On 23 July, the EU adopted its 21st and largest sanctions package against Russia — 218 listings, asset freezes on 94 banks, the first-ever threat of blanket third-country crypto bans. Within 24 hours Beijing retaliated with export controls on 14 European firms, including Germany’s Rheinmetall. The same day, five of China’s largest state banks quietly stopped retail investors trading paper gold and pushed them toward physical bars instead. Four days later the US Senate voted 86-12 to advance a bill authorising tariffs of up to 100% on the top buyers of Russian energy — a list headed by China and India. And on 30 July, the World Gold Council confirmed central banks had bought a record 289 tonnes of gold in the second quarter, up 74% year on year. Nobody reported these five events as one story. They are one story.
De-dollarization is the shorthand for a genuine structural shift: the dollar’s share of global central bank reserves fell below 57% last year, the lowest since 1995 and down 15 points from its 2001 peak, while gold’s share of reserves has climbed from roughly 13% to 30% over the same stretch. The proximate cause is well documented — when Washington and Brussels froze roughly $300 billion of Russian central bank reserves in 2022, every finance ministry outside the Western alliance drew the same lesson: dollar and euro reserves are conditional assets, seizable by political decision, while gold sitting in a domestic vault is not. Since then Russia and China have pushed bilateral trade settlement into rubles and yuan to 99.1%, built out China’s CIPS payment network as a working SWIFT alternative, and are preparing to unveil BRICS Pay — linking Russian, Chinese, Indian and Brazilian domestic payment rails — at September’s summit in New Delhi. That is the infrastructure this week is testing.
Iran on Monday denied that any negotiations were taking place with the United States, directly contradicting U.S. President Donald Trump’s claim that talks were scheduled later in the day and exposing fresh uncertainty over Washington’s strategy after months of military confrontation.
The conflicting statements came after Trump once again backed away from threatened military action against Iran, saying he preferred diplomacy over escalation. Tehran, however, insisted that no negotiations were planned and that no meetings with American officials had been arranged.
Iran Rejects Trump’s Claims
Speaking aboard Air Force One on Sunday, Trump said the United States would begin negotiations with Iran on Monday afternoon, describing diplomacy as preferable to launching another round of attacks.
Iran swiftly dismissed the claim.
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Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said there were no negotiations under way with Washington and no plans to host American officials or dispatch Iranian negotiators abroad. He added that, apart from Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, who is currently on a religious pilgrimage in Iraq, all Iranian negotiators remain inside the country.
A senior Iranian source also told Reuters that no talks had been scheduled and that Araqchi would remain unavailable until at least the end of the week.
According to Tehran, the only ongoing discussions involve Oman and focus exclusively on managing shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.
A Familiar Cycle of Escalation and Retreat
The latest episode mirrors a pattern that has defined the five month conflict between Washington and Tehran.
Since launching Operation Epic Fury alongside Israel, Trump has repeatedly threatened major military action before stepping back at the last moment, often citing diplomatic efforts as justification.
Iran has consistently rejected direct negotiations since the collapse of a U.S. backed memorandum of understanding in early July, arguing that Washington has failed to uphold previous commitments while continuing military pressure.
The repeated cycle of escalation followed by de escalation has left uncertainty hanging over regional security and global energy markets.
Hormuz Remains the Central Dispute
At the heart of the dispute remains the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most strategically important oil shipping route.
Washington argues that the failed June agreement required Iran to reopen the waterway to unrestricted international shipping. Tehran maintains that the document explicitly preserved its authority over traffic through the strait, allowing it to retain significant leverage.
The inability of the United States to secure unrestricted access has become one of the most significant unresolved issues of the conflict.
For the Trump administration, failure to reduce Iran’s influence over Hormuz would represent a strategic setback after months of military operations aimed at weakening Tehran’s regional position.
Strategic Goals Remain Unfulfilled
Five months into the conflict, many of Washington’s stated objectives remain largely unmet.
The United States has sought to dismantle Iran’s nuclear programme, reduce its capacity to strike regional rivals, protect commercial shipping, and increase pressure on Iran’s leadership.
Instead, Iran has continued to demonstrate its ability to disrupt regional energy infrastructure and maritime trade while maintaining leverage over one of the world’s most critical energy chokepoints.
Each round of military escalation has been followed by Iranian retaliatory actions targeting shipping, Gulf energy infrastructure, or U.S. interests in the region, complicating Washington’s efforts to establish deterrence.
Despite the diplomatic confusion, financial markets welcomed Trump’s decision not to proceed with further attacks.
Brent crude prices fell more than 4 percent to around 84 dollars per barrel as traders anticipated a reduced immediate risk of supply disruptions in the Gulf.
Nevertheless, tensions remain elevated.
The British maritime security organisation UKMTO reported that a commercial vessel in the Strait of Hormuz detected an explosion in nearby waters overnight, although no injuries or damage were reported.
Diplomatic Uncertainty Persists
The contradictory messages from Washington and Tehran highlight the absence of a clear diplomatic pathway toward ending the crisis.
While Trump continues to present negotiations as an alternative to military action, Iran’s categorical denial suggests that no formal channel currently exists between the two governments.
With the Strait of Hormuz still contested and military incidents continuing across the Gulf, the conflict remains caught between diplomacy and confrontation, leaving regional stability and global energy markets vulnerable to further shocks.
Model distillation, a widely used artificial intelligence training technique, has emerged as a new point of tension in the growing technology competition between the United States and China. While the method has long been accepted within AI research, concerns have intensified over whether proprietary AI capabilities can be replicated without the consent of their developers.
Leading U.S. AI companies and policymakers argue that some Chinese firms are using distillation to extract valuable capabilities from closed-source AI models, raising questions about intellectual property, technological leadership and AI security.
What Is Model Distillation?
Model distillation is a process that transfers selected capabilities from a large, powerful AI model—known as the “teacher”—to a smaller “student” model.
Instead of copying the original model’s architecture or internal parameters, the student learns by analyzing the teacher’s outputs, such as answers, computer code or generated text. The result is a lighter, more efficient model capable of performing many of the same tasks while requiring significantly fewer computing resources.
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Why Is Distillation Important?
Training frontier AI models demands enormous investments in advanced chips, computing power and massive datasets.
Distillation makes AI more affordable by enabling smaller models to deliver strong performance on less expensive hardware. These compact systems can be deployed across smartphones, factories, vehicles, enterprise software and private networks, expanding AI adoption without the infrastructure costs associated with frontier models.
The technique has therefore become an important tool for both commercial AI development and national technology strategies.
Why Are Reasoning Traces Valuable?
Recent advances in AI have increased the importance of “reasoning traces”—the intermediate steps an AI model follows before producing a final answer.
Rather than simply learning correct outputs, smaller models can learn how complex problems are solved, improving their reasoning abilities.
Researchers compare this to studying detailed worked solutions instead of only reading the final answers to mathematical problems. As reasoning traces become more sophisticated, they are increasingly viewed as valuable intellectual property because they reveal how advanced AI systems approach difficult tasks.
Who Uses Model Distillation?
Distillation is widely used across the global AI industry and is not inherently controversial.
American researchers and technology companies have employed the technique in projects such as Stanford University’s Alpaca model and Microsoft’s Orca research. Chinese researchers have likewise used outputs from advanced AI systems to develop Chinese-language instruction models.
The key distinction lies between open-weight models, whose underlying parameters are publicly accessible, and closed-source models, such as OpenAI’s ChatGPT and Anthropic’s Claude, which are only accessible through proprietary platforms and APIs.
Why Has It Become a US-China Flashpoint?
The dispute centres not on distillation itself but on whether proprietary AI outputs are being systematically harvested without authorization.
U.S. AI companies argue there is a clear difference between legitimate academic research and large-scale extraction of outputs designed to replicate commercially valuable capabilities from closed-source systems.
Anthropic has accused several Chinese AI companies, including DeepSeek, Moonshot and MiniMax, of attempting to extract capabilities from its Claude models, particularly in software engineering and advanced reasoning. OpenAI has also reported detecting attempts by Chinese actors to use its systems for distillation-related purposes.
Chinese companies have not publicly accused U.S. firms of conducting similar activities involving closed-source models.
Why It Matters
The debate over model distillation reflects a broader shift in global AI competition from hardware and semiconductors to the protection of advanced algorithms and proprietary knowledge.
As AI becomes central to economic growth, military capabilities and technological leadership, governments and companies are increasingly treating model outputs, reasoning methods and training techniques as strategic assets. The controversy over distillation is therefore likely to play an increasingly important role in shaping future AI regulation, international competition and the evolving U.S.-China technology rivalry.
Analysis: AI Distillation Signals the Next Phase of the US China Technology War
The controversy surrounding model distillation marks a turning point in the global artificial intelligence race. The competition between the United States and China is no longer driven solely by access to advanced semiconductors or computing power. Instead, it is increasingly centered on protecting the knowledge embedded within frontier AI models. As reasoning capabilities become the most valuable component of modern AI, companies and governments are beginning to treat model outputs as strategic assets rather than simply products or services.
For years, Washington’s strategy focused on restricting China’s access to advanced chips and manufacturing equipment, hoping to slow Beijing’s AI progress by limiting computational resources. Model distillation challenges that strategy because it enables developers to build highly capable systems without replicating the enormous costs of training frontier models from scratch. If smaller models can absorb sophisticated reasoning from larger ones, technological leadership becomes harder to preserve through hardware controls alone.
This development is also forcing a rethinking of AI intellectual property. Unlike traditional software, where source code defines ownership, modern AI derives much of its value from learned behavior and reasoning patterns. The legal and ethical boundaries surrounding whether outputs generated by proprietary models can be used to train competing systems remain largely undefined. As governments struggle to regulate these practices, AI firms are likely to tighten access to their models, limit reasoning transparency and strengthen technical safeguards against unauthorized capability extraction.
The geopolitical implications are equally significant. AI has become a core element of economic competitiveness, military modernization and national security. Any method that accelerates another country’s ability to close the technological gap will inevitably attract government attention. The United States increasingly views the protection of advanced AI capabilities as part of its broader strategy to maintain technological leadership, while China sees affordable AI development as essential to reducing dependence on foreign technology and overcoming export restrictions.
Ultimately, the debate over model distillation illustrates that the next phase of the AI race will not be determined solely by who builds the most powerful model, but by who can best control, protect and commercialize advanced intelligence. As AI becomes a strategic national asset, disputes over knowledge transfer, model security and intellectual property are likely to become as consequential as the earlier battles over semiconductor supply chains.
On July 10, almost exactly a year after the Pentagon announced it was becoming the largest shareholder in MP Materials, the International Energy Agency put a number on what that deal was designed to prevent: $6.5 trillion in global downstream production now sits exposed to China’s rare-earth export curbs — restrictions currently suspended under an October 2025 truce that lapses again around October 2026. In the year between those two dates, Washington did not simply subsidize its way out of dependency on Chinese processing. It bought in: $400 million for 15 percent of MP Materials, a decade-long price floor for neodymium-praseodymium set nearly double the market rate, and a ten-year promise to buy everything a new Texas magnet plant produces. The Pentagon is now, functionally, a mining shareholder. The interesting question is not whether that has worked — MP’s private financing round attracted $1 billion from J.P. Morgan and Goldman Sachs within weeks — but what it costs to win a state-capitalist contest by becoming a state capitalist.
The stakes are structural, not cyclical. China controls roughly 70 percent of the world’s rare-earth and critical-mineral refining capacity, a chokepoint built over three decades while Western producers treated minerals as ordinary commodities rather than strategic assets. Beijing’s October 2025 tariff-war truce with Washington postponed, rather than cancelled, an expanded licensing regime that already cut U.S. yttrium imports from 333 tonnes to 17 tonnes in eight months — a squeeze aerospace manufacturers say could force production pauses. Washington’s answer has three parts: Project Vault, a $12 billion public-private stockpile signed by executive order on February 2, 2026, covering all 60 minerals on the USGS critical list; a fast-growing portfolio of direct government equity stakes in miners and processors; and a parallel push to sign allied-supply agreements with eight partners, including Australia, Japan, the UK and the UAE. Europe, meanwhile, is running a different playbook: a €3 billion RESourceEU plan, a joint-purchasing platform, and a stockpiling pilot — procurement and coordination, not ownership.
The MP Materials deal is the template, and its mechanics matter more than its headline. The Department of Defense’s July 2025 investment made it MP’s largest shareholder, attached a $150 million loan for expanding the Mountain Pass mine, and guaranteed a $110-per-kilogram floor price for NdPr oxide — a level industry analysts put at nearly double the prevailing market price — alongside a ten-year offtake covering the full output of a planned magnet facility in Fort Worth. Private capital followed the government’s signal almost immediately, which is precisely the point: Washington concluded that a guarantee was worth more to investors than a grant. That logic has since scaled. The administration has taken a $670 million stake in magnet producer Vulcan Elements, a 10 percent, $35.6 million position in Trilogy Metals, converted a renegotiated Energy Department loan into equity in Lithium Americas, and expanded the official critical-minerals list to include copper and metallurgical coal. Total direct equity commitments now exceed $1 billion, on top of Project Vault’s $12 billion stockpile.
The backlash has been immediate and specific, and it is worth taking seriously rather than waving off as sour grapes. Rival producers argue the price floor lets MP “undercut commercial bids, using federal subsidies to shield its margins,” while former White House and Pentagon officials warn the arrangement could “distort global NdPr pricing, crowd out innovation, and deter private investment in alternative supply chains” — in effect, recreating the very state-directed monopoly the policy exists to counter. That is the strongest objection, and it does not fully land: a government willing to take equity risk, rather than hand out grants, at least has an incentive to see the investment succeed and can in principle profit from the upside, which is the argument the Treasury and National Energy Dominance Council make for why this is smarter policy than Cold War-style stockpiling alone. But the objection identifies a real cost even if it doesn’t defeat the policy: an above-market, government-guaranteed price for one company makes every unsubsidized competitor in the same commodity harder to finance, which narrows rather than widens the eventual supplier base — the opposite of the diversification the strategy claims to deliver.
