Africa

Niamey, Niger – The failed mutiny in Niger has shown the extent to which President Abdourahamane Tiani now relies on Russian support when his government comes under threat, including from within his own security forces.

On August 29, soldiers calling themselves the Armed Forces for the Restoration of the Homeland attacked Air Base 101 at Niamey’s international airport, the presidential palace and the national broadcaster in a coordinated assault. A statement circulated during the fighting falsely declared that Tchiani had been removed.

Loyalist presidential guard units held the palace overnight, while about 200 Russian Africa Corps soldiers, backed by drones and reportedly reinforced from Mali and Libya, helped retake the airbase by evening. At least 27 people were killed, and about 100 mutineers were arrested.

The mutiny showed who Tchiani could rely on when his own security forces turned against him. Nigerien troops held the presidential palace, while Russian personnel and equipment helped loyalist forces retake the key airbase.

A fractured army

Speaking to Al Jazeera, Ryan Cummings, head analyst at Signal Risk, said the attempted mutiny was rooted in grievances that had been building inside the military.

“The insurrection indicates discord within the Nigerien armed forces,” he said. “This stems from multiple sources. The foremost pertains to significant casualties being inflicted against the country’s military by an array of non-state armed actors which appear to be as well equipped, if not better, than their military counterparts.”

Cummings pointed to a widening gap between soldiers fighting on the front lines and those protecting the country’s political leadership.

“Other factors include discrepancies in deployment and remuneration between low- to middle-ranking officers, who led the attempted mutiny and putsch, versus their more senior counterparts, such as the presidential guard who thwarted the coup attempt,” he said.

“Junior to middle-ranking soldiers are generally deployed to conflict front lines, where they face well-equipped and increasingly professional militant units that are capable of overrunning their positions,” Cummings noted. “Conversely, more senior military units, most notably the presidential guard, are deployed to garrisoned cities such as Niamey and Agadez, where the threat of engagement is generally lower. Despite facing a lower risk profile, senior military units generally enjoy significantly higher remuneration than their low- to middle-rank counterparts.”

The mutiny exposed the gap between soldiers fighting on the front lines and those serving in better-protected units in the capital.

Russia’s role grows

Tchiani expelled French and American troops in 2023 and 2024, and troops from Russia’s Africa Corps entered Niger as the military government sought to replace Western support.

But the mutiny showed that Moscow’s role now goes beyond helping Niger fight armed groups.

When soldiers inside Niger’s own military threatened the government, Russian personnel and equipment helped loyalist forces retake Air Base 101. The episode showed that Russia’s role in Niger now extends beyond the fight against armed groups to helping protect the military government itself.

That is a significant shift from how the partnership was initially presented to Nigeriens: as a way to strengthen the fight against armed groups after the departure of Western forces.

For Tchiani, that reliance on Moscow comes as he faces continued attacks by armed groups and growing discontent among soldiers fighting them.

A test for the AES alliance

The response from Niger’s fellow military leaders also raised questions about how much help the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) can provide when one of its members is under serious pressure.

According to Romane Dideberg, a research analyst at Chatham House’s Africa Programme, the response was one of the most revealing aspects of the rebellion.

“What the security response says about the cohesion of the Alliance of Sahel States might be one of the most telling elements of the mutiny,” she said. “As with the April attacks in Mali, the two other Sahelian juntas remained largely unreactive during this existential moment for the Nigerien junta, reacting only once the mutiny was neutralised.”

“This partly reflects the operational shortcomings of the confederation’s security architecture, but also, more critically, the sensitive relations between Tchiani’s junta and his Malian and Burkinabe counterparts,” she said.

Dideberg said Tchiani was rumoured not to have reached out to Mali. She also pointed to a generational and cultural gap between Tchiani and his Sahelian allies, saying his government showed more continuity with the former establishment while a different rationale had underpinned the coup that brought him to power.

The mutiny tested how far the three miltary governments were prepared, and able, to come to one another’s aid.

The UAE allegations

Alongside the Russian role, allegations have emerged that French and Emirati interests were connected to the mutiny, amid wider friction over Niger’s Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline project.

The allegations have not been independently substantiated.

Roger Gabriel, a Nigerien army captain and commander of the elite 1st Parachute Battalion, appeared on state television on September 4 and alleged that several people, including associates of deposed President Mohamed Bazoum and officers from Chad, Benin and the Ivory Coast, were behind the attack.

He also said people from the United Arab Emirates had called and urged him to join the mutiny.

The claims are difficult to independently verify, but they have put fresh attention on the UAE’s growing presence in the Sahel.

Speaking to Al Jazeera, Hossamaldeen Ibrahim, an Africa analyst at the Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute (BISI), said the possibility of Emirati involvement “cannot be dismissed” given the information circulating and the UAE’s broader regional activity.

“The UAE has been expanding its influence across the Sahel, from the western states to Sudan, primarily through official partnerships with military regimes, but also via informal networks, resource extraction, notably gold, and ties to non-state actors including separatist groups when needed,” he said.

“Its approach is pragmatic and dual-track: it prioritises formal state-level relations first, then pivots to alternative channels if the official path falters,” Ibrahim said.

“All of this is deeply political and strategic, interlinked with ambitions to secure leverage over Mediterranean and Red Sea routes. The growing friction with Algeria underscores how these moves are widely read in the region as an effort to reshape the balance of influence, making any allegations around the recent events in Niger worth careful scrutiny rather than either exaggeration or dismissal,” he said.

For now, the allegations remain allegations.

Tchiani survived the mutiny, but the failed attempt to remove him exposed strains inside his military, highlighted his growing reliance on Russia, and raised questions about how much help his closest regional allies can provide when he needs it.

For Dideberg, the implications go beyond the failed attempt to unseat Tchiani.

“This mutiny calls the effectiveness, but also, to an extent, the sincerity, of the mutual assistance pact into question,” she said.

Egypt can leverage the US-China rivalry and its strategic partnership with Beijing to bolster its national security and its position as a global logistics hub through several strategic avenues:

1) Enhancing its status as a global logistics and trade center, through:

– Developing the Suez Canal Economic Zone: Leveraging the massive Chinese investments and projects in the TEDA zone in Ain Sokhna to establish vital industries such as green hydrogen, solar panels, and electric vehicles, transforming Egypt from a mere waterway into a global manufacturing and logistics hub.

– Linking the Belt and Road Initiative with Egypt’s Vision 2030: Integrating Egyptian ports, such as East Port Said, Alexandria, and Ain Sokhna, into the Chinese maritime trade network, while maintaining a balance that allows for alternative investments in other ports and logistics corridors to expand its options and international network of allies.

– Alternative Supply Chains: Egypt offers a secure regional base for global and Chinese companies seeking to diversify their supply chains away from areas of direct conflict, leveraging its strategic location connecting three continents.

2) Enhancing National Security and Red Sea Security, through:

– Diversifying Sources of Armament and Military Technology: The partnership with China allows Egypt to acquire advanced military technology, such as drones, air defense systems, and space and satellite technology, without the stringent political conditions imposed by Washington, thus strengthening the independence of Egyptian military decision-making.

– Securing Navigation in the Red Sea and the El-Mandeb Strait: This can be achieved by utilizing the Chinese military presence in Djibouti and China’s interest in maritime security to coordinate and build a joint security umbrella protecting the Suez Canal from emerging threats, such as attacks in the Red Sea, given that the stability of this waterway is a vital shared interest for both Egypt and China.

– Balancing Political Pressures: By employing flexible diplomacy and strategic balancing, Egypt’s rapprochement with China (especially after joining the BRICS group) provides it with strong leverage in its negotiations with the United States and Western international institutions, and vice versa.

3) Egyptian Expansion and Influence in Africa via China, through:

The Joint Projects (Triangular Cooperation) by acting as a strategic gateway for Chinese investments directed towards the African continent, through the implementation of joint infrastructure projects (roads, power plants, dams) in cooperation between Egyptian and Chinese companies in the Nile Basin and Horn of Africa countries, Egypt can enhance its influence and development diplomacy.

Here, Egypt can benefit from international and Chinese competition over Africa, the Red Sea, and Ethiopia, and from its partnership with China, to strengthen its national security and its position as a logistical and commercial hub. Thus, Chinese economic influence can become a factor of stability and development for Egypt, rather than a new arena for international competition in the future.  Egypt can enhance its national security and logistical standing by leveraging its unique strategic location as a link between Africa, Asia, and Europe and by transforming international competition and its partnership with China into well-considered development opportunities. This can be achieved by studying and understanding the following strategic dimensions:

– First: Mechanisms for Egypt to Benefit from International Competition and the Chinese Partnership

– Developing Global Logistics Hubs: Continuing to expand and develop the Suez Canal Economic Zone in conjunction with Chinese investments, such as the TEDA Zone in Ain Sokhna, to transform the canal from a mere waterway into a global manufacturing and re-export hub.

