Confirmed cases have reached 3,532, the DRC Ministry of Communication and Media said in a statement on Friday. The data show that the current outbreak has surpassed the country’s 10th on record, which ran from August 2018 to June 2020 and saw roughly 3,470 cases recorded.
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“It’s the fastest spreading Ebola epidemic that we have ever seen,” Carl Skau, acting head of the United Nations World Food Programme, told the Reuters news agency. “The world needs to pay much more attention.”
A total of 1,556 people have died from the virus, bringing the case fatality rate to 44.1 percent, data compiled by the Ministry of Public Health showed.
A reported 807 patients remain in isolation or hospital while 626 have recovered.
Less than three months since the outbreak began, the disease has killed five times as many people as previous outbreaks had by the same stage, according to Africa’s top public health agency, the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC).
The latest figures indicated that only the 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak in West Africa was bigger with 28,616 cases and 11,310 deaths recorded across Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, according to the World Health Organization (WHO).
The DRC outbreak is caused by the rare Bundibugyo strain of the Ebola virus, which has no approved vaccine or treatment.
Medical personnel are also battling a lack of security and attacks on health facilities across the eastern DRC, where dozens of armed groups operate, while contending with significant foreign aid cuts that have stretched resources.
A lack of trust in authorities and education among the population is also creating hurdles to bringing the outbreak under control.
Angele Gapio, head of emergencies for the Caritas charity in the northeastern city of Bunia, said awareness campaigns were failing and front-line responders were exhausted.
“The disease has now settled in the community,” she told the Reuters news agency. “People continue to seek treatment from traditional healers, and the chain of transmission continues.”
The WHO said this month that the true scale of the outbreak could be up to four times higher than official figures suggest.
The Africa CDC said in June that it would require $1.4bn to contain the outbreak, three times its earlier estimate.
The virus has affected five provinces across the DRC: Haut-Uele, Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu and Tshopo.
There’s still no vaccine for the Bundibugyo strain of the virus as the country struggles for control in infected areas.
Published On 30 Jul 202630 Jul 2026
The Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has killed more than 1,500 people, as the spread of the virus continues to outpace response efforts, new statistics have revealed.
DRC has now recorded 3,442 cases of the virus and 1,521 deaths, a government update said on Thursday. The data marks a 50 percent increase in the death toll over the past week, with authorities continuing to struggle to rein in the outbreak in the east of the country, where decades of conflict with rebel groups have left government control and infrastructure lax or absent.
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The Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) said that the sharp rise since last week partly reflects a backlog of cases and deaths that had not yet been confirmed or recorded.
The lack of a proven vaccine for Bundibugyo, which is the rarest of the four variants of Ebola known to affect humans, and the fact the epidemic is unfolding in an area of active hostilities between armed groups, producing a shortage of public health resources, has helped to allow the virus to spread “like wildfire”, a public health consultant who helped establish Africa CDC told Al Jazeera earlier this month.
Africa CDC added that delays in contact tracing, difficulties accessing affected areas, and mistrust from communities have hindered an effective response.
The outbreak is mostly concentrated in eastern Congo’s remote Ituri province, which accounts for nearly 90 percent of cases, but five other provinces have confirmed cases, including one of the country’s largest cities, Kisangani.
Neighbouring Uganda declared itself free of Ebola on Tuesday following the discharge of the country’s last patient in mid-June.
Africa CDC Director-General Dr Jean Kaseya said 63 percent of confirmed deaths in the last two weeks occurred outside treatment centres.
This is largely due to the “unsafe handling of infected bodies” by residents, including touching the remains of the deceased, whose bodies remain highly infectious.
Earlier this month, some healthcare workers in Ituri went on strike over unpaid wages and unsafe working conditions, which has also impeded efforts to hold back the disease’s rapid spread.
In Ituri’s Nyakunde health zone, international partners supporting the Ebola response had to temporarily relocate after a July 15 attack on a hospital and a treatment centre, prompted by a patient’s death. Officials said this disrupted surveillance, contact tracing and supplies.
Despite the accelerated death toll in DRC, the World Health Organization has said the risk of a global spread remains low because Ebola does not travel through the air, making it much harder to spread than respiratory viruses.
Cases detected outside the DRC have so far been quickly identified and contained without leading to sustained transmission, the agency said.
Citizen vigilantes patrol Ghana’s streets, fighting an opioid crisis. We meet those taking the law into their own hands.
Ghana is facing an opioid addiction crisis, with a flood of cheap, synthetic drugs destroying lives and communities. In the northern city of Tamale, a group of civilians, frustrated by what they see as the inaction of local authorities, are taking the law into their own hands. The ‘anti-drug task force’ patrols the streets, seeking out dealers and users and meting out its own brand of justice. Some government officials condemn the vigilantes, while others embrace them as a useful tool in the fight against illegal drugs. As word spreads about the success of Tamale’s task force, some question whether civilians can properly replace state services – and warn about the dangers of vigilante justice.
South Africa defender Olwethu Makhanya has become Rangers’ eighth summer signing, joining for an undisclosed fee from Philadelphia Union.
The 22-year-old centre-back played for the Major League Soccer side 53 times after breaking into the first team last year.
He has signed a four-year deal at Ibrox with the option of a further year.
“I can’t even explain how I am feeling right now, it is honestly a big honour and a huge blessing for me to join such a big club with so much history. I can’t wait to get started,” Makhanya said.
“For me, it has always been a dream to play football in Europe, ever since I was a kid, so to be here is a dream come true.”
Makhanya, who started his career with Stellenbosch in his homeland, was rewarded for his impressive club form by being included in South Africa’s 2026 World Cup squad.
The defender did not play at this summer’s finals, but Rangers boss Derek McInnes feels he has all the tools to thrive in Scotland.
“He’s got a lot of athleticism and good potential,” McInnes said prior to his side’s Scottish Premiership opener at Dundee United on Friday.
“And while he’s coming from the MLS, to a different country and a different type of football, we feel he’s got the attributes that can cope with that.”
Kizza Besigye, who faces treason charges, is reported to be ‘unconscious’ in hospital after collapsing in court.
Published On 30 Jul 202630 Jul 2026
Detained Ugandan opposition leader Kizza Besigye has been hospitalised in an unresponsive state after he collapsed during a court hearing on Wednesday, according to his wife.
Besigye, who has been in prison since late 2024 on treason charges, is now “unconscious, unable to speak, and unresponsive”, his wife, Winnie Byanyima, said in a post on X on Thursday.
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He has been admitted to the intensive care unit at Mulago National Referral Hospital in the capital, Kampala, added Winnie Byanyima, who also heads the United Nations AIDS programme UNAIDS.
Byanyima has called for her husband to be transferred out of Mulago hospital, a public facility, and into a private facility where he can be treated by his personal physician.
“[Besigye’s] family is saying he needs special treatment and they do not trust the government hospital,” reported Al Jazeera’s Catherine Soi from Nairobi in neighbouring Kenya.
“There’s a lot of frustration. The court has not granted that permission for him to be transferred.”
‘Not responding to anything’
Besigye, 70, was seen falling into the dock during his Wednesday courtroom session while protesting against his trial without lawyers of his own choosing, after authorities also detained and charged his main lawyer, Erias Lukwago.
