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Pakistan announced on Friday that it had shot down 77 Israeli-made attack drones launched by India, in the latest escalation between the two sides following exchanged attacks.

This was announced by Military spokesman Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry during a press conference addressing developments in the military situation in the region, according to the local newspaper Dawn.

Chaudhry confirmed that the death toll from Indian attacks had risen to 33, while the number of injured had reached 62. He accused India of “deliberate attacks and targeting civilian areas.”

Responding to Indian allegations that Pakistani aircraft had been shot down or that Pakistan had carried out attacks inside India, Chaudhry said, “India should present the wreckage of at least one aircraft if its claims are credible.”

He revealed that the Pakistani army had not lost any of its people in the clashes between the two countries, despite the casualties among its ranks.

READ: US President Trump claims India, Pakistan have fought over Kashmir for 1,500 years

Chaudhry sent a message to India, saying, “If you enjoy our response, we will meet your requests at a time, place, and means of our choosing.”

He continued, “We are prepared for all eventualities. If they decide to continue escalation, let them know that we are the ones who will finish what they started.”

On Thursday, Indian media reported that Pakistan had carried out strikes targeting ammunition depots on the Indian side of Jammu and Kashmir. The Pakistani Foreign Ministry later denied this, asserting that allegations of attacks in the Pathankot and Srinagar areas were “baseless.”

It is worth noting that on 6 May, India launched missile strikes targeting what it described as ‘terrorist hideouts” inside Pakistani territory, in retaliation for a deadly attack on 22 April in the Pahalgam district that killed 26 people.

According to New Delhi, its strikes targeted nine militant sites, while Islamabad said the strikes hit six civilian sites, killing 33 people and wounding 62 others.

Pakistan also announced that it shot down 5 Indian warplanes during the attack, a claim that has yet to be confirmed by Indian authorities.

OPINION: The Indo-Pak war: recklessness and diversion in the service of pharaohs 

Saurara a: Apple Podcast | Spotify | RSS

Christie Garba mace ce mai shekaru 38, uwa ga yara bakwai, wadda ke zaune a Billiri, Jihar Gombe, a yankin Arewa maso Gabashin Najeriya. Ta kasance tana zaune a Jihar Yobe tare da iyalinta kafin rikicin Boko Haram ya addabi yankin. A wancan lokacin, hare-hare sun riga sun faru a wasu wurare kusa da su, amma ba su kai ga al’ummarsu kai tsaye ba.

Christie da iyalinta sun zauna kimanin watanni huɗu bayan hare-haren sun fara, amma yayin da rikicin ya ƙaru, sojoji suka gargadi mazauna yankin cewa lamarin ya yi tsanani sosai, ba zai yiwu su ci gaba da zama ba. Dokokin hana fita (curfew) da suka biyo baya sun sa rayuwar yau da kullum ta zama mai matuƙar wahala.

A wannan shirin na #BirbishinRikici mun ba da labarin yadda Christie da iyalinta suka koma Jihar Gombe da kuma yadda ta yi rayuwa ta hanyar fara sabon kasuwanci.

Mai Gabatarwa: Rukayya Saeed

Marubuciya: Sabiqah Bello

Muryoyin Shiri: Sabiqah Bello

Fassara: Rukayya Saeed

Edita: Aliyu Dahiru

Furodusa: Mu’azu Muhammad

Babban Furodusa: Anthony Asemota

Babban Mashiryi: Ahmad Salkida

Secessionists in the western Canadian province of Alberta recently announced that they have gathered enough signatures to launch a referendum on independence from the rest of the country.

Leading secessionists said that they formally submitted about 300,000 signatures to election authorities earlier this week, far more than the 178,000 required for the province to consider a referendum.

“This day is historic in Alberta history,” secessionist leader Mitch Sylvestre said.

“It’s the first step to the next step — we’ve gotten by Round 3, and now we’re in the Stanley Cup final,” he added, referring to a hockey championship tournament.

Even if a vote were in favour of independence, an uncertain and protracted process would follow, including possible legal challenges and negotiations with the federal government.

But the possibility of a referendum has brought renewed attention to Alberta’s longstanding frustrations with federal power in Canada and calls for greater autonomy.

What is driving Alberta’s secessionist movement? What are the prospects of success for the referendum, and what could it mean for Canadian politics? Here’s what you need to know.

How many signatures were collected?

Alberta secessionists said on Monday that they had submitted nearly 302,000 signatures, more than the 178,000 required to qualify for referendum consideration.

Alberta Premier Danielle Smith has said she would move forward with the vote if the petition gathered enough signatures, although she does not support independence from Canada herself.

What would the referendum ask voters?

If the proposed measure makes it to the ballot, it would ask voters: “Do you agree that the Province of Alberta should cease to be a part of Canada to become an independent state?”

Does this guarantee a referendum, and could Alberta actually separate from Canada?

Meeting the signature requirement does not in itself guarantee that a referendum will take place.

Elections Alberta, the province’s electoral authority, still needs to verify the petitioners’ names, a process that has been stalled by a court ruling.

Indigenous groups have also filed a legal challenge, stating that separation would be a violation of their treaty rights.

There are also questions about whether the referendum will gather sufficient support among voters to pass. Polls have shown that about 30 percent of residents would support such a measure.

What’s behind Alberta’s bid for separatism?

While secession has never been so close to a vote in Alberta, pro-independence sentiment has been part of the province’s political culture — home to about 5 million people — for decades.

That sentiment is driven largely by the feeling of many in Alberta that the province is distinct — culturally, economically, and politically — from the rest of Canada.

The oil-rich western province has long expressed frustration with political decision-making in Ottawa, the Canadian capital, despite what it sees as its outsized economic contribution to the national economy through its massive fossil fuel industry.

Environmental regulations and efforts to address climate change have become another flashpoint, with secessionist leaders depicting Alberta’s primary industry as hamstrung by regulatory decisions made by bureaucrats with little understanding of the province.

“We’re not like the rest of Canada,” secessionist leader Sylvestre told the news service AFP. “We’re 100 percent conservative. We’re being ruled by Liberals who don’t think like us.”

“They’re trying to shut down our industry,” he added.

Have any other provinces considered separating from Canada?

Alberta is not the only region with a complicated relationship with the rest of Canada.

The French-speaking province of Quebec is home to a decades-old nationalist movement that has pushed to separate from Canada, rooted in a desire to recognise Quebec’s distinct linguistic and cultural identity.

The popularity of that movement has ebbed, with a March poll finding Quebecois secessionism at its lowest level of support since voters narrowly rejected a referendum in 1995. Still, the secessionist Parti Quebecois political party is polling high in advance of a provincial election set for later this year.

Has the push for independence attracted criticism?

As with all independence movements, the province’s bid for separation from the rest of Canada has become a source of passionate disagreement.

“It stands for something that most of us Albertans and Canadians don’t stand for,” Thomas Lukaszuk, the province’s former deputy premier and a strong supporter of federalist identity, told AFP. “It’s a form of treason.”

Expressions of support from the administration of United States President Donald Trump, who has angered Canadians by suggesting that the country should become a US state, have also sparked criticism that the secessionist movement is undermining Canadian unity.

Asked about the possibility of independence in January, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said that Alberta would be a “natural partner” for the US.

“Alberta has a wealth of natural resources, but they won’t let them build a pipeline to the Pacific,” Bessent told a US right-wing commentator. “I think we should let them come down into the US, and Alberta is a natural partner for the US. They have great resources. The Albertans are very independent people.”

“The separatists are not elected members. They’re just citizens of Canada residing in Alberta, and they actually formed delegations and are received by the highest levels of US administration,” Lukaszuk said. “That must be very empowering to them.”

Regardless of whether the proposed ballot measure succeeds, the development is likely to serve as a shot in the arm for the province’s secessionist forces.

“I think this is going to be a permanent change in our political culture,” independent historian and supporter of independence Michael Wagner told AFP, adding that the movement “is not going to just disappear”.

What happens next?

A provincewide ballot could take place as soon as October, as part of a larger referendum on several questions relating to constitutional issues and other matters, such as immigration, scheduled for October 19.

Justice Shaina Leonard issued a monthlong stay on the certification of the independence petition on April 10, following a legal challenge from several First Nations groups who say separation would violate treaty rights.

That ruling did not bar the gathering of signatures, and a decision on legal challenges from Alberta First Nations is expected later this week. A decision in favour of the First Nations challengers could render the process academic.

Bayern Munich players, coaching staff and fans at the Allianz Arena were in disbelief after they were denied a penalty for a handball by Joao Neves in their Champions League semi-final second leg against Paris St-Germain.

Trailing the holders 1-0 on the night and 6-4 on aggregate, the German side’s players surrounded referee Joao Pedro Silva Pinheiro at the half-hour mark when Vitinha rifled a clearance against his own team-mate Neves’ arm inside the box.

But Pinheiro waved away the Bayern protests with the video assistant referee (VAR) also not intervening, leaving social media wondering why a spot-kick was not given.

According to BBC Sport’s football issues correspondent Dale Johnson, it was because of a little-known exemption within the handball law.

According to the laws of the game, it is not a handball if “hit on the hand/arm by the ball which has been played by a team-mate (unless the ball goes directly into the opponents’ goal or the player scores immediately afterwards, in which case a direct free-kick is awarded to the other team)”.

“It covers when the ball is unexpectedly hit at you by a team-mate, even if your arm is away from your body – the law says you should not give away a penalty,” said Johnson.

“When Vitinha blasts the ball clear, could Joao Neves think the ball would be hit straight at him?

“Of course, this could be overridden by deliberate handball, but in the context of this situation, a penalty would not be expected to be awarded.”

The ceasefire between the US and Iran has been in place for nearly four weeks. The Strait of Hormuz has not been at peace for a single day.

