Russia

Ukraine hits Russia’s Afipsky oil refinery and gas plant in latest attacks targeting energy infrastructure.

A fire broke out at the Afipsky oil refinery in Russia’s Krasnodar region following a drone attack, local authorities have said.

At least two people were killed and two others were injured due to falling drone debris at the Afipsky railway station, Governor Veniamin Kondratyev said on Tuesday.

Ukraine has been targeting Russia’s oil refineries and ⁠other infrastructure, attempting to undermine ⁠Moscow’s war efforts and reduce financial revenue.

Ukraine’s General Staff said its forces struck facilities at Afipsky.

It said its forces also hit a gas processing plant in Russia’s Astrakhan region overnight.

Russia’s Ministry of Defence said its forces had struck a cargo vessel carrying goods for the Ukrainian army in the port of Pivdennyi near Odesa, as well as port infrastructure facilities used for unloading military cargo.

The ministry said Russian air defences shot down 148 Ukrainian drones overnight.

Ukraine has ramped up attacks on Russian energy infrastructure in recent months, escalating a fuel crisis in the country.

Amid the continuing attacks, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on Monday that would allow the state to take temporary control of critical infrastructure found to be inadequately protected from attack.

The attacks come after a meeting in Kyiv where Ukraine’s allies pledged to continue supporting the country during the ongoing war.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told the assembled leaders in an evening address that he wanted to “raise production” of drones and missiles to wage “more attacks” on Russia, matching its strikes on Ukraine.

The meeting was attended by 30 leaders of the so-called Coalition of the Willing, including British Prime Minister Andy Burnham, who called for negotiations with Russia, and French President Emmanuel Macron, who participated remotely and predicted that “NATO countries will be targeted and the provocations will multiply”.

Finnish President Alexander Stubb was also in attendance, urging Ukraine’s allies to help expand its ability ⁠to strike deeply inside Russia.

The Kremlin said on Tuesday that Burnham and Stubb belonged to the “party of war”.

Owing to his illness, 26-year-old Sasha from Orenburg, a city in Russia close to the Kazakhstan border, has a Category V military ID, which under normal circumstances makes him ineligible for service.

But not during wartime.

Just before partial mobilisation was declared in 2022, he considered leaving for Kazakhstan. But while awaiting the bus, he struck up a conversation with his soon-to-be girlfriend.

As they turned back together, they decided against making the drastic move.

Over the past year, however, they have grown increasingly anxious.

“Since mid-2025, my girlfriend and I have been experiencing a severe decline in mental health. We see psychiatrists and take antidepressants,” Sasha told Al Jazeera.

He requested to be identified only by his first name to protect his anonymity.

“I don’t go outside unless it’s urgent and try never to be alone. I carry pepper spray for protection against aggression if it happens, like in Penza.”

Since June, there have been reports of attempted press-ganging in Penza, 625km (388 miles) southeast of Moscow.

Recent footage shared on social media has shown individuals dressed in plainclothes trying to force fighting-age men into vehicles to take them to the recruitment centre, while weeping women try to intervene – echoing similar scenes in Ukraine.

Potential recruits have also been reportedly summoned to police stations under bureaucratic pretexts, then beaten or threatened – for example, by having illicit drugs planted on them – into signing a military contract.

Local authorities deny the reports, claiming only men attempting to dodge the draft, who have already been mobilised, are being approached. They have also accused residents who have shared footage of the roundups of spreading disinformation.

Although the Penza roundups have received attention lately, local authorities throughout Russia have been accused of coercive methods for some time.

“In October 2022, a friend was stopped at night by military police,” said Sasha. “They identified themselves as civilians and didn’t show identification. They demanded a passport or military ID, and that he accompany them. My friend ran away.”

According to Mikhail Liberov, from the Conscientious Objectors Movement, military recruiters select the “right targets who, for one reason or another, are vulnerable to seduction, deception, blackmail, or are simply unaware of their actions”.

He said this group includes drug addicts, alcoholics, mentally unwell people, those with large debts and migrants “who don’t speak Russian or barely know what’s actually written, and are also afraid of deportation”.

Men above 35 years of age are also approached, and some are “willing to risk their lives and the lives of others for big money and the chance to become ‘heroes’.

“Then comes the threat of prison: A man arrested for petty hooliganism might be intimidated by the idea that, say, ‘We’ll plant drugs on you and put you in prison for 12 years,’ and many agree to sign contracts.”

Oleg Ignatov, senior Russia analyst at the International Crisis Group, said the recent roundups in Penza are likely isolated instances of local authorities trying to fill their recruitment quotas, rather than a systemic, nationwide effort.

‘Mobilisation will still happen’

These renewed recruitment incidents come amid rumours of a mobilisation effort and an expected Russian offensive this winter that will likely involve ramped-up attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure.

“I’ve already accepted that mobilisation will still happen, unless something happens that forces (Russian President Vladimir) Putin to end the war in Ukraine,” said Liberov, who believes Russia will ready troops within a year.

“Human rights activists are already working on the assumption that mobilisation will take place this fall,” he said.

In September 2022, Putin signed a decree allowing for partial mobilisation. Fearing deployment, thousands of men fled to neighbouring countries. But that mobilisation effort effectively ended two months later.

Russia has since been able to replenish its ranks by enlisting prisoners, as well as promising generous payouts.

However, the recruitment pool is dwindling.

According to the independent Russian news site IStories, the number of people voluntarily signing military contracts halved by late 2025. Those who enlist are disproportionately from underprivileged corners of society.

“The protracted war with Ukraine, the large number of dead soldiers, and the degradation of the Russian economy demotivate people from participating in such an adventure in the name of Putin,” said Liberov.

Official casualties are not made public in Russia.

The Washington, DC-based Center for Strategic and International Studies puts the number of deaths among Russian forces since the invasion of Ukraine in early 2022 at nearly 450,000.

Meanwhile, the 2022 mobilisation decree remains in effect, and the Russian offensive in Ukraine is lagging. The war is now being felt at home as Ukrainian drones strike deep into Russian territory.

“I only live once. I’m not going to sacrifice it for someone else’s wishes and will fight to the bitter end,” said Sasha. “Human life is priceless, and you have to cling to it until the end.”

Vladimir from Ulan-Ude, who has previously served as a conscript and is thus eligible for mobilisation, said he has a “generally negative attitude” about Russia’s war in Ukraine.

“I am preparing for a possible draft. In the event of an escalation, I will insist on the alternative civil service,” said the 35-year-old, who requested to withhold his surname over fears of reprisal. “I wouldn’t want to leave the country.”

According to the Russian constitution, alternative civilian service can be applied for when “convictions or religious beliefs contradict military service”.

Conscripts can serve either for 21 months at an organisation “subordinate to the bodies of the executive branch”, often taking jobs as nurses, cleaners or postal workers, or for 18 months at a defence manufacturing plant. According to the Ministry of Defence, about 2,000 people apply for alternative civilian service each year, with approximately half receiving approval.

Earlier this summer, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy claimed the Kremlin was secretly preparing for a mass mobilisation – a claim backed by reports in Russian independent media.

In June, lawmaker Andrey Gurulev of the governing United Russia party wrote on Telegram that “there’s now active talk, both behind the scenes and in high places, about the need for a new large-scale mobilisation.”

But expanding the army is expensive while budgets are under strain, and a huge influx of recruits still leaves a shortage of experienced officers and trained specialists.

“I would say that Russia’s problems right now are less about the quantity, but more about the quality of contractors,” said Crisis Group’s Ignatov.

“Russians need more skilled soldiers who can operate drones, who can operate modern warfare systems. And here they have more problems than the Ukrainians.

“But if this war continues, of course, we can assume that (mobilisation) could happen.”

China is set to launch its Chang’e-7 unmanned, robotic space mission, possibly as early as Monday morning, to look for ice water in the permanently shadowed craters of the moon’s south pole.

This marks China’s seventh and most ambitious moon mission so far. Here is what we know about it.

What do we know about Chang’e-7?

The Chang’e‑7 launch window runs from Monday, August 24 to Monday, August 31, according to launch observers. That means the mission could lift off on any day in that period.

The Chang’e-7 comprises an orbiter, a lander, a rover and a hopper.

• The orbiter is the main spacecraft which will remain in the moon’s orbit, mapping the surface and taking images while the mission is under way. It will also relay data and communications between the other Chang’e‑7 components and Earth.
• The lander is the vessel that will touch down on the lunar surface, loaded with the necessary scientific instruments for lunar exploration, near the edge of the Shackleton Crater, a 21km-wide (13-mile-wide) pit close to the moon’s south pole. Lunar missions before this have never come this close to the pole.
• The rover is a small robotic vehicle which can drive around the landing site and which carries equipment to analyse the local environment, including rocks and soil.
• The hopper is a small robotic craft powered by solar energy, designed to “hop” – or fly – short distances from the surface of the moon and land again. It will be used to explore the Shackleton Crater.

