security

WASHINGTON — The Supreme Court is weighing President Trump’s claim that his new White House ballroom is urgently needed to protect him, his staff and guests from attacks by drones, terrorists and snipers.

On Friday, with a lower-court order about to go into effect halting construction on the controversial project, Chief Justice John G. Roberts decided that the court needed more time. He issued a temporary order pausing the case and allowing construction to continue while the justices decide on a pending legal challenge.

Last week, Trump’s lawyers described the East Wing ballroom as an “integrated military complex” that is “vitally required by national security.” They argued that a judge’s order blocking further construction threatened the safety of the president and must be overturned. They also said the project is nearly two-thirds completed.

At issue is whether the president acting on his own may build a huge new ballroom complex that is expected to dwarf the historic Executive Mansion.

It is a confrontation over the boundaries of executive power at a moment when Trump has repeatedly tested the ability of courts, Congress and independent institutions to constrain his agenda.

Trump bulldozed the historic East Wing before the courts had resolved whether the administration had the authority to proceed, leaving opponents to argue the project could become effectively irreversible before judicial review was complete.

The National Trust for Historic Preservation sued in December and argued that the president had overstepped his authority.

U.S. District Judge Richard Leon agreed and ordered a stop to the above-ground construction — that is, on the ballroom. He said the work on the underground bunker may proceed.

The U.S. court of appeals affirmed his order by a 2-1 vote on Aug. 7 but put the decision on hold until Friday. Roberts’ order did not explain the reason for the delay, or how soon the court might rule.

In a fast-track appeal to the Supreme Court, Trump administration lawyers sought to refocus the case as one about national security and the president’s safety.

“Given the current unprecedented levels of danger … every day the President does not have access to the vital security features of the military complex presents unacceptable risk,” Solicitor Gen. D. John Sauer said Wednesday in his final brief to the court.

Construction continues on the White House East Wing ballroom on Aug. 20.

(Andrew Harnik / Getty Images)

The Constitution and federal law say new buildings may not be erected on public property in the District of Columbia “without the express authority of Congress.”

But acting on his own, Trump ordered the East Wing of the White House torn down in October and work began on a new and much larger building to replace it.

He said the new ballroom could provide safe and secure seating for 1,000 dinner guests. He did not ask Congress to weigh in or approve the massive project.

In defense, Trump administration lawyers pointed to an annual appropriation from Congress that funds “the care, maintenance, repair, alteration, refurnishing” and other such improvements at the White House.

They also said private donations would pay most of the $400-million cost of the new ballroom. One estimate placed the cost of the ballroom and the bunker at $600 million, with taxpayers covering half, the Washington Post reported.

The president, his family and White House employees would have secure underground space, Sauer said, while a “totally secure ballroom space” would provide a new level of protection for guests and foreign dignitaries.

Otherwise, they would be seated outside in tents on the lawn, Trump said, which was neither appealing nor safe.

President Trump speaks to the media as the construction of a new helipad on the South Lawn of the White House continues on Aug. 19.

(Alex Wong / Getty Images)

His solicitor general also argued it was too late to stop the project.

“A 250-person crew is working 20 hours a day, seven days a week to keep the project ahead of schedule and under budget,” he wrote on Aug. 13. “Today, the project is 65% complete in its entirety, and moving quickly toward total completion.”

Trump’s signature construction project has fueled accusations from his political opponents that he is abusing his power to build a lavish space for entertaining guests as ordinary Americans struggle with affordability.

In April, Republicans in Congress sought to put federal money behind the project, despite Trump’s earlier insistence that private donors would pay for the ballroom.

The effort never became law, faced with bipartisan opposition to a bill that would tie them to the unpopular project, leaving the administration to proceed with a privately financed effort whose legal authority was already being challenged in court.

The Society for the Rule of Law and a group of former White House lawyers warned the court against accepting Trump’s broad claims of power.

“Under the executive’s view, the President could bulldoze the entire White House and replace it with a new building of his own design, including a skyscraper. No other President has asserted such transformative power,” they wrote in a friend-of-the-court brief.

“The invocation of national security is not a magic incantation that suspends the rule of law,” they added.

The biggest hurdle facing the challengers may be the issue of standing.

The court’s conservatives are often skeptical of lawsuits if it is not clear the plaintiffs have or will suffer a distinct injury that goes beyond their opposition to a government policy.

In this case, the National Trust said its historians and preservationists will be disturbed to walk by the White House grounds if there is a massive new structure that is not in keeping with the historic Executive Mansion.

Construction continues on the East Wing ballroom at the White House on Aug. 10, 2026, in Washington, D.C.

(Andrew Harnik / Getty Images)

“The subjective displeasure of an offended observer does not amount to a concrete injury,” Sauer said.

The D.C. Circuit judges were also split on the threshold issue of standing.

Judges Patricia Millett, an Obama appointee, and Bradley Garcia, a Biden appointee, ruled the suit may proceed because the plaintiffs suffered injuries to their “aesthetic, cultural and historical interests.”

Judge Neomi Rao, a Trump appointee, dissented and said the preservationists walking by the White House would not suffer the kind of concrete injury that gives them standing.

Taiwan Warns Chinese Vessel to Leave Sensitive Waters

Taiwan’s coast guard said on Friday it had warned off and shadowed a Chinese research vessel operating in sensitive waters west of the island, marking the third time the ship has appeared near Taiwan since May.

The vessel, the Tongji, was spotted late Thursday about 24.9 nautical miles northwest of Taiwan’s Penghu islands, which sit in the Taiwan Strait and host important Taiwanese military facilities.

Taiwan views the repeated presence of Chinese vessels near the island as part of a broader campaign of maritime pressure by Beijing.

Coast Guard Monitors Tongji as It Moves South

Taiwan said the Tongji was not seen deploying or towing scientific equipment during its latest appearance.

The coast guard dispatched a patrol vessel to sail alongside the Chinese ship and issued what it described as strong warnings for it to leave the area.

By Friday morning, the Tongji had moved to around 28 nautical miles west-southwest of Liuqiu island in southern Taiwan, continuing southeast through the Taiwan Strait.

Taiwan’s coast guard said it would continue proactively deploying vessels to respond to Chinese ships and protect the country’s waters.

China’s Taiwan Affairs Office had not immediately responded to a Reuters request for comment.

Why Is the Research Ship Significant?

The Tongji was commissioned only last year and has appeared near Taiwan several times since May.

Taiwan previously reported seeing the vessel lowering ropes into the water, raising concerns that it could have been conducting scientific or survey operations without authorisation.

Chinese state media describes the ship as capable of operating in all weather conditions and carrying remotely operated vehicles, laboratories and unmanned systems.

The latest incident is therefore significant because the vessel’s presence comes amid wider concerns in Taipei over Chinese maritime activity around the island.

Taiwan Sees a Broader Grey-Zone Strategy

Taiwan has increasingly described the activities of Chinese coast guard and other vessels around the island as grey-zone pressure.

Rather than directly launching military action, such operations can create persistent pressure through patrols, maritime activity and the repeated presence of Chinese state vessels in disputed or sensitive areas.

Taiwan argues that these activities can gradually create an impression of Chinese jurisdiction while testing Taipei’s ability to monitor and respond to incursions.

The research vessel’s repeated appearances add another dimension to that pressure because scientific and survey activity can have potential strategic value even when a vessel is not openly conducting military operations.

Chinese Military Activity Continues Around Taiwan

The latest maritime encounter comes against the backdrop of China’s almost daily military activity around Taiwan.

Beijing considers Taiwan part of China and rejects the Taiwanese government’s claims to sovereignty. Taiwan’s government rejects Beijing’s sovereignty claims and maintains control over the island.

This has produced an increasingly competitive environment in which military aircraft, naval vessels, coast guard ships and other Chinese platforms regularly operate around Taiwan.

Analysis: Why the Tongji Matters Beyond Scientific Research

The immediate incident does not appear to represent a direct military confrontation. Taiwan said the Tongji was not observed deploying equipment, and the coast guard’s response consisted primarily of monitoring and warnings.

But the repeated appearance of the same vessel is strategically significant.

Research ships can perform legitimate scientific functions, but their ability to operate sophisticated equipment and collect information in strategically important waters means their activities can also have implications for maritime surveillance and future military operations.

For Taiwan, the challenge is therefore to distinguish between legitimate research and activity that could contribute to China’s broader strategic objectives without unnecessarily escalating tensions.

The incident also illustrates the evolving nature of cross-Strait competition. China does not need to launch a military attack to increase pressure on Taiwan; persistent maritime activity can gradually test Taiwan’s responses, expand China’s presence and challenge Taipei’s control over the surrounding waters.

As Chinese vessels continue appearing near Taiwan, incidents involving research ships, coast guard vessels and military platforms are likely to become an increasingly important part of the island’s security challenge.

With information from Reuters.

Activist group says the ‘twisted’ Hong Kong judicial system had long ago decided that the pair were guilty.

A Hong Kong court has found two pro-democracy activists guilty on national security charges in a trial widely viewed as exemplifying the erosion of freedom of expression in the Chinese city.

Lee Cheuk-yan, 69, and Chow Hang-tung, 41, former leaders of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China, were found guilty of “incitement to subversion” for their role in organising candlelit vigils to mark Beijing’s deadly 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, in a Hong Kong court on Friday. The two had pleaded not guilty and were charged in 2021.

The pair could face up to 10 years in jail. Sentencing is expected at a later date.

Prosecutors argued that the pair “endanger[ed] national security in the name of human rights”.

Chow, a human rights barrister who represented herself, told the court in May that the law itself was on trial.

Friday’s verdict was “no surprise”, said Mark Clifford, president of the Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation.

Hong Kong’s “twisted” judicial system had already decided the pair were guilty in 2021, he said. He described Lee and Chow as “true Chinese patriots” who were silenced because they “spoke truth to power” and “held up a mirror to the Chinese Communist Party”.

Hong Kong’s crackdown

For three decades, the candlelight vigil organised by the alliance was the only large-scale public commemoration of the Tiananmen crackdown, drawing tens of thousands of people annually to mourn the victims in China. The event was banned in 2020 during the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic, weeks before Beijing imposed the security law on Hong Kong to quell the 2019 massive antigovernment protests.

The alliance’s leaders have been behind bars since they were charged.

Chow and Lee “exposed the Chinese government’s fears of the memory of its own atrocities”, Elaine Pearson, Asia director at Human Rights Watch, said, urging governments around the world to hold Beijing to account for erasing Hong Kong’s freedoms.

Earlier this year, Jimmy Lai, 78, a media mogul and high-profile rights campaigner in Hong Kong, was found guilty on national security charges and sentenced to 20 years behind bars.

Led ‘like a dog on a lead’

In a personal blog published in the days leading up to the verdict, Chow detailed her treatment by correctional services, in which she described being led “like a dog on a lead”, shackled at the wrists, waist and ankles.

