Russia

The Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) has been described as a successful solid platform since its creation. It increasingly attracts guests from widely different countries, especially leaders of China, India, Malaysia, Mongolia, and Myanmar. The leaders of Vietnam, Kazakhstan, Laos, and Thailand have visited it in various capacities. The business segment of the forum has long gone far beyond the geographical boundaries of Eurasia. Its frequent unprecedented large number of guests includes businesspeople from South America, Africa, and the Middle East. That, however, it remains open for entrepreneurial contacts with everyone whose natural interests are primarily in the trade, economic, and social spheres. This cross-platform cooperation between the structures is developing, growing deeper and creating a new agenda. The most essential feature is that the platform is guided by the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and honest dialogue, which are entirely different from those of Western-oriented structures. 

The EEF, which opened on 1st-4th September, in Russia’s Far Eastern city of Vladivostok, has become a solid platform for open and constructive dialogue among business leaders, government officials, and members of the expert community. It has also become a unique venue for discussing the strategic development of the Russian Far East and the country as a whole, while fostering and strengthening potential partnerships with counterparts, particularly from the Asia-Pacific region, in food production, infrastructure, logistics, industry, energy, and many other sectors of the economy. While recognizing the huge untapped economic potential of the region, it is also understandable that the development of the Far East largely depends on human capital, entrepreneurial efforts, and the ability of regions to create the necessary conditions for realizing the practical expectations.

On 2nd September, as part of the business program, the “Towards a Common Future: Inclusion as a Development Resource for the Far East” discussion was held with a strong focus on how to create an equal opportunity environment, develop human capital, and engage diverse groups in economic and social life. The following day, the majority of the participants in the “Inspiring Investments: A Development Strategy for Growth and Scaling” session touched on funding mechanisms for creative projects, opportunities to enter foreign markets, and collaboration between businesses, investors, development institutions, and government agencies. The key point focused on the development of the creative economy and international cooperation with Asia-Pacific countries, industry investments, the export of intellectual property and creative products, the media’s role in the development and positioning of regions in the Far East, new content formats, and training personnel for the economy of the future.

As part of the discussions at the forum, Russia and the United States continued their business dialogue, headed by Robert Agee, president and CEO of the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia (AmCham Russia), and with the participation of US representatives. It was spearheaded by the Roscongress Foundation in Russia.  Anton Kobyakov, Adviser to the President of the Russian Federation, noted, however, that there is a strong appetite on both sides for direct professional engagement. What matters most is to sustain the momentum and possibly broaden the agenda to include bilateral entrepreneurial partnership. 

“There is the need to facilitate more networking to identify specific strategic areas for cooperation,” said Robert Agee, president and CEO of the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia, and unreservedly agreed to continue their work on developing business ties and prepare for the participation of American representatives in the Russian Federation.

With many Asian and Pacific participants, explored opportunities for developing small and medium-sized enterprises. This is becoming increasingly important amid structural changes in the economy, as businesses look for new avenues for growth. The EEF made it possible not only to exchange experience but also to find concrete solutions that will help entrepreneurs adapt to changing conditions and unlock new opportunities for growth.

Developing trade, strengthening of interstate ties, and the creation of a common space for interaction among Asia-Pacific countries have assumed a new trend with Russia. The argument was logically based on Russia’s historical experience of cooperation with East Asian countries. It was further underlined that Russia and the Asia-Pacific attract politicians and entrepreneurs from around the world. In these current geopolitical circumstances, Russia needs to seek out new opportunities for development, particularly from the Asia-Pacific region, and with reference to the emerging new multipolar world. At the heart of the forum program was the search for new sources of growth and resilience for SMEs amid structural changes in the economy, from raising productivity and adopting new technologies to managing risks and adapting business models. One section of the program focused on the role of automation and artificial intelligence, changes in business processes, employees’ readiness to work with new technologies, and ways of improving productivity. 

In addition to the above, a special session was devoted to analysis where experts outlined the key economic trends across the Asia-Pacific region. As monitored, this session was set out in the analytical review entitled “Asia Trends 2026: The AI Boom, Industrial Relocation, and Geopolitical Fragmentation,” prepared ahead of the opening of the Eastern Economic Forum on 1st September. The review clearly noted, among other things, that Asia accounts for around 60% of global GDP growth and is becoming the world’s new center of trade, industry, technology, finance, and military power. Within the region, however, economic growth is highly uneven, while technology and capital are concentrated in a small group of states, making consolidation difficult. The ASEAN countries, meanwhile, face competition from Chinese manufacturers while also coming under growing geopolitical pressure from Washington. More broadly, the Asia-Pacific region is more exposed than any other to the effects of the energy crisis and to climate risks such as a super El Niño. 

According to the International Monetary Fund, Asian GDP grew by 5% in 2025, significantly ahead of global growth of 3.5%. Within the region, however, countries face a range of specific challenges, from high labor costs and insufficient industrial capacity to balance-of-payments difficulties and currency instability. These factors are driving increasingly divergent development paths among Asian economies. The region’s advanced economies, such as Japan and South Korea, posted lower growth rates, at 1.2% and 1%, respectively, in 2025. Asia’s emerging economies grew by 5.5% overall over the same period, with performance ranging from a 2% contraction in GDP in Myanmar to an 8% surge in Vietnam. 

Countries with the strongest growth prospects are attracting investment, leaving others with fewer opportunities to draw in capital. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, developing countries in Asia attracted US$644 billion in foreign direct investment in 2025. That is around 40% of the global total and more than 70% of all investment in developing countries. Capital flows are unevenly distributed: eight of the ten largest recipients of foreign direct investment among developing countries are in Asia, and together they account for around 60% of all inflows to developing economies and more than 80% of inflows to the region. 

Capital is becoming increasingly concentrated not only in a small number of countries but also in a narrow range of sectors, particularly artificial intelligence, clean energy, semiconductors, and critical minerals. In the longer term, this could deepen inequality and worsen the position of countries without a strong presence in these fields. Asia is one of the principal beneficiaries of the global AI boom. The investment cycle associated with its development has driven up demand for semiconductors, memory, servers, network equipment, and related electronics. The region occupies a central position in the global supply chain for these products. Technology exports will remain a powerful engine of economic growth in Asia, although the benefits will be distributed unevenly depending on each country’s position in the value chain.

South-East Asia’s role as an industrial center is growing as production capacity relocates there from China, which is no longer a low-cost manufacturing base. Chinese companies have begun redirecting production to Vietnam and Indonesia in particular in order to mitigate the impact of US tariffs. At the same time, China has increased its exports of industrial components and capital goods, supplying the equipment and parts needed by manufacturing centers in other countries. Exports of intermediate goods, including memory chips, other semiconductors, and industrial components, rose by 9% in 2025. Part of this represented an indirect offset to reduced shipments to the United States, as components, particularly in electronics, were used by manufacturers in other countries to produce goods that were subsequently exported to the US. A fall of roughly US$15 billion in smartphone exports, for example, was matched by a comparable increase in shipments of components, notably to India. 

In many other cases, however, the growth in exports of components and equipment was not linked to replacing sales China had lost in the US. Instead, it supported the expansion of production in third markets, especially developing ones, reinforcing China’s role as a supplier of production inputs rather than an exporter of finished goods. The result is an integrated supply chain taking shape across the region, encompassing research and development and the manufacture of high-technology components in China, assembly and packaging in an ASEAN country such as Malaysia or Vietnam, and the subsequent shipment of products to markets within the region and beyond. 

Amid the fragmentation of the global economy and trade, the development of the Eurasian space calls for resilient regional supply chains and logistical connectivity between states. Russia’s Far Eastern Federal District can play a strategically important role here. Thanks to its location, the district can serve as a resource and logistics gateway within the transport corridors linking European Russia with Asia. For a long time, infrastructure constraints held back the expansion of ties between Russia and Asian states, but the situation has begun to change with the development of the Eastern Operating Domain, which comprises the Baikal–Amur Mainline and the Trans-Siberian Railway. 

A program to modernize the Eastern Operating Domain has been under way since 2013, aimed at eliminating bottlenecks on the railways of Siberia and the Far East. Over that period, its carrying capacity has increased by 84%, reaching 180 million tonnes in 2025. The modernization is expected to raise that figure to 210 million tonnes by the end of 2030 and 270 million tonnes by the end of 2032. The development of the rail network and port infrastructure will largely determine the prospects for Eurasia and for the Asia-Pacific region in particular, as the world’s economic, financial, and trade center shifts towards the region. 

Emerging trends are reshaping the world; South-South economic partnership is seemingly becoming both the political and economic architecture. Logically, developing collaboration with Asian partners, anchoring discussions on technological leadership, and making breakthroughs in scientific fields and adopting innovative technologies are increasingly reshaping the world. Today, the role of academic institutions is to build a solid scientific and technological foundation that addresses applied industrial challenges while enhancing business efficiency, eco-friendliness, and sustainability. It is only through this synergy between science and the real economic sectors that can bring true multifaceted sovereignty. In conclusion, Asia-Pacific and Russia have to create a new model of economic and business and trade relations in the Global South.

As monitored from official reports, Russia is creating practically a new model of development of the Far East with maximally comfortable conditions for enterprises, as well as legal innovations for the investment climate in the region. Therefore, potential Asia-Pacific investors have to work on new ideas and new strategies for developing trade, agro-processing, industry, and other economic sectors in the Far Eastern region. The Eastern Economic Forum was held from September 1 to 4 on the campus of the Far Eastern Federal University. This year’s theme: “The Far East: Development for the Benefit of People.” It was the 11th EEF and organized by the Roscongress Foundation.

As the war drags on in Ukraine, its civilians are again suffering.

Thirty-eight people were killed in the village of Myla on August 29, when a Russian drone attack struck an ammunition depot. Another 12 were killed in attacks across the country on September 1.

Civilian deaths have sharply increased this summer as Russia is using jet-powered drones, which fly at about half the speed of a passenger jet and are more difficult to intercept than propeller-powered drones.

Jet-powered drones numbered about 2,800 in August, said Ukraine Air Force spokesman Yurii Ihnat, compared with about 1,500 in July, several times the number launched in June. Ukraine has an interception rate of more than 90 percent against propeller-powered drones, but only 60 percent against the jet-powered variant, Ihnat said.

Ukraine said Russian forces suffered 42,020 casualties last month, as Moscow’s territorial gains dropped to a fraction of last year’s rate of advance.

Ukrainian armed forces figures showed Russia’s monthly casualties were only slightly below July’s 42,860 and well above the 39,290 in June.

Al Jazeera cannot independently verify casualty estimates by either side, but if accurate, those summer figures – 25.8 percent higher than the casualties Ukraine inflicted in the spring – suggest the high Russian casualty rate is not a passing event.

Russian recruitment rates are thought to be well below those totals, estimated by Ukraine at about 32,500 a month this year.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has publicly shared intelligence suggesting that Russian leader Vladimir Putin will conscript 300,000 or more troops next month.

Zelenskyy has said that up to 80 percent of Russian casualties were inflicted in Kostiantynivka, the southernmost of Ukraine’s “fortress belt” of cities in the eastern Donetsk region, whose capture Putin has repeatedly prioritised.

Russian forces are thought to control only a portion of the city, but have infiltrated more than 70 percent of it with scattered individual troops sent to drop supplies and await reinforcements. Ukrainian drone operators have been targeting the troops as Russia replenishes them.

This week it was revealed that Ukrainian commander-in-chief, Mykhailo Drapatyi, reinforced the Donetsk front around Sloviansk and Dobropillia, north and south of Kostiantynivka, respectively, but kept the Kostiantynivka front largely unchanged. That suggests Ukraine may be adopting the tactic of fighting a prolonged rearguard in the urban landscape to inflict attritional losses, as it did in the battles of Bakhmut, Pokrovsk and Chasiv Yar.

The fight for Kostiantynivka has sapped troop strength elsewhere on the front line, where Ukraine liberated 130sq km (50 square miles) of its land in August, limiting Russia’s overall advance.

Russia seized just over 90sq km (35 square miles) in August, estimated the Institute for the Study of War, a Washington-based think tank that assesses territorial gains using open-source geolocated sources.

While still a net gain, that is less than a fifth of the land Russia seized in August last year.

During June, July and August this year, the ISW assessed that Russia gained firm control of 160sq km (60 square miles), compared with 1,440sq km in the summer months of 2025 (560 square miles) – a 90 percent decrease.

Ukraine’s response

Ukraine has turned its focus from Russian refineries to strikes against Russian air defences, radar systems and drone launch sites.

Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces (SBS) destroyed 33 air defence elements in August, increasing the annual total to 263.

Ukraine also kept up some strikes on refineries, hitting 12 in August, along with two gas-processing plants and three oil transshipment terminals, according to its defence ministry.

During the past week, Ukraine struck the Yanos refinery in Yaroslavl and the Kirishi and Ust-Luga refineries near Leningrad, all 800km (500 miles) from its border.

Those strikes have caused petrol shortages, further hurting Russia’s economy.

Ukraine’s military intelligence reported that certain Russian exports had fallen by 80 percent compared with pre-war levels. Oil has been among the hardest hit, as Ukraine has struck terminals and hundreds of tankers carrying Russian oil in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov.

Russian oil exports from the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk fell from 800,000 barrels a day in July to 350,000 barrels per day in August, said Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service.

“The Russian side acknowledges that its Black Sea Fleet ships are effectively blockaded in Novorossiysk due to our drone strikes and are unable to operate at sea,” said Zelenskyy.

“Since the Russian fleet is unable to provide escorts for the commercial and shadow fleet …  one of the solutions being considered is to equip civilian ships with small arms, electronic warfare (EW) equipment and military personnel,” he said. “We will prepare appropriate countermeasures.”

The strikes on the oil industry have not only reduced exports. They have reverberated across the Russian economy, creating queues at petrol stations and raising prices for motorists.

This week, Russia extended its ban on diesel exports to the end of September to keep its army and transport industry supplied and sought to import petrol.

Occupied Crimea, where petrol distribution has been restricted to government-owned vehicles, has been hard hit.

The Russian-appointed governor of the region, Sergei Aksyonov, said on September 2: “Fuel supplies to the region are currently not fully meeting the needs of the residents. Unfortunately, some residents of Crimea will, at this stage, face limited access to gasoline”.

Kyiv, Ukraine – Russian Aerospace Forces (RAF) chief Aleksandr Chayko barely survived a blast that killed his son-in-law.

