Africa

Gambian authorities have announced that funds from the sale of the country’s former president’s mansion in the United States would be used to pay reparations to victims of his rule.

The Gambia Reparations Commission confirmed Tuesday that it received just more than $2.5m from the sale of a property in the wealthy Washington, DC suburb of Potomac, Maryland, belonging to ex-President Yahya Jammeh.

The commission, which was set up to compensate victims of abuses committed during Jammeh’s 22-year rule ending in 2017, said in a statement that “the funds were deposited directly into the Reparations Fund account at the Central Bank of The Gambia and shall only be utilized for the payment of reparations”.

“The Commission is committed to ensuring that the funds are managed responsibly, transparently and accountably, with due regard to the rights and needs of victims and survivors,” it added.

Jammeh currently lives in Equatorial Guinea, after he was forced out under pressure from The Gambia’s West African neighbours following his 2016 election loss to current President Adama Barrow.

He is accused of presiding over the murder of political opponents, disappearances, rape and torture.

A commission of inquiry estimated that between 240 and 250 victims were killed by Jammeh’s forces in the former British colony of two million people.

Proceeds from corruption

President Barrow said in a statement that his government would heed any recommendations by official auditors on how the funds would be allocated to victims.

The US Justice Department filed a civil forfeiture complaint in 2020 alleging that the property was bought with proceeds of corruption. A court ordered its forfeiture in 2022.

The property, it asserted, was purchased through a trust set up by Jammeh’s wife.

The US Justice Department had announced in September that it would return the funds from the mansion sale to The Gambia.

A 24-year-old man, who was already being held in quarantine, is the latest to test positive, according to the Health Ministry.

⁠Kenya has confirmed ⁠a new Ebola case, bringing the total ‌number of infections in the country to ⁠nine, amid an outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), raising concerns about a regional spread.

A 24-year-old man, who was already being held in quarantine, is the latest to test positive, Kenya’s Ministry of Health said in a statement on Tuesday.

“He was isolated at the first sign of illness, tested and started on treatment immediately upon confirmation of his positive test result,” it said, adding he “was already in quarantine when he fell ill”.

The man was a close family member of Kenya’s first Ebola patient, who had travelled from the DRC, through Uganda and before arriving in Kenya and dying at a Nairobi hospital on ⁠October 5.

“All nine cases belong to one cluster, and as of ‌today there is no evidence of transmission outside this group,” Director-General for Health Patrick Amoth said in a statement on Tuesday.

“Eight patients are stable and responding well to treatment, while 134 of 135 contacts have been traced and quarantined,” Amoth said.

Amoth said a milestone was in sight for the majority of the contacts in quarantine as they had remained well for the 21-day monitoring period and could return home from October 25.

It appealed to communities to welcome them back, saying they “pose no risk of infection”.

The ministry said no infections had occurred within quarantine facilities and that it was continuously monitoring infection-prevention measures to protect health workers.

Despite the nine infections, Kenya has not imposed restrictions on travel, trade or public gatherings, with authorities saying the country remains open for business.

In the DRC, there have been more than 9,000 Ebola cases and 4,000 deaths since May.

The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control says it’s the second-largest epidemic on record.

It has been difficult to contain because there is no licensed vaccine or specific treatment for the Bundibugyo strain of the virus.

The Court of Arbitration for Sport will announce its verdict on the title after it was awarded to Morocco by CAF.

A decision on Senegal’s appeal ‌‌after being stripped of this year’s Africa Cup of Nations title will be made ⁠⁠at the end of ⁠⁠November, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) has confirmed.

“This process will require several weeks, with the CAS Award expected at the end of November 2026,” the court said in a statement on Monday.

Senegal are contesting the decision by the Confederation of African Football (CAF) to declare Morocco champions, despite Senegal beating the hosts ⁠⁠1-0 after extra time in January’s final in Rabat. Their arguments, plus those of Morocco and CAF, were heard by CAS in Lausanne on October 8.

At the time, CAS said ⁠⁠it expected a decision within days but has now decided to issue a complete ruling, including legal grounds, known as a CAS Award.

Senegal walked off the pitch for 14 minutes ‌‌after a penalty was awarded against them late in regulation time, with several players returning to the dressing room in protest before they resumed play.

Morocco missed the spot kick, sending the match into extra time, where Senegal scored the winner to secure victory.

However, they were stripped of the title two months later after CAF’s Appeal Board ruled that Senegal had forfeited the match by walking off the pitch, overturning the result and awarding a 3-0 victory to ⁠⁠Morocco.

Senegal quickly followed with an appeal to CAS, ⁠⁠which was lodged on March 25 but heard some six months later. The basis of their arguments is that the referee’s decision is final and he allowed the match to be completed.

“I know it’s a long wait for the fans, ⁠ ⁠a few months after the final between Senegal and Morocco,” CAS Director General Matthieu Reeb said outside the hearing earlier this month.

“The facts are set, are clear and the discussions will be on some procedural issues and legal aspects,” he added.

The CAS panel is presided over by French sports law expert Gerald Simon, with the assistance of Italian international law ‌‌professor Luigi Fumagalli and Hamburg-based lawyer and professor of law at the University of Zurich, Ulrich Haas.

CAS decisions are called awards and hold the same value as a national court judgement. CAS awards may be enforced by sports federations or state courts, depending on the circumstances.

Mogadishu, Somalia – The fishing town of Bander Beyla, on Somalia’s Puntland coast, has become a focal point of the renewed piracy crisis. But beyond the hijackings and international security operations, residents are struggling to protect their livelihoods as fishing restrictions, arrests and surveillance reshape daily life.

Abdifatah Mohamed has spent 20 years fishing off Somalia’s coast. He began at 15, but says declining catches and foreign trawlers have made it increasingly difficult to support his family.

“I don’t catch as much fish anymore, and the prospects for catching lobsters have become rare,” the 35-year-old said.

“Foreign trawlers are emptying out the seas,” he added.

Somalia’s central government collapsed in 1991, weakening maritime oversight and leaving its waters vulnerable to illegal fishing. Some fishermen, angered by foreign vessels exploiting the country’s resources, have turned to piracy.

“We’re [fishermen] no match for the foreign trawlers, who possess capabilities far greater than us, which impacts the livelihoods of our families on land,” Mohamed said.

He added, “Some from our community have taken up arms at sea, but deep down I know it’s hurting our community.”

Piracy has surged off Somalia since late April 2026. The reported number of hijackings varies according to whether counts include commercial ships, fishing vessels and dhows. Several seized vessels have been held near Bander Beyla, bringing the crisis close to the town’s fishing community.

In late August, local authorities restricted fishermen from going to sea amid concerns that pirates were disguising themselves as fishermen.

“The local authorities gave an order the last week of August preventing us from going out at sea, which would remain in effect for two months,” Mohamed said.

“Our families depend on what we catch at sea. Even though our catches [of fish] have gone down in recent years, it helped provide for our families at home. But it’s like we were being punished for crimes we have nothing to do with, and our families have suffered for it.”