This week pushed that contradiction to its most dangerous point yet. The United States launched Project Freedom, a naval escort operation designed to guide roughly 2,000 ships stranded on either side of the Strait through to open water. Iran said any ship attempting passage without IRGC permission would be fired on. Within hours, both sides were claiming to have hit the other, the UAE was scrambling missile alerts for the first time since the ceasefire began, an oil refinery in Fujairah was on fire, and commercial aircraft bound for Dubai were turning around mid-air.

As of Tuesday evening, Trump announced Project Freedom would be paused “for a short period of time” to see if an agreement with Iran could be reached. Secretary of State Rubio told reporters the US was now in a “defensive” posture. Twenty-four hours earlier, both sides had been shooting and denying it simultaneously.

Here is what we know, what is contested, and what it means.

What Is Project Freedom and Why Did the US Launch It?

Trump announced the operation on Sunday, framing it in humanitarian terms, an effort to free the seafarers and cargo companies that had done nothing wrong and were caught between two governments fighting a war neither had formally ended. About 2,000 ships have been stranded on either side of the Strait since late February, unable to move without IRGC permission, which Iran began requiring and charging for after the ceasefire took effect.

The US had already begun a naval blockade of Iranian ports on April 13. Project Freedom was the next escalation — a direct challenge to Iran’s assertion that the Strait was now under its operational control. Trump described it as a “humanitarian gesture.” Iran described it as a violation of the ceasefire and an act of military aggression in a sensitive oil region that affects the economies of countries around the world.

Two American-flagged merchant ships successfully transited the Strait on Monday with US Navy escort. A Danish shipping company confirmed one of its vessels crossed with US military protection. But the transit did not go smoothly.

Did Iran Attack a US Warship? What the Claims Say

By Monday afternoon, the competing narratives had become almost impossible to untangle, which is itself part of the story.

Iran’s Fars News Agency reported a US warship had been hit by two Iranian drones after refusing to turn back from the Strait. CENTCOM denied any warship had been hit. US Admiral Brad Cooper said CENTCOM forces had sunk six IRGC vessels that tried to interfere with Project Freedom. Trump later said seven. Iran’s state broadcaster then reported that Tehran had launched an investigation and its preliminary conclusion was that the vessels the US claimed to have sunk were not IRGC boats at all, they were two small civilian craft carrying passengers from Oman to the Iranian coast, and five civilian passengers had been killed. The US has not commented on that claim and it has not been independently verified.

Why Iran Attacked the UAE in 2026: The Fujairah Strike Explained

The UAE’s Ministry of Defense said its air defenses engaged 15 ballistic missiles, three cruise missiles, and four drones launched from Iran on Monday, the first Iranian attacks on the UAE since the ceasefire took effect on April 8. One drone struck an oil refinery in Fujairah, wounding three Indian nationals and setting the facility ablaze. Four missile alerts were issued across the country, sending residents to shelter. Commercial aircraft bound for Dubai and Abu Dhabi turned around in mid-flight.

Iran’s position was that the Fujairah attack was not a premeditated strike on the UAE but a consequence of what it called US military adventurism in the Strait. An Iranian military official said the Islamic Republic had no preplanned programme to attack UAE facilities, and that what happened resulted from the US attempt to create an illegal passage through restricted waters. The UAE’s Foreign Ministry rejected that framing entirely, condemning what it called renewed terrorist and unprovoked Iranian attacks on civilian sites, and warning it reserves the full right to respond.

Why the Attack Claims Cannot Be Independently Verified

One detail worth noting is the shifting count of Iranian vessels supposedly sunk. Admiral Cooper said six. Trump said seven. No independent observer has confirmed either figure, and Iran has denied any IRGC boats were hit at all. This pattern: each side claiming damage inflicted while denying damage received, with no neutral verification , has run throughout the conflict and is not unique to this week’s exchange. What is different now is that the Strait is supposed to be under a ceasefire, and the exchanges are happening in a waterway where 2,000 civilian ships are anchored and waiting to see who wins the argument.

How the Hormuz Escalation Is Threatening Iran Ceasefire Talks in 2026

Trump’s decision to pause Project Freedom on Tuesday is significant precisely because of how quickly it followed the launch. The operation began Sunday. By Tuesday, with the UAE under attack, Iranian drones targeting ships in the Strait, and competing claims circulating with no resolution, the White House stepped back. Rubio reframed the entire mission as defensive rather than offensive, and a new UN Security Council resolution on freedom of navigation was announced, co-authored by Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar. A previous similar resolution was vetoed by China and Russia, and the outlook for this one is no clearer.

The pause does not resolve the underlying problem. The Strait remains contested. Iran still insists ships must seek IRGC permission and pay for transit. The US still insists the Strait is international water under international law. Two thousand ships are still stranded. And the ceasefire that is supposed to govern all of this is being tested in ways its text was never designed to handle.

The attacks this week did not happen in isolation from the negotiations still technically underway. Pakistan has been trying to bring the US and Iran back to a second round of talks after the Islamabad discussions collapsed on the nuclear question in April. Every exchange of fire, every competing claim, every missile alert in Abu Dhabi makes that second round harder to convene and harder to trust once convened.

As Shahram Akbarzadeh, a professor in Middle East and Central Asian politics at Deakin University, told Al Jazeera: “We see escalation after escalation against the backdrop of shuttle diplomacy. Such attacks, even if they are aimed to be contained, risk exploding into another major combat.” Neither the Americans nor the Iranians want a return to full-scale war, Akbarzadeh said, but neither is prepared to show weakness. “This dynamic has locked them in a perpetual conflict and in desperate need of a circuit breaker.”

The circuit breaker Pakistan offered in April produced a ceasefire. That ceasefire is now generating its own escalation cycle, in twenty-one miles of water, over a question neither side has answered: who controls the Strait of Hormuz, and on what terms does the world’s most important waterway reopen.

Two thousand ships are waiting for the answer.

Caracas, May 6, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The US Treasury Department has issued a sanctions waiver allowing the provision of services related to the restructuring of Venezuelan debt.

General License 58 (GL58), issued on Tuesday, authorizes the provision of “legal, financial advisory, and consulting services” to the Venezuelan government and state oil company PDVSA in relation to “potential restructuring of debt” owed by the Venezuelan state, PDVSA, and PDVSA affiliates.

The license does not allow creditors to transfer or settle debt, nor directly engage with Venezuelan authorities. It additionally forbids any payment to consultants using cryptocurrencies or gold.

The Trump administration’s latest move is a necessary step to locate creditors and assess the size of Venezuela’s foreign debt, estimated to be as high as US $170 billion, split between defaulted bonds, unpaid loans, and international arbitration awards.

Venezuelan bonds, which have steadily increased in value in recent months, rallied again on Tuesday as investor confidence in a restructuring deal grows. Bonds that fell below 10 cents on the dollar are currently trading between 40 and 60 cents on the dollar. Creditor groups have also held meetings with the Trump administration as they seek to engage Caracas.

Though the Nicolás Maduro government prioritized debt service after the Venezuelan economy fell into deep recession after 2014, US economic sanctions beginning in 2017 accelerated the economic tailspin and shut Venezuela out of financial markets, making debt payments impossible. The defaulted state and PDVSA bonds, estimated at around $66 billion, have been accruing interest ever since.

The Venezuelan government, led by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, has not publicly disclosed plans regarding the country’s external debt. In March, the Trump administration recognized Rodríguez as Venezuela’s “sole leader,” clearing another hurdle for creditors. 

Rodríguez, who previously served as vice president, took over the presidency following the US kidnapping of Maduro on January 3. In the four months since, the acting administration has fast-tracked a diplomatic rapprochement with Washington. Trump officials have made multiple visits to Caracas and have been hosted at the presidential palace.

In parallel, Venezuelan authorities have advanced multiple pro-business legislative reforms in a bid to attract foreign investment in sectors such as energy and mining. Projects to change the Caribbean nation’s labor, tax, and housing laws are currently underway. 

In parallel, Rodríguez has installed a commission to assess the “strategic” value of Venezuelan state assets and their possible privatization. The Cisneros Group, one of the country’s largest private sector conglomerates, has announced plans to raise funds ahead of potential sell-offs of state assets.

Caracas also reestablished ties with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in April. Economy Vice President Calixto Ortega was recently appointed as the country’s representative before the IMF. Venezuelan leaders have stated that their priority is to access around $5 billion in IMF-issued Special Drawing Rights to address urgent needs in public services and infrastructure.

Rodríguez has stated that there are “no plans” to contract an IMF loan, though a debt-restructuring agreement would place a significant burden on Venezuelan finances. The government’s budget for 2026 was estimated at around $20 billion.

For her part, IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva stated that the Washington-based institution is willing to support a loan program for Venezuela but that clarity on economic data and external debt is a necessary prior step.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Caracas.

With new threats emerging at home and abroad, the U.S. Coast Guard has created a new Special Missions Command (SMC) to oversee its “deployable specialized forces.” The move, officially unveiled today, comes as the Trump administration is increasing the use of these units for ship and drug interdictions around the globe. The Coast Guard is a uniformed military service, but has specific law enforcement authorities. Under Title 14 of the U.S. Code, its personnel can board vessels, carry out seizures, and make arrests.

The Coast Guard’s uniquely trained and equipped units are often at the tip of the spear for both the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), under which the service currently falls, and the Department of War (DoW). Some of its ‘deployable’ teams, for instance, recently helped interdict and seize Iranian-linked oil tankers in the Indian Ocean. Earlier this year, Coast Guard specialized forces chased a sanctioned Russian oil tanker from the Caribbean and across the Atlantic Ocean to take it over. They also play a large role in reeling in large amounts of illicit drugs, enforcing immigration laws at sea, protecting ports in the United States, and taking part in counter-terrorism operations.

Operation Pacific Viper 200k

The SMC will “fully integrate the service’s Deployable Special Forces under a single operational commander to provide oversight and advocacy, improve readiness, mission effectiveness, and interoperability,” according to the Coast Guard.