Chayko, who turned 55 in the last week of July, was reportedly having a belated birthday party on August 1 at a high-end Italian restaurant in central Moscow.

But the celebration was cut short, as an ‌unidentified woman carrying a homemade bomb tried to enter the restaurant. She was stopped by a security ‌guard, according to Russia. The explosive in her bag detonated, killing at least five people.

The Kremlin did not confirm the casualties, but blamed the attack on the “bloody tentacles” of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s government.

Kyiv has not commented on the attack.

Russia’s space programme in the firing line

Chayko helped lead Russia’s intervention in Syria and commanded Russian forces north of Kyiv in early 2022.

Ukraine has accused him of war crimes.

In May, President Vladimir Putin appointed him commander-in-chief of the RAF that controls the military component of Russia’s space programme.

The RAF’s satellites and ground-space facilities have been used for gathering intelligence, navigation, and supporting the coordination of ground troops and drone and missile attacks.

These facilities are located mostly in western Russia, and new Ukrainian long-range drones and missiles are capable of striking them.

“Key factories are few, and they all are within the reach of Ukrainian missiles,” Nikolay Mitrokhin, a researcher with Germany’s University of Bremen, told Al Jazeera.

“These attacks may result – and certainly will – in the problems with all of Russia’s space programme, including specifically civilian and international programmes,” he said.

‘Long-range sanctions’

In late June, Ukrainian drones hit the giant space communications centre in the leafy, tranquil town of Dubna outside Moscow that managed reconnaissance satellites and processed military data.

The strike damaged a 32-metre (105-foot) satellite antenna, hardware modular complexes, central control consoles and technical buildings.

“Our long-range sanctions against Russia for this war once again reached the Dubna space communications centre,” Zelenskyy said on June 30.

Russian authorities said an unspecified building in Dubna was damaged and a six-month-old baby died.

Ukrainian drones also struck three smaller space communication centres in western Russia and annexed Crimea.

“These centres are very expensive, very labour-consuming from the viewpoint of construction,” Anatoly Zak, a United States-based author and one of the foremost experts on the Russian space programme, told Al Jazeera. “It’s very difficult to transfer their functions to another infrastructure” because they manage geostationary satellites “tied” to a certain location.

So far, there have been no signs that the satellites lost orbit or became unmanageable, but “behind the scenes there are for sure serious communication problems”, Zak said.

Ukraine attacks ‘when there’s a fully-fuelled rocket on the launchpad’

On August 23, swarms of Ukrainian drones flew more than 1,800km (1,120 miles) to reach Russia’s northwestern Arkhangelsk region.

Some 40 drones were downed, regional authorities claimed, but at least two reached the area near Plesetsk, Russia’s military cosmodrome, or spaceport, and launchpad for intercontinental ballistic missiles and rockets carrying military satellites.

No harm was done. A day later, Roscosmos, the state-run space corporation, reported the successful launch of a rocket with unnamed “military satellites”.

The timing of the Ukrainian attack – along with two more strikes earlier this year – was calculated to strike a booster rocket that had just been fuelled and lifted for takeoff.

“There have been three attempts to air-raid Plesetsk, and not just air-raid, but air-raid at the moment when there’s a fully-fuelled rocket on the launchpad that is about to start,” Zak said.

The attempts were serious enough to be publicly reported to Putin.

“Our [Ukrainian] ‘friends’ did everything to make this launch not happen,” Dmitry Bakanov, head of the Kremlin-run Roscosmos space agency, told Putin in April.

At least a dozen drones are necessary to damage Plesetsk’s launch table or rocket assembly shop, according to Pavel Luzin, an analyst with the Jamestown Foundation, a think tank in Washington, DC.

The military satellites launched from Plesetsk are part of the Rassvet (Dawn) satellite fleet designed to rival and replace Starlink satellite modems by Elon Musk’s SpaceX company, Moscow claimed.

The world’s most launched spaceship

Sputnik 1, the Earth’s first artificial satellite, was the size of a fitness ball, and had nothing but a radio transmitter and three silver-zinc batteries inside.

The “Sputnik moment” was the US’s realisation, after the Soviet Union launched the first satellite in 1957, that the USSR had taken the lead in space technology and science.

But Sputnik 1 was launched on a modified R-7 – the world’s first intercontinental ballistic missile, designed to carry a hydrogen bomb across continents. The same rocket technology that could deliver a nuclear warhead into the US had been repurposed to put a satellite into orbit.

The R-7 became a prototype of the Soyuz booster rockets, the world’s most launched spaceships that made Soviet and then Russian launches routine and precise, unlike US launches of space shuttles.

“Rain or shine or sleet or snow don’t matter,” Mark Bowman, deputy director of NASA’s human spaceflight programme, told this reporter in 2007 at the Baikonur spaceport, the world’s oldest in southern Kazakhstan that Russia leases.

The only place where the Soyuz rockets are produced is the Progress Rocket and Space Centre in the Volga River city of Samara – and Ukrainian missiles struck it on August 15. The attack ignited a fire and slightly damaged one of the facilities.

“So far, we see that the damage in Samara wasn’t critical,” Luzin said.

If it becomes critical, Russia would be unable to manufacture the Soyuz rockets, but the existing stash of rockets would still last a year, he said.

Communist Moscow never advertised the military component of its space programme, emphasising its “peaceful exploration of space”.

The USSR was first to send a dog, a man and a woman into space, and to launch the world’s first space station. In 1988, its Buran space shuttle became the first to complete an unmanned orbital flight and land automatically.

Its unmanned probes soft-landed on Venus and Mars and took the first photos of the moon’s dark side.

Some key figures of the Soviet space programmes were born in what is now Ukraine, and a string of crucial design bureaus and manufacturing facilities kept working there after the 1991 Soviet collapse.

Following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and the subsequent breakdown in Russian-Ukrainian relations, Ukrainian aerospace facilities severed their longstanding ties with Moscow, disrupting decades-old supplies of booster rockets, guidance systems, electronics and other components.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine also deepened the international isolation of its civilian space programme, with Western governments and space agencies suspending or abandoning several planned missions and partnerships.

After the war began in 2022, the European Space Agency terminated its cooperation with Roscosmos on ExoMars, removing the Russian-built Kazachok landing platform from the mission designed to search for signs of past life on Mars.

The same year, Berlin switched off its X-ray telescope on Spektr-RG, a Russia-German space observatory that maps clusters of galaxies and surveys the universe for black holes.

For the sake of seizing insignificant areas in eastern Ukraine, “Putin will waste the Russian space programme the way he wasted the rest of the Soviet legacy”, analyst Mitrokhin believes.

Yet Russia has not been completely cut off from international space cooperation.

Despite the collapse of some partnerships, NASA and Roscosmos have continued to work together on board the International Space Station, while Moscow has turned to China and other non-Western partners for new projects.

Moscow challenges Norway’s seizure of vessel, the Professor Molchanov, calling it an act of piracy.

Norway has seized a Russian ship in ⁠the Arctic to ⁠enforce a compensation claim by Ukrainian energy firm Naftogaz, linked to Russian asset seizures in Crimea.

Norway seized the ship on Wednesday, after Moscow failed to pay Naftogaz $4.22bn plus interest and legal costs to compensate for ⁠assets it seized in ⁠Crimea after a tribunal ruling at The Hague in 2023.

In a post on X, Naftogaz said the seizure made up “part of global efforts to enforce the arbitral award obtained by Naftogaz against the Russian Federation in connection with the unlawful expropriation of their assets in Crimea, which Russia illegally annexed in 2014”.

The vessel, the Professor Molchanov, was taken off the Norwegian Arctic archipelago of Svalbard after a 24-hour standoff with the Norwegian Coast Guard, according ⁠to Covington, the US law firm representing Naftogaz.⁠

Russian state news agency TASS quoted a Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson as calling the Norwegian action “piracy”.

Alexei Chekunkov, Russia’s ⁠minister for the development of the Russian ⁠Far East and Arctic, ⁠said Moscow would challenge the ruling.

Chekunkov called Norway’s seizure of the Professor Molchanov “another ‌example of Western countries’ legal nihilism and lawlessness,” according to the ‌Interfax ‌news agency.

Naftogaz has been pursuing legal action against Russia since 2016 to seek compensation for the expropriation of its property in Crimea.

“Russia cannot evade responsibility simply by refusing to comply with an international arbitral award,” said Naftogaz Acting CEO Sergii Fedorenko.

“We will continue to pursue Russian assets around the world until the compensation ‌awarded ‌to Naftogaz and other Naftogaz Group companies is paid,” the Ukrainian company said.

Covington, the law firm, said it had been tracking the Professor Molchanov, a Russian-owned vessel that is used for commercial cruises, for months.

The ship was being used for commercial expedition cruises, including to Svalbard, according to the company.

Naftogaz said the passengers on board are being handled by Norwegian authorities.

Russian drone attacks across Ukraine have killed at least one person and wounded more than a dozen others, as Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Vladimir Putin threatened to escalate the conflict.

Between Tuesday and Wednesday, Ukrainian authorities reported attacks in the capital, Kyiv, in the southern city of Odesa and in eastern Dnipro, where the body of a man was retrieved from under rubble.

The air war between Russia and Ukraine has intensified as the conflict stretches into its fifth year following Moscow’s invasion of its neighbour. The front line in eastern and southern Ukraine remains largely deadlocked, and US efforts to negotiate a peace settlement have yet to produce a path to peace.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy exchanged threats late on Tuesday over what their next steps might be.

Zelenskyy warned foreign airlines that the skies over Russia are not safe for flights due to Ukrainian long-range drone attacks, saying that “Russian airspace will effectively be closing”. He said Ukrainian military pressure aims to compel Russia to accept peace negotiations.

Putin accused Zelenskyy of “state terrorism” and said: “We don’t negotiate with terrorists.”

At a late-night news conference on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Kyrgyzstan, Putin also addressed reports that the Ukrainian military had used British-made drones to strike targets inside Russia.

Asked whether Russia would strike British military facilities if the UK government continues to provide Ukraine with weaponry, Putin declined to rule it out. With a small smile, he told reporters it was “a military secret”.

China and North Korea, meanwhile, have provided military support for Russia, as has Iran in previous years.

The Russian and Ukrainian leaders’ comments came as European officials weigh their response to the latest in what they say is Moscow’s campaign of continental sabotage and disruption aimed at weakening European support for Ukraine. Germany on Tuesday blamed Russia for an attempted attack at Leipzig/Halle airport last month using a drone laden with explosives.

Odesa power outage

Russia fired 174 attack drones, about half of them jet-powered drones that are hard to stop and are increasingly being deployed by Moscow, as well as two ballistic missiles and two plane-launched missiles at Ukraine overnight, according to the Ukrainian Air Force.

Officials in the southern Ukraine region of Odesa reported that the attack damaged a 24-storey residential building, destroying apartments on several floors and wounding eight people, including a child.

Odesa office buildings and two educational facilities were also damaged, Serhiy Lysak, head of the Odesa city military administration, said. The barrage also caused a power outage that halted electric-powered public transport, the city council said.

A man and a woman were wounded by shrapnel in morning attacks on the Kyiv region, according to Tymur Tkachenko, head of the regional military administration.

It was the seventh straight day Kyiv came under attack, although the latest barrage wasn’t as heavy as in previous days. The assault started a fire at a warehouse, officials said. Russian forces have targeted civilian facilities in what Ukrainian officials say is an effort to disrupt daily life and sap public morale.

A fire broke out at an educational facility and a medical practice was also damaged, the Kyiv city military administration said.

Meanwhile in Russia, air defences destroyed 130 Ukrainian drones overnight, the Defence Ministry said on Wednesday. The drones were shot down over 11 Russian regions, as well as the annexed Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea and the Black Sea, it said.

Ukrainian drone attacks killed two people in Russia’s Belgorod border region and wounded 16 more, acting governor Aleksand Shuvaev said. Ukrainian forces hit the region 140 times over the course of 24 hours, he said.

Ukraine’s domestically developed long-range drones have repeatedly targeted Russia’s oil sector, hoping to dent the economy and the warehouses of online retailers to make the Russian public feel the effects of war.

Germany has now formally accused Russia of directing an attempted explosive-drone attack against Ukrainian cargo aircraft at Leipzig/Halle Airport, a story we previously reported on. At the same time, authorities are separately investigating a sophisticated sabotage attack against a critical power-grid node in Brandenburg, underscoring Germany’s growing concern over hybrid threats to its critical infrastructure.

The two incidents, occurring against the backdrop of growing German and European warnings about Russian hybrid warfare, underscore the expanding range of vulnerabilities facing critical infrastructure across the country.

German Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt and Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul said Tuesday that the Russian state had apparently provided the equipment and technical know-how for the Leipzig operation, with locally recruited “low-level agents” allegedly tasked with carrying it out.

The drone, discovered inside the secured area of Leipzig/Halle Airport during the night of August 4-5, was carrying approximately 1.3 pounds of explosives and was found close to a Ukrainian-operated Antonov An-124 heavy cargo aircraft used to transport weapons to Ukraine.

The detonator on the device apparently failed, preventing what German officials said could have been a catastrophe.

The incident appears to have combined several characteristics of the emerging European hybrid threat: a relatively inexpensive drone, military-grade explosives, a strategically significant target, and the alleged use of local operatives to provide distance between the attack and its suspected state sponsor.

As we discussed at the time, the choice of target at Leipzig/Halle is particularly significant. The airport is an important cargo hub, and Ukrainian Antonov aircraft operating there have been used to move weapons to Ukraine. At the very least, an explosive device detonating near one of those aircraft could have disrupted a logistics link supporting Kyiv while simultaneously creating a major aviation safety incident.

A successful attack on one of Antonov’s cargo aircraft could have caused casualties, damaged or even destroyed the aircraft, and disrupted airport operations. The presence of explosive material inside a secured airport area also demonstrates the potential for covert actors to penetrate or exploit security around critical aviation infrastructure. But above all else, the loss of an Antonov Airlines An-124 would have been highly symbolic as the huge aircraft are a global symbol of Ukraine and its resilience.

Investigators later found traces of hexogen, or RDX, a military explosive near the airport on August 14, together with another drone.

Authorities initially believed the second drone could have been part of the planned attack, although investigators have since expressed doubts about that assessment. Nevertheless, German officials now say there is sufficient evidence to attribute the attempted operation to Russia, an accusation that Moscow rejects.

The Leipzig incident was not the only major security concern confronting Germany on Tuesday.

