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More than 2,700 Yemenis have fled to Djibouti, many making dangerous sea crossings to escape the conflict. Al Jazeera’s Hasan Razzaq spoke with some of those who have arrived in the northern town of Obock, where they are seeking shelter and assistance.
Published On 19 Sep 202619 Sep 2026
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CNN and MS NOW journalists have been denied access to the White House after US President Donald Trump announced he was banning the outlets.
An MS NOW reporter and a photographer tried entering the White House grounds on Saturday morning, but their badges would not scan and an officer confiscated them, the outlet reported.
CNN also said Saturday morning that one of its reporters was denied access and had her badge seized.
Trump said on Friday he was barring MS NOW, CNN, and Politico – three major US media outlets – from the White House, accusing them of writing “fiction or lies” about his administration. Press freedom advocates called the move “unconstitutional”.
“The officer asked me to hand over my badge. He said that it was disabled,” MS NOW reporter Akayla Gardner said. “I asked why I was not able to get inside. He said it was above him.”
Gardner added that while her and her colleague’s badges were disabled, an MS NOW producer was still able to scan her badge to get in, though she was not given an explanation as to why the producer’s badge still worked.
CNN reporter Betsy Klein said a Secret Service agent told her her badge had been deactivated.
An MS NOW spokesperson said in a statement that the White House “belongs to the American people and the decisions made inside are funded by our tax dollars”.
“MS NOW intends to take any and all steps necessary to defend our First Amendment rights and the essential role of independent journalism in our democracy.”
It was not clear whether Politico reporter were at the White House on Saturday. Following Trump’s ban, all three outlets have spoken out against the decision, accusing Trump of violating their constitutional rights to free speech and freedom of the press.
“We have a right under the US Constitution to do our reporting without hindrance or interference from the government and this ban is an illegal assault on this fundamental right,” CNN said.
In his announcement, Trump did not mention specific stories or reporting from the three outlets that prompted the move, but later said “it’s really just cumulative stories over the last few years”.
Trump added that there “may be others to join them”, but has not given a directive banning additional news outlets. When later asked by a reporter what he meant by others to come, Trump responded: “Others to come in terms of fake news? Well, you know, the New York Times is fake news, the Washington Post is fake news.”
Several groups dedicated to the freedom of the press have called out Trump’s White House ban as illegal and unconstitutional.
A major group that provides legal services to the media – the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press – said it expected Trump’s ban to be struck down quickly by the courts because it was “flatly unconstitutional”.
“The First Amendment is clear that once the White House invites in some journalists, it can’t ban others because it doesn’t like their reporting,” said Bruce Brown, president of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, which provides legal services to the media.
It’s the latest in a series of moves by the administration to target media outlets Trump says are critical of him, including legal action against US and international outlets like The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and the BBC.
Some of the lawsuits have resulted in media organisations agreeing to pay multimillion dollar settlements. Trump’s lawsuit against the BBC is ongoing.
Additional reporting from Bernd Debusmann Jr and Max Matza.
Who: Atletico Madrid vs Real Madrid
What: La Liga
Where: Metropolitano Stadium, Madrid, Spain
When: Sunday, September 20, at 4:15pm (14:15 GMT)
How to follow: Al Jazeera Sport will bring you all the build-up from 11:15 GMT before our live text commentary stream
Atletico host bitter city rivals Real for the Madrid derby as both sides look to keep up with early La Liga pacesetters Barcelona.
Madrid trail unbeaten champions Barcelona at the top of the table by three points, with Atletico third.
Atletico have bounced back from back-to-back defeats to Bilbao and Liverpool earlier in September, beating Real Sociedad 3-0 and Osasuna 4-0 in their last two games.
Real come into the game in decent form under boss Jose Mourinho but have had wobbles this month, with a defeat to Betis and scoring late to beat bottom club Elche after squandering a two-goal lead.
Atletico Madrid thrashed Osasuna 4-0 on Wednesday to build some form in the run-up to Sunday’s derby clash against rivals Real Madrid.
Jonathan David, Lee Kang-in, Robin Le Normand and Alex Baena’s goals helped Diego Simeone’s side cruise to a comfortable home victory.
They were without injured striker Julian Alvarez, but it did not matter after they secured a second straight win to cut the gap on top two Barcelona and Real Madrid.
The comfortable victory was important for an Atletico side with lots of new faces still bedding in, after two defeats in their three matches prior.
“We controlled it in the first half even though we weren’t clinical,” said coach Diego Simeone. “We were clinical in the second half and controlled the game.”
Real Madrid squandered a two-goal lead before substitute Carlos Espi struck in stoppage time to secure a dramatic 3-2 victory at Elche in La Liga on Tuesday.
Real went 2-0 up inside 33 minutes through a Matias Dituro own goal and Kylian Mbappe, but second-half strikes from Abiel Osorio and Fer Nino hauled Elche level before Espi restored the visitors’ lead in the 91st minute.
It was the second time in six league matches that the 21-year-old Espi had come off the bench to score a late winner, although Mourinho remained concerned by Real’s failure to control the second half in advance of Sunday’s derby against Atletico Madrid.
“The problem seems obvious to me. It’s harder to know why, but it’s easy to understand that there are matches that seem over and, in the end, aren’t,” said Mourinho.
“[There are] matches where we have three, four, five chances to finish them and don’t,” he said at the pre-match news conference.
“After failing to do so, it feels like we go from ease, because it seemed easy, to losing control.”
Mourinho said his team’s defensive issues were of concern.
“Not just for Sunday’s match, but for every match. I like my team to score goals … but I also like controlling matches,” explained Mourinho.
“I don’t like gifting control. It’s not about the goals, it’s about giving away control of the match.”
The Opta supercomputer has made Real Madrid the favourites, with a win probability of 46.6 percent. Atletico were given a 28.3 percent chance of winning, while a draw was estimated at a 25.1 percent likelihood.
The rivals have faced each other on 243 occasions; Real Madrid won 125 games, Atletico won 60, while 58 matches ended as draws.
Last five encounters:
Vinicius Jr scored twice as Real Madrid fought back to beat Atletico Madrid 3-2 at the Santiago Bernabeu in a breathless Spanish capital derby in March.
Atletico’s Ademola Lookman opened the scoring in the 33rd minute, finishing a slick counterattack involving Matteo Ruggeri and a delightful back-heel from Giuliano Simeone.
Vinicius equalised from the penalty spot in the 52nd minute, after David Hancko clumsily tripped Brahim Diaz, and Federico Valverde capitalised on a Jose Maria Gimenez error three minutes later to make it 2-1 to Real.
Nahuel Molina silenced Real’s Bernabeu stadium with a thunderous 30-metre strike in the 66th minute, but Vinicius restored Real’s lead with a cracking solo effort six minutes later.
Julian Alvarez scored twice as Atletico Madrid came from behind to thrash city rivals Real Madrid 5-2 in a pulsating derby in September 2025.
Atletico’s aggressive start paid off when Robin Le Normand opened the scoring with a header in the 14th minute.
However, Kylian Mbappe burst through to level with an unstoppable strike from close range in a quick counter in the 25th minute, with Arda Guler netting a volley from a Vinicius Jr cross 11 minutes later to put the visitors in front.
Alexander Sorloth’s header in added time before the break gave Atletico a boost, and they regained the lead five minutes into the second half when Alvarez converted a penalty after Guler’s high boot clipped Nico Gonzalez on the face inside the box.
After Alvarez extended their lead in the 64th minute with a sublime free kick into the top corner, substitute Antoine Griezmann sealed the win in a quick counter in added time.
Alvarez, Pablo Barrios, and Sorloth are doubts, as all three are struggling with muscle issues.
Jonathan David is likely to continue up front if Alvarez is absent or starts on the bench.
Predicted starting XI:
Oblak (goalkeeper); Llorente, Romero, Le Normand, Grimaldo; Lee, Koke, Cardoso, Baena; David, Lookman
Eder Militao, Rodrygo, and Ferland Mendy are unavailable due to injuries, but otherwise Mourinho appears to have a full squad to choose from.
Predicted starting XI:
Courtois (goalkeeper); Dumfries, Konate, Huijsen, Cucurella; Valverde, Tchouameni; Guler, Bellingham, Vinicius; Mbappe
Lockheed Martin and the U.S. Air Force are once again discussing new-build F-16s. The development comes as the service grapples with a fighter fleet that is simultaneously aging, shrinking, ballooning in sustainment cost and being called upon to do more. This also comes at a time when the Air Force is now investing heavily in the F-15EX, another fourth-generation type it hadn’t bought for many years after committing to an all stealth future fighter fleet in the 2000s.
According to Aviation Week, the company has proposed an aircraft called the F-16G, an enhanced derivative of the F-16 Block 70. The proposed configuration reportedly incorporates conformal fuel tanks, 600-gallon wing tanks, an infrared search-and-track (IRST) system, a Sniper targeting pod, and a drag chute. All of these features have appeared on previous F-16s in one form or another. Lockheed is positioning the new version as a potential replacement for USAF F-16 units whose existing aircraft are approaching the end of their useful lives.
The Air Force, for its part, says that it has not yet settled on either the requirements or the options for addressing the problem. As it stands, the service has not committed to buying any new F-16s. The proposal is nevertheless notable because it follows an earlier round of discussions in which the Air Force was already examining whether a new-build F-16 could help address the growing fighter gap.
