Africa

Entity called Al-Majd Europe taking families on buses out of Gaza to Israel’s Ramon Airport – and then to unknown destinations.

A Palestinian man who says he left Gaza through a shadowy organisation that has landed 153 people in South Africa without documentation describes the process set up to encourage more Palestinians to leave the devastated enclave.

The man, whose identity remains anonymous due to security concerns, told Al Jazeera there was “strong coordination” between the Al-Majd Europe group and the Israeli army on such displacements.

He said the process seemed “routine” and included a thorough search of personal belongings before he was put on a bus that moved through southern Gaza’s Israeli-controlled Karem Abu Salem crossing (which Israelis call Kerem Shalom) into southern Israel and the Ramon Airport.

At Ramon, “since there is no recognition by [Israel] of a Palestinian state, they did not stamp our passports,” the Palestinian man said.

A Romanian aircraft took the group to Kenya, a transit country. He said there appeared to be some coordination between Al-Majd Europe and the Kenyan authorities.

None of the passengers knew which country they would end up in, he said, adding that there were at least three people coordinating from inside Gaza while several Palestinian citizens of Israel carried out the rest of the network communication from outside the enclave.

Initially, there was an online registration, followed by a screening process. The man said he paid $6,000 to get himself and two family members out of Gaza.

“The payments are made through bank applications to the accounts of individual persons, not to an institution,” he said.

The first group he knew about left Gaza for Indonesia in June while the transfer of a second group to an unknown location was delayed before it received a call to leave in August.

The Palestinians on board Friday’s flight to South Africa were made to pay $1,500 to $5,000 per person to leave Gaza. They were allowed to bring only a phone, some money and a backpack.

Mysterious operation

Al-Majd Europe has been moving people using unofficial channels facilitated by the Israeli military. It has been demanding payments from Palestinians to leave Gaza. But it is unclear who is behind its operations.

The group claims it was founded in 2010 in Germany, but its website was registered only this year. The website shows images generated by artificial intelligence of its executives with no credible contact details. The website provides no office location, which is in the Sheikh Jarrah neighbourhood of occupied East Jerusalem.

Al Jazeera spoke to another Palestinian man who identified himself only as Omar in WhatsApp text messages. He said an Al-Majd Europe representative told him a passport and a birth certificate would be required to be accepted for a flight and there would be an initial charge of $2,500 per person as a down payment.

Omar, however, said his request for a transfer out of Gaza was rejected by the representative because the group did not accept solo travellers.

Speaking from az-Zawayda in central Gaza, Al Jazeera’s Hind Khoudary said Palestinians in Gaza have been hearing more about the operation and some are driven to consider it due to the “unbearable living situation” after two years of Israeli bombardments and ground operations.

“The education system in Gaza has also collapsed, so some Palestinians feel there is no future for them and their children,” she said.

The Israeli military acknowledged “facilitating” transfers of Palestinians out of Gaza, which is part of the “voluntary departure” policy for Palestinians that is backed by Israel and the United States.

The Israeli army established a unit in March to further encourage and facilitate this policy after obtaining approval from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s security cabinet.

South Africa secured their first Test victory in India since 2010 as they triumphed in a low-scoring thriller inside three days in Kolkata.

The Proteas, who won the World Test Championship at Lord’s in the summer, had trailed by 30 runs on first innings – but reversed that to pull off a 30-run victory as the hosts, needing only 124 to win, were bowled out for 93 in 35 overs.

Veteran spinner Simon Harmer, 36, did the damage with four wickets in each innings for match figures of 8-51.

India were a batter short in their second innings after captain Shubman Gill suffered a neck injury on day two.

Gill remains in hospital for observation, with India having announced before play on Sunday that he would take no further part in the game.

More to follow.

When we talk about conflict in a country, we usually think of war, crisis, violence, and so on. Of course, these conflicts are crucial phenomena and need to be discussed. The civil war in Sudan is no exception. Sudan has been a country experiencing a humanitarian crisis since the military clashes in 2023. There are strong allegations of foreign interference through illicit funding, which has exacerbated this crisis. This issue is important to address because it shows that transnational societies are not always glorified as positive entities and that globalization can be an instrument contributing to the suffering of the Sudanese people.

The crisis in Sudan was sparked by a power struggle between the government military, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo. Initially, the two military groups were allied to overthrow the regime of President Omar Al-Bashir, but disagreements arose over how to integrate their respective forces. Suspicion arose on both sides, leading to fierce fighting on April 15, 2023. The capital, Khartoum, suffered extensive damage, and the fighting spread, displacing more than 3 million people across the country and abroad. (Prayuda, Syafrana, Sundari, Shiddiqy, & Riau, 2024) 

Given the complexity of the Sudanese conflict, the author views the Sudanese conflict as a concrete illustration of how transnational society and globalization can give rise to new contradictions: promising interconnectedness and collaboration across borders, while simultaneously giving rise to networks that exacerbate humanitarian crises. The author analyzes the Sudanese conflict based on the concepts of transnational networks and shadow globalization. This paper focuses not only on domestic phenomena but also involves various non-state actors. Thus, the author is guided by three arguments, namely: first, how the transnational network strengthens the conflict so that the conflict has been organized to the global level; second, how globalization becomes a tool for illegal flows, thus triggering ongoing violence; and third, how the presence of transnational networks and shadow globalization makes the Sudanese conflict not only related to domestic affairs but also a global responsibility due to complex interdependence.

The Sudanese conflict has involved transnational actors who play a role as suppliers of weapons and illegal funding for the warring factions. A report from Amnesty (2024) asserts that “the conflict in Sudan is being fueled by a constant flow of weapons into the country,” originating from China, the UAE, and Turkey. Anti-material rifles, jammer drones, and mortars made in China; armored personnel carriers (APTs) from the UAE; hundreds of thousands of blank firearms from Turkey; and variants of civilian light weapons from Russia have provided external support for both parties in the conflict. All this data clearly shows that national borders are no barrier to the export of violence. Brokers, military contractors, and sponsoring states continue to supply weapons, ultimately providing them with ammunition for war. In other words, the Sudanese conflict could transform into a global war, with transnational communities acting as intermediaries in supplying weapons and interests across borders.

The role of transnational networks is the reason why the Sudanese conflict is difficult to stop. When supply A is blocked, another supply emerges. In the concept of transnational networks, “Transnational networks are webs of interactions that connect actors across national borders for the exchange of resources, information, or influence” (Keck & Sikkink, 1999), so these cross-border non-state actors are independent and not controlled by national governments. Reporting from France 24, according to Sudanese officials themselves, there are sources of mining industry and Swissaid research; almost all of Sudan’s gold flows to the UAE through official trade routes, smuggling, and direct Emirati ownership. This certainly provides funding for the warring armies to purchase new weapons.

Amidst the rapid flow of globalization, we cannot ignore shadow globalization. This concept describes how aspects of the illicit economy are transforming from the domestic sphere into transnational networks operating under official auspices, thus giving rise to mutually beneficial relationships between markets and criminal groups. According to Peter Lock (2005), when countries reduce regulations and begin to open their economies as part of neoliberal globalization, this actually allows criminal agents and groups to move freely in the global sphere, for example, through money laundering or illicit trade. There is a strong suspicion of the misuse of legal economic activities, ultimately leading to illegal objectives that violate international law. Thus, shadow globalization is the dark side of globalization because it operates in accordance with legitimate global flows.

