Africa

Macron, who has acknowledged French ‘responsibility’ in the genocide, called the memorial a reconciliation ‘milestone’.

French President Emmanuel Macron has presented a memorial in Paris dedicated to the victims of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, as France pursues closer ties with the East African country and continues to grapple with its role in the historic atrocity.

Speaking at the inauguration event alongside his Rwandan counterpart Paul Kagame on Tuesday, Macron said the monument marked “the culmination of a long and patient quest for truth”.

“An unprecedented reconciliation has emerged between Rwanda and France,” said Macron. “This monument, while it is an achievement, is not an end. It is a milestone on a path we have opened.”

Dubbed “L’Archive” (The Archive), the monument consists of two black brass steles, and it bears an engraved tribute to the estimated 800,000 men, women and children, mostly ethnic Tutsis, massacred between April and July 1994.

The memorial’s inauguration comes five years after Macron travelled to Kigali and first acknowledged France’s failure to heed warnings of impending massacres in Rwanda.

Macron has said Paris and its Western and African allies did not have the will to halt the genocide, though he has stopped short of issuing a formal apology.

‘Requires real courage’

Speaking at the ceremony, Kagame hailed France’s efforts to assume its share of responsibility, and praised Macron for his “courage and humanity”.

“France was not alone in falling short, far from it,” said Kagame, who had long accused France of “complicity”.

“Many other countries did so as well, but none has gone as far as France in setting the record straight and accepting its part in the tragedy.

“Confronting historical responsibilities requires real courage because it generates a fierce opposition by those with a case to answer,” Kagame said.

When the genocide against the Tutsis occurred in 1994, France had been a long-standing backer of Rwanda’s Hutu-dominated government, leading to decades of tensions between the two countries, including a break in diplomatic ties between 2006 and 2009.

A commission set up by Macron and led by historian Vincent Duclert concluded in 2021 that France had been ⁠blinded by its colonial attitude to events leading up to the genocide ⁠and bore a “serious and overwhelming” responsibility ⁠for failing to foresee the slaughter.

However, it said there was no evidence that Paris was complicit in the killings.

‘Part of France’s public history’

Duclert said the unveiling of the monument was a “powerful” step. “The genocide against the Tutsi is now fully part of France’s public history,” he said.

The French courts, acting on the principle of universal jurisdiction to try the most serious crimes committed worldwide, have convicted several Rwandans for their part in the massacre.

In May, France’s judiciary ordered the resumption of an almost two-decade investigation into accusations that the widow of late Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana, who has lived in France since 1998, was involved in the genocide.

Recent arguments advocating for the international recognition of an integral part of Somalia called Somaliland rest on a series of assumptions that deserve closer scrutiny. While proponents portray Somaliland as a unified, stable, and strategically indispensable state deserving immediate recognition, the realities on the ground tell a far more complicated story.

The first and most fundamental misconception is that the former British Somaliland Protectorate exists today as a coherent political entity. It does not.

The territory that briefly gained independence in June 1960 ceased to exist when it voluntarily united with the Trust Territory of Somalia to form the Somali Republic. More importantly, the geographic and political boundaries claimed by today’s Somaliland administration are neither uncontested nor uniformly accepted by the populations living within them.

Over the past two years, the eastern regions of Sool, Sanaag, and parts of Cayn (SSC) have demonstrated precisely this reality. Following prolonged conflict and popular mobilisation, local communities overwhelmingly rejected rule from Hargeisa and established the North Eastern administration, which has since aligned itself with the Federal Government of Somalia. The people of these regions have made clear that they do not share Somaliland’s secessionist project and instead seek their future within a federal Somali state alongside the vast majority of the Somali people. This development alone undermines the central claim that Somaliland represents a unified political community exercising uncontested authority over the territory it claims.

In the west of the Somaliland region, growing political movements in Awdal have increasingly questioned Hargeisa’s perceived monopoly over political and economic decision-making. Calls for a distinct regional administration have gained momentum, reflecting longstanding grievances regarding political representation, economic development, and governance. These dynamics suggest that the future political map of northwestern Somalia is far more fluid than some advocates of recognition acknowledge.

Recognition advocates frequently point to Somaliland’s stability. Yet, stability cannot be measured solely by the existence of institutions or periodic elections. Genuine stability requires political inclusion, territorial legitimacy, and social consensus. None of these conditions currently exists within the Somali territory of Somaliland.

The reality is that the Somaliland secessionist project faces significant internal opposition. Political disagreements, clan-based tensions, territorial disputes, and competing visions of governance remain unresolved. International recognition cannot erase these challenges. Indeed, it risks intensifying them by encouraging zero-sum political calculations among communities that already feel excluded from decision-making processes.

Equally problematic is the argument that Somaliland’s recognition should be driven primarily by geopolitical competition in the Red Sea. The Horn of Africa should not become another arena where local political disputes are transformed into instruments of broader regional rivalries. Moreover, the attempts to frame Somaliland as a strategic asset in competition with Iran, the Houthis, China, or other global actors overlook a basic reality: sustainable security arrangements cannot be built on unresolved sovereignty disputes.

History offers numerous examples of external powers pursuing short-term strategic gains only to discover that local realities ultimately prevail. Durable partnerships emerge from political legitimacy and regional consensus, not from efforts to bypass internationally recognised states.

Recent developments surrounding Israel’s engagement in the region further illustrate this danger. Rather than producing greater cohesion, external involvement has generated new political tensions and heightened anxieties among local communities concerned about militarisation, foreign influence, and the future direction of regional governance.

The disingenuous assumption that foreign recognition of the Somaliland part of Somalia automatically translates into stability is not supported by any evidence. Moreover, recognition of Somaliland would not simply affect Somalia, as it would carry implications far beyond the Horn of Africa.

The African Union has consistently maintained its commitment to preserving inherited borders and resolving disputes through dialogue. This principle has been essential in preventing countless territorial conflicts across the continent. Creating exceptions without a broad regional consensus risks opening debates that many African states have spent decades working to contain.

The path to lasting peace and stability in Somalia, like in most post-conflict states, lies not in fragmentation but in reconciliation, dialogue, and constitutional settlement among Somalis themselves. Significant progress has already been made through federal institutions, expanding political participation, and locally driven governance arrangements. While challenges remain, they are best addressed through inclusive internal political processes rather than externally imposed outcomes in line with international law.

The Somali government remains committed to dialogue, reconciliation, and constitutional processes that allow all Somali communities to participate in shaping the country’s future. Sustainable peace and stability globally and, specifically, in the Horn of Africa at this most challenging time in human history will be achieved not through fragmentation, but inclusive political solutions that strengthen cooperation, legitimacy, and national unity.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous moments in its recent history without an agreed path towards elections or a political transition. United States and United Kingdom-led talks between the government and the opposition collapsed on May 15, the date on which President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s original four-year term was due to expire, leaving the legitimacy of key federal institutions under serious strain.

Justin Davis, the US chargé d’affaires to Somalia, and the UK’s ambassador, Charles King, had been trying to persuade political leaders from both sides to reach an agreement on a political transition roadmap. Their failure leaves the country without an agreed way forward at the worst possible time.

Since 2008, Somalia has frequently been ranked as one of the world’s most fragile states. Under President Mohamud’s leadership, the country is now facing a political deadlock that threatens its survival. This crisis is unfolding amid insecurity, humanitarian distress, economic fragility, widespread corruption and shifting geopolitical rivalries.

At the heart of the crisis is the contested nature of the Somali state itself. Somaliland seeks independence, while Puntland and Jubbaland have broken ties with the Federal Government. Al-Shabab controls significant parts of the country and key roads. The Federal Government and at least three Federal Member States are also operating beyond their mandates. The scheduled electoral calendar has lapsed without a vote: parliament’s four-year mandate expired in April 2026, and the president’s term ran out a month later, yet no agreed roadmap for elections or political transition exists to replace them.

