Tigray

Mekelle, Ethiopia- In Mekelle, shops are reopening, and banks are resuming services, but residents remain anxious about what comes next. Ethiopian federal forces and allied fighters retook the Tigray regional capital on October 4, as renewed fighting raised fears that the region’s fragile recovery could be derailed once again.

Tigray, in northern Ethiopia, is still recovering from the 2020–2022 war between federal forces and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the region’s dominant political movement. For residents, the return of fighting has brought new uncertainty over jobs, education, security and the future.

Daily life resumes, but hardship remains.

Businesses and financial services are gradually reopening in Mekelle, but many households are struggling to afford necessities. Delayed salaries have left public employees struggling to cover food, rent and school costs, while years of conflict have depleted family savings.

“Things may be reopening, but that does not mean our problems are over. We still have expenses every day, and without our salaries, it is difficult to know how we will manage,” said Gebregziabher, a public servant in Mekelle.

The funding crisis has affected the wider public sector. In March, Tigray’s interim administration said it could no longer cover monthly salaries for about 137,000 civil servants because expected federal budget transfers had not arrived. In April, the regional finance bureau reported an 8.5-billion-birr (about $52,000) funding shortfall affecting salary payments and development projects.

For many residents, the reopening of businesses offers only a partial return to normality. Without reliable incomes and greater security, everyday expenses remain difficult to manage.

Students fear losing more time

For students in Tigray, renewed fighting has revived fears of another interruption to their education. Many already lost valuable study time during the previous war and worry about falling further behind.

In Adigrat, Shewit, a grade 10 student, said uncertainty about classes and security had left him worried about his future.

“I have already lost so much time because of the war. I am afraid that if our education is disrupted again, I will lose another year and fall further behind,” he said.

Some university students have left Tigray for Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’s capital, to seek transfers to other public universities. The Ministry of Education announced temporary placements at universities elsewhere in the country for students enrolled at institutions in Tigray. More than 5,000 returning students had applied by September 17–18, according to reporting on the ministry’s programme.

Abel, a third-year student at Axum University, travelled to Addis Ababa to request a transfer.

“I didn’t want to leave, but I also can’t keep putting my education on hold. I came to Addis to see if I can transfer to another university and continue my studies. I just want to finish what I started,” he said.

For students who have already lost years to conflict, the uncertainty means more than interrupted classes. It threatens to delay graduation and make an already difficult path to employment even harder.

Border communities fear a wider conflict

Near the Eritrean border, military movements and conflicting accounts of troop deployments have heightened fears that the fighting could spread beyond Tigray.

On October 8, The Associated Press reported claims by a commander allied with Ethiopia’s government that Eritrean troops had entered Adigrat earlier that week and Idaga Hamus the following day. The AP said it could not independently verify those accounts. The conflict-monitoring organisation ACLED separately reported Eritrean troops crossing the border at Zalambessa.

On October 13, Reuters reported that Ethiopian government forces had advanced into Zalambessa, citing people in contact with residents and other sources. The report said it remained unclear whether Eritrean troops or Tigrayan opposition fighters were still present in the town. The differing accounts underscored the difficulty of establishing control of individual towns as the fighting shifted.

The developments have unfolded amid worsening relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara. On October 8, Ethiopia’s foreign minister, Gedion Timothewos, accused Eritrea of sending troops as far as 60km (37 miles) into Ethiopian territory in several areas of Tigray and appealed to the United Nations Security Council to respond.

Eritrea has denied invading Ethiopian territory. Its government said Ethiopia’s accusations amounted to a declaration of war and called on the Security Council to take action against Ethiopia. The competing claims have raised fears that renewed fighting in Tigray could lead to a direct confrontation between the two neighbours.

Ethiopia and Eritrea fought on the same side during the 2020–2022 Tigray war, when Eritrean forces supported the federal government against the TPLF. Their deteriorating relations have added a regional dimension to the renewed conflict.

In Zalambessa, residents are watching developments with concern. One resident, who declined to be named, said the uncertainty made it difficult to know what to expect in the coming weeks.

An uncertain road ahead

On October 16, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed announced a six-month caretaker administration for Tigray, tasked with restoring public services, helping displaced people return and preparing the region for elections. The announcement followed the federal forces’ takeover of Mekelle and other major towns.

The federal government says the temporary administration will help restore stability and pave the way for elected regional leadership. The TPLF has opposed the federal advance, and it remains uncertain how effectively the new administration will operate across the region.

