USA

The Iranians have come out on top after the conflict. They have demonstrated themselves as a pure and united nation by not dividing into small factions during the recent militarily confrontation with the United States and Israel. The Americans and Israelis were seemed to be launching a shock and awe strategy against the Iranians to overwhelm them and easily bring down their regime. 

However, they were unable to accomplish their task, resulting in social pressure from within the United States, as 61% people were not in favor of launching a war of choice against Iran while the escalation concluded in huge financial setbacks for both the U.S and Israel.

According to John Kiriakou – the former CIA officer, Trump was told by the Israeli Prime Minister that they could easily topple the regime of Iran due to prevailing social unrest at that time. But the Iranians remained intact and united, rallying behind their government. This shattered Americans and Israelis ambitions.

On the day Americans and Israelis launched an unprovoked aggression against Tehran, Iran imposed a closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which made Iran to maintain upper hand throughout the confrontation and sustain its position against the enemy.

Strait of Hormuz was open before 28^th February, but during the war it was observed that the United States presented its closure as a cause of war, whereas it was obviously a consequence of the war. In addition to this context, Tehran laid a lot of mines in the waters of the Strait of Hormuz to hinder the flow of maritime trade across the strait.

From the beginning, the Iranians adopted a military strategy called Mosaic Defense, in which they decentralized their defense system, dividing their military into 31 factions which were able to take any decision on spot without asking from the central command of Tehran. This gave their military to take sudden military decisions and hit military targets as per their choice. This strategy significantly helped the Iranians hold the upper hand in the conflict, maintain their position, and stand firm against their enemy.  

The Iranians also pursued the strategy of asymmetric warfare, attacking with cheap Shahed-136 drones and using different types of missiles to overwhelm the enemy. They used drones of worth around  20000 to 50000 $ while the Americans and Israelis were using expensive defensive equipment of worth 1 million to 4million dollars.

Iran fought Americans forces using a strategy called horizontal warfare, broadening the conflict across the Middle East by attacking Americans bases in the region and making the region increasingly vulnerable and unstable for the other countries there. This helped Iran consolidate their hard power in the region.

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) eliminated the most expensive radars of the US situated in different countries of the region. They blew up AN/FPS-132 and AN/TPY-2 Radar systems of the US in Qatar and Jordan respectively. 

Along with that, they decimated American 5^th fleet headquarter in Bahrain, which held 75% of the US military power in the region, resulting in heavy losses for Washington. Furthermore, Iran inflicted pain on more than dozen American bases in the Middle East. 

It was seemed that Tehran converted this war into a war of attrition by slowly weakening the Americans over time. They were fully prepared for this protracted war but it did not go in favor of the United States, as Washington was unable to afford a protracted war at lot. 

Therefore, President Trump was increasingly perceived as pursuing a deal with Tehran over time, emphasizing that a deal was in progress and would be reached soon.  As a result, president trump had to sign a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Tehran on 17^th June 27, 2026 to save the world economy from another Great Depression.

The extent which Washington achieved its objectives remain open to debate. These goals included the overthrow of the regime, the de-weaponization of Iran, and the weakening of the country’s strategic potential.  

According to the U.S political scientist Robert Pape, Iran has emerged as the fourth center of power, following the US, China, and Russia. It was obvious that Iran had been preparing for possible military misadventure by the U.S and Israel since 1979. 

One of the crucial steps that Iran took after the Islamic revolution was the creation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) parallel to its national army. Consequently, it had huge leverage over the US and Israel during overall confrontation.

Moreover, this military confrontation between the U.S and Iran gave huge advantage to Tehran, making its position stronger in the regional politics and globally. Resultantly, Tehran has achieved what it had been unable to gain over the last 47 years. It successfully gained the removal of sanctions, the release of its $24B frozen assets, dominance over the Strait of Hormuz, and recognition as a regional power. Apart from that, it still retains its regional proxies and ballistic missile program. 

While the Americans and Israelis miscalculated the war, assuming that they could win a quick and decisive victory by decapitating the regime. For that they orchestrated a plan to quickly topple the regime through a shock-and-awe campaign and they wanted to place people on the top that were subservient to them. However, the Iranian military emerged as a key deterrent against the adversary and made the pursuit of Washington’s objectives complicated.

Until not so long ago Latin America had been considered a quiet region, located far from the world’s superpower main strategic confrontations, with sporadic but crucial moments that helped to shape the international order as we know it today. The Cuban Missile Crisis is the clearest example: it became the starting point for a series of agreements and treaties on nuclear and strategic security, involving both the US and the Soviet Union at first, and later extending to other actors of the international community, from Europe, Asia and Latin America, which became the first region free from nuclear weapons after the signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967, 5 years after the crisis. After this episode, the region’s relevance seemed to fade, and Latin American countries appeared condemned to a destiny of surfing between weak political cohesion internally and relatively stable economies, even as most of its governments remained closely aligned with Washington on foreign policy matters.

It was precisely during this period of perceived irrelevance that China began building its presence in the region, very gradually and over the course of a little more than two decades. Washington largely ignored this process, even as it became clear that the Asian giant was becoming the largest trading partner for several South American countries, such as Peru and Brazil, and in many cases also the main investor in their economies. This neglect was not born of ignorance: it reflected, instead, a confidence that local governments would remain compliant regardless of who was investing in them. President Trump’s first term illustrates this well. Despite isolated clashes with the governments of Mexico and Venezuela, these episodes looked minor when compared to the “tariff wars” waged against the EU and China. In fact, the only time Trump ever set foot in the region during his entire first term was in November 2018 when he attended the G20 Forum in Buenos Aires. Significantly, there was a planned short visit in Colombia after this event, but I was cancelled. This was widely read at the time as a confirmation that Latin America remained a low priority for Washington’s foreign policy agenda, more due to the expectable compliance of local governments than ignorance of the importance of the region as a resource base capable of fueling US power projection in other regions.

It was only during Trump’s second term that American foreign policy has shifted towards the Western Hemisphere, attributing strategic importance to the region and setting the objective to maintain a near-absolute dominant presence, involving both economic and military dimensions, as is stated in the latest National Security Strategy of 2025.

By the time this shift was formalized, China’s footprint in the region was already deep and country-specific. In Brazil, China had been the largest trading partner since 2009; bilateral trade hit a record $171 billion in 2025, with China accounting for 27.2% of Brazil’s total foreign trade, besides, EV plants and a still planned bi-oceanic railway linking Brazil to Peru’s Pacific coast were being negotiated as part of the Chinese investment strategy in both countries. In Argentina, China became the primary supplier of mobile network infrastructure, part of a broader Chinese push into Latin American 5G and data-center markets. And in Peru, China invested around $1.3 billion in the strategic port of Chancay, a deepwater facility that entered full operation stage in November 2024, and set a new phase for trade between China and South America, bypassing the traditional deepwater ports located in the US, like the ports of Oakland and Stockton. Reinforcing this, China pledged in May 2025, at the CELAC forum ministerial meeting in Beijing, to ramp up its regional engagement even further. These were not isolated transactions but a structural presence, one that the 2025 National Security Strategy now identifies strictly as the rival foothold it intends to dislodge.

Now, within this context in 2026 the declared shift of interests proved it wasn’t merely rhetorical. The year started with the launching of Operation Resolve, when a group of American special military forces conducted a military raid and captured President Nicolás Maduro and his wife in Caracas, transporting them to New York to face narcoterrorism charges. Trump declared that the US was now “in charge” of Venezuela until a transition takes place. This meant in practice that the US would hold control over the country’s oil exports, which during the first four months after Maduro’s capture were estimated at $8 billion, but the data on how much oil has been sold, the revenue from it and the use given to those funds remains secret. The main importers of Venezuelan oil during this period were the United States (43 percent), India (26 percent, part of the strategy to reduce Indian import of Russian oil), and Spain (8 percent). This episode, condemned by critics as a return to the old days of imperialism, set the tone for the rest of the year: a hemisphere where Washington would use military force, tariffs, and other mechanics for pressuring countries to sign economic deals where American core interests prevail.

An example of this is the new and controversial Trade and Investment agreement signed by the United States and Argentina in February of this year. According to the text, Argentina shall adapt the regulatory framework to implement US trade standards and prioritize American direct investment in the country, while the counterpart shall “try to review its tariffs” and “consider supporting investment financing”. Milei’s government has justified this as the price for ideological loyalty and continued financial support after the $20 billion credit line that helped to stabilize the local currency (peso) last year.

On the other hand, Brazil took the opposite path: rather than just seeking accommodation to this policy, the government of Lula da Silva accelerated diversification, finalizing the long-delayed EU-Mercosur agreement in January, deepening trade with China and signing a memorandum of understanding with aims for further strategic partnership with Russia. Notably, the US has implemented another mechanism of pressure here, condemning the imprisonment of former president Jair Bolsonaro and holding a meeting with his son Flavio Bolsonaro, who will participate in the presidential elections this October. This gives clear signs of indirect support for this far-right candidate, following the regional trend with Milei in Argentina and Keiko Fujimori in Peru.

Peru, meanwhile, illustrates a third pattern and an interesting case, because alignment here is imposed less by negotiation than by sheer state fragility. Amid a presidency turning over for the ninth time in a decade, the US State Department warned in February that China’s control over the Chancay megaport threatens Peru’s sovereignty, following a Peruvian court ruling that exempted the port from national oversight. Peru’s case pictures a scenario where both counterparts keep pushing for concessions and more privileges. Under the government of José María Balcázar, the ninth president in 10 years, the country has been involved in the controversial purchase of 12 F-16 jetfighters with a cost of around $3.5 billion. On April he postponed the official ceremony where this deal was supposed to be signed arguing that it would have to be the responsibility of a new president, the decision was met with pushback, both internally, with declarations from the Ministry of Defense and in the US Embassy, with ambassador Bernardo Navarro declaring “If you deal with the U.S. in bad faith and undermine U.S. interests, rest assured, I, on behalf of [President] Trump and his administration, will use every available tool to protect and promote the prosperity and security of the United States and our region.” After this, with both internal and diplomatic pressure, the deal was signed on the 17th of April.

