USA

Authors: Rahul Mishra & Harshit Prajapati

The US-Israel conflict with Iran dragged almost every country into a phase of energy insecurity. While Iran’s neighboring countries are directly affected by the armed conflict, immediate regions too have not remained insulated from the ongoing conflict. For India, the conflict has demonstrated the implications of getting caught in the crossfire of a conflict in its vicinity. Two particular incidents—the US sinking of the Iranian warship IRIS Dena in the waters off the coast of Sri Lanka (just 40 nautical miles away) and the reported firing of two ballistic missiles towards the joint UK-US base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean—serve as a grim reminder about a conflict spiraling in India’s maritime backyard in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

For decades, the Indian Ocean region has remained largely peaceful, away from any direct impact of a conflict in a neighboring region or any major power conflict with a regional impact. The two above-mentioned incidents highlight the need for littoral states of the IOR to have a regional security mechanism to deal with any crisis in the region in a more cohesive and coordinated fashion. Being one of the major stakeholders in the region, it is incumbent upon India to foster meaningful and substantial cooperation with IOR littoral states through regional mechanisms such as the Colombo Security Conclave (CSC) and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). It would be a timely exercise to strive to move beyond non-traditional security cooperation mechanisms to protect the shared maritime space, especially during such conflicts.

The sinking of IRIS Dena in the IOR when it was returning to its home after participating in the International Fleet Review and multinational exercise MILAN, hosted by India, serves as a major strategic lesson to countries of the region. Since the International Fleet Reviews are an acknowledgement by the regional and global peers of the host country’s sovereignty and maritime supremacy in its neighborhood, the sinking of an Iranian warship does not augur well for India’s claim as a net security provider or preferred security partner in the IOR.

Additionally, Iran’s launch of two ballistic missiles, which failed to strike the designated target, towards the Diego Garcia base, reflects the risk of a distant war reaching India’s maritime backyard. The 2025 decolonization agreement between the UK and Mauritius enabled the transfer of the Chagos archipelago, including Diego Garcia Island, to Mauritius; however, the UK retained access to the Diego Garcia military base for 99 years. Thus, in the event of a conflict, Diego Garcia, as the joint UK-US base, may become a target, thereby drawing the war into the Indian maritime backyard. With the escalating conflict with Iran, Hezbollah, and the Houthi rebels, the possibility of repetition of such an incident cannot be ruled out.

During the Cold War, India and the IOR countries endeavored to halt the foreign military presence in the IOR, as illustrated by the UNGA Resolution 2832 of 1971, which sought to establish the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZOP). However, the regional countries failed to implement the declaration because of resistance from the major powers. In 2016, India attempted to revive implementation of the 1971 resolution but failed to garner significant attention from the IOR countries, putting aside any major power.

Rather than seeking IOZOP through restrictions on foreign military presence, India should strengthen its naval capabilities, especially its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms. Earlier, in 2018, India envisioned a 200-ship fleet by 2027; however, in 2026, the goal was revised to a 200-plus-ship fleet by 2035. Despite the induction of new platforms, this goal seems ambitious, as older platforms retire faster than new ones are inducted, especially given the constrained budget allocation to the Indian Navy.

A sizable portion of India’s submarine fleet is aging. The current force comprising Russian-origin Kilo-class submarines and German-origin Type 209 submarines has been in service for decades and is set to retire soon. Although the induction of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine Aridhaman in April 2026 and Arighaat in August 2024 strengthened India’s nuclear triad, the pace of induction of conventional submarines remains lagging. Project 75I, aimed at developing advanced diesel-electric submarines, was originally set in motion in 2007; however, its deal with the manufacturer—a German firm—has yet to be signed.

Earlier, it was planned that India would expand its fleet of long-range maritime reconnaissance Boeing P-8I aircraft from 12 to 28. But then the plan to expand the fleet to 28 P-8I aircraft was reduced to 20-22 due to constrained spending. Additionally, the Indian Navy only possesses 15 MQ-9B high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) drones.

Therefore, if India needs to entrench its position as a preferred security partner in the IOR and realize its vision of Security and Growth for all in the Region (SAGAR)—upgraded to Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions (MAHASAGAR) in 2025—in the IOR, then it needs to support its normative framework with military capabilities.

Given India’s lack of naval capabilities—across all three mediums (air, surface, and undersea)—to conduct persistent surveillance of the enormous IOR (spanning more than 70 million square kilometers), India should collaborate with littoral countries to conduct surveillance in the IOR through regional mechanisms such as the CSC and the IONS. Presently, cooperation in these forums is largely limited to countering non-traditional security threats, such as piracy, trafficking, maritime disasters, etc. Challenges such as differing threat perceptions, disparity in naval capabilities, and a lack of regional consciousness hinder meaningful and substantial cooperation.

However, if the littoral countries of the IOR seek to avoid getting caught in the crossfire of a distant conflict, such as the present one, they need to move beyond non-traditional security cooperation to develop a common understanding of how to protect the shared maritime space in the IOR, especially during such conflicts. India, being the most militarily equipped country in the IOR, should take the lead in forging the collaborative efforts to conduct persistent surveillance in the IOR, as maritime wars do not respect geographical boundaries.

Iran displayed its strengthened control over the Strait of Hormuz on Thursday by releasing video footage of its commandos boarding a large cargo ship. The video, aired on state television, showed masked troops storming the MSC Francesca and included scenes of another captured ship, the Epaminondas, which Iran accused of trying to cross the strait without proper permits.

As tensions remain high, the U. S. announced that it boarded another tanker, the Majestic, in the Indian Ocean. This was likely a reference to the supertanker, the Phonix, which was carrying 2 million barrels of crude oil off Sri Lanka. Since the start of conflict in February, Iran has effectively restricted access to the strait, asserting control after peace talks between the U. S. and Iran were halted shortly before a ceasefire expired.

Iran’s willingness to re-engage in talks depended on the U. S. lifting its blockade and releasing Iranian ships. In a post on Truth Social, U. S. President Donald Trump indicated that he ordered the Navy to “shoot and kill” Iranian boats that were laying mines in the strait, escalating military actions without addressing other Iranian tactics like speedboats and drones.

Iran’s judiciary chief stated that the merchant vessels attacked by Iran’s forces had faced legal consequences, while Iran’s vice speaker announced that the first toll revenue collected from ships using the strait had been transferred to the central bank, but provided no specifics on payments or amounts.

Tehran proclaimed it would not reopen the strait, which typically handles a significant portion of global oil and gas shipments, until the U. S. lifted the blockade considered a breach of the ceasefire. Although Trump refrained from escalating attacks in the ceasefire’s final hours, he remained firm on not lifting the blockade. There was no formal extension of the ceasefire nor plans for new negotiations.

Iranian citizens faced uncertainty and anxiety in what they termed a state of “neither peace nor war,” fearing potential attacks from the U. S. or Israel. Pakistan, previously facilitating talks, remained in contact with both countries about reviving discussions, but Iranian officials hesitated to commit due to the U. S. blockade.

On the U. S. side, another round of discussions was set for Thursday, focused on Israel and Lebanon, where Lebanon sought an extension of a recent ceasefire amidst continued Israeli airstrikes that resulted in casualties, marking a significant day since the ceasefire began.

In a significant personnel change, U. S. Navy Secretary John Phelan was dismissed amid conflicts over shipbuilding decisions and tensions with high-ranking officials.

The ongoing situation in the Strait of Hormuz has caused volatility in markets, pushing oil prices upward, while stock prices in the U. S. reached record highs despite uncertainty about energy supply. Washington has thus far failed to achieve its stated war goals of limiting Iran’s military capabilities, ending its nuclear efforts, and fostering regime change. Iran maintains its missile and drone capabilities and stockpiles of highly enriched uranium, while its government remains resilient against internal dissent. Despite threats from Trump, Iran’s control over the strait appears to strengthen its position in the conflict.

With information from Reuters

The Jamieson Greer has told Mexican industry leaders that tariffs imposed by Donald Trump will remain in place, even as negotiations to revise the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement intensify ahead of a July review deadline.

The remarks, delivered during meetings in Mexico City, signal a major shift from decades of tariff free trade under USMCA and its predecessor NAFTA.

End of Zero Tariff Era

According to multiple sources, Greer made it clear that the United States does not intend to return to a zero tariff framework.