For fishermen, Mohamed said, going to sea has become a risk whether they obey the restrictions or defy them.

“It’s a two-way risk, because if the authorities know you went out to sea, they could accuse you of piracy or even transporting supplies to the ships that were hijacked,” he noted.

“While out at sea, you could face arrest or violence from international navies, and get mistaken for pirates, and taken away to a jail in a foreign land. It’s happened to a lot of men from this town.”

Abdirizak Said, who has fished in Bander Beyla for 15 years, said the crackdown has deepened the hardship faced by residents.

“Dozens have been arrested, most of them after they brought food or khat to the pirates, when the ships were anchored near Bander Bayla,” he said.

“Businesses and stores were even ordered by the [local] government not to sell anything to pirates, and if they do, they’ll be viewed as pirates themselves.”

The networks behind piracy

Some of the people involved in the hijackings come from the same town now bearing the consequences.

“Some of the pirates involved in the hijackings are from Bander Bayla and hail from this community,” Said added.

Jethro Norman, a senior researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), said that piracy cannot be understood solely as a criminal activity at sea. It also depends on networks on land that can provide money, equipment, manpower and protection.

“Kinship networks can effectively function as a form of financial and social infrastructure, and for piracy, this is no different,” he said. “Pirate groups have historically been able to mobilise credit, and get equipment, manpower and protection.”

“In other words, clan relationships can underwrite the practical resources and act of mobilising that make piracy possible. This is precisely why effective counter piracy requires understanding the land-based networks that make those operations possible,” Norman added.

These networks also help explain why efforts to disrupt piracy reach into ordinary commercial life. Said noted that the consequences extend beyond fishing: boats carrying supplies from Yemen to Somalia have stopped arriving, for instance.

“The boats that used to bring supplies from Yemen have also ceased, because of these [pirate] attacks,” he said.

Residents push back

Despite the disruption, Mohamed said that some residents have tried to prevent young men from joining the attacks.

“Recently there was an attempt by local youth with guns trying to go out at sea, but the residents told them not to do it and that they would be harming their community even more,” Mohamed said.

“It was civilians that took the initiative to stop them and not the government because it’s the civilians in this town that will suffer the blowback if they launch attacks from here,” he added.

Two local government officials, speaking anonymously because they were not authorised to talk to the press, confirmed that restrictions had been imposed to weaken the local support networks supplying pirates.

“The security restrictions were lifted on October 1 after successful anti-piracy operations led to the release of three ships,” the first local official said.

The International Maritime Organization confirmed on October 2 that three hijacked vessels, Honour 25, Seamull (also known as Sibu 1) and Eureka, had been freed. It said 44 seafarers were released and reported that five crew members died during the rescue operation involving Honour 25.

The lifting of restrictions has not ended the visible security presence around Bander Beyla, according to the officials.

“Military helicopters flying inland from the sea routinely hover over the town, and these flyovers are more frequent in the nearby remote coastal areas,” one local government official added.

“They’re looking for any movements of armed individuals on the coast,” a second local government official said.

Both officials said the helicopters belonged to the European Union Naval Force, which has conducted counter-piracy operations in the region for years.

Security forces stretched thin

The renewed attacks have emerged amid wider regional instability and competing demands on maritime security forces. Abdinur Abdella, a Somali political and security analyst, said international naval attention shifted after Houthi attacks began in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden in late 2023.

“When Houthis began carrying out attacks in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden in late 2023 in response to the conflict in Gaza, it saw international navies change their focus and efforts to the Houthi threat, which allowed armed groups active on the Somali coast to take advantage of the lax in security,” Abdella said.

Norman said Puntland’s maritime forces have also been diverted by other security challenges.

“The PMPF [Puntland Maritime Police Force] has been stretched thin by its fight against ISIS in the Al-Miskad mountains. It also lost some personnel to the 2023 anti-Somaliland rebellion in Las Anod,” he told Al Jazeera. “Some Dhulbahante fighters from Puntland’s forces, including the PMPF, joined the uprising, which wrested roughly a third of Somaliland’s claimed territory from its control.”

“Again, this links back to the clan dimension, and the strength of kinship ties and obligations as essential to understanding contemporary piracy networks and counter piracy initiatives,” Norman added.

For residents of Bander Beyla, these overlapping security pressures are not abstract geopolitical developments. They determine whether fishermen can work, whether supplies arrive and whether people risk being mistaken for pirates.

Said noted that the presence of aircraft remains a reminder that even after restrictions were lifted, fishermen are still being watched.

“We can hear the sound of aircraft and the louder it gets, the closer they are, so we know they’re watching,” he said. “I just want to make a living without worrying whether I’ll make it back to shore safely.”

Kenyan health authorities say latest patient was likely exposed to the country’s first Ebola case.

Kenyan health authorities say an eighth Ebola case has been detected, bringing the total number of known infections in the East African nation to eight.

Director-General for Health Patrick Amoth told Kenya’s Citizen TV that of the 38 people tested on Sunday, one had returned a positive result.

“He is a 49-year-old man who is not a healthcare worker. He developed fever, headache and muscle pain,” he said.

Amoth said the man, who worked as a patient attendant cleaning utensils and linens, was likely exposed to Kenya’s first Ebola case, discovered earlier this month.

He developed symptoms on Saturday, was quarantined and tested for the virus, a Ministry of Health source said.

The ministry reported four new cases on Saturday, three of whom were health workers who treated the country’s first Ebola patient, a man who travelled from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to Nairobi and died at a Nairobi hospital on October 5.

In a post on X, the ministry said the fourth person was related to the deceased patient.

Kenya has been on heightened alert, as the Ebola outbreak has spilled across the border from the DRC. The current outbreak is of the Bundibugyo strain of the virus, for which there is no vaccine or specific treatment.

The DRC has recorded at least 9,400 cases, including more than 4,500 deaths, in the deadliest outbreak in the country’s history, which started in May.

Ituri province in eastern DRC remains the disease’s epicentre, accounting for almost three quarters of confirmed cases, according to the government’s most recent data. It announced on Sunday that the virus has reached an eighth province, North Ubangi.

State-run news agency ACP reported on Sunday that authorities in North Kivu province, where the World Health Organization said substantial transmission continues, are introducing a one-week ban from Monday on people entering the province from Ituri in an effort to slow the spread.

Other measures set to be introduced include restrictions on passenger numbers in cars and on motorbikes and suspension of large public gatherings.

Neighbouring Uganda recorded 20 confirmed cases, including 15 imported from the DRC, and two deaths, before it was declared Ebola-free in August.

Hasanat al-Rashid, 48, has lived with diabetes for 15 years, and the three-and-a-half-year civil war between Sudan’s military and the Rapid Support Forces paramilitary group has worsened her situation. Finding the treatment she needs has become a daily struggle.

When the war broke out in April 2023, she was forced to flee south from her home in Haj Yousif in Khartoum North to Umm Daw Ban in Khartoum State.