For residents, the immediate concerns are whether salaries will be paid, schools and health facilities will function, and displaced families will be able to return safely.

In Zalambessa, Gebrehiwot said residents knew from experience what another conflict could bring.

“People are worried because we know what war means for this area. We have already suffered enough, and nobody wants to see things reach that point again,” he said.

Eritrea denies troop movement inside northern Ethiopia as US calls for de-escalation.

Ethiopian forces and allied fighters say they have expanded control across Tigray and entered the historic city of Aksum, as fighting in the northern region continues.

The pro-government militia, the Tigray Peace Force (TPF), also claimed on Thursday that troops from neighbouring Eritrea have retreated towards the border.

Solomon Hailemariam, spokesperson for the TPF, said Eritrean forces had sustained significant casualties during the fighting.

But Eritrea’s Information Minister Yemane Gebremeskel rejected the claims as false in comments to local media. The extent of the reported losses could not be independently verified.

The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), an independent conflict-monitoring organisation, documented Ethiopian government forces and TPF fighters entering Aksum, while rival Tigrayan fighters remained in surrounding mountainous areas.

ACLED also reported Eritrean troops withdrawing across the border through Zalambessa, following advances by Ethiopian forces and their allies into several strategic towns.

“Ethiopian troops are on one side, and Eritrean troops are on the other,” Selam, a resident of Zalambessa whose first name was changed for security reasons, told the AFP news agency on Thursday.

AFP reported that there is no fighting now, but the town has been without power or water for a week.

“We are caught in the middle and living in deep anxiety,” Salem told the news agency.

Trading accusations

ACLED also documented Ethiopian tanks and heavy weapons moving towards the Eritrean border on Tuesday, raising concerns about a possible confrontation between the neighbouring countries.

Addis Ababa has accused Eritrea, as well as Sudan and Egypt, of backing a rebel alliance of seven groups that is fighting the government of Abiy Ahmed.

Eritrea has denied accusations that its forces entered Tigray to support the armed opposition groups, accusing Ethiopia of threatening its sovereignty.

Eritrea, which fought alongside Ethiopia’s federal army in the 2020-2022 war, severed diplomatic ties with Ethiopia over the accusations earlier this month.

Khartoum and Cairo have also denied involvement in the conflict.

The TPF supports Ethiopia’s federal government in its campaign against the Tigrayan rebels linked to the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).

Ethiopian forces captured Tigray’s regional capital Mekelle earlier this month, and the TPLF confirmed that it had withdrawn from the city and moved its regional administration “temporarily” to another location. Government forces also retook the towns of Adwa and Adigrat from the TPLF without a fight. Further, there are reports of Ethiopian advances in the town of Rama, close to the border with Eritrea.

On Wednesday, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio called for de-escalation in a phone call with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy, following reports of the alleged confrontation between Ethiopian and Eritrean forces.

Rubio said the region could not tolerate more conflict, according to a statement from the US Department of State.

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia – As renewed fighting in Ethiopia’s Tigray region threatens to destabilise the Horn of Africa, public backing by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of Ethiopia’s federal government and Saudi Arabia’s record of regional diplomacy are drawing scrutiny.

Both Gulf powers have strategic interests in the Horn of Africa, but their roles differ. The UAE has publicly backed Ethiopia’s government while Saudi Arabia has previously helped broker an Ethiopia-Eritrea rapprochement and was reported to have offered to mediate between the two countries in 2025.

The renewed fighting threatens to unravel the November 2022 Pretoria peace agreement, which ended a war between Ethiopia’s federal government and Tigrayan forces. As tensions with Eritrea add to the risks of a wider confrontation, the positions of Abu Dhabi and Riyadh offer a window into the interests of external powers in the crisis.

The UAE: Clear alignment, unproven leverage

On September 25, the UAE condemned attacks by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and its allied armed groups against Ethiopian federal forces, the seizure of airports in Tigray and the escalation in the neighbouring regions of Afar and Amhara.

Sheikh Shakhboot bin Nahyan Al Nahyan, the UAE minister of state, expressed solidarity with Ethiopia’s government and people, reaffirmed support for the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and called for an end to hostilities, the protection of civilians and adherence to the Pretoria Agreement.

