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The armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have taken over the town of Luvungi in the Rusizi Plain of Uvira territory in South Kivu after M23 fighters vacated the area. Following the fierce battle for control among the warring parties, the Rwandan troops and their M23 allies retreated, succumbing to military and diplomatic pressure.

The Congolese army officially retook control of the town on Monday, May 12, restoring the blurry hope of civilians trapped under the violent rule of the rebels.

“We do not know yet whether this withdrawal by the Rwandan army and their M23 surrogates is in respect of various UN resolutions and international demands for the Rwandan army to withdraw from zones they occupy in the DR Congo, or it is just a tactical military withdrawal,” a senior official of the armed forces declared in Kinshasa, the country’s capital city.

Some members of the M23 group and Rwandan fighters are reportedly still present in Katogota, a neighbouring town to Luvungi. The Congolese army has stated that rebel reinforcements have arrived in Kamanyola, which is a strategic border town in South Kivu.

Reagan Mbuyi Kalonji, the spokesperson for Operations Sukola 2, a military campaign aimed at neutralising rebel groups in South Kivu, has revealed that Rwandan forces have deployed heavy weapons on the Bugarama hills. This positioning is intended to maintain their military and strategic control over Kamanyola and its surrounding areas.

The entry of Congolese troops into Luvungi signifies the culmination of troop movements observed in the Rusizi Plain and the upper plateau of South Kivu. Since Saturday, May 9, the Congolese army has been systematically occupying positions left vacant by the M23 fighters, moving from Sange to Mutarule and finally to Luvungi.

The army attributes the withdrawal of Rwandan troops and their M23 allies to “intense military and diplomatic pressure,” while the M23/AFC describes their withdrawal as a “repositioning and a gesture of goodwill” towards the peace process. 

Austria says that, for two days in a row, its fighters were sent to intercept U.S. military aircraft, at least two of which entered its airspace without authorization. According to the Austrian Ministry of Defense, the aircraft were U.S. Air Force PC-12 turboprops, almost certainly a reference to the U-28A Draco, which the Air Force Special Operations Command uses primarily for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).

On Sunday and Monday this week, the Austrian Air Force scrambled Eurofighter Typhoons in response to the alleged flights in the neutral country’s airspace. This was confirmed by Austrian Ministry of Defense spokesperson Michael Bauer on X.

According to Bauer, the incident on May 10 saw the Austrian Air Force scramble two Eurofighters after a pair of “PC-12s” were detected flying without authorization in the Totes Gebirge region of Upper Austria. Once Austrian Eurofighters intercepted the aircraft, they are said to have turned back and returned to Munich, Germany.

The following day, at 12:31 p.m., two more Eurofighters scrambled in response to an overflight by two “PC-12s.” This was a so-called Priority A intercept, meaning the highest-priority response for the Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) force. On this occasion, however, Bauer said it was unclear whether the U.S. Air Force aircraft had the necessary clearances — in contrast to Sunday’s incident.

An official Austrian Ministry of Defense video shows a QRA scramble involving the Eurofighter:

Alarm für die Luftstreitkräfte

Austria retains clear guidance for the procedures of transiting its airspace, as detailed on this webpage.

“The matter is to be resolved through diplomatic channels,” Bauer added.

In general, there appears to have been something of a spike in U.S. military aircraft activity over the Alpine region in recent days.

According to reports in the Swiss media, a total of nine overflights by the U.S. Air Force have taken place over Switzerland over the past three days. All of these flights were authorized.

The U-28A is a militarized version of the Pilatus PC-12M single-engine turboprop and carries a variety of sensors, including electro-optical and signals intelligence (SIGINT) equipment. It can also perform light utility duties in a pinch, among other missions.

Not all of the Draco aircraft share the same configuration, with different iterations appearing over the years. It is known that most of these aircraft have a sensor turret with electro-optical and infrared cameras, as well as SIGINT systems to geo-locate and monitor hostile communications and other emitters. There are also reports that some of the aircraft may have a synthetic aperture radar imaging capability. 

AFSOC has also upgraded the U-28A to a configuration known publicly only as EQ+. This update includes a new sensor turret with a high-definition, multi-spectral imaging full-motion video camera, which also offers better standoff range, according to Pentagon budget documents. This allows the aircraft to fly at higher altitudes and operate further away from its target, reducing risks to the crew and allowing for more discreet surveillance.

The Draco also features an extensive communications and data-sharing suite. This allows them to transmit the information it gathers back to command centers for further exploitation or straight to personnel on the ground, all in near real-time. These capabilities give the Draco a robust overwatch capability for special operations forces on the ground.

The exact size of the current U-28A fleet is not entirely clear. In a report published in December 2023, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) said that close to 40 U-28As remained in service.

In September 2024, the GAO confirmed to TWZ that it was conducting a classified review of SOCOM’s decision to divest the U-28As, as well as its King Air-based ISR aircraft, the latter of which are often referred to collectively as MC-12s.

Meanwhile, the Draco continues in service. Since its first combat deployment in June 2006, these unassuming aircraft have established themselves as an important component of U.S. counter-terrorism operations around the world.

For Austria, airspace policing is one of the core functions of its air force. Indeed, the country’s controversial Eurofighter fleet is dedicated to this mission, with no air-to-ground capability at all.

Sitting outside of NATO puts Austria in a somewhat unusual position as regards U.S. overflights, although it should be noted that permissions were also denied by alliance members during Operation Epic Fury, the campaign against Iran.

While the Pentagon hasn’t officially disclosed the use of the U-28A in Epic Fury, it would not be surprising, especially considering its ability to operate from small airports and forward operating bases with limited infrastructure. 

U.S. Air Force U-28A FARP Training

Meanwhile, there is also a precedent for unauthorized U.S. military overflights in Austrian airspace.

As we recounted in the past, in 2002, when the U.S. military was building up its forces in the Middle East ahead of a possible offensive against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, the Air Force attempted to sneak two F-117A Nighthawks through Austrian airspace.

On that occasion, the U.S. Air Force filed a flight plan for a KC-10A Extender tanker to fly through Austrian airspace, something that was easier to gain clearance for, since it was unarmed. In fact, two F-117s were neatly tucked under the wings of the big tanker in close formation during the flight.

Due to irregularities in the flight plan, two Austrian Air Force Saab Drakens were scrambled and soon identified the two F-117s. 

Imagery of the intercept was presented by the Austrian Minister of Defense during a meeting of the National Security Council and was presented as part of a diplomatic protest lodged at the U.S. Embassy in Vienna. 

A glance at the map reveals why the U.S. military regularly overflies Austria and Switzerland when routing from Germany to Italy or to the Middle East, to avoid long transits over France. Due to Austria’s geography, incursions typically only occur for a few minutes, especially where the flight time between German and Italian airspace is very short.

We have reached out to the U.S. Air Force for clarification on the incidents.

At the very least, the apparent incursions demonstrate that the U-28A remains very much in operational use and active around Europe, while underscoring the sometimes fraught nature of overflight agreements.

UPDATE: May 13, 7:00 AM EDT-

Austrian Ministry of Defense spokesperson Michael Bauer has provided more details of the Austrian Air Force scrambles that took place earlier this week.

According to Bauer, a flyover request was filed on May 10 for two U.S. Air Force PC-12s, flying from RAF Mildenhall, England, to Bucharest, Romania. Bauer continued:

“However, around 2:10 p.m., two other USAF aircraft approached Austrian airspace. At 2:21 p.m., an alarm scramble of Eurofighters was therefore triggered. The two USAF aircraft, however, turned away before entering Austrian airspace.”

On May 11, another U.S. Air Force flyover request was submitted and approved. As filed, two PC-12 aircraft flew over Austria. On this occasion, two Eurofighters monitored the flyover and verified that the flyover request matched the actual flight.

Meanwhile, Defense News has published the following statement provided by an official from U.S. European Command, relating to the May 10 incident:

“This flight took place after an administrative error in the overflight clearance paperwork was corrected. The United States continues to work closely with Austrian authorities on any questions regarding overflights and fully complies with Austrian laws and procedures.”

Contact the author: thomas@thwarzone.com

Israeli attacks on Gaza have killed at least 871 Palestinians since the so-called ceasefire began last year.

Israeli attacks across the Gaza Strip have killed at least five Palestinians, including three in Deir el-Balah, and others in Khan Younis and Beit Lahiya.

Sunday’s attack on the central city of Deir el-Balah targeted a community kitchen and all three victims were charity workers, according to Al Jazeera’s Hind Khoudary, reporting from Gaza City.

“This shows that Israel is not only targeting people, but also organisations serving the community across Gaza,” Khoudary added.

Reacting to the same attack, Hamas said it was “a deliberate war crime and a renewed scene of the ongoing genocide against our people in the Gaza Strip”.

“This occurs amid an unjustified international silence and inaction that emboldens the occupation to continue its massacres, in blatant disregard for all international values, norms, and laws,” said the armed group’s statement.

According to Gaza’s Health Ministry’s statistics published on Sunday, Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza has killed at least 72,760 Palestinians since October 7, 2023, including at least 871 since the so-called ceasefire started last October.

Israel’s military occupies about 60 percent of Gaza’s territory, demarcated by a so-called “yellow line” buffer zone.

In that zone on Sunday, the Israeli army said its forces killed a person saying, without providing evidence, that the victim was armed and posed an imminent threat to soldiers.

The army statement also said a Hamas commander was killed, identifying the man as Bahaa Baroud. There was no immediate confirmation from the group.