She described a new method of restraint, with specialised handcuffs, as the source of significant pain during her long detention: “One can only ‘choose’ which part of the body shall suffer in turn” due to the bodily contortions forced by the restraints she has been held in.

Chow is one of the few high-profile political prisoners detained in Hong Kong to continue to speak out publicly against the authorities.

In June 1989, China’s government sent tanks and soldiers to crush a pro-democracy movement that had installed itself in Beijing’s central Tiananmen Square. Hundreds, possibly thousands, of people were killed by soldiers, and many were injured. Beijing has since sought to censor mention of the incident in China.

Lee and Chow were also leaders of the now-defunct Hong Kong Alliance (HKA).

The HKA was founded in May 1989 to support students holding pro-democracy rallies. Weeks later, the Communist Party crushed pro-democracy protests in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square with troops and tanks. Estimates of the death toll range from a few hundred to many thousands.

Over the next three decades, HKA called on authorities to accept responsibility for the crackdown, free dissidents and introduce democratic reform.

The Alliance’s leaders were charged in 2021 and have been behind bars since.

Rights group Amnesty International has said the case “relies on vague, overly broad and arbitrary definitions of ‘subversion'”.

Sarah Brooks, Amnesty International’s Deputy Regional Director, said Chow and Lee had “not committed any recognisable crime”.

“Chow Hang-tung and Lee Cheuk-yan are prisoners of conscience who should never have been prosecuted in the first place. They must be released immediately and unconditionally”, she added.

In a separate case, Chow was arrested in June 2021 for “inciting” the public to take part in that year’s vigil and later found guilty.

However, Hong Kong’s top court overturned that conviction in 2022, with a judge ruling the police hadn’t properly justified the vigil’s ban.

Chow Hang-tung spoke to the BBC in 2021, weeks before her arrest on 4 June 2022.

“I am prepared to be arrested. That is how Hong Kong is now,” she had said.

“I am willing to pay the price for fighting for democracy”.

The Red Sea does not recognise political borders as maps draw them. Instead, it binds every country on its shores to a shared fate with its neighbours across the water. When the western shore of this sea is shaken, the eastern shore does not remain untouched. This is a hard geopolitical reality that Saudi Arabia has understood well through decades of dealing with crises in the Horn of Africa and Yemen as a direct extension of its own domestic security.

It is through this deep understanding of geography as a shared destiny that the agreement establishing the Saudi-Sudanese Coordination Council, signed in Riyadh on August 17, 2026, should be read. It is the institutional expression of a firmly held Saudi conviction: that the stability of a unified Sudan is indispensable to the stability of the kingdom itself, and that Sudan’s collapse or fragmentation would inevitably become a Saudi national security crisis.

Historical ties and cultural common ground

Long before strategic considerations and geopolitical crises came to the fore, Saudis viewed Sudanese people with great respect and as among those to whom they felt closest. Since the earliest times, Hijazis have shared cultural and linguistic traits with people on the other side of the Red Sea, particularly Sudanese people.

Throughout modern history, relations between the two countries have not been marked by serious crises. Indeed, they have been distinguished by a unique historical fact: the relationship has never witnessed a political crisis between the two states or their peoples, and there has always been mutual appreciation between them. This exceptional relationship, rooted in religious, cultural and social ties, has made the two countries a rare model of intra-Arab relations that has withstood all regional storms.

Saudi Arabia has stood by Sudanese people through every ordeal, including Nile floods and natural disasters, as well as the country’s crises and civil wars. This has created a fabric of human ties that goes beyond narrow political interests. It was this unique historical legacy that made Saudi mediation welcome to both sides when the war broke out, with the Jeddah platform working to ease the conflict and address the humanitarian crisis.

Saudi Arabia’s current position towards Sudan, then, is not merely the product of cold strategic or political calculations. It is the natural extension of a relationship that lived in people’s hearts before it was translated into institutions and agreements.

A framework for strategic partnership

This relationship culminated in the Saudi-Sudanese Coordination Council, whose founding agreement was signed in Riyadh on August 17, 2026, by the two countries’ foreign ministers, Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud and Mohieddin Salem. Sources say it is not merely a conventional diplomatic framework, but a comprehensive institutional platform intended to oversee 10 major strategic areas. These reflect the depth of the partnership between the two countries and their desire to move from political and humanitarian support towards a long-term strategic, economic and investment partnership.

The 10 areas covered by the council include Sudan’s reconstruction; agriculture and food security; livestock; gold and mining; the Red Sea and ports; energy and electricity; finance and banking; industry and food processing; communications and digital transformation; and tourism, real estate and services.

Taken together, these areas constitute an integrated roadmap for turning bilateral relations into a genuine development partnership, drawing on Saudi Arabia’s investment and technological capabilities and Sudan’s enormous natural and human resources.

According to the Sudanese foreign minister, the council’s priorities centre on security, defence and the economy, with the Red Sea added as an area of strategic cooperation because of its importance to both countries. This is why Sudan joined the maritime defence alliance established by Saudi Arabia on July 30, 2026. This reflects a shared understanding that security and stability are the essential preconditions for any economic development, and that Red Sea security is a shared responsibility that cannot be separated from the stability of the states along its shores.

Sudan and the wider Arab project

For more than a decade and a half, the Arab region has witnessed a wave of systematic projects of fragmentation targeting pivotal states such as Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen and Somalia. Countries that once played an active role in the regional order have been turned into open arenas of conflict managed by regional and international actors through local proxies. With its enormous resources and vital location connecting the Arab world with the African interior, Sudan has always been an ideal target for such a project of division.

When Saudi Arabia acts to support a path that preserves the unity of the Sudanese state and its national institutions, it objectively contributes to thwarting one link in this scheme targeting the Arab world as a whole. Every Arab state protected from fragmentation represents another defeat for this project, while every state that succumbs to it represents a victory that encourages its repetition. From this perspective, Sudanese stability is a collective Arab battle, and Saudi Arabia finds itself in the position of a state capable of leading that battle in defence of a collective Arab project that cannot afford to lose another link.

Sudan in the regional equation

Sudan occupies a unique position that makes it one of the region’s most important strategic keys: it is an Arab state that borders both the Red Sea and the Nile, connects the Horn of Africa with the Sahara, the Sahel and the Arab hinterland, and borders seven African and Arab countries.

This location makes Sudan a natural bridge between the Arab world and Africa, a vital maritime gateway on the Red Sea and a strategic water nexus on the Nile.

If a state in such a position fragments, it opens a geopolitical rupture whose effects extend from the Nile Basin to the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, and from the African Sahel to the Arabian Peninsula. The recent experience of Yemen has clearly demonstrated how the collapse of a state on the Red Sea can transform a vital maritime chokepoint such as Bab al-Mandeb from a safe commercial passage into an arena of direct threats to global shipping.

Saudi Arabia, which has paid a heavy price in both security and economic terms as a result of the war in Yemen, has realised that the security of waterways cannot be safeguarded merely by guarding the passages themselves, but by ensuring the stability of the states whose coastlines surround them.

Security beyond borders

In classical and contemporary strategic thought, the security of any major state is measured not only at its immediate borders, but also through its “strategic depth”: the wider geographical sphere that absorbs shocks before they reach the core. This idea, whose roots can be traced to strategic thinkers such as Nicholas Spykman and Walter Lippmann, holds that a state exists within a geopolitical environment that either acts as a buffer and absorbs crises, or transmits and amplifies them.

Given Saudi Arabia’s position as a pivotal regional power, it cannot content itself with securing its immediate borders while crises rage throughout its strategic surroundings. From this perspective, Sudan is not merely a neighbour across the sea, but one of the most important components of Saudi strategic depth. Its stability means stability along the kingdom’s western maritime frontier, control over flows of irregular migration and smuggling, and keeping at bay the spectre of a security vacuum that could be exploited by armed groups and extremist organisations.

When Riyadh invests in Sudan’s reconstruction and development through permanent institutional frameworks such as the Coordination Council, it is building a wall of stability around its strategic depth. It has understood that genuine security cannot be bought with walls alone, but is built through the prosperity of its neighbours.

A new Saudi approach to Red Sea security

The security of major waterways is not simply the product of military protection of the passage itself, but of the strength and stability of the states along its shores. A Red Sea bordered or surrounded by fragile or collapsed states, or states penetrated by irregular forces, is an insecure Red Sea regardless of the military capabilities of the major powers along its shores.

From this lesson, a more mature Saudi vision has emerged: it is not enough for the kingdom to be strong on the eastern shore. The states along the western shore and the Red Sea’s southern approaches, including Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia, must also be strong, cohesive and capable of exercising full sovereignty over their coastlines. By placing the “Red Sea” alongside security and defence among its areas of focus, the Saudi-Sudanese Coordination Council puts this philosophy into practice: strengthening Sudan’s ability to control its coastline is a direct Saudi investment in the security of the Red Sea as a whole.

The responsibility of regional power

The Saudi-Sudanese Coordination Council is an expression of a broader political philosophy embraced by Riyadh: genuine regional power does not grow stronger by isolating itself behind borders, but by assuming responsibility for the stability of its surroundings. At a time when projects of fragmentation are proliferating, supporting Sudan’s unity, strengthening Saudi strategic depth and safeguarding Red Sea security are three sides of the same coin.

When Saudi Arabia safeguards the unity of its neighbour, it safeguards the integrity of its own strategic project. When it protects the stability of the Sudanese coast, it protects the stability of its own. This is the dialectic of shared geography: neither neighbour can be secure without the other, and neither shore can be stable without the one opposite it.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

GOING to the airport follows a strict process – check in, drop your bags off, head through security and – for many of us – get stopped for a search.

And when that inevitably happens, nine out of 10 times the reason is something that seems silly or you could have easily prevented.

And there are actually two items that we all carry that cause issues.

The first is our gadgets – whether that be a laptop, iPad or phone.

According to Which?, layering electronics can trigger a manual search.

Smiths Detections has said that layering electronics should be avoided.

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Instead, travellers should place them next to each other.

They explained: : “Where possible, avoid stacking multiple electronic devices directly on top of one another in cabin baggage. Instead, place them side by side.”

And another popular item most of us travel with – a water bottle – can also cause an issue.

Smiths Detection explained that travellers should avoid packing bottles and liquid containers near to gadgets.

They explained that they “should ideally be packed separately from electronic devices and not directly underneath or immediately adjacent to them”.

While in a lot of airports new CT scanners allow us to keep all our gadgets and liquids in our bag, these items can still be flagged.

The scanners are meant to make the security process faster, but you could still queue to have your bag manually checked.

If you are heading through an airport as a family, make sure to look out for family lanes which can help you bypass queues.

At London Luton Airport you can reserve a 30-minute window online from between four days and 60 minutes before you arrive at security to bypass the queues, for free.

Manchester Airport has a similar system but you get a 15-minute slot.

Californians are more concerned about the Trump administration interfering in the state’s midterm elections than they are about voter fraud, noncitizens voting illegally or foreign interference, according to a new poll.