How do we know there is water on the moon?

Over the past two decades, several space missions have established that there is water on the moon.

Since the 1960s, even before the first Apollo landing in 1969, scientists speculated that water could exist on the moon. However, when Apollo crews returned samples for testing in the late 1960s and early 1970s, they appeared to be dry.

Finally, in 2009, NASA deliberately crashed a rocket segment and its probe into a shadowed lunar crater to analyse the dust plume it kicked up. This provided one of the clearest direct confirmations that significant ice water does exist on the moon, building on earlier detections of water and hydrogen by probes.

In October 2020, NASA scientists announced that water on the moon is more widespread than previously known. They said water molecules had been found to be encapsulated within mineral grains on the lunar surface and speculated that more water is hidden in ice patches which are in permanent shadows.

NASA describes these permanent shadows as dark areas inside deep craters near the north and south poles of the moon where sunlight has not reached for millions or even billions of years. In 2018, prior to confirming it in 2020, NASA had detected water ice in shadowed parts of the moon through mapping.

Why is it important to find out more about the water on the moon?

Expanding knowledge about water on the moon is vital because ancient polar ice may have preserved a record of lunar volcanic activity and of water delivered by comets and asteroids to the Earth-moon system, offering clues to how our own oceans originally formed.

Additionally, if there is enough water on the moon that is realistically accessible, it could serve as a source of drinking water for crewed lunar missions, and could also help to keep equipment cool.

Hydrogen could also be extracted from moon water to provide fuel, while oxygen could be extracted to breathe, supporting onward missions to Mars or lunar mining.

Could anyone ‘own’ the water on the moon?

The 1967 United Nations Outer Space Treaty bans any nation from claiming sovereignty over the moon or owning it as territory. It does not explicitly prohibit commercial operations, but it requires private activities in space to be authorised and supervised by states and leaves key questions about resource ownership unresolved.

Which recent space missions have searched for frozen water on the moon?

In 2023, Russia’s lunar spacecraft, Luna-25, was launched to look for frozen water in the moon’s south pole. However, the Luna-25 spun out of control and crashed. The crash prevented any scientific data collection or water discovery.

Racing against the Luna-25 mission was India’s Chandrayaan-3, which also aimed to expand knowledge of lunar water ice. Chandrayaan-3 successfully landed in August 2023 and found critical new evidence of water on the surface of the moon’s south pole through soil temperature readings.

Why is exploring the moon’s south pole a challenge?

Attempted landings at the moon’s south pole have failed before because of its challenging terrain, which is full of craters and deep trenches.

The south pole is far from the equatorial region targeted by previous missions, including the crewed Apollo landings.

What is different about the Chang’e-7 mission?

The upcoming Chang’e-7 is aiming to expand knowledge about where, exactly, water is located in the craters of the moon, how deep it is, what form it is in and whether it is indeed possible to access it.

The Chang’e-7’s six-legged hopper has been designed to jump into and out of the deep, shadowed craters near the south pole that are hard for traditional rovers to reach, to look for water ice and other resources.

No previous space mission has used a dedicated hopper to jump in and out of lunar craters in this way.

Russian ballistic missile attacks have begun to cause record civilian deaths in Ukrainian cities without any Patriot interceptors to stop them, but Ukraine’s long-range strikes have destroyed Russian fuel supplies.

With the Russian economy struggling, a top expert warned that social unrest could unfold in a matter of time – and consequently lost his job.

On Tuesday, Russian missiles killed at least 10 people in Pechenihy, a town 40km (25 miles) east of Ukraine’s northern city of Kharkiv. On Thursday, they killed 15 people in Kyiv, three in the western city of Zhytomyr and injured 40 at a border crossing between Odesa and Moldova.

Russia said it was targeting weapons manufacturing sites in Kyiv, but Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Russian forces struck 30 residential buildings, a school and a children’s hospital.

The United Nations said Russia killed a record 437 people in July and injured 2,610, surpassing its previous record in June by 30 percent.

Civilian casualties have continued in August, because Ukraine has run out of Patriot interceptors and has been unable to stop incoming ballistic missile attacks since the beginning of the month.

As Zelenskyy pointed out, Ukraine’s interception rate of cruise missiles and drones is still in the 90-percent range. But Russia is doubling down on the use of ballistic missiles and has brought in an additional 50 North Korean weapons, according to Ukrainian military intelligence.

Ukraine strikes back

Since June 25, Ukraine has launched a campaign of mid-range strikes to disrupt Russian logistics and has harassed fuel and ammunition supplies so effectively that it has made 233sq km (90 square miles) of territorial gains this year.

By August 16, Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces announced it had put 228 supply ships out of action in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov, as well as destroying 243 power stations, electricity substations and gas distribution nodes in Crimea.

They have also been striking relay antennas used to guide Russian drones and radar stations that detect Ukrainian counterstrikes. On August 20, Ukraine struck drone launch sites in Donetsk City and Primorsko-Akhtarsk on the Sea of Azov, as well as a fuel terminal in the Kerch Strait used to supply Crimea.

Ukraine’s long-range strikes have served a different purpose – to undermine the Russian economy’s ability to fund its war.

On August 15, Ukraine managed to fly two of its Flamingo cruise missiles into the Progress Rocket and Space Centre, 800km (500 miles) east of Moscow, despite Russia’s use of four A-50 early warning aircraft and its reported downing of 822 Ukrainian drones that day.

Ukraine said it hit an engine assembly workshop for Soyuz rockets, causing a fire covering half a hectare.

Russia is using Soyuz to launch satellites for its Rassvet constellation to replace dependence on the US Starlink system, after Ukraine managed to cut Russian access to Starlink on February 1 . Russia needs satellites to increase the speed and precision of its counter-battery fire on Ukrainian positions. Its loss of that capacity has been partly responsible for Ukrainian gains this year.

“One Soyuz-2.1b launch vehicle can put 20 satellites into orbit,” said Ukrainian electronics expert Serhiy Beskrestnov. “To create a basic satellite constellation in orbit, Russia needs to carry out 12-15 launches.”

The following day, Ukraine set ablaze a 25-hectare warehouse belonging to the Wildberries online retail chain, Russia’s equivalent of Amazon, and said it had destroyed seven out of Wildberries’ ten largest logistical hubs.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on July 28 that the Kremlin was monitoring the damage to Wildberries.

Russian President Vladimir Putin implied on Thursday that he might provide government funds for Wildberries to rebuild, saying “logistics and warehousing capacity certainly needs to be restored, including with government support”.

Ukraine has also succeeded in destroying Russian oil refineries and starving its economy of petrol

It has recently struck the Ust-Luga refinery, the Taneco refinery in Tatarstan and the Perm refinery, 1,500km (930 miles) from its borders.

Similar strikes this year have so reduced petrol supply in Russia. The Izvestia newspaper reported that only 28 percent of petrol stations across the country could supply fuel this week, citing mobile app GdeBENZ, which monitors real-time fuel availability.

Izvestia said only five petrol stations in Moscow were selling high-octane AI-98 fuel. Russians posted video of Rosgvardia police units sitting outside petrol stations to avert some of the fights involving motorists in recent months.

Deputy Prime Minister, Alexander Novak, said lower-grade fuel was being supplied to ease market tensions, and confirmed that Russia is now importing refined fuel for the domestic market.

“We expect a number of oil refineries to complete maintenance work soon and the situation to improve significantly,” Novak told Vesti journalist Pavel Zarubin, but that may be wishful thinking. Ukraine has struck Russia’s largest refineries not once but repeatedly. On Wednesday [August 19 ], it struck a refining unit at Ufa, which was undergoing repairs from a previous strike. It is 1,300km (810 miles) from Ukraine.

Ukraine also struck significant military targets during the week, including the Kamenyy Kombinat plant in Rostov, which makes solid rocket fuel for missiles, and the Savasleika airfield, from where MiG fighters armed with Kh-47M2 ballistic missiles take -off.

Russian economy in trouble

Some Russian economists have begun to warn of impending social and political upheaval as a result of the slowing economy.

Andrey Klepach, chief economist at Vnesheconombank, a state bank that finances the Kremlin’s national projects, warned on August 18 that, “Losses from Ukrainian military strikes … are already becoming a significant macroeconomic barrier to Russian economic growth.

