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China’s ballistic missile arsenal has undergone a dramatic transformation over the past two decades. Once centered on a relatively small force of nuclear missiles designed primarily for deterrence, which we discussed in the first part of this series, the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) now fields the world’s largest — and one of the most diverse — conventional and nuclear-armed ballistic missile forces. Among its increasingly advanced regional ballistic missiles are several types that are capable of carrying either conventional or nuclear warheads, further complicating crisis stability.

Ranging from short-range systems optimized for a Taiwan contingency to intermediate-range weapons capable of striking Guam and threatening U.S. naval forces deep into the Western Pacific, these regional missiles have become the backbone of Beijing’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy. The land-based examples are road-mobile, solid-fueled, and increasingly precise. Some are fitted with hypersonic or maneuvering warheads to further complicate the work of an adversary’s air defenses. As of last year, the Pentagon assessed that China fielded 600 missiles in the ‘boosted hypersonic’ category, which includes systems carrying hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) as well as air-launched ballistic missiles, also covered in this article.

This guide examines China’s principal short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missile systems, how they evolved, and the roles they are expected to play in any future conflict in the Indo-Pacific.

In this context, a short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) refers to a ballistic missile with a range of up to 1,000 kilometers (621 miles), typically intended for battlefield or nearby regional targets; a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) covers ranges of 1,000-3,000 kilometers (621-1,864 miles) and is designed to strike targets across a broader region; and an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) has a range of 3,000-5,500 kilometers (1,864-3,418 miles), enabling it to reach distant regional targets.

This article also discusses multiple missiles that carry either a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) or a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV). These weapon types can potentially be adapted to hit moving vessels. A MaRV follows a roughly ballistic path to its impact point, maneuvering to improve terminal accuracy and defeat missile defenses. If paired with a seeker, among other alterations, they can potentially be used to strike ships. Meanwhile, unlike a traditional ballistic reentry vehicle, an HGV is designed to be boosted to high speed and released before proceeding along a relatively shallow, atmospheric flight path to its target. It remains maneuverable throughout much of its flight, allowing it to change course and vary its altitude. That combination of sustained hypersonic speed and unpredictable flight profile makes it far more difficult to successfully engage, while also reducing the time air defenses have to defend against it — provided they even have weapons that can successfully do so.

Short-range ballistic missiles

The PLARF fields multiple variants of the DF-11, DF-15, and DF-16 SRBM families. Among their most important roles is to hold Taiwan and the southern reaches of the Japanese archipelago at risk. Ongoing modernization efforts to improve accuracy, survivability, and operational flexibility underscore the continued importance of these systems, particularly for a cross-Strait campaign. Just as significant is their sheer quantity, which would enable sustained strikes against the many military and infrastructure targets that would need to be engaged in a major conflict.

DF-11A (CSS-7 Mod 2)

The origins of the DF-11 can be traced back to 1985, and work on a new single-stage solid-fuel ballistic missile. The initial requirement called for a 300-kilometer (186-mile) range, matching that of the widely used Soviet Scud-B, using a similar road-mobile transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). However, development trailed the DF-15, culminating in a successful flight test in mid-1990.

The DF-11 entered PLARF service in 1992, but work on an improved version reportedly began almost immediately. Development of the DF-11A started as early as 1993 and focused primarily on extending the missile’s reach to approximately 600 kilometers (373 miles), effectively doubling the range of the original design. Following its maiden flight in 1997, the program was publicly acknowledged the following year, and the DF-11A formally entered Chinese service in 1999.

China also developed a specialized bunker-busting variant known as the DF-11AZT, reportedly entering service in 2013. Believed to use the DF-11A airframe, the missile replaces the standard high-explosive payload with a penetrator warhead optimized for attacking hardened and fortified targets. Images of the system surfaced in Chinese media in 2016, followed by the release of footage showing a 2013 test launch the following year.

Although rumors have periodically claimed the DF-11 family can carry a nuclear warhead, the available evidence does not support that assessment. Today, it appears that only one brigade still operates the system.