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There is a second problem the price-floor logic obscures: capital committed is not the same as metal produced. The Center for Strategic and International Studies frames this as the difference between “distance” — how much progress has been announced — and “displacement” — how far supply chains have actually moved from their starting point. Japan’s experience with Lynas Rare Earths is the sobering comparison: fifteen years and $250 million of patient, low-drama investment before Lynas achieved the first commercial dysprosium production outside China, in 2025. Washington’s approach substitutes speed and scale for that patience, which may be the correct trade given the urgency, but it means the MP deal’s real test has not yet arrived — it arrives when the Fort Worth facility is supposed to reach full commercial output, not when Wall Street decides to match the Pentagon’s bet.
None of this is happening in a China-versus-America vacuum, either. The Democratic Republic of Congo has extended its cobalt export suspension specifically to tighten leverage over Chinese refiners, and Indonesia has repeatedly resisted pressure to loosen nickel export quotas, forcing processing onshore on its own terms. Producer states, not only the two superpowers, are now treating minerals as instruments of strategic leverage rather than commodities to be sold at whatever price clears the market. That reframes the whole contest: this is not simply Washington racing to catch Beijing, but a broader shift in which every government that sits on a mineral deposit is deciding whether to sell it or wield it.
Which is where Europe’s exposure becomes concrete. RESourceEU gives Brussels coordination and buying power, but no board seats and no offtake priority — and Chatham House’s own assessment is blunt that the UK and EU “cannot match the scale of what the US is attempting” and risk being “left behind” without equity of their own. That matters because Washington’s price floors do not stay domestic: a guaranteed $110/kg for MP’s output resets the benchmark every other buyer, including European manufacturers, has to price against, while offtake agreements tied to U.S. defense production can put European buyers behind the queue when supply tightens. The diversification Europe wants — away from dependence on Beijing — is real, but the replacement supply chain now runs increasingly through companies Washington part-owns and whose output is pre-committed to American industry first. Substituting one chokepoint for another is not the same as building a market.
What Happens Next
Base case (our estimate: roughly 55 percent probability). Washington’s equity-and-price-floor model extends to more minerals — copper and metallurgical coal are already on the list — and more companies, Project Vault’s stockpile builds through 2026–27, and the October 2025 China truce holds past its lapse date. Europe continues a purchasing-only strategy, remaining a price-taker on a benchmark increasingly set in Washington rather than Shanghai. This depends on Congress and private markets continuing to treat government equity as a credible signal rather than a fiscal liability, and on China preferring managed leverage over an open rupture.
Downside case. China allows the truce to lapse on schedule around October 2026 and resumes full licensing enforcement — already quietly restarting, according to recent customs-audit reports — before Vault-funded and MP-style projects reach meaningful output. Aerospace and defense manufacturers, already forced to ration yttrium and dysprosium at a fraction of pre-2025 volumes, face renewed production pauses in the exact window (2026–2028) when domestic capacity is still years from scale, exposing the gap between announced investment and actual tonnage.
Upside case. Government stakes prove to be a bridge rather than a permanent structure: MP, Vulcan Elements and Lithium Americas hit production targets on schedule, price floors become unnecessary as Japan’s Lynas eventually showed is possible after fifteen years of patient investment, and the eight-nation allied-supply framework matures into a genuinely plural, competitively priced market that Europe can buy into on equal terms rather than through Washington’s balance sheet.
The Pentagon’s bet on MP Materials shows that the fastest way to out-compete a state-directed rival was to become one — and by the only metric available so far, capital raised, that gamble is working. But capital raised is not resilience, and every mineral now being withheld or weaponized elsewhere, from Congolese cobalt to Indonesian nickel, shows the world’s supply chains are being redrawn along political lines everywhere, not simply rerouted away from Beijing.
Watch whether China lets its rare-earth export truce lapse on schedule around October 2026, and whether MP Materials’ Fort Worth magnet plant is producing at commercial scale when it does. If the truce holds and the plant delivers, Washington’s ownership model will keep expanding. If either fails, the U.S. will have discovered it bought a shareholding in a company, not a supply chain immune to the country it was built to out-manoeuvre.
In celebration of the 99th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), established in August 1927, the PLA commemorates its founding on August 1st each year (remembering the Nanchang Uprising of 1927). This anniversary is marked amidst ongoing efforts to modernize its defense capabilities, alongside diplomatic and military endeavors to strengthen dialogue, partnerships, and the exchange of experiences with European, Asian, and international militaries. The PLA is considered the cornerstone of China’s national defense, and Chinese military leaders at all embassies and consulates worldwide organize numerous official events to mark its founding on August 1st each year. Chinese embassies and military attachés around the world, such as the Chinese Embassy in Belgium and other European countries, host official receptions to highlight the PLA’s role in maintaining global peace and stability, as well as its development capabilities and readiness. The PLA is focused on transforming into a modern, integrated military force encompassing land, sea, and air.
China’s military relations with European militaries reflect the logic of military diplomacy, as China seeks to deepen military ties with its European allies and partners within its strategy of mutual military engagement, cooperation, and learning opportunities. Here, Chinese military channels with European countries serve as avenues for dialogue and the exchange of views on regional and international security to achieve balance and stability. Beijing, through its diplomatic activities, emphasizes the importance of balanced partnerships with the European Union and its member states to provide stability and certainty to the world. In this context, Beijing’s relationship with European militaries takes on a dual character of strategic competition and mutual caution, especially given Washington’s efforts to utilize NATO to contain Chinese power. Consequently, tension has arisen between the Chinese military and NATO due to China’s rejection of NATO’s Asian expansion into its regional sphere. Beijing views NATO’s attempts to broaden its security engagement with Asia-Pacific countries as a threat to stability and incompatible with the multipolar world order, while China rejects the logic of military hegemony. The Chinese military, in its strategic literature, emphasizes its opposition to American power and hegemonic policies implemented through the NATO military alliance. China and the People’s Liberation Army also strongly reject NATO’s involvement in Asia-Pacific affairs, viewing it as interference that threatens regional and global stability and leads to confrontations between military blocs.
Herein lies the official Chinese military stance on the NATO military alliance, describing it as a relic of the Cold War that extends beyond its original geographical scope. China explicitly accuses NATO of instigating tensions and provoking confrontations in Asia. Furthermore, China warns against the militarization of the region through NATO partnerships with countries such as Japan and Australia. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) maintains that China’s defense policy aims to protect national sovereignty and regional security, viewing Western actions as attempts to contain Chinese influence and impose American hegemony. Therefore, Chinese intelligence, military, defense, and security circles reject the logic of linking Euro-Atlantic security to issues in the Indo-Pacific region.
The most significant dynamics of the Chinese military relationship with European armies are characterized by the maintenance of strategic autonomy. Some European capitals seek to avoid full involvement in the US-China conflict, preferring to preserve commercial interests and pursue self-sufficiency. This is further complicated by technological and industrial competition between European armies and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. NATO closely monitors the development of the Chinese military’s cyber capabilities and artificial intelligence, viewing them as strategic challenges impacting global supply chains. Meanwhile, China perceives NATO’s policies as subservient to US interests at the expense of European national security. NATO’s ongoing monitoring of Chinese cyber capabilities and the escalating technological competition between China, Europe, and the United States for leadership in the digital and economic future are noteworthy. These tensions manifest in mutual concerns regarding cybersecurity and global supply chains, which raise serious concerns for NATO due to the numerous strategic challenges and cyber threats they pose. Here, NATO monitors digital operations and hybrid attacks linked to Beijing-affiliated actors targeting critical infrastructure and technological security, according to NATO’s military perspective. NATO’s military strategies focus on protecting technological superiority in artificial intelligence and semiconductors to prevent any potential disruption to global supply chains.
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For this reason, China’s stance toward NATO is characterized by accusations of American political dominance. Beijing believes that NATO’s expanding policies and transatlantic orientation serve the US strategic agenda at its expense and in confrontation with China, which, from the Chinese perspective, affects European security itself. China considers NATO’s increasing involvement in Asia-Pacific issues and technological confrontation not to serve Europe’s own security interests but rather to threaten international stability as a whole. Thus, China’s position on NATO is based on the accusation that it serves American hegemony and threatens security and stability in Asia and Europe. Beijing views NATO as a tool for implementing America’s strategic plans, aiming to mobilize member states of the military alliance to pursue a policy of Asian expansion in the face of China. China and the People’s Liberation Army reject NATO’s involvement in Asia-Pacific issues, arguing that NATO’s policies harm Europe’s economic and technological security. From a Chinese perspective, the alliance’s technological confrontation poses a threat to international stability and European security, with China believing that NATO’s policies ultimately undermine Europe’s own security.
The summer sun has set on “Love Island USA” fan favorites Olandria and Nic Vansteenberghe‘s romance, a year after their time on the hit series.
People, citing an unnamed source, reported on Wednesday that the pair of reality TV stars — known among fans as “Nicolandria” — agreed to go their separate ways. The outlet reported that the amicable split comes as “the distance between them and their busy schedules made it challenging to maintain their connection.” The “Love Island USA” Season 7 stars remain friends and “will always support one another.”
Neither of the stars have publicly addressed their separation on social media.
Olandria and Vansteenberghe entered the “Love Island USA” villa in Fiji in June 2025 and officially coupled up weeks into the production. “Love Island USA,” the American version of the U.K. series, streams on Peacock and follows a cast of singles as they search for love and test their connections. Olandria and Vansteenberghe were among a handful of day-one contestants who advanced to the competition’s final episode.
Amid their post-”Love Island USA” fame, Olandria and Vansteenberghe spoke candidly to Glamour about handling the newfound deluge of popularity, demand and fan love — and how they support each other through it.
“It’s so draining. We always have check-ins, like, ‘How’s your mental? How are you today? I’m always here,’” Olandria recalled to the magazine. “I wish we didn’t have to do that as much as we had to. Thank God we’ve got each other, because I don’t know what we would do without each other, literally, when it comes to that.”
Vansteenberghe said elsewhere in the interview: “Everything that came from [“Love Island USA”] is so beautiful and amazing. I feel like that’s why we did well. We enjoyed ourselves and had fun with it.”
“Love Island USA” crowned its latest winning couple earlier this month. Fan favorites and day-one contestants Bryce and Trinity were declared winners and won the $100,000 grand prize, after a season rocked by racial-slur scandals and with local roots in a surf and coffee shop in Mar Vista.
The conflict between the United States and Iran intensified on Monday, with both sides launching fresh military strikes that raised fears of a broader regional crisis threatening global energy supplies, maritime security and critical civilian infrastructure. While oil prices briefly climbed above $90 a barrel amid renewed disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, attacks on desalination facilities also highlighted a dangerous expansion of the conflict beyond military targets.
Despite the escalating violence, both Washington and Tehran signalled they remain open to diplomacy, suggesting that negotiations have not been completely abandoned even as the war enters a more volatile phase.
US and Iran Exchange Fresh Strikes
Iran’s Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) said they had launched missile attacks against U.S. military assets across the Middle East after another night of American bombardment targeting several Iranian cities.
According to Iran, ballistic missiles targeted U.S. military facilities at Jordan’s Aqaba Airport, Kuwait’s Al Adiri Camp and Ali Al Salem Air Base, as well as American positions in Syria. Bahrain also activated air raid sirens, while Kuwait reported intercepting hostile drones during the attacks.
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Meanwhile, U.S. Central Command confirmed it had carried out a ninth consecutive night of strikes against Iran, saying the operations were intended to degrade Tehran’s capability to threaten commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.
Iranian media reported explosions in several cities, including Tabriz, Chabahar, Konarak, Bandar Mahshahr and Bandar Imam Khomeini, with at least one person killed and several others wounded.
President Donald Trump defended the latest strikes, describing them as retaliation for the deaths of U.S. service members in recent Iranian attacks.
Hormuz Shipping Faces Renewed Disruption
The Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one fifth of global oil supplies normally pass, remains at the centre of the confrontation.
The IRGC claimed two oil tankers had exploded after attempting to navigate what it described as an unsafe route through the strategic waterway. Tehran did not provide details about the vessels or casualties, and the reports could not be independently verified.
Separately, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) agency reported that a commercial vessel off the coast of Oman had been struck by an unidentified projectile, leaving the ship adrift though its crew remained safe.
Shipping disruptions pushed Brent crude briefly above $90 per barrel as traders worried that prolonged instability in Hormuz could significantly reduce global oil exports.
The renewed uncertainty comes after vessel traffic through the strait had already fallen sharply in recent days, with many shipping companies delaying voyages or rerouting vessels due to security concerns.
Civilian Infrastructure Becomes a New Battlefield
Beyond energy markets, the conflict is increasingly threatening essential civilian infrastructure.
Kuwait confirmed that one of its desalination plants was attacked for a second consecutive day, causing a fire. Desalination facilities provide the majority of drinking water across Gulf countries, making them among the region’s most critical infrastructure assets.
Iran has accused the United States of previously striking one of its own desalination facilities and warned that any attacks on Iranian civilian infrastructure would trigger reciprocal action against similar installations across the Gulf.
The targeting of water infrastructure represents a significant escalation, raising humanitarian concerns alongside military and economic risks.
Diplomacy Remains on the Table
Despite intensifying military operations, officials from both countries suggested diplomacy has not been completely abandoned.
U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Washington would continue targeting Iranian capabilities as long as Tehran threatened international shipping but stressed that the United States remained open to a diplomatic solution.
Iran’s Foreign Ministry echoed that position, stating diplomacy remains one of the country’s instruments for pursuing national interests despite ongoing hostilities.
Tehran also confirmed that Iran’s interior minister would travel to Pakistan, which has served as an important intermediary between the two sides since the conflict began, although Iranian officials described the visit as focused primarily on bilateral relations.