“I believe Russia won’t collapse, but I’m almost certain we’ll reach a social crisis.”

He was removed from his post after making the comments during a discussion at the Moscow Exchange’s Nikitsky Club.

Russians are withdrawing savings in increasing amounts, reported The Washington Post. While businesses are increasing “voluntary” donations to the state defence budget, in addition to having to pay for their own air defences, putting further strain on the economy.

At a meeting of the Council for Strategic Development and National Projects this week, Putin acknowledged that Ukraine’s strikes are “certainly” causing damage, adding that “overall economic performance is modest but positive”.

That damage took financial form in the $1.18bn Putin newly released to aid regional budgets, in addition to previous financial assistance. Some $52m of that was destined for Crimea.

Ukraine’s defence ministry estimated that every dollar spent on drone strikes caused five times that amount in costs to the Russian economy.

Police allege Australian-Russian citizen joined Ukrainian military seeking to send information to Russian intelligence.

Australian police have charged a dual Russian-Australian citizen for trying to pass Ukrainian military information to people he believed were linked to Russian intelligence.

The 27-year-old man was due ⁠to appear in court in Brisbane on Friday on charges of foreign interference.

Australian Federal Police Commissioner Krissy Barrett told a news conference that the suspect travelled to Russia for training in October 2024. He then returned to Australia but “maintained contact” with individuals he believed were linked to Moscow’s intelligence services.

The police allege the man enlisted in the Ukrainian military in May 2025, ‌where he “gained access to information relating to their military personnel, units and locations”.

Barrett said he shared the information obtained in Ukraine with “individuals he believed were acting on behalf of Russian intelligence services”, putting the safety of Ukrainian military staff at risk.

“We don’t want Australia to become a safe haven for people who are undertaking foreign interference on behalf of other countries,” the commissioner said.

The identity of the suspect, who is unemployed, has not been revealed. Police said there was no indication he had received military training in Australia. Search warrants have been executed, they added, noting the possibility of further arrests related to the case.

Australian Federal Police and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation spy agency conducted the investigation.

“This case should put regimes perpetrating foreign interference on notice: we have zero tolerance,” ASIO Deputy Director-General Claire McGuinness said.

Russia’s embassy in Australia said it had no knowledge of the case.

“At this stage, no official requests or notifications have been received by the Embassy or the Consulate General in Sydney, either from the Australian authorities or from the individual concerned,” the embassy said in an email to the AFP news agency. “We are currently using the available channels and resources to establish the circumstances of the case.”

Russia arrests Ukrainian operatives

Meanwhile, Russian authorities have arrested nine people and charged them with working for Ukrainian intelligence, state media reported on Friday.

The TASS media agency said eight of the suspects were found to have 35 drones, equipped with explosives smuggled from the European Union, and planned ‌to attack a strategic defence enterprise in the Moscow region.

Separately, a foreign ⁠national was detained close to the Norwegian border. The FSB security service said that the man – whose nationality it did not reveal – had been arrested for trying to launch a surveillance drone over Moscow to help Ukrainian intelligence plot an attack on the Russian capital.

The FSB said it had detained the individual as he was trying to flee to Norway on foot.

Fifteen years since the uprising against Muammar Gaddafi in Libya began, and with civil strife leading to the downfall of what was once one of Africa’s wealthiest countries, several actors are seeking to end the civil war and reunite the country.

Among them are the US, which has commercial interests in Libya’s oil fields. Qatar, Egypt and Turkiye are also pushing for a return to “One Libya”, after more than a decade of fighting between two rival authorities for control of the country.

Here’s what we know:

What happened 15 years ago?

The Libyan uprising erupted during the Arab Spring, when thousands of people in the port city of Benghazi took to the streets to protest against Gaddafi’s more than four decades of absolute power.

Violence against the demonstrations pushed the protesters into an armed rebellion against Gaddafi’s rule, with a civil war starting between the two sides.

A United Nations Security Council resolution authorised an international military intervention force – led by NATO members, the United States, United Kingdom and France – to enforce a no-fly zone and ensure the protection of civilians in Libya. This bombing campaign pushed back Gaddafi’s forces from Benghazi and aided the rebels in seizing territory.

Gaddafi was eventually captured and killed in October 2011, 42 years after he first seized power in a military coup that overthrew King Idris.

How is Libya divided?

Following Gaddafi’s death, a power vacuum emerged, with multiple groups – and their allied militias – competing for power.

Control of the country is now split between two rival administrations: the UN-recognised Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli, led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dheibah, and the eastern, Tobruk-based administration backed by Khalifa Haftar and his self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA).

The GNU is recognised by the UN and other countries, and officially has authority in the capital and western Libya.

Under Gaddafi, Haftar was exiled in the US for two decades where he holds citizenship.

His forces control vast resource-rich lands in the east, including the strategic port city of Benghazi, reportedly with the backing of Russia.

The UN began formal mediation efforts in 2020 under the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). This roadmap advocates for a three-track strategy that includes unifying the two rival administrations, presidential and parliamentary elections, and hosting national dialogue meetings.

The US was a key mediator behind the scenes, and in May 2021, appointed Ambassador Richard Norlan as Special Envoy to Libya, to lead high-level talks between the two sides.

What is the US’s new plan?

Under Massad Boulous, US President Donald Trump’s African and Middle Eastern affairs adviser, and father-in-law to Tiffany Trump, Washington is intensifying efforts to reunite the country. But this can only be achieved if both sides agree to form a single government.

According to leaked details, Trump’s initiative centres on the promise that if the rival governments cooperate, the US would encourage American investment in Libya’s sizable oil fields. This comes as the Libyan Central Bank, which is attempting to finance both authorities, sounds the alarm over the dire economic situation.

While Tripoli has international legitimacy, Haftar’s forces control the oilfields and terminals.

The US is also proposing a power-sharing deal that would see Dheibah continue to lead the government while Haftar’s son and LNA army chief, 35-year-old Saddam Haftar, serves as president.

There are obvious opportunities for US energy companies and economic and political incentives for European countries in a unified and stable Libya.

They include stopping irregular migration from Libya and other North African countries to the EU.

Some criticise the US-led plan as lacking input from the Libyan people. The deal, some say, could entrench the power of political dynasties, which might be best for long-term stability in Libya.

What have the results been?

There are signs that Haftar’s camp, at least, is on board with the US plan. Saddam Haftar, whose father, Khalifa, was based in Virginia until 2011, reportedly met with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in DC in July.

Experts attribute the ongoing mediation efforts to the unified national budget of 2026, signed in April – the first in more than a decade.

However, there are still no talks or signs of a unified government forming.

What is Turkiye’s role?

Turkiye, which earlier deployed troops to support the GNU, has also made efforts to mediate between the two sides and is pushing a ‘One Libya’ policy.

Last month, Foreign Affairs Minister, Hakan Fidan, met with Saddam Haftar in Ankara. Earlier this month, Fidan travelled to both Tripoli and Benghazi for high-level talks with Dheibah and Khalifa Haftar.

What has Egypt done?

The Egyptian government has traditionally cooperated with Haftar’s Tobruk government, which is just across the border.

On Wednesday, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi met with Khalifa Haftar in Cairo and discussed unification talks.

Earlier this month, Dheibah visited Cairo, while Egyptian intelligence chief Hassan Rashad travelled to Tripoli.

What is Qatar’s stance?

Qatar has largely backed the UN mediation channels in Libya: the UNSMIL and the UN roadmap for peace.

While it has good relations with the GNU, Qatar seeks stabilisation efforts led by Libyan parties and elections.

In April, Qatar and other states welcomed the unified budget for 2026. A statement issued by Qatar, Egypt, France, Germany and several others called for all parties in Libya to follow the UN roadmap to “advance a Libyan-led political process leading to unified governance and national elections.”

All the Ukrainian-born PoWs we interviewed came from areas occupied since 2014 and almost all joined the Russian army voluntarily.

But one man from Donetsk region told us he had been forced to fight.

His eyes darted around as he talked, unsure who he could trust.

One official tally, citing “intelligence”, suggests more than 50,000 Ukrainians have been conscripted against their will in occupied areas. Others put the figure far higher.

This man told us that when the Russians invaded, his family had stayed, not through any political or national allegiance but because Donetsk was their home.

Now, his only ambition was to get back to his wife and children, then avoid being returned to the front. “I’m just going to hide,” he confided.

Beneath the hospital windows and newly whitewashed walls there are rows of strawberries and cucumbers planted by the prisoners.

Further on, the stench of varnish from an outhouse is overpowering.

