Middle East

A young girl in southern Lebanon joined hundreds mourning her father, one of three paramedics killed in an Israeli “double-tap” strike during the US-brokered ceasefire. At least 95 emergency responders have been killed in Lebanon, a pattern the UN says may amount to a war crime.

Chris Weafer, the CEO of Micro-Advisory Partners, says the UAE’s OPEC exit frees one million barrels of spare capacity. He warns Kazakhstan and Venezuela may follow, leaving OPEC far less influential on global oil pricing.

World leaders condemn the interception of the boats bound for Gaza as violating international law.

Israel has intercepted 22 out of the 58 aid ships travelling through international waters and bound for the besieged Gaza Strip.

The ships make up part of a second Global Sumud Flotilla to try in recent months to break an Israeli blockade by carrying humanitarian aid to Palestinians in Gaza. They sailed from the Spanish port of Barcelona on April 12.

The vessels were seized by Israel late on Wednesday in international waters off Greece’s Peloponnese peninsula, hundreds of miles from Gaza, the flotilla’s organisers said on Thursday.

Israel “kidnapped” 211 of the 400 activists taking part in the flotilla, including a Paris city councillor, according to the flotilla’s organisers. Israel’s Foreign Ministry had earlier put the number of those detained at 175.

Here’s how world leaders have reacted to the news:

Italy

Italy called for the immediate release of Italian nationals on board the flotilla.

Italy “condemns the seizure of the Global Sumud Flotilla vessels… and calls on Israel to immediately release all the unlawfully detained Italians”, the government said in a statement.

Italy’s ANSA news agency cited sources among the organisers saying 24 Italians had been detained.

In its statement, the government also called for the “full respect of international law and guarantees on the physical safety of the people on board”.

It said it was “committed to continue supplying humanitarian aid to Gaza in the framework of our cooperation and in respect of international law”.

Germany

In a joint statement with Italy, Germany said it was following developments regarding the flotilla with “great concern” and called for international law to be respected and for “restraint from irresponsible actions.”

Spain

Spain’s Foreign Ministry said it “energetically condemns” Israel’s seizure of the flotilla, which is carrying Spanish nationals.

Madrid has summoned Israel’s charge d’affaires to convey its protest over the detention of the vessels, the ministry added in a statement.

Turkiye

Turkiye’s Foreign Ministry condemned Israel’s seizure of the boats in the flotilla as “an act of piracy.”

“By targeting the Global Sumud Flotilla, whose mission is to draw attention to the humanitarian catastrophe faced by the innocent people of Gaza, Israel has also violated humanitarian principles and international law,” the ministry said in a statement.

Hamas

In a post on Telegram, the Palestinian group Hamas condemned the interception, accusing Israel of committing a crime without accountability and calling for the release of those detained.

Global Sumud Flotilla organisers

The flotilla’s organisers condemned Israel’s seizure of its vessels.

“This is piracy,” they said in a statement. “This is the unlawful seizure of human beings on the open sea near Crete, an assertion that Israel can operate with total impunity, far beyond its own borders, with no consequences.”

“No state has the right to claim, police, or occupy international waters, but Israel has done that, extending its control outward to occupy the Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Europe,” the statement said.

Israel

Israel’s Foreign Ministry called the flotilla organisers “professional provocateurs” and said that its forces acted lawfully.

“Due to the large numbers of vessels participating in the flotilla and the risk of escalation, and the need to prevent the breach of a lawful blockade, an early action was required in accordance with international law,” the ministry said in a statement.

On March 11, the Thai cargo ship Mayuree Naree was struck by two projectiles while crossing the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important waterways located between Iran and Oman. A fire broke out in the engine room, and while 20 sailors were rescued, three remained trapped inside the stricken vessel. Their remains were found weeks later when a specialised rescue team boarded the vessel, which had run aground on the shores of Iran’s Qeshm island.

At about the same time, a “shadow fleet” of tankers continued to navigate the very same waters safely. Operating with fake flags, disabled signals and unspecified destinations, this covert armada survived because it operates outside the traditional rules of maritime trade.

Iran threatened to block “enemy” ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz – a crucial chokepoint for a fifth of the world’s oil – in the wake of the United States-Israeli war launched on February 28. Soon, navigation through the strait was disrupted amid fears of attacks.

Following a temporary ceasefire on April 8, the United States imposed a full naval blockade on Iranian ports on April 13. Theoretically, traffic through the strait should have come to a complete halt.

However, tracking data reveals a remarkably different reality.

An exclusive Al Jazeera open-source investigation tracked 202 voyages made by 185 vessels through the strait between March 1 and April 15, navigating both under fire and across blockade lines.

The numbers behind the shadows

To understand how the strait operated under extreme pressure, Al Jazeera’s Digital Investigative Unit monitored the waterway daily, cross-referencing vessel International Maritime Organization (IMO) numbers with international sanction lists from the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), the European Union, the United Kingdom and the United Nations. An IMO number is a unique seven-digit figure assigned to commercial ships.

Of the tracked voyages, 77 (38.5 percent) were directly or indirectly linked to Iran. Notably, 61 of the ships transiting the strait were explicitly listed on international sanctions lists.

The investigation divided the conflict into three distinct phases to map the fleet’s behaviour:

• Phase 1: Open War (March 1 – April 6): 126 ships crossed the strait, peaking at 30 vessels on March 1. Among these, 46 were linked to Iran.
• Phase 2: The Truce (April 7 – 13): 49 ships crossed during this fragile pause. More than 40 percent of these vessels were tied to Iran, including the US-sanctioned, Iranian-flagged Roshak, which successfully exited the Gulf.
• Phase 3: The US Blockade (April 13 – 15): Despite the explicit naval blockade, 25 ships crossed the strait.

Breaking the blockade

When the US blockade took effect, the shadow fleet adapted immediately.

The Iranian cargo ship “13448” successfully broke the blockade. Because it is a smaller vessel operating in coastal waters, it lacks an official IMO number, allowing it to evade traditional sanction-monitoring tools. The vessel departed Iran’s Al Hamriya port and reached Karachi, Pakistan.

Similarly, the Panama-flagged Manali broke the blockade, crossing on April 14 and penetrating the cordon again on April 17 en route to Mumbai, India.

The investigation uncovered widespread manipulation of Automatic Identification System (AIS) trackers. Vessels such as the US-sanctioned Flora, Genoa and Skywave deliberately disabled or jammed their signals to hide their identities and destinations.

Fake flags and shell companies

To obscure ultimate ownership, the shadow fleet heavily relies on a complex web of “false flags” and shell companies. The investigation identified 16 ships operating under fake flags, including registries from landlocked nations like Botswana and San Marino, as well as others from Madagascar, Guinea, Haiti and Comoros.

The operational network managing these ships spans the globe. Operating firms were primarily based in Iran (15.7 percent), China (13 percent), Greece (more than 11 percent) and the United Arab Emirates (9.7 percent). Notably, the operators of nearly 19 percent of the observed vessels remain unknown.

The toll of a parallel system

Despite the intense military pressure, energy carriers dominated the traffic, with 68 ships (36.2 percent) transporting crude oil, petroleum products and gas. Ten of these tankers were directly linked to Iran. Non-oil trade also persisted, with 57 bulk and general cargo ships crossing during the open war phase, 41 of which were tied to Tehran.

Before the war, at least 100 ships crossed the Strait of Hormuz daily. Today, a staggering 20,000 sailors are trapped on 2,000 ships across the Gulf – a crisis the International Maritime Organization described as unprecedented since World War II.

A shadow Iranian fleet, meanwhile, has been navigating seamlessly as part of a parallel maritime system born from 47 years of US sanctions on Tehran. Washington slapped sanctions on Tehran following the 1979 Islamic revolution that toppled the pro-Washington ruler Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The two countries have had no diplomatic ties since 1980.