Just over three years ago, the U.S. Air Force moved to cancel the AGM-183A Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) hypersonic missile. ARRW had been in line to be the U.S. military’s first operational hypersonic weapon. Now, the program has not only reemerged from purgatory, with missiles being ordered for operational use, but a new variant is on the horizon. The “Increment 2” ARRW is set to feature an all-new seeker, which would give it a moving target engagement capability. A version of the AGM-183 able to strike enemy ships at sea could be especially relevant in a future high-end fight against China in the Pacific.

The U.S. Air Force is asking for just over $296 million to support work on the new ARRW variant in its 2027 Fiscal Year budget request. This money would fund “the design, test, and evaluation of Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) Increment 2 with terminal seeker and data link capability and other cost reduction production initiatives into ARRW,” according to official budget documents.

The Air Force’s budget documents also indicate that prior work has already been done that “integrated Air Force and DARPA [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency] enabled system technologies into a prototype that demonstrated the viability of this concept to be fielded as a long range prompt strike capability.”

Furthermore, the “ARRW [program] designed, developed, manufactured, and tested, [sic] a number of prototype vehicles to inform decisions concerning ARRW acquisition, production, and leave behind capability,” the budget documents add. “ARRW Inc.2 adds enhanced capability.”

“FY27 [Fiscal Year 2027] plans to begin [ARRW] INC 2 technology efforts such as but not limited to integrating pre-planned product improvements, design, trade studies, hardware upgrades, facilitization, affordability initiatives, and testing,” the documents also note.

To take a step back quickly, ARRW is known as a boost-glide vehicle-type hypersonic weapon. Designs of this type use a rocket booster to get an unpowered glide vehicle to an optimal speed and altitude. The glide vehicle then detaches from the rest of the weapon and proceeds to its target along a relatively shallow flight path within the Earth’s atmosphere. The vehicle is also designed to maneuver along the way, sometimes erratically. The combination of speed, flight trajectory, and maneuverability creates particular challenges for opponents when it comes to spotting and tracking incoming glide-vehicles, let alone attempting to intercept them or otherwise reacting to the threat. It is this ability to pierce enemy air defenses and very rapidly strike very high-value targets that makes hypersonic weapons so attractive.

“The Air Force will employ units equipped with ARRW to provide an offensive, high-speed strike capability to destroy high-value, time-sensitive, land-based targets in anti-access/area-denial environments,” according to a report from the Pentagon’s Office of the Director of Test and Evaluation that was released in March. “Launched from bomber aircraft, ARRW provides standoff capability to prosecute targets in a timely fashion.”

To date, the Air Force has disclosed plans to integrate ARRW onto its B-52 and B-1 bombers, but other aircraft could potentially carry these weapons, or variants thereof, in the future.

ARRW, in its current guise, is also understood to only be capable of engaging static targets. Adding a terminal seeker would open up the ability to hit targets on the move, including ones at sea. The budget documents do not provide any further details about what kind of seeker the Air Force is looking to add to the Increment 2 variant. Imaging infrared sensors, radars, or passive signal homing seekers – or some combination thereof – could be potential operations.

The extreme heat and physical stress that hypersonic weapons experience in flight, as well as the shape of the glide vehicle, would make integration of any seeker system of these more complex. It is worth noting that ARRW’s prime contractor, Lockheed Martin, is already developing an anti-ship-optimized version of the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) short-range ballistic missile for the U.S. Army. A key element of the new PrSM variant is the addition of a multi-mode seeker system to enable engagement of moving targets. It is possible that some of that technology could be applicable now to work on the new iteration of the AGM-183.

A data link would also allow targeting updates to be sent to Increment 2 ARRWs in flight, helping to get it first to a general area where the enemy is, or at least believed to be, before its seeker takes over. That system would also need to be able to communicate under hypersonic flight conditions. Given the AGM-183A’s range, off-board platforms would be required for initial target detection and tracking. The weapon’s ability to close that distance very quickly does limit the time available for the target to try to leave the area.

The Air Force did demonstrate exactly the kinds of networks that would be required to close this extremely long-range kill chain in a simulated ARRW strike during Exercise Northern Edge 2021. The designated target was 600 nautical miles from the launch platform, a B-52 bomber. In that instance, no weapon was actually released.

Multiple ARRW flight tests have been conducted since then, including the launch of an AGM-183A with a live warhead from a B-52 flying from Andersen Air Force Base on Guam in 2024. As TWZ noted at the time, the Guam test sent clear signals to China. The Air Force has made no secret of how important it views the development and fielding of hypersonic weapons as part of larger preparations for a potential future high-end fight against the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the Pacific. This is further underscored by the fact that the mention of the “terminal seeker and data link capability” for Increment 2 of ARRW is actually contained in the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) section of the Pentagon’s Fiscal Year 2027 budget request.

In the context of a major conflict in the Pacific, there would also be a very high demand for prompt, long-range anti-ship capability. The ability to conduct those strikes even in the face of dense anti-air defenses would be even more attractive for engaging very high-value vessels, such as China’s growing fleets of aircraft carriers or big deck amphibious assault ships. The PLA Navy’s (PLAN) combat fleets, overall, continue to grow in scale and scope at a prodigious rate, as well. This, in turn, has put additional emphasis on the development and fielding of new and improved anti-ship capabilities that can be air-launched, as well as employed from the maritime and ground domains, across the U.S. military in recent years. Increment 2 ARRWs could also offer another means to strike mobile, high-value targets on land, such as ballistic missile transporter-erector-launchers.

For its part, the PLA has been actively developing and fielding various types of hypersonic weapons, including boost-glide vehicle designs. Its ever-growing arsenal of traditional ballistic missiles now includes several air-launched types, including ones with nuclear and conventional warheads. The latter are widely believed to be capable of being employed against enemy ships, as well as targets on land.

To reiterate, a plan now to develop an Increment 2 version of ARRW is also just an important step forward for the program as a whole. As mentioned, the Air Force had previously moved to cancel work on the AGM-183 in 2023. The announcement followed a number of failed flight tests of what had been expected to be the first operational hypersonic weapon anywhere within the U.S. military. The explicit intent at the time was to shift resources to the Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM) effort. HACM is an air-breathing hypersonic cruise missile that functions in a completely different way from ARRW.

In the years that followed, there were steady signs that the Air Force’s position on ARRW was changing and that it had not actually been axed in the end. Last year, it became clear that the service had rebooted the program when it requested funds to purchase missiles for operational use in its Fiscal Year 2026 proposed budget. The Air Force ultimately received $362.15 million for the procurement of ARRWs in the current fiscal year, and is now seeking a little over $452 million to continue doing so in Fiscal Year 2027. How many of the weapons the Air Force has ordered to date, and how many more it plans to buy in the coming years, is currently deemed to be Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) that is not releasable to the general public.

Depending on how ARRW and HACM programs progress, the former could still be the first hypersonic weapon to enter operational U.S. Air Force service, with an Increment 2 version able to hit targets on the move following close behind.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy claims it has greatly expanded how it defines the Strait of Hormuz, which it has closed to most shipping since the start of the now-paused war. The move comes as that closure has wide-ranging impacts on the global economy and with U.S. President Donald Trump mulling new military actions against Tehran amid deadlocked peace negotiations and a tenuous ceasefire barely holding.

Under its new definition, the IRGC claimed a tenfold expansion “forming a complete crescent” of “about 20 to 30 miles to one now over 200 to 300 miles,” Political Deputy of IRGC Navy Mohammad Akbarzadeh said in a TV interview, according to the official Iranian FARS news agency.

“The Strait is no longer viewed as a narrow stretch around a handful of islands but instead has been greatly ​enlarged in scope and military significance,” Akbarzadeh noted. “In the past, the Strait of Hormuz was defined as a limited area ​around islands such as Hormuz and Hengam, but today this view has changed. The Strait is now defined as a strategic zone stretching from ‌the ⁠city of Jask in the east to Siri Island in the west.”

We asked the White House and CENTCOM for reactions to the IRGC Navy announcement. The White House dismissed it.

“During Operation Epic Fury, Iran was crushed militarily – their ballistic missiles are destroyed, their production facilities are dismantled, their navy is sunk, and their proxies are weakened. Now, they are being strangled economically by Operation Economic Fury and losing $500 million per day thanks to the United States military’s successful blockade of Iranian ports,” White House Deputy Press Secretary Anna Kelly told us. “The Iranian regime knows full well their current reality is not sustainable, and President Trump holds all the cards as negotiators work to make a deal.”

CENTCOM has not responded to our query.

The reported expansion is the second announced by Iran since the start of its conflict with the U.S. and Israel.

The IRGC did not specify what actions it would take under its expanded definition. However, while the vast majority of Iran’s naval forces have been destroyed during Epic Fury, it has been attacking ships in the region with cruise missiles, drones and its fleet of small attack boats that remains largely intact. In addition, Iran has reportedly continued mining the Strait even after the April 7 ceasefire.

Both U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and Iran say the IRGC launched strikes against U.S. Navy warships and commercial vessels they were helping to protect during the short-lived Project Freedom on May 4. That was an effort, created by Trump, to help guide ships through the Strait that was paused after about 36 hours. CENTCOM forces responded with strikes on attacking ships. Days later, another exchange of fire took place, with CENTCOM saying it bombed Iranian targets after destroyers came under fire transiting the Strait to the Gulf of Oman.

Meanwhile, the Navy has disabled four Iranian vessels trying to run the ongoing blockade.

The IRGC said the new definition was created in response to yesterday’s statements by President Donald Trump repeating that Iran’s Navy has been destroyed by U.S. attacks during the now-paused Operation Epic Fury.

“This very design and implementation of the new plan shows that this force is present on the scene with authority,” Akbarzadeh proffered.