An official lifts a gold-coloured plastic handle from a bag near the door. “Guess what this is for?” he challenges us, grinning.

Inside, I do a double-take: the men working inside are hammering together wooden coffins. I am told the last contract the prison got was for garden sheds. This one feels macabre.

Across the courtyard in another workshop a handful of PoWs are making artificial Christmas trees, gaudy baubles strung from their machines. Like the coffin-makers, they tell me they use their wages to buy extra food and cigarettes.

Sergei was born in the Ukrainian city of Luhansk but says he is Russian like his parents, who moved to the Donbas when both countries were part of the Soviet Union.

He joined the Russian army a decade ago “to defend my homeland”, but claims he will retire when he gets back, not return to the front. “I’ve done my bit.”

Most will have no choice.

Stacking plastic branches next to Sergei is a drug dealer who signed up, like many, “exclusively” to avoid a long jail term.

“For me, 15 years in prison was too much,” Konstantin explains. “I know it probably doesn’t excuse me, but it’s a fact. I’m 44 now, I would be 60. So no.”

But Vshniki, or convict-soldiers, have to survive to the end of the war to be released and in the assault troops the odds are not good.

Three convicted murderers told us they had thought they could walk free after fighting for a year, only to have their contacts renewed automatically.

A wave of overnight Russian missile strikes has killed at least five people in the capital Kyiv and the surrounding region, Ukrainian authorities say.

Apartment blocks and warehouses were targeted in the “massive attack” on Thursday, according to the State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS). At least least 23 people were injured in the strikes.

Authorities are scrambling to rescue anyone trapped underneath the rubble of demolished buildings, with crews already pulling one survivor from debris.

Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko said a children’s hospital had been damaged in the overnight strikes, where windows were broken and cars set ablaze nearby.

An industrial centre in the Solomyanskyi district, south-west Kyiv, was also hit by missiles, the mayor said.

An attack in Brovary district of the broader Kyiv region killed one man and wounded another, Kyiv regional governor Tymur Tkachenko said.

The regional administration issued an alert earlier in the night warning residents to take shelter. It continued: “Air defense operations are possible in the area”.

More missile alerts were issued from regional authorities, citing warnings from the Ukrainian air force.

The Russian airstrikes cut power to thousands of properties overnight, plunging parts of the Kyiv region into darkness, with technicians racing to repair the damaged energy grids.

Russia’s Defence Ministry says 453 Ukrainian drones were downed overnight in various regions.

At least five people have been killed and 11 others injured in Russian attacks on Ukraine, authorities said.

A Russian drone attack on a bus in the front-line city of Kherson killed at least four people and wounded four others on Wednesday, Kherson regional Governor Oleksandr Prokudin said.

The attack took place at about 8:50am local time (05:50 GMT), and all the casualties were bus passengers.

In a post on the Telegram app, Prokudin said the wounded had been taken to hospital.

He posted blurred photos of a yellow bus with bloodied steps and shattered windows.

Russian forces regularly strike Kherson, which was under Moscow’s control from March to November 2022 – the initial months of the war – with drones, in what Ukraine says is the deliberate targeting of civilians.

Earlier this month, Ukraine accused Russia of chasing a man in a street market in Kherson with a remotely piloted FPV drone, calling it a “safari” targeting civilians.

The city had a population of about 280,000 before the war began with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Russian forces, repelled from the city by a Ukrainian counteroffensive in the last quarter of 2022, are now positioned on the opposite bank of the Dnipro River, which flows past Kherson.

There has been an uptick in civilian deaths in the conflict throughout this year, the United Nations has reported, with 437 civilians killed in Ukraine last month alone, the highest monthly toll since May 2022.

Russian authorities reported 79 civilians killed in Ukrainian attacks in July, up from the previous month.

The four-and-a-half-year war continues to grind on, as United States-backed talks aimed at ending the conflict remain stalled.

In a separate Russian attack, one person was killed and seven others injured in Ukraine’s southeastern city of Zaporizhzhia, according to regional Governor Ivan Fedorov.

Russian drones struck the regional capital, damaging both residential and nonresidential buildings and causing a fire.

Meanwhile, Russian forces struck a cargo vessel in the Black Sea near the Ukrainian port of Odesa, Russian news agency Interfax reported, citing the Ministry of Defence.

The vessel was carrying military cargo, the ministry said.

It said Russia’s air defence brought down 453 Ukrainian drones overnight in various regions.

At the same time, Russian authorities were rushing to put out a small fire after a drone fell in an industrial area in the city of Ufa in the Russian republic of Bashkortostan, the republic’s head Radiy Khabirov said on Telegram.

Khabirov added that a drone hit an apartment building and a few cars in Ufa, an oil refining hub, injuring one person.

Concern over the security of Europe’s largest nuclear plant has been rife since Russia launched its full-scale war on Ukraine nearly five years ago.

A drone strike close to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in occupied southeastern Ukraine has killed one nuclear specialist and wounded 17, according to Russian reports.

Moscow asserted on Tuesday that the drone was launched by Ukraine. The security of Europe’s biggest nuclear plant has provoked significant global concern amid the full-scale war on Ukraine that Russia launched in February 2022.

Most of those injured by the strike were employees of the plant, according to a Telegram update by the Russian management of the nuclear facility. It asserted that the attack constituted one of the most serious incidents in the plant’s history.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) earlier confirmed reports that the strike hit staff members at a bus stop.

“No nuclear safety or security damage was reported,” the IAEA, the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog, said on social media.

However, it called “on military commanders responsible for these actions as well as all others aiming on nuclear power plants and/or their staff to put an immediate stop to these unacceptable actions”, citing the “great risks to nuclear safety”.

The Zaporizhzhia plant was seized by Russian forces a month after Moscow launched its invasion. The facility has been under Russian management since.

The safety of the plant – and the potential consequences of a hit amid the hostilities – have been a concern since the start of the war.

Zaporizhzhia’s six reactors can produce nearly six gigawatts of electricity, and the plant was crucial to supplying power to Ukraine’s national grid. All of the reactors have been shut down since Russia captured the plant, but a strike could cause damage and potentially cause serious leaks of radioactive material.

Tuesday’s strike came ahead of a scheduled visit by IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi to assess nuclear safety. It’s not clear if that visit will still take place.

A Russian strike on a thermal power plant was reported in central Ukraine a few hours later, forcing a halt to operations, according to DTEK, Ukraine’s largest energy provider and the company that operates the plant.

No casualties were reported, but DTEK stated on social media that the attack caused “significant damage to equipment”.

Russia has attacked the company’s thermal plants 230 times since the start of the war, according to DTEK’s Telegram channel, as it wages a campaign to destroy Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.

By chaining bilateral naval exercises across a widening circle of partners — Russia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, and now Indonesia — Beijing is not assembling an alliance. It is manufacturing the impression that a Chinese warship’s presence near every regional flashpoint, including the waters off Taiwan, is unremarkable.

On July 29th, the Indonesian frigate KRI I Gusti Ngurah Rai wrapped up a two-day naval drill with the Russian navy in Vladivostok, part of Exercise Orruda 2026. Two weeks later, on August 12th, China’s Ministry of National Defense announced that the same ship, on its way home, would run a “passing exercise” with a Chinese frigate, the Honghe — not in Indonesian waters, not in the South China Sea, but east of Taiwan. Jakarta’s navy described it in the blandest terms available: communications drills, a resupply run, “a universal naval tradition.” Taipei was not reassured. Taiwan’s foreign ministry said it “sternly condemns” the move and complained that Beijing had “unilaterally claimed” Indonesian participation before Jakarta had said a word about where, or why, this was happening.

That gap — between Jakarta’s shrug and Taipei’s alarm — is the story. It is also a useful corrective to how most coverage of Chinese naval activity is currently framed. The default lens is bilateral and confrontational: China versus the Philippines at Second Thomas Shoal, China versus Japan around the Senkakus, China versus Taiwan in the Strait. That lens catches real events, but it misses the connective tissue between them — a growing schedule of joint drills with third parties, each one small and individually deniable as “routine,” that collectively do something the confrontational track cannot: they make China’s presence in the surrounding water look normal to everyone except the state it is actually disputing with.