Sudan possesses abundant natural resources, including oil, gas, and gold reserves, but these resources are diverted through illegal cross-border channels. A report from Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs) indicates that the country lost approximately US$5.7 billion between 2012 and 2018 due to illicit activities, particularly in the gold and oil resources sectors. (Integrity, 2024).  There are strong indications that funds intended for the benefit of the Sudanese people are instead being diverted to fund armed groups. More broadly, a 2020 UNCTAD report also stated that Africa loses approximately US$50 billion annually to illicit financial flows. This aligns with other reports that define illicit financial flows as funds whose origin, transfer, or use are illegal (In, 2020). Comprehensively, globalization can be an instrument of the shadow economy to support the ongoing violence in Sudan.

The situation in Sudan demonstrates that global structures are interdependent. Connectedness through technology, economics, politics, and security forces has erased national borders. Consequently, the decisions of actors, both formal and informal, influence other countries. Transnational networks and shadow globalization have transcended national borders through financial flows, arms trade, and gold, which have entered global markets and indirectly implicated external actors. Consequently, dependencies created by globalization impact economic stability, security, and humanitarianism.

Global responsibility is questionable, as the assumption that the conflict in Sudan is solely domestic is a misleading narrative. Every actor involved behind the scenes must recognize their moral responsibility for the profits derived from this conflict, for example, through the trade in gold, oil, and arms. According to a report by Chatham House (2023), the Sudanese conflict has a strong transnational dimension due to the involvement of Gulf states and global markets in the war economy. Furthermore, UNCTAD (2020) has confirmed that illicit financial flows in Africa have resulted in the loss of billions of dollars that could have been used for development and stability. Therefore, if globalization is understood as a global realm connecting all actors, the authors strongly argue that stability must be seen as a shared responsibility.

The three arguments above demonstrate that the Sudanese conflict can no longer be viewed as a domestic issue. The role of transnational networks and shadow globalization clearly illustrates how globalization fosters openness to cross-border cooperation but also opens up illicit flows of funds, weapons, and resources that exacerbate conflict. Furthermore, the concept of complex interdependence explains how the actions of one actor impact others. Therefore, the Sudanese conflict is a moral and political responsibility of the international community. Globalization has bound countries in interdependent relationships, so achieving stability must be seen as a shared project of the entire global community. With this awareness, the world is expected to view conflicts like Sudan as a real test of global solidarity and humanity.

Therefore, any findings regarding foreign funding and the involvement of global actors in the Sudanese conflict require further reporting. This article is not intended to marginalize any particular party but rather to open up space for reflection on the fact that amidst globalization, the boundaries between local and global interests are increasingly blurred. This relevance reminds us that the Sudanese conflict is not merely a spectacle but rather a mirror for shared humanitarian responsibility.

Concerns have been raised about a ‘humanitarian organisation’ that flew people from Gaza to South Africa. Inquiries into Al-Majd Europe revealed a website based in Iceland, crypto payments and AI images showing ‘executives.’ The company didn’t respond when asked to comment.

The agreement is not expected to immediately change things on the ground, but to move forward a larger peace process.

Representatives from the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group have signed a peace deal in Qatar with the ultimate goal of putting an end to years of fighting.

Qatar and the United States announced the “comprehensive” deal in Doha on Saturday, setting it up as a roadmap to stop the deadly fighting and improve the dire humanitarian situation in the Central African nation.

The two sides have been holding mediated talks for months, and signed a truce deal in July that must still be subjected to more negotiations over exactly how it will be implemented.

Addressing a press conference in Doha on Saturday, Qatar’s Minister of State Mohammed bin Abdulaziz Al-Khulaifi said the latest agreement enhances the process in order to “find peaceful solutions through dialogue and understanding” to re-establish calm in the DRC.

He said the different sides achieved progress on several substantial topics in order to build on previous agreements discussed and signed over the past several months.

The agreement includes eight implementation protocols, two of which have already been signed, including one on ceasefire monitoring and another on prisoner exchange.

The rest of the protocols are expected to be discussed and finalised over the coming weeks. They will include a timeline as well as details on how different processes will work, how humanitarian aid will be allowed to reach the ailing population, and how to enable the return of refugees and internally displaced people.

Restoring state authority, implementing economic reforms, reintegration of armed groups into the government and the elimination of foreign groups are among other protocols that will need to be finalised.

Both sides have agreed to establish an independent committee to implement the peace process, and also to provide recommendations for recompensation within the framework of national reconciliation, which will be in line with the constitution of the republic, Qatar’s Al-Khulaifi said.

Massad Boulos, a senior advisor and envoy for US President Donald Trump who represented Washington in the talks, thanked the state of Qatar and other stakeholders who assisted the process, including the African Union and the state of Togo.

He told the conference in Doha that the agreement comes amid joint efforts with Qatar that have also yielded results in other areas, including the ceasefire deal reached between Israel and Hamas.

“Today is a historic occasion in many ways,” he said, referring to the framework deal on DRC as a “launching pad” for an eventual peace deal that will be built based on previous and ongoing negotiations.

“People were expecting some immediate results on the ground, but this is a process, this is not a light switch that you can turn on and off, and there are many angles to it,” Boulos said.

Reporting from Goma, Al Jazeera’s Alain Uakyani said the peace agreement has inspired hope among the population in the DRC, but not for any immediate and tangible changes on the ground.

He pointed out that the M23 said its forces were bombarded by the government on Saturday morning, but managed to take more ground from DRC soldiers.

Officials said the suspension related to broadcasts about an ongoing blockade that has caused major fuel shortages.

Mali’s media regulator has suspended French broadcasters LCI and TF1 over allegedly broadcasting false information on a fuel blockade imposed by an al-Qaeda linked armed group.

TF1 is a French commercial television station that broadcasts in several countries, and LCI, La Chaine Info, is a French free-to-air news channel that is also part of the TF1 group.

Mali’s High Authority for Communication (HAC) said in a letter to image distributors in Mali, dated November 13 and made public on Friday, that it had suspended TF1 and LCI, claiming the two private TV channels had made “unverified claims and falsehoods” in a broadcast on November 9.

“LCI and TF1 television services have been removed from your packages until further notice,” the document read.

The letter said the authority disputed three passages in broadcasts by the two channels, specifically that “the junta has banned the sale of fuel,” “[the regions of] Kayes and Nioro are completely under blockade,” and “the terrorists are now close to bringing down the capital [Bamako].”

The channels have not been accessible in Mali since Thursday evening, a journalist for the AFP news agency reported.

Since September, the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) group, linked to al-Qaeda and primarily operating in Mali, has imposed a blockade on fuel entering the landlocked country, by sealing off major highways used by tankers to transport fuel from neighbouring Senegal and the Ivory Coast.

In recent weeks, fuel shortages caused by the blockade have created long lines at gas stations and further deteriorated the security situation in the country.

Several Western embassies, notably those of the United States and France, have asked their citizens to leave Mali.

Mali, alongside its neighbours Niger and Burkina Faso, is governed by military leaders who took power by force in recent years, pledging to provide more security to citizens.

But the security situation in the Sahel has worsened since the militaries took power, analysts say, with a record number of attacks and civilians killed both by armed groups and government forces.

All three countries have withdrawn from regional and international organisations in recent months, while forming their own bloc known as the Alliance of Sahel States.

The three West African countries have also wound back defence cooperation with Western powers, most notably their former colonial ruler, France, in favour of closer ties with Russia, including Niger nationalising a uranium mine previously operated by French nuclear firm Orano.

Within the three countries, the military governments are fighting armed groups that control swaths of territory and have staged attacks on army posts.

Human Rights Watch and other advocacy groups have accused the fighters, the military and partner forces of Burkina Faso and Mali of possible atrocities.