DF-15 (CSS-6)

China began developing a new generation of conventionally armed, mobile SRBMs during the 1980s, mainly with export customers in mind. The DF-15 has evolved through several iterations, although publicly available information on the missile family remains fragmented and, in some cases, contradictory. The first major upgrade, the DF-15A, reportedly entered service in 1996 and has occasionally been described as being capable of carrying a nuclear payload. However, the only PLARF brigade still believed to operate the variant is consistently identified in open-source assessments as a conventional missile unit. Estimates of its maximum range are equally inconsistent, with figures ranging from the original 600 kilometers (373 miles) to as much as 900 kilometers (559 miles).

A more substantial redesign followed with the DF-15B (CSS-6 Mod 3), which reportedly entered operational service around 2006 before making its public debut during China’s military parade in 2009. The most obvious external change is its triconic reentry vehicle fitted with control fins, a configuration widely interpreted as incorporating a MaRV warhead.

Around 2013, another variant, the DF-15C (CSS-6 Mod 2), reportedly entered service. Based on the shape of its warhead, the missile is widely believed to be optimized for attacks against hardened and deeply buried targets, much like the previous DF-11AZT.

The DF-15 remains in service with only a small number of PLARF brigades and appears to be steadily giving way to the newer, longer-ranged, and more capable DF-16.

In 2022, the PLARF fired multiple DF-15s into the waters around Taiwan during live-fire drills following then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. This reflects the fact that missiles in this category remain central to any contingency involving the island.

DF-16 (CSS-11)

Another conventionally armed mobile SRBM, the DF-16 has steadily replaced the DF-15. Although it made its public debut during China’s 2015 military parade, the missile is widely believed to have entered PLARF service several years earlier, around 2011 or 2012. Nevertheless, Much about the DF-16 remains unclear.

The DF-16 closely resembles the older DF-15, but lacks the prominent aerodynamic fins found on its predecessor. This suggests the missile relies on a more advanced guidance and flight-control system capable of maintaining stability without the need for large external control surfaces. There is also some uncertainty about its range: this could potentially surpass 1,000 kilometers (621 miles), a threshold that would place it in the MRBM category.

Stills from a video showing a test of a DF-16 with a submunitions warhead:

DF-16 from mid 2010s, with a submunition warhead.

Employment of submunition warheads against land based targets is well established, but for the PLA, their use for large and medium naval targets from AShBMs are more interesting especially from a mission kill pov. pic.twitter.com/m6S4QFAgDS

— Rick Joe (@RickJoe_PLA) March 8, 2026

A version equipped with what appears to be a MaRV, commonly identified as the DF-16A (CSS-11 Mod 2), was spotted in footage of a Chinese military exercise released in early 2017, indicating it was already operational by that point. Chinese state media later revealed another DF-16 warhead configuration in 2018, widely interpreted as evidence of a further variant, the DF-16B (CSS-11 Mod 3?). Despite the emergence of multiple versions, open-source reporting consistently indicates that the DF-16 family is intended exclusively for conventional strike missions.

Medium-range ballistic missiles

Over the past decade, Beijing has invested heavily in modernizing both the quality and quantity of its medium-range ballistic missile forces. Today, it fields a diverse mix of MRBMs, backed up by long-range land-attack cruise missiles, capable of executing both conventional and nuclear missions across the Indo-Pacific. All of these MRBMs are road-mobile, carried on wheeled TELs, and powered by solid-fuel rocket motors, allowing them to disperse rapidly, launch with minimal preparation, and complicate efforts to destroy them either before or after firing.

DF-17 (CSS-22)

One of the PLARF’s most significant recent additions is the DF-17, the world’s first operational ballistic missile designed from the outset to deliver an HGV. Publicly unveiled during China’s 70th anniversary military parade in 2019, the system is estimated to have entered service shortly beforehand.

With an estimated range of 1,800-2,200 kilometers (1,118-1,367 miles), the DF-17 can reach targets across Taiwan, South Korea, and most of Japan, as well as U.S. military facilities throughout the First Island Chain. Traveling at speeds reportedly approaching Mach 10, the DF-17 could cover its maximum range in roughly a dozen minutes, representing a far more difficult target for existing air and missile defense systems.