In December 2025, Inside Defense reported that the Air Force had reached out to Lockheed Martin about pricing for Block 70 F-16s — the current export standard. The conversations were described as exploratory, with no firm procurement plan, but the reporting established that the idea had moved beyond a purely theoretical discussion. One congressional aide told the publication that officials were looking at ways to “plug their holes” as part of their future force-structure planning.
A new Viper variant based on the Block 70 would be cheaper than replacing an aging F-16 with an F-35, while allowing the Air Force to retain much of the infrastructure, training, and experience associated with the existing aircraft. This is a major advantage as the F-35’s unique infrastructure and support requirements are a costly addition to the aircraft’s base price tag. An even bigger factor is unrelated to acquisition and bed-down costs: a Block 70 is far cheaper to sustain and operate over its service life than an F-35, a difference that compounds significantly across a fleet.
The idea of a new Viper buy had already reached the highest levels of Air Force leadership several months earlier.
In May 2025, Sen. Tom Cotton asked then-Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Allvin about the possibility of buying a U.S.-configured “Block 80” F-16 if Congress provided additional funding. Allvin did not endorse the proposal, but he did not dismiss it either, saying he needed to examine the time required to adapt the Block 70 design, where a U.S. aircraft could fit into Lockheed Martin’s production line, and what the industrial base could support. He also noted that the existing Block 70/72 line was already heavily occupied by foreign military sales.
At the same hearing, Allvin acknowledged the broader force-structure logic, saying the Air Force needed both the high-end capabilities required for an Indo-Pacific fight and other fighters that “may not need to be as sophisticated as our fifth-generation, sixth-generation.” He also emphasized that the first increment of Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) was intended to augment rather than replace crewed fighters like the F-16.
Taken together, the developments show that the concept has remained alive through the Air Force’s evolving force-structure debate.
At first glance, the idea of buying new F-16s for the Air Force in the late 2020s might seem puzzling. The F-16 entered U.S. service in the 1970s, and the Air Force stopped buying new examples for itself more than 20 years ago. The established plan has been to replace the legacy F-16 fleet with the F-35A. For a long time, the service’s stated ambition was ultimately an all-stealth tactical fighter force — but that vision has already largely melted away as budget, operational and industrial-capacity realities have set in.
Today, the fighter fleet is still far older on average than it needs to be and legacy fourth generation types, minus a handful of new F-15EXs, are now well over 20-years old at the youngest. The oldest of these aircraft are increasingly challenging and costly to support. Meanwhile, the F-35 has had its fair share of successes and challenges, but replacing all of the USAF’s oldest fighters with JSFs in a timely and efficient manner, and operating those aircraft over future decades, looks increasingly problematic. The F-47 is also on the horizon, but that aircraft fits a different capability set more aligned with the F-22 than the F-16 and will come at a much higher cost than any fighter currently being procured.
Above all else, the problem is that the Air Force’s fighter challenge is one of numbers.
The service’s 2025 long-term fighter force-structure assessment concluded that it needed 1,558 combat-coded manned fighters by 2035 to reach what it considers a low-risk operational posture. The Air Force had only 1,098 fighters in its inventory as of May 2026, below the statutory minimum of 1,145.
At the same time, the service is trying to retire old aircraft, expand F-35A procurement, introduce the F-47, acquire additional F-15EXs, and field large numbers of CCAs. Those programs address different requirements, but they all compete for money, industrial capacity, personnel, and infrastructure.
For the Air Force, the question has not simply been whether the F-16 remains militarily useful, but also whether the aircraft provides a possible answer to a capacity shortfall, while also dealing with delays in F-35 deliveries, and the retirement of the A-10, blowing another hole in the inventory. Meanwhile, some older F-16s that had been expected to leave the fleet are instead receiving upgrades, including a new radar and electronic warfare suite, to keep them flying longer.
That creates a difficult transition period. The Air Force wants to retire aging fighters, but it also needs to keep enough aircraft available while their replacements arrive. The F-16 keeps reappearing because it offers a way of addressing at least part of that problem with a very well known commodity and without requiring every legacy fighter to be replaced by an F-35 or F-15EX.
There is another reason the F-16 procurement idea refuses to disappear: Lockheed Martin already has an F-16 production line operating in the United States.
The Greenville, South Carolina, facility was established to produce Block 70/72 aircraft for foreign customers and is now the world’s only F-16 production facility. The Air Force helped establish the line as part of its broader effort to sustain the F-16 industrial base through foreign military sales. The line moved there after the massive Lockheed Martin plant at Fort Worth, Texas — where the F-16 had been built for decades — transitioned fully over to F-35 production.
So, buying new F-16s would not require reviving a dormant production line or spinning up an entirely new aircraft program. The basic manufacturing infrastructure already exists, and the additional work required for a U.S.-specific aircraft may end up being minimal — potentially amounting to little more than taking an existing Block 70 and tweaking it, rather than a large-scale new engineering, testing, and weapons-integration effort.
The Air Force has been aware of that possibility for years. In 2021, then-Air Force Assistant Secretary for Acquisition Will Roper argued that the service should consider the new F-16 production line as part of its capacity solution. Roper specifically pointed to the upgraded capabilities available from the South Carolina production line.
However, Greenville is not an empty production line waiting for a U.S. customer. Lockheed Martin’s F-16 facility already has a substantial Block 70/72 backlog for foreign operators, with the company reporting more than 100 aircraft in the queue and continued potential for additional international orders. It’s also unclear how much the facility could realistically be expanded, since it was designed around a relatively more modest foreign military sales production volume rather than the kind of surge a large U.S. order could require. Still, the USAF could step in and buy up open slots, which would also ensure the line stays open for the foreseeable future, which has major strategic and industrial protection benefits.
That brings us back to Gen. Allvin’s question in May 2025 about where a U.S. aircraft could fit on the production line. Even if the Air Force decided to buy the jets, it would have to compete for production capacity with an established international order book while developing whatever U.S.-specific configuration, testing, and integration work it requires.
The proposed F-16G is also significant because it is not simply another upgraded F-16C/D like the USAF already has.
Lockheed’s proposed configuration reportedly would add conformal fuel tanks and 600-gallon wing tanks, along with an IRST, and the latest Sniper targeting pod, as well as a drag chute. All of these systems are already fielded and available today rather than requiring new development.
Those additions point toward an aircraft intended to provide even more basing flexibility, range, persistence, weapons and sensing capability than the current F-16, which had already grown into a medium-weight fighter years ago. That is relevant to how such an aircraft might actually fit into the future Air Force.
A contemporary F-16 is already a very different proposition from the aircraft that entered U.S. service decades ago. Modern AESA radars, electronic warfare systems, digital architecture, datalinks, advanced cockpit interfaces and weapons have substantially expanded its capabilities. The proposed F-16G would push that evolution further, but, like the F-15EX, it would still occupy a different part of the spectrum from the F-35 and whatever eventually emerges from the F-47 program.
That distinction could be useful in a larger force. An F-35 provides capabilities, particularly its combination of stealth and advanced sensor fusion, that an F-16 can never reproduce. But the Air Force does not conduct every mission in the most heavily defended portion of an adversary’s airspace. Homeland defense, training, defensive counter-air, a range of strike missions, and operations in permissive or partially contested environments don’t necessarily require the same characteristics as a penetration mission against an integrated air defense network. In a major conflict, no fighter will fight alone, either. Far from it. Operation Midnight Hammer, the B-2 strikes against Iran’s nuclear program, provides a salient example here, with F-16s flying deep into the country along with F-22s and F-35s, to clear the way for the B-2 strike force. By now, the Air Force is well-versed in leveraging the total-force fourth-and-fifth-generation mix, and it has discovered that they complement each other in unique ways that can be an advantage, not just compensation for lack of capability.
As far as the drag chute, that is a highly relevant addition to the USAF’s F-16 capability set. The chute would allow for the F-16 to better execute Agile Combat Employment (ACE), which includes operating from austere airfields within the enemy’s weapons engagement zone. The F-16 can get off the runway pretty quick, but landing is a different story. The chute can help greatly in this regard.
There is no question that an F-16 is not a replacement for an F-35. But it could help the Air Force better allocate its limited inventory of increasingly expensive fifth-generation and future sixth-generation aircraft while also maintaining a much larger overall fighter fleet.
One factor that is easy to overlook is Collaborative Combat Aircraft. CCAs are not just a complement to fifth- and sixth-generation fighters, they can also breathe new relevance into fourth-generation types like the F-16. Pairing stealthy, and even optionally expendable CCAs with a fighter like the F-16G could substantially boost its survivability and lethality by pushing sensing, shooting, and some of the risk forward onto uncrewed platforms, extending the F-16’s combat relevance even into higher-end scenarios where it would otherwise be at a disadvantage. In that sense, CCA may end up being arguably as relevant to fourth-generation aircraft as it is to fifth-generation ones.
In other words, CCAs are a positive factor in the F-16G’s business case.
While the F-22 and F-35 are slated to get CCAs first, the F-16G can be built ready to interoperate with them, which could be a massive force multiplier to what would be the most affordable crewed tactical asset in the inventory. CCAs can eventually be used to also help augment F-16Gs operating in a homeland defense mission and other more mundane roles as well.
New Block 70s could make particular sense for the Air National Guard.
The Guard continues to operate F-16s in large numbers, meaning that its personnel, facilities, simulators, and maintenance infrastructure are already built around the aircraft. A new-build F-16 could therefore replace an aging F-16 without requiring the same organizational transition associated with converting a unit to an entirely different fighter, and especially a highly complex fifth-generation type with all its unique support requirements.