Beirut, Lebanon – On April 8, Ahmad Hamdi, 22, was sitting on his couch at home in Beirut’s Tallet el Khayat neighbourhood, hours after Israel had launched more than 100 attacks in under 10 minutes across Lebanon.

Then he heard the “indescribable sound” of a rocket. Ahmad jumped off the couch as the glass in his building shattered around him before more rockets hit.

Clouds of dust obscured the view from his apartment on the fourth floor. When they dispersed, he saw the building directly facing his had been reduced to a pile of rubble.

He looked back at the couch he had been sitting on. At some point between the second and fourth explosion, shards of shrapnel had hit the couch exactly where his chest had been when the first rocket struck.

“When you think of Tallet el Khayat, you feel it is safe and secure,” Ahmad told Al Jazeera. “No one would expect something like that would happen.”

Indiscriminate attacks

April 8 has become known in Lebanon as Black Wednesday. Israel’s attacks on that day killed at least 357 people across the country. Israel claimed it killed 250 Hezbollah operatives. The exact breakdown of civilians and combatants is still not known, but numerous sources looking into the day’s casualties told Al Jazeera that the attacks appeared to be indiscriminate at best and in some cases may have amounted to the direct targeting of civilians. United Nations experts have described Israel’s attacks on April 8 as “indiscriminate”.

“The method in which the attacks happened in the middle of the day with dozens of strikes all at one time without warning and when civilians were present shows recklessness in Israeli military conduct,” Ramzi Kaiss, Lebanon researcher at Human Rights Watch, told Al Jazeera.

On March 2, Israel intensified its war on Lebanon for the second time in under two years. Earlier that day, Hezbollah had responded to near-daily Israeli attacks on Lebanon for the first time since December 2024 in response to the United States and Israel’s assassination of Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Israel also invaded southern Lebanon, where it has gone about systematically destroying towns and villages in what experts – and Israeli officials – said is an effort to create an uninhabitable “buffer zone” along its border.

“Part of [Israel’s] military strategy is to create a buffer zone and no man’s land,” Bassel Doueik, the Lebanon researcher for the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) conflict monitor, told Al Jazeera. “What Israel is doing in southern Lebanon is creating a multilayered buffer zone inside Lebanese territory and that is why they are demolishing houses in towns along the border.”

Israel has not stopped attacking Lebanon since October 2023 and has violated a November 2024 ceasefire more than 10,000 times, according to the UN. Most of its attacks have been in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley in the east.

Doubts about Israel’s claims

Israel conducted 100 air strikes and dropped more than 160 bombs across Lebanon on April 8, according to ACLED.

Israel claimed the attacks targeted Hezbollah headquarters, command-and-control sites, military formations and assets of its air force unit and elite Radwan Force.

Hezbollah discontinued the practice of providing the circumstances of its fighters’ deaths in September 2024. The Lebanese group does conduct some public funerals for fighters killed during the battles in southern Lebanon, but it is difficult to ascertain the exact number of those killed, making it hard to prove or disprove Israel’s claims.

But groups investigating the April 8 attacks said the available information casts doubt on the Israeli narrative. Analysts with ACLED said they are still confirming casualties but early indications showed that only a few victims were known Hezbollah members.

“One hundred one women and children were killed on April 8,” Ghida Frangieh, a Lebanese lawyer and researcher with Legal Agenda, a Beirut-based nonprofit research and advocacy organisation, told Al Jazeera. “For this number of 250 to be correct, it means every man killed must have been a Hezbollah combatant. This is not true as we were able to document several civilian men killed during these attacks.”

Lebanese media reported on a number of those killed by Israel on April 8, including employees of local restaurants, teachers, a poet, journalists, Lebanese soldiers and a member of a Druze-majority political party.

In some cases, Israeli attacks wiped out several members of the same family. Seven members of the Nasreddine family were reportedly killed on April 8 in Hermel in northeastern Lebanon. And three generations of the displaced Hawi family, including three children, were killed in the Jnah neighbourhood bordering Beirut.

Israel ’emboldened to continue’ violations of international law

Even if Hezbollah targets were present at all of the sites struck during the April 8 attacks, researchers said the attacks should still be considered indiscriminate. And while there still may be a discrepancy over the exact numbers of Hezbollah members vs civilians killed, international humanitarian law places the burden of proof on the attacking army.

“International humanitarian law is clear: Armed forces must distinguish at all times between civilians and military objectives,” Reina Wehbi, Amnesty International’s Lebanon campaigner, told Al Jazeera. “Even when there is a legitimate military target and in order to avoid indiscriminate, disproportionate or other unlawful attacks, parties must respect the principle of precaution and do everything feasible to verify that targets are military objectives, to assess the proportionality of attacks and to halt attacks if it becomes apparent they are wrongly directed or disproportionate.”

Over the past two and a half years, Israel has regularly violated the laws of war in Lebanon and in Gaza by indiscriminately attacking civilians, targeting paramedics and journalists, and using white phosphorus. Still, experts said there is little chance Israel will be held accountable.

“For the Israeli military, there is no deterrence to committing violations in Lebanon,” Kaiss of Human Rights Watch said. “After the crimes of humanity against Gaza, countries could have immediately suspended arms sales, the transit of arms through airports, placed targeted sanctions on officials, and the US and others could have suspended arms sales, but none of that happened.”

Kaiss said Lebanon could also give jurisdiction to the International Criminal Court (ICC), of which it is not currently a member, to investigate and prosecute Israel’s crimes in Lebanon. The ICC has already issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza.

Attacks on Beirut have temporarily halted since US President Donald Trump announced a ceasefire in Lebanon on April 16. But the war rages on in southern Lebanon with Israel continuing to kill civilians, including rescue workers. Israel and Lebanon have started to engage in direct negotiations despite Hezbollah’s objections in what the Lebanese state hopes will bring an end to Israel’s attacks and occupation of southern Lebanon.

But on the ground, there has been little deterrence or accountability for Israel’s crimes against civilians.

“This hasn’t happened in the last two years, so the Israeli military on the ground feels emboldened to continue,” Kaiss said.

Freedom of the press around the world has fallen to its lowest level in a quarter of a century, according to the leading Paris-based press freedom NGO, Reporters Sans Frontieres (RSF), or Reporters Without Borders.

Every year, RSF publishes a World Press Freedom Index used to compare the level of freedom enjoyed by journalists and media outlets in 180 countries. Its ranking uses a five-point scale to assess a country’s level of press freedom, ranging from “very serious” to “good”.

For the first time since RSF started producing the index in 2002, more than half of the world’s countries fall into the “difficult” or “very serious” categories for press freedom – “a clear sign that journalism is increasingly criminalised worldwide”.

Only seven mostly Nordic countries are ranked with “good” press freedom, with Norway, the Netherlands and Estonia in the top three. France ranks 25th with a “satisfactory” score, while the United States ranks 64th with a “problematic” score, falling seven places since President Donald Trump took office.

RSF reports that Trump “has turned his repeated attacks on the press and journalists into a systematic policy”, citing the detention of Salvadoran journalist Mario Guevara, who was later deported, while he was documenting a protest against immigration raids, as well as the suspension of several notable public media institutions.

In Latin America, RSF highlighted the dramatic fall of Javier Milei’s Argentina (98th, -11) and of El Salvador (143rd), which has dropped 105 places since 2014 following the launch of a war against the Maras criminal gangs.

The press freedom NGO said that “Eastern Europe and the Middle East are the two most dangerous regions for journalists in the world, as they have been for 25 years”, notably putting Russia (172nd) and Iran (177th) in the bottom 10.

It added that wars and restrictions on access to information are some of the driving factors for the decline in press freedom. It cited Israel’s attacks on journalists in Gaza, the occupied West Bank and Lebanon as an example of this, ranking Israel 116th.

