Africa

The African island nation also expels French embassy personnel over acts linked to the destabilisation investigation.

Madagascar has detained a French serviceman over an alleged plot to destabilise the island and also declared an agent at the French embassy persona non grata over acts linked to the destabilisation investigation.

Deputy Prosecutor Nomenarinera Mihamintsoa Ramanantsoa said in a video statement released late on ⁠Tuesday that the former French national serviceman, Guy Baret, had been placed ⁠in pretrial detention at Tsiafahy maximum-security prison.

A Malagasy army officer, Colonel Patrick Rakotomamonjy, and other alleged accomplices were also implicated, he said.

According to Ramanantsoa, prosecutors have charged the suspects with spreading false information to disturb public order, plotting to sabotage infrastructure including power lines and ⁠thermal plants operated by state utility Jirama, harbouring wanted individuals, and criminal conspiracy. Authorities said the group had planned actions initially set for April 18.

Rakotomamonjy is awaiting ‌presentation ‌before an investigating judge. Two other suspects were placed under judicial supervision, with prosecutors saying they did not appear to be the masterminds of the conspiracy

Madagascar is a former French colony that retains close political links to France and has had a history of instability in recent decades.

The country’s military ruler, President Michael Randrianirina, seized power in October last year, after a wave of youth-led protests against his ‌predecessor, Andry Rajoelina.

France helped Rajoelina flee in October as protests over lack of water and energy escalated and ultimately forced him from power.

France said Wednesday that it had summoned the charge d’affaires of the Madagascan embassy in Paris “to vigorously protest” the expulsion of the diplomatic official.

“He was informed that France categorically rejected any accusation of destabilising the Refoundation regime of the Republic of Madagascar,” French Foreign Ministry spokesman Pascal Confavreux said, adding that the official had been summoned on Tuesday.

“Such accusations are not only unfounded, but also incomprehensible.”

The Madagascar Foreign Ministry said French Ambassador Arnaud Guillois had been summoned and informed ‌of the decision over the embassy agent. It did not identify the agent or specify the acts in question.

ISIL (ISIS) has claimed responsibility for the attack on Guyaku village, which lasted several hours.

Armed attackers killed at least 29 people in Guyaku village in Nigeria’s Adamawa State, an attack that lasted several hours and left property destroyed, officials said.

“My heart breaks for the people of Guyaku,” state Governor Ahmadu Umaru Fintiri said in a post on social media as he visited the bereaved community on Monday.

“Today, I stood on the ground where our brothers and sisters were cruelly taken from us. This act of cowardice is an affront to our humanity and will not go unpunished,” he said.

Fintiri also said his administration would continue to support “military and vigilante groups” as it intensified security operations in response to the attack.

The ISIL (ISIS) group claimed responsibility for the attack in a post on the Telegram messaging app, according to the Reuters and Associate Press (AP) news agencies.

There are two major ISIL-backed armed groups in Nigeria, but it was not immediately clear which one was behind the attack, according to the AP.

The Guyaku attack occurred on the same day that armed attackers raided an orphanage in north-central Nigeria and abducted 23 children.

Fifteen were later rescued, and the government said “intensive operations” were under way to “secure the safe return of the remaining eight victims and apprehend the perpetrators”.

No group immediately claimed responsibility for the abductions in a region of the country that has seen an increase in kidnappings for ransom.

The statement did not say how old the abducted children are, but the term “pupil”, which the statement had used, in Nigeria usually refers to someone in kindergarten or primary school, covering ages up to 12.

US President Donald Trump and other US conservative voices have accused Nigerian authorities of failing to protect the nation’s Christians from a “Christian genocide“, amid violence from armed groups, including Boko Haram.

The Nigerian government has said that while it wants to do more to protect civilians from ISIL and al-Qaeda affiliated groups, people of all faiths have been killed in attacks, including Muslims and traditional worshippers.

Data from ACLED, a US crisis-monitoring group, found that, out of 1,923 attacks on civilians in Nigeria between January and November 2025, the number of those targeting Christians because of their religion stood at just 50.

US forces launched air strikes on ISIL-affiliated fighters in December, and then deployed 100 soldiers to northern Nigeria in February to train and advise local forces.

Coordinated attacks by armed groups and Tuareg rebels in Mali is threatening the ruling junta, driven Russian mercenaries from key northern areas, and left the defence minister dead. Al Jazeera’s Nada Qaddourah explains how the groups appear to be joining forces.

The future of I’m A Celebrity All Stars has been revealed by a TV insider, following the chaotic live final that delighted viewers last week.

I’m A Celeb All Stars will reportedly not return to our screens until 2029, despite the final being a huge success with massive viewing figures.

The South Africa-based show was pre-filmed in 2025, with the explosive final taking place live in London last Friday night. The final episode saw Adam Thomas win the show while arguing with Jimmy Bullard and David Haye.

The mayhem initially broke out when David interrupted Adam’s interview before the winner was announced. It rumbled on further when Jimmy Bullard interrupted to have his say over what he called “intimidating” actions by Adam in camp.

The row was so severe between the campmates that Sinitta and Gemma Collins stormed off, and Ant clashed with David and Jimmy.

It has been reported that around 2.8million people tuned in for the explosive finale, but despite the huge interest, show makers won’t be bringing back the all-stars version for a few years.

“The aim was never for it to be made or be on air in 2027, even though there may be an appetite for that right now. The aim was to deliver something as a special show that was on from time to time, not an annual revisit like the main I’m A Celebrity show,” an insider told The Sun.

This was the second all-stars version of the series, with the first season airing in May 2023 after being recorded in the autumn of 2022.

The series 6 runner-up, Myleene Klass, was crowned winner of the series after beating series 16 campmate Jordan Banjo in the final survival trial. It was three years between the first and second seasons of the show, so fans might be waiting a little while for the next season if ITV continues to follow suit.

Voting figures for the show were revealed earlier today, showing that Adam won by a landslide. The Emmerdale actor came first in the vote for the final four, with 51 per cent. He was followed by Sir Mo Farah, who won 32 per cent, while Harry Redknapp and Craig Charles each got 9 per cent.

I’m A Celebrity is expected to return later this year with the usual format. Adam’s win came off the back of a series of dramatic moments for the actor on the show. Things first took a dramatic turn when David Haye was accused of bullying Adam after he ruled himself out of a trial. He called the actor weak and later doubled down, claiming that the Waterloo Road star was using his arthritis to get out of doing Bushtucker Trials and challenges.

Adam was also at the centre of a row with Jimmy Bullard. He was left angry when Jimmy quit the show mid-trial, which could have tanked Adam’s time on I’m A Celeb, as they were doing the trial in pairs.

Adam swore at Jimmy. Though he later apologised, Jimmy was insistent that Adam was “aggressive” and “intimidating”, and blasted ITV for not showing the full clip. ITV have said what they showed was a “fair and accurate” representation of what happened.

The Mirror has approached ITV for comment.

Like this story? For more of the latest showbiz news and gossip, follow Mirror Celebs on TikTok, Snapchat, Instagram, Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and Threads.

