Russia

Moscow and Copenhagen trade blame for the incident as Denmark says it will not invoke NATO treaty.

Moscow has warned Denmark to avoid “reckless” action after a Russian frigate fired two flares that narrowly missed a Danish military helicopter.

Moscow’s ambassador in Copenhagen, Vladimir Barbin, on Tuesday insisted that “dangerous manoeuvres” taken by the Danish aircraft were to blame for the Baltic Sea incident.

The Russian diplomat told state news agency RIA Novosti that he had delivered a formal note demanding steps to prevent a repeat of the episode.

He said that the helicopter’s actions were provocative and condemned Danish attempts to call them routine, saying they raised “serious concern about the possible consequences of such recklessness”.

The Fennec helicopter was on a routine mission to photograph the frigate as it sailed in international waters off Denmark, the Danish defence command said. Ships typically use such flares as warning signals.

Denmark’s Defence Minister Jeppe Bruus told TV 2 News that one flare passed within a “matter of metres” of the aircraft, and accused Russia of “deeply unprofessional seamanship”.

When asked if Denmark would seek Article 5 consultations over the incident – invoking the NATO measure that considers an attack against one member of the bloc to be an attack against all of them – Bruus said the incident was being taken seriously, but “we are not there”.

Barbin said he had complained last year about what he called dangerous fly-bys and low hovering by a Danish helicopter over the Russian warship Vice-Admiral Kulakov.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov declined to comment, saying he lacked details.

The Danish Straits – where most Danish incidents with Russia have taken place – are the Baltic’s main shipping gateway and a key oil route, including for Russian oil tankers.

Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen called the incident serious but not surprising, describing it as part of a pattern of intensifying Russian hybrid warfare against Europe and testing NATO.

‘Fear and discord’

“Russia wants to sow fear and discord,” Frederiksen said, calling for closer unity and stronger defences for Denmark and Europe.

Russia denies carrying out hybrid attacks in Europe. However, the potential for the war in Ukraine to escalate and entangle Europe’s NATO member states is rising.

A spokeswoman for Russia’s Foreign Ministry later on Tuesday warned Western politicians and diplomats to “soberly” assess ⁠the risks of travelling to Ukraine, following a Russian drone strike on a rail line on which a train carrying former British ⁠Prime Minister Boris Johnson ⁠and former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt had passed minutes earlier.

Rail hubs ⁠and transport infrastructure serving Ukraine’s ⁠military are legitimate ⁠targets, she said, and Russia warned foreign diplomats in May to leave ‌Kyiv because of strikes on Ukraine’s military-industrial ‌complex.

WASHINGTON: US President Donald Trump said Monday that Ukraine and Russia had agreed not to target each other’s energy facilities, a day after he chastised Kyiv for hitting Russian oil refineries.

“Ukraine has agreed not to hit Russian Energy targets. Russia has agreed to do, likewise!” Trump said on his Truth Social network.

“The World’s Diesel price rise is mostly caused by the Russia/Ukraine War, not Iran.”

There was no immediate confirmation from Kyiv or Moscow of any deal.

Trump’s claim comes as oil prices continue to soar in the seventh month of the Iran war, raising American fuel costs and inflation just weeks before crunch US midterm elections.

The US leader has insisted that the Iran war will finish immediately after the midterms and gas prices will drop — but has in the meantime apparently found a new target to blame for the cost at the pump.

Trump had lashed out at Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky during a trip to Ireland on Sunday, saying he had to do “one thing” and “stop knocking out diesel fuel” refineries in Russia due to growing shortages.

“Let him go after targets, but not diesel fuel, because he’s causing a shortage of diesel,” Trump said, again insisting the Russia-Ukraine war — not the US-Israel conflict with Iran — was to blame.

Trump added he had spoken to Ukraine’s leader about the country’s stepped-up attacks on such sites over recent months.

“There are plenty of other targets. Don’t hit diesel fuel because that’s hurting. That’s hurting the world. We don’t want him to hit diesel fuel… He’s hitting diesel refineries.”

Ukraine has hit numerous Russian oil refineries far from its border with Russia, while Moscow has also intensified its long-range attacks in recent months, leading to a jump in civilian deaths.

Kyiv has been firing record numbers of drones at Russia, while Moscow has been launching all-time high missile attacks.

Trump said last week he had a “great conversation” with Russian President Vladimir Putin, insisting that Putin wanted to make a deal to end Moscow’s war on Ukraine.

Putin “is wanting to make a deal, and if Zelensky is wanting to make a deal, that’d be very nice,” Trump told reporters on Wednesday.

Zelensky said last week he would be willing to meet Putin at the G20 summit at Trump’s own Doral resort in Miami in December, but the Kremlin immediately ruled it out.

Tetiana Bubynets collapsed on the asphalt after a Russian drone exploded at a gas station in the southern Ukrainian city of Zaporizhzhia.

Despite the violent shockwave and blast of drone shrapnel produced by the attack on July 6, the 18-year-old accounting student had no visible wounds except for a nosebleed.

She was rushed to hospital and pronounced dead shortly after, alongside two other civilians, aged 41 and 48.

One of her lecturers, Tetiana Melikhova of Zaporizhzhia National University, said Bubynets was an only child and that her mother “lost the meaning of life” after she died.

“She couldn’t speak. At the funeral, she just lay on the coffin; she couldn’t let her child go,” Melikhova told Al Jazeera.

The strike that killed Bubynets was the first recorded case of Russia’s use of a fully autonomous attack drone powered by artificial intelligence (AI), according to a New York Times analysis.

While drone strikes have hammered Ukraine since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukrainian officials who examined the wreckage found the unmanned vehicle to be unlike others.

In place of an antenna, it featured an AI-powered minicomputer sold commercially by US technology company Nvidia, which rendered it capable of directing itself to the type of target it was programmed to spot – likely propane tanks in this case – lock on to it and proceed to strike.

AI-powered drones are the tip of the iceberg as Russia and Ukraine race towards boosting tech infrastructure aimed at coordinating reconnaissance and attack, according to analysts.

“It’s not about a drone having AI in it, and then seeing something and striking,” Marina Miron, researcher at the defence studies department at King’s College London, said. “Rather, it’s the drone seeing something, communicating to a software complex which knows how to map the GPS coordinates on a live battlefield map, and notifying the closest artillery unit.”

Referred to as reconnaissance-strike architecture, these unified battlefield management systems act like a central command. They track the location of friendly forces and identify enemy positions.

AI acts as the accelerator, instantly processing massive amounts of data collected through sensors in drones or any other military products, including interceptor missiles or artillery units.

The tactical advantage on the battlefield is given by the system’s ability to compress the kill chain – meaning coordinating and distributing the intelligence to military assets on the ground to find, track and destroy targets in a matter of minutes.

In such an ecosystem, AI-powered automated drones are just pieces of a broader puzzle.

Ukraine is known to be developing its system, which it named DELTA. Following operational trials in late 2025, Russia has been rolling out its version, the Svod Tactical Situational Awareness Complex, to front-line units.

Both sides claim that once the battlefield data is processed, a decision support system (DSS) presents a military commander with options to choose from, keeping a human in the decision-making loop, said Miron.

“In how far that is true is, of course, impossible to find out,” she added.

Acknowledging full AI autonomy would provoke ethical and legal questions.

Even if humans were to retain final decision-making authority, research has shown AI systems subtly shape choices, predetermining outcomes.

“Under time and pressure, commanders often do as AI suggests,” said Miron, whose research focuses on military AI and remotely piloted and autonomous systems.

Towards full automation

Coordinated AI-powered military systems are the next frontier of modern warfare, said Serhiy Beskrestnov, a Ukrainian Ministry of Defence adviser on loitering munitions, known by his callsign Flash.

“That’s what it will all come to,” he posted on his Telegram channel on July 1. “Navigation, search for a target, and attacks will be fully autonomous.”

Drones with some autonomous capabilities are already being deployed at scale.

