TODAY

Confusing messages about Britain’s budget are damaging the government’s credibility, according to investors, businesses, and think tanks. Bond prices fell after finance minister Rachel Reeves changed her stance regarding income tax. After suggesting that she might raise income tax to stick to her fiscal plans, a Financial Times report confirmed that she had decided against it, raising concerns about the government’s commitment to its fiscal promises.

Reeves’ initial comments during a pre-budget speech hinted at a possible income tax increase, which would contradict the Labour Party’s pledges for the upcoming 2024 election. Andrew Goodwin, chief UK economist at Oxford Economics, described the situation as a communication failure, especially after the government had already retracted welfare reforms earlier in the year, making many question their ability to make tough financial decisions.

A government official mentioned that a better forecast from the budget watchdog might allow the abandonment of the income tax plan, further undermining the credibility of the government’s financial assumptions. Ben Zaranko from the Institute for Fiscal Studies criticized the inconsistent messaging, stating that it reflects poorly on the policy-making process, which appears rushed and unstable.

Business leaders are worried about these mixed signals, fearing the budget may only include minor tax adjustments that introduce uncertainty for companies. Mohammad Jamei from the Confederation of British Industry emphasized that such unpredictability would lead businesses to delay investment decisions. A senior executive expressed frustration over the political implications of the situation.

Financial markets are also concerned about a return to inconsistent tax increases, with experts believing this could suggest a lack of support for the chancellor from her party. Jane Foley from Rabobank noted that Reeves’ changing statements have harmed her credibility, affecting the UK asset market negatively. Long-dated government bond yields rose significantly in response to these developments.

Investors are reminded of the economic turmoil caused by former Prime Minister Liz Truss’s policies, which still impact their confidence in the UK’s financial stability. Stephen Millard from the National Institute of Economic and Social Research suggested that Reeves needs to create a financial buffer to ensure stability and reduce speculation about the government’s fiscal policies, leading to clearer communication and more dependable budget planning.

With information from Reuters

A resident of the Gaza Strip, who is one of 153 Palestinians that landed in South Africa without the correct paperwork this week, says the group did not know where they would end up when they left Israel.

Loay Abu Saif, who fled Gaza with his wife and children, told Al Jazeera on Friday that the journey out of the battered and besieged enclave was a “trip of suffering”.

“We were not too convinced that any group … would be able to make this kind of evacuation,” Abu Saif said from Johannesburg, a day after the chartered plane his group was on landed at the city’s OR Tambo International Airport.

“I can say I feel safe … which means a lot for Palestinians, especially for those in Gaza,” he added.

Details are slowly emerging of a controversial transit scheme run by a non-profit, through which activists say Israel is encouraging the displacement of Palestinians out of Gaza by helping them settle in other countries.

Based on Abu Saif’s testimony to Al Jazeera, the Israeli military appears to have facilitated his group’s transfer through an Israeli airport.

The flight carrying Abu Saif left Israel’s Ramon Airport and transited through Nairobi, Kenya, before landing in Johannesburg on Thursday morning, where authorities did not initially allow the passengers to disembark as the Palestinians did not have departure stamps from Israel on their documents.

All in all, the journey lasted more than 24 hours and involved a change of planes.

Abu Saif said his family left Gaza without knowing their final destination. They only learned they were bound for Johannesburg when boarding their connecting flight in Nairobi.

Al Jazeera’s Nour Odeh, reporting from Amman, Jordan, on Friday, said Israel was yet to comment on the issue, but it was unlikely the Palestinians who left did so without “Israeli coordination”.

“Nobody can approach that imaginary yellow line [in Gaza] without being shot at. These people had to be bused through the yellow line, through the 53 percent of Gaza that the Israeli army still controls and is operating in out of Gaza, through Israel to the Ramon airport,” she reported.

Uncertainty loomed

According to Abu Saif, his wife registered the family with a nonprofit called Al-Majd Europe, with headquarters in Germany with an office in Jerusalem, according to their website.

The group advertised the registration form on social media, he revealed. On how he was selected, Abu Saif said the process appeared to focus on families with children and required a valid Palestinian travel document, along with security clearance from Israel.

“This is all what I know about the criteria,” he said.

When asked whether he knew in advance when they would leave Gaza, he said no timelines were given.

“They told us … we will inform you one day before – that’s what happened,” he said, adding that the organisation told them not to carry any personal bags or luggage except relevant documents.

In terms of cost, people were charged about $1,400-$2,000 per person for the trip, Abu Saif said. Parents also paid the same fee per child or baby they carried with them.

After they were selected to leave, Abu Saif and his family were taken by bus from the southern Gaza city of Rafah to the Karem Abu Salem crossing (called Kerem Shalom in Israel), along the border with Israel, where they underwent checks before being transferred onward towards Israel’s Ramon Airport.

He said their travel documents were not stamped by Israeli authorities, but he thought it was just a routine procedure since there were no Palestinian border officials in Gaza.

“We realised the problem … when we reached South Africa and they were asking us … ‘Where are you coming from?’” Abu Saif said.

Future plans

The group that organised the trip, Al-Majd Europe, said they would be able to help his family for a week or two, after which they would be on their own, Abu Saif said.

However, he added that the evacuees had made their own plans going forward.

“They have their papers for Australia, Indonesia, or Malaysia. We can say that 30 percent of the total number of passengers left South Africa on the same day or within the first two days,” he said, while others may choose to stay for several reasons, including receiving treatment.

South African authorities reported that of the 153 Palestinians who landed on Thursday, 130 entered the country, while 23 transferred to other destinations.

“People have calculated that the cost of life in any country … will be cheaper compared to the cost of living in Gaza,” said Abu Saif.

Questions have been raised over how hundreds of Palestinians were able to leave Gaza, board a plane in Israel, and arrive in South Africa without departure stamps in their passports or indication of their intended destination.

Swedish police say no information the Stockholm bus accident was an attack, without giving numbers of those killed.

Several people have been killed and injured when a bus hit a bus stop in central Stockholm, Swedish police said, adding that they had no information pointing to it being an attack.

There were six casualties in the incident on Friday, a spokesperson for Stockholm’s rescue services said, without giving the numbers of those killed and injured.

The spokesperson said there were no passengers on the bus at the time.

“It is being investigated as involuntary manslaughter. The bus driver has been arrested, but that is routine in such an incident,” a police spokesperson said.

Health authorities spokesperson Michelle Marcher told the AFP news agency that two seriously injured people had been transported to hospital.

Police said that several people were hit, but they were not immediately providing information on their number, gender or ages.

Ambulances, police and rescue services were working at the scene, they added.

A picture on daily Aftonbladet’s website showed emergency services at the site, surrounding a blue double-decker bus, with debris scattered around the vehicle.

The incident occurred near the Royal Institute of Technology university, police said.

‘Unreal’

A woman identified as Michelle Mac Key told the daily newspaper Expressen she stepped off another bus at the scene just after the accident happened.

“I crossed the road and saw the double-decker bus that had mowed down an entire bus stop queue,” she said. People were screaming and trying to help the injured.

She said she saw both injured and dead people lying on the ground. “There must have been more people under the bus,” she said.

A nurse by profession, she and another man who was a doctor, offered their help to police when they arrived.

“They told us to stand next to the dead bodies,” she said. “I thought it was an exercise at first. That maybe they were dolls. It was so unreal. Chaos.”

Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson said his thoughts were with the victims and their families.

“I have received the tragic news that several people have died and been injured at a bus stop in central Stockholm,” he wrote on X.

“People who might have been on their way home to family, friends, or a quiet evening at home. We do not yet know the cause, but right now my thoughts are primarily with those affected and their loved ones.”

China’s first super-sized Type 076 amphibious assault ship, the Sichuan, has left port for its first sea trials. The Type 076 is unlike any other big deck amphibious warship design globally, featuring an electromagnetically-powered catapult to support an air wing expected to include naval versions of the GJ-11 stealthy flying-wing uncrewed combat air vehicle (UCAV).

Sichuan, which has now also been assigned the hull number 51, left Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard in Shanghai on its maiden voyage earlier today. The ship, which is currently the only one of its type, has been under construction in that yard since at least 2023. A ceremony marking its launch was held on December 27, 2024, and it was actually floated for the first time in its basin sometime afterward.

“This sea trial will mainly test and verify the reliability and stability of the power, electrical, and other systems,” according to a release from China’s Ministry of National Defense. Since its launch, the ship “has successfully completed mooring tests and equipment installation and debugging, and has met the technical conditions for sea trials.”

There had already been signs in recent weeks of significant new progress on the final fitting out of Sichuan, including the painting of full markings on its flight deck.

Another image, seen in the social media post below, had emerged at the end of last month showing what is very likely a red-colored catapult test ‘truck’ on Sichuan‘s deck. This, in turn, had pointed to the start of testing of the ship’s lone catapult.

Shipbuilders and navies around the world, including China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and the U.S. Navy, have long used weighted trucks to test catapults on aircraft carriers as part of their construction or following maintenance. 

The video below shows testing of the catapults on the U.S. Navy’s supercarrier USS Gerald R. Ford using weighted trucks.

Overall, Sichuan represents a particularly notable development for the PLAN. Chinese officials have said the Type 076 displaces more than 40,000 metric tons (44,000 U.S. tons). TWZ has previously assessed that the ship is around 864 feet long and that it is some 141 feet wide (or 263 and nearly 43 meters, respectively). China’s previous Type 075 amphibious assault ships, of which there are now four in service, have a stated displacement of between 32,000 and 36,000 metric tons (35,000 to 40,000 U.S. tons) with a full load, and are just over 761 feet long and nearly 121 feet wide. Sichuan is also notably wider than other big deck amphibious warfare ships in service globally, including the U.S. Navy’s America class.

Sichuan‘s unusually wide flight deck is absolutely core to the design. Along with the ship’s two islands, this has long made clear the ship is heavily focused sustained flight operations. This will include fixed-wing types launched via the catapult at the bow end and recovered via some form of arresting gear.

There have been growing signs for years now that a navalized variant of the GJ-11 UCAV, also sometimes referred to as the GJ-21, will be an especially significant part of Sichuan‘s future air wing. Most recently, around the beginning of this month, pictures emerged showing a version of the drone with an arresting hook very prominently deployed. Last year, apparent GJ-11 mockups had also appeared at a test and/or training site right on Changxing Island in Shanghai, very close to where the Type 076 was being built.

As it seems, for the first time clear images of a GJ-21 in flight are posted and this one – based on the still installed pitots – has its tail hook down. pic.twitter.com/5h1nVZHzIe

— @Rupprecht_A (@RupprechtDeino) November 1, 2025

Just this week, Chinese authorities announced that the land-based version of the GJ-11, now officially named the Mysterious Dragon, had entered operational service with the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). Any future naval versions of the drone could also find their way onto other big deck ships in the PLAN’s inventory, including its first catapult-equipped aircraft carrier, the Fujian, which was commissioned last week.