As we noted yesterday, frustrated by the pace of negotiations, Trump threatened new military action against Iran ranging from resuming Project Freedom to new airstrikes against Iranian targets and perhaps even a ground incursion to retrieve Iran’s highly enriched uranium.

The closure of the Strait is having a direct impact in the U.S., spurring Trump to consider pausing the federal gas tax as a form of relief for American consumers as energy prices soar, The Washington Post noted. The move — which requires congressional approval to pass — would mark the latest in a string of government interventions to address fallout from the war.

“Since the war began in late February, the price of a barrel of Brent crude oil, an international benchmark, has skyrocketed from about $70 to more than $107. U.S. gas prices — now an average of $4.50 a gallon — have reached levels not seen since 2022 and contributed to Trump’s falling approval ratings ahead of the November midterms,” the Post stated.

The impacts of the closure are even greater in Asia, which relies more heavily on oil that normally transits the Strait. For instance, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi asked his nation’s 1.4 billion people to spend less on fuel, fertilizer, and travel, The New York Times reported. 

Modi “made these sweeping recommendations in a national address on Sunday after securing a big win for his party in recent state elections,” the newspaper added. “With that victory in hand, he no longer has to worry that voters might punish his candidates for higher prices of fuel, food and transport, which are tightly controlled by India’s government. Instead of subsidizing the losses and running huge budget deficits, India’s leader appears emboldened to ask its people to bear the burden.”

The killing of Izz al-Din al-Haddad, the recently appointed head of Qassam Brigades, the armed wing of Hamas, has dealt a symbolic blow to the Palestinian group in Gaza, but the impact on its military operations is far from certain.

Al-Haddad was killed on Friday in a sophisticated dual-strike on a residential apartment in Gaza City’s Remal neighbourhood and a vehicle attempting to flee the scene. The delivery of heavy munitions into a densely populated area, packed with displaced civilians, killed seven other Palestinians, including women and children, and wounded 50 people.

Yet, despite Israeli claims that the killing will cripple the group’s operational capacity, analysts argue that its decentralised nature is built to absorb such shocks. As the region watches to see how the resistance faction will respond, al-Haddad’s death raises critical questions about the future of the fragile “ceasefire” and who remains to lead the Qassam Brigades.

Operational impact: Will the Qassam Brigades collapse?

The killings of Qassam Brigades commanders, including Mohammed Deif, Marwan Issa, and Yahya Sinwar’s brother Mohammed, left al-Haddad as the key military figure managing the fight against Israel.

Saeed Ziad, a Palestinian political analyst, told Al Jazeera that while the loss is a “massive symbolic and moral blow” to Palestinians, the immediate operational impact on Hamas’s armed wing will be limited.

“The Qassam Brigades are not built on a hierarchical, sequential structure, but a parallel one,” Ziad explained. “Over the past two decades, Hamas has transitioned into a decentralised guerrilla force. Units operate as isolated, self-sufficient groups with their own logistical supply lines and combat doctrines.”

“If a brigade or battalion loses its commander, the group already knows its mission and has the resources to execute it independently,” he said. Reorganising the Qassam Brigades’ central command to cope with the loss will likely take mere days, not months.

Furthermore, al-Haddad had successfully utilised the October ceasefire with Israel to rebuild the group’s infrastructure. “Over the past 200 days, he reconstructed the resistance’s capabilities – its tunnels, weaponry and combat formations – making it capable of defending itself once again,” Ziad noted.

Who is left in the Hamas military leadership?

Israeli officials have boasted that they are close to dismantling Hamas’s central command, claiming that only two members of the military council before the pre-October 2023 attacks on Israel – Mohammed Awad and Imad Aqel – are alive.

However, analysts point out that Hamas’s military wing, which boasted roughly 50,000 fighters before the war, possesses a deep bench of cadres and a strict protocol for leadership succession that enables it to quickly recover when commanders are killed.

“The resistance typically appoints a first, second, and third deputy for every active commander, from the general commander down to the platoon leaders,” Ziad said. “Filling these voids happens rapidly.”

Hamas immediately confirmed Haddad’s death, with spokesperson Hazem Qassem officially mourning him as the “General Commander” of the Qassam Brigades. He stressed that despite his death being a “massive loss”, the group’s “long journey of resistance continues”.

The ‘Ghost’ of the Qassam Brigades

Born in the early 1970s, al-Haddad joined Hamas upon its inception in 1987. He rose through the ranks from an infantry soldier to commander of the group’s Gaza City Brigade, overseeing six battalions – each consisting of 1,000 fighters plus 4,000 support personnel.

He played a foundational role in establishing al-Majd – Hamas’s internal security apparatus designed to track down Israeli intelligence collaborators. But it was his ability to survive multiple assassination attempts – including bombings of his home in 2009, 2012, 2021, and three separate times during the current genocidal war on Gaza – that earned him the moniker “Ghost”.

Al-Haddad left an indelible strategic mark on the movement as a primary architect of the October 7, 2023 attacks. He personally oversaw the breach of the eastern fence, directed elite units that stormed the Re’im military base and the Fajja outpost. According to intelligence reports, it was al-Haddad who handed localised commanders a paper hours before the attack detailing the operation and ordering the capture of Israeli soldiers.

In January 2025, an Israeli air raid killed his son, Suhaib, but al-Haddad survived and continued to command operations and oversee the detention of Israeli captives until a deal was reached.

A fragile ‘ceasefire’ on the brink

Shortly after Friday’s strike, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defence Minister Israel Katz issued a rare joint statement, boasting that the killing was carried out under their direct orders.

Mohannad Mustafa, an analyst of Israeli affairs, said al-Haddad’s killing shows that Israel is attempting to “normalise” blatant violations of the “ceasefire” agreement, while the Netanyahu-Katz statement was an appeal to Washington to allow it to continue the killing campaign. At least 871 Palestinians have been killed since the “ceasefire” was announced on October 10, 2025, most of them civilians.

“Netanyahu is pitching this to the US administration as a necessary step to ‘disarm Hamas’ under the Trump plan,” Mustafa told Al Jazeera. “But the reality is that Israel never wanted this ceasefire. It was imposed on them.”

By systematically killing civilians, police, and military figures without offering immediate justifications for “ceasefire” breaches, Israel aims to provoke a response. “The ultimate goal is to force Hamas to retaliate, leading to the collapse of the agreement and giving Israel the green light to launch ‘Gideon 2’ – a military operation to occupy the entirety of the Gaza Strip,” Mustafa added.

With Netanyahu lacking a definitive strategic victory, such as the total surrender of Hamas, Ziad said the Israeli leadership is now leaning heavily on a “philosophy of assassinations” to project a “picture of victory” to its domestic base.

But history has shown that killings of leading military figures, such as al-Haddad, rarely have a significant long-term impact on armed Palestinian movements like Hamas.

“For the fighters and the society in Gaza, these killings create a blood covenant,” Ziad said. “It hardens their resolve. Retreating after the loss of leaders like Deif, Sinwar, or Haddad is viewed as a betrayal of that blood.”

An Ebola outbreak caused by the rare Bundibugyo strain has killed dozens in Democratic Republic of the Congo and is spreading into Uganda, raising fears of regional transmission. Health officials say instability and shared borders are complicating containment efforts as the World Health Organization declares a global health emergency.

By the time the announcement that Abu Bilal Al-Minuki was killed reached the outside world, the strike itself was already hours old. In the early hours of Saturday, May 16, somewhere in Metele, in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria, a compound had been hit. 

First, US President Donald Trump posted a statement on Truth Social. Another came from Bayo Onanuga, Special Advisor to Nigeria’s president on Information and Strategy, on Facebook and X. Al-Minuki, described as one of the most senior figures inside Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), was dead, both statements claimed.

“Tonight, at my direction, brave American forces and the Armed Forces of Nigeria flawlessly executed a meticulously planned and very complex mission to eliminate the most active terrorist in the world from the battlefield. Abu-Bilal al-Minuki, second in command of ISIS globally,” Trump said in the post.  

The Nigerian military said special forces were deployed to block escape routes while air components executed precision strikes against what was described as a “concealed and fortified terrorist enclave.” The mission was completed, the military added, “without casualties or equipment loss on the part of friendly forces.”

During a televised interview, the Director of Nigeria’s Defence Media Operations, Major Gen. Michael Onoja, explained that the US military provided intelligence and surveillance support, while Nigeria deployed boots on the ground for the operation. 

“There were no foreign boots on the ground during this operation. What we received were intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance support and other force enablers,” he said.

There was only one problem: according to the Nigerian military itself, Al-Minuki had already been killed once before – in 2024.

For nearly two years, Al-Minuki’s name – also known as Abubakar Mainok or simply Abu-Mainok – had existed in the strange afterlife of Nigeria’s counterterrorism war; a conflict where terrorist commanders are frequently declared dead only to reappear later through propaganda videos, from Abubakar Shekau to Abu Mus’ab Al-Barnawy. 

“Our determined Nigerian Armed Forces, working closely with the Armed Forces of the United States, conducted a daring joint operation that dealt a heavy blow to the ranks of the Islamic State,” President Bola Ahmed Tinubu said in a statement issued from Aso Villa on Saturday. “Early assessments confirm the elimination of the wanted IS senior leader, Abu-Bilal Al-Manuki, also known as Abu-Mainok, along with several of his lieutenants, during a strike on his compound in the Lake Chad Basin.”

However, in the counterinsurgency operations in northeastern Nigeria, where insurgency and information warfare have become deeply intertwined, certainty is always expensive.