Taken together, these cases suggest the current US approach to Latin America is not fueled by a single ideological logic, but by transactional calculations that value compliance and heavily punishes resistance, exploiting weaknesses here and there and aiming to these policy goal indifferently to whether the country in question is led by a right, left or ideologically undefined government. What seems quite clear is that the decades of quietness in Latin America have ended, not necessarily because the region has changed, many of the deep challenges for development are still present, but because the rivalry that once defined the Cuban Missile Crisis has returned, this time fought over trade tariffs, infrastructure and technology access rather than missiles.

Wednesday’s win over Bosnia-Herzegovina in San Francisco Bay Area Stadium was thoroughly deserved and earned Pochettino’s side a date with Belgium in Seattle on Monday evening (01:00 BST on Tuesday).

It did not, however, come without a price.

Folarin Balogun, the 24-year-old former Arsenal youngster, who inspired the US to a thumping win over Paraguay with two goals to begin their campaign, added his third of the tournament to break the deadlock shortly before half-time.

He might have had a hat-trick, firing one effort wide of the near post, seeing an effort ruled out for offside and slicing a shot onto the bar from close range, but just after the hour mark his night, and potentially his World Cup was ended.

What looked an innocuous tussle with Bosnia defender Tarik Muharemovic for a looping ball down the left channel ended with the forward being shown a straight red card.

As Balogun attempted to shield the ball, Muharemovic managed to get in front of him, and as the forward’s boot returned to the ground it landed on the back of the Bosnian’s ankle, causing it to twist gruesomely.

In real time, and in all likelihood in reality, it looked entirely accidental, but Brazilian referee Raphael Claus was sent to the monitor to watch a super slow-motion replay, which gave him little choice but to brandish the red card.

It etched Balogun’s name further into the record books.

On the night when he became just the third American to score three goals in a World Cup edition, he also became the fourth player to both score and be sent off in a knockout match, following Brazil’s Garrincha in the 1962 semi-final, his compatriot Ronaldinho in the 2002 quarter-final against England, and France’s Zinedine Zidane in the infamous 2006 final against Italy.

The sending-off brings an immediate one-game ban, ruling him out of the Belgium match, but it could yet be extended by Fifa officials to potentially rule him out of the quarter-final and semi-final, should the Americans make it.

Long-time Fulham target Ricardo Pepi is the man most likely to fill Balogun’s boots , though he has not scored in his 184 minutes on the pitch at this tournament, nor in the four friendly games before it.

The PSV man’s last international goal came in a Nations League game in November 2024.

Crystal Palace and US defender Chris Richards said the players were supporting Balogun.

“We told him we have got his back,” he said. “We are a team of 26, not just one.

“Ultimately we are going to miss him for the next game but we know whoever is going to step up is going to do a job just as well as he did.

“I think it’ll keep us stronger. One man is down, the next guy steps up. We are a team, we are more than just one player, we are more than just 11 players.”

Pochettino added: “When Balogun received the red card, I thought that is the moment we need to show we are a team and the eyes of the players were [saying], ‘Coach, we are ready to go and fight’ and that is amazing.

“These guys are creating a legacy in this country and with our amazing fans everything is possible. Why not us?”

The United States is expected to formally notify its North American partners that it will not extend the United States Mexico Canada Agreement (USMCA), triggering the pact’s sunset review process and beginning a potential 10-year countdown to its expiry in 2036. While the move does not immediately terminate the agreement, it opens a prolonged period of negotiations during which the three countries will seek to resolve disputes over automotive rules, regional manufacturing, market access and measures to prevent Chinese goods from benefiting from preferential trade provisions.

The decision reflects the Trump administration’s push to reshape North American trade around greater US manufacturing content and stricter supply chain rules rather than preserving the agreement in its current form.

Sunset clause launches a decade of negotiations

The notification activates the USMCA’s sunset review mechanism, requiring annual consultations if no agreement is reached to renew the pact for another 16 years. Rather than ending the agreement immediately, the process creates a structured but uncertain negotiation period that could last until the agreement expires in 2036 unless the three countries reach a revised deal.

The review mechanism is intended to keep the agreement under continuous assessment but also introduces long-term uncertainty for businesses operating across North America.

Washington pushes for tougher automotive rules

The United States is seeking significant changes to the agreement’s rules of origin, particularly in the automotive sector. Washington wants a substantially larger share of vehicle components to be produced in the United States while increasing overall North American content requirements to reduce dependence on Asian supply chains.

The proposals form part of a broader industrial strategy aimed at strengthening domestic manufacturing, creating more US jobs and preventing third-country producers, particularly China, from indirectly accessing preferential North American trade benefits.

US and Mexico lead negotiations while Canada remains sidelined

Current negotiations are taking place primarily between Washington and Mexico, with Canada playing a more limited role amid ongoing bilateral trade disputes with the United States.

The narrower negotiating format highlights differing priorities within the three-country partnership and raises questions about whether a comprehensive trilateral agreement can be achieved without parallel negotiations involving Ottawa.

Trade policy reflects broader supply chain strategy

The proposed revisions extend beyond traditional tariff issues and reflect a wider effort to reorganise North American manufacturing. By tightening content requirements and strengthening origin rules, the United States aims to encourage companies to relocate production closer to home while limiting opportunities for Chinese manufacturers to circumvent trade restrictions through regional supply chains.

This shift illustrates how trade policy has become increasingly intertwined with industrial policy and national economic security objectives.

Businesses face prolonged policy uncertainty

The activation of the sunset clause is unlikely to disrupt trade immediately, but it introduces a prolonged period of uncertainty for manufacturers, exporters and investors whose operations depend on integrated North American supply chains.

Companies may delay long-term investment decisions until greater clarity emerges on future tariff structures, production requirements and the overall direction of regional trade policy.

Future Outlook

Negotiations are expected to intensify over the coming months as the United States continues pressing for stricter manufacturing rules and stronger regional content requirements. While Mexico appears willing to negotiate toward shared industrial objectives, Canada’s future role remains less certain given unresolved bilateral trade disputes.

Unless the three countries reach a mutually acceptable compromise, the USMCA could remain under annual review for the next decade, prolonging uncertainty for businesses while reshaping North America’s manufacturing landscape. The outcome of these negotiations will likely determine not only the future of the trade agreement but also the competitiveness of regional supply chains and the balance between economic integration and national industrial policy.

With information from Reuters.

The United States’ head of homeland security said he “danced a happy dance” when Iran were eliminated from the World Cup.

Iran missed out on qualifying from the group stage on goal difference after having a stoppage-time winner against Egypt disallowed for a marginal offside.

Coach Amir Ghalenoei said his team were the “most oppressed” at the tournament amid the backdrop of the country’s conflict with the US and Israel.

Iran’s training base was switched from Arizona to Tijuana in Mexico before the World Cup began and they faced travel restrictions throughout.

Despite Saturday’s 1-1 draw with Egypt, Iran still had a chance of qualifying as one of the eight best third-placed teams.

But their elimination was confirmed when Algeria and Austria played out a dramatic 3-3 draw on Sunday.

Speaking to reporters on Monday, secretary of the Department of Homeland Security Markwayne Mullin said: “I’m just glad they’re done, and they’re not coming back.

“I was so happy when we were able to pull their visas and said they could leave the US soil, and I might’ve sung a song or two or maybe even danced a happy dance.”

He added: “There wasn’t a single team that we had to spend more time dealing with than Iran.”

Iran were only permitted to enter the US the day before their first two matches and had to leave on the same day as the game, under the terms of their visas.

Those restrictions were eased for their final group game in Seattle, allowing them to arrive two days early, but they again had to return to Tijuana after Saturday’s match.

Iran coach Ghalenoei said that the US, co-hosts of the World Cup with Canada and Mexico, had “treated us very unfairly” and that his squad had been given “less than half” the training window it needed to prepare.

Iran captain Mehdi Taremi added: “This kind of tension undermines the joy of the World Cup. I felt the tension from the first moment we arrived.”

The international order is falling apart, happening visibly, rapidly, and in ways that no longer surprise even the most committed defenders of the post-1945 liberal framework. The United Nations Security Council has not been able to do anything about the problems in Gaza and Ukraine. The group of countries known as BRICS is getting bigger. Now has nine members. Some countries in the Gulf are thinking about using a currency to price oil instead of using the US dollar. All of these things are putting a lot of pressure on the system that the United States has been in charge of.

Many people in the Global South think this is a thing. They do not think the United States has been fair in the way it has enforced the rules. They think the United States has only looked out for its interests and the interests of its friends. This is not a thing to say. The United States has been inconsistent in the way it has applied the rules about weapons, sanctions, and international crime.

The problem is that just because the old system is falling apart, it does not mean that something better will take its place. The question is not whether the United States is losing its power because it is clear that this is happening. The question is what will happen next. Will the new system be fair, more stable, and better at dealing with global problems?

The Architecture of Decline

The truth is that the United States has been losing its power for a time, but this has happened much faster since 2022. When Russia invaded Ukraine, it showed that big countries can still go to war with each other. It also showed that the United States and its friends cannot stop this from happening. The war in Ukraine has led to the use of financial sanctions in history, with over $300 billion in Russian assets being frozen.

This has made other countries want to reduce their dependence on the US dollar. They are afraid that if they rely much on the United States, they will be vulnerable to its power. According to International Monetary Fund estimates, the group of countries known as BRICS has expanded to include Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Ethiopia, and Egypt. This group now accounts for over 40 percent of the economy. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has also gotten bigger. Now includes Pakistan, India, and Iran in addition to Russia and China. This organization is now the regional security group in the world. These changes are not just symbolic; they show a shift in where power is concentrated in the world.