Heorhii Volkov, commander of Ukraine’s Yasni Ochi drone strike unit, said this is currently mostly used in the final phase of long-distance strikes, where first-person view (FPV) drones are likely to lose radio connection due to electronic warfare or the curvature of the Earth.

The use of AI in so-called last-mile operations solves this battlefield hitch. If the signal is lost, an integrated AI-enabled onboard module takes full control of the unmanned vehicle, autonomously locks on the target and carries the strike to completion.

Yaroslav Azhnyuk, founder of Ukrainian technology company The Fourth Law, which develops AI-powered autonomy software for unmanned vehicles, said Russia and Ukraine were working to deploy a wider range of autonomous systems.

“This is not simply a race to demonstrate a fully autonomous drone. It is a race to make autonomy reliable, affordable and deployable at scale,” Azhnyuk told Al Jazeera. “Electronic warfare, increasingly long engagement distances and the growing number of drones are making human-controlled systems less sufficient. Autonomy solves exactly these constraints.”

Azhnyuk believes autonomy will become a game-changer over the next six to 12 months.

“The decisive advantage will belong to the side that can deploy reliable autonomy across tens or hundreds of thousands of systems, not just demonstrate it in prototypes,” he said.

Kateryna Bondar, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), noted the dangers of AI’s reliance on algorithms.

“The system doesn’t understand what it’s doing; it’s just following the algorithm and the rules which people created,” said Bondar, who works at the CSIS’s Wadhwani AI Center. “AI has to be trained to recognise targets and engage these targets,” but writing code that distinguishes between a bus and a tank is easier than between a Russian and a Ukrainian soldier.

Additionally, cost-effective FPV drones have low-quality cameras and their resolution can be lowered further by adverse atmospheric conditions.

Military units using autonomous systems therefore “delegate the decision to a very imperfect technology that cannot distinguish between a civilian and a military person, combatant or non-combatant”, Bondar said.

“This is why there is a conversation around who makes a decision and who has responsibility for mistakes and errors.”

Niamey, Niger – The failed mutiny in Niger has shown the extent to which President Abdourahamane Tiani now relies on Russian support when his government comes under threat, including from within his own security forces.

On August 29, soldiers calling themselves the Armed Forces for the Restoration of the Homeland attacked Air Base 101 at Niamey’s international airport, the presidential palace and the national broadcaster in a coordinated assault. A statement circulated during the fighting falsely declared that Tchiani had been removed.

Loyalist presidential guard units held the palace overnight, while about 200 Russian Africa Corps soldiers, backed by drones and reportedly reinforced from Mali and Libya, helped retake the airbase by evening. At least 27 people were killed, and about 100 mutineers were arrested.

The mutiny showed who Tchiani could rely on when his own security forces turned against him. Nigerien troops held the presidential palace, while Russian personnel and equipment helped loyalist forces retake the key airbase.

A fractured army

Speaking to Al Jazeera, Ryan Cummings, head analyst at Signal Risk, said the attempted mutiny was rooted in grievances that had been building inside the military.

“The insurrection indicates discord within the Nigerien armed forces,” he said. “This stems from multiple sources. The foremost pertains to significant casualties being inflicted against the country’s military by an array of non-state armed actors which appear to be as well equipped, if not better, than their military counterparts.”

Cummings pointed to a widening gap between soldiers fighting on the front lines and those protecting the country’s political leadership.

“Other factors include discrepancies in deployment and remuneration between low- to middle-ranking officers, who led the attempted mutiny and putsch, versus their more senior counterparts, such as the presidential guard who thwarted the coup attempt,” he said.

“Junior to middle-ranking soldiers are generally deployed to conflict front lines, where they face well-equipped and increasingly professional militant units that are capable of overrunning their positions,” Cummings noted. “Conversely, more senior military units, most notably the presidential guard, are deployed to garrisoned cities such as Niamey and Agadez, where the threat of engagement is generally lower. Despite facing a lower risk profile, senior military units generally enjoy significantly higher remuneration than their low- to middle-rank counterparts.”

The mutiny exposed the gap between soldiers fighting on the front lines and those serving in better-protected units in the capital.

Russia’s role grows

Tchiani expelled French and American troops in 2023 and 2024, and troops from Russia’s Africa Corps entered Niger as the military government sought to replace Western support.

But the mutiny showed that Moscow’s role now goes beyond helping Niger fight armed groups.

When soldiers inside Niger’s own military threatened the government, Russian personnel and equipment helped loyalist forces retake Air Base 101. The episode showed that Russia’s role in Niger now extends beyond the fight against armed groups to helping protect the military government itself.

That is a significant shift from how the partnership was initially presented to Nigeriens: as a way to strengthen the fight against armed groups after the departure of Western forces.

For Tchiani, that reliance on Moscow comes as he faces continued attacks by armed groups and growing discontent among soldiers fighting them.

A test for the AES alliance

The response from Niger’s fellow military leaders also raised questions about how much help the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) can provide when one of its members is under serious pressure.

According to Romane Dideberg, a research analyst at Chatham House’s Africa Programme, the response was one of the most revealing aspects of the rebellion.

“What the security response says about the cohesion of the Alliance of Sahel States might be one of the most telling elements of the mutiny,” she said. “As with the April attacks in Mali, the two other Sahelian juntas remained largely unreactive during this existential moment for the Nigerien junta, reacting only once the mutiny was neutralised.”

“This partly reflects the operational shortcomings of the confederation’s security architecture, but also, more critically, the sensitive relations between Tchiani’s junta and his Malian and Burkinabe counterparts,” she said.

Dideberg said Tchiani was rumoured not to have reached out to Mali. She also pointed to a generational and cultural gap between Tchiani and his Sahelian allies, saying his government showed more continuity with the former establishment while a different rationale had underpinned the coup that brought him to power.

The mutiny tested how far the three miltary governments were prepared, and able, to come to one another’s aid.

The UAE allegations

Alongside the Russian role, allegations have emerged that French and Emirati interests were connected to the mutiny, amid wider friction over Niger’s Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline project.

The allegations have not been independently substantiated.

Roger Gabriel, a Nigerien army captain and commander of the elite 1st Parachute Battalion, appeared on state television on September 4 and alleged that several people, including associates of deposed President Mohamed Bazoum and officers from Chad, Benin and the Ivory Coast, were behind the attack.

He also said people from the United Arab Emirates had called and urged him to join the mutiny.

The claims are difficult to independently verify, but they have put fresh attention on the UAE’s growing presence in the Sahel.

Speaking to Al Jazeera, Hossamaldeen Ibrahim, an Africa analyst at the Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute (BISI), said the possibility of Emirati involvement “cannot be dismissed” given the information circulating and the UAE’s broader regional activity.

“The UAE has been expanding its influence across the Sahel, from the western states to Sudan, primarily through official partnerships with military regimes, but also via informal networks, resource extraction, notably gold, and ties to non-state actors including separatist groups when needed,” he said.

“Its approach is pragmatic and dual-track: it prioritises formal state-level relations first, then pivots to alternative channels if the official path falters,” Ibrahim said.

“All of this is deeply political and strategic, interlinked with ambitions to secure leverage over Mediterranean and Red Sea routes. The growing friction with Algeria underscores how these moves are widely read in the region as an effort to reshape the balance of influence, making any allegations around the recent events in Niger worth careful scrutiny rather than either exaggeration or dismissal,” he said.

For now, the allegations remain allegations.

Tchiani survived the mutiny, but the failed attempt to remove him exposed strains inside his military, highlighted his growing reliance on Russia, and raised questions about how much help his closest regional allies can provide when he needs it.

For Dideberg, the implications go beyond the failed attempt to unseat Tchiani.

“This mutiny calls the effectiveness, but also, to an extent, the sincerity, of the mutual assistance pact into question,” she said.

United States President Donald Trump has made no secret of his hostility towards BRICS.

