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The video is horrifying, though it is the kind of horror now synonymous with the behavior of Israel, its military, its armed settlers, and society that has been conditioned to see the ‘other’ as subhuman.

Yet, this was not the typical viral video that emerges almost daily from occupied Palestine. The victim, this time, was not a Palestinian. She was an elderly French nun.  

On May 1, footage surfaced from Jerusalem showing a 36-year-old Israeli man running behind a French nun—a researcher at the French School of Biblical and Archaeological Research—and shoving her violently to the ground. 

In a chilling display of cruelty, the assailant did not simply hit and run. He walked away a few paces, then returned to the fallen woman to kick her repeatedly and mercilessly as she lay helpless.  

What was most astonishing was the sense of normalcy that followed. The assailant remained on the scene, conversing with another man who appeared entirely unperturbed by what should have been a devastating event in any other context. 

The video briefly imposed itself on the mainstream media scene, garnering perfunctory condemnations. Many explained the event as part of the larger landscape of Israeli violence, highlighting the ongoing genocide in Gaza as the most obvious example of this unchecked aggression.

But even the context of general violence does not fully explain why a French nun was targeted. She is not dark-skinned, she is European, she is Christian, and she holds no historical or territorial claims that would typically trigger the ‘security’ paranoia of the Zionist state. 

READ: Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem files complaint over Israeli occupiers’ encroachments on church-owned lands in West Bank

Still, the incident was anything but ‘isolated,’ despite the rush by Israeli officials to label it a ‘shameful’ exception. To the contrary, the nun was attacked specifically because she is Christian. 

This raises the question: why? 

To answer this, we must acknowledge how Palestinian Christians have been systematically written out of the history of their own land.  

Palestinian Christians are not merely present in the land; they are among the most historically rooted communities in Palestine. They are anything but ‘foreigners’ or ‘bystanders’ caught in a supposed religious conflict between Jews and Muslims. 

In fact, the Christian Arab presence in Palestine predates the Islamic era by centuries. They are the descendants of historic tribes who shaped the region’s identity long before the advent of modern political labels.  

The marginalization of Palestinian Christians is a relatively new phenomenon, deeply linked to Western colonialism. For centuries, European powers used the pretense of ‘protecting’ Christian communities to justify their own imperial interventions. 

Consequently, this framed the native Christian not as a sovereign Arab with agency, but as a ward of the West—a narrative that effectively stripped them of their indigenous status and alienated them from their own national fabric in the eyes of the world.

Zionism added a lethal layer to this erasure. It has often projected itself as a ‘protector’ of Christians to avoid raising the ire of its Western backers. 

In reality, Palestinian Christians have been subjected to the same policies of ethnic cleansing, racism, and military occupation as their Muslim brothers and sisters. How else can we explain the catastrophic dwindling of the Christian population? 

Before the 1948 Nakba, Palestinian Christians made up roughly 12% of the population. Today, that number has plummeted to a mere 1%. During the Nakba alone, tens of thousands were expelled from their homes in West Jerusalem, Haifa, and Jaffa, their properties looted and their communities dismantled.  

A quick look at the map of Jerusalem and Bethlehem today tells the story of an ongoing erasure. Jerusalem is being systematically emptied of its native population, both Christian and Muslim. Christian properties and houses of worship are restricted, and the ‘Little Town’ of Bethlehem has been swallowed by a ring of illegal settlements and an 8-meter-high Apartheid Wall that has transformed the birthplace of Christ into an open-air prison. 

Yet, despite this, we rarely hear about the struggle for survival of Palestinian Christians. Instead, the world occasionally glimpses ‘incidents’—like the common habit of Jewish extremists spitting on foreign pilgrims and clergy in Jerusalem. This behavior has become so normalized that Israeli ministers, such as Itamar Ben-Gvir, have previously defended the act as an “ancient custom” that should not be criminalized.  

The reason the Palestinian Christian story is rarely told is that it fails to factor neatly into the convenient narratives used by Western governments. They are keen on presenting the ‘conflict’ as a Jewish state fighting for its identity against a monolithic ‘Islamic’ threat. Israel is heavily invested in this same ‘Clash of Civilizations’ trope, positioning itself as the vanguard of “Western civilization” against Arab extremism.

READ: Israeli army demolishes Christian monastery, nuns’ school in southern Lebanon

But some Palestinians—Muslim and Christian alike—are, to a lesser degree, also guilty of falling into this trap. The former often frame the Palestinian resistance as an exclusively Muslim struggle; meanwhile, some Christians participate in the very discourse that led to their marginalization in the first place. 

The Gaza genocide, however, has proven this logic not only erroneous but unsustainable. Throughout the slaughter, Israel has destroyed over 800 mosques, but it has not spared the Christian sanctuaries. 

On October 19, 2023, an Israeli airstrike targeted a building within the compound of the Church of Saint Porphyrius—one of the oldest churches in the world. 

In that massacre, 18 Palestinian Christians were killed, their blood mixing with the dust of a sanctuary that had stood for 1,600 years. It was a devastating reminder that the Israeli missile does not distinguish between a mosque and a church, nor between the blood of a Muslim and a Christian. 

The story of the French nun is worth every bit of the attention it received, as is the targeting of pilgrims. But as the headlines move on, we must remember that Palestinian Christians endure a suffering that is collective and rooted in the very soil of Palestine. They are now an endangered community, and Israel is the culprit. Without them, Palestine is not the same. 

The Palestinian homeland is only whole when it is the cradle of religious coexistence, and Palestinian Christians sit at the very heart of that history, dating back two millennia. Their survival is not a ‘minority issue’—it is the survival of Palestine itself.  

OPINION: Subjects of empire: Breaking the cycle of Arab dependency on US elections

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

Lebanon’s National News Agency reported that Israeli warplanes targeted the Ezzedine residential project in Srifa on Thursday morning.

Israel has ramped up its attacks on southern Lebanon, killing two people and issuing several forced displacement orders as the two sides prepare for United States-brokered talks on extending a ceasefire.

Lebanon’s National News Agency (NNA) reported on Thursday morning that Israeli warplanes targeted the Ezzedine residential project in the town of Srifa, killing two people.

The Israeli army announced in a post on Telegram that it had begun targeting alleged Hezbollah infrastructure sites in several areas in southern Lebanon.

Earlier, the Israeli army’s Arabic language spokesperson, Avichay Adraee, announced on X the forced evacuation orders for the towns and villages of Libbaya, Sahmar, Taffahata, Kafr Malek, Yohmor (Bekaa), Ain Tineh, Houmin al-Fawqa and Mazraat Sina.

NNA reported that one person was injured following a raid by an Israeli drone near the vocational school between the towns of Breqa and Zrarieh.

An air strike was also reported on the town of Ain al-Tineh in the Western Bekaa.

Reporting from Beirut, Al Jazeera’s Rory Challands said in the past few days Israel has launched one of its “most intense periods of aerial bombardment in weeks”.

“There have been many individual strikes – usually by drones – on cars and motorbikes. Several of these have happened on the main coastal highway that leads south from Beirut,” he said.

According to Lebanon’s Ministry of Public Health on Wednesday, at least 2,896 people have been killed in Israeli attacks since the conflict resumed in early March.

At the same time, the Israeli army announced on Telegram that a drone launched by Hezbollah had fallen in Israeli territory near the shared border, injuring several people who were evacuated to hospital for treatment.

Israel-Lebanon talks

Representatives from both sides are expected to meet in Washington, DC, on Thursday for a new round of talks aimed at extending the ceasefire, which is scheduled to expire on Sunday.

“The discussions are controversial here in Lebanon. One of the reasons is that Hezbollah is not at the table. Hezbollah doesn’t want these talks to go ahead at all,” Challands explained.

“It says any direct discussions between Lebanon and Israel are basically capitulation. It wants first a full-on ceasefire, for Israel to have withdrawn from the country, for hundreds of thousands of displaced people to return to their homes, and for reconstruction to have started,” he said, adding that the Lebanese government, however, believes these points can be discussed during the talks with Israel.

President Zelenskyy says rescue operations continue after Russia used ‘more than 1,560 drones’ during its overnight attacks.

Russia launched a barrage of missiles and drones targeting Ukraine’s capital Kyiv, killing at least three people and wounding 40 others, Ukrainian authorities have said.