That has financial implications beyond the aircraft itself. Replacing an existing F-16 squadron with Block 70s would reduce construction costs and training requirements because much of the existing infrastructure and expertise could be retained.
The Air Force would still have to pay for the aircraft and sustainment, but it would not be starting from scratch in terms of operating infrastructure, while the modernized fourth-generation capabilities of an F-16G would still mark a step forward for the Guard over its older F-16s.
It’s worth noting there has also been discussion of replacing more aging F-16s with additional F-15EXs instead. That path, however, is more expensive on both the acquisition and operating-cost side, and it would still require units to convert to a different airframe rather than simply recapitalizing in place.
A new F-16 offers a fresh and highly mature airframe — one with a full service-life ahead of it, on the order of 12,000 flight hours without the need for structural upgrades — double that of the original F-16. This is compared to existing F-16s in the inventory with the decades of wear and fatigue already accumulated on them, with structural upgrades keeping them in the air. That difference in remaining structural life is arguably the single biggest advantage a new-build aircraft has compared with extending an existing one.
Dumping more money into existing F-16s is becoming questionable. Service life extensions and technical upgrades can only go so far and supporting these jets is becoming harder as parts dry up and suppliers who made them are long gone. A new airframe would give the Guard many decades of highly efficient service and the piece of mind for future force planning that goes with it.
Also, just like F-15EX, the development of the Block 70 F-16 has already been paid for largely by foreign customers over many years. It is as off-the-shelf of a solution as it gets and that is a very attractive proposition to an air arm trying to balance its books.
Above all, F-16 sustainment and operating costs run far below the F-35’s — a gap that already holds true even with older F-16s, and one that would widen further with new-build jets.
One seemingly obvious alternative would be to accelerate F-35A procurement. But the F-35 is not simply another fighter that can be substituted one-for-one whenever an F-16 reaches the end of its service life. That would also be difficult to do in practice. F-35A production is effectively capped and there are dense order books, and the well-documented troubles with the Block 4 upgrade are a huge factor pushing the Air Force to look at alternatives like the F-16G in the first place.
The Air Force’s current force-structure plans call for significantly more fighters overall, while the service is simultaneously pursuing F-35As, F-15EXs, and the F-47.
Among the reasons why a modernized F-16 might be considered alongside those programs are concerns not only about the cost of those aircraft, but also about the timing of F-35 deliveries, something that has been disrupted by well-publicized problems with Joint Strike Fighter upgrades. At the same time, keeping older F-16s active through upgrades is an increasingly unattractive way of managing the shortfall.
The issue is therefore less about choosing the F-16 instead of the F-35 than about deciding whether the Air Force should use both aircraft for different portions of the force structure.
The service is already doing something along these lines with the F-15EX. It has accepted that a modernized fourth-generation aircraft can have a role alongside the F-35 and the F-22, rather than requiring every new fighter to be stealthy.
A new F-16 would extend that logic to a lower-cost segment of the fleet, potentially allowing the Air Force to use F-35s where their particular capabilities are most valuable while maintaining additional capacity with a less expensive aircraft.
Even if Air Force leaders conclude that the F-16G makes operational sense, Congress would still have to decide whether it is worth funding.
The December 2025 reporting identified the central problem: lawmakers would want the service to demonstrate that buying new aircraft is preferable to continuing to upgrade the F-16s it already owns. They would also have to weigh the proposal against the F-35 and CCA programs.
If an existing F-16 can be kept operational with a relatively inexpensive upgrade, a new aircraft has to justify its acquisition cost and the additional long-term sustainment burden. But if maintaining an increasingly old F-16 fleet doesn’t save large sums of money over the long haul, the new Block 70 variant begins to look more compelling.
There remains a substantial gap between Lockheed Martin pitching the F-16G and the Air Force actually buying it. The service told TWZ that it is “in the initial phases of analyzing options for the next Future Years Defense Program.” The Air Force spokesperson added: “At this stage, we have neither defined the precise mission requirements nor the spectrum of options that could fill it.”
That is consistent with the status described by Inside Defense nine months earlier. At the time, the Air Force had no plans to procure Block 70s, and the discussions with Lockheed were described as exploratory. Even if senior officials ultimately favored the aircraft, Inside Defense reported that the program could not appear in the Future Years Defense Program until at least fiscal 2028 because the FY2027 budget process was already too far along.
The F-16G therefore remains a proposal rather than a program. But the persistence of the idea is itself significant. It should be noted that the F-15EX buy emerged out of very similar machinations, with the benefits proving to be undeniable.
The new proposal would let some Guard and Reserve units swap their F-16s for vastly improved F-16s — the same logic that drove the F-15EX buy — while also keeping the Greenville line hot, which is a significant benefit in its own right. And it accomplishes both in the most efficient way possible: not just in acquisition cost, but in sustainment cost, which is really the more problematic burden of the two. In the end, this points to another glaring reality check for the all-stealth-force concept, a vision the Air Force has effectively already abandoned.
The Air Force has spent years describing the F-35 as the replacement for its F-16 fleet, yet it now has to contend with aging F-16s, delayed or constrained fighter production, a larger stated requirement for total fighter capacity, and the lengthy transition toward the F-47 and uncrewed combat aircraft. In that environment, a new-build F-16 provides an option that sits between extending legacy aircraft and buying the most sophisticated — and expensive — fighters available.
Regardless, there are so many priorities facing the force right now, buying new F-16s will be a challenge at every turn, but that doesn’t mean it won’t become too compelling of a proposition to accept. Still, many will argue that every dollar should be invested in higher-end fighter and uncrewed platforms that are more survivable against America’s primary pacing threat, China. That country is rapidly evolving its own air arm with stealth fighters and advanced uncrewed aircraft. Stepping back to the F-16 while facing down such a threat can appear to be counterproductive when taken at face value. At the same time, the F-16 is already slated to stay in the inventory by the hundreds for decades to come, which does take some of the bite out of that argument.
In the end, it is remarkable that the F-16 was supposed to have left the U.S. fighter equation years ago. Instead, every time the Air Force looks closely at the gap between the fighter force it has and the force it says it needs, the aircraft somehow finds a way back into the conversation.
Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com
An annual award has gone to one of the U.S. Air Force’s most secretive drone squadrons, offering a very rare window into its activities. The 30th Reconnaissance Squadron is one of two units known to operate the stealthy RQ-170 Sentinel, and it is unusual to hear anything about its operational exploits. Much about the RQ-170 itself remains highly classified 17 years after its existence was first officially acknowledged.
The General Atomics Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) Squadron of the Year award for 2025 was presented to the 30th Reconnaissance Squadron at the Air & Space Forces Association’s (AFA) 2026 Air, Space & Cyber Conference on Tuesday, at which TWZ was in attendance. The AFA’s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies works together with General Atomics’ Aeronautical Systems, Inc. division (GA-ASI) to recognize an Air Force drone unit in this way each year.
“The RPA Trophy is awarded annually at the USAF level for outstanding performance of active duty, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard … squadrons in achieving persistent attack and/or reconnaissance over the preceding calendar year,” the Mitchell Institute told TWZ in a statement. “Squadrons are judged on performance across their specified mission sets, exercise participation, and squadron and individual achievements.”
The institute sent an additional statement regarding this year’s particular award to the 30th Reconnaissance Squadron, which is as follows:
“Through relentless combat support, operational agility, and enterprise leadership, the 30th Reconnaissance Squadron – known as the Blackbirds – has set the standard for the remotely piloted aircraft community and strengthened the Joint Force’s intelligence advantage. In 2025, the 30th Reconnaissance Squadron conducted intrusive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions across three areas of responsibility, filling critical intelligence gaps and disrupting enemy networks. In the face of urgent deployment requirements, the squadron demonstrated exceptional agility, rapidly pivoting resources to establish forward operating locations and execute critical missions under severely compressed timelines. The Blackbirds’ accomplishments paved the way for future remotely piloted aircraft capability, distinctly identifying them as the Air Force’s most outstanding RPA squadron.“
Larry Stutzriem, the AFA’s Executive Vice President, while presenting the award to representatives of the 30th Reconnaissance Squadron ahead of a panel at the Air, Space & Cyber Conference.
“In 2025, the 30th Reconnaissance Squadron conducted 87 ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] missions across three different AORs [areas of responsibility], filled critical intelligence gaps, and disrupted enemy networks,” Stutzriem said. “On the unit mobility side, the Blackbirds executed 7.2 million dollars worth of airlift in six movements across four combatant commands, moving 250 tons of personnel, top secret material, and equipment to provide low-observable RPA support for a critical Secretary of War-directed mission.”
“With their deployments, the Blackbirds demonstrated exceptional agility under extremely compressed timelines,” he added.
Furthermore, during 2025, the squadron “also executed six large force exercises to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures; validated joint force tactical objectives in land and maritime environments; and provided combat-relevant training,” according to Stutzriem. “Instructors and evaluators graduated the largest ever combat mission-ready class, 30 percent ahead of schedule, and accelerated mission-ready status 33 percent, while increasing total unit aircrew by 26 percent.”
Though Stutzriem noted that the 30th Reconnaissance Squadron provided “low-observable RPA support,” no explicit mention was made of the RQ-170. Whether or not the squadron may now operate other kinds of low-observable (stealthy) drones is unknown. As mentioned, to date, the Air Force has only confirmed that Sentinels are assigned to two units, the other being the 44th Reconnaissance Squadron. Both the 30th and 44th are assigned to the 432nd Wing at Creech Air Force Base in Nevada. Between 20 and 30 RQ-170s, in total, are understood to be in the Air Force’s inventory.