Sichuan‘s air wing will not be limited to variations of the GJ-11 design, and is expected to include a host of other current and future crewed and uncrewed types. Various helicopters, as well as an as-yet unnamed crewed tiltrotor aircraft under development in China, which is now in flight testing, could be part of that mix.

The Type 076 design also has a well deck at the stern to support traditional amphibious assault operations.

As TWZ previously wrote about the overall significance of the Sichuan:

“The potential value to the PLAN of having a fleet of very large deck amphibious assault ships that are highly capable of large-scale drone operations as well as traditional amphibious assaults is clear. These ships could be used to launch and recover UCAVs like the GJ-11 and other types of drones to perform a host of missions from maritime strike to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). They could be used to provide additional ‘mass’ in support of the operations of larger carrier strike groups and help to free the air wings of flattops like Fujian up for tasks they might be better suited for. In addition, they could provide a lower tier of naval aviation support that could be employed independently.”

…

“Simply having more naval aviation capacity overall would give the PLAN added flexibility for various operations closer to the mainland, including a potential military intervention against Taiwan or defending its expansive and largely unrecognized territorial claims in places like the South China Sea. Type 076s could also help project naval and air power further from China’s shores, something that has also been a driving factor behind the country’s broader carrier ambitions.”

…

“The Type 076 could help provide support during humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. Big deck amphibious warfare ships, in general, provide their operators with immensely valuable platforms for projecting both hard and soft power.”

Sichuan is reflective of a larger effort by the PLAN to significantly expand its capabilities and operational capacity, including for projecting power well beyond China’s shores and any regional contingencies. A dramatic expansion in the naval aviation realm has been a particular centerpiece of this modernization push, which traces all the way back to the 1990s. This is all further underscored by the increasingly strong evidence that China’s next supercarrier will be a nuclear-powered design.

Whether the PLAN’s current ambitions include plans to acquire more Type 076s is unclear. Putting to sea now is certainly another major step in the process of getting Sichuan into actual operational service.

Contact the author: [email protected]

The US-imposed ceasefire of October 10 has not stopped Israel’s regular attacks on the Gaza Strip. Nor has it threatened to hold a parliament and society that largely cheered on the war, which has been deemed genocidal by multiple international bodies, accountable for their actions.

Instead, fuelled by what analysts from within Israel have described as an absolute sense of impunity, anti-Palestinian violence has intensified across the country and the occupied West Bank while much of the world continues to look away, convinced that the work of the ceasefire is done.

In the parliament, or Knesset, a senior lawmaker and member of the governing party openly defended convicted ultranationalist Meir Kahane, long considered beyond the pale even by members of Israel’s right wing and whose Kach movement has been banned as a “terrorist organisation”. At the same time, the parliament is debating reintroducing the death penalty, as well as expanding the terms of the offences for which it might apply – both unambiguously targeting Palestinians.

Under the legislation, proposed by ultranationalist National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir – who himself has past “terrorism”-related convictions for his outspoken support of Kahane –  anyone found guilty of killing Israelis because of “racist” motives and “with the aim of harming the State of Israel and the revival of the Jewish people in its land” would face execution.

That bill passed its first reading this week.

“The absence of any attempt to assert accountability from the outside, from Israel’s allies, echoes into Israel’s own Knesset,” analyst and former Israeli peace negotiator Daniel Levy said. “There’s no sense that Israel has done anything wrong or that anyone should be held to account.”

Even Israel’s media, traditionally cheerleaders of the country’s war on Gaza, has not proven exempt from the hardening of attitudes. Legislation is already under way to close Army Radio because it had been broadcasting what Defence Minister Israel Katz described as political content that could undermine the army, as well as extend what lawmakers have referred to as the so-called “Al Jazeera law”, allowing them to shutter any foreign media perceived as a threat to Israel’s national security.

“Israel has built up this energy through two years of genocide,” Orly Noy, editor of the Hebrew-language Local Call, told Al Jazeera. “That hasn’t gone anywhere.

“Just because there’s a ceasefire and the hostages are back, the racism, the supremacy and the unmasked violence didn’t just disappear. We’re seeing daily pogroms by soldiers and settlers in the West Bank. There are daily attacks on Palestinian bus drivers. It’s become dangerous to speak Arabic, not just within the ‘48, but anywhere,” she said, referring to Israel’s initial borders of 1948.

‘May your village burn’

In the West Bank, Israeli violence against Palestinians has reached unprecedented proportions. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), there were 264 attacks against Palestinians in the month the ceasefire was announced: the equivalent of eight attacks per day, the highest number since the agency first started tracking attacks in 2006.

Israel’s interior appears no less secure from the mob. On Tuesday, a meeting at a private house in Pardes Hanna near Haifa, hosted by Ayman Odeh, a Palestinian member of the Knesset, was surrounded and attacked by a mob of right-wing protesters. As police reportedly stood nearby, Israeli protesters surrounded the house, chanting “Terrorist! Terrorist!” and singing “May your village burn” in an attempt to interrupt the meeting, which was billed as a chance to build “partnership and peace” after “two years characterised mainly by pain and hostility”.

And in the Israeli Supreme Court on Monday, two of the soldiers accused of the brutal gang rape of a Palestinian prisoner at Sde Teiman prison last year were met, not by condemnation, but applause and chants of “We are all Unit 100”, referring to the military unit accused of raping the Palestinian man.

“They’re not cheering rapists, they’re cheering this idea that nothing matters any more,” Ori Goldberg, a political scientist based near Tel Aviv, said. “Genocide devalues everything. Once you’ve carried out a genocide, nothing matters any more. Not the lives of those you’ve killed and, by extension, not your own. Nothing carries any consequence. Not your actions, nothing. We’ve become hollow.”

Seeming to prove Goldberg’s point in the Knesset on Wednesday was Nissim Vaturi, the body’s deputy speaker and a member of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s governing Likud party. Vaturi crossed one of Israel’s few political rubicons and directly referenced Kahane, whose name has become a rallying cry for settlers and ultranationalist groups across Israel.

Asked if he was in favour of “Jewish terror”, Vaturi replied “I support it. Believe me, Kahane was right in many ways where we were wrong, where the people of Israel were wrong,” he said, referencing the former lawmakers convicted of “terrorism” offences in both Israel and the US and whose party, Kach, remains a proscribed “terrorist group” across much of the world.

“Once you’ve manufactured consent for genocide, you need to be proactive in dialling the cruelty levels down, which is something we’re not seeing,” analyst and former Israeli peace negotiator Daniel Levy said. “If anything, we’re just seeing it continue. They have dialled the cruelty levels up to 11 …  and they’re leaving them there.”

UN rights chief urges countries to ‘stand up against atrocities’ committed by paramilitary RSF in takeover of the city.

The United Nations’s top human rights body has ordered a probe into abuses in Sudan’s el-Fasher, where mass killings have been reported since the city fell to the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) last month.

During a special session in Geneva on Friday, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution ordering the UN’s Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan to urgently investigate violations in el-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur state.

The resolution also called on the investigative team to “identify, where possible” suspected perpetrators in an effort to ensure they are “held accountable”.

The move comes weeks after the RSF, which has been battling the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) for control of Sudan since April 2023, took full control of el-Fasher on October 26 after an 18-month siege on the city.

Nearly 100,000 people have fled el-Fasher since the RSF’s takeover, with displaced Sudanese civilians saying they faced indiscriminate attacks and sexual violence, among other abuses. Many said they saw dead bodies lining the streets.

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk told the council on Friday that the “atrocities that are unfolding in el-Fasher were foreseen and preventable” and “constitute the gravest of crimes”.

He said the UN had warned that the fall of el-Fasher “would result in a bloodbath”.

“So none of us should be surprised by reports that since the RSF took control of el-Fasher, there have been mass killings of civilians, ethnically targeted executions, sexual violence including gang rape, abductions for ransom, widespread arbitrary detentions, attacks on health facilities, medical staff and humanitarian workers, and other appalling atrocities,” Turk said.

“The international community has a clear duty to act. There has been too much pretence and performance and too little action. It must stand up against these atrocities, a display of naked cruelty used to subjugate and control an entire population.”

Violence spreading

The RSF has denied targeting civilians or blocking aid, saying such activities are due to rogue actors.

But the UN, human rights groups and other observers have said evidence suggests that mass killings were committed by the paramilitary group.

Sudanese medics have also warned that the RSF appears to be trying to bury the bodies of those killed in el-Fasher in an effort to conceal what happened.

Meanwhile, tens of thousands of people are believed to remain trapped in the city, prompting the head of the UN’s migration agency this week to urgently call for a ceasefire and a humanitarian corridor to provide aid to those civilians.

During Friday’s Human Rights Council session, Mona Rishmawi, a member of the UN’s independent fact-finding mission on Sudan, described examples of rape, killing and torture and said a comprehensive investigation is required to establish the full picture.

She said RSF forces had turned el-Fasher University, where thousands of civilians had been sheltering, “into a killing ground”.

Meanwhile, Turk warned that violence is “surging” to the neighbouring Kordofan region, where bombardments, blockades and forced displacement have been reported. “Kordofan must not suffer the same fate as Darfur,” he said.

The council, which is made up of 47 UN member countries, does not have the power to force countries or others to comply, but can shine a spotlight on rights violations and help document them for possible use in places like the International Criminal Court (ICC).

In early November, the ICC said it was “taking immediate steps regarding the alleged crimes in el-Fasher to preserve and collect relevant evidence for its use in future prosecutions” as part of an ongoing investigation into abuses committed in Darfur since April 2023.

Flooding is likely, especially within the Amber warning areas.

With flood warnings in place in some parts of the country already, Ben Lukey, Flood Duty Manager at the Environment Agency, said:

“Storm Claudia will bring heavy prolonged rainfall across parts of England, with significant surface water flooding probable across parts of central England on Friday, while significant river flooding impacts are also possible, and into Saturday.”

There will also be some difficult driving conditions with transport disruption.

RAC breakdown spokesperson Alice Simpson said: “We urge drivers to take the amber weather warnings associated with Storm Claudia extremely seriously, as they indicate roads are likely to become flooded and therefore represent a risk to life.”

“Drivers may wish to consider delaying their journeys until the worst of the impacts are over, especially in areas that are hardest hit this weekend”.

National Highways said it was checking culverts, gullies and drains to help drain rainwater on the motorway.

The old walls of St. Francis Xavier Catholic Church in Owo, Ondo State, South West Nigeria, shook at 9:30 a.m. on June 5, 2022. It was Pentecost Sunday, and the priest’s burning of incense hung in the air. The choir was mid-hymn when the first explosion fractured the rhythm.