In the eastern state of Brandenburg, authorities said the power grid was deliberately targeted with specially prepared incendiary devices and rockets carrying conductive material. The attack targeted the Turnow-Preilack substation, a critical high-voltage node connecting the Jänschwalde power plant to the 50Hertz transmission network.

According to Brandenburg Interior Minister Jan Redmann, rockets carrying conductive material were fired into extra-high-voltage transmission lines, producing two short circuits. Authorities recovered more than a dozen devices at the site, with the number still increasing as the search continued. Redmann said the design and deployment of the devices required substantial preparation.

The attack caused a brief power interruption, but 50Hertz said all affected lines had returned to operation and that the general electricity supply was never disrupted.

At the Jänschwalde power plant, the incident triggered an automatic shutdown of one generating unit. The unit was expected to return to service Tuesday evening.

While the physical damage was limited, the nature of the attack is likely to attract significant attention from German security officials. Unlike Leipzig, German authorities are not currently attributing the Brandenburg sabotage to Russia. Redmann said authorities could not rule out the involvement of a foreign power, while also declining to exclude domestic extremist or activist groups. Left-wing activists have previously attacked German electricity infrastructure.

But the incident demonstrates the same underlying vulnerability Berlin is increasingly concerned about. In an age of hybrid warfare, relatively small-scale acts of sabotage exploiting weaknesses in infrastructure can have outsized consequences. Redmann described Germany’s critical infrastructure as excessively vulnerable.

“When it comes to our critical infrastructure, we in Germany are far too vulnerable,” he said, adding that the vulnerability extended to airports.

Taken together, the incidents illustrate the breadth of the threat German officials are attempting to address.

Germany’s assessment of the Leipzig operation also points to an increasingly familiar model of suspected Russian covert activity. German officials say Russian state actors supplied the expertise and equipment but relied on local agents to conduct the physical operation. That type of operation could provide Moscow with additional deniability while allowing sabotage to be conducted by individuals already inside the target country. It also complicates the security challenge for European governments.

German intelligence sources cited by German media have reportedly identified possible links between drone, explosive, and weapons incidents in Germany and other European countries, including Bulgaria, Italy, Poland, Romania, and the United Kingdom. Investigators are understood to be examining the incidents in parallel.

If those links are confirmed, the Leipzig operation could represent one element of a broader campaign involving recruited personnel, explosives, and uncrewed systems operating across multiple European countries. Europe has spent much of the past several years strengthening conventional military deterrence while simultaneously confronting an expanding gray zone of cyberattacks, espionage, sabotage, and influence operations. Critical infrastructure is an especially attractive target in that environment. Power grids, airports, railways, telecommunications networks, ports, undersea cables, and industrial facilities are typically dispersed, difficult to protect comprehensively, and often interconnected.

An attacker does not necessarily need to destroy infrastructure to achieve an effect. A temporary shutdown, disruption to logistics or forced security response can itself create economic and operational costs, and help generate a climate of fear and mistrust. This has already been seen in the mass drone incursions over sensitive locations across NATO countries, and especially in Germany.

There has been a growing acknowledgement of a new kind of threat, in which state-backed or state-directed actors could potentially use inexpensive systems, local recruits, and covert methods to create disruption without crossing the threshold of an overt military attack, for years now. Germany is now preparing measures aimed at increasing the costs of executing these kinds of operations for Moscow. The Russian consulate in Bonn is scheduled to close later this month. Berlin also intends to remove Russian House, a cultural and scientific organization in the German capital that German authorities have associated with alleged Russian intelligence activity.

Berlin is also preparing additional measures against Russia’s so-called shadow fleet, vessels used to transport Russian oil and other commodities while circumventing Western restrictions.

Germany also plans additional sanctions and tighter border controls for Russian nationals entering the country.

At the European level, Berlin is supporting the European Commission’s proposed 22nd sanctions package against Russia, reportedly covering approximately 1,600 additional companies and organizations linked to Russia. Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said Russia would respond to what she called Berlin’s “anti-Russian action.”

NATO and EU officials have backed Germany following the Leipzig attribution. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said Berlin had presented clear evidence supporting its assessment of Russian involvement. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen likewise pledged European solidarity.

The incidents at Leipzig/Halle Airport and in Brandenburg underscore Germany’s growing concern over hybrid threats to its critical infrastructure. Both demonstrate how an adversary could potentially impose costs on a NATO country while operating below the threshold of open warfare.

At the same time, these actions come as concerns grow that Russia could openly and directly challenge NATO’s resolve militarily.

Regardless, for Germany and its European allies, the biggest question that needs to be answered may now be how many apparently isolated incidents could actually be pieces of a larger campaign?

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Germany has formally accused Russia of attempting an attack last month at the Leipzig-Halle airport, a state-owned facility in the eastern part of the country.

On Tuesday, German Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt said his country’s intelligence community had determined that a drone discovered at the airport was consistent with Russian technology. The drone had been bearing explosives, according to official reports.

The announcement triggered several retaliatory measures, including the announcement that Germany would shut down a Russian consulate.

The incident is seen as part of a growing trend in Europe, where officials fear Russia is mounting a campaign of intimidation against members of the NATO military alliance.

What was found at the Leipzig airport? How have officials responded? And what does it say about tensions between Europe and Russia as Moscow’s war in Ukraine drags on? Read on for a quick explainer on the basics.

What happened at Leipzig airport?

An explosive-laden drone was found near a cargo plane belonging to the Ukrainian firm Antonov Airlines on the evening of August 4.

An employee flagged the drone, which was located in a cargo area near a runway, resulting in a temporary shutdown at the Leipzig-Halle airport, a major cargo hub in the eastern German state of Saxony.

Specialists were called in to defuse the explosives with a robot. A second drone was reportedly destroyed after it collided with an aeroplane near the airport.

Why does Germany blame Russia?

Dobrindt, Germany’s interior minister, said investigators identified a configuration and components resembling those seen in Russia’s war against Ukraine.

“Taken together, the police investigations, the pattern and intelligence findings prove a Russian responsibility for the attempted attack at Leipzig airport,” Dobrindt said.

Germany’s government has not publicly shared specifics connecting the incident to Moscow or released all the evidence.

But Dobrindt said the device reflected “a high degree of technical expertise”. He added, however, that the task of carrying out the attack appears to have fallen to “low-level agents”, whom he described as people acting “on behalf of Russian state entities”. He did not specify which ones.

How has Germany responded?

Germany has taken a series of retaliatory actions since announcing the intelligence community’s findings.

Starting on September 18, a Russian consulate in Bonn, a major German city on the Rhine River, will be shuttered. The Russian House, a cultural gathering place in Berlin, will also be closed, though the date has yet to be determined.

German leaders said they would also recommend more Russians be added to the European Union’s sanctions list and consider heightening entry controls for Russian citizens.

The German Foreign Ministry has also summoned Russia’s ambassador to the country to discuss the incident.

How has Russia reacted to Germany’s claims?

Moscow has denied it had anything to do with the drone. The Russian Embassy in Berlin called the claims absurd and warned that the accusations would have consequences.

Separately, Russian President Vladimir Putin accused the government of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz of pointing the finger at Moscow to distract from domestic problems and falling approval ratings.

He also suggested that Germany had planted evidence to frame Russia for the drone incident.

How have NATO and European allies responded?

NATO allies like Poland, Italy, the United Kingdom, Sweden and the Czech Republic have all backed Berlin’s claims against Moscow.

“Whenever Russian hybrid activities target one of our allies, we are all exposed,” the Czech Foreign Ministry posted on social media.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said she would discuss the incident with NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte, and EU foreign ministers are expected to prepare a joint response.

How has Ukraine responded?

Since February 2022, Ukraine has been battling a war that began with Russia’s full-scale invasion of its neighbour.

There has been speculation that Moscow’s increasing military threats in Europe are designed to weaken NATO support for Kyiv.

Ukraine has welcomed Germany’s measures against Russia, with Ukrainian Ambassador Oleksii Makeiev praising Berlin’s response on Tuesday.

Germany has been a key strategic partner for Ukraine, and in April, the two countries unveiled a security cooperation agreement that would strengthen joint air defences.

As part of the deal, Berlin agreed to fund missile contracts for Kyiv, and the two would collaborate on drone co-production.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said that his country’s airspace is becoming increasingly unsafe for civilian aviation, with both sides in the war increasingly relying on drone warfare.

What other actions has Russia been accused of in Europe?

Critics have long warned that Russia is taking an increasingly aggressive stance towards Europe, which has opposed its invasion of Ukraine.

The Associated Press news agency has logged some 200 incidents of sabotage and malign activity in Europe since the 2022 invasion.

Those acts include cyberattacks, espionage, disinformation campaigns, arson and interference with infrastructure.

One case, in March 2024, involved a warehouse in east London being set on fire. The facility stored aid for Ukraine, and prosecutors blamed the attack on members of the Russian-backed Wagner Group, a paramilitary organisation.

Such low-level operations are often called “hybrid” attacks, as they remain below the threshold of open conflict but still succeed in sowing unease through violence.

Why are these tensions erupting now?

Germany says covert operations like the attempted drone attack at the Leipzig airport are meant to undermine the country’s political backing for Ukraine in its defence against Russia.

The war has stretched for more than four years, and Ukrainian officials have warned that the coming winter may prove the most challenging yet.

The attempted drone attack also comes at a pivotal time for German politics.

On September 6, the eastern province of Saxony-Anhalt is holding elections, and the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party is hoping to make gains, building in part on public weariness with the war.

The AfD has called for strengthening ties with Russia and has been critical of support for Ukraine. It is currently leading in public opinion polls ahead of the vote.

Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov has made a surprise appearance at United States-hosted G20 finance talks in North Carolina, sparking frustration and dismay among European ministers and officials.

Siluanov’s appearance at the talks in Asheville on Monday marks the first time the minister, who was appointed in 2011, has attended a G20 meeting in person since Moscow launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

He held a bilateral meeting with US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, with Russia’s Ministry of Finance saying the two men discussed financial cooperation within the G20 framework.

A US official said the meeting focused on US President Donald Trump’s peace plan for Ukraine.

Asked about the invitation to Siluanov, Trump told reporters: “We like getting along with everybody. One of the reasons I’m so successful, I get along with everybody.”

European officials, however, criticised the move.

Polish Finance Minister Andrzej Domanski said he was unhappy to see Moscow represented, although he recognised the right of G20 hosts to invite guests.

“We do not trust Russia. They lie constantly, and you need to be really, really cautious while discussing with them,” ⁠he told the Reuters news agency, stressing that Russia was the aggressor in its conflict with Ukraine.

“So for me, it would be very difficult to have any kind of conversation with Russia.”

‘Troubling’ signal

German Finance Minister Lars Klingbeil said the US’s decision to welcome Siluanov sent a “signal I find troubling”.

He said he told Siluanov during a plenary session that Moscow had to end the war and “that we clearly support Ukraine”.

He also said Europe was preparing a further package of sanctions against Russia and hoped for close cooperation with Washington on the measures.

European ministers and central bankers also opposed appearing with Siluanov in the traditional G20 “family photo”, European officials said. The photograph was ultimately taken without the Russian minister.

Klingbeil said European officials, including European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde, had discussed Russia’s involvement on Sunday and agreed that maintaining an avenue for dialogue could allow them to deliver a frank message to Moscow.

“However, the mere fact that the Russian finance minister is back – after, I believe, four G20 meetings without Russian participation – indicates an attempt at normalisation, and that makes it all the more important for us to push back,” he said.

Siluanov’s appearance marked a sharp contrast with the G20 meeting in Washington, DC, in April 2022, when his virtual participation prompted officials from Canada, the United Kingdom, the US, and the European Central Bank to walk out.

White House defends talks with Russia

Asked about Siluanov’s attendance, White House spokesman Kush Desai told the AFP news agency that the Trump administration had been working with Russia to push for a deal that “would stop the endless bloodshed that the president has really condemned”.

“The president and the administration will never shy away from talking with the folks we need to talk to, to further that,” he said. “That’s what we’re working on here at the G20.”

Separately, Reuters and AFP, citing sources familiar with the Washington-Moscow talks, said Bessent had made clear that the US would not provide Russia with economic relief until war in Ukraine was over.

Trump has pushed Moscow and Kyiv to reach a deal to halt the fighting, but an initial 28-point plan that largely adhered to Russia’s demands was criticised by Ukraine and European governments.

The US, which currently holds the rotating G20 presidency, did not invite South Africa, last year’s G20 host, to the gathering. Poland, which is not a permanent G20 member, was invited.

Certain reporters from major US newsrooms, including The New York Times and Bloomberg News, were not granted credentials to cover the gathering.

The decision was condemned by the National Press Club, which said that “no administration should be allowed to handpick the press corps that scrutinizes it”.

The two-day meeting comes as global debt levels have reached a record of nearly $353 trillion and the global economy faces an energy shock triggered by the US-Israel war on Iran. The talks also come amid rising tensions over China’s large trade surplus and uncertainty over the effects of a surge in artificial intelligence investment.

Aug. 31 (UPI) — Finance ministers and other officials from the Group of 20 nations, as well as many CEOs, met Monday in Asheville, N.C., at a summit in which U.S. leaders intended to focus on growth and Iran — but also drew protests from other leaders for the inclusion of the Russian minister.

U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent told officials that the United States wants to focus on the mission of accelerating growth and said the countries need to work together

“The world is awash in debt, and the only way for us to get out of this is to grow our way out of this,” Bessent said, CNBC reported.

He also said a “durable” global economy” cannot rest on “beggar-thy-neighbor acts that stifle fair, market-based competition,” The New York Times said.

In introductory comments, U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Kevin Warsh also focused on growth, saying the time is one of “secular growth.”

“If I were to try to characterize this moment, it would be one of a global investment surge,” he said.

Bessent said earlier Monday in a CNBC interview that the U.S. plan to pressure and isolate Iran through its economy can work without China, which opposes the sanctions. He is expected to ask the other finance ministers to join in those sanctions.

Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov was at the meeting — at the invitation of the Trump administration — for the first time since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

This drew protests from other European ministers, who have issued their own sanctions against Russia for that war. Finance Minister Lars Klingbeil told The Times that he scolded Siluanov over the war and said the European ministers demanded the Russian minister be left out of a traditional group photo. It was eventually taken without Siluanov.

“Receiving the Russian finance minister here sends a signal I find troubling,” he told reporters. “I would have preferred clear positioning from the U.S. side that he not be received like a regular guest.”