New Poles, Old Problems

The problem with a world is that it does not necessarily mean that things will be more fair or more stable. In the century Europe had a multipolar system, but it still had many wars. The same thing happened in the 20th century. Just because there are powerful countries does not mean that they will behave in a certain way.

The problem with a world is that it does not necessarily mean that things will be more fair or more stable. In the century Europe had a multipolar system, but it still had many wars. The same thing happened in the 20th century. Just because there are powerful countries does not mean that they will behave in a certain way.

The Institutional Vacuum

The biggest risk of the situation is that the international institutions that we have will become useless. The United Nations Security Council has not been able to do anything about the security crises of the past few years. The World Trade Organization is also not working properly.

When powerful countries use these institutions for their purposes, it undermines their legitimacy. This is a problem because it means that smaller countries will suffer the most. The rules of law are only useful if they are applied equally to everyone.

The Global South’s Strategic Dilemma

For countries in the Global South, the transition to a world is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it gives them space to maneuver and more access to financing for infrastructure projects. On the other hand, it also means that they will have to navigate a more complex and uncertain world.

The best way forward is to try to shape the transition to a world in a way that preserves the international institutions that we have. This means reforming the United Nations Security Council to make it more representative of the world. It also means strengthening the courts and the World Trade Organization.

Towards a Legitimate Multipolarity

This will not be easy. It is necessary. If we do not do this, we risk creating a world where might makes right. There is no shared set of rules to govern the behavior of states. This would be a disaster for everyone, for the smallest and weakest countries.

The multipolar world may signal the end of the order, but it does not have to mean the end of order itself. We have to work to create a system that is fairer, more stable, and more just.

In May 2026, just hours before President Donald Trump met President Xi Jinping, OpenAI’s Vice President of Global Affairs Chris Lehane floated the idea of a US-led global governance body for artificial intelligence that would include China as a member. The model, according to media reports, was compared to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a familiar reference for managing strategic technologies with global consequences.

One month later, at the G7 summit in Évian-les-Bains, a different tone emerged. Several influential AI executives joined leaders from advanced economies to discuss AI governance, online safety, and global security. According to Axios, Anthropic’s Dario Amodei and Google DeepMind’s Demis Hassabis leaned towards a more selective framework among democratic countries, while OpenAI’s Sam Altman used broader language, calling for an international forum to develop shared testing standards and risk assessments.

These two moments reveal something important: the meaning of “global AI governance” remains unsettled. In one setting, global means including China for legitimacy. In another, it can mean a trusted coalition designed to manage access, capability, and strategic risk. AI governance is becoming part of the architecture of global power.

Three Voices, Different Emphases

Their presence at the G7 showed how quickly AI firms have moved from building systems to helping shape the politics around them. The leaders of OpenAI, Anthropic, Google DeepMind, Mistral, Cohere, and other firms were not simply observers of geopolitics. They were part of the conversation about how technological power should be governed.

Their positions were not identical. Amodei reportedly urged democratic countries to coordinate more closely so that AI governance would not fragment. Hassabis stressed the strategic importance of frontier capability. Altman, by contrast, used more institutionally neutral language, suggesting that advanced AI should not be shaped only by the companies building the most capable systems.

Even among frontier AI developers, there is no settled imagination of global governance. Should it include all major AI powers, including strategic rivals? Should it be built around trusted coalitions? Should it prioritize safety, democratic values, geopolitical advantage, or public legitimacy?

The question became more complicated because the G7 discussions came shortly after the US government imposed export controls that forced Anthropic to suspend foreign access to its Fable 5 and Mythos 5 models. Reuters reported that the order required Anthropic to block access to the models for foreign nationals, leading the company to disable them more broadly to ensure compliance. The episode showed how frontier AI governance can move from abstract principles to abrupt restrictions. Even among democratic allies, technological solidarity has limits. When AI becomes strategic infrastructure, every country begins to think about its own room for maneuver.

The Asymmetry of “Global”

The deeper issue lies in who has the power to define the word “global” in the first place. In May, global governance could mean a US-led institution that includes China. In June, it could mean coordination among democracies to manage frontier capability and strategic access. The definition changed because the political room changed.

This reveals a double asymmetry. The first is technical: only a small number of firms can define what counts as a frontier model, how its capabilities should be tested, and who should be allowed to access it. The second is narrative: the same ecosystem also helps frame the language through which the world discusses governance.

For countries outside the frontier AI circle, they may be invited to conversations but not always to the stage where categories, thresholds, and governance priorities are first shaped. They may be asked to adopt best practices whose assumptions were formed elsewhere. They may be told that risks are global, even when preparedness remains highly unequal.

G7 outreach to partner countries such as India, Brazil, Kenya, South Korea, and Egypt is important. It recognizes that AI governance cannot remain a conversation among advanced economies alone. Yet there remains a difference between being present in a forum and helping design the architecture of the forum itself. The question is who defines the table, the agenda, the risk categories, and the meaning of global governance itself.

When the AI Frontier Moves Towards the Market

There is another reason why a broader governance imagination is necessary. Frontier AI innovation is no longer centered primarily in universities or public research institutions. It is increasingly shaped by private firms with the capital, compute, talent, data access, and infrastructure required to train and deploy the most capable models.

Stanford’s AI Index 2025 noted that nearly 90 per cent of notable AI models in 2024 came from industry, up from 60 per cent in 2023. A report prepared for the European Economic and Social Committee on generative AI and foundation models also described significant US dominance across the value chain. These findings point to a structural shift: the frontier is becoming more concentrated, more expensive, and more closely tied to corporate and geopolitical capacity.

Much of AI’s progress has come from companies willing to take risks, scale products, and build technical capability at extraordinary speed. But the center of gravity has shifted. When frontier AI is largely financed, defined, and deployed by market actors, the default imagination of AI development can tilt towards commercial viability, platform advantage, user growth, and strategic positioning.

Public interest does not disappear in such a system. It risks becoming secondary unless other actors are strong enough to bring it back into the room.

Open Future, a European digital policy organization, has warned that concentrations of power in AI can make public activities dependent on “a narrow group of monopolists.” The phrase matters because infrastructure-level dependency can weaken society’s ability to negotiate the terms of the technologies it relies on.

A Wider Public-Interest Layer

In a multiplex digital world, power does not flow only through states or markets. It also moves through universities, civil society organizations, professional associations, media, labor groups, open-source communities, public-interest technologists, and moral institutions. Together, these actors form the society layer often missing from discussions dominated by states and markets.

States define security priorities. Companies define technical possibility. Society must help test legitimacy. Who bears the risk? Who benefits from deployment? Who is excluded from design? What harms are being normalized because they are commercially convenient or geopolitically useful?

This is why Pope Leo XIV’s recent intervention on AI is politically relevant beyond its religious context. In his encyclical Magnifica Humanitas, he argues that protecting the human person in the age of AI requires renewed reflection on the common good, solidarity, social justice, and human dignity. Such interventions will not replace regulation or technical standards. They help recover a truth easily lost in frontier AI politics: governance is also about preserving the human meaning of technological progress.

The same question of authorship is beginning to appear in empirical research. Ongoing fieldwork-based research at the University of Oxford has started to examine whether countries in the Global South are developing approaches to AI governance that are neither simple copies of Western regulatory templates nor rejections of international cooperation but pragmatic syntheses shaped by local institutional capacity, regulatory sequencing, and historical experience with technology transfer. Indonesia has appeared as one of the country cases in this line of inquiry.

Governance models worth studying are not only those negotiated in Évian, Brussels, Washington, or New York. They are also being improvised, often informally, by mid-sized digital economies navigating dependency and ambition at the same time.

The United Nations’ Global Digital Compact (GDC), adopted in September 2024, offers a useful multilateral reference point. It frames digital cooperation and AI governance around inclusion, human rights, open standards, interoperability, digital public goods, and multi-stakeholder cooperation. The Compact does not resolve the power asymmetries of frontier AI by itself, but it gives societies, alongside states and firms, a language for claiming a legitimate role in digital governance.

The practical task is to strengthen public-interest evaluation: the ability to test social impact, language bias, local risks, institutional misuse, and deployment consequences in different societies. The aim is to preserve enough room for public reasoning so that the future of AI is not defined only by those with the largest models, the biggest markets, or the strongest strategic leverage.

Imagining a More Inclusive AI Governance

The lesson from the IAEA analogy and the G7 discussions is not that one model is right and the other is wrong. Both reflect real concerns. A broadly inclusive governance arrangement may be necessary for legitimacy, especially when AI risks cross borders. A trusted coalition may also be necessary when capability access raises genuine security concerns. The problem begins when either model claims to be global while leaving too many societies downstream of decisions made elsewhere.

For emerging economies, the strategic challenge is not simply to wait for a better invitation to the next summit. Participation matters, but it is not enough. Countries and societies need stronger capacity to evaluate AI systems, understand their dependencies, articulate local risks, and negotiate governance terms with greater confidence.

This is a call for a more plural architecture of governance, where states, markets, and society all have meaningful roles. The uncomfortable question is not whether AI requires international coordination. It clearly does. The harder question is whether that coordination can remain open enough for societies, not only states and companies, to shape the terms of technological power.

In the age of frontier AI, the future will not be determined only by who builds the largest models. It will also be shaped by who gets to define risk, test systems, question assumptions, and decide what counts as progress.

Every era that has tried to govern a transformative technology eventually learns the same lesson: legitimacy borrowed from power is not the same as legitimacy earned through participation. The IAEA’s own history shows that global trust is rarely built at the moment institutions are created; it is earned over time, through broader representation, credible restraint, and shared accountability. The real question for AI governance is whether it can shorten that distance by design, rather than waiting for legitimacy to arrive only after contestation.

Artificial intelligence is increasingly being used in the military for planning and operations as a decision support tool at multiple stages. The US’s use of Anthropic’s Claude model against Iran marks a significant moment in the history of warfare. Integrated via Palantir’s Maven Smart System, AI-supported intelligence analysis, target identification, and operational simulations enabled planners to process information faster than human capabilities. While analysts have framed this as an “AI war,” the more significant shift lies in the growing influence of algorithmic systems in shaping military decision-making architectures.