During her displacement, she went for days without medication and was forced to eat foods unsuitable for her condition, such as asida, a traditional Sudanese porridge.

She underwent operations on her foot twice when she developed complications of diabetes, including a severe infection.

She moved between hospitals in Gezira State south of Khartoum, seeking treatment in Rufaa, Wad Madani and Al-Hasahisa. When fighting spread to these areas in December 2023, she fled again, arriving in Port Sudan, a city on the Red Sea that was less affected by the war.

Her condition has worsened to the point that she now has to use insulin every day and with this comes added costs, something that forces diabetes sufferers in Sudan to choose between medicine and other essentials, such as food.

“The doses vary depending on whether my blood sugar is high or low,” she told Al Jazeera.

The war has pushed income levels in Sudan back to those last seen in the 1990s, according to the United Nations Development Programme. This means Hasanat and other diabetes sufferers are struggling to afford the medicine they need to treat the condition.

Hasanat’s doctor recommended she use an insulin pen, a device used to inject insulin under the skin. She would need one or two of the devices a month, but the cost at 70,000 Sudanese pounds ($8) is more than she can afford up front, so she opts for a vial of insulin.

This is cheaper at 17,000 Sudanese pounds ($1.80), but there is the additional cost of buying ice every day to keep the insulin cool. She spends 180,000 pounds ($20) a month on ice to preserve the medicine. But she is able to spread these costs out through the month, making the vials her only viable option even if the overall costs are higher than an insulin pen.

“It may last a month or less, but the challenge is that I don’t have a refrigerator, so I struggle to store the insulin properly,” she said.

She also needs painkillers and vitamins on a regular basis to manage complications caused by the diabetes.

The rising cost of treatment

Fatima Adam, 75, is among the patients at Port Sudan Hospital struggling to afford the medicines she needs to manage her hypertension and a thyroid condition.

She was admitted to the hospital with complications caused by high blood pressure, which has started to impact her heart. Too unwell to speak to Al Jazeera herself, her daughter, Aisha, described how the rising cost of treatment has affected her whole family.

Before the war, Fatima received medicine through the National Health Insurance Fund. She paid a quarter of the cost while the fund covered the rest. But when the war started and the economy collapsed, the medicines she needed were no longer covered by the scheme.

“My mother takes six different medicines because hypertension has affected her heart in addition to her thyroid medication. The war has made things harder because the prices of these medicines have gone up,” Aisha told Al Jazeera.

The responsibility for paying for Fatima’s treatment and supporting her and her daughter falls on her son, who works as a casual worker. With no fixed income, he goes to the market every day in search of work but sometimes returns home empty without any luck.

“Sometimes, when my brother finds work, we buy enough medicine to last a month. Other times, we have to buy smaller quantities and take the medicines intermittently,” Aisha said.

She bought a month’s supply of her mother’s medication a few days ago for 160,000 Sudanese pounds ($17.80), a substantial expense for a family whose income depends on day labour but essential to treating Fatima’s condition.

War damage

The war has caused an estimated $500m in losses to medicine stocks, infrastructure and transport fleets, dealing a major blow to Sudan’s pharmaceutical supply system, the National Medical Supplies Fund told Al Jazeera.

The National Medicines and Poisons Board estimated that only eight of the 30 pharmaceutical factories in Khartoum that shut down during the conflict have resumed operations despite the security situation in the capital recently improving.

This has increased Sudan’s reliance on imported medicines, but the subsequent depreciation of the Sudanese pound has driven up the costs of pharmaceutical procurement and production.

Hossam al-Naeem, who works as a pharmacist in Port Sudan, said customers with diabetes and hypertension require regular painkillers and vitamins to help their overall condition.

“I feel deeply saddened when I see the expressions on some patients’ faces as they ask about the prices of medicines and discover how much they have increased because of the depreciation of the Sudanese pound,” Hossam told Al Jazeera.

The currency’s collapse has created added challenges for pharmacists. Before the war, a dollar traded for roughly 600 Sudanese pounds. Now black-market currency traders are quoting rates of 9,300 pounds to the dollar, meaning higher costs for most goods in Sudan.

Sometimes Hossam incurs losses himself when he finds that the prices of drugs have risen sharply, and keeping essential medicines stocked is becoming difficult.

“I used to sell a strip of cold and flu tablets for 6,000 Sudanese pounds [70 cents]. But when I went to buy new stock, I found that the supplier’s price was also 6,000 pounds per strip. That means I made no profit, not even enough to cover the pharmacy’s operating costs,” he said.

The struggle to afford heart medication

Huda Mahmoud, 58, lives in el-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan state in south-central Sudan, where drone attacks and other violence remain a problem while the military is making advances towards the city.

Huda has lived with heart problems for more than 12 years and described the impacts of the war as being physical, financial and emotional.

“I take five different medicines. There was a time when they weren’t available, and I suffered a lot. Sometimes, I had to ask people in Wad Madani, Sennar or Port Sudan to send them to me,” she told Al Jazeera. “The medicines were extremely expensive, costing me 300,000 Sudanese pounds [$33.30] a month.”

Taking medication has become a carefully managed routine with each pill tied to a specific time of day.

“I’ve become tied to my pills: this one before eating, that one afterwards. If I forget one, my heart starts beating very fast,” she added.

In March, Huda was forced to travel from el-Obeid to Omdurman. Following her strict treatment regimen has become increasingly difficult during repeated periods of upheaval.

She has now returned home to el-Obeid, where her regular medicine is priced at 151,000 Sudanese pounds ($16.80) a month, something she can barely afford.

Her greatest fear is running out of medicine or being unable to afford her next supply, which would put her at risk of a blood clot.

“I’m afraid of becoming incapacitated. I used to be responsible for the whole household, but now I need help. I feel like I’ve become a burden on my family,” she said.

East African neighbours Ethiopia and Eritrea are once again perilously close to all-out war.

Territorial disputes have dogged their relations since Eritrea gained independence in 1993.

They fought a bitter war between 1998 and 2000. And despite a truce, they remained in a state of war for nearly 20 years.

The Jeddah accord in 2018 brought peace. But tensions have lingered.

Ethiopia accuses Eritrea of supporting rebels in its Tigray region, while Eritrea accuses landlocked Ethiopia of planning to capture one of its key Red Sea ports.

Can diplomacy end this deep-rooted conflict?

Presenter: James Bays

Guests:

Faisal Roble – Political analyst specialising in the Horn of Africa

Jervin Naidoo – Senior political analyst at Oxford Economics Africa

Matt Bryden – Strategic adviser at Sahan, a think tank focused on governance, politics and security in the Horn of Africa

For every five plates of food served around the world, roughly one ends up in the bin. That adds up to more than a billion tonnes of food a year.

Meanwhile, 645 million people, about one in 13 of the world’s population, went hungry in 2025, according to the UN.

That gap is the focus of World Food Day on October 16, the annual UN observance marking the founding of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in 1945. This year’s theme, “Innovate today, nourish tomorrow”, calls for food systems that feed more people and waste less.