A majority of voters — 61% — identified potential federal interference as a “major concern” heading into November, slightly more than the 59% who cited possible foreign interference as such, according to the poll from the UC Berkeley Institute of Governmental Studies, co-sponsored by The Times.

By comparison, 41% of California voters identified voter fraud and 37% identified noncitizens voting as major concerns, the poll found.

The polling reflects the liberal leanings of the state, where registered Democrats outnumber registered Republicans by a nearly 2-to-1 margin, as well as the nation’s hyperpartisan divide on voting issues and vulnerabilities.

That divide has been driven for years by President Trump’s relentless criticism of U.S. elections, particularly in large blue states such as California, and recently by his administration’s attempts to wrest control over voting processes from the states based on unverified claims of widespread fraud and the fierce pushback against those claims from California Democrats and other liberal leaders around the country.

The White House has dismissed concerns about interference and accused Democrats of obstructing its efforts to protect American elections from fraud, including through the proposed SAVE America Act — which would enforce strict new ID and proof-of-citizenship requirements for voters nationwide.

While 80% of Democratic respondents to the poll said potential federal interference in the state’s elections was a major concern, just 28% of Republican respondents identified it as such.

Voter fraud was identified as a major concern by 84% of Republican voters but just 21% of Democratic voters, the poll found. Noncitizens voting illegally also was identified as a major concern by 85% of Republicans but just 12% of Democrats.

Republicans also have substantial concerns about the security of mail ballots and how slowly California counts its vote, while Democrats were far less concerned about those issues, the poll found.

Mark DiCamillo, the poll’s director, said it clearly reflects the partisan divide around election issues and “shows that in this state, federal interference is a big deal — more so than in other places around the country.”

He called that a “big finding” in line with previous polls that found “Californians are very concerned about prioritizing efforts to defend democracy and to protect election systems,” including in the face of threats from Trump — who routinely has focused on the state in his regular attacks on election integrity.

“For 61% of Californians to say that’s a major concern to them in terms of the threats to the election system, I think that’s very newsworthy,” DiCamillo said.

He also noted the particularly stark difference between state Democrats and Republicans on the issue of noncitizens voting.

“Nearly 90% of Democrats say that’s not a concern, whereas 85% of Republicans feel it is,” he said. “Californians have a lot of noncitizens in the state, but Democrats don’t think they’re infecting the voter rolls, so they’re not concerned about it.”

That was striking, DiCamillo said, given how much Trump has pointed to California to claim that noncitizens are voting.

“Obviously, the Democrats are very strongly opposed to the president, what he’s trying to do, and the Republicans are supportive,” DiCamillo said.

Other findings in the poll also support that conclusion.

For instance, while Trump has claimed without evidence that mail ballots are a major source of fraud and their use should be reined in, the poll found that 72% of Californians approve of mail ballots as a primary method for voting in the state — with 58% saying they strongly approve.

California law requires every registered voter in the state to be sent a mail ballot, and more than 80% of voters have used such ballots in recent elections.

Trump also repeatedly has accused California officials of failing to secure state elections against fraud and of cheating as they count later-arriving mail ballots. But the poll found that Californians by greater than a 2-to-1 margin — 65% to 31% — are confident local election officials are accurately and fairly counting ballots. However, the poll did find that more than half of respondents, 53%, had concerns about delays in California’s vote-counting process.

Overall, 64% of respondents were confident in the integrity of the state’s election system, compared to 34% who were not.

Kim Alexander, president of the California Voter Foundation, downplayed the threats of voter fraud and noncitizens voting in the state, but acknowledged they are real concerns for some voters — which is a problem in itself.

“I see election security as both a matter of actual security and perceived security. And the truth is that we have a great deal of actual security in California elections, but, unfortunately, that security is not being perceived by some voters,” she said. She attributed that in part to the “constant drumbeat that we’ve had now for a decade, coming from the occupant of the White House, that our elections are rigged.”

Alexander said California law requires registering voters to prove and attest to their identity and has multiple verification measures to ensure people casting ballots are who they say they are. She said there are “common sense” reasons why noncitizens do not try to vote — including that it requires them to turn over personal information and could be grounds for criminal charges and deportation, which is “a huge disincentive.”

Alexander also said Trump administration interference in the midterms is a real concern, but so is overhyping the threat to the point it discourages voters from casting ballots.

“Not to dismiss the threats — the threats are real — but the more we talk about them, the more we scare voters,” Alexander said. “I’ve encountered voters who’ve said this to me: ‘What’s the point in voting when they’re just gonna cheat?’ Or, you know: ‘It’s all rigged.’ And that’s part of the play here — is to scare people into thinking that voting doesn’t matter.”

To counter that, Alexander said it is “really important that people be aware that there are threats, but to not let those threats be debilitating or to allow them to dissuade people from wanting to participate.”

The poll surveyed 4,207 registered voters in California from Aug. 3 to 9, online in English and Spanish, and has an estimated margin of error of about 2.5 percentage points in either direction.

The Iran war has pushed the global energy system into a deeper crisis, with the disruption increasingly shifting from crude oil supplies to the refined fuels that power transportation, industry and economies worldwide.

While global oil markets have adapted relatively well to the loss of a significant share of Middle Eastern crude production, the refining industry has had far fewer options to compensate.

That imbalance is already visible in fuel prices.

Brent crude is around $90 a barrel, roughly 25% above its level when the conflict began on February 28 but well below its wartime peak of $118.

Refined fuel prices, however, have remained much higher. European diesel prices have risen more than 70% since the start of the war, while U.S. gasoline prices have increased around 60%.

The growing divergence suggests that the biggest energy shock may no longer be coming from crude oil itself, but from the world’s ability to turn crude into usable fuel.

Why Are Fuel Prices Rising Faster Than Oil?

The key problem is declining refinery capacity.

The International Energy Agency estimates that more than 20% of the Middle East’s 9.6 million barrels per day of refining capacity was knocked out during the conflict.

At the same time, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has restricted fuel exports and disrupted the movement of Gulf crude.

The result has been a chain reaction.

Refineries, particularly in Asia, have had to reduce operations because of difficulties obtaining crude, while damaged Middle Eastern facilities have struggled to return to normal production.

This has created a shortage of diesel, gasoline and other refined products even as crude oil prices have retreated from their wartime highs.

How Has Russia Made the Fuel Crisis Worse?

The Middle East is not the only source of disruption.

Months of Ukrainian attacks on Russian energy infrastructure have also reduced global refining capacity.

Russian refinery throughput has fallen by nearly 30% in recent months to below 4 million barrels per day.

The decline has forced Moscow to restrict diesel exports, removing another major source of refined fuel from international markets.

The combination of Middle Eastern refinery damage and reduced Russian output has left the global market with fewer alternatives.

That is particularly important for diesel, which is essential for freight transportation, agriculture, construction and industrial activity.

Why Are Diesel Refining Margins Surging?

The shortage is reflected in refining margins.

European diesel refining margins have more than tripled since February, rising above $75 a barrel.

U.S. diesel margins have increased more than 140%, reaching a record $100 earlier this week.

These figures demonstrate how severe the shortage has become.

Refineries capable of producing diesel and other fuels are commanding exceptionally high margins because demand remains strong while available capacity is shrinking.

The problem is that simply increasing refining margins does not immediately create new refining capacity.

Building or repairing refineries can take months or years, particularly when specialised equipment is required.

Have Global Fuel Inventories Been Depleted?

Yes, and that could become one of the biggest problems in the months ahead.

Fuel stockpiles provided an important buffer when the conflict began.

That buffer is now largely gone.

According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, global oil inventories fell at a rate of around 3.5 million barrels per day between March and July.

Stocks are expected to continue declining through the end of the year.

U.S. diesel inventories are already at their lowest seasonal level in three decades, while gasoline stocks are at their weakest seasonal level since 2012.

This leaves the market increasingly exposed to any additional disruption.

Is There a Global Fuel Production Shortfall?

The data suggests there is.

Global refinery runs during the second quarter were 5.1 million barrels per day lower than a year earlier, according to the IEA.

High fuel prices have reduced consumption, with demand for refined products falling by around 4 million barrels per day.

But that reduction has not been sufficient.

The result was still a shortfall of more than 1 million barrels per day.

The imbalance could become even worse during the third quarter.

Refinery runs are expected to remain 4.1 million barrels per day below last year’s level, while demand is projected to fall by only 2.4 million barrels per day.

In other words, fuel supply is declining faster than demand.

Would Reopening the Strait of Hormuz Solve the Crisis?

Not necessarily.

A diplomatic breakthrough between Washington and Tehran that permanently reopened the Strait of Hormuz could send crude prices sharply lower.

But cheaper crude would not automatically translate into cheaper gasoline and diesel.

The reason is that the refining infrastructure itself has been damaged.

More than 20 Gulf refineries suffered damage during the war, and many require extensive repairs.

Crucial equipment such as compressors, heat exchangers and specialised catalysts can take significant time to obtain.

Lead times for some of these components were already stretched before the conflict.

Consequently, even if crude shipments resume quickly, refinery capacity could remain constrained for much longer.

Why Is China Important to the Energy Crisis?

China’s response could have a major impact on global fuel markets.

China is the world’s second-largest refining centre and sharply reduced refinery processing rates and fuel exports during the conflict.

If Beijing keeps exports limited, the international market will lose another potential source of refined products.

Conversely, an increase in Chinese refinery utilisation and exports could provide some relief.

But China must also balance domestic fuel demand, inventory requirements and its own energy security.

That makes its decisions particularly important for Asia and the wider global market.

Could the Energy Crisis Fuel Global Inflation?

The answer could be yes.

The immediate impact of higher fuel prices is already appearing in inflation data.

U.S. consumer prices rose 3.4% year-on-year in July, with energy costs increasing 14.7% and gasoline prices rising 24.6%.

Euro zone inflation accelerated to 2.9%, driven partly by a 10% increase in energy costs.

Japan’s producer price index rose 7.2% in July.

These figures raise concerns that the energy shock could spread beyond fuel markets.

Higher transportation costs increase the cost of moving goods, while expensive diesel raises costs for agriculture, manufacturing and logistics.

If those increases persist, businesses may eventually pass them on to consumers.

Why Could the Energy Crisis Last for Years?

The central problem is that refining capacity cannot be restored as quickly as crude production.

Oil wells can continue producing once transportation routes reopen.

Refineries, however, require complex infrastructure, specialised machinery, skilled workers and maintenance.

If damaged facilities need major reconstruction, restoring capacity could take years.

At the same time, depleted fuel inventories will eventually need to be rebuilt.

That means refiners could face sustained pressure to process more crude even after the immediate crisis ends.

The result could be a prolonged period of elevated refining margins and fuel prices.

What Does This Mean for Europe and Asia?

Europe and Asia could face particularly severe pressure.

Both regions rely heavily on imported energy and have already experienced increases in refined fuel and liquefied natural gas prices.

