security

Authors: Dr Soumyodeep Deb & Aung Kyaw*

Myanmar’s president Min Aung Hlaing is currently on a 5-day state visit to India on the invitation of Indian prime minister Narendra Modi. This is his first foreign visit after the recent election where he was elected as the new president of Myanmar. However, the elections that brought him to power were not democratic in nature. Therefore, “Min Aung Hlaing is not Myanmar’s legitimate president,” as noted by Mercy Chriesty Barends, a member of the Indonesian Parliament and chairperson of the ASEAN Parliamentarian on Human Rights. He oversaw a campaign of widespread crimes against his own people after masterminding a bloody coup that toppled a democratically elected government. As a result, APHR has asked India to condemn Min Aung’s government as undemocratic and illegal. Thus, the question of why India, which claims to be the largest democracy in the world, is dealing with an undemocratic administration that is accused of violating its own citizens’ human rights emerges.

The idea of democracy and human right violation had been India’s central position during the 1988 military coup in Myanmar. The Indian government had cut ties with the then military junta. India’s idealistic position had sidetracked India-Myanmar relations and led China to occupy the strategic sphere in India’s immediate neighborhood. Chinese investment and trade with Myanmar grew exponentially with the junta purchasing military hardware worth $1 billion from Beijing in 1989 one of the largest weapons deals in Myanmar’s history. This had led China to exert its influence on Myanmar. For Beijing the geo-strategic location of Myanmar having access to the Indian Ocean was of strategic interest. Enhancement of Chinese influence in Myanmar had a security implication for India as China used Myanmar to train major northeastern Indian insurgent groups like NSCN, ULFA etc. Thus, India’s rupturing of relationship with Myanmar after 1989 on idealistic grounds led China to exploit major gain at India’s immediate neighborhood.

This had led India to recalibrate its strategy towards Myanmar post the 2021 coup when India took a more pragmatic stand. The Indian ministry of external affairs had categorically pointed that any development in Myanmar has implications for India so India’s policy must serve its strategic interest. Therefore, we have seen India engaging both the military junta and the ethnic armed groups trying to balance its ties with both the parties. Since the coup India has been providing steady military assistant to the junta in form of military hardware and spares. It has also engaged the various ethnic armed groups by sending officials across the border and by inviting some of the groups to New Delhi for a conference. This makes it very evident that rather than maintaining the moral superiority of democracy, India is striving to further its strategic interests. The support to the rebel groups like the Arakan Army (AA) which controls a major part of strategic Rakhine state. After seizing control of majority of the state the Arakan Army pushed the initiative to have dialogue with the military junta. The AA had always held the ambition of having greater strategic autonomy in the Rakhine state. Thus, India’s engagement with the AA by sending government officials over to Myanmar signals that it wants to have strategic relation with the AA as that would enhance its influence and uphold India’s economic and trade ambitions. 

For India, the geographical location of Myanmar holds a great strategic significance. It shares a 1,693 kms of border and is seen as India’s gateway to the ASEAN. This had led India to invest heavily on major infrastructure projects in Myanmar. The Kaladan Multimodal Transit Corridor and Sittwe Port are two of India’s largest projects in Rakhine and Chin state of Myanmar. This project is seen to give India’s landlocked northeastern states access to Myanmar’s Sittwe port. This project is also seen as a counter to China’s Kyaukphyu Port at the Rakhine state. This has made the relation with Arakan Army of geo-strategic importance. The other major project that India is working on is to physically connect itself ASEAN via the India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway. This project would give India land access to the two ASEAN states which can further be expanded to other nations like Vietnam. Although the projects are currently stalled due to the civil war, India is working with both the ethnic armed groups and the government to safeguard and fast-track the projects.

Thus, the recent visit of Min Aung Hlaing to India shows that India has chosen pragmatism over idealism. New Delhi has kept itself away from the nature of democracy in Myanmar and is trying to engage based on strategic interest. During the press briefing the Indian foreign sectary had pointed that India’s engagement with Myanmar is not based on Myanmar’s internal political arrangement. India does not want to disengage based on internal political dynamics as history has shown that other powers which has no interest in democracy would eventually take the advantage. This statement although has not mentioned China but was directed towards it. Therefore, the visit led to the signing of various agreements and MOUs between both the states. Myanmar has also reiterated that it won’t allow its territory to be used against anti-India activities. The recent advancement by the Myanmar Army is further leading it to consolidate its power and capture grounds. With the new conscript law, it can funnel additional troops to keep its advancement. Further being supported by Russia, China and India the firepower of the junta is superior to the rebel forces. This has also led India to recalibrate its Myanmar policy by engaging the current powerful junta and strategic rebel forces like the AA in Rakhine state.

Therefore, it can be argued that the growing India-China competition has made India move its Myanmar strategy towards pragmatism from idealism. Unlike in 1988 when India lost its strategic foothold to China in Myanmar due to its idealistic stand, the situation has now altered as the competition grows. But as a democracy, India must tread carefully on this fine line and bring up important issues of human rights and democracy in Myanmar.

Bio: Aung Kyaw is a recent graduate from Lingnan University majoring in Global Development and Sustainability and minor in Sociology. His research interests are politics of southeast asia, peace and conflict studies, social development, social issues in southeast asia. kyawkyawaung@ln.hk

Senators Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) and Bernie Moreno (R-OH) urged Congress to boost the payroll tax cap to save Social Security benefits, according to an op-ed piece published by the New York Times on Tuesday.

As the law currently stands, the payroll

The disruption caused by the Iran war and the temporary closure of the Strait of Hormuz has prompted countries around the world to reconsider their energy security strategies. Governments that suffered economic damage from supply shortages and soaring prices are now looking to build larger strategic oil and gas reserves, potentially creating demand for hundreds of millions of additional barrels over the coming years.

Hormuz Crisis Exposed Energy Vulnerabilities

The near-total closure of the Strait of Hormuz disrupted around one-fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas supplies for more than three months, sending shockwaves through energy markets.

Brent crude prices surged to nearly $120 a barrel as import-dependent economies faced rising fuel costs, supply uncertainty and growing inflationary pressures.

Emergency Reserves Helped Stabilize Markets

One of the key factors preventing a deeper energy crisis was the release of strategic petroleum reserves.

All 32 members of the International Energy Agency agreed to a record release of 400 million barrels from emergency stockpiles, helping offset supply disruptions and ease pressure on global markets.

The coordinated action highlighted the importance of maintaining large emergency reserves during major geopolitical crises.

China’s Stockpile Strategy Pays Off

China emerged from the crisis in a stronger position than many other major importers due to its massive strategic petroleum reserve.

The country has spent years building what is believed to be the world’s largest emergency oil stockpile, estimated at more than one billion barrels.

During the conflict, China significantly reduced crude imports, allowing it to avoid buying large volumes of oil at elevated prices and limiting the economic impact of the disruption.

Import-Dependent Economies Face Greater Pressure

Countries with limited strategic reserves faced much greater challenges.

Several Asian economies relied on emergency measures such as:

• Fuel subsidies
• Consumption restrictions
• Reduced working hours
• Energy-saving programs

The experience exposed vulnerabilities among countries heavily dependent on Middle Eastern energy supplies without substantial emergency stockpiles.

India Eyes Larger Strategic Reserves

India is among the countries most likely to expand its emergency storage capacity.

As the world’s third-largest oil importer and one of the fastest-growing energy consumers, India currently holds reserves covering only a small fraction of its import needs.

Meeting International Energy Agency standards would require hundreds of millions of additional barrels of storage capacity.

Recent plans under consideration suggest New Delhi is moving toward expanding its strategic petroleum reserve network.

Pakistan Also Reviewing Energy Security

Pakistan, which relied heavily on Middle Eastern oil and LNG imports before the conflict, is also examining ways to increase domestic storage capacity.

The Hormuz disruption underscored the risks facing countries that lack sufficient reserves to absorb prolonged supply interruptions.

Australia Moves to Address Reserve Gap

Australia, long criticized for failing to meet International Energy Agency stockpile requirements, has announced plans to significantly increase fuel reserves.

The move reflects a broader recognition that energy security has become a national security issue amid growing geopolitical uncertainty.

Europe Considers Additional Gas Storage

Europe already maintains extensive gas storage infrastructure to manage winter demand.

However, the war has renewed concerns about dependence on imported LNG, particularly as the region increasingly relies on overseas suppliers.

Additional government-controlled gas storage facilities may become part of future energy security planning.

Gulf Producers Seek Overseas Storage

The lessons of the Hormuz disruption are also influencing major energy exporters.

National oil companies in the Gulf are exploring opportunities to expand storage capacity outside the region to maintain export flexibility during future crises.

Additional overseas storage could help producers continue serving customers even if regional shipping routes face disruptions.

Oil Market Impact

The expansion of strategic reserves worldwide could create substantial new demand for crude oil and refined products.

At the same time, emergency reserves that were depleted during the conflict will need to be replenished.

Together, reserve rebuilding and new storage programs could generate demand for roughly one billion barrels over the coming years, providing support for global oil prices even if overall supply growth remains strong.

What It Means for Global Energy Security

The Hormuz crisis has reinforced a lesson many governments learned during previous energy shocks: supply security can be just as important as supply availability.

Countries are increasingly viewing strategic reserves not as emergency assets to be used rarely, but as a core component of economic and national security planning. The crisis has also demonstrated how large stockpiles can provide governments with flexibility to reduce imports during periods of market stress and extreme prices.

Analysis

The most significant consequence of the Iran war may not be the temporary spike in oil prices but the long-term shift in how countries manage energy security. The conflict exposed a clear divide between nations with large strategic reserves and those forced to absorb the full impact of supply disruptions. China emerged as a model for energy resilience, while countries such as India and Pakistan were reminded of their vulnerability to geopolitical shocks.

If governments follow through on plans to expand storage capacity, the global oil market could gain a major new source of structural demand. Reserve construction and replenishment may help absorb future supply surpluses and provide a floor for prices, particularly during periods of weak economic growth.

At the same time, larger strategic stockpiles could make future oil shocks less severe. Countries with substantial reserves are better positioned to reduce imports during crises, dampening demand spikes and limiting extreme price volatility. In the longer term, the world could emerge from the Hormuz crisis with a more resilient energy system, but one in which strategic stockpiles play a much larger role in shaping oil demand, trade flows and government policy.

With information from Reuters.

The occupied West Bank has seen sustained and rising violence amid ongoing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. Israeli forces conduct frequent raids in Palestinian areas, saying they are targeting militants and preventing attacks, while Palestinians and rights groups accuse the military of using excessive force and say settlement expansion is a major driver of instability. Israeli settlements in the territory are widely considered illegal under international law by the United Nations and most countries, though Israel disputes this and views the West Bank as disputed land with historical and security significance. In recent months, tensions have further escalated with increased restrictions on Palestinian movement near settlements, alongside a rise in attacks by both Palestinians against Israelis and by settlers against Palestinians, contributing to a cycle of violence that continues to claim lives on both sides.