Last year, he threatened an additional 10 percent tariff on any country aligning itself with what he called the bloc’s “anti-American policies”. Since then, his administration has continued to wield tariffs aggressively against trading partners, including BRICS members such as Brazil, India and China.

The message appears straightforward: Countries that challenge US economic power should expect to pay a price.

But coercion has consequences. And as BRICS leaders meet in New Delhi today, Trump may be strengthening the very incentives that made the bloc attractive in the first place. The more Washington demonstrates its willingness to use access to its markets, its financial system and the dollar as instruments of political leverage, the more reason other countries have to reduce their exposure to them.

This does not mean BRICS is becoming an anti-US alliance. Far from it.

The bloc’s 11 members – Brazil, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and the United Arab Emirates – have enormous political and economic differences. Together, they account for nearly half the world’s population and about 40 percent of global gross domestic product, but they do not share a common ideology, security policy or even geopolitical orientation.

Recent events have made those divisions impossible to ignore. Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE find themselves on opposite sides of a growing regional conflict. In May, Iranian and Emirati representatives clashed during a foreign ministers’ meeting in New Delhi. India and China have had a heated border dispute that led to deadly skirmishes in 2020-2021; only in the past two years have their relations gradually stabilised.

So Trump is not producing a united geopolitical front against Washington.

He may, however, be giving countries with otherwise divergent interests a common reason to cooperate economically: Protection against vulnerability to US power.

For countries outside the Western core, dependence on US-centred economic infrastructure carries risks.

The dollar’s centrality gives the US enormous structural advantages. International transactions pass through financial institutions subject to US jurisdiction; access to US markets can be restricted; sanctions can isolate governments and companies from parts of the global financial system.

BRICS’s efforts to diminish dependence on the US financial system do not mean the dollar is about to lose its position as a global reserve currency. This claim is often made around BRICS summits, usually accompanied by breathless predictions of a new BRICS currency. The evidence does not support it.

The dollar remains overwhelmingly dominant. According to the International Monetary Fund, it accounted for 57.1 percent of global foreign-exchange reserves in the first quarter of 2026. The Chinese renminbi accounted for just 2 percent. Indeed, the dollar’s share rose slightly during the quarter.

But replacing the dollar and reducing dependence on it are two very different things.

BRICS countries are already experimenting with the latter. South Africa has connected to China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System, allowing transactions with China to be settled directly in renminbi. Brazil and China are increasingly using their own currencies in bilateral trade, while India and the UAE have settled transactions in rupees and dirhams. China and Russia have shifted much of their bilateral trade into their national currencies.

BRICS itself is also moving cautiously towards greater financial connectivity.

Last year, its leaders called for continued work on a cross-border payments initiative and greater interoperability among members’ payment systems. In August, Reserve Bank of India Governor Sanjay Malhotra confirmed that BRICS countries are discussing linking their fast-payment networks and potentially their central bank digital currencies. India itself is also encouraging greater use of the rupee in international trade.

The New Development Bank offers another example. Established by the original BRICS countries as an alternative source of development finance, it has made lending in members’ currencies an explicit strategic objective. Its current strategy targets 30 percent of financing in local currencies, partly to reduce borrowers’ exposure to foreign-exchange risks and costly currency swaps; the number could increase to 40-50 percent for the next cycle, 2027-2031.

None of this amounts to a rival global financial system. Much of it remains experimental, bilateral or limited in scale.

But that is precisely why the fixation on whether BRICS can “replace” the dollar misses what is happening. The more significant development is the gradual construction of options that allow governments and businesses to conduct a number of transactions without relying on the dollar and Western-dominated financial infrastructure.

Trump’s policies give this process additional urgency.

Consider Brazil. Washington imposed a new 25 percent tariff on a range of Brazilian products in July, affecting billions of dollars in exports, despite running a trade surplus with the country. The Trump administration has also scrutinised Brazil’s hugely successful Pix instant-payment system, which competes with established card-payment networks.

Sanctions demonstrate the same vulnerability more dramatically. Russia and Iran have been pushed towards alternative payment and trading arrangements precisely because their access to Western financial networks has been restricted. Washington is now considering further measures that could penalise countries heavily reliant on Russian energy, including China and India.

No BRICS member needs to sympathise with Moscow or Tehran to understand what this implies.

US financial power depends not simply on possessing the world’s largest economy or issuing its dominant currency. It also depends on other countries continuing to regard participation in a US-centred system as more advantageous than the alternatives.

The more frequently Washington turns that system into an instrument of coercion, the stronger the incentive to construct escape routes from it.

That said, most BRICS countries do not appear eager to exchange dependence on Washington for dependence on Beijing.

India maintains extensive relations with the US while buying Russian energy and pursuing closer economic cooperation within BRICS. Brazil has long sought greater autonomy without becoming a Chinese satellite. Saudi Arabia and the UAE remain deeply intertwined with Western economies while expanding their relationships with China.

Their objective is less likely to be replacing one hegemon with another than increasing their ability to manoeuvre between competing centres of power.

That distinction matters. A trade transaction settled in rupees, a loan denominated in renminbi or rand, or a payment made through a system that does not depend on the same Western intermediaries will not overthrow dollar dominance.

But multiply such arrangements across countries and over time, and they begin to reduce the costs of saying no to Washington.

This is why portraying BRICS simply as an anti-US threat risks becoming self-defeating. Punishing countries for seeking alternatives gives them another reason to develop those alternatives.

Trump wants to make challenging US power costly. Instead, he may be making dependence on US power costlier still.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

KYIV: US President Donald Trump’s administration should impose new sanctions on Russia “now” over recent deadly strikes on Ukraine, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said Friday.

“Sanctions need to be imposed now,” Zelensky told the Yalta European Strategy forum. “Honestly, I sometimes do not understand why decisions cannot be made quickly,” he added.

Second day of strikes on fuel stations suggest a new campaign focused on civilian areas in the Ukrainian capital.

Russian drone attacks on two fuel stations in Kyiv have killed two people and injured others, as Moscow continues to target civilian areas.

They were struck early on Friday within ten minutes of each other in the capital’s Obolonskyi and Dniprovskyi districts, shortly after emergency sirens rang out, Mayor Vitali Klitschko said in a statement.

Russia also targeted fuel stations in Kyiv on Thursday, suggesting a new campaign focused on civilian areas in the capital. Ukrainian authorities have warned people to avoid filling up when air raid sirens sound.

One person died at the scene of one of the attacks, Klitschko said, while the other died in hospital. Six people required hospital treatment.

While fuel stations near the eastern and southern battle lines have been hit regularly for months, authorities have long warned that the attacks could extend to the capital as an intimidation strategy.

Russia and Ukraine both deny targeting civilians as the conflict – started with Moscow’s invasion in February 2022 – has developed into a series of daily attacks with missiles and drones.

Other Russian drone strikes overnight hit near a shopping mall in Pavlohrad, leaving five dead and 67 injured, while a mother and son were injured in Zaporizhzhia when a drone hit an apartment building and a mall.

Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrii Sybiha, declared Friday a day of mourning.

On Thursday, he condemned Russia for attacking civilian areas in a bid to sow fear.

“Russia is systematically attacking places where it knows people will be spending their time going about their daily lives, seeking to maximise casualties, spread fear and put pressure on Ukrainian society,” he stated.

Ukraine unleashed its own large-scale drone attack through the night, with Russia’s Ministry of Defence reporting that its forces shot down 777 drones in 16 regions.

Two people were killed and three injured in Tula, to the south of Moscow, local authorities reported.

MOSCOW: Russia said on Friday it would aim its nuclear warheads at Lithuania if the Baltic state hosted any weapons from the nuclear arsenals of its NATO allies on its territory.

Lithuania is moving to lift a constitutional ban on having nuclear weapons stored in the country, part of an effort to boost its security posture amid Russia’s offensive on Ukraine.

The decision is currently working its way through parliament — where it needs a two-thirds majority to pass and has the support of the president and major parties — and could come into force this winter.

It would be “a very serious turn in terms of escalating tensions”, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told state TV when asked about the plan.