“The creation of the Special Missions Command is a vital evolution for our service,” Adm. Kevin Lunday, Commandant of the Coast Guard, said in a statement. “We are forging our most elite operators into a single, razor-sharp instrument of national power. The Special Missions Command is not an administrative change; it is an investment ensuring these elite teams are the best trained, equipped, and organized force possible, ready to protect the Homeland and support the Joint Force.”

The proposed budget for Fiscal Year 2027 includes funding to support an increase of 130 personnel “to manage the complexity of modern specialized missions,” a Coast Guard spokesman told us. It would also give the service $20.8 million “to establish a command to unify the service’s specialized tactical communities, streamline training, doctrine, and equipment procurement to enhance readiness and global responsiveness,” the spokesman added.

The new SMC “shifts specialized force management from a geographic model to a functional one,” the spokesman explained. “For example, in a complex scenario such as a high-consequence maritime threat at one of our nation’s major ports requiring the employment and integration of counter-terrorism teams (MSRT), deployable boat units (MSSTs), and hazardous material experts (NSF), the SMC streamlines the force-generation by reducing the need to coordinate between two geographical commands and headquarters and allowing us to mobilize with speed.”

“Under the legacy system, Area Commanders may consider coordinating across regional boundaries to align priorities; however, the SMC will have the full operational picture before any major incident occurs,” the spokesman noted. “A single operational commander for the SMC separates force generation from mission execution, standardizes tactical readiness, and creates a unified hub for Joint Force integration.”

By establishing the SMC, “the service is creating a singular standard for training, readiness, and integration,” according to the spokesman. “This uniformity ensures our teams are prepared to deploy at peak readiness and interoperability for any emergent crisis.”

The SMC will be commissioned on Oct. 1 and headquartered at the Coast Guard’s C5I Service Center facility in Kearneysville, West Virginia. It will include the following Coast Guard units, according to the service, which provided a description for each.

• “Maritime Security Response Teams serve as the Coast Guard’s first responders to maritime terrorism and other high-risk threats. They are equipped to conduct the nation’s most critical maritime security and defense operations at home or abroad, with both partner law enforcement agencies and joint services.”

Maritime Security Response Team (MSRT) 360

• “Tactical Law Enforcement Teams provide law enforcement expertise across the full spectrum of maritime response situations with specific focus on counter-trafficking and criminal networks attempting to exploit maritime transit zones.”

• “Maritime Safety and Security Teams are rapidly deployable boat teams that provide port, waterway, and coastal security capability to safeguard the public, protect the marine transportation system, and respond to maritime crime, sabotage, and terrorist activity.”

• “Port Security Units provide shoreside and waterborne security including point defense of strategic shipping, designated critical infrastructure, and high value assets in joint and combined expeditionary warfare environments.”

• “Regional Dive Lockers provide dedicated undersea capabilities for a variety of missions. These missions include ensuring the security of ports and waterways, maintaining aids to navigation, and conducting ship maintenance and repair, often in extreme environments like the remote polar regions.”

• The “National Strike Force provides highly trained technical experts and specialized equipment to Coast Guard and other federal agencies to prepare for and respond to the most complex crises and natural disasters, including oil, hazardous substances, and chemical, biological, radiation and nuclear incidents.”

National Strike Force Training at Camp Fuji, Japan

“The geopolitical landscape is evolving and the demand for Coast Guard Deployable Specialized Forces is at an all-time high,” said Capt. Robert Berry, Special Missions Command pre-commissioning team lead. “These forces are instrumental to the Coast Guard’s readiness and its role as a global leader in maritime contingency response. The service has always turned to its specialized forces to respond to national threats and disasters, and establishing this command is the natural next step to enabling our forces to lead the way at the tip of the spear.” 

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

Chinese military and intelligence analyses for 2025 and 2026 indicate that China views the expansion of the Egyptian Armed Forces in establishing numerous naval and air bases, such as the Bernice and Gargoub bases, with strategic interest. Beijing considers this trend, spearheaded by the Egyptian political leadership under President El-Sisi and the Egyptian Ministry of Defense, a vital component of a comprehensive strategic partnership between Egypt and China, aimed at securing shared interests in strategically vital regions. Chinese intelligence and military agencies view the Egyptian expansion in establishing military bases, such as the Mohamed Naguib base, the July 3 base, and bases east and west of the Suez Canal, as part of a comprehensive Chinese strategy to develop the Egyptian Armed Forces and enhance their deterrent capabilities against Beijing’s adversaries in the region. This perspective aligns with Beijing’s view of Egypt as a key strategic partner in Africa and the Middle East. The Chinese military establishment’s vision for this Egyptian military development of air and naval bases up to 2026 can be detailed, as follows: Supporting the Egyptian political leadership’s vision, from a Chinese perspective, of Egyptian military development under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, is seen as a serious attempt to modernize the army and transform it into a smart deterrent force capable of protecting national security and the country’s economic interests. This aligns with China’s +1 strategy (localization), as China seeks to leverage the development of Egyptian bases to become centers for localizing Chinese military technology in Egypt, particularly in the areas of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), such as the Wing Loong and advanced air defense systems, such as the HQ-9B.

In this context, China views Egypt’s expansion in establishing military bases, such as the Mohamed Naguib Base, the July 3 Base, and the bases east and west of the Suez Canal, with strategic interest as a crucial element in strengthening the comprehensive strategic partnership between Cairo and Beijing. China considers these Egyptian military bases, especially those located on the Mediterranean Sea and near the Suez Canal. Bases like the July 3rd Air Base serve as vital support points for protecting China’s commercial interests and the routes of its Belt and Road Initiative, which passes through the Egyptian Suez Canal. Egypt represents a cornerstone in China’s 21st-century strategy. Therefore, China aims to bolster Egypt’s deterrent capabilities (a defense partnership). Chinese military officials believe that modernizing the Egyptian armed forces through these naval and air bases and localizing Chinese defense industries in Cairo, in accordance with President Sisi’s vision, enhances the independence of Egyptian military decision-making, paves the way for multipolarity, supports developing countries in the Global South, and contributes to regional stability. Relations between Egypt and China have moved beyond mere arms deals to the localization of Chinese technology within Egypt, enabling Egypt to confront regional challenges more effectively and creating a kind of regional balance of power. Here, Beijing, by supporting Egyptian military expansion through these bases, aims to create a strategic balance in the region amidst a growing Egyptian-Chinese rapprochement seen as an alternative to or complement to traditional partnerships with the West. This can be inferred from the military exercises. The air capabilities and joint military exercises between Egypt and China are reflected here. Joint air exercises, such as Eagles of Civilization 2025, and cooperation at Wadi Abu Rish Air Base are Egyptian-Chinese joint training exercises aimed at exchanging expertise in air combat and protecting maritime routes. This coincides with Egypt’s interest in military and arms deals with China, such as the J-10C. Other Egyptian military negotiations with China regarding the purchase of advanced submarines, known as the Yuan class, are also underway. This reduces Egypt’s military dependence on Washington and the West and strengthens the Chinese presence in the Egyptian military arsenal. This reflects a convergence of military visions between the two countries, with China supporting Egypt’s efforts to modernize its military infrastructure. The new bases are considered a cornerstone for securing shared interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea.

Beijing also aims to strengthen the comprehensive strategic partnership. Here, the Chinese vision extends beyond mere arms deals; it views this as a core partnership aimed at establishing a broad military alliance with Egypt to develop the Chinese military Silk Road. This includes joint operational planning and training exercises, as demonstrated in the Civilization Eagles 2025 maneuvers. China seeks to effect a comprehensive shift in the regional balance of power. Chinese intelligence believes that establishing bases and developing naval and air forces will grant Egypt strategic independence and reduce its dependence on the West. This, in turn, opens the door for China to enhance its influence in the region through defense cooperation, thereby securing shared Chinese and Egyptian military interests. Beijing considers securing Egyptian bases for maritime routes (the Suez Canal) and the Red Sea to be in line with Chinese economic and security interests within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative. In general, the Chinese military establishment views Cairo as working to build a strong regional pivot point, and Beijing sees this expansion as an opportunity to deepen defense and technological ties with Cairo, paving the way for the formal declaration of a Chinese-Egyptian military Silk Road partnership.

China views the new Egyptian military bases as a means of protecting its strategic interests within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative. These bases, particularly those located on the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Suez Canal, occupy vital maritime chokepoints, and China considers them a guarantee for the security of its international trade routes. The relationship between Egypt and China has evolved from mere arms purchases to the localization of defense industries, such as the production of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and electronic warfare systems, increasing Egypt’s military reliance on Chinese technology. These Egyptian military bases, which enhance Egypt’s rapid deployment capabilities, align with China’s interests in establishing a multipolar regional order that reduces American influence in the Middle East. Chinese intelligence, military, defense, and security reports indicate a qualitative shift in Egyptian military doctrine. Chinese military institutions affiliated with the People’s Liberation Army analyze that Egyptian military bases, such as the July 3rd base, provide strategic depth and protection for economic assets (gas fields and the Dabaa nuclear power plant), thus contributing to the economic stability in which China participates. For this reason, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is seeking to train and qualify the Egyptian military elite through the Military Academy for Advanced Studies as an alternative to Western and American training.

The Chinese intelligence and military establishments view the Egyptian army’s expansionist vision in establishing naval and air bases within Egypt as part of the development strategy adopted by the Egyptian Armed Forces and the political leadership of President El-Sisi. This strategy aims to complete the modernization of the Egyptian Armed Forces and advance the Chinese military Silk Road with Egypt’s assistance. China supports the Egyptian Armed Forces’ efforts to modernize Egyptian military infrastructure, considering the new Egyptian military bases a cornerstone for securing China’s shared interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea. China views these new Egyptian military bases, particularly on the Red Sea, as essential for securing Chinese trade routes (the military/maritime Silk Road) and mitigating risks. In addition to the significant role Egypt plays for China as a regional power center and a key player in the balance of power, relevant military circles in Beijing analyze the modernization of the Egyptian army as a center of gravity for stability in the Middle East and Africa. A strong and stable army serves China’s interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, China translates its vision into tangible support, including modernizing Egypt’s military infrastructure to align with the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative in its maritime, air, and naval components and equipping it with advanced weapons systems.