Admiral Brad Cooper, who led Operation Epic Fury, said that AI systems processed massive amounts of intelligence and surveillance data, allowing commanders to gain insights within seconds. This is part of a wider movement to shift more complex intelligence tasks to algorithmic systems, raising questions about transparency, oversight, and reliance on algorithmic assessments.

This is also observed in other conflict zones, but in different operational roles. In Gaza, Israel’s Lavender system, developed by Unit 8200, assisted in the targeting of 37,000 suspected individuals, based on reported affiliations, using AI. Structural strikes and real-time tracking were made possible through the use of additional tools like “The Gospel” and “Where’s Daddy?” These systems reduced human review into quick, seconds-long “stamp of approval” decisions, moving targeting to machine-driven validation. In Ukraine, AI tools were used to assist in drone operations and battlefield analysis by training datasets. Initial programs, like Project Maven, relied on manually labeling 150,000 images. Currently, the Brave1 has enabled over 100 defense-tech firms to train combat AI on millions of annotated images from ongoing missions to improve these AI models.

The modern battlefield produces unprecedented volumes of data from interwoven sensor networks, drones, satellite imagery, and localized communications streams. This information comes at high speed and volume, which can overload the human brain. AI is being used to deal with this information overload, but there are concerns about the accuracy of AI-driven assessments and how much human oversight might be required to rely on AI. Military officials emphasize that humans have the final authority, but systematic integration poses challenges to oversight quality. The other predicament is automation bias, a psychological phenomenon in which a human operator, particularly under pressure or high stress, is likely to rely on the system’s recommendations. Therefore, striking a balance between speed and responsibility, ethical judgment, and accountability in the use of force is a key challenge.

Another area of concern pertains to legal and ethical issues. International humanitarian law is based on the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution. With the growing use of AI in military operations, it becomes more difficult to apply these principles, thereby making accountability and scrutiny more difficult. The International Committee of the Red Cross has warned that, when algorithmic systems provide input for analysis, targeting, or operational planning, it is hard to assign responsibility for any errors. Even with humans “in the loop,” the black-box nature of machine learning limits transparency and complicates legal review. It is not just a theoretical problem; it has been seen in practice. In the early US campaign against Iran, an AI-assisted missile struck a girls’ school near an IRGC compound, killing 120 children, likely due to a classification error. Anthropic’s CEO’s admission of limited awareness over Claude’s use in the strike highlights a broader issue. AI developers are fully aware of the risks associated with delegating autonomous functions to AI, yet they continue to promote its adoption. As AI assumes greater decision-making roles, concerns over misidentification and the possibility of AI acting against human directives are often overshadowed by narratives emphasizing its benefits.

For Pakistan, these developments are neither distant nor theoretical. In a region where crises can escalate quickly, AI-enabled decision support offers advantages but also carries risks. It improves situational awareness and accelerates analysis but compresses decision time, limits verification, and heightens the risk of miscalculation. Considering both, Pakistan is accelerating efforts to build AI capacity and strengthen its supporting infrastructure. At the policy level, this translates to a recognition that successful adoption is not just about adopting algorithms but about enhancing data governance, institutional maturity, and a skilled workforce capable of embedding AI into decision-making processes. Thus, Pakistan’s approach remains focused on leveraging AI to bolster human judgment in intelligence fusion, surveillance, logistics, and cyber defense.

There is a clear lesson from the academic literature and initial operational experience: algorithmic systems are transforming military information processing. However, as their role in decision-making grows, they also entail bias, error propagation, lack of transparency, and overreliance on machine-generated recommendations. AI, therefore, must be used as a support system, with humans retaining final decision-making responsibility. This requires investment in training, auditability, and institutional safeguards to ensure that human decision-makers are meaningfully engaged, rather than merely present in form. The future of warfare will likely be defined not by machines acting alone, but by humans making increasingly time-pressured decisions shaped by machine-generated insights. The central strategic challenge is not whether to adopt algorithmic tools, but how to ensure that their speed never outpaces sound judgment.

It seems “Love Island USA” producers pulled one bombshell aside for a chat, one that has led to her firing from the hit reality dating series.

Contestant Alannah Keyser’s time in Fiji has officially come to an end as she faces backlash for apparently using a racial slur in a video and social media comments that recently resurfaced on social media. “Love Island USA” streamer Peacock confirmed to The Times on Friday that Keyser, a film student at USC from Miami, will no longer appear on the series. She is the second contestant Peacock dismissed this season over a racial slur scandal.

Keyser made her “Love Island USA” debut last week as one of the six women hopeful to strike up a connection with the male contestants in Casa Amor, testing the men’s relationship with their partners back in the villa. Keyser appeared to pair up with contestant Zach Georgiou. In her debut episode, she informed Georgiou she had a brief romance with his older brother Charlie, a previous “Love Island USA” contestant.

“Love Island USA” parted ways with contestant Alannah Keyser after she used a racial slur in social media comments and posts.

(Ben Symons / Peacock)

She faced allegations of racism amid her first “Love Island USA” episode when a social media user surfaced screenshots of Keyser allegedly using the N-word on Snapchat and Instagram. A user on X (formerly Twitter) also published video of Keyser seemingly saying the slur as she sings along to Roddy Ricch’s “The Box” at a party. Some viewers — and other contestants on the series — also observed that Keyser interacted less with the Black men on the series in her debut episode.

A source familiar with “Love Island USA” production said the controversial video and posts only became public on social media after Keyser’s first episode and that the posts were not viewable during the series’ vetting process. Peacock confirmed Kesyer’s firing hours after the U.S. Sun reported her exit and minimized screen time. “Producers were disappointed and embarrassed that this has become another mishap,” a source told the outlet.

Keyser did not immediately respond to a request for comment via social media.

Keyser is the fourth “Love Island USA” contestant in two years to face scrutiny for her past use of racial slurs. Earlier this month, Peacock pulled beauty technician Vasana Montgomery from its Season 8 lineup before the season started. Last year, contestant Cierra Ortega prematurely left the villa as she faced criticism for her past social media posts that included a slur for Chinese (and, more generally, Asian) people. A month before that, contestant Yulissa Escobar was dismissed by the season’s second episode amid social media outcry over her use of the N-word.

Those three contestants have since publicly apologized for their posts.

The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz has restored the flow of oil and natural gas after more than 100 days of disruption, but the crisis has already left a lasting mark on global energy markets. The prolonged closure exposed the vulnerability of the world’s energy supply chain and has prompted governments to reconsider how they secure fuel supplies.

Analysts say the crisis mirrors the impact of the 1973 Arab oil embargo, which transformed global energy policy by encouraging conservation, diversification, and strategic stockpiling. While today’s energy system proved more resilient, the Hormuz disruption may accelerate a broader shift away from fossil fuels.

What Happened?

The Strait of Hormuz, through which nearly 20 percent of global oil and liquefied natural gas supplies normally pass, remained effectively closed for more than three months during the US Israeli conflict with Iran.

Despite the disruption, global markets avoided a severe supply crisis through rapid rerouting of cargoes, the release of strategic reserves, reduced Chinese imports, and shifting demand patterns.

However, analysts say these emergency measures were only temporary. Energy inventories fell sharply during the crisis, and markets were approaching a critical point before shipping resumed.

Why the Crisis Matters

The Hormuz disruption demonstrated that even today’s highly interconnected global energy system remains vulnerable to geopolitical conflict.

Unlike previous crises, the world avoided a complete energy collapse because governments, traders, and shipping companies quickly adapted. Nevertheless, the episode exposed the limits of those emergency responses and reinforced concerns about overreliance on a single strategic chokepoint.

The crisis is expected to influence long term energy investment decisions far beyond the Middle East.

Lessons From the 1973 Oil Embargo

The 1973 Arab oil embargo fundamentally changed global energy policy after oil producing nations restricted exports to countries supporting Israel during the Yom Kippur War.

The embargo caused oil prices to surge, triggering inflation and prompting governments to adopt fuel efficiency standards, develop domestic oil production, establish strategic petroleum reserves, and create the International Energy Agency.

Rather than ending fossil fuel use, the crisis encouraged countries to consume energy more efficiently while reducing dependence on imported oil.

A New Energy Strategy Emerges

The Hormuz crisis appears to be driving another major strategic shift, particularly across Asia.

Countries heavily dependent on Middle Eastern oil and gas are increasingly prioritizing energy security over low fuel costs. Governments are expected to expand strategic petroleum reserves while accelerating investment in domestic renewable energy, nuclear power, and alternative fuel sources.

India, Pakistan, Japan, and South Korea are among the countries reviewing long term strategies aimed at reducing exposure to overseas energy disruptions.

Europe Continues Its Energy Transition

Europe entered the Hormuz crisis after already reshaping its energy system following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

The loss of Russian energy supplies forced European countries to cut gas consumption, diversify imports, and rapidly expand renewable energy capacity.

The latest Middle East disruption is expected to reinforce that trend by encouraging further investment in clean energy and energy efficiency while reducing dependence on imported fossil fuels.

Investment Trends Support the Shift

Global investment patterns already suggest that energy markets are evolving.

According to the International Energy Agency, worldwide energy investment is projected to reach 3.4 trillion dollars this year, with much of the growth directed toward renewable energy, electricity infrastructure, battery storage, and grid resilience rather than new oil production.

Electric vehicle sales continue to rise rapidly across Europe, Latin America, and Asia Pacific, while Chinese solar panel exports have surged across Africa and Southeast Asia.

Governments are also increasing spending on energy efficiency, with around 20 countries introducing new conservation measures directly in response to the Hormuz crisis.

Why It Matters

The Hormuz crisis has reinforced that energy security is becoming just as important as energy affordability.

Rather than relying solely on global oil markets, governments are increasingly pursuing diversified energy systems that combine fossil fuels with renewables, nuclear power, strategic reserves, and domestic production.