The statement made Abu Dhabi’s public position clear: It backs Ethiopia’s federal government while calling for de-escalation and dialogue. It did not establish whether the UAE was providing military assistance or had secured commitments from the parties to end the fighting.

The UAE also has commercial interests across the Horn of Africa. Dubai Ports World (DP World) operates Berbera port in Somaliland, and a shipping route launched in 2025 connects the port with Jebel Ali in the UAE, providing an additional corridor for cargo serving inland destinations, such as Ethiopia. Landlocked since Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Ethiopia relies heavily on Djibouti for access to international trade.

These commercial links help explain Abu Dhabi’s interest in regional stability and its relationship with Addis Ababa. However, they do not establish that the UAE can influence the TPLF, persuade Eritrea to de-escalate or change Ethiopia’s military calculations.

The extent to which Abu Dhabi can use its relationship with the federal government to encourage a political response to the conflict remains unclear.

Saudi Arabia: Diplomatic experience, uncertain engagement

Saudi Arabia has yet to publicly announce its position on the latest fighting in Tigray.

The kingdom has not publicly commented on the renewed war, according to an October 1 analysis by Critical Threats, although it undertook diplomatic efforts earlier this year to reduce tensions between Ethiopia’s federal government and the TPLF.

Saudi Arabia has previously sought to mediate between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In November 2025, Chatham House reported that sources said Riyadh had offered to mediate between the two countries amid rising tensions over maritime access and regional security.

A June 2026 analysis by Germany’s SWP think tank said previous Saudi mediation efforts had failed, partly because negotiations did not address Ethiopia’s interest in the Eritrean port of Assab.

The kingdom’s broader regional alignment also matters. An August 2026 analysis by the Soufan Center described Saudi Arabia and Egypt as backing Eritrea in opposition to Ethiopia’s ambitions for Red Sea access.

This is an assessment of regional alignment, however, not evidence that Saudi Arabia is directly providing military support to Eritrea or the TPLF in the current fighting.

Saudi Arabia has a strong interest in Red Sea security, a vital corridor for international shipping and its own oil exports. Whether Riyadh will take a more public diplomatic role as tensions escalate remains unclear.

Egypt’s rivalry with Ethiopia adds to regional tensions

Egypt’s role in the crisis is shaped by its longstanding dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and its growing ties with Eritrea.

Cairo has also stressed that responsibility for the governance and security of the Red Sea rests with countries bordering the waterway, a position shared by Asmara. The issue has added to regional tensions as Ethiopia seeks reliable access to the sea.

In September, Ethiopia’s army chief, Field Marshal Birhanu Jula, accused Egypt and Sudan of supporting armed groups fighting the federal government, including the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).

His remarks, reported by Al Jazeera on September 28, did not provide evidence substantiating the accusation. Egypt’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Nader Zaki, subsequently reaffirmed Cairo’s commitment to state sovereignty and non-interference, rejecting suggestions that it had departed from those principles.

He did not directly address the specific allegation of Egyptian support for the TPLF.

Egypt’s relationship with Eritrea has nevertheless become an important part of the regional picture. President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi met Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki in Cairo on June 8, 2026.

According to Egypt’s presidency, the talks covered bilateral cooperation, developments in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea security.

The two leaders also stressed the importance of coordination to maintain regional stability. The meeting highlighted closer cooperation between Cairo and Asmara, but did not establish that either country was involved in the renewed fighting in Tigray.

For Cairo, the dispute with Ethiopia extends beyond Tigray to the Nile and the balance of power in the Horn of Africa.

Its relations with Eritrea and its disagreements with Addis Ababa form part of the wider regional context, but they are not evidence of direct Egyptian involvement in the renewed conflict. Whether these regional relationships will affect the course of the fighting remains uncertain.

From Tigray to a wider regional crisis

The risks extend beyond Tigray. Ethiopia’s pursuit of maritime access has become a source of tension with Eritrea, whose Red Sea coastline includes the port of Assab. Addis Ababa argues that reliable access to the sea is a national priority while Asmara rejects any threat to its sovereignty.

Ethiopia has accused Eritrea of sending troops across the border and supporting armed groups. Eritrea denies the allegations and has called on the United Nations Security Council to intervene. The allegations remain contested, but deteriorating relations have raised the stakes of renewed fighting in northern Ethiopia.

A wider confrontation could put more civilians at risk, complicate humanitarian access and disrupt regional trade and security. It would also test whether external partners could encourage restraint without appearing to endorse either side’s military objectives.