“Before he collapsed, he cried out that he was being injured,” said Byanyima.
Ingrid Turinawe, a close confidant of Besigye, told The Associated Press that she and others were not allowed to see Besigye at Mulago hospital.
“He is in the ICU, and he is not responding to anything,” she said, adding that Besigye’s personal physician was able to see him several hours after he collapsed.
Besigye, a former ally-turned-critic of longtime President Yoweri Museveni, has been in custody since November 2024. He was jailed together with his aide Obeid Lutale in Kenya and both were repatriated to Uganda where they were subsequently charged with treason.
Besigye’s lawyers, supporters and rights activists say that the charges are politically motivated and that his prolonged detention is part of an ongoing crackdown on opponents by Museveni.
Both Museveni and his son, military chief Muhoozi Kainerugaba, have already weighed in against Besigye.
Kainerugaba, alleging that Besigye plotted to kill his father, has previously described the opposition figure as “a dead man walking”. And Museveni himself has said Besigye must answer for “the very serious offences he is alleged to have been planning”.
In recent days, prosecutors have moved to present evidence they say will prove Besigye and others plotted to overthrow the government
Museveni, 81, was declared winner of the last election in January although the results were rejected by runner-up Bobi Wine, who has since gone into exile in the United States.
Jibia, Katsina State, Nigeria – Safiya Musa’s sewing machine has given her something violence had taken away: a way to provide for her children.
But the livelihood she built after losing her husband and two of her children has left her facing a painful choice: whether to return home or risk losing the fragile independence she has created after being forced to flee.
Safiya cannot remember which month it was, only that it was 2023, when armed bandits raided the town of Kankara in Katsina State, where she and her husband had built their life after moving from their hometown of Batsari. Kankara is a small rural community where farms sit close to homes, and her husband worked as a farmer and foodstuffs trader. They lived there with their two youngest children, Umar (4) and Maryam (6), while their three older children, Sani (12), Hajara (10) and Zubaida (8), were staying with relatives in Batsari.
The attackers had come to kidnap the town head, but the attempt failed. As gunfire spread through the community, Safiya locked herself inside her room while Umar and Maryam were outside playing with other children. Her husband had left for the farm when the attack happened. The bandits killed about 20 people as they left the town.
Three days later, after she had learned that her husband had also been killed during the attack, she fled to Batsari, where she was reunited with Sani, Hajara and Zubaida. When another bandit attack reached Batsari, she fled again with her three surviving children – now aged (15), (13) and (11) – to Jibia, where they eventually settled in a camp for displaced people.
She still remembers the night she lost much of her family.
“Minutes later, silence overwhelmed the atmosphere,” she recalled. “Then I started thinking about my husband, who had left for the farm, and my children, who were outside playing with other kids.”
The thought of them pushed her out of hiding.
But she was too late.
“They were all killed,” she told Al Jazeera.
Safiya’s experience reflects a wider crisis affecting communities across northwest Nigeria. For more than a decade, the region has faced attacks, kidnappings and village raids by armed groups commonly called bandits.
The violence has forced thousands of families from their homes, disrupted farming and trade, and left many people struggling to rebuild their lives.
Katsina State, which borders Niger, has been among the areas hardest hit.
After arriving in Jibia, Safiya survived by taking whatever work she could find. She ground grain for local residents and relied on temporary jobs to support her children.
She was then selected for a handbag-making training programme organised by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) through its Climate Security Project.
The initiative provides women affected by conflict with vocational training and equipment to help them start small businesses.
Months later, the programme gave her a source of income. The work brought stability, but it also created a new uncertainty: whether she could continue the business if she returned home.
“The essence is to give them an opportunity to become self-reliant,” said Muhammad Hamisu, the project coordinator in Jibia.
A skill that changed her circumstances
After completing the training, Safiya turned handbag-making into a source of income for her family.
With sewing materials and new skills, she began cutting fabric, stitching designs and producing handbags she could sell to support her children.
The work did not erase the pain of what she had lost, but it gave her something she had struggled to regain since fleeing: the ability to provide for herself.
“I used to wake up with nothing to offer my children,” she said. “There were days I sent my boys out with bowls to beg for food because I had nothing to give them. Now I can feed them myself.”
In March 2024, the Climate Security Project trained 20 women in Jibia in handbag production and provided sewing machines and materials to help them begin working.
Jibia’s location near the border with Niger also gives traders access to cross-border markets, including those in the Maradi region, one of Niger’s major commercial areas.
For some women, the business has become an important source of income.
“I make approximately $50 a month,” said 30-year-old Karima Sule, who has lived in Jibia since fleeing violence four years ago. “When demand is high, I earn even more. I help my husband and pay the school fees for my two older children from this business.”
A business shaped by insecurity
But building a business in a conflict-affected area remains difficult.
Safiya said her biggest challenge is finding enough money to buy materials.
“Sometimes I run out of stock and don’t have the funds to buy more,” she said. “When that happens, I lose customers.”
Karima said violence continues to affect sales.
“Whenever violence happens, market activities slow down for days,” she said. “People stop buying, and we lose income.”
Their growing economic activity may also expose them to new risks, according to Abdussamad Ahmad Yusuf, a human security researcher at HumAngle, a Nigerian newsroom that reports on conflict.
“Kidnapping for ransom in that region is becoming more targeted,” he said. “Authorities should conduct regular conflict and security risk assessments to identify high-risk trading routes, markets and emerging threats before expanding commercial activities.”
The Katsina government established the Community Watch Corps in 2023, a local security initiative that uses community members to gather intelligence and support responses to attacks.
Officials said security has improved in some communities, but many families who fled violence remain uncertain about returning home.
An uncertain future
Safiya hopes to return home one day and reunite her children with their relatives.
But the livelihood she has built in Jibia has become a reason to hesitate.
The handbag business has allowed her to buy food, support her children and depend less on unstable work. Leaving it behind could mean losing the independence she has worked hard to build.
She has been told that conditions in her hometown are improving, but she remains unsure whether she could rebuild the same source of income there.
For Safiya, returning home is not only about finding safety again. It is also about whether she can continue providing for her family.
“I want to go back home because my children need their relatives,” she said. “But I am afraid of losing this business. If I cannot continue it there, how will we survive?”
Football’s world governing body announces plans to sell stakes of up to 20 percent in the World Cup and other events.
Published On 29 Jul 202629 Jul 2026
FIFA has proposed a plan to sell stakes in the World Cup and other events to private investors, provoking a furious response from the European football governing body, UEFA.
Under the plans announced by FIFA on Tuesday, a $20bn subsidiary would be created to run the World Cup and other events.
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World football’s governing body said it would retain a majority share in the new FIFA Forward Enterprise, offering minority stakes to external investment to raise up to $4.2bn.
The plan still needs to be voted on by FIFA’s 211 member nations.
If successful, the proposed investor group is expected to be led by a vehicle founded by Joshua Kushner, the brother of US President Donald Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, FIFA said.
UEFA said the proposal “crosses a line that football’s governing institutions should never cross”.
Reinvested in the game
FIFA has just held a 48-team World Cup across the United States, Canada and Mexico – the biggest in the tournament’s history.