Fatal Shooting Near Beit Ummar

The incident took place near the town of Beit Ummar in the southern West Bank.

Palestinian news agency WAFA identified the victims as teenagers aged 15 and 19. A relative confirmed their ages to Reuters.

Israeli Military’s Account

The Israeli military said its forces confronted three individuals who were throwing fire bombs and burning tyres near the settlement of Karmei Tzur.

According to the military, soldiers opened fire, killing two of the individuals and wounding a third.

Reuters could not independently verify the military’s account.

Third Teenager Hospitalized

WAFA reported that the third person involved in the incident was hospitalized in stable condition.

The Palestinian Red Crescent Society said the wounded individual is 15 years old.

Tensions Remain High in the West Bank

Israeli forces regularly conduct raids across the occupied West Bank and have tightened movement restrictions around Palestinian communities located near Israeli settlements in recent months.

The territory has experienced heightened tensions amid ongoing violence involving Israeli security forces, settlers and Palestinians.

Dispute Over Settlements

The international community, including the United Nations and most countries, considers Israeli settlements in the West Bank illegal under international law and a major obstacle to the creation of a Palestinian state.

Israel rejects that position, describing the territory as disputed and citing historical Jewish ties to the area.

Rising Violence

According to United Nations data, at least 57 Palestinians have been killed this year in incidents involving Israeli settlers and security forces.

At the same time, Palestinians have carried out attacks against Israeli soldiers and settlers in the West Bank, including at least one fatal attack in 2026, according to Israel’s Shin Bet domestic security service.

What’s Next

The Israeli military is expected to continue reviewing the circumstances of the shooting, including whether the individuals posed an immediate threat and how the confrontation unfolded near the settlement.

Palestinian officials are likely to pursue diplomatic and legal avenues, as similar incidents in the West Bank are often raised with international bodies, including the United Nations, amid ongoing disputes over the use of force by Israeli troops.

On the ground, the incident is likely to add to already high tensions in the West Bank, where Israeli raids, settlement activity, and Palestinian attacks have contributed to a cycle of violence in recent months.

Further clashes cannot be ruled out, particularly in areas close to settlements where movement restrictions and security operations have intensified.

International attention on West Bank violence is also likely to continue, especially as reported fatalities involving Palestinians and Israelis have remained elevated this year, keeping pressure on both sides amid an already fragile security situation.

With information from Reuters.

The 14-point Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Iran deserves cautious support, not celebration. Its most important promise is immediate and permanent cessation of military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon. That is a serious achievement if it holds. The reported US-Iran text also commits both sides to avoid threats or use of force and to respect sovereignty. But wars do not end because officials announce elegant clauses. They end when armies, proxies, navies, banks, inspectors and political leaders behave differently the next morning.

The reported Versailles signing, with President Macron nearby, gave the accord theatrical weight. The reported confirmation by Iran’s Foreign Ministry gave it visibility in Tehran. Yet the title “Islamabad” may be the most revealing symbol. It suggests that diplomacy around Iran is no longer owned by Washington and Europe alone. Pakistan, Qatar, Oman and Gulf states now matter. That is healthy. But symbolism cannot replace sequencing. A memorandum is useful only if it becomes a disciplined path toward a final settlement.

Hormuz is the pressure point

The Strait of Hormuz is the economic heart of this agreement. The International Energy Agency describes it as one of the world’s critical oil chokepoints, so restoring commercial shipping is a global necessity. The MOU’s promise of safe, toll-free passage for 60 days can calm markets, but it cannot settle maritime governance. Iran’s future talks with the Sultanate of Oman and other littoral states must produce rules on fees, inspections, de-mining, escorts and disputes. Without that, Hormuz remains a bargaining chip, not a secure passage.

The most controversial part is economic. Washington would provide waivers for Iranian oil exports, make frozen assets usable, avoid new sanctions during talks and support a reconstruction plan of at least $300 billion. This could be pragmatic statecraft or a strategic mistake. The OFAC Iran sanctions system affects banks, insurers, traders and shippers. Recent State Department sanctions show how aggressively Iranian petroleum networks had been targeted. Relief must therefore be sequenced with measurable action. If Tehran receives benefits before verification, critics will call it capitulation. If Washington delays relief after compliance, Tehran will call it bad faith.

Nuclear language cannot stay vague

Iran’s renewed pledge not to build nuclear weapons is necessary, but not enough. The decisive issue is the future of enriched material, enrichment activity and inspection access. Any final deal must put IAEA Iran monitoring at the centre. The IAEA’s NPT safeguards framework and the Non-Proliferation Treaty offer the right balance: Iran has civilian nuclear rights, but the world has a right to credible assurance that military pathways are closed. Down-blending enriched material under inspection may be a start. It cannot be the finish line.

Including Lebanon in the ceasefire is wise, but risky. The promise to protect sovereignty echoes the UN Charter. But Lebanon has long suffered from the gap between formal sovereignty and armed reality. If Hezbollah, Israel, Iran or any other actor treats Lebanon as a loophole, the ceasefire will collapse at its weakest seam. The final text must clarify what “all fronts” means, how non-state armed groups are restrained, and what happens if a party violates the ceasefire through an ally.

The final agreement must be public and enforceable

A binding UN Security Council resolution is essential, but it should not rubber-stamp ambiguity. The history of Resolution 2231, wider UN sanctions practice, IAEA reports to the Security Council, and the UN record on Iranian ballistic missiles shows why detail matters. The final agreement must define deadlines, verification triggers, consequences for breach and the exact sanctions schedule. The Guardian’s analysis and Iran International’s reporting underline the same reality: the MOU buys time, but time can be wasted.

The Islamabad MOU is not peace. It is a pause with possibilities. It should be supported because war has already proved disastrous, but it must be judged by performance: ceasefire maintained, Hormuz reopened, sanctions relief sequenced, nuclear material verified, Lebanon protected and the final deal anchored in law. Anything less would turn a promising memorandum into another diplomatic mirage.

For decades, satellites have provided critical data for military activities in active and non-active combat zones. One of the most significant integration of space-based technologies emerged in missile defense systems during the Cold War. Satellite constellations provided critical data on the launch sites and trajectories of ballistic missiles. The US Defense Support Program (DSP) was the first program to launch satellite constellations to detect heat signatures of Soviet ICBMs with infrared sensors. The Soviet Union launched the first generation of early warning systems under OKO satellite constellations against US missile threats. These systems of satellite constellations allowed both the US and the USSR to maintain a close watch over each other’s strategic capabilities and allowed for much needed early warning that upheld mutual deterrence between the two powers.

Fast forward to the current era, today’s missile defense systems have shown a very limited success rate against hypersonic missiles. The tracking and interception capabilities of current missile defense systems have remained effectively limited due to speed, maneuverability, and depressed flight of hypersonic missiles. Traditional missile defense systems have been outmaneuvered by hypersonic missiles, which increases the threat level due to their capability to reach and hit targets with a high success rate. Modern hypersonic missiles can still be detected with infrared sensing during their boost phase, but Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs) are extremely difficult to track and intercept primarily due to their maneuverability. The radar-evading capabilities of HGVs affect the strategic calculus by shrinking detection and reaction time duration during crises and conflicts.

As a remedy, the US has introduced the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensors (HBTSS) to counter the threat of HGVs and Hypersonic Cruise Missiles (HCMs). The HBTSS will be a major component of the US Golden Dome missile defense project. It is a layered network of command-and-control systems, interceptors, and space-based sensors to build an advanced layer of missile defense system. What makes HBTSS different from traditional missile defense systems is the satellite constellation, which provides real-time tracking data of missiles. Traditional defense systems like Space Based Infrared System (SBIR) could detect the launch of missiles, but HBTSS can detect, track, and possibly predict the target of the missile.

Because HGVs present a unique challenge due to low flight path and maneuverability and often operate under the coverage of conventional radars, which make it difficult for traditional defense systems to detect. HBTSS relies on space-based sensors, which can detect and track continuously from space. Theoretically, it can be called a space-based missile defense system reflecting the growing strategic importance of space in the military domain. It relies on an interconnected satellite network that can work as a kill web across the globe against the threat of hypersonic missiles.

HBTSS is an emerging strategic shift as it starts a new era of space weaponization with a layer of satellites for enhanced detection and tracking. A reliable space-based tracking system bolsters a state’s capabilities to deal with the threat of hypersonic missiles with improved early warning and missile tracking systems, and reduces the threat of surprise attacks from an adversary. Although missile forces hold great impact on deterrence stability, the induction of HTBSS will question the effectiveness of missiles during crises and conflicts if a more advance missile defense system is introduced. This will provide a wider view from space with more accuracy and precision, and increase the vulnerability of missile forces of states.

Because ground-based nuclear forces are considered vulnerable, many countries have developed second-strike capabilities, particularly at sea, to preserve deterrence even after absorbing an initial attack. But the development of HBTSS undermines the survivability of a state’s missile forces with an enhanced detection and tracking system. Even though the United States and Russia continue to maintain certain crisis management and risk reduction mechanisms, including hotlines and military deconfliction channels, the suspension of New START has weakened the broader framework of strategic stability. While in conflict-prone regions like South Asia, India and Pakistan possess a more limited and less institutionalized set of confidence-building measures (CBMs), making crisis management in South Asia particularly challenging due to emerging technologies.

The peaceful use of outer space depends on the intent and actions of major powers. Sometimes measures taken for self-defense can also prompt a proportionate reaction in the form of countermeasures. The strategic impact of HBTSS on the missile forces may lead to more advance, fast, and lethal missiles for survivability. The development of HBTSS will not end the arms race, it will intensify the arms race with countermeasures.

China officially objected through its Foreign Ministry to the Japanese draft resolution to increase armaments and abandon Japan’s post-World War II commitment not to rearm its military, as approved by the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan during its general council meeting. The draft resolution proposed amending three key security documents, which are the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Medium-Range Defense Forces Enhancement Plan. It was to be submitted to the Japanese government and parliament for further discussion. Chinese authorities officially rejected and objected to the draft, deeming it a threat to their national security and their spheres of direct influence in Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Indo-Pacific region. They considered it a radical escalation of Japan’s security strategy, detrimental to Chinese national security and to the global security initiative proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Here, the revision of Japan’s three security documents, represented in the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Force Enhancement Plan, represents a strategic shift away from its post-war pacifist constitution toward more proactive and independent military policies. The nature of this shift is evident in Tokyo’s easing of restrictions on lethal weapons exports and its reorientation of its armament toward counter-offensive capabilities and missile development. Under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s administration, the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan has adopted a proactive approach, reshaping Japanese industries and institutions to address the greatest strategic challenge posed by China. The updated National Security Strategy has already fundamentally altered the country’s pacifist military doctrine by disarming the Japanese military and preventing its rearmament since World War II, a move that has drawn staunch opposition from China, which seeks to protect its own national security. The most significant amendments to the three Japanese security documents included Japan’s acknowledgment of its ability to double and enhance its counter-strike capabilities. This was achieved by allowing Japan to possess long-range missiles capable of striking enemy targets before launch. Simultaneously, Japanese authorities approved doubling defense spending, raising the military budget to 2% of GDP.