In a controversial process, the government unilaterally changed the constitution, passed an electoral law viewed by its opponents as self-serving, and established an election commission they reject as one-sided. Over the past four years, executive, legislative and judicial powers have become increasingly concentrated in the hands of President Mohamud.

Somalia’s national opposition, along with Puntland and Jubbaland, has characterised the government’s actions as a power grab and rejected them. They argue that the 2012 constitution, which reflects Somalia’s political settlement, remains the law of the land. As a result, Somalia is now caught between two competing claims to constitutional legitimacy. For its part, the government maintains that it is advancing a democratic goal long sought for Somalia, a move from indirect, clan-mediated selection to one-person, one-vote elections, and that the constitutional amendments extending the presidential term from four to five years were lawfully approved by parliament.

Universal suffrage and party-based politics remain a distant aspiration for Somalis. Acknowledging this reality, both the government and the opposition continue to accept the clan-based power-sharing system. However, they disagree on how members of parliament representing clans should be selected at the state and federal levels. The government seeks a one-year term extension and proposes an electoral system for clan representatives that critics say would help it maintain its hold on power. The opposition, by contrast, advocates an improved indirect election process through which clans would choose their representatives.

This political rupture is unfolding in a country already facing severe security and governance challenges. Although security in the capital has improved, widespread violence persists, particularly in south-central Somalia. According to the ACLED database, national fatalities reached a record high in 2025, and al-Shabab is responsible for the large majority of conflict deaths recorded over the past two decades. During the current administration’s four years in office, the same data points to tens of thousands of deaths nationwide, primarily concentrated in Banadir, Lower Shabelle, Lower Jubba and Hiran.

The crisis is also taking place against a worsening humanitarian and economic backdrop. Despite the arrival of rains across the country, humanitarian agencies warn that millions of Somalis are food insecure. International humanitarian efforts are struggling to raise funds to assist those affected by poverty, displacement and conflict. Foreign aid has been declining since the Trump administration dismantled USAID in 2025, while Somalia’s domestic revenue-to-GDP ratio remains in the low single digits. Concerns over the viability and affordability of the state have led many to look towards a resource-based economy, particularly as Turkiye expands its involvement in Somalia’s oil and fisheries sectors.

Corruption has further weakened public trust in state institutions. According to the Corruption Perceptions Index, Somalia has consistently ranked among the most corrupt countries in the world over the past decade. Widespread corruption has undermined almost every aspect of governance. The government’s approach to land management has deepened these concerns, with critics accusing it of forcibly evicting people who occupied public lands during the war and selling some of these lands to merchants without due process. Many citizens with legal documents from previous governments have also lost their homes.

These domestic pressures are being sharpened by regional and global rivalries. Somalia is struggling to navigate intensifying competition in the Horn of Africa, the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea and the western Indian Ocean. Its divided political class is managing these challenges not as a cohesive state, but through regions, clans and rival political blocs. Different groups have aligned themselves with various regional powers and neighbouring countries.

Regional players, including Turkiye, Saudi Arabia, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Iran and Egypt, are increasingly active in the Horn of Africa. Israel became the first country to officially recognise Somaliland late last year, intensifying competition among rival regional powers and drawing further attention to Somalia and Somaliland amid the region’s shifting geopolitics.

The political, security, economic and humanitarian pressures have also had serious implications for civic space. The government has been accused of silencing dissent by jailing journalists and civic activists. The opposition is now calling for demonstrations, while the government is openly discouraging public participation.

What should happen now

Somalia stands at a critical juncture. Timely intervention by the international community could help redirect the country away from violence and political fragmentation. In the past, traditional donors, mainly the US, the European Union and the UK, helped facilitate Somalia’s last five political transitions, in 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2022.

The American and British diplomats in Mogadishu made important efforts to bring the parties together and facilitate dialogue, although these efforts came late. A final push may now require more direct involvement from Washington and London, as well as engagement with non-traditional Gulf donors. Turkiye has also expressed interest in contributing to mediation efforts. This should be welcomed, as Ankara has influence with political actors in both the government and the opposition.

The international community should first pressure the government to negotiate a political roadmap in good faith, with a focus on a workable and timely election process. Villa Somalia should also stop using state institutions, including security forces, the aviation agency and international assistance, as tools in the political dispute.

At the same time, the opposition should be encouraged to engage constructively with the government and avoid initiating a parallel process that could lead to the formation of an alternative government. Most importantly, the international community should impose targeted sanctions on political spoilers who use extrajudicial means to destabilise the country.

Beyond the immediate political impasse, there is also a pressing need for genuine national dialogue and reconciliation. Previous peace processes in Djibouti and Kenya involved a wider range of actors in peacebuilding and helped establish the Third Republic. One lesson from those processes is that institutions built by people who have not fully reconciled cannot last. Somalis have never had the opportunity to engage in a serious and inclusive national dialogue. They need an open forum, genuine reconciliation and state institutions they collectively own.

Somalia is on the brink of political disintegration, but it remains at the prevention stage. That is precisely why the broader international community must act now, as it has in the past. There is still time to guide Somalia away from a self-destructive path and safeguard decades of investment in state-building and peacebuilding.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

The violence prompted 300 Mozambicans to return home by their own means over the weekend, with more than 500 still in the country now beginning the official repatriation process.

At least five Mozambican nationals have been killed in “xenophobic attacks” in South Africa over the weekend, the Mozambican government said, marking the first deaths officially linked to country-wide protests against undocumented immigration.

About 800 Mozambicans got caught up in violence that broke out in the southern coastal city of Mossel Bay on Friday, the government press office said in a statement received on Tuesday.

“Regrettably, seven Mozambican citizens have died, five of them as a direct consequence of the xenophobic attacks and the other two as a result of a road accident, when they were travelling in a private vehicle on their way back to Mozambique,” the statement said.

The violence prompted 300 Mozambicans to return home on Saturday, said the statement.

“The remaining just over 500 have since been sheltered in a safe location in the Western Cape Province, and as of today, 1 June, the process of their repatriation to Mozambique is already underway,” it said.

South African police said on Sunday they were investigating the deaths of two men at an informal settlement in Mossel Bay, a port town about 380km (236 miles) east of Cape Town, where xenophobic attacks had been reported.

They did not say whether the deaths were linked to the protests. It was also not immediately clear what nationalities the two men were.

But the area mayor, Dirk Kotze, voiced “deep concern and dismay at the current xenophobic attacks where people have been murdered, houses burned and families displaced”.

The region has seen anti-migrant protests similar to those reported in the financial capital Johannesburg, Durban and parts of the Eastern Cape province in recent weeks.

South Africa has faced recurring waves of xenophobic violence since 2008, when dozens of migrants were killed and thousands displaced in attacks across the country. Similar flare-ups occurred in 2015 and 2021.

The latest spike in anti-immigrant tensions comes as political parties seek support before local government elections in November.

Bafana Bafana’s departure was delayed due to non-issuance of visas for several players and support staff.

The South African national team members have left for their World Cup training base in Pachuca, Mexico, in advance of their opening game against the tournament cohosts on June 11.

The delegation that left on Monday did not include assistant coach Helman Mkhalele, who has yet to obtain a United States visa.

The charter flight departed Johannesburg following a frantic 24 hours after the squad was originally scheduled to leave on Sunday, but was held back by a delay in obtaining visas in what was described as an administrative bungle by the South African Football Association (SAFA).

Mkhalele, a former international winger who played 66 times for Bafana Bafana, including at their World Cup debut in France in 1998, will have to travel later after his visa application was initially denied.

Blaming the US Consulate General in Johannesburg for the delay, SAFA president Danny Jordaan told the South African Broadcasting Corporation, “They refused the visa, but gave no reasons. It is very difficult to deal with the process where you get no information.”

“We don’t know [why it was denied], we are clutching in the dark, but we hope the matter will be resolved [soon]. All of the players are [on the flight] and 99 percent of the technical staff.”

South Africa are due to play Jamaica in a friendly on Friday before taking on Mexico in the showpiece opening match in Mexico City.