The UAE’s close ties with Addis Ababa could provide a channel for diplomatic engagement while Saudi Arabia’s record of regional diplomacy offers a possible opening for renewed talks. However, the available public evidence does not establish that either country is currently leading an initiative to contain the crisis.

Influence must be measured by outcomes

The UAE and Saudi Arabia should not be cast as pursuing opposing strategies simply because one has publicly backed Ethiopia’s federal government while the other’s current position is less visible. Their interests and diplomatic approaches differ, but the evidence does not show that either has decisive influence over the fighting.

Their contribution should be assessed by whether they can help secure concrete steps towards de-escalation, renewed political dialogue and a reduction in tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Public statements, commercial interests and past diplomatic achievements may create opportunities for engagement, but they are not substitutes for progress on the ground.

The Pretoria Agreement remains the framework for a political settlement in Tigray, yet renewed fighting underscores the difficulty of sustaining peace while underlying disputes persist. A durable settlement will depend primarily on the parties themselves. External partners could contribute by encouraging restraint and supporting credible negotiations.

For now, the UAE’s public alignment with Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic record offer different potential channels for engagement. Whether either country can turn those relationships into a meaningful contribution towards de-escalation remains unresolved.

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia – After nearly two weeks of fierce fighting, Ethiopian federal forces entered the Tigrayan capital of Mekelle as forces from an alliance of rebel groups, including the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), withdrew from the city.

The fighting that erupted late last month has effectively ended the 2022 Pretoria ceasefire and the fragile peace that followed the devastating Tigray war.

But Mekelle’s capture may mark the end of conventional warfare rather than the end of the conflict. Fighting has continued elsewhere in Tigray, while reports of Eritrean troops entering northern Tigrayan towns have added a potentially more dangerous regional dimension.

Ethiopian federal forces used air power and ground forces to advance across Tigray. After suffering successive defeats around the towns of Alamata and Kobo, rebel forces withdrew into the surrounding countryside. They have pledged to continue fighting.

“We will confront the enemy on our terms and where we choose,” TPLF leader Debretsion Gebremichael said.

A war that may not be over

There are echoes of the war that began in 2020, when Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government declared victory after federal forces captured Mekelle. Tigrayan forces subsequently regrouped in the mountains, retook much of the region and recaptured the capital, prolonging the war for nearly a year and a half.

The renewed conflict could follow a similar trajectory, particularly if the TPLF and other armed groups succeed in turning the mountainous terrain into a prolonged armed rebellion. Ethiopia is already fighting insurgencies in Amhara and Oromia, raising the prospect of its federal forces being stretched across multiple fronts.

But the battlefield reversals suffered by the rebels could have implications well beyond Tigray. They have raised concern in Egypt and among other Ethiopian rivals, according to Hossamaldeen Ibrahim, an African analyst at the Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute.

“Egypt views the Renaissance Dam, and any Ethiopian [army] move towards the Red Sea, as a strategic threat, so it has allied with Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia against any Ethiopian unilateralism,” Ibrahim told Al Jazeera.

“Ethiopia is seeking a sea outlet; Eritrea sees this as an existential threat.”

Ethiopia’s Red Sea ambitions

Ethiopia has been landlocked since Eritrea won its war of independence in 1991, leaving Addis Ababa heavily dependent on neighbouring countries for access to international trade.

Abiy has increasingly made access to the Red Sea a strategic priority since 2023, raising concerns in Eritrea over Ethiopia’s ambitions, particularly over the port of Assab.

Ethiopia currently relies heavily on Djibouti for maritime trade, while also pursuing alternative arrangements, including through Kenya and Somaliland.

After being sworn in on Monday for another five-year term following his party’s victory in the June 1 election, Abiy again put the issue at the centre of his parliamentary address.

“Based on the principle of give and take, we will work diligently to ensure that Ethiopia has an outlet to the sea,” he told parliament.

The issue has increasingly become part of a wider regional contest.

A loose regional alignment

In recent months, Egypt, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia have found themselves sharing concerns over Ethiopia’s regional ambitions. On October 4, the leaders of the four countries met for a quadrilateral consultative summit in New Alamein, Egypt, where they discussed regional issues and pledged to strengthen political, economic and trade cooperation as well as consultation and coordination.