Strategic realignment 

Saturday’s strike was the first major public success to emerge from the military partnership between Nigeria and the US. The operation, designated under Nigeria’s existing counterterrorism framework as falling under Operation Hadin Kai, commenced at 12:01 a.m. and ended at 4:00 a.m. on May 16, according to a statement from the Joint Task Force North-East spokesperson, Lt.-Col. Sani Uba.

The operation reflects a rebuilding of the partnership after it had been almost damaged after a single catastrophic night on Christmas Day 2025, when Donald Trump ordered missile strikes into Sokoto State. Trump framed the strikes as retaliation against militants killing “innocent Christians”—a language that resonated with parts of his domestic base but landed badly across northern Nigeria, where the conflict is far more complicated than the religious framing imposed on it from abroad.

Several of the missiles reportedly malfunctioned. One strike landed near a civilian settlement with no known militant presence. Nigerian officials found themselves balancing two competing realities: the military needed American intelligence and surveillance capabilities, but the Nigerian government could not afford to appear subordinate to the US narrative of the war.

The months that followed produced a quieter arrangement. American military personnel arrived in northeastern Nigeria – eventually around 200 troops – under a structure designed carefully around optics as much as operations. Nigerian authorities retained formal command. The Americans supported intelligence gathering, aerial coordination, and technical operations around the A-29 Super Tucano fleet already deployed against insurgent groups in the Lake Chad Basin.

The choreography surrounding the recent announcement of Al-Minuki’s death was as deliberate as the operation itself. Donald Trump spoke first. Tinubu issued his statement a few hours after Trump posted on Truth Social. Major Gen. Samaila Uba, Director of Defence Information, released a detailed press statement under the Armed Forces of Nigeria letterhead, complete with Al-Minuki’s full array of aliases — Abu Bakr ibn Muhammad ibn Ali al-Minuki, Abor Mainok, Abubakar Mainok, Abakar Mainok — and a comprehensive accounting of his alleged roles. 

Everyone involved in the recent communication appeared determined not to repeat the Sokoto embarrassment on  Christmas Day, when Washington’s messaging had almost completely overshadowed Abuja’s.

“Nigeria appreciates this partnership with the United States in advancing our shared security objectives,” Tinubu said. “I extend my sincere gratitude to President Trump for his leadership and unwavering support in this effort. I look forward to more decisive strikes against all terrorist enclaves across the nation.”

The statement was noted for its tone and content. Tinubu’s public gratitude to Trump marks a significant shift from the friction that defined the relationship only five months ago, when parts of Nigeria’s political and diplomatic establishment, along with some ordinary Nigerians, were quietly furious over both the Christmas strikes and the framing of responding to the claims of Christian genocide that accompanied them. 

So who exactly was Al-Minuki?

Trump described him as “the second in command of ISIS globally.” AFRICOM called him “the director of global operations for ISIS”. The Nigerian Defence Headquarters offered the most specific claim: that as recently as February 2026, Al-Minuki “may have been elevated to the position of Head of the General Directorate of States, placing him as the second most senior leader within the ISIS global hierarchy.”

The same statement linked him to the 2018 Dapchi kidnapping of more than 100 schoolgirls, to the facilitation of fighters into Libya between 2015 and 2016, to weapons manufacturing and drone development, and to “economic warfare” coordination across the Sahel.

“His death removes a critical node through which ISIS coordinated and directed operations across different regions of the world,” the Defence Headquarters’ (DHQ) statement said.

Al-Minuki was a product of the insurgency itself. Born in 1982 in Mainok, a town along the Benisheikh axis of Borno State, he took his nom de guerre (pseudonym) from his hometown. Those who knew him in his early years, during the rise of Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram, told HumAngle that he was a young man who ran a small barbing salon in Mainok village, about 58 kilometres west of Maiduguri in northeastern Nigeria. Long before his name became associated with violence and insurgency, he was known simply as a village barber.

Before pledging allegiance to the Islamic State in 2015, he was a senior Boko Haram commander with a documented antagonism toward Abubakar Shekau. His split with Shekau was a result of competing visions of insurgency: Shekau operated through spectacle, brutality, and deliberate isolation from the Islamic State central command. The faction that became ISWAP sought structure, territorial governance, and integration with the IS international hierarchy. When IS reportedly requested fighters for Libya during the height of the Syrian conflict, Shekau refused. Al-Minuki, then commanding ISWAP’s Lake Chad division, complied — one reason, analysts say, he rose within IS’s provincial bureaucracy while Shekau remained suspect in its eyes.

The DHQ’s assertion that Al-Minuki served as “Nigeria-based al-Furqan GDP Office Emir” from 2023 onward is consistent with what analysts had been tracking for several years: his role as the connective tissue between ISWAP’s local operations and the IS’s transnational administrative architecture. His designation as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist by the US in June 2023 under Executive Order 13224, cited in Saturday’s military statement, reflected assessments that he had become central to ISWAP’s financial networks, weapons procurement, drone acquisition, and communications between the Lake Chad insurgency and IS-linked structures across West Africa and the Sahel. 

The “second in command of ISIS globally” framing is a political claim, pitched to an American domestic audience that requires a recognisable villain. Still, it doesn’t situate Al-Minuki well within ISIS’s formal hierarchy. 

Al-Minuki had long occupied a powerful position within the ranks of ISWAP, but his influence deepened after the deaths of Abu Musab al-Barnawi and, later, the death of Abu Rumaisa or Abba, both sons of Boko Haram founder Mohammed Yusuf in 2023, as reported by HumAngle. Their deaths created a vacuum at the centre of the ISWAP leadership structure and how it interacts with the Islamic State global networks, thrusting Mainok into a more strategic role in coordinating operations of the terror group across the Lake Chad region.

Al-Minuki was the man most responsible for keeping ISWAP wired into the Islamic State’s international infrastructure. His death is a meaningful disruption, but not the decapitation of a global terrorist hierarchy. 

ISWAP has repeatedly demonstrated that it can regenerate leadership after losses. It replaced leaders and survived the loss of top commanders. Its resilience has never derived primarily from any single commander; rather, it has stemmed from the political and economic conditions within Borno and across the Lake Chad Basin that continue to enable recruitment, taxation, and territorial control. The DHQ acknowledged as much, noting that “Battle Damage Assessment is ongoing, while follow-up exploitation operations are being conducted to clear remaining terrorist elements in the area.”

“Mistaken identity” 

The official statement from the Army said it was common for numerous terrorists to use the same names or aliases, suggesting that both the individual killed in 2024 and the commander killed in this strike shared the same name. It did not acknowledge any mistakes. 

“This time around, this individual [we killed] is the original owner of that name,” the Director of the Defence Media Operation said. 

Meanwhile, Bayo Onanuga, President Tinubu’s spokesperson, in a Facebook post on Saturday, claimed the discrepancy between the person killed in 2024 and the one killed now was due to a case of mistaken identity. He also warned that sceptics had “rushed to question the authenticity of the Nigerian-American joint military operation” and said the criticism was “premature and not grounded in the realities of modern counterterrorism operations.” He noted that Nigeria’s Armed Forces were “operating in one of the world’s most complex insurgency environments where targets often move across borders and use multiple identities.”

Nigeria has lived through this before. Shekau was declared dead multiple times across more than a decade until soldiers grew to distrust the announcements and civilians in Borno learned to reserve judgment until they saw real change on the ground.

The Presidency’s warning that “premature dismissal of military claims can inadvertently undermine operational morale and strategic messaging” is a legitimate concern. But it is also an argument for public deference rather than public accountability. 

For now, Trump has another example to point to as evidence that American military engagement abroad delivers results. Tinubu also has a successful joint operation that projects competence and international partnership without appearing commanded from outside.

The Armed Forces of Nigeria, in Major Gen. Uba’s words, have demonstrated “unwavering resolve to confront terrorism and deny extremist groups the ability to threaten national, regional and international security.”

But in the displacement camps and farming communities scattered across Borno State, the significance of Saturday’s strike will be measured differently. 

HONG KONG — As President Trump left Beijing on Friday, Chinese social media resurfaced a familiar nickname for the president — flattering at first glance — declaring that Chuan Jianguo, the “Nation Builder,” had returned.

It was not meant as a compliment. The nation he is building, according to the Chinese, is not the United States but their own, through a series of inadvertent yet costly mistakes inflicted by Trump at home and abroad.

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If the Chinese government was self-assured entering Trump’s summit with Xi Jinping, then the results of the state visit, in which Beijing refused to offer Trump any meaningful deals or concessions, signal their unmistakable confidence in American decline.

Chinese government statements in local media stating as much made their way back to Trump as he was departing, aggravating the president, a U.S. official said. But the White House secured a clarification from the Chinese that seemed to placate Trump. America was only declining under President Biden, they said — not anymore.

President Trump and President Xi Jinping tour Zhongnanhai Garden on Friday in Beijing.

(Evan Vucci / Pool via Getty Images)

The Trump administration argues the trip was a success, having secured the display of conciliation and partnership the president had sought after years of increasingly dangerous acrimony.

Foreign policy hawks on China will be displeased with his new direction of friendship and cooperation with a government they view as openly hostile to the United States. But Trump seems to have reached a similar conclusion as past administrations, that China might require a relationship in pursuit of, as Xi put it, “constructive strategic stability.”

Trump was notably out of character throughout his stay here, deferential to his host, marveling at displays of Chinese power and reticent to speak with the press.

Five times over two days, Trump referred to Xi as his friend, taking every public opportunity to offer his compliments and pats on the back. None of it was reciprocated. The Chinese leader, Trump told Fox News in an interview, was “all business” in private, as well, apparently uninterested in his overtures of personal goodwill.

Presidents Xi and Trump tour Zhongnanhai Garden on Friday.