“Now we are very happy that we can go to Mexico,” South Africa coach Hugo Broos said. “The past days have been a little bit stressful with all the problems we had, but those problems are behind us now, and we can focus on what’s coming.”

“These 10 days go very fast. Once we get there, we will start working, focusing on the first game against Mexico, so time will pass very quickly. I think everybody is looking forward to starting the World Cup.”

South Africa are in Group A and will face Czechia in Atlanta on June 18 and South Korea in Monterrey, Mexico, six days later.

They are appearing in their fourth World Cup and looking to advance from the group stage for the first time.

On a modest bed inside his war-battered home in the Khartoum North neighbourhood of the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, Murtada Mohieddin, a diabetic patient in his early 50s, carefully counts his remaining doses of insulin. His search for medicine has transformed into a harrowing battle – not just to find the treatment he needs to survive his diabetes, but to ensure the medicine is not expired or ruined.

“Sometimes the insulin is spoiled,” Mohieddin tells Al Jazeera, inspecting his limited supply. “You wouldn’t know if it is ruined or expired. You can check the expiration date, but it could still be damaged from poor storage.”

More than three years of civil war have crippled Sudan’s healthcare infrastructure: hospitals, health centres and pharmaceutical factories have been shut and vital medical supply chains and storage across the country have been disrupted.

The war, which erupted as a power struggle between Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), has killed more than 50,000 people and displaced 14 million – nearly a quarter of the country’s population.

The devastating conflict has paralysed domestic pharmaceutical production and collapsed vital supply chains across the country.

According to a World Health Organization (WHO) news release dated April 14, 2026, Sudan represents the world’s largest humanitarian crisis, with 21 million people lacking basic healthcare services out of 34 million needing aid.

In the void left by the closure of pharmaceutical companies, smuggling networks have flourished, flooding the market with unregulated drugs locally known as “Boko” medicines.

These include critical intravenous malaria medications smuggled across borders. Because they completely bypass strict temperature controls and quality checks during transit, these drugs are frequently spoiled, rendering them either totally ineffective or lethally toxic to patients.

A double threat

Inside local pharmacies in Omdurman, located on the outskirts of Khartoum, the crisis is not just limited to scarcity. Patients now face the double threat of exorbitant costs and life-threatening quality issues, as these illicit medicines are often severely spoiled due to a lack of proper storage and refrigeration.

Mutawakil Hamza, a pharmacist based in Omdurman, said the reliance on unregulated channels is putting lives at immediate risk.

“Most malaria medicines are now brought in through smuggling,” Hamza said. “These are ultimately injections for intravenous use, and this is highly dangerous to a patient’s health.”

Because intravenous treatments bypass the body’s natural defences and require absolute sterility, administering improperly stored or degraded smuggled injections can rapidly cause severe bloodstream infections, systemic shock, or death.

The war has effectively dismantled local manufacturing, reversing years of medical self-reliance. Yasser Ahmed Youssef, a pharmaceutical industry expert whose factory is located in Khartoum, noted the stark contrast to the pre-war era, when local factories managed to produce “very large quantities of life-saving medicines, including drugs for blood pressure, diabetes, colds, and paediatric care”.

Now, the majority of those production lines are silent, leaving the population dependent on a shattered healthcare system. According to the October 2025 Health Resources and Services Availability Monitoring System (HeRAMS) report cited in a WHO Public Health Situation Analysis from January 6, 2026, 40 percent of health facilities nationwide are entirely nonoperational.

The situation is even more drastic regionally, with 87 percent of facilities shut down in Khartoum and 85 percent closed in North Kordofan, whose control is contested between the rival sides.

In active conflict zones such as Gezira, Khartoum, Darfur and the Kordofan regions, the shortages are particularly dire.

A United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) emergency report from August 2025 highlighted that the only functioning maternity hospital in the besieged city of el-Fasher faces critical medicine shortages and risks imminent closure.

El-Fasher, the last SAF stronghold in the western region of Darfur, was taken over by the RSF in late October 2025, trapping approximately 700,000 civilians – mostly women and children. People have been cut off entirely from food and medicine and subjected to attacks.

Collapsed warehouses and supply lines

In the government-funded public sector, the National Medical Supplies Fund maintains that it is working to secure essential medicines despite the fighting, claiming to have achieved 75 percent availability for cancer medications and fully secured supplies for kidney patients.

However, officials admit the overarching infrastructure is in ruins, with the local health ecosystem almost destroyed.

“We have been massively affected by the ongoing war inside Sudan,” said Abubakar Salouha, a department director at the fund. “The medical supplies have been severely impacted; there has been a collapse at the level of the main warehouses at the headquarters.”

International aid deliveries from neighbouring countries also face enormous logistical hurdles.

The WHO’s January 6 situation analysis detailed that cross-border transit times for medical commodities can take up to 90 days to reach remote regions like Darfur from the Cameroonian city of Douala via Chad. Compounding these suffocating delays, armed groups have repeatedly targeted medical infrastructure, looting pharmacies and stripping remaining hospitals of their vital medical supplies.

Recent attacks highlight this systematic destruction by rival sides. On March 20, 2026, a drone attack on Al-Daein Teaching Hospital in East Darfur state killed at least 64 people, including medical personnel, and injured 89 others. Sudanese rights group the Emergency Lawyers reported that the army was behind the attack.

On April 2, another drone attack struck Al-Jabalain Hospital in White Nile state, killing 10 staff members, including the hospital’s director while he was performing surgery. That same day, the Family Hospital in el-Daein was looted, and patients and health workers were assaulted and expelled. Similarly, a hospital in Kurmuk, Blue Nile state, was looted on March 25, its equipment destroyed, and patients forced out. The RSF was blamed for these attacks.

“Sudan is confronting one of the gravest humanitarian and public health emergencies in the world today. The ongoing conflict has pushed the health system to the edge of complete collapse,” warned WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus on April 4.

“These incidents are stark reminders of the urgent need for renewed international solidarity and decisive political and humanitarian action. Sudan cannot endure this crisis alone.”

Bembou Silaty, Guinea – Mamadou Aliou walks through the small village of Bembou Silaty in northwestern Guinea carrying an irresolvable contradiction.

The 38-year-old works in the environmental health and safety department for a bauxite mining company, yet he is also an activist striving to improve life in his community, which often means criticising the actions of another mining company in the area.

“Before these companies arrived, we cultivated our land, and it sustained us,” Aliou told Al Jazeera.

“We could cover our daily needs, especially food. But now, when a piece of land is registered and belongs to a mining company, you have nothing there any more.”

The foreign-linked mining companies are part of the global scramble for Guinea’s bauxite. The West African nation holds the world’s biggest reserves of the ore, which is the source material for alumina and ultimately aluminium, a metal essential for car and aircraft frames, windows, wind turbines, and solar panels.

Over the past three decades, Guinea has multiplied its bauxite production tenfold. More than a dozen projects of bauxite production are currently ongoing in the country, according to the online cadastre.

As the global energy transition demands ever more aluminium, it has placed Guinea in a strategically crucial position. Approximately 75 percent of the bauxite exported by the country over the past decade has ended up in China, which produces 60 percent of the world’s aluminium.

Companies from Russia, the United States, and the United Arab Emirates have also established themselves in the country to secure the ore. In Bembou Silaty, an Indian company that began operations in 2019 now holds an exploitation concession until 2034.

Located in the prefecture of Telimele (Kindia region), Bembou Silaty has undergone a transformation since bauxite was discovered on its land about five years ago.

Yet, on the ground, many lament the cost: Contaminated water, loss of farmland, and a steep decline in agricultural productivity.

‘No land, no money’

In the traditional bauxite heartlands of Kindia and Boke, the main roads are in notably good condition, a cut above the rest of the country. Steady jobs in technical roles or transport logistics have created economic opportunities for some Guineans.

Yet Bembou Silaty remains a quiet, peaceful village without electricity, and farming methods that are untouched by mechanisation.

