Africa

For more than a decade, governments got used to cheap borrowing. That era may now be ending.

Government bond markets are flashing warnings around the world.

Across major economies, yields – the interest rates governments pay to borrow – are climbing to levels not seen in years and, in some cases, decades.

Investors are pricing in more risk before they’ll lend to governments already carrying heavy debt loads.

Inflation remains stubborn, geopolitical tensions are adding pressure, and central banks may have to keep interest rates higher for longer.

Those higher borrowing costs are pushing up what banks charge companies and homeowners.

The reported truce follows the release of 360 villagers abducted during a Boko Haram attack in northeastern Nigeria.

The Nigerian government has been involved in a secret ceasefire with Boko Haram for the past three months, according to an investigation by The New Humanitarian, in a development that could mark a rare pause in years of fighting in northeastern Nigeria.

The reported truce began in June after negotiations that secured the release of 360 civilians abducted from Ngoshe village, in the foothills of the Mandara Mountains near Nigeria’s border with Cameroon, The New Humanitarian reported.

Three people with contacts among Boko Haram members, including some senior figures, independently told the organisation that the ceasefire had been in effect since June and was likely to be extended for another 40 days.

Two of the sources said attacks had stopped in communities around Ngoshe, which have repeatedly been targeted by the armed group.

Truce followed mass abduction

The 360 villagers were abducted in March during a Boko Haram attack on a nearby army base, according to The New Humanitarian.

The negotiations that led to their release reportedly included a payment of five billion naira ($3.7m) by the Nigerian government.

The alleged payment has become controversial in Nigeria, with the government denying that it paid a ransom.

The New Humanitarian said it contacted government, defence and army spokespeople to verify the reported ceasefire but received no response before publication.

Al Jazeera has not been able to independently verify the reported ceasefire or the alleged payment.

The reported agreement does not include Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), a rival armed group that operates in northeastern Nigeria and the wider Lake Chad region.

Fighting between Boko Haram and ISWAP has continued, according to The New Humanitarian.

Government publicly rejects talks

The reported ceasefire comes despite the Nigerian government’s public rejection of negotiations with Boko Haram, which is designated as a “terrorist organisation” by the Nigerian authorities.

President Bola Tinubu has instead focused on expanding the military’s capacity to fight armed groups. In July, he announced plans to recruit 30,000 additional personnel and create four new army divisions.

Behind the scenes, however, there have been repeated attempts to establish dialogue with Boko Haram, according to The New Humanitarian, citing security officials, diplomats and mediators familiar with previous efforts.

Those efforts have included ceasefire arrangements that eventually collapsed.

Conflict researcher Malik Samuel told The New Humanitarian that the latest reported agreement should not necessarily be interpreted as the beginning of a lasting peace process.

“It could be just a temporary, tactical ceasefire that benefits both sides, but doesn’t really affect the trajectory of the war,” Samuel said.

The current arrangement could also allow Boko Haram to strengthen its position, with two sources warning that the group could use the pause to move equipment into the Mandara Mountains, The New Humanitarian reported.

Boko Haram has carried out attacks and kidnappings in northeastern Nigeria and neighbouring countries around the Lake Chad region since 2009. The group has since fractured into several factions, while ISWAP operates as a separate and rival armed group.

Barrow pledges new power infrastructure, including a 24-megawatt plant, to tackle The Gambia’s worsening electricity crisis.

Gambian President Adama Barrow has said the country will boost energy supplies by next month, hoping to quell violent protests over prolonged power outages as the premier stands for re-election.

Protesters burned tyres and built barricades blocking traffic, demanding that Barrow resign, in The Gambia’s capital, Banjul, and nearby cities on Monday and Tuesday.

Police used tear gas to disperse crowds who gathered in multiple locations, including near Barrow’s residence and the National Water and Electricity Corporation (NAWEC) headquarters, which supplies the country’s electricity.

Barrow declared the outages an emergency and a “national security issue” during a visit to a NAWEC power station. In a national address, he announced that the government would install a 24-megawatt generation machine by the end of October.

“I know that the fans have stopped turning, children work in the dark, mothers throw away stale food, and the heat is unbearable by day and by night,” Barrow said.

The rolling blackouts are taking place during the West African country’s hot season and have lasted up to 48 hours in some places.

The Gambian president also announced an additional 50-megawatt solar power plant that would begin construction soon.

NAWEC Managing Director Gallo said the prolonged electricity cuts were in part due to climate change and the US-Israel war on Iran. The electricity provider, in a statement released in August, also claimed that it was experiencing an “unforeseen surge” in demand due to high temperatures.

The blackouts come just months ahead of the December presidential election, in which Barrow is running for a third term.

Kenya is beginning a crackdown on foreign nationals operating small retail shops and engaging in hawking, after President William Ruto directed authorities to shut down such businesses from September 7.

Ruto made the announcement on September 2 while addressing micro, small and medium-sized enterprise (MSME) traders at State House in Nairobi.

He said foreigners should not compete with Kenyans in businesses such as hawking and small retail, while foreign investment was welcome in activities requiring greater capital and investment.

What is Kenya doing?

Ruto directed authorities to begin shutting down small businesses operated by foreign nationals from September 7, saying hawking and small-scale retail should be reserved for Kenyans.

He said the government would take administrative action while the Parliament of Kenya considers the proposed Local Content Bill, 2025.

He also directed National Assembly Majority Leader Kimani Ichung’wah and Trade Cabinet Secretary Lee Kinyanjui to accelerate the bill’s passage through Parliament.

Why is Kenya moving against foreign traders and small retailers?

Hesbon Hansen Owilla, a professor at Aga Khan University in Nairobi, said the policy would help protect Kenyan traders.

“Yes, this is the best way to protect Kenyan small businesses and traders,” he told Al Jazeera. “Kenya is trying to bring in only investors who are bringing capital that can spur economic development by creating jobs rather than allow small-time foreign traders who only stifle Kenyan small traders while enjoying the robust infrastructure that Kenya has built and social securities.”

“It’s like expatriates. A country cannot allow expatriates in for jobs locals have expertise in,” he said.

The proposed Local Content Bill, 2025, would require foreign companies to increase local sourcing and employment, among other measures.

The bill is still being considered by Parliament and has not yet been enacted into law.

What businesses and traders are affected?

The directive is aimed at foreign nationals operating small retail shops and engaging in hawking. Ruto specifically referred to hawking and small shops when announcing the crackdown.

Kenya’s broader micro, small and medium-sized enterprise (MSME) sector covers a wider range of businesses. The government has not publicly provided a comprehensive list of all businesses covered by the September 7 directive or an estimate of how many foreign nationals will be affected.

Ruto also directed Ichung’wah to engage the State Department for Immigration’s principal secretary and establish the requirements governing permits issued to foreign investors and traders. It is therefore not yet clear how the directive will apply to foreign nationals who already hold permits to conduct business in Kenya.

Foreign Affairs Principal Secretary Korir Sing’Oei said on September 6 that foreign nationals who meet Kenya’s legal requirements, including holding the necessary work permits and licences, remain legally protected to operate businesses in the country. He said Ruto’s remarks had been taken out of context and were made in the context of the Local Content Bill, 2025.

How significant is foreign investment in Kenya?

Kenya’s 2024 Foreign Investment Survey, the latest such survey published by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS), put the country’s stock of foreign direct investment at  1.458 trillion Kenyan shillings ($11.27bn) at the end of 2023, up 8.5 percent from 1.343 trillion Kenyan shillings ($10.4bn) at the end of 2022.

These figures cover foreign investment across the Kenyan economy and are not limited to the small-scale trading activities targeted by Ruto’s directive.

Surveyed foreign-invested enterprises employed 224,769 people in June 2024, including 221,267 Kenyan employees. Foreign employees accounted for 1.6 percent of the workforce in those enterprises.

What is the Tata Chemicals case?

The Tata Chemicals dispute is separate from the small-business crackdown.

Tata Chemicals Magadi operates a soda ash business at Lake Magadi in Kajiado County. On July 28, the Kenyan government suspended the company’s mining operations, citing alleged compliance issues under the country’s mining laws. The suspension also affected its soda ash exports.

On September 3, Ruto said he had ordered Tata Chemicals to leave Kenya, saying the company had not provided sufficient benefits to the local community in Kajiado County. He said the government would bring in two new companies to establish glass and chemical manufacturing facilities in the area.

Tata Chemicals said it had submitted the information requested by Kenyan authorities and was awaiting further communication. The company has said it complied with regulatory requirements and remained committed to resolving the matter through legal and regulatory channels.

The Tata dispute concerns the company’s soda ash operations at Lake Magadi. This is separate from the directive targeting foreign nationals operating small retail businesses and hawking.

What does this mean for foreign investment?