In this visual explainer, Al Jazeera looks at global hunger, which countries waste the most food and simple ways to waste less at home.

Hunger is falling, slowly

Global hunger has fallen for a third year in a row, but it remains above levels seen before the COVID-19 pandemic.

According to the UN’s annual State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World report, an estimated 645 million people, or 7.8 percent of the world’s population, faced hunger in 2025. That is down from 8.1 percent in 2024 and a peak of 8.6 percent in 2022, but still about 61 million more people than in 2019.

Where are people the most hungry?

Africa has more hungry people than any other region.

In 2025, an estimated 309 million people in Africa were undernourished. That is one in five people on the continent and almost half of the world’s hungry people.

By comparison, 292 million people in Asia (6 percent of the population) and 32 million in Latin America and the Caribbean (4.8 percent) were undernourished.

The 2026 Global Hunger Index shows a similar pattern at the country level. The index scores countries out of 100, combining undernourishment with child stunting, child wasting and child mortality. Scores of 35 or more are considered “alarming”.

Hunger is classed as alarming in eight countries, seven of them in Africa. Somalia has the worst score of the 122 countries ranked, followed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad and Madagascar.

Sudan, South Sudan, Burundi and Yemen were also classed as alarming, but conflict and data gaps meant the index could not calculate their scores.

At the same time, a large share of the food the world grows never reaches a plate.

How much food is wasted every year?

Food is lost and wasted at every stage of its journey from farm to table.

According to the FAO, about 13 percent of the food produced globally is lost after harvest and before it reaches shops, spoiling in storage, during transport or in processing. Fruits and vegetables suffer the highest losses.

Food lost before it reaches shops is worth more than $400bn a year, according to the FAO.

Shops, restaurants and households then throw away almost a fifth of the food available to consumers, about 1.05 billion tonnes in 2022, according to the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). That is equivalent to 52.5 million trucks, each carrying 20 tonnes.

Households account for the most, 60 percent, followed by restaurants and other food services at 28 percent and shops at 12 percent.

How to reduce food waste at home

Most food waste happens at home, which means households can make a real difference. Here are some simple steps recommended by food waste campaigners and UN agencies:

1. Plan before you shop: Check what you already have, plan meals for the week and shop with a list to avoid buying more than you need.
2. Understand date labels: “Use by” dates are about safety, but “best before” dates are about quality. Food is often still safe to eat after its “best before” date.
3. Store food properly: Keep your fridge at 5C (41F) or below, and store fruit and vegetables where they last longest. Bananas, for example, speed up the ripening of other fruit nearby.
4. Use the freezer: Bread, cooked meals, meat and many fruits and vegetables can be frozen before they go off.
5. Cook the right amount: Measuring portions, especially for rice and pasta, cuts down on leftovers that get thrown away.
6. Eat the oldest food first: Move older items to the front of the fridge and cupboard so they get used before newer ones.
7. Use leftovers and scraps: Turn leftovers into new meals, and use vegetable peels and stalks in soups and stocks.
8. Compost what you can’t eat: Composting inedible parts such as peels and eggshells keeps them out of landfills, where rotting food releases methane.

Which country wastes the most?

On average, every person in the world wastes about 132kg (291 pounds) of food a year, roughly the weight of two adults. Of that, 79kg (174 pounds) was thrown away at home.

But the amount varies widely. Hotter countries tend to waste more at home, UNEP says, possibly because of more fresh produce and less refrigeration.

The Maldives wastes the most food, with each person throwing away about 260kg (573 pounds) a year, about twice the global average. Syria, the Dominican Republic, Seychelles, Mexico and Tunisia follow, each wasting more than 210kg (463 pounds) per person, according to UN estimates.

Spain recorded some of the lowest levels, at around 39kg (86 pounds) or less per person.

What does food waste cost?

Food loss and waste costs the global economy more than $1 trillion a year, according to the UN.

To put that in perspective, what else could $1 trillion buy?

Use the + buttons to add items to your cart and see how the money would be spent across 35 categories.

Throwing food away also wastes the money, land and energy used to produce it.

About 1.4 billion hectares (3.5 billion acres) of land, or 28 percent of the world’s agricultural land, is used to grow food that is never eaten. That is an area larger than Canada.

Food loss and waste also generate an estimated 8 to 10 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions, including methane released as food rots in landfills.

Eritrea denies troop movement inside northern Ethiopia as US calls for de-escalation.

Ethiopian forces and allied fighters say they have expanded control across Tigray and entered the historic city of Aksum, as fighting in the northern region continues.

The pro-government militia, the Tigray Peace Force (TPF), also claimed on Thursday that troops from neighbouring Eritrea have retreated towards the border.

Solomon Hailemariam, spokesperson for the TPF, said Eritrean forces had sustained significant casualties during the fighting.

But Eritrea’s Information Minister Yemane Gebremeskel rejected the claims as false in comments to local media. The extent of the reported losses could not be independently verified.

The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), an independent conflict-monitoring organisation, documented Ethiopian government forces and TPF fighters entering Aksum, while rival Tigrayan fighters remained in surrounding mountainous areas.

ACLED also reported Eritrean troops withdrawing across the border through Zalambessa, following advances by Ethiopian forces and their allies into several strategic towns.

“Ethiopian troops are on one side, and Eritrean troops are on the other,” Selam, a resident of Zalambessa whose first name was changed for security reasons, told the AFP news agency on Thursday.

AFP reported that there is no fighting now, but the town has been without power or water for a week.

“We are caught in the middle and living in deep anxiety,” Salem told the news agency.

Trading accusations

ACLED also documented Ethiopian tanks and heavy weapons moving towards the Eritrean border on Tuesday, raising concerns about a possible confrontation between the neighbouring countries.

Addis Ababa has accused Eritrea, as well as Sudan and Egypt, of backing a rebel alliance of seven groups that is fighting the government of Abiy Ahmed.

Eritrea has denied accusations that its forces entered Tigray to support the armed opposition groups, accusing Ethiopia of threatening its sovereignty.

Eritrea, which fought alongside Ethiopia’s federal army in the 2020-2022 war, severed diplomatic ties with Ethiopia over the accusations earlier this month.

Khartoum and Cairo have also denied involvement in the conflict.

The TPF supports Ethiopia’s federal government in its campaign against the Tigrayan rebels linked to the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).

Ethiopian forces captured Tigray’s regional capital Mekelle earlier this month, and the TPLF confirmed that it had withdrawn from the city and moved its regional administration “temporarily” to another location. Government forces also retook the towns of Adwa and Adigrat from the TPLF without a fight. Further, there are reports of Ethiopian advances in the town of Rama, close to the border with Eritrea.

On Wednesday, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio called for de-escalation in a phone call with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy, following reports of the alleged confrontation between Ethiopian and Eritrean forces.

Rubio said the region could not tolerate more conflict, according to a statement from the US Department of State.

Formula One returns to Africa for the first time in more than three decades, but DR Congo slams decision to race in Rwanda.