It is one of the world’s wealthiest sporting organisations, generating billions of dollars, largely from broadcasting rights, sponsorship and other commercial deals linked to the World Cup.
But it says this proposal can increase funds to widen access to the sport and strengthen global participation, with all net benefits to be reinvested in football.
“Football is the world’s most popular sport,” FIFA President Gianni Infantino said in a statement.
“Parts of the game have turned that popularity into remarkable commercial value – and we celebrate that success and want it to continue, because it lifts the whole game.
“Our job is to make sure the rest of football grows with it: FIFA exists to support sustainable, inclusive development in every corner of the world.”
FIFA said that in addition to retaining sole control of the subsidiary, it would retain authority over football governance, competitions, match calendars and regulatory and sporting decisions.
‘World Cup is not a product’
The proposal deepens the divide between FIFA and UEFA, with Europe positioning itself as football’s custodian, while FIFA, a not-for-profit organisation, says it is focused on broadening access with financial largesse.
In a statement, UEFA said it takes the new proposals “extremely seriously”.
“So should every National Football Association. So should every stakeholder: leagues, clubs, players, supporters, governments and everyone who cares about the future of the game.
“The soul and governance of football are not assets to trade – especially with zero transparency as to who gains financially. None of us are the owners of football. It is not FIFA’s to sell.”
The United Kingdom’s new prime minister, Andy Burnham, joined critics, saying on social media that the sport does not belong to investors.
“The World Cup is not a product. It is the greatest competition in world sport, and it was never anyone’s to sell,” Burnham wrote on X.
“Dress the deal up however you like. Once you have sold a piece of it, you have sold out.”
Health minister urges people in the country ‘to remain alert’ and continue observing public health measures.
Published On 28 Jul 202628 Jul 2026
Authorities in Uganda have declared the country free of Ebola, as infections from the viral haemorrhagic disease continue to surge in neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).
Ugandan Health Minister Chris Baryomunsi on Tuesday announced the “successful completion of the mandatory 42-day monitoring period which begun after the discharge of the last Ugandan national, a locally transmitted patient, on the 16 of June, 2026”.
“Throughout this period the Ministry of Health maintained intensive surveillance nationwide, and no new Ebola cases have been detected,” Baryomunsi said.
In a later statement on social media, Baryomunsi urged Ugandans “to remain alert” and continue observing public health measures.
Of the 20 confirmed cases, 18 were discharged while two died from the viral haemorrhagic disease, both of whom were from the DRC, where a much larger outbreak has been under way since mid-May.
According to the Congolese Ministry of Health, there have been at least 3,262 infections in the DRC, with 1,437 people killed. This is nearly the same as the 2018-2020 outbreak that is the largest ever recorded in the country.
The World Health Organization says the latest Ebola outbreak is the fastest spreading ever recorded, and that its true scale could be two to four times larger than reported data.
The virus strain spreading in the DRC is Bundibugyo, which is the rarest of the four variants of Ebola known to affect humans and currently has no approved vaccines or treatments.
Ebola is a viral haemorrhagic disease that can cause fever, vomiting, diarrhoea and internal bleeding. It spreads through direct contact with the bodily fluids of people who are sick with the virus or who have died from it.
Months after the United Nations Security Council backed a comprehensive framework to end Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza, Israel’s security cabinet has approved a highly constrained pilot project to allow foreign security forces into a narrow pocket of the devastated territory.
Israeli media reported on Sunday that the so-called International Stabilization Force (ISF), part of United States President Donald Trump’s 20-point “peace plan”, will include 200 members from countries such as Morocco and Uganda deploying to a designated “test” zone in the southern city of Rafah.
While international officials have welcomed the move, analysts describe the limited deployment as a calculated diplomatic gesture with little practical effect that comes as the US-backed peace process has largely stalled and as Israel’s deadly attacks continue.
Instead of a genuine transition towards peace, they argue, the move is a political manoeuvre designed to deflect US pressure ahead of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to Washington this week, while simultaneously entrenching the geographic fragmentation of the Gaza Strip.
“Netanyahu is going to Washington to say ‘no’ to the broader demands of withdrawal” from the Strip, says Wissam Afifa, a Gaza-based political analyst. “Instead, he is offering this alternative: ‘Take this small appetiser, take this minor achievement, and play within this highly restricted space.’”
Scaled-back forces and ‘rubber batons’
The Israeli daily Haaretz reported that the original plan anticipated the deployment of 500 Moroccan troops to a refugee camp in the city. The drastic reduction to just 200 troops may indicate that Israel’s political-security cabinet has decided to divide the deployment into even smaller, heavily controlled stages.
The force will operate in full coordination with the Israeli military. According to the Israeli news outlet Ynet, National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir was the sole cabinet member to vote against the measure, arguing that the Palestinian group Hamas had failed to fulfill its commitment to disarm and insisting that “the solution in Gaza is to encourage migration”.
Israeli media also reported that the government maintains that the Israeli military will retain control of the “Yellow Line” – a unilaterally imposed boundary that effectively places up to 70 percent of the Gaza Strip under tight Israeli control – and that no withdrawal will take place until Hamas has fully disarmed.
The original framework endorsed by UNSC Resolution 2803 called for the deployment of an international force alongside a transitional Palestinian administration.
Earlier this month, Hamas announced it would dissolve its government in Gaza and hand over power to a new, Palestinian technocratic governing authority called the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG).
Analysts said Hamas’s move was likely designed to apply pressure on Israel and demonstrate the group’s commitment to handing over governance and allowing the rebuilding of the territory.
The pilot programme also envisions the NCAG’s entry to oversee civil affairs in Gaza. Yet, according to Haaretz, the Palestinian police accompanying them will be stripped of firearms, permitted to carry only “rubber batons and tasers”.
Meanwhile, preparations on the ground appear to be moving forward to accommodate this new security architecture. Israeli Army Radio recently broadcast a video showing a military base under construction in the southern “Gaza envelope” near the Karem Abu Salem (Kerem Shalom) crossing.
The station reported that the sprawling facility is being built specifically to host the incoming multinational forces before their deployment.
Despite the severe Israeli restrictions, Nickolay Mladenov, the high representative for the Board of Peace, welcomed the Israeli cabinet’s decision, praising it as a “critical part of the agreed framework for stabilizing Gaza, supporting demilitarization, and enabling the transition to effective Palestinian transitional administration”.
A ‘sweetener’ for Washington
To understand the timing and motivation behind the decision, experts pointed to the diplomatic deadlock surrounding the US-brokered peace initiative. Trump’s plan envisioned a phased approach, bridged by the handover of Gaza to a technocratic committee. However, this framework has been stalled by Israel’s refusal to link a ceasefire to the broader political situation and its rejection of a phased withdrawal.
Afifa said the “failure” of the US administration’s flagship initiative had left it “embarrassed” as the project that was repeatedly highlighted by Trump “as a great achievement, resulted in zero”.
With Netanyahu heading to Washington, the Israeli prime minister desperately needed a deliverable, said Afifa. The cabinet’s decision, passed hastily via a telephone vote during a Knesset recess to avoid internal coalition fractures, provides exactly that, he added.