“Since October 2023, more than 220 journalists have been killed in Gaza by the Israeli army, including at least 70 who were slain while carrying out their work,” it said.

Broadly speaking, RSF reported that “the criminalisation of journalism, which is rooted in circumventing press law and misusing emergency legislation and common law, is proving to be a global phenomenon”.

It reported that more than 60 percent of countries – 110 out of 180 – have criminalised media workers in various ways, notably citing India (157th), Egypt (169th), Georgia (135th), Turkiye (163rd) and Hong Kong (140th) as prime examples of state-imposed crackdowns.

“Although attacks on the right to information are more diverse and sophisticated, their perpetrators are now operating in plain sight,” Anne Bocande, RSF’s Editorial Director said.

She cited “authoritarian states, complicit or incompetent political powers, predatory economic actors and under-regulated online platforms” as the main causes “for the global decline in press freedom”.

Bocande called on democratic governments and citizens to do more to end this global criminalisation of journalists, particularly through “firm guarantees and meaningful sanctions”.

“Current protection mechanisms are not strong enough; international law is being undermined and impunity is rife,” she said. “Inaction is a form of endorsement,” while concluding that “the spread of authoritarianism isn’t inevitable”.

Islamabad, Pakistan – Pakistan has opened six overland transit routes for goods destined for Iran, formalising a road corridor through its territory as thousands of containers remain stranded at Karachi port because of the United States blockade of Iranian ports and ships trying to pass through the Strait of Hormuz.

The Ministry of Commerce issued the Transit of Goods through Territory of Pakistan Order 2026 on April 25, bringing it into immediate effect. The order allows goods originating from third countries to be transported through Pakistan and delivered to Iran by road.

The announcement coincided with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s visit to Islamabad for talks with Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and army chief Asim Munir, the latest in a series of diplomatic engagements as Pakistan seeks to mediate an end to the two-month war between Washington and Tehran.

Federal Minister for Commerce Jam Kamal Khan described the initiative as “a significant step toward promoting regional trade and enhancing Pakistan’s role as a key trade corridor”.

Iran has not publicly commented on the move, and Al Jazeera’s query to the Iranian embassy in Islamabad went unanswered.

The notification does not extend to Indian-origin goods. A separate Commerce Ministry order issued in May 2025, following the India-Pakistan aerial war that month, bans the transit of goods from India through Pakistan by any mode and remains in force.

Routes and regulations

The six designated routes link Pakistan’s main ports, Karachi, Port Qasim and Gwadar, with two Iranian border crossings, Gabd and Taftan, passing through Balochistan via Turbat, Panjgur, Khuzdar, Quetta and Dalbandin.

The shortest route, the Gwadar-Gabd corridor, reduces travel time to the Iranian border to between two and three hours, compared with the 16 to 18 hours it takes from Karachi – Pakistan’s biggest port – to the Iranian border. The Gwadar-Gabd route could cut transport costs by 45 to 55 percent compared with costs from Karachi port, according to officials.

But for Iran, firms sending their goods to the country, and transporters, all routes into Iranian territory today are viable options, with the principal maritime passage they have traditionally used – the Strait of Hormuz – blockaded by the US Navy.

Corridor shaped by conflict

The current US-Iran war began on February 28, when US and Israeli forces launched attacks on Iran.

In the weeks that followed, Iran restricted commercial navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway through which roughly a fifth of the world’s oil and gas passes during peacetime, disrupting one of the most critical arteries of global trade.

Pakistan brokered a ceasefire on April 8 and hosted the first round of direct US-Iran talks on April 11, in Islamabad. The negotiations lasted nearly a day but ended without a deal. Two days later, Washington imposed a naval blockade on Iranian ports, throttling Tehran’s maritime access.

A second round of talks has since stalled. US President Donald Trump cancelled a planned visit to Islamabad by special envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner last weekend.

Iran has ruled out direct negotiations with Washington while the blockade remains in place, though Araghchi told Pakistani officials that Tehran would continue engaging with Islamabad’s mediation efforts “until a result is achieved”.

The transit order appears to be a direct economic response to that impasse.

More than 3,000 containers destined for Iran have been stuck at Karachi port for several days, with vessels unable to collect the cargo. War-risk insurance premiums have surged from about 0.12 percent of a vessel’s value before the conflict to roughly 5 percent, making shipping to the region too expensive for many operators.

Shifting regional dynamics

The corridor also signals a shift away from Afghanistan, whose relations with Pakistan have deteriorated sharply.

The two sides engaged in clashes in October 2025 and again in February and March this year, with skirmishes continuing along the northwestern and southwestern borders.

The Torkham and Chaman crossings have ceased to function as reliable commercial routes since tensions escalated, limiting Pakistan’s overland access to Central Asian markets.

“This is a paradigmatic shift. Pakistan’s relations with the Afghan Taliban, the de facto rulers in Kabul, have no reset switch,” Iftikhar Firdous, cofounder of The Khorasan Diary, told Al Jazeera.

“Kabul has been diversifying away from Pakistan towards Iran and Central Asia, but this move flips the equation. Pakistan can now bypass Afghanistan entirely for westbound trade. The impact on Kabul’s transit relevance and revenue is strategic, not immediate – but it is real.”

Firdous said the implications extend beyond bilateral ties.

“This corridor also reduces Pakistan’s reliance on longer maritime routes through the Gulf. Geopolitics, security, and infrastructure will ultimately determine which corridors dominate, but it places Pakistan as the main overland gateway for China-backed trade routes into West Asia and beyond,” he said.

Minhas Majeed Marwat, a Peshawar-based academic and geopolitical analyst, urged caution. “A cornered Afghanistan is a destabilised Afghanistan, and Pakistan knows better than most what that costs,” she wrote on X on April 27.

“The opportunity here is real. So is the risk. Security on the northwestern and southwestern borders remains the variable that could unravel everything. Pakistan is positioned well. It is not yet positioned safely. Those are different things.”

Fifty-nine years of membership, ended with a statement on a Tuesday and an effective date of Friday. The United Arab Emirates announced it will exit OPEC and OPEC+ on May 1, citing national interests, its evolving energy profile, and a long-term strategic vision that no longer aligns with the organization’s direction. The Energy Minister did not consult Saudi Arabia before making the announcement. He did not raise the issue with any other member country. He simply said the time had come. 

The timing tells the whole story. OPEC was preparing to meet in Vienna on Wednesday when the news landed. The Iran war had already wiped out 7.88 million barrels per day of OPEC’s production in March alone, resulting in the biggest supply collapse for the producers’ group in recent decades, surpassing even the 2020 Covid shock and the 1970s oil crisis. The UAE had been absorbing Iranian drone and missile attacks for weeks. The Strait of Hormuz, through which the UAE ships its own oil, has been functionally closed or severely restricted since early March. And sitting across the OPEC table was Iran, the country that had been targeting UAE infrastructure repeatedly, and Russia, which had been a steadfast partner to Iran throughout the conflict.

Walking out was not an impulsive decision. It was the logical conclusion of a calculation that had been building for years.

Why Abu Dhabi Was Already Done With OPEC 

The UAE’s frustration with OPEC production quotas is not new. The quotas have capped UAE output at around 3.2 million barrels per day, while the country has the ambition and the capacity to produce closer to 5 million barrels per day by 2027, suggesting production could almost double without OPEC’s constraints. For a country that has invested heavily in expanding ADNOC’s capacity and has the infrastructure to back it up, being told by a cartel committee how much it can produce has become an increasingly poor trade. 

The UAE’s sovereign wealth fund is so large that its economy is now more significantly tied to global economic growth than to the global price of oil. That shift in economic identity matters enormously for understanding why OPEC membership has become structurally uncomfortable. OPEC exists to keep oil prices elevated through production discipline. The UAE increasingly benefits from a growing global economy that demands more energy, more investment, and more trade, all of which are better served by producing at full capacity and building relationships with the countries that need what Abu Dhabi has to sell. 