The Ukrainian military said on Thursday that the overnight strikes hit six districts of Kyiv and another six in the surrounding areas. Deputy Prime Minister Oleksii Kuleba said attacks had targeted ports in the southern Odesa region and railways.

In a post on X, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said rescue operations were continuing following an attack on a nine-storey building in Kyiv after Russia launched “more than 670 attack drones and 56 missiles against Ukraine”.

“In total, since midnight yesterday, Russia has used more than 1,560 drones against our cities and communities. These are definitely not the actions of those who believe the war is coming to an end,” he wrote on Thursday.

“It is important that partners do not remain silent about this strike. And it is equally important to continue supporting the protection of our skies,” Zelenskyy added.

The mayor of Kyiv, Vitali Klitschko, said 40 people were wounded in the attacks, including two children, while Ukrainian emergency services said three people had been killed.

Reporting from Kyiv, Al Jazeera’s Audrey Macalpine said people are still feared trapped under the rubble of the building.

Macalpine said it was one of Russia’s largest attacks of the war, “in a single 36-hour period just by sheer number of drones”.

The attack comes as a setback for efforts to end the war after United States President Donald Trump raised faint hopes for peace by brokering a three-day ceasefire between Kyiv and Moscow last week, and Russian leader Vladimir Putin suggested the war could be winding down.

The truce – put in place as Putin presided over a scaled-down military parade in Red Square to mark the anniversary of World War II victory – was marred by allegations of violations by both sides.

Ukraine and Russia launched long-range drone attacks immediately after it ended on Tuesday.

The Kremlin has poured cold water on the idea that Putin’s vague comments, issued Saturday, about the war “heading to an end” could mean a softening in Moscow’s position.

On Wednesday, it repeated its demand that Ukraine fully withdraw from the eastern Donbas region before a ceasefire and full-scale peace talks can take place.

Kyiv has rejected such a move as tantamount to capitulation.

The next global food crisis is unfolding in a narrow stretch of water.

The United Nations warns that if fertilisers cannot pass through the Strait of Hormuz within just a few weeks, the world could face mass starvation.

It says the consequences could be severe if shipping disruptions linked to the Iran conflict drag on.

Food prices are already at a three-year high, while fertiliser costs critical for agriculture have rocketed.

Aid agencies fear a prolonged disruption could push tens of millions more people into hunger.

For vulnerable economies already struggling with debt and high import costs, the risks are growing fast.

The latest developments surrounding Nvidia’s H200 chip sales to China highlight the growing complexity of the technological rivalry between the United States and China. Although Washington has reportedly approved several major Chinese firms to purchase Nvidia’s advanced artificial intelligence chips, no deliveries have taken place so far.

The situation reflects how geopolitical competition is increasingly disrupting even officially approved commercial agreements in the semiconductor sector.

Nvidia, the world’s leading artificial intelligence chip manufacturer, now finds itself caught between United States export control policies and China’s push for technological self reliance.

What Is the H200 Chip?

The H200 is Nvidia’s second most powerful artificial intelligence chip and is designed for advanced AI model training and data center operations.

The chip is particularly valuable for companies developing large language models, cloud computing systems, and next generation AI applications.

Before export restrictions tightened, Nvidia dominated China’s advanced AI chip market with an estimated market share of around 95 percent.

China also represented a major source of revenue for Nvidia, making access to the Chinese market strategically important for the company’s long term growth.

Which Chinese Companies Were Approved?

According to reports, the United States Commerce Department approved around ten Chinese firms to purchase H200 chips.

These reportedly include major Chinese technology companies such as:

• Alibaba
• Tencent
• ByteDance
• JD.com

Several distributors were also reportedly approved, including:

Under the licensing terms, each approved customer could reportedly purchase up to 75,000 chips.

However, despite these approvals, no actual sales or deliveries have yet been completed.

Why Have the Sales Stalled?

The delays appear to stem from concerns on both the United States and Chinese sides.

Chinese Concerns

Chinese authorities reportedly fear that reliance on Nvidia chips could undermine Beijing’s efforts to strengthen its domestic semiconductor industry.

China has invested heavily in local AI chip development, particularly through companies such as Huawei.

Beijing increasingly sees semiconductor self sufficiency as a national security priority amid escalating technological competition with Washington.

There are also concerns within China regarding supply chain security and possible vulnerabilities linked to imported American technology.

Recent Chinese regulations aimed at reducing foreign dependence in critical technology sectors have reportedly intensified scrutiny of these chip purchases.

United States Restrictions

The United States has simultaneously imposed strict export control requirements on advanced semiconductor sales to China.

Chinese buyers must reportedly prove that the chips will not be used for military purposes and that adequate security procedures are in place.

Nvidia must also satisfy inventory and compliance conditions under American export laws.

Additionally, reports suggest the Trump administration negotiated an unusual arrangement in which the United States would receive a portion of revenue generated from the chip sales. This reportedly requires the chips to pass through American territory before shipment to China.

Such conditions have further complicated the transaction process.

Jensen Huang’s Diplomatic Push

Nvidia Chief Executive Officer Jensen Huang has emerged as a key figure in efforts to preserve Nvidia’s access to the Chinese market.

Huang reportedly joined President Donald Trump during a diplomatic visit linked to talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping.

His participation underscores the economic significance of the semiconductor dispute and the importance of China to Nvidia’s business strategy.

Huang has repeatedly warned that export controls risk permanently weakening Nvidia’s position in China while encouraging Chinese firms to accelerate domestic alternatives.

The Larger Strategic Battle

The Nvidia dispute reflects a broader struggle between the United States and China over technological dominance in artificial intelligence.

Washington increasingly views advanced semiconductor technology as a strategic national security asset. American policymakers fear that unrestricted access to advanced AI chips could strengthen China’s military and technological capabilities.

China, meanwhile, sees semiconductor independence as essential to reducing vulnerability to foreign pressure and sanctions.

As a result, both sides are attempting to balance economic interests with long term strategic competition.

Implications for the Global AI Industry

The uncertainty surrounding Nvidia’s China business could have major implications for the global artificial intelligence industry.

If Chinese companies lose access to Nvidia chips, they may accelerate investment in domestic alternatives, potentially reshaping the global semiconductor market over time.

At the same time, restrictions on AI chip trade risk fragmenting the global technology ecosystem into competing American and Chinese spheres.

This could reduce international collaboration, disrupt supply chains, and intensify geopolitical competition over emerging technologies.

Future Outlook

Despite current delays, neither the United States nor China appears willing to completely sever technological and commercial ties.

However, the Nvidia case demonstrates that semiconductor trade between the two powers is becoming increasingly politicized and strategically sensitive.

The future of AI competition may ultimately depend not only on innovation, but also on which country can build the most resilient and independent technology ecosystem.

For Nvidia, maintaining its position between the world’s two largest economies will likely remain one of its greatest strategic challenges.

Conclusion

The stalled Nvidia H200 deal illustrates how deeply geopolitical tensions now shape the global technology industry.

Although the United States has approved limited chip exports to China, political distrust, national security concerns, and strategic competition continue to obstruct implementation.

As artificial intelligence becomes central to economic and military power, semiconductor trade is no longer simply a commercial issue. It has become a defining arena in the broader contest between Washington and Beijing for technological leadership in the twenty first century.

With information from Reuters,

The imposition of Venezuelan state sovereignty over the oil industry was one of the pillars of the Bolivarian Revolution from the get-go.

This edition of Tatuy Tv’s “Chávez the Radical” compiles several speeches by Comandante Chávez where he discusses the multiple policies that had subordinated the Venezuelan oil industry to transnational corporate interests and their nefarious consequences.

Issues like state ownership, royalties, taxes, and international arbitration are as relevant as ever today as the country undergoes major pro-business reforms in the oil sector.

Source: Tatuy Tv

Russia attacked the Ukrainian capital Kyiv with drones and missiles early on Thursday, officials said, damaging several buildings, including one which partially collapsed with residents likely trapped under rubble.

Chinese President Xi Jinping is welcoming US President Donald Trump to Beijing for high-level talks. Tariffs, competition over tech, the US-Israeli war on Iran, and Taiwan are all on the agenda for the two-day visit.