Less than 2km (1.2 miles) away, however, the lush green landscape and mild climate of the rainy season give way to the electric-powered site of the Indian mining company.

There, excavators and trucks laden with bauxite constantly traverse the wide, unpaved roads, built to accommodate the heavy traffic, in a noisy, busy zone where the mining economy bulldozes its way forward.

People working in technical roles at the mine can earn up to about $300 a month.

For other locals who make a living from farming, most don’t have a regular wage and rely on the yield from their crops.

Across Guinea, an estimated half of the population depends on agriculture for their livelihood.

Locals in Bembou Silaty say every hectare claimed by mining is a hectare lost to farming, in a country that spent more than $500m importing rice in 2024.

“They give you compensation for your land, but it’s not enough, and in the end, it’s mismanaged,” Aliou said.

“Within a month or two, someone who received 50 or 100 million Guinean francs ($5,700-11,400) has nothing left. No land, no money. They have to start over, from below zero.”

Locals who still own land continue to grow rice, cassava, peanuts and cashews in the village, but they have ever less space and agricultural productivity is falling.

The village women have set up an association, “Allawalli” (which means “God help us” in Fula), to work cooperatively.

‘Not enough’

Walking through the alleys of Bembou Silaty, a few houses stand out.

They are made of cement, which withstands the rains better than the more common mud-brick homes, though many remain unfinished.

Locals say they were built with compensation money.

Fatoumata Binta Bah, a neighbour of Aliou’s, comes from a family of farmers. They once cultivated cashews, their livelihood.

Then the Indian mining company started up operations and offered them less than 50 million Guinean francs (about $5,700) for their land. That compensation, paid as a lump sum, seemed like a decent amount of money, she says.

But now, the money is gone, and their new house is still incomplete.

“The land they took from us was productive. That’s what we lived on,” said Bah, 20, as she prepared tea over a fire in the family courtyard.

“In the end, it wasn’t enough,” she lamented.

The Indian company did not respond to Al Jazeera’s questions on the purchase of land.

Meanwhile, on the outskirts of the village, surgical holes drilled into the ground mark where mining companies have tested for bauxite – a reminder to the farmers that the impact on the land is felt even before extraction begins.

In a recent report, Djami Diallo, the Guinean minister of the environment and sustainable development, stated that each year, certain companies had their impact studies and evaluation reports rejected for failing to comply with environmental standards.

Three or four companies in Boke, Kindia’s neighbouring region that is considered the bauxite capital in the country, were said to be affected. But the minister acknowledged that “just because companies do not meet the conditions to obtain the compliance certificate does not mean that everything stops.”

Clean water, the greatest challenge

Not all homes in Bembou Silaty, a community of about 5,000, have indoor toilets and plumbing. In the centre of the village, there are communal latrines for those who do not have facilities available in their homes. Showers can be taken in the same place, using a bucket and water collected from the spring.

One small gain for the community since the mining company’s arrival is a new water point in the village. The tap serves nearly all the residents. Even Aliou uses it to fill buckets for his household – for cooking and drinking – though he says he knows the water contains iron, as contamination occurs.

Still, he considers himself luckier than his friends in the neighbouring village of Koussadji Dow, who rely on now-brown, contaminated river water.

Tala Oury Sow, a trader and farmer, washes her cooking utensils in the murky river water – a daily struggle.

She starts speaking softly, surrounded by neighbours, but her voice rises to a shout.

“Do you think we can live like this?

“We had hoped the mining company’s arrival would improve things, but it has gotten worse,” she protested.

“Since the mining companies came, we’ve had this problem with the water. The children get sick, and the parents too,” added Mariama Kindi Diallo, a farmer, in her courtyard.

“The doctors tell us not to drink the rain or river water. There are no roads, no school, no phone signal. What are we supposed to do? We are asking for help to have a dignified life,” she pleaded, as her family and neighbours nodded in agreement.

The Indian company did not respond to requests for comment on these issues.

‘We need refineries here’

To escape the increasingly difficult conditions in villages like Bembou Silaty, some people leave the rural areas and head to the capital, Conakry.

Bauxite mining so dominates Guinea that one can chance upon a driver of one of the trains hauling ore from the mines to the port of Kamsar.

Alpha, who did not want his real name published, works for a United States-backed company and provides a window into the immense volume of resources being exported.

“We operate six trains of 150 wagons each day,” he said, explaining that the annual target for 2025 was to export 17.5 million tonnes of bauxite.

“The government wants to change things, because the profits we make in Guinea right now are small. We need refineries here to increase the state’s revenue,” he added.

Alpha lives near the coast, where his job has allowed him to build a house for his family and achieve a standard of living unattainable for most of his compatriots.

The government of Mamady Doumbouya, which came to power in a 2021 coup, is attempting to reorganise the mining sector. It is pressing investors to process bauxite within Guinea, ensuring a portion of the value stays in the country.

Processing bauxite into aluminium can multiply its price by 37 times.

Instability in Iran amid the US and Israel’s war has contributed to rising aluminium prices, which surpassed $3,600 per tonne in April.

Doumbouya is set to lead the country for the next seven years, after winning the December 2025 elections with nearly 87 percent of the vote. While opponents view him as illegitimate, many Guineans agree on the need to reform the mining sector.

Achieving this, however, requires a huge increase in electricity generation – power that is non-existent in villages like Bembou Silaty and unreliable even in Conakry, where blackouts are frequent when fans and TVs are switched on at night.

Guinea is working with neighbouring Senegal on a solution: Using Senegalese gas to generate enough electricity to process its bauxite on African soil. Currently, both countries export raw materials, while jobs and wealth are created elsewhere.

Following the bauxite route

More than 3,000km (1,900 miles) away, across the ocean, Spain is also a part of the Guinean bauxite story.

Parets del Valles, a municipality of 18,000 people less than 30km (19 miles) from Barcelona, represents the journey’s end.

From the town centre to its industrial outskirts, businesses specialising in aluminium are plentiful: Aluminium distribution, carpentry, and window fitting, much of them serving household needs.

For Spain, Europe’s largest consumer of Guinean bauxite, more than 90 percent of its imports come from Guinea-Conakry.

The aluminium produced there, mainly in the country’s north, feeds the automotive industry and serves both industrial and domestic purposes.

Parets is another world compared with the bauxite’s point of origin in Guinea.

In Spain, there is light, hot water, paved roads – all the base elements of a decent life. It’s why many say growing numbers of West Africans are arriving in Parets and across the Valles Oriental region. This is part of a broader trend in Catalonia and Spain, according to the Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE): The Guinean population has quadrupled in Spain since 2000 – from 2,700 to 11,000 people – and in Catalonia from 1,000 to 4,000.

These figures don’t include those who go unregistered.

Increasingly, more boats are leaving directly from Guinea, towards the Canary Islands and on to mainland Europe. According to Frontex, the European Union border security agency, more Guineans arrived in the Canary Islands, Spain, in 2023 (2,324) than in the previous 13 years combined. In 2024 and 2025 combined, another 6,000 Guineans arrived.

Migrants, predominantly men from Senegal and increasingly from Guinea, come alone, settling where they have contacts and job prospects. The newest arrivals, often very young, spend long hours with their mobile phones as their sole companion – the only tether to the country they left behind.

Many left, following the bauxite trail, hoping to find something more in the places where their resources are both enjoyed and exploited.

As Aliou, back in Bembou Silaty, says: “If you compare the bauxite we export with what we get in return, the difference is enormous. We gain almost nothing. Just enough to survive.”

This article was produced in collaboration with the Catalan association SETEM Catalunya, promoted by the Connect for Global Change consortium and Lafede.cat, and with financial support from the European Union and the Government of Catalonia (Generalitat de Catalunya)

Millions of Ethiopians are heading to the polls for general elections on June 1.

The governing party of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who has consolidated power since he took office in 2018, says it is confident of victory.

Abiy’s government has faced years of turmoil and conflict. Despite that, it is portraying the vote as the next step on the path towards what it calls genuine democracy.