Formula 1 will “polish the image of an authoritarian leader” if it goes ahead with plans to hold an African Grand Prix in Rwanda, the foreign minister of neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo, Therese Kayikwamba Wagner, said Thursday.

Rwandan President Paul Kagame joined F1 Chief Executive Stefano Domenicali and FIA President Mohammed Ben Sulayem on Tuesday to announce the race. It will be held at a circuit yet to be built at Bugesera, near Rwanda’s capital Kigali, in “the early 2030s,” F1 says. The series last raced in Africa in 1993.

The DRC, the United States and UN experts accuse Rwanda of backing M23 rebels in eastern DRC. Rwanda says its security measures are intended to protect it against threats from armed groups operating across the border.

“In February 2025, I warned Stefano Domenicali and the F1 authorities that allowing Rwanda to host a Grand Prix would be morally indefensible,” Kayikwamba Wagner said in a statement. “[The DRC] welcomes Formula 1’s return to Africa, but giving Paul Kagame this platform would help polish the image of an authoritarian leader whose government has helped fuel a devastating war in our country.”

Kayikwamba Wagner said the DRC backs rival efforts from South Africa to host a race instead.

“This is also an opportunity for F1 to show its audiences and supporters what the sport truly stands for,” she added. “It should require credible, independent guarantees that no money used to host the race comes from conflict-linked minerals or the exploitation of Congolese resources.”

The DRC has previously objected to other Rwandan efforts to promote its brand through sports, especially a string of high-profile sponsorship agreements with leading European football clubs.

The US imposed sanctions on Rwanda’s military and four senior officers in March over their support for M23 rebels in eastern DRC. Rwanda rejected the sanctions as one-sided and said they misrepresented the conflict.

Lagos, Nigeria – As Israelis prepare to vote on October 27, African governments from Pretoria to Rabat are weighing what the result could mean for their own foreign and domestic policies.

The war on Gaza has exposed sharp differences across the continent, with some governments pursuing diplomatic measures against Israel while others maintain commercial and security ties.

Recent polling has shown a closely contested race between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party and the far-right coalition it leads and a bloc of Jewish-led opposition parties.

Neither is projected to win the 61 seats needed for a majority in the 120-seat Knesset, with a protracted period of coalition talks expected to follow the vote.

The next government’s approach to Gaza and the Palestinian question could influence Israel’s efforts to preserve and expand its partnerships across the continent.

Israel’s relationships across Africa are shaped by competing priorities. While the Gaza war has intensified diplomatic pressure and public opposition in many countries, security needs, commercial interests and longstanding bilateral partnerships continue to influence government decisions.

Diplomatic strain vs closer ties

Since the war began in October 2023, South Africa has emerged as one of Israel’s most vocal critics in Africa. Its government brought a case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), alleging violations of the 1948 Genocide Convention. Israel rejects the allegations. The court’s so-called provisional measures in 2024, including an order for Israel to take action to prevent acts of genocide, are not a final ruling on whether genocide has occurred.

In November 2023, South Africa’s National Assembly adopted a motion calling on the government to close the Israeli embassy and suspend diplomatic relations. The motion did not itself implement those measures, but it underscored the strength of political opposition to Israel’s military campaign.

Other African governments have taken different approaches that reflect national political priorities and foreign policy calculations rather than a single continental position.

Chad recalled its ambassador to Israel in November 2023, while some countries have maintained relations despite criticism of Israel’s military campaign in Gaza.

Morocco offers a contrasting example. It restored relations with Israel in 2020 under a US-backed arrangement linked to Washington’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. Despite public demonstrations opposing normalisation, Rabat has continued to pursue closer ties.

On September 16, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar and Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita met in New York at a trilateral summit hosted by US Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz. The three countries reaffirmed plans to upgrade diplomatic relations, elevate their respective missions to embassies and appoint ambassadors.

They also agreed to conclude investment protection and double taxation agreements by the end of this year, expand flights to include Moroccan airlines and arrange reciprocal high-level visits in the coming months. These were announced commitments, rather than confirmation that the changes had already been implemented.

For Idowu Johnson, associate professor of international relations at the University of Ibadan, the diversity of African states makes it difficult to predict a uniform response to Israel’s election.

“Africa’s heterogeneity means individual states have handled relations with Israel separately. Since the October 7, 2023 attacks, African criticism has focused on Israel’s denial of Palestinian statehood.

“The October 27 election will therefore be pivotal, as a new government’s stance on the Palestinian cause will shape how far Africa cooperates on agriculture, trade, security and technology, guided by self-determination and international law as well as bilateral interests,” Johnson said.

Israel’s relationship with the African Union (AU) also reflects these divisions. In 2021, the AU Commission chairperson accredited Israel’s representative to the organisation, prompting objections from member states.

In February 2022, the AU Assembly established a committee of heads of state and government to consult on Israel’s observer status. The dispute continued into 2023, when the AU moved to suspend Israel’s accreditation pending further consideration.

The disagreement has reflected wider divisions over Israel’s treatment of Palestinians and the organisation’s approach to the conflict.

A new Israeli government could seek to ease those tensions, but any change would depend on its policies as well as the positions of AU member states.

Security ties may outlast diplomatic tensions

Security cooperation has been a significant part of Israel’s relationships with some African governments. Israeli companies have pursued defence and security contracts involving equipment, surveillance technology and training.

But the nature and scale of those relationships vary by country and claims about particular agreements or technologies should be tied to documented cases rather than treated as evidence of a uniform Israeli security presence across the continent.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo offers a recent example of efforts to deepen cooperation. Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi visited Israel on August 31 and September 1, meeting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Isaac Herzog. Discussions covered security, defence, agriculture, infrastructure, energy and high technology. Both sides expressed a desire to strengthen their strategic partnership and expand cooperation across several sectors.

The visit followed memorandums of understanding signed on July 27. Congolese officials said the visit would review those agreements and explore further Israeli investment, including opportunities linked to the Lobito Corridor. The meetings demonstrate the potential scope of bilateral cooperation, but do not establish that a specific new security contract has been concluded.

For governments confronting armed groups, insecurity can create incentives to seek equipment, intelligence and training from foreign partners. Yet the importance of Israeli cooperation differs between countries and diplomatic tensions will not necessarily have the same effect on every security relationship.

The limits of Israel’s diplomatic outreach were also evident after it recognised Somaliland as an independent state on December 26, last year, the first country to do so. Somalia and other critics rejected the move, arguing that it undermined Somalia’s territorial integrity. The decision triggered demonstrations in Somalia and Somaliland.

Speaking to Al Jazeera this month, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud said Somalia will not accept Israeli presence in the country “under any circumstances”. He added that Israel was planning to establish a naval base in Berbera and use the city’s airport, adding that its real aim was to get closer to the Gulf states and Iran.