International business consultant and Sols Inclinations Ltd Managing Director Solomon Kinyanjui said the distinction was not between welcoming foreign investment and rejecting it, but between foreign capital that complements Kenyan enterprise and activity that displaces it.

“The issue is not whether foreign capital is welcome, but what role it should play in Kenya’s economy,” he told Al Jazeera. “Foreign investment should complement Kenyan enterprise, not substitute for economic activities Kenyans can competitively undertake themselves.”

He said the stronger case for foreign investment was where it brought capital, technology, skills, industrial capacity and access to export markets, but warned that the government needed to draw the boundary clearly and apply its rules predictably.

Hafsa Abdiwahab Sheikh, a journalist, said the policy could have both benefits and costs depending on how it is implemented.

“The policy could create more jobs for Kenyans and encourage skills transfer, while helping protect local employment,” she told Al Jazeera.

“However, if implemented unpredictably, it may discourage foreign investment and increase business costs, leading to higher prices. It could also affect relations with foreign communities if foreigners are blamed for unemployment.”

This is a meditation on my writing life and routine. It follows. It’s also a prayer. I don’t believe I belong to anything. To any man or woman or to my contemporaries. I dive into Hallmark movies that are so American: Thanksgiving and peach cobbler. The love story- what is that? Does it mean taking selfies together? A friend is in love with a young lady. It suits him to be in love. I never hear from him anymore, which I think is a good thing. We were becoming too close, (physically, emotionally and intellectually) and every male and female relationship that is a friendship and is not bound by the confines of intimacy needs a divide. I am a strong believer in the separation of both the soul and the spirit when it comes to friendship between a young man and a young woman. Nothing can and must happen. The friendship, I have decided, between a man and a woman is a very delicate and fragile thing.

What is normal? I don’t know what that is anymore? Why am I filled with fear and this sudden anxiety that floods through me? The books beside my bed have a lonely, resolute air to them. In summer the days are long, sweet and warm, though sometimes unbearably hot. I feel I have stood the test of time so far, not quite. My bones are weary, dripping with exhaustion. Chronic fatigue gnaws at my mind, and so I fall. I have the tickets to get there. Silence comes into view with its glacier walls made of a kind of ice rock. The love affair has come to an end, or whatever that was. The steadfast man was quick to recover, and he has moved on. My brother, my father tells me, wants to leave his teaching job. He wants the greener pasture but can’t afford to get there. 

I watch this landscape of events play itself out, not all deft curves, and it definitely does not speak of tranquillity. I think of the man’s lips on mine and his frame folding into me as he takes me in his arms and months later, though it could’ve been weeks or days or hours he leaves me behind to start a new life. My life is immediately permeated with an irrevocable sadness that it seems that I will never completely recover from. How does any woman recover from being humiliated by the man she loves or her mother? I find happiness in moments spent with my brother’s ex-girlfriend’s four small children (his latest girlfriend, who he wants to turn into a fiancée, is unashamedly pregnant). I also accept happiness in bursts. For example, listening to classical music (it’s soothing and gentle, its powers magical, resourceful, imaginative, healing and restorative) and writing down my thoughts. 

I found my calling in writing, and the pathetic useless frustration that so oftentimes unnerved me stopped cutting through me at will. It is, of course, natural for the will to have this acute stamina to draw on and superfluous discipline as its framework. My brother and his girlfriend watch provocative Netflix shows. My mother descends upon me and my father in the sitting room and announces she is going for a walk. I had announced to her a few minutes ago that there was money in the joint bank account she has with my father. But off she goes because she has to. She returns about twenty minutes later to inform me that the lights were off at the garage on account of loadshedding. 

I look forward to sleeping. At night I settle down and try to read a few pages before calling it a night. Slow and steady wins the race. I wonder what this sense of alarming loneliness that I feel now will be like when I am elderly and what I will look like. Lines on my face where no lines had been before, wrinkles at the corners of my eyes and my mouth, speckled and mottled skin, arthritis, would I walk with a cane or a walker, would I still be capable of smiling, of making conversation at what life or rather what I still had left within me to offer life? I imagined the people at the funeral at the back of my mind. I don’t know anyone that would attend and have no close ties, no bonds with family. But then again so do so many people. My father has his people. Though distant he still has people. Some friends, family and church people in his life. I don’t want to look back on my life with regret but somehow I know there will be a list. I had enjoyed swimming and walking when I was young but now felt no inclination for displays of endurance, athleticism, sports or survival.

I think of how sadness tears into me during the day. I think of sadness as a wound. It’s like an incision is there in my skin. A little fold of broken skin that I have to put a band-aid on. Another man, an editor, tells me to fall in love. To trust that feeling, to become centred in it as if it would make me whole again. I don’t really listen, and I know in my heart that it will go on my list of regrets. Already I have the Athol Fugard writer’s retreat that I wanted to go on (but didn’t) when I was sixteen years old in New Bethesda when I was a learner at Collegiate to put on that “regret” list. I can only think of that now. I feel cold. It’s cold, I realise as I shiver. It has started to rain. It had been raining this morning. I think of how cold it was in Grahamstown. At Robert Berold’s farm. I think of his wife Mindy Stafford’s delicious cooking. That writing retreat I went on,, which was held on that farm, was the highlight of my year and would become one of my most cherished memories. My mother turns to look at me and says, “Can you go and type in your own room?”

I sit here listening to the sound of the rain. Something about the rain always comforts me. It’s soothing and imaginative like the classical music I listen to sometimes. My thoughts are drawn to death these days. You watch it in films, read the obituaries at the back of the newspaper. I know that physically I am not well. I have many problems on a cellular level that are complex in nature. If I had done things differently five or even ten years ago, I would be singing a different tune. But it is what it is. If I had existed in a different era, everything would have been against me. But I stand here now, overpowered by the things I can’t change. These things, health and my financial circumstances, threaten my livelihood but they have given me this wonderful life. This career as a writer. I have all the hours and all the silence I can stand to want. Everybody struggles to a certain extent in life. I can’t argue with that. Some struggle at things and don’t quit. I struggle with so many simple tasks. Getting a SIM card on my cell phone, for one. Making conversation with my mother who looks as if life has nothing left to offer her. I can’t help her. She’s in the autumn of her years, she can’t hide her sadness, her loneliness from me anymore. Did she ever love my father? He tells me that he loved her. I ask him if they ever spoke to one another in the way of deep, meaningful conversation, and he says no, that they never did. He says this quite matter-of-factly.

I remember that inside the cave I am the guest and the jewel is the writing. I meditate, I pray, I write a little, I scratch the pen across the surface of the page and then I go to bed. It is never easy to fall asleep. The older male figures of my past still haunt me but fall asleep I must and the dreams when they come still hold me in their grip when I wake up the following morning.

I want to remember you, the man who was very briefly in my life, how beautiful that period was, followed by the restless nights that separated us. I write this for you even though you will never see it. The love letters I have revised, reworked and reimagined in a sense into a book. I hid you between two women. The female protagonist of the book and an artist. The book is really a novel with a modern setting. I think of the men in my life and how I have failed them and not the other way round. To my beloved, the love of my life, I have this to say. I want you to still think of me as writing, as a writer, as writing to you even if you won’t. You were, of course my last chance at love, whatever that was between us.

Niger’s military government has accused France of orchestrating a failed mutiny that rocked the capital, Niamey, last week.

France denied any involvement in the events in its former colony, but the accusation indicates that tensions between them remain high.

Here’s what you should know:

What happened last week?

Shortly after midnight on August 29, renegade soldiers targeted Base 101, a major military facility inside Niamey’s international airport complex.

Authorities said the mutineers detained some of their comrades and opened fire at “certain sensitive sites” in the capital.

Fighting spread to the presidential palace and temporarily knocked the state broadcaster off air, with explosions and gunfire echoing around Niamey for hours until Niger’s army, helped by Russian paramilitary fighters known as the Africa Corps, contained the mutiny.

State media said hundreds of soldiers took part, with dozens killed or arrested.

The mutiny happened three years after Abdourahamane Tchiani seized power in a coup that overthrew President Mohamed Bazoum, saying the elected government had failed to contain armed groups. However, violent unrest has persisted, while governance grievances and economic challenges remain.

What has Niger’s military government said?

As with previous rounds of unrest, Niger’s military authorities blamed France and other West African countries.

“This operation, with its international ramifications, was instigated and sustained by a vast network of collusion headed by the French regime of Mr [Emmanuel] Macron,” said Soumana Boubacar, Niger’s government spokesperson, in a statement read out on TV on Friday.

“Traitorous and renegade elements, to whom promises of great things were made, were tasked with carrying out unfulfilled ambitions of Macron and his cronies in our country,” he said, adding that such “undermining manoeuvres will always fail”.

The Niger Council of Ministers, which functions as the cabinet since the 2023 coup, said a “substantial body of evidence has been compiled regarding this attack and Niger reserves the right to ⁠⁠bring the matter before international courts”. Details were not provided.