Critics and the opposition, however, argue that is unlikely because of Ethiopia’s ethnic and regional divisions. Some opposition parties have been excluded and violence is preventing voting in dozens of constituencies.

So, will the vote hold any significance?

Presenter: Mohammed Jamjoom

Guests:

Samuel Getachew – Journalist and commentator specialising in Ethiopian politics and security

Martin Plaut – Senior research fellow at King’s College London

Bizuneh Yimenu – Lecturer in comparative politics at Queen’s University Belfast who specialises in federalism.

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia – Ethiopians vote on Monday in a general election to choose members of parliament, who will in turn select the next prime minister. The National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) said 47 political parties and more than 10,900 candidates are in the race, including 2,198 for the federal parliament, 8,736 for regional and city councils and 73 independents.

More than 50 million voters are registered, with official voter registration figures showing women account for around half of the electorate. Young Ethiopians make up a large share of the population, with a median age of about 19 years, according to United Nations population estimates, giving them a substantial presence in the country’s electorate.

The contest brings together ruling, opposition, regional and independent politicians under Ethiopia’s federal parliamentary system, where the government is formed through a parliamentary majority and MPs select the prime minister.

Here is a closer look at the main political parties, coalitions and independent candidates.

Prosperity Party (PP)

The Prosperity Party is the ruling political party in Ethiopia, led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. It was formed in 2019 following the merger of several regional parties that previously made up the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The party holds a majority in the House of Peoples’ Representatives following the 2021 general election.

According to the Prosperity Party programme and public statements, it emphasises national unity, economic reform and state-led development within Ethiopia’s federal system.

The party is fielding candidates for seats in the House of Peoples’ Representatives and regional councils across almost all federal and regional constituencies under Ethiopia’s parliamentary system.

National Movement of Amhara (NAMA)

The National Movement of Amhara is a regional political party operating mainly in Ethiopia’s Amhara region. It is led by Belete Molla and participates in Ethiopia’s federal parliamentary elections through constituency-based contests.

According to party statements, NAMA focuses on political representation, security concerns and cultural and regional rights of the Amhara population within Ethiopia’s federal system.

The party is fielding candidates primarily within the Amhara region for federal and regional council seats under Ethiopia’s electoral framework.

Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (EZEMA)

The Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice is a national political party led by Berhanu Nega. Formed in 2019, it has participated in national elections since 2021 and operates across multiple regions.

According to party statements and its leadership, EZEMA promotes liberal democratic governance, the rule of law, market-oriented reforms and broader national unity.

For this vote, the party is contesting seats in both the House of Peoples’ Representatives and regional councils across multiple federal and regional constituencies.

Peace for Ethiopia coalition

The Peace for Ethiopia coalition is an alliance of smaller regional parties, including the Agew National Council, Gamo Democratic Party, Gambella Peoples’ Freedom Movement, Kaffa Green Party, and Tigray Democratic Cooperation.

According to coalition statements, the alliance brings together member parties to improve coordination and representation of diverse regional interests within Ethiopia’s federal system.

The coalition coordinates candidate lists across its member parties while allowing each to retain separate regional identities. Members are contesting seats in both federal and regional councils.

Regional and ethnic-based parties

Regional parties contest seats across Ethiopia’s federal system, including in Oromia, Somali, Tigray and southern regions. They operate within their respective states and are registered with NEBE to field candidates in federal and regional constituencies.

According to their public positions, these parties generally focus on regional governance, local autonomy, and development priorities specific to their constituencies.

They participate in the House of Peoples’ Representatives and regional councils under Ethiopia’s parliamentary electoral system.

Independent candidates

A total of 73 independent candidates are registered to contest seats in the 2026 elections.

According to political observers, independent candidates tend to focus on local governance issues and constituency-level concerns rather than formal party platforms or national ideological positions.

They are running for both federal and regional council positions under Ethiopia’s constituency-based parliamentary system.

Electoral stakes

The election will determine the composition of Ethiopia’s federal government and which party or coalition controls parliament. Elected MPs will select the prime minister, who then forms the federal government.

The results will shape the distribution of power between federal and regional authorities under Ethiopia’s constitutional system. The vote is part of the country’s regular parliamentary electoral cycle under the 1995 constitution.

The allocation of seats in the House of Peoples’ Representatives will determine legislative authority at the federal level.

The election is being held under Ethiopia’s federal parliamentary system, in which executive power is derived from a parliamentary majority.

Political environment

The National Election Board of Ethiopia oversees the administration of voting and candidate registration across all regions. Polling arrangements have been established nationwide under Ethiopia’s electoral framework.

Voting will take place in constituencies across urban and rural areas in all federal member states.

Electoral procedures are implemented under national electoral law, which defines the responsibilities of federal and regional election authorities.

NEBE is responsible for coordinating polling operations, voter registration, and ballot administration across constituencies.

Youth and voter engagement

NEBE reports that more than 50 million people are registered to vote in the election.

Young people make up a large share of the population, with a median age of about 19 years, according to UN population estimates.

Registered voters include both first-time and returning voters participating in federal and regional elections across the country.

Voting is conducted under Ethiopia’s legal framework for universal adult suffrage, which grants citizens aged 18 and above the right to vote.

Women voters and participation

According to NEBE voter registration figures, women account for around half of registered voters.

They are eligible to vote and contest seats at both federal and regional levels under Ethiopia’s electoral law, and female candidates are participating across multiple regions.

Both sexes are subject to the same voter registration and candidacy requirements under Ethiopia’s electoral framework.

Female candidates are contesting seats in both federal and regional races across the country.

Women in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo are disproportionately impacted by Ebola as shortages of protective gear amid funding cuts accelerate the spread of disease. Al Jazeera’s Imogen Kimber reports how these caregivers to the living and the dead are most at risk.

Workers in eastern DR Congo are rebuilding an Ebola treatment centre that was burned by protesters earlier this month, as health officials warn misinformation is driving families to hide sick relatives. The Congolese government confirmed over 1,000 suspected cases and at least 220 deaths since the outbreak was declared.

Foreign workers in South Africa are yet again facing violence and protests by anti-immigrant groups. They accuse them of residing and working in the country illegally and are demanding that they leave by June 30.

South Africa has seen recurrent waves of anti-immigrant violence in the past decade – often directed at other African nationals.

Since the end of apartheid in 1994, the country has become a destination for thousands of workers from neighbouring countries. But many South Africans say the government is not upholding its immigration laws.

So, does South Africa still need foreign workers?

Presenter: Tom McRae

Guests:

William Gumede – Associate professor, School of Governance at the University of the Witwatersrand

Lindiwe Zulu – Member of the ANC Committee on International Relations and a former South African minister of social development

Ashraf Essop – Immigration lawyer

At least 16 students were killed and dozens injured after a fire tore through the dormitory of a girls’ boarding school in Kenya’s Rift Valley early Thursday. Panicked parents gathered outside the school searching for their children hours after the blaze was extinguished.

The first flight carrying around 300 Ghanaians evacuated from South Africa following anti-immigrant tensions and reported attacks on foreign nationals has arrived in Accra. Authorities welcomed returnees with reintegration support and transport assistance.

Harare, Zimbabwe – Precious Mvundura woke up with joint pain, a high fever and a pounding headache on a chilly autumn morning in eastern Zimbabwe.

The 37-year-old initially thought it was just the flu. But when the headache persisted for three days, she became worried.

Her five-year-old son had also fallen ill and was sweating heavily.

In early May, the pair sought help from a village health worker in Chishakwe, a rural farming community outside Zimbabwe’s third-largest city, Mutare. Both tested positive for malaria.

“I felt relieved,” Mvundura told Al Jazeera.

“From the moment I took that medication, I started getting better.”

Her son has also recovered and is back in school.

Their ordeal comes as malaria cases and deaths surge across Zimbabwe after US funding cuts disrupted key malaria control programmes.