China objected to the Japanese draft resolution, which aimed to increase Japanese armament and militarize the region and global supply chains, and threatened to escalate the situation. Beijing strongly condemned these trends, describing them as new militarism. A key point of contention for China was what Chinese intelligence and military circles perceived as a warning of Japanese and foreign interference in Taiwanese affairs, as China considers Taiwan an integral part of its territory. Beijing condemned the Japanese leadership’s statement that any emergency in Taiwan is an emergency for Japan, describing a potential Chinese military intervention in Taiwan as an act of aggression. Here, Beijing rejects Japan’s new military approach, characterized by advanced military deployment. China has officially protested and taken countermeasures against Japan’s plans to deploy defensive missiles on Yonaguni Island, located only about 110 kilometers from Taiwan. China has strongly accused Japan of violating its commitments, arguing that this new Japanese military expansion violates Tokyo’s international obligations and its pacifist constitution. China has warned Japan that it will pay a heavy price if it intervenes militarily in the Taiwan Strait.

Chinese intelligence, military, security, and defense circles link Japan’s armament activities in Taiwan to American interference in Chinese affairs through its network of allies in the Asian region, such as Japan, given its close alliance with Washington. Here, Japan defends its military rearmament against China, with several of its officials sending political and security warnings to China. They argue that, given the uncertainty in Japan stemming from US policies and the fluctuating stance in Washington, Japan seeks to bolster its own capabilities and build regional alliances (with the Philippines, Australia, and NATO) to expand deterrence against Beijing and maintain regional security from a Japanese perspective. Strategic circles in Tokyo view the potential fall of Taiwan to China as a direct and existential threat to Japanese national security and vital shipping lanes, making the protection of the Taiwan Strait a fundamental component of Japan’s updated defense doctrine.

For these reasons, China’s decisive response was seen as a challenge to its national security, especially given Japan’s de facto official classification of Beijing as the greatest and most unprecedented strategic challenge to its security. This classification was further reinforced by Japanese authorities’ approval of developing military production, strengthening domestic defense industries, and easing restrictions on arms exports. This is where the dimensions of China’s official rejection and objection lie, as it is considered a violation of the pacifist principle enshrined in the Japanese military doctrine, which was internationally and regionally agreed upon after World War II for Japan’s disarmament. Beijing believes that Tokyo is abandoning its pacifist constitution and returning to a militaristic path, while Japan exaggerates the narrative of a China threat. Beijing accuses Japan of fabricating flimsy pretexts to justify its military expansion and arsenal, which threatens China’s regional security. Therefore, China warned that these Japanese steps to increase armament undermine peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and jeopardize the principles of China’s global security initiative. China also registered its objection to Japan’s exclusionary approaches to its initiative based on shared and sustainable security. Furthermore, China linked this Japanese escalation in its confrontation with China in the region to the sensitive issue of Taiwan and the close alliance between the United States and Japan, while categorically rejecting Japanese interference in Taiwan’s affairs and considering the island’s security an integral part of China’s national security.

Iran’s government has portrayed the interim agreement with the United States as a victory that ended months of conflict and prevented further escalation. The deal halted a war that saw U.S. and Israeli airstrikes, disruptions to trade, and severe economic damage across Iran.

However, interviews with ordinary Iranians reveal a starkly different picture. Many citizens say years of sanctions, combined with the recent conflict, have left them struggling with rising prices, declining living standards, and deep uncertainty about the future. While the fighting may have stopped for now, many remain unconvinced that the agreement will bring meaningful economic relief or lasting stability.

Economic Hardship Continues to Dominate Daily Life

For many Iranians, the ceasefire has not changed the reality of daily economic struggles.

Business owners, students, and workers interviewed across the country described a population focused on survival rather than recovery. Many reported cutting household spending, reducing social activities, and adjusting to higher living costs. Small businesses continue to face weak consumer demand, while young people increasingly worry about their economic prospects.

The war added another layer of pressure to an economy already weakened by years of international sanctions, inflation, and limited foreign investment. As a result, many citizens see little immediate prospect of improvement even if the ceasefire holds.

Divided Views on the Outcome of the Conflict

The agreement has exposed a clear divide between the government’s narrative and public sentiment.

Supporters of the Islamic Republic view the deal as proof that Iran resisted external pressure and preserved its political system. Some hardliners argue that the country emerged stronger and demonstrated resilience despite military and economic pressure.

Many ordinary citizens, however, are less focused on geopolitical outcomes and more concerned about living standards. For them, the key measure of success is whether the agreement leads to lower prices, economic opportunities, and greater stability. So far, few appear convinced that such changes are imminent.

Concerns Grow Over Political Freedoms

Beyond economic concerns, many Iranians fear that the post war environment could lead to tighter political controls.

Some citizens believe the government may use the conflict and national security concerns to justify stronger oversight and restrictions. These fears are particularly pronounced in regions populated by ethnic minorities, where previous protests have often been met with heavy security responses.

There is also uncertainty about whether public frustration over economic conditions could trigger future demonstrations. While many people remain cautious after previous crackdowns, underlying grievances over jobs, inflation, and political freedoms remain unresolved.

The ceasefire may have reduced the immediate threat of war, but it has done little to address the deeper challenges facing Iran. Public opinion appears increasingly shaped by economic realities rather than political declarations of victory.

The government may benefit in the short term from ending the conflict and avoiding further military escalation. However, lasting stability will depend on whether authorities can deliver tangible economic improvements and restore public confidence.

The biggest challenge for Tehran is that expectations remain extremely low. Many Iranians do not see the ceasefire as a turning point but rather as a temporary pause in a broader cycle of economic hardship and political uncertainty. If future negotiations fail to produce sanctions relief, investment, and economic recovery, public frustration could continue to grow despite the end of active conflict.

Stakeholders

• Iranian government and political leadership
• Iranian citizens and businesses
• United States
• Israel
• Ethnic minority communities in Iran
• International investors and energy markets
• Regional governments monitoring stability in the Middle East

What’s Next

Attention will now shift to negotiations aimed at turning the interim agreement into a permanent settlement. Iranian leaders will seek economic benefits and sanctions relief, while Washington is expected to push for further commitments on security and nuclear issues.

Domestically, the government faces the challenge of managing economic expectations and maintaining stability. Whether the ceasefire translates into meaningful improvements for ordinary Iranians may ultimately determine how the agreement is judged inside the country.

With information from Reuters.

The announcement of a preliminary US-Iran agreement has generated cautious optimism in Lebanon, where months of conflict have displaced large portions of the population and devastated communities across the south.

While the framework reportedly calls for the immediate cessation of military operations, Lebanese authorities are warning residents against assuming that conditions are safe enough for a rapid return.

The caution reflects uncertainty over how the agreement will be implemented and whether all parties will abide by its terms.

Adding to those concerns, Israel has made clear that it does not consider itself bound by the agreement and intends to maintain security zones in southern Lebanon.

Lebanon became one of the principal battlegrounds of the wider regional conflict after Hezbollah opened a front against Israel in support of Iran following the outbreak of hostilities.

The resulting escalation led to extensive Israeli military operations across southern Lebanon, causing widespread destruction and one of the largest displacement crises in the country’s recent history.

Entire communities were uprooted as residents fled bombardment and military activity.

Iran consistently pushed for any agreement with Washington to include provisions addressing Lebanon, viewing the conflict there as inseparable from broader regional tensions.

The inclusion of Lebanon in the framework agreement therefore represents a significant diplomatic concession and a central element of Tehran’s negotiating position.

Why This Matters

Lebanon has become one of the clearest examples of how regional conflicts can produce devastating humanitarian consequences.

The conflict has:

• Displaced more than a million people.
• Damaged homes, infrastructure, and businesses.
• Increased pressure on Lebanon’s already fragile economy.
• Deepened political and social instability.

A durable ceasefire could allow reconstruction efforts to begin and reduce the risk of further regional escalation.

However, the humanitarian benefits will depend on security conditions improving on the ground rather than merely on diplomatic declarations.

The Challenge of Returning Home

For displaced families, peace announcements do not automatically translate into confidence.

Many residents remain uncertain about:

• Whether military operations have truly ended.
• The presence of Israeli forces in southern areas.
• The condition of homes and infrastructure.
• Future security guarantees.

The hesitation expressed by displaced residents reflects a broader reality in conflict zones: trust often takes much longer to rebuild than physical infrastructure.

Even if active fighting stops, communities may remain reluctant to return until they believe the risk of renewed conflict has genuinely diminished.

Israel’s Position Complicates the Picture

A major obstacle to immediate normalization is Israel’s position.

Israeli officials have indicated they will continue maintaining security zones and reserve the right to conduct operations they deem necessary for national security.

This creates ambiguity regarding implementation of the broader agreement.

While the US-Iran framework may establish a diplomatic foundation for reducing violence, the practical situation on the ground will depend on decisions made by actors who were not direct participants in the negotiations.

This distinction could prove crucial in determining whether the agreement produces lasting stability.

A Test of Regional Diplomacy

The inclusion of Lebanon in the agreement demonstrates how interconnected Middle Eastern conflicts have become.

The war was never confined solely to the United States and Iran. It involved multiple regional actors, proxy groups, and overlapping security concerns.

As a result, success will be measured not only by whether Washington and Tehran uphold their commitments but also by whether the agreement influences behavior across the broader region.

Lebanon is likely to become one of the first and most visible tests of that process.

Key Stakeholders

• Lebanon and its government institutions
• Displaced Lebanese civilians
• Israel and its military leadership
• Hezbollah
• Iran
• The United States
• Regional mediators including Pakistan
• Humanitarian organizations operating in Lebanon

What to Watch Next

• Whether military activity in southern Lebanon decreases in the coming days.
• Israeli decisions regarding security zones.
• Hezbollah’s official response to the agreement.
• The pace of civilian returns to southern communities.
• International support for reconstruction and humanitarian assistance.
• Broader negotiations during the 60-day ceasefire period.

The agreement creates an opportunity for Lebanon to move toward greater stability after months of destruction and displacement.

If implemented successfully, reduced hostilities could pave the way for reconstruction, humanitarian relief, and the gradual return of displaced populations.