Based on the preceding understanding and analysis, we conclude that the new Egyptian military bases (naval and air) are considered, according to the Chinese military and strategic vision, strategic strengths. Their benefits extend beyond Egypt, securing China’s commercial and military interests in the Mediterranean and Red Seas. They also provide a Chinese technological alternative in a region previously dominated by Western and American platforms, paving the way for China’s gradual expansion of its military Silk Road initiative.

A Russian drone strike has hit a kindergarten in Ukraine’s Sumy region, killing at least one person and injuring two others, Ukrainian officials said. The attack came as Kyiv accused Moscow of violating a unilateral ceasefire proposed by Ukraine amid competing truce announcements from both sides.

United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio told reporters on Tuesday that Operation Epic Fury – the US-Israeli strikes on Iran which commenced on February 28 and prompted a regional conflict – had concluded as its objectives had been achieved. Washington now prefers “the path of peace”, Rubio said.

On the same day, US President Donald Trump announced that the US military operation to escort stranded ships out of the Strait of Hormuz – “Project Freedom”, which was launched the day before – had been paused.

So, does this mean the US-Israel war on Iran is over?

What did Rubio say about Operation Epic Fury?

In a media briefing at the White House on Tuesday, Rubio told reporters that Operation Epic Fury was over.

“The Operation Epic Fury is concluded. We achieved the objectives of that operation,” Rubio said.

“We’re not cheering for an additional situation to occur. We would prefer the path of peace. What the president would prefer is a deal,” he said, referring to Pakistan’s efforts to arrange direct talks between Iran and the US.

The first round of these, in Islamabad last month, ended without a resolution. Both sides have submitted new proposals since then.

“The on-again, off-again talks with Iran, alongside Trump’s abrupt about turn on ‘Operation Freedom’ to guide vessels out of the Strait of Hormuz has created unwelcome frenzy in the Gulf,” Burcu Ozcelik, a senior research fellow for Middle East security at UK-based think tank Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), told Al Jazeera.

“It also reflects the highly fraught and almost frantic diplomatic backchannelling aimed to extract deep concessions from Tehran on the nuclear issue that will lock in commitments that exceed previous conditions, and which will convince the US to lift the blockade on Iranian ports and unlock sanctions relief – thereby effectively ending the war.”

Ozcelik explained that Iran, on the other hand, wants guarantees that this will be the end of the war, rather than just a pause.

What did Trump say about Project Freedom?

The same day, Trump told reporters that Project Freedom had been paused “based on the request” of Pakistan and other countries, and the “fact that Great Progress has been made towards a Complete and Final Agreement” with representatives of Iran.

Project Freedom was the US forces’ operation to escort stranded ships through the Strait of Hormuz that Trump announced the day before. It had appeared to signal a direct challenge to Iran’s closure of the strategic waterway, through which 20 percent of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies are shipped in peacetime. Iran’s threats to attack ships in the strait have blockaded it since the US-Israel attacks on Iran began. Then, the US announcement of a naval blockade on Iranian ports added to the standoff around the strait.

After Trump announced Project Freedom, Iran said ships trying to use the strait without permission from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) would be fired on, igniting fears of a return to war. His announcement triggered a war of words between the US and Iran, with claims and counterclaims about strikes continuing throughout the day.

First, Iran’s Fars agency claimed it had hit a US warship with drones after it ignored orders to turn back from the Strait of Hormuz. US Central Command (CENTCOM) denied a US ship had been struck, however, and instead claimed to have sunk at least six IRGC vessels. Iran denied that. Tehran then published a new map extending its claimed area of control over the strait into UAE waters, raising fears of a new regional confrontation.

The UAE accused Iran of launching strikes on its Fujairah port, the site of an important oil pipeline, which sparked a fire in an oil refinery.

On Tuesday, the US operation had been stopped, according to Trump.

“We have mutually agreed that, while the [US] Blockade will remain in full force and effect, Project Freedom (The Movement of Ships through the Strait of Hormuz) will be paused for a short period of time to see whether or not the Agreement can be finalized and signed,” he wrote on his Truth Social platform.

Iran has not immediately responded to this.

Shahram Akbarzadeh, a professor in Middle East and Central Asian politics at Australia’s Deakin University, told Al Jazeera that while it is difficult to determine exactly why Trump has paused Project Freedom, the pause comes against the backdrop of growing antiwar public opinion in the US.

“At the same time, Trump may be losing patience with the war; he says he has time to drag this out,” Akbarzadeh said.

“But in reality, Trump has a short attention span and needs to secure a win – soon. Pausing Project Freedom allows diplomacy to pick up pace, bringing US and Iran closer to a deal that Trump would label as a win.”

Is this the end of the war on Iran?

Not exactly. Akbarzadeh said pausing Project Freedom could serve as “the beginning of the end for the war”.

“We know that the Iranians are desperate for an end, so there is little chance of them resuming attacks on US Navy if Trump sends explicit signals that diplomacy has a green light,” he said.

However, he added, “The problem is that we have been here before. Earlier opportunities were squandered because Israel insisted that the US could get a better deal or because Trump misread the situation and expected the military option to grant him more concessions.”

What happens next?

It is difficult to predict this, but neither side appears to want a return to full-scale war, so both are likely to prioritise a diplomatic way out, Akbarzadeh said.

Still, “neither can afford to be seen as the loser,” he added. “They feel their public image needs to be preserved for their own respective domestic audience. This complicates negotiations and reaching a deal.”

Ozcelik said what happens next “will be determined by what the fractured leadership in Tehran commits to on the nuclear file.

“While it has rejected that talks involve curbs on Iran’s nuclear programme, this type of posturing has aimed to assuage domestic, hard-line and Iranian nationalists who are rattled by the US-Israel strikes and see nuclear issues from a nationalist, sovereign rights perspective.”

She predicted that the United Nations may soon issue a formal condemnation of Iran for unilaterally blockading the Strait of Hormuz.

“But the real pressure, mounting by the day, is the economic one – that shutting the strait is imposing punishing costs on Iran’s economic recovery prospects,” she said.

“Despite rhetoric on resilience and survival, the remaining Iranian leadership is undeniably concerned about the costs of the war. The possibility of renewed military strikes against Iranian critical infrastructure and the destabilising impacts these would inevitably have might be finally forcing Tehran’s hand,” Ozcelik concluded.

On a hauntingly cold night in 2008, a 28-year-old impressionable fan of Mohammed Yusuf sat in the latter’s compound in the London Ciki area of Maiduguri, northeastern Nigeria, at 1 a.m., placed his hand in his, and swore to give his life for Boko Haram. He would advance to become a top commander in the terror group.

That night, the Man was accompanied by a few trusted friends, all of whom pledged their allegiance to the cause. Yusuf started by reciting eight commandments to the small group and asking that they swear to abide by them. He made it clear they could refuse to join the army, in which case, they were not to disclose any of the things that happened that night to another living soul. 

Many of them would die in battle in the years that followed, and Yusuf himself would be killed in a matter of months, but the Man would survive. He had been led there by his friend, who had also been led there by his own friend. 

Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of the Boko Haram terror group, was preparing to wage war against the Nigerian state and was assembling what would later become an army. This army would go on to kill over 35,000 people between 2009 and 2020, indirectly lead to the death of over 300,000 others, and displace over two million more. Through fieldwork involving extensive interviews with a few first-generation members of the terror group who are still alive, victims, and a review of nearly 100 archival materials, such as newspapers and videos, this report documents the strategy that made that army possible.

Since his preaching was still largely peaceful at the time, Yusuf recruited men covertly, so as not to alert the government to the war he was planning. 

But the story of the Man’s radicalisation began long before that night. As far back as 1995 and 1996, the Man, then merely a boy, had begun to listen to Mohammed Yusuf’s preaching, agreeing with a lot of the things he was hearing. But beyond Yusuf, the Man was also an ardent follower of Sheikh Jafar Mahmud, who had been schooled at the University of Madina, Saudi Arabia, a feat he found astonishing.

“That time, I was impressed with the way Malam [Mohammed Yusuf] was. He was a young man like me–he was just a bit older than me. But he was so educated, and that was my dream, too. To become so knowledgeable about the religion,” the Man told me one October afternoon in 2025 in northeastern Nigeria. We were sitting on a mat just outside a rafia hut.

“He had started becoming popular among the Izala and the Abba Aji students, just like how the likes of Gambo Kyari, Bukar Mustapha, Umoru Mustapha, and the rest were popular then. Like Malam Ibrahim Gomari, Bashir Kashara, who was killed, and so on. He [Mohammed Yusuf] was their peer when it came to Islamic scholarship.” 

His ideologies aligned with those of scholars like Sheikh Jafar, who was based in Kano but was preaching regularly at and leading prayers at the Indimi mosque every Ramadan in Maiduguri. In 1999, Yusuf’s fame began to rise beyond his immediate community, his words taking root in the minds of young men and women all across Borno State. The support and fandom were massive. The Man thinks this was due to two things.

“One, he was very young then. Two, he used to preach in both Hausa and Kanuri.” This enabled him to reach a wider audience without a language barrier, as these were among the most widely spoken languages in Borno State. 

Over time, around 2000 and 2002, his preaching began to diverge from that of the likes of Sheikh Jafar and other revered scholars popular at the time. He began to speak against Western education, voting, democracy, and modern science and civilisation. He preached about a radical form of religion that had total government control over the people’s private and public lives. 