What three specific AORs the 30th Reconnaissance Squadron operated in during 2025 is also not known.
However, at least one, and possibly two, RQ-170s took part in the mission to capture Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro in January of this year, as you can read more about here. It’s very likely that the Sentinels were tracking Maduro ahead of the operation. In December 2025, Air Forces Southern (AFSOUTH) had also made a post on X that included a picture of an individual wearing a name patch with the silhouette of Sentinel and the sleeve insignia of the 432nd Wing, prompting questions about whether the drones were operating in the region. The post was subsequently deleted.
Further in the past, RQ-170s are also known to have been deployed to the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Pacific. The Sentinel first emerged publicly in Afghanistan in the late 2000s, prompting the U.S. military to confirm its existence in 2009. Sentinels are notably understood to have surveilled Al Qaeda founder Osama Bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan in the lead-up to the raid that led to his death in May 2011.
Later in 2011, one of the drones infamously went down in Iran while presumed to be on a mission to monitor aspects of that country’s nuclear program. With that in mind, it is possible, if not extremely probable, that RQ-170s likely played a role in relation to the Operation Midnight Hammer strikes on Iranian nuclear sites last year. Sentinels could have provided direct surveillance over the sites in question, as well as collecting post-mission bomb damage assessments and other intelligence. These are exactly the kinds of missions the drones were designed for and that operators have trained for.
A satellite image available through Apple Maps, seen below, also shows an RQ-170 at Naval Air Station Sigonella in Italy, likely in the 2023-2024 timeframe, based on the state of construction visible elsewhere at the base. It is not known how many Sentinels were deployed to Sigonella and for how long. The Apple Maps image does lend some credence to earlier reports that these drones may have flown missions in the Black Sea region, gathering intelligence on Russian forces on the heavily defended, occupied Crimean Peninsula, between 2022 and 2023.
Overall, the RQ-170 does still appear to be a go-to for performing penetrating tactical reconnaissance missions, especially when there is a need to provide persistent surveillance in denied areas, resulting in extremely important intelligence collection.
Again, it is important to reiterate here that we do not know if the 30th Reconnaissance Squadron operates any other stealthy drones beyond the RQ-170, or has in the past. A very stealthy high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) surveillance and reconnaissance drone commonly and unofficially referred to as the RQ-180, or an evolution thereof, burst into the public eye in March after it was spotted landing in broad daylight at a base in Greece. Much about the drone, including what units are involved in its operation and where the home base of the fleet is, as well as the reasons for its deployment to the region, has yet to emerge. It does seem unlikely that the 30th would have taken on operation of the RQ-180, which is a larger strategic reconnaissance-focused platform compared to the smaller, tactically-minded, and less exquisite RQ-170. This is also just one example of what could still be lurking in the classified realm.
Whether or not the awarding of the 2025 RPA Squadron of the Year trophy to the 30th Reconnaissance Squadron might now point to a new willingness to talk about that unit’s activities and/or the RQ-170 remains to be seen. Regardless, the award and its description are yet more reminders of just how important the Sentinel remains nearly two decades after it first appeared.
Contact the author: joe@twz.com
This year, AGRA, the donor-funded agricultural development initiative formerly known as the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa, is celebrating its 20th anniversary.
AGRA’s slogan is “sustainably growing Africa’s food systems”, but for years, researchers and farmers have warned that the policies it promotes are having a negative impact on African agriculture.
Our new research provides more evidence to that effect. We have documented how AGRA’s Green Revolution, with its well-funded promotion of commercial seeds, fertilisers and other inputs, has failed to spur the “productivity revolution” promised by its founders.
Worse still, its promotion of monocultures, such as maize, has led to the massive expansion of land dedicated to them. At the same time, more resilient and nutritious local crops, such as millet, are losing ground.
Hunger continues to increase in Africa, driven by climate change, desertification, conflict and disruptions to international supply lines from international conflicts like the Ukraine war. The Green Revolution promoted by AGRA does not seem to have made much of a difference.
In countries where AGRA has had significant presence, the number of undernourished people has increased by about 60 percent – roughly the same rate as the rest of the continent.
The United Nations is calling for greater attention to “affordable healthy diets”. For Africa’s small-scale farmers, who grow what their families and communities eat, that means more, not less, crop diversity, which is the opposite of what the Green Revolution has produced.
In countries that have participated in AGRA projects, crops such as maize are promoted and funded with billions of dollars in subsidies and investment. Despite that, yields for maize have grown only modestly, just 40 percent over 18 years, well below the 100 percent improvement promised by AGRA.
Some countries, like Malawi and Ethiopia, have seen stronger yield growth for maize, but some, such as Kenya – where AGRA’s headquarters are located – have seen yields decline.
Maize production has soared across participant countries, driven mainly by the massive expansion of plantings as subsidies drive farmers to plant maize on new land.
In contrast, our research shows that traditional African staples such as sorghum, cassava, and groundnuts have lost land and investment. Since AGRA was launched in 2006, 13 countries that have participated have seen a decline in productivity of 21 percent for cassava and 10 percent for groundnuts in total.
But millet – a climate-resilient, nutritious grain – is the crop that has suffered the most. Before 2006, millet was as prevalent as maize in these countries. Since 2006, millet production has fallen 27 percent, while maize production has more than doubled. Millet yields have fallen 17 percent with the lack of investment. And as land allocated to maize production increased 71 percent, land for millet fell 12 percent.
Millet is not some backward crop waiting to be replaced by maize. For generations, it has fed communities across some of Africa’s driest regions. It can withstand heat and drought, grow with relatively few external inputs, and provide nutritious food where other crops struggle.
In 2023, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) celebrated the “Year of Millets”, highlighting the multiple benefits of the crop to the environment and social welfare.
The same is true of many of Africa’s traditional crops – sorghum, fonio, cowpeas, cassava, indigenous vegetables and many others. They are part of the biological diversity of African farming, but also of our cuisines, knowledge and cultures.
At a time of climate change, pushing such crops aside makes particularly little sense. Farmers need more options in their fields, not fewer. A diverse farm spreads risk: when one crop suffers from drought, pests or disease, another may survive. Rotation and diversity of crops help keep soils more fertile.
Rhetorically, AGRA now professes to value the very crops that its Green Revolution helped push to the margins. It speaks of diverse, nutritious and climate-adapted crops, and its seed programmes include millet, sorghum, cowpea, groundnut and others.
We welcome serious investment in these crops. It is overdue. But there is no indication that AGRA and other Green Revolution proponents will abandon their chosen monocrops, such as maize. AGRA’s current seed strategy still emphasises improved varieties, certified seeds, faster variety turnover, commercialisation and market-oriented seed systems.
Investment needs to support farmers’ rights to save, use, exchange and develop their seeds, protect crop diversity and indigenous knowledge, and ensure that farmers and communities – not seed markets alone – determine which varieties survive and spread.
African farmers do not need saving, but their crops – millet, sorghum, cowpea, fonio, and other traditional crops need to be rescued from Green Revolution crop-breeders.
When a traditional crop disappears from farmers’ fields, we can lose locally adapted seed varieties, knowledge about how to grow and prepare them and foods that are central to local diets and identities.
This is why the decline of millet should concern us far beyond the millet field. Africa is already dangerously exposed to climate shocks and volatile international food and fertiliser markets. Diversity is one of our greatest protections against those risks. Yet we are subsidising its disappearance.
It is not enough for the UN to call for greater access for all to nutritious diets. For the majority of Africa’s rural populations, who are also among its least food-secure, crop diversity is key to diet diversity. It is time for AGRA, the African Development Bank, foreign donors and African governments to stop subsidising and promoting the crops that are driving the loss of such diversity.
The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
United States President Donald Trump claims the US has reached a deal with Denmark granting it “permanent control” over Greenland’s security “and all other needs”.
The announcement comes more than a year after the US president threatened to seize the self-governing Arctic territory, which is part of Denmark. Those threats roiled the NATO security alliance that Washington and Copenhagen are part of.
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According to Denmark, the deal is expected to be signed during next week’s United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York. Copenhagen has stressed that it retains sovereignty over Greenland, and this deal will still need to be ratified in the Danish and Greenland parliaments.
Here’s what we know about the deal and what it could mean for the US and Greenland:
The official text has yet to be released. But according to Trump, the deal gives the US permanent control over Greenland’s security and “all other needs”, at no cost to the US.
The deal bars US adversaries from establishing a military presence or making “sensitive investments” in Greenland without US approval, said Trump.
A US Department of State official cited by the BBC said the deal will mean non-NATO states won’t be able to set up bases in Greenland and will be barred from “making investments in Greenland that could threaten the United States”.
The official said that means China and Russia won’t be able to build bases or send troops to Greenland, and that those states would be blocked from investing “in sensitive sectors”.
However, Mikkel Olesen, a senior researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies, told Al Jazeera that it is unlikely to be a major concession because “the Danes and Greenlanders never wished for Russia or China to have bases in Greenland.”
However, it is unclear whether other countries could similarly be labelled “adversaries” to the US in the future, subjecting them to these restrictions.
Trump called the deal an “‘Infinite Life’ Agreement”, meaning “it never ends”.
The State Department official also said the agreement gives the US the right to build more military sites on the island without Greenland or Denmark approving. According to the official, the deal would remain in force even if Greenland were to become an independent state in the future.