Mamoun Abu Amer, an expert on Israeli affairs, echoed this assessment. He viewed the rushed cabinet vote as an attempt to preempt US pressure and present an image of compliance to Trump, while fundamentally altering the agreement’s core terms to suit Israel’s long-term security strategy.
Abu Amer also said that Israel has effectively turned Resolution 2803 upside down through selective and highly conditional implementation.
“This is an inverted process,” said Abu Amer. The original text implied that the NCAG would enter Gaza, the ISF would deploy and the Israeli military would withdraw to new lines to allow for stabilisation. Instead, Israel is demanding unilateral disarmament first, while keeping the technocratic committee besieged within an Israeli security envelope.
Abu Amer also suggested the requirement for the Palestinian police force to only carry rubber batons and tasers reflects a premeditated Israeli strategy to strip the Palestinian administration of genuine law enforcement capabilities, reducing them to subcontractors managing municipal decay in a thoroughly devastated environment under a strict military occupation.
The NCAG itself appeared to reject this Israeli paradigm. In a recent statement, the committee declared it would only assume responsibility for Gaza after UNSC approval of the force’s deployment and, crucially, a full Israeli military withdrawal.
‘False witnesses’
The spatial realities of the Israeli plan reveal a strategy of deep fragmentation and long-term control, experts said, pointing to the cabinet’s decision to explicitly restrict the ISF and the technocrats to operating strictly outside the “Yellow Line”.
Afifa warned that transforming a small pocket of Rafah into an “experimental bubble” subverts the idea of Gaza as a single, contiguous territorial entity.
“This raises a massive question about the fate of two million people,” he said. “If this entire project is reduced to a few thousand individuals selected under Israeli criteria, it means a tacit agreement from the international community to leave two million Gazans hostage to a catastrophic humanitarian crisis while Israel claims to be implementing a peace plan.”
This also carries significant diplomatic risks for the participating nations. Israeli media reported the cabinet’s decision stipulated that ISF contributors must be nations that have peace agreements with Israel and do not pursue legal actions against it in international forums.
“It is not wise for an Arab country like Morocco to be a party to helping Netanyahu implement his political agenda,” said Abu Amer, urging participating nations to reject the altered Israeli formula and insist on a comprehensive withdrawal.
Failing to do so, he cautioned, would reduce foreign troops to mere security buffers, acting as “false witnesses” to the continuation of the occupation and the destruction of the Palestinian society.
Bamako, Mali – An unprecedented battlefield partnership between a separatist movement and an al-Qaeda affiliate has transformed the conflict in northern Mali, shifting the military balance and deepening divisions over how, if at all, the war can end.
When the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) launched a joint offensive on April 25, 2026, the conflict entered a phase unlike any before.
A war that had long pitted the Malian state against multiple armed groups gave way to a coordinated campaign stretching from Kidal and Anefis to Tilemsi, Gao and Sevare, posing the most serious challenge to the Malian army in years and to Russia’s Africa Corps, the Kremlin-backed force that replaced the Wagner Group in Mali.
Since then, the fighting has been marked by simultaneous assaults, ambushes, drone strikes and attacks on military convoys, with all sides claiming significant battlefield gains.
Bamako says it is working to restore state authority and dismantle what it calls a “terrorist alliance” between the FLA and JNIM.
The FLA says it remains committed to independence for Azawad, the name separatists use for northern Mali, while JNIM portrays the war as part of a campaign to “liberate” Mali and overthrow the government, which it accuses of relying on Russian forces.
More significant than the offensive itself, however, is the unprecedented military cooperation between a nationalist separatist movement and an al-Qaeda affiliate.
Their political ambitions remain fundamentally different, yet their cooperation has already reshaped the conflict and could have far-reaching implications for security across the Sahel.
The partnership emerged after the collapse of the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement, which sought to end years of fighting between Bamako and northern armed groups through greater decentralisation and political representation, but whose implementation repeatedly faltered.
Successive military coups after 2020 reshaped Mali’s political leadership and security strategy. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) suspended Mali and imposed sanctions, while Russia deepened its military role by deploying the Wagner Group in late 2021.
After Russia folded the Wagner Group’s operations into the state-controlled Africa Corps, renewed fighting left neither the government nor northern armed groups able to impose a lasting settlement.
How the alliance took shape
On paper, cooperation between the FLA and JNIM appears unlikely. The FLA traces its roots to northern separatist movements that declared the independence of Azawad during the 2012 rebellion, a claim never recognised by the Malian state or the international community.
Colonel Mohamed Issa, centre, one of the FLA’s most prominent military commanders [Photo: Courtesy of the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA)]
It presents itself as a secular nationalist movement seeking independence for Azawad, while JNIM seeks to overthrow governments it considers illegitimate and establish governance based on its interpretation of Islamic law.
Yet senior officials from both groups told Al Jazeera those ideological differences have been set aside to confront a common enemy.
Colonel Mohamed Issa, a senior FLA officer, said the movement remained committed to an independent Azawad, arguing that previous peace agreements repeatedly collapsed because successive governments in Bamako failed to honour them.
Negotiations, he said, would only be acceptable if they recognised Azawad’s right to separate.
Issa rejected suggestions of an ideological alliance, describing the relationship as a battlefield arrangement against a common enemy.
He said the JNIM-affiliated fighters operating alongside the FLA were exclusively Azawadis rather than members of the group’s wider regional network, arguing they were motivated primarily by defending their communities against the Malian army and what he described as Russian “mercenaries”.
Suleiman, a senior JNIM field commander who requested that only his first name be used for security reasons, described the relationship in broader terms.
He said the group approved operational coordination with the FLA after internal consultations because fighters on both sides largely came from “one people” caught up in the same conflict and because their liberation goals had become “relatively unified”.
He also claimed the FLA had accepted Islamic legal arbitration by local religious scholars, one of JNIM’s core objectives, a point the FLA itself did not raise. Bamako, meanwhile, has described the relationship as a “JNIM/FLA terrorist alliance” that threatens Mali’s sovereignty.
The differing accounts illustrate both the strength and the fragility of the arrangement. For now, shared battlefield interests appear to outweigh ideological differences. Whether that remains true as the conflict evolves is far less certain.
A shifting balance of power
The partnership has altered not only the battlefield but the way the war is fought.
FLA officials say working alongside JNIM has enabled both groups to divide responsibilities and pool expertise in attacks on military bases and supply convoys.
A destroyed vehicle at the site of recent fighting in northern Mali [Photo: Courtesy of the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA)]
Bamako disputes casualty figures released by the armed groups and insists its forces retain the initiative. Even so, the conflict has become markedly more sophisticated, with simultaneous attacks across distant locations, engagements lasting several days and ambushes targeting reinforcements before they reach the front lines.
Drones have assumed an increasingly prominent role, serving not only as reconnaissance platforms but increasingly as strike weapons against vehicles and military positions. Malian forces, backed by Russia’s Africa Corps, continue to rely heavily on air power, yet months of sustained fighting suggest neither side has secured a decisive advantage.
The war economy
Long-established financing and trafficking networks continue to sustain both sides.
JNIM sources describe a funding model built on regional commercial networks, organised zakat collections and resources accumulated over years, including proceeds linked to earlier al-Qaeda kidnapping-for-ransom operations.
