USA

‘Love Island USA’ producer James Barker dead after ‘medical emergency’

The “Love Island USA” production team is mourning the loss of executive producer James Barker, who died last week while on set in Fiji.

“Love Island USA” producers ITV America and Peacock confirmed Barker’s death in a media release shared with The Times on Monday. The announcement said that Barker died after “an unexpected medical emergency” but did not provide additional details, including the day of his death and a cause of death. Barker was 40.

“James’ unimaginable loss has been deeply felt across not just the entire Love Island USA production, but throughout all of ITV and Peacock,” the television companies said in a joint statement. “He was a beloved and greatly valued member of our collective family whose kindness, talent and dedication left an indelible mark on all of us and everyone who had the privilege of knowing and working with him. We extend our heartfelt condolences to James’ family, friends and colleagues.”

Barker began his tenure on “Love Island USA” in 2020, first working as a story producer. He has worked as an executive producer on the series for the last three seasons and was also a member of the producing team on “Love Island” companion series “Love Island Games” and “Love Island: Beyond the Villa.”

Barker, according to Monday’s statement, also oversaw the hit series’ pop soundtrack. For an interview with Rolling Stone in 2025, Barker recalled watching the original British “Love Island” series and how pop music supplemented the on-screen romances and heartbreak: “I think that is where my brain immediately said, ‘One, this is amazing, and more shows should be like this.’ And two, ‘How do I work on “Love Island”?’”

Barker also noted in the interview that he drew inspiration for the “Love Island USA” villa sound from his pre-TV career as a nightlife DJ and spoke about the process of hand-selecting music from established pop acts and up-and-coming artists.

“In the past, there was such a stigma about reality shows that a lot of artists didn’t want their music associated with reality shows. And that’s starting to turn around now,” Barker told the outlet. “[Artists are] more and more seeing, well, one, the financial aspect of having your music synced in these kind of shows, and also just the wide reach of viewers.”

Before “Love Island USA,” Barker was a producer on reality series “Pawn Stars,” “Counting Cars” and “Forged in Fire.” He later served as a story producer on “Queer Eye,” “Cosmic Love” and “Are You My First?” Outside of his TV work, Barker often performed as DJ Chaotic at gay bar C’mon Everybody in Brooklyn.

“Love Island USA,” which began its eighth season earlier this month, will pay tribute to Barker in Tuesday’s episode.

He is survived by his mother Malinda.



Source link

Can the US-Iran Peace Deal End Lebanon’s Humanitarian Crisis?

The announcement of a preliminary US-Iran agreement has generated cautious optimism in Lebanon, where months of conflict have displaced large portions of the population and devastated communities across the south.

While the framework reportedly calls for the immediate cessation of military operations, Lebanese authorities are warning residents against assuming that conditions are safe enough for a rapid return.

The caution reflects uncertainty over how the agreement will be implemented and whether all parties will abide by its terms.

Adding to those concerns, Israel has made clear that it does not consider itself bound by the agreement and intends to maintain security zones in southern Lebanon.

Lebanon became one of the principal battlegrounds of the wider regional conflict after Hezbollah opened a front against Israel in support of Iran following the outbreak of hostilities.

The resulting escalation led to extensive Israeli military operations across southern Lebanon, causing widespread destruction and one of the largest displacement crises in the country’s recent history.

Entire communities were uprooted as residents fled bombardment and military activity.

Iran consistently pushed for any agreement with Washington to include provisions addressing Lebanon, viewing the conflict there as inseparable from broader regional tensions.

The inclusion of Lebanon in the framework agreement therefore represents a significant diplomatic concession and a central element of Tehran’s negotiating position.

Why This Matters

Lebanon has become one of the clearest examples of how regional conflicts can produce devastating humanitarian consequences.

The conflict has:

  • Displaced more than a million people.
  • Damaged homes, infrastructure, and businesses.
  • Increased pressure on Lebanon’s already fragile economy.
  • Deepened political and social instability.

A durable ceasefire could allow reconstruction efforts to begin and reduce the risk of further regional escalation.

However, the humanitarian benefits will depend on security conditions improving on the ground rather than merely on diplomatic declarations.

The Challenge of Returning Home

For displaced families, peace announcements do not automatically translate into confidence.

Many residents remain uncertain about:

  • Whether military operations have truly ended.
  • The presence of Israeli forces in southern areas.
  • The condition of homes and infrastructure.
  • Future security guarantees.

The hesitation expressed by displaced residents reflects a broader reality in conflict zones: trust often takes much longer to rebuild than physical infrastructure.

Even if active fighting stops, communities may remain reluctant to return until they believe the risk of renewed conflict has genuinely diminished.

Israel’s Position Complicates the Picture

A major obstacle to immediate normalization is Israel’s position.

Israeli officials have indicated they will continue maintaining security zones and reserve the right to conduct operations they deem necessary for national security.

This creates ambiguity regarding implementation of the broader agreement.

While the US-Iran framework may establish a diplomatic foundation for reducing violence, the practical situation on the ground will depend on decisions made by actors who were not direct participants in the negotiations.

This distinction could prove crucial in determining whether the agreement produces lasting stability.

A Test of Regional Diplomacy

The inclusion of Lebanon in the agreement demonstrates how interconnected Middle Eastern conflicts have become.

The war was never confined solely to the United States and Iran. It involved multiple regional actors, proxy groups, and overlapping security concerns.

As a result, success will be measured not only by whether Washington and Tehran uphold their commitments but also by whether the agreement influences behavior across the broader region.

Lebanon is likely to become one of the first and most visible tests of that process.

Key Stakeholders

  • Lebanon and its government institutions
  • Displaced Lebanese civilians
  • Israel and its military leadership
  • Hezbollah
  • Iran
  • The United States
  • Regional mediators including Pakistan
  • Humanitarian organizations operating in Lebanon

What to Watch Next

  • Whether military activity in southern Lebanon decreases in the coming days.
  • Israeli decisions regarding security zones.
  • Hezbollah’s official response to the agreement.
  • The pace of civilian returns to southern communities.
  • International support for reconstruction and humanitarian assistance.
  • Broader negotiations during the 60-day ceasefire period.

The agreement creates an opportunity for Lebanon to move toward greater stability after months of destruction and displacement.

If implemented successfully, reduced hostilities could pave the way for reconstruction, humanitarian relief, and the gradual return of displaced populations.

Yet significant uncertainty remains. Security concerns, damaged infrastructure, and competing interpretations of the agreement could slow progress and complicate efforts to restore normalcy.

For many Lebanese families, the end of active conflict would represent only the beginning of a much longer recovery process.

Analysis

The most revealing aspect of Lebanon’s reaction is the disconnect between diplomacy and reality.

International leaders may celebrate ceasefires and framework agreements, but people living through conflict judge peace by different standards. They look not at official statements but at troop movements, security conditions, and whether it is safe to return home.

That gap is already visible in southern Lebanon. While diplomats describe the agreement as a breakthrough, local authorities are warning residents against rushing back. Israel’s decision to maintain security zones further reinforces uncertainty about how quickly conditions can normalize.

This highlights a recurring challenge in conflict resolution. Agreements can stop wars on paper, but rebuilding trust often takes far longer than negotiating a ceasefire.

Lebanon’s experience may therefore become a key measure of whether the US-Iran agreement delivers meaningful change beyond diplomatic symbolism. If displaced communities can safely return, reconstruction begins, and violence declines, the agreement will gain credibility. If insecurity persists despite the deal, questions will quickly emerge about its effectiveness.

Ultimately, Lebanon represents the human dimension of the broader regional settlement. The success of the agreement will not be judged solely by geopolitical outcomes or energy markets but by whether ordinary people feel secure enough to rebuild their lives after months of war.

With information from Reuters.

Source link

Inside the US-Iran Deal: What Both Sides Have Agreed So Far

The preliminary memorandum represents the first formal framework outlining how Washington and Tehran intend to move from military confrontation toward diplomacy.

While many details remain unpublished, statements from U.S., Iranian and Pakistani officials provide a broad outline of the deal’s structure.

Rather than resolving every dispute immediately, the agreement establishes a phased process aimed at reducing tensions first and addressing more difficult issues later.

The approach reflects the reality that both sides were able to reach consensus on ending hostilities more easily than on the underlying disputes that fueled the conflict.

Phase One: Ending the Fighting

The first stage focuses on immediate de-escalation.

According to mediator Pakistan, both sides have agreed to permanently halt military operations across all fronts.

The formal memorandum is expected to be signed in Switzerland, after which implementation would begin.

The objective of this phase is straightforward: stop active hostilities, reduce the risk of escalation, and create space for broader negotiations.

This represents the most immediate achievement of the agreement and is likely the reason markets reacted positively.

Reopening the Strait of Hormuz

The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz is arguably the agreement’s most significant economic provision.

The waterway serves as one of the world’s most important energy transit routes and has been at the center of global concerns throughout the conflict.

Both sides indicate that commercial shipping will resume following the signing of the memorandum.

The restoration of maritime traffic could:

  • Increase global oil supply.
  • Reduce shipping disruptions.
  • Ease pressure on energy prices.
  • Lower inflation risks for major economies.

However, questions remain over how the route will be governed.

Iran has suggested it will coordinate management of traffic with Oman, potentially giving Tehran a more formal role in overseeing one of the world’s most strategically important waterways.

That issue could become a future source of diplomatic friction.

The Nuclear Issue Has Been Deferred

The most controversial subject in the negotiations remains unresolved.

Rather than settling the nuclear dispute immediately, both sides appear to have agreed to address it during a 60-day negotiation period.

According to Iranian officials, Tehran would freeze nuclear activities during that time by halting additional enrichment and refraining from expanding facilities.

The long-term future of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure remains unclear.

Washington continues to emphasize inspections and preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.

Tehran continues to insist that its nuclear program is peaceful and seeks recognition of its right to maintain civilian nuclear activities.

These competing positions are likely to dominate the next phase of talks.

Sanctions Relief Could Shape the Success of the Deal

Economic issues may ultimately prove as difficult as nuclear negotiations.

Iran expects meaningful sanctions relief as part of any final settlement.

Iranian officials have spoken about:

  • Temporary waivers on oil sanctions.
  • The release of frozen assets.
  • Financial support mechanisms.
  • A pathway toward lifting U.S. and international sanctions.

The Trump administration has signaled a more cautious approach.

Washington has indicated that sanctions relief will depend on Iranian compliance and future negotiations rather than automatic implementation.

This difference highlights one of the central tensions in the agreement: each side expects benefits on different timelines.

Lebanon Remains a Flashpoint

The agreement’s treatment of Lebanon illustrates how regional conflicts have become intertwined.

Iran views a ceasefire in Lebanon as a critical component of the broader settlement.

Lebanese political leaders have welcomed the inclusion of Lebanon in the framework.

Israel, however, has made clear that it does not consider itself bound by all aspects of the agreement and intends to maintain military positions in areas it views as strategically important.

This creates uncertainty about whether the Lebanon component can be implemented as envisioned.

The issue could quickly become one of the first tests of the agreement’s durability.

Why This Matters

The memorandum matters because it shifts the conflict from the battlefield to the negotiating table.

The agreement addresses several immediate concerns:

  • Rising energy prices.
  • Shipping disruptions.
  • Escalating regional instability.
  • Growing economic uncertainty.

At the same time, it leaves the most difficult questions unresolved.

This means the framework should be viewed as the beginning of a diplomatic process rather than its conclusion.