This marks a fundamental change in North American trade policy, where free trade in autos and parts had been the norm for over 30 years. The introduction of tariffs, including a 25 percent duty on automotive imports, has disrupted deeply integrated supply chains across the region.

Impact on Key Industries

The implications for Mexico are significant:

• More than half of Mexico’s auto and steel exports go to the United States
• Vehicle exports have already declined, with job losses in the auto sector
• Steel and aluminum industries face steep duties, some as high as 50 percent

These pressures have weakened Mexico’s competitive position, especially as the United States has negotiated lower tariffs with other partners.

Shifting Trade Rules

U.S. negotiators are also pushing for stricter rules of origin.

Proposals include requiring 100 percent North American sourcing for key components such as engines and electronics, up from current thresholds of around 75 percent. This would force manufacturers to further regionalize supply chains, potentially increasing costs but aligning with Washington’s goal of boosting domestic production.

Mexico’s Position

The Mexican government, led by Claudia Sheinbaum, is seeking relief from tariffs as part of the USMCA review. Officials aim to secure at least partial reductions, particularly in the auto and steel sectors, before finalizing broader trade revisions.

However, the latest signals from Washington suggest that while some easing may be possible, a full rollback is unlikely.

Why It Matters

This development underscores a broader shift in global trade policy away from pure free trade toward managed trade and economic security.

For Mexico, the stakes are high due to its deep economic integration with the United States. Persistent tariffs could reshape manufacturing patterns, investment decisions, and employment across North America.

What’s Next

Formal negotiations are set to begin in late May, with both sides aiming to resolve key disputes before the July deadline.

Key areas of focus will include:

• Tariff levels on autos and metals
• Rules of origin requirements
• Broader economic security cooperation

The outcome will determine the future structure of North American trade.

Analysis

The U.S. position reflects a strategic recalibration rather than a temporary policy shift. By normalizing tariffs, Washington is prioritizing domestic industry and supply chain control over traditional free trade principles.

For Mexico, this creates a structural challenge. Its export driven model, built on open access to the U.S. market, now faces persistent barriers. While some adjustments may preserve competitiveness, the era of frictionless trade appears to be over.

Ultimately, the negotiations will test whether North America can adapt to a new trade paradigm or whether tensions will deepen within one of the world’s most integrated economic regions.

With information from Reuters.

European stock markets slipped on Monday as investor sentiment weakened amid renewed tensions between the United States and Iran. The downturn followed the seizure of an Iranian cargo ship by US forces and Tehran’s vow of retaliation, raising fears that a fragile ceasefire nearing its expiry may collapse.

The situation has been further complicated by Iran’s rejection of fresh peace talks and ongoing uncertainty over maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz, a critical global energy route.

Market Reaction

The pan-European STOXX 600 index declined by 0.8%, reflecting broad-based caution across financial markets. Major indices also moved lower, with Germany’s DAX down 1% and France’s CAC 40 falling 0.9%.

Losses were concentrated in sectors sensitive to geopolitical risk. Travel and leisure stocks led declines, followed by banking and automobile shares, which also came under pressure. In contrast, energy stocks rose as oil prices surged, reflecting concerns about supply disruptions.

Oil and Energy Impact

Crude oil prices jumped sharply, with Brent crude rising more than 5% to around $95 a barrel. The increase reflects heightened fears of disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, through which a significant portion of global energy trade passes.

Energy-dependent European economies remain particularly sensitive to price volatility, adding to investor caution across broader markets.

Geopolitical Tensions

Market sentiment shifted sharply from the previous week’s optimism, when easing signals from the Strait of Hormuz had briefly boosted equities. That optimism faded quickly after renewed maritime incidents and political escalation.

The United States and Iran continue to exchange accusations over ceasefire violations, while diplomatic efforts appear increasingly uncertain. The rejection of fresh negotiations by Iran and continued US pressure have added to concerns that the conflict could intensify further.

Outlook

Financial markets remain closely tied to developments in the Middle East. With the ceasefire approaching its expiration and no clear diplomatic breakthrough in sight, volatility is expected to persist.

Investors are likely to remain cautious until there is greater clarity on both maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz and the future of US–Iran relations.

With information from Reuters.

The smartest thing Trump can do for the United States is to adopt a “cake-sharing” strategy to cope with the arrival of a multipolar era. He wants to ensure that America still gets the largest slice of the cake, with its power base rooted in traditional energy—oil and natural gas.

This aligns well with “Cold War thinking.” From the perspective of oil reserves, the United States plus its friendly Gulf states accounts for about 55%–60% of the global total. If Venezuela—now under U.S. control—is added, the share rises to 72%–77%.

Spreading out the energy map, according to estimates by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), Greenland holds approximately 39 billion barrels of oil equivalent (combining East and West Greenland). Cuba has 4–5 billion barrels.

Nigeria, a major oil-producing country in Africa, has 37 billion barrels of oil reserves. The Trump administration has threatened military action against it under the pretext of “persecuting Christians.”

Iran’s oil reserves stand at 2,086 billion barrels, accounting for 13.3% of the global total.

The regions Trump has singled out—Iran, Venezuela, Greenland, Cuba, and Nigeria—clearly show that he is deciding how to “share the cake” with China and Russia based on the traditional energy map.

Although reserves and actual output are two different things, for Trump this is irrelevant. What he puts on the negotiating table is merely a piece of paper for “bidding”—he doesn’t need to worry about minor details.

On the other side of the negotiating table, China’s chips are new energy and critical minerals. In the area of critical minerals, Iran, Venezuela, Greenland, Cuba, and Nigeria all possess rich potential, and all have varying degrees of investment and cooperation ties with China.

One reason Trump scorns “new energy” may be that, within his limited term, competing with China in the new energy field is simply impossible. In the traditional energy domain, however, the United States holds a significant advantage.

Successfully pocketing Venezuela has encouraged Trump to take risks in Iran. Originally, Trump wanted to approach Beijing for a major deal from the position of a traditional energy hegemon, but Iran’s fierce resistance has dampened his ambitions. The United States has been outmaneuvered by Iran, and Trump has postponed his visit to China.

Iranian President Pezeshkian publicly stated: “China is now also seen by the United States as its main enemy; we are just next in line. They want to take us down first, then deal with China.” Behind this statement lies the landscape of U.S.-China competition over energy and critical minerals.

It cannot be said that Trump is unrealistic—this “cake-sharing” strategy has its own rationality. Nor can it be said that Trump has overestimated America’s military strength, because he knows very well that the United States cannot even handle the Houthis, let alone Iran. One can only say that the success of the “decapitation operation” in Venezuela has inflated his sense of luck, and Israel has exploited this psychology to successfully lure Trump into risking involvement in Iran.

The United States and Israel jointly eliminated the appeasement faction in Tehran and greatly underestimated Iran’s counterattack capability. They wanted to control oil but ended up being controlled by Iran on oil export routes. This is a complete strategic failure, and its medium- to long-term damage to the United States far exceeds the energy sector.

We don’t even need to discuss the rise and fall of petrodollars versus petroyuan—just look at the new energy sector. This round of energy crisis has greatly heightened the global urgency for new energy development, and the countries and regions most urgently in need are precisely America’s allies worldwide, including the Gulf states.

America’s allies are mostly developed countries. They have long recognized that China is a superpower in new energy. Before the Iran war, the broader Western camp was developing new energy while trying to reduce dependence on Iran. Now, however, the sense of urgency has pushed these countries to rely even more deeply on China.

These countries and regions include France, Germany, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, as well as India, Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asian nations such as Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia. They are either industrially advanced or rapidly industrializing countries that heavily depend on stable energy supplies.

In the core area of the Iran war—the Gulf states—are also actively accelerating the development of new energy industries, with the solar industry as the key focus. China is the only source capable of providing cheap, high-quality equipment and products. After the war ends, Iran may also exchange oil for the components needed for new energy development with China, achieving economic diversification like the Gulf states and reducing reliance on oil exports.

China’s solar equipment originally suffered from overcapacity; now it stands to gain relief.

What revolves around the core issues of new energy is nothing more than industrial supply chains and critical minerals. In this regard, mainland China’s industrial strength needs no emphasis. In critical minerals, the Democratic Republic of the Congo—China’s deep cooperation partner—will see half of its cobalt mines belong to Chinese enterprises. Given that Congo holds the world’s largest cobalt reserves, China will possess an indisputable “cobalt dominance.” Cobalt is a key mineral for lithium-ion batteries.