Yet significant uncertainty remains. Security concerns, damaged infrastructure, and competing interpretations of the agreement could slow progress and complicate efforts to restore normalcy.

For many Lebanese families, the end of active conflict would represent only the beginning of a much longer recovery process.

Analysis

The most revealing aspect of Lebanon’s reaction is the disconnect between diplomacy and reality.

International leaders may celebrate ceasefires and framework agreements, but people living through conflict judge peace by different standards. They look not at official statements but at troop movements, security conditions, and whether it is safe to return home.

That gap is already visible in southern Lebanon. While diplomats describe the agreement as a breakthrough, local authorities are warning residents against rushing back. Israel’s decision to maintain security zones further reinforces uncertainty about how quickly conditions can normalize.

This highlights a recurring challenge in conflict resolution. Agreements can stop wars on paper, but rebuilding trust often takes far longer than negotiating a ceasefire.

Lebanon’s experience may therefore become a key measure of whether the US-Iran agreement delivers meaningful change beyond diplomatic symbolism. If displaced communities can safely return, reconstruction begins, and violence declines, the agreement will gain credibility. If insecurity persists despite the deal, questions will quickly emerge about its effectiveness.

Ultimately, Lebanon represents the human dimension of the broader regional settlement. The success of the agreement will not be judged solely by geopolitical outcomes or energy markets but by whether ordinary people feel secure enough to rebuild their lives after months of war.

With information from Reuters.

Ukraine’s defence ministry believes artificial intelligence is set to fundamentally transform modern warfare, as Kyiv accelerates efforts to integrate AI into battlefield operations amid its ongoing war with Russia.

According to Danylo Tsvok, head of Ukraine’s Defence Ministry AI Research Centre, the country is already employing artificial intelligence across multiple military functions, including drone operations, battlefield planning, intelligence analysis, and missile attack assessments.

The centre, established in March, is part of a broader effort to make data driven decision making a core component of Ukraine’s defence strategy. Officials envision a future where AI systems, sensors, drones, command centres, and weapons platforms operate through a unified digital network capable of processing battlefield information and recommending military actions in real time.

Why It Matters

Ukraine’s experience is increasingly being viewed as a preview of how future wars may be fought. The conflict has already demonstrated the growing importance of drones, autonomous systems, and real time intelligence, but AI could push military operations into an entirely new phase.

Rather than merely supporting commanders, future AI systems may become central to battlefield decision making by processing vast quantities of data faster than human operators can manage. This could dramatically shorten the time between identifying a target and launching an attack.

The implications extend far beyond Ukraine. Military planners around the world are closely monitoring the conflict as a testing ground for next generation warfare technologies.

The Rise of AI Driven Combat

The war has already evolved into a technological competition in which both Ukraine and Russia are attempting to gain advantages through automation, data analysis, and autonomous systems.

Ukraine is working toward a battlefield operating system capable of integrating information from drones, reconnaissance assets, weapons systems, and frontline units into a single decision making framework. The objective is to create a comprehensive operational picture that enables faster and more effective responses.

Russia is pursuing similar capabilities, particularly in drone warfare and strike planning, creating what Ukrainian officials describe as an emerging competition between military operating systems rather than simply armies.

Global Defence Implications

The conflict has attracted significant attention from defence technology firms and AI developers seeking real world operational data. Companies and governments increasingly view Ukraine as one of the most important testing environments for military AI applications.

The lessons learned from the war could influence defence procurement, military doctrine, and security planning across NATO, Asia, and other regions facing evolving security challenges.

As AI becomes more deeply embedded in military systems, countries may be forced to rethink command structures, training requirements, and the role of human decision makers in combat.

Key Stakeholders

• Ukraine military
• Russian military
• Defence technology companies
• NATO members
• Artificial intelligence developers
• Defence ministries worldwide
• Military planners and strategists

Future Outlook

Over the next three to five years, military competition is likely to shift increasingly toward AI enabled command systems, autonomous platforms, and integrated battlefield networks.

Countries capable of rapidly processing information and converting it into actionable decisions may gain a significant operational advantage. At the same time, concerns about autonomy, accountability, and human oversight will become more prominent as AI systems assume larger roles in combat operations.

The race to integrate AI into warfare is expected to intensify, making technological superiority as important as traditional military strength.

Analysis

Ukraine’s assessment points to a deeper transformation than simply adding artificial intelligence to existing weapons systems. What is emerging is a shift from platform centric warfare to data centric warfare, where military advantage depends less on the number of tanks, aircraft, or soldiers and more on the ability to collect, process, and act on information faster than an opponent.

The most significant aspect of this transition is the compression of decision making time. Historically, military success depended on commanders interpreting information and issuing orders. AI has the potential to reduce that cycle from hours or minutes to seconds, creating a battlefield where speed of analysis becomes as important as firepower.

This evolution could fundamentally alter military hierarchies. If AI systems become capable of generating reliable operational recommendations faster than humans can assess them, commanders may increasingly act as supervisors rather than primary decision makers. The challenge will be balancing military effectiveness with accountability and ethical oversight.

The Ukraine conflict is therefore becoming more than a territorial war; it is also serving as a laboratory for the future of warfare. The countries that emerge with the most effective integration of AI, autonomous systems, and battlefield data networks may define military power for decades to come. In this sense, the competition between Ukraine and Russia increasingly resembles a contest between technological ecosystems, foreshadowing a future in which wars are won not only through weapons but through algorithms and information dominance.

With information from Reuters.

As Washington and Tehran move towards a long-term ceasefire agreement, Gulf states will likely look for new long-term security solutions when a war in their region – which they did not start – finally ends.

It comes as United States President Donald Trump cancelled new strikes on Iran saying that a deal with Tehran was imminent, and that a “time” and “place” for signing would soon be announced.

In Tehran, officials appeared more cautious with one senior Iranian official telling Al Jazeera that the government was still reviewing a proposed Memorandum of Understanding with Washington.

Subsequent comments by Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif point to a deal being made, and what follows in the coming days could have important implications for collective regional security.

Attacks on the Gulf

The United States operates military facilities in at least 19 locations across the MENA region, including permanent bases in Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, according to the Council on Foreign Relations. Between 40,000 and 50,000 US troops were stationed across the region before the war on Iran started.

This US-Gulf nexus appeared to insulate states from conflicts engulfing other parts of the region, but over the past four months, Gulf states hosting US military facilities have been targeted by Iran.

“If there is a way to describe the prevailing security model in the region since the 1980s, the concept of security partnerships best encapsulates it,” said Mahjoub Al-Zuwairi, an academic and expert on Middle East politics.

“The countries of the region have chosen to align their security with broad international alliances. For decades, this model has provided a reasonable deterrent and logistical and intelligence depth that is difficult to replace.”

A security umbrella with holes

The war on Iran has exposed a paradox – while Iranian officials have repeatedly referred to their Gulf neighbours as “brothers”, they have also repeatedly targeted them during the war.

Despite the protestations of Gulf states that no attacks on Iran were launched from their soil, they have been repeatedly targeted.

At least 28 people have been killed across the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states in suspected Iranian drone and rocket attacks, since the US and Israel launched their offensive on Iran on 28 February. This has led to questions about the US-Gulf security arrangement.

“Just the war itself has pierced that sense of security, the US security umbrella is moribund at worst, or ineffective at best,” Simon Mabon, professor of international relations at Lancaster University, told Al Jazeera.

“They’ve long relied on it for their own security. Yet the presence of US forces on their territory directly meant they became targets. They can’t escape their geography [and] despite the tensions, despite the hostilities, despite the attacks, Iran isn’t going away. They have to find a way of dealing with this reality.”

The economic cost of war

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has proven be a setback for some Gulf states working to diversify their energy-reliant economies towards tourism, services and finance, but not all have been affected equally.

Saudi Arabia was able to redirect some oil exports through its East-West pipeline to the Red Sea, while Oman – whose main ports are outside the Strait of Hormuz – has also benefited from rising energy prices.

The UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar have been more heavily affected due to their dependence on the waterway for their energy exports, but the war has encouraged new thinking on long-standing security and economic arrangements.

“There are new pipelines being set up, but the capacity of these alternatives is infinitely smaller than the Strait itself,” said Mabon. “It will take enormous investment and years of development before they can come close to replacing it.”

Moving closer to Iran?

One possible lesson from the conflict is that Gulf states may seek engagement with Iran rather than confrontation, something that Gulf states had already made some groundwork on before the US-Israel war began.

The UAE restored diplomatic ties with Tehran in 2022, and a year later, Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to normalise relations in a deal brokered by China.

Al-Zuwairi says that the conflict could revive plans for MENA-led regional security arrangements, as envisioned in the 2019 Hormuz Peace Initiative, which proposed a Gulf security framework involving Iran, Iraq and the six GCC states.

But the distrust fostered since then – notably Tehran’s strikes on its Gulf neighbours – would make such a formation unlikely in the near future. 

“The recent war has opened the door wide to reconsidering the Gulf security system with its neighbours,” Al-Zuwairi said.

“How can Tehran propose a non-aggression pact while raining missiles on neighbouring cities? The initiative appears theoretically sound but practically bankrupt unless Iranian behaviour changes.”

Looking beyond Washington?

The solution for the Gulf could be a hybrid arrangement where ties with Washington are maintained, but other regional and domestic options are explored, including greater investment in local defence industries.

A possible blueprint for this could be the mutual defence agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan last September, stating that an attack on one country would be considered an attack on both.

Yet previous instances when Gulf states felt abandoned by the US have led to divergent responses, with the UAE and Bahrain deepening ties with Israel, but a new paradigm means that a more collective action to the issue of security might be considered.

“The war has demonstrated that every guarantor, no matter how many banners it flies, primarily protects its own interests,” said Al-Zuwairi.

“The region ends up paying the price for a war it did not choose … The security of the Gulf will not be created in Washington … It will be created when Gulf countries recognise that they must build it themselves, because when fires start, it is always those closest to the flames who pay the price.”

France and Germany have announced this week that they are ditching a landmark project to jointly develop a sixth-generation fighter jet.

French President Emmanuel Macron confirmed on Monday that the project is being terminated, in what is being seen as a major blow to efforts to boost defence cooperation between European Union states, a key issue amid uncertainty cast by United States President Donald Trump over the readiness of the US to help defend its NATO allies.

Trump’s disdain for Europe’s reliance on the US has been building for years.

Since 2019, the US president has been flirting with the idea of obtaining Greenland.

His remarks about his desire for the island, a self-governing territory which is part of the Kingdom of Denmark, built to a crescendo at the start of this year, with European leaders signalling their displeasure with the idea and Trump even threatening additional trade tariffs on those countries standing in his way.

Both Denmark and Greenland have repeatedly stated that the island is not for sale.