This transition is expected to influence investment, industrial policy, and international trade for years to come.

Future Outlook

Oil and natural gas are expected to remain central to the global economy for decades, particularly in transportation, manufacturing, aviation, and power generation.

However, future growth in fossil fuel demand may become significantly slower as governments invest more heavily in renewable energy, electric vehicles, battery storage, and efficiency improvements.

The Hormuz crisis may ultimately be remembered not as the event that ended the oil era, but as the moment many countries accelerated preparations for a more diversified energy future.

Implications

The Hormuz crisis is likely to have consequences that extend far beyond the immediate recovery in oil and gas flows. Governments that experienced supply disruptions are expected to place greater emphasis on energy security, even if it comes at a higher economic cost. This could accelerate the expansion of strategic petroleum reserves, diversify import sources, and increase investment in domestic energy production, including renewables, nuclear power, and critical energy infrastructure.

For oil exporters in the Gulf, the crisis may strengthen the case for developing alternative export routes that bypass the Strait of Hormuz, reducing dependence on a single maritime chokepoint. Import dependent economies, particularly across Asia, are also likely to rethink long term procurement strategies by securing more flexible supply contracts and expanding storage capacity.

Financial markets are also expected to assign a higher geopolitical risk premium to energy prices. Even after shipping has resumed, investors may continue to price in the possibility of future disruptions, increasing volatility across oil, gas, shipping, and insurance markets. The crisis could also accelerate capital flows into technologies that reduce dependence on imported fossil fuels, including electric vehicles, battery storage, hydrogen, and energy efficiency.

Analysis

The Hormuz crisis may ultimately prove more significant for what it revealed than for the physical disruption it caused. Although global energy markets demonstrated remarkable resilience, that resilience depended on temporary measures such as drawing down inventories, rerouting cargoes, reducing consumption, and relying on spare production capacity. These mechanisms bought time rather than solving the underlying vulnerability of the global energy system.

Unlike the 1973 Arab oil embargo, which primarily forced consuming nations to improve efficiency while expanding fossil fuel production elsewhere, today’s crisis occurred at a time when commercially competitive alternatives to oil and gas already exist. Renewable energy, electric vehicles, battery storage, and advanced power grids have matured into viable strategic assets rather than purely environmental investments. As a result, governments are increasingly viewing clean energy not only as a climate policy but also as a national security priority.

Another important distinction is the shift in investment behavior. Historically, supply disruptions often encouraged greater investment in oil exploration and production. Following the Hormuz crisis, however, a growing share of capital is moving toward energy diversification instead of simply increasing fossil fuel output. This suggests policymakers increasingly see reducing oil dependence as a more sustainable way to improve resilience than expanding strategic reserves alone.

The crisis also exposed a structural imbalance in global energy markets. While production remains concentrated in politically sensitive regions, demand growth is increasingly centered in Asia, leaving major importers highly exposed to geopolitical instability. Countries such as India, Pakistan, Japan, and South Korea may therefore pursue parallel strategies of securing diversified hydrocarbon supplies while rapidly expanding domestic renewable generation, nuclear power, and energy storage.

Perhaps the most important takeaway is that energy security has overtaken cost as the dominant driver of policy decisions. For decades, governments largely optimized their energy systems for affordability and efficiency. The Hormuz disruption demonstrated that the cheapest energy source can quickly become the most expensive if geopolitical events interrupt supply. That realization is likely to reshape government policy, corporate investment, and global energy trade for years to come.

The crisis does not signal the immediate end of the oil era. Oil and natural gas will remain indispensable for transportation, petrochemicals, aviation, heavy industry, and electricity generation in many regions. However, it may represent an inflection point where the trajectory of fossil fuel demand begins to flatten as countries systematically reduce their strategic dependence on imported hydrocarbons. In that sense, the Hormuz crisis could be remembered less as an energy supply shock and more as the catalyst that accelerated the next phase of the global energy transition.

With information from Reuters.

The disruption caused by the Iran war and the temporary closure of the Strait of Hormuz has prompted countries around the world to reconsider their energy security strategies. Governments that suffered economic damage from supply shortages and soaring prices are now looking to build larger strategic oil and gas reserves, potentially creating demand for hundreds of millions of additional barrels over the coming years.

Hormuz Crisis Exposed Energy Vulnerabilities

The near-total closure of the Strait of Hormuz disrupted around one-fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas supplies for more than three months, sending shockwaves through energy markets.

Brent crude prices surged to nearly $120 a barrel as import-dependent economies faced rising fuel costs, supply uncertainty and growing inflationary pressures.

Emergency Reserves Helped Stabilize Markets

One of the key factors preventing a deeper energy crisis was the release of strategic petroleum reserves.

All 32 members of the International Energy Agency agreed to a record release of 400 million barrels from emergency stockpiles, helping offset supply disruptions and ease pressure on global markets.

The coordinated action highlighted the importance of maintaining large emergency reserves during major geopolitical crises.

China’s Stockpile Strategy Pays Off

China emerged from the crisis in a stronger position than many other major importers due to its massive strategic petroleum reserve.

The country has spent years building what is believed to be the world’s largest emergency oil stockpile, estimated at more than one billion barrels.

During the conflict, China significantly reduced crude imports, allowing it to avoid buying large volumes of oil at elevated prices and limiting the economic impact of the disruption.

Import-Dependent Economies Face Greater Pressure

Countries with limited strategic reserves faced much greater challenges.

Several Asian economies relied on emergency measures such as:

• Fuel subsidies
• Consumption restrictions
• Reduced working hours
• Energy-saving programs

The experience exposed vulnerabilities among countries heavily dependent on Middle Eastern energy supplies without substantial emergency stockpiles.

India Eyes Larger Strategic Reserves

India is among the countries most likely to expand its emergency storage capacity.

As the world’s third-largest oil importer and one of the fastest-growing energy consumers, India currently holds reserves covering only a small fraction of its import needs.

Meeting International Energy Agency standards would require hundreds of millions of additional barrels of storage capacity.

Recent plans under consideration suggest New Delhi is moving toward expanding its strategic petroleum reserve network.

Pakistan Also Reviewing Energy Security

Pakistan, which relied heavily on Middle Eastern oil and LNG imports before the conflict, is also examining ways to increase domestic storage capacity.

The Hormuz disruption underscored the risks facing countries that lack sufficient reserves to absorb prolonged supply interruptions.

Australia Moves to Address Reserve Gap

Australia, long criticized for failing to meet International Energy Agency stockpile requirements, has announced plans to significantly increase fuel reserves.

The move reflects a broader recognition that energy security has become a national security issue amid growing geopolitical uncertainty.

Europe Considers Additional Gas Storage

Europe already maintains extensive gas storage infrastructure to manage winter demand.

However, the war has renewed concerns about dependence on imported LNG, particularly as the region increasingly relies on overseas suppliers.

Additional government-controlled gas storage facilities may become part of future energy security planning.

Gulf Producers Seek Overseas Storage

The lessons of the Hormuz disruption are also influencing major energy exporters.

National oil companies in the Gulf are exploring opportunities to expand storage capacity outside the region to maintain export flexibility during future crises.

Additional overseas storage could help producers continue serving customers even if regional shipping routes face disruptions.

Oil Market Impact

The expansion of strategic reserves worldwide could create substantial new demand for crude oil and refined products.

At the same time, emergency reserves that were depleted during the conflict will need to be replenished.

Together, reserve rebuilding and new storage programs could generate demand for roughly one billion barrels over the coming years, providing support for global oil prices even if overall supply growth remains strong.

What It Means for Global Energy Security

The Hormuz crisis has reinforced a lesson many governments learned during previous energy shocks: supply security can be just as important as supply availability.

Countries are increasingly viewing strategic reserves not as emergency assets to be used rarely, but as a core component of economic and national security planning. The crisis has also demonstrated how large stockpiles can provide governments with flexibility to reduce imports during periods of market stress and extreme prices.

Analysis

The most significant consequence of the Iran war may not be the temporary spike in oil prices but the long-term shift in how countries manage energy security. The conflict exposed a clear divide between nations with large strategic reserves and those forced to absorb the full impact of supply disruptions. China emerged as a model for energy resilience, while countries such as India and Pakistan were reminded of their vulnerability to geopolitical shocks.

If governments follow through on plans to expand storage capacity, the global oil market could gain a major new source of structural demand. Reserve construction and replenishment may help absorb future supply surpluses and provide a floor for prices, particularly during periods of weak economic growth.

At the same time, larger strategic stockpiles could make future oil shocks less severe. Countries with substantial reserves are better positioned to reduce imports during crises, dampening demand spikes and limiting extreme price volatility. In the longer term, the world could emerge from the Hormuz crisis with a more resilient energy system, but one in which strategic stockpiles play a much larger role in shaping oil demand, trade flows and government policy.

With information from Reuters.

U.S. President Donald Trump has said he is exploring ways to ensure Americans benefit directly from the rapid growth of artificial intelligence, raising the possibility of the government acquiring stakes in leading AI companies. The idea comes as firms such as OpenAI and Anthropic pursue valuations that could make them among the most valuable companies in the world, fueling debate over whether the public should share in the wealth generated by AI technologies.

Why the Idea Is Gaining Attention

The AI boom is expected to create enormous wealth for technology companies, investors and founders. Policymakers and advocates argue that because AI development relies heavily on public infrastructure, government research and vast amounts of publicly generated data, ordinary citizens should receive some of the financial benefits.

The debate has intensified as major AI developers seek billions of dollars to build data centers, chip infrastructure and advanced computing systems.

Option One: Taxing AI Companies Through Equity

One proposal would require AI companies to pay part of their taxes in shares rather than cash.

Under this approach, the government would gradually accumulate ownership stakes in AI firms without directly investing taxpayer money. Supporters argue that it would allow the public to benefit from future growth while avoiding large government expenditures.