Political Pressure Mounts in Washington
The conflict is also creating growing domestic challenges for the White House.
U.S. gasoline prices climbed above $4 per gallon on Monday, reversing declines seen after the temporary ceasefire reached earlier this year. Rising fuel costs have historically carried significant political consequences for American administrations and could become a major issue ahead of November’s congressional midterm elections.
Trump defended the military campaign by arguing that Iran had suffered severe damage and insisted the United States had effectively secured control over the Strait of Hormuz, despite continued Iranian attacks across the region.
Why It Matters
The latest escalation illustrates how the conflict is evolving beyond conventional military strikes into a broader campaign targeting global trade routes and critical infrastructure. While the Strait of Hormuz remains the world’s most important energy chokepoint, attacks on desalination plants introduce a new humanitarian dimension that could directly affect millions of civilians across the Gulf.
At the same time, continued disruptions to commercial shipping threaten global oil markets, supply chains and inflation at a time when many economies are already grappling with elevated energy costs.
What’s Next
The coming days will determine whether the conflict enters an even more dangerous phase. Iran appears determined to maintain pressure on U.S. forces and commercial shipping while signalling it could expand attacks against civilian infrastructure if American strikes continue.
Washington is likely to sustain military operations aimed at securing freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz while attempting to deter further Iranian retaliation. However, any successful attack on major oil facilities, shipping lanes or water infrastructure could trigger a broader regional crisis involving additional Gulf states.
Although both sides continue to leave the door open for negotiations, the cycle of retaliation has significantly reduced the prospects for an immediate diplomatic breakthrough. Until meaningful talks resume, the Gulf is likely to remain one of the world’s most volatile flashpoints, with global energy markets and regional stability hanging in the balance.
The Asia Pacific’s geopolitical balance is under change. While the U.S. remains the main architect of the plan, it is Australia that is becoming the executor of the strategy in the Oceania region. Through the signing of multiple defense agreements with the small island states, Canberra is transforming itself from a middle power to a regional security player in the South Pacific region.
Australia, being the most trusted ally of the United States and a member of the two most important defense cooperations, i.e., AUKUS and QUAD, makes it suitable to provide security to its neighbors. By signing the bilateral agreements in the defense domain, Australia, particularly, and the United States, generally, want to counter China’s rising military presence in the Pacific region. The defense deals signed with Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, and Fiji collectively demonstrate that work on a broader security plan is under process. Instead of deploying American military bases directly in these states, Washington is relying on Canberra to expand its security footprint in the South Pacific region.
The recent signing of the Australia-Fiji agreement named “Ocean of Peace Alliance” on July 6, 2026, is the latest in the series. This agreement marks Fiji’s first mutual defense treaty and Australia’s fourth, following treaties with the United States, New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea. Secondly, the announcement of the Pukpuk Treaty entering into force between Australia and Papua New Guinea by PM Anthony Albanese and PM Honourable James Marape MP on July 8, 2026, also showcases a mutual defense commitment. Thirdly, the signing of the Nakamal Agreement between Australia and Vanuatu in June 2026 prevented China from creating military bases in the country.
In addition to this, the new PM of the Solomon Islands, Matthew Wale, has also shown interest in reducing the country’s dependence on China. He stated that the Solomon Islands-China pact, signed in 2022, needs to be revised, which would allow China to deploy its military and police personnel. By signaling on revising the agreement, it clearly demarcates that the Solomon Islands do not want to allow their land to be used for Chinese military bases. This statement proved a silver lining for Australia’s hegemonic designs in the region, as it was fearful that the Solomon Islands would be a foothold for China in the Pacific.
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The momentum and process of acquiring a broader Pacific security strategy are extending, as New Zealand PM Christopher Luxon has also shown interest in joining the recently signed Ocean of Peace Alliance. This also marks Australia’s victory in that these Pacific states are gradually turning away from China and moving towards Western allies. This also shows defense cooperation, military exercises, information sharing, and maritime cooperation. In such a case, when there is an attack on any ally in these domains, then others will come to aid and rescue.
Also, the opening of the US Embassy in the Solomon Islands back in 2023 and the agreement between another QUAD member, i.e., Japan, and the Solomon Islands also strengthen Australia’s position in the Pacific region.
Now, the bigger question here is why this change in geopolitical balance is happening and why the regional players are taking the lead despite having the hegemon, i.e., the United States. Rising interference of China by expanding its naval capabilities has drawn concerns of the states in the Oceania region. The recent firing of a long-range ballistic missile in the South Pacific region on the same day that Australia and Fiji signed the treaty sends a clear message that China will not remain quiet on these expanding relations. Although Chinese state media have stated that this firing was just a mere test using dummy warheads. But the concerns of the government officials of the Pacific countries and their rising apprehensions have clearly shown that concerns for Australia and its allies are increasing against China. This fear has enabled them to move towards a securitization strategy and maximize their security capabilities.
Along with benefits, there are various risks for Australia and partnering nations as well by entering into these defense deals. The original plan of keeping the Indo-Pacific free and open for trade for all is gradually turning into a hub of militarization. Therefore, strategic competition between China and Australia will increase more than ever before, compelling Canberra to engage in more economic and defense treaties in the broader Indo-Pacific region to maintain its central position. Additionally, small island states are also in turmoil as they are caught between China and the Western bloc.
Thus, it is clear that the US is expanding its network in the South Pacific region by making Australia a regional security player. This also sends a signal to China that its growing capabilities and tactics will not go unanswered. Moreover, Pacific Island countries are also diversifying their options by signing defense agreements and are not predominantly relying on China. These agreements also reduce the possibility of Beijing having a military presence in the Oceania region. Therefore, whether Australia’s expanding defense network succeeds or not depends on mutual trust. By not compromising the sovereignty of these states, Canberra can only become the regional security provider on its own terms.
On July 14 the crews of the Mombasa and the Al Bahiyah found out. Two UAE-flagged tankers were hit by Iranian cruise missiles in the southern lane, inside Omani territorial waters, according to the Emirati defense ministry. An Indian sailor was killed and eight others were hurt, six Indians and two Ukrainians, and India summoned Iran’s deputy ambassador the same day. The Revolutionary Guard said the ships had run dark and ignored repeated warnings on a mined route. They had been following the other government’s instructions.
This is what a diplomatic technique looks like when it fails in public.
The technique has a name, and for fifty years the profession has been proud of it. Constructive ambiguity, Henry Kissinger’s phrase, is the art of writing a sentence that lets two enemies sign the same page while believing opposite things. Resolution 242 called for Israeli withdrawal from “territories” occupied in 1967, and the missing definite article has been argued over for fifty-nine years. The Good Friday Agreement left the sovereignty question deliberately unfinished. Ambiguity is not a drafting failure. It is often the only reason a war stops on the day it stops.
The Islamabad Memorandum, signed on June 17 by Donald Trump and Masoud Pezeshkian and brokered by Pakistan, used the same tool. Read Paragraph 5 and you can watch it happen. Iran undertakes to use “best efforts” for the safe passage of commercial vessels “with no charge, for 60 days only,” and to open a dialogue with Oman on the strait’s future administration “in line with the applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states. ” Tehran reads that as recognition that Iran determines safe passage and will price it when the clock runs out. Washington and the Gulf states read best efforts as an obligation to facilitate passage and nothing more. Fourteen points. One waterway. Two meanings, both sincere.
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Here is what the drafters missed, and it is the reason the strikes came back and the market is repricing this week. Constructive ambiguity works on questions that can sit still. A border can stay contested for six decades because a border does nothing in the meantime. Sovereignty over Northern Ireland is not exercised on Tuesday at 4 p.m. by a specific person who has to make a call.
A strait is not like that. Before the war, roughly 130 vessels crossed Hormuz every day. That is one ship approaching the disputed sentence about every eleven minutes, each one requiring somebody to physically wave it through or turn it back. Paragraph 5 does not get to be undecided. It gets decided, hundreds of times a day, by a coastal battery commander at Bandar Abbas and a watch officer on a destroyer, neither of whom has the luxury of interpretation.
The memorandum deferred two questions to a second phase. One of them, Iran’s nuclear program, can wait, because centrifuges do not require a daily ruling. The other cannot wait an afternoon. The drafters treated them as the same kind of problem, and only one of them is shooting. JD Vance, who runs the American side of the file, conceded the point on a podcast Wednesday without appearing to notice he had made it: the nuclear negotiations he leads have stalled over the strait.
Everything since follows from that. Six consecutive nights of American strikes. A naval blockade of Iranian ports has been back in force since Wednesday, with a Curacao-flagged tanker disabled by Hellfire missiles fired into its smokestack near Kharg Island. Iran’s ambassador filed a letter at the U.N. listing 42 American violations of a text Trump declared dead on July 8 and Tehran stopped complying with on the 13th, which tells you the memorandum has become useless as a truce and indispensable as a claim. Both capitals still cite Paragraph 5. Neither will be governed by it. They are both telling the truth about a sentence that says two things.
Trump’s week makes more sense in this light than in any other. On Monday he declared the United States “guardian” of the strait and announced a 20% charge on cargo passing through it. By Tuesday the fee was gone, swapped for promises of Gulf investment, after the International Maritime Organization said there is no legal basis for mandatory tolls simply to transit a strait and shipowners refused to play. On Thursday, IRNA reported that Tehran is preparing environmental compensation fees on transiting ships. Both governments have now tried to invoice the same water in the same week, and neither can collect. That is not a strategy, and it is not a neoconservative plot. That is what happens when the document you signed does not contain the authority you thought you had bought.
He said on Tuesday that next week come the bridges. The bridges came Friday. American strikes hit six of them around Bandar Khamir and a railway junction outside Bandar Abbas, cutting Iran’s main port off from the roads inland, and collapsed the control tower at Chabahar. Iran’s health ministry counts 38 dead and more than 400 wounded since the strikes resumed. Even Trump’s own deadlines are now being decided faster than he sets them.
The market is the only participant being paid to read Paragraph 5 honestly, and its verdict is arriving. Brent touched $86 on Tuesday, a one-month high, and held above $85 through a week in which the peace was formally alive. Traffic tells it better than price. Eleven ships crossed on the day Iran declared the strait closed. Seven crossed on Wednesday. Three crossed Thursday, the fewest since May, against 130 a day before the war. One ship every eleven minutes has become one ship every eight hours.
Rory Johnston of Commodity Context makes the harder point, and it deserves more attention than it has received. The stock cushion that absorbed the spring’s supply shock has been drawn down, which means the next shock will not be padded the way the last one was. The price is not high because the war is bad. It is high because the peace is unreadable.
Americans are paying in a currency the ceasefire never touched. Thirteen of the fourteen U.S. service members killed in this war died in March, before any truce existed. What has climbed through every pause is the wounded count, now 414, most of them with traumatic brain injuries. Truces here have reliably stopped the funerals and never stopped the concussions.
The mediators still working the phones in Islamabad, Doha, and Cairo do not need a grand bargain by August 16, when the memorandum’s sixty-day clock runs out and Iran has promised to start charging. They need something duller and much harder. They need to convert one sentence into a procedure: who physically waves the ship through, on whose radio frequency, under whose flag, and with what recourse when someone gets it wrong. Not sovereignty over the strait. Traffic control of it. The nuclear file can keep. The lane cannot.
Iran released an American detainee on Wednesday, which some in Washington read as a hand reaching for a rail. Nobody has set a date for the conversation that would matter. If none is set, the war will not restart in August. It will simply stop pretending to have paused, and a ship’s master off Oman will keep making a sovereign decision on behalf of two governments that refuse to make it for him.
Constructive ambiguity is a loan against the future. Most disputes let you pay it back slowly. Hormuz charges interest by the hour.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently launched a public attack on the International Criminal Court (ICC), vowing to “dismantle the ICC—brick by brick.” Washington’s position is that the ICC has no authority to try officials from non-member states—such as the US itself—or their allies, and that it will not accept any international court exercising jurisdiction over American citizens without US consent. Washington therefore intends to use diplomatic pressure and sanctions to counter the Court.
If one still believes in the international community’s definition of war crimes, this looks like a political move to absolve the United States and Israel of war crimes committed in the Middle East. To that end, Washington is pressuring allies — including states that are parties to the Rome Statute — to withdraw from the ICC.
“Trump said in January, ‘I don’t need international law’ to highlight his ‘America First’ policy. He is now keeping that promise, and the ICC is just one example.”
The day before Rubio announced his intent to dismantle the ICC, fourteen countries, including the United States, publicly reaffirmed their support for the ten-year-old ruling in the South China Sea Arbitration—a decision handed down by another international arbitration body: an ad hoc Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), administered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
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Ironically, of the fourteen countries, only the Philippines—the actual party to the case—has a direct stake in South China Sea rights. The other five countries with genuine interests in the South China Sea did not join this “cheerleading squad”: Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, and Indonesia. Of these, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei are, like the Philippines, “principal claimant states.”
Aside from the US and the Philippines, every other country among the fourteen marking the tenth anniversary of the ruling is an ICC member state: Australia, Canada, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, New Zealand, Romania, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom.
These 12 ICC member states have no stake whatsoever in South China Sea affairs, yet they support an international arbitration body — and are now being pressured by the United States to boycott another international arbitration body they themselves belong to. Fourteen countries are happy to use international law to pressure China, but when international law becomes inconvenient for the US and Israel, is that suddenly a different matter?
The Philippines finds itself in the most awkward position of all. Manila withdrew from the ICC in 2019, yet after Ferdinand Marcos Jr. took office as president, it allowed Interpol and Philippine airport authorities to arrest former president Rodrigo Duterte in 2025 and hand him directly over to the ICC for trial.
The real story behind this episode is domestic political rivalry within the Philippines, combined with Washington’s long-standing displeasure with Duterte. International institutions have played the role of “witch-hunt enforcer,” helping the US and Manila nail a political opponent to the cross.
In the past, the international community could invoke Rome Statute standards to brand Duterte’s “war on drugs” a crime against humanity. But what now?