Students from Venezuela’s leading universities blocked the main highway in Caracas to demand the immediate release of political prisoners. Demonstrators said more than 450 people remain imprisoned despite government promises of amnesty and reconciliation.

The world today is no longer witnessing isolated geopolitical crises. From Ukraine and West Asia to Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific, almost every major flashpoint bears the imprint of an expanding strategic contest between the United States and China. The emerging order increasingly resembles a “Cold War 2.0” — though very different in structure, methods and consequences from the US-Soviet rivalry of the 20th century.

Unlike the earlier Cold War1.0, the present contest is not defined by ideological blocs alone. The US and China remain deeply intertwined economically, technologically and financially even as they posture against each other militarily, diplomatically and strategically. It is therefore a paradoxical competition: adversarial coexistence under conditions of mutual dependence.

The forthcoming summit between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing assumes significance far beyond bilateral optics. It is not merely about tariffs or trade balances. It is about whether the world’s two largest powers can manage competition without pushing the international system into prolonged instability.

Cold War 2.0: Similarities and Differences

There are unmistakable similarities between the old Cold War and the current strategic rivalry. Technology races, military posturing, proxy theatres, sanctions, espionage, supply-chain wars and ideological narratives are again shaping global politics. Taiwan today resembles what Berlin once symbolised during the original Cold War — a potential trigger point with global implications.

Yet the differences are even more important.

The US and Soviet Union operated largely in separate economic ecosystems. In contrast, America and China remain deeply integrated through trade, manufacturing, investment flows and technological supply chains. As a result, Cold War 2.0 is less about total decoupling and more about selective disengagement, strategic denial, and competitive coexistence. China’s rise has also changed the nature of power transition; unlike the Soviet Union, China is economically embedded within the global capitalist system while simultaneously challenging Western strategic dominance. Beijing does not seek immediate overthrow of the international order; rather, it seeks gradual restructuring of global institutions and norms to reflect Chinese power and preferences.

Because of this interdependence, direct conflict is expensive for both parties. As a result, selective disengagement, strategic denial, and competitive coexistence are more important in Cold War 2.0 than total decoupling.

The nature of power transitions has also changed as a result of China’s growth. China, in contrast to the Soviet Union, both challenges Western geopolitical dominance and is economically integrated into the global capitalist system. Beijing aims to gradually restructure international institutions and norms to reflect Chinese strength and preferences rather than topple the current international order.

Trump’s Return: Strategic Pressure with Transactional Flexibility

President Trump’s return has introduced a more personalised and transactional dimension to US-China relations. His approach combines aggressive economic nationalism with pragmatic deal-making. Trump views geopolitics substantially through the prism of economic leverage, tariffs, industrial revival and negotiated advantage.

During his earlier tenure, Trump launched the trade war against China, challenged Chinese technological expansion and questioned assumptions of unlimited globalisation. In his second term his tariff rhetoric and coercive stance seems tampering down by Beijing’s stiff retaliation and domestic vows through courts; hence appears focused on “managed competition” rather than ideological confrontation.

Current indications suggest that Trump seeks three broad objectives from Beijing:

• Reduction of trade imbalances and greater market access for American companies.
• Chinese restraint regarding Iran, fentanyl precursors and strategic technology transfers.
• Taiwan and Indo-Pacific tensions should be relatively stable to prevent unchecked escalation. At the same time, Trump appears willing to negotiate tactical understandings with Beijing if they produce visible economic or political gains domestically.

This reflects an important distinction between traditional American strategic establishments and Trump’s worldview. Washington’s institutional security establishment and deep state often sees China as a long-term systemic challenger. Trump, however, also sees Beijing through the lens of bargaining opportunity. This creates unpredictability both for allies and adversaries.

Xi Jinping’s China: Strategic Patience and Controlled Assertiveness

If Trump represents transactional nationalism, Xi Jinping represents centralised strategic continuity with greater diplomatic maturity.

Beijing’s military modernisation, naval expansion, technological aspirations, and Belt and Road outreach reflect a long-term strategy aimed at reducing dependence on the West while enhancing China’s centrality in global affairs. Under Xi’s leadership, China has evolved from a cautious economic power into an increasingly assertive geopolitical actor. Beijing’s long-term objective to lessen reliance on the West and increase China’s influence in world affairs is reflected in its military modernisation, navy expansion, technological aspirations, and Belt and Road outreach.

Xi’s leadership style is marked by centralised authority, ideological discipline and strategic patience. Unlike the short electoral cycles of Western democracies, China’s leadership can pursue long-duration geopolitical objectives with consistency.

Beijing today appears more confident than during Trump’s first presidency. Despite economic headwinds, demographic pressures and property-sector challenges, China has strengthened domestic technological capabilities and diversified export networks.

China’s approach to global dominance differs fundamentally from America’s traditional model.

The United States historically exercised leadership through alliances, military presence, financial systems and institutional influence. Its dominance relied substantially on coalition-building and normative legitimacy, an approach, which seems to be eroding under President Trump, America First/America only agenda.

China’s model is more infrastructure-centric, economically transactional and state-driven. Beijing prefers influence through trade dependency, technology ecosystems, strategic investments and manufacturing centrality. It avoids formal alliances but expands leverage through economic penetration and calibrated coercion.

In essence, Washington exports political influence backed by military power to dislodge all potential competitors; Beijing exports economic dependency backed by state capacity aims at not dislodging potential markets to include U.S., EU and India.

The Taiwan Factor and Indo-Pacific Competition

No issue captures Cold War 2.0 more sharply than Taiwan.

For China, Taiwan remains a core sovereignty issue tied to national rejuvenation. For the United States, Taiwan represents strategic credibility, Island chain dominance in the Indo-Pacific and the larger balance of power against China.

Neither side currently appears to seek direct military confrontation. Yet both are steadily preparing for prolonged strategic competition around Taiwan. China continues military signalling and grey-zone pressure, while the US strengthens Indo-Pacific partnerships and defence arrangements.

Trump’s Beijing visit is therefore expected to prioritise “stability management” rather than dispute resolution. Beijing seeks assurances against perceived American encouragement of Taiwanese independence and military capacity building, while Washington seeks deterrence against coercive reunification efforts.

With recent claims of President Trump on Greenland, Canada, and Panama and actions in Venezuela, he doesn’t have any moral leverage to lecture China on Taiwan, because his security concerns over these areas are woefully short of Chinese security concerns of Island chains. Thus the reality of Cold War 2.0 is more of escalation management more than genuine reconciliation, as competition remains.

The Real Issue: Supply Chains and Technology Agendas

Artificial intelligence, semiconductors, rare earths, cyber systems, quantum technologies and critical supply chains have become strategic weapons. Economic security is increasingly inseparable from national security.

America still leads in advanced innovation ecosystems, financial influence and military alliances. China dominates large parts of manufacturing, industrial supply chains and infrastructure scalability.

The contest is therefore asymmetric. Washington seeks to slow China’s technological ascent through export controls and alliance-based restrictions. Beijing seeks self-reliance through indigenous innovation and strategic diversification.

Simultaneously, both nations are competing to shape global narratives.

The US projects democratic resilience and rules-based order. China projects efficiency, development delivery and non-interference. Many countries in the Global South increasingly engage both sides pragmatically rather than ideologically.

US-Israel War on Iran: Uneasy Calm Amid Strategic Contestation

China and the United States both need  regional stability in Middle East to avoid economic shockwaves and disruption of global energy flows, but their strategic intentions are quite apart. Trump led America’s action plan, duly influenced by Israeli lobby includes military action, coercive deterrence, and the retaining American strategic dominance in West Asia, especially Petro-dollar domination. China, on the other hand, is attempting calibrated balance, openly supporting de-escalation while covertly defending its long-term geopolitical, economic, and energy links with Tehran.

Beijing will refrain from any overt alignment that could lead to direct conflict with Washington, but it is unlikely to desert Iran. China seems confident that it can endure supply chain crisis in Strait of Hormuz longer than Trump and Iran. In any case a over-engaged US with depleted reserves works towards Chinese strategic advantage.