Eyewitnesses recalled two men stationed by the doors, firing automatic rifles into the congregation. When the smoke cleared, over 40 worshippers lay dead — children, ushers, and the parish catechist among them. HumAngle spoke to families of the victims, including Akinyemi Emmanuel, whose wife was killed, and Christopher, whose older brother was also a casualty.

The massacre made global headlines, but beyond the horror lay a familiar pattern — the tactics, the timing, and the grim echoes of earlier carnage: Madalla’s St. Theresa’s Church (2011), Kano’s Central Mosque (2014), Kaduna’s Murtala Square (2014),  and Mubi’s Madina Mosque (2017).

The data of devastation

HumAngle’s field researchers verified 20 major attacks on places of worship across Nigeria between 2011 and 2025. Each incident was cross-checked against ACLED, CFR’s Nigeria Security Tracker, official statements, and humanitarian field reports.

“Every line of data is a broken family,” said a researcher who assisted in the compilation. “We tracked events, but what we found was grief mapped onto geography.”

Key Figures

From 2011 to 2015, churches bore the brunt — Boko Haram’s campaign against the state and society, often weaponising sectarian imagery. Between 2016 and 2021, mosques and Islamic gatherings became targets as extremists purged dissenting clerics. By 2022, the pattern shifted again — terrorists and militias attacked worshippers of both faiths for ransom or reprisal.

Early years of fire (2000–2010): Shari’a, riots, and mob rule

The roots of Nigeria’s religious bloodshed date back to pre-independence; however, this report will examine only the events from 2000 to 2025. In the year 2000 when 12 northern states reintroduced Shari’a law. What began as a demand for moral order soon morphed into violent attacks against non-Muslims.

By 2001, the tension had already turned deadly. Over 100 people were killed in Kano, according to The Guardian (UK), after riotous Muslim youths attacked the minority Christian population in the city. Human Rights Watch later documented the carnage of reprisal that took place in Jos, with similar riots in Kaduna.

Shari’a’s reintroduction became both symbol and signal — a moral protest against state failure but also a green light for mob justice.

The spiral continued. In 2002, Kaduna was a flashpoint again. The infamous Miss World Contest riots, triggered by a controversial ThisDay article deemed blasphemous against Islam. The riots left at least 200 dead.

As the years passed, intolerance became routine. In 2006, a Bauchi-based teacher, Florence Chukwu, was lynched for allegedly confiscating a Qur’an from a student. A year later in Gombe, another teacher, Christiana Oluwasesin, met the same fate. Then, in 2007, Kano’s Tudun Wada suburb witnessed the killing of dozens of Christians after a student was accused of alleged blasphemy.  

Two decades later, the script remained tragically familiar. In May 2022, a Christian student, Deborah Samuel Yakubu, at Shehu Shagari College of Education, Sokoto State (a Muslim-majority state), was accused of blasphemy, then stoned, beaten and set on fire by a mob of Muslim students.

Even Muslims have not been spared from mob attacks due to alleged blasphemy against Islam. In 2008, a 50-year-old man was beaten to death in Kano, while Ahmad Usman, a Muslim vigilante, was burnt alive in Abuja in 2022.

In 2023, Usman Buda, a butcher in Sokoto, was stoned to death by his peers. In 2025, food vendor Ammaye met a similar fate in Niger State after an argument over religious differences.

From Pandogari to Sokoto, Facebook posts, WhatsApp messages, and street rumours have become digital triggers for extra-judicial deaths.

Nigeria’s decade of supposedly holy violence took a new form with Boko Haram’s rise. The insurgency’s ideological war turned places of worship into battlefields  as they circulated videos of beheading of Christians and the Muslims they accused of spying for the Nigerian state.

The Madalla Christmas massacre — 2011

On Christmas morning, a suicide bomber detonated a car outside St. Theresa’s Catholic Church in Madalla, Niger State, killing at least 40. Boko Haram claimed responsibility, vowing more attacks against Christians “for government sins”.

Attack on COCIN Headquarters in Jos — Feb 2012

A year later, a suicide bomber drove an explosives-laden vehicle into the Church of Christ in Nations (COCIN) headquarters in Jos during Sunday service, killing at least three worshippers and injuring dozens. The blast destroyed parts of the church and nearby buildings.

Suicide Bomb Attack at St Finbar’s Jos — March 2012

Barely a month after the attack, a car bomber targeted St. Finbar’s Church in the Rayfield area of Jos during Mass. The explosion killed 14 people and wounded over 20, causing extensive damage to the church premises.

Silencing the critics — 2011–2014

In Biu, Borno State, Shaykh Ibrahim Burkui was assassinated in June 2011 for criticising Boko Haram. His death, along with that of Ibrahim Gomari in Maiduguri and Shaykh Albani Zaria in 2014, underscored the extension of the group’s wrath to Muslims who opposed its doctrine.

Kano Central Mosque bloodbath — 2014

On Nov. 28, 2014, twin suicide blasts struck Kano’s Central Mosque. As worshippers fled, gunmen opened fire. About 80 died. Boko Haram attacked Sunni Muslims loyal to the Emir of Kano, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, who had condemned extremism.

Eid of Ashes — Damaturu 2015

A 10-year-old girl walked into an Eid prayer ground in Yobe and detonated explosives, killing 50. A morning of celebration turned into a funeral for hundreds of people.

Mutations of terror (2016–2021)

AAfter the insurgency’s initial high tide receded, violence splintered into ideological and economic strands.

• 2016 (Molai-Umarari, Borno): Two female suicide bombers killed 24 during dawn prayers.
• 2017 (Mubi, Adamawa): A teenage bomber killed 50 in a mosque.
• 2017 (Ozubulu, Anambra): Gunmen killed 12 during a Mass — incident later linked to a local feud.
• 2018 (Mubi, Adamawa): 86 worshippers were killed after two suicide bombers detonated explosives in a mosque during an afternoon prayer. 
• 2021 (Mazakuka, Niger): Terrorists killed at least 18 worshippers at a local mosque during Fajr prayers.
• 2021 (Yasore, Katsina): 10  killed in evening prayers.
• 2021 (Okene, Kogi): Three people were abducted from a Living Faith Church during a prayer meeting. They were later released. 
• 2021 (Fadan Kagoma, Kaduna): Terrorists attacked and kidnapped three seminarians at Christ the King Major Seminary. Michael Nnadi, one of the captives, was later killed, while the others were released.

“The violence metastasised,” said Olawale Ayeni, an analyst in Abuja. “What began as jihadist warfare became an economy of fear — raids, ransoms, and retaliations.”

The new normal (2022–2025): Terrorism meets belief

Owo, Ondo State — June 2022

On Pentecost Sunday, attackers detonated explosives and opened fire at St. Francis Xavier Church, killing 41 and injuring 70. Initially attributed to ISWAP, investigations revealed financial links to northwestern terrorist networks.

Kafin Koro, Niger State — January 2023

Isaac Achi, a Catholic priest, was burnt to death in the early hours of the morning at the presbytery of Sts. Peter and Paul Catholic Church, Kafin Koro, in Niger State. The residence was also reduced to ashes. Achi was the parish priest in charge of St. Theresa’s Catholic Church, Madalla, when it was attacked in 2011.

Kajuru, Kaduna State – September 2024

Gunmen invaded two churches in Bakinpah-Maro during service, killing three and abducting several others. Videos later surfaced showing captives reciting prayers under duress.

Bushe, Sokoto – February 2025 

Terrorists invaded a mosque in Bushe Community of Sabon Birni LGA, Sokoro State. They kidnapped the Imam and 10 other worshippers during the dawn prayer. 

Marnona Mosque Attack, Sokoto – August 2025

On Sunday, Aug.  12, terrorists stormed a mosque in Marnona village in Wurno LGA of Sokoto State, killing one worshipper and abducting several others. 

Unguwan Mantau, Katsina — August 2025

During early morning prayers, terrorists opened fire inside a mosque, killing 27. Survivors said the attackers accused locals of tipping off soldiers.

Gidan Turbe, Zamfara State – September 2025

Terrorists stormed a mosque in Gidan Turbe of Tsafe LGA, Zamfara State, and abducted 40 worshippers during a dawn prayer. Reports indicated that the attack happened barely 24 hours after a peace deal with the gunmen terrorising the village. 

In recent years, the distinction between ideology and economics has become increasingly blurred.  Many southerners who are predominantly Christians living in the north are business owners; oftentimes, they are attacked, not for their beliefs but for their wealth.

Documented discrimination against Igbo Muslims

While the north burned, intolerance also took other forms in the country’s southeastern region. Minority Muslim residents, including Igbo indigenes, who practice Islam, face periodic attacks and persistent discrimination, such as institutional exclusion and social ostracism. 

In Nsukka, Enugu State, mobs razed two mosques between Oct.  31, 2020 and Nov.  2, 2020, looting Muslim-owned shops after a local dispute spiralled. Though the state later rebuilt and returned the mosques to the Muslim community in 2021, the incident exposed how fragile interfaith coexistence remains. 

Around the same period, in Afikpo, Ebonyi State, an Islamic school reportedly received threats of invasion, prompting nationwide Muslim organisations to condemn what they described as “a wave of attacks on Muslims in the South East”.

Beyond physical violence, Igbo Muslims speak of systemic discrimination in both public and social spheres. The Chief Imam of Imo State, Sheikh Suleiman Njoku, in March 2024, lamented how Muslim indigenes are stigmatised – denied marriage prospects, labelled traitors, and treated as outsiders in their ancestral communities.

Similar accounts featured in a 2021 Premium Times report, where Igbo Muslims detailed how even acquiring land to build mosques or express faith publicly invites suspicion and resistance. 

Their testimonies mirror those of Christian minorities in majority-Muslim northern states, where churches are denied land ownership, leading to social alienation. There are also allegations of these minorities being denied state-of-origin certification. 

This reciprocal intolerance across regions highlights a broader national crisis in which faith identity, rather than shared citizenship, continues to shape belonging, opportunity, and trust among Nigerians.

School segregation

In northern Nigeria, school segregation along religious lines has deeply eroded interfaith tolerance and national cohesion. Historically, Christian mission schools, Islamic schools and public institutions evolved in isolation, reflecting entrenched religious divisions rather than shared civic identity. 

In many states, such as Kano, Kaduna, and Sokoto, Christian students often face discrimination or limited access to education in public schools dominated by Muslim administrators. Research shows that separate religious instruction – Christian Religious Knowledge (CRK) for Christians and Islamic Religious Knowledge (IRK) for Muslims —.has created parallel moral universes with little mutual understanding. This separation sustains mistrust and heightens communal suspicion.