Mass kidnappings are a common way for gangs and armed groups to make quick money in Nigeria.

Gunmen have raided an orphanage and kidnapped at least 23 children, authorities in Nigeria report.

The gang took the children late on Sunday from an unregistered facility called the Dahallukitab Group of Schools, located in an “isolated area” in Kogi State’s capital, Lokoja, Kogi Information Commissioner Kingsley Fanwo said in a statement on Monday.

Mass kidnappings have become a common way for gangs and armed groups to make quick money in Africa’s most populous country, especially in rural areas with little government presence.

Fanwo said the “prompt and coordinated response” of security agencies led to the rescue of 15 children but eight are still missing.

The wife of the proprietor of the orphanage was also abducted, according to the statement.

“Intensive operations are ongoing to secure the safe return of the remaining eight victims and apprehend the perpetrators,” the official said.

The orphanage was operating “illegally” in a remote location without the knowledge of relevant authorities and security agencies, Fanwo added.

The statement did not disclose the ages of the abducted children, but it referred to them as “pupils”, which in Nigeria usually refers to someone in kindergarten or primary school, covering ages up to 12.

No group immediately claimed responsibility for the attack.

Nigeria faces multiple conflicts from long-running violence by the Boko Haram armed group to “bandit” gangs, farmer-herder violence and southeastern separatists.

The ISIL (ISIS)-linked Lakurawa group also operates in communities in the northwestern part of the country bordering Niger.

The North Central Zone of Nigeria, where Kogi is located, has seen violent attacks, including raids on schools, in recent months with some of the attacks blamed on armed groups.

Hundreds of students were taken by gunmen from their school in neighbouring Niger State in November in an attack security sources blamed on Boko Haram.

Former enemies in Mali, including an al-Qaeda-linked group, have join forces to target military sites.

The defence minister has been killed.

Russian mercenaries backing the government have come under attack.

What are the implications of this unrest?

Presenter:

Imran Khan

Guests:

Oluwole Ojewale – Regional co-ordinator for West and Central Africa at the Institute for Security Studies

Nicolas Normand – Former French Ambassador to Mali and vice president of the Friends of Mali Association

Ovigwe Eguegu – Policy analyst at Development Reimagined, an independent African think tank, and a specialist in West Africa and Sahel geopolitics

Mali has been rattled by coordinated attacks carried out by several unidentified ⁠armed groups beginning on Saturday, escalating the political and security crisis in the country, which has been under military rule for most of the past 14 years.

On Sunday, a military source told Al Jazeera that Mali’s Defence Minister Sadio Camara had been killed amid coordinated attacks on military sites across the country, including the capital, Bamako. His residence in Kati was attacked on Saturday.

“The General Staff of the Armed Forces informs the public that unidentified armed terrorist groups targeted certain locations and barracks in the capital and the interior early this morning, April 25, 2026. Fighting is ongoing,” Mali’s military said in a statement on Saturday.

Al-Qaeda-linked group Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) has claimed responsibility for attacks in Kati, near the capital, as well as the Bamako airport and other locations further north, including Mopti, Sevare and Gao. Tuareg rebels also claimed participation in the latest assaults.

The current military ruler, Assimi Goita, came to power in the 2021 coup on the promise to boost security amid the growing influence of armed groups in one of the most impoverished nations in the world. Goita has yet to make a public statement.

So, what is the latest situation in the country and have the armed attacks been contained?

Here’s what we know:

What happened?

On Saturday morning, Mali’s army said unidentified ⁠“terrorist” groups ⁠had attacked several military positions in ‌Bamako and the country’s interior.

Two loud explosions and sustained gunfire were heard shortly before 6am (06:00 GMT) near Mali’s main military base, Kati, just north of the capital. Soldiers were deployed to block roads, witnesses said.

There was similar unrest at around the same time in the central town of Sevare, and Kidal and Gao in the north.

Gunfire ⁠could be heard near a military camp close ⁠to the Bamako airport, where Russian mercenary forces are based, a resident told the Reuters news agency.

Heavy gunfire was also reported in Kati, where Goita also has his residence, witnesses told the AFP news agency.

AFP reported that Kati residents uploaded images on social media showing their homes destroyed. “We are holed up in Kati,” one resident said.

The military said in a statement it had killed “several hundred” assailants and repelled the assault, which hit multiple sites in or near Bamako. It is unclear how many assailants were killed.

It said the situation was under control, adding that a large-scale sweep operation was also under way in Bamako, the nearby barracks town of Kati and elsewhere in the gold-producing country.

Reporting from Dakar, Senegal, on Saturday, Al Jazeera’s Nicolas Haque said the scale and coordination of the attack appeared to be unprecedented.

He said, despite the situation having come under control, “there’s an unprecedented level of panic in the military ranks”.

The African Union, the secretary-general of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and the United States Bureau of African Affairs have condemned the attacks.

Indications that different armed groups launched a coordinated attack in Mali signal a “very dangerous development”, according to Ulf Laessing, Sahel analyst at the German think tank Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

He told Al Jazeera on Saturday that since the crisis began in 2012, security has been “degrading” every year, and the government has little control over large areas of the country.

Mali’s democratically elected President Amadou Toumani Toure was deposed in a coup led by soldiers in May 2012. His government was accused of failing to handle a Tuareg-led rebellion in the north.

Since then, the country has been experiencing a severe security and political crisis, armed rebellions and two military coups.

Mali is “a vast territory, twice the size of France. Most people live in the south, the north is desert and mountains … it’s impossible to control it, not even the French could do it, let alone the Russians”, Laessing said.

“There’s no military solution”, and armed groups are “entrenched” in the countryside.

“The only good news is, so far, they [armed groups] haven’t been able to control … larger cities,” he added.

Who is behind Saturday’s attack?

The JNIM and Tuareg rebels have claimed responsibility for the attacks.

In a statement published by SITE ‌Intelligence Group, JNIM claimed attacks in Kati, Bamako and in localities further north, including Mopti, Sevare and Gao.

JNIM is the Sahel affiliate of al-Qaeda and the most active armed group in the region, according to conflict monitor ACLED. Since September, JNIM fighters have been attacking fuel tankers, bringing Bamako to a standstill in October 2025.

It also imposed an economic and fuel blockade by sealing off major highways used by tankers transporting fuel from neighbouring Senegal and the Ivory Coast to the landlocked Sahel country.

For weeks, most of Bamako’s residents were unable to buy any fuel for cars or motorcycles as supplies dried up, bringing the normally bustling capital to a standstill.

Despite several months of calm, Bamako residents faced a diesel shortage in March, with fuel prioritised for use in the energy sector.

On Saturday, the JNIM said the city of Kidal was “captured” in an operation coordinated with the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), a Tuareg-dominated rebel group.

Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane, a spokesperson for FLA, said on social media ⁠that the group had taken control of multiple positions in Kidal and Gao. Al Jazeera could not independently verify the claim.

Videos posted online and verified by Al Jazeera showed armed men entering the National Youth Camp of Kidal on Saturday.

Al Jazeera’s Haque noted that it seems the FLA is gaining ground in the north of the country.