At one point, before Trump backed down after agreeing to a “framework of a future deal” on Greenland during a January meeting with NATO’s Mark Rutte in Davos, it seemed as if the US might even try to take the island by force – a notion that would have been inconceivable before the era of Donald Trump.

The threat of military action set off alarm bells in European capitals.

In addition to all this, Trump has withdrawn much of the US’s support for Ukraine and has consistently berated his European NATO partners for not spending enough on their own defence for years, outright urging them to reduce their reliance on the US for military protection.

More recently, Europe’s refusal to join the US-Israeli war on Iran, which began with strikes on Tehran on February 28, has further irked the US president and deepened concerns that a widening transatlantic rift could weaken the continent’s security and embolden Russia.

Until this week, a counterweight to these burgeoning concerns was in hand – the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) project, a landmark pact to jointly develop a next-generation fighter jet involving France, Germany and Spain.

But disagreements over whether France’s Dassault Aviation, or Airbus, which also represents Germany and Spain, should take the lead on the project have ultimately led to its collapse.

Analysts, however, say all hope is not lost: despite the dissolution of the bellwether venture, Europeans can indeed become strategically autonomous, they say – but the road there runs through shared military integration, rather than shared political aspiration.

The FCAS hoopla does “highlight the limitation of Europe’s defence industrial landscape, where national needs sometimes clash with the broader goal of defence integration”, Giuseppe Spatafora, a policy analyst at the European Union Institute for Security Studies, told Al Jazeera.

“But we also shouldn’t overestimate its impact.”

Setback, not collapse

According to Jamie Shea, a retired NATO official and associate fellow with the International Security Programme at Chatham House, FCAS’s dissolution is certainly a setback – but does not spell the collapse of European defence integration in its entirety.

“It was the type of high-tech, innovative and future-oriented programme that Europeans need to be able to achieve successfully if they are to become strategically autonomous and break their dependence on the US for major weapons systems,” Shea told Al Jazeera.

It had been hoped that FCAS would move the needle forward, particularly in the areas of artificial intelligence (AI), space, data fusion, and the manned and autonomous systems interface space, he said.

Others would have additionally joined the project as it gained momentum, as Spain did, he added, potentially creating a domino effect in next-generation defence technologies across the continent.

But, crucially, Spatafora said, the project dates back to 2017 – a different era, before Russia’s full-scale war on Ukraine and before Trump’s return to the White House.

“Nowadays, the project might be designed differently to reflect the scenario,” he said.

“But it doesn’t affect the broader trend in Europe towards reducing dependencies on US military systems and strengthening its own defence capabilities.”

France and Germany will continue with some components of FCAS, such as its “combat cloud” feature, which will increase Europe’s cyber command-and-control capabilities, said Spatafora.

Airbus and a number of other German companies are also seeking to continue the programme in other areas, particularly software architecture and drone technology, Shea said.

“So there may be benefits for European defence and its defence technology base even if a manned fighter aircraft is not built,” said Shea.

Furthermore, there are “scores” of other joint defence projects being launched in Europe at the moment, even if they are not quite as ambitious as FCAS, he added.

Guntram Wolff, a senior fellow at the European think tank Bruegel, similarly urged against alarmism.

“I would not interpret this decision overly negatively,” Wolff told Al Jazeera.

“FCAS was a very complicated project and its military relevance may well be overstated at a moment of increasing importance of cheap autonomous systems. In part, the decision also reflects a reassessment of whether the high cost was really warranted.”

Europe, meanwhile, has other strengths it can build on, the analysts said.

The continent is strong in shipbuilding, submarines, short-range missiles and air defence – with systems like the German IRIS-T and the French-Italian SAMP/T – and has demonstrated it can build capable fighter jets, such as the Eurofighter Typhoon, Tornado and Gripen programmes have shown, Shea said.

Lessons and challenges

Europe’s main problem is underinvestment and the difficulty it has in scaling up to the level of mass production that modern warfare demands, said Shea.

This issue was brought into sharp focus this week when the UK’s secretary of state for defence dramatically resigned from government over defence funding.

He simply cannot keep the country safe on what he has been given to spend, he said. In his resignation letter to the prime minister, he wrote: “You have been unable and the Treasury has been unwilling to commit the resources that the nation needs to defend the country at this time of rising threats,” he wrote.

Ultimately, European nations are going to have to come together if they have any hope of matching US military might in the future, analysts say.

“It is the challenge of integrating all systems and all domains into a single battlefield management space where the US is in advance of the Europeans,” Shea said.

“Drones, which Russia and Ukraine are producing in the millions, are a case in point. Even the US suffers from weapons shortages as we have seen in the Iran war,” the former NATO official added.

Spatafora echoed the idea that the Russia-Ukraine war has lessons to offer the rest of Europe.

“The lesson of the war in Ukraine is that, in order to deter and defend itself properly, Europe needs cheap, mass-produced capabilities,” he said.

FCAS was about a very expensive capability, “so it was not really the key need for Europe’s deterrence today”, the analyst said.

The more pressing question that FCAS raises is how European nations will coordinate large projects which single countries cannot produce on their own and which could clash with the interests of numerous national industries. This is the conundrum which will likely shape the design of future EU instruments to support cooperative defence projects, said Spatafora.

Another challenge facing the continent is that major platforms like aircraft, ships or land warfare vehicles can take decades to develop, and contracts signed today will yield equipment that will not be on the battlefield before 2040, Shea said.

Europe will need to upgrade its current capabilities – recent upgrades to the Eurofighter jet and the Leopard tank are examples he cited – and look for gap-fillers elsewhere.

Spatafora argues that the FCAS collapse should not push European countries back towards reliance on American systems – or at least not more than they already have.

“The Trump administration’s approach and the depletion of stock after the Iran war have significantly reduced the reliability of US supplies,” he said.

The reliability of US guarantees, he added, depends on other assets – long-range missiles, forward-deployed troops, command-and-control infrastructure – “rather than on a next-generation fighter jet”, the analyst added.

‘Military requirements’ over ‘political ambition’

The FCAS failure is certainly good news for Russia, Shea said, “and also for the US, which will hope to sell Europe even more F-35s and maintain Europe’s traditional dependency on US military equipment”.

A rebound from the collapsed project, therefore, he argued, is necessary. But that is already in the works, analysts say, as Europe is already turning away from US dependability.

They point to the high likelihood of renewed interest in the UK-Italy-Japan Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) for a sixth-generation stealth fighter jet, in European Space Agency military space capabilities, and in EU defence financing mechanisms like the Security Action for Europe (SAFE).

Joint ventures with Ukraine, which, under fire from Russia for four years, has mastered mass production of drone technology and AI, should also help keep Europe up to speed in key areas, Shea added.

“The US has proven to be unreliable, or simply unable to remain committed to Europe, and the defence budgets are growing,” Spatfora said.

Washington will continue to remain relevant for certain capabilities – nuclear deterrence above all – but over time, European countries will seek to develop more and more on their own.

The ultimate lesson of FCAS, however, Shea argued, is that defence integration “has to be driven by military requirements rather than political ambition”.

Cooperation between France and Germany has always been difficult, he said – they have large defence companies “that do not want to play second fiddle to the other”, he said.

A more promising model, he said, is the joint UK-Norway agreement to produce a new destroyer-class warship, with BAE Systems as the main contractor and smaller Norwegian companies participating.

“Both countries operate in the North Atlantic and the Baltic Sea and share exactly the same concept of what the ship should be,” explained Shea.

“So it is this model of bottom-up, natural cooperation rather than top-down political cooperation that Europe needs to pursue.”

June 10 (UPI) — President Donald Trump signed a bill to fund the Department of Homeland Security’s immigration enforcement agencies through 2028 after months of battles to prevent it from happening.

“This morning I’m thrilled to sign the Secure America Act to immediately and fully fund the Department of Homeland Security through the end of my term, so we won’t have to be talking about it anymore,” the president said in the Oval Office.

The Senate passed the $70 billion funding package on Friday, and the House approved it on Tuesday.

Democrats fought the funding for months, refusing to agree to the bill unless there were reforms to the organization after two American citizens — Renee Good and Alex Pretti — were killed by federal agents in Minneapolis earlier this year. But the measure was passed via reconciliation, which only requires a majority vote instead of 60 votes needed to overcome a filibuster.

“We’ll give the heroes of ICE and Border Patrol — and that’s what they are, they’re heroes, what they have to go through to keep us safe — the support and resources they need to defend our borders, protect our homeland and to keep America safe,” the president added He also gave House Speaker Mike Johnson, R-La., credit for passing the bill with a slim majority in the House.

“Despite Democrat efforts to shut down ICE and Border Patrol, Republicans have now fully funded these agencies through President Trump’s entire second term to the tune of nearly $70 billion,” Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., in a statement. “Thanks to President Trump, our border has gone from its weakest point to its most secure point in less than two years.”

June 8 (Asia Today) — Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s government is moving forward with talks to revise Japan’s three core security documents, with defense spending, nuclear policy and artificial intelligence emerging as central issues.

The documents are Japan’s National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy and Defense Buildup Program. They set the direction for diplomacy and defense policy for about the next decade, as well as defense spending and major equipment plans for five years.

Japan first adopted a National Security Strategy in 2013 under former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s government revised all three documents in 2022.

Asahi Shimbun reported Monday that the Takaichi government’s review centers on eight issues: defense spending, Japan’s three non-nuclear principles, AI and drones, the defense industry, nuclear-powered submarines, ties with the United States, perceptions of China and economic security.

The largest issue is defense spending. The Kishida government’s 2022 documents called for raising defense-related spending to about 2% of gross domestic product by fiscal 2027. Takaichi’s government is seeking to reach that level in fiscal 2025 and then pursue another revision.

Asahi reported that the Trump administration has called on allies to raise defense spending to 3.5% of GDP, or 5% including related costs. If Japan applied the 3.5% target, annual defense spending could exceed 20 trillion yen, or about $125 billion.

Japan’s three non-nuclear principles are also under discussion. The principles commit Japan not to possess, produce or allow the introduction of nuclear weapons. The current National Security Strategy says Japan will maintain them.

Takaichi has questioned the realism of the principle barring the introduction of nuclear weapons, citing Japan’s reliance on U.S. nuclear deterrence. An Asahi poll conducted from March to April found that 75% of respondents supported maintaining the principles, compared with 21% who said they should be reviewed.

AI and drones are another major focus. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and conflicts in the Middle East have raised the importance of low-cost drones, AI-based information processing, cyberattacks and cognitive warfare. Japan is considering expanding drone procurement, building domestic supply chains and using AI in defense.

The defense industry is also expected to be included in the review. Takaichi’s government views the sector as one of 17 priority areas in its growth strategy. Japan revised its defense equipment transfer guidelines in April, expanding the path for exports of weapons with lethal capabilities.