In about 60 videos of him around this time that HumAngle reviewed, each 3-6 minutes long, he can be seen preaching against democracy and the West. “The thing the West brought is apostasy,” he said in one of them. “We reject it. This democracy is not good. These soldiers are not genuine soldiers–they do not protect the religion of Islam… God said we should kill them. Allah said in the Qur’an that he would humiliate the enemy by our hand. Did you think he meant our hands holding prayer beads?” and here he chuckles. “Of course not,” he answered himself to the ecstatic screams of his congregation. “He was referring to our hands wielding guns.”

At this time, many of the scholars he used to be known with began to withdraw from him. Rather than see this as the alarm that the larger public saw it as, the Man and many young people like him saw it as a sign of legitimacy. They saw Yusuf as brave, courageous, and unwavering. 

“We believed what he was preaching was the truth because what he was saying regarding the government, jihad, correlated with Qur’an verses and hadiths,” he said. He quoted verses from Chapters Ahzab and Taubah to back up his claim, saying that the scriptures had already said that nothing could change the world if not jihad, which he personally interpreted as war.

Islamic scholars have long disproved this interpretation of scripture and the word ‘jihad’. HumAngle shared the Man’s interpretation of the verses in Ahzab and Taubah with a prominent Islamic scholar, Prof. Ibrahim Maqari, who currently serves as the Chief Imam at the central mosque in Abuja, the federal capital. He said the interpretation was inaccurate. 

“Those verses have been taken out of context. Islam is very clear on there not being compulsion in religion,” he said. “Islam allows war only when war is brought upon you. In that sense, you have a responsibility to fight back in order to protect yourself. There are laws on how warring parties must treat even animals and trees–how can the same religion be used as an excuse to slaughter innocent, unarmed populations, if even animals and trees are expected to be protected even in times of war?”

He also offered an additional, but often ignored, definition of the word: restraint, whether emotional or mental. 

“To stay away from what one craves but has been outlawed by Islam could also be a form of jihad.”

The Boko Haram group views it differently. “Jihad means blood must be spilt,” the Man said.

Following his split with Sheikh Jafar, Yusuf stopped preaching at the Indimi mosque and began preaching in his home, then at the Al’amin Daggash Mosque for several months before he was kicked out again, before eventually establishing the Markaz (Ibn Taimiyya) mosque. 

“Only about 40-50 of us went with him then. That was 2002–2003. With the help of Allah, after like two years, Markaz couldn’t even contain people; we could not even count the number of students anymore.”

There were very few journalists or researchers at the time who were able to accurately document this sociological (and religious) revolution. One of them was Ahmad Salkida, who dispatched the first-ever news article on Mohammed Yusuf in 2006 and was the first to alert the public to what was brewing. He observed in one report that Yusuf enjoyed wide acceptance from young people at the time because of the effects of bad governance and the resulting socioeconomic inequalities—corruption, rampant inequality, lack of education. 

By appealing to a shared victimhood philosophy, he created an Us (victims) Vs Them (the government/the oppressor) dichotomy and garnered a large following. The weaponisation of a sense of community to further genocidal violence is a tactic that is recurring in speeches of warlords or leaders of violent movements. It was apparent in the popular 1943 speech made by Heinrich  Himmler, one of the key military leaders who executed the Holocaust. In it, he frames the killing of jews as a moral obligation, while making the Nazis out to be the victims.  “We have a moral right, we had the duty to our people to do it, to kill [some use the word ‘destroy’ here as the original speech was in German] these people who would kill us… We have carried out this most difficult of tasks in a spirit of love for our people,” he said in the speech. 

As the number of his students and followers began to increase, Yusuf decided it was time to take his message beyond his house and Maiduguri. He began to travel to Konduga, Bama, and Gwoza. He soon went beyond Borno State into Yobe State, to places like Potiskum, Gashua, Geidam, and others. He also went to Bauchi. 

“We started getting senior students like Abu Mohammed Bauchi, Abu Maryam, etc. It later crossed to Kano, and there, we got senior scholars, even though they later withdrew.”

It was at this time, when his preaching became regular in Bama, that Fatima, another first-generation member of the group, began to attend. Alongside her entire family, she became a loyal follower of Yusuf. She took the bay’ah in a way that resembled what the Man described. 

“We were gathered around 4 p.m. and then separated into men and women, then took the oath,” she recalled. At this time, the preaching was mainly that the government did not have their best interest at heart, and did not care about Islam. Fatima went alongside her parents and husband. She remembers being told that the Nigerian constitution was forbidden for them to follow or abide by. They also told them that they might be killed, but they should rest assured that they would go straight to paradise if that happened. 

“There are people, these days, who claim that the drinking of blood is somehow part of the oath-taking process. This is not true. At least, not during our time,” she said.

The preachings, at this time, had started to grow more and more radical and inciting.

“This caused some people to lose their wives, some their parents, some their trading partners, and some to destroy their school certificates,” the Man said. Young people, in compliance with the very foundation of Boko Haram, which directly translates to “Western education is forbidden”, began to publicly burn school certificates that they had already acquired before they became radicalised.

“We all knew this was going to happen; it wasn’t a secret,” the Man said of the eventual uprising. “There are scholars who would preach saying we have to shed blood in this country, but once they are done preaching, you will see them with the same government they are criticising in their houses, with cars given to them. But Malam was never like that. He was never in cahoots with the government, so we all believed in him and that he was going to carry out what he had intended–the war.”

The early army

The Man claimed that Yusuf first appointed 11 close friends, whom he termed his commanders. They were the first members of the Boko Haram army. He sat with these 11 and explained the reason for the war, assuring them it would happen soon. He told them they each must be willing to sacrifice their lives if it came to that, and also bring men who believed in the cause and would be willing to do the same. 

He trained them for an initial period of nine months. Some CDs were played for them on war preparation. There were long periods of preaching and indoctrination. 

“Some of these men are in prison, but most of them have died. The only person who is not in prison and is alive was released from prison two years ago: Mohammed Idris. He was imprisoned in 2009. There is Usman Sidi in the Malam Sidi deradicalisation centre in Gombe, and Ibrahim Agaji, who is still in prison. And so on.”

It was one of these first 11 commanders who reached out to the Man, inviting him to join the army. Yusuf had mandated that each of them come with three trusted men who could join. This was not as easy as it sounded, especially because speaking to the wrong person could jeopardise the entire plan if they chose to go to the authorities with what they knew. When the commander reached out to the Man, he explained this, adding that he himself did not know up to three people he could trust, only the Man. He asked the Man to bring the other two. He, too, only trusted one person and asked that person to bring one person as well. In that way, the commander fulfilled his assigned quota of three. Soon, the 11 commanders and their individual recruits totalled 40. Together, they formed the first version of the army, gathering in Yusuf’s house that night in the London Ciki area of Maiduguri and taking the bay’ah after listening to the commandments.

“The first commandment was that we must agree to give our lives if it came to it; then, seeking Islamic knowledge to understand our ancestors; we must also not do things except as stated in the books, whether we like it or not; then, there was confidentiality. I have forgotten most of the conditions. There were like eight conditions. If you agree to them, Malam would take your hand and hold it as you took the bay’ah. You would promise never to discuss it with anyone. If you do, it’s like you have betrayed the religion.”

After that night, they proceeded to undergo a four-month intensive period of prayer and training. They had access to one man, Habib, who used to be a sergeant in the Nigerian Army but whom Yusuf had won over with his preachings. He trained them in combat. Yusuf had also won over one medical doctor, a prominent consultant from Yola known as Abu Adam. He equipped them with basic medical skills, including how to remove a bullet lodged in a wound and how to stitch a wound.

“To this day, whenever my kids get sick, I am able to administer injections for them once they are prescribed and I buy them, because of the skills I learned from that doctor,” the Man said. 

The initial group of 40 was also mandated to come with recruits – some were mandated to come with up to 10 recruits each, others were mandated to come with only three – and in that way, the army expanded little by little. Once they were in their hundreds, Yusuf broke them into battalions and named each battalion after an Islamic historical figure. The Man was under the Zubair Ibn Awwam battalion. Those who later moved to the Timbuktu triangle were named after Umar Farouk. Each of the 11 commanders was also assigned four sub-commanders known as Munzir. The Man was a Munzir at this time. Each Munzir was in charge of about 70–100 people. The Munzirs, in turn, appointed people they called the Naqeeb, each of whom had 25 people under their care. This system made organising easier. 

“Whenever Mohammed Yusuf says to the leader of Zubair Ibn Awwam battalion, ‘I want you to gather your people for me,’ the leader would look for other Munzirs and me. At that time, four of us were Munzirs under that battalion: Mohammed  Sani Tela, Bako Mai Madara, Abdullahi, and me. So, when Malam says to our commander, ‘Gather your people for me,’ he would just call us (the Munzirs) and say, ‘Gather your people.’ If, for example, I have 100 people under my care, how would I reach them? They’re too much for me, so I would call my Naqeeb and tell them to each bring the 25 people under their individual care. You see, this way it is easier for both me and my superior because 25 people are not a lot to gather.”

“That time, we had not yet relocated to the forest. This all happened in Maiduguri,” he clarified. 

There were several locations used for training in Bauchi and Biu in Borno. As things began to heat up, with preparation for the war being heavily underway, Yusuf got word that the government suspected a war was brewing and planned to attack him and his followers. He was invited multiple times by the DSS and the police in both Maiduguri and Abuja, where he was detained briefly and interrogated over those allegations. He denied arming or preparing for war.

“Since they were planning to attack us, we were supposed to also get ready for them. Before they attack us, let’s attack them. We should just be prepared. So we got ready as much as we could. We got our war arms–Malam and a few people had been getting the arms ready all this time with the help of the former sergeant in the Nigerian Army.”

Just then, they began to face some logistical challenges. Some members of the group who had been entrusted with guns in the past few months of preparation and had been told to bury them for safekeeping suddenly said they no longer remembered where they had buried the guns. This caused a setback with planning, and Yusuf, at first, found it puzzling. 