“There’s video footage circulating on social media showing some of these fighters entering the residence of the governor of Kidal,”  he said.

“Kidal is not the biggest town in the north, but it’s high in symbolism because whoever holds the town of Kidal controls the north,” he added.

Ibrahim Yahaya Ibrahim, deputy director for the Sahel at the International Crisis Group, says Malian authorities appear to have been caught off-guard by the latest wave of attacks.

Speaking to Al Jazeera from Dakar on Saturday, Ibrahim said the offensive fits into a broader pattern of escalating violence.

“Even though it is hard to say that it is totally a surprise, I think it is just another dramatic episode in a series of spectacular attacks that we have witnessed in recent years by JNIM attacking the government,” he said.

What role did Russian mercenaries play during the attacks?

Witnesses told Al Jazeera’s Haque that Russian mercenaries were involved in fighting in Bamako, around the airport, where they have one of their headquarters.

“But because there’s been so much pressure on the Russia-Ukraine front, some of these Russian mercenaries are being pulled out from Mali, which is affecting the security situation in Mali now,” Haque said.

Al Jazeera’s Haque said that “the Russian mercenaries seem to have surrendered the town of Kidal or at least the military camp where they were with the Malian forces”.

“The Tuareg fighters had asked them to surrender weapons. It is unclear whether they did that or not but what’s clear is that the Russians are stepping out of the town of Kidal,” he said, adding that “Russian mercenaries not fighting against armed fighters “is something significant”.

In June last year, Russia’s Wagner group said it would withdraw from Mali after more than three and a half years on the ground. The paramilitary force said it had completed its mission against armed groups in the country.

But Wagner’s withdrawal from Mali did not mean the departure of Russian fighters. Russian mercenaries have remained under the banner of the Africa Corps, a separate Kremlin-backed paramilitary group created after Wagner founder Yevgeny Prigozhin led a failed mutiny against the Russian military in June 2023.

Besides Mali, Africa Corps is also active in other African countries, including Equatorial Guinea ⁠and the Central African Republic.

What does all this mean for Mali’s and the Sahel’s security?

Since gaining independence in 1960, the West African country has experienced alternating cycles of political stability and instability, punctuated by rebellions, financial woes and military coups.

In 2012, ethnic Tuareg separatists, allied with fighters from an al-Qaeda offshoot, launched a rebellion that took control of the country’s north.

But fighters from the armed group Ansar Dine swiftly pushed out the Tuareg rebels and seized key northern cities, triggering French military intervention in early 2013 at the request of the government. Ansar Dine and several other groups later merged to form the JNIM.

In September 2013, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita was elected as president. His fragile democratic rule ended in 2020. Under his government, the United Nations brokered a peace deal between the government and northern Tuareg groups fighting for an independent Azawad in 2015.

President Keita was deposed in a military coup in August 2020 following months of mass protests over severe economic woes in the country and the advance of armed groups in the north. In September that year, Bah Ndaw, a retired colonel, was sworn in as interim president, with Goita as vice president, to lead a transitional government.

In May 2021, Goita, the leader of the previous year’s power grab and vice president of the interim government, seized power in a second coup. Mali is currently being run by Goita’s military government. Initially, the military government pledged to return to civilian rule in March 2024, but it has not kept the promise.

Goita invited Russian mercenaries to support the military administration in its fight against armed groups in December 2021 after asking the French troops to leave the country. This created a security vacuum. In January 2024, Mali’s rulers also terminated the 2015 peace deal with Tuareg rebels, accusing them of not complying with the agreement. This led to a breakdown in the country’s security situation once again.

In September 2025, the JNIM began a fuel import blockade, crippling life in Bamako.

Mali, along with Niger and Burkina Faso, formally split last year from the West African regional bloc ECOWAS to form the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).

However, earlier this week, Malian Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop attended a security forum in Senegal where he said the withdrawal was “final”, but added that the AES could maintain a constructive dialogue with ECOWAS on freedom of movement and preserving a common market.

“Even for the Malian minister to come to this conference signals that they are afraid for themselves and they need to open up,” Adama Gaye, political commentator on the Sahel and West Africa, told Al Jazeera. “It is also an indication that they want to reach out to ECOWAS.”

Gaye added that the Goita-led military government “cannot have legitimacy in their own country”.

“They have been terrible in economic progress, peace and stability,” he added, describing the ongoing situation in Mali as “very dire”.

“These attacks will be another negative aspect to their claims that they can control Mali,” he said.

DEVELOPING STORYDEVELOPING STORY,

Camara’s house in the garrison town of Kati came under attack amid simultaneous attacks across the West African country.

Mali’s Defence Minister General Sadio Camara has been killed amid coordinated attacks on military sites across the country, sources told Al Jazeera.

The news on Sunday came a day after his residence in the garrison town of Kati came under attack during the simultaneous attacks launched by al-Qaeda affiliate and Tuareg rebels on Saturday.

Camara was a central figure in the military government that seized power after back-to-back coups in 2020 and 2021.

“He was one of the most influential figures within the ruling military leadership and had been seen by some as a possible future leader of Mali,” said Al Jazeera’s Nicolas Haque, who has reported extensively from Mali.

“His death is a major blow to the country’s armed forces.”

Haque said attackers carried out a suicide car bomb assault on Camara’s residence in Kati, a heavily fortified military town about 15km (9 miles) northwest of the capital, Bamako.

“Kati is considered one of the most secure locations in the country, yet fighters from the al-Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, along with Tuareg fighters from the Liberation Front of Azawad, were able to launch the attack,” he said.

Gunmen also attacked several locations across Mali, including Bamako, as well as Gao and Kidal in the north, and the central city of Sevare.

“As we speak, people in the garrison town of Kidal can still hear heavy gunfire and loud explosions,” Haque added. “This remains an ongoing operation more than 24 hours after it began.”

Interim President Assimi Goita has come under pressure since the offensive, with analysts saying the authorities appeared to have been caught off guard by the latest wave of violence.

Haque said Goita was “alive and well in a secure location”.

“When the attack took place, he was moved to safety, so he remains in command of the military,” he said.

The African Union, the secretary-general of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and the US Bureau of African Affairs condemned the attacks across Mali.

Unrest reported in several locations around the country.

Africa has shown itself in the past week again as a continent of dramatic contrasts, in which moral leadership, political turmoil, and financial aspiration come into collision in a manner that would not only chart its own future but also that of the world. The continent is going through a time that is both precarious and radical, as the potent moral rhetoric of a papal visit gives way to an ever-worsening political persecution and systemic economic disparities.

A Moral Voice in a Fractured Continent

The visit of Pope Leo in some parts of Africa, such as Angola and Cameroon, has been one of the most intriguing this week. His message attracted crowds of more than 10,0000 people, and it was not only religious but also very political, declaring Africa a beautiful but wounded continent and demanding unity, justice, and an end to violence.

It is not only the size of the meetings but also the content of the message that is important. The Pope was outspoken in an attack on corruption, inequality, and exploitative governance systems—the problems that are at the core of most of the struggles in Africa today. His words about people being more important than corporate interests are well-received in a continent where natural resource wealth has not always translated into widespread prosperity.