Government and ruling party officials are also discussing whether the state should own ammunition and other military supply plants while allowing private companies to operate them.

Whether Japan should introduce nuclear-powered submarines is another key question. China and Russia operate nuclear-powered submarines and North Korea is believed to be pursuing them. South Korea has also announced plans to deploy nuclear-powered submarines in the late 2030s.

Some Japanese officials and experts have argued for next-generation submarines that can remain submerged for long periods and travel long distances. Development costs, staffing and consistency with Japan’s Atomic Energy Basic Act remain challenges.

Relations with the United States and Japan’s view of China are also expected to shape the wording of the revised documents. The Trump administration is demanding greater defense burden-sharing from allies. If U.S. foreign policy priorities shift, Japan may need to adjust security plans that assume heavy reliance on Washington.

The 2022 documents described China as Japan’s “greatest strategic challenge.” Attention is now focused on how Japan will describe China after increased Chinese aircraft carrier operations, airspace incursions and concerns about a possible Taiwan contingency.

Economic security is expected to be treated as a separate pillar. Tensions in the Middle East, risks involving the Strait of Hormuz, dependence on energy and food imports and possible supply-chain disruptions are broadening Japan’s security debate. The Japanese government is emphasizing what it calls “collective autonomy” with allies and like-minded countries to maintain supply chains.

The Takaichi government is aiming to complete the revision by the end of the year. Asahi said the review could affect not only defense policy but also Japan’s national direction and public burden.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260608010002583

NEW YORK — Donald Trump is set to be the first sitting U.S. president to attend an NBA Finals game, bringing strict security measures that will require New York Knicks fans to navigate an extensive safety perimeter around Madison Square Garden and an expected lengthy wait to get inside the building.

The security for Game 3 between the Knicks and San Antonio Spurs and the scene around the arena more closely resembled New Year’s Eve in Times Square, and for fans, it might seem more akin to a trip to the airport. They were asked to get to the game two hours early and will be required to provide a ticket to get past various checkpoints along with passing through a TSA-style magnetometer.

Trump’s appearance led the New York Police Department and Secret Service to establish a multi-block security perimeter around the arena, cancel a watch party outside and institute a no-bag policy for ticket-holders. Fans had gathered around the Garden to watch games during this playoff run, during which the Knicks have won 13 games in a row to reach the final for the first time since 1999 and move two victories from their first NBA title since 1973.

“The NYPD in coordination with the Secret Service made the decision for Game 3, where we have a presidential visit, that we could not support watch parties right outside of the Garden,” Police Commissioner Jessica Tisch said at a news conference Monday. “We are looking forward to bringing back watch parties for Game 4. But I think New Yorkers are used to presidents coming to town, and they understand that that generally means lockdowns of areas and that’s what you’re going to see tonight at the Garden.”

Trump has attended several major sporting events in his time as president, and the security measures have created major hassles for fans.

Thousands of fans missed the start of last year’s U.S. Open men’s singles final between Carlos Alcaraz and Jannik Sinner because of lengthy security lines. Even though the U.S. Tennis Association pushed back the start of the match by a half-hour, many fans still couldn’t get in because added measures meant that they had to go through screening not only when they arrived at the Billie Jean King National Tennis Center but again in front of the steps into Arthur Ashe Stadium, where Trump watched from a suite.

Asked his thoughts on Trump attending, Knicks center Mitchell Robinson said: “Cool, I guess. We can still get out there and play (no matter) who’s here and who’s not.”

Mayor Zohran Mamdani and other dignitaries are also expected to be at the game Monday night.

It was already hard enough for Knicks fans to get inside Madison Square Garden because of astronomical ticket prices. The get-in price for a ticket is higher than the average cost of monthly rent in New York, surging over $6,000. The best seats are tens of thousands of dollars. Mamdani said he bought his ticket for about $1,000 directly from Madison Square Garden.

The difficulty of seeing the game in-person has prompted fans to crowd bars, streets and watch parties all over the city. The watch party near the Garden has become a major event all through the playoffs, but with Trump attending, that event will be moved a few blocks away outside the security perimeter, at Bryant Park.

“We improvise,” said Knicks guard Jose Alvarado, who is a New York native. “We’re New Yorkers. We’re going to find a way to watch a game, and that’s what we’re doing.”

Whyno writes for the Associated Press. AP writer Brian Mahoney contributed to this report.

NEW YORK — Donald Trump was booed loudly by fans inside Madison Square Garden when he was shown on video screens during the national anthem prior to Game 3 of the NBA Finals on Monday night.

Trump was shown for several seconds giving a military salute. The boos ended when the U.S. flag followed him on the screens, and fans cheered when New York Knicks players were shown. Mentions of the San Antonio Spurs also elicited loud boos.

Trump is watching from Knicks owner James Dolan’s suite, along with granddaughter Kai, personal adviser Boris Epshteyn and Cabinet secretaries Lee Zeldin, Sean Duffy and Doug Burgum. He is the first sitting president to attend an NBA Finals game.

Trump’s Marine One helicopter flew from his home in New Jersey and landed near Wall Street before his motorcade made its way up through Manhattan and to the arena roughly an hour before tipoff. He encountered a handful of people making rude gestures, and outside the area, one group held signs saying “Trump must go.”

He settled into Dolan’s suite shortly afterward.

During the afternoon before Trump’s arrival, the New York Police Department and the U.S. Secret Service set up a large perimeter surrounding Madison Square Garden. Fans lined up to get inside the arena more than four hours before tip-off, in a scene more closely resembling New Year’s Eve in Times Square than the usual leadup to a basketball game.

They were required to provide a ticket or pass to get past various checkpoints, along with going through a Transportation Security Administration-style magnetometer. Secret Service personnel and police were positioned at every corner and in large numbers. Daily commuters, tourists and fans were all confounded at various times as they tried to maneuver the security.

New Yorkers forced to adjust

After traveling from his new home in Florida for the game, Knicks fan Greg Weldon said the main inconvenience he’s faced so far has been the lack of information.

“We’ve asked so many cops, Secret Service, guys with machine guns, what to do, where should we go,” he said. “Nobody knows.”

Knicks coach Mike Brown and Spurs counterpart Mitch Johnson downplayed any concept of being inconvenienced by the closures and enhanced security because of Trump.

“There’s a lot going on, and I’d much rather be a part of it than not,” Johnson said.

With security stepped up, a watch party outside was canceled, and ticket holders were not allowed to bring bags inside the Garden. Fans had gathered near the arena to watch games during this playoff run, during which the Knicks have won 13 games in a row to reach the Final for the first time since 1999 and move two victories from their first NBA title since 1973.

“We are looking forward to bringing back watch parties for Game 4,” Police Commissioner Jessica Tisch said at a news conference Monday. “But I think New Yorkers are used to presidents coming to town, and they understand that that generally means lockdowns of areas and that’s what you’re going to see tonight at the Garden.”

Incidents heighten attention to Trump’s security

This is the latest major sporting event Trump has attended during his time as president, and the security measures have created major hassles for fans.

Thousands of fans missed the start of last year’s U.S. Open men’s singles final between Carlos Alcaraz and Jannik Sinner because of lengthy security lines. Even though the U.S. Tennis Assn. pushed back the start of the match by a half hour, many fans still couldn’t get in because added measures meant that they had to go through screening not only when they arrived at the Billie Jean King National Tennis Center, but again in front of the steps into Arthur Ashe Stadium, where Trump watched from a suite.

Federal law enforcement officials have been reexamining Trump’s security in light of three incidents in the past two years: a shooting at a 2024 rally in Butler, Penn.; the discovery of a man armed with a rifle as Trump played golf in West Palm Beach, Fla., later that year; and the recent shooting at the White House Correspondents’ Assn. dinner.

Asked Sunday his thoughts on Trump attending, Knicks center Mitchell Robinson said: “Cool, I guess. We can still get out there and play [no matter] who’s here and who’s not.”

New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani and other dignitaries were also at the game.

It was already hard enough for Knicks fans to get inside Madison Square Garden because of astronomical ticket prices. The get-in price for a ticket is higher than the average cost of monthly rent in New York, surging over $5,000. The best seats are tens of thousands of dollars. Mamdani said he bought his ticket, which he said was standing room only, for about $1,000 directly from Madison Square Garden.

The difficulty of seeing the game in person has prompted fans to crowd bars, streets and watch parties all over the city. The watch party near the Garden has become a major event all through the playoffs, but with Trump attending, that event was moved a few blocks away outside the security perimeter, at Bryant Park.

“We improvise,” said Knicks guard Jose Alvarado, who is a New York native. “We’re New Yorkers. We’re going to find a way to watch a game, and that’s what we’re doing.”

Whyno and Price write for the Associated Press.

WASHINGTON — A Treasury inspector general report raises concerns about Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s ability to safeguard taxpayer information after ICE and the Internal Revenue Service agreed in 2025 to share taxpayer data for the purpose of immigration investigations.

The recently released report provides the first official accounting of the scale of the IRS-ICE information transfer and documents security concerns surrounding an arrangement that has been the subject of multiple lawsuits and significant controversy inside both agencies.

The Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration found that the 2025 data-sharing agreement between ICE and the Treasury Department — which allowed ICE to submit names and addresses of immigrants in the U.S. illegally to the IRS for cross-verification against tax records — resulted in inconsistent formatting in ICE’s data and the IRS’ matching criteria, which led to errors.

The deal led the then-acting commissioner of the IRS to resign.

The report says that after the agreement was signed, ICE requested address information on more than 1.2 million people, and that the IRS ultimately provided last-known addresses for about 47,000 people.

The inspector general concluded that the IRS’ automated matching process was flawed. Inconsistent formatting in ICE’s data led to questionable matches, including in cases in which incomplete or inaccurate addresses were labeled as valid, the report says.

Representatives from the Treasury Department and the IRS did not respond to a request for comment.

The plan to cross-verify tax and immigration data is part of President Trump’s agenda to secure U.S. borders and his nationwide immigration crackdown, which has resulted in deportations, workplace raids and the use of an 18th century wartime law to deport Venezuelan migrants.

However, this is not the first time it’s been revealed that tens of thousands of taxpayers’ information was revealed to ICE.

In February, a federal judge said the IRS broke the law by disclosing confidential taxpayer information to ICE, referring to the same 47,000 disclosures that the inspector general points out.

U.S. District Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly found that the IRS had erroneously shared the taxpayer information of thousands of people with the Department of Homeland Security as part of the 2025 agreement.

No recommendations were made in the new inspector general report, according to a letter by Nancy A. LaManna, deputy inspector general for inspections and evaluations.

“However, we plan to share some concerns we identified during our review with the DHS Office of Inspector General,” her letter says.

Hussein writes for the Associated Press.