Ukraine’s finance minister was not present in person at the meeting.

In addition, European ministers protested that the United States did not invite representatives from South Africa, a G20 country, to the meeting. Trump administration officials also invited many U.S. business executives but denied requests to include business leaders from other G20 countries.

Wheat prices have risen sharply amid disruptions to Black Sea exports as the Russia-Ukraine war continues and as changing weather patterns cause droughts that have sharply reduced production.

Over the past month, Russia and Ukraine have stepped up attacks on each other’s grain terminals on the Black Sea. With Russia the world’s largest wheat exporter, and Ukraine among the top 10 grain-producing countries, these attacks have taken their toll on global wheat and grain supply.

Chicago wheat futures, the global benchmark for the grain market, hit a three-year high on Friday, before nudging down 0.54 percent on Monday to $7.79 per bushel by 02:00 GMT. Authorities in Russia’s Rostov region called a state of emergency on Friday after announcing that port closures and navigation disruptions in the Sea of Azov and Black Sea basin have led to a pile-up of agricultural products at farms.

Meanwhile, the rising temperatures and lack of rain have threatened to cut this year’s wheat harvest in South Africa’s Swartland, which produces about 20 percent of the country’s wheat.

Here’s what we know:

What impact is the Russia-Ukraine war having on prices?

Over the past month, strikes on ports, vessels and grain facilities amid the Russia-Ukraine conflict have disrupted grain terminals and forced shippers to delay or cancel cargo loadings during the peak export season.

While Russian missile attacks have impacted Ukraine’s grain exports, Ukraine’s drone attacks in the Sea of Azov have also sharply curtailed Russian shipments of both grain and wheat. At the same time, attacks on Russia’s Novorossiysk and Taman ports have increased shipping costs out of its Black Sea ports.

According to Ukraine’s Ministry of Infrastructure, in July, Ukraine suffered 35 Russian attacks on vessels in port, 22 at sea and 67 on port facilities. By comparison, the total number of vessel strikes for the whole of 2025 was just 14.

On Friday, Kyiv’s agricultural minister said recent Russian air attacks have destroyed around 90 percent of retailers’ food logistics. With transport of wheat curtailed, prices have risen, raising fears of food insecurity around the world.

Joe Glauber, a research fellow emeritus in the director general’s office at the International Food Policy Research Institute, said that the issue, therefore, is less the amount of wheat being produced and more about the cost of getting it to buyers and consumers.

“There’s plenty of wheat in Russia and Ukraine, and ultimately that wheat will make it out on to the market. But right now it can’t, or it comes out with a very high cost, and so wheat prices have reflected that,” he told Al Jazeera.

“There’s a lot of wheat in the world…it’s not a question of availability, it’s a question of affordability,” he added.

Egypt, the world’s largest wheat importer, usually spends around $3bn per year on importing wheat. In the first half of 2026, it sourced more than 82 percent of its stock from Russia and Ukraine.

In Asia, second-largest wheat importer Indonesia bought $361m of wheat from Ukraine and $102m from Russia between 2023 and 2024, according to the Observatory of Economic Complexity. Indonesia usually sources between 15 percent and 20 percent of its wheat from the two countries.

An official at Indonesia’s Flour Millers’ Association told Reuters last week that current stocks can meet immediate food-grade wheat requirements. “But we don’t have abundant or excess supply. We have to look at other origins such as Bulgaria, Australia, Romania and Argentina for cargoes that do not get shipped from Russia and Ukraine,” the official said.

How does climate change fit into this?

Besides the war in Ukraine, droughts and drier weather patterns have taken a toll on wheat production and contributed to rising prices.

According to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), as of July 1, the US, also one of the biggest wheat exporters, is forecast to yield “46.7 bushels per acre, down 0.1 bushels from last month and down 8.2 bushels from last year’s average yield of 54.9 bushels per acre”.

“If realised, the United States yield would be the lowest since 2015,” the USDA said.

In a report updated on August 14, the department wrote: “This year’s small crop is a product of long-term decline in US wheat acreage and widespread drought impacts on HRW [Hard Red Winter wheat] production in the Great Plains States. Total wheat supplies are forecast down 13 percent from the previous year, with larger beginning stocks dampening the effect of the smaller crop.”

For Canada, the world’s sixth-largest wheat producer, the USDA’s Foreign Agricultural Service found that for the 2026-2027 production year, total production is forecast to be 34.6 million metric tons (MMT) – also 13 percent lower than the year before – due to reduced planted area and a return to lower-than-average yields.

Amid the heatwaves that have hit European countries over the past three months, wheat production in the bloc has also reduced. According to COCERAL, the European association of trade in cereals, oilseeds, rice, pulses, olive oil, oils and fats, animal feed and agrosupply, the excessive heat is expected to reduce grain crops in 2026 by around 9 million tonnes to 286 million tonnes.

In a report published in July, COCERAL said: “The weather has started to affect corn pollination in the southern half of France and in Hungary. More damage is expected from the forecast heat in other parts of the EU.”

The El Nino weather pattern is also expected to bring drier-than-usual conditions to the Southern Hemisphere this year, with South Africa and Australia expected to experience droughts as a result.

What can be done to mitigate all this?

While the Russia-Ukraine war continues, in July 2022, the year the war started, a Black Sea Grain Initiative was brokered to allow for the safe exports of grain, food and fertiliser from Ukrainian ports to stabilise and lower global food prices.

While that agreement held, more than 1,000 ships full of grain and other foodstuffs left Ukraine, according to the EU. However, Russia ended the agreement in July 2023.

The answer to the current crisis is far from easy, experts say.

Bringing prices down now would necessitate a major shift in war strategy by both Russia and Ukraine, while the impact of climate change could be mitigated by governments implementing policies including improving water management on farms through the use of reservoirs to support drought-affected crops and reduce the loss of production.

Moreover, Glauber explained, while alternative routes exist to ship out grain from Russia and Ukraine, they are costly, adding that a return to a possible Black Sea Grain Initiative “would help calm wheat markets a lot”.

One answer may be for other countries to step in.

According to Glauber, during the 2022 global grain price surge, other wheat producing countries such as India exported more to make up for shortages.

“India, for example, had record exports in 2022. It’s probably less likely this year, just because of El Nino and other other factors affecting them, but they could also provide more wheat. I think the world wheat market proved very resilient in 2022, and I expect we’ll see the same in in 2026,” he said.

Leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), including Chinese President Xi Jinping, his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, are set to gather in Kyrgyzstan’s capital Bishkek for an annual summit.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian is also attending the summit, which marks 25 years of its existence.

The two-day summit, starting on Monday, comes at a time when the world is grappling with the aftermath of the US-Israel war on Iran, which has upended global energy and financial markets, and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war.

So, what will be the main agenda of the summit, and will the SCO leaders try to use the gathering to push for a multipolar world and Global South cooperation on trade and security issues, as United States President Donald Trump’s unilateral foreign policy has eroded the global rules-based order?

Here’s what we know:

Who is attending the SCO summit and where is it being held?

This year’s summit is taking place in Bishkek under the motto: Together for Sustainable Peace, Development and Prosperity.

Xi, Putin and Modi will be joined by the Iranian president and leaders of Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, among others.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Secretary-General Kao Kim Hourn are also expected to attend the summit.

William Yang, senior analyst for Northeast Asia at the International Crisis Group, noted that the ongoing wars are putting more strain on the rules-based international order, and against this backdrop, the summit serves as an important occasion for several of the world’s rising great powers, including China and India, to elevate their global influence and deepen their engagement and cooperation with other countries in the Global South.

“For years, SCO has been viewed as one of the avenues for China to promote the multipolar world order and form its own bloc with other developing countries. Despite its narrow scope of cooperation at the beginning, SCO member states have sought to expand the scope of their mandate and the number of member states,” Yang told Al Jazeera.

Amid the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and Europe, Yang said, “China could use this year’s summit to present itself as a great power that advocates for a peaceful resolution of the conflicts, thereby sharpening the contrast with the US.”

“However, these efforts are likely to be limited to rhetoric rather than any substantive proposal for conflict resolution,” he said.

Alicia Garcia-Herrero, chief economist for Asia Pacific at French investment bank Natixis, said the summit is particularly significant because it marks the grouping’s 25th anniversary and offers the first chance to turn last year’s Tianjin strategy, which called for a multipolar world order that fosters mutually beneficial international cooperation, into action. Last year’s summit took place in China’s Tianjin region.

“Putting Modi, Putin and Xi in the same room, with India-China border talks still live and a scheduled Modi-Putin bilateral, is a visible test of how far the recent thaw goes and how Eurasia wants to organise security, connectivity and trade without defaulting to Western institutions,” she told Al Jazeera, referring to the recent India-China talks amid the warming up of New Delhi-Beijing ties.

What is the SCO?

The SCO started in 1996 as a security bloc, dubbed the “Shanghai Five”. It was formed by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to settle their border disputes following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

But in June 2001, the grouping evolved into the SCO, and expanded to include Uzbekistan, with headquarters in Beijing. In 2017, the bloc expanded to include India and Pakistan. Iran and Belarus were also added as full members in 2023 and 2024, respectively.

In addition, the organisation has 14 key dialogue partners, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, Turkiye, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Cambodia.

SCO member states account for 43 percent of the world’s population and 23 percent – or almost a quarter – of the global economy.

Analysts have pointed out that while the SCO emerged with a focus on regional security, the expansion of its mandate to include trade and other Global South concerns means it is difficult to understand what sets the grouping apart from other Global South organisations like the BRICS, which is an acronym derived from the initials of the founding member countries, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

Alejandro Reyes, adjunct professor in the department of politics and public administration at the University of Hong Kong, said the SCO has grown into a “counterbalance” to the US-led Asia Pacific alliance aimed at countering China’s rise. India is part of both groupings. “Interestingly, India is part of the SCO, and the US appears to have dropped the Indo-Pacific nomenclature,” he said.

Reyes emphasised that “the SCO is not a coherent anti-US, anti-Western alliance”. “It is better understood as a forum in which countries with very different interests can demonstrate that they have alternatives and strategic room for manoeuvre – agency in this more volatile geopolitical order, dominated by China and the US. It is less an anti-American alliance than a venue for countries hedging against and hinging away from American power,” he told Al Jazeera.

“The significance this year is that current US policies, especially with regard to Iran and continuing US tariff and sanctions action, may be making that hedging more attractive and necessary,” he added.

What is on this year’s agenda?

The US-Israel war on Iran, the Russia-Ukraine war and the economic and social situation in Afghanistan are key issues leaders are expected to discuss this year, according to the SCO Secretariat.

Relations between India and China – Asia’s two major economies – are also expected to be discussed. Last year, Beijing and New Delhi began a rapprochement after five years of tensions over a 2020 deadly border skirmish. Trump’s tariff war on Indian goods last year forced New Delhi to mend ties with Beijing. For the first time since 2018, Modi visited China last year for the SCO summit.

Border tensions between India and Pakistan also persist, and the issue is expected to be discussed at this summit.

Manoj Kewalramani, chairperson of Bengaluru-based think tank Takshashila Institution’s Geostrategy Programme, told Al Jazeera that apart from the traditional security agenda, this year’s summit might include any forward movement on issues of economic integration or financial cooperation architecture.

“In Tianjin, we had the agreement on establishing the SCO Development Bank,” Kewalramani said.

“The Kyrgyz leadership has said that its priority will be to move the needle on the bank, the SCO Development Fund and SCO Investment Fund,” he said, adding that while talks have reportedly been taking place in this direction, there is no clarity on whether any agreements will be announced at this year’s summit.

According to the SCO Secretariat, economic connectivity will be a key topic the group will discuss as the US and Israel’s war on Iran continues to paralyse key maritime routes like the Strait of Hormuz, which has upended global supply chains, the energy market and financial markets.

The group is expected to discuss new trade and transport corridors, such as the 7,200km (4,474-mile) International North-South Transport Corridor, which links the Russian port city of St Petersburg with India’s financial capital, Mumbai, through Iran and ports on the Gulf.

Herrero pointed out that with Modi and Putin scheduled to hold a bilateral meeting, discussions on the Northern Sea Route, which runs through the Arctic coast, are also expected. China last month announced a new shipping route through the Arctic Ocean, aimed at easing global trade amid the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and attacks in the Bab al-Mandeb in the Red Sea, which will pass through the Northern Sea Route.

According to Indian media reports, Moscow and New Delhi could negotiate the use of the Northern Sea Route by India as the crisis in West Asia continues to affect trade routes.

The SCO will also seek to establish a network of Silk Road stations to support international freight traffic across Eurasia.

Can the SCO agree on all issues?

The Eurasian grouping has often been unable to agree on global geopolitical issues.

For instance, Russia has been able to get most SCO members to align with its interests when it comes to its war in Ukraine, but India has attempted to play a more balanced role – seeking peace and stronger ties with Ukraine, while also buying record levels of oil from Russia.

But this year, Ukraine is expected to feature in discussions, with Turkiye’s Erdogan and Russia’s Putin holding bilateral talks on the matter, according to a Kremlin aide. Europe’s deadliest war since World War II is in its fifth year.

Yury Ushakov, Putin’s foreign policy adviser, said the meeting would take place on the sidelines of the SCO summit.

“There are many issues to discuss. Of course, these include the situation in the Black Sea and the Ukraine issue in general,” he told reporters, referring to the rise in attacks in the Black Sea.

The SCO has, however, taken a more collective position on the US-Israel war on Iran and Israel’s genocidal actions in Palestine.

In March, the SCO condemned the US-Israel war on Iran. “The SCO member states considered the use of force as unacceptable and advocate for the resolution of existing differences exclusively by peaceful means, based on dialogue, mutual respect, and taking into account the legitimate interests of all parties, in accordance with the norms of international law and the principles of the UN Charter,” it said in a statement.

India, which has strong ties with Israel, had refused to endorse an SCO joint statement condemning Israel for its attack on Iran in June 2025.

Iranian President Pezeshkian is also scheduled to meet Putin on the sidelines of the summit, according to Iran’s official IRNA news agency. Russia is a close ally of Iran and the two countries cooperate on defence issues. China has emerged as Iran’s biggest economic lifeline as it buys more than 80 percent of its crude oil. Moscow and Beijing have also lent diplomatic cover to Tehran at the UN.

Frictions also exist on how the group views border tensions between India and Pakistan. New Delhi has repeatedly called on the organisation to condemn “cross-border terrorism”, for which it blames Islamabad, a close economic and defence ally of China.