Indonesia and China have their own maritime dispute: Beijing’s nine-dash line overlaps Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone around the Natuna Islands, and Chinese fishing incursions there froze bilateral naval drills between 2015 and 2021. Those “Sharp Knife” exercises resumed in 2021 and have picked up pace since 2024. That history matters, but it is not what explains this month’s drill, because this drill did not happen anywhere near Natuna. It happened off Taiwan — waters Indonesia has no claim to and, until now, no naval presence in alongside China. Indonesia is simply the newest and most sensitive addition to a list that already includes Russia (the mature anchor partnership, most recently “Joint Sea-2026” in July), Malaysia (“Peace and Friendship 2025” in the Strait of Malacca last October), Cambodia (“Golden Dragon” at the newly built Ream Naval Base logistics center last spring), Thailand (“Blue Strike” and “Falcon Strike,” the latter launched again this month), and Vietnam (a Beibu Gulf coast guard and navy patrol series now past its fortieth iteration). All of this sits alongside a separate, unilateral track — a 100-plus-vessel show of force spanning the Yellow Sea to the western Pacific last December, and routine coast guard patrols around Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal.

The claim of this piece is that these two tracks are not separate stories about Chinese assertiveness. They are one story, working in tandem: the unilateral patrols draw the lines, and the bilateral drills erase them, by training a widening circle of regional navies — and the publics who read about them — to treat a Chinese warship’s presence near contested space as routine bilateral traffic rather than a signal.

The Indonesia case is the clearest evidence yet, because the location was Beijing’s choice, not Jakarta’s. Indonesia had no dispute-driven reason to be operating near Taiwan; its dispute with China sits in the Natuna Sea, hundreds of miles away. What Jakarta had was a frigate already at sea, returning from Russia, and a willingness to let Beijing choose the itinerary’s final leg. Global Times, writing for a domestic Chinese audience, called the drill’s timing “of great significance” — language China’s defense ministry does not use for routine port calls. The exercise also landed in the same week that Elbridge Colby, the U.S. Under Secretary of War for Policy, was in Jakarta courting Indonesia’s alignment. Chaining a Chinese passing exercise onto the tail of an Indonesian-Russian one, in waters adjacent to the most dangerous flashpoint in the region, at the exact moment Washington was making its own pitch, is not the profile of a routine bilateral courtesy call.

The strongest objection to this argument comes from analysts of Malaysia’s drills with China, who point out that Kuala Lumpur treats “Peace and Friendship” as a hedging tool it controls, not a concession Beijing extracted — the exercises are deliberately unsophisticated (humanitarian assistance, counter-piracy, no live fire), and Malaysia’s own defense establishment remains wary of Chinese assertiveness even as it participates. That is a fair description of Malaysia’s intent, and it likely holds for Cambodia and Thailand too: these governments are managing great-power competition on their own terms, not capitulating to it. But intent on the partner’s side does not determine the effect on Beijing’s side. Whatever Kuala Lumpur or Phnom Penh tell their own publics, every additional bilateral drill lowers the diplomatic and psychological cost, for Beijing, of being seen operating a warship near water someone else disputes. Indonesia’s case shows why that distinction matters: Jakarta’s intent was almost certainly routine — a frigate coming home. Beijing’s was not. It picked the coordinates.

None of this means China is close to fielding a formal coalition in the NATO sense; nothing here involves interoperability, shared command, or mutual defense. What it means is narrower and, in some ways, more useful to Beijing: a maintenance routine that makes normalization cumulative rather than a single dramatic claim to defend. Each additional partner adds one more government that has, at least once, treated a joint Chinese naval presence near contested water as unremarkable — and one more precedent for the next invitation.

The guest list is also instructive. The one claimant conspicuously absent from it is the Philippines — the country with the loudest ongoing disputes with Beijing, at Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal, and the one treaty ally the United States has directly on the South China Sea’s rim. Manila gets unilateral coercion, not invitations: coast guard patrols, water-cannon incidents, and jamming, rather than passing exercises. Every partner on the actual list — Russia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia — either has no U.S. mutual defense treaty or, like Thailand, treats its treaty commitments as dormant rather than active. That is not a coincidence; it is a selection criterion. Beijing is not inviting the states most capable of resisting the normalization effect. It is inviting the states most likely to accept it, and saving coercion for the one state structurally immune to the charm offensive.

What happens next

Base case (roughly 55 percent).  The Indonesia relationship deepens but recalibrates location. A higher-tempo revival of the Sharp Knife series continues, concentrated in Indonesian or South China Sea-adjacent waters near Natuna rather than repeated performances off Taiwan. Jakarta absorbs the diplomatic cost of this month’s episode privately — quiet reassurances to Taipei and Washington — while keeping the relationship with Beijing intact. The key assumption: the backlash from Taiwan and the attention from Washington made a second Taiwan-adjacent rerun more costly to Jakarta than its benefit to Beijing.

Downside case.  Beijing repeats the chaining tactic with a second partner within the next twelve months, most plausibly Brunei — the quietest South China Sea claimant, which in February 2025 already agreed to joint oil-and-gas development with Beijing in disputed waters it claims. A first-ever Brunei-China passing exercise, timed to overlap with a Brunei exercise involving another power and staged near a genuinely contested reef rather than international water, would confirm this is a repeatable playbook rather than an Indonesia-specific improvisation — and would be far harder for the U.S. and Japan to counter, since Brunei has never been a vocal claimant to rally around.

Upside case.  Taiwan’s public condemnation, paired with Washington’s trilateral drills with Australia and the Philippines, hardens into an explicit regional habit of naming the chaining tactic itself — not just the individual exercise — making it reputationally costly for the next candidate partner to accept the choreography. The coalition-of-drills strategy stalls not because China stops asking, but because fewer navies say yes.

The takeaway

Beijing did not build a coalition off Taiwan this month; it borrowed one, for two days, from a country with no stake in the fight. That is a cheaper and more durable tool than a formal alliance would be, and it will not show up as a single dramatic escalation — it will show up as a pattern, one passing exercise at a time.

Watch for:  whether Indonesia’s navy does it again, and where. A repeat performance near another sensitive location within the next two quarters would confirm the pattern; a retreat to home waters would suggest Jakarta drew its own line. Watch, too, whether Brunei’s navy — quiet for decades — puts to sea with a Chinese frigate for the first time following its 2025 oil-and-gas pledge in disputed waters.

Russia summons Japan’s ambassador to Moscow over Prime Minister Sanae ⁠Takaichi’s ‘anti-Russian’ remarks.

Russia has strongly protested to Japan’s ambassador ‌to Moscow the “anti-Russian” comments made by ⁠Prime Minister Sanae ⁠Takaichi after Russian President Vladimir Putin visited one of the disputed Kuril Islands for the first time last week.

Putin’s controversial visit to the territories last Thursday prompted Japan to summon Russia’s ambassador in protest.

Japan’s prime minister called Putin’s visit to the disputed islands “grave” and “absolutely unacceptable”. “The Northern Territories are inherently part of Japan’s territory, both historically and under international law,” she said.

“This visit has further hardened anti-Russian sentiment within Japan and has made the restoration of relations over the medium- to long- term more difficult,” Takaichi added.

Japan’s ambassador to Moscow left the meeting at Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Tuesday after 25 minutes without making any comment.

Disputed islands

Ties between Russia and Japan have long been dogged by the Kuril Islands, known in Japan as the Northern Territories.

The islands were seized in 1945 by the Soviet Union, which went on to expel the Japanese population.

The dispute over the southern Kuril Islands – Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and the Habomai Islands – prevented Russia and Japan from signing a post-World War II peace treaty.

Deteriorating relations

On Monday, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said Takaichi’s comments on Putin’s visit had “crossed the line of decency” and criticised Tokyo’s “militaristic line”.

Relations between Moscow and Tokyo have worsened since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Japan has joined other G7 countries in sanctioning Russia and giving financial and non-lethal defence aid to Ukraine, which recognises Japan’s claim over the disputed islands.

Japan indirectly supports Ukraine’s air defence by exporting domestically produced Patriot interceptor missiles to the United States, helping replenish US stockpiles that have been reduced by military aid to Kyiv.

Analysts said Putin’s visit to the Kurils could be a warning to Japan not to deepen its support for Ukraine by supplying Patriot missiles directly to Kyiv or working closer with NATO.

In recent years, Japan has relaxed pacifist policies by lifting a ban on lethal weapons exports. But it remains unable to supply lethal military equipment directly to a country at war, including Ukraine.

Aug. 18 (UPI) — Russia is warning Britain that there will be “consequences” following reports that Ukraine has struck within Russian territory with drones provided by London and made by British companies.

In a statement Tuesday, the Embassy of Russia to the United Kingdom accused London of escalating Russia’s war against Ukraine by providing the weaponry, while chastising it for “hypocritically professing a desire for peace.”

“London’s actions will inevitably carry consequences for which it will have to answer,” the embassy said.