Niger also accused a number of regional countries of being involved, including the regional economic bloc ECOWAS. Benin’s government, one of the countries accused, rejected the accusations.

In contrast, Niger thanked Russia, Algeria and allies in the Sahel region – Burkina Faso and Mali – for their support.

What has been the French response?

France dismissed the allegations as “pure fantasy”.

“There never was any intention, nor means that France would have mobilised,” French Foreign Minister, Jean-Noel Barrot, told the French radio station, RFI.

“All of this is, as usual, a way of wrongly blaming France for something it is simply not responsible for.”

Tensions between the two countries have increased following the 2023 coup.

Niger has since ordered the withdrawal of about 1,500 French troops, expelled the French ambassador, revoked a number of bilateral military agreements and suspended French state-funded stations, such as France 24 and RFI, from broadcasting there.

Is Niger’s security situation worsening?

Henri Nsaibia, West Africa senior analyst at Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), said the Nigerien armed forces’ fight against armed groups linked to ISIL and al-Qaeda could be weakened following the mutiny.

“The regime will likely divert resources from fighting jihadist groups to monitor internal threats,” he said.

Niger’s security situation is facing several challenges.

Since the 2023 coup, nearly 6,000 people have been killed in more than 1,400 violent incidents, according to ACLED. The casualties represent a sharp increase compared to the three years before Tchiani was in power, when nearly 3,200 people were killed in more than 1,300 violent incidents.

“Niger still experiences less intense violence than neighbouring Mali and Burkina Faso, but faces a wider range of armed threats,” said Nsaibia.

What’s the history of French colonialism in Niger?

France’s influence has dropped dramatically throughout its former colonies in West Africa in recent years in the wake of failed military interventions and allegations of interference.

The rise in anti-French sentiment has helped coup leaders in a number of countries claim legitimacy, including in Niger, where France has a long history of brutality.

France’s 1899 military campaign in Niger is still remembered for its intense violence, mass executions and destruction of towns and villages.

Niger became part of France’s colonial empire the following year and gained independence in 1960, but Paris still meddled in its internal politics and economic policies.

In recent years, discussions about potential reparations as compensation for the looting and extraction of the country’s resources during and after French rule have intensified.

EXPLAINER

Pick which country is bigger, then watch it morph from Mercator to Equal Earth projection to see how close you were.

The map of Africa is much larger than most people think. However, most classroom maps and atlases still understate it – a distortion embedded in the Mercator projection that has shaped world maps for more than four centuries.

The distortion in question is not subtle. On a Mercator map, which was designed for European colonial exploration and maritime trade in the 16th century, Greenland appears roughly the size of Africa, which is actually about 14 times larger.

The exaggeration increases the farther you travel from the equator, so it falls almost entirely on one half of the world, inflating Europe, including Russia, and North America while shrinking Africa, Latin America and South Asia.

To address this, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voted 164 to 1 on Friday to adopt a resolution promoting the Equal Earth projection, which shows continents in their true proportions, as an alternative to Mercator.

Led by Togo on behalf of the African Group and backed by the African Union, it encourages schools, institutions and tech companies to switch, correcting the shrinking of Africa and other equatorial regions. The African Group is the largest regional voting and dialogue bloc at the UN, consisting of 54 African Union member states.

Map quiz: Pick the bigger country

See it for yourself: pick which country is bigger, then watch it morph from Mercator to Equal Earth to see how close you were.

How did countries vote?

The United States was the only country to vote against the resolution calling the measure a “radical ideological project”. Serbia, Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania, Moldova and Ukraine abstained.

US representative Yaryna Ferencevych said before the vote that the resolution is “the reason this institution is losing its credibility”. “Instead of focusing on genuine problems … this body is debating map projects from the 16th century,” she said.

Friday’s resolution is nonbinding, intended only to encourage the world’s default maps to change. The UN said it does not ban Mercator or impose a replacement, but simply encourages wider use of the Equal Earth projection.

Togo’s Foreign Minister Robert Dussey told the UNGA that maps shape education, imagination and collective perception, and that the resolution affirms African reality.

The African Union adopted Equal Earth in March. Togo is planning a meeting in Lome early next year, with UNESCO, the African Union and technology companies including Google, to work out what implementation looks like in practice.

Why flat maps lie

Every flat map lies because the Earth is a sphere and no projection can flatten it without distorting something: shape, area, distance or direction.

Gerardus Mercator, a cartographer and geographer who published the world map in 1569, chose to preserve angles and straight bearings, a trade-off that made sense for 16th-century ships but has kept shaping perceptions of the world for nearly 500 years since. Equal Earth makes the opposite trade-off, preserving true area so continents can be compared honestly, at the cost of slightly bending their outlines.

The United Nations General Assembly has voted to back a resolution spearheaded by several African countries to adopt a map that shows the continent as much bigger than it is on conventional world maps.

On Friday, the resolution aimed at “a more accurate representation” of continental landmasses on the globe was supported by 164 countries, while the United States voted against it and six other states abstained.

The new map – known as the Equal Earth cartographic projection – “is a relevant option for improving the accuracy of the cartographic representation of the world”, the resolution stated.

Foreign Minister Robert Dussey of Togo, which drove the resolution, said maps “guide education, nourish the imagination, and influence collective perceptions”.

“The resolution adopted today reaffirms African reality,” he added.

But how does the new map differ from the traditional version, and why did the US object?

What has the UN decided?

The UN has urged member states to adopt a new map in place of the centuries-old, traditional Mercator projection, which was designed for maritime navigation by Flemish cartographer Gerardus Mercator in 1569.

That projection focused on accurate depictions of the shapes and angles of land masses, but their relative sizes were often inaccurate – in part because of the challenge of rendering a three-dimensional globe onto a two-dimensional surface.

It inflated northern regions and compressed equatorial ones, making Europe and North America appear much larger, while shrinking Africa and South America.

How big are Africa, Latin America, South Asia and Oceania?

It does not look like it on the conventional Mercator map, but Africa is a giant among the world’s continents at about 30.3 million square kilometres (11.7 million square miles).

It is large enough to contain the US, China, India and most of Europe, yet on a Mercator map it looks roughly the same size as Greenland, which is actually about 14 times smaller than the continent.

Latin America covers roughly 20 million sq km (7.7 million sq miles), of which South America accounts for 17.8 million sq km (6.9 million sq miles).

Oceania spans about 8.5 million sq km (3.3 million sq miles), almost all of it Australia.

South Asia is the smallest of the four at about 5.1 million sq km (2 million sq miles), though it is home to about a quarter of the world’s population.

Combined, the four cover about 64 million sq km (24.7 million sq miles), more than 40 percent of the world’s land surface.

Europe, by comparison, is 10.2 million sq km (3.9 million sq miles).

What has the response to the change of maps been?

Largely positive.

France, which co-sponsored the resolution in support of the new map, announced on Friday that it would abandon the Mercator projection.

In that map, “the United States, Russia and China take on a disproportionate visual prominence compared to Africa, Latin America or Southeast Asia”, while “Greenland appears almost as big as Africa,” Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot said.

“Changing maps obviously doesn’t change the world,” he added. “But correcting a distorted representation is already an act of truth.”

Only the US voted against it, while six other countries – Serbia, Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania, Moldova and Ukraine – abstained.

US representative Yaryna Ferencevych said before the vote that the resolution is “the reason this institution is losing its credibility”.

“Instead of focusing on genuine problems … this body is debating map projects from the 16th century,” she said.

What is Equal Earth?

Equal Earth was launched in 2018 by three cartographers – Bojan Savric of the Environmental Systems Research Institute, Tom Patterson of the US National Park Service, and Bernhard Jenny of Monash University.

“Equal Earth preserves the relative surface areas of continents and, as much as possible, shows their shapes as they appear on a globe,” Savric told the AFP news agency in 2025.

The UN resolution encourages governments and institutions worldwide to adopt the Equal Earth projection.

Will the world map actually change?

Friday’s resolution is not binding, but is intended to encourage changes to maps used by default around the world.

The UN said in its report that it is not banning the Mercator projection or imposing a replacement, but is merely encouraging the use of the Equal Earth projection.

The announcement revives a 2023 commitment by President Tshisekedi and comes as several governments signal plans to deepen diplomatic ties with Israel.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has reiterated its decision to move its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, becoming the latest country to announce such plans.

Following a visit to Israel by President Felix-Antoine Tshisekedi, both countries said in a statement on Thursday that they would take steps towards “the relocation of the embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem”, AFP news agency reported.

The plan dates back to September 2023, when Tshisekedi met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the United Nations General Assembly in New York.

In 2020, the DRC president announced plans to appoint an ambassador to Israel after two decades and establish an economic section of the embassy in Jerusalem while the embassy remained in Tel Aviv.