Last July, India demanded that the grouping condemn the April 2025 attack by armed men in Indian-administered Kashmir, in which 26 people were killed. Pakistan has also blamed India for armed attacks inside its territory.

During the Tianjin summit, the bloc condemned “terror” attacks in both India and Pakistan, taking a more balanced position on the issue.

What are Russia, China and India going to gain at the summit?

Reyes from the University of Hong Kong pointed out that all eyes will also be on Russia, China and India.

“For China, the SCO is partly about institution-building. Beijing wants to demonstrate that it can convene a large part of Eurasia around an agenda of security, connectivity, trade and development, while promoting a more multipolar, agentic international order. It also reinforces China’s increasingly important economic position in Central Asia, a strategically key region of the Eurasia landmass,” he said.

“For Russia, the summit is an opportunity to show that it is not isolated internationally. Maintaining strong relationships with China, India, Iran and Central Asia is economically and diplomatically important, given the Ukraine war and Western and other sanctions. But Moscow also has an interest in preserving its own influence in Eurasia rather than simply becoming more and more dependent on China.

“India is in an intriguing position. Modi’s participation is not an indication that India is joining the China-Russia axis, such as it is. India itself describes its SCO priorities as ‘security, connectivity and opportunity’. That is much more consistent with India’s longstanding pursuit of strategic autonomy – its agency amid the great-power rivalry,” Reyes explained.

He added that New Delhi wants “access and influence in Central Asia, continued relations with Russia [from which it buys the bulk of its defence equipment], and a mechanism for managing its difficult but gradually stabilising relationship with China”.

“At the same time, New Delhi maintains important relations with Washington, including through the Quad security arrangement.

“So China and Russia may see the SCO partly as an instrument for building a less US-dominated international order. India, meanwhile, sees it more as one of several overlapping platforms through which it can maximise its own agency.”

What does all this mean to the US?

As part of his unilateral foreign policy vision, Trump has undermined the Western-led international order and lashed out at Global South blocs, such as BRICS, which he sees as a threat to the US’s economic dominance. He has called the grouping “anti-American”.

However, Kewalramani noted that the Trump administration has continued some of its predecessors’ approaches and deepened engagement with countries in the region where this year’s SCO is being hosted, especially with the C5 or Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

“Joe Biden had established a leader-level meeting mechanism with C5 countries in 2023. Trump also hosted them in DC in November 2025. [US Secretary of State] Marco Rubio and subsequently Trump are expected to visit the region later [this] year. Kazakhstan has announced accession to the Abraham Accords, becoming the first Central Asian state to join [the Trump-led diplomatic efforts to cajole Muslim countries to recognise Israel]. The US has been engaged with the region on critical minerals and other business deals,” he said.

“In other words, C5 members are also adopting a diversified diplomatic approach, seeking to balance China and Russia’s dominance,” he noted.

“But the fact that you are witnessing these countries meeting with far more purpose to think about alternative financial and energy architectures is a reflection of the limitations of the US’s disruptive foreign policy,” Kewalramani added.

Herrero said for the US, the SCO summit is a reminder that countries like India will keep practising strategic autonomy: it will sit in the Quad and buy US defence equipment while also talking to Moscow and Beijing in a China-heavy forum.

The Quad or Quadrilateral Security Dialogue was established by India, Japan, Australia and the US in 2007 to counter China’s growing influence in the Asia Pacific region. Over the past quarter-century, India has grown closer to the US and its allies, amid shared concerns over Beijing’s rise.

Reyes warned that Washington should be careful not to read the SCO as a consolidated anti-US coalition, even though China, Russia and Iran are members.

“The differences among China, Russia and India are far too substantial to substantiate that label. The more important message is that American economic and geopolitical pressure can sometimes produce convergence among countries that otherwise might disagree with one another more,” he said.

“The SCO’s criticism of unilateral economic measures is significant in that respect. China and Russia explicitly want a less US-dominated international order. India does not necessarily share that objective, but it does want a world in which Washington cannot dictate its foreign-policy choices.”

Kyiv, Ukraine – The 2022 destruction of the Nord Stream pipelines, whose construction cost $19bn, epitomised the failure of “change through trade”, Berlin’s policy of softening Moscow’s hardline leadership through mercantile ties, according to some analysts.

Pressurised gas was pumped from Yamal, Russia’s Arctic peninsula of deer herders and treeless tundra, to Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Germany’s Baltic region of chalk cliffs and medieval castles.

But on September 26, 2022, several underwater blasts created a kilometre-wide (0.6-mile) bubbling geyser of natural gas that became history’s worst release of methane and screeched the pipeline flows to a halt.

Dubbed an act of sabotage, the apparent operation has drawn the attention of Hollywood director Doug Liman, known for blockbusters such as The Bourne Identity and Mr & Mrs Smith.

Oscar-winning actors Sean Penn and Adrien Brody star in Liman’s upcoming drama, titled Snake Island, about Ukrainian divers who plunge into the Baltic’s blue waters from a sleek rented yacht to blow up the world’s longest undersea pipelines.

Back in the real world, one of the suspected divers, Volodymyr Zhuravlev, a 46-year-old father of three with more than two decades of free-diving experience, was a consultant on Liman’s film set in Croatia. He was arrested in the Croatian city of Pula on August 19 and is to be extradited to Germany.

Last year, another accused member of the sabotage team, Serhii Kuznetsov, was arrested in Italy and extradited to Germany.

The 49-year-old reportedly worked for Ukrainian intelligence and complained that he had been “abandoned by his country and president”.

Their arrests and upcoming trials have highlighted how the sabotage shocked Germany’s economy, overhauled its energy exports and consumption – and still affects ties between Berlin and Kyiv.

“The Nord Stream sabotage reinforced a key lesson from the 2022 energy crisis – Germany had become far too dependent on Russian fossil gas,” Claudia Kemfert, a professor with the Institute for Economic Research in Berlin, told Al Jazeera.

The pipelines were designed to deliver 110 billion cubic metres (3.9 trillion cubic ft) of natural gas a year and made Germany “captive to Russia”, United States President Donald Trump said in 2022.

Nord Stream 2 never became operational but did contain pressurised gas at the time of the explosions. Nord Stream 1 along with other Russian pipelines provided 55 percent of Germany’s natural gas.

It heated homes, generated energy and fuelled the economic pillars of Europe’s largest, export-oriented economy, the chemical and steelmaking industries.

The alleged sabotage “changed the debate on energy security fundamentally”, Kemfert said. “Today, security means reducing fossil import dependence through diversification, renewables, efficiency, grids and storage.”

The crisis also prompted a major, rapid expansion of infrastructure for liquefied natural gas. The latter proved to be a silver lining.

“The central lesson is clear: The less Germany depends on imported fossil fuels, the more resilient its economy and energy system become,” Kemfert said.

‘Politically sensitive’ questions

Meanwhile, the unresolved questions surrounding Nord Stream “remain politically sensitive” in Berlin-Kyiv ties, she said.

After Trump removed Washington from the political chessboard of the Russia-Ukraine war, Berlin became Kyiv’s largest and staunchest Western backer.

But Germany seems adamant about prosecuting the sabotage team.

“It’s a matter of principle for the German government, but it’s also a matter of the rule of law,” Cristian Vlas, an expert with ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data), an international think tank, told Al Jazeera.

And Ukraine’s most coveted post-war dream – integration into NATO and membership in the European Union – could be thwarted if the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party comes to power.

AfD opposes military and financial aid to Ukraine, wants to block its EU and NATO membership, lift Western sanctions slapped on Moscow for invading Ukraine and resume Russian energy imports.

“We can certainly see the rejection of Ukraine’s application as one of the key points on AfD’s agenda,” Vlas said. “It rejects delivering further military support to Ukraine with the purported pretence that it extends the war.”

EU and NATO integration could be “further in time”, Kyiv-based analyst Aleksey Kushch told Al Jazeera, but the suspected act of sabotage still succeeded in severing the “umbilical cord” of the Berlin-Moscow alliance that hurt Ukraine economically and politically.

In 2008, Berlin and Paris blocked a NATO membership invitation to Ukraine, insisting it would “provoke” Russia.

After Nord Stream 1 was launched in 2011, Kyiv lost half of its annual $3bn in transit fees for Russian gas pumped westwards through Ukrainian pipelines.

Berlin also denied arms deliveries to Kyiv after Moscow’s 2014 annexation of Crimea.

After Russia’s full-scale invasion began in 2022, Berlin admitted it was wrong about the “change through trade” approach to Moscow’s belligerence.

“We failed on many points,” German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier told the ZDF broadcaster in 2022. “It’s true that we should’ve taken the warnings of our Eastern European partners more seriously, particularly regarding the time after 2014.”

After the pipeline blasts, no country or group claimed responsibility, and pundits pointed fingers at Washington, which was opposed to the pipeline’s construction, and Moscow, which some believed would benefit from higher natural gas prices and chaos in Europe’s energy markets.

In turn, Moscow accused “Anglo-Saxon powers” of masterminding the explosions.

It took German prosecutors almost two years to zero in on the sabotage team and accuse Kyiv of organising the bombing.

But Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has repeatedly denied Kyiv’s involvement.

Germany “knows very well that Ukraine wasn’t behind the implementation and the very conception to carry out this particular operation”, he recently said at a news conference.

So far, the upcoming trials of Zhuravlev and Kuznetsov are not affecting aid from Berlin.

“Germany still has a huge credit of trust towards Ukraine, which, however, won’t prevent prosecutors from doing their job and finishing the case and courts from convicting average executioners,” Nikolay Mitrokhin of Germany’s Bremen University told Al Jazeera.

But aside from the pipeline blasts, tensions have been seen before between the German political establishment and Ukrainian politicians.

In 2022, Andrii Melnyk, Ukraine’s ambassador to Berlin at the time, lambasted Germany’s then-Chancellor Olaf Scholz for not providing enough lethal weapons, calling him an “offended liver sausage”.

Also in 2022, Dmytro Kuleba, Ukraine’s then-foreign minister, bristled at Berlin’s slow arms deliveries, calling them “disappointing signals”.

“For Ukraine’s future, things are bad because [Ukrainian] elites are confident that that’s the way to get things done and this style, not this individual case [with the sabotage], can cost them membership in the European Union,” Mitrokhin said.

“Germany remembers everything, and after [German Chancellor Friedrich] Merz, who is kind to Ukraine, somebody else who is not that kind could come to power,” he said.

Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova told a briefing held on August 20, 2026, that “a substantial package of intergovernmental documents and commercial contracts is planned to be signed during the Russia-Africa summit, scheduled for late October.” Given the “mutual interest in stepping up our trade and investment cooperation, we plan to focus the agenda of the upcoming summit meeting on economic matters,” she said.

There, the attendees can discuss in substance a wide range of matters, including boosting Russian-African ties in agriculture, healthcare, education, and scientific-technical and cultural cooperation. “We expect to sign a substantial package of interstate documents and commercial contracts during the event. Well, and we also note, of course, with satisfaction, our partners’ considerable interest in the forthcoming event. Many African capitals have already confirmed their attendance and declared their intention to send representative delegations to Moscow, including heads of state entities and businessmen, of course,” Zakharova explained.

“We have a huge potential in this sphere, which has not yet been fully realized, as everyone admits. Key priorities have also been determined: to cooperate on peaceful uses of nuclear power; to develop independent payment systems, food security, and digitalization, including the adoption of artificial intelligence,” Zakharova underlined.

It is time to face rising realities and the balance of investment power in this 21st century. Whether Russia colonized Africa or never colonized Africa, the most convincing and essential factor is Africa simply has to work with the world’s players. Africa should collaborate with potential foreign investors with adequate funds, in practical terms, ready to invest in its development as exemplified by China. And there is still a growing sense of analytical debates over Russia’s policy approach, though. Ultimately, at least three fundamental assumptions, or appropriately primary principles, can be described as follows:

*Russia’s forthcoming October 2026 The Russia-Africa summit is framed as a chance to consolidate dozens of prior agreements and shift toward concrete economic cooperation in trade, investment, nuclear energy, food security, digitalization, and independent payment systems, yet critics note that rhetoric and signed MoUs have so far produced limited tangible results on the ground.

*Despite historical Soviet-era goodwill and frequent high-level visits, Russia remains a marginal player in African infrastructure, industry, and agriculture compared with China, the EU, and the United States; many announced projects have stalled, financing instruments are weak, and younger Africans see little contemporary economic impact beyond anti-Western messaging.

*Experts and African partners urge Moscow to move beyond nostalgia for past assistance, deliver on existing pledges with real capital and project execution, leverage platforms such as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), and engage Africa’s large youth and middle-class markets if it wishes to convert political alignment into sustained, mutually beneficial economic partnership.

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) provides a unique and valuable platform for businesses to access an integrated African market of over 1.4 billion people. The growing middle class, estimated at 380 (twice the aggregate of Russia’s population), among other factors, constitutes huge market potential in Africa. The African continent, currently, has enormous potential as a huge market, which some experts often refer to as the last business market frontier. Nevertheless, Africa’s trade with the European Union stands at $400 billion, and with China, almost $300 billion. And based on military equipment and weapons and agricultural products such as ice cream, chicken meat, fertilizers, and grain exports, Russia quoted a bilateral trade figure as $27 billion in June 2026.

The world is, increasingly, becoming multipolar. Therefore, Africa’s strength has to be directed at continental development and entrepreneurship, not at building solidarity for geopolitical games. Many African countries are enacting economic reforms; demand is growing for high-quality, competitive products. Russian businesses are interested in this niche, but Russian operators are extremely slow. The ‘snail-pace approach’ reflects their inability to determine financial instruments for supporting trade with Africa and corporate investments in Africa.

There is some level of optimism for a change, though. Russia plans to hold the next Russia-Africa summit in late October 2026. And Sergey Lavrov, minister of foreign affairs of the Russian Federation, indicated in an explicit message mid-July that “in these difficult and crucial times, the strategic partnership with Africa has become a priority of Russia’s foreign policy. Russia highly appreciates the readiness of Africans to further step up economic cooperation.”

At a meeting of the ministry’s collegium, Lavrov strongly suggested the necessity of borrowing a chapter on policy approaches and methods adopted by China in Africa. In fact, Lavrov’s suggestion exposes the inability to play catch-up and, most significantly, Russia’s financial fragility. Lavrov also said, “It is in the interests of our peoples to work together to preserve and expand mutually beneficial trade and investment ties under these new conditions. It is important to facilitate the mutual access of Russian and African economic operators to each other’s markets and encourage their participation in large-scale infrastructure projects. The signed agreements and the results will be consolidated at the forthcoming Russia-Africa summit.”