The larger strategic picture shows for Beijing, the crisis offers an opportunity to project itself as a responsible stabilising power while gradually expanding influence through economic leverage and diplomatic positioning; as a result, the likely outcome is not cooperation in the classical sense, but competitive crisis management—limited convergence to avoid uncontrolled escalation, while China advances through strategic patience, economic penetration, and calibrated diplomacy. Demonstrating credibility and deterrence to adversaries, such as China, is another goal for Washington in the Iran theatre.

Thus, Iran becomes yet another arena in which China gains through strategic patience, economic penetration, and calibrated diplomacy, while the US primarily depends on military power and a weakening alliance structures.

Likely Outcomes of the Trump–Xi Engagement: Competitive Coexistence, Not Resolution

Expectations from the Trump–Xi engagement must remain realistic and free from rhetorical overstatement. The structural contradictions driving US–China rivalry — Taiwan, technological dominance, supply chain control, military competition, sanctions regimes and competing visions of global order — are too deep to be resolved through summit diplomacy alone. At best, both sides may seek temporary stabilisation of tensions to avoid simultaneous economic disruption and strategic overstretch. Therefore, the likely outcome is not reconciliation, but managed confrontation under conditions of deep interdependence.

Trump’s pressure tactics may slow certain aspects of China’s technological rise and compel tactical adjustments, but they are unlikely to reverse Beijing’s long-term strategic trajectory or ambition for greater influence in global governance structures.

Equally, China is not positioned to replace the United States as a singular global hegemon, as yet. Internal economic pressures, demographic decline, debt vulnerabilities, trust deficits and the absence of robust alliance structures remain important constraints on Chinese power projection.

Consequently, the more plausible scenario is a prolonged strategic contest marked by partial economic bifurcation in critical technologies, competing digital and AI ecosystems, intensified military signalling in the Indo-Pacific, and expanded geopolitical competition across the Global South through infrastructure financing, trade dependency, arms transfers and narrative warfare.

Emerging World Order: What should remaining World Do?

Cold War 2.0 will not produce a neat bipolar world nor purely multipolar. Unlike the 20th century, today’s international system is multipolar, economically interconnected and technologically diffused. Middle powers such as India, regional blocs and strategic swing states will play increasingly important roles in shaping outcomes through strategic balancing avoiding bloc politics. The aim remains to avoid collateral damage in a competition, which neither U.S. nor China can decisively win in the foreseeable future.

The prudent course lies in strategic autonomy backed by economic resilience, technological self-reliance, diversified partnerships and flexible diplomacy. Nations will increasingly pursue sector-specific alignments while resisting pressure to become instruments of either camp’s maximalist strategic narratives.

In this evolving landscape, Trump’s coercive unilateralism and “America First” orientation may paradoxically accelerate the very multipolarity Washington seeks to resist. Many nations, including close American partners, increasingly seek strategic hedging against unpredictability in US policy, even while remaining cautious of China’s expanding influence and coercive economic practices

Cold War 2.0 is unlikely to end through a dramatic collapse or military victory. It will instead remain a long geopolitical test of endurance, adaptability, economic resilience and strategic patience in an era of competitive coexistence, issue based cooperation and crisis management below the threshold of military confrontation.

Trump’s leadership may make the contest louder, sharper and more transactional, while Xi’s China may continue pursuing calibrated expansion with long-term strategic discipline. Yet the underlying structural reality remains unchanged: the US–China rivalry is here to stay, and the rest of the world must learn to navigate carefully between pressure and prudence, rhetoric and reality, competition and coexistence.

The U.S. Air Force has confirmed it has come up with a new set of requirements as it continues to look for a successor to its hard-working MQ-9 Reaper fleet. In contrast to the Reaper, the replacement aircraft is likely to be more flexible in terms of mission spectrum. At the same time, the service wants to use new manufacturing technologies to ensure that it can be built at scale and at a lower price point than the MQ-9. This would allow it to be bought in larger numbers and risked more freely in contested environments.

All this reflects the continued high utility placed on the MQ-9 fleet, as well as its considerable loss rates sustained against mid-tier and lower-tier adversaries. It also points away from filling the MQ-9’s role with a far more exquisite, costly, but more survivable asset, which seemed to have been the direction the Air Force was heading, at least in part, for many years now. With this in mind, this new direction appears to accept that many losses will occur in future combat scenarios and embraces that reality to leverage quantity over quality for whatever eventually takes over from the MQ-9.

Testifying before a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing yesterday, Maj. Gen. Christopher Niemi, the acting head of Air Force Futures, said that a new requirements document for an MQ-9 replacement had been approved. Aviation Week was first to report the development.

The approval clears the path for the Air Force to begin a new acquisition process for an uncrewed aircraft system (UAS) that will assume the MQ-9’s role. A medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) system, the Reaper is primarily used for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and strike missions.

Niemi told the Senate Armed Services Committee that improvements in technology since the MQ-9 was developed mean the service now considers it possible for a new drone to be “more flexible,” leaning upon open architectures.

At the same time, modern production methods mean the new drone will be easier and cheaper to produce “in mass numbers,” Niemi said. The result should be a drone that the Air Force can “use in a more attritable way.”

Interestingly, within the Air Force, there has in recent years been a shift away from the term attritable — meaning inexpensive enough to be willing to lose on high-risk missions while being capable enough to be relevant for those missions — to “affordable mass.” This is something TWZ previously highlighted was already happening back in 2021.

This change came about as a way of helping define the kinds of advanced drones that the Air Force is planning to acquire in the coming years, reflecting that their capabilities will necessarily come at a cost that will make them less than “attritable.”

Last month, the Air Force published a market survey notice, requesting information from industry on a new attritable ISR drone.

This notice included some key performance parameters for the drone, including a range of up to 932 miles and a 20-hour endurance. The attritable nature of the drone was reflected in a requirement for it to fly 100 missions with a “low-to-medium acquisition” cost.

The basic Reaper can fly for more than 20 hours unarmed, or more than 12 hours with weapons. In the case of the MQ-9B version, with an extended wingspan, flight endurance can be increased to more than 40 hours.

“Operators desire low-cost, fast-to-field, fast-to-deploy airborne ISR mass to increase mission flexibility and mission surging,” the market survey notice added.

The process of figuring out what to replace the Reaper with has been ongoing for many years now. However, the latest effort is noteworthy for its emphasis on a lower-cost, more attritable platform.

Back in 2020, the Air Force published a request for information for a program dubbed MQ-Next, also seeking an MQ-9 successor. This was focused on ISR and strike capabilities, but also stated a desire for reduced operating costs and greater persistence, survivability, and range.

By 2021, the Air Force was concentrating more on a family of systems — the so-called Next-Generation Multi-Role Unmanned Aerial System Family of Systems (Next-Gen Multi-Role UAS FoS) — including a growing emphasis on low-observable (stealth) technologies. The same year, the service said it was seeking a replacement for the MQ-9 that could possibly include defensive counter-air capabilities to protect high-value manned aircraft, such as tankers, as well as potentially fly red air aggressor missions. Fast forward to today, and it’s clear that these higher-performance air-to-air focused missions could be taken over, at least in part, by the current Collaborative Combat Aircraft program. As a result, whatever replaces the MQ-9 is unlikely to have such broad requirements.

The Next-Gen Multi-Role UAS FoS included scope for platforms that could be survivable and reusable, or ones that would be attritable or expendable. This was not a single platform solution, either. It would likely need to include a mix of systems.

The 2021 document also stipulated that the MQ-9’s successor should be tailored for Great Power Competition, pointing to a drone ecosystem suitable for the kinds of highly contested environments that would be encountered during a conflict with a peer rival such as China or Russia. At the same time, the solution was also intended to fly missions in more permissive environments, like the MQ-9.

Around this same time, the Air Force also said it wanted to leverage advances in development and manufacturing, meaning that smaller numbers of manned aircraft could be produced quickly to meet dynamically evolving threats. This reflected the Air Force’s “Digital Century Series” that was in vogue at that time, and which led to talk about “throwaway” technology and essentially “disposable” aircraft. Some of this appears to have made it into these new requirements, which stipulate that the aircraft needs to be able to fly just 100 missions.

Meanwhile, the latest statements from the service describe a drone with increased flexibility achieved through open architecture, rather than building bespoke batches of drones for particular requirements. Previous statements from the service outlined an aspiration to have its new drone capable of accommodating rapidly reconfigurable payloads, something that open architecture would expedite.