“If there are nuclear weapons on the territory that are aimed at us, accordingly, the territory of that country will fall into the crosshairs of our own nuclear weapons,” he said.

Lithuania’s President Gitanas Nauseda had announced the plans in July, saying his country wanted to be an “integral part of this nuclear deterrence”.

In a historic move last week, the United Nations General Assembly voted overwhelmingly to encourage the use of new world maps which more accurately depict continents with their true sizes.

The move followed months of lobbying by the African Union, which itself adopted a new map earlier in February. A total of 164 countries voted in favour while six abstained.

The United States was the only member to oppose it. US representative Yaryna Ferencevych said before the vote that the resolution was “the reason this institution is losing its credibility”.

“Instead of focusing on genuine problems … this body is debating map projects from the 16th century,” she said.

But since the resolution was approved, at least three other countries have voiced concerns about the changes: India, Ukraine and Japan.

None are explicitly opposed to adopting a new projection. However, they are raising concerns about how certain disputed territories should be depicted.

Here’s what we know:

Why is there a new world map?

The UN endorsed a resolution promoting the Equal Earth projection of the world map, rather than the Mercator projection, which is currently widely used.

The resolution does not ban Mercator or impose a particular replacement – it merely encourages nations to adopt the Equal Earth version, which was created by three researchers in 2018.

The Mercator projection, which was produced by Flemish cartographer Gerardus Mercator in 1569 when the West was busy “conquering” new territories, attempts to show a three-dimensional globe on a two-dimensional surface. That is why countries closer to the poles appear much larger than countries at the equator.

For decades, map experts have pointed out that Mercator’s projection disproportionately shrinks the true size of the African continent and that of other developing regions, while making Europe and the US seem much larger by comparison.

For example, Greenland is shown as roughly the same size as Africa, but, in reality, it could fit into the continent 14 times over. Europe, which is portrayed as bigger than South America, is actually half its size.

Advocates from African countries pointed out that the map is problematic because of the size issues. Importantly, they argued, it reinforces negative perceptions of Africa.

Several cartographers have attempted to develop equal area maps. However, African activists specifically pushed for the Equal Earth projection map, which significantly expands Africa and shrinks Europe and the US.

Experts say while maps are inherently inaccurate because of the constraints of depicting a spherical world on a flat plane, the Equal Earth projection is as close as it gets.

Why is Ukraine worried about the new map?

Ukraine was one of six countries which abstained from the vote at the UNGA, along with Estonia, Georgia, Moldova, Serbia and Lithuania, who voted in solidarity with Ukraine.

Kyiv has complained that the Equal Earth projection depicts the Russian-occupied Crimean peninsula in a distinctly lighter shade than mainland Ukraine.

Russia illegally occupied and annexed Crimea in February 2014, a move the UN has denounced.

Although the peninsula is also shaded differently from mainland Russia on the new map, its yellowish tint appears closer to the Russian shade than Ukraine’s.

“Ukraine does not in principle oppose the core issue addressed in this draft resolution,” Andrii Melnyk, the country’s permanent representative to the UN, said in an address to the assembly.

Melnyk said Kyiv had asked for corrections before the vote but had not received positive responses. The new map, he said, could be tantamount to opening a Pandora’s box, enabling the “abuse and distortion” of the world map.

“It would be a truly fatal mistake for all of us, and for this General Assembly, to seek to correct a historical injustice in the geographical depiction of countries and continents by simultaneously allowing a deeply troubling interpretation of the text of this draft resolution,” he added.

What is Japan demanding?

Meanwhile, on Thursday, Tokyo, which voted in favour of the new map, said it had also asked for corrections to the Equal Earth projection because the map uses the same colours and shades for Russian territory as it does for the disputed Kuril Islands.

Russia and Japan have long fought over control of the four islands, known in Russia as the Southern Kurils and in Japan as the Northern Territories. In 1945, during World War II, the Soviet Union invaded and annexed the islands as part of a pact with Western Allies that stipulated the Soviets would take the disputed territory. The islands’ Japanese inhabitants were removed.

Subsequently, Japan and the US have claimed that the islands were not part of the original pact. The islands, however, remain under Russian administration.

In August this year, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin paid his first-ever visit to the islands, drawing condemnation from Japan. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi called the visit “absolutely unacceptable”, saying it “offends the sentiments of the Japanese people”.

This week, Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara said the Japanese embassy in the US has asked Equal Earth’s creators to change the map.

“Displays that contradict the Japanese government’s position are seen [on the map],” Kihara said at a news conference. “We need to prevent incorrect perceptions regarding our country’s territories and geographical names from spreading.”

Why is India uneasy about the map?

India also voted in favour of the Equal Earth projection, but on Sunday, the Ministry of External Affairs published a caveat regarding depictions of the disputed border territory of Kashmir.

Following the Indian partition of 1947, both Pakistan and India lay claim to the former state of Jammu and Kashmir, which had been controlled by the British through indirect rule. The region has subsequently been a flashpoint for tensions between the two rivals and has led to several wars.

Parts of Kashmir are administered by Pakistan, while other parts are administered by India. China, which also disputes some Kashmir territory with India, administers its northeastern portion.

In his statement, spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal noted that the UN vote was in favour of encouraging the use of equal area projections and that it had not made the use of any one map mandatory.

“India’s sovereign territory, including the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, must be depicted in accordance with India’s official map,” he said. “Any inaccurate or misleading depiction is unacceptable.”

World War Two continues to shape relations between Russia, China, Taiwan and Japan, with competing interpretations of the conflict increasingly intersecting with present day geopolitical tensions.

The issue resurfaced last week when Russian diplomats in Taiwan screened a film about Japanese militarism and World War Two. The screening raised concerns in Taiwan that Moscow was helping Beijing promote a narrative of a rising Japanese military threat while also creating divisions between Taipei, Tokyo and their Western partners.

The disagreement reflects fundamentally different interpretations of who fought Japan, who ultimately defeated Japanese forces in East Asia and which governments have the right to claim that legacy.

What’s Happening

Russia’s presentation of Japan’s wartime history comes against the backdrop of its own unresolved dispute with Tokyo over territory captured at the end of World War Two.

Soviet forces entered the war in East Asia only during its final weeks, when the Red Army moved into Japanese occupied northeastern China. Soviet forces withdrew from most of the region in 1946 and transferred many captured Japanese weapons to Mao Zedong’s communist forces.

The Soviet Union quickly recognized Mao’s government after the People’s Republic of China was established in October 1949 following the communist victory over Chiang Kai shek’s Republic of China.

Soviet forces also seized four islands off Japan’s Hokkaido at the end of the war. Russia calls them part of the Kurils, while Japan refers to them as the Northern Territories. Moscow continues to control the islands.

Russia and Japan have never signed a formal World War Two peace treaty, with the territorial dispute remaining a major obstacle.

China’s View of World War Two

Beijing presents the history of the war as a central part of China’s national narrative.

The Chinese government says China sacrificed 35 million people during its struggle against Japan, which Beijing dates back to Japan’s 1931 invasion of Manchuria.

China officially refers to the conflict as the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and describes World War Two as the World Anti Fascist War.

Beijing argues that China and the Soviet Union were the mainstays of resistance against Japan and Germany, while Chinese communist guerrilla forces formed the backbone of the resistance inside China.

This interpretation gives the wartime struggle an important role in China’s broader political narrative and its portrayal of Japan’s contemporary military posture.

Taiwan’s View

Taiwan strongly disputes Beijing’s interpretation.

Taiwan’s government argues that the People’s Republic of China cannot claim credit for a war fought before the PRC was established in 1949.

During World War Two, the Republic of China under Chiang Kai shek was China’s government, while Taiwan itself was under Japanese colonial rule. Republican forces carried out much of the fighting against Japan.

The Chinese civil war was temporarily suspended during the conflict as Chiang’s forces and Mao’s communists formed an uneasy alliance against Japan.