The UN Security Council says further extensions would hinge on real progress between Sudan and South Sudan.

The United Nations Security Council has voted to renew a UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), the peacekeeping mission in the oil-rich disputed region between Sudan and South Sudan, for another year.

A 12-0 vote late on Friday, which saw Russia, China and Pakistan abstain, extended the mission until November 2026, but warned that progress on ending bloody fighting in the region would be crucial to any potential future extensions.

The United States submitted the draft resolution that renewed the mandate, which was due to expire on November 15, and said it “negotiated this draft in good faith, asking only for reasonable and common-sense benchmarks for this mission”.

Friday’s resolution stated that further renewal would be based on “demonstrable progress” by Sudan and South Sudan, including the creation of a joint police force for Abyei and the complete demilitarisation of the region, as agreed upon by the two sides in 2011 when South Sudan gained independence.

The 4,000 police and soldiers of UNISFA are tasked with protecting civilians in the region plagued by frequent armed clashes.

UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres is now tasked with presenting a report by August 2026 on whether Sudan and South Sudan have made any tangible progress, which would also enable the Security Council to assess the consequences of reducing the peacekeeping force.

“These benchmarks will help describe the mission’s impact and provide a critical tool to hold host governments accountable for measurable progress,” said US representative Dorothy Shea.

UNISFA is a small but politically sensitive mission, operating in a region where clashes have displaced thousands and humanitarian access has often been constrained by a lack of security and dangerous road conditions.

Unrest in the disputed area with South Sudan also continues at a time when Sudan is devastated by a civil war that erupted in April 2023, when two generals started fighting over control of the country.

Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which have been committing atrocities in Darfur and other regions, have also been active in Abyei.

A resident of the Gaza Strip, who is one of 153 Palestinians that landed in South Africa without the correct paperwork this week, says the group did not know where they would end up when they left Israel.

Loay Abu Saif, who fled Gaza with his wife and children, told Al Jazeera on Friday that the journey out of the battered and besieged enclave was a “trip of suffering”.

“We were not too convinced that any group … would be able to make this kind of evacuation,” Abu Saif said from Johannesburg, a day after the chartered plane his group was on landed at the city’s OR Tambo International Airport.

“I can say I feel safe … which means a lot for Palestinians, especially for those in Gaza,” he added.

Details are slowly emerging of a controversial transit scheme run by a non-profit, through which activists say Israel is encouraging the displacement of Palestinians out of Gaza by helping them settle in other countries.

Based on Abu Saif’s testimony to Al Jazeera, the Israeli military appears to have facilitated his group’s transfer through an Israeli airport.

The flight carrying Abu Saif left Israel’s Ramon Airport and transited through Nairobi, Kenya, before landing in Johannesburg on Thursday morning, where authorities did not initially allow the passengers to disembark as the Palestinians did not have departure stamps from Israel on their documents.

All in all, the journey lasted more than 24 hours and involved a change of planes.

Abu Saif said his family left Gaza without knowing their final destination. They only learned they were bound for Johannesburg when boarding their connecting flight in Nairobi.

Al Jazeera’s Nour Odeh, reporting from Amman, Jordan, on Friday, said Israel was yet to comment on the issue, but it was unlikely the Palestinians who left did so without “Israeli coordination”.

“Nobody can approach that imaginary yellow line [in Gaza] without being shot at. These people had to be bused through the yellow line, through the 53 percent of Gaza that the Israeli army still controls and is operating in out of Gaza, through Israel to the Ramon airport,” she reported.

Uncertainty loomed

According to Abu Saif, his wife registered the family with a nonprofit called Al-Majd Europe, with headquarters in Germany with an office in Jerusalem, according to their website.

The group advertised the registration form on social media, he revealed. On how he was selected, Abu Saif said the process appeared to focus on families with children and required a valid Palestinian travel document, along with security clearance from Israel.

“This is all what I know about the criteria,” he said.

When asked whether he knew in advance when they would leave Gaza, he said no timelines were given.

“They told us … we will inform you one day before – that’s what happened,” he said, adding that the organisation told them not to carry any personal bags or luggage except relevant documents.

In terms of cost, people were charged about $1,400-$2,000 per person for the trip, Abu Saif said. Parents also paid the same fee per child or baby they carried with them.

After they were selected to leave, Abu Saif and his family were taken by bus from the southern Gaza city of Rafah to the Karem Abu Salem crossing (called Kerem Shalom in Israel), along the border with Israel, where they underwent checks before being transferred onward towards Israel’s Ramon Airport.

He said their travel documents were not stamped by Israeli authorities, but he thought it was just a routine procedure since there were no Palestinian border officials in Gaza.

“We realised the problem … when we reached South Africa and they were asking us … ‘Where are you coming from?’” Abu Saif said.

Future plans

The group that organised the trip, Al-Majd Europe, said they would be able to help his family for a week or two, after which they would be on their own, Abu Saif said.

However, he added that the evacuees had made their own plans going forward.

“They have their papers for Australia, Indonesia, or Malaysia. We can say that 30 percent of the total number of passengers left South Africa on the same day or within the first two days,” he said, while others may choose to stay for several reasons, including receiving treatment.

South African authorities reported that of the 153 Palestinians who landed on Thursday, 130 entered the country, while 23 transferred to other destinations.

“People have calculated that the cost of life in any country … will be cheaper compared to the cost of living in Gaza,” said Abu Saif.

Questions have been raised over how hundreds of Palestinians were able to leave Gaza, board a plane in Israel, and arrive in South Africa without departure stamps in their passports or indication of their intended destination.

Cape Town, South Africa – On an August evening in 1977, 30‑year‑old Steve Biko was on his way back from an aborted secret meeting with an anti-apartheid activist in Cape Town, taking the 12‑hour drive back home to King William’s Town. But it was a journey the resistance fighter would never finish, for he was arrested and, less than a month later, was dead.

Against the backdrop of increasingly harsh racist laws in South Africa, Biko, a bold and forthright youth leader, had emerged as one of the loudest voices calling for change and Black self-determination.

A famously charming and eloquent speaker, he was often touted as Nelson Mandela’s likely successor in the struggle for freedom after the core of the anti-apartheid leadership was jailed in the 1960s.

But his popularity also made him a prime target of the apartheid regime, which put him under banning orders that severely restricted his movement, political activities, and associations; imprisoned him for his political activism; and ultimately caused his death in detention – a case that continues to resonate decades later, largely because none of the perpetrators have ever been brought to justice.

On September 12 this year, 48 years after Biko died, South Africa’s Justice Minister Mmamoloko Kubayi ordered a new inquest into his death. The hearing resumed at the Eastern Cape High Court on Wednesday before being postponed to January 30.

There are “two persons of interest” implicated in Biko’s death who are still alive, according to the country’s National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), which aims to determine whether there is enough evidence that he was murdered, and therefore grounds to prosecute his killers.

While Biko’s family has welcomed the hearings, the long wait for justice has been frustrating, especially for his children.

“There is no such thing as joy in dealing with the case of murder,” Nkosinathi Biko, Biko’s eldest son, who was six at the time of his father’s death, told Al Jazeera. “Death is full and final, and no outcome will be restorative of the lost life.”

The Biko inquest is one of several probes into suspicious apartheid-era deaths that South Africa’s justice minister reopened this year. The inquiries are part of the government’s plan to address past atrocities and provide closure to families of the deceased, the NPA says.