Its success will depend on whether negotiators can transform temporary understandings into binding commitments.

Key Stakeholders

  • United States
  • Iran
  • Pakistan (mediator)
  • Israel
  • Lebanon
  • Oman
  • European powers
  • Gulf Arab states
  • International energy markets
  • Global shipping industry
  • International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and nuclear inspectors

What to Watch Next

  • Formal signing of the memorandum in Switzerland.
  • Reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.
  • Progress during the 60-day negotiation period.
  • Discussions on Iran’s nuclear program.
  • Decisions regarding sanctions relief.
  • Reactions from Congress and international partners.
  • Israeli actions in Lebanon and other contested areas.

The memorandum creates a framework for de-escalation, but its long-term success remains uncertain.

If implemented effectively, the agreement could stabilize energy markets, reduce regional tensions, and create momentum for broader diplomatic engagement.

However, many of the issues that triggered the conflict remain unresolved.

Nuclear enrichment, sanctions, regional security arrangements, and competing strategic interests are all likely to generate difficult negotiations.

The coming 60 days will therefore be more important than the announcement itself.

They will determine whether the framework becomes a durable peace process or merely a temporary pause in a conflict whose underlying disputes remain intact.

Analysis

The structure of the agreement reveals a pragmatic calculation by both Washington and Tehran.

Rather than attempting to solve every dispute at once, negotiators prioritized issues where agreement was achievable: ending active hostilities, reopening shipping routes, and creating a mechanism for future talks.

This approach reflects the political realities facing both governments.

For President Trump, reducing energy prices and ending a costly conflict addresses growing domestic pressure. For Iran, halting military operations while preserving room to negotiate on sanctions and nuclear issues offers a path to economic relief without immediate capitulation.

Yet the framework’s greatest strength may also be its greatest weakness.

By postponing the hardest questions, the agreement creates momentum for diplomacy but also leaves significant room for disagreement later. Nuclear enrichment, sanctions relief, and regional security arrangements are not peripheral issues—they are the core disputes that drove the conflict.

As a result, the memorandum should be viewed less as a peace treaty and more as a diplomatic bridge. It lowers immediate risks and creates opportunities for negotiation, but it does not yet resolve the strategic rivalry between the United States and Iran.

Whether this becomes a historic breakthrough or a temporary truce will depend on what happens after the signatures are placed on the document. The real negotiations are only beginning.

With information from Reuters.

Source link

Exploitation Lies Behind a Veil of Diplomacy in Iran

Behind a veil of good-natured diplomacy, American adversaries are exploiting the conflict in Iran by gaining insights, strategic lessons, and geopolitical power while the United States wages feckless war against the Middle Eastern theocracy. Beyond the bombings, the blockade, and the oil prices, Russia and China keenly watch how America struggles, succeeds, and scrambles. In doing so, these adversaries are leveraging the conflict to challenge America’s readiness, aid its adversaries, and gain invaluable intel on America’s successes and failures.

The concept of observing a conflict to acquire critical intelligence on how to best conduct combat is not unique to the war in Iran. For example, in the Russo-Ukrainian War, America has gained indispensable knowledge on the most and least effective tools of 21st-century warfare, including information on the power of unmanned aerial systems. With the war in Iran, though, Russia and China are the scientists, and America is the experiment. The Middle East is now a testing ground for cutting-edge drone swarm technologies and a catalyst for how smaller powers can effectively deny their adversaries from accomplishing their objectives—a lesson that China is certainly eager to learn about for a possible conflict over Taiwan. Therefore, when America wages war against Iran, there are consequences that are crucial to recognize, and one of those consequences is that the United States is inadvertently empowering and informing its adversaries.

Maintaining its signaled commitment of multipolarity and geopolitical neutrality, China’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning commented, “…China…has been making active efforts to promote ceasefire and peace…we will continue playing an active role in restoring…tranquility to the Middle East…” Reality demonstrates that this is false. China is discreetly gaining intelligence on the U.S. military’s readiness, pacing, and warfighting strategies. Furthermore, China has directly supported Iran, providing anti-missile weaponry, building blocks for ballistic missiles, and invaluable military intelligence to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Instead of promoting peace and tranquility, these actions are designed to empower Iran and keep America locked in the struggle, weakening the country and allowing China to acquire more intelligence on U.S. readiness. Despite China’s claimed intentions, it’s clear that the nation is bolstering Iran’s strength and sustaining its defenses. Even from a domestic point of view, these actions are increasing domestic American division and the depletion of America’s defense resources. The conflict with Iran is not limited to Iran; by proxy, it’s with America’s foremost adversaries, too.

Similarly, Russia has provided critical support to Iran in the form of targeting intelligence, which Iran couldn’t have otherwise acquired. Shahed drones, assets that have proven to be exceptionally effective against western defenses, are manufactured in Russia’s Alabuga Special Economic Zone and are being provided to Iran by Russia. Contradicting these actions, a statement by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that the country “…stands ready to assist in advancing peaceful solutions grounded in international law, mutual respect, and a balanced consideration of interests.” But equipping Iran with efficacious tools of war is not a peaceful solution. Giving the nation targeting information cannot be construed as a neutral or geopolitically insignificant act. In reality, America’s adversaries are taking an active, hands-on approach to the war in Iran, indirectly but clearly aiding the nation and actively working against U.S. goals.

In response to this tacit yet significant aid to Iran, the natural response for America should be to publicly highlight the hostile actions of its adversaries. But the United States has been hesitant, if not downright unwilling, to do so. For example, Matthew Whitaker, the U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO, commented that “China certainly is not participating and is not aiding and abetting the Iranian demise…” Separately, he claimed, “There’s no indication that we can talk about publicly that the Russians are participating with the Iranians.” Public investigations, though, have proven both those assertions false. The trepidation of the United States to clearly and confidently condemn its adversaries’ belligerence in the region is an enormous blunder of strategic communications. Contrasting this, Russia and China have simultaneously and aggressively pursued campaigns of condemnation to weaken America’s global power. For example, Russia has often claimed that certain U.S. support to Ukraine may constitute an act of war; China strongly condemned recent American intervention in Venezuela as violating the international laws by which America claims to be guided. U.S. adversaries are eager and willing to strategically undermine and criticize U.S. actions, yet America is unwisely unwilling to do the same.

Russia’s and China’s cooperative aid to Iran demonstrates that the conflict is, in many senses, between world powers. A new ‘axis of resistance’ against Western liberalism is developing, and allowing American adversaries to act without denunciation is a failure of strategic communications and allows these nations to act with undeserved impunity. As the United States continues to wage war against Iran, it’s crucial to recognize that every bomb America drops, every mission American soldiers complete, and every destroyed military asset is a datapoint that U.S. adversaries will exploit. Russia’s and China’s critical support to Iran is hostile and counter to American goals; ignoring this is strategically imprudent. Beyond the explosions, America’s adversaries are watching—and acting. It’s the responsibility of the United States to expose those actions for what they really are.

Source link

The Centrality of India-US Ties in Shaping Quad’s Future

With its recent Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Delhi, the Quad has again shown it remains active, defying widespread rumours of collapse.

While the Japanese and Australian foreign ministers highlighted their countries’ strong relations with India and the Quad’s central role in shaping the Indo-Pacific security architecture, Marco Rubio’s four-day visit to India was the most noteworthy aspect, as he repeatedly emphasized the significance of Indo-US relations.

Speculations about the Quad’s potential dissolution, reminiscent of developments in the 2000s, were fuelled by the postponement of the leaders’ summit, President Trump’s apparent lack of interest, and a more conciliatory approach toward China. Even so, the meeting reaffirmed the US’s ongoing engagement in the region and its support for the Quad.

The Quad’s momentum currently faces its principal challenge not from India’s or the US’s relations with Australia and Japan, but from a complicated Indo-US relationship.

Two factors show why India-US relations are central to the Quad’s minilateral framework.

Over the past year, India has faced unprecedented criticism from the US administration, particularly from President Trump, who has been critical of India on trade and security fronts. Issues such as tariff disputes, H-1B visa restrictions affecting Indian professionals, deepening US relations with the Pakistan Army, and increased US involvement in Bangladesh and Nepal have contributed to growing distrust about the US’s willingness to cooperate with India and promote stability in the Indo-Pacific.

In response to several contentious statements by President Trump directed at India, Rubio’s visit served as a diplomatic effort to restore bilateral relations. His repeated emphasis on India’s role as a strategic partner signalled a commitment to improving ties. While a single visit cannot resolve all tensions from the past year, it reassures India and reduces the risk of further deterioration.

The Quad Foreign Ministers’ meeting became feasible only after India and the US undertook concerted efforts to revive bilateral relations. Notable examples include India’s invitation to the US to attend the AI Impact Summit in February 2026, ongoing trade agreement negotiations, and the US decision to invite India to the Pax Silica initiative. The meeting occurred only after a certain level of normalization had been achieved. Even so, a leaders’ summit is unlikely unless President Trump and Prime Minister Modi demonstrate a clear commitment to advancing India-US relations.

Second, without proactive American engagement, Japan, Australia, and India may develop their own trilateral regional strategies, perhaps with some Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore. However, the impact of such an alternative would be limited and localized. Japan could take a greater role in sustaining and rebuilding regional economic frameworks, replicating the Trans-Pacific Partnership experiment. Still, due to constitutional and capacity constraints, Tokyo is unlikely to replace Washington as the region’s primary security guarantor soon.

Although the Quad’s resilience is maintained by the agency and commitment of Australia, India, and Japan rather than by exclusive US leadership, strong US involvement in the Indo-Pacific security mechanism will remain a cornerstone of the Indo-Pacific architecture.

China’s persistent assertive behaviour remains the central factor. It continues to employ coercive tactics and expand its influence in regions critical to the US and its partners, so the original motivations for revitalizing the Quad remain relevant. Although the US approach to China is evolving, the fundamental dynamics of US-China relations remain unchanged. In the long term, Washington will require frameworks such as the Quad to maintain stability in the Indo-Pacific and prevent the erosion of its strategic influence. Consequently, the Quad is likely to remain central to regional strategy, with India as a key partner.

The US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau’s statement that the US is not going to make the same mistakes with India that it made with China 20 years ago must not guide Indo-US relations. The US needs India as much as India needs the US, and unlike China, India-US relations rest on shared values – democracy, freedom of speech, multiculturalism, and a common vision of maintaining a rules-based liberal international order. Both countries require mutually beneficial cooperation to advance their strategic objectives. Other Quad members and Indo-Pacific stakeholders also depend on collaboration between Washington and New Delhi to maintain strategic equilibrium and preserve the bloc’s cohesion.

The US regards India as a responsible stakeholder and a regional counterweight to China, especially after the limited outcomes of President Trump’s recent visit to China. Conversely, India depends on the US for advanced technology, strategic investments, and long-term defense needs. This mutual dependence makes both countries indispensable to each other, and significant short-term trade diversification is unlikely. Even if achieved, it would likely harm both parties.

The US must strengthen its engagement in the Indo-Pacific by leveraging the Quad and its member states to develop an effective regional strategy. Closer strategic coordination among Quad partners, particularly with India, is essential to this effort.

Source link

‘Dream come true’: World Cup fever ignites Los Angeles as USA beat Paraguay | World Cup 2026 News

Los Angeles, United States – Draped with a US flag, Alex Saldivar could hardly contain his broad smile as he exited the stadium after the United States beat Paraguay 4-1.