The FLA says it relies primarily on donations organised by tribal leaders, traders and community associations.
Officials from both groups also acknowledged that individuals linked to the movements participate in illicit economies, including trafficking across the Sahara, although the extent to which those activities finance the war remains difficult to verify.
Weapons have proved as important as funding. Arms have flowed across the Sahel since the collapse of Libya in 2011, providing armed groups with a steady source of equipment.
The latest fighting has opened another supply channel: weapons and military vehicles captured from Malian forces now form an increasingly important part of both groups’ arsenals.
Can either side win?
There is little to suggest the conflict is nearing an end.
The Malian army retains a clear advantage in air power, backed by Russia’s Africa Corps. Yet the FLA and JNIM continue to mount coordinated operations across much of northern Mali.
An armed man carries a weapon in a desert area of northern Mali, where government forces and armed groups have been fighting for control of territory [Photo: Courtesy of the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA)]
The military standoff reflects a wider political deadlock. Bamako remains committed to preserving Mali’s territorial integrity, the FLA insists on independence for Azawad and JNIM continues to seek the overthrow of the government.
None has shifted position since the latest fighting began, and nothing on the battlefield has yet forced any of them to do so.
Those competing objectives also cast doubt on how long the two groups can continue fighting together. Their partnership rests on a common enemy rather than a shared political vision, making its future uncertain.
A war without an endgame
Three months into the latest offensive, northern Mali remains locked in a conflict with no obvious end in sight. The partnership between the FLA and JNIM has reshaped the military landscape, while Bamako continues to reject any outcome that could weaken Mali’s territorial integrity.
What began as a confrontation between the state and separate armed movements has evolved into a conflict shaped by competing visions of sovereignty, separatism, rule by al-Qaeda-linked armed groups and the involvement of external powers.
Unless those competing ambitions – territorial unity, independence and regime change – are addressed alongside the fighting, a negotiated settlement is likely to remain elusive.
Whatever happens next, the partnership forged in April 2026 has already changed the course of the war in northern Mali. Whether it endures or fractures under the weight of its competing ambitions, it has created a new military and political reality whose consequences are likely to extend well beyond Mali’s borders.
How land conflict, state neglect and racist ideology have driven Darfur towards alleged genocide.
This episode examines how mass violence in Darfur has been constructed over time and why many activists, governments and courts have labelled it genocide, even as that term remains politically contested. It traces how environmental stress, neglect of the peripheries and competition over land fed grievances between communities. It shows how Khartoum armed and mobilised militias, how racialised language framed “Arabs” and “Africans” as enemies and how aerial bombing, burning of villages and mass displacement became tools of policy. Through survivors’ testimony and legal analysis, the film follows the path from counterinsurgency to crimes against humanity and alleged genocide and asks what justice has – and has not – been delivered for Darfur.
Extreme heat and strong winds are fuelling a wave of wildfires across North Africa, with major fires burning in Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Tunisia has called in international firefighting aircraft as crews battle fires threatening forests, farmland and nearby communities.
The 40-year-old goalkeeper made headlines around the world after starring in Cape Verde’s goalless draw with Spain.
By AFP, Reuters and The Associated Press
Published On 26 Jul 202626 Jul 2026
Cape Verde’s heroic World Cup goalkeeper, Vozinha, has reached an agreement to join Chilean club side Colo Colo.
The 40-year-old stopper, who made headlines around the world after starring in a goalless draw with Spain, will travel to Chile for a medical before being unveiled, Colo Colo’s president, Anibal Mosa, announced on Saturday.
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Vozinha became one of the most talked-about players at the World Cup with a string of remarkable saves against top teams, including defending champions Argentina.
The goalkeeper, who left Portuguese second-tier side Chaves before the summer, was voted into FIFA’s fan-selected World Cup dream team.
“Vozinha will be a Colo Colo player. In the coming days, he will travel to Chile, undergo the usual medical examinations and then be presented here at the Estadio Monumental,” Mosa said.
He added that Vozinha’s World Cup performance showed he deserved the move, while acknowledging the signing also carried marketing appeal for the Chilean side.
Colo Colo teased the signing on social media with an image appearing to show the veteran goalkeeper’s trademark curly hair.
Vozinha, whose full name is Josimar Jose Evora Dias, has also become a social media star, with help from Brazilian influencer Casimiro. The goalkeeper’s Instagram following has soared from 50,000 to nearly 30 million.
He also made headlines after revealing that his mother, Ana Candida Evora, was unable to travel to watch her son due to the cost of a bond payment for a visa to enter the US.
Harare, Zimbabwe – Zimbabwe wants to move beyond being a supplier of raw minerals and build industries that process and manufacture from its own resources. But as the government tightens restrictions on unprocessed mineral exports, smaller miners are asking whether they will share in that transformation or be left behind.
The government has restricted exports of unprocessed strategic minerals, including lithium, as part of a broader drive to increase domestic beneficiation. Authorities argue that Zimbabwe should capture more value from its mineral wealth instead of exporting raw materials and allowing other countries to profit from refining and manufacturing.
The policy has attracted more than $1bn in investment into Zimbabwe’s lithium value chain, according to government officials and industry representatives. But smaller miners warn that the cost of building processing facilities, unreliable electricity supplies and limited access to finance could make it difficult for them to participate in the country’s industrial ambitions.
Speaking during a technical media tour of Prospect Lithium Zimbabwe (PLZ) in Goromonzi, Mashonaland East, on 17 July, Minister of Mines and Mining Development Polite Kambamura said Zimbabwe’s 2022 ban on exports of unbeneficiated lithium ore had encouraged companies to invest in domestic beneficiation.
“The construction of the first lithium sulphate plant in Africa is behind me, and this was done in Zimbabwe,” Kambamura said.
He said Zimbabwe’s ambitions extended beyond lithium sulphate and lithium carbonate production, with a long-term goal of developing industries capable of manufacturing lithium batteries and solar panels locally.
Prospect Lithium Zimbabwe, owned by China’s Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt, said its lithium carbonate plant was about 90 percent complete.
PLZ public relations officer Patience Mushore said Huayou’s investments had generated more than $1.1bn in foreign exchange for Zimbabwe while expanding the country’s lithium value chain.
Policy shift
Supporters of Zimbabwe’s export restrictions argue that the country can no longer remain a supplier of raw minerals while other nations capture greater profits through refining and manufacturing.
Public policy expert Tedious Ncube said Zimbabwe’s lithium sector demonstrated why the government had prioritised beneficiation.
Mechanics work on a machine installed at Arcadia Lithium in Goromonzi, Zimbabwe [Tafadzwa Ufumeli/Getty Images]
He pointed to investments at Arcadia Mine and Bikita Minerals as examples of companies expanding Zimbabwe’s lithium sector.
Ncube said domestic processing could create skilled jobs, strengthen local suppliers and allow Zimbabwe to retain a greater share of the income generated from its mineral resources.
“The success of Zimbabwe’s lithium industry shows that the right policy can attract investment that builds industries, creates jobs and leaves a bigger share of mineral wealth in Zimbabwe,” he said.
Mining concerns
For smaller producers, the debate is not whether Zimbabwe should process its minerals locally, but whether they will have the infrastructure, finance, and market access needed to participate.