The relationship has since expanded. Israeli President Isaac Herzog visited the DRC capital, Kinshasa, in November. Tshisekedi has spoken warmly about Israel for years, saying his support is driven by his Christian faith. He has also been eager for support from the United States, which has increasingly pressured Rwanda over armed rebel advances in the DRC.

Why does the embassy move matter?

The announcement comes weeks after Colombia’s new hard-right president, Abelardo de la Espriella, also announced that he would move his country’s embassy to Jerusalem, a sharp shift from his leftist predecessor who criticised Israel over its genocidal war on Gaza.

The United States moved its embassy to Jerusalem in 2018 during President Donald Trump’s first term. Fiji, Guatemala, Honduras, Papua New Guinea and Paraguay have followed.

Kosovo and Somaliland, which are not UN member states, also maintain missions they consider embassies in the city.

Most countries that have diplomatic relations with Israel keep their embassies in the Tel Aviv area, maintaining that Jerusalem’s final status should be determined through negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians.

Israel considers the entire city its capital and has encouraged foreign governments to establish embassies there. Palestinians want occupied East Jerusalem to serve as the capital of a future Palestinian state.

The UN Security Council has rejected measures seeking to alter the status of Jerusalem and has called on countries not to establish diplomatic missions there.

As many as 20 million children in 21 countries have experienced online sexual abuse or exploitation each year, according to new findings from the United Nations children’s agency, UNICEF.

More than one in five children aged 12 to 17 in countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Eastern Europe have been targeted on digital platforms, according to the UNICEF report released on Thursday.

Researchers surveyed 21,000 children aged 12 to 17 who used the internet across 21 countries between 2020 and 2021, and then again between 2024 and 2025. They also conducted in-depth interviews with 100 young people who have experienced childhood abuse.

Social media facilitated more than half of the abuse cases, according to UNICEF, which cautioned that figures could be inaccurate due to underreporting by children. Less than 1 per cent of all abusive incidents were reported to authorities, the researchers found.

Last week, US social media giant Meta agreed to a landmark $18bn settlement in a major US federal case accusing the company of endangering children. Meta has faced an avalanche of legal cases this year, most arguing that it has deliberately designed its platforms to be addictive and that they have harmed children. The company has now agreed to make major changes to the features of its social media platforms.

What are the key findings of the UNICEF report?

The report estimated that in the periods studied, more than 15 million children were exposed to unwanted sexual content, nine million were asked to engage in sexual conversations or share sexual images against their will, and four million children had sexual images of themselves shared without their consent.

UNICEF said the issue is compounded by the fact that children often don’t recognise abuse or know who to report it to, and fear repercussions if they do. Formal systems can feel distant, complex or intimidating, the report noted.

“The report reveals a painful reality. More than 20 million children across the countries studied were subjected to unwanted explicit sexual content or exploitation online, often in the digital spaces where they learn, play, and connect with friends,” said UNICEF Executive Director Catherine Russell. “These experiences cause profound emotional and mental distress. Many children suffer in silence, unsure where to turn for help. We cannot look away.”

Where was data collected?

Information for the report was based on nationally representative survey data collected between 2020 and 2025 from approximately 21,000 internet-using children from the following countries:

• Eastern and South Africa: Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania and Uganda 
• Southeast Asia: Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam
• Latin America and the Caribbean: Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic and Mexico 
• Eastern Europe: Armenia, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia
• South Asia: Pakistan

Where are children being abused?

Abuse often begins in public spaces, such as in schools or local neighbourhoods, before moving to digital spaces which can further facilitate harm.

Social media and messaging platforms enable different stages of abuse, “including initial contact, relationship-building, sexual solicitation, image-sharing, coercion, blackmail and the continued circulation of sexual content”, the report said.

Sometimes abuse takes place solely online.

According to the report’s findings, more than 60 percent of cases occurred on social media platforms, with the majority on Facebook (50 percent), WhatsApp (29 percent), Instagram (24 percent), SnapChat (13 percent) and TikTok (12 percent).

Do children report abuse?

Most children do not seek help if they are being abused. Less than one percent of cases are reported to the police, a social worker or a helpline, while more than four in 10 cases not being disclosed to anyone at all.

“Children are not failing to report; they have correctly worked out that there is nowhere to report to,” Nighat Dad, executive director of the Pakistan-based Digital Rights Foundation, told Al Jazeera.

Dad, whose NGO works to provide safe online spaces in Pakistan, noted that incidents repeatedly occur online because of a “design problem – the message request, the move to a private chat, the reshare, the ability to return after being blocked”.

Many children minimise their experiences or do not recognise when they’ve been abused, she said.

Even when children do speak out, to a close friend, sibling, or parent, doing so may not necessarily stop the abuse or bring perpetrators to account.

UNICEF emphasised that its research interviews were the first time many of the children it interviewed had spoken to someone about the abuse they were subjected to.

Dad also cautioned that Pakistan, for example, is a “low-disclosure country” where notions of family “honour” and other cultural barriers prevent children from disclosing the harm they’ve experienced.

“A girl who speaks risks her phone, her schooling and sometimes her safety, and a boy is expected to cope in silence,” Dad said.

How does gender factor into online abuse?

Perpetrators often play on gender norms when exploiting children. Stigma and blame are used against girls to keep them silent, while boys are expected to cope alone, or threatened by perpetrators.

“Peer cultures and harmful norms around gender or masculinity can further normalise behaviours that cause significant harm, making abuse harder to recognise and address,” UNICEF noted.

What kind of impact does online sexual abuse have on children?

The repercussions are severe, UNICEF said: Children exposed to technology-facilitated sexual abuse and exploitation are four times more likely to have suicidal thoughts and to self-harm, along with higher levels of anxiety.

In Mexico or North Macedonia, for example, the risk of suicidal thoughts or behaviours was more than eight times higher among children who experienced abuse, while in Pakistan the risk of self-harm was more than seven times higher than average, the report found.

Abuse extends well beyond the digital sphere, seeping into children’s everyday lives, schooling and relationships.

What should be done about this?

UNICEF said the onus to protect children online must be placed on governments and technology companies, which must change how online spaces are designed and regulated.

It also highlighted that while children often take steps to protect each other, societies, schools and families must work to shift the burden of protection away from children.

Citing Meta’s recent settlement, Dad acknowledged that design changes, such as better age verification and parental controls, can and should happen.

“For years those of us working outside the US were told these defaults would break the product. Meta has now shown the product can change.”

A spokesperson for Meta told Al Jazeera, “This report is based on surveys from as far back as 2020, before we introduced the protections UNICEF recommends, like automatically defaulting teens into private accounts and preventing adults from messaging teens they’re not connected to.

“While the report doesn’t provide any specific evidence of abuse, we’ll continue to fight child exploitation aggressively across our apps and support law enforcement in prosecuting the criminals behind it.”

The spokesperson also pointed out that Meta-owned WhatsApp is a private messaging service rather than a social media platform. “We don’t have algorithms that make a piece of content more or less likely to be viewed, and you need someone’s phone number or exact username to connect with them for the first time.”

Snapchat and TikTok have not responded to requests for comment for Al Jazeera.

Carlos Queiroz quit the job after leading Ghana to the World Cup Round of 32 but has returned for an interim period.

Carlos Queiroz has been reappointed Ghana coach for an indeterminate period, two months after stepping down in the wake of the country’s FIFA World Cup campaign.

The Ghana Football Association (GFA) said on Wednesday the 73-year-old Portuguese coach would “embark on a new coaching mandate, commencing with the upcoming international window”.

“The GFA believes Queiroz’s extensive international experience, technical expertise, and knowledge of the Black Stars position him strongly to lead the team into this next chapter,” the association said in a statement.

The experienced former Iran, Portugal, Colombia and Egypt coach guided the Black Stars to the round of 32 at the World Cup despite having only a couple of months to prepare them for the tournament.

Ghana were left without a coach 72 days before the World Cup kickoff ‌‌after parting company with Otto Addo following friendly defeats by Austria and Germany in March.

Ghana are scheduled to play home and away group matches against Ivory Coast in qualifying for the 2027 Africa Cup of Nations during the next international window, which runs from September 21 to October 6.

Queiroz led Portugal to the round of 16 at the 2010 ⁠⁠⁠⁠World Cup and later coached Iran in the last three ⁠⁠⁠⁠editions of the tournament, ⁠⁠⁠⁠recording three wins in 13 matches.

Born in Mozambique, the former goalkeeper has also held coaching positions with Egypt, Japan, ‌‌‌‌Colombia and South Africa, and previously led Portugal in the early 1990s.

Spain faces unrest as residents protest, while migrants and asylum seekers search for shelter and resources in Ceuta.

Thousands of protesters have rallied across Spain against the ongoing migrant crisis in Ceuta, a small Spanish territory on the African coast.