Not only did his team win their World Cup opener, they did so on home soil – and the 23-year-old got to witness it.

Recommended Stories

list of 3 itemsend of list

“This is a dream come true, a serious dream come true. I don’t know what to say,” Saldivar said, as he swayed from side to side, alternating his standing foot.

His excitement sums up the historic day for US football.

Tens of thousands of fans had descended on SoFi Stadium, putting on an eccentric display of oversized hats and US flag-themed outfits.

White and red striped dungarees, blue and white hair, star-spangled trousers, painted faces and Uncle Sam suits – supporters represented their country’s colours in every possible way.

Ryan Schellhous, who came to Los Angeles from San Jose in northern California, was dressed literally from head to toe in US flag colours, including a mask that only showed his eyes.

He told Al Jazeera it was great to have the World Cup in the US.

“There’s a lot of excitement for soccer in America right now, and this is great,” Schellhous said, adding that he expected Team USA to go deep in the tournament if players perform to the best of their ability.

USA fans ahead of Paraguay World Cup game
USA fans ahead of the World Cup game against Paraguay in Los Angeles, on June 12, 2026 [Al Jazeera/Ali Harb]

For many fans, the World Cup is offering a rare opportunity to experience football at its best. And they are cherishing the moment.

Michele Churchill, who travelled from Virginia with her three children to attend the opening match, called it a “bucket list” event.

Asked about the exorbitant ticket prices, she said the experience is worth it.

Churchill also had a bold prediction for the US team’s fortunes at the tournament.

“They’re going to win. They’re going to take the cup,” she told Al Jazeera.

Law enforcement

Fans started streaming into the stadium four hours before the game. One was dressed in a Gulf-style thobe with a US flag as a headscarf. Another was in an outfit resembling George Washington, the first president of the US.

Despite concerns about logistics and organisation, everything went largely smoothly with armies of staff and volunteers ensuring safety and orderliness.

An alphabet soup of law enforcement agencies was present.

The Transportation Security Administration staffed entrances to oversee the airport-style security checkpoints. Agents from the Drug Enforcement Administration, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and Department of Homeland Security were also at the scene.

On the local level, heavily armed agents from the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department were also deployed around the stadium, as were Inglewood Police officers.

Many agents were accompanied by police dogs. Before crowds started to arrive, some had their canine companions pose for a photo next to the oversized World Cup ball outside the stadium.

Reports that President Donald Trump may attend the first game ultimately did not materialise to the apparent relief of many fans in mostly liberal Los Angeles.

Inside the stadium, it was celebrities – the likes of Tom Cruise and David Beckham – who got the cheers from the crowd.

USA fans are seen outside Los Angeles Stadium ahead of Paraguay match at World Cup 2026
USA fans are seen outside Los Angeles Stadium ahead of the Paraguay match at the World Cup 2026 [Al Jazeera/Ali Harb]

Stadium atmosphere

It took a while for the stadium to fill out.

About an hour from kickoff, during the first part of the opening ceremony, which featured several rappers, including Future and Rema, the venue was still almost half-empty and the crowd was quiet.

But coinciding with Katy Perry taking the stage before the first whistle, the stadium started to come to life, and chants of “USA, USA” grew louder.

It was really forward Christian Pulisic who electrified the crowd with his first-half display, running straight at his markers and producing dangerous crosses or shots.

The once faint chants turned into deafening roars when the US scored their first, courtesy of a Paraguayan own goal in the seventh minute.

The distinct screams of goal celebrations would ring out three more times for Team USA at the stadium, with Folarin Balogun finding the net twice and Giovanni Reyna scoring a gorgeous curler from the edge of the box to wrap up the game.

A stadium announcer said more than 70,000 people were in attendance.

“We have a full house,” he said to the cheers of the crowd.

But the announcement did not pass the eye test.

Many seats throughout the stadium remained empty, especially in the most expensive sections overlooking the middle of the field.

It is possible that organisers FIFA did sell every seat but resellers struggled to offload some tickets.

The bottom line – ticket prices and Trump’s travel policies may be dampening the buzz around the World Cup, but the tournament is still delivering what football promises: happiness, excitement and a sense of togetherness.

Source link

USA hit Paraguay for four in dream start to their World Cup campaign | World Cup 2026 News

USA beat Paraguay 4-1 in Los Angeles as each of the three World Cup cohosts have now staged a game in the 2026 edition.

The United States could scarcely have scripted a better start to their World Cup as a Folarin Balogun brace and a Gio Reyna curler fired the cohosts to a 4-1 drubbing of Paraguay in front of Hollywood royalty in Los Angeles.

The hosts took the lead in the tournament’s first game on US soil within seven minutes thanks to an own goal, and by the end of an utterly dominant half, the home fans were in dreamland, their side up by three.

Recommended Stories

list of 4 itemsend of list

Tom Cruise, Leonardo DiCaprio and Paris Hilton were among a sold-out 70,492 crowd as the US – cohosting the tournament with Mexico and Canada – piled wave after wave of attacks on the South Americans, with Reyna polishing off the win late in stoppage time after Mauricio had pulled one back.

The win and emphatic scoreline put the US in a favourable position already to progress from Group D, which also contains Australia and Turkiye.

The night’s only potential sour note was the half-time withdrawal of Christian Pulisic, the US attacking talisman who is carrying the hopes of the nation as they attempt a deep run into the World Cup knockouts for the first time since their quarterfinal appearance in 2002.

Paraguay could not have been more obliging guests from kickoff. In the seventh minute, Weston McKennie picked up the ball in the centre circle and drove upfield, finding Pulisic.

Pulisic darted between two defenders and returned the ball to McKennie, whose pass to striker Balogun was bundled into his own net by a hapless Damian Bobadilla.

The stadium erupted, and a US onslaught began.

The hosts oozed confidence. Both McKennie and Tillman played backheel through balls into the area, while captain Tim Ream sprayed out passes from the heart of defence.

US midfielder #07 Giovanni Reyna (R) scores his team's fourth goal during the 2026 World Cup Group D football match
USA midfielder Giovanni Reyna scores his team’s fourth goal [Valerie Macon/AFP]

Balogun had a goal ruled out in the 28th minute. He had strayed offside, as had Pulisic in the buildup.

But the Monaco striker had the ball in the net again three minutes later, thanks to a superb ball down the left flank by Antonee Robinson to Pulisic, whose cross to Balogun took a slight fortuitous deflection.

The US added a third on the cusp of half-time. Tillman found Balogun down the right, who evaded Omar Alderete’s challenge, skipped inside Gustavo Gomez and curled his shot perfectly into the top left corner.

It could have been four or five, with Chris Richards – returning from injury – flashing a header barely an inch wide. The US had 75 percent possession in the first half.

Now, without the dangerous Pulisic, the hosts sat back slightly in the second half.

Paraguay finally offered a threat. Their dangerous forward Julio Enciso, who started despite a hamstring injury, picked up the ball on the edge of the area and fed in Brazil-born substitute Mauricio, who pulled one back.

Reyna scored a superb fourth with the outside of his right foot that curled just inside the far post.

The game had been preceded by a Tinseltown-style opening ceremony. Katy Perry delivered the headline performance, accompanied by singers Future, Tyla, Anitta and K-pop singer Lisa.

Performers danced around a giant World Cup trophy beneath enormous “FIFA” letters in the gold favoured by US President Donald Trump – who did not attend, instead wishing the team luck via phone before kickoff.

Source link

The Republican Party’s Trump Problem: Why Some Conservatives Are Getting Ready for Life After Him

By June 2026, the cracks inside the GOP weren’t hidden anymore. On May 19, the Senate voted 50–47 to push forward a bipartisan war powers resolution that would limit President Donald Trump’s ability to keep military ops going against Iran. Four Republican senators crossed the aisle and voted with Democrats. Then on June 3, the House went even further with a 215–208 vote—four House Republicans joined Democrats in a pretty blunt pushback against Trump’s leadership.

At first it looked like just another fight over war powers and Congress doing its job. But it feels like something bigger: the start of a real tug-of-war over what the Republican Party is going to be once Trump isn’t the center of everything.

For almost ten years now, Republican politics has been all about Trump. You rose if you stood with him, and you got sidelined if you didn’t. Loyalty often counted more than old-school conservative ideas, passing bills, or sticking to principles. But every party eventually has to answer the tough question that personality-driven movements hate: what happens when the big guy starts looking more like a problem than a winner? That question is getting harder for Republicans to dodge.

Trump didn’t just take over the party in 2016 — he remade it. The old Republican worldview of strong alliances, free trade, and steady leadership shifted toward a more populist, Trump-centered style.

It worked for a while. He won elections, fired up voters who felt ignored, and built a super-loyal base. As long as the wins kept coming, most Republicans went along. Parties get tested in the tough times, though — not the good ones. And the Iran conflict is turning into exactly that kind of test.

A lot of Republicans who backed Trump’s rise never thought they’d end up defending another big Middle East war. Trump made “no more endless wars” one of his best lines—slamming both parties for the messes in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Now the fighting with Iran has dragged on for months. Costs are adding up, gas prices sting at the pump, and nobody’s really clear on what “winning” would even mean. That’s created real quiet discomfort inside the party. The senators and reps who voted to rein in Trump’s war powers weren’t just talking procedure. They were signaling that blind loyalty isn’t automatic anymore.

Parties talk a lot about ideology, but when things get serious, survival often wins out. Some Republicans are starting to put distance between themselves and Trump — not because they hate everything he stands for, but because they don’t want their own careers sinking with one person. There’s a real difference between backing conservative policies and handing the whole party over to a single leader. More of them seem to be waking up to that.

What’s interesting is that the pushback is coming from inside the tent. Democrats opposing Trump is old news. When Republicans do it, it hits different. Senators like Rand Paul, Susan Collins, Lisa Murkowski, and Bill Cassidy broke ranks on the Senate vote. In the House, guys like Thomas Massie, Brian Fitzpatrick, Tom Barrett, and Warren Davidson did the same. These are still small numbers. But big shifts often start small.

The bigger story might be that some Republicans are finally imagining a future without Trump dominating every headline. A younger crop is coming up—they agree with him on immigration, trade, and culture wars, but they don’t want the party to be defined only by personal loyalty to him forever. They want a Republican Party that can keep going after he’s gone—Trumpism as one important piece, not the whole thing.

History shows parties sometimes tie themselves too tightly to charismatic leaders. Sometimes it revitalizes them. Sometimes it drags them down.

Right now, some inside the GOP worry Trump might be moving from asset to liability—especially with the Iran war dragging on and polarization getting worse. Trump is still the biggest force in the party with a rock-solid base. But power and lasting control aren’t the same.

These congressional votes show that at least some Republicans are already looking ahead to the next chapter. They see the risks of hitching the whole party’s future to one man. Whether they’re right or wrong, time will tell. But the conversation inside the party has clearly moved past just Iran or war powers. It’s now about whether the Republican Party still belongs to Trump — or whether it can finally start belonging to itself again.