– Continental Connectivity and Infrastructure: Leading regional connectivity projects in Africa, such as the Cairo-Cape Town Highway and the Lake Victoria-Mediterranean Waterway Project, and utilizing funding from China’s Belt and Road Initiative to connect African trade to the Red Sea.

– Diversifying security and military partnerships: Leveraging international competition in the Red Sea to secure navigation and combat piracy and terrorism through building flexible alliances and modernizing Egyptian naval capabilities (the Berenice naval base) without aligning completely with any single international power.

– Localizing industry and technology: Making technology transfer and the localization of industries, such as electric vehicles, renewable energy, and communications, a requirement in investment contracts with China and Western countries. This will reduce reliance on imports and bolster Egyptian economic security.

– Second: Chinese Economic Influence: Stability and Development or an Arena of Competition? Future indicators of Chinese influence in Egypt and the region point to two overlapping scenarios:

– The first scenario: A factor of stability and development, achieved by focusing on infrastructure, providing soft loans, creating local job opportunities, and supporting regional integration. This would have a positive impact on Egypt and Africa, contributing to easing conflicts stemming from poverty and offering African countries alternative financing options for developing their economies.

– The second scenario: Chinese influence within Africa as a negative factor, transforming it into a new arena of international competition. Increased Western (American and European) fears of Chinese hegemony and attempts to contain it through counter-initiatives or political pressure could turn the Red Sea region and Africa into areas of military and political polarization, forcing countries to choose between the Eastern and Western blocs.

– Third: Analyzing China’s role regarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) issue and whether Beijing can play a role in supporting stability and negotiations between Egypt and Ethiopia

On the other hand, given China’s growing relations with Ethiopia and the Nile Basin countries, its role regarding the GERD issue can be viewed positively for Egypt. Beijing can play a role in supporting stability and negotiations, even though its economic interests might make it more cautious about clashing with Ethiopia. Here, China adopts a pragmatic and cautious approach, balancing its substantial economic interests in Ethiopia with its strategic relationship with Egypt. This limits its role to quiet diplomacy and calls for negotiations without exerting direct pressure or engaging in confrontation with Addis Ababa. This can be understood through:

1) Analyzing China’s role regarding the GERD

– Technical and financial support: Chinese companies and funding have contributed directly to the infrastructure and electricity distribution stations associated with the GERD and Ethiopian projects.

– Non-interference policy: Beijing traditionally adheres to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and avoids taking public stances against Ethiopian development projects.

– Diplomatic balance: China is careful to issue joint statements with Egypt emphasizing the importance of international law and the need to avoid harming water security, but these remain diplomatic statements that fall short of exerting pressure through mediation.

2) Can Beijing support stability and negotiations between Egypt and Ethiopia?

– The capacity exists: China possesses significant economic and financial influence over Ethiopia, enabling it to exert influence if it so desired, given the scale of its investments and loans.

– The will to exert pressure is lacking: China refuses to become a serious mediator or a pressure party and prefers to distance itself from the sharp points of contention between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan.

– Maximum possible role: Beijing’s available role is limited to quiet mediation and encouraging the parties to return to regional negotiating tables without imposing binding solutions.

3) Economic interests and avoiding confrontation:

– Deep strategic partnership: For China, Ethiopia is a key gateway and the heart of Africa ​​for implementing the Belt and Road Initiative and penetrating the Horn of Africa.

– Interconnected projects: Chinese interests in Ethiopia are linked to agricultural, electricity, and railway projects that directly benefit from the dam’s energy.

Here, we conclude that major economic interests make China very wary of losing its Ethiopian ally, which keeps its position biased towards avoiding confrontation and refraining from imposing any forced settlement on it.

From this, we understand that Chinese influence holds enormous developmental potential for Africa, but it remains surrounded by the risks of geopolitical competition with other powers, most notably the United States.  Egypt’s ability to achieve diplomatic balance and rely on a policy of multiple partners is the guarantor of transforming this influence into a stabilizing factor that supports its national security.

Fort Portal, Uganda – When King Oyo Nyimba Kabamba Iguru Rukidi IV of Tooro was buried on September 12, the ceremony unfolded under the shadow of a bitter dispute over who should succeed him.

Prince Edward Rukidi Kijanangoma, a 56-year-old news anchor and editor at Uganda Broadcasting Corporation, had been selected by the royal clan to succeed Oyo. During the burial at the Karambi Royal Tombs in Fort Portal, he formally assumed power by casting nine coffee berries into the king’s grave, part of the traditional handover ritual.

But the succession remains contested.

Oyo’s mother, Queen Mother Best Kemigisa, and his sister, Princess Ruth Komuntale, have opposed Kijanangoma’s selection, saying the late king’s will named a son as his heir.

Oyo never married and was not publicly known to have children. After his death, Tooro’s Prime Minister Calvin Armstrong Rwomiire Akiiki announced that the king had left a son whose identity would be revealed at an appropriate time. The child has not been publicly identified.

Oyo’s family says a 2022 will named a son whom he described as his lawfully recognised biological son as heir to the throne. But Babiito clan elders, who are responsible for guarding the Tooro royal lineage, determining succession and safeguarding the kingdom’s traditions, say Oyo had not introduced the child through the customary process and instead backed Kijanangoma as his successor.

“The will is not a determinant of who is supposed to be a king; it is a document that expresses one’s wish,” said Reverend Father Charles Oyo, a Babiito clan elder. “The Musuuga [Babiito clan leader] is above the will.”

Princess Komuntale has accused the elders of trying to take over the throne.

“King Oyo was a very peaceful man, a very humble man,” she said. “I just don’t want these evil vultures to come and steal what he worked so hard for. I continue to stand with my brother.”

The dispute has divided opinion over who should be regarded as Oyo’s legitimate successor. The Ugandan government also became involved in talks aimed at resolving the dispute before the burial.

The child king

Oyo’s own path to the throne began when he was just three years old.

He became king in 1995 after the death of his father, Patrick David Matthew Kaboyo Olimi III, and was recognised as the world’s youngest reigning monarch.

As a child, Oyo was homeschooled, with the palace serving as his classroom. When he later joined primary school, childhood friends remember him as a kind and warm person.

During school holidays, he sometimes sneaked out of the family’s private residence in Buziga, Kampala, to play football in the neighbourhood.

Martin Odong, a radio journalist and childhood friend, remembers him as “friendly, social and compassionate”.

Oyo would stop football games to check on an injured player, regardless of which side they were playing for, Odong said.

His love of football continued into adulthood. He promoted local tournaments, including the Tooro Kingdom MTN Masaza Cup, which was suspended as his health deteriorated.

Oyo died on August 27, aged 34, in the United States while receiving cancer treatment. His body was returned to Uganda for nine days of mourning before his burial at the Karambi Royal Tombs, which coincided with Empango, the anniversary of his coronation.

At St John’s Cathedral, Queen Mother Best Kemigisa remembered her son as someone who had always protected her.

“He was my shield who always stood for me,” she said.

She recalled praying for his life when she was in hospital.

“When I was in the hospital, I said, ‘God, please leave my son alone; take me first,’” she said. “He [God] decided to take him [King Oyo] first. I said, ‘Why? Because he was closer to You than me.’”

Princess Komuntale described her brother as a “funny person” who “always brightened my day”.

Although he was younger than her, she said, he often behaved like the older sibling and protected her and their mother after their father “left to be with the Lord”.

Father Charles Oyo remembered him as a “handsome king who loved his kingdom so much”.

He said Oyo died just as he was “beginning to demonstrate his abilities and capacity as a king”.

A king without political power

Uganda is a constitutional republic, and its traditional kings have no formal political authority. But the kingdoms retain cultural influence and command loyalty among many of their communities.

Uganda abolished its traditional kingdoms in 1967. They were restored in 1993 under President Yoweri Museveni.

Oyo was guided by regents while he was a child and took on the full responsibilities of the monarchy as an adult.

His unusual position meant he met presidents, royalty and other world leaders from a young age. Among them was former South African President Nelson Mandela, who reportedly wanted to meet the young king during a visit to Uganda. Oyo, however, was more interested in playing with his toys behind the VIP tent.

As an adult, he used the platform of the throne to promote issues beyond the kingdom.

In 2020, he climbed the Rwenzori Mountains to draw attention to climate change and the retreat of the glaciers there.

He also supported a campaign to plant 10 million trees across Tooro over five years.

He promoted healthy living and took part in cancer awareness runs. Komuntale called him her “best workout partner”.

Before his death, Oyo had allocated land and begun fundraising for a paediatric hospital in Kyenjojo district. Clan elders have since appealed to the government to complete the project and establish a specialised cancer facility and an international stadium in his memory.

His final months

Oyo’s illness was kept largely private.

According to his sister, he began experiencing pain in his back and rib cage last year. The family initially thought it might be linked to strenuous exercise or ulcers.

He later travelled to Kenya, where he was diagnosed with angiosarcoma, an aggressive form of cancer, before travelling to Germany for treatment and eventually to the US.