The Deborah Samuel case in 2022, where a Christian student was lynched in Sokoto over alleged blasphemy, exemplifies how intolerance fostered from childhood schooling silos can erupt violently in adulthood. Studies by the EU Asylum Agency highlight that exclusion from inclusive schooling deprives youth of empathy across faiths, embedding prejudice into the social fabric. When children never learn together, they rarely learn tolerance. Unless education in northern Nigeria becomes deliberately integrative through mixed enrollment, pluralist curricula and interfaith engagement, religious segregation will continue to reproduce the fear, inequality and division that weaken Nigeria’s fragile unity.

Mass school abductions

Over the past 12 years, Nigeria has witnessed a series of mass school abductions that expose the evolving tactics of both terrorists and armed groups. Notably, on April 14,  2014, Boko Haram abducted 276 girls from Government Girls’ Secondary School, Chibok, Borno State, sparking the global #BringBackOurGirls campaign. 

Years later, in February and March 2021, a wave of similar attacks swept across the north: 279 girls were taken from Government Girls’ Science Secondary School, Jangebe (Zamfara); 27 students and staff were kidnapped from Government Science College, Kagara (Niger); and 39 students were seized from the Federal College of Forestry Mechanisation, Afaka (Kaduna). 

The cycle continued in March 2024, when gunmen abducted about 287 pupils from a school in Kuriga, Chikun Local Government Area, Kaduna State — one of the most significant of such incidents in recent years.

These abductions mark a clear shift from Boko Haram’s ideology-driven kidnappings to the ransom-motivated tactics of armed groups operating across the North West and North East. Christianity and Islam were affected by these abductions, and adherents have endured rape and psychological struggles following their ordeals. 

Among these tragedies, Leah Sharibu’s story remains one of the most haunting. 

On Feb. 19, 2018, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), a Boko Haram offshoot, abducted 110 schoolgirls from Government Girls’  Science and Technical College, Dapchi, Yobe State. While most were later freed, Leah was held back for refusing to convert from Christianity to Islam. Now in her seventh year of captivity, she has become a symbol of religious persecution and the wider suffering of abducted girls. Her story underscores how Nigeria’s school kidnapping crisis intersects with issues of faith, gender  and insurgency.

In contrast, Lillian Daniel’s ordeal highlights the hundreds of lesser-known victims whose abductions pass with minimal notice. The 20-year-old zoology student of the University of Maiduguri, originally from Barkin Ladi, Plateau State, was kidnapped on Jan. 9,  2020, while travelling along the Benisheikh–Jakana–Maiduguri road.

Her abductors were ISWAP terrorists who disguised themselves as security personnel. Another passenger was released, but Lillian remains missing. Her case, briefly reported but soon forgotten, reflects the anonymity of many victims caught in transit through conflict zones.

In summary, Leah Sharibu embodies the now globally recognised face of Nigeria’s school abduction crisis, shaped by ideology and prolonged captivity. At the same time, Lillian Daniel represents its hidden dimension — solitary, underreported, and tragically routine. Together, their stories reveal the spectacle and the silence of Nigeria’s enduring tragedy of school abductions.

When clergy became premium kidnapping targets.

Each ransom funds further raids. Analysts estimate that up to 15 per cent of ransom payments flow back into logistics for insurgents in Zamfara and Katsina.

Faith and identity: The shari’a factor revisited

The Shari’a revival was more than a legal reform; it was a reclamation of identity amid state collapse. Many Muslims saw it as a return to the moral order of the Sokoto Caliphate; others viewed it as the spark of two decades of religious strife.

Public institutions that once integrated faiths became segregated. Teachers and traders were attacked or expelled. The divide deepened, from classrooms to markets.

Shari’a, in principle, reserves blasphemy trials for qualified jurists. But in practice, mobs assumed divine authority, executing citizens in the name of faith. Many Christians and a few Muslims became victims of this street theocracy.

The justice vacuum

Out of the 20 worship-site attacks recorded, only one — Owo 2022 — reached federal arraignment. Fourteen remain unprosecuted; five are stalled as “unknown gunmen” cases.  

On the  Kano Central Mosque attack, no suspect has faced trial, while the Madalla bombing file remains “under review”.

“Justice in Nigeria moves slower than grief,” said a human rights lawyer in Abuja. “When the killers are never named, the dead are never remembered.”

Impunity has become policy. Each unsolved massacre guarantees the next.

A geography of grief

Nigeria’s worship-site attacks reveal a tragic spatial logic:

• North East (Borno, Yobe, Adamawa): Insurgent bombings, suicide IEDs, and procession attacks.
• North West (Katsina, Zamfara, Niger): Terrorists storming mosques during fajr prayers.
• North Central (Benue, Plateau, Kaduna): Reprisal killings and clergy kidnappings.
• South (Ondo, Anambra): Rare, symbolic assaults for national impact.

These are not frontlines of faith but fault lines of governance — places where the state’s absence defines daily life. 

At a mosque in Konduga, the imam now carries a walkie-talkie. In a church in Makurdi, ushers rehearse evacuation drills. Security has become as sacred as scripture. Concrete barriers line entrances. Metal detectors hum where choirs once sang. Pastors rotate parishes weekly to confuse abductors.

“When we gather,” said a priest in southern Kaduna, “someone must always watch the door. It used to be an usher. Now it’s a man with a rifle.”

Multiple faces of mob justice, one failure of the state

Mob justice in Nigeria takes many forms. In the north, a whisper of blasphemy or even sexual orientation can summon a crowd to lynch anyone to death. In the south, a cry of “Ole” (thief) or even an allegation of witchcraft can become a death sentence, with tyres and fire replacing the courtroom and the judge. 

The motives differ, but the barbarity does not.

Accused of robbing point of sale (PoS) machine operators, for instance, three women were burnt to death along the Aba-Owerri road in Aba, Abia State, on July 3, 2022. In March of this year, 16 hunters travelling from Rivers State capital Port Harcourt to Kano State were tied to used tyres and set ablaze in Uromi, Edo State, on suspicion of kidnapping.

What unites these episodes is a simple truth: they are crimes, yet their prosecutions are rare. That gap between law and practice isn’t a cultural quirk; its Local Security Equals High Fatality Rates. 

Across faiths, executioners signal that citizens expect neither safety nor fairness from the state. Each unpunished lynching teaches the next crowd that there will be no price to pay.

Lessons in numbers

From 15 years of blood and rebuilding, four insights emerge:

1. Predictable Patterns: Attacks cluster around worship hours and feast days.
2. Declining Ideology: Ransom and revenge now outweigh religion.
3. Governance Gaps: Weak local security equals high fatality rates — across faiths.
4. Institutionalised Impunity: No justice, no deterrence.

Policy paralysis

Successive Nigerian administrations have treated worship-site attacks as isolated tragedies, not system failures. Troops arrive shortly after each attack. Condolences flow. Then silence.

“There is no single desk in Abuja tracking attacks on religious sites,” admitted a senior intelligence official. “The data is fragmented, politicised, and rarely analysed.”

Without institutional memory, the nation is condemned to repetition.

Reconstructing faith’s refuge

HumAngle analysts recommend modest, achievable reforms:

• Architectural retrofits: Two outward exits for every 150 congregants; Eid checkpoints relocated from dense zones.
• Safety training: Rotating volunteer marshals during peak services.
• Clergy protection: GPS-tracked parish vehicles and secure communications.
• Public case tracker: Government–media collaboration to document investigations and trials.

Each measure is a step toward rehumanising worship in a country where prayer itself is perilous.

Faith beyond fear

In Konduga, survivors of a 2013 mosque attack still gather under a patched tarpaulin. In Owo, St. Francis Church has reopened — some survivors sit by the very pews where they once fell to the ground.

“They wanted to destroy faith,” said Sister Agatha, who lost her niece in Owo. “But faith is the only thing that made us rebuild.”

Nigeria’s crisis of worship-site violence is neither a Christian nor a Muslim story. It is a national failure of protection and justice.

When a mosque burns in Borno and a church is bombed in Ondo, the message is the same: extremism recognises no creed. The silence that follows — the absence of trials, the forgetting of names — has become a form of complicity.

Faith in Nigeria today is more than belief. It is resistance — quiet, fearful, and defiant. From Madalla to Owo, from Kano to Katsina, the faithful still gather. Each whispered prayer in a bullet-scarred hall is an act of remembrance and a testament to resilience.

To remember both streams of suffering in one chronicle is to reject the propaganda of division. It is to insist that faith, stripped of politics, can still illuminate what violence seeks to obscure: our shared humanity.

Data collection by Abdussamad Ahmad Yusuf

Japan’s Acquisition Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA) has offered the first look at damage to a target ship after it was hit by projectiles fired from a prototype electromagnetic railgun in testing earlier this year. Japanese authorities say valuable data and experience were gleaned from the demonstration, which will feed into its continued push toward an operational railgun capability. This is an area of development where the U.S. Navy notably halted work in the early 2020s, despite having seen promising progress, due to significant technological impediments.

ATLA provided additional details about the at-sea railgun testing that took place this past summer during a presentation at its annual Defense Technology Symposium, which opened earlier this week. For the tests, the prototype weapon system was installed on the rear flight deck of the JS Asuka, a one-of-its-kind 6,200-ton-displacement testbed warship belonging to the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). Pictures of the railgun onboard Asuka first began to emerge in April. ATLA released an initial batch of imagery from the at-sea tests, along with a brief statement about the results, in September.

The prototype railgun used in the testing is an evolution of a design that ATLA has been developing since the mid-2010s. That work has included previous live-fire testing at facilities on land, as well as at least one earlier at-sea test that did not involve shooting an actual target vessel.

Railguns, in general, use electromagnets instead of chemical propellants to fire projectiles at very high velocities. Dart-shaped projectiles, each with four fins at the rear and no warhead, were fired during the at-sea tests earlier this year. The projectiles were initially held inside a sabot that broke apart after leaving the muzzle. There was also a metal armature at the rear that served to push the projectile in the sabot down the barrel, which fell away after firing.

A tug-like ship was used as the target for the railgun installed on the JS Asuka. The target vessel was moving during at least some of the test shots, but under tow behind another ship rather than its own power. It was struck multiple times, with the cross-shaped impact points showing the fin-stabilized projectiles flew in a stable manner, as seen in the images at the top of this story and below.

In addition to level shots at the target ship, the railgun was fired at a 45-degree upward angle to provide an opportunity to gather data on the basic ballistics of the weapon and round combination.

Operators aimed the railgun remotely using a camera mounted under the barrel. An additional high-speed camera and a small radar were also positioned on JS Asuka‘s flight deck to collect additional data. A drone filmed the testing from above. When ATLA first released imagery from the testing back in September, TWZ highlighted the presence of what was likely a small radar array, as well as electro-optical and/or infrared cameras, which has now been confirmed.