In addition, graphite and tantalum are also dominated by China. Tantalum is a critical metal for capacitors, which are essential for stabilizing wind and solar power generation. Graphite is the anode material for lithium-ion batteries and an indispensable mineral for renewable energy storage systems and solar panel production.

Currently, renewable energy plus nuclear power accounts for 40% of global electricity generation, while fossil fuels still account for 60%. However, when looking at the global share of “capacity” (installed capacity) for renewable energy plus nuclear, it has already reached about 55%. Among this, renewable energy accounts for 49.4% and nuclear for about 5%.

“Capacity” refers to installed capacity—in plain terms, the theoretical maximum power generation. The actual global generation share of renewable energy is about 32%. The gap between theoretical and actual values exists because renewable energy generation is less stable than fossil fuels. Adding nuclear’s actual generation share (about 8%), the actual generation share of so-called low-carbon energy reaches 40% globally.

There is no doubt that the oil crisis will inevitably trigger a “green energy surge.” Looking ahead five years, the actual generation share of green energy will exceed 50%. Assuming nuclear can grow to 10% of actual generation and renewables grow by 8%, China’s additional revenue from the global renewable energy business in the next five years could reach the level of hundreds of billions of dollars.

From this perspective, China—which strongly supported green energy development from the very beginning of the climate agenda—did so not so much for carbon reduction as for industrial preparation in the name of energy security. Expanding the global new energy business is merely an added value.

Of course, the key technologies for manufacturing new energy equipment may be even more important than critical minerals. Last November, China imposed export controls on certain lithium batteries, key cathode and anode materials, and their manufacturing equipment and technologies. Given that China controls about 96% of global anode material production capacity and 85% of cathode material capacity, the impact of these export controls is enormous.

On April 15, according to Reuters, China has held preliminary consultations with solar panel production equipment suppliers and is considering restricting exports of the most advanced technologies and equipment to the United States. If true, Beijing is raising the stakes in new energy, waiting for Trump to come to the negotiating table in May.

Admittedly, Trump has no intention of developing new energy. However, considering that the Democrats may return to the White House in three years, Beijing is now blocking America’s path to new energy development, essentially laying the groundwork for U.S.-China competition three years from now.

If Trump’s energy strategy map on the table also included a new energy layer, he should realize that the setback in the Iran war has allowed the new energy domain to encroach upon the traditional energy domain, enabling China to expand its energy power without firing a single shot. As for critical minerals, the United States has made no outstanding progress—at least nothing sufficient for Trump to boast about.

Now, the “cake” being pushed in front of Xi Jinping is getting bigger and bigger. On the surface, Beijing has gained it effortlessly, but today’s harvest is mainly due to strategic 布局 made one step ahead. These layouts are often “low-profit” but highly effective investments, and new energy is merely one of them.

In an uncertain world, those who provide “certainty” win. Therefore, the winner of the Iran war is China—even if Beijing is extremely reluctant to admit it.

There is another way to read the ongoing Middle East crisis, one that makes legible what standard analysis consistently struggles to explain. It begins not with capability but with the geometry of the system through which capability must travel to produce effects. The United States and its partners possess overwhelming military superiority over Iran, and that superiority is not in question, yet the conflict has produced a pattern that defies its logic. A superpower coalition has been unable to impose coherent strategic outcomes against an adversary operating through proxies, low-cost disruption, and the systematic exploitation of global commercial vulnerabilities.

Over the past two years, we have seen multiple instances of this kind of disruption with consequential effects on the global system. Houthi drones force the rerouting of global shipping, with Red Sea cargo volumes falling by roughly 50% through early 2024 as major carriers diverted around the Cape of Good Hope, adding up to two weeks to transit times, driving freight costs sharply higher across European markets, and costing Egypt nearly $800 million per month at peak in lost Suez Canal revenue. A non-state network spanning Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Gaza has absorbed sustained air campaigns, targeted eliminations of senior commanders, and repeated ground operations without losing its capacity to generate coordinated pressure across multiple theaters simultaneously. The asymmetry seems to follow a deliberate strategic logic that raw power analysis struggles to read, precisely because the conflict operates on a surface that capability assessments were never designed to map. What this suggests is that the decisive variable is not what actors possess but whether the relationships connecting them can transmit coordinated action when the system is under strain.

When that system cannot coordinate, something important breaks down. An alliance that formally exists but faces operational friction at every decision point ceases to be an alliance in any meaningful strategic sense. A security guarantee that cannot be transmitted rapidly to the partner it is meant to protect has, in effect, already failed its primary function. It follows that the gap between what a system formally is and what it can actually do under pressure is not a secondary consideration but the surface on which this conflict is being decided. Conventional analysis, calibrated to count warheads and assess intentions, consistently leaves this gap unmapped.

Analysts know that Saudi Arabia’s OPEC production decisions have repeatedly positioned Riyadh against Washington’s economic preferences, they know that European energy dependency complicates transatlantic alignment, and they know that Iran’s proxy network extends across five countries and absorbs military pressure without fracturing. Yet what the available frameworks cannot do is convert that knowledge into a structural reading of the system. They show that these conditions exist. What they cannot show is how those conditions interact, where they compound, and what the aggregate geometry of their interaction means for whether coordinated action is possible at all.

Power analysis was built to read capability differentials between states, and it does that well. Alliance theory was built to read the conditions under which formal commitments hold or fail, and it does that too. Neither, however, was built to read the operational weight of the ties through which capability and commitment must travel to produce effects.

The instruments available are calibrated to answer questions different from those the current situation poses. Deploying them on a problem they were not designed to read produces the consistent failure to explain what is actually happening that has marked analysis of this conflict from the start.

Adjacency mapping is an instrument designed to read that gap by mapping connectivity, by which I mean their operational weight, specifically their capacity to carry coordinated action under strain. What distinguishes it from standard approaches is its unit of analysis. Rather than the actors themselves, it treats the weight of the relationships as primary. The question it asks is not who holds power but whether the ties connecting power-holders can transmit that power when the system needs them to. Two states can be formally allied, operationally integrated in name, and structurally disconnected at the same time, and nothing in standard analysis will tell you which of those conditions is actually operative until the moment of crisis reveals it.

The instrument assigns each significant relationship in the system a weight between 0 and 1, reflecting how frequently the two actors interact operationally, how reliably information moves between them, how the tie has behaved under recent stress, and how quickly it transmits pressure when the system is under strain. At the higher end of the scale, a weight at or above 0.6 indicates that coordination approaches automaticity, and the tie carries load without constant investment to maintain it. Around 0.3, friction accumulates. In this setting, decisions require deliberate effort at every juncture, slowing the system and making it susceptible to gradual degradation that never triggers a visible rupture. At or below 0.2, the tie has effectively ceased to function as a transmission pathway, leaving the actors operationally disconnected regardless of what their formal relationship nominally says.

These weights are analytical judgements calibrated against observable evidence. In other words, their value lies in making visible what experienced analysts already carry as intuition and in giving that intuition a structure precise enough to argue about. The numbers are therefore analytical judgements, not measurements. A more rigorous application would derive them from quantifiable indicators across each dimension, including military interoperability, intelligence exchange depth, crisis responsiveness, economic interdependence, and signaling consistency, averaged and weighted systematically. That work lies beyond the scope of this piece, but the architecture is designed to accommodate it.

There is a risk management dimension to this reading that is worth making explicit. Standard geopolitical risk assessment focuses on actor-level variables such as regime stability, military capability, and leadership intentions. What adjacency mapping adds is a structural layer that those assessments typically miss. A coalition whose load-bearing relationships operate in the friction zone is exposed to a category of risk that capability assessments do not capture and that becomes visible only when the system is read structurally.

What the matrix adds is the ability to see how compound weakness across multiple relationships produces cascading effects that bilateral assessment alone would struggle to predict. A system whose dominant actor holds several weak partnerships faces more than friction. As a consequence, the geometry of those weaknesses determines whether any concerted response is structurally possible at all. Aggregate capability becomes, in that light, secondary to that question.