Shelton Lucas, business development director at Naivo Mining, said the company operates chrome, antimony and tungsten projects in Mashava, Ngezi and Kadoma but faces challenges accessing affordable processing options.
Lucas said smaller producers were struggling to access processing capacity, particularly in the chrome sector.
“For our raw chrome, we are now forced to sell to local Chinese smelters where they underpay us. For antimony, I have the resources to build the value-addition plant, but for chrome I cannot because the plant is very expensive,” he said.
He said he supported domestic processing but warned that smaller miners could be excluded if new requirements were introduced without support mechanisms.
Lucas proposed a toll-smelting system, where public institutions or industry bodies invest in shared processing facilities that miners can access at transparent rates while retaining ownership of their minerals.
“The challenge is not only building processing plants, but also ensuring smaller producers can access capacity on fair terms,” he said.
Without such measures, he warned that a small number of companies could end up controlling processing capacity and market access.
“If these companies also hold export rights, they could dictate prices to small-scale miners, creating what could become a predatory market that undermines the very people the mining sector is meant to empower,” he said.
Economic constraints
Economists say Zimbabwe’s processing ambitions will depend on whether the country can overcome longstanding challenges affecting mining and manufacturing.
United Kingdom-based Zimbabwean economist Chenayi Mutambasere told Al Jazeera that the policy faced obstacles including power shortages, expensive financing, weak transport infrastructure, foreign exchange constraints and limited access to processing technology.
“The ban should be more than a political slogan; it should be an industrial practical strategy,” she said.
A worker oversees operations at Prospect Lithium Zimbabwe’s (PLZ) three-line, single-phase lithium sulphate plant in Goromonzi, Mashonaland East [Enos Denhere/Al Jazeera]
Mutambasere said the government needed to support the policy with reliable electricity, investor incentives, skills development and clear implementation timelines.
She warned that restrictions introduced before the necessary support systems were in place could create unintended consequences.
“An abrupt ban where companies have invested in the sector may push the mining sector further underground, which could increase mineral leakage,” she said.
Government vision
Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Information, Publicity and Broadcasting Services Nick Mangwana told Al Jazeera that the policy was intended to ensure Zimbabwe gains more from its finite mineral resources.
“The government is implementing this beneficiation policy in our minerals for the growth of our economy and to create a lasting legacy that will be witnessed by future generations,” Mangwana said.
He said the policy applied not only to lithium but also to other strategic minerals, including platinum group metals such as palladium, rhodium, ruthenium, iridium and osmium.
Zimbabwe’s push reflects a wider debate among resource-rich countries: whether restricting raw exports can build domestic industries without concentrating opportunities among a few large companies.
For smaller miners, the success of the strategy will depend not only on how much mineral processing takes place inside the country, but whether beneficiation creates broader participation or leaves only the biggest players able to compete.
Lucas said the goal should be to ensure that local processing expands opportunities across the mining sector rather than creating new barriers for smaller producers.
“Beneficiation should not become a barrier to participation. It should be an enabler of inclusive growth, industrial development and sustainable economic transformation,” Lucas said.
Ishan Kishan and Tilak Varma sets up 90-run win over Zimbabwe as India takes 2-0 lead in T20 series.
Published On 25 Jul 202625 Jul 2026
India inflicted another heavy defeat on Zimbabwe when they won the second Twenty20 international at Harare Sports Club by 90 runs to secure their three-match series.
Ishan Kishan scored 81 and Tilak Varma an unbeaten 60 as India amassed a formidable total of 219-5 after being put into bat before dismissing Zimbabwe cheaply for 129 to secure the victory on Saturday.
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Kishan, whose runs came off 44 balls, and Tilak, who took 29 balls to get to 60, accelerated the scoring in the middle overs, taking advantage of bowling that was often too full.
They put on 94 off 44 balls for the fourth wicket before Ishan was caught in the deep mistiming a slog at a wide delivery.
Zimbabwe faced a record run chase and, although opener Brian Bennett offered some early hope, they were always up against it and were dismissed in 17.5 overs.
Bennett played an array of strokes for 32 runs off 19 balls before falling to Yash Thakur, who finished with 2-30 on his T20 international debut.
Once Bennett had been dismissed, there was a steady fall of wickets, with the slow left-arm bowling of Abhishek Sharma producing the best figures of 3-17.
India won the opening match of the three-game series at the Harare Sports Club by seven wickets with 40 balls to spare.
Nairobi, Kenya – The death toll from the latest Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo has surged above 1,309, an extraordinary rise of more than 40 percent in just five days, government figures show, as a leading public health consultant says the virus is “spreading like a wildfire”.
Updated data released by the government on Saturday showed that as of Thursday, the total number of confirmed cases, including deaths, had climbed to 2,973. This was a 27 percent rise from the figure last Saturday.
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The unprecedented rate at which cases are increasing and deaths are mounting has made the DRC epidemic the fastest-spreading Ebola outbreak ever documented.
Compounding the danger, the virus spreading in the DRC is Bundibugyo, which is the rarest of the four variants of Ebola known to affect humans and currently has no approved vaccines or treatments.
Abdulsalami Nasidi, a public health consultant who helped establish the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC), the African Union’s public health agency, told Al Jazeera the lack of a proven vaccine meant the virus was “spreading like a wildfire.”
Nasidi said the epidemic was unfolding in an area of active hostilities, compounding the shortage of public health resources common to African governments confronting outbreaks.
Scientists are racing to find a way to slow the epidemic, and the University of Oxford’s Oxford Vaccine Group said a volunteer had received the first dose of a rapidly developed experimental vaccine on Friday.
“This is an important milestone for the trial, and marks the next phase in our multinational collaborative journey to develop a Bundibugyo ebolavirus vaccine,” said the Oxford team’s chief investigator, Katrina Pollock.
The largest and deadliest Ebola outbreak in history killed more than 11,000 people out of at least 28,000 cases between 2013 and 2016, primarily in West Africa across Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone.
That outbreak took about eight months to reach the first 1,000 deaths. The latest epidemic in the DRC has done so in less than 10 weeks.
“We must act now,” Africa CDC Director-General Jean Kaseya wrote in a post on X last week. “If we do not stop it today, this will become the worst outbreak the world has ever documented.”
Al Jazeera’s Alain Uaykani, reporting from the DRC city of Goma, said the government’s response had lacked coordination and urgency, leaving medical personnel overstretched and working in poor conditions.
He said the death toll among health workers continued to climb on Saturday, with a doctor and a health worker among the latest victims.
More than 100 health workers have been infected since the outbreak was declared in May, and around 35 have died, a toll compounded by shortages of protective equipment and, in some communities, hostility from residents who question whether the disease is real.
An increasing number of healthcare workers at several medical facilities in the northeastern province of Ituri, the epicentre of the outbreak, have gone on strike over unpaid wages and unsafe working conditions.
Last week, dozens of workers at Rwampara General Hospital near Bunia went on strike. The hospital operates a major Ebola treatment centre, parts of which were set ablaze in May by angry residents who also chased after health workers fleeing in trucks.
The latest strike began on Saturday at the Elikya Ebola Treatment Centre in the provincial capital of Bunia. Activities were largely paralysed as doctors, nurses and security staff stopped work.