During the past years, there have been several meetings of various bilateral intergovernmental commissions both in Moscow and in Africa. The first Sochi summit discussed broadly the priorities and further identified opportunities for collaboration. There were 92 agreements signed in Sochi, which totaled RUB 1.004 trillion (equivalent to $12.5 bn), and approximately 240 agreements during the African Leaders Summit held in St. Petersburg, according to official documents. It, however, requires understanding the specific tasks and emerging challenges. The current tasks should concretely focus on taking practical and collaborative actions leading to goal-driven results. Notwithstanding the lapses, Lavrov hopes “the signed agreements and the results will be consolidated at the forthcoming Russia-Africa summit.”

Accentuating the importance of multilateral cooperation between Russia and Africa, Advisor to the President of the Russian Federation Anton Kobyakov said, “The current situation in the world is such that we are witnesses to the formation of new centers of economic growth in Africa. Competition for African markets is growing, accordingly. There is no doubt that Russia’s non-commodity exporters will benefit from cooperating with Africa on manufacturing, technologies, finances, trade, and investment.”

Kobyakov pointed to modern Russia, which already has experience of successful cooperation with African countries under its belt, as ready to make an offer to the African continent that will secure a mutually beneficial partnership and the joint realization of decades of painstaking work carried out by several generations of Soviet and Russian people.

The Soviet Union was quite extensively engaged in Africa, comparatively. Historical documents show that after the Soviet collapse, there were approximately 380 mega-projects across Africa. In the early 1990s, Russia exited, closed a number of diplomatic offices, and abandoned all these, and now there are hardly any signs of Soviet-era infrastructure projects across Africa. And now post-Soviet relations are interestingly engulfed in extensive geopolitics; Russia has only engaged in trading anti-Western slogans on the continent, which also threatens the African Union’s steps to consolidate African unity. 

In addition, Russia has only been criticizing other foreign players during the past two decades without showing any of its own template model of building relationships directed at transforming Africa’s economy. Moreover, Russian officials have underestimated the fact that Russia’s overall economic engagement is largely staggering; various business agreements signed are still not fulfilled with many African countries. Its foreign policy goal is simply to sustain the passion for declarations, signing several MoUs and bilateral agreements with African countries. Grappling with reality, there are equally many investment challenges, including official bureaucracy and the governance system in Africa.

Despite this policy rhetoric and attractive summit outlines, Russia still plays very little role, particularly in Africa’s infrastructure, agriculture, and industry. Investing in agriculture to ensure food security and investing in industry to add value to raw materials in the continent. While, given its global status, it ought to be active in Africa with noticeable corporate investments, similar to policy models of Western Europe, the European Union, the United States, and China, it is all but absent, consistently engages in geopolitical symbolism and rhetoric, and plays a negligible role, according to Professor Gerrit Olivier at the Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria, and former South African Ambassador to the Russian Federation.

Now at the crossroads, it could be meandering and longer than expected to make the mark. If existing challenges, obstacles, and impediments are not addressed, Russia’s return journey could take another generation to reach its destination, Africa. If not at the crossroad, then possibly at the periphery of Africa. With the current rapidly changing geopolitical world, Russia has to redefine and reassess policy parameters and adopt a more strategic approach, working with absolute consistency within the principle of finding common solutions to Africa’s development expectations and consolidating its economic sovereignty.

*This is part of the forthcoming book: Putin’s African Dream: Emerging Challenges and Opportunities (Third e-handbook).

Russia has suddenly ramped-up the number of attacks, and their duration, on Kyiv. Ukrainian officials state there was a record number of waves of one-way attack drones on the capital on Thursday. This is in contrast to the typical Russian mass barrages that launch a larger number of missiles and drones that strike over a short period in an attempt to overwhelm defenses and inflict maximum damage. The change from prioritizing amplitude to frequency of these assaults indicates that Moscow could be switching to a new strategy aimed at wearing down the populace, halting commerce and exhausting air defenders.

“Again and again throughout the day, sirens sounded as Russia launched drones in small groups towards the Ukrainian capital,” the Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Ministry noted on X. “Each new threat put people at risk and forced them to seek safety – while repeatedly interrupting work, public services, transport, and everyday plans. In total, Kyiv spent 872 minutes – almost 15 hours – under air raid alert that day.”

This was reportedly the largest number of air raid alerts experienced in Kyiv since the opening days of the all-out war. “The previous record appeared to be set on March 1, 2022, when Kyiv was placed under air raid alert 12 times in a single day,” the Kyiv Independent explained.

In addition, “the capital saw eight more air raid alerts by the morning of Aug. 28 as Russian forces continued attacking Kyiv and the surrounding areas overnight,” the publication added.

Iryna Terekh, CEO of the Fire Point company that makes FP-1 and FP-2 drones and heavy-hitting Flamingo cruise missiles, suggested that Russia is trying to drain the populace of the will to resist.

“For over 40 hours straight, Russia has been terrorizing Ukraine’s capital with combined barrages, setting a new grim record for the number of air raid alerts and destroyed civilian infrastructure sites,” Terekh stated on X Friday. “The enemy has long employed this tactic in frontline cities, scorching the earth and any chances of normal life. Its goal is to make our hands drop in despair. To make us search for culprits among ourselves. To make us snap at our own. To make us peer into the future with squinted eyes. To leave not a single minute when it’s appropriate to rejoice in anything: from life’s little joys to our successes on the front lines. To let exhaustion win.”

A former high-ranking Ukrainian military officer offered us a similar assessment, though he surmised that it could backfire on Moscow.

“They want to keep constant pressure on the population and plant a fear of losing lives, increasing starvation, demoralizing the population, plant panic etc.,” the retired officer told us. “My belief is that they won’t achieve such strategic objectives. It is too late. It could have the opposite effect: more hate, more aggression and anger toward Russians.”

The retired officer posited that this spike in the pace of Russian strikes could be part of the escalation Russian President Vladimir Putin recently threatened. Still, it remains unknown at this point whether this is a one-off or the sign of things to come. The coming days should give us an indication of that.

The Latest

Most of the fiercest fighting at this point is centered around Kupyansk in Kharkiv Oblast and Slovyansk in Donetsk. Here are some key takeaways from the latest Institute for the Study of War (ISW) assessment:

• Kharkiv: Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 26 and 27 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked. The Russians also continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 26 and 27 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.

• Donetsk: Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on August 26 and 27 but did not make confirmed advances as Ukrainian forces counterattacked around Lyman. Russian forces also continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area, Pokrovsk, near Novopavlivka itself and northeast and south of Oleksandrivka on August 26 and 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

• Zaporizhia: Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 26 and 27 but did not advance.

• Kherson: Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on August 27.

Ukrainian officials are investigating why weapons were stored in a residential neighborhood after a deadly Russian drone attack on a warehouse in a village near Kyiv. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said the investigation centers on negligence. The strike and resulting secondary explosions at the facility in the village of Myla killed at least 37 people and injured at least another 15, according to Ukraine’s Defense Ministry (MoD).

Zelensky didn’t specify the exact variants of the weapons stored, but the Russians claimed they struck a warehouse containing the Fire Point company’s FP-1 and FP-2 drones and another one in a different Kyiv suburb that stored Flamingo cruise missiles.

TWZ cannot independently verify this Russian claim and Ukriane did not confirm the attack on the warehouse containing the Flamingos. We’ve reached out to Fire Point for more details.

“Since yesterday evening and throughout the day today, I have been receiving reports on the situation in the village of Myla, Kyiv region, where detonation began following a Russian strike,” Zelensky stated on X. “A terrible situation and terrible negligence on the part of those who stored explosives right next to people. Another such crime – after what happened in Vyshneve – is absolutely unacceptable.”

Since yesterday evening and throughout the day today, I have been receiving reports on the situation in the village of Myla, Kyiv region, where detonation began following a Russian strike. A terrible situation and terrible negligence on the part of those who stored explosives… pic.twitter.com/YyRpBxQ8Kz

— Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський (@ZelenskyyUa) August 29, 2026

Vyshneve is a town where an ammunition depot belonging to the Ukrainian defense conglomerate Ukroboronprom, the country’s largest weapons manufacturer, was attacked in July. The secondary explosions killed seven and wounded 29 others, according to the Kyiv Independent.

“I expect the details to be presented to the public promptly,” the Ukrainian leader added. “The first strike was on an ammunition storage site that definitely shouldn’t have been there – a Defense Forces storage facility. Shells, mines, other ammunition, and drones detonated. The scale is significant. We have already spoken with the Prosecutor General, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Security Service of Ukraine, and the Commander-in-Chief – they have everything necessary for the investigation. I want to separately thank everyone who is there on the ground and at other sites of Russian strikes, doing everything possible to help and save people.”

Smoke is still rising from the ammunition depot in the village of Myla, Bucha District, Kyiv Oblast, which was targeted by Russian Geran-4 drone strikes.

The reported death toll has risen to 37, with at least 42 others injured and 381 people evacuated.

Ukrainian President… https://t.co/PBAQllR7BI pic.twitter.com/toDpPvjFkU

— OSINTWarfare (@OSINTWarfare) August 29, 2026

The retirement home at Myla near Kyiv where twenty people died after a Russian strike caused secondary detonations at a secret ammunition depot placed amidst dense suburbia. pic.twitter.com/iPhODiVXJ7

— Leonid Ragozin (@leonidragozin) August 29, 2026

The Ukrainian MoD called for a full accounting of all weapons and ammunition storage locations.

“Siting depots holding explosives next to civilians is unacceptable,” MoD stated on X. “The heads of all relevant components of the Security and Defence Forces and of Ukraine’s defence industry must carry out a full audit of the sites where weapons and ammunition are stored. Facilities of this kind must not stand next to residential buildings where people live.”

We bow our heads in deep sorrow together with every family that has lost loved ones in the terrible tragedy in the village of Myla, Kyiv region.

As of 15:00 on 29 August, 37 people are known to have been killed and 15 injured. Two more are still being searched for under the…

— Defense of Ukraine (@DefenceU) August 29, 2026

As we noted earlier in this story, the Russian Defense Ministry (MoD) claims it hit “an ammunition depot in [Myla] (Fire Point LLC), where components and launch boosters for long-range FP-1/FP-2 unmanned aerial vehicles were stored in warehouses.”

The MoD also claims it struck the “Fim Service transport and logistics centre in Chayki” whose “warehouses were used to store Flamingo long-range cruise missiles.” The village is also near Kyiv; however, there have been no reports of collateral damage. Ukrainian officials have not independently confirmed that weapons were stored there. The Kyivschina24 media outlet reported that the Chayki attack struck a tile warehouse owned by the Agromat company, not a weapons storage area.

Whether it was the case in these instances or not, it should come as absolutely no surprise that Moscow would do everything possible to target Fire Point standoff munitions and their supply chain, considering how big of a threat they have become. Regardless, while Ukrainian officials are now investigating why explosives were stored so close to a residential neighborhood, the incident highlights the precarious nature of the country’s weapons production. Due to repeated Russian attacks, this work is widely distributed to avoid having a single point of failure.

In a recent interview with TWZ, Terekh, the Fire Point CEO, addressed that concern.

“Well, the logistics are hell, to be frank,” she told us. “But we do not have the luxury to have the factory in a classic way, with the walls and roof, … when I say factory — and we have 90 of them in the moment — when I say factory I mean this whole ecosystem with logistics, with warehouses, everything is hidden and dissolved in a way that the critical components are always duplicated, triplicated, quadruplicated. It’s a lot of additional investments and, of course, a lot of risks and a lot of additional time for logistics specifically, but again, we do not have any other choice. Therefore, the factory in this matter is a whole ecosystem.”

Footage of the production and testing of the FP-1/2 attack UAVs and the FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile

In the wake of the Vyshneve attack, Ukroboronprom fired two of its directors after Zelensky said that the ammunition depots were stored too near to civilian areas “in violation of Ukrainian law and orders from military leaders,” the Kyiv Independent noted. The criminal investigation in that case is ongoing.

It is too early to say what will happen with this latest incident. The investigation into the Myla case has just started and there is no immediate word about whether Ukraine is also investigating the storage of weapons in Chayki. We will monitor this situation and provide updates when warranted. A satellite image obtained by TWZ appears to back up Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s claim that his country’s Alpha Unit destroyed a Tu-95MS Bear bomber during a drone attack on Russia’s Engels Air Base. The facility is located about 350 miles east of Ukrainian-held territory.

The satellite image, provided by Vantor, shows the right wing of the bomber partially severed. It is unclear from the image how extensive any damage was caused by shrapnel.

Ukraine has frequently attacked Engels in its effort to destroy the bombers housed there. Russia, trying to defend against this ‘kill-the-archer’ approach, is building protective shelters for its military aircraft, which now extend to long-range bombers, an unprecedented development for the Russian Aerospace Forces.

Engels, also known as Engels-2, is one of the most important airfields of Russia’s Long-Range Aviation Branch. It is home to the 22nd Heavy Bomber Aviation Division, which is responsible for Russia’s only squadron of Tu-160s, plus another squadron of Tu-95MS bombers.

Both of those types have been widely employed in the conflict in Ukraine and especially in the standoff strikes that have targeted Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, among other objectives, civilian and military, across the country.

Zelensky said the U.S. read him in Friday on CIA Director John Ratcliffe’s mysterious visit to Moscow. However, the Ukrainian leader offered no details of what was discussed.

“Today, we received information from the American side about the meetings in Moscow that took place the other day,” the Ukrainian leader stated on X. “There was a series of meetings. We spoke before the meetings, and we have spoken again now with the Americans. Thank you for the information – and for the necessary tone of the conversation with Russia.”

“We value the alignment of steps and the fact that America is advancing a realistic vision of what needs to be done and what must be achieved,” he added. “Russia must end its war, and all the necessary conditions must be created to make that happen.”

Ratcliffe’s visit has sparked a wide range of conjecture, and disparate reports about the purpose. The New York Times, for instance, wrote that the journey was made “to privately share his bleak assessment of the state of the Russian war against Ukraine, and to urge the Russians to cut a deal before their military and economic situation gets worse.”

The Wall Street Journal reported that Ratcliffe was there to warn Putin, whom he didn’t see, not to attack NATO.