The ICC cannot prosecute non-member states, but it can prosecute individuals—such as Benjamin Netanyahu. Moreover, under the Rome Statute’s territoriality principle, the Court has jurisdiction if the alleged crime occurred on the territory of a member state. In the Middle East case, Palestine is a state party. In the Philippine case, although Manila withdrew from the ICC in 2019, crimes committed before that withdrawal remain within the Court’s reach.
The reason the US can attack the ICC so freely is that other international arbitration bodies do not follow this same “detour through territoriality” to claim jurisdiction over non-member states, nor do they try individuals—they adjudicate sovereign states (or transnational corporate entities). As such, they strictly adhere to the most fundamental principle of international law: the principle of state consent.
Interestingly, the tribunal that presided over the South China Sea arbitration itself violated the principle of state consent by ruling on a case brought against China, which refused to participate. This is precisely why China has never recognized the ruling as having any legal basis. Yet the fourteen countries that support the ruling seem untroubled by this violation of a core principle of international law.
In other words, both the ICC and the ad hoc tribunal behind the South China Sea arbitration suffer from the same flaw: overreach. The ICC has been accused of an “idealism” that oversteps state sovereignty, while the South China Sea tribunal has been criticized for “procedural overreach”—under UNCLOS, an ad hoc tribunal has no authority whatsoever over land territorial sovereignty, yet the tribunal accepted the Philippines’ framing that “downgraded” what were really sovereignty and maritime-delimitation questions into a simple matter of “the legal status of islands and reefs” and used that framing to assert jurisdiction for itself.
Taiwan was an innocent bystander caught in the crossfire of the South China Sea arbitration. Itu Aba (Taiping Island), which is under the actual control of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and has both fresh water and the capacity to sustain human habitation, was nonetheless ruled to be a mere “”rock”—stripping it of any 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone.
Given that both international arbitration bodies suffer from the same problem of overreach, if one follows the US in opposing the ICC, shouldn’t one logically also oppose the South China Sea ruling? This month, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs launched an “urgent assessment” to awkwardly grapple with exactly this dilemma, since Manila has skin in both games—the Duterte case and the South China Sea ruling.
If Manila agrees to help dismantle the ICC, what happens to Duterte, still awaiting trial in The Hague? And if China then uses that same logic to reject the South China Sea ruling, what then? The other twelve member states that joined this “witch hunt” find themselves in an equally awkward spot.
Second only to the Philippines in embarrassment is Japan. Tokyo is the ICC’s largest financial backer; the Court’s current president, Tomoko Akane, is Japanese; and Japan has long been one of the ICC’s staunchest supporters. Is Tokyo now expected to help the US dismantle the ICC or to withdraw from it altogether?
Japan also finds itself in a glaring contradiction over the South China Sea ruling. If Taiwan-controlled Taiping Island—with an area of 510,000 square meters (roughly the size of 71 standard football pitches), fresh water, and the capacity to sustain habitation)—was ruled a mere “rock,” then how can Okinotorishima, an outcrop Japan claims sovereignty over that covers just 9.44 square meters (about the size of a double bed), possibly qualify as an “island”?
By that logic, Tokyo’s support for the South China Sea ruling effectively concedes that Okinotorishima has no exclusive economic zone at all — a self-inflicted contradiction that China has been quick to mock.
One could, therefore, say all fourteen countries backing the South China Sea ruling are applying a double standard, and that thirteen of them have no connection to the South China Sea whatsoever. Aside from the Philippines, the only country with any real claim to South China Sea interests is the United States — and the US holds international law in contempt, going so far as to vow to destroy an international arbitration institution outright.
This episode symbolizes the unraveling of the international order—a world reverting to the law of the jungle. The United States is dismantling the very international order it built, and the ones hurt most are precisely its own allies.
The Philippines and Japan have been given the responsibility of encircling China on the front line by the United States, but the footholds of the two countries are also being dismantled by the United States. In front of them, there is only the risk of opposing China and the weakening guarantee.
Above all, the United States has proven, by its own actions, that the so-called international order was never fair and never operated on a fixed standard — it was merely a temporary tool for an empire to rule the world. And when the tool stops being useful, it gets discarded, leaving its followers staring, embarrassed, at the tool still in their hands.
When Washington celebrates the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence on July 4th, the celebrations will arrive bruised. There will be the customary funding disputes, a federal commission fighting against a more partisan task force from the White House, and a public worn by years of political turmoil, all of which will turn what could have been an occasion of civic healing into another USA ‘celebration’ in the world. None of this has gone unnoticed in Beijing, given that this ‘celebration’ is being interpreted more as a diagnosis than a birthday. What is being asked throughout the commentaries from Qiushi (求是), on CCTV, in Tsinghua and Peking University, is simply put, what kind of America is turning 250?
Within the last five years, the interpretation given from both the official channels and the more informal academic channels in Beijing has varied considerably. Most importantly, these streams have been diverging for some time and therefore offer significant insight into how Beijing has been interpreting the country it has been comparing itself to for the last 20 years.
From “the East rising” to a measured retreat
Many are familiar with the upbeat version of the story. After 2020, the phrases that framed China’s worldview included “great changes, unseen in a century” (百年未有之大变局) and “the East is rising, the West is declining” (东升西降). The latter, used by Xi Jinping in remarks to senior officials in early 2021 and again in 2023, provided the slogan for the official narrative. The Covid-19 pandemic, the insurrection at the US Capitol, and a decade of US political instability seemed to provide the empirical evidence for a thesis, rooted in Chinese Marxist theory, that capitalist systems contain the principle of their own disintegration. This was rationalized and systemized after the 2008 financial crisis and has remained largely unchanged.
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However, the reality is far more complicated than the slogan implies. Researchers who have traced the terminology in Chinese academic publications through the CNKI database have found that scholarly use of “the East is rising, the West is declining” (东升西降) peaked around 2021 and has subsided since then, even though the idea itself remained more prevalent than it was during the entire duration of Donald Trump’s first presidential term. In other words, the slogan was being diplomatically retracted within scholarly circles at the very moment it was most associated with official optimism. When Xi’s speech in 2023, which was published in Qiushi in January 2025, described the West’s decline, it was more a formal, official copy of a sentiment than a newly published speech.
The official rhetoric, however, did not soften. A Brookings study found a near doubling in the use of “American decline” terminology in official Chinese documents from 2025. State Security Minister Chen Yixin wrote in Qiushi in December of 2025, what could be described as a near complete inventory of the ills of the world: the usurpation of unipolar dominance gives way to economic decline and social disintegration, a domestic credit crisis and the collapse of foreign mythic structures. Around the same time, a popular phrase borrowed from gaming, the “kill line” (斩杀线) found its way to official Chinese publications. A Qiushi article from January 2026 described an America, the working class of which had been pushed (beyond the point of no return) along the path of ruin by an unrepairable (decomposing) industrial base while financial capitalism strangled the benefits. The conclusion that was drawn was that we had already entered the post-American world.
The correction of early 2026
Then the story changed once more, and the correction was from within Beijing’s own strategic community.
The consensus in Chinese policymaking following the Busan summit in October 2025, was that China had won the trade war and forced the US into a stalemate. The years of maximum pressure, they said, did not lead to the systemic concessions China had sought, but rather worsened American inflation and reduced productivity. For a few months, the optimism was high. However, by 2026, the optimism was replaced by apprehension. A series of adverse events for China, from losing equity in a German port buyout, to the Nexperia debacle, to the Iran war, led many to wonder if China’s victory was, in fact, a loss. The dominant question that the strategic community was debating was whether American power was in decline or if it was in fact, power rebounding.
What was most interesting was who took the cautious side. Both Chen Wenling and Yan Xuetong argued that the US had, and has, the military and economic capability to project power. In their view, the US had the edge, and Trump’s high stakes, risky policy decisions were based on the belief that the US had the dominant position. The gap was definitely closing, but was not yet a reality. The advice they gave was to be patient. If China was able to “manage its own affairs well,” it was likely that the US would be compelled to return to a more stable relationship.
The key observation regarding prominent intellectuals in Beijing is this. They have never been champions of the triumphalist position. Yan Xuetong has spent a great deal of time dismissing talks of “The East is rising and the West is declining” and multipolarity as delusional. His recently published book, Inflection of History (历史的拐点), which was published by CITIC Press in December of 2025, predicts a US-China bipolarity which, during the next decade, would be expected to stabilise rather than destabilise. In this scenario, over the next decade the gap in capability between the two powers would be expected to converge, although the US would retain an overall advantage. In this scenario, the US would retain overall dominance in services, cyberspace and global influence, while China would retain relative superiority in manufacturing and be dominant in the international arena. In this scenario, Yan does argue that Trump would be expected to damage American power, especially with regards to the international balance, through the closure of laboratories, the loss of researchers, and a declining international trade. However, damage to the leader of the bipolar order is not the same as the collapse of the order, and Yan is very cautious not to make confuse the two.
As China’s foremost authority on US studies, Wang Jisi (王缉思) of Peking University, has placed the greatest emphasis on the need for a clear and level-headed approach. His influential essay, titled, “Has America really declined? Chinese people should hold a sober understanding” ( 美国到底有没有衰落?中国人应有清醒认识), leads with the argument that the most important factors influencing the relationship are domestic political issues, and are not to be found in some quantifiable assessment of relative national strength, or within the confines of the Thucydides Trap. He has argued that the effects of Trump’s immigration restrictions would be more symbolic than real, and would not negatively impact the long-term potential of the US economy. Along with American scholar David Lampton, he wrote, that while both societies have convinced itself that the other is an existential threat, which is a dangerous narrative trap, similar to a noticeable shift of power.
Why AI keeps rewriting the script
If the quest for technological dominance was to be provided as a single reason for the inconsistency in the narrative, it would be the most accurate. The same confidence that characterized 2025 is the same that will characterize the sobriety of 2026. When Trump had his second inauguration in January 2025, DeepSeek had launched their R1. It disrupted the presumption of AI dominance in America and had a day effect of 200 billion on Nvidia’s valuation. For Chinese decision makers, since then, it has been electric. Carnegie researchers described it as the rediscovery of technological confidence. The effect was the realization of the theory of “The East is rising and the West is declining” (东升西降): a monumental achievement with controls on exports from a young lab in Hangzhou.
The second installment was more sobering. The launch of DeepSeek’s next model, V4, in April 2026, was received with indifference. In fact, DeepSeek’s own internal product documentation stated that V4 was between three and six months behind American models. Furthermore, V4 was reliant on domestic chips from Huawei, and was, in most assessments, dependent on American technology that was not easily replaceable. For Chinese analysts, this was not a case of falling behind, but one of the more difficult problems of maintaining the technological edge. Reshoring and tariffs told a similar story. The American industrial base, which the “kill line” (斩杀线) commentary presumed was a terminally stagnated industrial base, was the target of a renewed, aggressive, and partially successful push to bring industry back to America. A competitor with such a focus on rejuvenation and renewal is not, on the surface, a declining competitor.
The G2 Puzzle
There’s another element coming from Washington that adds to the complexity of the story of American decline. This element relates to Trump. Before the Busan meeting, Trump used the term “G2,” and several Washington officials followed suit. The decline thesis cannot account for this. If America is indeed in decline, why is it offering G2 (shared leadership) with China?
Chinese reflexive responses are interesting. The official position, as expressed in Zhou Li’s (周力) December 2025 article, is that G2 as a hegemony is incompatible with China’s commitment to a multipolar world and would alienate the Global South which China is trying to court. These scholars have found their own workarounds. Yan Xuetong and Zheng Yongnian have suggested that G2 is more a description of a scenario of existing bipolarity than a policy to adopt. Xia Liping of Tongji University has suggested that G2 be rephrased as “China-US coordination” (中美协调) instead of “China-US co-governance” (中美共治), which makes it easier for Beijing to accept peer status while not succumbing to a duopoly. The attempt to manage the terminology suggests that the US at 250 is still sufficiently powerful that its offer of co-leadership is significant, even to a China that is more confident than ever.
A mirror, not a verdict
What emerges from five years of this commentary is not a single Chinese view of America at 250 but a layered one. The loudest polemical phrase is that the US, a hegemon, is in an irreversible decline. Within a Chinese context, this serves a purpose unrelated to the US. The state media have found it convenient to juxtapose gun violence and homelessness against the backdrop of Chinese economic performance. The decline of the US economy flouts the-premise, as socialism is the ultimate victor among capitalist competition.
But that was in the loud tier. In the reserved tier, the people in Beijing who are actually relying on reading Washington have converged on a more cautious and, frankly, more accurate assessment. They have described America as a relative decline, but erratic, and still very formidable as well as technologically advanced, especially in the field of the upcoming and new challenges of competition. The assessments have consistently referred to America as “declining but dangerous,” and this phrase has proven to be the most accurate of the lot. Reality has justified the phrase. The same cannot be said of unqualified and total victory.
The inconsistency in narratives can be attributed to the fact that the accounts are serving two purposes simultaneously. They are both analysis and propaganda, and the two types of work are at odds with each other. After AI successes or trade wins, the propaganda is ahead of analysis. After the impacts of reshoring or when a Chinese model stays behind, the analysts bring it back. The occasion is provided by the anniversary, but the underlying reason is that China has not decided, and maybe cannot decide, if they think that simply waiting will work in their favour or if the gap they have slowly been closing over the past 25 years is going to be a stubborn gap.
At 250, in other words, the United States functions in Chinese discourse less as a subject to be judged than as a mirror. What Beijing sees in it, in any given month, tells you a great deal about how confident Beijing is feeling about itself
The greatest geopolitical and economic challenge facing the United States today is the proliferation of international Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs.) While the United States has the “sweet geopolitical spot in the world’s geography and topographic landmass,” its economic dominance is being challenged by the proliferation of international SWFs. It is true, at present, that the United States has the largest reserve of oil and mineral wealth in the world, yet with SWFs gaining traction in the world economy, the oil reserves and mineral wealth may not matter.