Two separate incidents of violence have left nine people injured in World Cup host cities in the United States, raising concerns over the safety and security of fans attending the tournament that starts in three days.

Six people were wounded in a stabbing on Sunday at New York’s Penn Station, the city’s mayor said, as the metropolitan area geared up to host two major sporting events, the NBA Finals and the FIFA World Cup.

Meanwhile, nine people sustained non-life-threatening injuries in a shooting near England’s World Cup base camp in Kansas City, Missouri, on Saturday.

The New York City Fire Department said a suspect was detained and the victims, including one with serious injuries, were taken to hospital.

Fire Department officials initially reported five wounded, but Mayor Zohran Mamdani said on X that “based on the information available right now, six people were stabbed and the alleged perpetrator is in custody.”

Circumstances of the attack were not immediately clear, but city Comptroller Mark Levine said on X that the suspect is “said to be an emotionally disturbed homeless person”.

All victims are expected to survive, he added.

State Governor Kathy Hochul described the attack as “an act of horrific violence”.

“New Yorkers deserve to feel safe wherever they go, and we will never stop working to make that a reality,” she said in a statement.

The incident occurred at one of the nation’s busiest rail and subway transport centres as the city prepares for two huge sporting spectacles.

Madison Square Garden, located directly above Penn Station in downtown Manhattan, will host games three and four of the NBA Finals on Monday and Wednesday between the New York Knicks and the San Antonio Spurs.

MetLife Stadium, outside the city in neighbouring New Jersey state, will host its first match of the World Cup on Saturday.

US President Donald Trump is scheduled to attend Monday’s NBA game at Madison Square Garden, saying recently that he accepted an invitation from Knicks owner James Dolan.

Security has been enhanced in the city before the two events.

New York’s official emergency notification system did not describe the incident but said people should avoid the area and “expect traffic delays, road closures, mass transit disruptions & emergency personnel near Penn Station”.

Before the stabbing, New York officials had already cancelled an outdoor watch party set for Monday outside the Garden.

Thousands of spectators descended onto the streets outside the venue on Friday for a game two watch party. New York authorities said a police officer was assaulted and 26 people were arrested as a number of fans turned rowdy.

Meanwhile, Kansas City police said there were no suspects in custody and that at least three of the shooting victims were taken to local hospitals.

The incident occurred about 6.5km (4 miles) from where England are set to train at the Swope Soccer Village. England have not arrived in Kansas City and are due to play a friendly against Costa Rica in Orlando, Florida, on Wednesday.

What security measures has the US put in place for the World Cup?

The 48-team, 104-match World Cup comes with an unprecedented security challenge for the host nations, particularly the US, which is hosting 78 matches across 11 cities.

Overseeing the sprawling security apparatus is a legion of federal agencies, state and local police departments and private entities. Their responsibilities range from securing stadiums and fan zones to escorting teams and protecting dignitaries.

Their tools include hunter drones that can shoot nets over objects in restricted airspace, bag-inspecting robot dogs, giant X-ray trucks and thousands of AI-powered cameras trained on public spaces soon to be thronged by fans.

Drones are prohibited over stadiums and fan zones, and the FBI has a “full suite of options” to thwart incursions, according to FBI Special Agent in Charge Amit Kachhia-Patel.

On match days, the FBI will activate joint operations centres in each host city, bringing together local, state and federal law enforcement agencies to monitor and investigate threats.

The tournament has the same high-level federal security designation as the Super Bowl, just below a presidential inauguration or a national political convention, ensuring federal, state and local coordination. It coincides with other major events linked to the 250th anniversary of the US’s founding.

So far, there are no credible threats, according to Andrew Giuliani, executive director of Trump’s World Cup task force, which is overseeing the multiagency effort.

The Department of Homeland Security, focused on Trump’s immigration enforcement crackdown and hit by a funding lapse only recently resolved, estimates that up to seven million people will visit the US for the World Cup.

The US Secret Service, under scrutiny after security breaches and attempts on Trump’s life, is in charge of protecting world leaders who show up to cheer on their countries. Trump has expressed interest in attending a match.

Gun violence is common in the US, where there were more than 400 mass shootings in 2025, according to the Gun Violence Archive.

Taiwan has accused China of carrying out a “provocative act” after Chinese Coast Guard vessels conducted patrols in waters east of the island. The operation followed announcements by Japan and the Philippines that they would begin formal talks on maritime boundary delimitation, a move Beijing views as involving waters linked to Taiwan.

Chinese state media described the deployment as a special maritime law-enforcement operation. Taiwan responded by dispatching Coast Guard vessels, which reportedly warned the Chinese ships away from restricted waters. Defence Minister Wellington Koo characterized the patrols as both a challenge to Taiwan’s sovereignty and an example of “cognitive warfare” aimed at reshaping perceptions of territorial control.

The incident comes amid sustained Chinese military activity around Taiwan, including frequent air and naval operations. Taiwan is also monitoring the movements of the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning, which is operating in the Western Pacific near waters east of the Philippines.

Why It Matters

The patrols represent more than a routine maritime operation. They signal China’s growing willingness to extend its presence beyond the Taiwan Strait and into areas east of Taiwan that have traditionally been viewed as strategically important for the island’s defence.

The move also demonstrates Beijing’s opposition to emerging regional cooperation among U.S. partners and allies. The maritime boundary discussions between Japan and the Philippines reflect increasing efforts among regional states to clarify maritime rights and strengthen coordination in contested waters.

For Taiwan, Chinese Coast Guard activities present a complex challenge. Unlike military operations, law-enforcement patrols operate within a legal grey zone that allows Beijing to advance territorial claims without triggering a conventional military confrontation. Such actions can gradually normalize China’s presence in disputed areas while increasing pressure on Taiwan’s security apparatus.

The incident further highlights the growing integration of maritime, legal, and information-based strategies in China’s approach to territorial disputes across the Indo-Pacific.

Stakeholders

Taiwan

• Protecting maritime sovereignty and territorial claims.
• Maintaining freedom of navigation and security in eastern waters.

China

• Expanding operational presence around Taiwan.
• Reinforcing sovereignty claims through maritime law-enforcement activities.

Japan

• Engaged in maritime boundary discussions with the Philippines.
• Monitoring Chinese activities that could affect regional security.

Philippines

• Seeking greater legal clarity over maritime boundaries.
• Increasing security cooperation with regional partners.

United States

• Maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait and broader Indo-Pacific region.
• Supporting freedom of navigation and regional deterrence efforts.

Regional Security Partners

• Including Australia and other Indo-Pacific states concerned about changing maritime dynamics.

Strategic Implications

The patrols illustrate China’s increasing reliance on so-called “grey-zone” tactics, which fall below the threshold of open military conflict while steadily advancing strategic objectives. By deploying Coast Guard vessels rather than naval forces, Beijing can challenge Taiwan’s authority while reducing the risk of immediate military escalation.

The incident also reflects the expanding geographical scope of cross-strait competition. Traditionally concentrated in the Taiwan Strait, tensions are increasingly extending into the Western Pacific, where control of maritime approaches carries significant strategic value for both China and Taiwan.

Furthermore, the timing of the operation suggests that Beijing is seeking to influence regional maritime diplomacy. By responding directly to Japan-Philippines boundary discussions, China is signaling its opposition to initiatives that could strengthen legal and political frameworks contrary to its territorial claims.

The episode reinforces concerns among regional governments that maritime disputes are becoming increasingly interconnected, linking Taiwan, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea into a broader strategic contest.

What’s Next?

Several developments warrant close attention in the coming weeks:

• Taiwan is likely to increase coordination between its military and Coast Guard to strengthen maritime surveillance and response capabilities.
• China may continue deploying Coast Guard vessels east of Taiwan as part of a sustained effort to normalize its operational presence in the area.
• Japan and the Philippines are expected to proceed with maritime boundary discussions despite Beijing’s objections, potentially drawing further diplomatic responses from China.
• Increased activity by the Liaoning carrier group could provide additional indications of China’s broader military objectives in the Western Pacific.
• The United States and regional partners may intensify maritime monitoring and security cooperation to deter unilateral attempts to alter the status quo.

Future outcomes

The incident reflects a broader shift in regional security dynamics, where maritime law-enforcement operations are increasingly being used as instruments of strategic competition. Rather than relying solely on military pressure, China is employing a combination of legal, political, and operational tools to reinforce its territorial claims and shape the regional security environment.

For Taiwan, the challenge extends beyond the immediate presence of Chinese vessels. The longer-term concern lies in preventing the gradual normalization of Chinese activities in areas that Taipei considers vital to its sovereignty and security. As regional actors deepen cooperation on maritime governance and security, incidents of this nature are likely to become an increasingly important indicator of the evolving balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.

With information from Reuters.

NEW YORK — The World Cup, a 48-team, 104-match behemoth kicking off this week in Los Angeles and across 15 other cities in the United States, Mexico and Canada, presents an unprecedented security challenge, with more countries, games and a larger footprint than ever before.

It also comes against the backdrop of the U.S. and Israel’s war with Iran, mounting political violence in President Trump’s orbit and growing fears of artificial intelligence-fueled disruptions, creating a complex threat environment for authorities.

Overseeing the sprawling security apparatus is a legion of federal agencies, state and local police departments and private entities. Their responsibilities range from securing stadiums and fan zones to escorting teams and protecting dignitaries.

Their tools include hunter drones that can shoot nets over objects in restricted airspace, bag-inspecting robot dogs, giant X-ray trucks and thousands of AI-powered cameras trained on public spaces soon to be thronged by fans.

In the U.S., it’s “78 Super Bowls over 39 days,” said Andrew Giuliani, executive director of Trump’s World Cup task force, which is overseeing the multiagency effort.

“There’s never been a summer like this in American history from a security angle,” said Giuliani, son of former New York City Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani. “We’re as prepared as we can be.”

Collaborative effort

The tournament has the same high-level federal security designation as the Super Bowl, just below a presidential inauguration or a national political convention, ensuring federal, state and local coordination. It coincides with other major events linked to the 250th anniversary of America’s founding.

So far, Giuliani said, there are no credible threats.

The Department of Homeland Security, focused on Trump’s immigration enforcement crackdown and with a funding lapse only recently resolved, estimates that as many as 7 million people will visit the United States for the World Cup.

The U.S. Secret Service, under scrutiny after security breaches and attempts on Trump’s life, is in charge of protecting world leaders who show up to cheer on their countries. Trump has expressed interest in attending a match.

“I feel very comfortable where we’re at, and we feel like we have a zero-fail mission,” Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin told Congress last week, noting that the Secret Service was understaffed by about 860 agents. “But it’s going to be complicated.”

Officials have indicated they are confident they can keep Trump safe because they will be integrating his usual security into the robust World Cup plan on days he may watch a match.