“He told us to keep it private, and we respected that,” Komuntale said.

She said that shortly before his death, Oyo spoke to key workers in Uganda about returning home. He wanted to celebrate Empango, the anniversary of his coronation, with his people.

He never made it home.

For Komuntale, the king remained her younger brother even after he became one of Africa’s most recognisable traditional rulers.

She remembered playing dodgeball with him and his love for his three dogs.

“Even though you were crowned a king, you were still a kid who loved to play,” she said.

“I will keep your legacy, what you loved, and we will talk about you every day.”

Yemeni refugees arrive in Obock, Djibouti, within 24 hours as Houthis tighten their grip on the Bab al-Mandeb strait.

About 1,400 people have fled Yemen for Djibouti in a 24-hour period, Djibouti’s economy and finance minister says, as Houthi fighters tighten their grip on the Bab al-Mandeb strait.

Ilyas Moussa Dawaleh wrote on X on Saturday: “1,400 refugees arrived in Djibouti from Yemen in just 24 hours.”

In a separate post on Friday, the minister said that 500 refugees had arrived in the coastal city of Obock, including women and children, after they were rescued at sea when their boats ran out of fuel while crossing the Bab-el-Mandeb strait.

Obock, a city only about 20 kilometres (12 miles) across the water from the Yemeni coast, has for several years been a preferred arrival point for those seeking refuge from war-torn Yemen. The Bab-el-Mandeb strait is also used in the opposite direction by migrants from the Horn of Africa, who transit through Yemen on their way to Gulf countries.

Safiya Ibrahim, humanitarian response coordinator for the International Organization for Migration (IOM), told AFP that “vulnerable groups such as women and children have reached the shores of Obock, with more expected in the coming days”.

The IOM warned on Friday that at least 46,000 people had been displaced in Yemen since fighting escalated last week.

“Families are being forced to flee for the second or third time in this conflict, with almost nothing left,” Amy Pope, the IOM director general, said in a statement. “As fighting spreads, reaching people with lifesaving assistance is becoming harder. We urgently need safe, unimpeded access.”

Djibouti hosts tens of thousands of refugees and asylum seekers. United Nations Refugee Agency figures from March 2026 show a registered population of more than 36,000, with the majority from Somalia, Ethiopia and Yemen.

The Houthis seized the Red Sea port city of Mocha on Thursday and have since overrun the coastline and islands surrounding the Bab al-Mandeb strait. The rapid offensive has forced thousands of families to flee, with entire villages reportedly emptied in districts such as Maqbanah, Jabal Habashi and al-Maafer.

Spain’s Congress has approved a bill that would open a special route to Spanish citizenship for Sahrawis born in Western Sahara while the disputed territory was under Spanish occupation.

The bill passed by 168 votes to 31, with 145 abstentions. It must still go through the Senate before it can become law.

So what exactly would the measure do, and why is Morocco watching it closely?

What does the bill do?

The proposed law would allow people born in Western Sahara before September 29, 1977, to apply for Spanish nationality through a special procedure without having to meet the normal residency requirements. First-degree descendants would also be covered.

It would also shorten the duration of the residence requirement for eligible Sahrawis legally living in Spain. Instead of the usual 10 years, they would be able to apply after two years.

Supporters describe the measure as a way of addressing what they see as a historical injustice.

Spain was the colonial power in Western Sahara until it ended its administration of the territory in 1976. The territory has remained disputed ever since, with Morocco considering it part of its sovereignty, while the separatist Polisario Front seeks independence.

Why does Morocco care?

The law would not change the territorial status of Western Sahara. It would not recognise an independent Sahrawi state, nor would Spanish citizenship give its holders sovereignty over the territory.

The concern in Rabat is instead about the relationship the law could create between Spain and people with direct links to Western Sahara.

Reuters has reported that between 70,000 and 110,000 people could eventually qualify, although estimates vary. Anyone who obtains Spanish nationality would also become a European Union citizen and acquire the rights that come with that status.

Potential beneficiaries could include eligible Sahrawis living in Western Sahara as well as members of the Sahrawi refugee population around Tindouf in Algeria, where the Polisario Front is based.

For Morocco, that could mean a larger community of Spanish and EU citizens with personal or family ties to an issue at the centre of its relationship with Madrid.

Why is the timing important?

The bill comes after a significant change in Spain’s policy towards Western Sahara.

In 2022, Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez’s government backed Morocco’s autonomy proposal for the territory, describing it as the most serious, realistic and credible basis for resolving the dispute.

That decision helped repair relations between Madrid and Rabat after a major diplomatic crisis. Since then, the two countries have strengthened cooperation on migration, security, trade and other areas.

The new citizenship measure does not formally change Spain’s support for the autonomy proposal. Madrid can argue that supporting autonomy as a political solution is one matter, while dealing with the consequences of its former colonial rule is another.

But the two issues are difficult to separate completely from Morocco’s perspective because both concern Western Sahara.

What is the debate inside Spain?

The bill has also divided Spain’s political parties.

The governing Socialist Party and its allies in Sumar supported it. The conservative People’s Party abstained, while Vox voted against it.

The disagreement has centred partly on how Spain should address the legacy of its former rule in Western Sahara and on the legal route proposed for granting nationality.

The debate is important to the Moroccan side because it shows that the measure is not simply a technical change to Spanish nationality law. It has also become part of a discussion inside Spain about its colonial past and its relationship with Western Sahara.

Moroccan and international media have also focused on the measure. While Moroccan media have highlighted its potential implications for Spain’s policy towards Western Sahara and its relations with Rabat, Reuters has reported that the move could further strain relations between Spain and Morocco.

Does the bill recognise the Polisario?

No. The proposed nationality route does not recognise the Polisario Front or an independent Sahrawi state.

Nor does acquiring Spanish citizenship indicate support for the Polisario. Nationality is a legal status, and Sahrawis hold different political positions.

The connection to the Polisario is nevertheless relevant because many Sahrawi refugees live around Tindouf, where the Polisario has its headquarters and administers the refugee camps.

If eligible people from those communities acquire Spanish nationality, they would become Spanish and EU citizens while retaining their existing personal and political identities.

Why is Spain referring to its colonial past?

Spain was the colonial power in Western Sahara until it ended its administration of the territory in 1976.

Supporters of the bill argue that people born in the territory during Spanish rule were left in a difficult legal position after Spain withdrew. They therefore present the measure as a way of addressing what they consider a historical wrong.

Spain has used historical ties in nationality policy before.

In 2015, it introduced a procedure allowing Sephardic Jews who could establish their Sephardic origin and a special connection with Spain to apply for Spanish nationality. The measure was linked to the expulsion of Jews from Spain beginning in 1492.

That precedent is relevant to the Moroccan debate because Spain has previously used historical ties to establish a special route to nationality.

And what about Ceuta and Melilla?

This is where the issue becomes particularly sensitive for Morocco.

Morocco considers Ceuta and Melilla an integral part of its territory and sovereignty. The two cities are located on Morocco’s northern coast in North Africa and are under Spanish administration.

Spain rejects Morocco’s claim and considers the cities Spanish territory. Successive Spanish governments have maintained that their sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla is not negotiable.

The Moroccan argument here could be about how historical ties are treated.

If Spain can draw on its historical and colonial relationship with Western Sahara to create a special nationality route for Sahrawis, and has previously used historical ties with Sephardic Jews, whose connection to Spain dates back more than five centuries, Morocco could ask why its own historical and geographical relationship with Ceuta and Melilla should be considered irrelevant when it makes its claim to sovereignty over the two cities.

For eight centuries, Muslim dynasties, including the Almoravids and Almohads, ruled parts of the Iberian Peninsula.

Morocco’s potential argument is therefore narrower: if historical ties can help establish present-day legal rights, then history and geography can also form part of the case it makes about two cities located on the North African coast.

What would the law change for Morocco?

In territorial terms, very little.

The citizenship measure would not change who controls Western Sahara, determine the territory’s final status or alter the United Nations-led political process. Nor does it, in itself, change Spain’s official position in support of Morocco’s autonomy proposal.

Its significance lies mainly in the relationship between Spain and Morocco. The measure brings Spain’s colonial history in Western Sahara into a broader domestic political debate, raising questions about how that history should be addressed and what its growing political significance could mean for the delicate relationship between Madrid and Rabat.

Rugby’s Greatest Rivalry – Fourth Test

South Africa (17) 43

Tries: de Allende (2), van den Berg, PS du Toit, Arendse, Hanekom Cons: Feinberg-Mngomezulu (2), van den Berg, Libbok (2) Pens: Feinberg-Mngomezulu

New Zealand (14) 28

Tries: Taylor, Jordan, Blackadder, B Barrett Cons: McKenzie (4)

South Africa completed a 3-1 series win over New Zealand as the world champions’ consistency, power and cohesion once again proved too much in the fourth Test in Baltimore.