Those countries that have initiated SWFs as part of their economic and geopolitical life are on an upward trajectory. The United States, on the other hand, is on a downward path by not marshalling its vast mineral wealth in a comprehensive and dynamic SWF. If things continue on their present course, those countries utilizing their mineral wealth and excess cash surplus will eventually catch up and overtake the size of the US economy. This is an evolving threat to the national security of the United States and to its very polity.
The most immediate threat to the United States is the race to develop mining facilities on the Moon to harvest and transport the critical element of Helium-3 (He-3.) He-3 is a critical element for the increasing economic demands of a modern world economy. Whoever can establish mining dominance for this critical element will become the world’s leading economic power in the world, regardless of that nation’s mineral wealth on Earth.
However, with its present economic and political strength, the United States has the means to reverse that trend if its two major political organizations can compromise on the very nature of the framework that establishes a United States SWF; this challenge is not easily dealt with.
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This article discusses the legislative gridlock surrounding the creation of a United States SWF and the accelerating international competition that challenges the current United States dominance in space technology.
Commonwealth Fusion Systems (CFS) is currently constructing the SPARC at Devens, Massachusetts. CFS is constructing the SPARC to demonstrate to the world that it has solved the fusion problem. Despite some technological setbacks, CFS is on schedule to make the SPARC operational by the end of 2026, or early 2027. At the same time, CFS is currently constructing a fusion reactor (called a tokamak) in Virginia, which is scheduled to go online in the early 2030s. Critical to the ARC’s development is a shortage of the element He-3. He-3 is ignited by radio frequency and is the sparkplug that begins the plasma process, which is fusion energy, in the ARC tokamak.
The Commercial Landscape: U.S. Private Frontrunners
Terrestrial Helium-3 supply—derived primarily from nuclear stockpile maintenance—is severely capped at 22,000 to 30,000 liters annually. With surging demand for ultra-low-term quantum computer cooling, private aerospace firms are leading the transition to lunar harvesting:
Interlune: Founded by former Blue Origin executives, the company unveiled a full-scale prototype harvester developed with Vermeer to process one hundred metric tons of regolith per hour. Backed by a $6.9 million NASA contract for its Prospect Moon payload, Interlune secured a historic $300M+ supply agreement with Finnish quantum firm Bluefors. Its first mapping payload is scheduled for an upcoming commercial lunar launch.
Lunar Helium-3 Mining (LH3M):This firm holds five U.S. patents on a non-invasive, gas-separation architecture designed to extract solar wind volatile gases while bypassing traditional, high-wear mechanical regolith excavation.
The U.S. Sovereign Wealth Fund Gridlock
While Helium-3 is valued at roughly $20 million per kilogram, the asset cannot currently be utilized to seed an American Sovereign Wealth Fund due to severe political domestic gridlock:
The Legislative Catch-22: The U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act explicitly protects private enterprise, granting corporations exclusive ownership over extracted space resources. To capture this value, Congress would need to enact “space-severance taxes” or equity-for-infrastructure deals—both of which face massive ideological pushbacks in a deeply divided legislature. It should be noted that American taxpayers have invested some $1.9 trillion (adjusted for inflation) in technology developed by NASA. Since the American people invested this money, they should be entitled to a return on investment.
The Deficit vs. Surplus Dilemma: Traditional SWFs rely on state-managed resource surpluses (e.g., Norway’s oil). The U.S. operates at a massive structural deficit. Republicans propose seeding a fund via tariffs or fossil-fuel extraction, while Democrats demand funding via corporate wealth taxes or clean-energy equity. These disputes, combined with immediate 2026 midterm election priorities, have stalled the SWF framework completely.
Global Geopolitical Competitors: State-Driven Alternatives
While the U.S. model depends heavily on the private market, international adversaries are leveraging unified state power to establish dominance over lunar resources:
China (CNSA): China’s Chang’e lunar exploration program is systematically mapping Helium-3 concentrations. Unlike the U.S. focus on near-term quantum cooling, Beijing explicitly views lunar He-3 as a long-term strategic energy priority to fuel Earth-based Deuterium-Helium-3 nuclear fusion reactors.
The China-Russia Coalition: Beijing and Moscow have formalized a binding industrial partnership to construct an automated nuclear reactor on the Moon’s South Pole by 2035–2036. This autonomous reactor is designed to resolve the “Lunar Night” problem, providing continuous power to massive, automated mining rovers and scientific labs under the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) framework.
Japan (ispace): In the allied sector, Japanese lunar robotics firm ispace has partnered with European mining tech developers to pioneer its own automated, energy-efficient recovery models for lunar Helium-3.
· Conclusion
· The race for Helium-3 represents a critical shift from symbolic space exploration to deep-space industrial supply chains. While U.S. commercial tech is moving quickly, domestic policy gridlock risks ceding permanent, state-backed infrastructure dominance to the China-Russia ILRS coalition.
· While the concept of using outer space resources to build national wealth is actively discussed by think tanks, Congress has separate, targeted pieces of legislation addressing artificial intelligence revenue, foreign transparency, and space resource exploration rules.
·
· The primary draft bills and legislative vehicles currently stalled in committee reveal how Congress is attempting to navigate these frameworks:
The American A.I. Sovereign Wealth Fund Act (S. 4825)
Introduced in June 2026 by Senate Finance Committee member Bernie Sanders (I-VT), this is the most direct legislative attempt to create a federal wealth fund.
The Mechanism: The bill proposes imposing a specialized excise tax on systemically critical artificial intelligence models and automation infrastructure. The revenue would seed a citizen-owned national wealth fund.
Why It’s Stalled: It is currently deadlocked in the Senate Finance Committee. The bill faces severe pushback from lawmakers who argue that taxing emerging domestic tech sectors will cause the U.S. to lose the AI race to China, preferring instead to seed a potential fund via tariffs or natural resources.
2. The Sovereign Wealth Fund Transparency Act (S. 1488)
Introduced by Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), this bill tackles the national security and foreign policy side of state-owned investment vehicles.
The Mechanism: Rather than creating a U.S. fund, this bill forces heavy disclosure requirements, financial auditing, and security screening on foreign sovereign wealth funds operating within U.S. critical infrastructure, high-tech, and aerospace sectors.
Why It’s Stalled: Referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, it has remained stagnant due to concerns that over-regulating allied sovereign wealth funds (such as those from Gulf state allies or Singapore) could chill necessary foreign direct investment into U.S. tech startups.
There is currently no singular active bill trying to place federal royalties on lunar Helium-3 mining. Instead, the debate is gridlocked during budget reconciliation and agency authorizations within the House and Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committees.
The Conflict: Congressional research reports on space resource extraction outline a widening gap in regulatory authority. NASA’s Artemis framework pushes heavily for in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) via public-private partnerships. However, some factions in Congress are pushing for strict government-owned procurement models to prevent private monopolies over lunar sites, effectively freezing long-term policy development
Midterm Postponements: Broad commercial space bills have been repeatedly delayed because committee attention is entirely consumed by urgent federal budget reconciliation battles and defense appropriations.development.
Summary of Bill Statuses
Bill / Initiative
Primary Committee
Current Status
Core Roadblock
S. 4825 (American A.I. SWF Act)
Senate Finance
Stalled / Introduced
Bipartisan disagreement over taxing tech vs. utilizing tariffs.
S. 1488 (SWF Transparency Act)
Senate Foreign Relations
Stalled / Introduced
Fear of discouraging foreign venture capital in U.S. aerospace.
NASA Authorization & ISRU Policies
Senate Commerce / Science
Blocked in budget cycle
Disagreements on private extraction rights vs. national ownership.
NASA Authorization & ISRU Policies
Senate Commerce / Science
Blocked in budget cycle
Disagreements on private extraction rights vs. national ownership.
Conclusion
Until the two major political organizations can begin to compromise for the good of the American people, the United States will eventually revert to a second-class power.
U.S. Vice President JD Vance has accused some members of the Israeli government of attempting to influence American public opinion to undermine Washington’s agreement with Iran, highlighting growing public differences between the two allies over Middle East policy.
Speaking on a podcast with Joe Rogan released on Wednesday, Vance defended the U.S.-brokered deal that ended last month’s conflict with Iran, despite criticism from Israeli officials and some U.S. lawmakers who argue the agreement leaves Tehran’s missile and nuclear capabilities largely intact.
Vance accuses Israeli officials of influence campaign
Vance said he was certain that some figures within the Israeli government sought to steer U.S. policy toward continuing military operations against Iran.
“I know beyond a shadow of a doubt that there have been people within the Israeli government who are trying to actually shift us away from that policy because they want to continue the military campaign,” Vance said.
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He added that although he maintains good relationships with some Israeli officials, others were trying to shape American public opinion.
“There are some people within their system that we know beyond a shadow of a doubt are manipulating and trying to change American public opinion to keep the war going on indefinitely,” he said.
Defends Iran ceasefire agreement
Vance argued that the agreement reached last month was the right decision, despite criticism that it failed to place sufficient limits on Iran’s ballistic missile programme or provide a clear roadmap for dismantling its nuclear facilities.
The deal has also been criticised in Israel for restricting its military campaign against Iran-backed Hezbollah in Lebanon.
The vice president said attempts by foreign governments to influence U.S. policy are common and not unique to Israel.
“It doesn’t bother me that Israel tries to do this. It frankly doesn’t even bother me that Russia or some of these other countries do it,” Vance said.
“What does bother me is when those operations, those influence campaigns, actually affect American political judgment.”
Growing public differences with Israel
The remarks add to increasingly visible disagreements between the Trump administration and Israeli leaders over how to handle Iran.
In June, Vance sharply criticised Israeli opponents of the Iran agreement, arguing that President Donald Trump remained Israel’s strongest ally despite objections from some members of the Israeli government.
Israeli officials have argued that the agreement does not adequately address Iran’s nuclear ambitions or ballistic missile programme, concerns they say are widely shared across Israel’s political and security establishment.
Would US have entered the conflict?
Asked whether the United States would have become involved in the recent conflict with Iran without Israeli influence, Vance replied, “Yes, yes I do.”
He added that President Trump independently believes Iran should never obtain a nuclear weapon.
“I think the president, separate from any influence from Israel, believes very strongly, and again I agree with this, that Iran should not have a nuclear weapon,” Vance said.
The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office did not immediately respond to requests for comment.
Why it matters
Vance’s comments expose unusually public tensions between senior U.S. and Israeli officials over the future of Middle East policy. They also underscore ongoing debate within Washington over the extent of foreign influence on U.S. decision-making and the long-term strategy toward Iran.
What to watch
The remarks are likely to draw scrutiny from both Israeli officials and members of the U.S. Congress as the Trump administration seeks to preserve the Iran agreement while managing its close security partnership with Israel. Further disagreements over Iran and regional military operations could test the traditionally strong U.S.-Israel alliance in the months ahead.
European shares were little changed on Friday but remained on track for their first weekly decline in five weeks as weakness in technology stocks and renewed tensions between the United States and Iran dampened investor sentiment.
The pan-European STOXX 600 index edged 0.1% lower to 640.28 points by 0849 GMT, with losses in technology companies offsetting gains in most other sectors.
The benchmark index is poised to end a four-week winning streak after investors reassessed lofty valuations in artificial intelligence-related stocks while monitoring escalating geopolitical risks in the Middle East.
Technology stocks remain under pressure
The technology sector fell 1.3% on Friday as investors continued taking profits following months of strong gains driven by enthusiasm for artificial intelligence.
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The sector also remained focused on the closely watched U.S. stock market debut of South Korean memory chip maker SK Hynix after its $26.5 billion share sale.
Among European chip-related stocks:
Soitec fell 3.3%.
BE Semiconductor Industries declined 1.6%.
ASML dropped 2.3%.
“The large swings we’re seeing in technology stocks suggest investors remain under stress amid elevated valuations,” said Ipek Ozkardeskaya, senior market analyst at Swissquote Bank.
“Attention is now turning to SK Hynix’s U.S. debut, which could help gauge broader appetite for AI-related stocks and influence sentiment across the sector.”
Iran tensions weigh on market sentiment
Investor caution also reflected renewed uncertainty in the Middle East after Iranian forces targeted U.S. military infrastructure in Gulf states following fresh U.S. strikes on Iran.
The latest escalation further weakened the fragile three-week-old ceasefire and renewed concerns over potential disruptions to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important energy trade routes.
Higher oil prices and possible supply disruptions have raised concerns about inflation, particularly in energy-importing Europe, where markets are closely watching the implications for economic growth and European Central Bank policy.
Telecoms and travel outperform
Despite weakness in technology, most sectors in the STOXX 600 traded higher.
Telecommunications stocks led gains, rising 1.4%, after Vodafone surged nearly 11%.
The rally followed an announcement by UAE telecoms group e& that it would sell its stake in Vodafone to the family investment group of French billionaire Xavier Niel.
Travel and leisure stocks gained 0.8%, supported by strength in airline shares.
British budget carrier EasyJet jumped 14% after agreeing in principle to a £5.7 billion ($7.65 billion) takeover approach from Apollo Global.
Steel stocks rally on broker upgrades
European steelmakers outperformed after J.P. Morgan adopted a more positive view of the sector.
The investment bank upgraded ArcelorMittal to “neutral” from “underweight,” lifting its shares 5%.
Austria’s Voestalpine climbed 6%, while Germany’s Salzgitter surged 10.3% after both companies received double upgrades to “overweight.”
Other movers
Wealth manager St. James’s Place was among the session’s biggest losers, falling 8.5% after reports that Sovereign Wealth, one of its largest partner firms, was in talks to join a Swedish wealth management group.
Future outlook
Markets are expected to remain focused on two key drivers in the coming days: whether the renewed U.S.-Iran hostilities escalate further and whether SK Hynix’s U.S. debut reinforces or weakens investor confidence in the AI-driven technology rally.