Source link

How Chinese Media Views the U.S. Hosting the FIFA World Cup

Chinese media and think tanks view the United States’ hosting of the FIFA World Cup from a purely geopolitical, economic, and commercial perspective, critically assessing the infrastructure and political climate. Chinese circles see the tournament not merely as a sporting event but as a central tool for the United States to polish its image, bolster its global leadership amidst current international polarization, and advance its political agenda. This perspective is highlighted through several key points, the most important being the geopolitical dimension. Here, Chinese think tanks argue that the tournament reflects the level of competition between major powers, with Washington attempting to use hosting as a soft power tool to project its influence. However, Chinese media, in turn, emphasized the state of sharp international polarization and division, criticizing the political challenges and the wrangling that accompanied the broadcasting negotiations. Furthermore, a number of (commercial considerations) have been raised, with the tournament facing criticism from Chinese media due to its exorbitant cost and the significant time difference between North America and China, leading to a decline in Chinese public interest. This hesitation was reflected in the negotiations, as FIFA incurred financial losses after China Media Group (CMG) signed the broadcasting agreement late and at a price significantly lower than FIFA’s requested.

Regarding the (organizational and policy challenges), Chinese research and media institutions expressed reservations about the tournament’s logistical challenges, particularly the longer travel distances between host cities compared to previous editions, as well as concerns related to US immigration laws and security restrictions. Despite the absence of the Chinese national team from the tournament, China’s commercial involvement was substantial. Beijing demonstrated its active presence through Chinese commercial sponsors, such as Hisense, and sporting goods factories in eastern China, which reaped significant economic benefits from manufacturing tournament flags and souvenirs. Chinese media coverage, particularly through its official channels, was extensive. CGTN, the Chinese state broadcaster, developed comprehensive plans to broadcast and cover the matches, ensuring the event reached millions of Chinese fans across its various platforms.

Furthermore, Chinese state media and intelligence and military think tanks utilized Washington’s hosting of the FIFA World Cup to offer a number of strategic, media, and intellectual analyses regarding China’s calculations in response to American actions. Major events are often used as a primary arena for geopolitical competition between the two superpowers. Beijing’s vision can be summarized by its use of major sporting, cultural, and other events as a political tool. Beijing views Washington’s hosting of major international tournaments or events as more than just sporting or cultural occasions; it sees them as an extension of American information and decision-making strategies aimed at projecting American influence and hegemony globally. While China seeks to highlight international contradictions, Beijing has directed its media apparatus to demonstrate that Washington’s attempts to unilaterally assume leadership or project messages of unity are, in reality, met with sharp division and polarization within the international system. Here, China has attempted to counter American soft power. This media coverage of the FIFA World Cup in the United States reflects a continuous Chinese effort to neutralize Western and American soft power by focusing on structural issues in international relations, such as the absence of multipolarity, and by promoting the Chinese model as an alternative striving for a more balanced world.

In this context, Chinese media and think tanks view the United States’ hosting of the World Cup through the lens of soft power, geopolitical strategies, and trade, while sharply criticizing the infrastructure and political circumstances surrounding the tournament, particularly in the aftermath of the Iran War and a number of global geopolitical upheavals stemming from US policies. Chinese analyses focus on purely commercial interests, criticizing the exorbitant costs of broadcasting rights. Conversely, they highlight the role of leading Chinese companies in profiting from the event by providing innovative and advanced broadcasting technologies and exporting merchandise and fan supplies. However, they also offer several critical observations regarding the infrastructure and political climate. Chinese research centers express critical skepticism about the readiness of US cities, suggesting that complexities related to visa requirements and a strict security and political environment could hinder fans and undermine the freedom of movement necessary for such events.

Based on the preceding understanding and analysis, we can discern the perspective of Chinese media and research centers that the United States exploits hosting international sporting and political events as a prominent tool for employing sports to enhance American soft power, attempting to project influence to manage conflict, and solidifying its leadership of the global order. Therefore, Chinese think tanks and intelligence agencies have developed a comprehensive media and research plan to expose American polarization worldwide. Conversely, Chinese media and think tanks emphasize Washington’s failure to garner international consensus, highlighting the sharp division and widening gap between Western powers and the rising powers of the Global South. This underscores the mechanism of conflict transformation, where competition is no longer limited to the economic and military spheres but has expanded significantly to encompass soft power tools and media discourse. This reflects a picture of expanded strategic competition and its impact on international stability.

Source link

Trump Calls Iran Deal Leak False

U. S. President Donald Trump expressed on Friday that Iran’s comments about a potential deal do not match what has been agreed in writing. He described their statement as weak and claimed they are not trustworthy in negotiations. Trump emphasized the urgency for Iran to “get their act together. “

On Thursday, Trump had decided against new strikes on Iran, believing a deal had been made. According to Iranian officials, the deal would meet many of their demands, while Trump did not achieve much besides the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran had closed following attacks he ordered in February.

A senior Iranian source stated that the draft deal would lift sanctions on Iran’s oil, unfreeze billions of dollars of Iranian assets, and require an end to hostilities in various regions, including Lebanon. Discussions on nuclear issues would be postponed. The U. S. aims for a deal to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, while Iran insists it does not seek such weapons. The source did not mention what Iran might offer in return.

With information from Reuters

Source link

Thousands welcome U.S. men’s soccer team to SoCal ahead of World Cup

With its World Cup opener just four days away, the U.S. team moved into its temporary home in Irvine on Monday, where the players found thousands of new Southern California neighbors waiting in line to watch them kick a ball.

After the U.S. announced that Orange County Great Park would be its base for at least the group stage of the tournament, the City of Irvine held a raffle for passes to see the team train in its only public workout.

Thirty-two thousand people applied and 5,500 received access on a warm Monday morning to watch the team rush through a light 45-minute practice that was notable primarily because it was the first in which injured center back Chris Richards was fully involved. Richards tore two ligaments in his left ankle playing for Crystal Palace, his English club team, on May 17 and hadn’t played or fully trained since. The team is rushing to get him ready in the hopes he can play at some point in the three-game group stage.

But the practice was also notable because it was the first at Championship Soccer Stadium, about 50 miles southeast of SoFi Stadium in Inglewood, where the U.S. will open its World Cup on Friday against Paraguay.

“[The] environment and facilities are crazy. It’s more than we expect,” U.S. coach Mauricio Pochettino said of the venue. “We are so grateful.”

Championship Soccer Stadium is owned and managed by the city, which has leased it to the Orange County Soccer Club of the second-tier USL Championship. But the club was temporarily evicted in late April to make space for the national team — which is just fine with them.

Irvine, CA - June 08: USMNT player Chris Richards autographs the shirt of a young fan.

U.S. men’s soccer player Chris Richards autographs the shirt of a young fan during a team practice Monday.

(Ronaldo Bolaños / Los Angeles Times)

“How can you not be excited about the host nation training in your facility?” said Dan Rutstein, president of business operations of the Orange County club.

“We’re proud to be associated with the U.S. national team. We wouldn’t want to ever block anything, even if we could.”

(And they couldn’t, the city said.)

The Great Park is a sprawling 500-acre complex built on the site of the former Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, which closed in 1999 after 56 years training pilots for conflicts from World War II through the first Gulf War. In 2001, voters approved a proposal to convert the space into a public park and nature preserve, one which now includes, among other things, five sand volleyball courts, four basketball courts, 25 tennis courts, 12 softball and baseball fields, the ice arena where the Ducks practice and 25 soccer fields, including the pristine one FIFA just installed inside the 5,500-seat stadium.

“The idea was that this would be a quality facility, a great park that we hope will rival San Diego’s Balboa Park and other great parks across the country,” Irvine mayor Larry Agran said. “It took a lot of nurturing, a lot of time, a lot of work.”

Bringing the World Cup — or at least a World Cup team — to Irvine also took a lot of time and work. Agran said the city put out feelers about hosting a training base five years ago and made the first cut in 2024 when the Great Park was placed on a list of options distributed to tournament qualifiers.

Over the next two years, Rutstein said, about a dozen national teams sent representatives to have a look while Sam Zapatka, the operations manager of the USMNT, said he scouted 27 facilities from Seattle to San Diego. After his first visit to the Great Park, however, he said he stopped looking and in March, the team announced it would train in Irvine.

On Monday, when the players filed out of the stadium’s locker room, which FIFA expanded and upgraded, they were greeted by rhythmic clapping and chants of “USA! USA!”

1

U.S. men's soccer player Weston McKennie takes part in a training session at

2

U.S. men's soccer players (from left) Weston McKennie, Christian Pulisic and Sergino Dest take part in a training session.

3

U.S. men's national soccer team coach Mauricio Pochettino waves to fans attending practice on Monday.

4

U.S. coach Mauricio Pochettino speaks to players after

1. U.S. men’s soccer player Weston McKennie takes part in a training session at Orange County Great Park. (Ronaldo Bolanos / Los Angeles Times) 2. (Ronaldo Bolanos/Los Angeles Times) 3. U.S. men’s national soccer team coach Mauricio Pochettino waves to fans attending practice on Monday. 4. Pochettino speaks to players after drills at Orange County Great Park on Monday. (Ronaldo Bolanos / Los Angeles Times)

“I think we’ve all been, I wouldn’t say overwhelmed, but possibly surprised by the excitement and the buzz,” said captain Tim Ream, who led the team onto the field. “Pulling up here with 5,500 fans ready to watch a training session is incredible.

“We get to train in an actual stadium with a good pitch. The support, really, from all the kids out there is amazing. You want to feel like you have a good home base, right? So really, we’re looking forward to being here.”

Especially after 5,000 of your neighbors show up for the housewarming party.

Source link

China’s military and intelligence views on Lebanon-Israel talks

China strongly condemns the Israeli airstrikes and ground incursion into southern Lebanon, describing these operations as a dangerous escalation that threatens the stability of the entire region. China demands that Israel immediately cease its military operations and fully withdraw its forces from Lebanese territory, warning of the dangers of its incursions and violations of established lines. China views the fourth round of Washington talks between Lebanon and Israel and the military tensions as an extension of a broader crisis. Beijing sees this conflict as a consequence of the Gaza war, emphasizing clear principles in its intelligence and military assessment of the situation across several axes, most notably the necessity of an Israeli withdrawal and a ceasefire. Beijing calls for an immediate cessation of military operations and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory, warning that expanding ground operations will drag the region into chaos. China’s efforts in the reconstruction of Lebanon focus on providing urgent humanitarian aid packages, signing development cooperation agreements, and encouraging Chinese companies to participate in infrastructure projects and long-term investments within the framework of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. China also defended the Lebanese position in the face of Israeli escalation at the United Nations, with its representative to the Security Council emphasizing that Israel’s advance to Beaufort Castle (Qalaat Al-Shaqif) was the most serious incursion into southern Lebanon in 30 years. He called on the international community to take urgent measures before the situation in Lebanon deteriorated further, demanding respect for Lebanese sovereignty and the withdrawal of all Israeli forces from southern Lebanon.

The most prominent features of these Chinese efforts for joint cooperation with the Lebanese side and the international community in the reconstruction of Lebanon and the cessation of Israeli attacks on southern Lebanon are the provision of direct financial and development support. The Chinese and Lebanese governments signed a development cooperation agreement in Beirut worth 50 million Chinese yuan to support reconstruction and sustainable development efforts, along with the provision of urgent humanitarian aid. China delivered shipments of emergency humanitarian aid through the Port of Beirut to alleviate the economic and living burdens on the Lebanese people. Furthermore, China encouraged the participation of Chinese companies and investments in reconstruction and development efforts in Lebanon. Beijing has expressed its readiness to encourage its major companies and national institutions to participate in Lebanon’s reconstruction projects and support the development of the energy, telecommunications, and infrastructure sectors through China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Lebanon has been a partner in this Chinese initiative since joining in 2017. China aims to enhance Lebanon’s role as a pivotal hub for trade and logistics in the Middle East. In addition to sustained Chinese diplomatic efforts, China has continued its diplomatic and developmental support for Lebanon, alongside its active participation in UN peacekeeping operations in southern Lebanon.