According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data project (ACLED), 110 demonstrations directly linked to Israel’s Somaliland recognition had been recorded by the time of its February 2026 Africa overview. Only seven supported the move, all in Somaliland; the others opposed it. The figures cover demonstrations linked to that particular decision, not all African views of Israel, and should not be treated as a continent-wide measure of public opinion.

Hossamaldeen Ibrahim, an Africa analyst at the Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute, argues that public opposition can constrain governments even when they see strategic value in maintaining ties.

“The strongest constraint, however, may come from African publics rather than governments: the Somaliland recognition drew widespread opposition, the African Union and many governments reaffirmed Somalia’s territorial integrity, and ACLED logged 110 related demonstrations, only seven in support.

“Depending on its approach, the next Israeli government could therefore either deepen strategic cooperation in Morocco, Sudan and the Red Sea, or face a legitimacy problem if it continues policies seen as tied to the Gaza war, widening the gap between state-level cooperation and public sentiment,” Ibrahim told Al Jazeera.

The Somaliland episode shows how a diplomatic move can provoke opposition when it is perceived to challenge a core principle of sovereignty.

It does not, by itself, establish that African governments will abandon security agreements with Israel. The consequences will depend on the countries involved, the terms of their cooperation and the domestic political costs of maintaining them.

Trade, agritech and the contest for influence

Trade and development cooperation offer Israel another route to maintaining relationships in Africa. Israeli firms and officials have pursued partnerships in areas including agriculture, irrigation, water management, health and technology.

Such cooperation can offer practical benefits to governments seeking investment and technical expertise, but commercial ties do not necessarily translate into public support for Israel’s policies.

Zambia illustrates Israel’s efforts to deepen bilateral engagement. Israel opened a resident embassy in Lusaka in August last year, after a 52-year absence. Agriculture, water management, health, education and technology have been identified as potential areas for closer cooperation. The move formed part of Israel’s broader effort to strengthen its engagement with African countries.

Some analysts have interpreted Israel’s renewed engagement with Zambia as an attempt to cultivate partners who could counterbalance South Africa’s influence in the region. That remains an interpretation, not an established explanation for the relationship.

Zambia has its own reasons for seeking investment and cooperation, particularly in agriculture, water management and technology; closer bilateral ties alone do not prove that countering South Africa is Israel’s objective.

Professor Iwebunor Okwechime, of Obafemi Awolowo University, points to the historical roots of South Africa’s position towards Israel.

“If we trace the stance South Africa took, it goes back to the apartheid era, when Israel backed the apartheid regime and refused to support the struggle against the minority government. This historical context is important for understanding South Africa-Israel relations today,” Okwechime told Al Jazeera.

For African governments, the challenge will be to balance security and commercial interests against public opposition, commitments to Palestinian rights and positions on international law. For Israel, the upcoming election will test whether a new government can ease diplomatic tensions across Africa without fundamentally changing the policies that have fuelled them.

As Okwechime told Al Jazeera, “There won’t be a radical change in sentiments regardless of the government in power”.

The G20 finance ministers and central bank governors are gathering in Bangkok, Thailand, on Thursday amid an uncertain global outlook shaped by the US-Israel war on Iran.

The meetings are being held in conjunction with the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, taking place in the Thai capital from October 12 to October 18.

Here are some of the key details about the meetings:

What are the G20, the IMF and the World Bank?

The G20 is an economic forum comprising 19 large economies, including the United States, China, the United Kingdom, Australia, Brazil, India, Japan, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, as well as the European Union and the African Union.

The grouping has an annually rotating presidency, currently held by the US.

Together, the G20 countries account for about 85 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP) and three-quarters of global trade.

The G20 was established in 1999 as a forum for finance ministers and central bank governors to address shared economic concerns in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis, before expanding into a broader forum for national leaders.

The IMF, based in Washington, DC, is an international financial institution that promotes international cooperation on monetary policy, trade and economic growth.

Its membership includes all but a handful of the world’s sovereign states, including North Korea, Cuba, the Vatican City and Monaco.

The World Bank, also based in Washington, DC, primarily serves as a provider of loans and grants to developing countries. It has 189 member countries.

The IMF and the World Bank were created at the 1944 Bretton Woods conference in the US, convened by the Allied Powers to establish the contours of the post-World War II international financial order.

Who will be attending the meetings?

Most finance ministers and central bank governors of the G20 will be in Bangkok, along with IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva and World Bank Group President Ajay Banga.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent will be a notable absence from the gatherings, as the top economic official of the world’s biggest economy and G20 chair.

US officials have cited “domestic engagements” for Bessent’s decision to skip the events, at which Washington will be represented by Deputy Secretary Francis Brooke and Undersecretary for International Affairs Erin Browne.

The G20 meeting, one of several gatherings of the group’s finance ministers each year, will help shape the agenda for the headline leaders’ summit in Miami, Florida, taking place on December 14-15.

What is on the agenda?

The economic fallout from the US-Israel war on Iran is expected to dominate discussions.

Attacks across the Middle East have upended economic activity across the region, while disruption to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz has driven a surge in energy prices worldwide.

Crude oil prices have exceeded $100 a barrel for much of the past eight months, placing a strain on government coffers and household budgets, particularly in the Gulf region and the rest of Asia.

In advance of the meeting, Australia’s Treasurer Jim Chalmers MP said he would use the discussions to call for an end to the conflicts in the Middle East and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz “because that’s what the global economy desperately needs”.

“The war in the Middle East is having a devastating economic impact and is pushing up fuel prices, inflation and interest rates around the world,” Chalmers said in a statement.

Other issues likely to feature on the agenda include the ballooning debt levels of many countries, which exceed 100 percent of GDP in the US, Canada, Japan, Italy and France.

In a speech on Wednesday, Georgieva warned that mounting debt posed a threat to the global economy and that there was no “magic” formula that would allow governments to avoid tax hikes or spending cuts.

G20 members will also bring more specific individual concerns to the table based on their economic and geopolitical priorities.

The US, for example, has repeatedly expressed concern about “global imbalances”, a veiled reference to China’s state-driven industrial model that has allowed Chinese exporters to flood overseas markets with cheap goods.

US President Donald Trump has long claimed that China’s large trade surplus, which stood at a cumulative $938bn in September, proves that international trade is stacked against US manufacturers.

In a statement addressed to the IMF on Wednesday, Bessent called for action to address mismatched trade balances.

“This especially includes strengthening its analysis and engagement on the role non-market policies and practices and exchange rates play in driving external imbalances,” Bessent said.

“Policymakers around the world are having difficult discussions about how to sustain market-based systems amid distortionary policies from some economies that skew competition and hurt employment.”

Divisions and competing interests cloud the prospects for coordination, however.

At the last meeting of G20 finance ministers in Asheville, North Carolina, US, held on August 31 and September 1, member countries failed to issue a joint communique after China objected to language to do with trade.

Nairobi, Kenya – Kenya’s response to an imported Ebola case has demonstrated its ability to mobilise a national response in the capital.

But a suspected case in the northeastern county of Wajir has raised a critical question: whether the country’s preparedness measures can protect communities far from major hospitals, laboratories and transport hubs.