Taiwan also points to the formal Japanese surrender at the end of the war. The Republic of China, represented by Chiang’s government, signed the surrender alongside the other Allied powers, including the Soviet Union.

From Taipei’s perspective, Mao’s communist forces used the war to strengthen themselves and subsequently benefited from the civil war that resumed after Japan’s defeat.

Why It Matters

The competing historical narratives are not simply disagreements about the past. They influence how the governments involved portray present day security threats and diplomatic relationships.

For China, Japan’s wartime history remains an important element of its criticism of Japanese military development. For Taiwan, however, Beijing’s use of that history is also connected to its claim over Taiwan and its attempt to define the historical legitimacy of the Chinese state.

Russia’s involvement adds another layer because Moscow has its own unresolved territorial dispute with Japan stemming directly from the final stages of World War Two.

The screening of a film about Japanese militarism in Taiwan therefore carries significance beyond historical commemoration. Taipei sees the issue through the lens of its current relations with Japan and the West, while Russia and China share interests in challenging what they portray as a resurgence of Japanese military power.

Key Stakeholders

Russia retains control of the disputed islands off Hokkaido and has never concluded a formal World War Two peace treaty with Japan.

China presents itself as a central force in the wartime resistance against Japan and emphasizes the enormous Chinese sacrifice during the conflict.

Taiwan argues that the Republic of China, rather than the People’s Republic of China, represented China during World War Two and carried out much of the fighting against Japan.

Japan remains directly affected by the competing historical narratives, particularly because of its territorial dispute with Russia and its increasingly important relationship with Taiwan.

What’s Next

The dispute over World War Two history is likely to remain intertwined with current tensions in East Asia.

For Taiwan, the concern is that Russia and China could use wartime history to portray Japan as an emerging military threat and undermine Taipei’s growing ties with Tokyo and other Western partners.

For Japan, historical disputes remain connected to its relationships with both Russia and China.

For Russia and China, emphasizing their wartime resistance against Japan provides a historical framework through which they can criticize what they see as a revival of Japanese military power.

Analysis

The significance of the dispute lies in how history is being used as a tool of contemporary geopolitics. The same war produces fundamentally different political narratives depending on which government is telling the story.

Beijing emphasizes China’s enormous wartime sacrifice and the role of communist forces. Taipei emphasizes the Republic of China’s role as the government that fought Japan and signed the Japanese surrender. Moscow emphasizes the Soviet Union’s final campaign against Japan and retains territory captured during that period.

These competing narratives matter because they provide historical legitimacy for present day political positions. As Japan strengthens its security relationships with Taiwan and Western partners, wartime memory can be used to frame those developments not simply as responses to current security concerns, but as part of a longer historical confrontation.

The dispute therefore shows how the legacy of World War Two remains an active element of East Asian power politics rather than simply a question of historical interpretation.

With information from Reuters.

Ukraine launches one of its deepest strikes to date, targeting gas plants in Russia’s Arctic region.

Russian forces have launched attacks across Ukraine, killing at least seven people, according to Ukrainian officials, as Kyiv claimed responsibility for a drone attack that set off a fire at a natural gas plant deep in Russia’s Arctic region.

Four people were killed in a Russian attack in Mykolaiv in southern Ukraine overnight on Thursday, while three were killed in a drone attack on a shopping centre in the northeastern city of Sumy, according to Ukrainian authorities.

Heorhii ⁠Reshetilov, the acting governor of the Mykolaiv region, said the Russian strikes there hit both civilian and industrial infrastructure, killing two men and two women. At least 19 others were wounded, he said on Telegram.

The attack in Sumy left at least 14 people wounded, according to Oleh Hryhorov, head of the Sumy Regional Military Administration. Three of the victims were children, he said on Telegram.

The Russian Ministry of Defence confirmed the attack in Mykolaiv, but said it targeted a drone warehouse. The ministry said it also hit the Ukrainian port of Chornomorsk and two vessels near Odesa on the Black Sea.

The targets of the strikes were being used for military purposes, the ministry claimed.

The attacks came after Russian authorities said Ukrainian forces had launched a drone attack on the country’s Yamal-Nenets region, which is located some 2,800 kilometres (1,700 miles) from the Ukrainian border.

Dmitry Artyukhov, the region’s governor, said the attack targeted an industrial facility in Novy Urengoy. The attack was repelled, but falling debris from the drone caused a fire, he said on Telegram.

“The main thing is that there were no deaths or injuries. The extent and nature of the damage are being determined,” he added.

Artem Zhoga, the Kremlin’s envoy to the Urals, said Wednesday’s strike was the first ever to hit the Arctic part of the region.

Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces (SOF) confirmed the attack in a series of posts on X.

“For the first time! Deepest strike of the war: Ukrainian SOF hit critical russian plants more than 3,000 km away,” it said. “Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces carried out the deepest strike inside russia since the beginning of the full-scale war.”

In the posts, the Ukrainian force claimed it “successfully struck” two gas plants, Novy Urengoy and Purovsky.

“Until today, the area was considered a safe rear zone for the aggressor,” it added.

The Ukrainian force said the facilities play a key role in Russia’s gas industry, processing large volumes of condensate from gas fields across the Yamal region, processing millions of tonnes of condensate per year.

Gazprom used ⁠to export gas from Yamal as far as Western Europe ⁠until relations broke ⁠down following the start of Russia’s war in Ukraine in 2022.

It estimated the region’s gas resources at ‌26.5 trillion cubic metres as of 2020, enough to cover global demand for more than ‌six ‌years.

Ukraine has escalated its long-range strikes on Russia in recent months, in retaliation for daily Russian bombardment of Ukrainian towns and cities.

Earlier this month, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said his country’s drones would make Russian airspace “completely unsafe” for the duration of the war.

A Russian gas plant more than 1,700 miles from the Ukrainian border was attacked by a drone on Wednesday, Ukrainian and Russian officials said. This is reportedly the longest-distance Ukrainian strike of the war and comes as Kyiv continues to target Moscow’s energy infrastructure. 

“Today, an attack by a drone was repelled against one of the industrial facilities in Noyabrsk,” Dmitry Artyukhov, governor of the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, stated on Telegram. “As a result of the drone’s debris falling, a fire broke out. Emergency services specialists are working at the scene. Most importantly: there are no casualties or injuries. The extent and nature of the damage are being determined.”

“I urge residents of Yamal to remain calm and to rely only on information from official sources,” Artyukhov added. “The situation is under control.”

“The criminal Kyiv regime has, for the first time, attacked the Arctic region of the Ural Federal District,” Artem Zhoga, the Presidential Envoy of the Russian Federation to the Ural Federal District, confirmed on Telegram. “As a result of debris from a drone falling on the territory, a fire broke out at a fuel and energy complex facility in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District… The enemy is trying to damage economic facilities in order to sow panic.”

The target of the attack was the Novourengoysky Condensate Stabilization Plant (CSP), according to Ukraine’s Armed Forces General Staff, which took credit for the attack.

“On 9th September 2026, units of the Defense Forces of Ukraine struck the Novy Urengoy Gas Condensate Processing Plant in Novy Urengoy, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug,” the general staff claimed on X. “The extent of the damage is being assessed.”

The plant has an annual processing capacity of approximately 19.5 million tons, the general staff added.

“It produces stabilized gas condensate, petroleum fractions, diesel fuel and other petroleum products,” the Ukrainian military pointed out. “Its products are used, among other purposes, to meet the needs of the Russian armed forces. Operations against key enemy military targets are ongoing.”

Ukrainian officials did not provide any details about how the strike was carried out.

One video that emerged from the scene showed a column of flames rising in the distance but does not offer much in the way of detail about where the attack took place or the extent of the damage.

Another video showed smoke rising in the distance, but again offered little in the way of detail about what happened.

The region is a significant target.