If we apply this to the Middle East security complex, the instrument produces one possible reading. This reading differs considerably from the picture conventional analysis generates. Its value is not in the precision of the numbers but in making the system’s geometry visible enough to argue about.

The matrix below maps operational connectivity across the system’s key actors. The numbers are analytical judgements, not measurements.

The geometry they make visible is what matters here.

The matrix is intentionally non-symmetric. Where operational influence flows asymmetrically between two actors, the weights reflect that directionality.

The matrix reveals, in this light, a system whose dominant actors are connected at fundamentally different weights. And more significantly, its most important bilateral relationship is operating in the friction zone. It’s formally excluded adversary has constructed the only alternative connectivity architecture in the system. What this implies is that the geometry of the conflict runs considerably deeper than standard alliance analysis tends to suggest.

On the coalition side, the US has high adjacency with Qatar, Bahrain, Israel, and Kuwait, ties that enable rapid coordination and require little maintenance, constituting the operational backbone of what Washington can actually activate quickly.

Its relationship with Saudi Arabia, however, sits at 0.4. That number is analytically more significant than almost anything else in the matrix. Saudi Arabia remains, on most readings, the relationship on which Gulf order coherence formally depends, the anchor of the security architecture since the 1970s, and it is operating in the friction zone where every significant decision requires renegotiation from scratch rather than flowing through an established channel. Saudi Arabia’s invitation to join BRICS in August 2023, yuan-denominated oil transactions with China, and its participation in the Chinese-brokered rapprochement with Iran in March 2023 all point in the same direction. Riyadh is hedging structurally toward China and the broader non-Western order, a posture that sits uneasily alongside its formal security alignment with Washington. Taken together, these are not isolated political episodes but evidence of a tie that has been operating below the coordination threshold for years and whose weakness is, on this reading, the system’s most consequential structural vulnerability.

Through the normalization architecture, the UAE has arguably become the system’s most structurally reliable node at 0.6 with both the US and Israel, its operational integration exceeding Saudi Arabia’s despite Saudi Arabia’s formal primacy. The Abraham Accords of September 2020 established the formal foundation for that integration. The operational depth it has since generated, across intelligence sharing, defence cooperation, and coordinated positioning on Iran, has made the UAE the coalition’s most functionally connected Gulf partner. Oman holds what is perhaps the system’s most anomalous position, meaningful adjacency with both the US coalition and Iran simultaneously, a profile no other state actor in the matrix replicates. That structural position gave Oman the back-channel role it played through the early phases of the conflict, with documented precedent in the secret US-Iran nuclear negotiations that began in Muscat in 2012 and ran through 2013. As the conflict has intensified, Pakistan has assumed the primary mediation function, but Oman’s position as a quiet facilitator has not disappeared; it has simply been supplemented by a node with more direct access to both capitals at this particular moment.

Pakistan has emerged as the conflict’s primary mediation node, hosting the highest-level direct negotiations between Washington and Tehran since 1979 and brokering the April 2026 ceasefire. That role reflects a structural position the matrix makes legible: high Saudi adjacency, a functioning Iran tie, and a rehabilitated relationship with Washington that no other regional actor currently combines. China’s influence over both Pakistani and Iranian decision-making operates as an exogenous pressure that the matrix only partially captures, and Pakistan’s own domestic constraints, including its difficulty developing direct channels with the IRGC, limit how far that mediation role can ultimately reach.

Iran’s position is where the matrix becomes most analytically revealing. Across the state actors in the system, Iran’s adjacency sits at or near fragmentation, built up through sanctions, absent operational channels, and decades of adversarial signalling that have left Tehran formally isolated from the coordination architecture the United States and its partners have constructed.

And yet the only high-weight tie Iran holds is with its proxy network at 0.7. That single number may go further toward explaining the architecture of the entire campaign than any other figure in the matrix.

It is an asymmetric relationship in which Tehran’s capacity to activate and direct exceeds the reverse influence those actors exert over Iranian strategic decisions. What that single structural condition implies goes further toward explaining the architecture of Iranian pressure operations than most analyses of Iranian intentions or capabilities tend to reach. Iran is geographically central and formally excluded. It is precisely that combination, positioned to apply pressure across every theatre while bearing none of the coordination costs that formal inclusion imposes. That, from this vantage point, is what makes legible a strategy that standard analysis, focused on actors and their capabilities, cannot see.

Seen through this lens, what Iran is doing across the region is something more structurally ambitious than a military campaign. It is attempting to restructure the matrix itself. The goal appears to be less about battlefield victory than about the gradual degradation of the ties connecting the United States to its regional partners, below the threshold at which coordinated response becomes automatic, eroding the will to keep paying the price of alignment while simultaneously building alternative adjacency in the nodes where US-aligned connectivity is weakest.

The Houthi campaign against Red Sea shipping is calibrated to stay below the threshold that would compel a unified military response. It introduces friction into the economic relationships connecting European states to the Gulf system, raising the cost of alignment with Washington’s regional posture without forcing the kind of direct confrontation that would unite the coalition. Strikes on Gulf infrastructure follow the same calibration, persistent enough to signal that the US security guarantee cannot insulate its partners from costs, yet restrained enough to avoid crossing the point at which coalition fragmentation becomes irrelevant because a unified response becomes compulsory. Across Iraq and Syria, simultaneous pressure from affiliated militias prevents the concentration of attention that sustained coalition coordination requires. In each case, the instrument targets a relationship rather than a capability, specifically the weight of the ties whose degradation would restructure the system’s geometry without requiring Iran to displace the existing order directly.

The US-Saudi tie at 0.4 is the primary focus of that degradation effort. Should that threshold be breached, Saudi Arabia hedges. As hedging reduces operational interactivity the tie weakens further. The process risks becoming self-reinforcing. Iranian military superiority over any individual partner is not required to sustain it.

The same logic extends across European actors, though not uniformly. Germany’s industrial exposure to energy price volatility, France’s residual strategic autonomy instinct, and the EU’s institutional preference for de-escalation all produce different thresholds for continued alignment with Washington. Their shared energy dependency gives them asymmetric stakes in the Gulf system’s stability, but their appetite for risk diverges from Washington’s in ways that are not identical across capitals, and each time Iran forces a decision about the cost of continued alignment, that divergence fragments the coalition’s coordination surface further.

By sustaining operational ties with non-state actors across the region, Iran is constructing alternative adjacency in precisely the nodes where US-aligned connectivity is weakest. These are populations and factions that the existing regional order has excluded from the dominant coalition’s coordination architecture. Deliberately so — Iran is building in the structural gaps the system leaves open. Displacing the existing order appears unnecessary. Becoming the more reliable pole of alignment for the actors that order has failed to integrate may be sufficient. All that is required is that the order fragment sufficiently at its margins for that offer to appear credible, and the current trajectory of US-Saudi friction and European hedging is steadily moving in that direction.

The coalition’s instruments are calibrated to military threats. The system, however, is failing along a different surface entirely, or so this reading suggests. The formal architecture remains largely intact, security guarantees have not been withdrawn, Gulf states remain formally aligned, and normalisation agreements hold. And yet the operational adjacency that gives that architecture its functional weight is under sustained pressure from an actor that has correctly identified the gap between formal commitment and operational tie as the system’s primary vulnerability. That identification is outpacing the coalition’s capacity to respond.

On this reading, the surface on which the conflict appears to be decided is not the one the coalition is defending.

What adjacency mapping reveals is a story about geometry. The system’s dominant actor holds formal commitments at weights the system cannot sustain under the pressure being applied to it. Its adversary, in turn, has built the only alternative coordination architecture in the space that those weakening ties leave open. The conflict is likely to be determined by which ties the system can no longer afford to lose under sustained and calibrated pressure. The question is whether the actors currently holding those ties in the friction zone can rebuild them to the coordination threshold before the process of degradation becomes irreversible. That is a question that capability assessments are not well-positioned to answer, and one that a structural reading of the system’s connectivity at least helps to make visible.

Keir Starmer is facing renewed calls for resignation after fresh revelations surrounding the appointment and vetting of former UK ambassador to the United States Peter Mandelson. The controversy has reignited scrutiny over governance standards inside the Labour government, coming at a politically sensitive time just months after Labour’s landslide election victory in 2024.