The meeting does not amount to a formal military alliance, and the four countries have different interests in their dealings with Addis Ababa. The summit’s joint declaration also called for respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, noninterference in internal affairs and the peaceful resolution of disputes.

But their concerns increasingly overlap around Ethiopia’s ambitions in the Red Sea, the Nile and the wider Horn of Africa.

Relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea have also deteriorated sharply since the Pretoria ceasefire. Ethiopia closed its embassy in Eritrea and expelled Eritrean diplomats on October 1, accusing Asmara of hostile acts and involvement in the renewed fighting. Eritrea responded by severing diplomatic ties, while denying that it supported the opposition alliance. Egypt and Sudan have also denied Ethiopian accusations that they are backing the alliance.

The Ethiopian army’s advance into Tigray has added another layer to that rivalry.

“The [Ethiopian army’s] advance in Tigray directly threatens [Eritrean President] Isaias [Afwerki] and the Eritrean state,” said Etana H Dinka, an assistant professor of African history at the University of Miami.

Eritrean forces fought alongside Ethiopian troops during the 2020–22 Tigray war, but relations between Abiy and Isaias have since deteriorated. Eritrean troops have reportedly been seen in towns in northern Tigray, adding a potentially significant new dimension to the conflict. The Associated Press news agency reported Eritrean troops entering Adigrat and Idaga Hamus after crossing into Ethiopia, while Eritrea has neither confirmed nor denied the troop movements.

Eritrea’s role could be decisive

For Eritrea, the location of the fighting matters as much as its outcome.

A prolonged conflict in Tigray could keep Ethiopian forces tied down and limit Addis Ababa’s ability to pursue its Red Sea ambitions. But a decisive Ethiopian victory could leave the federal government with greater freedom to turn its attention towards regional rivals.

“With reports that Eritrean troops are moving into Tigray, Eritrea seems keen on boosting TPLF forces withdrawing northwards, so that the engagement between Ethiopian and Eritrean soldiers takes place in Tigrayan territory, and not in Eritrea,” said Mohamed Kheir Omer, a researcher focused on the Horn of Africa.

That could create an incentive for Eritrea to support forces capable of keeping the Ethiopian army tied down, without necessarily entering a direct confrontation of its own.

Sudan adds another layer

Sudan’s war adds another dimension to the regional rivalry.

Egypt has provided political backing and logistical and technical support to Sudan’s army, according to the Reuters news agency, while the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have been accused of atrocities in Darfur.

Ethiopia has faced accusations of facilitating support for the RSF. A Reuters investigation reported in February that Ethiopia was hosting a camp in its western Benishangul-Gumuz region where thousands of fighters linked to the RSF were being trained. Reuters cited eight sources, including a senior Ethiopian government official, who said the United Arab Emirates financed the camp’s construction and provided military trainers and logistical support. The UAE denied the allegations, and Reuters said it could not independently verify the UAE’s role.

Those competing relationships are part of a broader contest over the Nile, Sudan, the Red Sea and access to trade routes.

For Egypt, its dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam remains a major strategic concern. For Eritrea, Ethiopia’s search for a Red Sea outlet is viewed through the lens of national security. For Sudan’s neighbours, the conflict threatens to reshape regional power balances.

Will Egypt, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia intervene?

The shared interests of Ethiopia’s regional rivals do not necessarily translate into direct intervention.

Egypt has its own calculations over the Nile and Sudan. Eritrea has a direct security interest in developments in Tigray. Somalia is dealing with its own security challenges and a complicated relationship with Addis Ababa. Sudan remains consumed by its devastating civil war.

At the same time, Ethiopia’s federal forces now face the possibility of fighting on several fronts.

The TPLF, Amhara Fano and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) have each sought to challenge the federal government in different parts of the country. If they can maintain pressure on the army while retreating from major population centres, the fall of Mekelle could prove to be only the first phase of a much longer conflict.

For Ethiopia’s rivals, the question is whether to exploit that vulnerability or avoid being drawn into another regional war.

The extent of any regional involvement may ultimately depend on whether the TPLF can keep federal forces tied down in Tigray, and away from the Eritrean border.

“It isn’t difficult to understand Cairo’s commitment to prevent Ethiopia from succeeding in the current warfare, whatever its army’s intended goals, including Abiy’s acclaimed access to the Red Sea, are,” University of Miami’s Dinka said.

The question now is whether those regional calculations will remain largely diplomatic or spill into the battlefield.