After victory in the series opener in Johannesburg last month, the All Blacks jumped to the top of the world rankings and threatened to shake up rugby’s world order.

However, South Africa clawed their way back to triumph – just as their director of rugby Rassie Erasmus had predicted.

While New Zealand were spirited and skilful in pursuit of a win to square the series, the Springboks’ go-forward up front and the depth of their bench kept the All Blacks at bay.

The match played out in front of a near-capacity crowd of 68,173 at the M&T Bank Stadium, the largest-ever crowd to watch a rugby match in the USA.

A successful stateside excursion completes a series that has been compelling viewing and stress-tested both sides’ aspirations of lifting the Rugby World Cup next year – the two nations have won the past five editions of the tournament.

It was New Zealand who started fastest in Maryland on Saturday.

Eight minutes in, their breathtakingly quick tiki-taka catch-pass, with the backline holding their depth, outflanked South Africa’s blitz defence to set up the first try of the match for hooker Codie Taylor.

However, the Springboks’ brute strength in the close quarters meant they could collect points without needing to resort to such high-risk passages of play.

With their forward pack on top in the scrum and winning collisions, Damian de Allende burrowed over from short range, before scrum-half Morne van den Berg flashed a dummy and darted past Sam Darry for a similar score.

Those tries opened up a 17-7 lead for the Springboks. With Eben Etzebeth crunching returning New Zealand fly-half Richie Mo’unga in the tackle and Jasper Wiese stampeding around in the loose, the Boks seemed poised to stretch away and out of sight.

Fly-half Sacha Feinberg-Mngomezulu, who had pushed a long-range penalty to the right of the uprights early on, missed a drop-goal shot. An overcooked attempt to find the corner also cost his team.

New Zealand’s combination of hard toil and sparkling hands then bought them a way back into the game just before half-time.

Will Jordan, his nation’s all-time leading try-scorer, streaked off his wing on a superb line to dunk down over the line at the end of 32 draining phases.

Four points down at the break, Dave Rennie’s side had hopes of taking home half of a specially-designed series trophy, which, held together by magnets, can be shared between the two sides.

But South Africa ensured that innovation went unused.

Malcolm Marx trundled over at the back of a rolling maul after the interval and, three minutes later, Pieter-Steph du Toit barged over after a sharp blindside break by the impressive Van den Berg.

Ethan Blackadder’s score in the final quarter cut the Boks’ lead to eight points, but South Africa hit the accelerator once again as the toll taken by a high-paced match and a long tour caught up on both teams and space opened up.

Kurt-Lee Arendse sliced through open field after Damian McKenzie had broken through in the opposite direction, but Josh Moorby failed to gather his pass.

Four minutes later, Cameron Hanekom scooped up scrappy ball to put the result beyond doubt and render replacement Beauden Barrett’s late try only a footnote.

South Africa: Willemse; Arendse, Kriel, de Allende, Hooker; Feinberg-Mngomezulu, van den Berg; Nche, Marx, Louw, Etzebeth, Nortje, Kolisi, du Toit, Wiese

Replacements: Fourie, Steenekamp, du Toit, de Jager, Esterhuizen, Hanekom, Reinach, Libbok

New Zealand: McKenzie; Jordan, Lienert-Brown, Barrett, Moorby; Mo’unga, Roigard; de Groot, Taylor, Newell, Tuipulotu, Darry, Vaa’i, Blackadder, Lakai

Aumua, Numia, Lomax, Lord, Sititi, Preston, Ioane, Barrett

Referee: Karl Dickson (England)

Assistant referees: Matthew Carley (England), Christophe Ridley (England)

TMO: Andrew Jackson (England)

DRC detected the outbreak of the rare Bundibugyo virus in mid-May; nearly 3,400 people have since died.

More than 7,000 Ebola cases have been recorded in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) worst outbreak of the deadly disease, according to figures from Congolese authorities.

The DRC officially detected the latest outbreak in mid-May, but experts suspect it had been spreading under the radar for weeks before.

Of the 7,022 registered cases, 3,398 people have died, according to DRC authorities. Currently, 837 people are in isolation or receiving treatment.

The outbreak of the rare Bundibugyo virus, DRC’s 17th Ebola epidemic, began in the northeastern Ituri province.

It has since spread across conflict-plagued, remote eastern and northern regions where armed groups have roamed for decades, the presence of the state is weak and health infrastructure is largely lacking.

Earlier this week, one case of the disease was confirmed in a seventh province, South-Ubangi, which is in the northwest of the country bordering the Central African Republic and Congo-Brazzaville.

Most of the recorded cases remain in Ituri, where Ebola has been detected in schools in the days after the post-summer holiday return to classes, causing alarm among parents and health workers.

“We are very worried because we don’t know which child comes from which family or what the health status of the members of that family is,” Angele Magani, a mother of a schoolboy in Bunia, Ituri’s provincial capital, told the AFP news agency.

“We are so scared, even though the school authorities reassure us about the health measures that have been put in place,” she added.

Bunia school official Roger Mungimbo told AFP that “there is a mandatory hand-washing system with soap, and we have also done everything possible to have a maximum of 30 pupils per classroom”.

“We regularly make the children aware that they must not touch each other, must not greet each other and must wash their hands regularly,” he added.

Ebola, which has killed more than 15,000 people in Africa over the last 50 years, is transmitted through contact with bodily fluids and can cause severe internal and external bleeding and organ failure.

The world’s deadliest outbreak in West Africa in 2014-2016 was the Zaire Ebola virus. That epidemic killed more than 11,325 people, mainly in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone.

The Bundibugyo strain currently seen in DRC has no approved vaccine or treatment currently, although several potential treatments and vaccines are being tested.

United States President Donald Trump has made no secret of his hostility towards BRICS.

Last year, he threatened an additional 10 percent tariff on any country aligning itself with what he called the bloc’s “anti-American policies”. Since then, his administration has continued to wield tariffs aggressively against trading partners, including BRICS members such as Brazil, India and China.

The message appears straightforward: Countries that challenge US economic power should expect to pay a price.

But coercion has consequences. And as BRICS leaders meet in New Delhi today, Trump may be strengthening the very incentives that made the bloc attractive in the first place. The more Washington demonstrates its willingness to use access to its markets, its financial system and the dollar as instruments of political leverage, the more reason other countries have to reduce their exposure to them.

This does not mean BRICS is becoming an anti-US alliance. Far from it.

The bloc’s 11 members – Brazil, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and the United Arab Emirates – have enormous political and economic differences. Together, they account for nearly half the world’s population and about 40 percent of global gross domestic product, but they do not share a common ideology, security policy or even geopolitical orientation.

Recent events have made those divisions impossible to ignore. Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE find themselves on opposite sides of a growing regional conflict. In May, Iranian and Emirati representatives clashed during a foreign ministers’ meeting in New Delhi. India and China have had a heated border dispute that led to deadly skirmishes in 2020-2021; only in the past two years have their relations gradually stabilised.

So Trump is not producing a united geopolitical front against Washington.

He may, however, be giving countries with otherwise divergent interests a common reason to cooperate economically: Protection against vulnerability to US power.

For countries outside the Western core, dependence on US-centred economic infrastructure carries risks.

The dollar’s centrality gives the US enormous structural advantages. International transactions pass through financial institutions subject to US jurisdiction; access to US markets can be restricted; sanctions can isolate governments and companies from parts of the global financial system.

BRICS’s efforts to diminish dependence on the US financial system do not mean the dollar is about to lose its position as a global reserve currency. This claim is often made around BRICS summits, usually accompanied by breathless predictions of a new BRICS currency. The evidence does not support it.

The dollar remains overwhelmingly dominant. According to the International Monetary Fund, it accounted for 57.1 percent of global foreign-exchange reserves in the first quarter of 2026. The Chinese renminbi accounted for just 2 percent. Indeed, the dollar’s share rose slightly during the quarter.

But replacing the dollar and reducing dependence on it are two very different things.

BRICS countries are already experimenting with the latter. South Africa has connected to China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System, allowing transactions with China to be settled directly in renminbi. Brazil and China are increasingly using their own currencies in bilateral trade, while India and the UAE have settled transactions in rupees and dirhams. China and Russia have shifted much of their bilateral trade into their national currencies.

BRICS itself is also moving cautiously towards greater financial connectivity.

Last year, its leaders called for continued work on a cross-border payments initiative and greater interoperability among members’ payment systems. In August, Reserve Bank of India Governor Sanjay Malhotra confirmed that BRICS countries are discussing linking their fast-payment networks and potentially their central bank digital currencies. India itself is also encouraging greater use of the rupee in international trade.

The New Development Bank offers another example. Established by the original BRICS countries as an alternative source of development finance, it has made lending in members’ currencies an explicit strategic objective. Its current strategy targets 30 percent of financing in local currencies, partly to reduce borrowers’ exposure to foreign-exchange risks and costly currency swaps; the number could increase to 40-50 percent for the next cycle, 2027-2031.

