation in the strait, Moreira da Silva said.

Iran and the US have exchanged proposals through intermediaries since a June interim ceasefire collapsed. Efforts to reopen the Strait of Hormuz have stalled over Tehran’s conditions and Washington’s insistence on addressing Iran’s nuclear programme from the outset.

“What we are telling them is, while you continue your discussions towards a comprehensive deal, let us work, let us do our job,” said Moreira da Silva.

His plea comes amid growing concern that fertiliser shortages could hit global food supplies.

In May, the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization warned that fertiliser scarcity could tighten food supplies from late 2026 into 2027, and would likely hit countries facing climate or other crises much harder.

In South Asia, where most rely on imported fertiliser, farmers are already struggling because of soaring costs and fertiliser scarcity. On Wednesday, farmers in Spain took to the streets to protest rising production costs amid high oil and fertiliser prices.

Much was made of South Africa’s run to the 2025 World Test Championship final at Lord’s.

They played only 12 Tests – no team played fewer – and qualified after drawing at home against India and losing in New Zealand, before beating West Indies, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan.

Mitigation for this latest Test also comes from the fact this is their first in almost a year and the majority of their batters played one domestic red-ball match to prepare.

Australia recently came off an eight-month break of their own and lost to Bangladesh in home conditions, as Conrad was keen to point out.

And last summer’s famous win over Australia and a 2-0 success in India proves they can beat the world’s top teams.

However, this Test only reinforced a worrying trend among South Africa’s batters.

Tristan Stubbs and Ryan Rickelton are fine white-ball players, but Stubbs’ two Test centuries have come against Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, and Rickelton’s against Sri Lanka and Pakistan.

This was an obvious step up.

In the first innings, Stubbs, two overs after Wiaan Mulder had been bounced out, top-edged a pull to fine leg, and in the second he played a loose drive on one.

Opener Rickelton drove and edged at a wide ball late on day two and nicked through a pull in the fourth over on day four.

Similarly, Mulder scored 367 not out against Zimbabwe last year, but Bangladesh are the only other side he averages more than 30 against. His 110-ball stay for 29 on the final day before being strangled down the leg side was at least encouraging.

Wicketkeeper Kyle Verreynne, in contrast, lasted only three balls before nudging Matt Renshaw’s part-time spin to slip. His Test average of 30.14 drops to 28 against Australia and 15 against both England and India.

Conrad said that “a few of the guys need to step up”.

“The real disappointment was the batting in the first dig on a really good wicket,” Conrad said.

“Yes, a world-class attack, but quite a few guys getting starts and not kicking on.”

Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar face double-digit declines in GDP amid the fallout from the US-Israel war on Iran.

The economy of the Middle East and Central Asia is set to shrink in 2026 amid the fallout of the US-Israel war on Iran, with countries such as Kuwait and Qatar facing double-digit contractions, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The region’s gross domestic product (GDP) is forecast to contract by 0.3 percent this year, a sharp downgrade from the 1.9 percent expansion projected in April, the IMF said in its latest economic outlook on Tuesday.

The IMF cited the prolonged disruption to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, a conduit for one-fifth of global oil supplies in peacetime, for the downgraded outlook.

Kuwait, Iraq and Qatar are forecast to have the most severe economic contractions, with their GDPs expected to shrink by 16.7 percent, 16 percent and 15.6 percent, respectively.

Bahrain’s GDP is forecast to contract by 11.3 percent, while Iran’s economy is projected to shrink by 7.6 percent.

Saudi Arabia, which has partially offset the hit to its energy sector by boosting oil exports through the East-West pipeline, is projected to record negative growth of 3.3 percent.

Kyrgyzstan is expected to have the strongest growth in the region, with GDP forecast to expand 9 percent.

The Middle East and Central Asia is the only region that is expected to experience negative growth in 2026.

Emerging and developing Asia’s GDP is forecast to grow 5.1 percent, while the economies of Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean are projected to expand 4.5 percent and 2.3 percent, respectively.

The United States and China, the world’s two largest economies, are forecast to register growth of 2.3 percent and 4.5 percent, respectively, while the eurozone’s GDP is estimated to grow 1.1 percent.

The IMF said it expected global GDP to grow 3.1 percent, up from 3 percent in its previous outlook.

The Washington, DC-based institution said while economic activity had proved resilient this year, the global economy faced multiple risks.

“Further escalation in conflicts, a reassessment of expectations surrounding artificial intelligence (AI), renewed trade tensions, and fiscal vulnerabilities could weaken growth,” it said.