For European economies, expensive diesel could increase transportation and industrial costs.

For Asian economies, disruptions to Gulf crude supplies and reduced Chinese fuel exports could create additional pressure.

The combination of higher fuel and LNG prices could therefore create a broader energy inflation shock rather than an isolated oil-market disruption.

Could Consumers Eventually Reduce Demand?

Demand destruction remains one of the few mechanisms capable of restoring balance.

If fuel prices remain extremely high, consumers may drive less and businesses may reduce transportation and energy consumption.

Companies may also delay investment and cut production.

That could eventually reduce demand enough to ease pressure on the refining system.

But demand destruction carries an economic cost.

A reduction in fuel consumption caused by efficiency improvements is very different from a decline caused by households and businesses being unable to afford energy.

The latter can slow economic growth while inflation remains elevated.

Analysis: Why the Refining Crisis May Matter More Than the Oil Shock

The most important lesson from the Iran war energy crisis is that the global energy system is not simply dependent on how much oil exists, but on whether the world can refine and transport that oil into usable fuel.

The crude market has shown considerable resilience.

Refined fuel markets have not.

That distinction could determine how long the current energy shock lasts.

Even if diplomacy reopens the Strait of Hormuz and crude prices fall, damaged refineries, depleted inventories and reduced Russian exports will continue to constrain fuel supplies.

This creates a particularly difficult situation for central banks.

If energy prices rise temporarily, policymakers can theoretically look through the shock. But if fuel shortages persist for months or years, higher transportation and production costs can become embedded across the economy.

That would make the assumption of a short-lived inflation shock increasingly difficult to defend.

The depletion of global inventories is perhaps the biggest warning sign.

Stockpiles normally provide a cushion against geopolitical disruptions. That cushion has now been significantly weakened.

As a result, another major refinery outage, shipping disruption or escalation in the Middle East could produce a much larger price response than it would have before the war.

The world therefore faces a dangerous mismatch: crude supplies may recover faster than the infrastructure needed to turn them into fuel.

That is why the energy crisis could outlast the war itself.

The Iran conflict may have started as a crude oil shock, but its most consequential economic legacy could be a prolonged global shortage of refined fuels, keeping inflation and energy costs elevated long after the fighting ends.

With information from Reuters.

COLUMBIA, S.C. — Sen. Darline Graham stumbled in a Tuesday night debate over an elementary question about foreign policy, a signature issue of her late brother. It was a high-profile misstep a week before she faces a runoff election in her bid to hold onto the South Carolina seat to which she was appointed last month.

Graham, a political novice, was asked whether the U.S. has a national security interest in Taiwan and the South China Sea — a longstanding contention of both Democratic and Republican administrations. She struggled to answer before admitting “national security is not my thing.”

“I’m not that informed on national security,” she added.

Her rival in next week’s runoff for the GOP nomination, Rep. Ralph Norman, suggested the answer showed Graham was unqualified for the role.

“By her choice, she’s running for the United States Senate. It’s a six-year term,” Norman said. “You need to get fully versed in what issues you’re going to be dealing with. This isn’t a ‘get training on the job.’ You can’t do that.”

It was a moment that drew a stark contrast to Graham’s brother, Lindsey, who died unexpectedly July 11. It also gave Norman, an established conservative politician, a fresh avenue of attack as he tries to overcome President Trump’s endorsement of Graham in her first campaign. The Republican president is set to visit South Carolina on Friday to campaign for her.

During his decades in the Senate, Lindsey Graham was known for his foreign policy involvement, making countless foreign trips, sometimes as part of a group of U.S. lawmakers meeting with international leaders and observing contentious areas firsthand.

There were multiple trips to Taiwan, including in 2022, when he led a delegation for a two-day visit that included meetings with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen and the island’s defense minister.

Darline Graham had been asked, “Are Taiwan and the South China Sea national security issues for the United States and if so, why or how?”

Graham avoided a direct response, and instead mentioned her brother’s wealth of experience and her desire to lead differently.

“My brother was in the Air Force for 33 years, so I will do everything I can to support the military,” said Graham, who often read during the debate from a legal pad on which she had notes, its pages draped over the front of her lectern. “My dad was in the Army. I’m not a polished politician up here; national security is not my thing, not my area of expertise, but I do support the military.”

As interim senator, Graham is surrounded by many of her brother’s Capitol Hill staff, many of whom worked with him for years on issues foreign and domestic. She’s repeatedly thanked them for getting her up to speed on legislative issues and has pointed to her several weeks on the job as a productive time in which she’s gotten legislation passed, including a Russia sanctions bill named for her brother.

In the wake of her brother’s death, Graham has been asked multiple times about how she would either further or shift away from his intense focus on national security, an attitude that was at the essence of his Senate portfolio.

Asked after the debate by reporters if she wanted another crack at her answer to the moderators’ question, she doubled down, saying she was more focused on South Carolinians’ everyday concerns.

“They’re worried about their pocketbooks more than they’re worried about the South China Sea, quite honestly,” Graham said. “So that’s going to be my biggest focus.”

Graham added that she had spoken multiple times during the debate about the overall national security threat posed by China.

“I realize national security is very important,” Graham said. “I probably said 10 times up there tonight how bad China is, how they’re a national threat to us.”

Taiwan has often been a flash point for aggression from China and international efforts to support its right to self-rule. The U.S. maintains a policy of strategic ambiguity over whether it would defend Taiwan militarily if the mainland invaded, but has committed to bolstering the island’s defense for generations.

Claimed by China as part of its territory, Taiwan sits along a South China Sea global trade route, virtually all of which China claims despite a 2016 arbitration ruling based on the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea that invalidated Beijing’s expansive claims.

During a visit to Manila this week, Adm. Frank Bradley, commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command, said that American special operations forces are ready to step up warfighting-readiness exercises with counterparts in the Philippines and other countries in Asia to further strengthen a security alliance and help deter a major conflict in the region.

Kinnard and Junkroski write for the Associated Press.

Japan has issued an unusually direct criticism of its U.S. ally after Washington imposed sanctions on International Criminal Court President Tomoko Akane and senior trial lawyer Abdoulaye Seye.

Japan’s foreign ministry described the sanctions as “very unfortunate” and reaffirmed Tokyo’s support for the ICC and its role in prosecuting serious international crimes. The statement marks a rare public disagreement between Tokyo and Washington over an issue of international law.

The dispute comes as the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump intensifies its campaign against the Hague based court. Washington has increasingly challenged the ICC over its investigations and arrest warrants involving Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, as well as its earlier investigation into U.S. personnel in Afghanistan.

For Japan, however, the issue is particularly sensitive. Tokyo depends heavily on the United States for its national defence, yet it has consistently supported the ICC and the broader international legal framework surrounding it.

Why Did the U.S. Sanction ICC Officials?

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the sanctions targeted individuals involved in ICC efforts to investigate, arrest, detain or prosecute officials from governments that have not consented to the court’s jurisdiction.

Among those sanctioned was Tomoko Akane, a Japanese judge who serves as ICC president. Abdoulaye Seye, a Senegalese senior trial lawyer, was also targeted. Seye was part of the prosecution team that sought an arrest warrant for Netanyahu and has been nominated for election as an ICC judge.

Washington argues that the ICC has exceeded its authority by pursuing officials from countries that have not accepted its jurisdiction.

The United States is not a member of the ICC and has repeatedly objected to the court’s actions involving American personnel and Israeli officials.

The latest sanctions therefore represent another escalation in Washington’s confrontation with the institution.

Why Is Japan Supporting the ICC?

Japan joined the ICC in 2007 and has consistently supported its role in prosecuting war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.

Tokyo’s foreign ministry said Japan remains committed to strengthening the rule of law internationally while maintaining communication with countries involved in the dispute.

Japan’s position reflects its broader commitment to international institutions and rules based governance.

For Tokyo, the ICC is not simply a legal institution. It is part of a wider international order in which disputes and allegations of serious crimes are addressed through established legal mechanisms.

That creates an obvious tension with Washington’s increasingly confrontational approach.

Why Is This Significant for U.S. Japan Relations?

Japan rarely criticises the United States publicly, particularly on issues involving national security.

The two countries maintain a close military alliance, with U.S. forces playing a central role in Japan’s defence and regional deterrence.

Japan’s decision to openly describe the sanctions as “very unfortunate” therefore carries diplomatic significance.

It does not indicate that Tokyo is abandoning Washington or challenging the broader alliance. Instead, it demonstrates that the two countries can maintain close security cooperation while disagreeing sharply over international law.

That distinction is becoming increasingly important as U.S. foreign policy under Trump diverges from the positions of several traditional allies.

The ICC Dispute Is Also Creating Friction in Europe

Japan is not the only U.S. ally to object to the latest sanctions.

The Netherlands, which hosts the ICC, has also criticised Washington’s action. Dutch Foreign Minister Tom Berendsen said the Netherlands opposed the sanctions and invited Akane to discuss continued support for the court.

The development places Washington increasingly at odds with European partners as well as Japan.

The disagreement therefore extends beyond the U.S. relationship with a single international institution. It raises broader questions about how far America’s allies are willing to follow Washington when its policies conflict with international institutions they continue to support.

What Do the Sanctions Actually Do?

The sanctions have significant practical consequences.

They freeze any U.S. assets held by the targeted individuals and largely cut them off from the American financial system. Because most internationally active banks maintain close connections with the U.S. financial system, the effects can extend beyond American jurisdiction.

The U.S. Treasury Department has also authorized a temporary wind down of transactions involving Akane and Seye through September 17.

The measures therefore do more than express political disagreement. They can directly affect the ability of sanctioned individuals to conduct international financial activities.

Washington’s Wider Campaign Against the ICC

The sanctions against Akane and Seye are part of a broader U.S. campaign against the court.

Washington previously imposed sanctions on several ICC prosecutors and judges after the court issued arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant and pursued an earlier investigation involving U.S. troops in Afghanistan.

Rubio has also indicated that the administration intends to intensify efforts against the ICC through diplomatic pressure on other countries.

According to Reuters, Washington has sought to encourage countries to leave the institution, with at least five countries already responding to the call.

The strategy therefore goes beyond individual sanctions. It represents an attempt to challenge the ICC’s legitimacy and reduce its international reach.

Why Does Japan’s Position Matter?

Japan’s response is significant because Tokyo has generally been closely aligned with Washington on major strategic questions.

Japan faces a challenging regional security environment involving China, North Korea and wider tensions in the Indo Pacific. Maintaining a strong U.S. alliance remains central to Japanese security policy.

Yet Tokyo has also invested heavily in supporting international institutions and the rule of law.

The ICC dispute highlights the possibility that these two pillars of Japanese foreign policy can sometimes pull in different directions.

Japan may need American military power for its security while simultaneously disagreeing with Washington on how international law should operate.

That is not necessarily a crisis in the alliance, but it illustrates its increasingly complicated political foundations.