China’s role in halting the Israeli war on Lebanon has focused on exerting diplomatic pressure through the United Nations and utilizing international platforms to call for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory, while supporting political and diplomatic solutions to prevent the conflict from escalating. China has consistently called for an end to Israeli military operations against Lebanon during UN sessions and warned that the collapse of ceasefires places the region on a more dangerous precipice. Beijing called for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from the devastated Lebanese territories, emphasizing the need to respect international resolutions, Lebanon’s sovereignty and independence, and the protection of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). China stressed the importance of ensuring that UN peacekeepers could carry out their duties freely and safely and condemned any attacks against UNIFIL personnel. China also emphasized the need to intensify humanitarian aid to the Lebanese people to address the repercussions of the war and expressed its full readiness to contribute to restoring regional stability.

Here, Chinese diplomatic and intelligence agencies affirmed that Lebanon’s sovereignty and security must not be violated, stressing that extending the authority of the Lebanese state and protecting its stability are the fundamental pillars for preventing the entire region from sliding into a comprehensive regional war. They reiterated the necessity of respecting Lebanon’s sovereignty and security, considering the stability and protection of the Lebanese state as essential to preventing a full-blown regional war. China also expressed its full support for the role of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and emphasized the need to provide guarantees for its protection and freedom of movement to carry out its mission. From an analytical perspective, Beijing believes that a political solution to the crisis must include respect for international resolutions and adherence to the two-state solution for Palestine and Israel. It also expressed concern that these negotiations might lead to regional arrangements that serve the interests of certain major powers and marginalize other parties in the region. On the other hand, China welcomes dialogue and diplomatic solutions as a means to ease tensions in the Middle East and supports efforts to restore Lebanon’s sovereignty. However, Beijing has criticized unilateral US actions in managing interconnected issues such as Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran, emphasizing the need to adhere to international resolutions and support regional stability, avoiding military interventions and the expansion of conflict.

Beijing adopts a clear strategic vision regarding the Lebanese crisis, which is summarized in its emphasis on respecting sovereignty. Chinese diplomacy strongly condemns any violations of Lebanese sovereignty and calls for an immediate halt to foreign military operations on Lebanese territory to ensure the safety of civilians. With Chinese intelligence and military agencies calling for a monopoly on weapons, a position reiterated by the Chinese Permanent Representative to the UN Security Council, China supports the Lebanese state as the sole guarantor of internal stability. This signifies Beijing’s strong support for the principle of state monopoly on weapons, considering official institutions the only guarantor of internal stability and the prevention of the country’s disintegration. China also supports the UNIFIL forces, opposing the termination of the UNIFIL mandate and demanding that it be enabled to fulfill its mission to ensure stability in southern Lebanon and contribute to regional de-escalation. Beijing emphasizes that escalation will not resolve crises, urging conflicting parties (including Washington and Tehran) to prioritize diplomacy and political negotiation to exercise restraint.

Source link

World Cup 2026: USA pioneer Desmond Armstrong and his legacy

Football came to Armstrong, via a television set, in suburbia.

His family moved from the Southeast part of Washington DC when Armstrong was young and later settled in a largely white neighbourhood in Maryland, where he befriended a soccer coach’s son. One afternoon, the coach called Armstrong over to the television.

He was pointing to a Brazilian in a New York Cosmos jersey.

“It was Pele,” says Armstrong.

“His movement reminded me of a lot of the point guards that played basketball, but he was doing it with a ball at his feet.

“He was one of the few black players on the team, so that connected me.”

While Pele was popularising a game he’d learned barefoot on the streets of Brazil, much of the American grassroots version was being built on privilege.

Unlike the developing youth academies of Europe and South America, where clubs like Ajax and Barcelona were putting money into young talent, development in the US has long run on a pay-to-play model.

Families must meet significant costs or seek sponsorship to give their children a shot at advancing – creating a system that has seldom favoured those from less affluent households.

“It’s kind of antithetical to what this game’s all about,” says Frank Dell’Apa, who has spent 40 years as the Boston Globe’s football columnist, covering the game since the days of the original North American Soccer League (NASL).

“This is the simplest game with the easiest access. Everybody plays it around the world with no money, no soccer balls, no shoes. And here, we had just the opposite thing going on.”

Armstrong knows just how easily his story could have been different.

“If my folks didn’t move into the suburbs, then hands down I’m not playing soccer,” he says.

Socioeconomics was not the only hurdle.

The NASL going under in 1985 during Armstrong’s time as a college player limited professional pathways for him and his peers before their careers had even begun.

“For me, personally, that was crushing,” Armstrong says.

He turned to the Major Indoor Soccer League to play professionally, where his performances earned him a US men’s national team debut in 1987, followed by a spot at the 1988 Seoul Olympics.

“I remember being on the field, hearing the national anthem and just thinking ‘this is where I’m supposed to be’,” he says.

That same year, world football’s governing body Fifa had selected the USA to host the 1994 World Cup finals – the first time the tournament had gone to a country outside Europe or Latin America.

They would be under the global spotlight.

“The US was not a factor in world soccer at all,” says Dell’Apa.

“I remember Des playing a lot of games on artificial turf. It was hard for those guys. They had to fight to get into line-ups, to get a playing field, to get a stadium.”

With no elite outdoor professional league in the country, the player pool was a fragmented mix largely consisting of college, semi-pro and indoor players like Armstrong.

The federation looked to work around this by securing a core group of them on full-time contracts, essentially turning the national team into the country’s professional set-up. It was an unorthodox approach, not unlike something from the Eastern Bloc playbook.

They appointed a German-Hungarian head coach named Bob Gansler. Armstrong was now among a group of young players who were handed a near impossible task: qualify for the 1990 World Cup in Italy.

Source link

Are Hidden Oil Flows From Hormuz Reshaping the Energy Market?

Oil shipments passing through the Strait of Hormuz have quietly increased in recent weeks, but traders say the movement reflects a fragmented and opaque energy market rather than a full recovery in global supply flows.

More than four months into the ongoing conflict involving Iran, tanker traffic remains heavily disrupted, with shipping patterns increasingly shaped by risk, secrecy and shifting political arrangements.

Tanker Traffic Shows Limited but Rising Movement

Shipping data suggests that only a small number of tankers are currently crossing the Strait of Hormuz compared with pre conflict levels.

Monitoring firms including LSEG and Kpler estimate that an average of just a few vessels per day are now passing through the strait, far below normal volumes.

Despite this, analysis of oil stored on tankers in the Gulf indicates that outflows have gradually increased, suggesting more crude is leaving the region than official shipping visibility shows.

Hidden Shipping Patterns and “Dark” Tankers

A growing share of tankers are reportedly turning off tracking systems during transit through the strait, a practice known as going dark.

This involves disabling Automatic Identification System signals, making it harder to track vessel movements in real time.

According to shipping analytics firms such as Vortexa, a large majority of outbound tankers recently used this method, reflecting rising caution among operators.

This has made it significantly harder for markets to accurately assess global supply flows and has increased uncertainty in oil pricing.

Oil Stored on Tankers Shows Gradual Decline

One key indicator of market movement is the volume of oil stored on ships inside the Gulf, often referred to as oil on water.

Estimates from Kpler suggest that volumes have fallen from a peak of around 184 million barrels in March to roughly 148 million barrels more recently.

This decline indicates that more oil is gradually leaving the region, even if it is not fully visible through standard tracking systems.

Analysts estimate that outflows have increased over recent weeks, suggesting a slow and uneven recovery in shipping activity.

Security Risks Continue to Disrupt Shipping

The ongoing conflict involving Iran has significantly disrupted maritime trade through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important oil transit routes.

Limited access to the strait has forced producers to reduce output in some cases, while storage constraints have added pressure to supply chains across the Gulf.

Some shipping routes are reportedly being managed through informal arrangements or alternative corridors, while others rely on higher risk transit strategies to avoid detection or confrontation.

Recovery Remains Uncertain

Despite signs of increased movement, analysts warn that the situation is far from a return to normal.

A sustained recovery in oil flows would require consistent shipping access, stable security conditions and sufficient tanker availability to support exports.

Many shipowners remain reluctant to operate in the region due to elevated insurance costs and the risk of vessels being stranded or targeted.

Long Term Structural Change Possible

Industry observers warn that even if diplomatic progress leads to a formal reopening of the strait, the global oil market may not return to previous conditions.

There is growing discussion that Iran could attempt to impose tolls or control systems on shipping through the waterway, which would fundamentally alter global energy logistics.

Such a scenario could force Gulf producers to seek alternative export routes or invest in new infrastructure to reduce dependence on the strait.

Analysis: Market Stability Replaced by Managed Uncertainty

The situation in the Strait of Hormuz highlights a shift from predictable global energy flows to a more fragmented and opaque system.

While oil continues to move out of the Gulf, the lack of transparency in shipping routes is creating uncertainty for traders and pricing benchmarks.

The increased use of stealth navigation and alternative transit arrangements reflects a market adapting to geopolitical risk rather than resolving it.

As long as tensions persist, energy markets are likely to remain volatile, with supply visibility as important as supply itself in determining global prices.

Conclusion

Oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz are slowly increasing, but hidden tanker movements and ongoing conflict mean the global energy market remains deeply uncertain. Without stable political conditions and transparent shipping routes, a full recovery in oil flows is unlikely in the near term, keeping traders cautious and markets volatile.

With information from Reuters.

Source link

Leadership Factor in Trump’s Iran War Policy: A Case Study

Introduction:

In recent years, the security strategy and foreign policy of the United States have witnessed a fundamental transformation in their main principles, as demonstrated by the second US-Israeli war against Iran, which this author refers to as the “Second Iran War” to distinguish it from the first military confrontation between these three parties in the summer of 2025, known as the “Twelve-Day War.”

The leadership factor, represented by President Donald Trump, has become an unprecedentedly broad influence on the decision-making process related to US foreign policy and national security, whether concerning the declaration and conclusion of war, or even in peacetime, particularly regarding Washington’s relations with its traditional allies in Europe and the Middle East.

This analysis focuses on the case of the “Second Iran War” as a clear example of the increasing role of the US president’s personal characteristics in shaping strategic decisions related to this war and managing Washington’s relations with its partners in the Arabian Gulf region.

This analysis is divided into two main sections, as follows:

First, the traditional determinants of US security strategy and foreign policy.

Second, the Trump administration and the growing role of the president in foreign policy and national security.

Third, the Second Iran War as a model for the increasing influence of the leadership factor in the US decision-making process.

First, the traditional determinants of US security strategy and foreign policy:

There is a set of traditional constraints governing decision-making in the United States, both in domestic and foreign policy. These constraints stem intrinsically from the nature of the American political system, the constitutional and societal environment within which it operates, and the historical development of the nation some 250 years ago.

In summary, these constraints can be divided into the following:

1. Constitutional and historical constraints, including the federal constitution and the practical actions of foreign and security policy-making institutions over the past decades.

2. Institutional determinants, which consist of the roles exercised by the legislative, executive, and judicial branches as defined by the Constitution, including: Congress (the House of Representatives and the Senate), and the federal departments and agencies concerned with U.S. foreign policy and national security (the Departments of State and Defense, the National Security Council, and the various intelligence agencies, most notably the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)).