But analysts note that the inquest comes amid growing public pressure on the government to bring about the justice it promised 30 years ago, as a new judicial inquiry is also probing allegations that South Africa’s democratic government intentionally blocked prosecutions of apartheid-era crimes.

Biko: ‘The spark that lit a fire’

Steve Biko was a medical student and national youth leader who, in the late 1960s, pioneered the philosophy of Black Consciousness, which encouraged Black people to reclaim their pride and unity by rejecting racial oppression and valuing their own identity and culture.

The philosophy inspired a generation of young activists to take up the struggle against apartheid, pushed forward by the belief that South Africa’s future lay in a socialist economy with a more equal distribution of wealth.

In his writings, Biko said he was inspired by the African independence struggles that emerged in the 1950s and suggested that South Africa had yet to offer its “great gift” to the world: “a more human face”.

By 1972, Biko’s student organisation had spawned a political wing to unify various Black Consciousness groups under one voice. A year later, he was officially banned by the government. Yet, he continued to covertly expand his philosophy and political organising among youth movements across the country.

In August 1977, despite the banning order still being in effect, Biko had travelled to Cape Town with a fellow activist to meet another anti-apartheid leader, though the meeting was aborted over safety concerns, and the duo left.

According to some reports, Biko heavily disguised himself for the road journey back east, but his attempts at going unnoticed were to no avail: When the car reached the outskirts of King William’s Town on August 18, police stopped them at a roadblock – and Biko was discovered.

The two were taken into custody separately, with Biko arrested under the Terrorism Act and first held at a local police station in Port Elizabeth before being transferred to a facility in the same city where members of the police’s “special branch” – notorious for enforcing apartheid through torture and extrajudicial killings – were based. For weeks in detention, he was stripped and manacled and, as was later discovered, tortured.

On September 12, the apartheid authorities announced that Biko had died in detention in Pretoria, some 1,200km (746 miles) away from where he was arrested and held. The minister of justice and police alleged he had died following a hunger strike, a claim immediately decried as false, as Biko had previously publicly stated that if that was ever cited as a cause of his death, it would be a lie.

Weeks later, an independent autopsy conducted at the request of the Biko family found he had died of severe brain damage due to injuries inflicted during his detention. Following these revelations, authorities launched an investigation. But the inquest cleared the police of any wrongdoing.

Saths Cooper, who was a student activist alongside Biko, remembers the moment he found out about his friend’s death. Cooper was in an isolation block on Robben Island – the prison that also held Mandela – where he spent more than five years with other political prisoners who had taken part in the 1976 student revolt.

“The news stilled us into silence,” the 75-year-old told Al Jazeera, recalling Biko’s provocatively “Socratic” style of engagement and echoing Mandela’s description of Biko as an inspiration. “Living, he was the spark that lit a veld fire across South Africa,” Mandela said in 2002. “His message to the youth and students was simple and clear: Black is Beautiful! Be proud of your Blackness! And with that, he inspired our youth to shed themselves of the sense of inferiority they were born into as a result of more than 300 years of white rule.”

After initial shock at the news of Biko’s death, “then the questions flowed of what had occurred,” Cooper recalled, “to which we had no answers.”

About 20,000 people, including Black and white anti-apartheid activists and Western diplomats, attended Biko’s funeral in King Williams Town on September 25. The day included a five-hour service, powerful speeches and freedom songs. Though police disrupted the service and arrested some mourners, it marked the first large political funeral in South Africa.

His death sparked international condemnation, including expression of “concern” from Pretoria’s allies, the US and the UK. It also led to a United Nations arms embargo against South Africa in November 1977.

Three years later, the British singer Peter Gabriel released a song in his honour, and in 1987, his life was depicted in the film Cry Freedom, in which Biko was played by Denzel Washington.

Nevertheless, Biko’s stature did nothing to hasten justice.

‘The unfinished business of the TRC’

Under the apartheid regime, any further investigation into Biko’s death was effectively put to rest for decades following the official 1977 inquest.

Then in 1996, two years after the end of apartheid, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was set up to investigate past rights violations, with apartheid-era perpetrators given the opportunity to disclose their crimes and apply for amnesty from prosecution.

Former security police officers Major Harold Snyman, Captain Daniel Siebert, Warrant Officer Ruben Marx, Warrant Officer Jacobus Beneke and Sergeant Gideon Nieuwoudt – the five men suspected of killing Biko – applied for amnesty.

At TRC hearings the following year, the men said that Biko had died days after what they called “a scuffle” with the police at the Sanlam Building in Port Elizabeth, while he was held in shackles and handcuffs. Up to that point, the commission heard, Biko had spent several days in a cell – naked, they claimed, in order to prevent him from taking his life.

In the decades since, it’s come to light that after being badly beaten at the Sanlam Building on September 6 and 7, Biko suffered a brain haemorrhage and was examined by apartheid government doctors, who said they found nothing wrong with him. Days later, on September 11, the police decided to transfer him to a prison hospital hours away in Pretoria. Still naked and shackled, Biko was put in the back of a van and moved. Although he was examined in Pretoria, it was too late, and Biko died on September 12 alone in his cell.

Despite admitting to beating Biko with a hose pipe and noticing his disoriented, slurred speech, the former officers claimed at the TRC that they had no indication of the severity of his injuries. Therefore, they saw nothing wrong with transporting him 1,200km away.

Eventually, the men were denied amnesty in 1999, partly for their lack of full disclosure of the events that caused Biko’s death. The suspected killers, some of whom have since died, were recommended for prosecution by the commission.

However, like most TRC cases, the prosecutions never materialised.

“The Biko case, along with others, must be viewed as the delayed activation of the unfinished business of the TRC – a matter that is a national imperative if we are to instigate a culture of accountability in South Africa,” Nkosinathi, now 54, said of the reopened inquest into his father’s death.

Though the scope of the Biko inquest has not been publicly stated, Gabriel Crouse, a political analyst and fellow with the South African Institute for Race Relations, worries that it will not examine new evidence, but that its goal will simply be to decisively determine whether Biko was murdered.

If this is the case, it would leave many questions unresolved, he says. For example, who pressured the initial forensic pathologist to declare a hunger strike as the cause of death; who ordered Biko’s killing; and what was the official chain of command?

‘The worms are among us’

Although the Biko inquest has renewed hope among his family that some of the perpetrators of his death will finally be brought to justice, analysts warn that the process may reveal uncomfortable truths about the nation’s past – including possible collusion between South Africa’s current government and the apartheid regime.

Nkosinathi now heads a foundation that promotes his father’s legacy. He points out that it is only pressure on the government that brought about this moment.

Months before the Biko inquest reopened, President Cyril Ramaphosa ordered the establishment of a commission of inquiry into whether previous governments led by his African National Congress (ANC) party intentionally suppressed investigations and prosecutions of apartheid-era crimes.

His move in April came after 25 survivors and relatives of victims of apartheid-era crimes launched a court case against his government in January, seeking damages.

The allegations of probes being blocked go back more than a decade. In 2015, former national prosecutions chief Vusi Pikoli caused a stir when he submitted an affidavit in a court case about the death of anti-apartheid fighter Nokuthula Simelane, in which he blamed the stalled cases on senior government officials interfering in the work of the NPA.

Former President Thabo Mbeki, who was head of state during Pikoli’s tenure, has denied that any such political interference took place. But the judicial inquiry, announced in April and now under way, lists former senior officials among those it considers interested parties.

The inquiry will look at why so few of the 300 cases that the TRC referred to the NPA for prosecution, including Biko’s, have been investigated in the last two decades.