The suspected case in Wajir tested negative, according to county officials, easing fears of wider transmission. Yet the incident highlighted the importance of local health facilities being able to recognise suspected infections, isolate patients safely and communicate reliable information to residents.

For communities near Kenya’s borders, preparedness requires more than screening travellers at airports and official crossings.

It also depends on trained health workers, appropriate protective equipment, functioning isolation facilities and clear referral procedures. Residents must know where to seek care and how to respond when health authorities raise the alarm.

Wajir’s readiness under scrutiny

Garad Saney Mohamed, communications director for Wajir county, told Al Jazeera that the county had established an isolation centre in Wajir town and formed a rapid response team to strengthen its preparedness.

He said the county was also using radio campaigns, community health promoters, school health programmes and posters to raise awareness about Ebola. A preparedness plan and budget had been put in place, he added.

However, the county did not provide details on the isolation centre’s capacity, the number of health workers trained specifically in Ebola response or the budget allocated to these efforts. Without that information, it is difficult to assess whether the county has the personnel and resources needed to manage suspected infections safely or respond to a wider outbreak.

The suspected case involved a 20-year-old man who had travelled from the Democratic Republic of the Congo through Uganda before reaching his home in Wajir on September 20. He was assessed at Habaswein Subcounty Hospital in Wajir South after presenting with a severe febrile illness.

His sample tested negative for Ebola, according to county officials. He was to remain under observation while receiving medical care.

The case prompted precautionary action, but it does not establish whether Wajir’s wider preparedness systems would be sufficient during an outbreak. That would depend on factors including the availability of protective equipment, staff trained in infection prevention and control, safe sample transport and reliable links between local facilities and designated testing laboratories.

Wajir’s proximity to Somalia, which lies 110km (70 miles) to the east, and the movement of people and goods across the border make surveillance and public communication particularly important. Screening at formal entry points remains essential, but it cannot replace the ability of local health facilities and community health workers to recognise warning signs and guide people towards appropriate care.

National screening, local challenges

Kenya’s national response intensified after an Ebola case was linked to a Kenyan travelling from the Democratic Republic of the Congo through Uganda. The patient arrived in Nairobi on October 3, was diagnosed with Bundibugyo virus of the disease and died on October 5, according to the World Health Organization (WHO). Kenya notified the WHO on October 6.

The patient had fallen ill while living in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and travelled by road to Kampala before flying to Nairobi. Laboratory tests at the National Virology Reference Laboratory and the Kenya Medical Research Institute confirmed the infection, according to the Ministry of Health.

On October 14, Kenya confirmed a second case of Bundibugyo virus disease involving a 39-year-old man who was a close family member of the first patient. He was already in quarantine and under daily monitoring when he developed symptoms, including fever, fatigue and joint pains, on October 13.

Laboratory tests confirmed the infection, and he was transferred to a designated treatment centre for supportive care. The Ministry of Health said the two cases were linked and there was no evidence of transmission in the wider community.

Authorities subsequently intensified surveillance at points of entry, contact tracing and public communication. The negative test result in Wajir underscored the importance of investigating suspected infections promptly and using laboratory testing to establish whether the virus is present.

As of October 6, Kenya had screened 652,584 travellers, tested 267 samples and trained 4,971 healthcare workers in Ebola prevention and management, according to the Ministry of Health.

By October 12, the WHO reported that more than 665,000 travellers had been screened and 127 contacts had been listed, with 94 in quarantine. Five laboratories had been designated to test for the disease, and nearly 5,000 health workers had received training.

These figures demonstrate the scale of the national response. But the number of travellers screened or health workers trained does not, on its own, establish how effectively those resources are distributed or whether individual counties can manage suspected infections.

For Wajir, the key questions concern the readiness of local facilities, the availability of trained personnel and protective equipment, and the speed with which samples can be transported for testing. The county has outlined the measures it has taken, but the available information does not provide a complete picture of its operational capacity.

Preparedness means more than the numbers

Health workers need to recognise suspected cases, follow infection-prevention protocols, collect and transport samples safely, and refer patients without exposing others. Facilities must also have appropriate protective equipment and clear procedures for managing suspected infections.

The WHO reported that Kenya’s national preparedness score rose from 66 percent in May to 82 percent in July. The assessment covered measures including surveillance, laboratory testing, isolation and treatment facilities, and trained response teams.

The improvement suggests that preparedness measures had advanced before the imported case was confirmed. However, a national score cannot establish whether every county has the equipment, staffing and referral arrangements needed to respond effectively. Assessments of local capacity are essential to identifying gaps that national figures may not reveal.

The Kenya Red Cross has also supported preparedness and public awareness efforts. Dr Paul Olale, a representative of the organisation, told Al Jazeera about a preparedness assessment. However, the basis of the separate figure attributed to the organisation was not established in the information available for this report, making it difficult to determine what it measured or whether it identified county-level weaknesses.

The organisation has highlighted the need to counter misinformation. During an outbreak, rumours can leave people uncertain about symptoms, how the virus spreads and whether they should seek medical attention.

For residents, information needs to be practical. People should know where to seek care, how to report a suspected illness and what to do while awaiting medical advice. Communication must also address stigma and reassure people that reporting a suspected illness can help protect their families and communities.

Community health promoters, local radio stations, schools and trusted community leaders can help deliver information in languages and formats residents understand. But awareness campaigns are most effective when they are consistent and backed by health services capable of responding promptly to concerns.

Wajir’s experience illustrates why Kenya’s Ebola preparedness must be measured not only by national screening figures and training totals, but also by the ability of individual counties to respond safely when a suspected case emerges.

An isolation centre, a rapid response team and public awareness campaigns are important components of an effective response. Their existence alone, however, does not establish whether facilities have adequate equipment, staff can follow established protocols or residents can access reliable information when they need it.

Kenya has demonstrated its ability to mobilise a national response, expand screening and undertake laboratory testing. The challenge is ensuring that these measures translate into effective protection beyond major transport hubs, including in remote communities where access to healthcare and timely information may be more difficult.

Dr Mary Muthoni, Kenya’s principal secretary for public health and professional standards, underscored the importance of protecting frontline staff in remarks delivered on behalf of Health Cabinet Secretary Aden Duale, according to a WHO statement released on October 12.

“No health worker in this country should be asked to attend to a suspected Ebola case without the right protective equipment.”

He ruled the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) for almost two decades.

And now, Joseph Kabila is making a comeback.

This time, he’s formed a coalition with M23 fighters in eastern DRC.

Kabila will lead the political-military alliance, which opposes the government in Kinshasa.

Many say the move will worsen the fighting in eastern DRC.

Several attempts to reach a peace agreement between government forces, rebels and armed groups in the region have so far failed.

Is this coalition likely to escalate the fighting?