None of this amounts to a rival global financial system. Much of it remains experimental, bilateral or limited in scale.

But that is precisely why the fixation on whether BRICS can “replace” the dollar misses what is happening. The more significant development is the gradual construction of options that allow governments and businesses to conduct a number of transactions without relying on the dollar and Western-dominated financial infrastructure.

Trump’s policies give this process additional urgency.

Consider Brazil. Washington imposed a new 25 percent tariff on a range of Brazilian products in July, affecting billions of dollars in exports, despite running a trade surplus with the country. The Trump administration has also scrutinised Brazil’s hugely successful Pix instant-payment system, which competes with established card-payment networks.

Sanctions demonstrate the same vulnerability more dramatically. Russia and Iran have been pushed towards alternative payment and trading arrangements precisely because their access to Western financial networks has been restricted. Washington is now considering further measures that could penalise countries heavily reliant on Russian energy, including China and India.

No BRICS member needs to sympathise with Moscow or Tehran to understand what this implies.

US financial power depends not simply on possessing the world’s largest economy or issuing its dominant currency. It also depends on other countries continuing to regard participation in a US-centred system as more advantageous than the alternatives.

The more frequently Washington turns that system into an instrument of coercion, the stronger the incentive to construct escape routes from it.

That said, most BRICS countries do not appear eager to exchange dependence on Washington for dependence on Beijing.

India maintains extensive relations with the US while buying Russian energy and pursuing closer economic cooperation within BRICS. Brazil has long sought greater autonomy without becoming a Chinese satellite. Saudi Arabia and the UAE remain deeply intertwined with Western economies while expanding their relationships with China.

Their objective is less likely to be replacing one hegemon with another than increasing their ability to manoeuvre between competing centres of power.

That distinction matters. A trade transaction settled in rupees, a loan denominated in renminbi or rand, or a payment made through a system that does not depend on the same Western intermediaries will not overthrow dollar dominance.

But multiply such arrangements across countries and over time, and they begin to reduce the costs of saying no to Washington.

This is why portraying BRICS simply as an anti-US threat risks becoming self-defeating. Punishing countries for seeking alternatives gives them another reason to develop those alternatives.

Trump wants to make challenging US power costly. Instead, he may be making dependence on US power costlier still.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

In a historic move last week, the United Nations General Assembly voted overwhelmingly to encourage the use of new world maps which more accurately depict continents with their true sizes.

The move followed months of lobbying by the African Union, which itself adopted a new map earlier in February. A total of 164 countries voted in favour while six abstained.

The United States was the only member to oppose it. US representative Yaryna Ferencevych said before the vote that the resolution was “the reason this institution is losing its credibility”.

“Instead of focusing on genuine problems … this body is debating map projects from the 16th century,” she said.

But since the resolution was approved, at least three other countries have voiced concerns about the changes: India, Ukraine and Japan.

None are explicitly opposed to adopting a new projection. However, they are raising concerns about how certain disputed territories should be depicted.

Here’s what we know:

Why is there a new world map?

The UN endorsed a resolution promoting the Equal Earth projection of the world map, rather than the Mercator projection, which is currently widely used.

The resolution does not ban Mercator or impose a particular replacement – it merely encourages nations to adopt the Equal Earth version, which was created by three researchers in 2018.

The Mercator projection, which was produced by Flemish cartographer Gerardus Mercator in 1569 when the West was busy “conquering” new territories, attempts to show a three-dimensional globe on a two-dimensional surface. That is why countries closer to the poles appear much larger than countries at the equator.

For decades, map experts have pointed out that Mercator’s projection disproportionately shrinks the true size of the African continent and that of other developing regions, while making Europe and the US seem much larger by comparison.

For example, Greenland is shown as roughly the same size as Africa, but, in reality, it could fit into the continent 14 times over. Europe, which is portrayed as bigger than South America, is actually half its size.

Advocates from African countries pointed out that the map is problematic because of the size issues. Importantly, they argued, it reinforces negative perceptions of Africa.

Several cartographers have attempted to develop equal area maps. However, African activists specifically pushed for the Equal Earth projection map, which significantly expands Africa and shrinks Europe and the US.

Experts say while maps are inherently inaccurate because of the constraints of depicting a spherical world on a flat plane, the Equal Earth projection is as close as it gets.

Why is Ukraine worried about the new map?

Ukraine was one of six countries which abstained from the vote at the UNGA, along with Estonia, Georgia, Moldova, Serbia and Lithuania, who voted in solidarity with Ukraine.

Kyiv has complained that the Equal Earth projection depicts the Russian-occupied Crimean peninsula in a distinctly lighter shade than mainland Ukraine.

Russia illegally occupied and annexed Crimea in February 2014, a move the UN has denounced.

Although the peninsula is also shaded differently from mainland Russia on the new map, its yellowish tint appears closer to the Russian shade than Ukraine’s.

“Ukraine does not in principle oppose the core issue addressed in this draft resolution,” Andrii Melnyk, the country’s permanent representative to the UN, said in an address to the assembly.

Melnyk said Kyiv had asked for corrections before the vote but had not received positive responses. The new map, he said, could be tantamount to opening a Pandora’s box, enabling the “abuse and distortion” of the world map.

“It would be a truly fatal mistake for all of us, and for this General Assembly, to seek to correct a historical injustice in the geographical depiction of countries and continents by simultaneously allowing a deeply troubling interpretation of the text of this draft resolution,” he added.

What is Japan demanding?

Meanwhile, on Thursday, Tokyo, which voted in favour of the new map, said it had also asked for corrections to the Equal Earth projection because the map uses the same colours and shades for Russian territory as it does for the disputed Kuril Islands.

Russia and Japan have long fought over control of the four islands, known in Russia as the Southern Kurils and in Japan as the Northern Territories. In 1945, during World War II, the Soviet Union invaded and annexed the islands as part of a pact with Western Allies that stipulated the Soviets would take the disputed territory. The islands’ Japanese inhabitants were removed.

Subsequently, Japan and the US have claimed that the islands were not part of the original pact. The islands, however, remain under Russian administration.

In August this year, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin paid his first-ever visit to the islands, drawing condemnation from Japan. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi called the visit “absolutely unacceptable”, saying it “offends the sentiments of the Japanese people”.

This week, Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara said the Japanese embassy in the US has asked Equal Earth’s creators to change the map.

“Displays that contradict the Japanese government’s position are seen [on the map],” Kihara said at a news conference. “We need to prevent incorrect perceptions regarding our country’s territories and geographical names from spreading.”

Why is India uneasy about the map?

India also voted in favour of the Equal Earth projection, but on Sunday, the Ministry of External Affairs published a caveat regarding depictions of the disputed border territory of Kashmir.

Following the Indian partition of 1947, both Pakistan and India lay claim to the former state of Jammu and Kashmir, which had been controlled by the British through indirect rule. The region has subsequently been a flashpoint for tensions between the two rivals and has led to several wars.

Parts of Kashmir are administered by Pakistan, while other parts are administered by India. China, which also disputes some Kashmir territory with India, administers its northeastern portion.

In his statement, spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal noted that the UN vote was in favour of encouraging the use of equal area projections and that it had not made the use of any one map mandatory.

“India’s sovereign territory, including the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, must be depicted in accordance with India’s official map,” he said. “Any inaccurate or misleading depiction is unacceptable.”

After lower house approval, the bill to grant tens of thousands of Sahrawis citizenship now goes to the Spanish Senate.

Spanish lawmakers have backed legislation that would grant citizenship to tens of thousands of Western Saharans who were born when Spain ran the disputed territory now largely controlled by Morocco.

Spain’s lower house of Parliament on Thursday approved the legislation 168-31, with 145 abstentions.

The bill still requires Senate approval before becoming law.

The text grants Spanish nationality to Sahrawis born before September 29, 1977 and to their children through naturalisation, even if they never resided in Spain.

Although the exact number of beneficiaries is unknown, Sahrawi groups estimate that between 70,000 and 120,000 people could benefit from the legislation, which supporters described as addressing a “historical injustice” by colonial Spain in the Western Sahara.

Tensions with Morocco

The vote comes at a particularly sensitive time for Madrid’s historically delicate relations with Rabat due to the migration crisis in Spain’s north African territory of Ceuta, and the mass arrival of at least 70,000 migrants from Morocco in July.

Spain’s leftist government has avoided blaming Morocco – which does not recognise Spanish sovereignty over Ceuta and Spain’s other North African territory of Melilla – but the right accuses Rabat of orchestrating the surge for political motives.

Morocco claims sovereignty over Western Sahara and began asserting control over the territory after Spanish ⁠rule ended.

The Algerian-backed Polisario Front independence movement seeks recognition ⁠of an independent state called the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic.

Many Sahrawis live in refugee camps in Tindouf in western Algeria, or elsewhere abroad, while others remain in Western Sahara.

Against this backdrop, the initiative to grant Spanish nationality to Sahrawis has divided opinion in Morocco but not prompted condemnation from the government.