“The deeper its involvement in the conflict and the greater its support of Kiev’s terrorist machinery, the higher the price it will pay.”

Britain has been an ardent supporter of Ukraine’s defense against Russia, which invaded its eastern neighbor in February 2022, launching the four-year war.

According to a July factsheet from the British government, London has committed more than $33 billion to Ukraine, including more than $21.6 billion in military assistance.

Britain has for years been focused on supplying Ukraine with drones, which have proved effective in Kyiv’s defense against the Kremlin. In April, its Ministry of Defense announced it would deliver at least 120,000 drones to Ukraine by the end of this year, a number it increased to 150,000 in June.

The threat from the embassy follows reports stating drones built by British companies were being used by Ukraine to hit targets within the borders of Russia, resulting in more than $47.3 billion in damages.

In response to the embassy, Britain’s Ministry of Defense told BBC News in a statement that London stands “shoulder to shoulder” with Kyiv.

“Russia should be in no doubt about the resolve of this government to stand against Russian aggression, in Ukraine and against the UK and our allies,” the ministry spokesperson said.

The attacks injured at least three people, including a girl, and damaged a Wildberries warehouse, Russian officials say.

Russian officials have reported more than 620 overnight drones targeting Moscow, in what appears to be one of Ukraine’s largest attacks on the Russian capital in years.

Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin said Russian defences shot down 180 drones over the capital region between Monday evening and ‌5am (02:00 GMT) on Tuesday. He said 17 more drones were shot down en route to the capital later.

Russia’s state-run news agency TASS described the barrage as the largest drone attack on Moscow in the past two years.

The drone attack wounded three people, including a 10-year-old girl, Moscow region’s Governor Andrey Vorobyov said on Telegram. He said the “most serious consequences” were reported in the Pavlovsky Posad district, where a house burned down. Several more homes and a guesthouse were damaged in Bogorodsky district, he added.

A warehouse east of Moscow belonging to e-commerce giant Wildberries was damaged in Tuesday’s drone assault. In a statement, the company said its logistics complex sustained “minor damage” after “debris hit the wall of the building”.

Ukraine has struck multiple Wildberries warehouses in recent weeks, saying the company supplies components for Russian drones.

Five injured in Ukraine’s Kharkiv

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian air force reported shooting down or suppressing 111 of 147 “enemy” drone attacks overnight.

Kharkiv’s regional Governor Oleh Syniehubov said five people, including a nine-year-old boy, were injured in an overnight Russian attack on the city of Izyum.

Russian drones also sparked fires and damaged buildings in Kyiv region’s Brovary city, including an office building and warehouses, said Mayor Ihor Sapozhko.

With front-line fighting at a near standstill and talks frozen, Ukraine and Russia have significantly stepped up long-distance attacks, pushing the civilian death toll to its highest levels since the war’s first months in 2022.

In July alone, 437 civilians were killed in Ukraine, the highest monthly toll since May 2022, according to a United Nations tally.

Russian authorities reported 79 civilians killed in Ukrainian attacks in July, up from the previous month.

Commercial satellite imagery shows Russia has been expanding the dedicated launch infrastructure for its long-range one-way attack drones, including newly constructed extended rails apparently intended to accommodate larger, newer Geran variants. The construction provides concrete evidence that Moscow is increasing its ability to stage and launch larger numbers of long-range strike drones from dispersed locations near Ukraine and Belarus. The launch sites also bring more NATO territory within the drones’ reach.

An investigation by The Telegraph, based on commercially available satellite imagery and analysis by drone-intelligence firm DroneSec, identified at least 10 Russian sites with newly constructed or expanded drone-launch infrastructure. The investigation counted at least 59 launch rails, roughly 20 of which were assessed to be long enough to support newer Geran-type drones. Open-source tracking data indicated that seven of the 10 sites had been used in Russian attacks on Ukraine.

Some of the facilities have been converted from existing military bases and civilian airfields, while others have been constructed in remote areas.

At Tsymbulova in Russia’s Oryol region, for example, commercial satellite imagery shows four launch rails, including two measuring roughly 280 feet. Construction of the extended rails was visible beginning in late 2025. Business Insider independently reported on the facility in April 2026, citing imagery from U.S. satellite-intelligence company Vantor.

More recent imagery reportedly shows the Tsymbulova facility with 16 launch positions, as well as dozens of drones and additional support infrastructure. Storage buildings and other structures have also been constructed at the site, consistent with an expanding ability to stage large numbers of drones before launch. Some of the facilities have storage capacity for more than 1,000 drones, The Telegraph reports.

The longer rails have been assessed as being associated with Russia’s newer Geran-4 and Geran-5 variants, which represent a further evolution of the long-range one-way attack munition concept. There is also the possibility that these rails will be used to launch other heavier types with less range, too. This would be of considerable utility for Russia, as they have worked to max out the effects of the warheads on the Shahed-136/Geran-2, and their destructive power is limited to certain target types. Harder-hitting drones with heavier warheads but less reach would reduce the need to expend far more expensive and less numerous ballistic missiles and cruise missiles to hit target types that lay outside of the capabilities of the Geran-2/Shahed-136.

Case in point, the Geran-4/5, these jet-powered drones are faster and more survivable. They are also able to carry substantially larger payloads than Shahed-136/Geran-2s. The exact performance of the newer systems remains difficult to independently establish from open-source evidence. According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR), the Geran-5 has a length of around 20 feet and a wingspan of approximately 18 feet. Overall, the drone’s payload weighs around 200 pounds, which is multiplied times that of a Shahed-136, and it is thought to have a range of around 620 miles.

While the heavier jet-powered one-way attack munitions may lack the range of the earlier propeller-driven Geran-2, which can hit targets at around 1,200 miles, this reach is not needed to strike targets even deep inside Ukraine, where payload maximization and reduced chances of interception are increasingly higher priorities. The jet drones allow for easier penetration, including at altitude, meaning they can operate outside the reach of lower-tier air defenses, ranging from SHORADS to drone interceptors. The Geran-4/5 can also be used at lower levels, depending on the area they are trying to penetrate.

The infrastructure expansion is occurring alongside a dramatic increase in Russian drone production. Russia adapted the Iranian-designed Shahed-136 into the Geran-2 and subsequently established large-scale domestic production. TWZ has reported that Russian output has reached thousands of Shahed/Geran-family drones per month, with production at the Alabuga complex potentially exceeding 50,000 annually in 2026. Earlier estimates put Alabuga production at roughly 2,000 drones per month, with plans to increase output to 5,000.

The expanding production capacity has transformed the Geran from a relatively limited weapon into the central component of Russia’s long-range strike campaign against Ukraine. TWZ has documented the progression from relatively small numbers of Shahed attacks over the winter of 2022-23 to barrages involving hundreds of drones and, by 2026, more than 1,000 in a single 24-hour period. The ability to manufacture the weapons in large numbers allows Russia to sustain repeated attacks and force Ukraine to expend scarce air-defense interceptors against comparatively inexpensive targets.

Satellite analysis indicates that Russia launched about 16,000 long-range drones against Ukraine in the period between January and March 2026, roughly 6,000 more than in the same period of 2025.

The attraction for Moscow is not simply range. Geran-type drones are sufficiently inexpensive to be expended in large numbers, and this cost-exchange reality forces Ukraine to balance the cost of defending against them against the much lower cost of Russia producing the drones in the first place. At the same time, the drones are critical to Russia since it cannot produce legacy standoff weapons at anywhere near the same scale, especially after years of sanctions and war.

Meanwhile, the expanded launch network also changes the geography of the threat. Some of the newly developed sites are close enough to Russia’s western borders that, depending on the actual performance of the newer drones, parts of Poland could fall within their theoretical reach. The entirety of the territory of the Baltic States would also be covered, placing a highly exposed and strategic part of NATO’s eastern flank under the potential threat of mass drone attacks.

While that does not demonstrate an intention to attack NATO, it does give Moscow additional options should the conflict broaden.

The development comes as NATO faces a wider range of Russian activity below the threshold of open warfare, including cyber operations, sabotage, GPS/electronic interference, drone activity and other “gray zone” measures on NATO’s territory. Earlier this month, Lithuania warned that Russia was considering a staged attack against that Baltic region, and the Baltic States, as well as Poland, have all stepped up security measures around dams, power plants and other critical infrastructure, amid fears of a false-flag operation, likely using drones.

A NATO official told The Telegraph that drones, more generally, have “fundamentally altered the character of modern warfare” and that the alliance is expanding its ability to produce, operate and neutralize drones at scale.