(Evan Vucci—Pool/Getty Images)

The summit may ultimately be remembered as the moment when Trump recognized a shifting power dynamic, where an American president had the rare and uncomfortable experience of entering a meeting clearly overmatched.

“I think the most important thing is relationship,” Trump said in the interview, describing the summit as “historic.”

“It’s all about relationship,” he added. “I have a very good relationship with President Xi.”

Taiwan was discussed ‘the whole night’

Little of substance was accomplished over two days of talks. But Chinese officials expected no less after warning Trump’s team before the summit that its minimal preparation had failed to lay the groundwork for diplomatic agreements.

Still, the lack of breakthroughs may come as a relief to some in Washington. Trump appears to have held to a long-standing U.S. line on Taiwan, for now, refusing to provide Xi with clarity on whether the United States would defend the self-ruled island if China tries to reclaim it by force.

The two men discussed the matter “the whole night,” Trump told Fox.

If China attacked, “they would be met harshly, and bad things will happen,” Trump said. Yet within the same answer, he questioned Taiwan’s “odds” against China if war were to break out, even with U.S. help, noting its proximity to the Chinese mainland and its vast distance away from the United States.

Whether Trump will proceed with arms sales to Taiwan — passed by Congress and obligated by law under the Taiwan Relations Act — is still an open question.

“If you kept it the way it is, I think China is going to be OK with that,” Trump said, referencing an ambiguous status quo around Taiwan’s status, “but we’re not looking to have somebody say, ‘Let’s go independent because the United States is backing us.’ ”

“Taiwan would be very smart to cool it a little bit,” he added. “China would be smart to cool it a little bit. They ought to both cool it.”

President Trump departs as President Xi looks on after a visit to Zhongnanhai Garden on Friday.

(Evan Vucci/ Pool via Getty Images)

Curious company

Trump’s choice of company in the U.S. delegation left the Chinese with questions over the purpose of the trip.

Lara Trump, a Fox News host and the president’s daughter-in-law, attended alongside her husband, Eric Trump, whose presence as a private citizen running the Trump Organization was a direct appeal to Beijing to treat the administration like a family business. Brett Ratner, director of the “Rush Hour” series and a documentary on the first lady that bombed at the box office, was given prime placement along with America’s top business leaders.

The last time a secretary of Defense attended a presidential state visit to China was on Richard Nixon’s famous trip in 1972. Chinese officials were unsure what to make of Pete Hegseth’s presence — whether it was meant to convey a softer stance, a hardening one, or simply an ignorance of basic diplomatic protocol.

Trump said he felt personally honored by the lavish welcome he received on the edge of Tiananmen Square, outside the Great Hall of the People, where China hosts all visiting dignitaries.

Before a lunch at Zhongnanhai, the secretive headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party, Trump asked Xi if he was special for getting to visit the compound. He was the fourth U.S. president to do so.

While the Trump administration offered itself glowing reviews of the outcome of the summit, the Chinese government offered little to say as he departed. And Chinese media highlighted Beijing’s resolute stance on American priorities — from trade to the Iran war — as evidence of Chinese confidence and American decline.

But all that business wasn’t the point of the trip, Trump told Fox’s Bret Baier. For the president, it was all personal.

“I want to thank President Xi, my friend, for this magnificent welcome,” Trump said in his toast at the state banquet, repeating the personal overture. “The American and Chinese people share much in common. We value hard work. We value courage and achievement. We love our families and we love our countries.

“Together, we have the chance to draw on these values to create a future of greater prosperity, cooperation and happiness and peace for our children,” Trump added. “We love our children. This region and the world — it’s a special world, with the two of us united and together.”

Bill Cassidy is among seven Republican senators who voted to convict Trump after the January 6, 2021, Capitol attack.

US Senator Bill Cassidy has lost his Louisiana Republican primary after years of criticism from supporters of Donald Trump over his vote to convict the United States president during his 2021 impeachment trial linked to the January 6 Capitol attack that year.

Cassidy failed to secure enough support in the southern state on Saturday to advance to a run-off, finishing behind Representative Julia Letlow and State Treasurer John Fleming. The two will face each other in a second round of voting on June 27.

The result underlines Trump’s continued influence over the Republican Party as he targets politicians seen as disloyal, even as he faces growing political pressure over inflation, falling approval ratings and criticism of the US-Israeli war on Iran.

Cassidy was one of seven Republican senators who voted to convict Trump after the attack on the US Capitol by Trump supporters who sought to overturn Trump’s 2020 election loss. While several Republicans who broke with Trump chose not to seek re-election, Cassidy campaigned aggressively for a third six-year term and heavily outspent his rivals.

On the morning of the vote, Trump attacked Cassidy on social media, calling him “a disloyal disaster” and “a terrible guy”. Speaking after his defeat, Cassidy appeared to respond indirectly to Trump’s remarks. “Insults only bother me if they come from somebody of character and integrity,” he told supporters.

He added: “Our country is not about one individual. It is about the welfare of all Americans, and it is about the constitution.”

Letlow, meanwhile, embraced Trump’s backing during her victory speech. “I want to say thank you to a very special man, … the best president this country has ever had, President Donald Trump,” she said.

She later described Cassidy’s impeachment vote as evidence that he had “turned his back on Louisiana voters”. Trump celebrated Cassidy’s loss online, writing: “That’s what you get by voting to impeach an innocent man.”

The Louisiana race is the latest in a series of contests in which Trump has backed efforts to remove Republicans who opposed him. Earlier this month, several Indiana state senators were also defeated after they had rejected Trump’s redistricting plan aimed at winning more seats in the US Congress for Republicans.

Saturday’s elections also took place amid confusion after a recent US Supreme Court ruling weakening part of the Voting Rights Act related to electoral district maps.

While the Senate primary went ahead as planned, Louisiana officials postponed primary elections for the US House of Representatives to redraw district boundaries. Civil rights groups challenged the delay, arguing it violates both the US Constitution and the Louisiana Constitution.

Russia has announced a successful test of its long-delayed Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which President Vladimir Putin now says will be operationally deployed later this year. The weapon, developed to deliver multiple nuclear warheads over great distances, has had a very mixed track record of testing so far, and was once planned to be fielded in 2020. All this makes today’s announcements more significant, although they have yet to be independently verified.

The test-launch from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome in the Arkhangelsk region took place at 11:15 a.m. Moscow time today, according to the Kremlin. Around half an hour later, Russian officials said that the missile hit its target at the Kura test range on the Kamchatka Peninsula in Russia’s Far East.

The commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Sergei Karakayev, informed Putin of the successful test. The Russian leader monitored the launch via video link from his office bunker.

Putin called the test a “major event and unconditional success.”

“The positive results of the Sarmat missile system launch will allow us to deploy the first missile regiment armed with this missile system to combat duty in the Uzhur formation of Krasnoyarsk Krai by the end of this year,” he added, referring to the 62nd Red Banner Rocket Division at Uzhur in Siberia.  

Putin says the missile’s range could exceed 35,000 kilometers (21,748 miles).

The RS-28 Sarmat, known to NATO by the codename SS-29 Satan II, is Russia’s new-generation heavy ICBM, intended to replace the Soviet-era R-36M2 system (SS-18 Satan).

A video shows the launch of the R-36M2 ICBM (SS-18 Satan):

Russian Intercontinental ballistic missile SS-18 Satan R36M2 Voevoda

The Sarmat is a silo-launched, liquid-fueled, nuclear-armed ICBM. The missile will reportedly have a host of capabilities intended to defeat ballistic missile defenses, ranging from decoys and other countermeasures to a fractional orbital bombardment capability, and independent post-boost vehicles (IPBV). There have even been suggestions that it could carry a payload of multiple hypersonic boost-glide vehicles.

While these features are all relatively novel, the fact that the Sarmat is liquid-fueled might seem like something of a throwback to the Cold War. However, as we have discussed in the past, it does bring certain benefits:

A liquid-fueled ICBM might seem somewhat dated, but it does offer the advantage of a more capable and dynamic propulsion arrangement. But unlike a solid fuel design, it has historically been difficult to keep these types of missiles in a fueled state indefinitely, often meaning that launch crews had to go through a lengthy process of fueling the weapon shortly before launch. However, a hydrazine-based liquid rocket fuel with nitrogen tetroxide (NTO) as the oxidizer provides a more stable, less corrosive option that allows for long-term storage of missiles in a fueled, ready state when combined with the right component materials and environmental controls.

Details of the missile were presented by Putin back in 2018, at the same time he unveiled several previously unknown strategic weapons systems.

An official video of the Sarmat released by the Russian Ministry of Defense in 2018:

Ракетный комплекс «Сармат»

The first successful test launch of the Sarmat took place in 2022, also from Plesetsk. However, it was followed by a failed test launch in February 2023. A further test in September 2024 was also unsuccessful, leading to the destruction of the Yubileynaya test silo at Plesetsk. 

The original plan was for the Sarmat to become operational in 2020, something that obviously did not come to pass.

Exactly what has caused the problems is unclear. The delays could be due to technical issues with the missile, Russia’s sluggish economy, or, very likely, a combination of factors. 

Indeed, there were delays in the development of the Sarmat even before Russia launched its all-out invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which has led to international sanctions and other strains on the country’s defense industrial base.

On the other hand, the slow progress made by the Sarmat so far means that it will now enter service after the demise of the New START Treaty, which expired in 2021.

New START had placed hard limits on the number of deployed and non-deployed land-based ICBMs, total available launch tubes for submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and nuclear-capable heavy bombers that Russia and the United States could have in total. The agreement also set a firm limit on total deployed and non-deployed systems.