Approximately 100 workers held a protest outside the centre, saying unpaid bonuses were undermining morale and disrupting patient care.
“We need to be paid, because in the meantime the disease is spreading at the treatment centre,” Martin Bolombi, one of the striking workers, told The Associated Press. “I’ve already had five people die who are still inside there. A solution must be found for us,”
WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus has warned that the true number of cases could be more than double the official count, as insecurity continues to restrict access to affected communities.
Contact tracing now reaches roughly 80 percent of known contacts, he said, but response teams still cannot reach every village or deploy where they are needed most.
The United States and Canada have both restricted entry for travellers who have recently been in the DRC, measures that run counter to the WHO’s own guidance issued in May, when it declared the outbreak a global health emergency.
Tedros has called for a ceasefire in the conflict gripping eastern DRC, arguing that medical resources alone are not enough to tackle the crisis, and political action is needed to open up access for responders before the virus takes hold in provinces not yet affected.
The world claims to regard education as a universal right. Its financial system tells a different story.
New figures released by UNESCO show that 113 countries with a total population of 6.1 billion now spend more on servicing debt than educating their people. In low-income countries, debt payments are nearly four times education expenditure. In 18 of the most heavily indebted countries, governments spend at least five times more on debt than on education.
These are not merely signs of strained public finances. They reveal a stark political hierarchy.
Creditors possess enforceable claims on government revenues. Children possess declarations, development goals and promises. When the two collide, creditors are paid first.
The consequences are visible in overcrowded classrooms, deteriorating school buildings, teacher shortages, unaffordable school fees and children leaving education prematurely. Yet these outcomes are generally described as funding gaps or failures of domestic governance, as though governments had freely decided to neglect their schools.
In reality, many governments are operating inside an international financial order that sharply restricts what they can choose.
The World Bank reports that developing countries transferred $741bn more to external creditors in principal and interest between 2022 and 2024 than they received in new financing. This was the largest net debt outflow in at least 50 years. In 2024 alone, low and middle-income countries paid a record $415bn in interest.
In other words, the financial flows are frequently moving in the opposite direction from the one suggested by the language of development assistance.
Poorer countries are commonly portrayed as beneficiaries of Western generosity. But vast amounts of public wealth are travelling from debtor countries to bondholders, commercial banks, multilateral institutions and wealthier creditor governments.
Money that could hire teachers, provide school meals or build classrooms is instead leaving the country.
This is particularly perverse because education is not simply another item of government consumption. It is an investment in a society’s future capacities. Cutting it may make debt payments easier today, but it will weaken productivity, public revenues and social resilience tomorrow.
Debt contracts are treated as binding obligations whose breach can trigger credit downgrades, capital flight, lawsuits and exclusion from financial markets. The right to education, by contrast, carries no comparable machinery of enforcement.
No ratings agency downgrades creditors when a country cannot afford enough teachers. No financial penalty is imposed on bondholders when debt service forces children out of school. Markets do not panic when classrooms collapse.
The system disciplines governments for failing creditors, not for failing children.
UNESCO has proposed expanding debt-for-education swaps. Under these arrangements, a creditor cancels or restructures part of a country’s debt in exchange for government investment in agreed educational programmes.
Such initiatives can produce tangible gains. A 2023 agreement with France helped Ivory Coast finance more than 30 schools in underserved areas. A German agreement with Egypt supported school feeding and basic services, while an earlier Spain-Peru programme funded education projects across vulnerable regions.
These programmes are worthwhile. But they are not a solution to the larger debt crisis.
Debt swaps typically cover only a small fraction of what countries owe. They are negotiated selectively, depend on creditor consent and may add new layers of external monitoring to domestic spending. Most importantly, they leave untouched the principle that creditors are entitled to repayment unless they voluntarily concede otherwise.
The question becomes how to persuade creditors to permit a little more education, rather than why the claims of creditors should take priority in the first place.
That question is especially urgent because education aid is also falling. UNESCO projects that international assistance for education could decline by as much as 30 percent between 2023 and 2027.
Debtor countries are therefore being squeezed from both sides: aid is retreating while debt payments continue.
The familiar recommendation that developing countries should mobilise more domestic resources is inadequate. Progressive taxation and reduced corruption matter. But additional revenues will not transform education systems if they are immediately diverted towards debts contracted at high interest rates, or made more expensive by currency depreciation.
Nor can the problem be solved by demanding ever more austerity. Education budgets consist largely of recurring expenditure, especially teachers’ salaries. When governments are instructed to freeze public-sector wage bills, they cannot solve teacher shortages or expand access, however often international institutions proclaim education a priority.
A more serious response would begin with large-scale debt cancellation for countries in distress, automatic suspension of payments during economic and climate emergencies, far cheaper concessional financing and a fair multilateral mechanism for restructuring sovereign debt.
At present, debt negotiations are fragmented among private creditors, bilateral lenders and international institutions. Debtor governments must bargain with powerful financial actors while trying to avoid being punished for seeking relief.
A binding United Nations framework for sovereign debt could establish shared rules, require both borrowers and lenders to act responsibly and prevent holdout creditors from obstructing restructuring. It could also make social rights central to assessments of what a country can genuinely afford to repay.
The world needs to move towards the idea that debt repayment cannot come at any human cost. A debt is not sustainable when paying it requires dismantling the institutions on which a society’s future depends.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
The Court of Arbitration for Sport has set a date for a hearing over Senegal’s appeal against being stripped of the 2025 Africa Cup of Nations title.
Hosts Morocco were declared the tournament winners after the Confederation of African Football (Caf) overturned the result of the final in January, which Senegal won 1-0.
The Senegalese players walked off the field after Morocco were awarded a stoppage-time penalty with the match goalless.
Following a delay of about 17 minutes, the players returned and Brahim Diaz’s penalty was saved before Senegal’s Pape Gueye scored an extra-time winner.
Senegal lodged their appeal with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (Cas) on 25 March, seeking to set aside Caf’s decision and reinstate them as tournament winners.
Caf deemed that Senegal had forfeited the final and awarded Morocco a 3-0 victory.
Caf and the Royal Moroccan Football Federation (FRMF) did not agree to expedite the procedure so there will now be a hearing on 8 October.
According to a Cas statement, that follows the standard timeline.
Caf and the FRMF did not request that the hearing is made public so it will take place behind closed doors at the Cas headquarters in Lausanne, Switzerland.
Cas cannot state when a final decision will be announced but it will not be on the day of the hearing.
Senegal given October date by CAS for appeal to regain AFCON title won in chaotic final against Morocco in January.
Published On 24 Jul 202624 Jul 2026
Senegal’s appeal to regain the Africa Cup of Nations (AFCON) title it won in a chaotic final against host nation Morocco in January will be heard at sport’s highest court on October 8.
The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) said on Friday the hearing will be held behind closed doors at its headquarters in Lausanne, with no target date set for a verdict.
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CAS judges can typically take several months to announce their decision.
Preparing the appeal hearing was in process throughout the World Cup, where Morocco reached the quarterfinals and Senegal lost in the round of 32 against Belgium.
Senegal beat Morocco 1-0 after extra time in an extraordinary AFCON final in Rabat. Senegal players walked off the field and delayed play for 15 minutes when Morocco was awarded a stoppage-time penalty kick that was eventually saved.