This visit was, in a sense, a symbol of a greater fact: Africa is not merely economically or politically challenged; it is morally and structurally challenged. The unity cry in Angola, the nation that is yet to overcome the adverse effects of decades of civil war, is a symptom of the bigger continental necessity to mend the wounds of the past and deal with the inequalities of the present.

Political Tensions and Disappearance of Space of Dissent

As the moral pleas of unity reverberated in stadiums, political realities on the ground painted an even more disturbing scenario. The South African arrest of activist Kemi Seba is part of an increasing trend in some parts of Africa, where there is an increased crackdown on dissenting voices.

Seba, the anti-colonial and anti-Western rhetoricist and critic of Western influence, now risks extradition to Benin on charges of inciting rebellion. His detention highlights a broader conflict: the fight between state power and political activism in an area where the democratic institutions are not yet balanced.

This is not a one-time event. Governments all over the continent are striking a fine balance between ensuring stability and political expression. In other instances, this equilibrium is leaning towards control over being open, and this leaves one worrying about the future of democratic governance.

The consequences are not confined nationally. The political situation in Africa is a topic of keen interest to the rest of the world, not just due to its size and population but because it offers one of the final avenues of democratic growth in the 21st century. Political space is reduced here, causing ripples way beyond the continent.

Structural Gaps in Economic Promise

Africa is still a puzzle economically. On paper, the figures are encouraging. Recently, South Africa obtained the promise of billions of investments, which indicates a great interest of other countries in the areas of green energy, infrastructure, and digital development. But the facts speak otherwise. Of these promised investments, only around 42 percent have been translated into real economic activity—much less than world averages. This delivery gap is indicative of an ongoing problem: it is one thing to attract investment and another to implement it.

Simultaneously, the recent climate financing agreement of South Africa with Germany that provides hundreds of millions of euros of loans and green energy assistance reminds us about the increased role of the continent in the global climate plan. Africa is also being increasingly viewed not only as a beneficiary of aid but also as a prime actor in the shift to sustainable energy.

However, structural problems are quite rooted. The effectiveness of economic initiatives is still hampered by policy inconsistency, poor infrastructure, and governance issues. Even the most ambitious plans of investment have a chance of failing without these underlying problems being addressed.

The Overlooked Crisis: Environment and Illicit Economies

The other trend of importance this week has been the further increase in wildlife trafficking in Nigeria, even though the legislation has been taking measures to reduce it. A lack of complete legislation on wildlife protection has allowed the illegal trade to continue, with several seizures of endangered species over the past few months.

The problem is indicative of a larger problem: that of a nexus between environmental degradation and ineffective enforcement. Africa has one of the most biodiverse regions in the world, but it is rapidly being threatened by illegal trade, climate change, and the exploitation of resources.

The inability to adequately deal with such problems not only damages the ecosystems but also weakens the governance and the stability of the economy. In places where there is poor regulation, illegal economies flourish and, as a result, establish parallel economies that undermine state power and promote corruption.

Africa: Moment between Opportunity and Uncertainty

Collectively, what happened this last week shows a continent at a crossroads. On the one hand, there is an increasing international appreciation of the significance of Africa, be it in climate policy, economic investment, or geopolitical strategy. Conversely, internal threats persist to restrict its ability to exploit these opportunities to their full potential.

The message of unity and justice that the Pope is calling for is the spirit of this moment. Africa is not poor in resources, talent, and potential. The greater challenge it confronts is alignment itself, leadership and citizens, economic growth and social equity, and global engagement and local realities.

Conclusion: A Turning Point, Not a Passing Moment

The events of this week do not represent one-off headlines, but they are evidence of larger trends that are defining the future of Africa. The continent is not just responding to the global events—it is steadily becoming one of the main arenas where the global issues are acted out.

The doubt now arises whether Africa will be able to utilize this moment of attention to become a changed continent. Will investment be translated into development? Will politics become more open? Do ethical demands of cohesion result in practical change?

The responses are unclear. Nevertheless, there is one thing that is clear: Africa is never at the periphery of world affairs any longer. It is here in the center, and what occurs here during times of this kind will make the continent and indeed the world.

For those who love to travel and want to tick off as many destinations as possible, there is one remarkable spot that serves as the ultimate shortcut

This extraordinary location lets you set eyes on four countries simultaneously – without moving a single step. The Kazungula Quadripoint sits along the Zambezi River, a rare geographical marvel where four nations lie within just a few hundred metres of one another.

Those four countries are Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe. While it may not be a perfectly precise four-corners crossing, the nations are close enough that visitors can stand in one country and stride into another, while gazing across the river at two more.

At the heart of this unique experience is the Kazungula Bridge, a 923-metre structure connecting Zambia and Botswana across the Zambezi River.

The bridge was meticulously designed to honour complex border boundaries, meaning it directly links only two countries – yet crucially, it sits within touching distance of both Namibia and Zimbabwe, reports the Express.

The remarkable result is that you can stand on the bridge joining the two nations.

Zimbabwe is just metres away on one side and Namibia clearly visible across the river – a truly breathtaking experience.

Prior to the bridge’s construction, travellers crossing between Zambia and Botswana were reliant on a ferry service notorious for its delays, which severely restricted movement between the neighbouring countries.

Nearer to home, there is another spectacular chance to take in multiple countries from a single vantage point – though you won’t be quite as close as the Kazungula Bridge allows.

Nestled in the Swiss Alps lies a mountain known as Hoher Kasten, which on a clear day boasts breathtaking panoramic views across the alps of Germany, Austria, Italy and France.

The best part is that you don’t even need to trek to the summit to soak up this stunning vista. Instead, a cable car whisks you up from the town of Brülisau, scaling the mountainside in just eight minutes.

Famine was confirmed in two places in 2025 – areas of the Gaza Strip and Sudan – the first such dual confirmation since formal famine reporting began, according to the Global Report on Food Crises (GRFC) 2026.

The annual report, produced by a coalition of 18 humanitarian and development partners, found that acute food insecurity remained widespread in 2025.

Across 47 countries and territories experiencing food crises, 22.9 percent of their populations – or about 266 million people – experienced acute food insecurity last year, a marginal rise from 22.7 percent in 2024 but nearly double the 11.3 percent recorded in 2016.

The proportion of analysed populations facing acute hunger has now stayed above 20 percent every year since 2020. In absolute terms, the number of people affected has grown from 108 million in 2016 to 265.7 million in 2025, having peaked at 281.6 million in 2023.

The GRFC cautioned that the slightly lower headline figure compared with 2024 mainly reflects a reduction in the number of countries covered – from 53 to 47 – rather than any real decline in needs.

Famine, catastrophe and emergency

Famine – the most extreme classification under the hunger-monitoring Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) system – was confirmed in parts of the Gaza Strip and Sudan in 2025. The risk of famine remained in other areas of Gaza, Sudan and South Sudan, and those projections extended into 2026.

According to the IPC, famine is when:

• At least 20 percent of households face extreme food shortages.
• Acute malnutrition affects more than 30 percent of the population.
• The death rate due to starvation or hunger-related causes exceeds two deaths per 10,000 people per day.