Could the Dispute Deepen Divisions Among U.S. Allies?

The ICC controversy could contribute to a wider pattern of disagreement between Washington and its traditional partners.

The United States is increasingly willing to use economic and diplomatic pressure against international institutions it considers hostile to American interests. Several European governments, by contrast, continue to view those institutions as essential components of the rules based international order.

Japan’s criticism adds an important Asian voice to that disagreement.

If more U.S. allies openly defend the ICC, Washington could face growing diplomatic isolation on the issue even while maintaining strong bilateral security relationships.

That could make the dispute increasingly difficult to contain as a narrow disagreement between the United States and an international court.

How Far Can Japan Disagree With Washington?

Japan’s criticism of the ICC sanctions should not be interpreted as a fundamental rupture in the U.S. Japan alliance.

Tokyo remains heavily dependent on Washington for defence and security, and there is little indication that the ICC dispute will fundamentally alter that relationship.

Its importance lies elsewhere.

Japan is signalling that alliance solidarity does not necessarily require complete alignment on international law.

For Tokyo, supporting the ICC is consistent with a broader foreign policy objective: maintaining an international system governed by rules and institutions rather than purely by the power of individual states.

Washington’s position is increasingly different. The Trump administration views the ICC as a potential threat to American sovereignty and to officials from the United States and allied governments who could face prosecution by the court.

This creates an unusual strategic contradiction.

The United States and Japan remain closely aligned against major security challenges in the Indo Pacific, yet they are increasingly capable of finding themselves on opposite sides of debates over the international legal order.

The consequences could extend beyond the ICC itself.

If Washington continues using sanctions and diplomatic pressure against international institutions while its allies continue defending them, the United States may find that its strategic partnerships remain strong militarily but become more divided politically.

For Japan, the challenge will be maintaining its essential alliance with Washington without abandoning its support for the international legal institutions it considers important.

The ICC dispute therefore reveals a broader tension within the U.S. alliance system: strategic partners may remain united on security while increasingly disagreeing over the rules and institutions that are supposed to govern international politics.

With information from Reuters.

Aug. 18 (UPI) — Two counties and two cities are suing the Trump administration over conditioning national security funding on local governments adopting sweeping election procedures, calling the requirement illegal federal overreach.

The Brennan Center for Justice filed the lawsuit Monday in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on behalf of Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn., Harris and El Paso counties, Texas, and Columbus, asking it to declare the decision to impose election administration conditions on grants unlawful and enjoin its enforcement.

“This is the kind of federal overreach we’ve come to expect from the Trump administration,” Harris County Attorney Abbie Kamin said in a statement emailed to UPI. “To threaten law enforcement and public safety funding our agencies rely on, to withhold dollars that protect our communities for a partisan power grab is not only improper, it’s dangerous.”

Since returning to office, President Donald Trump has taken a series of actions he says are to improve election integrity and security but that Democrats and civil rights advocates have described as efforts to interfere with and undermine U.S. elections.

In June, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, under the Department of Homeland Security, updated compliance requirements for Homeland Security Grant Program funds, which are to help local governments prevent terrorism. Conditions added include creating a plan for transitioning to hand-marked paper ballots, conducting a 5% post-election manual audit and citizenship verification for all poll workers and registered voters, among others.

FEMA said it will withhold 20% of the recipient’s total HSGP funding until receipt of proof of compliance with the new requirements.

The jurisdictions suing the administration described the withholding of funds as FEMA holding their money “hostage” and its new election-related conditions “arbitrary and capricious.”

“Never before has FEMA purported to regulate how states and counties run elections,” they said in the lawsuit, stating that such a change would require congressional authorization, which FEMA does not have.

“The power to administer elections belongs to the states, subject only to conditions imposed by Congress — not the president, not the secretary of Homeland Security and not FEMA.”

The plaintiffs state that FEMA has not provided a “reasoned explanation” for the change in funding administration while ignoring the legal, financial and logistical “chaos” the new conditions will cause with midterm elections less than two months away and the potential harm withholding anti-terrorism funds could cause.

“Holding cities hostage by threatening anti-terrorism funding if they don’t go along with the president’s absurd election manipulation is as dangerous as it is illegal,” Columbus City Attorney Zach Klein said in a statement.

“We’re fighting back to protect public safety and election integrity. We will not be bullied by this president and his administration.”

North Korea has intensified its criticism of Japan’s military expansion and its growing security cooperation with the United States and South Korea, portraying the developments as a threat to regional stability.

More than a dozen North Korean state media attacks since early July have focused on Japan’s defence buildup, including its acquisition of long range weapons, rising military spending and closer security ties with Washington and Seoul.

The campaign has also coincided with unusual silence from Pyongyang over its own recent missile launches, raising questions about what North Korea is trying to achieve with its latest messaging.

Why Is North Korea Targeting Japan?

North Korean statements have focused heavily on Japan’s acquisition of counter strike capabilities, its testing of U.S. made Tomahawk cruise missiles, increased defence spending and its annual defence white paper.

Kim Yo Jong, the influential sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, warned last week of “additional military options” in response to what she described as Japan’s transformation into a military power.

North Korea’s KCNA later described Japan’s 2026 defence white paper as a document aimed at justifying military expansion and preparing for what it called a “re invasion.”

Pyongyang has also criticised the annual U.S. South Korean Ulchi Freedom Shield military exercises, accusing Washington, Seoul and Tokyo of developing what it called a “nuclear alliance.”

The United States and South Korea maintain that the exercises are defensive.

How Has Japan Changed Its Defence Policy?

Japan announced in 2022 that it planned to double defence spending to 2% of gross domestic product in response to growing security concerns involving China, Russia and North Korea.

A major part of that expansion has involved acquiring long range missile capabilities, including U.S. made Tomahawk cruise missiles capable of striking targets more than 1,000 km away.

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s government is expected to revise Japan’s national security strategy this year, potentially leading to further increases in defence spending and investment in drones and domestic weapons production.

For Pyongyang, these developments represent a significant change in Japan’s traditional defence posture and provide another basis for portraying the regional security environment as increasingly hostile.

Is North Korea’s Campaign Really About Japan?

Analysts say Japan is only one part of a broader strategic message.

Park Won-gon of Ewha Womans University said North Korea is attempting to frame Northeast Asia as a confrontation between two opposing camps.

The objective, he said, is to create a U.S. South Korea Japan versus North Korea China Russia framework.

Such a narrative could serve several purposes for Pyongyang. It can strengthen North Korea’s argument that its nuclear weapons are necessary for self defence, while also encouraging closer political and military support from China and Russia.

South Korea’s Unification Ministry has expressed a similar assessment, saying North Korea appears to view Japan’s changing security posture, South Korea’s plans for nuclear powered submarines and trilateral military cooperation as part of a broader shift in the regional balance of power.

Why Is North Korea Silent About Its Missile Tests?

One of the more unusual aspects of the latest campaign is that North Korean state media has remained silent about recent missile launches.

North Korea conducted ballistic missile tests last week and again this week, but state media has not reported them, despite the launches being condemned by South Korea, Japan and the United States.

That differs from Pyongyang’s usual practice of publicising missile tests shortly after they take place.

Analysts believe the launches may have involved improvements to existing missile systems rather than entirely new weapons, making them less valuable as domestic propaganda.

Shin Jong-woo of the Korea Defense and Security Forum suggested that some tests could involve upgraded short range ballistic missiles developed with Russian technical assistance and potentially intended for Russia.

Another possibility is that North Korea does not want to publicise launches that could be connected to prospective military exports.

What Role Does Russia Play?

North Korea’s expanding military relationship with Russia is increasingly important to understanding its weapons development.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has repeatedly accused Russia of using North Korean missiles in Ukraine and Pyongyang of supplying Moscow with missiles, ammunition and troops.

Analysts say cooperation with Russia may also be helping North Korea improve the performance and accuracy of its missile systems through battlefield experience and technical assistance.

Recent launches could therefore represent tests of upgraded variants before they are deployed by North Korea or potentially supplied to Russia.

Analysis: What Is Pyongyang Trying to Achieve?

North Korea’s intensified criticism of Japan appears to be part of a broader attempt to reshape the strategic narrative around the Korean Peninsula.

By portraying the United States, South Korea and Japan as an increasingly integrated military and nuclear bloc, Pyongyang can present its own weapons development as a defensive response rather than an independent escalation.

The strategy also fits North Korea’s growing alignment with China and Russia. As security cooperation between Washington, Seoul and Tokyo deepens, Pyongyang has an incentive to emphasise the emergence of rival blocs and strengthen its position within the opposing camp.

Japan’s military expansion therefore provides North Korea with a useful political target. The immediate issue may be Japanese defence policy, but the larger objective is regional positioning.

If Japan continues expanding its military capabilities while U.S. South Korean and Japanese security cooperation deepens, Pyongyang is likely to use those developments to justify further weapons development and closer cooperation with Beijing and Moscow. The result could be a reinforcing cycle in which each side’s security measures become evidence for the other side that greater military preparedness is necessary.

With information from Reuters.

What Five Years of Directives Add Up To

On August 10, 2026, Reporters Without Borders marked five years of Taliban rule with an assessment that Afghanistan has become, in the organization’s words, a prison for information. The report catalogs more than twenty national directives and a long list of provincial decrees, most delivered verbally rather than published, that have progressively stripped Afghan journalism of independence. The starkest new detail is legal rather than administrative. A Code of Criminal Procedure quietly enacted in January 2026 now punishes insulting the country’s supreme leader with thirty nine lashes and a year in prison, and insulting the wider leadership with twenty lashes and six months. Afghanistan sits at one hundred seventy fifth of one hundred eighty countries in RSF’s 2026 World Press Freedom Index, alongside North Korea, Eritrea and China, as global press freedom overall falls to its lowest point in twenty five years.

From Verbal Orders to Written Law

The Taliban’s approach to media control has moved through recognizable phases since retaking Kabul in August 2021. Eleven rules issued that September gave authorities broad power over what could be published. Restrictions escalated from there: a November 2021 ban on interviewing regime critics, a March 2022 prohibition on rebroadcasting Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, and a July 2022 declaration by supreme leader Haibatullah Akhundzada that criticizing officials contradicts Islamic law, which recast basic accountability as religious transgression. Afghanistan’s 2015 Press Law, the last formal legal protection for journalists, was repealed in April 2024. What followed was an acceleration rather than a pause. September 2024 rules banned live political programming and limited on air guests to Taliban approved voices. A July 2024 law prohibiting broadcast images of living beings has since spread to more than twenty provinces. Women have been pushed out of the profession in stages, from mandatory face covering for television presenters in 2021 to a March 2025 Kandahar order banning women’s voices from radio entirely.