ATLA says that the testing also provided valuable new experience regarding the installation and operation of a railgun on an actual naval vessel. Of course, an operational naval railgun would likely be far more deeply integrated into a warship compared to the test arrangement on JS Asuka. A more traditional naval installation on any ship would require finding sufficient space above and below deck for the railgun and its associated systems, as well as making a host of other necessary modifications, which could be costly and time-consuming.

Otherwise, ATLA continues to work to improve various key underlying technologies as part of its ongoing railgun development efforts, including when it comes to power and cooling, as well as general wear and tear. Japanese authorities say they have now been able to demonstrate a barrel life of more than 200 rounds when firing projectiles at around 2,300 meters per second. As of 2023, ATLA had reportedly been able to fire projectiles from prototype railguns at around 2,230 meters per second and had said it was working toward a barrel life of 120 rounds.

The wear on barrels from the sustained firing of projectiles at very high speeds is one of a number of long-standing challenges for railguns, in general. A worn-out barrel can lead to the loss of range and accuracy, as well as increase the risk of a catastrophic failure.

Railguns also have significant power generation and cooling requirements, which have, in turn, historically made them very physically bulky. The installation on JS Asuka included four shipping containers full of additional systems and equipment to help meet those needs.

Kazumi Ito, principal director of the equipment policy division at ATLA, said his country’s railgun efforts were “progressing,” but acknowledged “various challenges,” while speaking through an interpreter at a panel discussion at the DSEI Japan 2025 exposition earlier this year, according to National Defense Magazine.

The ATLA video below shows previous live-fire testing of a prototype railgun at a facility on land.

In general, the potential rewards from developing a practical railgun suitable for operational military use are great. Such a weapon would offer valuable anti-air capabilities, as well as the ability to engage targets at sea and on land. It would also bring additional benefits in terms of the relatively low cost of its ammunition and magazine depth. As TWZ has previously written:

“In principle, a practical electromagnetic railgun would offer a highly capable and flexible weapon system that can rapidly engage a wide array of targets at sea, on land, and even in the air, and at considerable ranges. Japan has previously expressed interest in this capability explicitly to help protect against incoming hypersonic threats. Such a weapon would also offer benefits in terms of magazine depth and cost compared to traditional surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles, given the small size and lower unit price of the individual rounds.”

“When it comes to warships, in particular, where physical space is at a premium and where options for reloading missiles at sea can be at best extremely limited, having a weapon system firing lower-cost munitions from a large magazine and that can engage a broad swath of target sets would be a clear boon.”

The benefits railguns could offer extend to ground-based types, as well as ones installed on naval vessels. ATLA’s presentation this week shows a truck-mounted railgun, along with one on a warship, as part of the projected roadmap for further railgun developments. ATLA has highlighted the potential for land-based capability in the past, as well.

The previously released ATLA video below also depicts ground-based truck-mounted railguns.

As TWZ has noted in the past, Japan’s continued push ahead with the development of railguns stands in ever-starker contrast to the U.S. Navy’s shelving of its work on such a capability back in 2022, at least publicly. Starting in 2005, the service had been very actively pursuing an operational railgun and had plans to move from extensive on-land testing out to sea. However, the expected at-sea tests were repeatedly delayed and never came to pass. The Navy cited major technological hurdles in its decision to halt its railgun program.

Interestingly, ATLA has reportedly met with U.S. Navy officials to discuss its past railgun work and how it might be useful to Japan’s ongoing efforts. The possibility of greater collaboration in the future has also come up. Last year, ATLA signed a separate deal with the Franco-German Research Institute of Saint-Louis (ISL) to cooperate on the development of railgun technologies.

China has also been experimenting, on-and-off, with railguns since the 1980s. In 2018, a prototype railgun mounted in a large turret emerged on a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ship, but the exact status of that program is now unclear.

As mentioned, work on railguns is also ongoing as part of a joint effort between Germany and France. Turkey has received particular public attention for its railgun developments in recent years, as well. There continues to be general interest, globally, in railguns for naval and ground-based applications.

ATLA’s update on the at-sea railgun testing earlier this year makes clear that, regardless of any other global development, Japan very much remains committed to its pursuit of this capability.

Contact the author: [email protected]

UFC boss breaks up tense face-off between the two fighters before their welterweight title bout at Madison Square Garden.

UFC boss Dana White had to separate a tense staredown between welterweight title holder Jack Della Maddalena and Islam Makhachev before their fight this weekend, as the defending champ pledged to beat the mixed martial arts “legend” to bring the belt home to Australia.

The fighters came nose-to-nose and refused to break eye contact during a face-off after their news conference on Thursday at Madison Square Garden, New York, where they will headline UFC 322 on Saturday night, eventually leading White to prise them apart.

Della Maddalena (18-2) will mount his first title defence after beating Belal Muhammad by unanimous decision to become champion in May. The 29-year-old Australian is undefeated in the UFC and is now on an 18-fight win streak overall.

The 34-year-old Makhachev (27-1), who is regarded as a pound-for-pound great and is on a 15-win streak, vacated his lightweight belt to move up a weight class.

Della Maddalena was taciturn but appeared unfazed as he received a chorus of boos from the crowd at Thursday night’s news conference, with his Dagestani opponent the clear fan-favourite.

“This is what I got in this sport for – big challenges, big moments. I’m excited for the challenge and I’m looking forward to it,” Della Maddalena said.

“I’m going to bring this belt back home to Australia, no doubt,” he added.

“Obviously, Islam’s a legend. A big win over him would be a big name on the resume and it would definitely put me up on the pound-for-pound list.”

Makhachev responded by saying he would go 4-0 against Australian fighters – although he may have been lumping the New Zealander Dan Hooker in that list, as his only previous Aussie opponent was Alexander Volkanovski, who Makhachev beat twice.

“Australia, it’s a good place. I was there, I like it and now it’s 3-0, I will make it four,” he said.

Della Maddalena hit back by saying several Australian fighters were thriving in the UFC.

“I am very proud to be Australian, very proud to raise the Australian flag,” he said.

“Australia is very competitive, it has a fighting culture and that’s why we’re doing so well. We have two champions and after this weekend we will still have two champions.”

Although Della Maddalena and Makhachev are both well-rounded fighters, the Australian is renowned for his boxing while the Dagestani is famed for his ferocious ground game.

Makhachev smiled and said he “didn’t know” when asked if Della Maddalena was the best boxer in the UFC.

“Jack is one of the best, but I am also a good striker, so let’s see who is better,” he said.

Della Maddalena, meanwhile, told reporters he would “absolutely” be able to defend Makhachev’s takedown attempts for the entire fight, as he did so effectively in his victory over Muhammad.

“[I can do it for the] full 25 minutes,” he said, with a wry smile of his own.

Ronaldo at risk of being banned for first game of 2026 World Cup if Portugal qualify after red card against Ireland.

Ireland coach Heimir Hallgrimsson has said Cristiano Ronaldo was wrong to blame him for the red card he received as Portugal fell to a World Cup qualifying defeat.

The five-time Ballon d’Or winner exchanged words with Hallgrimsson after being sent off during Portugal’s 2-0 defeat in Dublin on Thursday.

Ronaldo said before the game the Ireland coach had tried to put pressure on the referee by telling the officials not to be influenced by the superstar striker.

With his team trailing by two goals in the second half, the 40-year-old was frustrated and elbowed Dara O’Shea in the back as the Ireland player marked him in the box.

“He complimented me with putting pressure on the referee, but listen, it had nothing to do with me, it was his action on the pitch that cost him a red card,” Hallgrimsson told reporters.

“It had nothing to do with me unless I got into his head.”

He added, “This was just a moment of a little silliness for him, I would say.”

It was Ronaldo’s first sending off in 226 appearances for the national side.

At the very least, Ronaldo will serve a mandatory one-game ban, but FIFA disciplinary rules require its judges to impose a ban of “at least two matches for serious foul play”.

Despite the blatant elbow, Portugal manager Roberto Martinez said the red card was harsh.

“I thought it was a bit harsh because he cares about the team,” Martinez told reporters. “He was almost 60 minutes in the box being grabbed, pulled, pushed and obviously he tries to get away from the defender.

“I think the action looks worse than what it actually is. I don’t think it’s an elbow; I think it’s a full body, but from where the camera is, it looks like an elbow. But we accept it.”

Martinez also questioned Ireland manager Heimir Hallgrimsson’s comments about Ronaldo “controlling the referee” in the reverse fixture in Lisbon last month, which Portugal won 1-0.

“The only thing that leaves a bitter taste in my mouth is at the press conference yesterday, Ireland coach was talking about the aspect of the referees being influenced, and then a big centre half falls on the floor so dramatically at the turn of Cristiano’s body,” Martinez said.

Portugal, who are assured at least a playoff spot, are two points clear of Hungary at the top of Group F with a superior goal difference. The Irish are one point further back.

Portugal host Armenia while Ireland travel to face Hungary in the final round of fixtures on Sunday.

New Delhi, India – Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s cabinet late Wednesday described the car explosion which jolted New Delhi earlier in the week as a “heinous terror incident, perpetrated by antinational forces”.

The Indian government’s words, two days after a slow-moving car blew up near the Red Fort, an iconic 17th-century monument in New Delhi, killing at least 13 people and wounding several, have since led to questions about how it might respond, raising concerns over the prospect of a new spike in regional tensions.

Earlier this year, in May, the Indian government had declared a new security doctrine: “Any act of terror will be treated as an act of war.”

That posture had come in the aftermath of an intense four-day air war between India and Pakistan, after India blamed Islamabad for an attack in Indian-administered Kashmir that killed 26 civilians.

Now, six months later, as India grapples with another attack – this time, in the heart of the national capital of the world’s most populous country – the Modi government has so far avoided blaming Pakistan.

Instead, say political analysts, New Delhi’s language suggests that it might be veering towards intensifying a crackdown on Kashmir, at a time when Islamophobia and anti-Kashmiri sentiments have skyrocketed across India in the aftermath of the car explosion.

A crackdown in Kashmir

Even before the blast in New Delhi, police teams from Indian-administered Kashmir had been carrying out raids across the national capital region, following a lead from Srinagar, which led to the seizure of a significant amount of explosives and arrests of nearly a dozen individuals.

Among the suspects are several Kashmiri doctors – including Umar Nabi, a junior doctor who is suspected of being the driver of the car that exploded – who were serving in hospitals in satellite towns outside New Delhi.

Since the explosion near the Red Fort, police in Indian-administered Kashmir have detained more than 650 people from across the Valley as they dig deeper into what sections of the Indian media are describing as a “white-collar terror module” that had gathered enough explosives for the biggest attack on India in decades, if members hadn’t been arrested.

Police teams have raided several locations, including the residences of members of banned sociopolitical outfits.

Indian forces on Thursday also demolished the home of Nabi, the alleged car driver. In recent years, Indian authorities have often demolished homes of individuals accused of crimes without any judicial order empowering them to do so, even though the Supreme Court has ordered an end to the practice. Rights groups have described the act of demolishing the homes of suspects as a form of collective punishment.