The Vetting Controversy:
The core of the scandal centres on reports that Mandelson did not properly pass security vetting before being appointed as ambassador. Despite this, official communications suggested that clearance had been confirmed. Downing Street has since dismissed a senior Foreign Office official, intensifying questions about how the appointment was handled and who within government was aware of the vetting status.

Political Fallout Inside Government:
The issue has exposed tensions within the Labour Party, with some lawmakers expressing concern over administrative failures while others defend the Prime Minister. Senior minister Darren Jones said Starmer was “furious” about not being informed of the vetting issues, while acknowledging serious breakdowns in communication between departments.

Opposition Pressure and Leadership Questions:
Opposition figures, including Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch, have accused Starmer of misleading Parliament and questioned his credibility. The central allegation is whether the Prime Minister knowingly misrepresented the status of Mandelson’s clearance when defending the appointment. These accusations have intensified calls for resignation from political rivals.

Wider Political Context:
The controversy comes at a politically sensitive moment for Starmer, as Labour prepares for key local elections across England, Scotland, and Wales. The government is also managing broader foreign policy challenges, including Britain’s positioning in global conflicts involving the United States and Middle East tensions, adding further pressure on leadership stability.

Institutional and Governance Concerns:
Beyond individual accountability, the scandal has raised broader concerns about administrative competence within the Foreign Office and Downing Street. The dismissal of senior officials has highlighted breakdowns in communication and vetting procedures, raising questions about how high-level diplomatic appointments are approved and overseen.

Analysis:
The Mandelson vetting scandal has evolved from a procedural controversy into a wider test of political authority and administrative control for Starmer. While there is no clear evidence yet that the Prime Minister deliberately misled Parliament, the perception of mismanagement and lack of oversight has created significant political vulnerability.

At its core, the issue reflects a deeper challenge of governance: maintaining institutional trust while managing complex bureaucratic systems. Even if the government survives immediate calls for resignation, the damage is likely to linger, particularly if further inconsistencies emerge. With elections approaching and internal party tensions rising, Starmer’s ability to project control and competence will be central to whether this episode becomes a temporary setback or a longer-term political liability.

China has taken a firm stance against the Israeli escalation in Lebanon, strongly warning against the region becoming a second Gaza and considering the events a blatant violation of Lebanese sovereignty and international law. The most prominent features of the Chinese response up to April 2026 to this Israeli military escalation in southern Lebanon included condemning the targeting of civilians and emphasizing the protection of Lebanese sovereignty while rejecting Israeli violations aimed at destroying the infrastructure of southern Lebanon. The Chinese Foreign Ministry condemned the extensive Israeli raids targeting towns in southern Lebanon, stressing that Lebanon’s sovereignty and security are a red line that must not be crossed. China also emphasized the protection of Lebanese civilians, with Beijing unequivocally affirming that the protection of civilians and civilian objects in armed conflicts is a legal obligation and expressing its shock at the scale of casualties and destruction inflicted on southern villages and towns.

China’s position is based on a comprehensive vision linking the stability of southern Lebanon to a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. Beijing believes that addressing the root causes of the conflict is the only way to prevent its spread throughout the Middle East. While condemning the destruction of Lebanese infrastructure and civilian areas, China’s Foreign Ministry denounced the Israeli airstrikes that killed hundreds of civilians and destroyed civilian infrastructure and property. Beijing categorically rejects any actions that lead to the destruction of infrastructure, considering them a violation of international law. China has consistently emphasized that Lebanon’s sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity are a red line that must not be crossed. Beijing has also declared its opposition to the Israeli ground incursion into southern Lebanon, warning that such actions exacerbate regional tensions. China has called for diplomatic solutions, urging all parties, especially Israel, to exercise maximum restraint and return to the path of political and diplomatic settlement, asserting that continued violence will not bring security to any party. China condemned the attacks targeting UNIFIL peacekeeping forces in southern Lebanon, stressing the need to ensure the safety of UN peacekeepers.

In this context, China deliberately directed veiled criticism at Washington regarding Israeli violations in southern Lebanon. China believes that the failure to contain the escalation in southern Lebanon is partly due to the military and political support provided to Israel by external powers, a clear reference to the United States, which hinders efforts to de-escalate the situation. Simultaneously, China warned of a second Gaza in southern Lebanon. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi explicitly cautioned against a repeat of the Gaza tragedy in Lebanon, emphasizing that violence cannot replace right and justice. China is pressing in international forums, particularly the Security Council, for an immediate and permanent cessation of Israeli hostilities, warning against the region sliding into a full-scale war. This stance reflects China’s desire to bolster its role as a peacemaker in the Middle East and to rival American influence by adhering to political solutions and international law.

Here, China sharply criticized the American role in the Israeli war against southern Lebanon and its recent escalation in April 2026, arguing that Washington contributes to undermining regional stability through its military and political support for Israel. Beijing considered the military operations supported or participated in by the United States to be a flagrant violation of international law and the principles of national sovereignty. While warning against the militarization of the region, China criticized the expansion of the American military presence, describing it as irresponsible and warning that such steps exacerbate tensions rather than de-escalate them. Beijing believes that Washington’s approach to the international order reflects the values ​​of the law of the jungle and fuels chaos and instability in the Middle East. While criticizing the US for its double standards, China, through its Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning, condemned the continued Israeli strikes on towns and villages in southern Lebanon despite ongoing efforts to de-escalate the situation. She emphasized that Lebanon’s sovereignty and security must not be violated.

China called on Israel to immediately withdraw from southern Lebanon, warning against a repeat of the Gaza scenario. Chinese President Xi Jinping issued direct warnings demanding the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, cautioning that continued military operations could lead to a humanitarian catastrophe similar to what occurred in the Gaza Strip. He also called for an end to the Israeli escalation in southern Lebanon. China maintains that violence does not solve problems but rather exacerbates crises, urging maximum restraint to de-escalate the volatile regional situation. Chinese President Xi Jinping called for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory, asserting that their current military presence violates Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. President Xi explicitly warned against allowing southern Lebanon to become another Gaza, pointing to the risk of a widespread humanitarian catastrophe and the destruction of civilian infrastructure.

To halt the cycle of violence and armed conflict in southern Lebanon, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed a four-point peace initiative to bolster stability in the Middle East. This initiative includes a call for a multilateral peace conference under the auspices of the United Nations, the re-establishment of the border along the Blue Line between southern Lebanon and Israel, and a reaffirmation of China’s rejection of any violation of Lebanese sovereignty. The Chinese Foreign Ministry has repeatedly emphasized, most notably on April 9, 2026, that Lebanon’s sovereignty and security are a (red line) that must not be crossed. These Chinese moves position Beijing as an active diplomatic alternative in the region at a time of escalating international tensions between major powers and ongoing regional conflicts. China has begun diplomatic efforts by proposing several peace initiatives to halt the cycle of armed conflict in southern Lebanon. The most prominent of these is the call for a multilateral peace conference. Beijing proposed hosting an international peace conference aimed at stabilizing the region and reinforcing the border along the Blue Line separating Israel and Lebanon, under the auspices of the United Nations. China holds Israel fully responsible, considering the ongoing fighting in Gaza to be the root cause of the instability in the Middle East. Therefore, China called on the international community, particularly the major powers, to play a constructive role in achieving a comprehensive and lasting ceasefire in southern Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. China has also supported the UNIFIL peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon, strongly condemning any attacks on UNIFIL forces as violations of UN Security Council Resolution 1701. Here, China used its influence in the UN Security Council and international forums to emphasize that any military operations outside the framework of the United Nations violate its Charter. It described the Israeli strikes on towns and villages in southern Lebanon as unauthorized actions.

Based on the preceding analysis, we understand the accuracy of China’s linking of the tensions in southern Lebanon to the war in Gaza. China called for restraint to prevent the conflict from spreading regionally, based on its principles of supporting sovereign states like Lebanon and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. China also called for a return to the diplomatic track to halt the cycle of violent armed conflict in southern Lebanon perpetrated by Israel. China condemned the extensive Israeli strikes, stressing that Lebanon’s sovereignty and security must not be violated. It emphasized the need to protect Lebanese civilians and civilian infrastructure during Israeli military operations and called for de-escalation and immediate steps to calm the situation and prevent further escalation of the conflict in southern Lebanon.