Roughly 50,000 people gathered in Madrid alone on Wednesday. In Ceuta itself, residents draped Spanish and city flags over their shoulders.

“Expel the invaders” and “Ceuta is not for sale, Ceuta must be defended” were among the crowd’s chants.

The protests fell on Ceuta Day, a local holiday that marks the Portuguese takeover of the North African city in the 15th century.

They also come a little more than a month after more than 70,000 migrants and asylum seekers crossed en masse from Morocco into Ceuta on July 30 and 31. The deadly surge killed at least 80 people.

While many of the arrivals have returned to Africa, some remain. Estimates vary as to how many. The Spanish government places the figure at about 5,000 people, including 1,200 minors, but local statistics have a higher count.

Among those who remain stranded in the Spanish territory is Otman Ianaya, 40. He swam to Ceuta with his wife and two young daughters, searching for better prospects.

“There is no work in Morocco,” he told the news agency AFP. “I want to build a future in my life.”

Some migrants and asylum seekers sleep on Ceuta’s beaches. The Spanish government has worked to expand emergency housing and increase funds to social services, but critics have blasted the effort as inadequate to answer the needs of so many people.

The strain has sparked isolated instances of violence, including fights, the stoning of a military patrol and reports of sexual assault.

Residents in Ceuta have also clashed with police and burned items belonging to migrants and asylum seekers, in protest of the influx of people.

“The situation has been chaotic, so much so that you can’t go out onto the street,” said Gema Guillen, a protester.

The July incident has also underscored political schisms.

Ceuta’s regional leader, Juan Jesus Vivas, represents Spain’s conservative Popular Party and has called the crisis a “violation of Spain’s territorial integrity”.

Meanwhile, Spain’s territorial policy minister, Angel Victor Torres, has accused the conservative and far-right opposition of exploiting the crisis “to attack the government of Spain” instead of helping the city.

Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez has blamed the surge on a misread court ruling and online disinformation that he said encouraged people to cross the border.

He also said negative coverage of the crisis has since been amplified by Russian and Israeli-linked accounts, though he did not offer proof, instead citing findings from Spain’s intelligence community.

Madrid has pledged 309 million euros ($357m) in aid for Ceuta.

Amid the standoff, while some migrants are looking for economic opportunities, others are seeking asylum to escape alleged persecution back home.

“They are people in a vulnerable situation; we need to have a little bit of empathy,” said Halima Ahmed of Luna Blanca, a nongovernmental organisation that distributes food and aid to migrants and asylum seekers.

“People are tired, people are fed up… but that does not justify any type of violence,” she added.

Tunis, Tunisia – More than 15 years after Tunisians rose up to topple longtime President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, familiar grievances are again being heard on the streets from north to south.

A slogan from the 2011 revolution is being heard again: “employment, freedom and national dignity”.

This time, those demands are being fuelled by water cuts, electricity outages, rising prices, medicine shortages and a struggle to make ends meet, problems increasingly affecting Tunisians across social and economic divides.

But the anger is unfolding in a very different political environment.

The discontent comes as Tunisia marks five years since President Kais Saied suspended parliament, dismissed the government and began ruling by decree, moves he described as necessary to end years of political paralysis and corruption.

Many Tunisians welcomed the move at the time, frustrated with a political system that had failed to address the country’s economic problems after the 2011 revolution.

Five years later, many of those grievances remain while the political space for challenging those in power has narrowed sharply.

Old demands, new anger

The decade that followed Ben Ali’s ouster brought competitive elections and greater space for political parties and civil society, but it also brought frequent government changes, political disputes and little improvement in the lives of many Tunisians.

Unemployment remained high, particularly among young people and in the country’s interior. Public services remained weak while rising prices continued to put pressure on household incomes. By the end of 2020, unemployment stood at 17.4 percent, according to the World Bank.

Tunisia also faced serious security threats, including attacks and political assassinations, adding to economic pressures and hitting sectors such as tourism.

Those frustrations helped Saied build support as an outsider promising to break with the traditional political establishment and what many Tunisians saw as a dysfunctional system.

On July 25, 2021, Saied suspended the Assembly of the Representatives of the People, dismissed Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi and lifted parliamentary immunity. He said he was acting to address a national crisis.

His opponents described the move as a coup.

Saied later dissolved parliament and oversaw the adoption of a new constitution in 2022 that significantly strengthened presidential powers.

Since then, opposition figures, journalists, lawyers and activists have been jailed or prosecuted in cases that rights groups describe as politically motivated. Civil society has faced increasing restrictions while critics have said institutional checks on presidential power have been weakened. Human Rights Watch, for example, has described the “conspiracy case” as part of a broader crackdown on dissent.

What is the “conspiracy case”?

The case centres on allegations by Tunisian authorities that opposition politicians, lawyers, activists and other public figures were involved in a conspiracy against state security and sought to destabilise the country and undermine the government. The defendants included figures from different parts of the political spectrum.

In April 2025, a Tunis court sentenced 37 defendants to prison terms ranging from four to 66 years. Human Rights Watch described the case as politically motivated and criticised the trial for failing to provide adequate due-process protections.

On November 27, 2025, a Tunis appeals court upheld convictions against 34 of the 37 defendants, sentencing them to between five and 45 years in prison, and acquitted three.

Human Rights Watch and other rights groups continued to criticise the proceedings and describe the case as part of a wider crackdown on dissent.

The authorities reject those accusations and maintain that the defendants were prosecuted for serious offences against state security.

But the political transformation has yet to produce the economic turnaround Saied promised.

Unfulfilled promises

Many of Tunisia’s economic problems predate Saied. Years of underinvestment, financial pressures and ageing infrastructure have left public utilities and other state services struggling to meet demand.

But those failures have become harder to separate from Saied’s record because he came to power promising that a stronger state could overcome the weaknesses of the old political system.

This summer, temperatures approached 50 degrees Celsius (122 degrees Fahrenheit) in parts of Tunisia, pushing electricity demand to record levels. Kairouan reached 49.8C (121.6F) on Thursday, according to the Tunisian Observatory for Weather and Climate. The Tunisian Company of Electricity and Gas introduced rotating power cuts in several regions, and the outages affected water-pumping stations in some areas.

Some people reported going days without running water. Bottled water shortages added to the pressure. Long queues formed outside shops and water trucks delivering supplies to some areas.

For Rebh, a 40-year-old cleaner from Tunis, the demands are not about luxuries but about being able to afford and access the basics of everyday life.

“People are tired. They are choosing to cross the sea and die [trying to reach Europe] instead. I hope we can stand together and find a solution now,” she told Al Jazeera. “We are not asking for the impossible. This is about water and electricity. We want to live as humans. We are feeling dead while we’re still alive.”

For many Tunisians, the shortages are part of a broader squeeze on purchasing power that has made it increasingly difficult to afford basic necessities.

The extreme heat has also put pressure on an already strained health system as doctors warned of increased pressure on emergency departments.

The point, however, is not that Saied created Tunisia’s economic problems. He did not.

The question is whether the more centralised system he built has delivered the more effective government he promised.

A shrinking space for dissent

For journalist Manel Derbali, the change has been visible not only in the media but in the wider public space.

After the 2011 revolution, she said, Tunisians gained a new ability to speak openly and access information. Despite the protests and political turmoil of the period, journalists felt they were not alone in challenging those in power.

“After years of censorship and police repression, everything opened up. The journalist felt that the street was with you in one way or another,” Derbali said.

She said journalists also had channels to raise concerns about their working conditions and make proposals to officials, including through parliament and ministries, while access to decision-makers remained possible.

“After July 25, all of these spaces became closed,” she said.

Derbali said journalists now struggle to obtain even basic responses from government institutions with official bodies sometimes leaving requests unanswered for months.

“Unfortunately, history is repeating itself, and we have returned to relying on citizens’ videos to investigate and verify information,” she said.

Her account reflects a broader concern among critics of Saied that the institutions and public spaces that emerged after the revolution have been steadily weakened.

Could economic anger become political?

The current protests are not limited to Tunisia’s traditional opposition.

The Nafas movement, which has organised recent demonstrations in Tunis, seeks to bring together political parties and independent figures beyond the country’s established opposition to Saied. Its protests have also attracted citizens who had not previously taken part in political demonstrations.

Rabii Qassem, a member of the Nafas collective, said comparisons between the past five years and the decade after the revolution should not be reduced to whether Tunisia was simply better or worse before Saied.

“I’m not saying that Tunisia between 2011 and 2021 was paradise,” he said. “There were very serious crises: unemployment, corruption, economic fragility, political conflicts and a failure to achieve a large part of the revolution’s goals.”

But according to Qassem, that period also brought gains, including greater freedom of expression and protest, a stronger civil society, a more diverse media and elections that allowed for peaceful transfers of power.