Shortly after returning to office for a second term in 2025, US President Donald Trump slashed foreign aid funding, including programmes backed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). In Zimbabwe, the cuts disrupted tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS and malaria research, prevention and treatment programmes.

Among the affected initiatives were the Zimbabwe Entomological Support Programme in Malaria (ZENTO) at Africa University in Mutare, which provided scientific research to support the country’s National Malaria Control Programme, and the Zimbabwe Assistance Programme in Malaria II (ZAPIM II), which helped strengthen malaria diagnosis, treatment and prevention in high-burden districts.

USAID had disbursed $270m for health and agriculture programmes in Zimbabwe in 2024.

Malaria cases jumped to 65,399 between January and April 2026, up from 36,000 recorded during the same period in 2025 and 17,000 in 2024, according to Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Health National Malaria Control Programme weekly surveillance report.

Deaths have also risen sharply, reaching 174 between January and April 2026, compared with 85 during the same period last year and 34 in 2024.

Mvundura and her son survived because they sought treatment early. In many other cases, the disease has been fatal.

Shortages of mosquito nets, test kits

Thomas Chuchu, the health programme lead at Save the Children Zimbabwe, said several malaria elimination activities previously supported by ZAPIM II had been disrupted.

“In practice, elimination has continued through government and other partners, but with weaker operational capacity and slower implementation,” Chuchu told Al Jazeera.

The ZAPIM II programme ran through Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Health system in 11 districts across the provinces of Central and East Mashonaland and the province of Matabeleland North.

Before falling ill, Mvundura said she had not been using mosquito nets or repellents.

“I only started using a mosquito net a friend shared when I fell sick,” she said.

In December 2025, Caroline Mawombedzi was diagnosed with malaria while living in Burma Valley, a farming community about an hour’s drive from Mutare.

She had last contracted the disease in the late 2000s while still a child.

In mid-May, her five-year-old daughter was also diagnosed with malaria by a village health worker in Chishakwe after suffering severe headaches and stomach problems.

Although her daughter received treatment, Mawombedzi said she could not afford preventive measures such as mosquito nets.

“I am unemployed. I cannot afford to buy a mosquito net. We have not been sleeping under a mosquito net for years,” she said.

Virginia Chakandinakira, a village health worker serving Chishakwe, said malaria diagnostic kits and drugs are now in short supply.

“I used to get plenty of malaria test kits and drugs. But in 2025, they did not give me. I referred everyone showing malaria to a nearby Chitakatira clinic,” she said. Chitakatira is a rural settlement about an hour’s drive from Chishakwe.

“I only received test kits and drugs in February. However, the supplies are limited. The authorities told us they were only distributing them to hotspot communities.”

Research programmes crippled

Professor Sungano Mharakurwa, the director of Africa University’s Malaria Institute, said the abrupt withdrawal of US support had worsened the malaria outbreak by affecting the programme.

ZENTO was contributing data from the surveillance of malaria-carrying mosquitoes, which guided strategies employed by the National Malaria Control Programme to control malaria transmission, he said.

The Trump administration’s funding cuts have also effectively put a stop to the US President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI), launched in 2005 by former President George W Bush to control and eliminate malaria worldwide. Mharakurwa said the PMI had played a major role in funding malaria medications, and communities had been left exposed without it.

He said the Malaria Institute later secured funding from the United Methodist Church General Board of Global Ministry, but it fell far short of previous US assistance.

Zimbabwe’s dependence on donor funding for essential medicines, diagnostic kits and mosquito-control supplies has left the country vulnerable.

Itai Rusike, the director of Zimbabwe’s Community Working Group on Health, said the government needed to strengthen domestic health financing to reduce dependence on foreign donors.

“It is risky for a country to depend substantially on external partners, as donors can withdraw financial support anytime should their interests shift,” he said.

Climate change fuels spread

Experts say climate change is also driving the spread of malaria and other vector-borne diseases across Africa.

Rising temperatures are allowing malaria to spread into higher-altitude areas, which were once less vulnerable to outbreaks.

Zimbabwe experienced El Niño between 2023 and 2024, a climate phenomenon marked by unusually warm temperatures in the Pacific Ocean, which typically disrupts rainfall patterns across Southern Africa.

Heavy rainfall followed in 2025 and 2026, creating ideal breeding conditions for mosquitoes.

Chuchu, from Save the Children Zimbabwe, said that the current spike in malaria cases was closely linked to the heavy rains during the 2025–2026 season.

“The rains created favourable breeding conditions for mosquitoes, particularly in already endemic provinces such as Mashonaland Central, Manicaland, Mashonaland East and Mashonaland West,” he said.

“The effect of heavy rains is likely being amplified by weakened prevention systems, including reduced mosquito-net coverage, delayed vector-control activities, reduced community surveillance, and challenges with timely testing and treatment following the discontinuation of ZAPIM,” he added.

Professor Mharakurwa, meanwhile, said that above-normal rainfall required equally strong preparation and resources to contain malaria transmission.

Government efforts

Zimbabwe aims to eliminate malaria by 2030, in line with the target set by the African Union.

Over the years, the government, working with international donors and aid organisations, has relied on indoor residual spraying, mosquito-net distribution, mass testing and public awareness campaigns to contain outbreaks, particularly in rural communities.

Health workers continue to carry out indoor spraying campaigns in malaria-prone areas, while village health educators use community meetings and radio programmes to encourage early testing and treatment. Authorities have also expanded surveillance and rapid-response systems in high-risk districts.

But some of these efforts have weakened following the disruption of donor-funded programmes. Key malaria elimination activities previously supported by ZAPIM II included active case tracking, targeted distribution of long-lasting insecticidal nets and district rapid-response systems.

For years, the government and aid organisations distributed mosquito nets annually to vulnerable communities, such as Chishakwe. But since the US funding cuts, shortages have become increasingly common.

Village health workers say malaria diagnostic kits and treatment drugs are also running low in some rural areas, forcing suspected malaria patients to travel long distances to clinics for testing and treatment.

Health experts warn that unless funding gaps are urgently addressed, Zimbabwe risks losing years of progress made in reducing malaria infections and deaths.

For Mvundura and her son, surviving malaria still feels like escaping death.

“We cheated death,” she said. “It was so bad.”

Uganda has closed its border with neighbouring DR Congo for four weeks in an effort to contain an Ebola outbreak. Authorities say at least seven cases, including one death, have been confirmed, while hundreds are being monitored.

Muslims around the world have begun celebrating Eid al-Adha, the “Festival of Sacrifice”, which falls on the 10th day of Dhul Hijjah, the 12th and final month of the Muslim lunar calendar.

One of the biggest holidays in the Muslim calendar, it coincides with the last day of the annual Hajj pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia.

In Gaza, where Israel’s months-long offensive has devastated neighbourhoods and displaced most of the population, many families are marking Eid in tents and crowded shelters, with little meat or festive clothing.

More than 1.7 million people are taking part in the Hajj this year, slightly up from 2025, even as a war pitting the United States and Israel against Iran casts a long shadow across the Middle East.

On Tuesday, pilgrims prayed on Mount Arafat, where Prophet Muhammad is believed to have delivered his final sermon. They then spent the night out in the open at Muzdalifah, halfway between Arafat and Mina, where they collected pebbles for the symbolic stoning of the devil.

After the stoning ceremony in Mina, pilgrims return to Mecca for a final circumambulation of the Kaaba, the cube-shaped building at the heart of the Grand Mosque towards which Muslims around the world face when they pray.

Eid al-Adha commemorates the Quranic story of Prophet Ibrahim’s willingness to sacrifice his son Ismail as an act of obedience to God. Islamic tradition holds that God spared the boy, replacing him with a ram.

The day is marked with the sacrifice of an animal – usually a sheep, goat or cow – and the distribution of its meat among family, neighbours and those in need, underlining the festival’s themes of faith, charity and community.

Mogadishu, Somalia- Muslims around the world celebrated Eid al-Adha, the Festival of Sacrifice, which marks the end of the Hajj pilgrimage period.