Moroccan media quoted Ramadan Messaoud, a member of the Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs, as saying in July that Rabat had “no problem” with Sahrawis obtaining Spanish citizenship. Others had done so “over the past few years”, noted Messaoud, who is also president of the Sahrawi Association for Human Rights.

‘Restoring’ identity

Western Sahara was a Spanish colony until 1975, when Spain relinquished its administration under agreements with Morocco and Mauritania.

Spain’s ruling Socialist Party and its junior left-wing partner Sumar, which filed the initiative, were among those who supported the bill, ‌while the opposition conservative People’s Party abstained and far-right Vox voted against it.

“With the adoption of this legislation, we are restoring – and I emphasise, restoring – the Spanish national identity card to those Sahrawis who once held it and from whom this state took it away,” said Tesh Sidi of the leftist Sumar coalition, the first woman of Sahrawi origin ⁠to serve in Spain’s Parliament.

The bill will now go to the Senate, where amendments are expected, before returning to the lower house for final approval.

For more than a decade, governments got used to cheap borrowing. That era may now be ending.

Government bond markets are flashing warnings around the world.

Across major economies, yields – the interest rates governments pay to borrow – are climbing to levels not seen in years and, in some cases, decades.

Investors are pricing in more risk before they’ll lend to governments already carrying heavy debt loads.

Inflation remains stubborn, geopolitical tensions are adding pressure, and central banks may have to keep interest rates higher for longer.

Those higher borrowing costs are pushing up what banks charge companies and homeowners.

The reported truce follows the release of 360 villagers abducted during a Boko Haram attack in northeastern Nigeria.

The Nigerian government has been involved in a secret ceasefire with Boko Haram for the past three months, according to an investigation by The New Humanitarian, in a development that could mark a rare pause in years of fighting in northeastern Nigeria.

The reported truce began in June after negotiations that secured the release of 360 civilians abducted from Ngoshe village, in the foothills of the Mandara Mountains near Nigeria’s border with Cameroon, The New Humanitarian reported.

Three people with contacts among Boko Haram members, including some senior figures, independently told the organisation that the ceasefire had been in effect since June and was likely to be extended for another 40 days.

Two of the sources said attacks had stopped in communities around Ngoshe, which have repeatedly been targeted by the armed group.

Truce followed mass abduction

The 360 villagers were abducted in March during a Boko Haram attack on a nearby army base, according to The New Humanitarian.

The negotiations that led to their release reportedly included a payment of five billion naira ($3.7m) by the Nigerian government.

The alleged payment has become controversial in Nigeria, with the government denying that it paid a ransom.

The New Humanitarian said it contacted government, defence and army spokespeople to verify the reported ceasefire but received no response before publication.

Al Jazeera has not been able to independently verify the reported ceasefire or the alleged payment.

The reported agreement does not include Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), a rival armed group that operates in northeastern Nigeria and the wider Lake Chad region.

Fighting between Boko Haram and ISWAP has continued, according to The New Humanitarian.

Government publicly rejects talks

The reported ceasefire comes despite the Nigerian government’s public rejection of negotiations with Boko Haram, which is designated as a “terrorist organisation” by the Nigerian authorities.

President Bola Tinubu has instead focused on expanding the military’s capacity to fight armed groups. In July, he announced plans to recruit 30,000 additional personnel and create four new army divisions.

Behind the scenes, however, there have been repeated attempts to establish dialogue with Boko Haram, according to The New Humanitarian, citing security officials, diplomats and mediators familiar with previous efforts.

Those efforts have included ceasefire arrangements that eventually collapsed.

Conflict researcher Malik Samuel told The New Humanitarian that the latest reported agreement should not necessarily be interpreted as the beginning of a lasting peace process.

“It could be just a temporary, tactical ceasefire that benefits both sides, but doesn’t really affect the trajectory of the war,” Samuel said.

The current arrangement could also allow Boko Haram to strengthen its position, with two sources warning that the group could use the pause to move equipment into the Mandara Mountains, The New Humanitarian reported.

Boko Haram has carried out attacks and kidnappings in northeastern Nigeria and neighbouring countries around the Lake Chad region since 2009. The group has since fractured into several factions, while ISWAP operates as a separate and rival armed group.

Barrow pledges new power infrastructure, including a 24-megawatt plant, to tackle The Gambia’s worsening electricity crisis.

Gambian President Adama Barrow has said the country will boost energy supplies by next month, hoping to quell violent protests over prolonged power outages as the premier stands for re-election.

Protesters burned tyres and built barricades blocking traffic, demanding that Barrow resign, in The Gambia’s capital, Banjul, and nearby cities on Monday and Tuesday.

Police used tear gas to disperse crowds who gathered in multiple locations, including near Barrow’s residence and the National Water and Electricity Corporation (NAWEC) headquarters, which supplies the country’s electricity.

Barrow declared the outages an emergency and a “national security issue” during a visit to a NAWEC power station. In a national address, he announced that the government would install a 24-megawatt generation machine by the end of October.

“I know that the fans have stopped turning, children work in the dark, mothers throw away stale food, and the heat is unbearable by day and by night,” Barrow said.

The rolling blackouts are taking place during the West African country’s hot season and have lasted up to 48 hours in some places.

The Gambian president also announced an additional 50-megawatt solar power plant that would begin construction soon.

NAWEC Managing Director Gallo said the prolonged electricity cuts were in part due to climate change and the US-Israel war on Iran. The electricity provider, in a statement released in August, also claimed that it was experiencing an “unforeseen surge” in demand due to high temperatures.

The blackouts come just months ahead of the December presidential election, in which Barrow is running for a third term.

Kenya is beginning a crackdown on foreign nationals operating small retail shops and engaging in hawking, after President William Ruto directed authorities to shut down such businesses from September 7.

Ruto made the announcement on September 2 while addressing micro, small and medium-sized enterprise (MSME) traders at State House in Nairobi.

He said foreigners should not compete with Kenyans in businesses such as hawking and small retail, while foreign investment was welcome in activities requiring greater capital and investment.

What is Kenya doing?

Ruto directed authorities to begin shutting down small businesses operated by foreign nationals from September 7, saying hawking and small-scale retail should be reserved for Kenyans.

He said the government would take administrative action while the Parliament of Kenya considers the proposed Local Content Bill, 2025.

He also directed National Assembly Majority Leader Kimani Ichung’wah and Trade Cabinet Secretary Lee Kinyanjui to accelerate the bill’s passage through Parliament.

Why is Kenya moving against foreign traders and small retailers?

Hesbon Hansen Owilla, a professor at Aga Khan University in Nairobi, said the policy would help protect Kenyan traders.

“Yes, this is the best way to protect Kenyan small businesses and traders,” he told Al Jazeera. “Kenya is trying to bring in only investors who are bringing capital that can spur economic development by creating jobs rather than allow small-time foreign traders who only stifle Kenyan small traders while enjoying the robust infrastructure that Kenya has built and social securities.”

“It’s like expatriates. A country cannot allow expatriates in for jobs locals have expertise in,” he said.

The proposed Local Content Bill, 2025, would require foreign companies to increase local sourcing and employment, among other measures.

The bill is still being considered by Parliament and has not yet been enacted into law.

What businesses and traders are affected?

The directive is aimed at foreign nationals operating small retail shops and engaging in hawking. Ruto specifically referred to hawking and small shops when announcing the crackdown.

Kenya’s broader micro, small and medium-sized enterprise (MSME) sector covers a wider range of businesses. The government has not publicly provided a comprehensive list of all businesses covered by the September 7 directive or an estimate of how many foreign nationals will be affected.

Ruto also directed Ichung’wah to engage the State Department for Immigration’s principal secretary and establish the requirements governing permits issued to foreign investors and traders. It is therefore not yet clear how the directive will apply to foreign nationals who already hold permits to conduct business in Kenya.

Foreign Affairs Principal Secretary Korir Sing’Oei said on September 6 that foreign nationals who meet Kenya’s legal requirements, including holding the necessary work permits and licences, remain legally protected to operate businesses in the country. He said Ruto’s remarks had been taken out of context and were made in the context of the Local Content Bill, 2025.

How significant is foreign investment in Kenya?

Kenya’s 2024 Foreign Investment Survey, the latest such survey published by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS), put the country’s stock of foreign direct investment at  1.458 trillion Kenyan shillings ($11.27bn) at the end of 2023, up 8.5 percent from 1.343 trillion Kenyan shillings ($10.4bn) at the end of 2022.

These figures cover foreign investment across the Kenyan economy and are not limited to the small-scale trading activities targeted by Ruto’s directive.

Surveyed foreign-invested enterprises employed 224,769 people in June 2024, including 221,267 Kenyan employees. Foreign employees accounted for 1.6 percent of the workforce in those enterprises.

What is the Tata Chemicals case?

The Tata Chemicals dispute is separate from the small-business crackdown.