“On the upside, stronger momentum in AI investment and productivity gains from AI or a sustained easing of geopolitical and trade tensions could strengthen growth.”

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia – As renewed fighting in Ethiopia’s Tigray region threatens to destabilise the Horn of Africa, public backing by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of Ethiopia’s federal government and Saudi Arabia’s record of regional diplomacy are drawing scrutiny.

Both Gulf powers have strategic interests in the Horn of Africa, but their roles differ. The UAE has publicly backed Ethiopia’s government while Saudi Arabia has previously helped broker an Ethiopia-Eritrea rapprochement and was reported to have offered to mediate between the two countries in 2025.

The renewed fighting threatens to unravel the November 2022 Pretoria peace agreement, which ended a war between Ethiopia’s federal government and Tigrayan forces. As tensions with Eritrea add to the risks of a wider confrontation, the positions of Abu Dhabi and Riyadh offer a window into the interests of external powers in the crisis.

The UAE: Clear alignment, unproven leverage

On September 25, the UAE condemned attacks by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and its allied armed groups against Ethiopian federal forces, the seizure of airports in Tigray and the escalation in the neighbouring regions of Afar and Amhara.

Sheikh Shakhboot bin Nahyan Al Nahyan, the UAE minister of state, expressed solidarity with Ethiopia’s government and people, reaffirmed support for the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and called for an end to hostilities, the protection of civilians and adherence to the Pretoria Agreement.

The statement made Abu Dhabi’s public position clear: It backs Ethiopia’s federal government while calling for de-escalation and dialogue. It did not establish whether the UAE was providing military assistance or had secured commitments from the parties to end the fighting.

The UAE also has commercial interests across the Horn of Africa. Dubai Ports World (DP World) operates Berbera port in Somaliland, and a shipping route launched in 2025 connects the port with Jebel Ali in the UAE, providing an additional corridor for cargo serving inland destinations, such as Ethiopia. Landlocked since Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Ethiopia relies heavily on Djibouti for access to international trade.

These commercial links help explain Abu Dhabi’s interest in regional stability and its relationship with Addis Ababa. However, they do not establish that the UAE can influence the TPLF, persuade Eritrea to de-escalate or change Ethiopia’s military calculations.

The extent to which Abu Dhabi can use its relationship with the federal government to encourage a political response to the conflict remains unclear.

Saudi Arabia: Diplomatic experience, uncertain engagement

Saudi Arabia has yet to publicly announce its position on the latest fighting in Tigray.

The kingdom has not publicly commented on the renewed war, according to an October 1 analysis by Critical Threats, although it undertook diplomatic efforts earlier this year to reduce tensions between Ethiopia’s federal government and the TPLF.

Saudi Arabia has previously sought to mediate between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In November 2025, Chatham House reported that sources said Riyadh had offered to mediate between the two countries amid rising tensions over maritime access and regional security.

A June 2026 analysis by Germany’s SWP think tank said previous Saudi mediation efforts had failed, partly because negotiations did not address Ethiopia’s interest in the Eritrean port of Assab.

The kingdom’s broader regional alignment also matters. An August 2026 analysis by the Soufan Center described Saudi Arabia and Egypt as backing Eritrea in opposition to Ethiopia’s ambitions for Red Sea access.

This is an assessment of regional alignment, however, not evidence that Saudi Arabia is directly providing military support to Eritrea or the TPLF in the current fighting.

Saudi Arabia has a strong interest in Red Sea security, a vital corridor for international shipping and its own oil exports. Whether Riyadh will take a more public diplomatic role as tensions escalate remains unclear.

Egypt’s rivalry with Ethiopia adds to regional tensions

Egypt’s role in the crisis is shaped by its longstanding dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and its growing ties with Eritrea.

Cairo has also stressed that responsibility for the governance and security of the Red Sea rests with countries bordering the waterway, a position shared by Asmara. The issue has added to regional tensions as Ethiopia seeks reliable access to the sea.

In September, Ethiopia’s army chief, Field Marshal Birhanu Jula, accused Egypt and Sudan of supporting armed groups fighting the federal government, including the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).

His remarks, reported by Al Jazeera on September 28, did not provide evidence substantiating the accusation. Egypt’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Nader Zaki, subsequently reaffirmed Cairo’s commitment to state sovereignty and non-interference, rejecting suggestions that it had departed from those principles.

He did not directly address the specific allegation of Egyptian support for the TPLF.