“But he later said we are going to be optimistic, whether they did not buy it, whether they cheated, or they did buy it and truly couldn’t find the place they buried it, it was still amusing. But he said we will not dwell on this, we will just seek Allah’s help with what we have with us.”

According to another source, another setback in the arms gathering department involved a man known as Aliu Tashaku, whom Yusuf met and presumably radicalised during one of his detentions at the Police headquarters in Abuja. Tashaku was later accused by Yusuf and several Boko Haram leaders of defrauding the group. They say he collected millions of naira with a promise to deliver dozens of AK-47 rifles, which he never fulfilled.

Still, plans continued. From Friday to Sunday, dawn till dusk, they were trained to use the guns they did procure: how to cock and shoot them. “Only a few of us were taught how to wield guns. Just the leaders. Not everyone.”

Finally, on that fateful day in June 2009, the ‘helmet’ incident happened. The incident has since been regarded as the beginning of the war. Some even say it was what caused it.

“I need you to understand,” the Man said, “that the helmet incident was not what led to the war. We had already assembled the army, gathered arms and supplies, and put the structure in place.”

What the incident did was accelerate the inevitable.

The helmet incident

In January 2009, authorities in Borno announced that anyone wishing to ride a bike in Maiduguri must wear a helmet as a safety precaution. The Boko Haram group did not agree with the rule (“how dare an illegitimate body tell us what to do?”). And so on that fateful day in June 2009, they came out en masse to bury four members who had died in a motor crash, flooding major roads. Many of them rode on bikes, and there was not a single helmet in sight. The police formed a blockade and refused to let them through, daring them to cross a particular line. They crossed the line, literally, and the police opened fire on the unarmed crowd. It was an act of extrajudicial violence, but for a people who already fancied themselves a parallel and legitimate government, the sect saw it as an act of war. And so they responded, warring for five days and killing indiscriminately across Borno, Yobe, and Kano. A review of Daily Trust newspapers during the whole week showed that the war dominated its front pages from July 27 to July 31 2009. Reports say that up to 800 people were killed. Abubakar Shekau, who was second-in-command at the time and would later lead the violent group after Yusuf, was wounded.

Yusuf himself was in Kaduna, northwestern Nigeria, on the day of the helmet incident. Sources say he flew into a rage when he learned of it. It was when he returned that he became more public and explicit about the war that must be fought, since the state, he said, had drawn first blood.

“He preached that if we didn’t do anything about these soldiers talking about helmets, there wouldn’t be peace, so at that time, he had not yet been captured. It wasn’t long after that the war happened in July, when everything became messy in Markaz. He spoke during evening prayers that this war was beyond us. For three days, it was like victory was on our side, but now security forces were well prepared, planning to attack us, and the little we had was already finished, and our senior commanders were all dead, so he said everyone should just find their way. That was when we went out, that was when he was arrested.”

The last time the Man saw Yusuf, they were trying to escape from their location as authorities advanced. One of his students insisted that Yusuf hop in his car so they could leave together, but Yusuf refused. By this time, he had sustained a bullet wound to the arm. And so when news of his capture and eventual summary execution arrived, it did not come entirely as a shock to the Man.

Ahmad Salkida, who was being held in a cell at the police headquarters at the time Yusuf was killed there, wrote that over 50 policemen emptied bullets into his body, making sure to avoid his head so that his identity could never be disputed. 

In a video of Yusuf’s remains that HumAngle obtained, there were tens of bullet wounds, his body mangled as though slashed open repeatedly, the inner bloody flesh hanging out in several places. The only body part that remained unwounded was his head. His eyes remained open, as though staring straight ahead. In the background, voices could be heard worrying about the stench. In another video I reviewed, this time of Yusuf being interrogated after he was arrested, he was questioned about medical supplies and arms being found in his home. This corroborates the Man’s accounts about medical supplies and arms having already been gathered. 

Later, the government claimed he had been trying to escape when he was shot and killed. The execution drew nationwide condemnation, and the then-President Umaru Musa Yar’adua ordered a probe into the officers responsible.

In the immediate aftermath, authorities went on a hunt for all members of the group. So the premature army and other followers of the group dispersed, and the Man himself relocated to Gwagwalada in Nigeria’s federal capital, Abuja.

He lived there for about two years with his wives and children, until one day, when former associates found him. Abubakar Shekau had healed, emerged from hibernation, and was ready to lead the army into war, the associates told him. He had sent them to him to deliver the message, and they would do so to as many key members of the army as they could find. They put him in touch with Shekau on the phone. 

“We spoke, and he said he was in good health, and he tasked me with gathering the people from my battalion and to lead them since our leader, as I told you, got captured and was only released last year. That was when I felt the weight of the world on my head because we were in hiding, and now we were being told we were to continue with operations.” 

And so the work of regrouping commenced. The structure that Yusuf had put in place helped in this process. Each commander searched for his Munzirs, and each Munzir searched for his Naqeebs. It was not as easy as it would have been were they all still in Maiduguri and not in hiding, because now they were scattered everywhere, and some people had even died.

HumAngle gathered that at this time, several members whom Yusuf facilitated in their travels to North Africa for arms training and other terrorism-related operations, a clear signal that preparations for war were underway long before the July 2009 ma’araka, returned to boost the army Shekau was assembling. Many of them were unable to return by the time the conflict erupted.

Once they had regrouped, the strategic efforts to topple the Nigerian government and establish what they believed to be an Islamic state started. This strategy, mainly, had to do with bombings, abductions, assassinations, and taking control of certain villages and towns to be able to forcefully radicalise and loot.

“We bombed towns, mosques, markets, and churches, too. We were the ones who put everything together. We later realised staying in town would not work because they started arresting our people. So we went to the forest.”

When the group migrated to Sambisa Forest, they turned it into their daulah – the “sovereign territory” – and operated fully from there. But this, in no way, lessened the brutality of the operations. This brutality was due, in part, to the fact that they had run out of supplies and money and were frantic. The Man had sold the lands he owned and used the money to purchase arms, and so had many others. Yusuf’s death had decimated a lot of plans. So they began to take villages.

On the surface, when villages fell to them, it was because they wanted to recruit or radicalise. But they were aware that no village or town could stay in their grip for long, as the Nigerian Army would eventually take it back. So, the more urgent reason was to loot the banks in the villages as soon as they took possession. 

“We held towns for months, except for places like Mubi, which wasn’t held for long but which still yielded us a lot of money because it had like nine to ten banks then. Only three banks were looted before the soldiers came and took over the town. So we started using the money, though a jet came and burnt down the money later on.”

HumAngle has interviewed dozens of people who were stuck in villages like Bama, Kirawa, Gwoza, Kumshe, Boboshe, Andara, and many others, during the periods when Boko Haram held the villages hostage. They described a heavily militarised setting, with people being killed on often unfounded allegations of spying. Baana Alhaji Ali, a man who used to be a trader in Andara before it fell to Boko Haram, told me that many of the laws sought to take complete control of their lives. “They refused to let us go out of the village; they imposed their laws on us; they said we shouldn’t allow our women to fetch water, gather firewood, and that we should be doing all that for them. Our women were never to be seen publicly. They took foodstuff away from us.”

During this time, the government was announcing on the radio that if anyone was brave enough to escape the villages and make it to Maiduguri, the capital city, they would be safely accepted and put into Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps. Thousands of people took the risk. Some were caught by the terrorists and brutally killed, but others made it out safely. Tragically, many of them were intercepted on the road and profiled by the Nigerian Army as members of the terror group. They went on to be detained without trial at detention centres like Giwa barracks, Borno Maximum Security prison, and Wawa military cantonment for about a decade. Some of them died. Others disappeared and have never been seen again. Baana and his family made it to Cameroon, where the local army transferred them into the hands of the Nigerian Army in Banki, a border town. While his wife and children were allowed to go, Baana was detained on allegations of being part of the terror group and held for seven years in conditions that bring tears to his eyes to recount. 

“We didn’t get enough water … some people died of thirst,” he said. “There were about 400 people in one cell, and people died from the heat … We didn’t have proper toilets at first, just plastic buckets to urinate and defecate. People would take them out when they were full and empty them.”

Amid all these, when taking villages became no longer sustainable, the Man said, they began to abduct for money. Though the Chibok abduction of 276 schoolgirls, as has already been extensively reported, was not planned but executed by lower Boko Haram members on their way back from a different assignment, it turned out to be one of their most successful money-making attempts. The Man says up to ₦300 million was paid as ransom for each girl who was released. Reports show that between 2016 and 2018, 103 girls were released, with the BBC reporting that $3.3 million was paid for them. The government, officially, insists that no ransom was paid.

“Abducting the Chibok girls became a blessing for us all in the forest because it touched the whole world. We got a lot of money. Money was made that time! At the time, the group was already facing financial difficulties. You know, when we first migrated to the forest, we would go and break into a shop and steal money, or steal cows and sell. We were struggling financially.”

The Man lived in Sambisa for over a decade with his three wives and nine children. He held numerous positions, including commander, judge, and, later, member of the Shura council.

Once in Sambisa, under the heavy-handedness of Shekau, he began to find ideological differences between what Shekau was doing and what he himself believed the scriptures said to do. This is a popular complaint among members of the group. Shekau believed deeply in violence and had no patience for negotiations. He believed that anyone who did not live in the daulah deserved to be killed. Hence, the bombing of markets, motor parks, mosques, churches, and other public places within state-controlled territories.

“We, on the other hand, believed our target was the Nigerian security forces and those who deserved it. We all agreed on that, but carrying out attacks on mosques, churches, motor parks, and killing children? We were not in support of Shekau doing that,” the Man said of himself and a growing group that had begun to plan to rebel.

“With Shekau, anybody that does not live within those forests, even if he prays, even if he goes to the Holy Ka’abah in Saudi Arabia to pray, then comes back every day, he sees him as a non-believer. He can be killed, and his money or belongings can be collected.”