“After July 25, the economic and social problems that already existed were not solved,” he said. “They were joined by a decline in political checks and balances, freedoms and the space for civil society.”

For Qassem, many of the demands raised in 2011 remain unresolved.

“Where is employment? Where is the water? Where are the public services? Where is the dignity?” he asked.

He said economic hardship and political repression have been increasingly feeding into each other as people struggling with rising prices and deteriorating services have also found fewer avenues to express their frustration.

That does not mean Tunisia is experiencing another 2011.

Many Tunisians remain wary of the political parties and politicians who dominated the decade after Ben Ali while Saied continues to have supporters who blame that period for years of economic stagnation and political instability.

Nor does every person angry about a water cut, electricity outage or rising price necessarily oppose the president.

But the protests show how economic and political grievances can increasingly overlap.

Before 2021, Tunisians could blame a democratic political system they saw as ineffective for failing to improve their lives.

After 2021, Saied dismantled much of that system and promised that a stronger presidency would deliver better government.

Five years later, many of the same grievances remain.

The difference is that the avenues for challenging them have become narrower.

“Employment, freedom and national dignity” was a demand of the revolution that ended Ben Ali’s rule.

Fifteen years later, Tunisians are again asking for jobs, basic services and greater freedoms – but now from a president who came to power promising to address the failures of the system that followed the revolution.

Niger’s military government has contained an attempted mutiny in the capital, but the uprising has exposed tensions inside an army struggling to contain persistent attacks by armed groups.

It has also highlighted the changing nature of Niger’s security partnerships, with Russian personnel helping government forces contain the unrest.

The mutiny began on Saturday at Base 101, a military installation at Diori Hamani International Airport in Niamey, before fighting spread to other sensitive sites, including areas near the presidential palace and the state broadcaster.

Niger’s army said it regained control of the base after hours of fighting. State media reported that dozens of soldiers were killed or arrested, although Reuters said it could not independently verify the figures.

Russia’s Africa Corps was involved in the government’s response.

Russia’s ambassador to Niger, Viktor Voropaev, said Nigerien authorities requested the force’s assistance to neutralise the mutineers. The Associated Press reported that Africa Corps provided ground and aerial support to forces loyal to the government.

The intervention is significant because Russian forces were helping Niger’s military government confront an armed challenge from within its own military.

What happened in Niamey?

The unrest began with a hostage situation at the military base, according to the Associated Press. Soldiers took fellow servicemen hostage before opening fire and attacking what Niger’s Defence Ministry described as “sensitive” sites in the capital.

Gunfire and explosions were heard around the airport, while the state broadcaster was temporarily taken off air. The presidential palace was also targeted, according to Reuters and Al Jazeera.

Government forces eventually regained control of Base 101, while the Presidential Guard remained loyal to General Abdourahamane Tiani, who seized power in a July 2023 coup.

The precise size and leadership of the mutiny remain unclear. Nigerien state media said hundreds of soldiers were involved, but Reuters said it could not independently verify that figure.

Some of those involved were reportedly from areas including Ouallam, Tera and Dosso in southwestern Niger, where the army has suffered heavy losses fighting armed groups.

The uprising appears to be the most serious internal challenge to Tiani’s rule since he came to power.

Why are Niger’s soldiers under pressure?

The precise motives of the mutineers have not been publicly established.

But analysts and security sources have linked the unrest to frustration over worsening insecurity and heavy military losses.

Niger’s army has been fighting groups affiliated with al-Qaeda and ISIL (ISIS), particularly in the country’s west.

Reuters reported that an attack by an ISIL affiliate earlier this month killed 18 Nigerien soldiers. The airport complex where Base 101 is located was also attacked earlier this year, including in January by an ISIL affiliate and in June by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), al-Qaeda’s Sahel affiliate.

The mutiny therefore came against the backdrop of the same security crisis that helped bring the military government to power.

Tiani and other officers who seized power in 2023 accused the elected government of failing to contain armed groups and promised to restore security. But the threat has persisted.

The unrest raises questions about the pressure facing front-line units as Nigerien forces continue to suffer casualties in their fight against armed groups.

Why did Africa Corps intervene?

Africa Corps is a Russian force operating under the Ministry of Defence that took over much of the Wagner Group’s role in Africa after Moscow reorganised its operations following the death of Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin in 2023.

The force includes former Wagner personnel and operates under Russian state control.

Africa Corps personnel are stationed at Base 101, according to AP, which reported that the force has between 200 and 300 personnel in Niger.

Voropaev said Niger had requested Russian assistance during the mutiny.

AP reported that Africa Corps provided ground and aerial support after forces loyal to the government struggled to regain control of the base.

The episode does not establish that Russia controls Niger’s armed forces.

But it demonstrates that when Niger’s military government faced an armed challenge from within its own military, it was able to call on Russian forces already operating inside the country.

That underscores how significantly Niger’s post-coup security arrangements have changed.

What does Russia gain from Niger?

Niger’s relationship with Russia has deepened since the 2023 coup.

The military government pushed French forces out of the country, while United States forces later withdrew. Niger also joined Mali and Burkina Faso in forming the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), as the three military-led governments moved away from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Moscow has cultivated closer military ties with all three governments.

Africa Corps is part of that wider security relationship, taking over much of Wagner’s former role while operating under Russian state control.

Its intervention in Niamey gives that partnership a new dimension.

Russia was not simply helping Niger fight armed groups. Its personnel were involved in helping the government respond to an armed challenge from within the military itself.

Whether that translates into greater Russian political influence over the military government remains unclear.

What role did Algeria play?

Russia was not the only foreign actor to support Niger during the crisis.

Niger’s presidential office said Algeria provided military assistance. Reuters reported that Algeria sent four fighter jets, a transport aircraft and a refuelling tanker.

The Alliance of Sahel States also backed Niger’s military government, while Turkiye expressed solidarity and called for restraint.

It was not immediately clear whether Mali or Burkina Faso provided direct military assistance. Their political support should therefore not be presented as evidence that their forces participated in suppressing the mutiny.

What does this mean for France and the UK?

The crisis highlights the reversal of Western military influence in Niger.

France had a major military presence in the country as part of its wider counterinsurgency campaign in the Sahel, but French forces withdrew after relations with the military government collapsed following the 2023 coup.

The US subsequently withdrew its forces from Base 101 and Niger’s other military installations.

Niger has since moved closer to Russia and strengthened its ties with Mali and Burkina Faso.

There has been no confirmed new French or British military response to this specific mutiny in the latest reporting.

France’s relevance is therefore primarily its withdrawal from Niger and the resulting shift in the country’s security partnerships. The United Kingdom had a much smaller military role in Niger than France.

Can Russia solve Niger’s security problem?

Africa Corps may have helped the military government contain the immediate threat, but its intervention does not resolve Niger’s wider security crisis.

Armed groups linked to al-Qaeda and ISIL remain active, while Nigerien soldiers continue to face heavy losses.

Tiani came to power promising greater security and sovereignty. Yet three years later, the armed-group threat persists, and soldiers have mounted an internal challenge to the government.

Russia can provide personnel and operational support. But there is no evidence from this episode that the Africa Corps can by itself resolve the insecurity driving Niger’s conflict or the pressures facing its military.

The immediate challenge to Tiani has been contained.

But the episode exposes a difficult contradiction for Niger’s military government: it seized power promising to make the country more secure, yet it continues to face a serious rebellion while confronting unrest within the armed forces.

For Russia, meanwhile, the crisis demonstrates the practical value of its growing security relationship with Niger.

When the government faced an internal military crisis, Africa Corps was already on the ground.

That does not mean Russia has replaced Niger’s own armed forces.

But it shows how far Niger’s security architecture has shifted since the 2023 coup, from one heavily reliant on Western partners to one in which Russian forces now have a visible supporting role.

Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova told a briefing held on August 20, 2026, that “a substantial package of intergovernmental documents and commercial contracts is planned to be signed during the Russia-Africa summit, scheduled for late October.” Given the “mutual interest in stepping up our trade and investment cooperation, we plan to focus the agenda of the upcoming summit meeting on economic matters,” she said.

There, the attendees can discuss in substance a wide range of matters, including boosting Russian-African ties in agriculture, healthcare, education, and scientific-technical and cultural cooperation. “We expect to sign a substantial package of interstate documents and commercial contracts during the event. Well, and we also note, of course, with satisfaction, our partners’ considerable interest in the forthcoming event. Many African capitals have already confirmed their attendance and declared their intention to send representative delegations to Moscow, including heads of state entities and businessmen, of course,” Zakharova explained.

“We have a huge potential in this sphere, which has not yet been fully realized, as everyone admits. Key priorities have also been determined: to cooperate on peaceful uses of nuclear power; to develop independent payment systems, food security, and digitalization, including the adoption of artificial intelligence,” Zakharova underlined.