Egypt’s relationship with Eritrea has nevertheless become an important part of the regional picture. President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi met Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki in Cairo on June 8, 2026.

According to Egypt’s presidency, the talks covered bilateral cooperation, developments in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea security.

The two leaders also stressed the importance of coordination to maintain regional stability. The meeting highlighted closer cooperation between Cairo and Asmara, but did not establish that either country was involved in the renewed fighting in Tigray.

For Cairo, the dispute with Ethiopia extends beyond Tigray to the Nile and the balance of power in the Horn of Africa.

Its relations with Eritrea and its disagreements with Addis Ababa form part of the wider regional context, but they are not evidence of direct Egyptian involvement in the renewed conflict. Whether these regional relationships will affect the course of the fighting remains uncertain.

From Tigray to a wider regional crisis

The risks extend beyond Tigray. Ethiopia’s pursuit of maritime access has become a source of tension with Eritrea, whose Red Sea coastline includes the port of Assab. Addis Ababa argues that reliable access to the sea is a national priority while Asmara rejects any threat to its sovereignty.

Ethiopia has accused Eritrea of sending troops across the border and supporting armed groups. Eritrea denies the allegations and has called on the United Nations Security Council to intervene. The allegations remain contested, but deteriorating relations have raised the stakes of renewed fighting in northern Ethiopia.

A wider confrontation could put more civilians at risk, complicate humanitarian access and disrupt regional trade and security. It would also test whether external partners could encourage restraint without appearing to endorse either side’s military objectives.

The UAE’s close ties with Addis Ababa could provide a channel for diplomatic engagement while Saudi Arabia’s record of regional diplomacy offers a possible opening for renewed talks. However, the available public evidence does not establish that either country is currently leading an initiative to contain the crisis.

Influence must be measured by outcomes

The UAE and Saudi Arabia should not be cast as pursuing opposing strategies simply because one has publicly backed Ethiopia’s federal government while the other’s current position is less visible. Their interests and diplomatic approaches differ, but the evidence does not show that either has decisive influence over the fighting.

Their contribution should be assessed by whether they can help secure concrete steps towards de-escalation, renewed political dialogue and a reduction in tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Public statements, commercial interests and past diplomatic achievements may create opportunities for engagement, but they are not substitutes for progress on the ground.

The Pretoria Agreement remains the framework for a political settlement in Tigray, yet renewed fighting underscores the difficulty of sustaining peace while underlying disputes persist. A durable settlement will depend primarily on the parties themselves. External partners could contribute by encouraging restraint and supporting credible negotiations.

For now, the UAE’s public alignment with Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic record offer different potential channels for engagement. Whether either country can turn those relationships into a meaningful contribution towards de-escalation remains unresolved.

Smith moves to 223 career catches, a record for fielders, as Australia bowl out South Africa for 284 in reply to 390.

Steve Smith has broken the Test record for the most career catches by a fielder as Australia have played themselves into a strong position on the third day of the first Test against hosts South Africa.

Smith held four catches on Sunday, taking his total to 223, as South Africa were bowled out for 284 in reply to Australia’s first innings of 390 at Kingsmead Stadium in Durban.

Nic Maddinson (17 not out) and Travis Head (10 not out) added 33 runs off just 5.4 overs to stretch Australia’s overall lead to 139 before bad light ended play for the third day in a row.

Maddinson, who laboured to a 33-ball duck in the first innings, hit two fours off Marco Jansen in the first over of the second innings and added a six off Wiaan Mulder before play was called off.

Australia’s bowlers applied relentless pressure on an easy-paced pitch and a succession of South African batsmen contributed to their own dismissals by playing poor shots.

Six Protea batters reached 30, but David Bedingham’s 49 was the top score.

Australian captain Pat Cummins took three for 54, and Mitchell Starc, Josh Hazlewood and Nathan Lyon claimed two wickets each as Australia’s long-serving bowling quartet combined with customary efficiency.

Smith special in the slips

Smith started the day on 219 catches, one behind Joe Root of England.

He equalled the record when he caught Temba Bavuma. Smith, playing in his 126th Test, broke the record when he lunged to his left from second slip to hold a sharp edge from Bedingham off Cummins.

Smith was in the action again with a spectacular catch to dismiss Verreynne, again anticipating well at slip as the South African wicketkeeper made good contact with a reverse sweep that Smith held in an outstretched right hand.

His fourth catch was from an edge to slip by last man Anrich Nortje off the bowling of Beau Webster.

Smith’s career haul of 223 catches exceeds the total of all but 11 specialist wicketkeepers.