There were also allegations of witchcraft against some elderly women in the group, who would then be stoned to death and sometimes beheaded. According to Fatima, the follower from Bama, things escalated wildly during that time and caused many people to fear. 

And so in 2016, a faction led by Mamman Nur, another high-ranking member, decided to break away into what is now known as the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), linked to the global Islamic State (IS) group.

ISWAP, at the time and perhaps even now, fancied itself purer and less violent than the Shekau-led sect. Still, over time, the Man began to feel as though even they were “not honest about the work they were doing.” 

As he spoke, it became clear to me that though he was no longer part of the group, he still believed in the cause and thought there was an “honest” or “right” way to do it. And so I asked: Why did he leave the terror group and return to state-controlled territories?

He paused for a moment, then asked, “Are you a Muslim?”

I said yes.

“So you know about the Islamic Khalifs?” he enquired. 

“Yes, Ali, Umar Ibn Khattab, Usman Ibn Affan and the rest?”

He nodded in satisfaction. “Those people you mentioned were among the Prophet’s most knowledgeable and trusted advisors. So, whenever they spoke or offered counsel during that time, they were listened to and taken seriously. We were supposed to be that for ISWAP, but whenever we spoke up against things that were wrong, nobody listened to us. It was made as though we were the ones spoiling people, even when all we were doing was finding them ease.”

He explained that his decision to leave was the culmination of many things, not just one, but the refusal to listen to him and his peers made it clear that the original cause, which he believed in and was once prepared to lay down his life for, no longer existed.

Leaving was risky because he was very high-ranking, he said. It meant that he could never just change his mind and decide to go back because he would be executed. It meant he would leave behind all the wealth he had acquired over the past decade. It also meant he would leave behind a life of status and comfort and take on an uncertain future, doubtless filled with hardship. 

Finally, in 2024, less than two full years ago, he defected with his entire family and surrendered to the Nigerian state. He underwent the Borno state-modelled deradicalisation programme – which is different from Operation Safe Corridor – and offered up his services to the state to aid its fight against the insurgency. He provides regular high-level intel to the government, remains a law-abiding citizen, and in return, the state pays his house rent.

“They paid last year, and they just renewed it this year,” he said.

Towards the end of our interview, I asked what he would do if a young man came to him today seeking guidance on how to join Boko Haram. 

“Kai. I’ll stop him!” he said immediately. “I can’t tell anyone to go, I am even trying to tell those there to come back. I won’t advise anyone to go because if that’s the case, I wouldn’t have come back.”

His own children now go to school. I ask what has changed to make him agree to them going to school, especially since the very foundation of the insurgency was that school was forbidden.

“There were a lot of mistakes I made from the start, and I admit this without shame. One thing we didn’t understand then was that, despite our fears about the ills of Western education, it was still useful. Now, I have come to understand that I only need to arm my children with a good upbringing at home and Islamic knowledge, so that when they come across any harmful teachings in school, they would have the sense to not take them to heart… I have a daughter who has graduated from secondary school, a son who is now in SS1 and another who is going to JSS1 soon.”

I spoke to several other former members whose children are now in school and who now share the same line of thinking.

The Man is now engaged in efforts to deradicalise young people at risk of falling into the same errors he made many years ago. Sometimes, he posts videos on TikTok, countering violent extremism and challenging violent interpretations of scripture. 

Researchers insist that accepting surrenders from people like the Man has always been integral to counter-terrorism efforts worldwide. But many Nigerians, especially those who have lost loved ones, feel differently, because there is still so much suffering, there is little justice and chance of reparations to those who have been wronged, and the institutional failures that led those young boys to Yusuf’s house that cold night in 2008 to take the bay’ah still remain.

Before the war, Baana Alhaji Ali, the man who fled with his family when Boko Haram attacked his village and was subsequently held for seven years in detention, was a trader who lived peacefully with his family. Now, he lives in a tarpaulin tent in Nguro Soye, cramped with his family, with no access to education, healthcare, or basic amenities. The past decade has seen him in prison, in a camp for internally displaced persons, and now in a resettlement site. 

When I talked to his wife about their feelings about former combatants being allowed back into the community, she was angered.

“All I can say is that we have been cheated, we have been violated, and we have been dehumanised.”

HumAngle has chosen to use the phrase “the Man” to anonymise the central source for this story in order to protect him from harm. 

With snow-capped peaks tumbling towards the turquoise waters of the Caribbean, the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta National Park is one of the jewels in Colombia’s tourism crown.

But behind the picture-postcard views lies a more sinister reality.

Armed groups are holding local businesses to ransom and terrorising Indigenous communities.

The signing of a 2016 peace deal between the Colombian state and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) ended more than half a century of war and helped propel a country long associated with druglords and rebels onto the global tourism stage.

Since then, thousands of visitors have poured into the Sierra Nevada each day, trekking through pristine jungle to white-sand beaches or climbing towards Colombia’s mountaintop Lost City, which predates Peru’s Machu Picchu.

Few notice the men in camouflage watching from a distance.

They are members of the Self-Defence Forces of the Sierra Nevada (ACSN), a group of former paramilitaries that controls cocaine trafficking routes in the region and is also involved in illegal gold mining.

Extortion has become another lucrative business for the group. The “Conquistadores”, as ACSN members are often called, demand a cut of the earnings of hotels, tour bus companies and Indigenous communities, whose hand-woven hammocks and bags are snapped up by visitors.

“We are afraid and anxious about the future,” said Atanasio Moscote, the governor of the Kogui Indigenous people, who live high up in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta National Park, which the Kogui consider “the heart of the world”.

In February, the government closed Tayrona National Park, a UNESCO World Heritage Site overlooking the Caribbean, for more than two weeks following threats against park rangers, allegedly issued by the ACSN.

Authorities have accused the group of pressuring Indigenous Wayuu residents in the park to resist a crackdown on illegal activities such as logging.

Together, Tayrona and the Sierra Nevada national parks received more than 873,000 visitors last year.

The influx of tourists marks a dramatic shift from the 1980s and 90s, when the region was a battleground for brutal clashes between paramilitaries and FARC rebels.

Ten years after FARC laid down its arms, the ACSN – founded by a paramilitary leader who was later extradited to the United States – holds sway in much of the area.

In recent months, Colombia’s biggest drug cartel, the Gulf Clan, has tried to muscle in, vying for control and prompting clashes with the ACSN.

Caught in the middle are Indigenous communities “who don’t speak Spanish, and who live off their crops and their traditional knowledge”, said Luis Salcedo, governor of the Arhuaco people, who also live in the Sierra Nevada.

Gustavo Petro, Colombia’s first left-wing president in modern history, included the ACSN in his bid to negotiate the disarmament of all armed groups in the country.

But four years after he launched his “Paz Total” (total peace) campaign, the ACSN still dominates the Santa Marta area, said researcher Norma Vera.

Extortion has now emerged as a key issue in the campaign to elect Petro’s successor in polls starting on May 31.

The Ministry of Defence says it has received more than 46,000 extortion complaints since 2022.

Omar Garcia, president of the hotel association in the coastal city of Santa Marta, a gateway to the Sierra Nevada, said he fears for Colombia’s fragile tourism boom.

“Any news affecting the image [of a destination] and visitor safety makes tourists think twice,” he said.

The U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force are working on a new “Compact Variant” of the AIM-9X Sidewinder. The smaller Sidewinder is being developed with a focus on increased magazine depth when carried internally by “advanced aircraft,” while also offering improved range and performance.

The Navy manages the Sidewinder program in cooperation with the Air Force. The Navy is asking for $83.3 million for work on the AIM-9X Compact Variant (CV) in its 2027 Fiscal Year budget request. The AIM-9X CV is also mentioned in the Air Force’s proposed budget for the 2027 Fiscal Year, but with the caveat that it does not plan to contribute funding explicitly toward its development until Fiscal Year 2028.

Current-generation Block II and Block II+ subvariants AIM-9X are already highly capable imaging infrared (IIR) guided anti-air missiles. They have thrust-vectoring, high-off-boresight targeting, lock-on-after-launch, and other capabilities that you can read more about in detail here.

Risk reduction work on the AIM-9X CV has already been underway since Fiscal Year 2025. However, the new version does not appear to have been mentioned by name in prior Navy or Air Force budgets. Previous funding was contained under the umbrella of the larger System Improvement Plan IV (SIP IV) upgrade effort.

“The AIM-9X CV repackages the SIP IV technology into a compact airframe optimized for internal carriage on advanced aircraft with improved kinematic performance,” according to the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2027 budget request. “The program will deliver increased capability to the warfighter with greater standoff range, increased aircraft weapon station capacity, and maintains inner boundary performance.”

In Fiscal Year 2027, the goal is that “the program will advance hardware and software designs. This effort will focus on design and development of critical hardware components and compatibility with advanced platforms,” the budget documents add. “The overall scope includes platform integration, material and energetics studies, and extensive modeling, simulation, and analysis. Activities will also incorporate system safety analysis, the establishment of requisite integration and test environments, risk- reduction testing, and other engineering efforts necessary to mature the complete system baseline.”

The Navy and Air Force budget documents do not offer any further details about the AIM-9X CV’s configuration, or how it will achieve “greater standoff range” and “improved kinematic performance” in a more compact package. How truncated the AIM-9X CV’s airframe, as well as its control surfaces, might be compared to existing versions is also unknown. The core AIM-9X design is already relatively short and narrow by anti-air missile standards at just under 10 feet long and five inches in diameter (not including its fins). For comparison, all variants of the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) are some 12 feet long and have bodies that are around seven inches in diameter.

The Navy and the Air Force previously considered developing a Block III variant of the AIM-9X, which could have included a highly loaded grain rocket motor. Though the Block III effort was shelved, at least publicly, the Navy has continued to make significant investments in this kind of rocket technology with a general eye toward improved range and performance for future missiles.