Students of medicine and practising doctors in Kashmir are also increasingly facing scrutiny – more than 50 have been questioned for hours, and some have had their devices seized for investigation.

“There is a sense of complete disbelief among all of us,” said a junior doctor at a government-run hospital in Srinagar, the capital of the federal territory of Indian-administered Kashmir.

The doctor requested anonymity to speak, fearing repercussions from the police.

The 34-year-old has seen conflict in Kashmir up close, treating injured protesters firsthand for weeks on end, during previous clashes with security forces. “But I never thought that we would be viewed with suspicion like this,” he said, adding that the explosion that killed 13 in New Delhi was “unfortunate and should be condemned”.

“It is unreal to us that a doctor can think of such an attack,” the doctor said. “But how does that malign our entire fraternity? If a professional defects and joins militants, does it mean that all professionals are terrorists?”

‘Away from Pakistan, towards an enemy within’

India and Pakistan have fought three wars over Kashmir since the nations were partitioned in 1947 as the British left the subcontinent. Today, India, Pakistan and China all control parts of Kashmir. India claims all of it, and Pakistan seeks control of all of Kashmir except the parts held by China, its ally.

After the April attack in the resort town of Pahalgam in Indian-administered Kashmir, India had launched missiles deep inside Pakistan. Modi claimed that the attacks killed more than 100 “terrorists”. Pakistan insisted that civilians and soldiers, not armed fighters, were killed. Pakistan, which had rejected Indian accusations of a role in the April killings in Pahalgam, hit back.

Over four days, the nuclear-armed neighbours fired missiles and drones across their contested border, striking each other’s military bases.

When the Modi government agreed to a ceasefire on May 10, it faced domestic criticism from the opposition – and some sections of its own supporters – for not continuing with attacks on Pakistan. The government then said Operation Sindoor is “only on pause, not over”.

Six months later, though, New Delhi has been significantly more cautious about who to blame for the Delhi blast.

“There is a lot of due outrage this time, but there is no mention of Pakistan,” said Anuradha Bhasin, a veteran editor in Kashmir and author of a book, A Dismantled State: The Untold Story of Kashmir After Article 370, about how the region changed under the Hindu majoritarian Modi government. The Kashmir administration has banned her book in the region.

“This time, it is not about a crackdown on Pakistan,” she told Al Jazeera. “The public anger is being directed away from Pakistan, towards ‘an enemy within’.”

She said the Modi government appeared to be aware that finger-pointing at Pakistan “would create pressure from the public to take [military] action” against the neighbour.

Instead, she said, “public anger can be assuaged by creating any enemy.”

‘Pandering to domestic gallery’

Analysts point to the Modi government’s use of the term “antinational forces” to describe the alleged perpetrators of the Delhi attack.

That’s a phrase the Modi government has previously used to describe academics, journalists and students who have criticised it, as well as other protesters and dissidents. Since Modi took office in 2014, India has continuously slid in multiple democracy indices for alleged persecution of minorities in the country and its crackdown on press freedom.

To Sumantra Bose, a political scientist whose work focuses on the intersection of nationalism and conflict in South Asia, the Indian cabinet resolution was significant in the way that it shied “away from naming and blaming Pakistan, which was a rather reflexive reaction for decades”.

After the fighting in May, the Indian government learned, the hard way, Bose said, that “there is no appetite and indeed no tolerance anywhere in the world for a military escalation in South Asia.”

Bose was referring to the lukewarm global support that India received after it bombed Pakistan without providing any public evidence of Islamabad’s links with the attackers in Pahalgam.

Instead, India was left disputing the repeated assertions of United States President Donald Trump that he had brokered the ceasefire between New Delhi and Islamabad, even as he hosted Pakistan’s army chief, praised him, and strengthened ties with India’s western neighbour. India has long held the position that all disputes with Pakistan must be resolved bilaterally, without intervention from any other country.

The contrast in New Delhi’s response to this week’s blast, so far, appears to have struck US State Secretary Marco Rubio, too.

Reacting to the Delhi blast, Rubio said “it clearly was a terrorist attack,” and “the Indians need to be commended. They’ve been very measured, cautious, and very professional on how they’re carrying out this investigation.”

India’s new security doctrine – that an act of terror is an act of war – “was a dangerous, slippery slope”, said Bose, who has also authored books on the conflict in Kashmir. His last work, Kashmir at the Crossroads: Inside a 21st-Century Conflict, published in 2021, is also banned in Kashmir.

The doctrine, he said, was aimed at pandering to Modi’s “domestic gallery” – a way of showing muscular strength, even at the risk of “serious military escalation” between India and Pakistan.

Now, by using terms like “white-collar terrorism”, analysts said Indian officials risked blurring the line between Kashmiri Muslims and armed rebels fighting Indian rule.

“The term doesn’t make sense to me, but it does put the needle of suspicion on young, educated Muslim professionals,” said Bose.

“The fact has been for decades that militants come from all sorts of social backgrounds in Kashmir – from rural farming families, working-class backgrounds, to educated professionals,” Bose argued. “If anything, it reflects the discontent that has been in the society across the groups.”

Bhasin, the editor from Kashmir, said the Indian government’s posture would lead to “adverse economic impact for Kashmiri Muslims and further ghettoisation, where they find it harder to get jobs or a place to rent”.

‘Everyone is so scared’

Kashmiris across India are already facing the brunt of hate and anger following the Delhi blast.

Since the bomb exploded on Monday in New Delhi, Indian social media platforms have been rife with rampant hate speech against Muslims.

Nasir Khuehami, the national convener of a Kashmiri student association, has spent four days fielding calls from Kashmiri Muslims.

“Across northern Indian states, Kashmiris are being asked to vacate their homes, there is active profiling going on, and everyone is so scared,” Khuehami told Al Jazeera, speaking from his home in Kashmir.

This is only the latest instance of this pattern playing out: An attack in Kashmir, or by a Kashmiri armed rebel, has often led to harassment and beating of Kashmiri Muslims – students, professionals, traders, or even labourers – living in India.

Khuehami said “to end this endless cycle of crises for Kashmiris” – where they are detained at home and abused outside – “the government needs to take confidence-building measures.”

Otherwise, Khuehami said, the Modi government was marginalising Kashmiris in India. By doing that, he said, India would be playing into the hands of the very country it accuses of wanting to grab Kashmir: Pakistan.

A man who jumped the barricade and grabbed actress Ariana Grande at a Wicked: For Good premiere has been charged with being a public nuisance.

A now viral video shows the Australian man, Johnson Wen, pushing past photographers and charging at Grande while the cast made its way down a yellow carpet surrounded by fans. Co-star Cynthia Erivo could be seen wresting the stunned actress away from Mr Wen.

The 26-year-old had posted on Instagram late on Thursday that he was “free after being arrested”.

However, on Friday afternoon he was charged with being a public nuisance by a Singapore court. Local media reports say Mr Wen, who was unrepresented, intends to plead guilty.

This is not the first time Mr Wen, who describes himself as a “Troll Most Hated”, has invaded a concert or event.

His Instagram feed includes clips of him disrupting other celebrity events, including jumping on stage at Katy Perry’s Sydney concert in June this year and in a similar way during The Chainsmokers performance in the city last December.

If found guilty, he may be fined up to S$2000 ($1540; £1170).

Fans had earlier called for him to be arrested or deported.

“There needs to be action [taken] against him as this is clearly a criminal offence,” wrote an Instagram user, in a comment a video Mr Wen posted of his act.

“Oh wow so you do this a lot… how aren’t you in jail?” one Instagram user wrote.

Several accused Mr Wen for “re-traumatising” Grande, who had spoken of experiencing post-traumatic stress disorder after a suicide bomb attack at the end of her May 2017 concert in Manchester, killing 22 people and injuring hundreds.

“Ariana has been through so many scary things… and at her Manchester concert and you thought it would be fun to jump the barricade?” said another comment on Instagram.

Some fans also criticised security officers at the Thursday event for not being vigilant enough; while others called for social media platforms to ban Mr Wen’s videos.

In clips circulating online, Grande appeared shocked when she was grabbed by the intruder. Her co-stars Michelle Yeoh and Erivo can be seen comforting her while Mr Wen was escorted away by security.

Grande has not commented on the incident, and the rest of the event proceeded as normal.

The BBC has reached out to Singapore’s police and immigration authority for comment.

Hundreds of fans had gathered in a sea of green and pink at the Wicked: For Good Asia-Pacific premiere in a Singapore mall, including some who had stood in line for as long as eight hours before it began.

The movie, to be released on 21 November, is the second of a two-part adaptation of the popular Broadway and West End musical Wicked, which centres on the unlikely friendship between two very different witches.

The musical itself is a spin-off of the 1900 children’s novel The Wonderful Wizard of Oz.

Grande, who plays the good witch Glinda, was decked out in a champagne pink sequin dress at the premiere while Erivo, who plays the wicked witch, wore a black tube grown embroidered with roses.

They were joined by co-star Jeff Goldblum.

The first movie, Wicked, was the highest-grossing movie of 2024 in the UK, and scored 10 Oscar nominations, winning two for best costume and production design.

Russia has created a new branch of its military to oversee the production, operation, and testing of uncrewed systems and the tactics and techniques for using them. Called the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), the new branch mirrors a similar one Ukraine created last year, even using the same name. Its work will encompass aerial, land and surface drones.

Ukrainian officials have acknowledged the creation of this new branch, with one calling it a “threat.”

In history’s most drone-saturated battlefield, both sides are seeking to streamline operations to better use the resources they have and stay ahead of the never-ending technology development cycle. The objective of the Russian USF is to do just that, according to its deputy chief.

“We have already formed established regiments, battalions, and other units,” Lt. Col. Sergei Ishtuganov told the Russian KP.Ru media outlet. “Their combat operations are conducted according to a unified plan and in coordination with other units of the troop groups. At the same time, the expansion of existing and the creation of new units… continues. We are assigning operators, engineers, technicians, and other support specialists to these units.”

The USF is already showing signs of success, Ishtuganov claimed, citing the situation in the embattled city of Pokrovsk, where both sides acknowledge that Russian drones have helped give Moscow the upper hand.

“Have you noticed what the enemy complains about most when surrounded in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad agglomeration? That’s right – drones,” exclaimed Ishtuganov. “Just a year ago, our troops weren’t so saturated with drones of all types. But gradually, Russian units managed to turn the tide in the skies and effectively ‘squeeze’ them from the Ukrainian Armed Forces.”

Beyond the battlefield, the USF is “conducting combat testing of both drones and electronic warfare systems, working closely with manufacturers,” the USF deputy chief noted.