Morocco was awarded the title several weeks later when appeal judges for the Confederation of African Football ruled Senegal had defaulted the game by leaving the field.
That ruling seemed to ignore the laws of football, which state the referee’s decision on the field of play is final.
Zambians will vote on August 13 in presidential and parliamentary elections, with polls and investors widely expecting President Hakainde Hichilema to defeat a fragmented opposition led by Brian Mundubile.
For investors, however, the central question extends beyond the election outcome. The focus is on whether a second Hichilema administration can transform Zambia’s post-default economic stabilisation into stronger, broad-based growth while maintaining fiscal discipline.
IMF Programme Seen as Key Test
One of the first issues investors will monitor is whether Zambia secures a new programme with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) after its previous $1.7 billion arrangement ended in January.
The earlier programme helped underpin Zambia’s sovereign debt restructuring after the country became Africa’s first pandemic-era sovereign default. Markets now view a successor agreement as an important indicator of policy continuity.
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Investors will closely watch how quickly negotiations conclude and whether any new programme shifts its focus from crisis management toward promoting long-term economic growth while preserving fiscal discipline.
Copper Industry Remains the Economic Backbone
Copper continues to dominate Zambia’s economy, accounting for about 70% of export earnings while serving as a major source of government revenue, foreign investment and employment.
Investors are watching whether planned investments can translate into higher production. Major projects include Vedanta’s return, continued expansion by Barrick Gold, and First Quantum Minerals’ ongoing investments.
The government has maintained that mining tax rates will remain unchanged, providing policy stability. However, investors are paying close attention to a proposed local-content law that would require mining companies to increase domestic procurement to around 40% over the next three to four years from roughly 20% today.
Mining companies have warned that many local suppliers currently lack sufficient financing and technical capacity, potentially creating supply chain challenges during a period of major expansion.
Among the priorities are increasing exploration spending to discover new mines, improving tax collection efficiency, and reforming Zambia’s grain market to reduce the government’s role in purchasing maize harvests.
A record maize crop is expected this year, but analysts warn that government purchases of surplus grain could increase fiscal pressure, particularly alongside election-related spending.
Some forecasts suggest Zambia’s fiscal deficit could exceed official government targets if these pressures continue.
Reliable Power Critical for Mining Expansion
Electricity supply has become another major concern following drought-induced power shortages that exposed Zambia’s heavy dependence on hydropower.
Although investment in solar energy is increasing, investors say expanding copper production will depend on creating a more reliable and diversified electricity system capable of supporting future mining operations.
Election and Climate Risks
While most observers expect a relatively orderly election, monitoring groups have highlighted concerns including alleged voter card confiscation, vote buying and the possibility of localized unrest if results are disputed.
Weather also remains a significant economic risk. Zambia remains highly dependent on rain-fed agriculture and hydropower, leaving the economy vulnerable to future droughts similar to the severe 2023–24 El Niño event that caused widespread crop failures and electricity shortages.
Analysis
The election itself is unlikely to unsettle investors if Hichilema secures the expected victory. Instead, markets will judge whether his government can move beyond economic stabilization toward sustained, private sector-led growth. A new IMF programme, continued mining investment, reforms to agriculture and tax collection, and a more resilient energy sector will be the key indicators of success. While Zambia has made notable progress since its debt default, structural challenges and climate risks continue to test the country’s long-term economic outlook.
The ‘Farmgate’ scandal nearly cost President Cyril Ramaphosa the leadership of his African National Congress in 2022.
Published On 24 Jul 202624 Jul 2026
South African President Cyril Ramaphosa has won a court challenge temporarily halting a parliamentary impeachment process over misconduct allegations linked to the “Farmgate” scandal.
The Western Cape High Court granted Ramaphosa an “interim interdict” that temporarily prevents the impeachment committee from proceeding with public hearings while the president challenges the legality of a 2022 report that found he “may have committed” serious violations and misconduct.
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“Pending the determination by this court of the applicant’s review … respondents are interdicted from proceeding with a public impeachment hearing,” Judge Andre le Grange announced on Friday.
“Farmgate”, a scandal involving half a million dollars stashed in a sofa at Ramaphosa’s ranch, nearly cost the president the leadership of his African National Congress (ANC) in late 2022. Meanwhile, allegations of corruption within the party contributed to the ANC losing its majority in an election in May 2024, the most closely contested vote in South Africa‘s democracy.
Ramaphosa has always denied any wrongdoing and ruled out resigning over the incident since the allegedly undeclared stash of foreign currency came to light after it was reported stolen in 2020.
The president said the $580,000 that was hidden at his luxury Phala Phala farmhouse in the northern Limpopo province was proceeds from the sale of buffaloes. But the episode has been a major embarrassment, raising questions about why he had so much money stuffed in furniture.
Friday’s ruling is a boost for Ramaphosa as he also awaits the outcome of a separate court case challenging an independent panel’s findings that he may have a case to answer over the scandal.
Ramaphosa’s spokesperson Vincent Magwenya said the president respects the ruling.
“[He] reaffirms his respect of judicial independence and separation of powers enshrined in our Constitution,” Magwenya said in a statement. “The president will continue to cooperate with and abide by processes of accountability.”
Political analysts expect Ramaphosa to remain in power, even if the impeachment process does get off the ground and ultimately leads to a vote on whether he should be removed from office.
Ramaphosa still enjoys the backing of his ANC party, the country’s biggest, which leads a coalition government. The ANC holds about 40 percent of seats in the National Assembly. It is not clear how all the ANC’s coalition partners would vote in the impeachment process.
The attacks reflect a surge in violence as armed gangs continue raiding villages in northwest and central Nigeria.
Published On 23 Jul 202623 Jul 2026
At least 20 people have been killed in northwest Nigeria after armed gang members attacked villages in Zamfara State, according to the AFP news agency.
“Today, between 3pm [14:00 GMT] and 4pm [15:00 GMT], a large number of bandits have invaded our communities, targeting all the people they meet,” Nasiru Lauwali, the representative of the Sauna district in the local government zone of Talata Mafara, told AFP on Wednesday.
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The attacks come amid increasing violence in northwest and central Nigeria, where armed gangs or bandits have raided villages in recent weeks. They are accused of stealing livestock and kidnapping residents for ransom.
Late on Tuesday, at least three suspected bandits were killed by security forces in the country’s Kwara State, according to Nigeria’s The Punch news website. The news service said that security forces managed to rescue a businessman, Tuhkur Sanni.
Kidnappings have become common in Nigeria, as armed groups seek large ransoms from the government and citizens.
The situation has been worsened by a security crisis, partly fuelled by the Boko Haram rebellion in the country’s northeast. In 2024, attackers earned more than $1.6m in ransom payments, according to SBM Intelligence.
Dozens of students and teachers were rescued earlier this month, 56 days after they were kidnapped from three schools in the southwestern state of Oyo.
Eight of the suspected kidnappers were arrested and an unspecified number were killed, according to a statement issued by President Bola Tinubu.
Defence Minister Christopher Musa said the suspects planned to use the hostages as leverage to pressure the government to release some of their commanders from prison.