The FBI has spent two years developing its security plan, incorporating lessons from other major events such as the Macy’s Thanksgiving Day Parade and New Year’s Eve ball drop in New York and testing them at smaller ones, including last weekend’s Israel Day parade in the city.

“We prepare for the worst day,” FBI Special Agent in Charge Amit Kachhia-Patel in New York told the Associated Press. “And that’s how we go into any single event.”

To help cover security costs, the Federal Emergency Management Agency has distributed $625 million to the 11 U.S. host cities. An additional $250 million is being directed toward tracking and neutralizing suspect drones.

The disbursement of those funds was held up by the department’s funding delay in Congress, which the Trump administration has argued hindered security planning.

Others involved in the planning effort said the federal government could have played a more hands-on role even before the partial shutdown.

John Cohen, a former senior Homeland Security official who has been briefing state leaders before the matches, said the government was largely absent from planning meetings last year and did not begin sharing threat intelligence with host regions until recently.

“With an event of this magnitude, one would expect the federal government would’ve played a more active role,” Cohen said. “It felt like a missed opportunity to showcase that collaboration.”

Evolving threats from drones and AI

In January, thousands of officials involved in World Cup security gathered for exercises simulating crowd surges, vehicle attacks and mass shootings.

A month later, the U.S. and Israel launched a war with Iran.

“The security picture fundamentally changed,” said Stefano Ritondale, chief intelligence officer at Artorias, a defense intelligence company not involved in the security preparations. “There’s a major difference in preparing for a lone-wolf radical who rams his car into a public place and a terrorist who is bankrolled by a foreign country we’re at war with.”

Among the greatest concerns are drones.

Since the last World Cup in Qatar in 2022, drones have become a prominent weapon in conflicts including Russia’s war in Ukraine and Hamas’ attack on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023.

“If there is one threat that keeps me up at night, it is from drones,” said New York City Police Commissioner Jessica Tisch, whose department is partnering with the FBI on drone mitigation.

Drones are prohibited over stadiums and fan zones, and Kachhia-Patel said the FBI has a “full suite of options” to thwart incursions. They include agents monitoring the sky and a “variety of means” to safely down the devices, he said without elaborating.

Before this year’s World Cup, the growing sophistication of AI videos was a particular concern, with officials warning that state actors can harness the technology to sow misinformation and panic.

On match days, the FBI will activate joint operations centers in each host city, bringing together local, state and federal law enforcement agencies to monitor and investigate threats.

“If there’s a video that shows an explosion going off at a site, and it’s AI-generated, we have people on the ground who can validate whether or not that’s true,” Kachhia-Patel said.

Opportunity for private tech

Some AI companies have pitched themselves to police departments in host cities, promising to comb through data and surveillance on game days to prevent threats, including unruly fan behavior.

“We know sports fanaticism around here in terms of the NFL and baseball to some extent, but nothing like international soccer,” said Jake Becchina, a police spokesperson in Kansas City, Mo., which is hosting six matches.

The department has contracted with Peregrine Technologies, which promises to sift through police data and publicly available information such as team practice locations and the country affiliation of popular bars, to get ahead of possible conflict.

In Dallas, a recent $120-million tech upgrade will give local police body cameras capable of real-time translations, helping law enforcement communicate with international visitors soon to descend on the region.

Several drone detection and mitigation companies are joining efforts to help federal agencies secure the skies.

One of those companies, Fortem, has claimed to have signed a multimillion-dollar contract with the Department of Homeland Security before the World Cup for an unusual drone mitigation strategy: quadcopters that can shoot nets at encroaching drones to trap them in midair. A Homeland Security spokesman declined to discuss the contract.

Just as the teams will aim to perform their best on the pitch, Giuliani said the security planning was a unique chance to “show off American exceptionalism.”

“If we do our job right,” Giuliani added, “nobody will be talking about security at the World Cup.”

Offenhartz, Sisak and Santana write for the Associated Press. Offenhartz and Sisak reported from New York, Santana from Washington. AP writer Alanna Durkin Richer in Washington contributed to this report.

WASHINGTON — Former Trump administration national security advisor John Bolton has agreed to plead guilty to a single count of retaining classified information under a deal with the Justice Department that could allow him to avoid prison time, a person familiar with the matter said Thursday.

The deal would resolve a criminal case filed in October that charged Bolton with 18 counts of either retaining or disseminating classified information, including diary-like notes from his time in government that officials say he shared with his family members as he was preparing a memoir about his time in office.

Under the agreement, Bolton would also face a $2.25-million fine, said the person, who insisted on anonymity to discuss a deal that had not been made public. Any prison sentence would be capped at five years, but the agreement allows for him to avoid time behind bars, though the punishment will ultimately be up to a judge.

The case against Bolton, filed weeks after prosecutors secured indictments against former FBI Director James Comey and New York Atty. Gen. Letitia James, unfolded against the backdrop of concerns that the Justice Department was using its law enforcement powers to pursue perceived adversaries of President Trump. The investigation burst into public view last August when FBI agents served search warrants at his Maryland home and Washington office, but it had been well underway by the time Trump returned to the White House in January 2025.

Bolton is a longtime fixture in Republican foreign policy circles who became known for his hawkish views on U.S. power. He served for more than a year in Trump’s first administration before being fired in 2019 and publishing a critical book that portrayed the Republican president as deeply misinformed, an unflattering portrait of his leadership and decision-making.

Trump’s administration fought unsuccessfully to block the publication of “The Room Where it Happened” on the grounds that the book risked disclosing classified information. The plea deal that Bolton will enter covers the notes he shared with relatives as opposed to information published in the tell-all book.

A rearraignment, which typically signals a plea agreement, is scheduled for June 26 in federal court in Greenbelt, Md.

The Justice Department declined to comment.

The indictment’s 18 counts carried a threat of a substantial prison sentence in the event of conviction.

Court documents alleged that he shared with two family members “diary-like” entries with information classified as high as top secret that he had learned from meetings with other U.S. government officials, from intelligence briefings or talks with foreign leaders. After sending one document, Bolton wrote in a message to his relatives, “None of which we talk about!!!” In response, one of his relatives wrote, “Shhhhh,” prosecutors said.

The indictment said that among the material shared was information about foreign adversaries that in some cases revealed details about sources and methods used by the U.S. government to collect intelligence. One document related to a foreign adversary’s plans for a missile launch, while another detailed U.S. government plans for covert action and included intelligence blaming an adversary for an attack, court papers say.

In a statement released after his indictment, Bolton described the charges as part of an “intensive effort” by Trump to intimidate his opponents, to ensure that he alone determines what is said about his conduct.”

Bolton also served in the Department of Justice during President Reagan’s administration and was a State Department point person on arms control during George W. Bush’s presidency.

Bolton was nominated by Bush to serve as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, but the strong supporter of the Iraq war was unable to win Senate confirmation. He resigned after serving 17 months through a recess appointment that allowed him to hold the job on a temporary basis without Senate approval.

In 2018, Bolton was appointed to serve as Trump’s third national security advisor. His brief tenure was characterized by disputes with the president over North Korea, Iran and Ukraine.

Those rifts ultimately led to Bolton’s departure, with Trump announcing on social media in September 2019 that he had accepted Bolton’s resignation.

Bolton subsequently criticized Trump’s approach to foreign policy and government in his book, alleging that Trump directly tied providing military aid to Ukraine to that country’s willingness to conduct investigations into Joe Biden, who was soon to be Trump’s Democratic rival in the 2020 presidential election, and members of the Biden family.

Trump responded by slamming Bolton as a “washed-up guy” and a “crazy” warmonger who would have led the country into “World War Six.”

Tucker writes for the Associated Press. AP writer Alanna Durkin Richer contributed to this report.

Russia’s influence across its traditional sphere of influence is facing growing challenges as the war in Ukraine continues to consume military, economic and diplomatic resources. For decades, Moscow maintained strong ties with former Soviet states through security guarantees, energy supplies and economic integration. However, several longtime partners have increasingly sought closer relations with the West, raising concerns in the Kremlin about the erosion of its geopolitical position.

One of the most notable examples is Armenia, a longtime Russian ally that has recently deepened engagement with the United States and Europe while exploring a path toward eventual European Union membership.

What Happened

Russian President Vladimir Putin has warned Armenia that pursuing closer integration with the European Union could come at a significant economic cost. Ahead of Armenia’s parliamentary elections, Putin suggested that Yerevan could lose access to discounted Russian oil and gas if it continues moving toward the EU.

The warning comes as polls indicate that the party of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who has pursued a more Western-oriented foreign policy, is likely to perform strongly in the vote.

Russia has already taken measures that many observers view as pressure tactics, including temporary restrictions on certain Armenian exports and warnings about possible reductions in economic cooperation.

Why Armenia Is Moving Closer to the West

Relations between Moscow and Yerevan have cooled significantly in recent years. Armenia signed a partnership agreement with the United States last month and has taken legislative steps that could eventually support EU membership aspirations.

Pashinyan’s government argues that Armenia must diversify its international partnerships and reduce its dependence on any single power. Supporters of closer Western ties point to economic opportunities, political reforms and security cooperation as key motivations behind the shift.

Russian officials, however, view Armenia’s growing engagement with Western institutions as part of a broader effort by the United States and Europe to weaken Moscow’s influence in the South Caucasus region.

Russia’s Wider Struggle to Retain Influence

The dispute with Armenia highlights a broader challenge facing Russia as it attempts to preserve its global standing while remaining heavily focused on the war in Ukraine.

Across multiple regions, Moscow is confronting increasing competition from Western powers. In Europe, countries once considered friendly to Russia are strengthening ties with the European Union and NATO. In the Balkans, political pressure is growing on governments that have traditionally maintained close relations with Moscow.

Russia also faces challenges in Moldova’s breakaway region of Transdniestria, where pro-European political forces are gaining influence. In Central Asia, Moscow is closely watching expanding Western engagement in a region it has long regarded as part of its strategic sphere.

Beyond its neighborhood, Russia’s relationships with partners such as Cuba, Venezuela and Iran are being tested as geopolitical dynamics shift and Western pressure intensifies.

What Comes Next

The outcome of Armenia’s parliamentary election will be closely watched in both Moscow and Western capitals. A victory for Pashinyan’s party could strengthen Armenia’s efforts to deepen ties with Europe and the United States, potentially leading to further tensions with Russia.

For the Kremlin, the situation represents a broader strategic dilemma. As the war in Ukraine continues without a clear resolution, Russia must balance military commitments with the need to maintain influence among traditional allies increasingly exploring alternative partnerships.

The coming months are likely to reveal whether Moscow can preserve its position in regions it has long considered part of its sphere of influence or whether Western engagement will continue to reshape the geopolitical landscape across Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and beyond.

With information from Reuters.