Six countries and territories had populations facing “catastrophic conditions”, or Phase 5, the highest level in the IPC’s classification of food insecurity. They numbered 1.4 million people, a more-than ninefold increase since 2016.

The Gaza Strip was the worst affected, with 640,700 people facing famine conditions, equivalent to 32 percent of its population, the highest share recorded globally. Sudan followed with 637,200 people, or 1 percent of its population.

Four other countries recorded catastrophic food shortages among specific groups of people: South Sudan – 83,500 (1 percent of the population), Yemen – 41,200 (0.1 percent), Haiti – 8,400 (0.1 percent) and Mali – 2,600 (0.01 percent).

Additionally, more than 39 million people in 32 countries were in Phase 4, or emergency conditions, representing 3.8 percent of the population analysed, a marginal increase from 2024.

Conflict remains the main driver of hunger

Conflict and violence were the primary drivers of acute food insecurity in 19 countries where 147.4 million people were affected. They represented more than half of those facing acute hunger globally.

Weather extremes were the primary driver in 16 countries, affecting 87.5 million people, while economic shocks led in 12 countries, with 29.8 million people affected.

Against that backdrop, humanitarian and development financing for areas facing food crises declined in 2025, falling back to levels last seen in 2016-2017, the report said.

As for 2026, the report said that based on a partial picture as of March, severity levels remain critical in multiple contexts. It added that the escalation of conflict in the Middle East exposes food-crisis countries to direct and indirect risks of global agricultural and food market disruptions.

A generation of malnourished children

An estimated 35.5 million children were acutely malnourished in 2025 across 23 countries experiencing nutrition crises, including just under 10 million with severe acute malnutrition, the most life-threatening form.

A further 25.7 million children suffered from moderate acute malnutrition. About 9.2 million pregnant and breastfeeding women were also acutely malnourished across 21 countries with available data.

Displacement is concentrated in food-crisis countries

The number of forcibly displaced people in the 46 countries covered fell slightly in 2025 to 85.1 million.

About 62.6 million of them were internally displaced across 34 countries, and 22.5 million were refugees and asylum seekers in 44 countries.

Without a sustained push to address the structural drivers of hunger, the world’s most fragile countries will continue to bear a disproportionate share of the global hunger burden well into 2026, the report concluded.

On the outskirts of Somalia’s southern port city, the land has become an open graveyard for cattle. Some are left where they fell, while others are buried in shallow graves after consecutive failed rainy seasons.

For many families here, pastoralists who rely on livestock for milk, meat, and income, animals were everything, but what was once a lifeline of food and income has now become a stark symbol of loss.

The impact is not just felt in Kismayo, but across the country, with 6.5 million people forced to skip meals and go hungry every day. Drought and rising costs only pushing the country deeper into crisis.

The humanitarian director at Save the Children, Francesca Sangiorgi, says the crisis is being driven by repeated climate shocks that are compounding over time. “We’re seeing multiple rainy seasons that have failed across the country,” she tells Al Jazeera, adding that even when rain arrives, it is often too uneven and too late to restore livelihoods that have already collapsed.

What’s the scale of the crisis?

The scale of Somalia’s hunger crisis is severe and rapidly worsening.

With a third of the population facing severe food insecurity (classified as IPC Phase 3 and above), many households are struggling to get enough food to meet their basic daily requirements (PDF) — and in some cases going without food altogether, leaving them more vulnerable to malnutrition and illnesses such as diarrhoea, measles, and other infections.

Of these, more than 2 million people are in the most critical conditions short of famine (IPC Phase 4 or emergency levels), where families are facing extreme shortages and are increasingly forced into displacement in search of basic needs, moving towards already overcrowded aid camps where resources are rapidly dwindling.

Children are among the most affected. According to the UN, an estimated 1.8 million children under five in Somalia are at risk of acute malnutrition, putting their survival in immediate danger.

Sangiorgi notes that the deterioration has been unfolding rapidly, its effects already evident.

“The situation of children across the country is extremely concerning,” she explains. “We’re seeing the spread of child illnesses across the country. Dropout rates are extremely high right now, and they continue to rise because of the drought. We want to make sure that children have a chance at life—access to the health and nutrition services they need, as well as education.”

According to Doctors Without Borders, known by its French initials MSF, more than 3.3 million people have been displaced, severely straining the already limited resources and basic services in these communities.

What does the crisis look like on the ground?

Near Kismayo, one of Somalia’s largest camps for displaced people has formed, sheltering families who have nothing to eat and have travelled from across Jubbaland.

One woman describes how her herd has fallen from 200 cattle to just four, ending her very livelihood.

Barwaqo Aden, a displaced Jamame resident in Lower Juba, arrived at the camp only recently, but her eight-month-old daughter is already in the local hospital with severe malnutrition due to the lack of resources.

Others arrive after exhausting journeys, fleeing areas controlled by the armed group al-Shabab. A displaced resident, Hodhan Mohamed, walked for days and crossed the River Juba by boat before reaching a crowded settlement, unsure what she would find. Like many new arrivals, she now waits for assistance that is limited and uncertain.

Sangiorgi explains that secondary displacement – when people who have already been forced from their homes are displaced again – is becoming increasingly frequent. “As services and commodities continue to shrink across the country, the prices of essential goods keep rising as well.”

More than 3.8 million Somalis are currently displaced, making up 22 percent of the population. Many have been uprooted multiple times, moving from one settlement to another as aid resources dwindle and access to support becomes more limited.

What’s driving the crisis?

At its core, the crisis is primarily driven by climate shocks.

Somalia has had three consecutive failed rainy seasons in recent years, drying out rivers, wells, and pasturelands.

For livestock-dependent communities, the impact has been immediate: animals are dying, and with them, livelihoods are disappearing.

As local production collapses, families are forced to buy from markets even as food, fuel, and water prices continue to rise. In rural areas, especially, incomes no longer stretch far enough to meet needs.

Insecurity caused by armed conflict adds further strain, displacing communities and limiting access for aid workers in some regions.

Beyond Somalia, the global economic crisis linked to the US–Israeli war on Iran has also played a role in constricting supply chains. A UN aid chief told the Reuters news agency in March that these disruptions are compounding costs and weakening the ability to deliver assistance, as humanitarian systems come under growing strain.

MSF reported last month that transport costs have risen by up to 50 percent in parts of Somalia, making it harder for people to reach health facilities and increasing the cost of delivering care as fuel prices climb.

The organisation also said more than 200 health and nutrition facilities have closed since early 2025 due to sharp funding cuts, leaving critical gaps in already overstretched health services.

What does the aid collapse look like?

As the need for aid rises, humanitarian funding and response capacities are only shrinking.

The UN response plan for Somalia is currently funded at just 20 percent of what is required — with $1.42bn needed but only $288m received. That discrepancy has forced major cuts, reducing the number of people targeted for assistance from 6 million to just 1.3 million.

For Somalia, which relies heavily on imported food and external assistance, the consequences are immediate. Fewer supplies are reaching ports, while the cost of delivering essentials continues to rise, testing an already fragile system.