3. Political determinants, foremost among them the role played by the President of the United States in decision-making—what political literature calls the “leadership factor”—which is determined, broadly or narrowly, by a range of considerations, including: the President’s political experience, personal characteristics and interests, and ideological orientations, convictions, and personal preferences.

Traditionally, American historical experience indicates that constitutional and institutional constraints have a dominant influence on foreign policy and national security decision-making, compared to the limited influence of the president’s personal characteristics and psychological environment.

This has resulted in a near-consistency in the general direction of US foreign policy and security strategy across successive administrations, regardless of the president’s party affiliation (Democrat or Republican) or personality traits.

Second, the Trump administration and the growing role of the president in foreign policy and national security:

Unlike previous administrations, Republican President Donald Trump, since his first presidential term (2016-2020), has expanded his role in the decision-making process related to US foreign policy and its security strategy abroad, to the point of bypassing the federal institutions responsible for making this policy and strategy, or at the very least marginalizing the role of these institutions and failing to coordinate with them in advance in an unprecedented manner.

Trump’s interference in this regard, and his violation of institutional limits during his second presidential term, which began in January 2025, has increased to the point of causing great embarrassment to those in charge of American foreign and security policy-making institutions on the one hand, and on the other hand, it has led to pushing towards taking decisions – or at best adopting a declared political discourse – that has caused great damage to the foreign relations of the United States and posed a threat to its strategic interests as a superpower, whether with its immediate geographical neighborhood in the Americas (Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, and Cuba), or with its traditional transatlantic allies (Europe and NATO), and finally with important partners in the Middle East region.

Without going into detail about the reasons for this excessive interference by President Trump in American foreign policy and security strategy, in our estimation, this is largely due to the psychological and personal characteristics of the Republican president, whose political discourse and vocabulary indicate that he considers himself the “savior” of the United States and personally qualified to restore it to its glory, which he expresses in his election slogan “Make America Great Again.”

Third, the Second Iran War as a model for the increasing influence of the leadership factor in the US decision-making process:

The events of the second Iran-Iraq War, which began on February 28, 2016, provide a clear example of the growing influence of leadership dynamics, at the expense of constitutional and institutional constraints, in shaping and implementing American foreign policy and security strategy decisions under the Trump administration.

This assertion is supported by two key indicators, as follows:

1. Washington’s Decisions to Launch the War and the Negotiations Related to Ending It:

A close examination of Washington’s decision to launch the war against Iran on the morning of Saturday, February 28, 2026, reveals that President Trump based this decision on his personal convictions regarding the reliability of the reports and information provided to him by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu – with whom he has a friendly and politically harmonious relationship – concerning the threat posed by Tehran’s nuclear program and its ballistic missile capabilities to Israel, America, and the region. He believed that the opportunity was ripe to quickly eliminate the religious regime in Iran by launching a powerful and swift military strike that would lead to its downfall after instigating an internal uprising.

In contrast, Trump ignored warnings from US foreign policy, national security, and defense institutions about the risks and feasibility of a war against Iran from the perspective of vital US interests in the Middle East. The Republican president also disregarded the reservations of senior administration officials regarding this military strike, including Vice President J.D. Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Special Envoy for Middle East Peace Steve Wittkopf.

Further bolstering this claim are Trump’s attempts to deny that Israel pushed him into this war. He has asserted on more than one occasion that he made the decision himself, and even that he was the one who pushed Tel Aviv to engage in it. He has also emphasized on other occasions that the matter of negotiating and ending the war is solely his responsibility, and that Netanyahu is simply doing what he asks of him regarding the war with Iran.

According to the literature of political psychology and the principles of political communication, when politicians exaggerate their denial of something, or deny it without directly accusing them, it often confirms the accusation, not the other way around.

This claim is is further supported by reports in the US indicating that Trump sent the Israeli Prime Minister a draft memorandum of understanding between Washington and Tehran to end the war, as part of the US president’s consultations to reach a final decision on ending the conflict.

This means that Trump made his decision to wage war on Iran—and will most likely make his final decision regarding negotiations to end it—based on elements of his psychological environment and personality traits, and not on the factual data contained in the reports and recommendations of the foreign policy and national security agencies, which are based primarily on the strategic interests of the United States and its international and regional orientations.

2. The Harshness and Crudeness of US Presidential Rhetoric Towards Strategic Partners in the Arabian Gulf:

President Trump’s public political discourse since the start of the war has included statements characterized by an unprecedented level of harshness in American policy towards Washington’s strategic partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.

For decades, the United States has maintained a balanced and rational approach to its relations with the Gulf states, a relationship cemented by strategic alliances and defense agreements since the 1991 Gulf War. This was true even during periods of open tension or simmering resentment between the US and some Gulf capitals.

In our estimation, this is explained by the fact that successive administrations and presidents in the White House have based their decisions, policies, and political discourse in general, and towards their allies and strategic partners in particular, on the constitutional and institutional parameters for drawing up and making Washington’s foreign policy and security strategy, especially in the vital geographical areas for national security and American strategic interests, as is the case with the Middle East region and at its heart the Arabian Gulf region.

However, in a departure from this approach and in an unprecedented move, the second Iran-Iraq War witnessed Trump’s political rhetoric, which included insults to some Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and belittling of others. He even went so far as to issue explicit and public threats against one of the Gulf Arab states, the Sultanate of Oman, in a surprising, shocking, and unprecedented act.

On May 28, 2016, Trump threatened Oman, saying he would “blow it up” if it cooperated with Iran on joint management of the Strait of Hormuz. The US Treasury Department also threatened to impose sanctions on Muscat if it proceeded with an agreement with Tehran to manage the strait, which Iran had used as a weapon of economic pressure during the war.

Conclusion:

The leadership factor, represented by the president’s personal characteristics, psychological environment, and political beliefs, has become the pivotal and most important factor in shaping US foreign policy and national security decisions during the administration of President Donald Trump, including the decision to go to war. This has come at the expense of the diminishing influence of other objective determinants, most notably constitutional and institutional ones.

This was clearly evident in Trump’s behavior and political rhetoric during the Second Iran War. This unprecedented development is likely to continue during the remaining two years of the Republican president’s term, until 2028.

The second Iran war demonstrated that such actions would negatively impact Washington’s future relations with its allies and strategic partners, or at the very least, erode trust in it as a reliable and credible international partner.

Furthermore, it would severely damage the prevailing image of the United States, both in the eyes of American and international public opinion, as an international superpower governed by institutions rather than individuals.

Source link

Hegseth Warns of China Threat, Urges Allies to Ramp Up Defense Spending

U. S. Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth called on Asian allies to increase military spending to counter China’s rising influence during his speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. He expressed concern over China’s military buildup and its potential to disrupt the regional balance of power. Hegseth emphasized the need for a robust network of allies that can deter aggression and maintain stability. The U. S. expects allies to raise defense spending to 3.5% of GDP, while the U. S. itself is investing $1.5 trillion in its military.

Hegseth addressed the need for action over discussions, suggesting that the region requires more military resources, such as ships and submarines, rather than just conferences. He underlined that partners want stability and that the U. S. must exhibit strength and disciplined leadership. He also noted improvements in U. S.-China relations, citing increased military communication to help manage tensions, while acknowledging that the relationship remains complicated.

Zhou Bo, a Chinese delegate, recognized a better tone in Hegseth’s remarks compared to the previous year, attributing this change to previous diplomatic engagements. He stated that both nations have communication channels open and that the situation might not be as severe as perceived. Hegseth reiterated President Trump’s call for allies to take more responsibility for their defense costs, proclaiming an end to U. S. defense subsidies for wealthy nations, emphasizing the need for allies to contribute actively.

Hegseth praised contributions from various allies and highlighted Japan’s efforts to enhance its defenses alongside the U. S. Regarding the Middle East, he stated the U. S. is prepared to resume strikes on Iran if diplomatic efforts fail and emphasized the ability to focus on both Asian and Middle Eastern interests simultaneously.

On the topic of arms sales to Taiwan, Hegseth avoided directly addressing concerns but affirmed that decisions about such sales are ultimately up to President Trump. The U. S. is reportedly considering a substantial arms package for Taiwan, which China views as its territory. Hegseth assured that there has been no change in U. S. policy towards Taiwan despite the ongoing dynamics in U. S.-China relations.

With information from Reuters

Source link

Mauricio Pochettino: USA boss holds initial talks with AC Milan over managerial vacancy

Mauricio Pochettino has held initial talks with AC Milan to become their next manager following Massimiliano Allegri’s sacking.

The 54-year-old Argentine is currently preparing for the World Cup with the United States, but his contract expires after the tournament.

Pochettino’s immediate focus is on this summer’s finals, which begin on 11 June and are being co-hosted by the US, Canada and Mexico, but an eventual return to club football may interest the former Tottenham and Chelsea head coach.

However, speaking after training on Thursday, Pochettino replied “no” when asked if he had met with AC Milan’s management before being opaque about his representatives’ dealings with the Serie A side.

When asked if his representatives had had a meeting, he replied: “Maybe, possible, because they need to do their job.”

He added: “If I met someone, what happened? What is going to change if I met someone?

“We have friends everywhere and my representative works for me into trying to find the best possibility for the future. That is normal.”

Pochettino said he and US Soccer Federation chief executive JT Batson had discussed the possibility of him staying.

“He asked if we are open to listen [to] the project of the federation for the next four years,” said Pochettino.

“And we said of course we are open. Do you think that if we have a commitment with another people, we are going to waste time to listen?”

Batson said Pochettino has been “incredibly transparent” about approaches from other clubs, right from when they first met a couple of years ago, and that “there were lots of people interested in Mauricio and his team”.

Batson added: “He had standing offers from other places and he wanted to be here. He’s a big believer in what we’re doing at US Soccer. He’s a big believer in soccer in America, and he’s a big believer in this men’s team.”

Pochettino’s last club spell was as Chelsea boss for the 2023-24 season, with the Blues finishing sixth in the Premier League and losing the Carabao Cup final to Liverpool.

Before that he was at Paris St-Germain for a season and a half, winning the Ligue 1 title and French Cup.

He also had a five-and-a-half-year spell at Tottenham and reached the 2019 Champions League final, only for Spurs to lose 2-0 to Liverpool.

Pochettino, who has also managed Espanyol in Spain and Southampton, was a defender during his playing career and made 20 appearances for Argentina.

AC Milan sacked Allegri earlier this week after failing to qualify for the Champions League, in a season the club’s hierarchy described as an “unequivocal failure”.

Milan dropped from third place to fifth in Serie A after a 2-1 home defeat by Cagliari on the final day to miss out on the elite European competition for the second year in a row, although they did secure a Europa League spot.

Source link

European Shares Slip as US Strikes on Iran Dampen Peace Deal Hopes and Push Oil Higher

European shares edged lower on Tuesday as hopes for an imminent de-escalation in the Middle East conflict faded following fresh U.S. strikes on Iran, triggering renewed geopolitical uncertainty across global financial markets.

The pan-European STOXX Europe 600 Index slipped 0.2% to 630.33 points by 0833 GMT, retreating from gains that had recently pushed it close to record levels.

On Monday, the index had closed at its highest level since late February, briefly coming within 1% of an all-time high on optimism that diplomatic progress could soon ease tensions in the region.

That momentum quickly reversed after renewed military action and comments from U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who said negotiations with Iran could take “a few days,” tempering expectations of a near-term resolution.