As we pointed out earlier in this story, both sides are rapidly developing new technologies and methods to defeat them. A big focus of the Russian USF is on electronic warfare (EW), where countermeasures often last just weeks or less before they no longer work. 

“If necessary, we modify these or other products, taking into account the rapidly changing situation,” Ishtuganov explained. “The enemy plays with frequencies; we reconfigure our electronic warfare systems. The enemy begins to suppress us with electronic warfare; we switch to other frequencies. And this is an ongoing process, requiring, among other things, technical expertise.”

While procurement is a major effort of the new military branch, Ishtuganov offered no details about the process. It is important to note that Russia is now receiving a good deal of assistance from Beijing, now producing drones completely made up of Chinese components. Overall, Moscow has announced lofty intentions for producing new drones. It has a factory where the goal is to build 6,000 Shahed-type drones per month. Russia also has plans to make a total of 2 million first-person-view (FPV) drones this year.

Equipment is just part of the equation. The USF is also recruiting top military talent, Ishtuganov said.

“The effectiveness of this new branch of the armed forces, which is still in its infancy, is demonstrated by its personnel approach,” he suggested. “The best service members are selected, taking into account their combat achievements, among other things.”

The USF was created at the behest of Russian President Vladimir Putin, who in December 2024 ordered the Defense Ministry to establish a dedicated branch for drone warfare. While Putin shrugged off concerns about the capabilities of his drone operations, one Russian military observer said a combination of issues had impeded operations. One is how troops are deployed, explained the Forces Group “ZAPAD” | News Telegram channel. The other is how they have been equipped.

“Drone operators should not be sent as assault troops, as some commanders do,” the Telegram channel pointed out. “Otherwise, the whole process loses its meaning. Patching holes is a consequence of problems. And the existence of such problems is a result of careless command actions. There is hope that the (USF) troops will become a kind of ‘shield’ for all successful drone operators.”

Resources have been another big issue.

“In combat conditions, losing a drone is very easy, and if you have a strict limit on the number of drones — you are limited in your capabilities,” Forces Group posited. “It is no secret that drones are currently in short supply almost everywhere. Especially night drones. Especially our equivalents of Baba Yaga.” Baba Yagas, as we have explained in the past, are large industrial quadcopter drones armed with guided munitions.

The only Russian unit immune to this concern is Rubicon, a secretive force of drone operators that helped Russia push back Ukraine’s Kursk invasion.

“There is hope that the UAV Forces are being created, among other things, to solve the supply problem so that each unit can eventually call itself at least a mini-Rubicon,” Forces Group “Zapad” postulated.

Samuel Bendett, a drone expert and researcher with the Center for Naval Analyses think tank concurred with much of the Telegram channel’s hypothesis.

“There are no official standards today for many tactical drone R&D and uses in the Russian military,” he told us. “There are uneven supplies, there are issues with UAV pilots treated as typical infantry used for assaults, uneven supplies of qualified pilots and drones, etc. There is hope from many in the Russian military that USF will solve many of these issues.”

The USF is not Russia’s first attempt to wrangle its drone operations. As we reported earlier this year, the Russian Navy dedicated regiments to operate uncrewed surface, undersea, air and land systems.

Ukraine, as we noted at the top of this story, created its own USF to address many of the same issues. The reaction in Kyiv toward the Russian version is one of concern.

“Heard a detailed intelligence report on the development of the enemy’s unmanned forces,” Oleksandr Syrskyi, commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, noted on his Telegram channel. “The occupiers are following our experience, particularly in creating regiments of unmanned systems and interceptor drones, and are directing significant resources towards this. We must constantly improve to maintain technological superiority.”

“Special attention,” he added, “is given to scaling the [Ukrainian] Unmanned Systems Forces units: increasing the number of trained crews, involving personnel, and creating infrastructure for their effective operation.”

One Ukrainian official posited that Russia’s following Kyiv’s lead presents a real danger.

“They copied our successful solutions,” Andrii Kovalenko, the head of Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation, stated on Telegram. “It was we who created strike UAV companies, which in 2023 allowed us to have an advantage over the enemy. And now the SBS operates very effectively. But the Russians copy and try to scale our innovations by quantity. This is a threat, of course.”

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In an era of global polarization and escalating crises, the promise of a Feminist Foreign Policy (FFP) has emerged as a beacon of progressive change. Yet, a troubling paradox lies at its heart: while political support holds steady, the financial backbone of the movement—women’s rights organizations—faces a “life-threatening” funding crisis. In an exclusive multi-respondent Q&A, experts from the Feminist Foreign Policy Collaborative—Katie Whipkey, Spogmay Ahmed, and Beth Woroniuk—break down the alarming data from their latest report and outline the path from minimalist commitments to a truly transformative global agenda.

1. The Rhetoric-Reality Gap: A “Life-Threatening” Divide

Your report’s data reveals a world where support for FFP is growing, yet funding for women’s rights organizations is in “urgent alarm.” How do you explain this gap?

Katie Whipkey: The report found that feminist foreign policy is not experiencing the rollback that we might have expected during this time of deep polarization and gender backlash. However, to say that it is growing may not be quite right—the interest is holding steady. That gives us a lot of hope. FFP has enabled governments to double down on existing commitments to gender equality in multilateral spaces and push for more gender-inclusive language. However, when it comes to the tougher structural issues like funding, especially for non-traditional funding targets such as women’s rights organizations (WROs), we see a gap. The brash reduction in Official Development Assistance (ODA) and the continually miniscule funding for WROs is alarming. ODA dropped 9% in 2024 and is predicted to fall up to 17% in 2025. Many of the biggest ODA donors are FFP governments, and they are cutting development budgets while simultaneously increasing military spending. This is life-threatening as 90% of WROs in crisis contexts report disrupted operations due to funding cuts. So what we see is that gender equality has been better rhetorically mainstreamed while remaining fiscally marginalized.

Beth Woroniuk: This gap is not new. There has always been a huge divide between the statements of support for gender equality on the part of the development assistance donors, and their actual support for women’s rights organizations. Between 2014 and 2023, just 0.1 per cent of ODA reached women’s rights and women-led organisations directly. Another example: financing to support the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda has ‘failed to match the scale of the challenge.’ The hope was that countries with feminist foreign policies would start to reverse this trend. And we saw this start to happen. Unfortunately this momentum is threatened by the current trend to slash development assistance budgets.

2. Resisting Backlash: The Second Generation of FFP

We’ve seen high-profile FFP abandonments in Europe and the Americas. Where are you seeing the most effective resistance to this backlash, and what does that resistance look like on the ground?

Katie Whipkey: Resistance to backlash takes several forms. Perhaps the single strongest form is from within through institutionalization of as many elements of FFP as possible. When we move away from political feminism—declarations or speeches that can be reversed overnight—and toward institutional feminism—incorporating inclusive and responsive policy into laws, budgets, bureaucracies, and diplomatic culture—we have a chance to stave off conservative pushback. This is the second generation of FFP, where the architecture outlasts the architects. The report identifies five mechanisms for institutionalization: policy, through legislative or administrative provisions; architecture, through dedicated departments; budgetary, through earmarked funds; leadership, through dedicated high-level roles; and capacity, through staff training. Resistance also looks like feminist bureaucrats and civil servants quietly keeping feminist norms alive through budget tagging and gender audits even when political leadership changes.

Spogmay Ahmed: While our report identifies FFP abandonments across Europe and the Americas, it also points out that engagement in FFP discourse—primarily by civil society—has deepened and diversified. For example, our own Global Partner Network for Feminist Foreign Policy has grown from 14 to over 100 partners. Over the past few years, regional networks have launched and expanded. Likewise, academic coverage has greatly increased. While there is no shortage of skepticism, our report demonstrates that interest has persisted, evolved and broadened. That too is one form of resistance.

3. Following the Money: Where Gender-Focused Aid Really Goes

The data shows FFP countries give more gender-focused aid, but the actual amount reaching women’s rights organizations is “miniscule.” Where is the money actually going, and how can it be redirected?

Beth Woroniuk: Development assistance that is counted as ‘gender focused’ supports a wide variety of goals and is provided to governments, international organizations, private sector companies, and NGOs. The vast majority of this funding is for projects that have just one component that supports gender equality, while a small percentage supports projects that directly target gender equality objectives. Traditionally, women’s rights organizations have been seen as too small and too risky to be chosen as key ‘implementors.’ In recent years, new mechanisms have emerged to address these challenges. For example, women’s and feminist funds have mobilized both development assistance and philanthropic resources to provide core, flexible, and predictable funding. These funds allow bilateral assistance entities to reduce the high transaction costs involved in providing multiple small grants.

4. Protecting Resources: A Political Choice

The report’s 5R framework highlights “Resources” as a key pillar. With major donors cutting Official Development Assistance (ODA), how can FFP countries practically “ring-fence” and protect funding for gender equality?

Beth Woroniuk: Protecting development assistance funding for gender equality is a political choice. When ODA budgets are cut, choices have to be made about what programmes are reduced or eliminated. At this moment, governments have an opportunity to say ‘we stand for gender equality and we will not cut these strategic investments.

5. Signature Initiatives: Funding Models That Work

The reports mention “signature initiatives” that partner directly with civil society. What is one concrete example of a funding model that is successfully getting resources to feminist movements?

Spogmay Ahmed: In our report, we outline a few of these ‘signature initiatives,’ such as France’s Support Fund for Feminist Organizations, which is allocated EUR 250 million over five years. Similarly, Canada invested CAD 300 million in the Equality Fund. We point to the Equality Fund as a powerful example of ‘institutionalizing’ feminist foreign policy; by making a large early investment, Canada helped ensure the Fund’s continued global impact.

Beth Woroniuk: These ‘signature’ initiatives all respond to calls from feminist activists to both increase investments in gender equality and change the terms on which this money flows – focusing more on feminist movements and providing more flexible funding.

6. The Power of Regional Partnerships

Beyond money, how are regional partnerships, like the one between Chile and Mexico, proving to be a powerful tool for advancing FFP goals?

Spogmay Ahmed: Our report recognizes a marked increase in regional cooperation. We see this primarily through a rise in ‘South-South’ cooperation efforts. One example is Chile and Mexico institutionalizing their FFP partnership through a memorandum of understanding on FFP, diplomatic training and Indigenous cooperation. Through such partnerships, governments are able to share learnings, strengthen collaboration, and collectively push for gender equality and human rights.

7. True Partnership: Beyond Writing Checks

The report recommends that FFP countries “ally with women’s and feminist funds.” What does a true, equitable partnership look like in practice, beyond just writing a cheque?

Katie Whipkey: We see that true, equitable partnership is grounded in co-creation and power-sharing. It means shifting from donor-recipient models to structures based on shared decision-making. Practically, this looks like feminist groups being involved in decision-making about how funds are prioritized, distributed, and evaluated. Feminists from the Majority World would be viewed and valued as knowledge experts. It also means long-term, core funding that enables spending on administrative and political work – not just service delivery.