It’s worth considering that these Russian drone launch facilities are far from being invulnerable “secret bases.” Ukraine knows where many of them are and has attacked launch sites in the past. However, disrupting drone launch operations, in general, has proved difficult. In addition, by using mobile launchers mounted on pickup trucks, Russia can conduct launches from any location, employing “shoot and scoot” tactics to avoid attack, as seen in the video below.

Aug. 17 (UPI) — Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service accused the intelligence services of a Western country of preparing, together with Ukraine, an operation aimed at portraying Moscow as an illegal supplier of weapons to drug cartels and organized crime groups in Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela.

The Russian agency said in a statement that Russian-made weapons captured by Ukrainian forces during the war are being transported to the three Latin American countries to be used as part of the operation.

According to the Foreign Intelligence Service, those responsible are also preparing photographs and videos intended to show Russia supplying weapons to Latin American criminal organizations through intermediaries.

The agency said the materials would be accompanied by forged documents seeking to link representatives of the Russian Armed Forces to the weapons transfers.

“The authors of this provocation naively hope in this way to undermine Russia’s constructive relations with the countries of this region and induce Latin American governments to support the anti-Russian policy pursued by the West,” the intelligence service said.

The statement did not identify the Western country it accused of orchestrating the operation or provide public evidence to support the allegations.

Russian intelligence said the objective would be to damage Moscow’s relations with Latin American countries and bring their governments closer to Western policies toward Russia.

As of Monday, the governments of Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela had not publicly responded to the allegations. Ukraine had also not issued an official response to the new statement.

The accusation comes after Russia previously linked Ukraine to Mexican criminal organizations. In late June, Russian officials accused Kyiv of maintaining ties with Mexican cartels, allegations that the Ukrainian Embassy in Mexico publicly rejected.

The Ukrainian diplomatic mission at the time described the claims as part of a Russian disinformation campaign and denied that Ukraine had ties to Mexican drug trafficking organizations.

In the final part of its Monday statement, the Foreign Intelligence Service framed the accusation within what it described as an information war waged by “Euro-Atlantic elites” against Russia since the start of the conflict in Ukraine.

The Russian agency cited as precedents the April 2022 Bucha massacre, which it described as a “bloody staging,” and the 1939 Gleiwitz incident, a false-flag operation carried out by Nazi Germany before the invasion of Poland.

SEOUL, South Korea — South Korea on Monday expressed hopes for resumption of diplomacy between the U.S. and North Korea to ease animosities on the Korean Peninsula, as President Trump’s order to cut military exercises with South Korea caused concerns it might hurt the allies’ readiness against North Korean threats.

Trump cited his good relationship with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un for the decision, a likely bid to reengage with Kim, who views U.S.-South Korean military exercises as invasion rehearsals. But experts say the North Korean leader, now emboldened by his advancing nuclear arsenal and expanding military cooperation with Russia, won’t likely return to talks unless he is assured of serious U.S. concessions.

The 11-day, summertime Ulchi Freedom Shield exercises began Monday morning as scheduled and it wasn’t known which parts of the training were being downsized. Trump’s announcement baffled many in South Korea, a key U.S. ally in Asia where national security is a top priority due to threats from nuclear-armed North Korea.

Trump orders military to ‘substantially reduce’ drills

Trump said in a social media post that the exercises are not only costly but “send a signal that is totally inappropriate and hostile” to North Korea, which he said “has been unthreatening and respectful” during his time in the White House.

Trump instructed Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth to “substantially reduce” the exercises. He added that he recently asked President Lee Jae Myung if South Korea would join the U.S. in the “denuclearization” of Iran, “and they said, ‘No thanks!’”

Trump’s move is the latest example of the American president appearing to turn against an ally in favor of a leader cast by previous administrations as an adversary. Trump and others in his administration also have railed against NATO allies over a perceived lack of support for his war against Iran, even as they seek to confront an increasingly aggressive Russia in the Baltic region.

The trust many South Koreans have in the U.S. has eroded following a tariff war instigated by Trump’s administration and his transactional approach to security.

South Korea hopes for talks between U.S. and North Korea

The office of South Korea’s president said later Monday that the government hopes “friendly relationship” between Trump and Kim would lead to “meaningful dialogue” between the U.S. and North Korea and start discussions on promoting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. It said that South Korea will make necessary diplomatic efforts for that.

South Korea and the U.S. are closely discussing practical and military contributions that can be made to restore freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, according to South Korea’s presidential office.

Lee is a liberal who espouses improved ties with North Korea. Since taking office last year, his government has taken proactive steps to improve ties with North Korea, including turning off front line loudspeakers that blared K-pop music and world news. On Saturday, Lee offered to hold talks to formally end the 1950-53 Korean War, which ended with an armistice, not a peace treaty.

The conservative People Power Party, the main opposition party, lambasted Lee for allegedly “turning a blind eye on the public’s security concerns” caused by Trump’s announcement and prioritizing hopes for U.S.-North Korea diplomacy.

North Korea has shunned any talks with South Korea and the U.S. and accelerated weapons testing activities since Kim’s high-stakes nuclear diplomacy with Trump broke down in 2019. Kim also has bolstered his diplomatic credentials by aligning with Russia over its war against Ukraine and taking steps to deepen cooperation with China.

In September 2025, Kim suggested he could resume talks with the American president if the U.S. drops “its delusional obsession with denuclearization” of North Korea. Experts say Kim likely aims to use his enlarged nuclear arsenal to win major concessions like extensive sanctions relief.

“Trump’s recent social media posts about Kim Jong Un suggest a willingness to reengage, but North Korea is busy profiting from Russia’s war against Ukraine while modernizing its own military,” said Leif-Eric Easley, a professor at Ewha University in Seoul.

Downsizing the U.S. and South Korean drills “can damage alliance coordination, slow the process of South Korea taking on greater responsibility for its own defense, and weaken deterrence against possible conflicts in Asia,” Easley said.

Duyeon Kim, a senior analyst at Washington’s Center for a New American Security, said “reducing joint drills weakens military readiness over time against another potential North Korean attack.”

Military drills test tactics and anger North Korea

South Korea’s military earlier said the Ulchi Freedom Shield exercises this year would be similar to previous years in scale, with about 18,000 South Korean soldiers taking part.

The U.S. military said the drills would incorporate lessens from recent conflicts such as North Korea’s battlefield experiences in the Russia-Ukraine front, while including a live-fire exercise to test joint precision targeting and maneuver, a wet gap crossing and distribution of prepositioned military equipment.

North Korea’s Foreign Ministry on Friday accused the U.S. and South Korea of plotting more provocative drills this year and vowed to respond with “a new level of a deterrent.” Earlier this month, North Korea fired two ballistic missiles into the sea in a likely protest of the drills.

Duyeon Kim, the analyst, said North Korea uses U.S.-South Korean drills “for domestic propaganda purposes to create a false narrative of a hostile America and justify its nuclear weapons program.”

This is not the first time Trump has sought to suspend the drills. After his first summit with Kim in 2018, Trump unilaterally announced the suspension of the U.S.-South Korean summertime exercises, calling them “very provocative” and “tremendously expensive.”

Kim Dong-yub, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul, said North Korea feels less urgency to return to talks with the U.S. and South Korea now than when it entered talks with its rivals in 2018, but is unlikely to completely ignore Trump’s overture.

He predicted North Korea will likely say it has noted Trump’s post but will wait for further action showing the U.S. intends to drop hostilities against North Korea.

Kim writes for the Associated Press.

The government of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz approved a landmark bill to expand the powers of the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) and the Domestic Intelligence Service (BfV) by 2027. This expansion grants them offensive and operational tools, including cyber counter-sabotage and espionage, with funding of €1.51 billion. This move has sparked significant concern among Chinese and Russian intelligence agencies regarding the radical shift in German security doctrine, stemming from the geopolitical context and the fears of Germany’s adversaries, China and Russia, regarding the ongoing hybrid warfare. The German initiative was driven by the escalating pace of gray and hybrid warfare, the most recent example being the discovery of a booby-trapped drone at Leipzig’s strategic airport. Consequently, intelligence, strategic, and security circles in Beijing and Moscow are closely monitoring this historic intelligence revolution approved by Chancellor Merz’s government on August 12, 2026.  This draft law (exceeding 700 pages) represents the most significant shift in Germany’s security doctrine since the end of World War II in 1945. From the perspective of Chinese and Russian intelligence, this shift constitutes a security revolution that ends the strict constraints imposed on Germany since World War II, transforming German intelligence agencies from mere information-gathering tools into entities capable of launching offensive and counter-sabotage operations. For these reasons, this internal German intelligence transformation is being closely monitored and analyzed in depth within intelligence and military circles in Beijing and Moscow, given its strategic dimensions and its connection to Berlin’s attempt to break free from American dependence. This move, analyzed by Chinese and Russian intelligence and military circles, is seen as a targeting of Russia and China. Although Berlin attempts to frame counterintelligence as a general effort, German officials, such as Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt, have explicitly stated that the goal is to deter Russian and Chinese sabotage operations and enable German intelligence to inflict pain on adversaries and operate on equal footing with allies like the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), rather than relying on them entirely. The German Federal Parliament (Bundestag) is expected to formally pass the bill after the summer recess, allowing these offensive powers to become fully operational in Germany by early 2027.