The Shift From Deniable Pressure to Permanent Law

What separates the January 2026 Code of Criminal Procedure from everything that preceded it is durability. Verbal orders and provincial decrees can be denied, reversed or applied unevenly, and much of what RSF documents over the past five years was communicated exactly that way, through unpublished instructions passed down from de facto ministries rather than through any formal legislative process. A criminal code cannot be waved away the same way. The document only became public because it was leaked; the Taliban never announced it. RSF notes the code does not mention journalists specifically, but it offers them no exemption either, meaning ordinary reporting on Taliban governance now falls under the same provisions that criminalize insulting the leadership. A separate article requires citizens to report any contact with government opponents, extending the incentive to inform beyond state security services into the population at large. Legal researchers reviewing the code have also flagged provisions dividing defendants into social categories, with punishment calibrated to status rather than offense, a structure that undercuts equal treatment under law well beyond the press freedom question alone.

The scale of the resulting collapse is difficult to overstate. RSF’s country data shows forty three percent of Afghan outlets disappeared within three months of the takeover, more than two thirds of the roughly twelve thousand journalists working in the country in 2021 have left the profession, and eight in ten women journalists have stopped working entirely. Behind each of those figures sits a newsroom that no longer exists or a byline that no longer appears, the practical result of a five year campaign that RSF’s South Asia desk head has described as turning criticism itself into a legal offense.

None of this makes Afghanistan an isolated case, which is what gives the story weight beyond South Asia. RSF’s own 2026 index places Afghanistan’s collapse inside a broader global pattern: more than half the world’s countries now rate as difficult or very serious environments for journalism, the worst showing the index has recorded in a quarter century. The organization has also pointed to a specific mechanism spreading well beyond authoritarian states, in which national security and counterterrorism justifications, first normalized after the September 11 attacks, are increasingly invoked to restrict reporting on matters of public interest, a pattern RSF says now appears in established democracies as well as in regimes like Afghanistan’s. Afghanistan represents the extreme endpoint of that continuum rather than an exception to it, which is precisely why treating it as a uniquely Afghan problem understates the lesson.

The crackdown has also produced a measurable outflow with consequences well beyond Afghanistan’s borders. RSF data shows the number of countries journalists have been forced to flee from worldwide has doubled over five years, from nineteen to forty, with Afghanistan topping the list. Those journalists do not disappear once they cross a border. Pakistan and Iran, the two most common host states, have each carried out mass deportations of Afghan refugees through 2026, and independent reporting from RSF and Human Rights Watch has documented Afghan journalists, including some holding valid visas, among those detained and forcibly returned toward the same authorities they fled. Resettlement pipelines to Europe and North America have slowed at the same time, leaving exiled journalists in prolonged legal limbo in third countries with limited protection. For policymakers well outside the region, that combination turns a domestic censorship story into a live test of asylum and non return commitments.

Three Paths From Here

The most likely trajectory is continued institutionalization rather than reversal. The Taliban leadership has shown no interest in press freedom as a bargaining chip for international recognition, and the shift from verbal directive to codified criminal law suggests an intent to make current restrictions permanent rather than negotiable. This path is highly likely through the remainder of 2026 and into 2027, with enforcement of the new code expanding province by province and further directives layered on top of an already dense regulatory web.

A second, less likely path involves narrow, tactical loosening tied to international engagement. If the Taliban pursues formal recognition or unlocked aid financing, cosmetic concessions on foreign broadcasters or select outlets are possible, mirroring past patterns of selective accommodation when the leadership has wanted to project moderation to specific foreign audiences. This outcome is possible but not likely to alter the underlying legal architecture, since Akhundzada’s own framing of criticism as a religious offense forecloses any structural reform led from within the leadership itself.

A third path, already underway, is a deepening exile crisis that draws in host and resettlement states more directly than the domestic censorship story alone ever could. Continued deportations from Pakistan and Iran, combined with stalled resettlement processing in Europe and North America, raise the probability of a high profile forced return case drawing sustained international attention, potentially forcing governments to clarify protection commitments to Afghan media workers in ways they have so far avoided through case by case handling. This path is likely to intensify over the next twelve months regardless of what happens inside Afghanistan itself, since it depends as much on Pakistani and Iranian deportation policy as on any Taliban decision.

Why a Domestic Censorship Story Is Not a Domestic Story

Afghanistan’s press freedom collapse will keep being read as an isolated horror story unless it is placed against the trend line RSF itself is now drawing, in which national security framing, once confined to the world’s most repressive states, is migrating into ordinary governance practice elsewhere. The clearest near term indicator to track is enforcement, not legislation. The Code of Criminal Procedure has existed on paper since January 2026 without a confirmed public prosecution under its press relevant articles. The first documented case brought under Article 19 or Article 23 against a journalist or commentator will mark the moment Taliban media law moves from threat to precedent, and from precedent to template.

Shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz fell to its lowest level in a week on Tuesday as vessel operators continued to avoid the strategically vital waterway amid ongoing hostilities in the Middle East.

Kpler data showed that only eight vessels were tracked in the strait on Tuesday, below the 10-day average of around 12 and the lowest daily total since August 5. Of those vessels, only one, a coal carrier, had exited the strait, while the remaining ships were still making their way through.Seven vessels entered the waterway, all using the Iranian route, highlighting the limited movement through the strait as uncertainty over its security continues to weigh on shipping activity.

Separate data from LSEG recorded 11 vessel transits on Tuesday, down from 14 the previous day, also pointing to a slowdown in traffic through the crucial maritime passage.

The decline comes as the United States and Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthis reported separate attacks, while prospects for an end to the Iran war appeared to weaken. Tehran has said the Strait of Hormuz will remain closed unless Washington accepts its conditions.

Hormuz Traffic Plummets

The scale of the disruption is stark compared with normal shipping activity. Around 130 to 140 vessels typically passed through the Strait of Hormuz before Iran closed the waterway following the start of U.S.-Israeli attacks on February 28.

The sharp reduction in traffic underscores the growing risks facing international shipping and energy markets as vessels avoid one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints.

The strait is particularly important for global energy supplies, meaning prolonged restrictions could increase pressure on oil markets and raise transportation and insurance costs for vessels operating in the region.

Red Sea Traffic Holds Up

Shipping activity through the Bab al-Mandab Strait at the southern end of the Red Sea showed a different trend.

Kpler data recorded 30 vessels crossing the waterway on Tuesday, above its 10-day average of 25.

The contrasting figures suggest that while some shipping activity continues through alternative routes, the Strait of Hormuz remains heavily affected by the ongoing hostilities and uncertainty surrounding its reopening.

With information from Reuters.

China’s test of a nuclear-capable missile into the Pacific has exposed the growing divisions among Pacific island nations over the increasing militarisation of a region they have sought to preserve as an “Ocean of Peace”.

The July launch, China’s first known ballistic-missile test into the Pacific since September 2024, took place just hours after Fiji and Australia signed a major defence treaty, marking Fiji’s first formal alliance. The timing highlighted the increasingly complex security environment in a region where China, the United States and their allies are competing for influence.

More than a month after the test, Pacific Islands foreign ministers were unable to agree on a collective statement condemning Beijing’s missile launch, despite individual leaders expressing concern about the growing military presence in the region.

Papua New Guinea Foreign Minister Justin Tkatchenko described the test as “totally inappropriate”, while stressing that China remained a close friend and ally of Papua New Guinea. He said Beijing had provided advance notice of the launch but had not given details about where the missile would land.

China defended the test, saying it had been conducted safely and urging countries not to over-interpret the launch.

Growing Military Activity in the Pacific

The missile test came after a year of increasingly visible military activity across the Pacific, a region that has become a major arena of strategic competition between the United States and China.

Chinese naval deployments and live-fire exercises in the Tasman Sea have coincided with U.S.-allied military exercises around Guam and Hawaii. Warship visits and expanding security partnerships have also increased across the region.

The United States retains a substantial military presence in the Pacific, including in Hawaii, Guam and the Marshall Islands.

For Pacific island governments, the growing military presence creates an increasingly difficult choice. Security partnerships can provide valuable capabilities for surveillance, disaster response, policing and training, but they can also increase the possibility that Pacific territory and waters become incorporated into wider strategic competition.

Tuvalu permanent foreign secretary Pasuna Tuaga expressed concern about the broader militarisation of the region, including security arrangements such as the AUKUS partnership between Australia, Britain and the United States.

Pacific Nations United in Principle but Divided in Practice

Pacific leaders endorsed the Ocean of Peace Declaration in September 2025, committing themselves to protecting the region and strengthening international peace and security.

The initiative reflected a long-standing desire among Pacific states to ensure that their security agenda is not dictated by larger external powers.

The defence agreement between Australia and Fiji, known as the Ocean of Peace Alliance, emerged from this broader regional framework.

But the growing number of security partnerships has created an inherent contradiction. Pacific governments want greater security capabilities while simultaneously opposing the militarisation of their region.

Australia and other partners argue that defence cooperation can strengthen regional resilience. Critics, however, fear that expanding bilateral arrangements could eventually leave Pacific nations with less influence over how their territory, waters and infrastructure are used.

Solomon Islands Foreign Minister Rick Houenipwela said the regional agenda must remain “conceived by the Pacific, shaped by the Pacific and only by the Pacific.”

Yet the failure to produce a unified response to China’s missile test demonstrated just how difficult that principle is to implement.

China Divides Regional Consensus

The disagreement over the missile test reflects the different political and economic interests of Pacific island nations.

Kiribati and Nauru, which have deepened their relations with Beijing after switching diplomatic recognition from Taiwan, did not support the wording of the proposed statement, according to an official familiar with the discussions.

New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters blamed foreign influence for the failure to reach consensus, although he did not identify a particular country.

The disagreement demonstrates that Pacific nations do not share a uniform approach toward China.

Some governments see Beijing as an important economic and diplomatic partner, while others are increasingly concerned about its military activities and the strategic implications of its expanding regional presence.

At the same time, many Pacific governments remain wary of becoming closely aligned with either China or the Western powers.

The Security Dilemma Facing the Pacific

The central problem for Pacific nations is the tension between security and strategic autonomy.

Countries require surveillance capabilities, military training, disaster-response mechanisms and other security resources. Defence partnerships can provide those capabilities.

But greater reliance on external powers can also make it more difficult for Pacific governments to maintain an independent regional agenda.

Fiji Foreign Minister Sakiasi Ditoka acknowledged this tension, saying countries wanted to be free from “war-making paraphernalia” while also recognising that some security capabilities helped keep them safe.

Fiji’s participation for the first time in U.S.-led RIMPAC military exercises further illustrates this balancing act.

The country is simultaneously promoting the idea of an Ocean of Peace while becoming more involved in established regional security structures.

Analysis: The Pacific Is Becoming a Strategic Battleground

The significance of China’s missile test goes beyond the launch itself. It has exposed the growing gap between the Pacific’s aspiration to remain an “Ocean of Peace” and the strategic realities surrounding it.

The region is increasingly being shaped by competing security partnerships, military exercises and the expanding strategic presence of major powers. China is becoming more active militarily, while the United States, Australia and their partners are strengthening their own defence relationships.