Donald Trump has indicated that the conflict with Iran could conclude “soon,” citing progress in negotiations and a possible meeting between the two sides in the coming days. A temporary ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon has added to cautious optimism, though the broader regional situation remains unstable. The war, which began with U.S.-Israeli military action, has had sweeping geopolitical and economic consequences.

Ceasefire in Lebanon:
A 10-day truce between Israel and Lebanon has come into effect, offering a brief pause in cross-border hostilities. However, early reports of violations underline the fragility of the arrangement. Hezbollah, aligned with Iran, has been urged by Washington to maintain restraint during this critical window.

Diplomatic Breakthrough Efforts:
Backchannel diplomacy, with Pakistan playing a mediating role, has reportedly led to progress on key issues. Talks are expected to produce an initial memorandum of understanding, potentially followed by a comprehensive agreement within weeks. Engagement between U.S. and Iranian officials is likely to intensify in the immediate term.

Global Economic Shock:
The conflict has disrupted global energy flows, particularly through the Strait of Hormuz, through which a significant share of the world’s oil supply passes. This has triggered sharp oil price fluctuations and raised concerns about a broader economic slowdown, even as markets show signs of stabilizing on hopes of a resolution.

Nuclear Issue as Core Dispute:
Iran’s nuclear program remains the central obstacle in negotiations. Washington is pushing for long-term restrictions, while Tehran seeks shorter commitments and the lifting of sanctions. Bridging this gap will be critical to securing a durable settlement.

Political Pressures and Regional Stakes:
The war has created domestic political challenges for Trump, particularly ahead of upcoming elections. At the same time, regional actors are closely watching the outcome, as any agreement will shape the balance of power and security dynamics across the Middle East.

Analysis:
Momentum toward a deal is clearly building, but the situation remains precarious. The ceasefire in Lebanon and progress in diplomacy suggest a window of opportunity, yet unresolved issues, especially around nuclear limits and sanctions relief, could still derail negotiations. Trump’s urgency reflects both strategic calculation and domestic political pressure, while Iran appears willing to engage but not at any cost. If a preliminary agreement is reached, it would mark a significant de-escalation, but sustaining peace will require careful management of deep-rooted tensions and competing interests on all sides.

With information from Reuters.

Britain has publicly distanced itself from Washington’s escalating strategy against Iran, with Prime Minister Keir Starmer making clear that the UK will not support any blockade in the Gulf.

Speaking after the United States announced sweeping restrictions on Iranian shipping, Starmer emphasized that Britain’s priority is not enforcement but de-escalation. He stressed the importance of keeping vital trade routes open rather than contributing to further disruption.

What Starmer Said

Starmer’s message was direct. The UK will not be drawn into the conflict and will not support a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.

Instead, Britain is focused on ensuring the strait remains open. While confirming the presence of British minesweepers in the region, he made clear their role is defensive and aimed at maintaining safe passage, not enforcing restrictions.

Contrast with Washington

The stance puts London at odds with the approach taken by Donald Trump.

The U.S., through United States Central Command, has announced a broad blockade targeting Iranian maritime traffic. Trump has gone further, warning that vessels linked to Iranian payments could be intercepted and threatening force against any resistance.

While Washington frames the move as pressure on Tehran, Britain is signaling concern about the wider consequences.

Why the Strait Matters

The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the most critical energy routes in the world. A significant share of global oil supply passes through it, meaning even partial disruption can send shockwaves through markets.

For the UK, keeping this route open is not just a regional issue but a global economic priority.

Implications: Cracks in Western Unity

Britain’s refusal highlights a growing divide among Western allies on how to handle the Iran crisis.

The U.S. is pursuing a strategy of maximum pressure, while the UK is prioritizing stability and the prevention of further escalation. This divergence could complicate coordinated action and weaken the overall Western response.

Analysis: A Strategic Balancing Act

Starmer’s position reflects a careful calculation. Supporting the blockade risks entangling Britain in a wider conflict and worsening global economic strain. Opposing it, however, creates visible distance from a key ally.

By focusing on keeping the strait open, the UK is attempting to balance security concerns with economic stability, while avoiding direct confrontation.

Britain’s stance sends a clear signal. Even close allies are not fully aligned on how far to go against Iran.

As tensions rise, that lack of unity could shape the next phase of the crisis just as much as the actions taken in the Gulf itself.

With information from Reuters.

Hungarians began voting in an important election on Sunday that could end Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s 16-year rule. This election is significant not only for Hungary but also for Russia and right-wing movements in the West, including the U. S. Orban, who identifies as a eurosceptic nationalist, has developed an “illiberal democracy” that has drawn parallels with Donald Trump’s MAGA agenda. However, many Hungarians are dissatisfied with Orban, 62, due to economic stagnation and high living costs, as well as the growing wealth of oligarchs linked to the government.

Current opinion polls suggest that Orban’s Fidesz party is trailing Peter Magyar’s center-right opposition Tisza party by 7-9 percentage points, with Tisza receiving around 38-41%. Voting started at 6 a.m. local time and is set to close at 7 p.m. Pollsters predict a record voter turnout. Many citizens, like Mihaly Bacsi, express a desire for change, highlighting tensions in the country under the current government. There is hope among voters for a return to Hungary’s Western commitments, which they associate with the pre-Orban era.

The election is being closely monitored by European Union officials, who have criticized Orban for undermining democracy, media freedom, and minority rights in Hungary. A potential defeat for Orban could also impact Ukraine negatively by blocking a crucial EU loan. Orban has framed the vote as a decision between “war and peace,” claiming that Magyar would lead Hungary into conflict, a point Magyar disputes.

Despite backing from figures like U. S. Vice President JD Vance and alliances with far-right European leaders, Orban’s campaign faced challenges due to allegations of collusion with Moscow. Orban emphasizes his goal of protecting Hungary’s national identity and values amidst global challenges. In contrast, Magyar, 45, appeals to voters’ frustrations over state corruption and declining living standards, especially among younger people eager for change.

Orban’s popularity is particularly low among those under 30. To combat this, he has introduced measures like income tax cuts for younger workers and a subsidized mortgage scheme. However, Magyar’s vision for change resonates more with the electorate. Analysts believe the election results are uncertain with undecided voters and changes to the electoral landscape, suggesting outcomes could range from a Tisza supermajority to a Fidesz majority. If Tisza wins, reversing Orban’s changes could be a challenging task for the new government.

With information from Reuters

The European Union and the United States are nearing a strategic agreement to coordinate the production and supply of critical minerals, according to reports.

The move reflects growing concern in Western capitals over the dominance of China in global supply chains for key resources such as rare earth elements, which are essential for modern technologies including electric vehicles, semiconductors, and defence systems.

What the Deal Involves

The proposed agreement is expected to take the form of a non binding memorandum of understanding, covering the entire lifecycle of critical minerals

Exploration and extraction
Processing and refining
Recycling and recovery

It also includes potential financial mechanisms such as minimum price guarantees designed to support non Chinese suppliers and reduce market volatility.

Beyond production, the deal emphasises coordination on standards, investment strategies, and joint projects, signalling a comprehensive approach rather than a narrow trade arrangement.

Strategic Motivation

At the heart of the initiative is a shared objective to reduce reliance on China’s mineral supply chains.

China currently dominates several stages of the critical minerals ecosystem, particularly processing and refining. This has given Beijing significant leverage over industries that underpin the global energy transition and advanced manufacturing.

For both the EU and the US, securing alternative sources is increasingly seen as a matter of economic security as well as geopolitical strategy.

Supply Chain Vulnerability

Recent global disruptions have exposed the fragility of supply chains, especially for materials concentrated in a small number of countries.

Critical minerals are particularly sensitive because their production is capital intensive, geographically concentrated, and difficult to scale quickly.

By coordinating efforts, the EU and US aim to build resilience against potential supply shocks, including those that could arise from geopolitical tensions or export restrictions.

Economic and Industrial Implications

The deal could reshape global competition in several ways

It may accelerate investment in mining and processing projects outside China
It could create new incentives for private sector participation through price stabilisation mechanisms
It may encourage the development of recycling industries to reduce dependence on raw extraction

At the same time, such measures could alter market dynamics, potentially leading to higher costs in the short term as new supply chains are developed.

Diplomatic and Trade Dimensions

The agreement also reflects a broader trend of economic alignment between the EU and the US on strategic industries.