An energy industry source familiar with the decision said the UAE felt it was “the right time to leave” and that “this decision is good for consumers and good for the world,” adding that the UAE would gradually increase production to supply global markets once freedom of navigation is restored in the Strait of Hormuz. The framing is deliberate. The UAE is not positioning itself as a cartel defector but as a responsible producer responding to a global energy emergency, which is a considerably more defensible diplomatic position. 

The Saudi Rupture Running Underneath It All

The official UAE statement was carefully worded, full of appreciation for “brothers and friends within the group” and “the highest respect for the Saudis for leading OPEC.” None of that diplomatic courtesy changes the underlying reality, which is that the UAE and Saudi Arabia have been on a collision course for some time and the OPEC exit is the most visible expression of that tension yet.

The two countries had joined a coalition to fight the Houthis in Yemen in 2015, but that coalition broke down into open recriminations in late December when Saudi Arabia bombed what it described as a weapons shipment bound for UAE-backed Yemeni separatists. That incident was the visible rupture of a relationship that had been quietly fraying for years over economic competition, differing visions for regional leadership, and diverging approaches to normalization, China, and the post-war order. Within OPEC, the two countries have clashed repeatedly over quota allocations, with the UAE consistently arguing it deserves a larger share based on its expanded capacity. 

The OPEC exit does not resolve any of those tensions. It sidesteps them entirely, which is probably the more elegant solution. By leaving, the UAE removes itself from a framework where Saudi Arabia holds dominant influence and gains the freedom to pursue its own production and partnership strategy without needing Riyadh’s agreement. That is a significant shift in the regional power dynamic, and it happened without a single confrontational statement.

What Remains of OPEC Now 

The UAE’s exit could prompt other members to follow suit, with analysts pointing to Kazakhstan as another significant producer that wants to grow beyond its current quota constraints. “If there is a time to leave, now is the time,” one Dubai-based energy consultant told CNN. 

The cartel’s power has always rested on a specific mechanism: spare production capacity held back from the market to stabilize prices. That spare capacity is concentrated almost entirely in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, with the other nine member countries possessing little to none. Removing the UAE from that equation means OPEC’s effective spare capacity narrows considerably, and the burden of price stabilization falls almost entirely on Riyadh and Kuwait City. Saudi Arabia will hold an even greater share of the cartel’s remaining leverage, but leverage over a smaller and weaker institution is not the same as leverage over a healthy one.

OPEC has lost members before, but the UAE is a much larger producer than previous departures, and its absence may over time pose an existential risk to the cartel’s sustainability. The organization that has shaped global energy politics since 1960 is now facing its most significant structural test, and it is doing so while simultaneously dealing with a historic supply shock from the Iran war, a closed strait, and a global economy pricing in the possibility that the disruption is not temporary. 

The Geopolitical Implications

Freed from production quotas, the UAE’s most immediate strategic move is likely to deepen its relationship with the countries that need its oil most urgently, and China sits at the top of that list. More production could help the UAE improve ties with oil-importing partners such as China, and given the economic damage caused by the Iran war, the prospect of maximizing energy revenues now is undoubtedly attractive to Abu Dhabi. 

The UAE-US relationship also stands to benefit. With the UAE free to leverage its spare capacity in pursuit of its own strategic interests, the move will likely strengthen the UAE-US relationship, particularly in relation to managing the strategic petroleum reserve and responding to the ongoing Hormuz supply shock. Trump has been publicly critical of OPEC for years, accusing the cartel of exploiting American military protection to keep prices artificially high. An OPEC that is smaller and weaker, with a major member now operating independently and aligned with US interests, is a more congenial arrangement from Washington’s perspective. 

For the global energy market, the picture is more complicated. Once the Strait reopens fully and UAE production ramps up without quota constraints, additional supply should exert downward pressure on prices that have been elevated since February. Whether that actually happens depends on a sequence of events, including a durable Iran settlement and the restoration of free navigation through Hormuz, that are still very much in progress.

Our Take: A Geopolitical Move Dressed as an Energy Decision 

The UAE’s OPEC exit is not primarily an energy story. It is a geopolitical statement about where Abu Dhabi sees itself in the emerging regional order, and the answer is: outside the frameworks that no longer serve its interests, and free to build the bilateral relationships that do. The exit from OPEC follows the same strategic logic as the Abraham Accords, the Huawei contracts, the US base agreement, and the China infrastructure ties. The UAE has been running a multi-alignment strategy for years, positioning itself as indispensable to every major power simultaneously, and OPEC membership was becoming a constraint on that strategy rather than an asset.

What happens to OPEC matters for energy markets in the short term. What the UAE’s departure signals about the fracturing of Gulf institutional solidarity matters considerably more for the regional order that everyone in the Middle East is trying to rebuild in the aftermath of a war that nobody fully planned for and nobody has yet fully ended.

The deeper story is what the UAE’s exit reveals about the post-war Middle East taking shape right now. The institutions that governed the region’s energy politics, security arrangements, and diplomatic alignments for decades were built in a different world, one where the Cold War defined choices, where oil producers had unified interests, and where the US sat at the center of every meaningful regional framework. That world is gone. What the Iran war accelerated, and what the UAE’s OPEC exit makes structurally visible, is that the Gulf’s most capable states are no longer willing to subordinate their individual strategic interests to collective frameworks that were designed for a regional order that no longer exists. 

Abu Dhabi did not leave OPEC because of a quota dispute. It left because it has decided that in the world emerging from this war, the countries that move fastest, align most flexibly, and free themselves from inherited institutional constraints are the ones that will define what comes next. Whether that calculation proves correct depends on what the Islamabad talks produce, how quickly the Strait reopens, and whether the ceasefire holds long enough for the region to build something more durable than a pause. But the signal Abu Dhabi sent on Tuesday was unmistakable, and every government in the region heard it.

Hundreds of Iranians have rallied in Tehran to demand an end to US threats and the ongoing blockade of Iranian ports. The blockade is causing Iran’s already devalued currency to sink further.

Israeli forces have intercepted around a dozen Gaza-bound aid boats from the Global Sumud Flotilla in international waters near the Greek island of Crete, more than 1,000km from Israel. Organisers call it an illegal attack on civilians in international waters.

Standoff in the Strait of Hormuz is pushing global oil prices above $120 per barrel, with average gas prices in the US hitting a four-year high.

Organisers of a Gaza-bound aid mission say their vessels are being intercepted by Israeli military speedboats in Greek waters west of Crete, more than 1,000km from Israel. Crew members of the Global Sumud Flotilla say communications have been jammed and an SOS issued.

Tehran, Iran – Iran’s national currency has plunged to new lows as authorities mobilise to dampen the impact of the naval blockade enforced by the United States.

The Iranian rial shot above 1.81 million to the US dollar on the open market by early afternoon on Wednesday before partially recovering. The embattled currency changed hands for about 1.54 million earlier this week, and its rate was about 811,000 per US dollar a year ago.

The rial had remained relatively stable over the past two months after experiencing an earlier drop as US forces amassed in the lead-up to the US-Israeli war on Iran, which began at the end of February.

The latest freefall follows on from unchecked inflation, which has been increasingly plaguing the Iranian economy as a result of mismanagement and sanctions, and continues to ravage households. Washington now has three aircraft carriers in the region and is bringing in more troops and equipment as Israel expresses readiness to restart fighting, three weeks after a ceasefire began.

Iran’s authorities this week projected a hardened stance on negotiations with Washington, and pledged to fight the naval blockade of Iran’s southern waters, which the US Central Command insisted on Tuesday had “cut off economic trade going into and coming out of” the country.