“Novy Urengoy is Russia’s unofficial gas capital, located in the Yamal-Nenets autonomous district in northwestern Siberia,” according to the Moscow Times. Gazprom “estimated the region’s gas resources at 26.5 trillion cubic meters as of 2020, enough to cover global demand for more than six years.”

In addition to being the first attack in this region of Russia, this was “the furthest strike since the start of the war,” the Russian Mediazona Telegram channel stated. “Previously, the record for distance was the attack on the Omsk Oil Refinery in July 2026. It is located approximately 2,500 km (about 1,550 miles) from the border in a straight line.”

While the Ukrainian Armed Forces General Staff offered scant details about the strike, officials from the Fire Point weapons company hinted online that one of their drones carried out the attack. 

“Guess who traveled over 3300 km (about 2,050 miles) and successfully achieved their goal,” the company stated on a Telegram post that included video of the gas plant attack.

“3200)),” Fire Point’s founder, Denys Shtilierman, teased in an X post with an image of the burning gas plant.

WASHINGTON — The Justice Department is demanding testimony before a Florida grand jury in an investigation aiming to establish an intelligence community conspiracy against President Trump, according to multiple people familiar with the matter.

New subpoenas being issued to former government officials represent an escalation in the yearlong investigation as the Justice Department pursues a loosely defined theory that members of the intelligence community who scrutinized Trump over the last decade, including over Russian interference in the 2016 election, conspired against him and violated his rights.

Investigators in recent days contacted some defense lawyers for witnesses advising them of forthcoming grand jury subpoenas. It was not clear how many, as of Tuesday, had received a subpoena or were still waiting to receive one, and the identities of the witnesses receiving subpoenas were also not immediately clear. The people who confirmed the subpoenas spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss a secretive grand jury investigation.

The investigation has focused in large part on the Trump-Russia probe

The contours of the conspiracy investigation aren’t fully known, but agents and prosecutors over the last several months have focused intensely on one of Trump’s chief grievances: the U.S. government response to Russian interference in 2016 and an intelligence community assessment that Moscow meddled on Trump’s behalf at the direction of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Trump, who spent much of his first term shadowed by an investigation into whether his campaign colluded with Russia to sway the outcome of the election, has for years lashed out at the intelligence community finding and cast it as a “deep state” conspiracy to undermine the legitimacy of his win.

Investigators searching for potential crimes in connection with the intelligence community response have conducted numerous voluntary interviews, but the subpoenas prepared for witnesses in recent days represent an apparent effort to lock down sworn testimony before a grand jury.

It remains unclear whether anyone will be charged or for what offense, though lawyers for former CIA Director John Brennan have said they have been informed that he is a target as investigators examine whether he falsely testified to Congress — something he has repeatedly denied. The Justice Department last spring subpoenaed witnesses before a Washington grand jury as part of an investigation into Brennan but swiftly withdrew the subpoenas in favor of voluntary interviews.

The investigation is being run out of Florida, with the Justice Department in April bringing back into government service a top prosecutor from the Reagan administration, Joe diGenova, to serve as a counselor to the attorney general and help lead a team of agents and prosecutors.

DiGenova, who had previously asked then-Atty. Gen. Pam Bondi to appoint him to the job and has openly and repeatedly claimed Trump was the victim of an intelligence community conspiracy, declined to comment Wednesday when reached by the Associated Press.

In an indication of the wide-ranging nature of the investigation, the AP reported last month that DiGenova’s team has sought interviews with law enforcement officials involved in the 2022 FBI search of Trump’s Mar-a-Lago property in Palm Beach, Fla., which recovered a trove of classified documents.

Concerns from defense lawyers about a ‘favored’ judge

Investigators have set up shop in Fort Pierce, Fla., the home court of U.S. District Judge Aileen Cannon, the Trump-appointed jurist who repeatedly appeared skeptical of the classified documents case against him and ultimately dismissed it after concluding that the prosecutor who filed the charges was illegally appointed.

Lawyers for Brennan last year asked the chief judge of the federal court in Florida to prevent the investigation from being steered to Cannon, whom they described as a “favored” Trump judge. They have since sued the Trump administration, demanding a court order requiring prosecutors to preserve records from the investigation so that Brennan could challenge any potential prosecution of him as vindictive.

Trump came to office in 2017 under scrutiny from the intelligence and law enforcement community about whether his successful campaign had colluded with Russia, which stole politically damaging Democratic emails and orchestrated their release through WikiLeaks as part of a wide-ranging interference scheme.

The FBI and Justice Department investigated but found insufficient evidence to prove a criminal conspiracy between Russia and the Trump campaign, though investigators did find the campaign eagerly hoped to benefit from Moscow’s help.

Subsequent investigations by an inspector general and Justice Department prosecutors identified errors by agents who conducted the Russia probe but found no evidence of criminal wrongdoing by senior law enforcement officials or an anti-Trump conspiracy like what prosecutors are now hoping to prove.

Deeply frustrated by those outcomes, Trump has amplified his demands for retribution, which the Justice Department heeded last year by directing that prosecutors utilize a grand jury. Last year, Bondi directed prosecutors to put evidence before a grand jury after the release of documents aimed at calling into question the legitimacy of the Trump-Russia inquiry.

Tucker writes for the Associated Press.

MOSCOW: Russian authorities said Tuesday they have detained a suspect in last week’s shooting that wounded a senior military officer, the latest in a series of attacks on personnel and figures linked to the war in Ukraine.

The Federal Security Service said a 21-year-old Moldovan national was detained for being allegedly “involved in an assassination attempt on a senior military officer of the Russian Defense Ministry” at the behest of Ukrainian intelligence services. He faced charges of attempted murder and illegal arms trafficking, it said.

The officer was shot at least six times on Sept. 3 in the Probuzhdenie settlement on the outskirts of Engels, a city in the Saratov region, said Svetlana Petrenko, a spokeswoman for Russia’s Investigative Committee, which is also involved in the case.

The region is home to a large air force base that hosts Russia’s strategic bombers and has carried out attacks on Ukraine.

The victim, who has not been identified by Russian authorities, survived the shooting and remains hospitalized.

The FSB alleged that the suspect was recruited by Ukrainian intelligence services in 2025 and arrived in Russia in June. He was detained in the southern Astrakhan region as he was trying to leave the country and return to Moldova, the agency said.

Petrenko said he was allegedly offered $70,000 for carrying out the attack.

There was no immediate comment from either Ukrainian or Moldovan officials. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky alluded to the attack on the day it happened, saying: “Wherever Russian criminals hide, they will be found, and today there is further confirmation of this fact – confirmation in the Saratov region.”

Last week’s attack follows a series of bombings in Russia targeting people involved in the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Moscow has blamed Kyiv for some of the blasts.

In late August, a serviceman was killed and his wife was injured by a car bomb on the outskirts of St. Petersburg. Three weeks before that, the director of a factory supplying drones to the Russian military was badly injured and his driver was killed when their car exploded just outside Yekaterinburg, 1,400 kilometers (about 870 miles) east of Moscow.

In those cases, the authorities did not immediately say who they believed carried out the attacks.

Earlier this year, President Vladimir Putin directed the FSB and other agencies to tighten security around military and government officials.

Kyiv has claimed responsibility for some attacks inside Russia. Ukraine’s SBU security service said in 2024 that it had organized the killing of Lt. Gen. Igor Kirillov, who headed the Russian military’s nuclear, biological and chemical protection forces.

Kirillov was killed by a bomb hidden in a scooter outside his apartment building in Moscow, a day after Ukraine’s security service leveled criminal charges against him.

Strikes resume in Russia and Ukraine after a three-day pause during US envoys’ visits to the countries’ capitals.

Russia has struck Kyiv after a three-day pause in attacks on the Ukrainian and Russian capitals expired, following a visit by two US envoys that yielded no tangible progress towards peace.

Two residential buildings were damaged by Russian air raids early on Tuesday, city officials in Kyiv said. Drones hit buildings in the capital city as well as in the Boryspil and Fastiv districts on the outskirts of Kyiv, according to the State Emergency Service of Ukraine.