For Pacific island states, the challenge is therefore not simply whether to oppose China’s military activities. It is how to respond to them without allowing the Pacific’s security agenda to become dominated by great-power rivalry.

The failure to agree on a common statement is particularly significant because regional unity is one of the Pacific’s strongest tools for maintaining its diplomatic autonomy. When governments cannot agree on how to respond to a major security development, external powers gain greater room to shape the regional agenda.

At the same time, completely rejecting security partnerships would leave many Pacific states without capabilities they consider increasingly necessary. The result is a difficult balancing act: accepting enough external security assistance to address genuine threats while preventing those partnerships from transforming the region into a military theatre.

China’s missile test therefore exposes a deeper strategic dilemma. The more Pacific states seek security through external alliances, the greater the risk that the region becomes militarised; yet the more they reject those partnerships, the harder it may become to respond to an increasingly competitive security environment.

The upcoming Pacific Islands Forum leaders’ meeting in Palau is likely to bring these questions back to the centre of regional diplomacy. The key issue will be whether Pacific nations can establish a collective security approach that protects their interests without allowing the strategic competition between China and Western powers to define the future of the region.

With information from Reuters.

Grace Adama puts on her earrings in her two-room flat in Abuja before grabbing her handbag and heading to work.

The health NGO worker earns 135,000 naira ($99) a month, nearly twice Nigeria’s minimum wage. Yet she says her income now disappears within days as the cost of housing, electricity and food continues to rise.

“If I’m paid today, my salary stays with me just for one week,” she told Reuters. “If you see the cost of living, house, electricity, everything has gone up.”

Adama’s experience reflects a wider cost-of-living crisis confronting millions of Nigerians as the country approaches elections. Living standards have deteriorated sharply since President Bola Tinubu introduced a series of sweeping economic reforms, including the removal of fuel subsidies, the devaluation of the naira and reductions in electricity subsidies.

The government and investors argue that the reforms were necessary to prevent a deeper fiscal crisis and put Africa’s largest oil producer on a more sustainable economic path.

But for many ordinary Nigerians, the promised benefits have yet to materialise.

The cost of preparing the country’s staple jollof rice has more than doubled since Tinubu took office, according to Lagos-based SBM Intelligence. Petrol prices, meanwhile, have risen roughly sixfold following the removal of subsidies, the weakening of the naira and higher global oil prices.

With elections approaching in January, Tinubu faces the difficult task of convincing voters that the economic pain they have endured will eventually translate into better living standards.

NIGERIANS FEEL THE PAIN AS INVESTORS CHEER

The contrast between economic indicators and everyday life has become increasingly striking.

The World Bank estimates that just over half of Nigeria’s population lived in poverty last year, compared with roughly 42% in 2022.

Some Nigerians have responded to the rising costs by cutting household spending, moving to cheaper accommodation and relying on loans to cover basic expenses.

Adama said she had stopped buying meat regularly, moved to a smaller apartment and was still forced to take short-term loans to pay her bills. She also said she could no longer send money to her elderly mother in Benue state as she had done previously.

“I can’t even send money to my aged mother at home,” she said. “I can’t do a lot of things that I used to do before.”

Yet investors have taken a markedly more positive view of Nigeria’s economic direction.

“This is the most positive investors have been about Nigeria probably in the last two decades,” said Thys Louw, a portfolio manager at Ninety One. “They’re taking the tough medicine now.”

That divergence creates a major political challenge for Tinubu. Financial markets can respond positively to reforms long before their benefits reach households, while voters tend to judge governments according to the immediate cost of food, transport, housing and electricity.

Tinubu has been nicknamed “T-Pain” by some Nigerians frustrated by the rising cost of living.

REFORMS AIM TO END YEARS OF ECONOMIC DISTORTIONS

Tinubu inherited an economy burdened by years of policies that had created significant distortions.

Under former President Muhammadu Buhari, the government maintained petrol subsidies, imposed import restrictions and operated tight currency controls. While those measures were intended to protect consumers and encourage domestic production, they also contributed to shortages, foreign-exchange difficulties and growing pressure on government finances.

Fuel subsidies alone cost the government around $10 billion in 2022.

“We were living in fiscal illusions,” Finance Minister Taiwo Oyedele said at a recent event in Abuja. “We needed to stop deceiving ourselves so the country can move forward.”

Tinubu’s government therefore moved quickly after taking office to dismantle several of those policies.

The removal of fuel subsidies immediately pushed up transportation and living costs. Currency reforms also caused the naira to lose significant value, increasing the cost of imported goods.

The government argues that these measures were unavoidable and that rebuilding the economy requires accepting short-term pain.

There are signs of progress.

Nigeria’s stock market has risen close to 60% this year. Capital inflows reached a six-year high of $23 billion last year, while the opening of the 650,000-barrel-per-day Dangote refinery has created hopes that domestic refining will eventually reduce the country’s dependence on imported petroleum products.

The government has also pointed to increased investment in domestic oil assets as evidence that its reforms are attracting capital.

But those improvements have not necessarily translated into better household finances.

A BOOMING STOCK MARKET, BUT FEW CAN INVEST

Nigeria’s financial markets have benefited significantly from renewed investor confidence.

However, fewer than 5% of Nigerian adults invest in capital markets, according to the Nigerian stock exchange.

Much of the recent capital inflow has also been concentrated in short-term financial instruments such as Treasury bills, allowing foreign investors to quickly withdraw their money if economic conditions deteriorate.

For ordinary Nigerians, borrowing remains extremely expensive.

The central bank’s key interest rate stands at 26.5% as policymakers attempt to control inflation, which remains close to 16%.

That makes it difficult for businesses to expand and for households to access affordable credit.

At the same time, petrol prices average roughly 1,600 naira ($1.18) per litre nationally. Although that is lower than prices in neighbouring Ghana and Ivory Coast, it remains prohibitively expensive for many Nigerians who had become accustomed to subsidised fuel.

“The solution for me is for government to bring the fuel price down,” said Lagos food seller Eji Uchenna.

She said customers who once purchased food in bulk can no longer afford to do so.

POLITICAL PRESSURE BUILDS

The economic pressure is increasingly becoming a political issue.

In June, federal workers rejected a proposed 100,000-naira minimum wage and threatened an indefinite nationwide strike.

A June voter sentiment tracker by SBM Intelligence found that 80% of Nigerians believed the country was moving in the wrong direction.

Economic hardship is not the only concern. Security, particularly widespread kidnapping, remains a major issue for voters.

Yet widespread dissatisfaction does not necessarily mean Tinubu is vulnerable at the ballot box.

Nigeria’s opposition remains fragmented, reducing the likelihood that dissatisfaction will automatically translate into a coordinated electoral challenge.

“The opposition is disunited, and… the only way the opposition beats Tinubu is if they are united,” said Cheta Nwanze, chief executive of SBM Intelligence.

That gives Tinubu some political space to continue pursuing his economic programme despite the public backlash.

THE TEST IS WHETHER GROWTH REACHES HOUSEHOLDS

Investors remain optimistic that the reforms will eventually produce stronger economic growth, lower inflation and greater investment.

Louw said that if the government maintains its policies, workers could begin to benefit as inflation falls and interest rates decline.

But the transition remains painful, and the government faces growing pressure to ensure that economic gains are not concentrated among investors and businesses while ordinary households continue to struggle.

The central challenge is therefore no longer simply whether Nigeria’s reforms are economically necessary. It is whether the government can make those reforms politically and socially sustainable.

Tinubu must demonstrate that the sacrifices demanded from Nigerians are producing tangible improvements in their daily lives before voters head to the polls.

Finance Minister Oyedele acknowledged that the government must do more to ensure that economic recovery translates into broader prosperity.

“When inequality persists, it becomes dangerous,” he said. “It’s like sitting on gunpowder; it explodes.”

For Nigeria, the coming election will therefore offer a test not only of Tinubu’s political standing but of whether a painful programme of economic reform can deliver benefits quickly enough for ordinary citizens to believe in it.

With information from Reuters.

Dhaka Seeks a New Start

Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rahman told India’s envoy on Monday that the two countries needed to create a “conducive environment” to strengthen bilateral ties, as Dhaka continues to press New Delhi over the politically sensitive issue of ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s exile in India.

Rahman’s remarks highlight his six-month-old government’s efforts to stabilise relations with its largest neighbour while seeking progress on issues that have remained major sources of tension since Hasina was ousted in August 2024.

While Rahman has sought closer relations with India since taking office, Monday’s comments were his first to explicitly stress the need to improve the broader environment for bilateral engagement.

Hasina’s Extradition Remains a Key Dispute

Rahman made the remarks during his first meeting with India’s new High Commissioner to Bangladesh, Dinesh Trivedi.

Rahman “emphasized the need to create a conducive environment to further advance the bilateral relations between the two countries”, Bangladesh’s Prime Minister’s Office said in a statement following the meeting.

Bangladesh also urged India to expedite Hasina’s extradition.

Hasina, who has remained in India since the collapse of her government, is facing legal proceedings in Bangladesh and was sentenced to death in November.

Hasina’s Return Raises Fresh Tensions

The extradition request came days after Hasina interacted with the media for the first time since fleeing Bangladesh.

During an online audio conference, she reiterated that she would return to Bangladesh in December, drawing renewed attention to her continued presence and political activities in India.

Bangladesh’s foreign ministry strongly criticised the event, saying that India’s decision to allow Hasina to participate was deeply hurtful and that Bangladesh was outraged.

India has said it is examining Bangladesh’s extradition request in accordance with its legal and judicial procedures.

India Signals Willingness to Engage

In a post on X, the Indian High Commission said Trivedi reiterated India’s commitment to working with Bangladesh in a “positive, constructive and forward-looking manner”.

The exchange reflects the delicate balancing act facing both governments as they attempt to preserve bilateral ties while disagreements over Hasina’s future continue to complicate relations.

Can the Relationship Move Beyond Hasina?

For Dhaka, securing Hasina’s extradition remains a politically sensitive issue, while for New Delhi, any decision on the request carries broader implications for its relationship with Bangladesh and the country’s evolving political landscape.

Rahman’s call for a “conducive environment” suggests that Dhaka is seeking to prevent the dispute from overwhelming wider bilateral relations.

For India and Bangladesh, cooperation on broader areas of mutual interest will increasingly depend on whether the two sides can manage the Hasina issue without allowing it to become a permanent obstacle to engagement.

With information from Reuters.

Trump’s latest Gaza roadmap hinges on two deeply contested conditions: Hamas must disarm, while Israel must withdraw from the territory. Hamas has endorsed the roadmap in principle, but Israel has rejected the idea of withdrawing before Hamas’s weapons are fully dismantled.

The plan, announced by U.S. President Donald Trump on July 30, seeks to revive the 2025 ceasefire framework after months of negotiations. It proposes an immediate halt to military operations, the creation of a Palestinian technocratic administration, Israeli withdrawal in phases and the deployment of an international stabilization force.