“That it has become necessary to have to look into such an allegation tells much about how the huge sacrifice that was made for our democracy has been betrayed,” Nkosinathi told Al Jazeera.

Cooper believes the delayed prosecutions are a result of a compromise made by the apartheid regime and the ANC to conceal one another’s offences, including alleged cases of freedom fighters colluding with the white minority government.

“It’s justice clearly denied,” Cooper said, adding that he once questioned TRC commissioners about why they had concealed the names of rumoured apartheid-era collaborators who went on to work in the new democratic government. “The response was, ‘Broer, it’ll open a can of worms,’” Cooper told Al Jazeera.

“I see one of the commissioners died, the other is around, and when I see him, I say, ‘There’s no more can of worms, the worms are among us.’”

Like Cooper, political analyst Crouse also believes some kind of “backdoor deal” was struck following the transition from apartheid to democracy in 1994.

Many political actors failed to apply for amnesty, he says, despite prima facie evidence of their guilt. “And so it became very apparent that white Afrikaner supremacists and Black ANC liberationists, some from both camps, had gotten together and said, ‘Let’s both keep each other’s secrets and go forward into the new South Africa on that basis,’” he said.

Pikoli’s 2015 affidavit seems to echo such analysis. In his document, Pikoli recalls a meeting in 2006, where former ministers grilled him about the prosecution of suspects implicated in the attempted murder of Mbeki’s former chief of staff, Frank Chikane. Pikoli does not specify what the ministers objected to but says it became clear they did not want the suspects prosecuted “due to their fear of opening the door to prosecutions of ANC members, including government officials.”

A plea bargain was struck with the suspects while Pikoli was on leave in July 2007, as part of which the suspects refused to reveal the masterminds behind the compilation of a hit-list targeting activists. Pikoli believes a court trial would have forced them to disclose more details.

‘A stress test’ for democratic South Africa

Mariam Jooma Carikci, an independent researcher who has written extensively about the failure of justice in the democratic era, believes the official inquiry into the hundreds of unprosecuted TRC cases, including Biko’s, is “a stress test” of democratic South Africa’s honesty.

“For three decades we treated reconciliation as an end in itself – truth commissions instead of prosecutions, memorials instead of justice,” she said.

She sees Biko’s ideas continuing to flourish in today’s student movements, for example, in the #FeesMustFall campaign that called for free university tuition and the decolonisation of education in 2015.

“You see his echo in decolonisation debates and student movements, but the truest honour is policy – land, work, education, healthcare – designed around human worth, not investor or political comfort,” Jooma Carikci said.

While the country waits to hear the outcomes of the Biko inquest and the wider TRC inquiry, Nkosinathi Biko remains haunted by constant reminders of his father.

His younger brother Samora, who recently turned 50, looks exactly like Biko, he says, but being only two at the time of his death, “he was unfortunate not to have had memories of his father because of what happened.”

Meanwhile, for the country in general, Nkosinathi sees connections between Biko’s death and the 2012 Marikana massacre, during which police shot and killed 34 striking miners – the highest death toll from police aggression in democratic South Africa.

In his mind, the image of police opening fire on unarmed protesting workers echoes the country’s dark history – a sign that the state brutality that ended his father’s life has spilled over into democratic South Africa.

IF you fancy African sunshine but less of the hustle and bustle from the likes of Marrakesh and Rabat, check out this alternative.

It still has everything you’d want from a visit, from historical sites to souks as well as lively festivals.

This is the city of Meknes in northern Morocco. It’s just 50 minutes away from Fez – and it’s much quieter.

For those who love history, Meknes has an interesting one as it was once the capital of Morocco.

During the late 17th and early 18th centuries, Sultan Moulay Ismail made it the capital of Morocco.

Meknes was transformed into a massive imperial city with palaces, fortifications, and monumental gates – lots of which still stand today.

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The Kasbah of Moulay Ismail was built during the 1600s and is one of the most popular sites for tourists to see in Meknes.

It’s still used as an occasional royal residence by the current King of Morocco.

The medina of Meknes is a UNESCO World Heritage Site in itself and according to VisitMorocco, is nicknamed the “Versailles of Morocco”.

Place El-Hedim has all kinds of shops with locals selling all sorts, from vases, plates to bracelets.

There are green spaces within the city too, from orchards to olive groves and vineyards.

Just outside of Meknes is a popular historical site, called Volubilis, a well-preserved Roman city, where tourists will find ruins of mosaics, and even a Triumphal Arch.

While Meknes is quieter than the likes of Fez because it generally has less tourists, that doesn’t mean there’s not much going on there.

In fact, Meknes holds festivals through the year, like Festival International de Volubilis des Musiques Traditionnelles du Monde – a big music festival.

This includes the International Festival of Animated Film and its own Fantasia festival which is a traditional Moroccan horse festival.

Like most of Morocco, Meknes is pretty warm throughout the year.

In November, there are highs of 30C and lows of 9C and little rainfall. The coldest month is generally January – but there can still be highs of 16C.

The hottest months are July and August, where the city can experience highs of 34C.

Meknes does not have its own airport as the closest is in Fez.

Brits can take direct flights to Fez in as little as three hours 20 minutes and journeys in November start from £17 with Ryanair.

It’s easy to get there from Rabat too, which you can fly to from the UK in a little over three hours.

From there you can get a direct train from Rabat to Meknes which takes around two hours and tickets cost as little as £5.50.

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Here’s a little more on other citiies in Morocco…

Marrakesh

From a bustling Medina, to activities in the desert, vibrant cafes and spice stalls, you can’t go wrong with Marrakesh.

The city in western Morocco is at the bottom of the Atlas Mountains and in the winter months offers warm weather and lots of sunshine.

Lisa Minot, Head of Sun Travel, went on a trip earlier this year and said: “I’ve spent a wonderful long weekend in Marrakech and the city is as exciting as ever.”

Agadir

Morocco doesn’t just offer city breaks, Agadir has incredible golden beaches. It’s known to be a premier resort destination with beautiful hotels and pristine pools.

Deputy Travel Editor Kara Godfrey visited Agadir last winter and enjoyed the much warmer weather of 25C.

Kara added: “The Moroccan city is home to the country’s largest market, Souk El Had, as well as a bustling harbour and modern marina. No wonder the North African country looks set to be a holiday hotspot as Brits look past Spain.”

Fez

Another lesser-visited city in Morocco is Fez. It’s found inland and has been referred to as the “country’s cultural capital”.

There’s plenty of shopping to be done in Fez at the Medina, which is the oldest in North Africa and a UNESCO World Heritage Site. It’s made up of over 9,000 alleys that are separated from the outside world by high walls. 

Inside you’ll find lots of food, leathers, handmade rugs and hand-painted ceramics.

Tangier

The city at the very tip of Morocco is Tangier – on a clear day, you can even see Spain across the Strait of Gibraltar.

Tangier has been a major trade centre for thousands of years thanks to its location and busy port.

Visitors can learn about its interesting history with a guided tour, and wander through Kasbah, the walled part of the city full of tiny streets and alleys.

Kasbah has been used for Hollywood movies including James Bond and the Bourne film series.

For more on Morocco, read more about Head of Sun Travel Lisa Minot’s trip to Marrakesh.

Plus check out this peaceful African city right by the sea that feels ‘more like Europe’ – but tourists always miss it.

In a remote and silent region, thousands of innocent lives have been lost for the sake of a country’s interests. The silence of Sudan has become a global tragedy, with more than 60,000 people killed and more than 11 million displaced. Yet the world seems silent and mute, as if they are ‘invisible.’

Is empathy for a life that is not recognized by digital algorithms so low?