With geopolitical risks pushing oil prices higher and technology valuations facing increased scrutiny, analysts expect volatility across European equities to remain elevated in the near term.
We threw in an education in United States history, geography, and the economics of the $20 baseball cap.
They expected an athletic tournament.
We staged a county fair, featuring nine exhibits stretched across 3,000 miles, with people and surroundings as varied as our twangs.
Visitors to the Boston venue will remember the success of the Soccer Train, a commuter rail and site of opposing pep rallies on the 50-minute trip to Foxboro Stadium.
Classic stories from the Los Angeles Times’ 143-year archive
Imagine that, longtime Bostonians said. A culture clash where nobody gets hurt.
Visitors to the Dallas venue will remember our failures: the blight around the aging Cotton Bowl, the empty seats inside, the construction-hampered traffic flow that turned game days into nightmares.
For nearly a month, in nine locations, the world has applauded our wonders, cringed at our bruises, and, in some places, even felt our embrace.
So how did we do?
Sometimes, we shined. Other times, we stumbled.
Sometimes we yelled too much, pushed too much. When the rest of the world was rushing joyfully out of a subway or dancing through an alley, often we put up our dukes and played the frightened bullies.
But we also smiled a lot, and listened a lot, and sometimes accepted that which we did not understand.
Like those hourlong postgame fan celebrations that forced stadium police to work overtime. We eventually realized something could not be so bad if it made so many people so happy.
We hollered and hugged, we were impatient and helpful. In other words, we were ourselves.
Sometimes we thrilled. But other times, we disappointed.
Visitors to the New York venue will remember what Dublin sales representative Gerry Taylor remembers.
Nothing.
Taylor learned on the first weekend that despite slick World Cup advertisements, New York was not New York.
Just as Boston was not Boston, but Foxboro. And Detroit was not Detroit, but Pontiac. And Los Angeles was Pasadena.
And New York was actually a smelly, industrial area in northern New Jersey.
Taylor left his Manhattan room early one Saturday morning, four hours before the opener between Italy and Ireland.
He wrapped himself in an Irish flag and planned on a making a pregame stop in a pub next door to Giants Stadium.
“Do this all the time in Dublin,” he said. “Pop a few Guinness at the pub, talk to other fans, get ready for the game.”
But upon arriving in East Rutherford, N.J., he realized the only thing he could drink next door to the stadium was toxic waste.
There wasn’t a pub in sight. Or a store. Or a house. Or even a street that wasn’t an expressway.
He spent the next three hours sitting with two friends on a curb, cursing his introduction to sports in America.
“Are all stadiums like this, away from cities, in the middle of nothing?” he asked. “Seems to me it must be hard to have good sports in places like this, isn’t it? We are let down.”
The only thing we can assure him, and others as disillusioned as Taylor, is it wasn’t because we didn’t try.
Rating the 1994 World Cup venues, best and worst of show:
Chicago
BEST: We knew this would be a great spot from the moment we first bit into something called “the Belly Buster,” sold at a hot dog stand near Soldier Field.
Ingredients: Polish beef dog, relish, ketchup, mustard, onions and jalapeno peppers. It lived up to its billing. Trust us.
And so did everything else.
Soldier Field is the perfect location for an international event, being just a short cab ride from one of America’s great downtowns.
Michigan Avenue has been buzzing for a month, what with German tourists in Bermuda shorts buying black patent leather shoes to accompany their white socks. At night, horse-drawn carriages fought with taxis for street space in some of the best action since Ben Hur.
Bolivian Marco Etcheverry tackles German captain Lothar Matthaeus from behind in Chicago, Ill. (AP Photo/Santiago Lyon)
(Santiago Lyon / Ap)
WORST: The only people who didn’t enjoy themselves here were the Greeks, both the national soccer players and the large Chicago-area community that gathered to watch them one Sunday morning against Bulgaria.
Greece lost that game, 4-0. In the process, the teams drove Greek fans so crazy they started seeing things.
At one point during the game, a Greek tossed a smoke bomb on the field, later claiming it was tradition to do so after his team scored.
His team is back in Athens, and it still hasn’t scored.
IMPRESSIONS: The World Cup’s kind of town, Chicago is. Not only were the streets brimming with international flavor, the shuttle system to Soldier Field was so efficient that cabbies complained about not getting enough chances to rip people off.
Now that’s a venue.
YOU HAD TO BE HERE: During a bachelor party held on the 36th floor of a prominent local hotel, somebody poured beer down the elevator shaft. By morning, the ale had dripped to ground floor and short-circuited the electrical system.
Many hotel guests–some checking out with reams of World Cup-related luggage–were forced to carry everything down 20 flights of stairs.
Once at the bottom, they had to tip valet-parking drivers for walking 10 steps to pick up their cars.
Boston
BEST: We marveled not at a city’s effect upon a World Cup, but vice versa.
“What has happened to a town divided along ethnic lines has been remarkable,” said E.J. Kahn of the Boston Host Committee.
By order of Mayor Tom Menino, the historic City Hall area was turned over to foreigners of every imaginable color and tongue.
Old-timers who never thought they would see an African soccer team playing at the home of the New England Patriots also never thought they would see people dancing on their cobblestone streets in tribal costumes.
Police were particularly worried the night after Argentina had defeated Greece in a first-round game. While the Greeks partied in front of City Hall, the Argentines celebrated eight blocks away in Copley Square.
The fiestas drew closer and closer until five Argentine fans wearing blue-and-white uniform shorts stood directly behind a dozen Greeks dancing in a circle.
Just as security guards prepared to move in, the circle slowly opened, and the Greeks motioned for the Argentines to join them. The Argentines did.
The hardened city sighed.
WORST: Many fans apparently didn’t realize that the game would be played about 45 minutes south of Boston in the desolate suburb of Foxboro.
And nobody knew that once they arrived at the stadium, in a forested area where parking availability seemed unlimited, parking spaces would cost $20 each.
Visitors got even with the World Cup Organizing Committee, though, by leaving their hotels in Boston and staying closer to the stadium in places such as Providence, R.I.
Our smallest state as a World Cup host? Not quite what organizers had in mind.
IMPRESSIONS: The Northeast may have tried harder than any other area, and it showed.
The normally reserved Bostonians, ranked 28th out of 36 U.S. city residents in a recent survey rating kindness to strangers, discovered warmth and tolerance.
When dozens of Irish tourists were swindled out of tickets, Bostonians found them more. When foreigners didn’t understand those distinct accents, Bostonians spoke more slowly.
YOU HAD TO BE HERE: For an hour after Argentina’s victory over Greece, more than a hundred Argentine fans remained at Foxboro Stadium, dancing and singing.
Police politely asked them to leave their seats, but the group only moved as far as the lower concourse. Thirty minutes later, police finally escorted them down the concourse and out the front gates, where they continued to party.
Was the game that exciting? Well, yes and no. With this stadium being 20 miles from the nearest decent-sized city, they had nowhere else to go.
Dallas
BEST: From the World Cup volunteers to city cab drivers, we appreciated the people. Amid bleak surroundings and uncomfortable temperatures, they provided the venue with some badly needed touches of humanity.
One hero was Laura Addington, a schoolteacher from Louisiana. She served as an interpreter for everyone. Well, at least everyone who spoke English, French, Spanish, Italian, German or Arabic.
Other stars were the African taxi drivers. They knew the roads, and they knew soccer, which is the only reason we were able to find Maradona during rush hour.
WORST: Some nights were almost cool enough to hold a sporting event. Yet most of the games were held in the blazing afternoon or early evening sun to accommodate European television.
Those brave enough to attend games suffered through stifling heat. Don’t buy those happy expressions you saw on ESPN. It was torture.
IMPRESSIONS: Dallas is a Cowboy town. And not the Germans, Argentines or any of the soccer fanatics who came through here changed that.
With poor attendance and a distinct lack of any electricity other than that generated by the Cowboys’ new set of uniforms, this proves there are about a thousand better places in this country to hold an international event.
Not that Dallas is a bad place–it’s merely the wrong place.
We have learned that events such as the World Cup require diversity of thought and appreciation of differences. Dallas is just too danged American for any of that.
What Dallas’ failure here portends for the 1996 Olympics in another southern town called Atlanta, well, that’s for another story.
YOU HAD TO BE HERE: By some estimates, the World Cup games here were outdrawn even by the demolition of the Cotton Exchange building downtown one Saturday morning. But at least at the soccer games, nobody was treated for smoke inhalation.
New York-New Jersey
BEST: With the melting pot of New York City nearby, this was the only truly international venue.
The stadium rocked with the sounds, colors and even smells of those countries competing.
Except for its location in New Jersey, Giants Stadium was also the perfect World Cup facility, with a beautiful field and gleaming facilities that had foreigners gawking.
WORST: The only Cup fever to hit New York City involved the Stanley Cup.
Maybe it was because of the Rangers. Or Knicks. Or Gay Games. It certainly wasn’t the Yankees, whose attendance was routinely tripled by the World Cup games.
Maybe it was because every day in New York City feels like an international festival. Or maybe it was because New York City simply didn’t have the time.
Whatever, the city that doesn’t sleep also didn’t care. It was interesting to drive to the stadium listening to New York City sports-talk radio hosts rip soccer, then arrive to discover mile-long lines at the front gates.
New Jersey license plates, all of them.
IMPRESSIONS: Organizers could save tourists and taxi fare by dropping all pretenses that the game is being played in New York City.
The success of this venue proves it is time to start celebrating the ethnic charms and splendid facilities of northern New Jersey . . . and leave New York to worry about the Mets.
YOU HAD TO BE HERE: The location for the World Cup host committee in this country’s largest city? New Brunswick, N.J., 90 minutes from Manhattan.
The location of these New Jersey-played games as listed on commemorative postal stamps? New York.
Detroit
BEST: Do not underestimate the accomplishment of organizers who ran the Detroit venue by avoiding all traces of Detroit.
Games were staged an hour’s drive north in the suburb of Pontiac, a bedroom community dominated by large front lawns and strip malls. If Detroit street gangs possess missiles that can fly that far, we didn’t see them.
The venue MVP (Most Valuable Professor) was Trey Rogers, the god of sod. The assistant prof of turf-grass science at Michigan State actually made grass grow inside the Silverdome.
After three years of experiments, at a cost of $2.4 million, the indoor stuff held up admirably and was hailed by all but the most serious allergy sufferers.
The crowd cheers at the Pontiac, Mich., Silverdome as the United States and Switzerland play. (AP Photo/Bill Waugh)
(Bill Waugh/AP)
WORST: Much like East Rutherford and Foxboro, there was no there there. The venue lacked big-city energy and a pulse.
The streets emptied at 10 p.m. After night games, if you hadn’t paid someone to hold a spot in line at Herschel’s Deli, the happening spot was a Taco Bell drive-through.
Of course, after a game in the non-air-conditioned Silverdome, all anybody wanted to do was lie down in a nice comfortable meat locker.
YOU HAD TO BE HERE: After the June 24 game between Brazil and Sweden, a thunderstorm passed directly over the media tent as hundreds of journalists were filing their stories. The thunder was deafening and the tent shook as if it were going to break.
Lightning threatened to knock out the power. The lights flickered, World Cup officials implored reporters to save their files or risk losing them.
This scene was repeated at media and hospitality tents in most of the venues. But aside from the Mexican team, nothing in the tournament has collapsed.
Washington
BEST: We never thought we’d say this, but we liked the subways.
The blue line, which stopped three blocks from RFK stadium, was a shoulder-to-shoulder mass of international passion.
The Dutch fans made their mark by pounding on the ceilings. The Swiss, by chanting through the underground terminals.
The Mexicans demonstrated their presence with songs, singing loud even though they could barely breathe while crushed in overloaded cars during the final 10 minutes of the trip.
It was all underground, but it was true democracy, rare even for our nation’s capital.
WORST: Everything was wonderful until you actually walked inside RFK.
The stadium is falling apart. The Mexican fans literally caused it to rock with their constant bouncing during Mexico’s emotional tie with Italy.
The stadium security officials were surly and overbearing. Maybe it was those horrible purple berets that made them so mad.
The stadium media-tent volunteers, mostly of college age, were the worst. This would be of no interest to the public, except many worldwide impressions of this country are created by foreign journalists.
And those foreign journalists were treated horribly. Little attempt was made to understand or deal with them.
Tickets were refused with no explanation given. Attempts to talk with media coordinators were denied. Questions about the facility were greeted with shrugs.
Translators working player interviews refused to even offer translated quotes until they had been typed and apparently approved by supervisors, which often took two or three hours.
When one Middle Eastern journalist complained about discrimination, one college girl working as a volunteer laughed in his face and replied, “I don’t think so.”
IMPRESSIONS: Sports organizers beware. Any further events staged here should not involve any local volunteers or officials from this World Cup.
This is a wonderful city, and as our capital, it should be the one of the first places promoters go for big events. But now we wonder if haughty attitudes and low-rent facilities haven’t kept the big games away.
The pre-game show at RFK Stadium prior to the Norway v Mexico group stage match of 1994 FIFA World Cup. (Photo by David Caban/Archive Photos/Getty Images)
(David Caban/David Caban)
YOU HAD TO BE HERE: A local activist hung a “Save Bosnia” sign in the stands during the opening game here between Mexico and Norway. It was taken down by local officials. He sued for the right to display it. He won.
Not that the guy wanted to rub it in, but visible the next game were two “Save Bosnia” signs.
San Fransisco-Palo Alto
BEST: We love Los Gatos. This mountain town of 28,000 near San Jose has adopted–and been adopted by–the Brazilians.
After Brazil’s games at Stanford Stadium in Palo Alto, Los Gatos became Little Rio, complete with samba music, incessant drumbeats and conga lines through Town Plaza Park.
“This is very exciting,” local resident Judy VanKampen said. “It is totally different than what you normally see in Los Gatos, which is people walking down the street with dogs and strollers.”