An air raid alert, published by the Kyiv city military administration, urged residents to take shelter due to the threat of an “enemy” drone attack.

Following the reported attacks in Ukraine, Russian regional Governor Roman Busargin said a Ukrainian drone attack injured several people after hitting civilian infrastructure in Saratov, nearly 1000km from Moscow. The number of casualties from both incidents remains unconfirmed (621 miles).

Russia and Ukraine pledged to halt strikes on each other’s capitals for three days as Washington dispatched envoys to Moscow and Kyiv. However, fighting continued elsewhere.

Attacks paused after leaders Vladimir Putin of Russia and Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine announced the ceasefire during the visits by US President Donald Trump’s envoys, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, to Moscow and Kyiv over the weekend.

Russia’s state news agency TASS confirmed that the three-day suspension Putin had ordered for his forces expired on Monday evening local time.

Witkoff and Kushner held talks with officials in Moscow and Kyiv regarding ending the conflict. Kremlin aide Yury Ushakov called the more than three-hour meeting in Moscow on Saturday “highly useful”.

After talks with Ukraine’s Zelenskyy, Witkoff said: “We’ve had a very meaningful discussion, substantive, important, and we are very encouraged, and we look forward to continuing this as long as it takes.”

Witkoff also raised the prospects of reviving three-way negotiations to end the war.

A White House official told the Reuters news agency that the next steps regarding the war, which Russia began with a full-scale invasion of its neighbour in February 2022, would be announced in the coming weeks.

All roads may lead to Rome, but not all rivers lead to the ocean.

You might have heard the phrase ‘all rivers flow to the sea’ – often used to mean that different paths will all lead to the same end at some point, While it’s a pleasing idiom, it’s not geographically true. In fact, one of the longest rivers in the world never reaches the sea at all.

The Volga is the longest river in Europe, flowing through central and southern Russia. Its basin sprawls across two-fifths of the European part of Russia.

The river begins in the Valdai Hills as a tiny trickling spring, before turning into the Volga.

It winds for a whopping 3,531 kilometres through forests and steppes before emptying into the Caspian Sea which, rather misleadingly, is not a Sea at all, but a colossal lake.

The river is connected to five different seas via an intricate network of manmade canals which were built over the centuries, although the Caspian is its main and natural mouth.

The canal system allows ships to travel from the Volga to the Black Sea, the Sea of Azov, the Baltic Sea and the White Sea.

The sprawling Volga Delta, where the river splits into more than 500 channels, is also a world-famous wildlife sanctuary.,

It is a spawning ground for the Beluga sturgeon, which means that the lower stretches of the Volga are the epicentre of wild black caviar – one of the most sought after and expensive delicacies in the world.

The river was also a lifeline during World War II, providing a lifeline for Russian troops during the Battle of Stalingrad.

The Soviet Army was pinned against its west bank, so all supplies had to be ferried across the mile-wide stretch of water under constant barrage from the German artillery.

As winter set in and the river began to freeze, it became too icy for boats to cross but not yet thick enough for trucks to drive on.

Russian forces were nearly starved of ammunition until it froze solid.

However, as the German army focused all its energy on fighting across the riverbank, the Soviets snuck across the eastern side of the river to launch a surprise attack and completely surrounded the German forces.

The statistics are sobering — so sobering that Defense Department officials refuse to confirm, deny or discuss them.

From Feb. 28 through July, the first five months of the war with Iraq, U.S. forces burned through almost 60% of the nation’s advanced defensive missiles — the Patriot and THAAD interceptors that protect American troops.

When the war began, the Pentagon had almost 2,800 Patriot and THAAD missiles in its worldwide inventory, according to a study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, an independent think tank. By the end of July, that number had dropped to about 1,100, CSIS reported. Almost two-thirds of the Patriots and almost 40% of the longer-range THAAD were gone.

“This is a generational annihilation of our theater missile defense capability,” said Tom Karako, director of CSIS’s Missile Defense Project. “There’s no way you can look at this and not see it’s a setback.”

The White House and the Pentagon have not challenged the CSIS figures, although they have issued sweeping denials that any shortage exists.

“We have far more munitions than anyone in the world, and far more than we need,” President Trump said in July.

That’s true, but misleading. The U.S. military still holds vast inventories of short-range offensive missiles. But the sophisticated defensive missiles that protect U.S. troops no longer are abundant — as even Trump has acknowledged.

“We have certain types of munitions [of which] we have unlimited, virtual unlimited supply,” he said last month. “We have others where it’s a little bit tighter.”

The result is a squeeze that has prompted U.S. commanders to husband Patriot and THAAD interceptors as scarce assets.

For much of August, when a frayed de facto ceasefire was in effect, U.S. forces did not respond with high-end missiles when Iran attacked oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz.

But when Iran launched rockets against U.S. bases in Jordan last week, Patriots reportedly were used to knock the incoming missiles down. (The Pentagon has declined to confirm or deny those reports.)

The U.S. weapons arsenal “no longer has the capacity to deter a Chinese attack against Taiwan,” the Council on Foreign Relations warned in a report last month. Defense planners share the same concern over a potential Russian assault on the Baltic states.

The conservative Heritage Foundation has forecast that the Pentagon’s inventory of missiles would run out “within the first week of a Taiwan conflict.”

In Europe, a U.S. defense official told the Associated Press last month that the shortfall was “beyond critical.” If Russia attacked a NATO country, the official said, U.S. forces in the area would “take punch after punch in the mouth.”

The core question is whether the United States has so few missiles that it cannot credibly deter China or Russia from attacking their neighbors.

“You’ve got to be strong enough to send a clear message that our enemies should not try anything because we’re a credible force,” said Leon Panetta, President Obama’s former defense secretary. “Now we’re losing a lot of that credibility — and that’s dangerous.”

Knowing that U.S. forces have been left without thousands of weapons needed to deter conflict, Karako said, could in itself be provocative. “It could tempt an aggressor to do something, knowing that we have fewer [missiles] to thwart them.”

The obvious remedy is to build more interceptors — a process Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth ordered even before the war began. But ramping up missile production won’t immediately replenish the stockpile.

Before the Iran war, defense contractors were producing only about 620 Patriots and 96 THAAD each year — fewer than half the number expended during a few weeks this spring.

At current production rates, it will take at least three years to return the Patriot inventory to its prewar level, and at least four years for THAAD, CSIS reported.

Defense experts warn that the stocks need to be even larger than they were before the war to credibly deter China or Russia.

Mark Cancian, a retired Marine colonel and principal author of the CSIS estimates, says most analysts believe it will take years after replenishing the stocks expended in the Persian Gulf to build a credible deterrent against China.

The Pentagon has enough munitions, both offensive and defensive, to continue fighting the campaign against Iran, he added — but some of those less-sophisticated weapons can be used only at shorter ranges, which means placing more troops in harm’s way.

Cancian said the CSIS figures were based on publicly available Pentagon budget and acquisition documents, updated in some cases from recent press reports — but not from leaks of classified information.

The roots of the missile shortage began long before the war with Iran. Trump and Hegseth are not the only ones to blame, although their belief that Iran would quickly capitulate appears to have been a major factor.

Nor did former President Biden cause the shortage, as Trump has claimed Biden gave several hundred Patriots to Ukraine, but the shortfall is far larger than that.

The underlying problem, defense experts say, is that the United States designed its missile defense programs for a world in which only a few major powers like China and Russia posed serious threats.

But the landscape of military technology has changed. Missiles and drones have become cheaper and easier to acquire, and countries like Iran can strike targets at great distances without making a huge investment in weaponry.

That’s a transformational change — and the Pentagon has been behind the curve, argues Michael C. Horowitz, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “This is the kind of situation in which great-power militaries like the United States struggle,” he said.

So the Trump administration faces several challenges. It needs to replenish its depleted stores of advanced defensive missiles — a process that has only just begun, and which Congress has not yet funded. Meanwhile, Horowitz and others argue, it also needs to build less expensive missile and drone systems to fill the multiyear gap before Patriot and THAAD inventories can be restored.