Oil Prices Jump as Hormuz Risks Return to Focus

Global energy markets reacted sharply to the escalation, with Brent crude rising more than 3%, reigniting inflation concerns across energy-importing economies, particularly in the euro zone.

The market remains highly sensitive to risks surrounding the Strait of Hormuz, a critical global shipping route through which a significant share of the world’s oil flows.

Analysts warned that any sustained disruption in the region could deepen inflationary pressures just as central banks weigh their next policy moves.

Airlines and Autos Under Pressure

Travel and transport-related stocks were among the biggest losers in Tuesday’s session.

Airlines including Lufthansa and Ryanair fell 1.4% and 0.7% respectively, reflecting investor concerns that higher fuel costs could squeeze margins.

Luxury and automotive stocks also came under pressure after Ferrari dropped sharply following the unveiling of its first fully electric vehicle.

The decline was compounded by a broader sell-off in the European autos sector, which fell 1.6% as investors reassessed competition risks from Chinese EV manufacturers and weakening global demand trends.

Market Sentiment Balances War Risk and Policy Signals

Despite renewed volatility, some investors noted that markets remain partially supported by expectations that diplomacy could still stabilize the situation.

One portfolio manager at Franklin Templeton said markets were reacting cautiously because investors believe a potential agreement could still restore stability in the Strait of Hormuz and normalize energy flows.

However, uncertainty around timing and scope continues to limit upside momentum in equities.

Inflation and Central Bank Policy Back in Focus

Attention is now shifting toward upcoming inflation data across major euro zone economies and the United States, which will help shape expectations for future monetary policy.

European Central Bank policymaker Yiannis Stournaras signaled that any persistent inflation overshoot would require a cautious shift toward tighter policy.

Market pricing currently suggests at least two further 25-basis-point interest rate moves before year-end, according to LSEG data.

Corporate Movers: Winners and Losers

While broader markets weakened, some stocks moved against the trend.

Kingfisher rose 2% after maintaining its full-year profit guidance, easing concerns about demand softness in the home improvement sector.

However, the overall tone remained risk-off as investors continued to weigh geopolitical escalation against macroeconomic uncertainty.

Analysis

The latest pullback in European equities reflects a familiar pattern: markets oscillating between hopes of geopolitical de-escalation and fears of renewed conflict risk in the Middle East.

The key transmission channel remains energy. With Europe heavily dependent on imported oil and gas, any disruption involving Iran or the Strait of Hormuz immediately feeds into inflation expectations, bond yields, and corporate earnings outlooks.

At the same time, equity markets had recently been pricing in a relatively optimistic scenario in which diplomatic talks would gradually stabilize the region. That positioning left stocks vulnerable to abrupt reversals when military developments resurfaced.

Sectoral divergence also highlights how uneven the impact of geopolitical shocks can be. Energy-sensitive sectors such as airlines and autos are under pressure, while defensive or domestically oriented companies remain relatively insulated.

The broader question for markets is whether this marks a temporary setback in diplomatic momentum or a deeper breakdown in expectations for a negotiated settlement. If tensions persist, volatility in oil markets is likely to remain the dominant driver of global equity sentiment in the near term.

With information from Reuters.

Source link

Critical Minerals Rush Risks Creating Global Oversupply, Industry Warns

Western governments are pouring tens of billions of dollars into critical minerals projects as they attempt to reduce dependence on China for materials essential to clean energy, defence technology and advanced manufacturing.

But industry executives, analysts and investors are increasingly warning that poorly coordinated state-backed investment could create severe oversupply problems similar to past commodity booms that ended in market crashes.

The concerns come as countries including the United States, Australia, European Union and Japan accelerate efforts to build strategic reserves and expand production of rare earths and other critical minerals.

Governments Ramp Up Critical Minerals Spending

The United States has committed more than $20 billion toward critical minerals development through multiple financing programmes, including Project Vault, a strategic stockpiling initiative worth around $10 billion.

Australia has also allocated at least A$13 billion to support critical minerals projects and reserves through several government-backed programmes.

These investments are designed to secure supplies of metals used in electric vehicles, semiconductors, renewable energy systems, aerospace equipment and military technologies.

Particular attention has focused on rare earth elements, a group of 17 metals essential for producing powerful magnets used in advanced defence systems and high-tech manufacturing.

Although the global rare earths market was valued at only about $6.4 billion in 2024, combined Western financial commitments to rare earth projects have already exceeded that figure.

Fears Grow Over Potential Oversupply

Mining executives and analysts warn that aggressive subsidies and overlapping national strategies could eventually flood global markets with excess supply.

Brett Beatty of Resource Capital Funds said the biggest danger lies in governments pursuing independent strategies without coordination.

According to Beatty, simultaneous efforts to rapidly increase production could create volumes far beyond global demand, ultimately crushing prices and undermining the very industries governments are trying to build.

Analysts drew comparisons to historical commodity gluts, including Europe’s “butter mountains” of the 1980s, Russian aluminium oversupply and Australia’s wool crisis, where subsidies and state support distorted markets and triggered sharp price collapses.

Rare Earth Market Could Face Surplus Pressures

Consultancy Project Blue warned that several rare earth markets are already on track to move into surplus over the coming years due to expanding state-backed production.

However, analyst David Merriman said governments may still be able to avoid major imbalances if they carefully adjust subsidies, stockpiling programmes and guaranteed purchasing arrangements.

Industry leaders say current stockpiles remain relatively small, limiting immediate risks of market disruption.

Lynas Rare Earths CEO Amanda Lacaze recently said rare earth stockpiles around the world remain modest and are not yet large enough to destabilise markets.

Australian Resources Minister Madeleine King also argued that today’s critical minerals policies differ significantly from past commodity intervention failures because they are more targeted and linked to long-term industrial supply chains.

Global Coordination Emerging Among Western Allies

Concerns about duplication and oversupply are pushing Western governments toward greater policy coordination.

The Group of Seven is reportedly discussing the creation of a permanent secretariat focused on coordinating critical mineral strategies and ensuring continuity between rotating national presidencies.

Industry experts say such coordination could help prevent destructive competition between allied nations while supporting more stable investment planning.

Lessons From Congo and Indonesia

Governments outside the West have already experimented with aggressive intervention in mineral markets.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo boosted cobalt prices by introducing export quotas and stockpiling measures designed to increase mining revenues.

While the policy initially lifted prices, analysts warn prolonged restrictions could encourage manufacturers to seek alternative materials or suppliers.

Similarly, Indonesia dramatically expanded its dominance in nickel production after banning exports of raw nickel ore in 2020 to force domestic processing investment.

Indonesia’s production surged within just a few years, but authorities have since struggled with falling prices and oversupply, forcing Jakarta to tighten mining quotas and centralise export controls.

These examples highlight the difficulty governments face in balancing national industrial ambitions with long-term market stability.

Analysis

The global race for critical minerals is increasingly becoming a strategic contest shaped as much by geopolitics as by economics.

Western governments view supply chain independence as essential after years of relying heavily on China for processing capacity and rare earth production. The push is not simply about commercial competition — it is tied directly to national security, technological leadership and energy transition goals.

However, the very scale of state intervention now unfolding raises the risk of creating distorted markets. If multiple governments simultaneously subsidise production, guarantee prices and build stockpiles without coordination, supply could rapidly outpace actual industrial demand.

That scenario would likely trigger sharp price declines, weaken private investment and potentially create another boom-and-bust cycle in the mining sector.

At the same time, the market dynamics of critical minerals differ from traditional commodities. Many of these materials are essential for emerging technologies, and demand is expected to rise significantly over the next two decades as countries expand renewable energy infrastructure, battery production and semiconductor manufacturing.

This means governments are not only competing to secure supply today but also positioning themselves for future industrial dominance.

Another key challenge is that refining and processing capabilities remain heavily concentrated in China. Even if Western countries succeed in expanding mining output, they may still depend on Chinese infrastructure unless domestic processing networks are developed alongside extraction projects.

The growing emphasis on “friend-shoring” and allied supply chains reflects an attempt to address this vulnerability.

Industry experts also point to a more sustainable model emerging through byproduct extraction. Instead of building entirely new mines based purely on high prices, companies are increasingly looking to recover critical minerals from existing industrial operations, reducing the risk of uncontrolled supply growth.

Projects involving Alcoa, Sojitz and Trafigura illustrate how governments and corporations are experimenting with lower-risk approaches to expanding supply.

Ultimately, the success of Western critical minerals strategies may depend less on how much money governments spend and more on whether they can coordinate policies, manage supply carefully and build integrated processing ecosystems capable of competing with China over the long term.

With information from Reuters.

Source link

Trump Ties Iran Deal to Abraham Accords Expansion

Donald Trump announced that he has requested several countries, including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey, to join the Abraham Accords to normalize relations with Israel as part of an agreement with Iran.

U. S. President Donald Trump announced that he has requested several countries, including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey, to join the Abraham Accords to normalize relations with Israel as part of an agreement with Iran. He stated he spoke to the leaders of these countries, as well as the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, which have already signed the accords.

Trump expressed his wish for all these countries to immediately sign the accords and suggested that if Iran agrees to a deal with the U. S., it would be an honor to include Iran in this coalition. He mentioned the complexity of the negotiations that the U. S. has been working on and said most countries should be open to making a historic settlement with Iran.

While Trump indicated that negotiations with Iran were progressing, he didn’t provide details about a potential deal. He also noted that Egypt and Jordan already have relations with Israel, and he remains optimistic about Saudi Arabia joining the accords, although no movement from Riyadh has been observed.

With information from Reuters

Source link

Why Keeping Silence on Taiwan Is No Longer Safe

Strategic ambiguity, the US policy of neither explicitly supporting nor opposing Taiwanese independence, has been considered effective for decades in maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait. However, the summit between Trump and Xi Jinping on May 14-15, 2026, in Beijing revealed signs that this formula’s effectiveness is beginning to be limited. China pushed the US not merely to “not support” but to actively “oppose” Taiwanese independence. The US responded by displaying an inconsistent position. Taiwan openly asserted its sovereignty. All three responses emerged within less than 24 hours, and no international forum was able to manage the contradictions.

AT His strategic ambiguity is not simply a matter of US foreign policy. It reflects deeper limitations in the global governance system in addressing unresolved sovereignty issues. At the same time, China is actively promoting an alternative world order through its Belt and Road Initiative, non-interventionist principles, and multipolarity agenda, which indirectly influence how the Taiwan issue is positioned on the international stage. Without a concrete framework for joint governance, the potential for miscalculations across the Taiwan Strait will continue to increase.

On May 16, 2026, the day after Trump left Beijing, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued an official statement. Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation. It is not under Chinese rule. This statement was not new rhetoric.

What makes this significant is the context. Trump had just called a $14 billion arms sale to Taiwan a bargaining chip in negotiations with Xi Jinping. China had just successfully pushed the US to soften its tone on Taiwan. In less than 24 hours, three main actors make statements that cannot all be true at the same time. And there is no one international institution that has the authority to decide which is more valid.

This isn’t a sudden diplomatic failure. It’s the result of a policy of strategic ambiguity that has been in place for more than five decades and is now beginning to show its limitations.

Strategic ambiguity was once effective because all parties had an incentive not to test its limits. That situation is changing. China is becoming increasingly assertive. militarily and increasingly actively shaping an alternative global order. Taiwan is becoming more assertive in claiming its political identity. The US under Trump is increasingly unpredictable. In these conditions, the ambiguity that once served as a buffer for stability has now become a source of uncertainty. The global governance system lacks adequate instruments to fill the gaps left by this increasingly outdated formula.