Even though crowds were lively, they were orderly. Some of the women might have strained the city’s public decency codes with their skimpy bikinis, but city officials, to their credit, looked the other way.
Sure they did.
Brazilian forward Romario beats United States defender Alexi Lalas at Stanford Stadium, July 4, 1994 in Stanford, Calif. (AP Photo/Thomas Kienzle)
(Thomas Kienzle / Associated Press)
WORST: The whining of Palo Alto politicians because World Cup organizers identified the venue as San Francisco.
But unless we are missing something, nobody has written a song called, “I Left My Heart in Palo Alto.”
IMPRESSIONS: Of all the venues, Stanford University was the worst in creating obstacles for World Cup organizers.
University officials were in position to drive a hard bargain because FIFA, soccer’s organizing body, wanted a presence in San Francisco but did not want to use Candlestick Park because of its smaller size.
Thus, Stanford Stadium is by far the least modern of the venues. Even though some improvements were made, World Cup organizers did not get all of their demands met.
Yet those academics learned that the World Cup is just the type of event that educational institutions should be encouraging.
The excellent soccer is the least of its legacies. Teams from four continents played here, and the visitors who followed those teams to Palo Alto left something of themselves behind.
Unfortunately for the merchants, it was not money. They were disappointed in their take.
But the visitors contributed something more valuable, their cultures. Los Gatos, one feels, will never be the same.
YOU HAD TO BE HERE: A Brazilian woman walked into an ice cream store in Los Gatos one hot day and ordered a beer.
Los Angeles-Pasadena
BEST: My, but the old lady still can sing. Our Rose Bowl looked wonderful with its face lift and colorful frills.
When the air is clear and the heat isn’t oppressive, there is no better view in this World Cup than that of the San Gabriel mountains looming behind the Rose Bowl scoreboard.
Well, OK, the view of that scoreboard after the United States played Columbia was pretty nice too.
Soccer fans inside the Rose Bowl stadium in Pasadena, Calif., prior to World Cup Final match between Brazil and Italy, Sunday July 17, 1994. (AP Photo/Lois Bernstein)
(Lois Bernstein / Associated Press)
WORST: That World Cup chief Alan Rothenberg would allow his hometown facility to rip off hungry and thirsty soccer fans–many of them his neighbors–with inflated prices is inexcusable. Two dollars and fifty cents for a Sno-cone? Fish and chips for $7.50?
IMPRESSIONS: The scene reminds us of the 1984 Olympics, causing emotions we never thought we would feel again. Traffic flowing smoothly, the city clean and pressed, citizens talking about something fun.
Surveys say that many people here couldn’t care less about the event, but the ones who do have made it memorable.
YOU HAD TO BE HERE: With so many men ignoring the “Women” signs on the portable toilets outside the Rose Bowl, officials placed “Out of Order” signs on several working potties and secretly passed around the word that women should use those.
Orlando
BEST: Quick, somebody get this town an NFL team. There was no better stadium-area atmosphere than here, where fans congregated less than a mile from the Florida Citrus Bowl at a trendy shopping and dining area called Church Street Station.
One night the Dutch fans were having so much fun, they started stealing baseball caps from policemen. Another night, the Mexicans were having so much fun they lay down on the railroad tracks upon hearing an oncoming train.
OK, so maybe we don’t all have the same kinds of fun.
Expensive restaurants became rollicking pubs. Thousands of foreigners became wailing, wandering messes.
Did we mention that the Irish were also in town?
WORST: This was soccer in a sauna. Every team that played under the unforgiving midday sun recorded a triumph of spirit.
For fans, merely getting to the games was a similar triumph. Ten dollars to ride a parking lot shuttle? Fifteen dollars to park at a local school, with the money being handed to a member of the PTA?
This was central Florida hucksterism at its worst. But then, they learned from the experts down the street, those guys wearing the ears.
IMPRESSIONS: With the Dutch and Belgians in town, this was supposed to be the site of hooliganism. Police from around the state were summoned for 12-hour shifts. But nothing happened. The most serious crime involved people refusing to leave bars at closing time.
Already our vacation capital, Orlando proved that it deserves to become a sports capital as well. It knows how to turn a game into an event without anybody getting hurt.
After existing for so long in the shadow of fantasyland, it acts as if it loves this real stuff.
YOU HAD TO BE HERE: In the downtown area on July 4, fans from everywhere joined to sing “Happy Birthday.”
To whom? To the United States, of course. Considering how we came of age in yet another international sporting scene this summer, it was a happy birthday indeed.
Times staff writers Elliott Almond, Julie Cart, Lisa Dillman, Chris Dufresne, Helene Elliott, Randy Harvey, Mike Penner and Times Sports Editor Bill Dwyre contributed to this story.
Turkey emerged as one of the biggest diplomatic winners from the NATO summit in Ankara after President Donald Trump lavished praise on Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, promised to lift U.S. sanctions and signalled openness to restoring Turkey’s access to the F-35 fighter jet programme.
The public display of warmth contrasted sharply with Trump’s criticism of several NATO allies during the summit and highlighted improving U.S.-Turkey relations after years of tensions.
Turkey rolls out high-profile welcome for Trump
Turkey spared little effort in welcoming Trump to Ankara.
The visit featured a red, white and blue aerial display by Turkish jets, while a newly opened airport terminal was named after the U.S. president. Erdogan personally greeted Trump at the airport before the two leaders walked together, exchanged warm remarks and held talks ahead of the summit.
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Trump later described Erdogan as a close friend and repeatedly praised the Turkish leader during the two-day gathering.
Trump says Erdogan convinced him to attend
For Turkish officials, securing Trump’s attendance was itself considered a diplomatic achievement.
Trump, who has frequently criticised NATO and questioned the alliance’s value, said he attended the summit because Erdogan was hosting it.
Erdogan welcomed the remarks after the summit.
“It was valuable that Trump emphasised the importance he places on myself and our friendship,” Erdogan said.
US signals shift on sanctions and F-35 fighter jets
The most significant outcome for Ankara was Trump’s indication that he intends to remove U.S. sanctions imposed after Turkey purchased Russia’s S-400 missile defence system in 2019.
Trump also said he was willing to consider allowing Turkey back into the F-35 stealth fighter programme, although he later clarified that he had not made a final decision.
If implemented, both moves would reverse major elements of U.S. policy that had severely strained bilateral relations during Trump’s first presidency.
U.S. lawmakers have previously insisted Turkey cannot participate in the F-35 programme while retaining the Russian-made S-400 system, making congressional approval uncertain.
Turkey could also face complications with Russia because agreements governing the S-400 purchase include end-user obligations that may limit Ankara’s options.
As a result, the announcements currently represent political commitments rather than guaranteed policy changes.
Erdogan strengthens Turkey’s position inside NATO
The summit reinforced Turkey’s ambition to play a larger role within NATO.
As the alliance’s second-largest military, Turkey has increasingly promoted itself as an indispensable security partner while seeking greater participation in European defence initiatives.
Trump also publicly defended Erdogan against criticism from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who opposed potential U.S. sales of F-35 fighter jets to Turkey.
The episode underscored Ankara’s growing diplomatic influence within the alliance.
Trump overshadows summit with disputes involving allies
While relations with Turkey improved, Trump generated fresh tensions elsewhere during the summit.
He threatened to halt U.S. trade with Spain over defence spending disputes and repeated claims regarding Greenland, drawing criticism from fellow NATO members.
Despite those disagreements, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte later described the summit as demonstrating alliance unity.
Human rights concerns receive limited attention
The summit also highlighted how Turkey’s strategic importance has reduced public Western criticism over democratic issues.
The gathering took place amid arrests of opposition figures, journalists and a prominent comedian in Turkey, prompting questions about democratic freedoms.
Rutte reiterated that democracy includes freedom of expression, free media and the right to protest.
Opposition figures argued Erdogan’s increasingly close relationship with Washington reflects growing political dependence on the United States, while critics contend Western governments have become less vocal about human rights as Turkey’s military and geopolitical importance has grown.
Future outlook
The NATO summit could mark a turning point in U.S.-Turkey relations if Trump’s pledges on sanctions relief and the F-35 programme translate into policy. However, congressional resistance, Turkey’s continued possession of the Russian S-400 system and wider geopolitical considerations remain significant obstacles. Ankara is also expected to continue pushing for greater influence within NATO and broader participation in European defence initiatives.
Analysis
The NATO summit marked one of the strongest public displays of U.S.-Turkey relations in years, with President Donald Trump using the gathering to signal a willingness to reset ties with Ankara after years of friction over Turkey’s purchase of Russia’s S-400 missile defence system. For President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, simply hosting Trump and receiving repeated public praise from him represented a significant diplomatic victory that reinforced Turkey’s strategic importance within the alliance.
Trump’s promises to lift sanctions and reconsider Turkey’s return to the F-35 fighter jet programme address two of Ankara’s longest-standing demands. However, turning those pledges into reality will be far more difficult. U.S. law and congressional opposition remain major obstacles, particularly while Turkey continues to possess the Russian-made S-400 system. Moscow could also object if Ankara takes steps that undermine agreements linked to the missile purchase.
The summit also highlighted a broader shift in Western priorities. During previous U.S. administrations, especially under Joe Biden, democratic backsliding and human rights concerns were central issues in relations with Turkey. This time, those concerns received relatively little attention as NATO focused on defence spending, military cooperation and regional security, reflecting Turkey’s growing value as a defence producer and a key NATO member on the alliance’s southeastern flank.
Trump’s warm embrace of Erdogan contrasted sharply with his confrontational approach toward several other NATO allies, including Spain and Denmark. That dynamic allowed Turkey to emerge from the summit with enhanced diplomatic standing even as broader alliance tensions persisted.
Whether this diplomatic momentum produces lasting policy changes will depend on decisions in Washington after the summit. If sanctions are eased and progress is made on the F-35 issue, bilateral ties could enter their most constructive phase in years. If congressional or legal barriers prevent those moves, however, the summit may ultimately be remembered more for its symbolism than for delivering concrete strategic gains.
Iran said on Thursday it had targeted U.S. military infrastructure across the Gulf in retaliation for fresh American strikes on Iranian territory, marking the latest escalation in a conflict that is increasingly testing a fragile ceasefire brokered just weeks ago.
The renewed exchange of attacks came as Iran prepared to bury its late Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei at the holy city of Mashhad following a week of nationwide funeral processions.
Although oil prices eased after surging on fears of wider disruption, investors and governments remained focused on whether the latest violence represented a temporary escalation or the beginning of a broader collapse of efforts to end the conflict.
Iran retaliates after U.S. strikes
Iranian armed forces said they targeted U.S. military facilities in neighbouring Gulf states after American forces struck military infrastructure across Iran’s southern coast and eastern provinces.
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According to Iranian officials quoted by state media, the latest U.S. attacks killed 14 people and wounded 78 others across five provinces on July 8 and 9.
The semi-official Fars news agency reported that one strike hit a railway bridge used for trade links with Russia and China.
Explosions were also reported on Thursday morning in Bushehr province, home to Iran’s only operational nuclear power plant, though authorities did not immediately provide details on the cause.
Gulf military installations targeted
Iran’s military said it launched drone and missile attacks against several U.S.-linked military facilities across the Gulf region.
According to Iranian state media, the targets included:
U.S. Patriot missile systems in Kuwait
An early-warning installation in Qatar
A U.S. military fuel storage facility in Bahrain
Kuwaiti authorities said their air defences intercepted a cruise missile, three ballistic missiles and ten drones. Officials reported one person was injured by falling debris.
Qatar, which hosts the largest U.S. military base in the Middle East, called for restraint and urged all sides to return to diplomatic negotiations.
During a phone call with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani also condemned attacks on commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.
Strait of Hormuz remains at the centre of tensions
The latest military confrontation follows attacks on commercial tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important energy shipping routes.
The U.S. military said Wednesday’s strikes were designed to protect international navigation after blaming Iran for attacks on three commercial vessels.
Although Tehran has not officially claimed responsibility for those attacks, analysts say Iran has increasingly used pressure around the Strait of Hormuz as leverage in negotiations with Washington.
Before the war began in late February, roughly one-fifth of global oil supplies passed through the narrow waterway.
Iran has since exercised significant control over maritime traffic in the strait, giving it considerable strategic influence over global energy markets.
The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) said American forces struck around 90 Iranian military targets.
According to CENTCOM, the operation targeted:
Air defence systems
Coastal surveillance infrastructure
Missile and drone storage facilities
Naval assets
Military logistics centres along Iran’s coastline
“The United States is holding Iran accountable for recent unjustified aggression against commercial shipping and civilian crews freely navigating a vital international waterway,” CENTCOM said.
President Donald Trump defended the operation on Wednesday, writing on Truth Social: “This is in retribution for yesterday’s bombing of ships by Iran. If it happens again, it will get much worse.”
Trump says ceasefire agreement is effectively over
While attending the NATO summit in Ankara, Trump said he believed the memorandum of understanding signed with Iran to halt the fighting had effectively collapsed.
Asked whether the agreement remained in force, Trump replied:”It’s a very interesting question. To me, I think it’s over. I don’t want to deal with them.”
He later added that even if another agreement were reached, he doubted Tehran would honour it.
Despite the renewed military exchanges, Trump said he did not expect the confrontation to develop into another prolonged war.
“Anything that happens is going to be over very quickly… and will only make it safer, including for oil,” he told reporters.
Iran vows continued retaliation
Iranian officials condemned the latest U.S. military operation as another breach of understandings reached after the ceasefire.
Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf warned Washington that future attacks would receive a military response.
“The U.S. has yet to learn that bullying and breaking its commitments no longer come without a cost,” he wrote on social media.
“The Strait of Hormuz will be reopened only under Iranian arrangements, not through U.S. threats.”
Oil markets remain on edge
Oil prices retreated on Thursday after jumping sharply a day earlier, as traders assessed whether the latest fighting would significantly disrupt Gulf energy exports.
Shipping also remains under close watch.