Amid threats by US President Donald Trump, the Iranian government has also tried to empower its own border provinces to import essential goods by reducing red tape. It has also allocated $1bn from the sovereign wealth fund to buy food, and made a partial policy U-turn to restart offering a preferential subsidised exchange rate with the goal of reducing prices, despite concerns about corruption.

Non-oil trade takes hit

According to customs data released by state media, Iran’s non-oil trade has been negatively affected after commercial ties were disrupted or cut off as a result of the war, and critical infrastructure was bombed.

Iran’s customs authority put the total value of non-oil trade in the Iranian calendar year that ended on March 20 at close to $110bn, with $58bn going to imports. The figure was about 16 percent lower than the year before.

The volume of non-oil trade was valued at approximately $9bn for the 11th month of the calendar year ending on February 19, and $6.46bn in the final month, indicating a drop of about 29 percent in connection with the war, which started on February 28. The final month was also about 50 percent lower than the more than $13bn estimated value for last year’s corresponding month.

Part of the drop is linked with the fact that shipping has been significantly disrupted through the Strait of Hormuz as Iran and the US spar over control of the strategic waterway. The US and Israel also directed some of their thousands of strikes against ports, naval facilities, airports, and railway networks across the country.

Iran’s top steel and petrochemical producers were also extensively bombed, as were oil and gas facilities, power stations, and major industrial zones. The US and Israel have threatened to take Iran “back to the Stone Age” through systematic bombing of civilian infrastructure like power plants.

To manage the impact and preserve domestic supply, Iranian authorities have imposed temporary restrictions on exports of steel, petrochemicals, polymers and other chemicals.

Oil exports in the crosshairs

The US is using its military capabilities and economic chokeholds to drive down Iran’s oil exports, a goal that it has also pursued over recent years through sanctions.

Since mid-April, the US military has been deploying its soldiers to take over or inspect ships transiting through waterways near Iran, in addition to targeting what is known as a shadow fleet of tankers used by Iran to circumvent sanctions and ship its oil.

Warships and thousands of troops could still launch a ground invasion or destructive aerial attacks against Iran’s Kharg and other critical islands, and the Trump administration expects increased pressure on Iran’s oil sector due to hampered access to export routes and supertankers keeping the oil stored on the water.

The US Treasury has been blacklisting refineries in China, the biggest buyers of Iranian crude oil, and going after the banking and cryptocurrency channels alleged to be facilitating Tehran’s oil trade, and having links to the IRGC – which Washington considers a “terrorist” organisation.

“We will follow the money that Tehran is desperately attempting to move outside of the country and target all financial lifelines tied to the regime,” said US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent on social media.

Chinese refineries buy roughly 90 percent of Iran’s oil shipments, and imported a record 1.8 million barrels per day ⁠in March, according to Vortexa Analytics data cited by the Reuters news agency, which also said purchases were expected to slow due to worsening domestic refining and processing margins.

According to figures released by the General Administration of Customs of China, the volume of the country’s bilateral trade with Iran during the first quarter of 2026 stood at $1.55bn, down 50 percent year-on-year.

In March, the first month of the war, trade stood at $184m, which was nearly 80 percent lower than the year before and 64 percent lower than the month before. China’s imports from Iran and exports to the country were both considerably reduced as a result of the war.

The removal of the United Arab Emirates as a major trade partner and import market for Iran has also significantly affected the country’s economy, increasing its reliance on land neighbours like Turkiye and Iraq to the west and Pakistan to the east.

The UAE, a big part of the Trump-led Abraham Accords that saw multiple countries normalise relations with Israel, was heavily targeted by ballistic missiles and drones launched by Iran.

The UAE has closed down numerous Iranian institutions on its soil over the past two months, including financial facilitators, instructed Iranian citizens to leave, and has said it will take years to restore bilateral relations to previous levels.

FAO, WFP and Lebanon’s government say 1.24 million people are ‘expected to face food insecurity’ at crisis levels or worse.

More than 1.2 million people in Lebanon are expected to face acute hunger this year due to “conflict, displacement and economic pressures” amid the latest war between Israel and Hezbollah, according to a United Nations-backed report.

The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Food Programme (WFP) and Lebanon’s Ministry of Agriculture issued a joint statement on Wednesday, saying that 1.24 million people were “expected to face food insecurity” at crisis levels or worse between April and August.

The figure, contained in a report conducted by the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), a UN-backed group that monitors hunger and malnutrition, marks a “significant deterioration” compared with the outlook before the war erupted on March 2, said the statement.

Prior to March, “an estimated 874,000 people, roughly 17 percent of the population, were experiencing acute food insecurity“, it said. But a “sharp escalation in violence” had “reversed recent food security gains in Lebanon and pushed the country back into crisis”.

“Families who were just managing to cope are now being pushed back into crisis as conflict, displacement and rising costs collide, making food increasingly unaffordable,” said Allison Oman Lawi, the WFP’s country director in Lebanon.

Nora Ourabah Haddad, the FAO representative in Lebanon, said, “Compounded shocks are undermining agricultural livelihoods and impacting food security, highlighting the urgent need for emergency agricultural assistance to support farmers and prevent further deterioration.”

A ceasefire that took effect on April 17 has reduced the intensity of the fighting between Israel and the armed group Hezbollah that has killed more than 2,500 people in Lebanon and displaced more than one million, according to Lebanese authorities.

Israeli forces are operating in south Lebanon near the border, where residents have been warned not to return, and both sides have been trading fire despite the truce.

“Acute food insecurity is likely to deepen without sustained and timely humanitarian and livelihood support,” the statement said.

Al Jazeera’s Tohid Asadi has been seeing more flights take off at the main airport in Iran’s capital, where operations resumed on Saturday as the ceasefire with the US and Israel continues.

Since the Straight of Hormuz was closed during the Iran War, the price of jet fuel has doubled. As a consequence, many airlines have cancelled flights. Regional airports are feeling the most strain

Europe’s smaller airports face an “existential threat”, according to the boss of the Airports Council of Europe.

Olivier Jankovec, the director general of ACI Europe, has warned that some of the continent’s smaller airports may not survive if jet fuel shortages triggered by the Middle East crisis lead to widespread route cancellations.

Since the Straight of Hormuz was closed during the Iran War, the price of jet fuel has doubled. As a consequence, many airlines have cancelled flights.

Regional airports are most exposed to airlines cutting capacity and raising fares, as demand on their routes is generally more price-sensitive than with bigger airports. This comes in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic, which has left some regional airports 30% below 2019 levels, according to Mr Jankovec.

“The current levels of jet fuel prices and the prospect of a new cost of living crisis mean that many regional airports across our continent are likely to face both a supply and demand shock. For them, this is nothing short of an existential threat,” the aviation boss told the Guardian.

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Conversely, the biggest airports in Europe have a different problem.

Heathrow, the UK’s busiest airport, delivered a stark warning about its capacity on Wednesday, as conflict in the Middle East triggered a surge in demand for connecting flights.

“Heathrow is full”, declared its chief financial officer, Sally Ding. Her comments came alongside the publication of first-quarter figures showing 18.9 million passengers passed through the airport in the opening three months of the year. That represents a 3.7% increase year-on-year.

Airspace closures stemming from the conflict in Iran led to a rise in transfer passengers. This pattern is expected to persist as geopolitical uncertainty continues, impacting one of the UK airport’s chief international competitors for worldwide connections, Dubai.

Heathrow’s trading update noted it had “temporarily absorbed demand from elsewhere”. It also warned “passenger numbers for the rest of the year are likely to be impacted whilst there is significant uncertainty in the Middle East”, as reported by City AM.

Yet as the long-running domestic saga surrounding planning permission for a third runway continues, Ding warned that Heathrow’s operating capacity meant “fewer choices and higher fares for passengers and missed opportunities for the UK economy”.