With those limits now gone, Russia will be able to replace the R-36M with Sarmat on a one-for-one basis, while still maintaining its other ICBMs if it desires, and moving ahead with other strategic weapons modernization programs, including the Avangard nuclear-armed hypersonic boost-glide vehicle.

A video released in conjunction with the fielding of the Avangard missile complex at the Dombarovsky Strategic Rocket Forces base:

Ракетный комплекс «Авангард»

Even under New START regulations, Russia had fewer than 520 deployed “launchers” as of September 2018, with the treaty allowing for a maximum of 700 such systems. These “launchers” in this context comprise land-based ICBMs, SLBM launch tubes, and heavy bombers.

Meanwhile, the lifting of New START limits on America’s nuclear arsenal means that, at this point, it is unclear whether or not the new LGM-35A Sentinel ICBMs will carry multiple warheads. Like the Sarmat, the Sentinel has faced issues, chief among them major delays and spiraling costs, driven heavily by complexities associated with building new infrastructure. Regardless, the ongoing development of the Sentinel in the United States is also spurring work on the Sarmat program.

At this stage, it remains to be seen whether the apparent success of the test today allows the Sarmat to enter service before the end of the year. So far, its test history has been distinctly patchy. If the missile can be perfected, however, it could pave the way for Russia to deploy even more strategic missiles in the future, with the potential for triggering a new arms race.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The Pentagon says it is working to amend its proposed Fiscal Year 2027 budget to request new funding for E-7 Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft to replace the U.S. Air Force’s aging E-3 Sentry jets. The original version did not ask for any money for E-7, which had raised the prospect of a new fight with Congress over the future of the program. Legislators intervened earlier this year to reverse a previous attempt to axe the Wedgetail. Secretary Pete Hegseth, previously a chief advocate for the cancellation, says his Department’s “mindset” has now fundamentally changed.

Rep. Tom Cole, an Oklahoma Republican, asked Hegseth for an update on the E-7 during a hearing before members of the House Appropriations Committee earlier today. In his question, Cole, who is Chairman of the committee, also highlighted the loss of one of the Air Force’s existing E-3s, also known as Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, in an Iranian attack on Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia in March. That has put new emphasis on the Wedgetail program. The latest conflict with Iran has also just added to the already significant strains on the dwindling fleet of aging E-3s, as TWZ has previously explored in detail.

“Let me ask you a specific question, and you may want to get back to me on this, I don’t know, but we’ve had some discussion over – you know, we lost one E-3. On the ground, thank goodness. Looks like no crew loss,” Rep. Cole said, leading into his question. “This committee has been interested in investing in the E-7. The Pentagon signed the contract for five additional planes. [It is] not in the Air Force budget [for Fiscal Year 2027]. Is there going to be a fix to that? Where are we at on thinking about the E-7?”

As of April, the Air Force had awarded contracts to Boeing for a total of seven developmental E-7s. Versions of the Wedgetail are already in service in Australia, South Korea, and Turkey. The United Kingdom is also set to field a fleet of these aircraft. However, a U.S.-specific configuration is now in the works.

“I am well aware of that dynamic. I know our department had taken the position that it was … other satellite ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities] that was probably going to be capable of a lot of that in the future,” Hegseth said in response to Rep. Cole’s question. “But I think that mindset was indicative of a mindset that we’ve shed, which is the divest-to-invest mindset, which was an austerity mindset, that we’re going to get continuing resolution after continuing resolution. So, we [sic] got to get rid of these platforms in order to invest in these platforms. And there are gaps that need to still be filled. And there are systems that still need to be funded that are used on the battlefield right now, say, MQ-9s, A-10s, you name it.”

“And the E-7 is one of those,” Hegseth continued. “So, we’ve actually sent a budget amendment to OMB [Office of Management and Budget at the White House] to add that. I think it has a future. It has a place on the battlefield. And we’ll get more information for you on that, as well.”

The continuing resolutions referenced here are short-term federal government spending packages that Congress routinely approves when it cannot pass a full annual budget.

Secretary Hegseth also touched on the Air Force’s long-term plan, which remains unchanged publicly, to eventually push most, if not all, air moving-target indicator (AMTI) tasks into orbit. His comments today implicitly acknowledge that cancelling the E-7 program would have risked a serious capability gap in the near term, with the hopes of a better solution coming in the future. This is something TWZ had been sounding the alarm on since last year. Despite major investments and prototyping activities already underway, those space-based capabilities are still years away, at best, from becoming a reality. The Air Force’s original plan to replace a portion of its E-3 fleet with E-7s underscored the expectation that airborne early warning aircraft would also continue to play a vital role for years to come.

As a replacement for the E-3, the E-7 is a much more modern and capable aircraft. The Wedgetail is arguably the best airborne look-down sensor platform anywhere in the world at present, which is especially valuable for spotting long-range kamikaze drones, as well as cruise missiles. The Boeing 737-based design is also adaptable to other mission needs, including battle management and serving as a networking node using its own expansive communications and data-sharing suite. TWZ highlighted all of this in March, when Australia announced it was sending one of its E-7s to the Middle East to help Gulf Arab States defend against Iranian attacks.

Northrop Grumman MESA Radar – Boeing E-7 AEWC

Hegseth’s comments today on the change in mindset at the Pentagon do not touch on the argument that he and others made last year, that the E-7 was too vulnerable to be viable in future conflicts. This was despite an accompanying plan for the acquisition of more of the E-2D Advanced Hawkeyes that the U.S. Navy currently flies to fill airborne early warning capability gaps in the absence of an Air Force Wedgetail fleet. TWZ and others had quickly pointed out that the same survivability questions applied equally to the E-2D, which is also not as capable an aircraft as the E-7, which you can read more about here.

When previously arguing for its cancellation, Hegseth and others had also cited cost overruns and delays that had befallen the Air Force’s Wedgetail program since it first kicked off back in 2022.

As noted, Congress had interceded to save the E-7 from purgatory, at least in Fiscal Year 2026, appropriating more than $1 billion in new funding for the program. Of the seven Wedgetails the Air Force has on order now, five were put on contract just this past March. The service had previously ordered two other jets to support rapid prototyping efforts. Even so, the Air Force had continued to sound somewhat noncommittal about the future of the E-7 program.

“We, of course, as we always do, follow congressional direction, and we will do the [E-7] rapid prototypes. We will fund those rapid prototypes,” Secretary of the Air Force Troy Meink told TWZ and other outlets at a roundtable on the sidelines of the Air & Space Forces Association’s (AFA) annual Warfare Symposium in February. “They told us to deliver a plan for additional aircraft. Now we will do that.”

“By the way, ‘deliver a plan’ does not mean we’re going to put it in the budget,” Meink also said at that time. “We will deliver a plan of what it takes to do it, and then we’ll have a discussion with them [Congress].”

This is what turned out to be the case, at least initially, with the E-7 again being absent from the Air Force’s proposed 2027 Fiscal Year budget when it was rolled out in full last month.

“The Department [of the Air Force] is committing to work with you to figure out how to adjust the [20]27 budget submission to fund the E-7, and then work the [20]28 [budget] going forward,” Meink said at a separate hearing more recently, according to Air & Space Forces Magazine.

Despite the Pentagon saying its position on the E-7 has now completely changed, when the Air Force might begin flying the jets operationally remains to be seen. The service’s original goal was to have Wedgetails flying real-world missions in 2027, but the schedule had already slipped to 2032 by the beginning of last year. Though it is back underway now, the program was effectively frozen for much of 2025, which could easily have set the timeline back even further. Steps could also now be taken to try to accelerate the acquisition and fielding of the aircraft.

In the meantime, the E-3 fleet, which has already shrunk dramatically in recent years, continues to struggle to meet operational requirements. Demand for AWACSs has now surged further due to the latest conflict with Iran. As noted, the Iranians also destroyed one of these prized aircraft in March. The Air Force has said that it is looking into replacing various aircraft lost in the fighting with Iran so far, but it is unclear if this will include regenerating a previously retired Sentry from storage. That would be a long and costly process, but there is no other realistic source available for a replacement E-3, the very last of which were delivered in the early 1990s.

As it stands now, the Pentagon and the Air Force look to have fully dropped their opposition to moving ahead with fielding the already sorely needed fleet of new E-7s.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

It could cost nearly $1.2 trillion to develop, field, and operate a new missile defense shield like the one the Trump administration proposes to establish under its Golden Dome initiative, according to a new estimate. Deploying and sustaining a constellation of 7,800 space-based anti-missile interceptors accounts for more than 60 percent of that projected price tag. This puts a particular spotlight on the potential costs of what is arguably viewed as the most critical and controversial aspect of the Golden Dome plan. At the same time, even with this grand investment, the ability of the space-based interceptor layer would only be able to engage 10 targets simultaneously, according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).

CBO released a detailed cost estimate of what it described as a notional “National Missile Defense System” yesterday. CBO’s $1.191 trillion figure covers various expenses over a 20-year timeframe. This is more than double the projected price tag that CBO had put forward last year. President Trump first announced plans for a new national missile defense architecture in January 2025. The initiative was originally dubbed Iron Dome before being renamed Golden Dome.

“The analysis is based on the objectives laid out in the President’s executive order titled ‘The Iron Dome for America.’ The Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) implementation of that order – an initiative now called the Golden Dome for America (GDA) – is in the early stages,” CBO’s latest estimate explains up front. “Although documents from DoD’s budget request for the 2027 fiscal year provide five-year projections of funding plans for GDA, details about what and how many systems will be deployed – the ‘objective architecture’ – have not been released, making it impossible to estimate the long-term cost of the GDA system being contemplated by DoD. In the absence of specific plans for GDA’s objective architecture, CBO has estimated the cost of a notional NMD architecture based on the defensive systems and capabilities that are called for in the executive order.”