There was no specific mention of potential US mining rights in Greenland, which has a rich deposit of rare-earth minerals, including zinc, iron, uranium and graphite, that are likely to interest Trump. These minerals are highly sought after and are used in the manufacture of hundreds of technological products, from smartphones to fighter jets.
However, some observers think this could be what Trump means by his mention of “sensitive investments”.
The US president has sought to expand the US’s global access to rare-earth metals, especially as China, a global leader in the technology, AI and renewables industries with 60 percent of the world’s known deposits of these minerals in its territory, restricts their exports.
Greenland and Denmark acknowledged the deal on Friday, but neither gave specific details about its terms. They said the agreement would be announced next week.
Greenland’s Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen said it “recognises Greenland’s interests” and is “to the benefit of us all”.
Denmark’s Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said it is “great for NATO and Europe”, as it “strengthens our common security in the Arctic and the North Atlantic Area”.
Olesen stressed that details of the deal remain unclear and that available information should be taken “with a grain of salt” as most of it has so far come from the US side.
No, it does not meet Trump’s previously stated objective of “ownership”.
Denmark’s Frederiksen said the agreement “recognises the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Kingdom and the Greenlandic people’s right to self-determination”.
Olesen said the deal could be positive for Greenland and Denmark as it “has the potential to end the crisis” caused by Trump’s insistence on acquiring Greenland last year, without sacrificing sovereignty.
Trump’s earlier threats to seize control of Greenland were met with high resistance on the island of 56,000 people. A January 2025 poll found that 85 percent of Greenlanders opposed becoming part of the US.
A substantial number. Under a 1951 treaty, the US has broad overflight and basing rights on the island.
In addition to giving the US the right to build bases and maintain personnel, the treaty also stipulates that the US can “control landings, takeoffs, anchorages, moorings, movements, and operation of ships, aircraft, and waterborne craft”.
As part of the treaty, the US currently operates a Space Force base in a remote part of northwestern Greenland – the Pituffik Space Base. It has more than 100 personnel stationed there.
That largely remains to be seen. Trump said the US will “immediately” begin building up a large military presence on Greenland. However, the US already had the right to build bases and send personnel there under the 1951 treaty.
Imran Bayoumi, a former Pentagon official, told the Reuters news agency that it would be new if the US could now build bases unilaterally, but “it seems that Washington could have achieved a lot of these objectives through diplomacy and dialogue without straining the broader US-NATO relationship.”
Trump has also said the US will support Greenlanders with “development and construction”, without elaborating.
Richard Weitz, a fellow at the NATO Defense College, told Al Jazeera the deal “defuses perhaps one of the most severe sources of internal tension” within NATO.
While Trump “backed down and settled for less” than he sought with respect to Greenland, he still “got pretty much everything he wanted, except formal annexation”, added Weitz.
Israel’s bitter political divisions are particularly sharp before the country’s October elections. But the furious response to a new documentary about the military’s actions in the genocidal war on Gaza has revealed an issue that much of Israel’s political and media establishment appears united on.
Few of the central allegations in NAZA, made by Israeli filmmakers Yuval Abraham and Rachel Szor, are new. Reports that the Israeli military was relying on artificial intelligence systems to generate targets in Gaza, often killing the inhabitants of entire buildings to kill just one individual identified by the system, were reported in April 2024.
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Other accusations against Israel, such as committing genocide, deliberately causing a famine, and unlawfully killing children, have also not received much attention in Israel.
In contrast, NAZA has unleashed a litany of abuse from across Israel, and brought the allegations to the centre of Israel’s political debate.
Culture Minister Miki Zohar reacted to the film’s premiere at the Venice Film Festival – where it received a 25-minute standing ovation – by calling for the directors to be stripped of their citizenship and to be investigated by the internal intelligence service for treason.
Army chief Eyal Zamir has dismissed the film as being built on blood libel and ordered a legal probe to hunt down its military and intelligence sources.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also cited the film when advancing legislation to revoke citizenship from anyone deemed to be smearing the country’s soldiers, while in the coastal city of Ashdod, graffiti branding the directors “traitors” has appeared on the walls.
“You can’t really understand the extent of the madness from outside of the country,” Orly Noy, an editor at Local Call, which first carried many of the accusations contained in the film, said. “They’re attacking the friends and families of [the filmmakers] Yuval Abraham and Rachel Szor. They’re talking about revoking their citizenship. They’re asking the Shin Bet to investigate them – for making a film, and it isn’t just the politicians. Journalists, who you might expect to show some kind of solidarity with them, are competing to attack them. It’s scary.”
In late 2025, the Committee to Protect Journalists reported escalating censorship and harassment in Israel, with Israeli journalists telling the organisation that the media’s approach had become “part of the war effort” and, by extension, significantly shaped Israeli view of their war on Gaza.
In October 2025, a study by the Israeli think tank Molad found that only 3 percent of Channel 12’s coverage of the first six months of the war mentioned Gaza’s humanitarian crisis. Of 206 war-related images and video clips broadcast by the network, Israel’s most-watched channel, only two showed Palestinian civilian casualties.
Nevertheless, before the film’s release, polls found that most Israelis believed the coverage they were receiving of the military’s conduct in Gaza was balanced.
“I guess it was because the mainstream media outlets in Israel did not investigate the conduct of the army during the war in Gaza, and hardly covered the war from the Palestinian point of view,” Anat Saragusti, the Israeli jurist and journalist responsible for press freedom at the Union of Journalists in Israel, said of the shock that had accompanied the release of the film. “[The Israeli media] hardly reported on the human toll and the scale of the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.”
Compounding the gap, Saragusti said, was a deep-seated national narrative: that the war had been imposed on Israel, that Hamas had carried out a massacre on October 7, 2023, and that Hamas’s use of civilians as human shields made mass casualties in Gaza all but unavoidable.
Palestinian deaths, in this telling, were framed less as the product of Israeli conduct than as collateral damage forced on Israel by its enemy’s tactics, she said.
“Even journalists that usually support the anti-Netanyahu bloc have criticised the filmmakers,” Israeli political sociologist Daniel Bar-Tal said.
“Israeli Jews deny the genocide,” he continued, “Even all the opposition parties joined the vicious criticism of the filmmakers.”
The language used against the filmmakers has been echoed by some of Netanyahu’s most prominent political rivals.
On Monday, former military chief and one of Netanyahu’s principal rivals Gadi Eisenkot denounced the film for “moral blindness, a detachment from reality, and harm to the State of Israel in a difficult hour”.
Former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, who is also running in October’s election, called the film a “horrific blood libel against our sons and daughters”.
“Everything gets heightened the closer to the election we get,” Noy said. “But I think only now, for those of us who live here, is the extent of the fascism becoming clear. Journalists, politicians and the media are forming some kind of incitement machine.”
“I’ve had anxieties over where Israel had been going for a long time,” she said, “but right now I’m genuinely worried for my friends and colleagues.”
Ugo Ugochukwu has become the first American driver to win the FIA Formula 3 Championship. The 19-year-old New Yorker talks to Al Jazeera’s Samantha Johnson about his road to the title, his Formula 1 ambitions, Nigerian heritage and meeting Lewis Hamilton.
Published On 19 Sep 202619 Sep 2026
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Russia’s parliamentary elections offer an excellent opportunity for a new round in the information war between the West and Russia. Western politicians, experts and journalists have been given yet another convenient occasion to tell their target audiences that democracy has long ceased to exist in Russia; that the federal parliament, like any other representative body, in practice determines nothing in Russian life; and that all genuinely important decisions for the country are made not even by the government but exclusively in the Kremlin, by an extremely narrow circle of individuals accountable to no one.
Therefore, in the view of many critics of the Russian authorities, elections in Russia need not have been held at all: their outcome was predetermined by Kremlin political strategists and, in any event, will have no significant impact on the country’s future.
And yet even the most biased outside observer could hardly fail to notice the obvious: the Russian authorities made consistent and persistent efforts to ensure that these elections attracted the highest possible participation and were conducted successfully under current electoral law. For at least the past several months, the country had experienced heightened political activity.
Leading politicians and state officials constantly reminded the electorate of the importance of the coming elections. Governors of politically “problematic” regions were urgently allocated additional subsidies. Payments to certain categories of public-sector employees and pensioners were hastily indexed. And inevitable but unpopular or painful decisions for the public – for example, the forthcoming significant nationwide increase in housing and utility tariffs – were postponed until after the elections.
Even possible shifts in Russia’s position on the conflict with Ukraine and future relations with the West were often linked in public and political discussions to the results of the September elections, which were supposedly meant to “untie the hands” of the Russian leadership, although there were very different, sometimes diametrically opposed, views about how exactly the leadership would use these “untied hands”. In any case, it must be acknowledged that the Kremlin did not take the easy path of its opponents in Kyiv, who simply postponed the 2024 Ukrainian presidential election until better, “postwar” times, despite clear discontent and muted grumbling from part of Ukraine’s political class.
What is going on here? Why should the Kremlin invest so much energy and so many resources in what is often interpreted outside Russia as little more than an unconvincing simulation of genuine political competition? Why launch a new full electoral cycle while a large-scale military conflict has yet to end, when the normal boundaries of peacetime political democracy tend, one way or another, to narrow?
It is difficult to suppose that holding elections in Russia is driven solely by Kremlin strategists’ obsessive desire to impress, at all costs, either their external opponents or their partners abroad. As for the former, they would not change their views about the nature of the Russian political system, even in the hypothetical event that the elections ended in a complete triumph for the radical opposition and a crushing defeat for all pro-Kremlin candidates. Such a scenario would most likely lead to endless speculation about yet another “cunning Putin plan”, intended to mislead a credulous Western public and conceal the consistently authoritarian nature of Russia’s political regime.