The Pentagon has begun that process, deploying several relatively inexpensive anti-drone missile systems.

Trump’s One Big Beautiful Bill Act last year included $7.7 billion for low-cost missile and drone programs, but 13 months later, more than 90% of the money remains unspent, Horowitz said.

Both Russia and Ukraine vow not to strike each other’s capitals for three days during talks in Moscow and Kyiv.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has begun talks with United States envoys on ending more than four years of war in Ukraine, ahead of their first visit to Kyiv expected on Sunday.

Putin met Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner – respectively President Donald Trump’s special envoy and business ally, and his son-in-law – at the Kremlin on Saturday.

“Dear colleagues, I warmly welcome you to Moscow. The situation is, of course, not simple,” Putin told the envoys in a grand Kremlin hall in footage aired by Russian TV.

Both Russia and Ukraine vowed not to strike each other’s capitals for three days during the negotiations, as Washington tries to revive US-led talks to end Europe’s worst conflict since World War II.

Trump earlier said Kushner and Witkoff were bringing “a proposal to end the war”.

In Putin’s address to the two men, he said: “I would like to ask everyone to convey their best wishes and words of gratitude to US President Mr Trump”.

Witkoff said Trump had sent his best wishes to Putin and ⁠thanked him for ⁠the limited ceasefire during the delegation’s visit. Putin said ⁠Russia would do its ⁠utmost to ensure ⁠the safety of the mediators.

‘Refrain from strikes’

The talks come as the grinding war – which began with a Russian invasion in 2022 – has seen increasing civilian deaths and attacks this summer.

Putin has repeatedly said Moscow intends to seize the rest of east Ukraine.

Russian strikes on Ukraine on Saturday killed at least seven people, including in the Kyiv suburbs, Ukrainian officials said.

The Kremlin said it would not strike Kyiv from midnight on Saturday, while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said he would halt strikes on Moscow “from now” until Monday.

“The Russian president, the commander-in-chief, has given the order from midnight tonight not to strike Kyiv for three days,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said.

Zelensky – who had offered a truce during the US visits – later said he had spoken to the US envoys and also promised Kyiv would not strike Moscow.

“From now through the end of Saturday, as well as on Sunday and Monday, Ukraine is ready to refrain from strikes on Moscow,” Zelensky said on social media.

The Ukrainian leader said he had spoken to the US officials and that he expected them in Kyiv on Sunday.

It will be the first time that Witkoff and Kushner visit Kyiv since Trump returned to office last year with a pledge to resolve the conflict.

At the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Bishkek this week, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian received precisely the kind of political support he had hoped for. The SCO condemned the military attacks against Iran, described them as violations of international law and the UN Charter, reaffirmed Iranian sovereignty and territorial integrity, and called for the conflict to be resolved through political and diplomatic means.

But the organisation did not offer to defend Iran. That distinction between political solidarity and collective defence is important. It tells us something not only about the Iranian experience with the SCO, but about the international order that is emerging around it.

For years, discussions about multipolarity have often suggested that the US-led international system would gradually be challenged by an alternative bloc centred around China, Russia and organisations such as BRICS and the SCO. From the perspective of middle powers, joining both institutions seemed to fit neatly into this transformation. Integration into non-Western organisations was supposed to make them less vulnerable to Western isolation and pressure.

The US-Israeli war on Iran has made clear that none of these alternative relationships can produce a security guarantee comparable to those provided by formal military alliances. The lesson is not that multipolarity has failed middle powers. It is that the emerging multipolar order may work differently from what many expected.

Rather than replacing one alliance system with another, it is producing an increasingly dense network of overlapping partnerships in which states gain diplomatic and economic options without necessarily acquiring new security guarantees.

For middle powers, this may be one of the defining characteristics of the emerging order: more room for manoeuvre, but less certainty about who will stand beside them when their security is threatened.

Turkiye provides a particularly revealing example. It has been a member of NATO for more than seven decades and remains embedded in the Western security architecture. Yet Ankara has increasingly demonstrated that alliance membership does not require automatic political alignment with Washington. Turkiye has maintained relations with Russia despite the war in Ukraine, expanded its engagement with China and participated in the SCO as a dialogue partner. At the same time, its differences with the US and Israel over the future regional order in the Middle East have become increasingly visible.

This does not mean Turkiye is abandoning NATO or moving into a Chinese- or Russian-led bloc. Quite the opposite. Ankara’s strategy depends precisely on avoiding such a binary choice. Its NATO membership provides security benefits that the SCO could not replicate. Its relationships with Russia, China, Iran, the Gulf states and other regional actors, meanwhile, expand its diplomatic and economic options.

Brazil represents another good example. Unlike Turkiye, Brazil is not bound to the US through a formal military alliance. But it has traditionally operated within a US-dominated hemisphere where Washington has expected considerable political alignment from regional governments.

Brazil’s refusal to join the US-led Americas Counter-Cartel Coalition (ACCC), together with its positions on the Iran war and other recent international crises, reflects its reluctance to accept that regional proximity should translate into automatic strategic alignment.

Yet Brazil is not simply switching sides. Its participation in BRICS, its extensive economic relationship with China and its calls for reform of the international system coexist with important political and economic relations with the US and Europe. Brasília’s objective is not to exchange dependence on Washington for dependence on Beijing, but to preserve the ability to cooperate with both, and disagree with either.

This may be one of the most consequential opportunities that multipolarity offers middle powers. The rise of alternative centres of economic and political influence reduces the cost of saying no. For decades, weaker states often confronted a difficult choice when facing pressure from a dominant power: comply, resist and risk isolation, or seek protection from a rival bloc.

The proliferation of partners and institutions complicates that calculation. A government that disagrees with Washington may deepen relations with Beijing without becoming a Chinese ally. A state dependent on China economically may strengthen security ties with the US without fully aligning with Washington. Membership in BRICS does not prevent cooperation with Western institutions, just as membership in a US-led security framework does not necessarily preclude engagement with China or Russia.

India has made this logic almost an organising principle of its foreign policy. New Delhi participates in the Quad with the US, Japan and Australia while simultaneously belonging to both BRICS and the SCO. At Bishkek, India supported the SCO declaration defending Iranian sovereignty while Prime Minister Narendra Modi also stressed to Pezeshkian the importance of preserving freedom of navigation and commerce through the Strait of Hormuz.

The Gulf Cooperation Council member states are pursuing their own version of this diversification. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, for example, continue to depend heavily on their relationships with the US for security, while simultaneously expanding economic and diplomatic ties with China, India and other Asian powers and participating in new regional and international arrangements.

None appears eager to replace Washington with Beijing. They want relationships with both. This suggests that the most significant consequence of multipolarity for middle and smaller powers may not be the emergence of a new bloc to which they can attach themselves. It may be the declining necessity of attaching themselves exclusively to any bloc at all.

But greater autonomy comes with a cost. The same flexible arrangements that allow states to avoid choosing sides also provide fewer guarantees when crises become existential. BRICS does not have an Article 5. Neither does the SCO, which explicitly defines itself as a non-military organisation.

Strategic partnerships can provide weapons, investment, diplomatic backing and political support without obligating partners to go to war for one another.

The emerging international system is therefore unlikely to resemble a simple transition from a US-led order to a Chinese-led one, or even a confrontation between two clearly defined blocs. The older alliance system is not disappearing.

NATO remains central to European and Turkish security, while US security relationships remain indispensable across much of Asia and the Gulf. What is emerging alongside it is another layer, a more fluid landscape of overlapping institutions, selective partnerships and transactional relationships.

Multipolarity, in other words, may not require states to choose a new camp. That gives middle and smaller powers greater agency. But it also places greater responsibility for their own security upon them. The world they are entering may offer more partners, more bargaining power and more freedom to say no. What it may offer less frequently is certainty about who will say yes when they ask for protection.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.