As UN humanitarian chief Tom Fletcher told Reuters in March, “These [constraints] will damage our humanitarian supply chains, reduce ‌the ⁠humanitarian supplies we can get to people who need them, but they’ll also drive up energy costs and food costs across the region, this really is a perfect storm of factors right now, and I’m seriously worried,” he stated.

The humanitarian response has been cut by 75 percent, meaning millions of Somalis are no longer receiving assistance, even as the crisis deepens on the ground.

Disruption to fuel and fertiliser supplies due to the Strait of Hormuz closure will hit crop yields, UNDP chief warns.

The Iran war will push more than 30 million people back into poverty, with the knock-on effects of the conflict likely to increase food insecurity in the coming months, the United Nations has warned.

Disruption to fuel and fertiliser supplies due to the ongoing blocking of cargo vessels through the Strait of Hormuz has already lowered agricultural productivity and will hit crop yields later this year, the UN’s development chief said on Thursday.

“Even if the war would stop tomorrow, those effects, you already have them, and they will be pushing back more than 30 million people into poverty,” said Alexander De Croo, administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

He also warned of other fallouts of the United States-Israeli war on Iran, including energy shortages and falling remittances.

Much of the world’s fertiliser is produced in the Middle East, and one-third of global supplies passes through the Strait of Hormuz, where Iran and the US are jostling for control.

The UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) last week warned that a prolonged crisis in the strait could lead to a global food “catastrophe”.

India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Kenya, and Egypt are among the countries most at risk, according to the FAO.

“Food insecurity will be at its peak level in a few months – and there is not much that you can do about it,” De Croo said.

Straining humanitarian efforts

The knock-on effects of the Iran conflict have already wiped out 0.5 percent to 0.8 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP), according to De Croo, who noted, “Things that take decades to build up, it takes eight weeks of war to destroy them.”

De Croo, the former prime minister of Belgium, also warned that the Middle East crisis is straining humanitarian efforts in other parts of the world, with the sector already facing funding cuts.

The US-Israeli attacks on Iran, which began on February 28, have also choked up key humanitarian aid routes, delaying life-saving shipments to some of the world’s worst crises.

“We will have to say to certain people, really sorry, but we can’t help you,” De Croo said. “People who would be surviving on help will not have this, and will be pushed into even greater vulnerability.”

Pope Leo XIV visited a prison in Equatorial Guinea on the last day of his Africa tour. The pontiff spoke to 600 detainees in the pouring rain about dignity and reconciliation, after criticising prison conditions.

Rights advocates have accused the Trump administration of using third-country deportations to intimidate asylum seekers and migrants.

Fifteen South American migrants and asylum seekers recently deported from the United States to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) say they are facing pressure to return to their countries of origin, despite concerns for their safety.

Women from Colombia, Peru and Ecuador told the Reuters news agency that, since being deported to the Central African nation last week, they have been given no credible options other than going back to their home countries.

“We feel pressured to agree to go back to our country, regardless of the risks,” a 29-year-old Colombian woman, who asked to remain anonymous out of fear of reprisals, told Reuters.

The group arrived in the DRC last week as part of a controversial third-country agreement with the administration of US President Donald Trump.

Since returning to the presidency for a second term, Trump has implemented hardline measures to restrict immigration to the US and expel immigrants already in the country, some of whom have legal status.

Among the 15 South Americans who were deported to the DRC, some say they had sought asylum — a legal immigration process — in the US after fleeing persecution in their home countries.

The 29-year-old woman, for example, wrote in her asylum application in January 2024 that she left Colombia after being kidnapped and tortured by an armed group, as well as suffering abuse at the hands of her ex-husband, who was a police officer.

A US immigration judge ruled in May 2025 that she was more likely than not to be tortured if she was sent home, according to court records reviewed by Reuters.

The AFP news agency also reported that a 30-year-old Colombian woman named Gabriela only learned that she was being sent to the DRC a day before last week’s flight. During a 27-hour trip, the hands and feet of the deportees were shackled.

“I didn’t want to go to Congo,” she told AFP. “I’m scared; I don’t know the language.”

Immigration advocates have said that third-country deportations are an effort to intimidate migrants and asylum seekers into agreeing to leave the US.

Such removals involve sending immigrants to places with which they have no familiarity. Many, including the DRC, are known for human rights concerns or are sites of active conflict.

“The goal is clear: Put people in a place so unfamiliar that they give up and agree to return home, despite the immense risk they face there,” said Alma David, a US-based lawyer representing one of the asylum seekers in the DRC.

First all-women cohort of winners hails from Colombia, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, South Korea, the UK and the US.

This year’s prestigious Goldman Environmental Prize has been awarded to six grassroots environmental activists from around the world for their efforts to fight climate change and save biodiversity.

For the first time since the prize was created in 1989 by philanthropists Richard and Rhoda Goldman, all recipients of the award are women: Iroro Tanshi, from Nigeria; Borim Kim, from South Korea; Sarah Finch, from the United Kingdom; Theonila Roka Matbob, from Papua New Guinea; Alannah Acaq Hurley, from the United States; and Yuvelis Morales Blanco, from Colombia.

Sometimes described as the “Green Nobel”, the Goldman Prize recipients are chosen from each of the world’s six primary regions. They each receive $200,000 in prize money.

“While we continue to fight uphill to protect the environment and implement lifesaving climate policies – in the US and globally – it is clear that true leaders can be found all around us,” said John Goldman, vice president of the Goldman Environmental Foundation.

“The 2026 Prize winners are proof positive that courage, hard work, and hope go a long way toward creating meaningful progress.”

Morales Blanco, the winner for the region of South and Central America, fought some of the world’s biggest oil companies to successfully stop the introduction of commercial fracking into Colombia.

The 24-year-old grew up in a family of fishermen along the banks of the Magdalena River in the Afro-Colombian community of Puerto Wilches. “We had nothing but the river – she was like a mother who took care of me,” she said.

She began organising protests after a major oil spill in 2018, which forced the relocation of dozens of local families and killed thousands of animals. Her activism, which made her a target for intimidation and forced her to temporarily relocate, helped halt projects and elevate fracking as an issue in Colombia’s 2022 election.

Two of the other five recipients of this year’s prize have also focused their efforts on fighting fossil fuels, which are causing both global climate change and more localised pollution around the world.

Borim, the winner for Asia who started the Youth 4 Climate Action organisation, won a ruling from South Korea’s Constitutional Court that the government’s climate policy violated the constitutional rights of future generations, the first successful youth-led climate litigation in the continent.

Finch, Europe’s winner, told The Times newspaper she will use her prize money to keep fighting fossil fuels.

Together with the Weald Action Group, she fought oil drilling in southeastern England for more than a decade, securing the “Finch ruling” from the Supreme Court in June 2024, stating that authorities must consider fossil fuels’ impacts on the global climate before granting permission to extract them.

Two other recipients have fought against the destructive environmental impact of mining projects.

Papua New Guinea’s Roka Matbob, winner for Islands and Island Nations, led a successful campaign that saw the world’s second-largest mining company, Rio Tinto, agree to address environmental and social devastation caused by its Panguna copper mine, 35 years after it was closed following an uprising.