It is the second major holiday in the Islamic calendar after Eid al-Fitr, which follows the holy month of Ramadan.

In Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, families and communities gathered across the city on Wednesday to celebrate the occasion.

The holiday is typically marked by communal prayers in the morning, family visits, festive meals and outings for children.

Popular locations for the city’s residents include Lido Beach, the Darus Salam Zoo, and Maka al-Mukarama Road, the central business district.

More broadly, Mogadishu has been tentatively emerging from the waves of violence that have rocked the city over recent decades.

Since 2006, the government has been battling al-Shabab, a local affiliate of al-Qaeda, for control of the country – a conflict that has made Mogadishu one of the world’s most dangerous capitals.

But improving security has led to a surge of investment in the city, alongside the emergence of new cafes, restaurants and other recreational spaces.

At an Eid speech at the Islamic Solidarity Mosque, Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud said, “We see the change that has happened in Mogadishu’s security,” and called on the public to protect the city’s peace. Ali Jimale Mosque, the country’s largest, usually draws the biggest crowds and serves as a gathering place for the city’s residents.

Central to Eid al-Adha is the ritual sacrifice of livestock, commemorating the Prophet Ibrahim’s willingness to sacrifice his son before God provided a ram in his place.

The meat is traditionally shared among relatives, neighbours and people in need, reflecting the festival’s emphasis on charity, community and devotion.

Costs for livestock have soared in recent months in Somalia due to failed rains and drought, with a United Nations hunger monitor warning of famine risk in parts of the country.

The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification has said 6.5 million people in Somalia are facing “high levels of acute food insecurity”, a crisis worsened by the country’s ongoing armed fighting and a political standoff that has persisted since the president’s term expired on May 15.

On May 7, Zimbabwe’s Agriculture Minister Anxious Masuka announced in parliament that the government would return 67 farms seized during the country’s land reform programme to European nationals from Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland. The farms, he said, were protected under bilateral investment protection agreements signed between Zimbabwe and the four European states before the land seizures.

The measure forms part of President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s effort to restore relations with Western governments and international financial institutions after more than two decades of crisis, sanctions, isolation and debt default linked in part to the fast-track land reform programme of the early 2000s.

Zimbabwe is trying to restructure about $11.7bn in external debt, including $7.7bn owed to multilateral and bilateral creditors. On May 20, the International Monetary Fund approved a staff-monitored programme to support reforms and debt restructuring.

Resolving disputes linked to land reform has become central to that re-engagement process. In July 2020, Zimbabwe signed a $3.5bn compensation agreement with former white commercial farmers for infrastructure and improvements on acquired land. Last year, it began compensating treaty-protected foreign farmers, including claimants from Germany, Switzerland and Belgium.

But this development also exposes a deeper contradiction embedded in the global order governing land and property rights in former settler colonies: European claims arising from postcolonial redistribution are treated as urgent, enforceable and respectable, while African claims arising from colonial dispossession remain largely outside the same legal and moral framework.

The colonial dispossession that created white land ownership in Rhodesia never received the same urgency as the one now directed at restoring European claims after postcolonial redistribution. At independence in April 1980, no comparable mechanism forced Britain, Rhodesia or settler beneficiaries to compensate Africans dispossessed through conquest, racial legislation and forced removal. Yet once postcolonial Zimbabwe attempted to redistribute that land, its protection suddenly became tied to legality, investor confidence and international respectability.

In October 1889, Cecil John Rhodes’s British South Africa Company (BSAC) received a royal charter from the British Crown, accelerating white settler expansion across the territory that became Southern Rhodesia. The 1893 war against King Lobengula’s Ndebele kingdom opened vast areas of land to settler occupation, while the crushing of the 1896-97 First Chimurenga, led by resistance figures such as Mbuya Nehanda, consolidated British control across the colony.

Early dispossession was not only territorial. After 1893, BSAC forces seized cattle on a large scale in Matabeleland, weakening the economic foundations of local communities. By 1958, Southern Rhodesia’s European population of roughly 207,000 controlled almost 48 million acres of prime agricultural land, while about 2.55 million Africans had 41.95 million acres of poorer, overcrowded and less arable land.

From the 1890s onwards, colonial land seizures in Rhodesia were enforced and legitimised through the selective application of British imperial law and BSAC decrees. African ownership of land was never recognised with the same standing granted to settler occupation.

That legal order survived the expansion of settler rule through the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 and continued to shape later legal frameworks.

That lopsided inheritance still shapes the global response to Zimbabwe’s land question decades after independence.

Bilateral investment treaties signed between Zimbabwe and foreign states gave protected investors the right to seek compensation when property covered by those agreements was expropriated. In practice, certain foreign-owned farms seized during fast-track land reform entered an international system backed by arbitration mechanisms, treaty enforcement and diplomatic pressure, even though the land itself had been acquired through conquest and war. The 67 farms covered by Masuka fall into that category.

Africans dispossessed under colonial rule were never granted comparable access to international reparations or protected claims against empire.

Part of this asymmetry is structural: European farmers can invoke treaties their governments signed and a compensation deal Zimbabwe itself agreed, while the dispossessed have no counterparty to sue, no instrument to enforce and, in Rhodesia, no surviving state to hold to account. But that is precisely the point. The legal architecture was built to recognise one kind of loss and not the other.

In April 2009, Dutch farmers protected under a bilateral investment treaty brought Funnekotter and others v Zimbabwe before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), and the tribunal ordered Zimbabwe to compensate them for expropriated farms. In 2015, another ICSID tribunal ruled in favour of European claimants linked to Swiss and German property interests in von Pezold and others v Zimbabwe after land seizures under fast-track reform.

The contrast is stark for everyday Zimbabweans.

My maternal grandparents lived in what was the Seke Reserve in Mashonaland, a place where most people were settled on small plots of land with “rather poor sand veldt with a lot of bush”. The reserve was created in 1899 along a boundary that ran roughly along the Hunyani River to the north and northeast, separating African-occupied land from areas soon to be claimed by white settlers.

On the other side of that line, colonial authorities allocated fertile, riverfront and midslope land to white commercial farmers, while families who had once farmed across that broader landscape were confined to a narrow, overcrowded reserve with low-grade soils and limited water.

This was part of a wider colonial regime that, from 1894, also pushed many Ndebele communities into the dry, low-rainfall and tsetse-fly-infested Gwaai and Shangani reserves in Matabeleland North.

Their subsequent, imposed impoverishment and losses, of land, cattle, livelihoods, political authority and economic autonomy, were absorbed into colonial history rather than treated as enforceable claims demanding compensation from the imperial system that created them.

They all died landless and economically broken, largely invisible to the global legal order and without meaningful redress, much like countless Indigenous communities around the country.

Yet Zimbabwe’s compensation framework, shaped largely by external pressure and Western imperatives, recognises losses arising from fast-track land reform and treaty-protected commercial farms. It does not recognise losses like those experienced by my grandparents, or by countless families whose land, cattle and livelihoods were taken under colonial rule.

For years, Zimbabwe’s debt re-engagement process has been tied to arrears clearance, economic reforms and the settlement of land-related disputes. The restoration of treaty-protected European claims has therefore become intertwined with Zimbabwe’s attempts to regain access to international finance and repair relations with Western creditors, chiefly the IMF and World Bank.

Compensation agreements and investor protections are presented as proof that Zimbabwe is becoming governable, predictable and safe again for international capital. In effect, Zimbabwe is being asked to rehabilitate confidence in settler-derived property rights as part of its return to global financial legitimacy.

Launched in 2000, Zimbabwe’s fast-track land reform programme was characterised by widespread economic disruption and violence against Black farmworkers, white farmers and opposition MDC supporters. Those failures do not erase the history of land theft that made redistribution a central political question in the first place.

The unresolved collision between colonial property systems and African restitution claims extends far beyond Zimbabwe. In former settler colonies such as Zimbabwe and Namibia, it is overwhelmingly Black Africans who are expected to absorb mass land dispossession without compensation.