Tata Chemicals Magadi operates a soda ash business at Lake Magadi in Kajiado County. On July 28, the Kenyan government suspended the company’s mining operations, citing alleged compliance issues under the country’s mining laws. The suspension also affected its soda ash exports.

On September 3, Ruto said he had ordered Tata Chemicals to leave Kenya, saying the company had not provided sufficient benefits to the local community in Kajiado County. He said the government would bring in two new companies to establish glass and chemical manufacturing facilities in the area.

Tata Chemicals said it had submitted the information requested by Kenyan authorities and was awaiting further communication. The company has said it complied with regulatory requirements and remained committed to resolving the matter through legal and regulatory channels.

The Tata dispute concerns the company’s soda ash operations at Lake Magadi. This is separate from the directive targeting foreign nationals operating small retail businesses and hawking.

What does this mean for foreign investment?

International business consultant and Sols Inclinations Ltd Managing Director Solomon Kinyanjui said the distinction was not between welcoming foreign investment and rejecting it, but between foreign capital that complements Kenyan enterprise and activity that displaces it.

“The issue is not whether foreign capital is welcome, but what role it should play in Kenya’s economy,” he told Al Jazeera. “Foreign investment should complement Kenyan enterprise, not substitute for economic activities Kenyans can competitively undertake themselves.”

He said the stronger case for foreign investment was where it brought capital, technology, skills, industrial capacity and access to export markets, but warned that the government needed to draw the boundary clearly and apply its rules predictably.

Hafsa Abdiwahab Sheikh, a journalist, said the policy could have both benefits and costs depending on how it is implemented.

“The policy could create more jobs for Kenyans and encourage skills transfer, while helping protect local employment,” she told Al Jazeera.

“However, if implemented unpredictably, it may discourage foreign investment and increase business costs, leading to higher prices. It could also affect relations with foreign communities if foreigners are blamed for unemployment.”

This is a meditation on my writing life and routine. It follows. It’s also a prayer. I don’t believe I belong to anything. To any man or woman or to my contemporaries. I dive into Hallmark movies that are so American: Thanksgiving and peach cobbler. The love story- what is that? Does it mean taking selfies together? A friend is in love with a young lady. It suits him to be in love. I never hear from him anymore, which I think is a good thing. We were becoming too close, (physically, emotionally and intellectually) and every male and female relationship that is a friendship and is not bound by the confines of intimacy needs a divide. I am a strong believer in the separation of both the soul and the spirit when it comes to friendship between a young man and a young woman. Nothing can and must happen. The friendship, I have decided, between a man and a woman is a very delicate and fragile thing.

What is normal? I don’t know what that is anymore? Why am I filled with fear and this sudden anxiety that floods through me? The books beside my bed have a lonely, resolute air to them. In summer the days are long, sweet and warm, though sometimes unbearably hot. I feel I have stood the test of time so far, not quite. My bones are weary, dripping with exhaustion. Chronic fatigue gnaws at my mind, and so I fall. I have the tickets to get there. Silence comes into view with its glacier walls made of a kind of ice rock. The love affair has come to an end, or whatever that was. The steadfast man was quick to recover, and he has moved on. My brother, my father tells me, wants to leave his teaching job. He wants the greener pasture but can’t afford to get there. 

I watch this landscape of events play itself out, not all deft curves, and it definitely does not speak of tranquillity. I think of the man’s lips on mine and his frame folding into me as he takes me in his arms and months later, though it could’ve been weeks or days or hours he leaves me behind to start a new life. My life is immediately permeated with an irrevocable sadness that it seems that I will never completely recover from. How does any woman recover from being humiliated by the man she loves or her mother? I find happiness in moments spent with my brother’s ex-girlfriend’s four small children (his latest girlfriend, who he wants to turn into a fiancée, is unashamedly pregnant). I also accept happiness in bursts. For example, listening to classical music (it’s soothing and gentle, its powers magical, resourceful, imaginative, healing and restorative) and writing down my thoughts. 

I found my calling in writing, and the pathetic useless frustration that so oftentimes unnerved me stopped cutting through me at will. It is, of course, natural for the will to have this acute stamina to draw on and superfluous discipline as its framework. My brother and his girlfriend watch provocative Netflix shows. My mother descends upon me and my father in the sitting room and announces she is going for a walk. I had announced to her a few minutes ago that there was money in the joint bank account she has with my father. But off she goes because she has to. She returns about twenty minutes later to inform me that the lights were off at the garage on account of loadshedding. 

I look forward to sleeping. At night I settle down and try to read a few pages before calling it a night. Slow and steady wins the race. I wonder what this sense of alarming loneliness that I feel now will be like when I am elderly and what I will look like. Lines on my face where no lines had been before, wrinkles at the corners of my eyes and my mouth, speckled and mottled skin, arthritis, would I walk with a cane or a walker, would I still be capable of smiling, of making conversation at what life or rather what I still had left within me to offer life? I imagined the people at the funeral at the back of my mind. I don’t know anyone that would attend and have no close ties, no bonds with family. But then again so do so many people. My father has his people. Though distant he still has people. Some friends, family and church people in his life. I don’t want to look back on my life with regret but somehow I know there will be a list. I had enjoyed swimming and walking when I was young but now felt no inclination for displays of endurance, athleticism, sports or survival.

I think of how sadness tears into me during the day. I think of sadness as a wound. It’s like an incision is there in my skin. A little fold of broken skin that I have to put a band-aid on. Another man, an editor, tells me to fall in love. To trust that feeling, to become centred in it as if it would make me whole again. I don’t really listen, and I know in my heart that it will go on my list of regrets. Already I have the Athol Fugard writer’s retreat that I wanted to go on (but didn’t) when I was sixteen years old in New Bethesda when I was a learner at Collegiate to put on that “regret” list. I can only think of that now. I feel cold. It’s cold, I realise as I shiver. It has started to rain. It had been raining this morning. I think of how cold it was in Grahamstown. At Robert Berold’s farm. I think of his wife Mindy Stafford’s delicious cooking. That writing retreat I went on,, which was held on that farm, was the highlight of my year and would become one of my most cherished memories. My mother turns to look at me and says, “Can you go and type in your own room?”

I sit here listening to the sound of the rain. Something about the rain always comforts me. It’s soothing and imaginative like the classical music I listen to sometimes. My thoughts are drawn to death these days. You watch it in films, read the obituaries at the back of the newspaper. I know that physically I am not well. I have many problems on a cellular level that are complex in nature. If I had done things differently five or even ten years ago, I would be singing a different tune. But it is what it is. If I had existed in a different era, everything would have been against me. But I stand here now, overpowered by the things I can’t change. These things, health and my financial circumstances, threaten my livelihood but they have given me this wonderful life. This career as a writer. I have all the hours and all the silence I can stand to want. Everybody struggles to a certain extent in life. I can’t argue with that. Some struggle at things and don’t quit. I struggle with so many simple tasks. Getting a SIM card on my cell phone, for one. Making conversation with my mother who looks as if life has nothing left to offer her. I can’t help her. She’s in the autumn of her years, she can’t hide her sadness, her loneliness from me anymore. Did she ever love my father? He tells me that he loved her. I ask him if they ever spoke to one another in the way of deep, meaningful conversation, and he says no, that they never did. He says this quite matter-of-factly.

I remember that inside the cave I am the guest and the jewel is the writing. I meditate, I pray, I write a little, I scratch the pen across the surface of the page and then I go to bed. It is never easy to fall asleep. The older male figures of my past still haunt me but fall asleep I must and the dreams when they come still hold me in their grip when I wake up the following morning.

I want to remember you, the man who was very briefly in my life, how beautiful that period was, followed by the restless nights that separated us. I write this for you even though you will never see it. The love letters I have revised, reworked and reimagined in a sense into a book. I hid you between two women. The female protagonist of the book and an artist. The book is really a novel with a modern setting. I think of the men in my life and how I have failed them and not the other way round. To my beloved, the love of my life, I have this to say. I want you to still think of me as writing, as a writer, as writing to you even if you won’t. You were, of course my last chance at love, whatever that was between us.

Niger’s military government has accused France of orchestrating a failed mutiny that rocked the capital, Niamey, last week.

France denied any involvement in the events in its former colony, but the accusation indicates that tensions between them remain high.

Here’s what you should know:

What happened last week?

Shortly after midnight on August 29, renegade soldiers targeted Base 101, a major military facility inside Niamey’s international airport complex.

Authorities said the mutineers detained some of their comrades and opened fire at “certain sensitive sites” in the capital.

Fighting spread to the presidential palace and temporarily knocked the state broadcaster off air, with explosions and gunfire echoing around Niamey for hours until Niger’s army, helped by Russian paramilitary fighters known as the Africa Corps, contained the mutiny.

State media said hundreds of soldiers took part, with dozens killed or arrested.

The mutiny happened three years after Abdourahamane Tchiani seized power in a coup that overthrew President Mohamed Bazoum, saying the elected government had failed to contain armed groups. However, violent unrest has persisted, while governance grievances and economic challenges remain.