And the award recipient for North America, Acaq Hurley, from the Yup’ik nation in the US, successfully fought alongside 15 tribal nations to stop a mega- copper and gold mining project that threatened ecosystems in Alaska’s Bristol Bay region, including the largest wild salmon runs in the world.

Meanwhile, Nigeria’s Tanshi, Africa’s winner, rediscovered the endangered short-tailed roundleaf bat and has been working to save its refuge, the Afi Mountain Wildlife Sanctuary, from human-induced wildfires.

In recent months, the frequency and intensity of attacks in northern Nigeria have shattered the comforting illusion that the region’s long insurgency has receded into the background of national life. As violent incidents have proliferated, many Nigerians have refused to confront this uncomfortable reality and have opted instead to embrace conspiracy theories suggesting that the resurgence is somehow tied to renewed American involvement in Nigeria’s  counterterrorism efforts.

It is not difficult to see why the theory of foreign collusion with terrorist groups resonates in Nigeria. In February 2025, United States Congressman Scott Perry claimed that the US Agency for International Development (USAID) had funded Boko Haram, but offered no evidence for the allegation. Richard Mills, then the US ambassador to Nigeria, rejected Perry’s statement, but by then the claim had already acquired a life of its own in the public space and on social media.

Then, American officials like Congressmen Ted Cruz and Chris Smith made statements that fuelled the “Christian genocide” narrative, which falsely claims that the killings in Nigeria exclusively target Christians.

Attacks on Christians have happened, including most recently on a church in Kaduna state on Easter Sunday, but Muslim communities have also been regularly targeted. The truth is that terrorist groups have long operated indiscriminately.

What this moment demands, therefore, is to go beyond the seduction of easy explanation, and embark on serious analysis of what is really happening in northern Nigeria.

That diagnosis must begin with clarity about what the attacks reveal. First, they reveal that the insurgency has adapted in both form and method. Second, northern Nigeria’s insecurity can no longer be understood in isolation from the rest of the region; it is part of the wider regional disorder across the Lake Chad basin and the Sahel. And third, the violence continues to feed on deeper domestic vulnerabilities that extend far beyond the battlefield: chronic poverty, educational exclusion, weak local governance, and the long erosion of the social contract in parts of the North.

Let us begin with the first point. Recent attacks demonstrate that the insurgent ecosystem has learned, adapted, and expanded beyond the old image of a crudely armed rebellion fighting in predictable ways. The ISIL affiliate in West Africa Province (ISWAP), in particular, has become more adaptive in structure and tactics, while its conflict with Boko Haram has weakened the latter and left ISWAP as the more organised and deeply entrenched threat in the Lake Chad region. It has consolidated its presence in parts of the Lake Chad basin and expanded into Sambisa Forest, widening the space from which it can threaten civilians and military formations alike.

This matters because insurgencies are sustained not by ideology alone, but by terrain, supply routes, local economies, and the ability to move men and materiel through spaces where the state is weak or absent. In that sense, the insurgency is no longer merely surviving in familiar hideouts; it is entrenching itself in a broader and more fluid battlespace, with ISWAP’s control of trade in and around Lake Chad now a major pillar of its resilience.

ISWAP has also refined the way it fights, demonstrating a growing capacity for coordinated assaults, night raids, ambushes, and operations designed not merely to inflict casualties, but to isolate military positions and slow the movement of reinforcements. This challenge is magnified by the sheer scale of the theatre itself.

Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states are each comparable in size to entire European countries: Borno is slightly larger than the Republic of Ireland; Yobe is roughly the size of Switzerland; and Adamawa is slightly larger than Belgium. Policing territories of that scale would test any state, all the more so when they border a fragile regional neighbourhood.

The terrain has also shaped the rhythm of the conflict, with the dry season, particularly the first quarter of the year, ushering in an intensification of attacks.

At the heart of this adaptation is the evolution of technology. What once seemed unthinkable in this theatre has now entered the insurgent repertoire. Drones, including commercially available models modified for combat, are now part of the operational environment. The significance of this shift is not merely technical; it is also psychological and strategic.

Beyond technology, the insurgency’s growing mobility has sharpened the threat further. Rapid assaults by motorcycle-mounted units demonstrate the extent to which insurgent violence now depends on speed, concentration, and dispersal. Fighters can assemble quickly, strike vulnerable locations, and disappear into difficult terrain before an effective response can take shape.

The advantage here lies not in holding territory in the conventional sense, but in imposing uncertainty, stretching the state’s defensive attentions, and proving that the insurgents can still choose where and when to shock the system.

Perhaps the most dangerous dimension of this adaptation is the infiltration of foreign fighters. Their significance lies not only in their numbers, but in what they bring with them: technical knowledge, battlefield experience, tactical imagination, and links to wider militant networks.

Their presence points to a deeper cross-fertilisation between local insurgency and global terrorist currents. More troubling still, they are now playing a more active role in the conflict, not only refining tactics and skills but also participating directly in combat.

That is why the regional dimension must be central to any serious analysis. The weakening of regional cooperation has come at the worst time, creating openings that insurgents are only too ready to exploit. A threat that has always been transnational becomes harder to confront when neighbouring states no longer act with sufficient cohesion.

Niger’s withdrawal from the Multinational Joint Task Force after the reaction of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to the military coup there has sharpened that challenge and weakened the perimeter defences of the north-east theatre. The force, comprising troops from Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad, with a smaller Beninese contingent at its headquarters in N’Djamena, was instrumental in earlier gains and remains vital for reinforcing positions, conducting operations in difficult terrain, denying insurgents safe havens, and intercepting the movement of foreign fighters.

Yet even regional analysis, necessary as it is, does not fully explain the problem. Insurgencies endure not only because they move across borders, but because they can recruit, regroup, and exploit social weakness at home.

Violence in northern Nigeria is sustained by a combination of doctrinal extremism, chronic poverty, educational exclusion, and a state whose presence is often too limited to command confidence in the communities where armed groups seek recruits. The argument, therefore, cannot remain confined to the military sphere.

Poverty and lack of education do not directly produce terrorism, but they increase vulnerability, especially where alienation, weak institutions, and manipulative ideological narratives are already present. This is why the educational crisis in northern Nigeria should be seen not only as a developmental challenge, but as part of the wider security landscape. Education does more than impart literacy and numeracy; it provides structure, routine, and pathways to self-actualisation and social belonging.

It is important to note that the government is not without a response. In 2024, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu signed the Student Loans (Access to Higher Education) Act into law, and the rollout of the Nigerian Education Loan Fund has since opened a wider path to post-secondary education and skills development. But the more decisive educational challenge lies earlier, at the basic level, where literacy begins, habits are formed, and attachment to institutions is either built or lost. By the time a young person reaches the threshold of higher education, the foundational work has already been done or neglected.

This is why local governance matters more to security than is often recognised. In Nigeria’s federal structure, primary education sits closest to the weakest and most politically distorted tier of government. If local government remains fiscally weak, administratively paralysed, or politically captured, one of the country’s most important long-term defences against radicalisation will remain fragile.