Some advocates have gone further, proposing substantial government ownership stakes and board representation to give the public a direct voice in how AI companies operate.

Option Two: Equity in Exchange for Government Support

Another model would involve the government receiving equity stakes in return for financial assistance or incentives.

This approach mirrors previous arrangements in strategic industries where federal funding was provided in exchange for ownership interests. Given the enormous capital requirements of AI infrastructure, government funding could potentially become a source of financing for companies building advanced computing facilities, semiconductor plants and other critical projects.

Supporters argue this would allow taxpayers to benefit if publicly supported companies become highly profitable.

Critics contend that such arrangements could blur the line between regulation and investment, potentially creating conflicts between public policy goals and financial interests.

Option Three: Public Wealth Funds and Citizen Dividends

A third proposal focuses less on government ownership and more on distributing AI-generated wealth directly to citizens.

Under this model, revenue generated through AI-related taxes or investments would flow into a public wealth fund, which would then distribute dividends to Americans.

The concept resembles Alaska’s Permanent Fund, which uses energy revenues to provide annual payments to residents. Advocates argue a similar system could ensure that AI-driven economic gains are shared more broadly across society rather than concentrated among a small number of technology firms and investors.

Some AI companies have expressed interest in versions of this idea, including proposals for digital dividends funded by taxes on the sector.

Why AI Companies Matter

The debate carries major financial implications because leading AI developers are becoming increasingly valuable.

OpenAI and Anthropic have both reportedly taken steps toward potential public listings, while companies across the sector are raising unprecedented sums to fund AI expansion. Some analysts believe the industry could generate trillions of dollars in economic value over the coming decade.

As a result, even relatively small government stakes could potentially produce significant long-term returns.

Challenges and Obstacles

Any effort to give the government ownership in AI companies would face significant legal, political and economic hurdles.

Questions remain over:

• How ownership stakes would be valued
• Whether companies would voluntarily participate
• The impact on private investment
• Potential conflicts of interest for regulators
• How revenues would be distributed to citizens

There is also likely to be strong opposition from free-market advocates who argue that government ownership could discourage innovation and distort competition.

What Happens Next

Trump has not outlined a specific mechanism for acquiring stakes in AI companies, and no formal proposal has been introduced.

However, the discussion highlights a growing debate over who should benefit from the AI revolution and whether existing economic structures are sufficient to distribute the gains from one of the most transformative technologies in modern history.

Analysis

The significance of Trump’s proposal lies less in whether the government ultimately acquires stakes in AI firms and more in what it signals about the future political debate surrounding artificial intelligence. As AI companies approach trillion-dollar valuations, pressure is likely to grow for policymakers to ensure that the economic gains extend beyond investors and technology executives.

The discussion mirrors earlier debates over natural resources, where governments sought ways to ensure that public assets generated public benefits. In this case, supporters argue that AI is built on public research, public infrastructure and publicly generated data, creating a rationale for broader wealth sharing.

At the same time, the proposal raises fundamental questions about the relationship between government and the private sector. Direct ownership stakes could provide taxpayers with financial upside, but they could also create tensions between the government’s role as regulator and its role as investor.

The debate is likely to become more prominent as AI companies grow larger, seek additional funding and exert greater influence over economic growth, employment and national competitiveness. Whether through equity ownership, taxation or public wealth funds, the central political question is increasingly becoming not whether AI will generate enormous wealth, but who will ultimately receive it.

With information from Reuters.

The Chinese strategy employs research and intelligence institutions working to foster closer ties between Iranian national security institutions and the Egyptian military, aiming to undermine the American presence in the Middle East. Prominent among these institutions are the Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University, the China Institute of International Studies, and the Center for West Asian and African Studies. These Chinese research centers, which shape China’s relations with countries in the region and the Gulf, include the Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University (SISU), which directs studies related to security and defense issues and facilitates direct dialogue between think tanks in Iran and research centers in Egypt. Another example is the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), which reports directly to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and works to engineer diplomatic plans that align Egypt’s strategic interests with the objectives of Tehran and resistance movements in the region. Chinese think tanks and intelligence agencies also rely on a number of People’s Liberation Army-backed space intelligence companies, such as MizarVision and EarthEye. These Chinese companies have provided high-resolution satellite imagery and intelligence data to support operations targeting US bases in the Gulf and the Middle East. These Chinese entities coordinate and plan operations through various mechanisms and initiatives officially launched by China, most notably the Global Security Initiative (GSI). Beijing also uses forums, such as the China-Arab Cooperation Forum, to pressure Middle Eastern and Gulf countries to withdraw foreign forces and end US hegemony in the Gulf and the Middle East. This is framed as ending direct interference in the internal affairs of countries in the region. Beijing is also seeking to establish permanent overseas bases, most prominently the Djibouti naval base in East Africa, to support its regional alliances and ensure the continuity of global supply lines for Chinese interests and investments within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative.

The relationship between Chinese military and intelligence think tanks and the Egyptian army is highlighted by their shared goal of countering American hegemony and expelling US military bases from the Gulf and the Middle East. China is strengthening its strategic cooperation with the Egyptian army as part of the Djibouti-UAE-Egypt axis, with Beijing relying on Cairo as a key launching pad to secure maritime navigation and reduce American military influence. Beijing is utilizing its strategic institutions and think tanks to provide technological and logistical support to the Egyptian army, aiming to create a regional power capable of maintaining strategic balance in the region against American hegemony and interventions. This escalating security and strategic relationship between the Egyptian and Chinese armies rests on several key pillars, most notably intelligence and military partnership. China aims to train the Egyptian military elite through Egyptian military academies and coordinate threat assessments and mutual monitoring of the military movements of the United States and its allies in the Gulf and the wider region. With the implementation of several joint exercises between the two sides, the Chinese vision crystallized in the (Civilization Eagles maneuvers), which brought together the air forces of China and Egypt. This paves the way for the transfer of military technology and the integration of Chinese systems with Egyptian defenses independent of the West, along with the localization of Chinese military industries in the heart of Cairo. China is negotiating with the Egyptian Ministry of Defense to develop local manufacturing capabilities and transfer defense technology. There are also reports of integrating Chinese systems into Egyptian systems to reduce Egypt’s dependence on American-supplied weaponry. Beijing seeks to create a counterweight to American hegemony in the Middle East and the Gulf. China sees Egypt’s refusal to host any American military bases as a cornerstone of its strategy, relying on the Egyptian and Emirati armies to guarantee regional security as an alternative to the traditional American presence in the Gulf and the Middle East.

Chinese research, military, and intelligence think tanks are working to engineer an asymmetric strategic partnership to end American hegemony in the Middle East and the Gulf. Chinese think tanks, military research centers, and intelligence agencies are operating according to a clear strategic vision aimed at building asymmetrical partnerships in the Middle East and the Arabian Gulf to reduce American influence and establish a multipolar world order. Beijing provides Tehran with technical and intelligence support to deter Washington, while simultaneously seeking to strengthen military cooperation with Egypt as a pivotal regional power. This strategy aims to diminish American influence and secure China’s vital economic interests. The Chinese strategy in the region rests on several pillars, most notably its strategy toward Iran and its technical and intelligence support for the country. China has secretly supplied Iran with advanced satellite technology from its BeiDou satellite system, bypassing Western and American GPS systems, as well as sophisticated air defense systems. This has significantly enhanced the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s ability to monitor and target American military bases in the region and the Gulf.

The objectives of Chinese think tanks, political, strategic, military, and intelligence research centers become apparent here, as they attempt to plan a path to link Iran to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and transform Iranian military pressure into a tool for destabilizing the US bases deployed in the region and the Gulf. The convergence between China and the Egyptian military is highlighted through the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries. Beijing is inclined to strengthen military cooperation with Egypt, capitalizing on its political stability and its geographic location controlling vital maritime trade routes, and to transfer advanced Chinese military technology to Egypt. Beijing has revealed its desire to be a major supplier of equipment to the Egyptian army, such as the J-10 aircraft. This aims to increase Egypt’s strategic maneuvering room and reduce the dominance of Western weaponry.

The stability achieved by the Egyptian leadership is a fundamental pillar supporting the comprehensive strategic partnership, as Beijing seeks to secure its economic and military interests with a stable and influential regional power. Therefore, China is investing in the Belt and Road Initiative, for which the Suez Canal is a vital artery in the Middle East. Cooperation extends to the exchange and transfer of military technology, joint military manufacturing, advanced air defense systems, and the evaluation of potential acquisitions of modern Chinese fighter jets. Furthermore, joint air exercises have been conducted, with the Egyptian Armed Forces carrying out their first-ever joint air exercise, dubbed Eagles of Civilization with China, involving multi-role fighter aircraft from both countries, underscoring the deepening defense partnership between them.

In this context, China relies on the Egyptian military within the framework of its strategic and African axis to counter American influence. For China, Egypt represents its strategic gateway to the African continent and a cornerstone in its maneuvers against the US Africa Command (USAFRICOM). In addition to joint military exercises, China and Egypt have conducted joint air force drills, a clear indication of an unprecedented military rapprochement that has drawn close American scrutiny. With China’s move to transfer technology and arms deals to Cairo, it is positioning itself to support the Egyptian army with advanced air defense systems, such as the HQ-9B. This enhances Egypt’s air deterrence capabilities and forms part of strategic military deals aimed at reducing dependence on the United States and its Western allies. On the other hand, China relies on Iran as a deterrent and direct driver, exerting pressure on American bases in the region. Iran represents the spearhead of China’s brinkmanship policy against American military bases in the Gulf, Iraq, and Syria, with Tehran threatening to strike them should any regional conflict erupt. In conjunction with the economic and diplomatic alliance between Beijing and Tehran, China uses emerging alliances, such as the BRICS group and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), to establish Iran’s political foothold. It sometimes resorts to mediation policies as a tool to reduce the likelihood of a direct confrontation with Iran, which could harm its commercial interests, such as China’s sponsorship of Pakistani mediation efforts between Iran and the United States to stop the war against Iran and allow the Strait of Hormuz to be opened to global trade and navigation.