This question seems to haunt me every time I open social media. I see many people around me who do not even know what is happening in Sudan. Their social media timelines never show any news or posts about it, as if nothing is happening. In fact, thousands of lives are lost there every day. This shows that digital empathy is highly controlled by algorithms on social media, which determine what should be visible and what should be left to sink into silence.

During a class discussion a few days ago, I realized that to attract empathy from the digital community, conflicts and global issues are influenced by hashtags used by prominent figures on social media. When they raise the issue of Gaza, the whole world will talk about it, so that issues that are invisible to them, such as Sudan, will never be seen by algorithms and will have an impact on the digital empathy of the community.

In her study, Zeynep Tufekci (2017) states that social media algorithms create filter bubbles, where users are exposed to information that confirms their views, while alternative views are ignored. This further shows that digital empathy is highly controlled by algorithms on social media. Thus, when information does not align with the algorithms and their behavior on social media, it is ignored. In other words, the digital world creates inequality in the space of empathy, where certain issues, such as Sudan, which are not included in social media algorithms, will remain buried and forgotten because they do not meet the logic of virality.

This phenomenon not only reveals the weakness of digital empathy but also how it shapes the hierarchy of humanity in the digital space. Safiya Umoja Noble (2018), in The Algorithm of Oppression, argues that social media algorithms are not neutral but refer to the interests within them. Social media search engines prioritize certain issues and promote websites that lead to a set of biased algorithms, ignoring issues that should be of global concern. As a result, a hierarchy of global empathy towards certain issues is formed, whereby issues that do not align with economic or political interests, such as Sudan, will never gain traction in the global arena.

The impact of this algorithmic bias is very real. The conflict in Sudan is an extreme example of the existence of a ‘Digital Empathy Hierarchy’ where only issues that receive a lot of response are considered important, while issues that do not receive much response and global attention are easily ignored. Hashtags such as #AllEyesOnRafah managed to capture the world’s attention, while hashtags such as #Sudan and #Sudanese only received brief attention and then disappeared into silence. In fact, the suffering in Sudan is no less tragic than what is being widely discussed, but the public seems to turn a blind eye, creating injustice in the digital space and allowing empathy to be controlled by invisible algorithms.

The agenda-setting theory states that the media can shape public opinion by determining which issues receive the most attention. It has been widely studied and applied to various forms of media, which easily gain global attention and are considered important by the international community. However, when issues in Sudan are not reported, people consider them unimportant, and the media agenda for Sudan is low, resulting in a low public agenda for Sudanese issues.

Sociologist Zygmunt Bauman (1993) states that moral distance causes people to lack a sense of responsibility to care about the suffering of others who are geographically and symbolically distant from them. This moral distance creates digital inequality because algorithms are increasingly widening, making it easy to dismiss information that does not attract mass attention. This imbalance in empathy and morality reflects the worsening humanitarian reality in Sudan. According to the OCHA report (2025), Sudan is facing the worst crisis in its history, with 30.4 million people, more than half of Sudan’s population, in dire need of humanitarian aid. Of that number, 16 million are children who are Sudan’s future generation. However, despite the large number of victims, Sudan remains invisible and neglected by a world that seems to prefer to remain silent.

Data from DataReportal (2025) shows that Sudan had 3.68 million social media users in January 2025, equivalent to 7.2 percent of the total population. Digital access in Sudan is indeed open and increasing, but the volume of discussion about Sudan is very small and even inaudible. This further proves that there is a paradox in the digital world, where the more connected humans are, the more disconnected they become from real empathy. This humanitarian crisis requires a response and support from the global media, but as long as everything is determined by algorithmic biases that are considered uninteresting to gain global attention and international support, then hundreds of lives lost and the suffering of the Sudanese people will be lost in silence and invisibility.

If issues that are considered important are only viewed in terms of their magnitude and depend on digital hierarchy algorithms, then humanity’s morals are declining. International organizations controlled by countries with political interests are increasingly eager to create narratives that seem to say that an issue is considered unimportant because it does not benefit them. This pattern slows down the response of international organizations in addressing issues due to digital inequality that creates a hierarchy that will continue to exist, leaving those who are suffering further behind and forgotten.

Many Sudanese people are waiting for hope and support from the global community, but they seem indifferent and uncaring towards the suffering experienced by Sudan. Even in classroom learning, issues that are not widely discussed on social media are often not discussed, and this is very much at odds with the sense of humanity that should be fundamental to international relations students.

As an international relations student, I understand that in this world, everything is determined by interests, power, and algorithms that appear in digital media. Conflicts that are ‘uninteresting’ in the digital space become irrelevant to those with political interests. However, we have a responsibility to eliminate this inequality and moral decline. If social media cannot create algorithms to raise these issues, then we must be the ones to take the lead in continuing to voice these issues in public until the world realizes that there are important issues that must be raised.

Because in truth, Sudan is not invisible, but we are the ones who choose not to see it.

Al-Qaeda-linked group JNIM has besieged Mali’s capital, Bamako, cutting off key routes and causing severe fuel shortages. Al Jazeera’s Virginia Pietromarchi explains how the group is tightening its grip despite the military government’s promises of security. Here’s what we know.

The Confederation of African Football (CAF) playoffs begin on Thursday with four teams – Cameroon, Gabon, Nigeria, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo – slugging it out to decide which nation will progress to the FIFA intercontinental playoff tournament in March, which is the final hurdle for qualification into the World Cup 2026 in North America.

The four teams were the best runners-up across the nine African qualifying groups – and the playoff winner will keep alive their nation’s hopes of becoming the continent’s 10th representative at next year’s finals.

Here is all to know about the CAF playoffs:

Where are the African playoffs being held?

Morocco’s capital Rabat will host the African World Cup playoffs, using three different stadiums for the three matches.

Al Barid Stadium and Moulay El Hassan Stadium will be used for the semifinals.

The newly built Prince Moulay Abdellah Stadium, which will host the upcoming Africa Cup of Nations (AFCON) final on January 18, will be the venue for the CAF playoff final.

What time do the African playoff matches start?

The two sudden-death semifinal playoffs will be played at the following times:

• Nigeria vs Gabon: Thursday, November 13 at 5pm (16:00 GMT) at Moulay El Hassan Stadium
• Cameroon vs Congo DR: Thursday, November 13 at 8pm (19:00 GMT) at Al Barid Stadium

The winner-take-all final will be played at the following time:

• CAF final (Teams TBD): Sunday, November 16 at 8pm local (19:00 GMT) at Prince Moulay Abdellah Stadium

How was the draw made for the CAF playoff matches?

The draw was based on the current FIFA world rankings of the four teams as of October 17.

Nigeria was ranked highest (#41), followed by Cameroon (#54), Congo DR (#60) and Gabon (#77).

Based on the rankings, FIFA implemented a No.1 (Nigeria) vs No.4 seed (Gabon) matchup for the first semifinal and a No.2 (Cameroon) vs No.3 (Congo DR) second semi.

What does the African playoff winner still need to do for World Cup qualification?

The winner of Sunday’s CAF playoff must still overcome teams from other continents in a FIFA intercontinental playoff scheduled for March in Mexico to decide the final two qualifiers for the World Cup.

The intercontinental playoff will feature two teams from the Confederation of North, Central America and Caribbean Association Football (CONCACAF) and one team apiece from the Asian Football Confederation (AFC), South American Football Confederation (CONMEBOL) and the Oceania Football Confederation (OFC).

How many African nations have already qualified for the FIFA World Cup 2026?