“DoD’s stated cost appears to cover a shorter time frame than CBO’s analysis and may reflect a different scope of activities and budget categories. Even so, that stated cost is far lower than CBO’s estimate for a notional NMD architecture consistent with the ‘Iron Dome” executive order,” CBO’s assessment adds. “That difference suggests either that GDA’s objective architecture is more limited than CBO’s notional NMD system or that DoD expects significant funding from other accounts to contribute to GDA (or both). For example, procurement of interceptors might be funded directly through the services’ missile procurement accounts instead of the GDA fund.”

For its part, the Trump administration has most recently pegged the price tag for Golden Dome’s “objective architecture” at approximately $185 billion. Last year, President Trump himself had put forward a $175 billion figure, which he said would include systems to be fielded “in less than three years.” TWZ has noted on several occasions now that the administration’s estimates may just cover a portion of the planned Golden Dome architecture, which could easily cost hundreds of billions in total to field and operate.

CBO’s analysis is broken into six main elements – the space-based interceptor constellation, upper wide-area surface sites, lower wide-area surface sites, regional sectors, self-defense for four existing surface sites, and a space satellite constellation for tracking targets – as well as a collection of miscellaneous ancillary costs. The surface site and regional sector categories primarily consist of costs associated with expanding on existing land and sea-based anti-missile interceptor and sensor capabilities, such as Aegis Ashore, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, and the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI).

An all-new constellation of 7,800 space-based interceptors is, by far, the largest single component of CBO’s projection. This capability is estimated to cost $723 billion to acquire, and then another $1 billion annually to operate and maintain ($20 billion over 20 years), for a total of $743 billion. This is 60 percent of the total estimated $1.191 trillion price tag, and 70 percent of the projected acquisition costs.

CBO provides a detailed breakdown of how it arrived at these figures.

“The average cost per SBI [space-based interceptor] satellite would be $22 million. That average is for the initial 7,800 SBIs as well as the nearly 1,600 SBIs that would be needed each year thereafter because of the satellites’ short five-year service life. The need to periodically replace SBIs means that the acquisition costs would be spread over the life of the system,” according to the cost assessment. “The total is based on a cost of $500 per kilogram to launch the SBIs into orbit. Although that launch cost is lower than typical launch costs today, it is thought to be achievable using the new generation of heavy-lift rockets, such as the Space-X [sic] Starship, that are being developed. Even lower launch costs may be realized in the future, but that could have only a limited effect on total costs for the SBI layer because, even at $500 per kilogram, launch costs account for less than 5 percent of the total.”

“Both the very large number of SBIs needed to engage just 10 targets simultaneously and the SBIs’ short service life are the result of how the satellites move in orbit. To be close enough to reach their targets within the three to five minutes available in the boost phase, SBIs must be in LEO at altitudes of roughly 300 to 500 kilometers,” it continues. “However, the characteristics of satellite motion in LEO affect the size of constellations meant to provide continuous coverage over specific locations on Earth. (For boost-phase SBIs, “coverage” is relative to an ICBM’s [intercontinental ballistic missile] launch location, not the location of the ICBM’s target.)”

“Satellites in LEO cannot be fixed over specific points on Earth; they orbit in a band centered on the equator and bounded equally north and south by their orbital inclination (usually measured in degrees of latitude). Therefore, constellations of many SBIs are needed to ensure that a sufficient number (20, for example, if two shots are needed against 10 ICBMs) are always close enough to potential launch locations to reach targets during the boost phase,” the assessment adds. “The total number of satellites in a constellation depends mainly on the speed of the interceptors, how quickly they can be launched, the number of simultaneous targets the system needs to handle, and the latitudes to be covered.”

“Because atmospheric drag at the altitudes at which SBIs would orbit causes their orbits to decay over time, each satellite would need to be replaced roughly every 5 years. (By contrast, the service life of surface-based interceptors can be 20 years or more, and surface-based interceptors can be maintained and upgraded during that time.),” CBO also says. “For CBO’s notional constellation, roughly 30,000 satellites would be needed to keep 7,800 in orbit for 20 years.”

All this being said, CBO’s notional space-based interceptor architecture is still predicated only on defeating a relatively limited strike (a single wave of 10 ICBMs) from “a regional adversary,” a term typically used to describe countries like North Korea and Iran. The Trump administration has indicated in the past that Golden Dome is intended to defend against a much broader array of threats, including from peer adversaries like Russia and China.

Furthermore, CBO points out that its cost estimate does not include additional space-based interceptors designed to engage missiles during the mid-course portion of their flight, which are also being explored now as part of the Golden Dome plan.

“Although the notional NMD system analyzed by CBO would be far more capable than defenses the United States fields today, it would not be an impenetrable shield or be able to fully counter a large attack of the sort that Russia or China might be able to launch,” the latest cost estimate also stresses. “As a result, the strategic consequences of deploying an NMD system with the capacity considered here are unclear because they hinge on an adversary’s perception of the defense’s capability and how that adversary chose [sic] to respond.”

“Such a deployment could prompt regional adversaries to increase their inventories of long-range missiles (nuclear or conventional) or to pursue more effective countermeasures to improve their chances of penetrating the NMD system,” the assessment notes. “Peer or near-peer adversaries could overwhelm CBO’s notional NMD system with salvoes of many missiles in a large-scale attack with their current nuclear forces, although they still might choose to increase their arsenals of long-range missiles (both nuclear and conventional) to ensure they maintain that capability.”

With this in mind, “DoD could opt to build a national missile defense system that was smaller or larger than (or altogether different from) CBO’s notional system. A larger system designed to handle a full-scale Russian ICBM attack, for example, could include more space-based interceptors or more NGIs at the three upper wide-area surface layer sites,” it also cautions. “It could also include more interceptors at lower levels. A smaller system, by contrast, might be able to engage fewer missiles or protect fewer areas. The total number of regional sectors in CBO’s notional system is based on providing some terminal coverage to the entire country as suggested by the language in the ‘Iron Dome’ executive order.”

As mentioned, putting interceptors in space has been one of, if not the highest profile aspect of the stated Iron Dome/Golden Dome plan from the very start. Space-based weapons were also a central element of the Reagan-era Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which was directly referenced in the original executive order outlining the new missile defense initiative. Infamously dubbed “Star Wars” by its critics, SDI never came close to achieving its ambitious goals. Its planned anti-missile capabilities in orbit were especially hampered by technical challenges and high costs.

The U.S. Space Force is already leading a new SBI program, with a stated goal of demonstrating a relevant capability integrated into the larger Golden Dome architecture by 2028. Space Force has already awarded deals with a combined value of $3.2 billion to 12 companies for SBI-related work. Several firms, including Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Anduril, have already announced work on prototype interceptor designs.

The Northrop Grumman video below includes a computer-generated clip depicting a space-based interceptor engaging a target outside the Earth’s atmosphere, starting at 0:13 in the runtime.

Northrop Grumman Third Quarter 2025 Highlights

Over the past year and a half or so, U.S. military officials have voiced particular support for the space-based component of Golden Dome, saying that advances in relevant technologies in the decades since SDI make it a more viable concept today. They have also downplayed the costs, as well as the geopolitical ramifications of further weaponizing space, as necessary to defend Americans against growing missile threats.

“I think there’s a lot of technical challenges,” Chief of Space Operations Gen. Chance Saltzman said during a live interview as part of Defense One‘s State of Defense 2025: Air Force and Space Force virtual conference last year. “I am so impressed by the innovative spirit of the American space industry. I’m pretty convinced that we will be able to technically solve those challenges.”

“Depends on where you sit, right, you know? But to say that it’s the responsibility for the U.S. government to protect its citizens from emerging threats makes perfect sense to me,” he added at that time when asked about the potentially destabilizing impacts of Golden Dome. “And we clearly see a country like the PRC [People’s Republic of China] investing heavily in these kinds of threats, whether it’s hypersonic [weapons], whether it’s threats from space. And so now it’s time for the U.S. government to step up to the responsibilities to protect American citizens from those threats.”

“We’re basically responding to a warfighting domain where our adversaries have already put interceptors in space, and we want to make sure that we rebalance that in terms of deterrence,” Saltzman said more recently in response to a question from our Howard Altman at a roundtable on the sidelines of the Air & Space Forces Association’s (AFA) annual Warfare Symposium in February.

“Interceptors by definition refer to a handful of well-acknowledged capabilities that other countries have, like ground and air-launched anti-satellite missiles or capabilities like the SJ-21, which has a grappling arm,” a Space Force spokesperson later clarified to TWZ when asked for further details about the “interceptors in space” Saltzman had mentioned.

This all highlights the very real prospect of actual fighting in space during future conflicts, something the U.S. military is increasingly preparing for, as you can read about more here. What would be necessary to protect 7,800 anti-missile interceptors in orbit, as well as critical associated space-based sensors and communications constellations, could easily add to Golden Dome’s total cost.

As CBO makes clear in its latest assessment, much is still unknown publicly about the actual scale and scope of Golden Dome, and what it might therefore cost in the end. At the same time, space-based interceptors are a very real part of the planned architecture, with work underway now to develop those capabilities.

The concept that CBO has outlined already involves an extreme expenditure of money and resources, all for a capability it still assesses to be useful only against relatively limited barrages from rogue states. Those are threats that could well be addressed using far less expensive surface-based systems, though not ones that can intercept targets in their boost phase.

As underscored now by CBO’s latest cost projection, a relevant constellation of interceptors in space remains likely to be the most costly and complex aspect of Golden Dome, if it comes to fruition at all.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Prime Minister Narendra Modi says his talks with the Dutch PM also focused on expanding cooperation in defence and security.