China’s major objectives in the Middle East lie in a strategy of attrition against the United States. China uses Iranian actions as a clever pressure tactic to test and deplete American military technology without direct involvement in wars of attrition, while simultaneously attempting to create a new regional order. Here, Chinese intelligence agencies coordinate networks of overlapping interests to push countries toward understandings that transcend the American security umbrella, paving the way for the future withdrawal of foreign military bases. The pillars of China’s strategy for alternative hegemony are based on asymmetric partnerships. Beijing focuses on presenting itself as a reliable economic and technological partner without political conditions or interference in internal affairs, unlike the American model based on conditionality and direct military alliances. With China’s emphasis on the economy as a gateway to security, it utilizes the Belt and Road Initiative and its massive investments in infrastructure and ports, such as the Khalifa Port in the UAE and the Port of Duqm in Oman, to solidify its strategic presence and transform economic dependence into long-term geopolitical influence. With Beijing’s use of security diplomacy and mediation, Chinese decision-making centers have adopted a common security approach and offered political mediation, such as sponsoring the Saudi-Iranian agreement, to solidify Beijing’s role as an international peacemaker and portray the United States as a destabilizing force through the militarization of the region. This is coupled with China’s technological and intelligence penetration of the region and the Gulf, where Chinese partnerships focus on transferring 5G technologies, artificial intelligence, and space cooperation with Gulf states. This grants Beijing intelligence-gathering capabilities and allows it to connect the region’s vital systems to the Chinese technological infrastructure. Chinese think tanks and intelligence agencies are planning to cautiously fill the void, as China avoids direct military confrontation with Washington in the region and prefers to capitalize on the Gulf states’ desire to diversify their partnerships and hedge against the gradual decline of American interest in the Middle East.

Accordingly, we analyze that China’s military strategy in the Middle East and Africa relies on building defense partnerships with diverse objectives. It utilizes the Egyptian army as a pivotal regional power to bolster its influence and counterbalance the American presence through advanced training cooperation while simultaneously leveraging its relationship with Iran to exert pressure on American bases, particularly in the Gulf, and secure its oil interests all within a comprehensive policy aimed at dismantling American hegemony in the region.

The 14-point Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Iran deserves cautious support, not celebration. Its most important promise is immediate and permanent cessation of military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon. That is a serious achievement if it holds. The reported US-Iran text also commits both sides to avoid threats or use of force and to respect sovereignty. But wars do not end because officials announce elegant clauses. They end when armies, proxies, navies, banks, inspectors and political leaders behave differently the next morning.

The reported Versailles signing, with President Macron nearby, gave the accord theatrical weight. The reported confirmation by Iran’s Foreign Ministry gave it visibility in Tehran. Yet the title “Islamabad” may be the most revealing symbol. It suggests that diplomacy around Iran is no longer owned by Washington and Europe alone. Pakistan, Qatar, Oman and Gulf states now matter. That is healthy. But symbolism cannot replace sequencing. A memorandum is useful only if it becomes a disciplined path toward a final settlement.

Hormuz is the pressure point

The Strait of Hormuz is the economic heart of this agreement. The International Energy Agency describes it as one of the world’s critical oil chokepoints, so restoring commercial shipping is a global necessity. The MOU’s promise of safe, toll-free passage for 60 days can calm markets, but it cannot settle maritime governance. Iran’s future talks with the Sultanate of Oman and other littoral states must produce rules on fees, inspections, de-mining, escorts and disputes. Without that, Hormuz remains a bargaining chip, not a secure passage.

The most controversial part is economic. Washington would provide waivers for Iranian oil exports, make frozen assets usable, avoid new sanctions during talks and support a reconstruction plan of at least $300 billion. This could be pragmatic statecraft or a strategic mistake. The OFAC Iran sanctions system affects banks, insurers, traders and shippers. Recent State Department sanctions show how aggressively Iranian petroleum networks had been targeted. Relief must therefore be sequenced with measurable action. If Tehran receives benefits before verification, critics will call it capitulation. If Washington delays relief after compliance, Tehran will call it bad faith.

Nuclear language cannot stay vague

Iran’s renewed pledge not to build nuclear weapons is necessary, but not enough. The decisive issue is the future of enriched material, enrichment activity and inspection access. Any final deal must put IAEA Iran monitoring at the centre. The IAEA’s NPT safeguards framework and the Non-Proliferation Treaty offer the right balance: Iran has civilian nuclear rights, but the world has a right to credible assurance that military pathways are closed. Down-blending enriched material under inspection may be a start. It cannot be the finish line.

Including Lebanon in the ceasefire is wise, but risky. The promise to protect sovereignty echoes the UN Charter. But Lebanon has long suffered from the gap between formal sovereignty and armed reality. If Hezbollah, Israel, Iran or any other actor treats Lebanon as a loophole, the ceasefire will collapse at its weakest seam. The final text must clarify what “all fronts” means, how non-state armed groups are restrained, and what happens if a party violates the ceasefire through an ally.

The final agreement must be public and enforceable

A binding UN Security Council resolution is essential, but it should not rubber-stamp ambiguity. The history of Resolution 2231, wider UN sanctions practice, IAEA reports to the Security Council, and the UN record on Iranian ballistic missiles shows why detail matters. The final agreement must define deadlines, verification triggers, consequences for breach and the exact sanctions schedule. The Guardian’s analysis and Iran International’s reporting underline the same reality: the MOU buys time, but time can be wasted.

The Islamabad MOU is not peace. It is a pause with possibilities. It should be supported because war has already proved disastrous, but it must be judged by performance: ceasefire maintained, Hormuz reopened, sanctions relief sequenced, nuclear material verified, Lebanon protected and the final deal anchored in law. Anything less would turn a promising memorandum into another diplomatic mirage.

Israel and Hezbollah agreed to a ceasefire in Lebanon after escalating violence threatened to derail potential peace talks regarding the ongoing war in Iran. This ceasefire was announced just before 4 p.m. Lebanon time, with a U. S. official confirming that negotiations, facilitated by the U. S. and Qatar with assistance from Iran, had led to this agreement. Both sides indicated they would uphold the ceasefire, with an Israeli official stating that Israel would remain in southern Lebanon but would not engage in conflict unless attacked.

The recent conflict included intense airstrikes that resulted in 18 deaths and injuries to 33 others in Lebanon. Four Israeli soldiers were also killed by Hezbollah. This violence could complicate U. S.-Iran negotiations, as establishing peace in Lebanon is key to a broader agreement. The recent memorandum signed by the presidents of the U. S. and Iran postponed discussions on critical issues like Iran’s nuclear program, granting parties 60 days to agree on a lasting solution or extend the current deal.

Technical talks were planned in Switzerland but were postponed, and officials from both the U. S. and Iran indicated that their respective negotiators would not be attending. Hezbollah lawmakers suggested that further discussions hinge on a complete ceasefire and urged the Lebanese government to reject any negotiations with Israel as long as hostilities continued.

The interim agreement seeks an end to military operations in various regions, including Lebanon, but Israel maintains that it is not a part of these deliberations. The fighting began when Hezbollah fired at Israel, prompting Israeli military responses, including strikes targeting Hezbollah’s positions.

Lebanon’s health ministry confirmed the heavy toll from recent airstrikes, and its President condemned Israel’s actions while emphasizing the commitment to achieve a comprehensive ceasefire. The broader conflict, which originated on February 28 with U. S. and Israeli attacks on Iran, has reportedly resulted in at least 7,000 deaths, primarily in Iran and Lebanon.

Despite the conflict’s impact on oil prices, which had risen due to concerns over regional stability, the signing of the interim deal resulted in a drop in prices as shipping through the Strait of Hormuz resumed. Under the terms of the agreement, Iran will receive economic relief and unfreezing of assets, with negotiators tasked with addressing the status of Iran’s nuclear program and establishing a reconstruction fund within the next 60 days.

In the face of criticism in the U. S., former President Trump defended the deal, arguing that the war had weakened Iran and affirming that the terms would lead to significant concessions from Iran without offering direct financial support.

With information from Reuters

China officially objected through its Foreign Ministry to the Japanese draft resolution to increase armaments and abandon Japan’s post-World War II commitment not to rearm its military, as approved by the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan during its general council meeting. The draft resolution proposed amending three key security documents, which are the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Medium-Range Defense Forces Enhancement Plan. It was to be submitted to the Japanese government and parliament for further discussion. Chinese authorities officially rejected and objected to the draft, deeming it a threat to their national security and their spheres of direct influence in Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Indo-Pacific region. They considered it a radical escalation of Japan’s security strategy, detrimental to Chinese national security and to the global security initiative proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Here, the revision of Japan’s three security documents, represented in the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Force Enhancement Plan, represents a strategic shift away from its post-war pacifist constitution toward more proactive and independent military policies. The nature of this shift is evident in Tokyo’s easing of restrictions on lethal weapons exports and its reorientation of its armament toward counter-offensive capabilities and missile development. Under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s administration, the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan has adopted a proactive approach, reshaping Japanese industries and institutions to address the greatest strategic challenge posed by China. The updated National Security Strategy has already fundamentally altered the country’s pacifist military doctrine by disarming the Japanese military and preventing its rearmament since World War II, a move that has drawn staunch opposition from China, which seeks to protect its own national security. The most significant amendments to the three Japanese security documents included Japan’s acknowledgment of its ability to double and enhance its counter-strike capabilities. This was achieved by allowing Japan to possess long-range missiles capable of striking enemy targets before launch. Simultaneously, Japanese authorities approved doubling defense spending, raising the military budget to 2% of GDP.