Above all else, the MQ-9 successor will still have to operate in contested environments.

In his testimony yesterday, Niemi presented a vision of a new drone, the design of which would stress being attritable, rather than survivable.

The Pentagon has long worked on the basis that a future conflict with a peer rival, and especially with China in the Pacific, would see it facing highly robust anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) scenarios. With that in mind, previous Reaper replacement studies had suggested that low observability would need to be incorporated into the design.

The latest thinking seems to reject that, or at least reorient the program toward a lower-cost platform of the kind that the Air Force would be able to field in mass, as well as to absorb the anticipated attrition in a high-end conflict. This does not preclude this airframe from featuring low-observable elements. In fact, it most likely will. But those would be more aggressively balanced against cost.

Concerns over the MQ-9’s vulnerability to air defenses have been ongoing for years now, although usually the nuances of this issue are not portrayed accurately in the media. Regardless, many MQ-9s were lost over Yemen, against a bottom-tier force. The war with Iran earlier this year underlined both the great utility and vulnerabilities of the platform. At least 24 Air Force Reapers were destroyed during the war, but these aircraft were pushed deep into Iran, loitered there for hours on end, and did some of the most important air-to-ground strike and surveillance work during the air campaign. While the Air Force says it plans to “buy back” some of the losses from that conflict, that will come with a hefty price tag, something that the service will want to avoid with its next ISR/strike drone. Furthermore, production of the MQ-9A model has now ended in favor of the MQ-9B.

The assumption that the MQ-9 replacement will be acquired in significant numbers is also noteworthy in terms of the current Air Force Reaper fleet, which includes more than 130 MQ-9As, according to Aviation Week.

What appears to be missing at this stage, or at least obscured, is an acquisition strategy for the new drones. As well as the aerial platforms, the MQ-9 successor will require suitable new ground control systems, sensors, and data exploitation technologies, all of which are compatible with open-architecture standards. These systems will also have to leverage the latest technologies to allow the drones to be more effective and more survivable over the battlefield.

Since MQ-Next, the U.S. drone landscape has changed considerably in terms of manufacturers. A few years ago, Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, and General Atomics would have been seen as the front-runners for the MQ-9 replacement. Now, there are more contenders, often with a founding focus on rapidly scaling up production at low cost. Still, these firms have much to prove, especially considering the risk in replacing an aircraft as important as the MQ-9. At the same time, in the more advanced drone space, the legacy defense “prime” contractors are also making major progress in leveraging new technologies to reduce production costs and migrating away from exquisite, very expensive drones as their default offerings.

Back in 2021, the Air Force was promoting a “Speed to Ramp” initiative for its MQ-Next, which would see the first iterations of this capability fielded before “the 2026/2027 timeframe.” Other solutions under the same effort would begin to be fielded “in the 2030 timeframe,” the Air Force said.

While the latter timeline might still be somewhat achievable, it will require a considerable effort and investment and, not least, the firming up of the requirements for exactly what the Air Force wants its MQ-9 replacement to look like.

What we do know is that, while the Reaper’s replacement might not be as survivable as once envisioned, it will certainly be tailored to the increasingly harsh realities of a conflict against an advanced peer-state adversary. 

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Amid an oil blockade against the island, the US blames Cuba’s communist leadership for ‘standing in the way’ of aid.

The United States has offered $100m in humanitarian assistance to Cuba on the condition that the island’s communist government agrees to “meaningful reforms”.

The sum was made public in a statement from the US State Department on Wednesday, though the administration of President Donald Trump underscored it had made the offer privately in the past.

But the $100m comes with strings: namely, that Cuba’s government commits to Trump-approved changes.

“Today, the Department of State is publicly restating the United States’ generous offer to provide an additional $100 million in direct humanitarian assistance to the Cuban people,” the statement said.

“The decision rests with the Cuban regime to accept our offer of assistance or deny critical living-saving aid and ultimately be accountable to the Cuban people for standing in the way of critical assistance.”

The statement marks the latest chapter in an ongoing pressure campaign designed to destabilise Cuba’s communist leadership.

Since Cold War tensions in the 1960s, the US has placed a comprehensive trade embargo on the Caribbean island, in part as a reaction to the Cuban Revolution.

It has become the longest-running trade embargo in modern history, and the US has justified its continuation by pointing to systematic repression under Cuba’s communist government.

But critics have denounced the trade embargo as worsening humanitarian conditions on the island.

The crisis reached a tipping point in January, after Trump abducted Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, a close ally of Cuba.

In the following weeks, Trump cut off Venezuelan funds and oil supplies to Cuba. He then threatened economic penalties against any country that supplied Cuba with fuel, implementing a de facto oil blockade on the island.

Since then, only one Russian oil tanker has reached Cuba in late March. That month alone, the island suffered two island-wide blackouts.

Cuba relies heavily on foreign imports of oil to power its ageing energy grid. Only 40 percent of its oil supply is produced domestically, according to the International Energy Agency.

The United Nations warned earlier this year that Cuba faces the possibility of humanitarian “collapse”, with public transportation grinding to a halt, food prices soaring and public services like hospitals struggling to keep the lights on.

Trump, meanwhile, has repeatedly threatened to shift his focus to Cuba after the US-Israeli war on Iran ends, saying the island is “next” on his list of countries where he would like to see regime change.

“As we achieve a historic transformation in Venezuela, we’re also looking forward to the great change that will soon be coming to Cuba,” Trump told Latin American leaders at a summit in March.

“Cuba’s in its last moments of life as it was. It’ll have a great new life, but it’s in its last moments of life the way it is.”

Earlier this month, the US president issued a fresh wave of sanctions against the Cuban government, accusing the island of posing “an unusual and extraordinary threat to US national security and foreign policy”.

Media reports have also indicated that the Trump administration has stepped up its surveillance flights around Cuba, possibly in preparation for a surge of military assets to the Caribbean.

In Wednesday’s statement, the State Department blamed the communist system for having “only served to enrich the elites and condemn the Cuban people to poverty”.

It did not mention the US role in the humanitarian crisis on the island but instead described Cuba’s government as a hurdle to delivering much-needed aid.

“The regime refuses to allow the United States to provide this assistance to the Cuban people, who are in desperate need of assistance due to the failures of Cuba’s corrupt regime,” the State Department wrote.

It added that, should Cuba accept its terms, the $100m would be distributed through the Catholic Church and “other reliable independent humanitarian organizations”, rather than through the island’s government.

The US state of Louisiana will hold several primary elections on Thursday, including for the United States Senate, the state’s Supreme Court, and a slate of local offices.

Notably absent will be the primary, in which members of the Democratic and Republican parties will select their candidates for the state’s six US House districts ahead of the general elections in November.

The primary vote has been paused by the state’s governor following a major Supreme Court ruling that opens the door to redrawing the state’s congressional district map, eliminating one of two majority-Black districts.

Rights groups have challenged the pause, saying it violates both the US and the state’s constitutions.

The situation comes amid a wider national redistricting battle, which has been shifting both parties’ electoral calculus ahead of consequential midterms that will determine control of the US House and Senate and, in turn, set the tone for the final two years of US President Donald Trump’s second term.

Here’s what to know.

What did the Supreme Court ruling do?

The 6-3 Supreme Court ruling in late April undid a key provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 meant to protect Black voting power from being diluted.

That can be achieved by effectively carving up areas with large Black populations to diminish their electoral influence. Black voters in the US have historically heavily skewed Democratic.

The ruling said that congressional districts could only be challenged if there was evidence of racist motivation behind how they were drawn. Dissenting liberal justices and critics have said such motivations would be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to prove.

Specifically related to Louisiana, the court ruled that a congressional map drawn in January of 2024, which created a second Black-majority district in the state, was unconstitutional.

That map was created following a legal challenge claiming that Louisiana was in violation of the Voting Rights Act because it had only one Black majority district out of six, despite Black residents making up one-third of the state’s voters.

Why did Louisiana pause its primary?

The Supreme Court ruling on April 29 came about two weeks before Louisiana’s US House primary elections were scheduled.

That left Republicans in the state scrambling to draw new maps ahead of the vote.