“The Next-Generation Highly Loaded Grain project team has matured the technology and seeded the development of future mission-modular propulsion systems that can increase weapon ranges by up to 1.5x while maintaining inner boundaries for short-range and time-critical missions,” according to one factsheet detailing notable achievements by NAVAIR’s Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division (NAWCAD) in 2023.

The benefits of greater reach and better kinematic performance, even in the AIM-9X’s existing form factor, are clear-cut. As the Navy and Air Force budget documents highlight, putting all that in a smaller package offers additional value from a magazine depth perspective. If an aircraft can carry multiple AIM-9X CVs on stations that can only accommodate one standard-size version, that means more engagement opportunities per sortie without any change to the rest of the loadout.

This is all especially important for stealthy aircraft that carry stores in internal bays with rigid dimensions when flying in their most low-observable configurations. As an example of what this means in practical terms, Lockheed Martin has spent years now working to develop a capability called Sidekick to increase the total number of AIM-120s that F-35s can carry in their weapons bays from four to six. Even so, that upgrade will only apply to A and C variants of the jet, as the bays on the B model are smaller to begin with.

The expectation that the AIM-9X CV will offer improved capabilities over its predecessors is also significant. The Air Force, in particular, has explored several concepts for air-to-air missiles that are smaller than Sidewinder, but which have generally been understood to trade range and/or performance for added magazine depth.

All of this brings us to the matter of Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) type drones, which impose additional constraints on weapons integration simply by virtue of their overall size and maximum takeoff weight. As described now, the AIM-9X CV might be well-suited for arming CCAs, which will have more limited internal and external stores capacity, overall, compared to traditional crewed tactical jets. Being able to load them with more total missiles per sortie, and increase their reach at the same time, would be a major boon.

The Air Force just recently started weapons integration work as part of its CCA program using Anduril’s YFQ-44A Fury, which does not have an internal bay. Fury has been seen so far conducting flight tests loaded with a pair of inert AIM-120s, one under each wing.

The YFQ-44A is one of two designs the Air Force is currently flight testing under the first phase, or Increment 1, of its CCA program. The other is General Atomics YFQ-42A Dark Merlin, which can carry stores internally. The Air Force has also been experimenting with other relevant drone designs in recent years, including Kratos XQ-58A and Boeing’s MQ-28 Ghost Bat, the former of which also has an internal payload bay. More recently, the service assigned the YFQ-48A designation to Northrop Grumman’s Talon Blue drone.

It is worth noting here that the development of the MQ-28 originally began for the Royal Australian Air Force, which has conducted at least one live-fire AIM-120 shot from one of those drones. The Ghost Bat carried the missile externally in that test. Future versions of the design are set to include internal weapons bays.

Uncrewed MQ-28 Ghost Bat showcases its combat capability

Back in the United States, the Marine Corps’ first CCA is set to be a variant of the XQ-58, and the service is also leveraging the YFQ-42A to support its CCA plans. The Navy is still early in the process of exploring potential carrier-based CCA designs.

The AIM-9X CV might also open up other kinds of new operational possibilities. A compact anti-air missile could provide defensive capability against incoming missiles for larger aircraft. This is something the Air Force has been particularly interested in, including as a way to help better protect aerial refueling tankers.

The compact version’s overall benefits could make it attractive for employment as a surface-to-air weapon, as well. Full-size AIM-9Xs are already an interceptor option for several ground-based air defense systems in service or otherwise on the market globally today, including the U.S. Army’s Enduring Shield.

With the development of the AIM-9X CV now fully out in the open, more details about the missile’s design, as well as how the Navy and Air Force might plan to field it, may now begin to emerge.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Iran has said it will only accept a fair and comprehensive agreement in ongoing negotiations with the United States, as talks continue alongside a fragile ceasefire in the Middle East conflict. Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi made the remarks following discussions with Wang Yi in Beijing.

At the same time, Donald Trump has pointed to what he described as significant progress, announcing a temporary pause in US naval operations linked to the Strait of Hormuz to support negotiations. The strait remains largely restricted, disrupting global oil flows and contributing to an ongoing energy crisis.

What does Iran mean by a comprehensive agreement
The key question is what Iran is asking for. A comprehensive agreement suggests Tehran wants more than a temporary ceasefire. It likely includes guarantees on sovereignty, relief from military pressure, and recognition of its rights under international agreements such as nuclear development for peaceful purposes.

This position indicates Iran is negotiating for long term security and political legitimacy rather than short term concessions.

What is the United States offering in response
The United States appears to be using a mix of pressure and incentives. Military actions and blockades continue, but the pause in naval escort operations signals willingness to de escalate if progress is made.

Statements from US officials show a firm stance on preventing Iran from controlling key shipping routes, while still leaving room for diplomacy. This creates a dual track approach of negotiation backed by force.

Why is the Strait of Hormuz central to the talks
The Strait of Hormuz is critical because it carries a significant share of global oil supply. Its disruption has already triggered sharp movements in energy markets and raised concerns about global economic stability.

Control over this route gives Iran strategic leverage, while reopening it safely is a priority for the United States and global markets. This makes the strait a core bargaining point in negotiations.

Implications for global markets and politics
The negotiations are directly influencing oil prices, currency markets, and investor sentiment. Even signals of progress have led to falling oil prices and improved market confidence.

Politically, the situation affects domestic dynamics in the United States, where rising energy costs are a concern ahead of elections. It also shapes regional power balances across the Middle East.

Analysis what are the possible outcomes
There are three main paths forward. First, a comprehensive agreement could stabilise the region, reopen energy routes, and reduce global economic pressure. Second, prolonged negotiations without resolution could keep markets volatile and maintain the current fragile ceasefire. Third, a breakdown in talks could lead to renewed escalation, further disrupting oil supply and increasing geopolitical risk.

The most realistic short term outcome appears to be continued negotiations with limited de escalation steps. A full agreement will likely require compromises on both security concerns and economic demands.

With information from Reuters.

At 14:15 local time on 8 April 2026, Israel launched a massive wave of strikes against Lebanon – just hours after US President Donald Trump announced a ceasefire between the US, Israel and Iran to pause fighting in the Gulf region.

Israel said it struck 100 targets in 10 minutes, dashing hopes in Lebanon that the pause in fighting in Iran would end the violence there too.

The latest conflict between Israel and Hezbollah – the Lebanese militia and political party that is funded and armed by Iran – started on 2 March after the group fired rockets into Israel, which responded with widespread air strikes and a ground invasion of southern Lebanon.

Since then, more than 2,600 people in Lebanon have been killed, according to Lebanon’s health ministry, and roughly a fifth of the population displaced, the UN says.

The BBC’s Nawal Al-Maghafi has been piecing together what happened that day and meeting people who lost loved ones on one of the deadliest chapters in the country’s recent history.

Read more about this story here.

Iran’s foreign minister meets his Chinese counterpart one week before President Donald Trump’s visit to Beijing.

Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi is holding talks with his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, in Beijing amid tensions with the United States in the Strait of Hormuz.

Araghchi’s one-day trip on Wednesday comes a week before US President Donald Trump’s scheduled ⁠visit to Beijing for a summit with President Xi Jinping on May 14 and 15.

China’s official Xinhua news agency reported the meeting between Araghchi and Wang had begun, without providing further details.

Araghchi’s visit to Beijing marks the first time he has travelled to China, a close ally of Tehran, since the US-Israeli war on Iran began on February 28. Araghchi had spoken with Wang by telephone at least three times following the start of the war.

Earlier in Washington, DC, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio expressed hope that Beijing would reiterate to Tehran the need to release its chokehold on the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran effectively closed the strait, through which major oil and gas supplies passed, after the war began, sending prices of fuel and fertiliser skyrocketing and rattling the global economy.

Following a ceasefire in April, the US imposed its own blockade on Iranian ports in a bid to compel Tehran to agree to Washington’s terms in peace talks.

Al Jazeera’s Katrina Yu, reporting from Beijing, said two things will be front and centre on the agenda of Araghchi and Wang’s meeting – maintaining the ceasefire and reopening the Strait of Hormuz.

“We know that China has been very critical of the US’s naval blockade on Iranian ports, calling it dangerous. But increasingly, Beijing has also been critical of Iran’s decision to continually close that vital chokepoint,” Yu said.

Wang is expected to speak to Araghchi about what kind of support China can continue to offer Iran if it continues to close the strait.

“Iran will need Chinese backing, for example, at the United Nations, to continue to block any action that would put any additional sanctions on Iran because of its closure of the strait,” Yu said.

“Reportedly, the Iranian foreign minister is looking for clarity from Beijing as to what it will put on the table when Xi meets with Trump, and whether Beijing will be making any concessions to Washington that could make Tehran nervous.”

China, in return, “wants its own assurances that Iran won’t act in any escalatory way or any dramatic fashion in the lead up to that very important meeting”, she added.

Araghchi and Wang’s meeting came as Trump announced a pause on a US military operation to escort stranded ships out of the Strait of Hormuz.

The effort, which began on Monday, ratcheted up tensions, with the US military claiming it sank several Iranian boats that attempted to interfere in the operation. The United Arab Emirates also reported coming under missile and drone attacks from Iran, with one assault sparking a fire at an oil refinery. Tehran denies the launching the attacks.

Trump said on Truth Social the pause was based “on the request of Pakistan and other Countries” and because “Great Progress has been made toward a Complete and Final Agreement with Representatives of Iran”.

Pakistan has been leading efforts for a peace deal between Iran and the US.

The two sides held direct talks in Islamabad on April 11 and 12, but the negotiations ended without an agreement. Key sticking points include US demands for Iran to halt all nuclear enrichment and Tehran’s wish to continue to exercise control over the Strait of Hormuz.

The pro-European Union coalition of Romanian Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan has collapsed after a 281-4 vote of no confidence. The Social Democrats, Bolojan’s allies, sided with far-right parties to oust the prime minister. The leu, Romania’s currency, fell to a record low against the euro before Tuesday’s vote.