Presenter: Dareen Abughaida

Guests:

Henry-Pacifique Mayala – Coordinator of the Kivu Security Tracker at the Ebuteli institute

Ovigwe Eguegu – Policy analyst at Development Reimagined, specialising in African geopolitics and great power competition

Vincent Rouget – Head of political risk for Africa at Control Risks, a global consultancy

Without a quick deal to move fertiliser through the strait, agricultural productivity would ‘significantly drop’.

A senior United Nations official has warned that parts of Asia and Africa could face a food security crisis unless Iran and the United States quickly agree on a UN-backed plan to move fertiliser through the embattled Strait of Hormuz.

UN ⁠Under-Secretary-General Jorge Moreira da Silva said on Wednesday that it was “absolutely critical” that the two countries agree to the proposal within weeks as planting season approaches. It calls for a UN-staffed coordination centre in Oman to help register vessels and oversee their safe passage in the waterway, through which a large portion of key global fertiliser inputs traditionally flow.

“If we miss that planting season, the productivity of agriculture would significantly drop and the impact on prices will significantly increase,” Moreira da Silva told Reuters on the sidelines of International Monetary Fund and World Bank meetings in Bangkok, Thailand.

Farmers operate strict crop calendars, and even slight delays could severely affect yield.

‘Negligible’ fertiliser shipments

Traffic in the Strait of Hormuz has been severely disrupted since the start of the US-Israel war on Iran, with Iran targeting vessels in the strait and the US and Iran exchanging fire in and around the waterway.

The disruption has hit global supplies of urea, the world’s most widely used nitrogen fertiliser, as well as seaborne sulphur, a key input. Before the war, roughly a third of global urea shipments and nearly half of seaborne sulphur passed through the strait.

Although some ships have been able to sail through amid the crisis, fertiliser products have made up a “very negligible” share of moving cargo, according to the Washington-based International Food Policy Research Institute.

Moreira da Silva said the UN-backed fertiliser mechanism, drawn up in March, could be activated within seven to 10 days if both Iran and the US agree.

Under the plan, UN monitors would work alongside local authorities at Gulf ports to verify cargo loading. Ships would be tracked during transit, and additional inspections could ⁠be carried out if countries raised concerns about a vessel or its cargo, said Moreira da Silva. He did not say why the US and Iran have not yet agreed.

The passage of only five vessels per day through the Strait of Hormuz could keep fertiliser supplies flowing to countries in critical need, he added.

‘Let us do our job’

The UN mechanism could work alongside negotiations for a “comprehensive deal” to restore freedom of navigation in the strait, Moreira da Silva said.

Iran and the US have exchanged proposals through intermediaries since a June interim ceasefire collapsed. Efforts to reopen the Strait of Hormuz have stalled over Tehran’s conditions and Washington’s insistence on addressing Iran’s nuclear programme from the outset.

“What we are telling them is, while you continue your discussions towards a comprehensive deal, let us work, let us do our job,” said Moreira da Silva.

His plea comes amid growing concern that fertiliser shortages could hit global food supplies.

In May, the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization warned that fertiliser scarcity could tighten food supplies from late 2026 into 2027, and would likely hit countries facing climate or other crises much harder.

In South Asia, where most rely on imported fertiliser, farmers are already struggling because of soaring costs and fertiliser scarcity. On Wednesday, farmers in Spain took to the streets to protest rising production costs amid high oil and fertiliser prices.

Much was made of South Africa’s run to the 2025 World Test Championship final at Lord’s.

They played only 12 Tests – no team played fewer – and qualified after drawing at home against India and losing in New Zealand, before beating West Indies, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan.

Mitigation for this latest Test also comes from the fact this is their first in almost a year and the majority of their batters played one domestic red-ball match to prepare.

Australia recently came off an eight-month break of their own and lost to Bangladesh in home conditions, as Conrad was keen to point out.

And last summer’s famous win over Australia and a 2-0 success in India proves they can beat the world’s top teams.

However, this Test only reinforced a worrying trend among South Africa’s batters.

Tristan Stubbs and Ryan Rickelton are fine white-ball players, but Stubbs’ two Test centuries have come against Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, and Rickelton’s against Sri Lanka and Pakistan.

This was an obvious step up.

In the first innings, Stubbs, two overs after Wiaan Mulder had been bounced out, top-edged a pull to fine leg, and in the second he played a loose drive on one.

Opener Rickelton drove and edged at a wide ball late on day two and nicked through a pull in the fourth over on day four.

Similarly, Mulder scored 367 not out against Zimbabwe last year, but Bangladesh are the only other side he averages more than 30 against. His 110-ball stay for 29 on the final day before being strangled down the leg side was at least encouraging.

Wicketkeeper Kyle Verreynne, in contrast, lasted only three balls before nudging Matt Renshaw’s part-time spin to slip. His Test average of 30.14 drops to 28 against Australia and 15 against both England and India.

Conrad said that “a few of the guys need to step up”.

“The real disappointment was the batting in the first dig on a really good wicket,” Conrad said.

“Yes, a world-class attack, but quite a few guys getting starts and not kicking on.”

Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar face double-digit declines in GDP amid the fallout from the US-Israel war on Iran.

The economy of the Middle East and Central Asia is set to shrink in 2026 amid the fallout of the US-Israel war on Iran, with countries such as Kuwait and Qatar facing double-digit contractions, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The region’s gross domestic product (GDP) is forecast to contract by 0.3 percent this year, a sharp downgrade from the 1.9 percent expansion projected in April, the IMF said in its latest economic outlook on Tuesday.

The IMF cited the prolonged disruption to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, a conduit for one-fifth of global oil supplies in peacetime, for the downgraded outlook.

Kuwait, Iraq and Qatar are forecast to have the most severe economic contractions, with their GDPs expected to shrink by 16.7 percent, 16 percent and 15.6 percent, respectively.

Bahrain’s GDP is forecast to contract by 11.3 percent, while Iran’s economy is projected to shrink by 7.6 percent.

Saudi Arabia, which has partially offset the hit to its energy sector by boosting oil exports through the East-West pipeline, is projected to record negative growth of 3.3 percent.

Kyrgyzstan is expected to have the strongest growth in the region, with GDP forecast to expand 9 percent.

The Middle East and Central Asia is the only region that is expected to experience negative growth in 2026.

Emerging and developing Asia’s GDP is forecast to grow 5.1 percent, while the economies of Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean are projected to expand 4.5 percent and 2.3 percent, respectively.

The United States and China, the world’s two largest economies, are forecast to register growth of 2.3 percent and 4.5 percent, respectively, while the eurozone’s GDP is estimated to grow 1.1 percent.

The IMF said it expected global GDP to grow 3.1 percent, up from 3 percent in its previous outlook.

The Washington, DC-based institution said while economic activity had proved resilient this year, the global economy faced multiple risks.

“Further escalation in conflicts, a reassessment of expectations surrounding artificial intelligence (AI), renewed trade tensions, and fiscal vulnerabilities could weaken growth,” it said.

“On the upside, stronger momentum in AI investment and productivity gains from AI or a sustained easing of geopolitical and trade tensions could strengthen growth.”