President Donald Trump, for his part, tried to downplay the whole thing, calling it “semi-routine,” which doesn’t exactly square with the fact that this was the first publicly known visit of a CIA director to Moscow since November 2021, just months before Putin launched his full-on invasion.

Today, we received information from the American side about the meetings in Moscow that took place the other day. There was a series of meetings. We spoke before the meetings, and we have spoken again now with the Americans.

Thank you for the information – and for the necessary… pic.twitter.com/2dBbHH4y2X

— Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський (@ZelenskyyUa) August 28, 2026

Kyrylo Budanov, the Head of the Office of the President, said the Armed Forces of Ukraine need to mobilize 30,000 every month in order to keep defending against Russia. He made the comments during an interview on the national nightly newscast.

 “Unfortunately, we have to accept it [mobilization] as it is,” Budanov explained. “We cannot do otherwise. We have to find the courage and honestly say: we cannot mobilize fewer than 30,000 people a month. This is the minimum number needed to maintain what we have.”

Budanov’s comments come as Ukraine is struggling to put enough troops on the front lines and is facing opposition to how recruits are often forced into service, sometimes physically.

“So, no matter how we say that we are now going to recruit people differently, the numbers will not change,” Budanov added. “And that means the number of dissatisfied people will not change either. There is nothing we can do about it.”

Meanwhile, Budanov expressed hope that it would be possible to change the approach to what he described as “forceful mobilization” to some extent.

“I hope we can change the approach to this forceful mobilization, which sometimes takes place,” Budanov acknowledged. “It is not happening everywhere, but such cases do occur. We need to tackle this.”

Kyrylo Budanov: “Unfortunately, we have to accept it [mobilization] as it is. We cannot do otherwise. We have to find the courage and honestly say: we cannot mobilize fewer than 30,000 people a month. This is the minimum number needed to maintain what we have.”… pic.twitter.com/csebu3b3cV

— Rob Lee (@RALee85) August 28, 2026

As we have frequently noted, AI plays a key role for Ukraine, especially helping guide weapons to target. To help improve these functions, Ukraine has created a sandbox of sorts where weapons developers can fine-tune their AI systems with real-world data. 

“In the past, coordinating a fire mission – from an observer detecting a target to the actual opening of fire – could take 15–20 minutes, or even longer, when done manually,” the Ukrainian Defense Ministry (MoD) explained. “In modern warfare, such a delay is effectively unacceptable. This is where artificial intelligence comes in to assist human operators.”

“At the find stage of the kill chain, reconnaissance drones can use visual data repositories to detect objects,” the MoD noted. “For this purpose, the Brave1 defense innovation cluster created Brave1 Dataroom, a secure platform that provides developers with access to structured datasets for testing, training, and fine-tuning military AI solutions.” 

Over 100 Ukrainian companies are already using this platform to train AI models on real-world data, MoD added. 

“The platform specializes in detecting and intercepting aerial targets, including Shahed-type drones,” the ministry proffered. “To train drone AI systems using real-world battlefield data, the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine has provided Ukrainian developers with access to Avengers Labs. The platform provides access to an annotated dataset of 5 million frames collected during military missions.”

The dataset is regularly updated, with Ukraine’s homegrown DELTA battlefield management and situational-awareness system serving as its primary source. 

“Targets included in the dataset range from tanks, artillery, and air defense systems to enemy infantry groups and aerial targets, including reconnaissance UAVs and Shahed-type drones,” according to the ministry.

Coordinating a fire mission manually once took 15-20 minutes. In this war, that’s a lifetime.

Avengers AI, trained on 5M annotated battlefield frames and integrated into DELTA, now flags 70% of enemy equipment in real time across 100,000+ video streams a month.

Read more:…

— Defense of Ukraine (@DefenceU) August 28, 2026

The city of Druzhkivka, in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region, is on the front line of a grinding battle. It is part of the so-called fortress belt of cities where ensconced Ukrainian forces have held off brutal waves of Russian attacks for years. Recently released drone video shows the extent of the damage, with virtually no building untouched and vast swaths of the city completely abandoned.

Irish journalist Caolan Robertson provides a gripping view of another fortress belt city, Kramatorsk, and the last power plant in the region, which is a frequent target of Russian attacks.

Another Ukrainian city is being wiped out right now while the world looks away

Here’s what’s happening in Kramatorsk:

• Glide bombs & FPVs pound the city to make them unliveable.

• Civilians evacuated every day but not everyone is leaving.

• I spent the night with power… pic.twitter.com/oUU4FoSfnc

— Caolan (@CaolanReports) August 28, 2026

Ukraine claims that Russian forces have executed at least 345 Ukrainian service members who surrendered and killed 375 Ukrainian citizens whose deaths in Russian captivity have been verified, the Ukrainian Ukrinform news outlet reported.

Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights Dmytro Lubinets made the statement during a press conference held at the publication, focused on Russian disinformation concerning prisoners of war, exchanges, and people missing in action.

According to the ombudsman, the 345 documented executions involved Ukrainian soldiers who had clearly surrendered, including by laying down their weapons, raising their hands, or lying on the ground to demonstrate that they were no longer taking part in hostilities.

TWZ cannot independently verify those figures.

That’s it for now.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

It has been six months since February 28, when the US and Israel shocked the world by launching missile strikes on Iran, killing Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and several senior Iranian officials in Tehran, as well as scores of children in a school in Minab, southern Iran.

US President Donald Trump then claimed the conflict would only last “four to five weeks”.

In the months since, the war has erupted on several other fronts, reaching as far as the Caspian Sea. It has triggered a global oil supply crisis as the US and Iran battle for control of the strategic Strait of Hormuz, through which more than one-fifth of oil and natural gas cargo transited.

And it has resulted in an estimated 8,000-10,000 deaths, as well as tens of thousands of injuries.

The conflict is also realigning the global order, experts say, as new alliances form and dominant ones show signs of crumbling.

Here’s what we know:

Has the US achieved any of its war objectives?

The US’s goals were not initially clear: officials first claimed the strikes were carried out in preemptive self-defence.

According to demands presented on the eve of the war, and a jumble of sometimes contradictory statements from Trump and senior US defence officials, they include the following:

Iran’s nuclear programme

Despite Trump’s claim that the US had “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear capabilities when it joined in at the end of Israel’s 12-day war on Iran in June 2025, the US and Israel again claimed in February that Tehran was just weeks away from developing nuclear weapons.

Repeated strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites during the war have likely caused vast damage to the facilities, but it is believed Tehran still possesses 440kg of highly enriched uranium, which could be used to make a weapon.

The Trump administration wanted Iran to hand over this stock to the US and to commit to zero enrichment of uranium going forward. Iran refused to do this, although at one point appeared open to the possibility of handing the stock over to a third country. Iran also insisted on retaining the capacity to develop a nuclear power programme, which requires much lower levels of uranium enrichment.

Later, Trump briefly floated the idea of US troops retrieving the stock by force – a potentially dangerous mission.

In the June 17 memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed by both sides, Iran agreed not to pursue a nuclear weapon – something it had always pledged anyway. The MoU unravelled as its vague wording led to disagreements about what it actually stipulated.

Clark Summers, a US military veteran and professor at Belmont Abbey College in North Carolina, said the US “can rightly assert that these ends have been achieved. Although for how long before Iran can rebuild is difficult to assess.”

But Iranian expert and professor at the Australian National University (ANU), Alam Saleh, disagreed, and noted that Iran’s nuclear power programme is still intact. “The US lost even before the war,” he said, adding that the effort also shows that Washington failed in last year’s 12-day war.

Regime change in Iran

On day one of the war – February 28 – the US killed Khamenei alongside several other senior officials. Trump, two days earlier, said regime change is “the best thing that could happen”.

As the US launched missiles, he also called on “Iranian patriots who yearn for freedom to seize this moment to be brave, be bold, be heroic, and take back your country”.

Iran’s political leadership has, however, remained largely the same under the new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei – the late ayatollah’s son.

Summers told Al Jazeera that the goal may have been “ad hoc” or improvised rather than well-planned. But “killing leaders does not mean strategic achievements, even if it’s a tactical success,” Saleh said.

Ending support for regional proxy groups

Iran’s “axis of resistance” is an umbrella comprising a number of armed groups around the region that it funds. This includes Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Hamas in the Gaza Strip, and several smaller groups in Iraq and Syria.

There are no signs that Tehran’s support for them has ended, and this demand did not appear in the MoU signed by the US.

Hezbollah went to war with Israel in Iran’s defence, and Iran has refused to negotiate an end to the war unless the Lebanon front is included. The Houthis, meanwhile, have launched a blockade on Saudi Arabia in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, partly in support of Iran.

Iran’s ballistic missiles programme

Washington swore it would “raze” Iran’s missile facilities to the ground when it launched the war on February 28. The US also pledged to destroy Iran’s navy.

Trump has since claimed that about 82 percent of Iran’s missiles are gone and the navy is degraded.

In April, he also said that 158 Iranian naval vessels had been hit, while US Central Command (CENTCOM) has continued to announce dozens of strikes on command centres of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Iran, however, has continued to fire missiles, most recently launching a long-range missile in July that killed three US soldiers in Jordan.

Furthermore, the demand for an end to Iran’s ballistic missiles programme was also absent from the July MoU.

Control of Iranian oil

In June, Trump said the US would seize and control Iran’s Kharg island, the heart of Iranian oil production.

To date, the US does not control any Iranian territory.

What have the US and Iran gained and lost during the war?

Besides the US demands at the start of the war, several other pressure points have emerged during the conflict.

Control of the Strait of Hormuz

Soon after the war began, Iran in effect closed the narrow but critical Strait of Hormuz, which passes through its territorial waters as well as those of Oman. Since then, shipping traffic has slumped from more than 100 ships per day to an average of about five.

To enforce this closure, Iran began striking vessels in the strait, the only route to the open ocean for Gulf oil and gas producers, which had not gained its explicit permission to pass through.

The US responded with its own naval blockade on Iranian ports in and around the strait. This is continuing.

Despite a large number of expletive-laden demands from Trump since then – many of them on social media – that Tehran reopen the strait, Iran has not budged. It is currently negotiating plans for the future of the waterway, through which more than one-fifth of the world’s oil and natural gas supplies were shipped before the war, with Oman.

As part of these negotiations, Iran announced this week that it has agreed to a shipping route, which it will partially control, with Oman.

While Trump has recently claimed that the US has “full control” of the strait and that it is open to vessels, shipping remains at an all-time low and Iran has continued to fire at any vessels trying to pass without its permission.

Iran sees the strait as its main piece of leverage in the war with the US, which Salah said, Iran views as an “existential threat”.

Economic impact

• Iran: The war’s impact on Iran’s economy has been severe. The Iranian rial has in effect collapsed. Food prices have surged amid the war, and the US blockade and renewed sanctions have hampered Iranian oil exports, with the blockade cutting oil revenue by at least $6bn. Tehran’s economy has long been battered by US sanctions, although the fragile ceasefire provided temporary relief. Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said last week that economic pressure is a “rerun we know by heart” and that the country knows how to survive it.
• US: US consumers have also felt the pressure of the war at the petrol pump, making the conflict highly unpopular. A July poll by The Associated Press revealed that two-thirds of Americans are against the conflict. While many tend to forget there’s a war, Summers said, they do remember it acutely when petrol prices rise. In states like California, gasoline prices doubled. That anger will likely translate into a political backlash against Republicans in November’s midterms, experts say.

Relations with allies

• Iran: Iran’s targeting of US military assets as well as both military and nonmilitary infrastructure in neighbouring Gulf states and Jordan has not made it popular regionally, experts note. Iran has hit infrastructure in Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain. Those states have called this a violation of their sovereignty. However, Iran’s economic and political ties with China have held, as Beijing has managed a delicate dance by advocating against sanctions on Iran while refraining from becoming fully entangled in the conflict. Trade relations with Russia also remain strong.
• US: The US has faced reluctance from its NATO allies to back it up in this war. Despite being asked directly by Trump, they have refused to join the war. Spain and Italy, in particular, have highly criticised the conflict, while Germany, Israel’s strongest ally in Europe, has done the same. France rejected calls to send warships to enforce the blockade. Gulf allies, Pakistan and Turkiye have all similarly refused, while in Asia, Japan, Australia and South Korea all declined to get involved. Gulf allies are also likely weighing the fact that it is the US’s war on Iran which has caused them to become targets.

Military capabilities

• Iran: US experts say that claims Washington has degraded Iran’s military capabilities are correct. Several army bases have been struck while Iran’s ballistic missile stockpiles are down by about 82 percent, according to Trump. However, Iran is still launching missiles and, while nuclear facilities have been damaged, it still has possession of its enriched uranium stockpile. Experts point out that Iran likely has a bigger appetite for an atomic weapon now than before the war began. Tehran has also continued to produce and deploy its mass-produced, cheap Shahed drones. An estimated 1,221 military personnel were killed by April, although the real toll is likely higher.
• US: The US has lost 18 soldiers and more than 750 have been wounded. That’s “quite low”, Summers said. However, US media reports suggest the Pentagon has severely depleted stockpiles of some of its most powerful and most expensive weapons – particularly its Patriot defence missiles – something Washington denies. Those missiles are only produced in the dozens annually and cost millions of dollars each. In August, the US signed a $22.9bn deal with manufacturer Raytheon to boost Tomahawk cruise missile production from 60 to more than 1,000 annually.

Is there an outright ‘victor’?

Observers say there is not.

“Both of them have not achieved anything,” Saleh of ANU said, noting that the US has failed to translate military superiority to actual gains despite being a “superpower” fighting a “middle power”.

China and Russia are likely observing Washington’s weaknesses, making new military calculations in the event of a future conflict with the US, he said. That has implications for Taiwan, especially as the US has now deployed its last aircraft carrier in the Pacific to the Middle East. The shift leaves the US without an aircraft carrier in the Western Pacific, despite Washington’s previous strategic emphasis on the region.

“Iran surviving also does not mean it’s a winner,” however, Saleh said. “This might be a defeat for the US, but it’s not a victory for Iran either.”

BEIRUT — Iran’s economy, already strained by high inflation, years of Western sanctions and a war that has sharply reduced oil revenue, is poised for more instability as the Trump administration tries to coerce other countries into ending all financial dealings with the Islamic Republic.