One of the vessels struck this week the Qatari LNG tanker Al Rekayyat remains stranded off Oman after suffering an engine-room fire following a projectile strike.
Industry sources said its liquefied natural gas cargo appears secure and that the immediate risk of explosion remains low.
Future outlook
The latest exchange of strikes has significantly weakened confidence in the U.S.-Iran ceasefire, even if neither side appears ready for a return to full-scale war.
Attention is now focused on whether further attacks occur around the Strait of Hormuz, where any prolonged disruption could quickly tighten global energy supplies and drive oil prices higher.
Diplomatic efforts led by Gulf states are likely to intensify, but Trump’s declaration that the interim agreement is “over” and Iran’s vow to continue retaliating have raised doubts over whether negotiations can still produce a lasting settlement.
From a challenge to “overturn” the result to a celebration that looked quite similar to the host team president’s signature dance move, the United States’ World Cup dreams not only came to a crashing halt in the last-16 fixture against Belgium but also became the centre of social media mockery following the controversial events of the past day.
Charles De Ketelaere scored twice to give Belgium a 4-1 win overshadowed by FIFA’s controversial decision to suspend USA forward Folarin Balogun’s ban. US President Donald Trump’s actions that prompted the overturn put both the team and the player in the spotlight.
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De Ketelaere gave Belgium the lead in the ninth minute with a simple tap-in before Hans Vanaken punished a goalkeeping howler, and substitute Romelu Lukaku added a fourth to settle a last-16 clash on Monday.
Once Lukaku put the result beyond doubt, he was joined by his teammates in a celebratory dance that looked all too familiar for the global audience. Social media users were quick to link it back to President Trump’s signature dance move.
Balogun, who was named in USA coach Mauricio Pochettino’s starting lineup after FIFA suspended a one-game ban, was largely anonymous throughout Monday’s knockout tie at Seattle.
Instead, a rampant Belgium ruthlessly dismantled the USA’s hopes of reaching a first World Cup quarterfinal in 24 years, in a bitterly disappointing end to a campaign that had captivated the host nation.
Criticism of FIFA and solidarity with Belgium had already poured in before Monday’s match, but the USA’s disappointing performance produced a new wave of jeers while the game was still ongoing.
The Belgian Red Devils shared a cheeky post captioned “Overturn this” minutes after the match ended, besides snubbing the USA for calling the game “soccer” rather than football.
Social media users pinballed the USA’s poor performance from every angle; some joked that it was the first time the team was playing a match, while others said it was more embarrassing than the previous 48 hours had been. Balogun put in a non-starter performance that saw him subbed off in the 92nd minute.
It was sarcasm for the most part – or, perhaps not – when social media users cautioned that Trump could overturn Belgium’s 4-1 win if he felt like it.
‘FIFA mafia’
FIFA President Gianni Infantino was in attendance for the match, watching from a suite with Pascale Van Damme, chair of the Belgian Football Association, and Cindy Parlow Cone, president of the USSF.
Belgium fans chanted “FIFA Mafia” during their pre-game march to Lumen Field.
People were quick to point out that when the Iranian team needed US visas, or when Somali referee Omar Artan was denied a US visa, or when Haiti was forced to change its jersey last minute over war imagery, Infantino shrugged his shoulders and absolved himself of any power to remedy crucial matters.
“We try always to find solutions – always,” Infantino had said at a news conference on the tournament’s eve.
“But then we need to respect that we are not the kings of the world who can rule over governments and police forces and I don’t know what. We are a sports organisation; we try to do our best with the means that we have.”
He fanned the flames at the news conference by adding: “We don’t control everything. Maybe it’s good to just chill, relax.”
Trump’s own niece, Mary Lea Trump – who has sued him over personal disputes and is one of his most vociferous critics – called out his interference in the matter.
“He casts a shadow over everything. He can only win if he cheats, and he thinks that applies to everybody else. Sad,” she wrote on X.
‘Do our talking on the pitch’
Belgium captain Youri Tielemans said the furore over Balogun had motivated his teammates.
“Let’s be honest: We held a meeting when we heard the news,” Tielemans said.
“We told ourselves we needed to do our talking on the pitch. That’s what we did today. I’m very proud of the team,” the Aston Villa midfielder told Belgium’s RTBF broadcaster.
Belgium players celebrate after the match as Belgium qualify for the quarterfinals of the World Cup at Seattle Stadium, Washington, US on July 6, 2026 [Agustin Marcarian/Reuters]
Belgium midfielder Nicolas Raskin said his side’s win felt like a measure of justice after FIFA’s decision on Balogun.
“Like I said, I think there is always a justice somewhere in life, and the fact that something can happen like that, you can put it all you want, but we don’t think that was fair,” Raskin told reporters.
“And today, I think it just brings us a little bit of luck. We needed to win the game and the message throughout.”
Belgium coach Rudi Garcia, however, played down the dispute in his post-match news conference when asked if it had spurred his players.
“No, it wasn’t needed or necessary … What really mattered to us is our game plan,” he said, adding that he had spoken with Balogun after the final whistle.
“He came to talk to me, I really like that,” he said. “It’s not his fault, he’s not the one to blame and that’s what I told him.”
Belgium will face Spain in Los Angeles on Friday for a place in the semifinals.
Belgium ease past a defensively sloppy United States in a match shrouded in controversy surrounding the delayed suspension of co-hosts’ striker Folarin Balogun.
United States goalkeeper Matt Freese makes a huge error in judgement when he gifts Belgium’s Hans Vanaken the ball, leaving him with an easy finish. Errors all around as Belgium take control of the last-16 tie.
FIFA’s decision to suspend the one-match ban on United States striker Folarin Balogun, allowing the team’s leading goal scorer to play in their crucial last-16 World Cup match against Belgium, has stirred a controversy hours ahead of the USA vs Belgium last-16 match.
The row and ensuing uproar deepend on Monday when US President Donald Trump confirmed asking FIFA to review its decision against Balogun, with FIFA utlimately making a U-turn on the player’s suspension from the crucial fixture.
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Was FIFA’s decision the result of an unfair power move from President Trump, or was it a warranted correction to a red card that should not have been issued in the first place?
It depends on who you ask.
Football fans of the cohost nation appear to be divided on the controversy.
While there is near consensus that the red card Balogun received against Bosnia and Herzegovina was harsh, not everyone agrees with Trump’s intervention.
“I think it’s bull****,” Cesar Espino, who was watching the Spain vs Portugal round-of-16 match at a pub near downtown Washington, DC, told Al Jazeera hours ahead of kickoff in the USA-Belgium game.
“I feel like if you win it’s a stain because Balogun is one of our top players.”
He added that the decision will make the USA “more unlikeable”, adding to the list of controversies for the host nation, including travel bans and the restrictions against the Iranian team during the group stage.
But 23-year-old Oscar Ramirez argued that the issue is more nuanced than the USA gaining an unfair advantage “because of the nature of the red card”.
“I think most people, including myself, believe the red card was unfair; it was unjust,” Ramirez said.
“I think you’ll have some people who will be like, we should keep the rules no matter what. And you’ll have some people who will be like, that card shouldn’t have happened in the first place.”
The USA fan admitted jokingly that he is biased, so he supports the decision.
“I’m American, and I want our best chances. And without him, we don’t have a good chance,” Ramirez said.
FIFA responds
Balogun, the USA’s top scorer in the tournament with three goals, received the red card for a studs-up contact near the ankle of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Tarik Muharemovic.
The USA striker was looking at the ball, so the incident appeared unintentional. Nonetheless, Balogun was sent off after an onfield VAR review, triggering an at least one-match suspension.
A FIFA board subsequently suspended the penalty without providing an explanation.
Trump, who enjoys close relations with FIFA President Gianni Infantino, confirmed on Monday that he requested a review of the suspension.
“All I did – I asked for a review because I didn’t think it was a foul,” Trump said.
He also suggested that the US conducted research on the referee who issued the card, calling the official “very suspect”.
“If you like I can provide you with the past,” he told reporters.
FIFA has insisted that the decision was taken by a judicial panel that operates independently with Infantino denying that his conversation with Trump may have influenced the process.
“During our conversation, I explained that there was an ongoing legal process involving FIFA’s independent judicial bodies and that the case would be decided in due course by the competent bodies,” the FIFA president said in a statement.
“That is how FIFA’s system works, and it is a principle that I will always uphold.”
Despite that assertion, US Senator Ted Cruz thanked Trump earlier for “getting rid of that ridiculous red card”.
The controversy has infuriated Belgian football officials. But in the US, some politicians and commentators lauded Trump for his intervention.
“I admit that I’m not the biggest soccer fan, but I’m glad President Trump urged FIFA to do the right thing. Good for President Trump, good for Folarin Balogun, good for the USA,” Republican Senator Tom Cotton wrote on X.
For his part, Fox Sport analyst Alexi Lalas said lifting Balogun’s suspension was surprising but welcome news.
“What happened here is America stood up for itself,” Lalas, a former USA player, told Fox News.
“The powers that be when it comes to the United States Soccer Federation did what they needed to do within the rules and regulations that exist in order to give ourselves the best possible chance of being successful.”
Mamdani invokes Mourinho
But CBS Sports commentator Nico Cantor said the episode set a “dangerous precedent” that undermines the authority of the referees making decisions based on their interpretations of the rules.
“For as much as I believe Balogun didn’t deserve the red, it’s an interpretable decision,” he wrote on X.
“Anything can now be questioned after the fact. And it’s up to FIFA’s ‘judicial body’ – whoever that is, wherever they are – to call make critical decisions as they see fit.”
New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani had also called the red card “cruel”, but he refused to comment on FIFA’s decision to suspend the suspension.
Instead, he posted a GIF of Real Madrid coach Jose Mourinho saying, “I prefer not to speak. If I speak – big trouble.”
Back in Washington, DC, US fan Lucas Faria said it was “crazy” that the suspension was overturned, but he added that the decision is unlikely to derail trust in the World Cup because it is already loaded with controversy.
Faria told Al Jazeera that the tournament has been a Trump-Infantino show.
“The tickets have been outrageous. It’s been an outrageous tournament so far. This is just an obvious thing,” he said.
Faria added, however, that the US team should not be judged for FIFA’s decisions.
Belgium’s football federation (RBFA) says it is “astonished” by FIFA’s controversial decision to suspend the one-match red card ban on USA striker Folarin Balogun and is “investigating all potential options” to uphold integrity in the sport.
The World Cup was plunged into uproar on Sunday after FIFA suspended a red card given to Balogun ahead of the host nation’s clash with Belgium, in a bombshell move welcomed by US President Donald Trump but slammed by Belgian officials.
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The extraordinary FIFA ruling means that Balogun is now free to play for the USA against Belgium on Monday in Seattle, with a place in the quarterfinals at stake.
The Royal Belgian Football Association said it is “investigating all potential options” to “safeguard the legitimate rights of all participating teams and to protect the fundamental principles of fair play in our sport”.
“I didn’t know that at the FIFA World Cup, the 5th of July is now the 1st of April, and that it’s April Fool’s Day,” added Belgium coach Rudi Garcia at a news conference.
“A lot of our thoughts and opinions are in the release,” Garcia said.
“We’re not defending the national team or the federation, we are defending football.”
Balogun had been set to miss Monday’s last-16 knockout clash with the Belgians after receiving a straight red card following a video review for stepping on the foot of a Bosnian defender in a round-of-32 clash that the US won 2-0.
Under FIFA rules, a straight red card automatically triggers a one-game ban, which cannot be appealed by the player’s team.
But FIFA said on Sunday that the ban will now be suspended for a year, in a stunning move for which no specific explanation was offered.
It is the first instance of a red-carded player being allowed to play in his team’s subsequent match since the introduction of the yellow and red card rules at the 1970 edition of the World Cup.
‘We are not the bad men’
Top scorer Balogun has been key to the USA’s progress in the tournament, netting three times, and his absence against Belgium would have been a blow to the team in Seattle.
The stakes are huge for the cohosts, whose strong start to the tournament has raised expectations to fever-pitch levels among the American public, and they are targeting a run to at least the quarterfinals. The last time the USA reached the quarters was in 2002.
Balogun himself had said on Friday that the red card ban was “something I have to just accept”.
However, the 25-year-old celebrated FIFA’s U-turn with an Instagram post of himself in the US team jersey and Michael Jackson’s Bad attached as the audio.
USA players and officials welcomed the news, which they received on their way to training on Sunday morning.
“I think a lot of us thought it was AI at first,” defender Chris Richards said. “I think we were really excited because we found out through social media; it was cool. It was a lot of question marks, but just very, very happy and excited overall.”
“It feels right,” forward Christian Pulisic added. “Really excited for him to have this opportunity. To see the smile on his face and to be able to give us a boost tomorrow is great.”
Head coach Mauricio Pochettino said that “it’s a fair decision because it should have never been a red card”, calling the punishment “too big” for an unintentional foul.
“It’s not that we are victims, but we are not the bad men, the mean ones here,” he said.
FIFA decision ‘a bit of a surprise’
In its statement, FIFA pointed to “article 27 of the FIFA disciplinary code”, which allows the suspension to be “suspended for a probationary period of one year”.
Balogun would serve the ban only if he commits another similar foul in the next year, it said.
There is some precedent for the decision.
Portugal superstar Cristiano Ronaldo earned a three-game ban for an elbow during qualifying last year, but had two matches of his ban suspended.
The move, which allowed Ronaldo to play in Portugal’s World Cup opener, drew criticism at the time.
Belgium goalkeeper Thibaut Courtois said it was “a bit of a surprise” that Balogun was cleared to play just a day before the match.
“Had it been done earlier, we’d have been able to be mentally more prepared, perhaps,” he said.
FIFA’s decision has stirred up a social media storm, with mixed reactions to the suspension.
DR Congo footballer Yannick Bolasie expressed his dismay at the decision by saying the reaction to FIFA’s U-turn would have been quite different had it been taken in the Africa Cup of Nations.