Colonial seizure is treated as inconvenient background history, while postcolonial attempts to restructure ownership are framed as threats to “markets” and “investor confidence”.

African efforts to recover land face more obstacles than the colonial systems that stole it.

Land reform should be lawful, accountable and economically productive. Nonetheless, international law cannot treat property rights created through settler colonialism as morally untouchable while dismissing African compensation as dangerous or illegitimate.

The 67 farms are standing remnants of an old and unresolved colonial atrocity.

My grandmother’s people also have rights.

Zimbabweans are still waiting for justice.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Ghana’s Thomas Partey, who joined Villareal from Arsenal in 2025, has pleaded not guilty to seven rape charges in the UK.

Former Arsenal midfielder Thomas Partey has been named in Ghana’s preliminary 28-man squad for next month’s World Cup.

The 32-year-old is due to stand trial next year in the United Kingdom, where he has pleaded not guilty to seven charges of rape and one count of sexual assault.

The charges related to allegations by four different women between 2020 and 2022.

Partey currently plays for Villarreal in Spain’s La Liga, where he moved in 2025, following five seasons with Arsenal.

He was initially charged last July, just days after his Arsenal contract expired. Villarreal signed him in August, two days after he was granted bail.

Partey played a full part in World Cup qualifying games for Ghana, for whom he has made 58 appearances.

Kudus misses out for Ghana at World Cup 2026

Tottenham Hotspur forward Mohammed ⁠Kudus ⁠will miss next month’s World Cup due to injury.

Kudus, who has scored 13 times in 46 international appearances, suffered a quad injury in January and was ‌expected to return in March. However, the 25-year-old forward suffered a setback in his recovery and has not played a game since Thomas Frank was coaching Tottenham.

Kudus, who ⁠joined from West Ham ⁠United last summer, made 19 Premier League appearances for Spurs this season, ⁠scoring twice.

Veteran coach Carlos Queiroz, who announced the latest squad list on Tuesday, will rely on Manchester ⁠City’s Antoine Semenyo and ⁠Athletic Club forward Inaki Williams, while PAOK’s former Chelsea defender Abdul Rahman Baba has been ‌recalled for the first time since 2023.

Ghana have been drawn in Group ‌L ‌alongside Croatia, England and Panama.

Ghana preliminary World Cup squad

Goalkeepers: Benjamin Asare (Accra Hearts of Oak SC), Lawrence Ati-Zigi (St Gallen), Joseph Anang (St Patrick’s Athletic), Solomon Agbasi (Accra Hearts of Oak SC), Paul Reverson (Ajax).

Defenders: Baba Abdul Rahman (PAOK), Gideon Mensah (Auxerre), Marvin Senaya (Auxerre), Alidu Seidu (Rennes), Abdul Mumin (Rayo Vallecano), Jerome Opoku (Istanbul Basaksehir), Jonas Adjetey (Wolfsburg), Kojo Peprah Oppong (Nice), Alexander Djiku (Spartak Moscow), Elisha Owusu (Auxerre).

Midfielders: Thomas Partey (Villarreal), Kwasi Sibo (Real Oviedo), Augustine Boakye (Saint-Etienne), Caleb Yirenkyi (Nordsjaelland), Abdul Fatawu Issahaku (Leicester City).

Forwards: Kamaldeen Sulemana (Atalanta), Christopher Bonsu Baah (Al Qadsiah), Ernest Nuamah (Lyon), Antoine Semenyo (Manchester City), Brandon Thomas-Asante (Coventry City), Prince Kwabena Adu (Viktoria Plzen), Inaki Williams (Athletic Bilbao), Jordan Ayew (Leicester City).

It has been almost nine months since rebel groups imposed a fuel blockade on Mali’s capital Bamako. In late April, the conflict escalated further. The Al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), along with members of Tuareg separatist movements, launched a coordinated attack on the Malian army and its Russian allies, the African Corps (formerly Wagner), which killed the Malian Defence Minister Sadio Camara.

The rebels seized control of military camps, recaptured the largest northern city of Kidal, and tightened the blockade on Bamako. This latest offensive is part of a long series of rebellions in what the Tuareg call Azawad, an area comprising the regions of Timbuktu, Taoudenit, Kidal, and Gao, which is predominantly populated by Tuareg communities.

The present crisis is compounded by the weakening of the Malian state following the 2021 coup and foreign intervention. In the absence of any serious effort to address it, instability could spill over across the whole Sahel region.

Ever since the country announced independence from France in 1960, Mali’s north has seen repeated upheaval as local Tuareg communities have demanded self-determination. Fourteen years ago, Tuareg groups allied with groups affiliated with al-Qaeda launched yet another rebellion. They managed to seize several cities in northern Mali, and had it not been for a French military intervention in 2013, they could have marched on Bamako.

Two French operations resulted in the weakening of the Tuareg movements and groups affiliated with al-Qaeda. This helped persuade them to participate in negotiations with the government, which ultimately ended with the signing of the Algiers Accords in 2015.

One of the most prominent clauses of this agreement was decentralisation in the Azawad region, which gave local leaders more power. Through this agreement, the Malian government secured the country’s territorial integrity in return for promises like the enhancement of development in the Azawad region, the integration of separatist fighters into the army, and the appointment of their leaders to political positions.

These accords helped maintain relative stability in Mali and the Sahel region by containing the sources of tension and secessionist calls. However, peace did not last long. Several challenges emerged, the most important of which was the failure of the government to honour its commitments to implement development projects in the north.

The situation got worse after the 2021 military coup led by General Assimi Goita. France, Algeria, and members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) refused to recognise the new authorities in Bamako. As a result, in 2022, the military government expelled French troops, and in 2024, abolished the Algiers Agreement. Thereafter, instead of diplomacy and dialogue, it adopted a militarised approach to controlling the restive north.

These steps strained Mali’s relations with Mauritania, Algeria, and France, with Bamako accusing them of providing logistical support to the rebels and interfering in its internal affairs. Consequently, the Malian state was weakened militarily and economically, as military coordination and trade with neighbours declined.

JNIM and the separatist movements exploited the situation. They sought to choke the capital by attacking key transport arteries where most imports and exports are routed. They disrupted supplies of gasoline and diesel coming from Senegal and the Ivory Coast, and began attacking Moroccan trucks carrying food supplies via Mauritania.

Like in 2012, the alliance between the Tuareg movements and al-Qaeda affiliates has proven successful. It has routed the Malian military, capturing more territory and operating freely close to Bamako.

This time, foreign forces have not been able to help the Malian army, as its Russian allies were forced to withdraw following the attack in late April. Meanwhile, Turkiye has seen its involvement in Mali grow amid growing instability. In early May, following the attacks on the Malian military, Ankara signed several defence agreements with the Malian military government.

The danger here is that the Malian crisis may not be contained only within the political crisis between the government and the separatist movements. It could also invite more foreign intervention as regional and global rivalries transfer onto Malian territory.

There is also the issue of the alliance between Azawadi movements and al-Qaeda affiliates, which could prove to be a ticking time bomb. There are clear contradictions within this relationship, as the two sides have no common ground except the agreement to overthrow the military regime in Bamako. This is why a future war in the north between the Azawadi movements and the Islamist groups is quite likely.

The Malian crisis inevitably has regional repercussions. The ongoing humanitarian crisis could trigger a major migration wave towards Europe and North America. Continuing instability in the north could open more space for the growth of extremist movements, which can expand their attacks across the region. Consequently, the Malian crisis can become a direct security threat to neighbouring countries, the region, and the world.

As the situation stands now, no warring side is able to achieve a decisive military victory. Therefore, a resolution of the conflict can only be achieved through dialogue and negotiation. Bamako needs to seriously consider the grievances of Tuareg communities in the north and their demands.

It is in the collective interest of neighbouring countries and regional powers to bring the parties to the negotiating table and seek peaceful solutions to this crisis. Under the threat of a regional spillover, there is no time to waste.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.