Heathrow’s £50bn proposal to increase capacity has been mired in political wrangling for years. Its blueprint for a new, 3.5-kilometre runway would elevate passenger capacity to 150m annually from 84m. With it, the airport could accommodate 756,000 flights per year, up from 480,000 currently.

“Our plan is privately financed, rigorously assessed and focused on value. With the right regulatory framework and government policy in place, we are ready to invest, grow and keep the UK connected to the world,” a statement from Heathrow said on Wednesday.

The project involves redesigning part of the M25, London’s ring road which passes close to Heathrow, by diverting it into a tunnel. For the first time in Heathrow’s history, the government examined a competing expansion proposal from another firm.

The more economical bid – costing £25bn, and put forward by the Arora Group, which runs hotels and is involved in property asset management as well as construction – would have avoided the M25 altogether. It was turned down last autumn by Transport Secretary Heidi Alexander. She selected Heathrow’s proposal, but it has faced further delays following a government decision to reassess its overarching strategy in its Airports National Policy Statement, now anticipated this summer.

The US naval blockade of Iranian ports and the Strait of Hormuz, in place since April 13, has raised concerns that Iran could run out of crude oil storage capacity and be forced to curb production.

Bloomberg reported analysis on Tuesday from the data and analytics company Kpler suggesting Iran could run out of crude storage in 12 to 22 days if the blockade persists.

Last week, United States Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent claimed that storage capacity at Kharg Island, where most of Iran’s oil is exported, would be full “in a matter of days”.

So how quickly could Iran run out of oil storage, and why does it matter?

What is happening in the Strait of Hormuz?

The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow channel that connects the Gulf to the open ocean. It spans the territorial waters of Iran on its northern side and Oman on its southern side. It is not in international waters.

During peacetime, 20 percent of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies are shipped through the corridor.

Two days after the US and Israel launched their first air strikes in their war on Iran on February 28, Ebrahim Jabari, a senior adviser to the commander in chief of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), announced that the strait was “closed”. If any vessels tried to pass through, he said, the IRGC and the navy would “set those ships ablaze”.

As the war has dragged on and negotiations have failed to achieve a settlement, Iran has at times in the past two months allowed some “friendly” ships and those that pay tolls to pass. It is currently refusing to allow any foreign-flagged ships, including those previously deemed friendly, to pass until the US lifts its own naval blockade.

Iranian First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref said on April 19 that the “security of the Strait of Hormuz is not free”.

“One cannot restrict Iran’s oil exports while expecting free security for others,” he wrote in a post on X.

“The choice is clear: either a free oil market for all, or the risk of significant costs for everyone,” he added. “Stability in global fuel prices depends on a guaranteed and lasting end to the economic and military pressure against Iran and its allies.”

Since the US naval blockade on the strait began, the US has opened fire on and taken control of an Iranian-flagged tanker near the Strait of Hormuz while also redirecting vessels on the high seas transporting cargo to or from Iran. Iran’s armed forces have denounced these actions as “an illegal act” that “amounts to piracy”.

The US naval blockade of the strait means that Iran might have to store the oil it produces.

Iran is the third largest oil producer in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) after Saudi Arabia and Iraq and exports 90 percent of its crude oil via Kharg Island in the Gulf for shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.

What has the US claimed?

The US is eager to curb Iran’s oil revenues, which have risen since Tehran closed the Strait of Hormuz to other shipping. This is the primary motive behind Washington’s naval blockade of Iranian ports.

Iran exported 1.84 million barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil in March and shipped 1.71 million bpd in April, compared with an average of 1.68 million bpd in 2025, according to Kpler.

However, the US naval blockade since mid-April now means that most of its exports are having to be stored instead.

Bessent wrote in an X post on April 22: “In a matter of days, Kharg Island storage will be full and the fragile Iranian oil wells will be shut in.”

“Constraining Iran’s maritime trade directly targets the regime’s primary revenue lifelines.”

How much oil can Iran store?

Iran’s domestic refineries have a production capacity of 2.6 million bpd, according to the energy consultancy Facts Global Energy.

Satellite data show the amount of oil Iran has in storage has risen sharply since the US blockade began, and in the days after the US tightened it, stocks were rising so fast that it appeared Iran had been barely able to export any oil at all.

From April 13 to April 21, data showed that stocks rose by more than 6 million barrels, according to the Columbia Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP). From April 17 to April 21, the stock increased very rapidly, growing by 1.7 bpd.

As of April 20, the storage tanks at Kharg were about 74 percent full after the island alone had taken on about 3 million extra barrels of oil, the CGEP reported.

Generally, oil companies avoid filling their storage beyond 80 percent capacity to balance safety, emissions control and flexibility.

However, Iran and other oil producing countries have exceeded this limit before, for instance, during the COVID-19 pandemic. In April 2020, Kharg island’s stocks reached close to 90 percent capacity, an all-time high.

Iran also has some crude oil storage capacity in the form of “floating tanks”, or parked ships. About 127 million barrels can be stored in this way, Frederic Schneider, a nonresident senior fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs, told Al Jazeera in an interview on April 14.

Will Iran need to cut oil production?

Muyu Xu, a senior crude oil analyst at Kpler, told Al Jazeera that the blockade could eventually force Iran to cut production.

“However, given there is still available storage capacity onshore (roughly covering 20 days of Iran’s current production), we expect any production reduction to be gradual over the coming week with a higher likelihood of acceleration into May,” she said.

Analysis by CGEP nonresident fellow Antoine Halff echoed this. Halff wrote in an article published by CGEP on Tuesday that it may be some time before the US blockade causes Iran to shut off its production “in a big way”.

However, Halff added, Iran may still choose to halt production “fairly aggressively” but this “would be more by choice than by necessity”.

He explained: “Doing so would have the advantage of providing Iran with relatively ample spare storage capacity after the shutdown and would allow for a smoother restart of operations once conditions permit, and the constraint is relaxed, thus minimising adverse impacts from the blockade on longer-term supply.”

Why does this matter?

Halting oil production risks damaging underground reservoirs by reducing reservoir pressure, allowing water or gas to encroach into producing layers and changing patterns of oil flow. This can make some oil harder or more expensive to recover later, experts said.

Restarting the process of oil production can also be slow and costly, involving repairs of corroded equipment or unclogging pipelines.

Halting production would also cause Iran’s export revenues to drop. However, analysts said that for a few months, Iran can continue to earn revenue from oil that is already in transit at sea.

Kenneth Katzman, former Iran analyst at the Congressional Research Service in Washington, DC, said Iran is not exporting new oil during the US blockade of Iranian ports but Tehran has 160 million to 170 million barrels of oil on ships around the world currently.

Holiday guru said people were coming to him asking if they should cancel their holiday

TV holiday expert Simon Calder has given a key holiday booking update for anyone thinking of going away in 2026. People who have booked with jet2, easyjet and TUI have been told that the operators will not charge supplementary fees for fuel even though the Iran conflict has seen prices soar.

The ITV and BBC expert said people were coming to him and asking if they should cancel their holidays. The EU has said that travellers face major problems this year due to the Middle East crisis and the UK Government has said it is working with airlines to monitor the situation.

However, Mr Calder said it was a great time to get mega deals – with some offering loads off. He told GB News: “ Do not cancel your holiday. And if you haven’t booked any and you’re feeling nervous, well, please don’t. Now is a fantastic time to book holidays.

“I wish there wasn’t, but I was looking for instance last night. So, these prices still available. Luton to Mykonos. Okay. Now, beautiful Greek island and most fares in July and August on that route are £55 one way. That is crazy. It should be three times that. It’s a fantastic time to book.

“And you might think, well, yeah, I’ll book the flight and then it’ll be cancelled. But air passenger rights rules are so strong that if you are if your flight is cancelled, then it’s not your problem. It’s the airlines problem. They have to find you an alternative on the same day if at all possible. So, of course, I snapped up one of these flights and I’m just looking forward to it. I’ve been booking holidays like there’s no tomorrow because there’s so many great deals around.”