India’s Tata Electronics has signed a deal with Dutch technology giant ASML to build a major semiconductor plant in western India, as Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited the Netherlands during his European tour.

The agreement, announced on Saturday, will support the development of Tata’s semiconductor facility in Dholera, Gujarat – Modi’s home state.

ASML, Europe’s largest technology company by market value, manufactures advanced lithography machines used to produce high-end microchips found in products ranging from mobile phones to cars.

The Dutch company said it would help “establish and ramp up” production at the plant by supplying its cutting-edge chipmaking tools.

Tata Electronics plans to invest $11bn in the facility, which is expected to manufacture chips for artificial intelligence, the automotive industry and other sectors.

ASML chief executive Christophe Fouquet said the company saw “many compelling opportunities” in India’s growing semiconductor industry.

“We are committed to establishing long-term partnerships in the region,” Fouquet said in a statement.

The deal comes as India and the Netherlands move to deepen economic ties, with New Delhi seeking foreign technology and investment to boost manufacturing and create jobs.

The European Union has increasingly viewed India – the world’s most populous country and one of its fastest-growing economies – as a key future market.

During his visit, Modi held talks with Dutch Prime Minister Rob Jetten and met King Willem-Alexander.

“My conversations with Prime Minister Rob Jetten were extensive and covered a wide range of topics,” Modi wrote on X.

“One of them was defense and security. I spoke about the possibility of drawing up an action plan for the defense industry as quickly as possible. We can also collaborate in sectors such as space travel, maritime systems, and maritime security.”

Modi also addressed members of the Indian diaspora and is expected to inspect centuries-old Chola copper plates being returned to India by Leiden University.

Indian and Dutch officials are also discussing a more flexible visa arrangement for Indian students and workers in the Netherlands.

Modi will next travel to Sweden for talks with Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson focused on trade, innovation and green technology cooperation. The visit marks his second trip to the country since attending the first India-Nordic summit in 2018.

Every major war in the Middle East has left the region permanently altered in ways that nobody fully anticipated at the time. The 1948 Arab-Israeli war created a refugee crisis whose consequences are still being negotiated seventy-eight years later. The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran reorganized the entire regional security architecture around a new fault line that nobody had planned for. The 2003 US invasion of Iraq created a vacuum that Iran filled faster and more effectively than anyone in Washington had anticipated, reshaping the balance of power across the Levant in ways that took a decade to fully understand.

The 2026 Iran war belongs in that category. Not because the outcome is clear, it is not, and the ceasefire that is currently holding is fragile enough that anyone claiming certainty about what comes next is not paying close enough attention. But because the war has already crossed several thresholds that cannot be uncrossed, set several precedents that will shape behavior for years, and broken several assumptions that the regional order was quietly depending on without anyone fully acknowledging it.

Here are seven dynamics that will define the Middle East that emerges from this war, whenever the shooting finally stops for good.

1.      Iran Survives, But the Rules It Played By Are Gone

2.      The Gulf Has Been Permanently Unsettled

3.      The Normalization Project Is Frozen

4.      The US-Israel Relationship Has a New Fracture

5.      China Emerged as the Indispensable Power

6.      The Nuclear Domino Is Now Spinning

7.      The Gulf’s Self-Image Is Broken, and Rebuilding It Will Take a Generation

Authorities have confirmed ‘Timmy’ the whale, whose rescue drew global attention, has been found dead off the coast of Denmark. The news comes two weeks after his complicated rescue off Germany’s Baltic coast and release into the North Sea.

Rousey won the fight with her signature armbar lock, forcing Carano into submission just 17 seconds into the bout.

Mixed martial arts (MMA) star Ronda Rousey has re-retired after demolishing fellow combat sports trailblazer Gina Carano in their long-awaited non-title comeback bout in Los Angeles, defeating her rival by armbar after just 17 seconds.

After a hype-filled build-up, the bout on Saturday was a jarring anti-climax, with Rousey flooring Carano almost immediately before wrestling her into an armbar to end the fight.

American stars Rousey, 39, and Carano, 44, are widely regarded as two of the most important female fighters in the history of MMA, helping to take the sport into the mainstream during their fighting heydays more than a decade ago.

Carano had parlayed her success into a Hollywood career, appearing in several action movie roles, but had not fought since 2009 before her appearance in Saturday’s featherweight bout.

Rousey, a 2008 Olympics judo bronze medallist who subsequently found huge success in the Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC), retired from the sport in 2016 after suffering back-to-back defeats against Amanda Nunes and Holly Holm.

The fighters were lured back into the cage for Saturday’s card at the Intuit Dome with the promise of a bumper payday that will reportedly see each fighter earn several million dollars from the streaming giant.

Rousey (13-2-0 MMA) secured her 10th submission win, returning to the cage following an exit from MMA in December 2016.

She insisted afterwards her return to the ring was a one-off and ruled out the possibility of fighting again after paying tribute to Carano.

“Gina is the only person who could have brought me back into MMA – she’s my hero,” Rousey said. “She changed my world, and we changed the world, and I’ll never ever forget that or be able to pay that back enough.

“I’m so glad we finally got to share this moment.”

Asked about possibly extending her comeback, Rousey added: “There’s no way I could have ended it better than this. I want to have some more babies, got to get cooking.”

Carano (7-2-0 MMA) ⁠⁠had been inactive in the sport since August 2009, returning to MMA after a conversation last year at Rousey’s encouragement. She admitted the fight was too fast for her, regretting what ⁠⁠more she could have done in a short timeframe.

“I feel great,” Carano said after the loss. “I wanted to fight, ⁠⁠and I didn’t get that. But she trained. She ⁠⁠had her game plan. I have so much love and respect for her, and this was a victory in my life. She changed it. I woke up at 3am every morning thinking about ‌‌her. I fell back in love with mixed martial arts. There’s ‌‌so ‌‌many things to think about here. It’s just [that] the fight didn’t go my way.

“I wanted that to last longer – I felt like I was so ready, I felt so good,” she said. “But I haven’t been here for 17 years. I wanted to hit her.”

Carano, 44, is unsure whether she’ll return to MMA, choosing to keep the door open.

Carano said the mere fact of getting in shape for her return – she revealed before the bout she had shed more than 100 pounds (45kg) in the two years leading up to the contest – was a victory.

“Right now, just getting in the cage was a victory, getting here after 17 years is a victory. Fighting a legend was a victory. I feel great, I just wanted to fight, and I didn’t get to do that.”

Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have been tense since the Taliban took power in 2021.

On Monday, Pakistan summoned a senior Afghan diplomat after an attack claimed by the Pakistan Taliban, known by the acronym TPP. The group said it carried out two more attacks since, mostly against security forces.

Islamabad accuses Kabul of backing the fighters, which it denies.

The latest violence started with a major border skirmish in February. Mediation efforts by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkiye and China led to a pause in the fighting.

But the two sides have continued to target each other. This includes a Pakistani strike on a drug rehabilitation centre that killed more than 250 people.

Will these breaches lead to a resumption of hostilities? And is lasting peace possible between the neighbours?

Presenter: James Bays

Guests:

Masood Khan – Former permanent representative of Pakistan, United Nations

Michael Kugelman – Senior fellow, Atlantic Council

Obaidullah Baheer – Adjunct lecturer, American University of Afghanistan

Iran to reveal its plan for Strait of Hormuz soon as Israel attacks Lebanon and Gaza, killing and wounding dozens.

Spain, Netherlands, Ireland, Iceland and Slovenia all withdrew in protest against Israel’s participation in the midst of its war on Gaza.

As the Eurovision Song Contest took to the stage for the Saturday night final in Vienna, thousands protested outside against Israel’s inclusion, and five countries boycotted the event over the genocidal war on Gaza.

Protesters marched through the Austrian capital to highlight what critics described as a double standard. The European Broadcasting Union (EBU) organisers refused to exclude Israel, despite banning Russia following its invasion of Ukraine four years ago.

Eurovision, which attracted 166 million viewers last year, is seeing the largest boycott in its 70-year history.

Spain, the Netherlands, Ireland, Iceland and Slovenia all withdrew because of Israel’s inclusion, with some of their national broadcasters refusing to air the show.

Spain’s Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez, who has emerged as one of Israel’s strongest critics in Europe, said on Friday that the decision puts Spain on “the right side of history”.

Last month, more than 1,000 artists called on fans to boycott Eurovision in an open letter against Israel’s participation. Among the artists were outspoken critics of Israel, Macklemore and Paloma Faith. Macklemore has released songs protesting against Israel’s war in Gaza.

Double standards

On Monday, Amnesty International Secretary-General Agnes Callamard denounced the EBU for allowing Israel to participate.

“The failure of the European Broadcasting Union to suspend Israel from Eurovision, as it did with Russia, is an act of cowardice and an illustration of blatant double standards when it comes to Israel,” she said.

Reporting from Vienna, Al Jazeera’s Charlie Angela said 2,000 demonstrators gathered in the city earlier on Saturday to protest against Israel’s participation.

Angela reported that protesters accused the competition of normalising Israel’s actions in Gaza, adding that Eurovision was “bending over backwards” to justify including Israel while excluding Russia.

Russia has faced a widespread cultural boycott following the Ukraine invasion. It is banned from international football tournaments, and FIFA and UEFA have excluded Russian domestic teams from all competitions, including the Champions League.

The winner of Eurovision will be selected by both a professional jury and TV viewers voting for their favourite act.

Austria won the competition last year, with Israel second.

The Israeli government was later accused of unfairly influencing voting. New rules have since been introduced.