“Allowing elections to proceed under an unconstitutional map would undermine the integrity of our system and violate the rights of our voters,” the state’s Governor Jeff Landry said in a statement on April 30.

He said his order suspending the vote “ensures we uphold the rule of law while giving the [state] legislature the time it needs to pass a fair and lawful congressional map”.

On Wednesday, Republicans in the Louisiana State Senate advanced an initial redrawn map.

What have rights groups said?

A coalition of voting and civil rights groups has challenged the suspension of the election, charging that some segments of voters, including those in the military or casting “absentee” ballots, may have already voted.

They further said the abrupt change in date would confuse and subsequently disenfranchise voters while undermining voter education groups already distributing information about the election.

“This illegal executive order threatens the integrity of our democratic system and disregards the voices of voters who have already participated in the May primary election in good faith,” the groups, which included the Legal Defense Fund, the League of Women Voters of Louisiana, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the Harvard Law School Race and Law Clinic, said in a joint statement in early May.

“By attempting to suspend an ongoing election, state officials are creating confusion, undermining public trust, and placing partisan interests above the constitutional rights of Louisiana voters,” the statement said.

What is the wider context?

The standoff in the southern state comes amid a wider, and unorthodox, flurry of congressional redistricting in the US.

While redistricting has historically taken place every decade following the US census population count, President Trump called on Republicans in Texas last year to redraw their maps to create more Republican-leaning districts.

That kicked off a flurry of tit-for-tat redistricting efforts by Democratic- and Republican-controlled state legislatures alike. To date, the US states of California, Missouri, Ohio, Virginia, Utah, Tennessee and Florida have redrawn their maps ahead of the midterms.

Republicans are expected to net more seats than Democrats in the push. While that is expected to cut into the margin, Democrats are still tentatively favoured to retake the US House in November.

Five nations are boycotting Eurovision, citing Israel’s participation. Their action is against Israel’s war in Gaza and allegations of vote manipulation in the song contest.

But why is it so important for Israel to take part? And is the competition’s future under threat?

Presenter: Folly Bah Thibault

Guests:

Steve Wall – Musician, actor and member of the Ireland Palestine Solidarity Campaign

Jonathan Hendrickx – Assistant professor in media studies at the University of Copenhagen

Ori Goldberg – Political commentator

A Republican senator who broke from his party to vote in favour of convicting US President Donald Trump in impeachment proceedings during his first term is facing a bruising primary challenge in his home state of Louisiana.

Bill Cassidy’s primary race on Thursday has been seen as a barometer of Trump’s continued hold over the Republican Party. Even as polls have shown the president’s approval tanking, early primary votes have shown the continued weight his endorsement carries.

Trump has backed US Representative Julia Letlow in the Senate race. State Treasurer John Fleming is also running. The winner of the Republican primary is all-but-assured to win in the general election in the deep-red state.

Cassidy had joined seven Republicans in the Senate in voting to convict Trump of “incitement of insurrection”, following his campaign to overturn the 2020 election results and his supporters’ storming of the US Capitol on January 6, 2021.

“Our Constitution and our country is more important than any one person. I voted to convict President Trump because he is guilty,” Cassidy said in a statement at the time.

Despite the handful of Republican defections, the chamber fell far short of the two-thirds majority needed to convict Trump of the charges, of which he was acquitted.

Initially viewed as politically toxic after leaving office in 2021, Trump mounted a stunning comeback in the years that followed, reshaping the Republican Party in his likeness.

That included the ascension of many lawmakers who endorsed Trump’s claims that the 2020 vote was stolen, for which he has provided no evidence.

Currently, most other Republican senators who voted to convict Trump alongside Cassidy have been ousted or chosen to leave office.

Among the group, only Republican centrists Susan Collins from Maine, who continues to be seen as a bulwark against Democratic challengers in her home state, and Lisa Murkowski from Alaska, who saw off a Trump-backed challenger in 2022, have escaped major intra-party fallout for their votes.

Letlow, an academic administrator who entered office in 2021, has also seized on Cassidy’s 2021 vote, saying in her campaign launch video that residents of Louisiana “shouldn’t have to wonder how our senator will vote when the pressure is on”.

A fine line

Cassidy, a physician, has walked a fine line during Trump’s second term, regularly touting the administration’s policy initiatives and appearing alongside Trump at the White House several times for healthcare-focused events and bill signings.

Still, Cassidy has had some high-profile clashes with the Trump administration. During Robert F Kennedy Jr‘s confirmation hearing to become health and human services secretary, Cassidy sparred with Kennedy over his vaccine scepticism.

“I am a doctor who has seen people die from vaccine-preventable diseases, and when I see outbreaks numbered in the thousands, and people dying once more from vaccine-preventable diseases, particularly children, it seems more than tragic,” he said during the hearing.

Cassidy later cast the deciding vote to confirm Kennedy after receiving assurances that he would not change federal vaccine recommendations. The HHS under Kennedy has since changed those recommendations.

In April of this year, Trump accused Cassidy of tanking his nominee for surgeon-general, Casey Means, who had come under fire for her vaccine scepticism and unproven wellness theories.

Trump decried what he called Cassidy’s “intransigence and political games”. In a subsequent post, he said hopefully Republicans “will be voting Bill Cassidy OUT OF OFFICE in the upcoming Republican Primary!”

Cassidy, in turn, has claimed opponent Letlow does not have conservative bona fides.

He has highlighted her past support of education diversity initiatives, which she has since disavowed, as well as her past attendance at the 2023 United Nations climate change conference.

Trump’s sway?

Trump carried Louisiana in the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections with about 58 percent of the vote, and in 2024 with 60 percent.

Heading into the primary vote, the president’s overall national approval rating has tanked, hitting a record low of 34 percent at the end of April. That has come amid widespread discontent over the US-Israel war on Iran and its economic toll.

Trump has maintained strong support among Republicans, but has notably seen dipping support among independents.

Polls have shown Cassidy trailing behind both Letlow and Fleming. If no candidate wins an outright majority, the race will move to a run-off on June 27.

Thursday’s race takes place amid an ongoing national battle over congressional redistricting.

While Louisiana’s US House of Representatives primary was also scheduled for Thursday, Governor Jeff Landry has temporarily suspended the vote.

That after the US Supreme Court struck down a major provision of the Voting Rights Act, paving the way for the state’s Republican-controlled legislature to redraw its congressional map to do away with one of two Black-majority districts.

Civil rights groups have filed a lawsuit alleging the suspension violates both the US and the state’s constitutions.

Protests were held after three church leaders were killed and three others injured in a deadly ambush in India’s Manipur state, the latest incident of ethnic violence that has killed more than 260 people since 2023.

In another sign of how much first person view (FPV) drones have changed warfare, Israel says it is building a new factory to produce thousands of these weapons. The move comes as its forces are coming under increasing attack from Hezbollah’s FPV drones in southern Lebanon, something we were among the first to report.

“The IDF is currently establishing a factory that will produce suicide drones (FPV drones) for use in all theaters of war,” Israel Army Radio reported. “The goal of establishing the factory is to industrialize and significantly expand the arsenal of suicide drones that the IDF has, in order to increase capabilities on the battlefield.”

Israel is racing to catch up to Hezbollah in the use of this class of fast, highly maneuverable munitions that became a main strike weapon for both Ukrainian and Russian forces, as well as elsewhere in the world. In our earlier reporting about the issue, we noted that the Iranian proxy has ramped up FPV attacks the deeper Israel has pushed into southern Lebanon. 

You can see some videos of those attacks below.

A big issue for Israel has been that while a domestic manufacturer is producing FPV drones, they include Chinese components, which represent both a security and a supply chain concern, the IDF-funded Israel Army Radio explained. By bringing production in-house to its Technology and Logistics Division, the IDF is looking to boost output, reduce cost and use only indigenous components.

The IDF estimates that the factory will begin supplying the army with drones in large quantities starting in July. Initially, the goal is to produce 1,000 per month, according to Israel Army Radio, with production then being boosted to tens of thousands.

Reaching that goal is not a huge leap for the IDF, one of the world’s most technologically advanced militaries in a country not devastated by the kind of war faced by Ukraine. In comparison, as we have reported in the past, Ukraine and Russia both make and use multiple millions of these drones every year. 