It is time to face rising realities and the balance of investment power in this 21st century. Whether Russia colonized Africa or never colonized Africa, the most convincing and essential factor is Africa simply has to work with the world’s players. Africa should collaborate with potential foreign investors with adequate funds, in practical terms, ready to invest in its development as exemplified by China. And there is still a growing sense of analytical debates over Russia’s policy approach, though. Ultimately, at least three fundamental assumptions, or appropriately primary principles, can be described as follows:

*Russia’s forthcoming October 2026 The Russia-Africa summit is framed as a chance to consolidate dozens of prior agreements and shift toward concrete economic cooperation in trade, investment, nuclear energy, food security, digitalization, and independent payment systems, yet critics note that rhetoric and signed MoUs have so far produced limited tangible results on the ground.

*Despite historical Soviet-era goodwill and frequent high-level visits, Russia remains a marginal player in African infrastructure, industry, and agriculture compared with China, the EU, and the United States; many announced projects have stalled, financing instruments are weak, and younger Africans see little contemporary economic impact beyond anti-Western messaging.

*Experts and African partners urge Moscow to move beyond nostalgia for past assistance, deliver on existing pledges with real capital and project execution, leverage platforms such as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), and engage Africa’s large youth and middle-class markets if it wishes to convert political alignment into sustained, mutually beneficial economic partnership.

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) provides a unique and valuable platform for businesses to access an integrated African market of over 1.4 billion people. The growing middle class, estimated at 380 (twice the aggregate of Russia’s population), among other factors, constitutes huge market potential in Africa. The African continent, currently, has enormous potential as a huge market, which some experts often refer to as the last business market frontier. Nevertheless, Africa’s trade with the European Union stands at $400 billion, and with China, almost $300 billion. And based on military equipment and weapons and agricultural products such as ice cream, chicken meat, fertilizers, and grain exports, Russia quoted a bilateral trade figure as $27 billion in June 2026.

The world is, increasingly, becoming multipolar. Therefore, Africa’s strength has to be directed at continental development and entrepreneurship, not at building solidarity for geopolitical games. Many African countries are enacting economic reforms; demand is growing for high-quality, competitive products. Russian businesses are interested in this niche, but Russian operators are extremely slow. The ‘snail-pace approach’ reflects their inability to determine financial instruments for supporting trade with Africa and corporate investments in Africa.

There is some level of optimism for a change, though. Russia plans to hold the next Russia-Africa summit in late October 2026. And Sergey Lavrov, minister of foreign affairs of the Russian Federation, indicated in an explicit message mid-July that “in these difficult and crucial times, the strategic partnership with Africa has become a priority of Russia’s foreign policy. Russia highly appreciates the readiness of Africans to further step up economic cooperation.”

At a meeting of the ministry’s collegium, Lavrov strongly suggested the necessity of borrowing a chapter on policy approaches and methods adopted by China in Africa. In fact, Lavrov’s suggestion exposes the inability to play catch-up and, most significantly, Russia’s financial fragility. Lavrov also said, “It is in the interests of our peoples to work together to preserve and expand mutually beneficial trade and investment ties under these new conditions. It is important to facilitate the mutual access of Russian and African economic operators to each other’s markets and encourage their participation in large-scale infrastructure projects. The signed agreements and the results will be consolidated at the forthcoming Russia-Africa summit.”

During the past years, there have been several meetings of various bilateral intergovernmental commissions both in Moscow and in Africa. The first Sochi summit discussed broadly the priorities and further identified opportunities for collaboration. There were 92 agreements signed in Sochi, which totaled RUB 1.004 trillion (equivalent to $12.5 bn), and approximately 240 agreements during the African Leaders Summit held in St. Petersburg, according to official documents. It, however, requires understanding the specific tasks and emerging challenges. The current tasks should concretely focus on taking practical and collaborative actions leading to goal-driven results. Notwithstanding the lapses, Lavrov hopes “the signed agreements and the results will be consolidated at the forthcoming Russia-Africa summit.”

Accentuating the importance of multilateral cooperation between Russia and Africa, Advisor to the President of the Russian Federation Anton Kobyakov said, “The current situation in the world is such that we are witnesses to the formation of new centers of economic growth in Africa. Competition for African markets is growing, accordingly. There is no doubt that Russia’s non-commodity exporters will benefit from cooperating with Africa on manufacturing, technologies, finances, trade, and investment.”

Kobyakov pointed to modern Russia, which already has experience of successful cooperation with African countries under its belt, as ready to make an offer to the African continent that will secure a mutually beneficial partnership and the joint realization of decades of painstaking work carried out by several generations of Soviet and Russian people.

The Soviet Union was quite extensively engaged in Africa, comparatively. Historical documents show that after the Soviet collapse, there were approximately 380 mega-projects across Africa. In the early 1990s, Russia exited, closed a number of diplomatic offices, and abandoned all these, and now there are hardly any signs of Soviet-era infrastructure projects across Africa. And now post-Soviet relations are interestingly engulfed in extensive geopolitics; Russia has only engaged in trading anti-Western slogans on the continent, which also threatens the African Union’s steps to consolidate African unity. 

In addition, Russia has only been criticizing other foreign players during the past two decades without showing any of its own template model of building relationships directed at transforming Africa’s economy. Moreover, Russian officials have underestimated the fact that Russia’s overall economic engagement is largely staggering; various business agreements signed are still not fulfilled with many African countries. Its foreign policy goal is simply to sustain the passion for declarations, signing several MoUs and bilateral agreements with African countries. Grappling with reality, there are equally many investment challenges, including official bureaucracy and the governance system in Africa.

Despite this policy rhetoric and attractive summit outlines, Russia still plays very little role, particularly in Africa’s infrastructure, agriculture, and industry. Investing in agriculture to ensure food security and investing in industry to add value to raw materials in the continent. While, given its global status, it ought to be active in Africa with noticeable corporate investments, similar to policy models of Western Europe, the European Union, the United States, and China, it is all but absent, consistently engages in geopolitical symbolism and rhetoric, and plays a negligible role, according to Professor Gerrit Olivier at the Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria, and former South African Ambassador to the Russian Federation.

Now at the crossroads, it could be meandering and longer than expected to make the mark. If existing challenges, obstacles, and impediments are not addressed, Russia’s return journey could take another generation to reach its destination, Africa. If not at the crossroad, then possibly at the periphery of Africa. With the current rapidly changing geopolitical world, Russia has to redefine and reassess policy parameters and adopt a more strategic approach, working with absolute consistency within the principle of finding common solutions to Africa’s development expectations and consolidating its economic sovereignty.

*This is part of the forthcoming book: Putin’s African Dream: Emerging Challenges and Opportunities (Third e-handbook).

Ten months after a coup, military leaders say the referendum is designed to stabilise future civilian governments.

Ballot counting is under way in a referendum in Guinea-Bissau that could significantly boost the presidency’s power.

Citizens of the West African nation took to the polls on Sunday to vote on a new constitution that would reform the country’s political system ahead of elections later this year.

Turnout “exceeded” 55 percent and the poll took place “without any incidents that would call into question the credibility of the vote”, Idrissa Djalo, executive secretary of the National Electoral Commission, told a news briefing on Sunday.

Results are expected on Tuesday.

The referendum comes less than 10 months after the military seized power in a coup.

The military government says it seeks to stabilise institutions before presidential and parliamentary elections, scheduled for December 6, designed to hand power back to a civilian government.

The new constitution, which citizens were asked to approve on Sunday, would switch Guinea-Bissau’s political system from a parliamentary to a presidential one.

It would abandon the system by which prime ministers came from the parliamentary majority, an approach that has led to uncomfortable power-sharing.

The new system would also allow the head of state to appoint and dismiss the prime minister and members of the government, and to dissolve parliament.

On Sunday, voters answered “yes” or “no” to the question: “Do you agree with the entry into force of the new constitution approved by the National Transitional Council?”

“What we want after this referendum is to allow whoever wins the elections to see out their mandate without hindrance,” military leader and transitional President General Horta Inta-A Na Man said.

Under the transitional charter he upholds, Inta-A Na Man is barred from running in elections.

The referendum follows years of political instability. In the November 2025 presidential election, both candidates declared victory and accused each other of electoral interference. The coup happened one day after.

Afghan national granted protection in the US is one of dozens of people deported to the war-torn Central African Republic.

The administration of United States President Donald Trump has deported dozens of people to the Central African Republic, including an Afghan whose family members collaborated with the US military, his lawyer and advocacy groups said.

The Afghan man, who is in his early 20s, was granted protection against deportation to Afghanistan by a US judge due to fears of persecution by the Taliban, his lawyer, Alma David, said.

Advocacy organisations AfghanEvac, a US-based group that assists Afghan allies, the American Civil Liberties Union, and Human Rights First also confirmed his deportation.

His family in Afghanistan had received threats from the Taliban, which governs the country, because of his brothers’ involvement in supporting the US military, according to court documents seen by The Associated Press news agency.