What has Niger’s military government said?

As with previous rounds of unrest, Niger’s military authorities blamed France and other West African countries.

“This operation, with its international ramifications, was instigated and sustained by a vast network of collusion headed by the French regime of Mr [Emmanuel] Macron,” said Soumana Boubacar, Niger’s government spokesperson, in a statement read out on TV on Friday.

“Traitorous and renegade elements, to whom promises of great things were made, were tasked with carrying out unfulfilled ambitions of Macron and his cronies in our country,” he said, adding that such “undermining manoeuvres will always fail”.

The Niger Council of Ministers, which functions as the cabinet since the 2023 coup, said a “substantial body of evidence has been compiled regarding this attack and Niger reserves the right to ⁠⁠bring the matter before international courts”. Details were not provided.

Niger also accused a number of regional countries of being involved, including the regional economic bloc ECOWAS. Benin’s government, one of the countries accused, rejected the accusations.

In contrast, Niger thanked Russia, Algeria and allies in the Sahel region – Burkina Faso and Mali – for their support.

What has been the French response?

France dismissed the allegations as “pure fantasy”.

“There never was any intention, nor means that France would have mobilised,” French Foreign Minister, Jean-Noel Barrot, told the French radio station, RFI.

“All of this is, as usual, a way of wrongly blaming France for something it is simply not responsible for.”

Tensions between the two countries have increased following the 2023 coup.

Niger has since ordered the withdrawal of about 1,500 French troops, expelled the French ambassador, revoked a number of bilateral military agreements and suspended French state-funded stations, such as France 24 and RFI, from broadcasting there.

Is Niger’s security situation worsening?

Henri Nsaibia, West Africa senior analyst at Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), said the Nigerien armed forces’ fight against armed groups linked to ISIL and al-Qaeda could be weakened following the mutiny.

“The regime will likely divert resources from fighting jihadist groups to monitor internal threats,” he said.

Niger’s security situation is facing several challenges.

Since the 2023 coup, nearly 6,000 people have been killed in more than 1,400 violent incidents, according to ACLED. The casualties represent a sharp increase compared to the three years before Tchiani was in power, when nearly 3,200 people were killed in more than 1,300 violent incidents.

“Niger still experiences less intense violence than neighbouring Mali and Burkina Faso, but faces a wider range of armed threats,” said Nsaibia.

What’s the history of French colonialism in Niger?

France’s influence has dropped dramatically throughout its former colonies in West Africa in recent years in the wake of failed military interventions and allegations of interference.

The rise in anti-French sentiment has helped coup leaders in a number of countries claim legitimacy, including in Niger, where France has a long history of brutality.

France’s 1899 military campaign in Niger is still remembered for its intense violence, mass executions and destruction of towns and villages.

Niger became part of France’s colonial empire the following year and gained independence in 1960, but Paris still meddled in its internal politics and economic policies.

In recent years, discussions about potential reparations as compensation for the looting and extraction of the country’s resources during and after French rule have intensified.

EXPLAINER

Pick which country is bigger, then watch it morph from Mercator to Equal Earth projection to see how close you were.

The map of Africa is much larger than most people think. However, most classroom maps and atlases still understate it – a distortion embedded in the Mercator projection that has shaped world maps for more than four centuries.

The distortion in question is not subtle. On a Mercator map, which was designed for European colonial exploration and maritime trade in the 16th century, Greenland appears roughly the size of Africa, which is actually about 14 times larger.

The exaggeration increases the farther you travel from the equator, so it falls almost entirely on one half of the world, inflating Europe, including Russia, and North America while shrinking Africa, Latin America and South Asia.

To address this, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voted 164 to 1 on Friday to adopt a resolution promoting the Equal Earth projection, which shows continents in their true proportions, as an alternative to Mercator.

Led by Togo on behalf of the African Group and backed by the African Union, it encourages schools, institutions and tech companies to switch, correcting the shrinking of Africa and other equatorial regions. The African Group is the largest regional voting and dialogue bloc at the UN, consisting of 54 African Union member states.

Map quiz: Pick the bigger country

See it for yourself: pick which country is bigger, then watch it morph from Mercator to Equal Earth to see how close you were.

How did countries vote?

The United States was the only country to vote against the resolution calling the measure a “radical ideological project”. Serbia, Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania, Moldova and Ukraine abstained.

US representative Yaryna Ferencevych said before the vote that the resolution is “the reason this institution is losing its credibility”. “Instead of focusing on genuine problems … this body is debating map projects from the 16th century,” she said.

Friday’s resolution is nonbinding, intended only to encourage the world’s default maps to change. The UN said it does not ban Mercator or impose a replacement, but simply encourages wider use of the Equal Earth projection.

Togo’s Foreign Minister Robert Dussey told the UNGA that maps shape education, imagination and collective perception, and that the resolution affirms African reality.

The African Union adopted Equal Earth in March. Togo is planning a meeting in Lome early next year, with UNESCO, the African Union and technology companies including Google, to work out what implementation looks like in practice.

Why flat maps lie

Every flat map lies because the Earth is a sphere and no projection can flatten it without distorting something: shape, area, distance or direction.

Gerardus Mercator, a cartographer and geographer who published the world map in 1569, chose to preserve angles and straight bearings, a trade-off that made sense for 16th-century ships but has kept shaping perceptions of the world for nearly 500 years since. Equal Earth makes the opposite trade-off, preserving true area so continents can be compared honestly, at the cost of slightly bending their outlines.

The United Nations General Assembly has voted to back a resolution spearheaded by several African countries to adopt a map that shows the continent as much bigger than it is on conventional world maps.

On Friday, the resolution aimed at “a more accurate representation” of continental landmasses on the globe was supported by 164 countries, while the United States voted against it and six other states abstained.

The new map – known as the Equal Earth cartographic projection – “is a relevant option for improving the accuracy of the cartographic representation of the world”, the resolution stated.

Foreign Minister Robert Dussey of Togo, which drove the resolution, said maps “guide education, nourish the imagination, and influence collective perceptions”.

“The resolution adopted today reaffirms African reality,” he added.

But how does the new map differ from the traditional version, and why did the US object?

What has the UN decided?

The UN has urged member states to adopt a new map in place of the centuries-old, traditional Mercator projection, which was designed for maritime navigation by Flemish cartographer Gerardus Mercator in 1569.

That projection focused on accurate depictions of the shapes and angles of land masses, but their relative sizes were often inaccurate – in part because of the challenge of rendering a three-dimensional globe onto a two-dimensional surface.

It inflated northern regions and compressed equatorial ones, making Europe and North America appear much larger, while shrinking Africa and South America.

How big are Africa, Latin America, South Asia and Oceania?

It does not look like it on the conventional Mercator map, but Africa is a giant among the world’s continents at about 30.3 million square kilometres (11.7 million square miles).

It is large enough to contain the US, China, India and most of Europe, yet on a Mercator map it looks roughly the same size as Greenland, which is actually about 14 times smaller than the continent.

Latin America covers roughly 20 million sq km (7.7 million sq miles), of which South America accounts for 17.8 million sq km (6.9 million sq miles).

Oceania spans about 8.5 million sq km (3.3 million sq miles), almost all of it Australia.

South Asia is the smallest of the four at about 5.1 million sq km (2 million sq miles), though it is home to about a quarter of the world’s population.

Combined, the four cover about 64 million sq km (24.7 million sq miles), more than 40 percent of the world’s land surface.

Europe, by comparison, is 10.2 million sq km (3.9 million sq miles).

What has the response to the change of maps been?

Largely positive.

France, which co-sponsored the resolution in support of the new map, announced on Friday that it would abandon the Mercator projection.

In that map, “the United States, Russia and China take on a disproportionate visual prominence compared to Africa, Latin America or Southeast Asia”, while “Greenland appears almost as big as Africa,” Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot said.

“Changing maps obviously doesn’t change the world,” he added. “But correcting a distorted representation is already an act of truth.”

Only the US voted against it, while six other countries – Serbia, Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania, Moldova and Ukraine – abstained.

US representative Yaryna Ferencevych said before the vote that the resolution is “the reason this institution is losing its credibility”.

“Instead of focusing on genuine problems … this body is debating map projects from the 16th century,” she said.

What is Equal Earth?

Equal Earth was launched in 2018 by three cartographers – Bojan Savric of the Environmental Systems Research Institute, Tom Patterson of the US National Park Service, and Bernhard Jenny of Monash University.

“Equal Earth preserves the relative surface areas of continents and, as much as possible, shows their shapes as they appear on a globe,” Savric told the AFP news agency in 2025.

The UN resolution encourages governments and institutions worldwide to adopt the Equal Earth projection.

Will the world map actually change?

Friday’s resolution is not binding, but is intended to encourage changes to maps used by default around the world.

The UN said in its report that it is not banning the Mercator projection or imposing a replacement, but is merely encouraging the use of the Equal Earth projection.