As for the latter, it is hard to imagine that the leaders of Iran, North Korea, Belarus or China are seriously concerned about the state or future of Russian democracy. The political systems of their countries, like those of many other foreign friends and partners of Russia, to put it mildly, do not entirely conform to the classical standards of Western liberal democracies. It is doubtful that Kim Jong Un, Alexander Lukashenko or, say, Mohammed bin Salman, or even Donald Trump, would suddenly decide to offer Vladimir Putin wise advice on how to organise polling stations properly and count votes.
It is hardly likely that the Kremlin felt an urgent need to erect elaborate and expensive but not especially durable scenery on the Russian political stage when the reaction of the potential audience to the forthcoming theatrical production was known in advance. It seems more logical to assume that the Russian authorities need elections not as cosmetic decoration for the façade of their political system, designed to attract the indifferent gaze of an outside observer, but as a quite effective and, above all, much-needed mechanism for maintaining dialogue between the authorities and society in the difficult geopolitical and socio-economic conditions of autumn 2026.
First and foremost, the Russian authorities are fighting hard for a high turnout, creating the most comfortable possible conditions for their voters to cast their ballots. This is no accident. A high turnout is convincing evidence of the population’s continued political activity and of the fact that Russian society has not descended into political apathy and wholesale cynicism. The idea of active civic participation is far from an empty phrase for the country’s leadership. In this sense, even a vote against the main “party of power”, United Russia, is clearly preferable to the alternative of a significant part of the electorate conspicuously choosing not to participate in the elections.
No less important, the authorities need the election results as a barometer of current public preferences, something even the most accurate opinion polls or in-depth sociological research cannot replace. Contemporary Russia undoubtedly has its own, albeit relatively narrow, political spectrum of “systemic opposition” parties reflecting the differing interests and expectations of various social, economic, age and regional groups. The constantly changing balance of power between these parties must, one way or another, be taken into account by the authorities when determining the future priorities of their strategy.
For example, relative success for the Communist Party, A Just Russia and candidates from other left-wing parties would be a signal that the authorities should pay more attention to social programmes, the fight against economic inequality and social polarisation, and to countering the many remnants of “wild capitalism” left over from the 1990s. Conversely, a large number of votes cast for the New People party and other right-wing candidates would provide grounds for accelerating structural economic reforms and creating additional opportunities for the private sector, including small and medium-sized businesses. Strong electoral results for the Liberal Democratic Party would indicate growing nationalist tendencies in Russian society. The authorities may respond to such political signals in different ways, but they cannot ignore them and must therefore read shifts in public sentiment correctly.
Moreover, it can be assumed with a considerable degree of confidence that the State Duma elections will, one way or another, lead to substantial changes in the composition of not only the lower house of the Russian parliament but also Russia’s federal government. Following the elections, significant personnel changes are likely to take place in the executive branch – both at the federal level and at other levels. Such personnel changes, in turn, will make room for fresh ideas, innovative programmes, unconventional projects and proposals. There is a clear demand for renewal in Russian society today. Parliamentary elections are one way of responding convincingly to this demand without calling into question the stability of the state’s overall strategy or its senior leadership.
The Duma elections are the first parliamentary elections held during the special military operation, during which Russian society has changed considerably. In a sense, they can be called a large-scale political experiment whose outcome remains difficult to predict with precision. For example, it is still difficult to determine with confidence which political force will be supported by the majority of people who have participated in the special military operation or who remain on the line of contact. No less uncertainty remains regarding the likely political preferences of many residents of the new Russian regions, for whom the September elections will be their first State Duma election in their new status.
Such an experiment probably carries a degree of risk for the Russian leadership. Nevertheless, the leadership appears prepared to take that risk, not without reason viewing elections not only as an important but as an indispensable mechanism for public confirmation of its continuing political legitimacy.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
Since returning to office in January 2025, Trump and administration officials have repeatedly clashed with members of the White House press corps. In his second term, Trump has also moved to bring conservative bloggers, influencers and other media into the press room, arguing it is necessary to provide diverse perspectives to the American public.
In February, the White House announced it was taking control of the press pool which has access to Trump and had for more than a century been managed by the White House Correspondents’ Association.
The same month, the administration moved to bar Associated Press (AP) reporters and photographers from spaces where access is limited, such as the Oval Office or Air Force One, because of the outlet’s usage of the term “Gulf of Mexico” instead of “Gulf of America”.
AP swiftly filed a lawsuit and the case remains ongoing.
The president has frequently clashed with reporters in the Oval Office on Air Force One and during White House events, often referring to them as “fake news” and “rude”.
In his first term, Trump also banned CNN correspondent Jim Acosta from the White House, although his credentials were restored after CNN sued.
CNN is one of only five US news outlets that film video for the pool. The pool refers to an outlet or reporter sharing material from a presidential event with other media outlets. The BBC contributes to the White House radio pool.
The announcement was immediately criticised by leading advocacy organisations for freedom of the press.
In a statement on Friday afternoon, the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University said that “with so many courts having ruled against him on exactly this point, you’d think President Trump would have learned this lesson by now”.
“If President Trump means to expel these news organizations from the White House press pool, his action is doubly unconstitutional because the press pool is a ‘public forum’ under the First Amendment, which means the president can’t exclude journalists from it on the basis of their viewpoints,” said the institute’s executive director, Jameel Jaffer.
A major group that provides legal services to the media – the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press – said it expected Trump’s ban to be struck down quickly by the courts because it was “flatly unconstitutional”.
“The First Amendment is clear that once the White House invites in some journalists, it can’t ban others because it doesn’t like their reporting,” said the group’s president Bruce Brown, calling the potential ban “textbook viewpoint discrimination”.
The Freedom of the Press Foundation also said it was illegal, adding: “It’s also hard to imagine a dumber move”.
Trump “has been retaliating against the press for years, but it hasn’t helped him,” it said, saying “these outrageous attacks only demonstrate how scared he is of an informed public”.
Trump has pursued legal action against a number of US and international news outlets, including The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times and the BBC.
Some of the lawsuits have resulted in media organisations agreeing to pay multimillion dollar settlements. Trump’s lawsuit against the BBC is ongoing.
The fallout from Earl Spencer’s book about Princess Diana leads most papers on Saturday.
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Swedish and German forces are conducting what appears to be the first joint rehearsal of their rapid-reinforcement plans for the Baltic island of Gotland. The exercise is another step in Sweden’s defense planning for an island whose position in the middle of the Baltic gives it an outsized strategic importance for controlling access, protecting the Baltic states, and maintaining NATO’s freedom of movement in a region where Russian military activity remains a persistent concern.
The exercise, Silver Wotan 2026, running between September 14-23, brings together Swedish and German forces across the land, maritime, and air domains. The scenario is built around a Swedish request for allied assistance, with German forces moving personnel and equipment across the Baltic before integrating with Swedish units already defending the island. The operation is testing the entire process of getting allied combat power to Gotland, protecting it during the movement to Visby, and rapidly incorporating it into the island’s existing defensive network.
A video shows troops coming ashore on Swedish CB90 fast assault craft, a type that German soldiers are also trained to operate:
A rapid deployment of German and Swedish forces to Gotland island is being carried out today. Units from 🇸🇪 and 🇩🇪 are rehearsing the swift reinforcement of the strategic island in order to ensure the security of the Baltic Sea.#SilverWotan#NATO pic.twitter.com/A0r3LF8XUP
— Försvarsmakten (@Forsvarsmakten) September 18, 2026
The strategic importance of Gotland has grown considerably following Sweden’s accession to NATO in March 2024, which was a direct response to the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Located approximately halfway between mainland Sweden and the Baltic states, the island occupies a central position in the Baltic Sea, close to the maritime approaches to the Gulf of Finland and within reach of the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. Its location gives forces operating from Gotland a potentially significant position from which to conduct surveillance, air defense, and maritime operations, while also making the island an important part of the wider network connecting NATO’s northern and eastern members.
At the same time, Gotland sits within an extremely complex littoral environment, where shallow waters, islands, narrow maritime approaches, and the proximity of multiple states can make both offensive operations and defensive planning more difficult. The region has also been shaped by longstanding Swedish concerns about Russian clandestine activity, including intelligence gathering and other forms of covert or deniable activity. The complexity of the Baltic operating environment can make such activities harder to detect and attribute, adding another layer of uncertainty alongside the more conventional military challenges facing the region.
Geography has long made Gotland important to Swedish defense planning, but its significance has taken on a broader dimension since Sweden joined the alliance. NATO has described the island as strategically important to its freedom of maneuver in the Baltic, while Swedish officials have highlighted its potential role as a hub for military operations and logistics in the region.
The current exercise is designed around the practical difficulties of reinforcing such a position.
Military equipment is being transported by sea to Visby, Gotland’s principal port, including by commercial ferry. In Visby, Swedish and German personnel are securing the harbor and conducting the reception of the arriving force. Among the equipment being moved are air defense systems, while Swedish forces are also operating coastal defense systems armed with anti-ship missiles.
Meanwhile, publicly available flight-tracking data showed German Luftwaffe transport aircraft, including at least one Airbus A400M airlifter, apparently involved in the effort. The commercial airport at Visby has long also been used for military activities related to Gotland and the wider Baltic region.