One of the Afghan man’s brothers lives in the US and served in the Afghan National Army, which collaborated with the US military before the Taliban seized power in 2021, David said.

Another brother was a pilot trained by the US and later killed by the Taliban, she added.

According to The New York Times, which identified the Afghan man only as Khalil, his sister and father also worked alongside US forces.

The deportation flight landed in the Central African Republic’s capital, Bangui, on Saturday, carrying 12 Afghans and eight Iranians, as well as several people from Nepal and Nicaragua, said Savi Arvey, director of policy, refugee and immigrant rights at Human Rights First.

It was the third deportation flight from the US to the Central African Republic this year, according to the rights organisation.

Under a series of often quietly struck agreements, the Trump administration has sent thousands of people to third countries where they have no ties as it pushes ahead with an immigration crackdown.

The latest US State Department Travel Advisory warns citizens not to travel to the African country for any reason, citing risks of unrest, crime, kidnapping, health, and “terrorism”.

Nquthu, South Africa – When Zwelibi Jack Ngubane died at the age of 105, he had already made one thing clear to his family: he wanted to be buried as a Muslim.

Hundreds of family and community members gathered for his funeral in Nquthu, a rural part of northern KwaZulu-Natal where Christianity and traditional African beliefs are dominant and Muslims are a tiny minority. Ngubane had converted to Islam late in life after observing the faith of his young grandson.

When he died, his family honoured his wishes. His funeral was conducted according to Muslim burial rites before he was laid to rest in the family burial plot in his village. For a community largely unfamiliar with Islamic burial practices, the funeral was a novelty.

But it wasn’t a controversy. That distinction has become increasingly important in South Africa.

In recent months, anti-Muslim rhetoric has become more visible online, intersecting with a heated national debate about immigration and anti-migrant movements. Posts have accused Muslims of attempting to take over South Africa, questioned their belonging in the country and accused Muslim organisations of using charity and poverty to convert Black South Africans to Islam.

One social media post complained that humanitarian organisation Gift of the Givers had been “getting on our nerves with their insistence on pushing their Muslim beliefs in South Africa”. Another claimed: “Most foreigners in South Africa are Muslim and if you look most countries experiencing war are Muslim countries not Christian ones.” Others have accused Muslims of “targeting poverty-stricken communities and converting them to Islam”.

But in the rolling hills and villages of Nquthu, the picture is different.

For Samukelisiwe Ngubane, her first encounters with Muslims came through Indian shopkeepers in a nearby town. “We have never had a problem. Some people are curious about what they [Muslims] do, but there have been no problems,” she told Al Jazeera.

When her brother, Khethukuthula Dlame, converted to Islam in 2012 as a teenager, it was hardly an issue. Dlame, now 26 and one of only a handful of Muslims known in his village, is familiar enough to his neighbours that his Islamic clothing is a source of teasing rather than hostility. One neighbour jokes that he wears a dress.

“In these communities, there’s harmony and respect. People really respect my religion,” he told Al Jazeera, standing alongside his grandfather’s gravesite.

The contrast raises a question: is South Africa experiencing a rise in Islamophobia, or is social media making a marginal phenomenon appear much larger than it is?

Muslims make up a small minority in South Africa. The country’s 2022 census counted less than one million Muslims, or approximately 1.6 percent of the population. South African Muslim leaders give higher estimates, with some putting the country’s Muslim population at between two million and five million people.

But Islam’s presence in South Africa stretches back centuries. Muslims came to the Cape through several routes, including enslavement and political exile, from parts of Asia and the Indian Ocean world under Dutch colonial rule from the 17th century. Muslims were already present at the Cape before the arrival in 1694 of Shaykh Yusuf of Macassar, a Muslim scholar and political exile.

Today, the community includes descendants of enslaved Muslims brought to the Cape centuries ago, South Africans of Indian ancestry whose families have lived in the country for generations, Black African Muslims, converts and more recent migrants.

Dlame believes attempts to mobilise people against Muslims are not primarily emerging from rural communities.

“The move to orchestrated hate towards Muslims is not at a community level. If you’re looking at people when they’re mobilising, it’s not people from the villages. It is people in cities and in hostels.”

“The people behind this understand the flash points. If you really want to cause divisions, you use tribal rhetoric and the people you mobilise and agitate are in hostels because the living conditions are not good.”

South Africa has repeatedly experienced outbreaks of xenophobic violence since the end of apartheid, with migrants from elsewhere on the African continent often bearing the brunt. The question is whether some of that anti-migrant rhetoric is also being directed at Muslims.

‘No widespread Islamophobia’

Thembisa Fakude, a South African political analyst and journalist who is Muslim, told Al Jazeera that fears of widespread Islamophobia are being overstated.

“I’ll argue that there is no widespread or any orchestrated, well-planned Islamophobia directed towards Muslims. We don’t have that.”

He acknowledges anti-Muslim rhetoric online, but argues that it should not automatically be interpreted as evidence that South African society itself has become Islamophobic.

“It’s true, but it’s not only South Africa. This is global … In South Africa, yes, it’s true. You find that there will always be bigots, you know, and others will be, you know, ultra-Zulu nationalist or ultra-nationalist.”

Fakude also argues that Muslim communities need to confront allegations of racism and exploitative labour practices within their own ranks rather than characterising every criticism as religious prejudice.

“It is a storm in a teacup. And I think what’s concerning me is this othering by Muslims wanting to position themselves as victims and taking this course by themselves. It’s extremely dangerous.”

What starts online does not always stay there

Muslim religious leader Moulana Sulaiman Ravat told Al Jazeera that, while ordinary South Africans are largely not Islamophobic, he is more cautious about what could happen next.

“At the same time, I think on the ground, South Africans in the main are not Islamophobic, and there’s a variety of indicators to substantiate that.”

But Ravat warns that online rhetoric can influence attitudes over time.

“I don’t think we can go to the other extreme. We must understand that there are certain global political realities, and the Islamophobia project aligns with those global agendas. And therefore, if we become complacent or nonchalant about it, what people are exposed to online could start impacting their psyche and how they think.”

Ravat argues that Muslim identity is sometimes being presented as evidence that a person is somehow less South African. For him, the premise is false.

“I would think I would say they are deeply religious and deeply patriotic, and there is no contradiction between the two.”

His own children, he said, are fifth-generation South African Muslims of Indian heritage.

“They don’t speak the language any more. They are as South African as anyone else.”

Two South Africas?

Back in Nquthu, Islam does not arrive through a social media algorithm. It arrives through a neighbour, where Dlame’s mother cooks a halal meal for this reporter and other guests. Earlier, at a community meeting, Dlame explained that Muslims, too, believe that Jesus was a prophet of God. Ordinary villagers listened attentively and joined in Zulu melodies in praise of God.

For now, the distance between the online conversation and life in communities such as Nquthu remains significant. But Ravat says that does not mean the possibility of deeper hostility should be dismissed.

“Better be proactive than reactive. It’s a global reality. It has been for the last 20 years. And the fact that it could increase in South Africa and could have serious consequences, you could argue, is unlikely but not impossible.”

Somali authorities say 14 pirates were killed in the 10-day operation to free a Cameroon-flagged cargo vessel.

Turkish and Somali forces have freed a cargo ship held captive by pirates off the coast of Somalia’s semi-autonomous Puntland state, according to authorities.

In a statement on X on Saturday, the Somali Ministry of Defence said that “14 pirates” died in the operation to free the Cameroon-flagged MV Latuf.

Four of their boats were also destroyed, it said.

The Defence Ministry said that “sustained pressure from the forces ultimately compelled the remaining pirates to abandon the vessel”, allowing the forces to take control of the ship.

The rescue operation was conducted under a defence cooperation agreement between Somalia and Turkiye, aimed at strengthening maritime security, protecting Somalia’s coastline and combating piracy, it said.

The Somali Defence Ministry did not provide details about any casualties or the wellbeing of the ship’s crew.

A local elder, Abdullahi Warsame, from the Jiifle community in the Godob Jiraan district of Puntland’s Nugal region, told The Associated Press news agency that the vessel and its crew had been freed.

The MV Latuf left the Turkish Port of Tekirdag in late July. It was hijacked on August 17 in waters off the coast of the Nugal region of Puntland, a semi-autonomous federal state in northeastern Somalia.

According to the Marine Traffic website, the cargo ship has continued its voyage to its reported destination in Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania.

Piracy was rampant off the coast of Somalia in the 2000s, peaking in 2011, before being curbed by international naval deployments and new protection measures for commercial shipping.

But attacks have surged since April, with at least 15 attacks off the coast of Somalia this year, the highest since 2013, according to figures from the International Maritime Organization. At least five cargo ships have been held hostage, the last of which was seized on August 20 off the coast of Yemen.