Discussions between EU Trade Commissioner Maros Sefcovic and US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer have signalled a willingness to deepen cooperation not only on minerals but also on tariffs and trade standards.

This coordination could strengthen transatlantic ties while also reshaping global trade patterns, particularly in sectors tied to clean energy and high technology.

Implications

The emerging deal highlights several key shifts

A move toward resource security as a central pillar of economic policy
Increasing alignment between Western economies in response to strategic competition
Growing importance of supply chain resilience in global trade

It also underscores how access to raw materials is becoming as geopolitically significant as access to markets.

Analysis

The EU US critical minerals initiative reflects a structural shift in global economic strategy, where control over supply chains is increasingly viewed through the lens of national security.

Rather than relying on open global markets, major economies are moving toward coordinated frameworks that prioritise trusted partners and reduce exposure to geopolitical rivals.

China’s dominance in critical minerals has effectively transformed these resources into strategic assets, prompting a response that blends industrial policy with geopolitical alignment. The inclusion of mechanisms such as price guarantees suggests a willingness to intervene directly in markets to achieve strategic goals.

At the same time, the non binding nature of the agreement indicates a cautious approach, balancing ambition with flexibility. This allows both sides to advance cooperation without committing to rigid structures that could face political or economic resistance.

The broader implication is the gradual fragmentation of global supply chains into competing blocs. As countries prioritise security and resilience over efficiency, the global economy may become less integrated but more strategically segmented, with critical minerals at the centre of this transformation.

With information from Reuters.

Iran showed no sign of accepting Donald Trump’s ultimatum to open the Strait of Hormuz by the end of Tuesday. Trump stated that “a whole civilization will die tonight” unless Tehran reached a last-minute agreement. As the deadline approached, strikes on Iran escalated, targeting railway bridges, a petrochemical plant, an airport, and power lines, according to Iranian media. Explosions were also reported on Kharg Island, which houses Iran’s oil export terminal. Iran stated it would no longer hold back from attacking the infrastructure of neighboring Gulf countries and claimed to have launched strikes on a ship in the Gulf and on Saudi industrial facilities tied to U. S. firms.

In a post on his Truth Social site, Trump expressed his concerns, saying, “A whole civilization will die tonight, never to be brought back again. ” He added that with “Complete and Total Regime Change,” there could be a positive outcome, stating that it could be one of history’s most important moments. Iran, however, rejected a proposal for a temporary ceasefire that had been communicated by intermediaries. A senior Iranian source explained that talks for lasting peace could only commence once the U. S. and Israel stopped their strikes, assured they wouldn’t resume, and compensated for damages. The Iranian source insisted that any settlement must give Iran control of the Strait, enabling them to impose fees on passing ships.

Trump’s deadline was set for 8 p.m. in Washington (midnight GMT and 3:30 a.m. in Tehran) for Iran to end its blockade of Gulf oil, with threats to destroy every bridge and power plant in Iran if they did not comply. Iran indicated it would retaliate against the infrastructure of U. S. allies in the Gulf. Despite intense military actions and heated rhetoric, global markets remained cautious about betting on whether Trump would follow through with his threats or retract them, as he had done in previous situations.

Reports indicated ongoing strikes inside Iran, including hits on railway and highway bridges and facilities. Power outages were reported in parts of Karaj, near Tehran, due to a strike on transmission lines. Israel warned Iranians via social media to keep away from trains, citing safety concerns. A synagogue in Tehran was reportedly destroyed in what Iran called Israeli air strikes, with Hebrew texts found among the debris. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards declared that their response to attacks on their infrastructure would result in a significant reduction of oil and gas supply to the U. S. and its allies.

Amid the rising tensions, Pakistan is trying to mediate an end to the conflict. An Iranian citizen expressed hope that Trump’s threats were a bluff, observing that Trump had previously backed off from similar ultimatums. The two nations had exchanged proposals through Pakistan, but a compromise seemed elusive, with each claiming victory in the conflict. Iran’s ambassador to Pakistan indicated that mediation efforts were at a critical stage but did not provide specific details. A proposal from Pakistan suggested a temporary ceasefire and lifting of Iran’s blockade while postponing a more comprehensive peace discussion. However, Iran’s 10-point response called for an end to the war, lifting of sanctions, and reconstruction pledges from damaged sites, alongside a new mechanism for governing passage through the Strait, which had been effectively blocked to most ships since U. S. and Israeli strikes began in February. Trump’s latest deadline statement used aggressive language, underscoring his seriousness about potential military action against Iran.

With information from Reuters

One of the greatest strikers of the past 15 years – Poland’s Robert Lewandowski – is among the big names who will not be playing at the 2026 World Cup in Canada, the United States and Mexico.

The 37-year-old Barcelona striker, who has scored 89 goals for his country, was not able to inspire his side as they lost 3-2 in Stockholm against Sweden in Tuesday’s play-off final.

Lewandowski, who won the German Bundesliga title on 10 occasions – twice with Borussia Dortmund and then in eight successive seasons with Bayern Munich, before winning La Liga twice with Barca – may have played in his last major international tournament.

We have taken a look at six players who have missed out on qualifying for this summer’s finals.

The Italian wins his fifth straight Grand Prix to take control of the world championship standings after three rounds.

Aprilia’s Marco Bezzecchi extended his perfect ⁠start to the ⁠year by winning the United States Grand Prix in Austin on Sunday for his third consecutive win of the ⁠year and fifth straight dating back to last season.

Bezzecchi led all 20 laps at the Circuit of the Americas, where he ⁠crossed the line 2.036 seconds ahead of teammate Jorge Martin. Pedro Acosta, who finished third in Saturday’s sprint before a penalty dropped him to eighth, rounded out the podium.

Bezzecchi, racing a day after he failed ‌to finish a sprint for the second time this season after a crash, also reclaimed the lead in the MotoGP standings with 81 points, four points clear of Martin, who won Saturday’s sprint race.

With the win, Bezzecchi became the third Italian rider to win five in a row after Hall of Famers Valentino ⁠Rossi and Giacomo Agostini. He is also ⁠the first rider to win the first three grands prix of the season since Marc Marquez in 2014.

“This is amazing. I mean, I wasn’t expecting a day like ⁠this after yesterday, because it wasn’t easy, and I made a mistake, and it was important ⁠to bounce back,” said Bezzecchi.

“Luckily, my team, ⁠my squad, was very close to me, and they gave me the motivation to try to bounce back.

“But anyway, I wasn’t expecting a race like this, and I’m ‌so happy – I really can’t describe my emotion right now. Very, very happy and proud.”

Polesitter Fabio Di Giannantonio of VR46 Racing finished ‌fourth, ‌while defending Austin champion Francesco Bagnaia of the Ducati Lenovo Team was 10th.

Comic and television host Stephen Colbert knows the feeling William Person recounts in his new lawsuit alleging that USA Bobsled/Skeleton was negligent by concealing knowledge that the repeated sub-concussive blows sledders endure could cause permanent brain damage.

Shortly after taking a bobsled run with Team USA in Lake Placid, N.Y., in 2009, Colbert described the experience.

“It felt like I was being hit in the head with ice hammers,” he said . “It was like losing the worst snowball fight of your life.”

Person can relate, according to his attorneys, who wrote in the suit filed Tuesday in Los Angeles County Superior Court that the symptoms of brain injury have a name among bobsled and skeleton athletes : “Sled Head.”

“This action seeks justice for a decorated American athlete who, in his pursuit of Olympic glory, was knowingly sacrificed to a silent epidemic of brain injury,” the court filing said.

Person says he experienced chronic headaches, migraines, fogginess, vertigo and blackouts during his career.

“[He] currently suffers from traumatic brain injury and latent neurodegenerative disease,” the filing said. “Memory loss, cognitive decline, emotional instability, and chronic pain. These injuries have required, and will continue to require, extensive medical care.”

The action is the second brought on behalf of Person, who competed internationally for the United States from 1999 to 2007. He filed a lawsuit in December 2021 that asked USA Bobsled/Skeleton to implement a medical monitoring system to identify and treat sledders with sled head symptoms.

That lawsuit, which languished in court for five years, included a class-action component and accumulated several hundred plaintiffs. Person’s new lawyers, Kamau Edwards and Christopher Perry, are taking a different approach. They plan to file separate lawsuits and seek monetary damages for each plaintiff based on their circumstances and diagnosis.