Nine African countries have already qualified via direct entry from the CAF group stage: Algeria, Cape Verde, Egypt, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Morocco, Senegal, South Africa, and Tunisia.

When and where is the FIFA World Cup 2026?

The tournament is being staged across the United States, Canada and Mexico. The first match will be played in Mexico City on June 11, while the final will be staged in New Jersey, the US, on July 19.

Due to the expansion of the tournament – from 32 teams to 48 – the 39-day event is the longest in its history.

What are the African squads for the CAF playoffs?

⚽ Cameroon:

Goalkeepers: 
Andre Onana (Trabzonspor, Turkiye), Devis Epassy (Dinamo Bucuresti, Romania), Simon Omossola (Saint-Eloi Lupopo, Congo)

Defenders: 
Michael Ngadeu-Ngadjui (Beijing Guoan, China), Nouhou Tolo (Seattle Sounders, US), Jean-Charles Castelletto (Al-Duhail, Qatar), Jackson Tchatchoua (Wolverhampton Wanderers, England), Darlin Yongwa (Lorient, France), Flavien Enzo Boyomo (Osasuna, Spain), Aboubakar Nagida (Rennes, France), Malcom Bokele (Goztepe, Turkiye)

Midfielders: 
Frank Anguissa (Napoli, Italy), Martin Hongla (Granada, Spain), Jean Onana (Genoa, Italy), Yvan Neyou (Getafe, Spain), Carlos Baleba (Brighton & Hove Albion, England), Arthur Avom (Lorient, France), Wilitty Younoussa (Rodez, France)

Forwards: 
Vincent Aboubakar (c) (Azerbaijan Neftci, Azerbaijan), Eric Maxim Choupo-Moting (New York Red Bulls, US), Moumi Ngamaleu (Dynamo Moscow, Russia), Christian Bassogog (Al-Okhdood, Saudi Arabia), Bryan Mbeumo (Manchester United, England), Georges-Kevin Nkoudou (Diriyah, Saudi Arabia), Frank Magri (Toulouse, France), Danny Namaso (Auxerre, France), Patrick Soko (Almeria, Spain), Karl Etta Eyong (Levante, Spain)

⚽ Congo DR:

Goalkeepers:
Matthieu Epolo (Standard Liege, Belgium), Timothy Fayulu (Noah, Armenia), Lionel Mpasi (Le Havre, France)

Defenders:
Rocky Bushiri (Hibernian, Scotland), Gedeon Kalulu (Aris Limassol, Cyprus), Steve Kapuadi (Legia Warsaw, Poland), Joris Kayembe (Racing Genk, Belgium), Arthur Masuaku (Sunderland, England), Chancel Mbemba (Olympique de Marseille, France), Axel Tuanzebe (Burnley, England), Aaron Wan-Bissaka (West Ham United, England)

Midfielders:
Theo Bongonda (Spartak Moscow, Russia), Michel-Ange Balikwisha (Glasgow Celtic, Scotland), Edo Kayembe (Watford, England), Nathanael Mbuku (Montpellier, France), Samuel Moutoussamy (Atromitos, Greece), Ngal’ayel Mukau (Lille, France), Charles Pickel (Espanyol, Spain), Noah Sadiki (Sunderland, England), Mario Stroeykens (Anderlecht, Belgium)

Forwards: 
Cedric Bakambu (Real Betis, Spain), Samuel Essende (Augsburg, Germany), Brian Cipenga (Castellon, Spain), Meshack Elia (Alanyaspor, Turkiye), Fiston Mayele (Pyramids, Egypt).

⚽ Gabon:

Goalkeepers: 
Francois Junior Bekale (Hafia, Guinea), Loyce Mbaba (Stella d’Adjame, Ivory Coast), Lukas Mounguenou (Paris Saint-Germain, France), Demba Anse Ngoubi (Mosta, Malta)

Defenders: 
Aaron Appindangoye (Sivasspor, Turkiye), Jonathan do Marcolino (Bourg-en-Bresse, France), Jacques Ekomie (Angers, France), Bruno Ecuele Manga (Paris 13 Atletico, France), Yannis Mbemba (FC Dordrecht, Netherlands), Johan Obiang (Orleans, France), Mike Kila Onfia (Hafia, Guinea), Anthony Oyono and Jeremy Oyono (both Frosinone, Italy)

Midfielders: 
Oumar Samake Nze Bagnama (Stade Abdijan, Ivory Coast), Eric Bocoum (Gol Gohar, Iran), Guelor Kanga (Esenler Erokspor, Turkiye), Mario Lemina (Galatasaray, Turkiye), Didier Ndong (Esteghlal, Iran), Andre Biyogho Poko (Amed, Turkiye)

Forwards: 
Pierre-Emerick Aubameyang (Olympique de Marseille, France), Teddy Averlant (Amiens, France), Denis Bouanga (Los Angeles FC, US), Alan do Marcolino (Lusitania Lourosa, Portugal), Randy Essang Matouti (Khenchela, Algeria), Noha Lemina (Yverdon Sport, Switzerland), Bryan Meyo (Oympique Lyonnais, France)

⚽ Nigeria:

Goalkeepers:
Stanley Nwabali (Chippa United, South Africa), Amas Obasogie (Singida Blackstars, Tanzania), Maduka Okoye (Udinese, Italy)

Defenders:
Chidozie Awaziem (Nantes, France), Semi Ajayi (Hull City, England), Calvin Bassey (Fulham, England), Benjamin Fredericks (Dender, Belgium), Bruno Onyemaechi (Olympiakos, Greece), Bright Osayi-Samuel (Birmingham City, England), Zaidu Sanusi (FC Porto, Portugal), William Troost-Ekong (Al-Kholood, Saudi Arabia)

Midfielders:
Alex Iwobi (Fulham, England), Wilfred Ndidi (Besiktas, Turkiye), Raphael Onyedika (Club Brugge, Belgium), Frank Onyeka (Brentford, England), Alhassan Yusuf (New England Revolution, US)

Forwards:
Akor Adams (Sevilla, Spain), Tolu Arokodare (Wolverhampton Wanderers, England), Samuel Chukwueze (Fulham, England), Chidera Ejuke (Sevilla, Spain), Ademola Lookman (Atalanta, Italy), Olakunle Olusegun (Nizhny Novgorod, Russia), Victor Osimhen (Galatasaray, Turkiye), Moses Simon (Paris FC, France)

CAPE TOWN, South Africa — President Trump says that his government will boycott the Group of 20 summit this month in South Africa over his claims that a white minority group there is being violently persecuted. Those claims have been widely rejected.

Trump announced Friday on social media that no U.S. government official will attend the Nov. 22-23 summit in Johannesburg “as long as these Human Rights abuses continue.” South Africa’s Black-led government has been a regular target for Trump since he returned to office.

In February, Trump issued an executive order stopping U.S. financial assistance to South Africa, citing its treatment of the Afrikaner white minority. His administration has also prioritized Afrikaners for refugee status in the U.S. and says they will be given most of the 7,500 places available this fiscal year.

The South African government — and some Afrikaners themselves — say Trump’s claims of persecution are baseless.

Descendants of European settlers

Afrikaners are South Africans who are descended mainly from Dutch but also French and German colonial settlers who first came to the country in the 17th century.

Afrikaners were at the heart of the apartheid system of white minority rule from 1948-94, leading to decades of hostility between them and South Africa’s Black majority. But Afrikaners are not a homogenous group, and some fought against apartheid. There are an estimated 2.7 million Afrikaners in South Africa’s population of 62 million.