At the centre of the dispute is the sequencing of disarmament and withdrawal. Israel insists that its forces will not leave Gaza until Hamas and other armed groups have surrendered their weapons. Hamas, meanwhile, says it is committed only to the original roadmap, which provides for negotiations on a timetable for disarmament rather than requiring immediate surrender.

Under the proposed framework, Israel would withdraw sector by sector as areas are verified to be free of usable weapons. A new Palestinian administrative body would oversee the storage and decommissioning of heavy weapons, military production facilities, weapons depots and tunnels.

The plan also envisages an International Stabilization Force deploying to areas vacated by Israeli troops. The force would help maintain security, train Palestinian police and facilitate humanitarian assistance. Morocco and Uganda have so far pledged troops, while Kosovo, Albania and Kazakhstan have offered military planners and medical personnel.

A fragile situation on the ground

Despite the October 2025 ceasefire, Israeli forces continue to control large parts of Gaza and have conducted strikes against what they describe as militant threats. Gaza health authorities say more than 1,200 Palestinians have been killed since the truce, most of them civilians.

Israel says its military operations are necessary to prevent attacks and target militants involved in the October 2023 Hamas assault that triggered the war.

The situation has left much of Gaza’s population concentrated in a small coastal area, with widespread destruction and severe humanitarian needs. Any international stabilization force would therefore face the enormous challenge of establishing security while supporting reconstruction.

Israel and Hamas remain divided

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said Trump’s proposal is unacceptable in its current form and reiterated that Israel will not complete its withdrawal until Hamas is disarmed.

Hamas has accepted the roadmap but objected to subsequent statements suggesting that it must surrender even light weapons before Israeli forces withdraw. The group argues that the original agreement allows negotiations over how and when disarmament would take place.

Trump’s plan therefore faces a fundamental contradiction: Israel wants disarmament before withdrawal, while Hamas expects withdrawal to proceed alongside a phased disarmament process.

The proposed sector-by-sector approach could provide a possible compromise. Under this model, Israel would withdraw from each area once its weapons have been secured and rendered unusable.

But with neither side willing to concede on the central sequencing issue, the success of Trump’s plan will ultimately depend on whether Washington can bridge the gap between Hamas’s demand for Israeli withdrawal and Israel’s demand for complete disarmament.

Analysis

The central problem with Trump’s roadmap is not the absence of a ceasefire framework, but the lack of agreement over who moves first. Hamas appears willing to discuss disarmament as part of a broader political settlement, while Israel insists that its forces cannot withdraw until Hamas is fully disarmed. That sequencing creates a fundamental deadlock: Hamas has little incentive to surrender its principal source of leverage before securing Israeli withdrawal, while Israel is unwilling to withdraw while Hamas retains military capabilities.

The proposed sector-by-sector approach could offer a potential compromise. If weapons are progressively removed from designated areas and Israeli forces withdraw in parallel, both sides would have a mechanism to demonstrate compliance without requiring either to make a complete concession at the outset. However, this would require an effective international monitoring mechanism and credible guarantees, neither of which has yet been fully established.

The International Stabilization Force could therefore become the most important element of the roadmap. Its credibility will depend not only on how many countries contribute troops, but also on whether those forces can operate independently, secure areas after Israeli withdrawal and help establish a functioning Palestinian security structure.

More broadly, the plan exposes the limits of treating disarmament as a purely military issue. Hamas’s weapons are tied to the wider political question of Gaza’s future governance and Palestinian statehood. Without a credible political pathway, disarmament could be viewed by Hamas as surrender rather than part of a negotiated settlement.

Trump’s proposal therefore represents a possible framework for ending the conflict, but not yet a guaranteed path to peace. Its success will depend on resolving the sequencing dispute, establishing credible security guarantees and answering the larger question of who ultimately governs Gaza. The real test is whether Washington can turn competing Israeli and Hamas demands into a phased bargain that neither side sees as capitulation.

With information from Reuters.

Aug. 9 (UPI) — Iran has replaced its top security official with another commander of its powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, a spokesman for Iranian Masoud Pezeshkian said late Sunday.

Mohsen Rezaei, who had been an adviser to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, will be the new secretary of the Supreme National Security Council. He replaced Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, who resigned.

Zolghadr had been in the post since his predecessor, Ali Larijani, was killed in an Israeli air strike in March. He will serve as political adviser to Khamenei.

The shakeup came as Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said Iran is not talking directly with the U.S. to end the war with Tehran and open the Strait of Hurmuz, despite claims by U.S. officials that the sides are near a deal.

Araghchi was quoted by the Mehr news agency as saying that “messages are being exchanged through intermediaries” and Iran isn’t talking directly with Washington. He reportedly added Washington must meet conditions by Iran if a deal is reached with Oman to open a trade route through the waterway.

U.S. President Donald Trump told Axios on Sunday his administration is “low keying it” in negotiations with Tehran.

“We are only semi-negotiating with them. We are just watching Iran with its huge inflation and the fact they have no money,” Trump said. “It will work out. It always works out. It’s like a chess game.”

Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and Khamenei would have to agree to any deal to open the strait.

On Saturday, Zolghadr said U.S. forces should be withdrawn from near Iran. He added that the U.S. should compensate Iran for war damages as well as lift sanctions.

Iranian diplomats said earlier last week that Tehran and Oman were near a new agreement to manage the strait.

Kuwait has since the beginning of the Iran War in February been targeted by Iranian drones and missiles 1,400 times. Why has this state—smaller than the US state of New Jersey—been targeted more than any of its larger neighbors including Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates?

A military node

This question takes us all the way back to 1991 when the US intervenes when Iraq under Saddam Hussein invades Kuwait. In return, Kuwait has since hosted one of the the largest US armies in the Middle East of 13,000 troops, and has the fourth biggest deployment of the US military globally. Furthermore, Kuwait is one of five U.S. Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) sites across the world— a cornerstone of the US’ global military strategy as it allows for rapid deployment and display of influence. And not only does Kuwait not charge the US for its land use, or restrict US troop movements on its territory—unlike most other host countries—but indeed pays the US for its troop presence, and subsidies energy and water costs for the military bases.

A geostrategic asset  

In exchange, Kuwait’s geostrategic location on the Arabian peninsula and along the air corridor between Asia and Europe makes the country an important location for the US to secure its interests and exert influence in the region and beyond. Indeed, the US has designated Kuwait as a Major Non-Nato Ally since 2004, and has located its biggest air logistics facility in the Middle East in conjunction with Kuwait international airport. Thus, Kuwait has proven a key logistical hub for US military operations in the region including against the Islamic State and during the withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021.

Furthermore, Kuwait holds 7% of the world’s oil reserves, reinforcing its importance for the US and other oil consuming countries, while also making it strategically vulnerable to Iranian attacks on energy plants in late July, as this adds to the ongoing energy insecurity created by the closure of the key oil trade route through the Strait of Hormuz.

The end of diplomatic balancing?

Despite these far-reaching strategic links with the US, Kuwait has long maintained a diplomatic balancing act, refusing to normalise relations with Israel while simultaneously refraining from condemning the Iranian regime. Moreover, Kuwait has often assumed the role of neutral mediator in the Middle East. For example, Kuwait mediated the 2021 rapprochement between Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, and has contributed to peace efforts in Yemen. In addition, Kuwait has been much more cautious in its statements concerning the Iranian regime, unlike its vocally critical, yet less targeted neighbors such as the United Arab Emirates, and has even refused to allow the US to use military bases in Kuwait for launching attacks on Iran.

Geographic liabilities

Even so, Kuwait has fallen prey to its geography. For one, its geographical proximity to Iran makes Kuwait a comparatively cheap and easy target for Iranian missiles, while its lack of naturally occurring fresh water and consequent reliance on desalination provides Teheran an additional pressure point, as illustrated by Iranian attacks on desalination plants in late July. Furthermore, its proximity to Iraq has exposed it to attacks by Iraqi Shia militias, allied with Teheran.

And the risk of further attacks in the future is high. On 1 August, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi declared that it would react ”decisively” against any US strikes, and warned Gulf states against permitting the US and Israel to use bases on their territories to launch attacks against Iran. Similarly, Iraq announced that its military forces stood ready to ‘thwart any attempts at targeting neighbouring countries within our regional sphere.’ Thus, recent developments suggest that Kuwait might no longer be able to remain an independent diplomatically oriented actor that can stay out of the conflicts in the Middle East.

Ideology

While Iran’s official rationale for the attacks has been to target US military targets and assets, the attacks on energy and desalination plants are neither; these are civilian infrastructures. Hence it is Kuwaiti civilians—not the US military capacity—that bear the brunt of the attacks. This suggests that Iranian attacks have not only immediate military objectives in context of the current war, but also underlying psychological and ideological motives, as these attacks can be seen as a way of scaring countries that go against Iran’s exhortations—reiterated since 1979–to its Gulf neighbors to cut ties with the US. In addition, the attacks expose the limitations of US security guarantee, and undermine the credibility of the US promises of stability and protection to its allies.

A change of strategy

Consequently, Kuwait may pivot toward building up more national military defence capabilities, as the deterrence guarantee that the well-accommodated US presence was supposed to provide has ostensibly failed, while Kuwait’s lack of domestic military resources to retaliate further enticed Iranian attacks.

Hence, it appears that the security order in the Middle East is set to become even more fragile, with the US increasingly proving incapable or unwilling to ensure what has long been considered a stabilising presence, and with regional actors increasingly divided and polarized, making neutral mediation harder.

A large-scale security operation is in place in the Republic of Ireland as the authorities prepare for the extradition of alleged crime boss Daniel Kinahan.

The 49-year-old was arrested in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in April and on Saturday an Irish government jet flew to Dubai to prepare to collect him.

The plane is expected to return to Dublin on Sunday and Kinahan will then be taken to the Special Criminal Court.

Ahead of the extradition, the Irish Prison Service bought a bulletproof and bombproof van which can be used to escort prisoners who are considered high-risk.

Irish authorities are expected to prosecute him for his involvement in leading an organised crime group.

Kinahan is not only wanted by the authorities in Ireland – the US Treasury Department once described the Kinahan cartel as one of the most dangerous in the world.

The US government imposed sanctions on Kinahan in April 2022 after he and other members of his family were identified as leaders of the Kinahan organised crime cartel.

He fought attempts to extradite him back to his native country, where the Kinahan cartel was involved in a long-running gangland feud that claimed 18 lives.

Kinahan himself became a target for murder and escaped an attempt on his life during a fatal shooting at a Dublin hotel in 2016.

He left Ireland and spent time living in Spain and more recently in Dubai, where a warrant for his arrest was issued by the Irish courts in April.

He appealed the extradition order over the past few months but his attempts were unsuccessful.

It is expected that shortly after his arrival in Ireland he will be taken to the non-jury Special Criminal Court in Dublin to face charges for alleged involvement in leading an organised crime group.