Beth Woroniuk: Most development assistance projects are highly bureaucratic. Women’s and feminist funds are rooted in and accountable to feminist movements. Working together as thought partners, co-creators, and innovators are promising examples of changing out-dated structures.

8. Learning from Outliers

The report notes that some non-FFP countries invest a greater percentage in gender equality than FFP countries. What can FFP champions learn from these outliers?

Beth Woroniuk: One of the lessons from the report is that you don’t have to have an FFP to invest development assistance in gender equality. There are countries supporting key initiatives who haven’t adopted this label. So one lesson is that all countries can boost their gender equality ODA investments. There can be feminist champions doing solid work, without the feminist label.

9. One Action for Real Commitment

If you could tell the leaders of the remaining FFP countries one thing they must do in the next year to prove their commitment is real, what would it be?

Spogmay Ahmed: Strengthen feminist principles across all areas of foreign policy. This brings us back to the ‘Reach’ in our global framework. I would encourage leaders to broaden the scope and application of their feminist foreign policies, as well as their ambition.

Katie Whipkey: Institutionalize. We need to guarantee our gains by legislating what we know works, including protecting staffing and training budgets, providing direct funding to women’s rights organizations, and mandating regular publishing of transparent progress reports.

Beth Woroniuk: I would encourage countries with FFPs to reach out and engage civil society organizations. Yes, activists are often critical, yet they are also an enormous source of strength and creativity. These relationships can be sources of inspiration, expertise, and accountability.

From Pledge to Power: The Road Ahead

The insights from Katie Whipkey, Spogmay Ahmed, and Beth Woroniuk paint a clear picture: the future of Feminist Foreign Policy depends on closing the gap between rhetoric and resources. While institutionalization and civil society partnerships offer hope, true progress requires political courage—to protect funding, share power with grassroots movements, and extend feminist principles across all areas of foreign policy. As Whipkey powerfully notes, “In a time of backlash, we need courage.” The stakes could not be higher, but neither could the resolve of those fighting for a foreign policy that serves all of humanity.

Islamabad, Pakistan – Pakistan has codified the most ambitious restructure of its military and judiciary in decades after President Asif Ali Zardari signed his assent to ratify the country’s 27th Constitutional Amendment on Thursday.

The amendment, which passed in both houses of parliament earlier in the week amid opposition protests and criticism from a range of civil society activists and sitting judges, makes major changes to Pakistan’s higher judiciary.

But many analysts believe that its most consequential feature is a sweeping overhaul of Article 243, the constitutional clause defining the relationship between Pakistan’s civilian government and the military.

The changes grant lifetime immunity from criminal prosecution to the country’s top military leaders, significantly reshape the military’s command structure, and further tilt the balance of the tri-services – the army, navy and air force – heavily in the army’s favour.

Analysts warn that this contentious reform risks colliding with entrenched institutional cultures and could rock the country’s fragile civilian–military equilibrium.

Al Jazeera has sought comment from the military’s media wing on the changes and the debate over them, but has received no response.

A new command structure

The revised Article 243 establishes a new post, the Chief of Defence Forces (CDF), to be held concurrently by the Chief of Army Staff (COAS). This effectively gives the army chief command authority over the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and Pakistan Navy (PN).

The incumbent COAS is Field Marshal Asim Munir, who assumed command in November 2022 and was elevated to a five-star rank on May 20 this year, just 10 days after Pakistan ended its four-day conflict with India.

Munir became only the second Pakistani military officer – after Field Marshal Ayub Khan in the 1960s – to receive the five-star designation. The air force and navy have never had a five-star official so far.

The amendment also abolishes the office of Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC) at the end of this month. The role is currently held by four-star General Sahir Shamshad Mirza, who retires on November 27. Another major change is the creation of the Commander of the National Strategic Command (CNSC), a post overseeing Pakistan’s nuclear command. The position will be limited to only an army officer, appointed in consultation with the CDF, with a three-year term extendable by another three years.

The amendment effectively transforms five-star titles from what were honorary recognitions into constitutionally recognised offices with expansive privileges.

Under the new arrangement, five-star officers will enjoy lifetime immunity from criminal prosecution and will “retain rank, privileges and remain in uniform for life.”

Removing a five-star officer will require a two-thirds parliamentary majority, whereas an elected government can be dismissed by a simple majority.

“While government spokespersons refer to these titles as ‘honorary’, given to ‘national heroes’ to celebrate their services,” Reema Omer, a constitutional law expert, said, the amendment “implies actual power, not just honorary significance”.

Omer told Al Jazeera that lifelong immunity from criminal proceedings was “concerning from a rule of law perspective”.

A former three-star general, speaking on condition of anonymity, acknowledged that the changes appeared to be “meant to consolidate” the army chief’s power.

Hours after the president’s ratification on Thursday evening, Pakistan’s government brought amendments to the laws governing the three services.

Under the revised Army Act, the clock on the tenure of the army chief will now restart from the date of his notification as CDF.

Last year, parliament had increased the tenure of the service chiefs from three to five years, which meant Munir’s term would run until 2027. Following the new changes, it will now extend even further. Once the revised rules take effect at the end of this month, Munir will hold both posts – COAS and CDF – at least until November 2030.

Military dominance – and the role of the India conflict

Since independence in 1947, Pakistan’s military, especially the army, has been the most powerful institution in national life.

Four coups and decades of direct rule have been accompanied by significant influence, even when civilian governments have been in power. The army chief has long been widely viewed as the country’s most powerful figure.

No prime minister has ever completed a full five-year term, while three of four military rulers have governed for more than nine years each.

General Qamar Javed Bajwa, Munir’s predecessor, acknowledged this history in his farewell address in November 2022, conceding that the military had interfered in politics for decades, and promising to break with that legacy.

But three years later, rights groups and opposition parties allege that little has changed, and some claim that the military has further strengthened its grip over state institutions.

The military restructure under the 27th Amendment also comes six months after Pakistan’s brief conflict with India in May, raising questions over whether the reforms were linked to that fight.

Aqil Shah, professor of international affairs at Georgetown University in Washington, DC, argued that the confrontation with India created the opening for this “unprecedented role expansion” for the army chief.

The changes “formalise the army’s de facto hegemony over the other two wings of armed forces in the guise of the ‘unity of command’ as a necessity for war fighting,” Shah told Al Jazeera.

But supporters of the amendment disagree. Aqeel Malik, state minister for law and justice, said that the amendment aims to “plug holes” in Pakistan’s national security architecture.

“The amendment granted constitutional cover to defence integration and improved coordination. We have also provided a constitutional cover to the honour bestowed upon our national heroes and have addressed a long overdue cohesive and better coordination within the forces for a swift response,” Malik said.

Ahmed Saeed, a former vice admiral, similarly described the reform as a “forward-looking institutional change”.

He said the conflict with India exposed that Pakistan’s command model was rooted in a 1970s framework, unsuitable for “multi-domain, hybrid warfare of the 21st century”.

“The amendment is not about ‘fixing what is broken’ but about modernising what is functioning to ensure sustained effectiveness in future contingencies,” Saeed told Al Jazeera.

Fears of imbalance

Other critics, including former senior officials and security analysts, believe the amendment is less about modernisation and more about institutional consolidation.

They argue that creating the CDF post cements the army’s dominance over the other branches.

Many question why the command structure should be overhauled when, by the government’s own narrative, the existing system delivered what Pakistan claims was an “outright victory” against India.

A retired three-star general who served in senior roles before retiring in 2019 said the abolished CJCSC role, despite being largely symbolic, provided a mechanism for balancing perspectives across the army, navy and air force.

“The PAF and PN may lose autonomy in strategic planning and most probably senior promotions, which has the potential to breed resentment,” he said.

“These risks institutional imbalance, undermining the very cohesion the amendment claims to enhance,” the former general added.

The CJCSC – a four-star post and the principal military adviser to the prime minister – can theoretically be filled by any service, but the last non-army officer to hold the position was Air Chief Marshal Feroz Khan in 1997.

Security analyst Majid Nizami said that while the amendment aims to codify five-star ranks, it may create challenges for “cohesion and synergy” among the services.

If the goal was to modernise warfare strategy, he argued, there should have been a dedicated officer focused solely on integration, not the army chief assuming dual authority.

“There is a lack of clarity on rules and terms of reference for the CDF,” Nizami said.

Shah, the Georgetown academic and author of The Army and Democracy, said the amendment “formalises the de facto power” of the COAS over the other branches.

Saeed, the former navy official who retired in 2022, however, disagreed with critics, arguing that the amendment simply clarifies the CDF’s strategic coordination role.

“The amendment retains the PAF and PN’s distinct command structures within their domains of responsibility, and the CDF’s function is limited to integration at the strategic level, not administrative control or operational interference,” he said.

He added that claims of “army dominance” stem from “legacy perceptions, not from constitutional reality.”

Control of nuclear command

The amendment also codifies the army’s control of Pakistan’s nuclear programme, including research, development and deployment, responsibilities that fall under the strategic command structure.

The former three-star general who spoke to Al Jazeera said the new system’s operational details remain unclear. Under the current model, the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) manages Pakistan’s ballistic and cruise missile programmes and nuclear assets.

Nizami said that although the CJCSC nominally oversaw the SPD, operational authority has long rested with the army. The amendment now formalises this reality.

Saeed, however, countered by arguing that in effect, even with the changes, “the entire nuclear enterprise operates under civilian-led oversight with constitutional clarity”.

Political fallout

Critics have described the amendment as a “constitutional surrender” by political parties to the military, and an attempt to institutionalise the “supremacy of the uniform over the ballot”.

It also comes at a time when Field Marshal Munir’s public profile has risen significantly. He has undertaken multiple foreign trips, including several to the United States, and has been described by President Donald Trump as his “favourite field marshal”.

Meanwhile, former Prime Minister Imran Khan, jailed for the past two years, accuses Munir of orchestrating the crackdown on him and his party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), since their ouster in 2022 through a no-confidence vote – a charge that the military has rejected outright.

In Pakistan’s February 2024 election, the PTI was barred from contesting as a party. But its candidates, contesting independently, secured the most seats even though they failed to secure a majority. Instead, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif formed the government with allies. The government and military rejected widespread accusations of election rigging.

Shah argued that the political class supported the amendment out of necessity.

“Lacking democratic legitimacy and faced with the political challenge posed by the PTI and Khan, the ruling PML-N government sees Munir as the key guarantor of their power and political interests,” he said.

Nizami, the Lahore-based analyst, meanwhile, said that separate appointments to the posts of the CDF and the army chief would have made more sense if the intent was to strengthen the military structure and balance. The amendment, he warned, could lead to “institutional imbalance instead of institutional synergy”.