Afrikaners are divided over Trump’s claims. Some say they face discrimination, but a group of leading Afrikaner business figures and academics said in an open letter last month that “the narrative that casts Afrikaners as victims of racial persecution in post-apartheid South Africa” is misleading.

Afrikaners’ Dutch-derived language is widely spoken in South Africa and is one of the country’s 12 official languages. Afrikaners are represented in every aspect of society. Afrikaners are some of South Africa’s richest entrepreneurs and some of its most successful sports stars, and also serve in government. Most are largely committed to South Africa’s multiracial democracy.

Trump claims they’re being ‘killed and slaughtered’

Trump asserted that Afrikaners “are being killed and slaughtered, and their land and farms are being illegally confiscated.” The president’s comments are in reference to a relatively small number of attacks on Afrikaner farmers that he and others claim are racially motivated.

Trump has also pointed to a highly contentious law introduced by the South African government that allows land to be appropriated from private owners without compensation. Some Afrikaners fear that law is aimed at removing them from their land in favor of South Africa’s poor Black majority. Many South Africans, including opposition parties, have criticized the law, but it hasn’t led to land confiscations.

Trump first made baseless claims of widespread killing of white South African farmers and land seizures during his first term in response to allegations aired on conservative media personality Tucker Carlson’s former show on Fox News. Trump ordered then-U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to look into the allegations, but nothing came of any investigation.

South Africa rejects the claims

The South African government said in response to Trump’s social media post that his claims were “not substantiated by fact.” It has said that Trump’s criticism of South Africa over Afrikaners is a result of misinformation because it misses the context that Black farmers and farmworkers are also killed in rural attacks, which make up a tiny percentage of the country’s high violent crime rate.

There were more than 26,000 homicides in South Africa in 2024. Of those, 37 were farm murders, according to an Afrikaner lobby group that tracks them. Experts on rural attacks in South Africa have said the overriding motive for the violent farm invasions is robbery, not race.

Other pressure on South Africa

Trump said it is a “total disgrace” that the G-20 summit — a meeting of the leaders of the 19 top rich and developing economies, the European Union and the African Union — is being held in South Africa. He had already said he wouldn’t attend, and Vice President JD Vance was due to go in his place. The U.S. will take on the rotating presidency of the G-20 after South Africa.

Trump also said in a speech last week that South Africa should be thrown out of the G-20.

Trump’s criticism of Africa’s most developed economy has gone beyond the issue of Afrikaners. His executive order in February said South Africa had taken “aggressive positions towards the United States and its allies,” specifically with its decision to accuse Israel of genocide against Palestinians in Gaza at the United Nations’ top court.

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio boycotted a G-20 foreign ministers meeting in South Africa in February after deriding the host country’s G-20 slogan of “solidarity, equality and sustainability” as “DEI and climate change.”

Imray writes for the Associated Press.

When e-commerce company Jumia wanted to go public in 2019, Africa’s most celebrated start-up didn’t list in Lagos, Nairobi, Kigali or Johannesburg. It went to New York instead. That tells you everything about Africa’s start-up problem: It’s not a money problem; it’s an exit problem.

African entrepreneurs can build world-class businesses, but investors hesitate because they cannot see how or when they will get their money back. Initial public offerings (IPOs) remain extremely rare, and most exits take the form of trade sales – often unpredictable and slow to clear. Our stock exchanges offer little comfort either with liquidity outside the largest firms still limited.

Start-ups here can remain “start-ups” for decades with no clear path to maturity.

By contrast, Silicon Valley hums along because everyone knows the playbook: build fast, scale up and within five to seven years either list on an exchange or get acquired. Investors know they will not be stuck forever. That certainty, not just the capital, drives the flow of billions.

If Africa wants its tech ecosystems to thrive, we need a parallel play alongside any new funds. Yes, let’s mobilise sovereign wealth, pensions, banks and guarantees. But equally, let’s change the rules of the game. Let’s build an exit clarity framework that gives investors confidence.

That means fast-track “growth IPO lanes” on our exchanges with lighter costs and simpler disclosures. It means standardised merger templates that guarantee regulatory reviews within clear time limits.

It means regulated secondary markets where early investors and employees can sell shares before an IPO.

It means modernising employee stock ownership rules so talent can build wealth too.

And it means creating anchor-exit facilities where big domestic players like South Africa’s Public Investments Corporation or IDC commit to buy into IPOs with risk-sharing from development partners.

The evidence shows why these matter. More than 80 percent of startup funding in Africa comes from abroad. African unicorns are overwhelmingly funded by foreign venture capital, with several having foreign co-founders or being incorporated outside the continent. This means exits and wealth creation largely flow offshore. When global shocks hit, whether interest rate hikes in Washington or political turmoil in Europe, our ventures shake.

On the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, small-cap boards make up only a sliver of daily trading activity, underscoring how limited liquidity is outside the blue chips.

In Kenya, the Growth Enterprise Market Segment, set up to serve fast-growing firms, has struggled to gain traction with only five companies currently listed as of 2024 – more than a decade after its 2013 launch.

To be sure, there are those who will argue that exits already exist: Trade sales are happening, holding periods in Africa are shorter than in many markets and capital is trickling in regardless.

That is true, but partial. Trade sales can be an option, but they are often unpredictable. Regulatory approvals take time, and deal terms are not always transparent enough for investors to build them confidently into their models.

This is not a system that inspires confidence from our own pension funds or sovereign wealth managers.

The response, then, is not to simply wait for more money to arrive but to fix the structures that govern its movement. If we could walk into investor meetings and say, “Here’s the pipeline of companies. Here’s the capital vehicle, and here is a clear five-year exit pathway,” we could shift the conversation entirely.

We could make African innovation not only attractive to foreign investors but also bankable for African ones. South Africa is uniquely positioned to lead this change. It has deep capital markets, capable regulators and institutional pools of capital looking for new growth opportunities.

The ask is not just to invest in start-ups but to invest in a new rulebook that makes exits real. If we succeed, we will have built more than another fund. We will have built a system that recycles African savings into African innovation, creating African wealth.

For too long, the debate has been framed around scarcity of money. But the truth is less about scarcity and more about certainty. Investors do not only chase returns. They chase predictable exits. Without exits, funds hesitate. With exits, funds multiply.

So, yes, let us mobilise capital and launch new funds. But let us also do the harder, braver thing: change the rules, not just the money. That is how we ensure our unicorns aren’t built on foreign capital alone. That is how we give our own savers and pensioners a stake in Africa’s growth.

And that is how we finally write a new playbook under which African innovation, African capital and African ownership all run on the same page because, in the end, the real lesson of Jumia is not that Africa cannot produce billion-dollar start-ups. It is that until we change the rules of exit, we risk exporting the wealth that should be owned and grown at home.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial policy.

Fighters affiliated with al-Qaeda have blocked fuel deliveries to Mali’s capital for two months, bringing the city of Bamako to a standstill.

They’ve sealed off the highways that tankers use to transport fuel from neighbouring Senegal and the Ivory Coast. This has put pressure on the landlocked Sahel country and its military government.

The scale of the blockade, and its impact, show just how much influence the armed group wields. So, are al-Qaeda-linked fighters trying to take power in Mali? And what does that mean for the battle against armed groups in the Sahel region?

Presenter: Nick Clark

Guests:

Moussa Kondo – Executive director of the Sahel Institute

Oluwole Ojewale – Coordinator for West and Central Africa at the Institute for Security Studies

Nicolas Normand – France’s former ambassador to Mali, Senegal and the Republic of the Congo/Congo-Brazzaville