He said that the current situation was leaving some people worried. He said:”Let me tell you first of all if you have booked a holiday – and I’ve had people it it takes me back almost to COVID – people saying I put this holiday the balance, is due I’ve got to pay you know a couple of thousand pounds should I just cancel the whole thing no go and have a lovely holiday in the UK.

“There will be some flight cancellations, and that is mostly big airlines like Lufthansa, which isn’t a holiday airline. They’ve cancelled 20,000 flights but they’ve done that basically because they were flights which they thought oh we’re not going to make any money out of that with fuel double the price it was so let’s just cancel those.

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“So they’ve taken those flights out. It’s not affecting anybody’s holiday that I know. We’ve had very very unhelpful warnings from European energy chiefs and from the prime minister saying, ‘Oh, you might have to think about your holiday.’No, you don’t. Just just plan your holiday as normal. There is a tiny chance that your flight might be merged with another flight. So, for example, and there is absolutely no plans for this, but if you look at easyJet from Gatwick to Nice, lovely destination, they got six flights a day.

“If they reduce that to four to save a bit of fuel. Well, it would be a slight nuisance for some people. They’d have to go at noon instead of 10:00 in the morning, but ultimately it’s not going to make any difference.

“Another real concern for lots of people is I could be stuck at the other end. Well, I actually put this to an airline boss yesterday and I said, ‘What what happens if you’re in Cyprus?’ Because with other destinations, if they run out of fuel in, I don’t know, Naples, that’s fine. You can just fly out with enough to fly back. Somewhere like Cypress, you can’t do that. And the boss said, ‘Well, it’s very easy. We’ll just do a pit stop in Athens on the way back’. So, there are lots of solutions. Do not cancel your holiday. And if you haven’t booked any and you’re feeling nervous, well, please don’t. Now is a fantastic time to book holidays.”

Jet2 has said holidaymakers are increasingly booking their trips at the last minute since the start of the Iran war amid increasing anxiety over the impact of the conflict and worries over jet fuel supply.

The firm said summer passenger number bookings so far are up 6.2%, thanks to growth across its airline and package holiday business, but in a sign of mounting nervousness among holidaymakers, it revealed the “booking profile has become increasingly close to departure” due to the Middle East war.

It said it is well protected from the fuel cost spike caused by the Iran war for the important summer season, adding it is “maintaining frequent dialogue with our fuel suppliers and airport partners on fuel supply”.

The group’s load factor – a key measure of how well it fills its planes – has remained flat year-on-year for its first quarter so far, though it said the conflict meant there was limited visibility for the peak summer season and beyond.

Its update followed a warning from Heathrow airport separately on Wednesday that it expects passenger numbers for the rest of the year to be affected by the situation in the Middle East.

Airspace closures following the outbreak of the war in the Middle East on February 28 have had a major impact on air travel, and while much of the region’s airspace has since reopened, many people are avoiding flying there because of the conflict.

A raft of European airlines have also recently alerted to impending jet fuel shortages within weeks, given the disruption to their main supply route through the Strait of Hormuz.

Around three-quarters of Europe’s jet fuel supply comes from the Middle East and travels through the crucial shipping route.

Steve Heapy, chief executive of Jet2, said: “Clearly, we continue to monitor the situation in the Middle East but remain focused on our medium-term goals.”

The group said it expects to report a drop in operating profits to between £435 million and £440 million for the past year to March 31, down from £446.5 million in 2024-25, but said this was in line with market forecasts.

It has increased its summer programme for 2026 by 7.7% to 19.9 million passenger seats.

It is unclear whether football officials from Iran were issued Canadian visas to attend AFC and FIFA congresses.

Representatives from Iran’s football federation were not present at the largest formal meeting of Asia’s football leaders before the World Cup.

In the presence of FIFA President Gianni Infantino, there was no discussion at the Asian Football Confederation (AFC) Congress about Iran’s participation in the tournament or whether the team’s games should be moved out of the United States because of the US-Israeli war on Iran.

Concerns were raised that visa issues could affect the Iranian delegation’s ability to travel to both the confederation meeting in Vancouver and the overall FIFA Congress on Thursday, as well as the World Cup starting on June 11.

The 48-team tournament is being hosted by the US, Canada and Mexico.

It was not clear if visa issues prevented Iranian representatives from attending the AFC Congress. However, as the nine AFC teams that qualified for the World Cup were presented with commemorative gifts, it was announced that Iran would receive their token “once they arrive”.

An Iranian government spokesperson said last week that the national team was preparing for “proud and successful participation” in its World Cup games in the United States.

FIFA, football’s international governing body, has consistently said Iran will stick to the World Cup game schedule decided last December, before the US and Israel launched military attacks on Iran on February 28, and has refused to entertain suggestions that the team’s games be moved to Mexico.

“Now even more, now that the world is going through a very, very delicate, difficult, dangerous time with many conflicts, and many of you are directly affected and involved in these conflicts,” Infantino told the AFC leaders.

“Now even more, we need to find ways to build these famous bridges, or maybe to build football fields instead. And to build competitions where people can join and come together.”

Iran are placed in Group G with Belgium, New Zealand and Egypt.

Team Melli’s planned training camp would be in Tucson, Arizona, and they are scheduled to open their World Cup campaign on June 15 against New Zealand in Inglewood, California, near Los Angeles.

Iran will play Belgium in Inglewood on June 21 before facing Egypt in the final group match in Seattle on June 26.

The Syrian Civil Defense says a 3-year-old boy was rescued after falling into an 18-metre-deep well in the countryside of Aleppo.

London, United Kingdom – Recent headlines from British newspapers speak to different areas of tension in the UK due to the United States-Israel war on Iran: economic woes, political friction and worries about the country’s readiness for the future, strategically and militarily, if the conflict persists.

On Thursday, the Financial Times blared, “Consumer confidence slumps to two-year low,” as The Guardian reported, “UK braces for price rises driven by Iran war as economic confidence plummets” and “UK prepared to deploy RAF Typhoons to keep Strait of Hormuz open after Iran war.” Earlier this month, The Independent reported that Prime Minister Keir Starmer risked US President Donald Trump’s wrath as he “refuses to let US use UK bases” for strikes on Iran’s infrastructure. And on Sunday, quoting a minister, The Times said the  “economic fallout from the Iran war” would last at least eight months.

Beyond the headlines is real public angst about what the war in Iran means on a human level and what the economic and political fallout may be.

For Iranians living in the UK, there is a whole other level of worry.

Omid Habibinia, a man in his 50s who was born in Tehran but moved to the UK 25 years ago, described the impact on him personally.

“Since the first day of the war, connection has been cut off. I am witnessing the pain and suffering of those close to me, many of whom have no news of their families. Beyond the fact that around 90 million people inside Iran have effectively been imprisoned by the internet shutdown and millions more have been deprived of contact with their loved ones, the attacks on the country’s critical infrastructure – alongside the killing and injury of thousands of civilians and the displacement of many – are deeply distressing to me,” he told Al Jazeera.

It seems clear that the impact will last long after the conflict has ended or at least a long-term ceasefire is agreed. There are worries of higher mortgage costs and higher food and fuel prices amid a continued cost-of-living crisis.

Luke Bartholomew, deputy chief economist at fund manager Aberdeen, said the UK economy is “particularly badly exposed to the Iran shock as a big energy importer with weakly anchored inflation expectations and an already soft labour market”.

For many people still recovering from the energy inflation shock that followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, this is a hit to their household finances that is hard to manage.

Although the government has urged people not to worry, sporadic queues at petrol stations and talk of a return to panic shopping seen during the start of the COVID-19 pandemic are commonplace.