Military think tanks and research centers affiliated with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Russian circles alike are analyzing all the operational and political dimensions of this strategic decision in Germany, focusing on understanding the German desire to shift from a defensive doctrine to an offensive operational approach and to adopt a cyber sabotage strategy and a counter-terrorism measure called “Hack-Back.” For the first time, the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) and the Federal Intelligence Service (BfV) are granted legal authority to penetrate the information systems of adversaries and attackers and modify or delete data to prevent large-scale cyberattacks and dismantle the infrastructure of hackers. This includes German approval for field sabotage operations in situations of German defense tension, whereby the BND is permitted to carry out active sabotage operations abroad, such as disabling servers and replacing military or vital technology components with damaged ones to prevent attacks, such as in drone factories and chemical laboratories of hostile states. This has been interpreted by Chinese and Russian circles as a German crushing of the principle of separation between German domestic and foreign intelligence agencies.   According to Chinese and Russian analyses, the new German law is also generating considerable legal controversy within Germany itself, as it narrows the historical distance between intelligence agencies (those concerned only with collecting information) and the police agencies (those concerned with implementation).

Here, the Chinese intelligence reading of the German reform can be understood as the end of historical restrictions imposed on Berlin, as Beijing views the move as a reversal of the strict restrictions imposed since the end of World War II and Berlin’s shift from purely information gathering to carrying out covert operations and penetrating adversaries’ networks.  In addition to what this represents for Beijing and Moscow in terms of reducing dependence on Washington, Chinese intelligence is monitoring Germany’s attempt to build independent self-reliance capabilities to reduce intelligence dependence on the United States and its allies amid mutual strategic suspicions. Intelligence, military, political, and strategic circles in Beijing also view with caution the (militarization of German digital space). Here, the Chinese analysis considers that allowing the disruption of infrastructure and the modification and deletion of data places German agencies in the ranks of major countries with active offensive doctrines, given the reliance of German domestic and foreign intelligence agencies on the pattern of practical and technical dimensions of reform and hybrid capabilities in reforming their security and intelligence agencies, through directly confronting drones, disrupting spy servers, or tampering with components of a weapon under production without resorting to human physical violence, with the expansion of the use of artificial intelligence technologies, through expanding the use of facial recognition technologies and reducing data protection restrictions to store and analyze information for longer periods. However, at the same time, German circles are facing parliamentary challenges, given that the draft law is undergoing legislative proceedings in both houses of the German parliament (the Bundestag and the Bundesrat) amidst local human rights objections warning of the erosion of personal freedoms and the principle of separating intelligence from the police.

Here, the Russian intelligence perspective (Moscow) on the German intelligence draft law comes to the fore. Russian intelligence agencies (SVR, GRU, and FSB) view this move as a direct response to their operations and interpret it within the context of an acknowledgment of hybrid warfare. Moscow believes that Germany is now officially treating Russia as an enemy in a state of undeclared war.  The increase in the budget of Germany’s foreign intelligence agency (BND) by 26%, reaching €1.51 billion, is seen as an indication of a long-term security buildup against Russia. Moscow also viewed this as a move to neutralize cognitive denial, especially given accusations from German domestic and foreign intelligence agencies that Russia is exploiting German bureaucratic sluggishness and strict data privacy measures to carry out cyberattacks and sabotage operations. Therefore, the Russian interpretation of this German decision can be seen as a direct response from Berlin to Moscow, aimed at closing this digital and security gap between the two sides. It can be interpreted as a German intelligence strategy of reciprocity, or, according to the Russian analysis, as an attempt by Germany to encircle disinformation networks by granting German intelligence the ability to take down Russian propaganda and disinformation servers, which pose a direct threat to Russia’s soft power tools aimed at destabilizing Germany.

On the other hand, Chinese intelligence circles, primarily the Ministry of State Security (MSS), which acts as the Chinese intelligence service, analyze German law from the perspective of technological and geopolitical conflict, targeting industrial and academic espionage by China. Here, the Chinese analysis focuses on the expansion of the powers of the German domestic intelligence agency (BfV) and the use of artificial intelligence. This analysis primarily aims to track Chinese soft networks that focus on stealing advanced German technology and conducting economic espionage in order to protect German infrastructure and communications. Beijing believes that the new German laws, which compel German telecommunications companies and digital platforms to hand over data to German intelligence, are primarily intended to isolate Chinese technology and impose complete German sovereign control over cyber data in the face of China. The most sensitive aspect of Russian and Chinese analyses lies in their dual interpretation of Germany’s desire to break free from the Five Eyes framework. They see it as either an intelligence network for exchanging signals intelligence, comprising the US, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, whose decisions are guided by Washington, or as a new dilemma facing Germany in building self-reliant capabilities and ending its dependence on the United States. This latter scenario serves the interests of China and Russia, promoting multipolarity and a multipolar international world and ending the one-way street of Washington.   The German Chancellery has publicly stated that reliance on allies (specifically the US) has been a one-way street, where Germany receives information without the ability to exchange it or protect itself independently. From a Chinese and Russian intelligence perspective, this represents a new German policy of hedging against Trump’s unpredictability. Moscow and Beijing believe that the primary motivation behind the conservative Merz government’s actions is strategic skepticism regarding the reliability of the United States, particularly with Donald Trump in the White House, and Berlin’s fear of the politicization or severing of US intelligence flows. This reinforces the Chinese-Russian view that this is a technologically impossible German attempt to break free from US control and dictates.

Accordingly, assessments in Beijing and Moscow agree that Germany—despite its ambition—will not be able to completely break free from intelligence dependence on America anytime soon. The United States controls the global cloud infrastructure, internet cables, and critical cyber technologies, making German intelligence independence a costly ambition that will take years to materialize technologically. However, it does give Berlin at least greater parity in dealing with partners, which China and Russia are trying to maximize.

Romania’s Defence Ministry didn’t specify the origin of the drone but has previously blamed Russia for similar incidents.

Russian strikes on Ukraine have killed at least one person and wounded seven more while a Spanish jet has shot down a drone that entered Romanian airspace.

A woman was killed and six others wounded in a missile and drone attack on Kryvyi Rig, the hometown of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the region’s governor said early on Sunday.

Authorities in the Ukrainian capital also said Kyiv was “under ballistic missile attack” late on Saturday, with one person wounded and fires sparked at non-residential sites in the Obolonsky and Holosiivskyi districts.

Separately, Romania’s Defence Ministry reported on Sunday that a Spanish F-18 fighter jet pilot on a NATO air policing mission to Romania had shot down a drone illegally breaching its national airspace.

It is the fourth drone shot down in Romania this year.

Romania’s Defence Ministry did not specify the origin of ‌the ‌drone.

In July, a Romanian jet shot down a suspected Russian drone, and in May a stray drone injured two people in the Romanian city of Galati when it collided with a building.

Romania shares a 634km (394-mile) border with Ukraine and has repeatedly seen Russian drones breaching its airspace as Moscow escalates its bombing campaign against Ukrainian civilian and military infrastructure.

Escalating long-range strikes

Russia has maintained near-daily missile and drone strikes across Ukraine since launching its full-scale invasion in early 2022, with areas far from the front lines frequently coming under attack.

The war’s impact has also spread to key regional shipping lanes, with reports of mines and unmanned sea drones found floating in the Black Sea.

Civilian casualties in Ukraine hit their highest level since 2022 this July, with at least 437 killed and 2,610 injured, according to the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission.

Meanwhile, in Russia on Sunday, authorities reported a large-scale drone incursion from the Ukrainians.

Moscow officials said they had downed more than 100 drones heading towards the capital overnight.

Emergency services were deployed to sites where debris fell, Mayor Sergei Sobyanin said, adding that three people were wounded.

Ukraine has increasingly targeted military, industrial and logistical facilities deep inside Russia, arguing its strikes are a response to Moscow’s ongoing bombardment of Ukrainian towns and infrastructure.