The movement is supported by Swedish and German naval forces and other aircraft, creating a scenario in which the maritime transit, protection of the port, air operations, and subsequent movement of troops and equipment ashore all form part of the same military problem. Once ashore, the arriving forces have to be moved into position and integrated with Swedish units already responsible for defending the island.
The Swedish Gotland Regiment, P 18, provides the core of the island’s permanent military presence. The regiment, Sweden’s youngest and smallest, has been rebuilding its capabilities since Sweden began expanding its military presence on Gotland. Its forces form the basis of the ground-defense structure into which allied reinforcements would be incorporated.
Swedish coastal defense capabilities are another important element of the drill. Land-based anti-ship missiles provide the island with a means of threatening hostile surface vessels operating in the surrounding waters, giving the defense of Gotland a direct connection to the wider maritime battle for the Baltic. During Silver Wotan, Swedish and German forces are also conducting anti-surface warfare activities alongside the broader reinforcement operation.
Germany is contributing more than 500 troops to the exercise, part of approximately 2,000 Bundeswehr personnel involved, including elements from the army, navy, and air force. The German Luftwaffe has deployed Panavia Tornado aircraft for surveillance, while German naval forces are participating in the maritime component, and German ground personnel are involved in the reinforcement and security activities on Gotland.
The exercise scenario is particularly relevant against the backdrop of Russia’s continuing military presence in the Baltic region.
Russia maintains major military infrastructure in Kaliningrad, including naval, air, missile, and air defense capabilities, while the Russian Baltic Fleet operates from bases in the region. Kaliningrad’s position between Poland and Lithuania gives Moscow a significant military foothold inside the NATO area, while Russian forces and military infrastructure elsewhere along the Baltic add to the complexity of operating and reinforcing allied territory in the region.
The security environment around the Baltic has also deteriorated considerably since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. NATO has increased its surveillance and military activity in the region, including the launch of Baltic Sentry in January 2025 following a series of incidents involving critical undersea infrastructure. The alliance has subsequently expanded efforts to monitor maritime activity and protect infrastructure and sea lines of communication.
Swedish authorities have stressed that Silver Wotan was planned in advance and is not being conducted in response to a specific imminent Russian threat. The exercise nonetheless reflects the operational environment in which Swedish and NATO planners now have to consider the possibility that maritime and air movements across the Baltic could be monitored, disrupted, or contested.
The exercise also builds on a series of increasingly large Swedish-led activities designed to test the reception of allied forces on Swedish territory. During Aurora 26 earlier this year, more than 18,000 troops from 13 countries participated in operations across Sweden, including the deployment of allied forces to Gotland alongside the Gotland Regiment and Swedish Home Guard. NATO described that activity as an emergency deployment intended to test the reinforcement of the island.
Silver Wotan places a more concentrated emphasis on the Swedish-German relationship and on the movement of an allied force into the island’s existing defensive structure.
Germany’s participation is also consistent with its growing military role in the Baltic and along NATO’s northeastern flank. Berlin is already providing forces for NATO’s forward defense in Lithuania and has increasingly emphasized the ability to move German forces rapidly across northern Europe in support of allied operations.
For Sweden, meanwhile, Gotland has become one of the clearest examples of how NATO membership has changed the country’s defense planning. The island remains a Swedish responsibility, but its location means that what happens there has consequences well beyond Sweden’s territorial defense.
A defended and adequately supplied Gotland provides NATO with a strategically positioned base for surveillance and defensive operations in the Baltic, while the ability to reinforce it demonstrates that the alliance can maintain access to the island even as the surrounding maritime and air environment becomes more contested.
The exercise comes as European allies are being forced to plan for a NATO in which the United States may provide less of the conventional military weight it has supplied for decades. The Pentagon is reviewing the size and posture of U.S. forces in Europe, including the forces and capabilities Washington would make available in a European crisis, while NATO’s top commander has said further U.S. troop withdrawals should be expected as European allies build up their own conventional capabilities.
At the same time, the alliance now describes Russia as its most significant and direct security threat, citing military activity alongside airspace violations, sabotage, cyber operations, and other forms of hybrid pressure. There are also growing concerns that Russia could try something in the Baltics, while it continues to step up its gray-zone activities regardless. NATO officials have warned that Russia could rebuild enough military capacity to pose a more serious conventional challenge to the alliance before the end of the decade.
There are escalating warnings from Poland that Russia is preparing to widen its war against Ukraine, with “accidental” missile and drone strikes on NATO territory.
Such a move – Russia falsely claiming air strikes that hit NATO allies happened by accident – would be designed to…
— Deborah Haynes (@haynesdeborah) September 18, 2026
For Sweden and Germany, the Silver Wotan exercise is a practical test of how quickly European forces can reinforce and defend one of the Baltic’s most strategically important positions. As the security environment grows more contested and Europe prepares for a future in which U.S. forces may not be as readily available, the ability to move allied combat power across the region and integrate it into existing defenses is becoming an increasingly important part of NATO’s deterrence.
Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com
Hundreds of people gathered at the University of Cape Town on Friday at a vigil for victims of femicide in South Africa. Anger is rising across the country as the bodies of nine women have been found near Johannesburg in just two months.
Published On 19 Sep 202619 Sep 2026
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Welcome to Bunker Talk. This is a weekend open discussion post for the best commenting crew on the net, in which we can chat about all the stuff that went on this week that we didn’t cover. We can also talk about the stuff we did or whatever else grabs your interest. In other words, it’s an off-topic thread.
This week’s caption reads:
2nd Lt. Michelle Lee and Capt. William Yau conduct pre-operational checks inside of a Launch Control Center used for training purposes at Minot Air Force base, North Dakota, Mar. 7, 2022. The 91st Missile Wing contributes to the nation’s strategic defense by sustaining and operating various Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles and the associated launch facilities.
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Separate attacks struck central refugee camps as officials warned Gaza’s health sector faces total collapse.
Published On 19 Sep 202619 Sep 2026
An Israeli strike on a motorcycle has killed one Palestinian and injured others, with one child in critical condition, reports the Palestinian Wafa news agency.
The air strike targeted the vehicle in the Sheikh Radwan neighbourhood, west of Gaza City, on Friday. Ongoing Israeli strikes on the besieged enclave have killed at least 1,381 people since the ceasefire was announced in October 2025.
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Israel has killed at least 73,795 people and wounded 174,869 others since the start of its genocidal war in October 2023.
On Friday, the Israeli army also opened fire in the Nuseirat and al-Bureij refugee camps in the central Gaza Strip, reports Wafa. The attacks on tents sheltering displaced people have resulted in multiple injuries.
Earlier this week, an Israeli “double-tap” air strike killed a paramedic and a 15-year-old schoolboy in Gaza City. Israeli forces claimed they were targeting Hamas operatives.
Last month, UNICEF found that, on average, one child is killed a day by Israel.
Families are now confined to about a third of the enclave, sheltering among destroyed buildings, rubble and uncleared waste, the agency said.
On Wednesday, a previously damaged building collapsed in Gaza City, killing at least 21 people, including 12 children. The Palestinian Civil Defence agency in Gaza struggled to recover bodies from under the rubble due to Israel’s severe restrictions on heavy equipment.
The Health Ministry warned on Wednesday that Gaza’s health system was on the verge of “total collapse” as Israel continues to limit the amount of medical aid and fuel permitted to enter the enclave.
While the country was under Spanish rule, a military parade was held whenever a new governor-general took office in Santiago. The First Government Junta’s formal inauguration took place in the city on September 19th 1810, as the first military parade of the new nation.
The National Army of Chile was created on December 2nd 1810, by order of the First National Government Junta.
The Day of the Glories of the Chilean Army was established in 1915. On September 28th 1819, a parade with all the nation’s army units was held to celebrate the victory in the Chilean War of Independence.
President Joaquin Prieto ordered a military exercise on La Pampilla fields in 1831, and President Manuel Bulnes obtained lands in the Pampilla area for annual military parades in 1842, leading to its transformation into a military installation in 1845. This land became O’Higgins Park in 1873 following the efforts of Luis Cousiño, who was inspired by European parks and decided to infuse a similar design with Chilean features. He commissioned Manuel Arana to design it, and Arana included the Field of Mars that has been used in the annual military parades since.
The purpose of this holiday is to remember all those who have fought in Chilean battles, in which the country has been victorious or defeated; the courage and courage of those who protected the country and its inhabitants are remembered.
The Chilean Army is one of the most technologically advanced and professional armies in the Americas.
Note that the Chilean Navy has its own public holiday. The Day of the Glories of the Chilean Navy is observed on May 21st and marks the date of the battle of Iquique on that day in 1879.
The war in Yemen intensifies with mounting clashes and reciprocal attacks between Saudi forces and the Houthis.
Published On 18 Sep 202618 Sep 2026
Yemen’s Houthi rebels have said Saudi Arabia carried out 26 strikes against areas under the group’s control in the past 24 hours, as the two sides continue trading attacks amid an escalating war in Yemen, according to the AFP news agency.
On Friday, the group claimed Saudi strikes on Houthi-held territory had reached 300 over the past week alone, hitting positions across the areas it controls, AFP reported.
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Yemen’s government, backed by Saudi Arabia, said on Friday its forces had killed 30 Houthi rebels and wounded more than 60 in clashes in the al-Wazi’iyah district of Taiz province, one of several fronts where combat has picked up this week.
The exchange has come on the heels of a widening escalation of fighting in Yemen between the government’s military and the Houthi fighters.