Удари російських дронів по українському Leopard 1A5 [Січень 2025]

Seeing the lessons learned from Ukraine, the U.S. too is scaling up, with plans to significantly increase the number of FPV drones it makes.

For Israel, however, boosting the number of FPV drones for its troops is only part of the equation in this realm of warfare. The IDF has been highly criticized in Israel for not reacting more quickly to defend against these weapons, especially after encountering them on a much smaller scale in 2024 and watching what has taken place in Ukraine and elsewhere.

Exacerbating the problem for Israel is that Hezbollah has been relying heavily on fiber-optic guided FPV drones. Fiber optic cables mitigate the effect of electronic warfare efforts to jam radio signals as well as some of the limitations imposed by geographical features that can impede the line-of-sight radio connection between drone and operator.

Faced with a threat that is causing casualties and damaging equipment, Israel is beginning to roll out new countermeasures. As we have previously noted, these solutions range from putting netting on vehicles to improving armor defensive systems.

In our past reporting, we explained that the idea behind netting is that drones will get caught up in these nylon or mesh metal barriers and become disabled, or, in some cases, the nets will help keep the drones far enough from the occupants before exploding to keep them from being killed. 

As for protecting armor, active protection systems (APS) on its tanks and armored personnel carriers are being adapted to provide hard-kill counter-drone protection. These systems use sensors to detect incoming rocket-propelled grenades, missiles, and other similar threats, and fire projectiles to hit them before they strike the vehicle. Israel is a major pioneer in the APS space, with systems being deployed for decades, but just how soon it can upgrade existing systems, such as Iron Fist, for this application isn’t clear. Also, this doesn’t help many lighter vehicles that do not have APS capabilities.

Iron Fist APS | Active Protection System for Armored Vehicles

The IDF is also working on other systems. The include equipment to better detect the drones as well as the creation of interceptor drones specifically designed to counter FPV drones, according to Israel’s YNet media outlet.

Israel is far from alone in trying to both make more FPV drones and defend against them. The U.S., for instance, recently came under attack by FPV drones in Iraq and its services are training on ways to defend against them. Given Israel’s advanced military tech base that produces weapons used around the world, we will keep an eye on the solutions to the FPV scourge it develops.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

“Both the State and Murdaugh’s defense skillfully presented their cases to the jury as the trial court deftly presided over this complicated and high-profile matter,” the justices wrote. “However, their efforts were in vain because Colleton County Clerk of Court Rebecca Hill placed her fingers on the scales of justice, thereby denying Murdaugh his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.”

The ongoing Iran conflict is expected to dominate discussions at the BRICS foreign ministers meeting in New Delhi, placing pressure on the expanded bloc to find common ground on one of the world’s most divisive geopolitical crises.

The two day meeting brings together foreign ministers and representatives from BRICS member states, including Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and the United Arab Emirates.

India, which holds the BRICS chairmanship for 2026, faces the difficult task of balancing competing interests within the group while attempting to secure a joint statement.

Iran Pushes for Stronger BRICS Position

Iran has urged BRICS members to condemn the actions of the United States and Israel in the Gulf conflict through a unified statement.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi is expected to participate in the meeting as Tehran seeks diplomatic support from emerging economies and Global South nations.

The conflict has become a major test of BRICS cohesion because member states hold differing positions on the war and regional security issues.

Divisions Emerge Within the Bloc

The sharpest disagreements are reportedly between Iran and the United Arab Emirates, which are aligned on opposing sides of the regional conflict.

Tensions have increased following reports of military strikes involving Gulf states and Iran, complicating efforts to draft a consensus statement acceptable to all members.

Indian officials previously acknowledged the difficulty of forging unity within BRICS because some member states are directly involved in the conflict.

Despite the divisions, India remains hopeful that ministers can still agree on a joint declaration after negotiations during the meeting.

Russia and China Maintain Key Roles

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov is expected to attend the gathering, reinforcing Moscow’s active role within BRICS diplomacy.

China, however, will not send Foreign Minister Wang Yi because of scheduling conflicts linked to U.S. President Donald Trump visiting Beijing this week.

Instead, China will be represented by Ambassador Xu Feihong.

Beijing has largely maintained a neutral public position on the Iran conflict while preserving close ties with both Iran and Gulf Arab states.

Energy Prices Add Economic Pressure

The war’s impact on global energy markets has become a major concern for BRICS economies, many of which are heavily dependent on imported oil and vulnerable to rising inflation.

Several BRICS nations, including India, have introduced emergency economic measures to shield consumers and industries from soaring fuel costs caused by the conflict.

The economic fallout is likely to strengthen calls within BRICS for diplomatic solutions and greater coordination among emerging economies.

India Attempts Diplomatic Balancing

India is seeking to use the BRICS platform to strengthen its leadership role among developing nations while avoiding direct alignment with any side in the conflict.

Analysts say New Delhi’s challenge lies in preserving BRICS unity despite deep geopolitical differences among member states.

Former Indian diplomat Manjeev Singh Puri described the participation of nearly all BRICS foreign ministers as a positive sign for dialogue and coalition building among emerging economies.

Analysis

The BRICS meeting in New Delhi highlights the growing difficulty of maintaining unity within an expanded bloc that now includes countries with competing regional interests and conflicting geopolitical priorities.

The Iran conflict has exposed the limits of BRICS as a coordinated political platform. While the group shares common interests in promoting a multipolar world order and strengthening the Global South, its members remain divided on security issues and regional conflicts.

India’s role as chair becomes especially sensitive because it must balance relations with Iran, Gulf Arab states, Russia, China, and Western powers simultaneously.

The absence of a strong unified Chinese diplomatic presence may also reduce the likelihood of a major breakthrough or coordinated BRICS response.

At the same time, the meeting demonstrates that BRICS is evolving beyond an economic grouping into a broader geopolitical forum where emerging powers increasingly debate global security and diplomatic issues.

Whether the bloc can produce a joint statement on the Iran war may become an important indicator of its future credibility and effectiveness as an alternative voice in global governance.

With information from Reuters.

In the past few months, the geopolitical chessboard has tilted dramatically, setting the stage for a highly anticipated yet asymmetrical summit between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping, now officially confirmed for May 13-15 following statements from both the White House and China’s Foreign Ministry. Washington has repeatedly signalled the importance it attaches to the meeting, while Beijing has approached it in its characteristically measured fashion, framing the summit less as a breakthrough than as part of the broader need for “communication” and “strategic guidance” between major powers.

This subtle diplomatic choreography speaks volumes about the shifting global balance of power. For the first time in decades, it is the United States that finds itself in a position of profound vulnerability, increasingly dependent on China’s cooperation to extricate itself from a self-inflicted disaster.

The source of this American predicament is the failure of its recent military adventurism in the Middle East. Having launched an illegal, unprovoked war against Iran alongside Israel, the US military has found itself trapped in a costly and protracted deadlock. In retaliation, Tehran has effectively choked off the Strait of Hormuz, with over a dozen US warships now enforcing a blockade that has rerouted dozens of vessels, sending shockwaves through global energy markets and raising fears of a worldwide economic meltdown. Washington now finds itself scrambling for an exit.

In a striking reversal of their usual hawkish rhetoric, top US officials — including Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent—have been making increasingly desperate public appeals for China to intervene. They are urging Beijing to use its considerable influence to convince Iran to reopen the vital waterway.

What makes this dynamic particularly striking is the contradiction at the heart of US policy. Even as Trump and Rubio appeal for China’s help on the Hormuz crisis, the broader US posture remains confrontational, with ongoing disputes over technology restrictions and other issues continuing to shadow the relationship. The contradiction exposes an administration increasingly driven by desperation.

Washington’s narrative conveniently frames China as the party most desperate for a resolution, citing Beijing’s heavy reliance on Middle Eastern energy imports. However, this assessment drastically miscalculates China’s strategic preparedness. Far from being paralysed by the disruption, Beijing has already demonstrated remarkable resilience. Through meticulous stockpiling, diversified supply chains, and robust domestic production, China has coped with the closure exceptionally well, avoiding the kind of immediate economic shock Washington appeared to expect.