Edwards and Perry also added new defendants. In addition to USA Bobsled/Skeleton, the United States Olympic and Paralympic Committee, Anschutz Southern California Sports Complex and former bobsledding supervisor Tracy Lamb are named.

Anschutz owns the Home Depot Center, where the U.S. bobsled and skeleton teams train. The lawsuit says the venue is responsible for premises liability and Lamb for negligent hiring and supervision.

The defendants have yet to be served with the lawsuit and declined to comment. Once served, they will have 30 days to respond through the court.

Edwards and Perry also filed personal injury lawsuits last week on behalf of two other former USA sledders — Joe Sisson and Rick Baird. Through their court filings, both recount head injuries sustained while sledding and lingering symptoms.

The New York Times published stories several years ago about former bobsled and skeleton athletes who struggled with symptoms similar to what Person, Sisson and Baird describe. A handful were posthumously diagnosed with chronic traumatic encephalopathy, the progressive, degenerative brain disease found in people with a history of repetitive head impacts.

Dr. Ann McKee, director of Boston University’s CTE Center, studied the brain of former Olympic bobsledder Pavle Jovanovic, who killed himself in 2020 at 43, and determined he had CTE.

Jovanovic wasn’t the first elite bobsledder to commit suicide. Steven Holcomb, who piloted the American bobsled known as the “Night Train” to the Olympic gold medal in 2010, was found dead in Lake Placid, N.Y., in 2017 from an apparent overdose of alcohol and sleeping pills.

Also, Sisson’s sledding mentor Travis Bell killed himself in 2012 at 27 after experiencing years of debilitating symptoms that Sisson believes stemmed from his career as a driver on the U.S. bobsled team.

“I’ve got survivor’s guilt big time,” Sisson told the New York Times in 2022.

Person’s lawsuit alleges that Lamb and USABS coaches witnessed his symptoms during training sessions but failed to intervene.

“They did not pull [Person] from the sled. They did not refer him for a neurological evaluation. They did not institute a concussion protocol,” the lawyers wrote. “Instead, fostering a culture of silence, they encouraged [him] to continue training through the injury, exacerbating the damage to his brain.”

The lawsuit asserts that the link between sledding and brain injury has been known since the 1980s and that officials intentionally concealed the information because “a full disclosure of the risks of CTE and permanent brain damage would deter top-tier athletes like [Person} from competing,” the suit said. “By suppressing this information, they robbed [him] of his ability to make an informed choice about his own life and health.”

Person was a track and field athlete at Weber State in Utah when he was recruited by USA Bobsled/Skeleton. He represented the United States in the America’s Cup, World Cup, Olympic Trials and World Championships from 1999 through 2007.

The dangers of sliding sports took center stage at the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics when 11 crashes occurred in two days of bobsled training ahead of the Games. Gold medal bobsled favorite Beat Hefti of Switzerland suffered a concussion and luger Nodar Kumaritashvili died after being ejected from the track at nearly 90 mph during the final training run.

MIAMI — The victors erupted onto the field and into multiple dogpiles. Some wore national flags around their shoulders. Within minutes, the Venezuelans wore T-shirts that read: “The Best Baseball in the World.”

The players from the United States watched from their dugout. Within minutes, they trudged back onto the field so a silver medal could be draped around their necks. Not every player wore the medal all the way back to the dugout.

You can say all you want about how the World Baseball Classic has matured into a must-see event for fans and a must-play event for the game’s elite players. You can salute Venezuela for a spirited and thrilling victory, and the Venezuelan fans for nine innings of joyful delirium.

But you also can say this: A U.S. team billed as featuring a killer lineup could not hit, and the U.S. could not use its best pitcher because the San Diego Padres said so. The result: For the second consecutive World Baseball Classic, the U.S. lost the championship by a 3-2 score.

U.S. captain Aaron Judge looks across the field after striking out against Velezuela at the World Baseball Classic Tuesday.

(Lynne Sladky / Associated Press)

“I’m not OK with winning silver,” Bryce Harper said. “I don’t want to win silver.

“I want to win gold, just like anybody else. But, at the end of the night, they did it, they won, all the congratulations to them. They fought hard. I’ve got nothing but respect for them.”

By the time the eighth inning rolled around, the mighty U.S. offense had not gotten a runner into scoring position on Tuesday, and had gone scoreless for 18 of its previous 19 innings. With two out in the eighth, and Venezuela up 2-0, Bobby Witt Jr. walked, and Harper followed with a 432-foot home run, so monstrous that Venezuelan pitcher Andres Machado could only watch the flight of the ball and smile.

Harper stood and watched too, then he flipped his bat toward the dugout. At third base, he stopped to give a salute, then spotted the cameraman trailing him around the bases and pointed to the American flag on his left sleeve.

“Just enjoying the moment,” Harper said. “Super grateful for it.”

With the game tied 2-2 entering the ninth, the pitcher trotting in from the U.S. bullpen should have been Mason Miller, who had not given up a hit in the WBC and struck out 10 of the 14 batters he had faced.

Before the game, U.S. manager Mark DeRosa had said Miller would be available. After the game, DeRosa said he and Miller’s employers, the Padres, had agreed Miller would only be used to protect a lead.

Once the game entered the ninth, Miller would not be able to protect a lead, since the U.S. was the home team and there could be no save situation for him. DeRosa nonetheless declined to use Miller.

“Honoring the Padres,” DeRosa said.

This is not on DeRosa, but that is nonsense. If a closer cannot be used three times in five days — with another week to ease into the regular season by throwing bullpens or in structured B games, or taking a few days off, or whatever — then he should stay home.

Venezuela scored the winning run in the ninth off Garrett Whitlock, on a walk, stolen base and RBI double by Eugenio Suárez.

In its final five WBC games — after routs of Brazil and Britain — the U.S. scored more than five runs once, with a two-run win, a two-run loss, a two-run win, a one-run win, and a one-run loss. In the semifinal and final, the U.S. combined to bat .159 and strike out 25 times, and every run came on a home run.

That — not any attempt at small ball — is American baseball. And the U.S. was outslugged by six other teams, including Australia and Italy. For glory, as the U.S. team hoodies said.

“A lot of pop ups, a lot of just-missed pitches,” U.S. captain Aaron Judge said. “I wouldn’t say we tensed up. We just didn’t execute when we needed to.”

Said DeRosa: “I mean, surprised because of the names at the back of the jersey, but not surprised because of where they’re at in spring training.

“Yeah, that’s my answer. I really don’t have a rhyme or reason to why. I just think you’re either hot or not in a seven-game blast like this.”

American Bryce Harper celebrates at home plate with teammates after hitting a two-run home run during the World Baseball Classic Tuesday in Miami.

(Lynne Sladky / Associated Press)

The WBC absolutely was a blast. The Venezuelan fans delivered concert-level noise all night long, without needing a silly stadium host or scoreboard command to do so. The WBC allowed fans to bring in 16 “permissible instruments,” including bongos, cowbells, maracas and trumpets.

“There’s bands playing,” Judge said. “There’s chants going on. You don’t usually hear that too much in the World Series games. That’s amazing. So much fun.”

More Americans watched the U.S.-Dominican Republic semifinal than watched last year’s NBA All-Star Game, according to Fox. The championship game almost certainly will have drawn more viewers than at least one game of last year’s NBA Finals.

In the 10 minutes I spent along the concourse before Tuesday’s game, I counted fans wearing the jerseys of many national teams and 17 MLB teams, plus the late and greatly beloved Montreal Expos. Japan did not qualify for the final four, but I nonetheless counted 11 fans in Japan jerseys with Shohei Ohtani’s name on the back. The advertisers believed too: DeRosa spoke in front of a banner displaying the logo of nine corporate sponsors, eight of them Japanese.

After such a lively event, can these players get fired up to go back to spring training, and then for the grind of a 162-game season?

“I’m always fired up for the Yankees, but I’m still pissed about this,” Judge said.

“I’m looking forward to the next time we get a chance to throw on the red, white and blue and take care of business.”

That would be the 2028 Olympics in Los Angeles, where Dave Roberts has expressed interest in managing Team USA at Dodger Stadium. The major leaguers are almost certainly coming, even if the details are still being worked out.

See you there, Bryce Harper?

“I hope so,” he said. “I really do.”