That is why local government autonomy, though often framed in dry constitutional terms, has direct implications for security. President Tinubu, an ardent champion of local autonomy, welcomed the Supreme Court’s July 2024 judgement affirming the constitutional and financial rights of local governments and has pressed governors to respect it. Resistance, however, is unsurprising: many governors have long treated local governments as subordinate extensions of their authority.

So what does the present moment demand from Nigeria? It demands, certainly, continued military pressure on insurgent sanctuaries. It demands stronger force protection, sharper intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, improved rural and urban security, and a more serious approach to trans-border diplomacy. It demands that regional diplomacy be treated not as a luxury of peacetime statecraft, but as part of the operational infrastructure of security.

But the crisis cannot be addressed by military action alone. It also calls for social, institutional, and educational measures across all tiers of government. The state must confront extremism not only through force, but through education and functioning local institutions. It must rebuild governance, restore trust, and close the social and institutional fractures through which violence renews itself.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

After talks in Switzerland, the two sides also made progress on a protocol for ceasefire oversight.

The government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and rival M23 rebels have agreed to ease aid deliveries and release prisoners, as mediators push to resolve a years-long conflict that has persisted despite multiple peace deals.

The two sides announced the measures in a joint statement shared by the US Department of State on Saturday, following five days of talks in Switzerland.

“The parties agreed to refrain from any action that would undermine the principled delivery of humanitarian assistance within the territories impacted by the conflict,” said the statement.

Both sides also pledged not to target civilians and to facilitate medical care for the wounded and sick as they noted progress on a protocol for humanitarian access and judicial protections.

They agreed to release prisoners within 10 days as part of efforts “to continue building confidence”.

In addition, the parties signed a memorandum of understanding for a ceasefire monitoring mechanism that will “begin conducting surveillance, monitoring, verification, and reporting on the implementation of the permanent ceasefire between the parties”.

Since 2021, the M23, backed by Rwanda, has seized territory in eastern DRC, a region ravaged by more than 30 years of conflict.

While the two sides signed a United States-brokered peace agreement in December, fighting has continued, most recently reaching the highland areas of South Kivu, according to media reports.

In a statement last week, Human Rights Watch accused the parties of blocking aid deliveries and stopping civilians from fleeing the South Kivu highlands.

“Civilians in South Kivu’s highlands are facing a dire humanitarian crisis and live in fear of abuses by all parties,” said Clementine de Montjoye, senior Great Lakes researcher at Human Rights Watch.

The latest round of talks, held in the Swiss Riviera town of Montreux, included representatives from Qatar, the US, Switzerland, the African Union (AU) Commission, and Togo serving as the AU mediator.

On March 25, the International Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Slavery and the Transatlantic Slave Trade, the United Nations General Assembly passed a landmark resolution. Proposed by Ghana, it recognised the transatlantic slave trade as the “gravest crime against humanity” and called for reparations. A total of 123 countries supported the resolution; three opposed it, including the United States and Israel, while 52 abstained, Britain among them, and several European Union countries.

The UN’s slavery resolution is a historic moment, but what comes next is even more important. Leading up to the resolution, the African Union urged its 55 member states to pursue slavery reparations through formal apologies, the return of stolen artefacts, financial compensation, and guarantees of non-repetition.

This raises a question the resolution does not directly ask: reparations from whom, and to whom? If the answer is simply from European governments to African governments, then the reparations movement risks ignoring the long history of European engagement with Africa, and in doing so delivering justice to the wrong people.

What the reparations debate misses

The contemporary framing of the reparations debate is seductive in its simplicity: Europeans arrived in Africa, Africans were enslaved, Europeans grew rich, and Africans became impoverished. Therefore, Europe owes Africa. This narrative carries moral force, but it risks flattening the complex history of European engagement with the continent.

While European actors undeniably drove the demand for enslaved labour, African political and economic elites were not passive victims. They played a significant role in capturing, transporting and selling enslaved people to European traders.

In some cases, African states, seeking to expand their treasuries and consolidate territorial power, preyed on neighbouring communities, condemning them to enslavement for profit. The Oyo Empire, a powerful Yoruba state in what is now south-western Nigeria, expanded significantly in the eighteenth century through its participation in this commerce. Across the region, African elites who had the means sustained the system by exchanging enslaved people for European goods such as alcohol, textiles and other manufactured commodities.

None of this diminishes European culpability in the slave trade. The demand was European. The ships were European. The plantation system was European. The racialised ideology constructed to justify slavery was European. But it does complicate the story.

The transatlantic slave trade was not solely a narrative of African victimhood and European perpetration. It is a story of elite collaboration, which did not end when the slave ships stopped sailing.

The historical argument: three phases, one logic

European encounter with African societies can be understood in three broad phases, each distinct in form but similar in the underlying logic of collaborative extraction.

The first phase was slavery. Europeans extracted human labour from Africa, often with the active participation of African political rulers. Britain emerged as the world’s leading slave-trading country, transporting roughly 3.4 million Africans across the Atlantic between 1640 and 1807. The abolition of the British slave trade in 1807 marked the formal end of this phase. But abolition did not disrupt the underlying logic of the elite collaboration. It reshaped it.

The second phase was colonialism. A less understood aspect of European domination in Africa is how seamlessly some African rulers transitioned from collaborators during the slave trade to intermediaries in the colonial period.

In Nigeria, for example, regional African rulers became intermediaries for British administrators. As Nigerian historian, Moses Ochonu, demonstrates in Emirs in London, a study of Northern Nigerian Muslim aristocrats who travelled to Britain between 1920 and independence in 1960, these African figures were far from passive subjects of British rule. They actively leveraged their relationship with British authorities to reinforce their own authority at home. Such sponsored travel to the imperial centre helped solidify personal ties between Nigerian elites and British administrators, reinforcing the system of indirect rule.

The third and current phase is the postcolonial era. While formal empire has ended, the structure of elite alignment endures. In countries such as Nigeria, the majority of citizens remain largely excluded from political and economic power. The institutional successors of intermediaries and collaborators during the eras of slavery and colonial rule are now running the African postcolonial states.

Rather than dismantling extractive systems, many have repurposed them. Similar patterns of exclusion and extraction that defined earlier periods have been reproduced, leaving the majority of Africans short-changed by a system that continues to serve elite interests.

Nigerian President Bola Tinubu’s state visit to the United Kingdom last month – complete with royal ceremony, photo opportunities and symbolic gestures – reflected this relationship whose origins lie in the very history the UN resolution condemns. While the majority of Nigerians face difficult socio-economic conditions, the British government announced that Nigerian companies would create hundreds of new jobs in the UK.

This is not an anomaly but a continuation of the extractive logic that shaped the slave trade and colonialism. It endures, now recast in the language of diplomacy and partnership.

Reparations are just, and Britain’s debt is undeniable. But direction matters. If compensation flows from one set of elites to another, the oppressed majority of Africans will once again be excluded. True justice must run in two directions: from European states to formerly colonised societies, and from African elites to the citizens they continue to exploit.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.