A decision by the United Arab Emirates to suspend trade relations with Iran last week kick-started the White House’s latest attempt to isolate Tehran into submission. Iran entered the war with its foreign commerce concentrated among a relatively small group of countries, leaving it with fewer places to turn now.

The success of the U.S. strategy largely will hinge on China, the main buyer of Iranian oil and its top trading partner. Russia, a fellow target of sweeping U.S.-led sanctions, has a military conflict and economic crisis of its own and probably can’t offer longtime ally Iran much hard financial support.

Regional partners like Turkey, Pakistan and Iraq maintain important relationships with both Iran and the U.S., giving them reason to avoid exposure to the secondary sanctions that Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said awaited nations that did not cut economic ties with Iran.

“Those who stand with the United States will reap the rewards of our partnership,” Bessent said Monday while outlining the plan he called “Operation Economic Outcast.” “Those who tether themselves to the Iranian regime should expect to share in the isolation.”

The Emirates will be hard for Iran to replace as a conduit for foreign goods and payments

Despite Western sanctions, Iran in 2024 exchanged $125 billion worth of goods globally, according to Trade Data Monitor, a private firm. Iran is not a member of the World Trade Organization.

The bulk of its declared international trade, though, was with a handful of partners. The UAE, China and Turkey supplied nearly three-quarters of Iran’s merchandise imports. Four countries — China, Iraq, the UAE and Turkey — accounted for more than two-thirds of its non-oil exports.

On the supply side, the UAE held outsized importance. It was Iran’s biggest source of imported items and a gateway to financial channels that helped Iranian businesses make and receive international payments. Both roles kept Iran connected to the global economy.

As a reexport hub, the UAE processed shipments from foreign suppliers reluctant to deal directly with Iranian customers.

“From Iran’s perspective, the UAE can be replaced, but the Iranians are openly saying it’s not going to happen overnight,” said Alex Vatanka, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington.

China has deep economic ties to Iran but depends less on the relationship

Beijing has economic interests in the Persian Gulf beyond Iran, and so far has avoided getting drawn into the conflict the U.S. and Israel initiated. China buys the overwhelming majority of Iran’s crude through opaque trading networks that bypass sanctions.

Its manufacturing clout and stranglehold on critical mineral supplies nonetheless give Beijing more room than Iran’s other partners to resist U.S. pressure, said David Lubin, a senior research fellow at Chatham House. Aggressive action against major Chinese banks and businesses could revive trade tensions as Chinese leader Xi Jinping prepares to meet with President Trump in Washington next month.

“I don’t see China playing ball by any means,” Lubin said.

China is both Iran’s largest reported export market and a supplier of essential parts and products, according to WTO and United Nations data.

During the Obama administration, Beijing did agree to reduce energy imports from Iran, said Atlantic Council fellow Daniel Fried, a former U.S. ambassador to Poland.

“We will want the Chinese to go a lot farther than they have gone in the past,” Fried said. “But it’s a lot harder now.”

China has experience helping an ally survive sanctions: It has long been North Korea’s economic lifeline and main diplomatic backer. Experts say China has avoided fully enforcing U.N. sanctions on North Korea and sent clandestine aid to help its impoverished neighbor stay afloat.

Expanding bilateral trade would create problems for Iran’s neighbors

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, who has been his country’s lead negotiator over the last six months, was in Iraq the day of the UAE’s trade suspension. A purpose of his visit, he said, was “speeding up efforts to expand joint cooperation among all countries in the region, without foreign interference.”

The U.S. dollar’s preeminence in international trade and finance, however, means none of Iran’s trading partners would antagonize Washington lightly, Vatanka said. “We’re still at a point where if the U.S. wants to hurt you, it will matter,” he said.

Underscoring potential consequences, Turkey settled a years-long U.S. dispute in July over the role of a state-owned bank in helping Iran evade sanctions through an oil-for-gold scheme. Trump also moved to lift sanctions on its fellow NATO member stemming from Turkey’s purchase of a sophisticated Russian missile system.

“I really don’t think Turkey would like to become the next country helping Iran to evade sanctions right now,” said Riccardo Gasco, an analyst at the IstanPol think tank in Istanbul.

Iran is a vital import source for Iraq and retains influence there through allied political factions and armed groups. Baghdad has sought closer economic and security ties with Washington. Since it invaded Iraq in 2003, the U.S. has significant control over the nation’s foreign currency reserves because they are housed in the Federal Reserve Bank in New York.

Oman, a frequent intermediary between Washington and Tehran, has found its balancing act suddenly precarious. Trump threatened Oman last week over its ongoing negotiations with Iran on the future management of the Strait of Hormuz.

One easy route for goods slipping past sanctions on Iran would be ports like Gwadar near the Persian Gulf in Pakistan, said Peter Harrell, a visiting scholar at Georgetown University.

“Ship an intermodal container of drone parts to one of the ports in western Pakistan and unload it onto a truck and have it driven across the border into Iran,” he said.

While Pakistan, a key ally and economic partner of China in the region, wants to increase trade with Iran, it faces competing pressures. It is serving as a key mediator between Tehran and Washington and has deep security ties with Saudi Arabia, Iran’s longtime regional rival.

Caspian Sea trade route alternatives unlikely to grow quickly

With the Strait of Hormuz mostly blocked and Russia’s war with Ukraine endangering ships on the Black Sea, Iran has sought to develop a “road of life” on the Caspian Sea, said Nikita Smagin, an independent analyst and a former Russian state news agency correspondent in Tehran.

Russia reportedly sent drones to Iran this year, repaying Tehran’s favor after Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It also rerouted exports to Iran via Caspian Sea ports like Astrakhan. Agricultural products make up 80% of Russia and Iran’s reported trade.

“Both economies are exporting natural resources and have little to offer each other,” Smagin said.

The other countries that border the Caspian — Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan — probably won’t rush to join in, said Umud Shokri, a fellow at George Mason University.

Yet Russia and Iran are already in an “axis of the sanctioned,” said Mark Galeotti, executive director of the Mayak Intelligence firm. For decades the pair have collaborated to thwart trade restrictions, and increasing bilateral trade in both “strategic goods” and contraband like military technology, microchips and Gucci handbags could be a next step.

“Pomegranates and tomatoes only go so far,” he said.

Chehayeb and McNeil write for the Associated Press. McNeil reported from Brussels. AP writers Amir Vahdat in Tehran and Dasha Litvinova in Tallinn, Estonia, contributed to this report.

Russia used a longer-range Iskander ballistic missile for the first time in an attack on Kyiv, Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence Directorate (GUR) said on Thursday. Missiles fired from deeper inside Russia would present additional challenges to Ukraine’s new campaign to attack the systems before they launch.

“In one of the combined missile strikes on the capital this summer, the enemy first used the updated 9M723-2 ballistic missiles, also known by the code name ‘Iskander-1000,’” GUR stated. “The updated missile, due to the increased engine and, accordingly, the increased launcher, is capable of hitting targets at a distance of up to 550 km (about 341 miles).”

According to GUR, the range of the previous Iskander variant, the 9M723-1, is 390 km, or about 242 miles.

In its statement about the new Iskander, GUR included photos of what appear to be recovered components of the weapon. However, the agency did not provide any specifics about what the components were, where they were found or when.

While GUR states that the new Iskander short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) was only recently fired at Ukraine, unconfirmed reports emerged in January that this weapon may have been introduced back then. Reports also began to appear last year that Russia was poised to start mass-producing a new version of the Iskander SRBM, with a range of about 600 miles and improved accuracy. Talk of the development of this new missile emerged after the termination by the United States of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) in 2019. This had previously prohibited the Soviet Union (later Russia) and the United States from fielding any ground-launched conventional or nuclear-capable missile of any type that can hit targets between 500 and 5,500 kilometers (310 and 3,420 miles) away. Russia formally abandoned the treaty a short while after the U.S pulled out.

We have reached out to GUR for details.

A Telegram channel operated by Russian paratroopers lauded the development.

“Now, rearward facilities that were previously considered relatively safe are within range,” gloated the Paratrooper’s Diary. “The missile retains its ballistic trajectory, which means it can maneuver throughout its flight path, making interception more difficult for air defense systems.”

“According to preliminary data, the increase in the fuel compartment may have allowed for adjustments to the warhead mass, but the missile is still capable of carrying both cluster and high-explosive warheads with increased power,” the paratroopers continued. “The deployment of the ‘Iskander-1000’ indicates that the Russian defense industry is not only replenishing stockpiles but also scaling up a major modernization of missile weaponry.”

Reducing the size of the warhead and increasing fuel storage is a well proven way of extended the range of certain missiles without drastically chaining its outer mold line. Other improvements, such as new motors and guidance capabilities can also help in this regard.

Russia produces dozens of these weapons a month, noted missile expert Fabian Hoffmann.

“Recently, Ukrainian intelligence provided an updated estimate of Russian missile production capacity, stating that Russia produces around 60 9M723 ballistic missiles per month,” he pointed out in May.

“Based on recent employment trends, this figure is not entirely implausible (at least compared to when this number was first mentioned in 2024), though it should be treated as an upper-bound estimate,” Hoffmann added. “More realistically, Russia’s combined 9M723 and Kh-47M2 production capacity in mid-2026 may be between 600 and 800 units annually, with monthly production potentially fluctuating significantly depending on the availability of internationally sourced components. This would allow Russia to sustain an average employment rate of roughly 50 to 70 monthly ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine, with greater peaks possible if part of the production is stockpiled in a given month.”

To bolster its stocks of short-range ballistic missiles, Russia is receiving more KN-23 and KN-24 missiles from North Korea, which are loosely akin to the Iskander-M. Russia has also asked Pyongyang for an additional tranche of KN-30 missiles, also known as the Hwasong-11C, according to a separate GUR report issued today.

“The new KN-30 ballistic missiles, which are three times more powerful than the KN-23/24, were requested by Moscow from Pyongyang, but so far, the transfer of these missiles from North Korea to Russia has not been recorded,” GUR added.

The KN-30 is an enlarged derivative of the original Hwasong-11 and designed to carry larger warheads. North Korea has previously said it has tested subvariants of the Da/C type with 2.5-ton and 4.5-ton conventional high-explosive warheads, and that it can also be fitted with a nuclear warhead.

Ukraine has had to absorb a lot of damage because it ran out of Patriots months ago. However, President Volodymyr Zelensky recently said an unspecified number of additional interceptors would be delivered. Evidence has also emerged that a new supply of Patriots is being used against Russian missiles, including Iskanders. Still, the concern stands because of the precarious nature of Ukraine’s interceptor supply and Russia’s ability to make new and improved missiles.

As we noted earlier in this story, Ukraine has a new campaign, recently announced by Zelensky, to go after Russia’s ballistic missiles prior to launching to offset a dearth of interceptors. However, Russia’s ability to launch missiles another 100 or so miles further away from Ukraine will make them harder to find and hit.

“When our anti-ballistic missile stocks are at a minimum, there is another tactic,” Zelensky commented. “It is more difficult, and we developed it. It is hunting their nearby positions from which ballistic missiles are launched.”

Zelensky offered no details about how the campaign would be carried out. However, “Ukraine has already targeted Russian ballistic missile infrastructure in several operations this year in Crimea and Rostov, Russia, with drones, Euromaidan Press reported.

❗️Zelensky says Ukrainian forces struck an Iskander-M missile launcher on Russian territory near Ukraine’s border. He called it another success and said operational details cannot be disclosed because of the mission’s sensitivity, but confirmed the launcher was hit. #Ukraine pic.twitter.com/Ao0ooa8JYt

— NOELREPORTS 🇪🇺 🇺🇦 (@NOELreports) August 23, 2026

It is always preferable to shoot the archer not the arrow, but doing so reliably is very challenging as the Iranians proved again in Epic Fury. Despite a concerted campaign by the U.S. and Israel to go after Iranian missile launchers, the Islamic Republic was still able to fire off numerous volleys, creating a swath of destruction across the region.

For Ukraine, this kind of effort would have to mirror its mid-range strike campaign against Russian logistics using longer-range drones. Ukrainians told us they are hitting targets up to 250 km away in the occupied territories. However, that’s been aided in no small measure by the use of Space X Starlink systems.

Carrying out a similar campaign in Russia would be challenging, because Space X owner Elon Musk is reluctant to allow their use deep inside Russia. As we previously noted, Ukraine is asking Musk for permission to “use Starlink-equipped drones against ballistic missile launchers up to 200km inside Russia,” the Financial Times reported last week.

However, Zelensky recently said Musk ultimately refused to grant that permission.

GUR is calling for increased efforts to cut off the supply of foreign assistance Russia receives.

“To counter the aggressor’s plans, it is crucial to consolidate efforts aimed at limiting Russia’s program for the development, production, and modernization of ballistic weapons,” the directorate proffered.

The Ukrainian intelligence information about the new Iskander was part of a report on the amount of foreign components found on these missiles. The information is published on the directorate’s War & Sanctions portal, which identifies foreign assistance to Russia’s weapons programs.

“Only a quarter of the 140 components published today are manufactured by Russian enterprises,” GUR stated.

Almost half – 63 – were manufactured by American firms, GUR explained. The Iskanders also contained components from Switzerland, Belarus, Germany, Taiwan and China.

“In one of the most important components of the missile guidance system — the flight information processing unit obtained from the laser gyroscope — only 5 out of 43 components are manufactured in the Russian Federation,” GUR added. 

That foreign components would be found in Russian weapons is neither surprising nor new. TWZ has been chronicling this since the start of the war. These parts have been found in everything from helicopters to radars to cruise missiles. There was even a decoy drone found to be made completely of Chinese components.

These parts all found their way into Russian weapons despite international sanctions designed to prevent that from happening.

Russia isn’t the only country whose weapons – reliant on foreign components – have been used in attacks on Ukraine. A short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) produced by North Korea and used against Ukraine by Russia in 2024 relied on more than 290 foreign-sourced components, many of them originating from U.S. manufacturers. This is the alarming result of a study by Conflict Armament Research (CAR), a U.K.-based investigative organization.

China is also providing engines for Russia’s drones, including its jet-powered variants.

All this news about Russian missile supplies comes as President Vladimir Putin has threatened to escalate attacks on Ukraine over its strikes on Russian infrastructure and the faltering peace process. The Russian leader is also reportedly again mulling using tactical nuclear weapons to stop these attacks. That would be a word-changing escalation and TWZ cannot independently confirm those claims.

Though he hasn’t pulled the trigger on expanding attacks yet, Putin is clearly building the means to do so if he chooses.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com