China objected to the Japanese draft resolution, which aimed to increase Japanese armament and militarize the region and global supply chains, and threatened to escalate the situation. Beijing strongly condemned these trends, describing them as new militarism. A key point of contention for China was what Chinese intelligence and military circles perceived as a warning of Japanese and foreign interference in Taiwanese affairs, as China considers Taiwan an integral part of its territory. Beijing condemned the Japanese leadership’s statement that any emergency in Taiwan is an emergency for Japan, describing a potential Chinese military intervention in Taiwan as an act of aggression. Here, Beijing rejects Japan’s new military approach, characterized by advanced military deployment. China has officially protested and taken countermeasures against Japan’s plans to deploy defensive missiles on Yonaguni Island, located only about 110 kilometers from Taiwan. China has strongly accused Japan of violating its commitments, arguing that this new Japanese military expansion violates Tokyo’s international obligations and its pacifist constitution. China has warned Japan that it will pay a heavy price if it intervenes militarily in the Taiwan Strait.

Chinese intelligence, military, security, and defense circles link Japan’s armament activities in Taiwan to American interference in Chinese affairs through its network of allies in the Asian region, such as Japan, given its close alliance with Washington. Here, Japan defends its military rearmament against China, with several of its officials sending political and security warnings to China. They argue that, given the uncertainty in Japan stemming from US policies and the fluctuating stance in Washington, Japan seeks to bolster its own capabilities and build regional alliances (with the Philippines, Australia, and NATO) to expand deterrence against Beijing and maintain regional security from a Japanese perspective. Strategic circles in Tokyo view the potential fall of Taiwan to China as a direct and existential threat to Japanese national security and vital shipping lanes, making the protection of the Taiwan Strait a fundamental component of Japan’s updated defense doctrine.

For these reasons, China’s decisive response was seen as a challenge to its national security, especially given Japan’s de facto official classification of Beijing as the greatest and most unprecedented strategic challenge to its security. This classification was further reinforced by Japanese authorities’ approval of developing military production, strengthening domestic defense industries, and easing restrictions on arms exports. This is where the dimensions of China’s official rejection and objection lie, as it is considered a violation of the pacifist principle enshrined in the Japanese military doctrine, which was internationally and regionally agreed upon after World War II for Japan’s disarmament. Beijing believes that Tokyo is abandoning its pacifist constitution and returning to a militaristic path, while Japan exaggerates the narrative of a China threat. Beijing accuses Japan of fabricating flimsy pretexts to justify its military expansion and arsenal, which threatens China’s regional security. Therefore, China warned that these Japanese steps to increase armament undermine peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and jeopardize the principles of China’s global security initiative. China also registered its objection to Japan’s exclusionary approaches to its initiative based on shared and sustainable security. Furthermore, China linked this Japanese escalation in its confrontation with China in the region to the sensitive issue of Taiwan and the close alliance between the United States and Japan, while categorically rejecting Japanese interference in Taiwan’s affairs and considering the island’s security an integral part of China’s national security.

Iran’s government has portrayed the interim agreement with the United States as a victory that ended months of conflict and prevented further escalation. The deal halted a war that saw U.S. and Israeli airstrikes, disruptions to trade, and severe economic damage across Iran.

However, interviews with ordinary Iranians reveal a starkly different picture. Many citizens say years of sanctions, combined with the recent conflict, have left them struggling with rising prices, declining living standards, and deep uncertainty about the future. While the fighting may have stopped for now, many remain unconvinced that the agreement will bring meaningful economic relief or lasting stability.

Economic Hardship Continues to Dominate Daily Life

For many Iranians, the ceasefire has not changed the reality of daily economic struggles.

Business owners, students, and workers interviewed across the country described a population focused on survival rather than recovery. Many reported cutting household spending, reducing social activities, and adjusting to higher living costs. Small businesses continue to face weak consumer demand, while young people increasingly worry about their economic prospects.

The war added another layer of pressure to an economy already weakened by years of international sanctions, inflation, and limited foreign investment. As a result, many citizens see little immediate prospect of improvement even if the ceasefire holds.

Divided Views on the Outcome of the Conflict

The agreement has exposed a clear divide between the government’s narrative and public sentiment.

Supporters of the Islamic Republic view the deal as proof that Iran resisted external pressure and preserved its political system. Some hardliners argue that the country emerged stronger and demonstrated resilience despite military and economic pressure.

Many ordinary citizens, however, are less focused on geopolitical outcomes and more concerned about living standards. For them, the key measure of success is whether the agreement leads to lower prices, economic opportunities, and greater stability. So far, few appear convinced that such changes are imminent.

Concerns Grow Over Political Freedoms

Beyond economic concerns, many Iranians fear that the post war environment could lead to tighter political controls.

Some citizens believe the government may use the conflict and national security concerns to justify stronger oversight and restrictions. These fears are particularly pronounced in regions populated by ethnic minorities, where previous protests have often been met with heavy security responses.

There is also uncertainty about whether public frustration over economic conditions could trigger future demonstrations. While many people remain cautious after previous crackdowns, underlying grievances over jobs, inflation, and political freedoms remain unresolved.

The ceasefire may have reduced the immediate threat of war, but it has done little to address the deeper challenges facing Iran. Public opinion appears increasingly shaped by economic realities rather than political declarations of victory.

The government may benefit in the short term from ending the conflict and avoiding further military escalation. However, lasting stability will depend on whether authorities can deliver tangible economic improvements and restore public confidence.

The biggest challenge for Tehran is that expectations remain extremely low. Many Iranians do not see the ceasefire as a turning point but rather as a temporary pause in a broader cycle of economic hardship and political uncertainty. If future negotiations fail to produce sanctions relief, investment, and economic recovery, public frustration could continue to grow despite the end of active conflict.

Stakeholders

• Iranian government and political leadership
• Iranian citizens and businesses
• United States
• Israel
• Ethnic minority communities in Iran
• International investors and energy markets
• Regional governments monitoring stability in the Middle East

What’s Next

Attention will now shift to negotiations aimed at turning the interim agreement into a permanent settlement. Iranian leaders will seek economic benefits and sanctions relief, while Washington is expected to push for further commitments on security and nuclear issues.

Domestically, the government faces the challenge of managing economic expectations and maintaining stability. Whether the ceasefire translates into meaningful improvements for ordinary Iranians may ultimately determine how the agreement is judged inside the country.

With information from Reuters.

Beijing warmly welcomes the peace agreement and memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran, considering it an important step toward de-escalating regional tensions. China supports the diplomatic path to resolving the crisis, based on a clear strategy aimed at protecting its economic and strategic interests. Beijing emphasizes that a permanent ceasefire, the protection of national sovereignty, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, and ensuring the safety of international navigation are top priorities. China contributed behind the scenes to shaping the negotiating framework and influencing Tehran to accept the agreement with the United States in order to safeguard its vital interests in the continued flow of Iranian oil. Accordingly, China officially welcomed the memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran, affirming that the agreement represents a crucial step toward de-escalating regional tensions. The Chinese diplomatic welcome focused on the key provisions of the agreement, as stated by the spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry. These provisions guarantee a comprehensive ceasefire, freedom of navigation, energy security, an end to the naval blockade, and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to global trade and energy supplies. China considers this essential for its energy and economic security. This agreement, along with the nuclear framework and negotiations, marks the conclusion of the first phase, followed by a 30-60 day negotiation period to discuss the Iranian nuclear program (uranium enrichment and the lifting of sanctions). This Chinese announcement came in support of international mediation efforts ahead of the official signing ceremony in Geneva.

The most prominent points welcomed by China in the US-Iranian agreement, according to announcements and follow-up by Chinese diplomatic channels and as included in the key provisions of the memorandum of understanding, were a cessation of military operations; an immediate and permanent ceasefire on all fronts, including the Lebanese front; freedom of navigation through a commitment to end the naval blockade and open the Strait of Hormuz to global trade and energy supplies; and the nuclear framework, with the conclusion of a phase one agreement stipulating that negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program (uranium enrichment and sanctions relief) would take place within a specified timeframe of 30 to 60 days following the signing.

China has played a pivotal, often unacknowledged, role as a diplomatic bridge between Tehran and Washington to protect its strategic and economic interests in the Middle East. The dimensions of China’s behind-the-scenes role include ensuring the flow of energy. Beijing seeks to maintain stability in the Gulf region to guarantee the uninterrupted supply of Iranian oil and to protect its interests and investments in the Belt and Road Initiative. Iran represents a crucial geographical and strategic hub in China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. To this end, Beijing has sought to leverage its strong economic ties and strategic partnership with Tehran to persuade it to make flexible concessions during critical times, while offering support to avoid military escalation. Beijing fears that the collapse of diplomatic channels could lead to a regional war that would jeopardize its extensive investments in the region.

On the other hand, Beijing seeks to counterbalance American influence. China prefers a negotiated framework between Tehran and Washington that limits American unilateral hegemony and positions itself as a responsible international player capable of peacemaking. China’s vision for diplomatic balancing between Washington and Tehran is shaped by several key strategic axes, most importantly (establishing the principle of a political settlement). Here, Beijing consistently emphasizes that dialogue is the only solution to the Iranian crisis, rejecting military escalation that harms the security of navigation and global trade. This is coupled with regional and international networking, where China supports parallel diplomatic efforts, such as Pakistani mediation. Beijing maintains continuous communication with the parties to the crisis to ensure the opening of indirect negotiation channels that prevent a full-scale confrontation and safeguard vital interests. China has maintained the flow of Iranian oil while simultaneously strengthening its extensive economic partnerships with the Gulf states, granting it unique diplomatic weight and influence that Western powers lack. Despite this notable progress, Beijing faces ongoing challenges due to US containment policies. China rejects Washington’s classification of its major technology companies as military entities and threatens retaliatory measures, making Beijing’s attempts to create a strategic balance with the United States an extremely delicate and sensitive process.

Based on the preceding understanding and analysis, we can see how successful Beijing has been in transforming escalating tensions in the Middle East into strategic gains. China has played an active mediating role by supporting diplomatic talks and the memorandum of understanding for peace between Washington and Tehran, thus positioning itself as a responsible international power seeking to establish stability and move away from unilateral hegemony.