Starting from the background, a US strategic ambiguity towards Taiwan was born of deliberate compromise. In the Shanghai Communique (1972), Washington used the word “recognizes” China’s position that Taiwan is part of China, not “accepts.” The difference in vocabulary was no accident. It opened diplomatic normalization with Beijing without formally abandoning Taipei.

This formula was then codified through the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 and three joint US-China communiques. During the Cold War era and the two decades that followed, this formula remained relatively stable because China was not yet strong enough to challenge it militarily and Taiwan was not yet confident enough to challenge it politically. As noted by T.Y. Wang in the journal Politics and Policy, strategic ambiguity is designed not only to deter China from attacking Taiwan but also to restrain Taiwan from taking steps that Beijing might deem provocative.

But the conditions that made that formula effective have changed structurally. Taiwan’s democratization since the 1990s has produced a political identity increasingly independent of the “One China” narrative. The PLA’s military modernization has changed the cost calculations of conflict. And Trump’s return to the White House has brought a transactional approach that, as noted by the Global Taiwan Institute, exacerbates existing ambiguities with conflicting signals that are record arms sales accompanied by a striking rhetorical silence on US security commitments to Taiwan.

On the ground, this uncertainty has already resulted in a measured escalation. Military exercises: Justice Mission 2025 In December 2025, a full-scale blockade of Taiwan was simulated, with over 90 aircraft crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait in a single day. These median line violations were not an anomaly. Since 2022, they have become increasingly routine and have rarely elicited an organized response from the international community.

The most important part to understand next is about the One China Policy. The One China Policy affirms that a single label includes three irreconcilable positions. Beijing maintains that Taiwan is an unreturned province and that reunification is a non-negotiable goal. Taipei maintains that the Republic of China (ROC) is a sovereign state that predates the People’s Republic of China and that the two have never ruled each other. Washington maintains its own version, based on the Taiwan Relations Act, that recognizes Beijing’s position without explicitly endorsing it.

These three positions exist simultaneously because they have never been tested in an international forum that has the authority to decide which is more valid. Brookings Institution; he noted that this policy was originally designed for a period when China was not yet acting like a revisionist power. Now, conditions have changed, and the old formula requires a recalibration that has yet to materialize.

There’s a compelling argument here. Strategic ambiguity has also served as a deterrent to war. It prevents China from attacking because it’s unsure whether the US will intervene. It also prevents Taiwan from declaring formal independence because it’s unsure whether the US would defend it. In this logic, ambiguity is a feature, not a bug.

However, analyst Brandon K. Yoder in the European Journal of International Relations, The effectiveness of deterrence hinges on credibility, which is currently eroding. When Trump called weapons for Taiwan a “negotiating chip,” he indirectly communicated to Beijing that the US commitment was conditional. When commitments are conditional, their deterrent effect is significantly weakened.

What results is not new stability, but rather an increasingly unpredictable gray area. Each party operates based on its own assumptions about the limits that can be tested. Without governance mechanisms that explicitly clarify these limits, the risk of miscalculation continues to grow.

The Taiwan issue cannot be read in isolation from China’s broader agenda of reshaping the global order. Over the past two decades, Beijing has not only protested the existing international system but also actively developed an alternative.

The Belt and Road Initiative, which now encompasses more than 140 countries, is more than just an infrastructure project. As analyzed in China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies, BRI serves as both a governance and economic mechanism, linking infrastructure development with new standards of connectivity and cooperation that reflect the Chinese model of development without political conditions.

Beyond the BRI, China is actively pushing three major initiatives: the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Governance Initiative. They share a common thread that is strengthening the norm of sovereignty, rejecting intervention based on Western values, and promoting multipolarity as a substitute for single-party hegemony. Bruegel noted that the concept of “Community with a Shared Future for Mankind” popularized by Xi at Davos 2017 has even been included in several UN General Assembly resolutions, demonstrating how far China has succeeded in pushing its global narrative into multilateral institutions.

The relevance to the Taiwan issue is that the more countries accept China’s sovereignty-based, non-interference-based governance framework, the more limited the space for international mechanisms to challenge Beijing’s claims to Taiwan. China’s global governance agenda and its claims to Taiwan are not separate issues. They are part of the same project: redefining who has the right to set the rules of the game in what have traditionally been called “internal affairs.”

This also makes Trump’s and Xi’s bilateral approach a more suitable instrument for China’s interests. When the Taiwan issue is managed through negotiations between the two great powers, broader norms, such as the right to self-determination and representation of sovereign entities, are not discussed. Observer Research Foundation noted that BRI cooperation with the UN from 2015 to 2019 was more about mutual legitimacy than structural integration, and a similar pattern is seen in the way China uses multilateral forums to validate its diplomatic positions without actually committing to the process.

Trump’s and Xi’s meeting in May 2026 shows a pattern that deserves serious attention. That is, the Taiwan issue is now managed almost entirely outside the multilateral framework. There are no regional forums, no UN mechanisms, no activated joint protocols. There are just two leaders, two delegations, and an agenda far broader than just Taiwan.

Observation: Both sides reveal a glaring asymmetry. In China’s version, Taiwan is referred to as the “most important issue,” and Xi warned of potential conflict if handled incorrectly. In the US version, Taiwan is not mentioned at all. CSIS noted that the meeting resulted in a commitment to “strategic stability” without concrete instruments to realize it. The lack of crisis communication protocol. Limited incident management framework. There isn’t any commitment to refrain from provocative military exercises.

This is not simply a shortcoming of the meeting. It reflects a more systemic limitation. namely the limitations There is no sufficiently authoritative multilateral platform to address this issue. The UN Security Council is hampered by Beijing’s veto power. ASEAN adheres to the principle of non-intervention, which actually benefits China’s narrative. The G20 has no mandate to address sovereignty disputes.

The result is what could be called a governance deficit. This doesn’t mean there are no institutions, but rather that the existing ones are insufficiently effective for the situation. And it’s in this deficit that military escalation moves in to fill the space that structured diplomacy should be filling. Modern Diplomacy noted that the US approved an $11.1 billion arms package for Taiwan by 2025 while simultaneously sending ambiguous rhetorical signals, a combination that makes it difficult for both China and Taiwan to read exactly where the real line is.

The following three recommendations are not intended to resolve the Taiwan status question. Their purpose is more limited and more immediate. namely for reducing the risk of miscalculation before a minor incident escalates into an uncontrollable crisis. All three rely on existing political conditions and momentum.

First, the momentum of the Trump-Xi meeting should be used to establish a permanent, dedicated military crisis communication channel for incidents in the Taiwan Strait. The most relevant precedent is the Washington-Moscow hotline, established after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, precisely because the world had nearly come to war due to miscommunication, not intention. CNBC noted the May 2026 meeting resulted in a relatively constructive atmosphere between the two leaders. This is a rare window of opportunity and should be used for something concrete.

Second, Indonesia, as a BRICS member and ASEAN dialogue partner with a relatively balanced working relationship with Washington and Beijing, could propose a regional consultation forum focused on managing incidents in the Taiwan Strait. This would not be a forum to decide Taiwan’s status, but rather a technical mechanism for de-escalation procedures and crisis communication. ASEAN has the foundation for this through the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and Indonesia’s current position within BRICS provides added legitimacy in Beijing’s eyes.

Third, the US, China, Japan, and South Korea need to negotiate a joint commitment that no party will change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait through force. This is inspired by the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, which successfully committed European countries not to change their borders by force, despite many of their mutual distrust. The agreement did not resolve existing disputes, but it did raise the costs of escalation measurably. With Xi seeking economic stability before 2027 and Trump seeking to avoid military engagement far from the US mainland, both sides’ calculations are now more open to this type of commitment than in previous periods.

It can be concluded that strategic ambiguity is one of the most ingenious products of Cold War diplomacy. It maintained stability in the Taiwan Strait for decades, not by solving the problem, but by making all parties unsure whether testing its limits was a good idea.

The conditions that make that formula work are changing simultaneously. China is stronger and more assertive. Taiwan is more assertive in its political identity. And the US under Trump is sending signals that are more easily read as conditional than committed. These three changes are not occurring one after the other, but simultaneously, and the global governance system has not yet responded accordingly.

The Trump-Xi meeting in May 2026 is neither a turning point in the war nor a step toward a resolution. It is a reflection of the current situation: three actors with three different interpretations, no referee, and increasingly little room for error.

What’s needed isn’t a final solution on Taiwan’s status, as that won’t come anytime soon. What’s needed are concrete steps that reduce the risk of miscalculation while keeping all options open. Crisis channels, regional consultative forums, and non-escalation commitments are small steps but have clear historical precedent. The question is whether the political will for these small steps can still be found amidst the escalating rivalry.

Source link

MAFS USA plunged into chaos as one bride storms off after furious row

Married At First Sight USA Season 19 is back with brand new episodes on E4, but things are already getting tense

A Married At First Sight bride has walked out following an uncomfortable encounter with her husband.

The US edition of the popular reality series has kicked off Season 19 with new episodes broadcasting weekdays on E4 at 8pm. Earlier this week, audiences watched five new couples tie the knot with complete strangers they’d never met before.

Thus far, viewers have remained sceptical about the revised format, particularly following an explosive Australian series, though the programme is still finding its feet as the newlyweds embark on their honeymoons.

In tonight’s episode (May 21), several couples faced significant challenges just days into their marriages. Brittany and Will have discussed their communication difficulties, with Brittany voicing worries about her husband’s failure to ask her questions.

Yet Will also highlighted concerns about their contrasting communication approaches, leading to Brittany walking off by herself, reports OK!.

She said: “I want to dive deep I want to have those conversations”, however Will interrupted her stating: “No, you haven’t asked me any questions.”

Acknowledging she has “been trying”, Will described her questions as “vague and conspicuous” as Brittany replied: “I didn’t realise I needed to be super specific.”

Following further exchanges, the couple failed to reach common ground and Will said: “I don’t need you to hold my hand all the time.” Exasperated, Brittany continued: “It’s bothering me… like really. Sorry, I’m going to calm down”, to which Will responded: “Do whatever you need, it’s okay.”

His reply only wound Brittany up more as she snapped: “I’m frustrated because we’re on two separate, I won’t even say two separate pages, we’re like in different books. I need someone who can communicate.”

Storming off, Brittany told producers it was like talking to someone who does not talk back, while Will made no attempt to follow his wife, telling cameras: “She left for a reason, I’ll let her leave.”

The row followed an uncomfortable moment on their wedding night. But will the pair manage to bridge their differences? Fans will have to keep watching weekdays to discover what happens next.

Plenty of viewers took to social media to share their views, with one person commenting: “This is what happens when couples have completely different communication styles.”

Another posted: “It looks like Will and Brittany need counselling already”, while a third added: “Omg the chats they’re having are not interesting enough for prime time TV.”

Meanwhile, Pat and Rhonda are also grappling with communication issues, with Rhonda revealing she wished her husband would show more interest in her life.

Despite this hurdle, the couple have already declared their feelings for each other, with Rhonda saying: “I love the person that you are, I love your kindness and generosity, I love everything about you.”

One viewer took to X to write: “I love yous already!” while another responded: “‘I love you.’ Already?”

Married At First Sight USA airs weekdays at 8pm on E4.

Source link