‘We will stand by working people’: Starmer

Starmer formed an Iran crisis committee that met on Tuesday to persuade people that “you can be sure we will stand by working people in this crisis”.

He hinted that people might change their holiday plans and might already be cutting back on food.

“I think we’ll see how long the conflict goes on. I can see that, if there’s more impact, people might change their habits, … where they go on holiday this year, what they’re buying in the supermarket, that sort of thing,” he said.

Critics said the government’s stretched finances mean it cannot afford the energy subsidy that may be needed. They have also lamented the government’s reluctance to exploit the nation’s untapped oil reserves in the North Sea. Experts disagreed on whether this would make any significant difference.

Before the Iran war began, the UK economy was turning a corner. Inflation and fuel costs were falling, government borrowing was down and unemployment was falling.

The hits to the UK population range from the relatively trivial to the potentially terrifying.

London house prices have tumbled as sellers become nervous and buyers sit tight, but some observers have noted that they were overpriced in the first place.

Flights being cancelled due to a lack of jet fuel might be an inconvenience. Higher prices for fuel and food and then everything else are a major problem for those whose incomes are already stretched.

Then there is the genuine fear of what a prolonged war could mean, such as a serious recession or military involvement.

Thomas Pugh, chief economist at the consulting firm RSM UK, said: “The Strait of Hormuz has effectively been shut since early March. The International Energy Agency called it the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market. Oil prices have spiked, gas prices are climbing and inflation fears are back. But the bigger risk is ‘demand destruction’.

“Demand destruction happens when high prices force people and businesses to buy less. We’re seeing it already in fuel rationing in emerging market economies. It means fewer cars sold, fewer homes bought, fewer restaurant meals, fewer business investments and eventually fewer jobs. Because this crisis is about more than oil, demand destruction appears across the whole economy.”

The Iran war arrived at a time when the UK population was already unhappy.

A survey by the polling company IPSOS in December reported: “Three quarters of Britons expect large-scale public unrest in 2026. 59 percent think there will be protests against the way their country is being run, highest in Peru (80%) and South Africa (76%). In Great Britain, 74% predict large scale unrest. Since 2019, three of the G7 countries – Great Britain, Japan (both+11pp [percentage points]) and United States (+10pp) – have seen a double-digit increase in the proportion that think there will be large-scale public unrest.”

Bartholomew added: “With inflation rising and wage growth sluggish after a sustained period of very weak employment activity, real wages are likely to turn negative in coming months, adding a further headwind to the economy. So it’s probably just too early for the full effects of the war to be felt or show up in the data yet. But one place the impact of the war is very clearly showing up is around the path of interest rates.

“It is very likely that were it not for the war, the Bank of England would be cutting rates at its April meeting. Instead, the market is pricing in a series of rate hikes this year. For households that were hoping for mortgage rate cuts this year, the prospect of rates staying on hold is almost as painful as renewed hikes.”

As Iran stares down the economic consequences of a prolonged blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, attention is shifting north.

With Gulf shipping lanes disrupted and oil exports constrained, Tehran may seek to depend less on the Gulf and more on a patchwork of railways, Caspian ports and sanctions-era trade networks linking it to Russia.

The importance of that relationship was underscored this week when Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi travelled to St Petersburg for talks with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, praising Moscow’s “firm and unshaken” support as the two sides discussed the war, sanctions and the future of the Strait of Hormuz.

But could Moscow really offer a lifeline for Iran’s beleaguered, war-torn economy, and would it even want to? We spoke to experts to find out.

Increasing but modest bilateral trade

Economic relations between Iran and Russia deepened after the US withdrew from a 2015 nuclear deal with Iran and other nations in 2018 and reimposed sweeping sanctions on Tehran.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 served to accelerate that trend as both countries found themselves increasingly cut off from the Western financial system. They turned to sanctions-evasion networks, alternative payment systems and non-Western trade corridors to keep goods, energy and money flowing.

Current trade is dominated by agricultural products – especially wheat, barley and corn – alongside machinery, metals, timber, fertilisers and industrial inputs. Tehran has also supplied Russia with low-cost Shahed drones, which Russia updated and has been using in its war on Ukraine.

“Trade turnover reached $4.8bn last year [2024], but we believe that the potential for our mutual trade is much greater,” Russian Energy Minister Sergey Tsivilyov told an intergovernmental commission on trade and economic cooperation between Moscow and Tehran in 2025.

Bilateral trade is reported to have increased by 16 percent during that period, driven largely by Russian exports of grain, metals, machinery and industrial goods.

But experts say that despite this increase, the overall trade relationship remains relatively modest compared with Iran’s trade with China or the Gulf countries.

Trade between the two is “not substantial, because both countries are producing almost similar products and the industries are similar”, Mahdi Ghodsi, an economist at the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, told Al Jazeera.

Alternatives to Hormuz

The backbone of Russia-Iran trade is the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a network of shipping lanes, railways, and roads linking Russia to Iran and onward to Asia, bypassing Western-controlled maritime routes.

Goods move from southern Russian ports, across the Caspian Sea to northern Iranian ports, including Bandar Anzali, before continuing by rail or truck.

The route has become increasingly important for Russian grain, machinery and industrial exports to Iran.

This route can serve as a “viable but partial lifeline”, Naeem Aslam, chief market analyst at London-based Think Markets, told Al Jazeera, adding that Russian ports in Astrakhan, on the Volga River delta near the Caspian Sea, and Makhachkala, on the Caspian Sea, are already “primed for a surge in grain, metals, timber and refined products”.

A western branch also runs through Azerbaijan, though a key missing rail link between Rasht and Astara in northern Iran remains unfinished.

In 2023, Moscow agreed to help finance the line, with Russia’s president calling the agreement a “great event” that “will help to significantly diversify global traffic flows”.

Easier in theory than in practice

Analysts say that, although these routes may provide a temporary solution, the Strait of Hormuz offers a scale and efficiency that rail and land corridors cannot easily replicate.

Although maritime trade has been highly volatile in recent weeks, “from a historical perspective it is simply the quickest and the most cost-effective way of transporting anything”, Adam Grimshaw, an economic historian at the University of Helsinki, told Al Jazeera.

“Roughly 90 percent of Iran’s international trade is maritime trade that goes through the Gulf, which can’t be quickly or immediately replaced through land access to Iran or through air transport to circumvent the American blockade”, Nader Hashemi, an associate professor at Georgetown University, told Al Jazeera.

Ghodsi said Russia might be able to offer a “lifeline” in the short term, as it did when it exported grain during Iran’s droughts, but in the long run, it simply “cannot substitute” the vast amounts of maritime trade.

Re-routing trade routes via land “takes time”, pushing up prices for consumers and creating more food waste as perishables rot en route.

Does Moscow want to help Iran?

Most analysts say throwing an economic lifeline to Iran is not in Russia’s interests.

“They’ve got their own economic problems,” John Lough, head of foreign policy at the New Eurasian Strategies Centre, told Al Jazeera, pointing to signs of stagnation inside Russia, pressure on reserves and growing frustration over the prolonged war in Ukraine.

While Moscow could offer symbolic support or limited humanitarian assistance, “now is not a good time” to invest in Iran, he said, referring to the US-Israel war on the country.

Replacing maritime trade with overland routes would be extremely difficult, despite years of discussion about alternative corridors linking the two nations, he said.

It also won’t necessarily help Iran’s economy, which needs all the export revenue it can get, experts say.

“Much of Iran’s economy revolves around the sale of oil, and with that blocked or prevented by the American blockade, Russia really can’t help in that regard”, Hashemi said.

Others are more optimistic, however.

“Propping [up] Iran locks in higher global oil prices that buoy Russia’s war economy, cements INSTC dominance for Asian trade, and keeps a key anti-Western ally alive – no downside for Moscow in a fragmented Gulf,” Aslaam said.