Tens of thousands marched through Sanaa on Friday in a show of support for the Iran-backed Houthis and against Saudi Arabia, as the rebels press gains that have brought large stretches of Yemen’s Red Sea coast, including the strategic Bab al-Mandeb Strait, under their control.
Earlier this week, the intensifying attacks between the Yemeni government and the Houthi rebels killed at least five people, including three children, according to reports from both sides.
Saudi Arabia said one person was killed in the Taif governorate after a Houthi drone was intercepted, while Houthi-linked media reported deaths from Saudi strikes in Taiz and the town of Abs.
The escalation has drawn in Washington, though reluctantly.
US officials met Houthi representatives at the US embassy in the Omani capital, Muscat, over the weekend after the group’s rapid territorial gains raised concern over shipping through Bab al-Mandeb, a vital corridor for global trade.
The Houthis reportedly assured Washington that vessels not linked to Saudi Arabia would not be targeted.
Despite appeals from Riyadh for US President Donald Trump to strike the Houthis directly, Washington has so far held back, wary of opening a new front while still fighting a costly war with Iran.
Meanwhile, European Union foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said on Friday the bloc’s Red Sea naval mission, Operation Aspides, had raised its alert level as the situation in the region worsened, the Reuters news agency reported.
“Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia are unacceptable and sabotage the global economy,” Kallas said in a post on X.
She added that she had spoken with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud about diplomatic efforts to end the fighting in Yemen and restore freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.
Keely Hodgkinson powered to victory in a custom-made full-body speed suit before being presented with a Tiffany & Co crown as Athlos made its London debut.
Hodgkinson was greeted by loud cheers as she emerged on to a stage and revealed the all-black aerodynamic outfit at the third staging of the all-female athletics meet.
The 24-year-old ensured she ended a mixed year with a dominant 800m victory in front of a sellout home crowd at StoneX Stadium, bursting clear on the back straight and crossing the line in one minute 56.40 seconds.
Speaking about the outfit, Hodgkinson told BBC Sport: “This has been like a year in the making. It’s a mixture of fashion and speed and science all coming together for maybe the future of athletics.
“It was a real honour for them to choose me to put this out first. We weren’t sure when we were going to wear it.
“But an all-women’s event that’s all about the glitz and the glamour and putting eyes on women, a bit of a moment, I think was the perfect way to finish the season.”
Created by Alexis Ohanian, Reddit co-founder and husband of tennis’ 23-time Grand Slam singles champion Serena Williams, Athlos was staging a meet for the first time outside of New York.
In addition to the silver Tiffany crown awarded to winners instead of medals, a top prize of $65,000 (£48,500) was on offer in each event.
The single-night meet included seven disciplines, each featuring six athletes, with money on offer for each position from a total event prize pot of $1.05m (£790,500).
American sprint stars Gabby Thomas and Sha’Carri Richardson were among the champions amid a party atmosphere which featured a live track-side DJ.
Who: Brighton vs Arsenal
What: English Premier League
Where: Amex Stadium, Brighton in United Kingdom
When: Saturday, September 19, at 3pm (14:00 GMT)
How to follow: Al Jazeera Sport will have all the build-up to our live text commentary stream from 11:00 GMT.
Premier League holders Arsenal head to Brighton on Saturday with a chance to extend their lead at the top of the table to three points.
Second-placed Manchester City, who have also won four from four to start the new English top-flight season, entertain Sunderland on Sunday.
Al Jazeera Sport takes a look at the game, which produced a feisty finale in the clubs’ last meeting.
Mikel Arteta has made peace with Brighton manager Fabian Hurzeler following their row last season as the pair go head-to-head again on Saturday.
Hurzeler criticised Arteta’s style of play during a 1-0 loss to the Gunners at the Amex Stadium in March.
The German said “only one team tried to play football” and accused Arsenal of “making their own rules”.
With the champions heading back to Brighton in the top flight this weekend, the spotlight will be fixed on the touchline to see if the spat lingers.
Hurzeler refused to back down this week when quizzed on his comments from last season.
“I think it’s very important that in football there are opinions,” he said.
“I will definitely always share my opinion if I am asked. But, in the end, I congratulate Arsenal for being deserved champions. They deserved it.”
Speaking on Friday, Arteta insisted there was no bad blood over Hurzeler’s blast.
“That’s all done. That’s all in the past,” the Arsenal manager told reporters.
“I have huge respect for Fabian, and what he’s done and what Brighton has done as a club.
“It’s just remarkable, and tomorrow is going to be a beautiful game to watch, I’m sure.”
Arsenal have made a flying start to their Premier League title defence, with four successive victories taking them to the top of the table.
The north Londoners also won their opening Champions League match against Napoli and booked their place in the League Cup fourth round on Tuesday with a win at Ipswich.
Teenage playmaker Max Dowman starred against Ipswich in his first appearance this season, scoring twice to underline why he is regarded as one of the brightest young talents in the Premier League.
The 16-year-old has made his case for a bigger role in Arteta’s plans after being an unused substitute in the opening weeks.
But when asked if the teenager has been knocking on his door to play, Arteta said: “The best way to knock on the door is to do it on the pitch, not in the office.
“Then you just leave out the arguments. When a player delivers constantly on the pitch, every single day in training, that’s the best way, that’s the best signal for the manager.”
Including the Community Shield against Manchester City, Arsenal have won seven consecutive matches.
Another victory on the south coast would equal the club’s 123-year record for their best start to a campaign.
“We know how complicated it is to win a football match at this level. So, to win seven, it tells a story,” Arteta said.
“After the World Cup, there were a lot of unknowns about how the players and the team were going to react. We didn’t have any time with them to work together.
“But I said from day one, the attitude and what I was seeing, I was really impressed with. Then you have to put it down to performances.”
Arteta is yet to sign a contract extension, with talks ongoing for several months, but the Spaniard is relaxed about the situation.
“I think we are all very much aligned; whenever the time is right, we’ll get that done. There is nothing to be concerned about,” he said.
The Seagulls last beat the Gunners on May 14, 2023, when they won 3-0 at Emirates Stadium in the league.
Julio Enciso, Deniz Undav and Pervis Estupinan scored the goals in the second half.
Opta’s supercomputer has given Arsenal a 57 percent chance of winning, while Brighton have been offered a 29 percent chance.
This will be the 36th meeting between the clubs, with Arsenal winning 20 of the encounters and Brighton emerging victorious on eight of the occasions.
Brighton are expected to revert to the side that beat Coventry in their last Premier League outing.
Jaouen Hadjam sustained a knock in the 3-2 League Cup win against Manchester United on Wednesday.
Femi Azeez, Evan Ferguson, Zadok Yohanna, Mats Wieffer, Jack Hinshelwood (unspecified), Kaoru Mitoma, Yankuba Minteh and Stefanos Tzimas all remain part of a lengthy injury list.
Verbruggen; Kadioglu, Dunk, Vuskovic, Boscagli; Gross, Ayari; Gomez, Yalcouye, De Cuyper; Kostoulas
Jurrien Timber missed the midweek League Cup win against Ipswich Town as a precaution and is set to be available for the trip to Brighton.
Piero Hincapie, Ben White and Cristhian Mosquera are all doubts, however, while William Saliba is still sidelined with a back injury.
Raya; Timber, Konsa, Gabriel, Calafiori; Guimaraes, Rice; Saka, Odegaard, Tzolis; Havertz
Thousands of people cheered as they welcomed Syrian icon Assala Nasri back at a sold-out concert in Damascus. She spent more than 15 years in exile after publicly supporting the 2011 uprising against the government of Bashar al-Assad.
Published On 18 Sep 202618 Sep 2026
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Acclaimed Russian film director who won 2026 Grand Prix award at Cannes, has been critical of the war in Ukraine.
Published On 18 Sep 202618 Sep 2026
The winner of a prestigious Cannes Film Festival award has been declared a foreign agent by Russian authorities for his criticism of Moscow’s war in Ukraine.
Acclaimed Russian film director Andrey Zvyagintsev was designated a “foreign agent” by the Kremlin on Friday, according to state news agency TASS.
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Zvyagintsev won the 2026 Grand Prix at the Cannes Film Festival for, Minotaur, a film depicting a Russian businessman who is forced to decide which of his employees should be mobilised to go and fight in Ukraine.
“Millions of people on both sides of the front line dream of only one thing: for the massacres to stop,” Zvyagintsev said in his acceptance speech, adding that Russian President Vladimir Putin was the only person capable of ending the war.
Moscow has kept casualty numbers from the fighting in Ukraine heavily restricted and has not provided timely or complete public updates, but estimates of Russian soldiers killed in the four-year war range from anywhere from 200,000 to half a million.
Russia’s Ministry of Justice on Friday accused Zvyagintsev of disseminating “false information about decisions taken by the public authorities of the Russian Federation and the policies they pursue”.
“He interacted with foreign agents and resides outside the Russian Federation,” it said.
The 62-year-old director, who has lived outside Russia since the COVID pandemic, is known for a series of other films including, The Return, The Banishment, and, Leviathan, a bleak portrayal of life in rural Russia.
People listed as foreign agents are subjected to onerous bureaucratic requirements and restrictions on their income in Russia.
They are barred from holding public office and forced to register their activities with the authorities.
They also have to add warnings on everything they publish, including on social media, that the content was produced by a foreign agent.
The label adds connotations of espionage to numerous people, including public figures, whom it deems to be engaging in anti-Russian activity with support from abroad.
Previously, writer Boris Akunin and rock musician Boris Grebenshchikov have been labelled as foreign agents by Moscow.