Consequently, Beijing views the Hormuz standoff as a pivotal stress test it has already passed. Knowing the stakes, China is in no rush to bail out a belligerent Washington. Recent diplomatic engagements have made this increasingly clear. China has maintained close communication with Iran throughout the crisis, with Foreign Minister Wang Yi hosting his Iranian counterpart for talks on the situation. Rather than simply pressuring Iran to reopen Hormuz, Beijing is positioning itself to demand a comprehensive “grand bargain.” Why settle for a minor concession when you can force the US to cease its hostilities against Iran, lift its crippling sanctions, and accept a new multipolar security architecture in the Middle East?

Iran has submitted a response to a US proposal to end the war, focused on ceasing hostilities and addressing Strait security, which Trump promptly rejected as “completely unacceptable,” highlighting the continued deadlock Washington hopes Beijing can break.

China did not start this fire, but it is now the indispensable power capable of extinguishing it, and strictly on its own terms. Beyond the immediate crisis, Beijing’s ultimate strategic focus remains unwavering: the core issue of Taiwan. This broader assertiveness will undoubtedly carry over into the Trump-Xi summit. While Trump is desperate for tangible deliverables and a successful photo-op to distract from domestic turmoil, Xi can afford to play the long game.

Unlike previous administrations that settled for vague diplomatic pleasantries, Beijing is expected to intensify the pressure significantly. China will likely demand that the US explicitly oppose Taiwan independence, moving decisively beyond the current, tepid commitment to merely “not support” secessionist forces.

Recognising Trump’s eagerness for a win, the US president may attempt to use Taiwan as a bargaining chip. He could offer concessions on the issue in exchange for Chinese cooperation on reopening the Strait of Hormuz, massive purchases of American agricultural and energy products, or even help brokering peace in other conflicts.

However, Beijing is far too disciplined to fall for such short-term traps. Taiwan is a non-negotiable core interest, and any temporary trade-off would be strategically foolish.

While Trump may lavish praise on his personal relationship with Xi Jinping and project an image of amicable deal-making, Beijing harbours no illusions about the man across the table. China’s leadership understands that Trump cannot be trusted; any agreement reached today could be discarded tomorrow based on his whims or domestic political calculations. Even as Beijing entertains the prospect of a “grand bargain” and maintains a cordial facade, it refuses to structurally rely on Trump’s commitments.

By stabilising its bilateral relationship with the US over the coming months — especially with several high-level meetings scheduled between the two leaders throughout the year — China aims to secure a predictable external environment conducive to its long-term rise.

For Beijing, however, the stakes extend far beyond Taiwan alone. A key priority for China will also be securing firm guarantees regarding the trajectory of Japan’s remilitarisation. As Tokyo rapidly expands its military capabilities and grows increasingly vocal about its willingness to intervene in a Taiwan contingency, China will demand that Washington strictly curtail its ally’s ambitions.

On a broader geopolitical scale, Beijing is positioning itself as a responsible and stabilising great power, repeatedly calling on the international community to de-escalate the Hormuz crisis and prevent wider economic disruption. In doing so, China is drawing a stark contrast with a United States that is openly launching illegal wars, engaging in what critics describe as state terrorism, including the extrajudicial kidnapping and killing of foreign leaders and their family members.

Ultimately, the coming days are critical not only for the future of US-China relations, but for the resolution of the US-Israel war on Iran and the broader structure of the international order. The era of US unilateralism is gasping for air in the Gulf. Armed with strategic patience and increasingly strong leverage over the crisis, China enters the Trump-Xi summit in a commanding position.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Andriy Yermak, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s former chief of staff and close aide, is now at the centre of the country’s biggest corruption investigation since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022.

Anticorruption authorities named him an official suspect on Monday in an alleged multimillion-dollar money laundering scheme linked to a luxury housing project outside the capital, Kyiv.

Yermak appeared at a Kyiv court on Tuesday for a hearing related to the charges, which are part of a widening probe drawing in other senior figures associated with the president, including his national security chief.

While Zelenskyy is not accused of any wrongdoing, the scandal could potentially threaten Ukraine’s aspirations for European Union membership as it seeks to convince the bloc that its anticorruption drive is on track.

So, what are the charges against Yermak? Are other allies of Zelenskyy also under a cloud of suspicion? And what does this mean for Ukraine’s standing with its Western allies?

What are the charges against Yermak?

Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) say Yermak is suspected of involvement in an organised criminal group that allegedly laundered about 460 million hryvnias ($10.5m) through a luxury real estate project near Kyiv.

Prosecutors are seeking to impose bail of about $5.4m on the 54-year-old while they continue their investigation.

Yermak, who resigned in November, has firmly rejected the claims. In a post on Telegram after a court hearing on Tuesday, he described the accusations as “unfounded”.

“As a lawyer with more than 30 years’ experience, I have always been guided by the law. And now, in the same way, I will defend my rights, my name and my reputation,” he said.

At one point during the hearing, Yermak told reporters that he “owns only one apartment and one car”.

His lawyer, Ihor Fomin, labelled the allegations against his client “groundless” and denied any role by Yermak in laundering funds through the high-end development. Fomin told Ukraine’s public broadcaster Suspilne that “this entire situation has been provoked by public pressure.”

NABU director Semen Kryvonos defended the proceedings, stating that authorities move to issue formal notices only when they believe they possess enough evidence to sustain charges in court. He clarified that Zelenskyy was not subject to any investigation.

But the case has dragged the shadow of corruption closer to the Ukrainian president than ever before. That’s because it isn’t just Yermak who has been caught up in the accusations of fraud.

Have other Zelenskyy allies been implicated, too?

Timur Mindich, a wealthy businessman who was Zelenskyy’s former partner from the entertainment world – the Ukrainian president is a former comedian – has emerged as another leading figure in the scandal. He left for Israel after corruption allegations surfaced last year.

The probe has also brought Rustem Umerov, the head of Ukraine’s National Security and Defence Council, into the crosshairs of the authorities. Umerov, who until last year was Ukraine’s defence minister, is Zelenskyy’s main representative in United States-backed diplomatic efforts to end Russia’s war on Ukraine.

Prosecutors say Umerov has been interviewed as a witness in the luxury real estate development case.

The case is part of a broader anticorruption operation, dubbed “Midas” and led by NABU and SAPO. The operation was first made public in November, when prosecutors accused Mindich of engineering a $100m kickback scheme at Energoatom, charges the businessman has refuted.

Zelenskyy has yet to publicly respond to the allegations involving Yermak. On Monday, a communications aide said it was premature to comment on the case.

Ukraine’s government in July passed a law in an effort to strip the independence of NABU and SAPO, which were established in 2014 after a pro-democracy uprising against the then-government of President Viktor Yanukovych.

Within days, protests broke out against the move, forcing Zelenskyy to reverse course and sign a new law to restore the anticorruption institutions’ independence.

Why does this matter?

The scandal has emerged at a particularly sensitive moment for Ukraine, as Kyiv continues to make the case for military and financial support from its allies in Western Europe and North America.

Last July, US senators Jeanne Shaheen and Lindsey Graham released a strongly worded statement denouncing the attempt by the government to, at the time, curb the anticorruption work of NABU and SAPO.

“One of the most widely used talking points for ending support for Ukraine is that it was awash with corruption,” they said. “We acknowledge that Ukraine continues to make progress on this front and we urge the government to refrain from any actions that undermine that progress.”

Moreover, Ukraine’s bid to join the EU has increased pressure on Zelenskyy’s administration to demonstrate institutional independence and accountability.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz last month cautioned against a quick accession of Ukraine to the EU, saying Ukraine cannot join the bloc due to several key concerns, including ending the war and fighting corruption.

Ukrainian opposition politician Oleksiy Goncharenko said the allegations had now reached a point that Zelenskyy “personally cannot ignore”.

However, Olena Halushka, a board member at the Anti-Corruption Action Centre in Kyiv, said the case against Yermak and others was a “clear example that the checks and balances system really works”.

Speaking to Al Jazeera, Halushka said it proved that in Ukraine there are “law enforcement institutions functioning independently and professionally, exercising their powers in defence of democracy”.

“These institutions were protected by the Ukrainian society and European partners from the political attack last summer, and now we see the tangible results of their activities,” she added.

In a survey conducted on May 6 by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 54 percent of Ukrainians said corruption was a bigger threat to the country than the war with Russia.