The PLARF would likely employ the DF-17 during the opening stages of a conflict to neutralize high-value assets, including integrated air and missile defense sites, long-range radars, command-and-control nodes, and other time-sensitive targets, thereby improving the effectiveness of follow-on strikes by less advanced missile systems.

Although Beijing maintains that the DF-17 is conventionally armed, Chinese media and senior U.S. military officials have suggested the missile may also possess a nuclear capability. If confirmed, it would join several other PLARF missile systems believed to be dual-capable, further complicating an adversary’s ability to distinguish between conventional and nuclear strikes during a crisis, and potentially increasing the risk of miscalculation.

Reports have also periodically pointed to the development of an anti-ship variant, which would further expand the DF-17’s role within China’s growing long-range precision strike arsenal.

DF-21

The origins of the DF-21 can be traced back to the late 1970s, when China began working in earnest on solid-fuel ballistic missiles. Following successful tests of a large-diameter solid rocket motor in 1978, development of the road-mobile DF-21 accelerated (as did work on a larger solid-fueled missile that would eventually evolve into the DF-31 intercontinental ballistic missile and its submarine-launched counterpart, the JL-2, both described in the first part of this feature).

The DF-21 completed its maiden successful test in 1985 and rapidly entered operational service with the PLA. The original DF-21 carried a single nuclear warhead and formed the backbone of China’s first generation of solid-fuel strategic missile forces. Its range is estimated at more than 1,750 kilometers (1,087 miles).

Even before the original DF-21 entered widespread service, work had begun on an improved version. Approved in 1986, the DF-21A (CSS-5 Mod 2) focused on reducing structural weight while increasing propellant capacity, extending the missile’s range and improving overall performance. Flight testing began in 1991, and by the mid-1990s the PLA had begun replacing the original DF-21 with the upgraded variant.

The DF-21 subsequently evolved from a purely nuclear deterrent into a remarkably versatile missile family. Around 2004, the PLA fielded the DF-21C (CSS-5 Mod 4), widely believed to be the first conventionally armed member of the series. Designed for precision land attack, the missile introduced an entirely new mission for the DF-21 but also highlighted a growing escalation risk. The DF-21C appears to have been retired, with surviving units reportedly having transitioned to newer missile systems.

Public information on a supposed DF-21B remains sparse. The designation may have referred to an intermediate development fitted with a MaRV before that technology matured into the much better-known DF-21D.

China’s Dong-Feng 21 “carrier killer” Salvo Launch

It was the DF-21D (CSS-5 Mod 5) that really brought the missile family into the spotlight, as one of China’s most closely watched strategic weapons. Public attention surged in 2010 after a senior U.S. Navy officer stated that the missile had reached initial operational capability. Equipped with a MaRV and designed specifically to attack moving warships, the conventionally armed DF-21D became the world’s first operational anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) and quickly earned the nickname “carrier killer” (since applied to several other weapon systems). Western sources attribute the DF-21D with a range of more than 1,500 kilometers (932 miles).

The concept reflected Beijing’s broader A2/AD strategy, which seeks to hold U.S. carrier strike groups at risk and complicate U.S. military intervention inside the First Island Chain. U.S. defense reports had been tracking the program since the mid-2000s, and subsequent reports indicate the DF-21D has been tested against both land-based carrier mockups and actual targets at sea, underscoring China’s continued investment in long-range precision strike capabilities.

While both the DF-21C and DF-21D are conventionally armed, there is also a more modern nuclear-armed addition to the family. First reported in 2016, information about this missile is scarce. Some sources refer to this variant as the DF-21E, though this designation has not been seen in an authoritative context in China, and the Western reporting name CSS-5 Mod 6 has meanwhile been applied.

For years, the medium-range DF-21 formed the backbone of China’s regional ballistic missile force, with different variants providing conventional land-attack, anti-ship, and nuclear strike capabilities. That role is increasingly being assumed by the longer-ranged DF-26 IRBM, which significantly expands the PLARF’s reach by bringing Guam, and its concentration of critical U.S. military facilities, within range. The in-development DF-27 looks set to push that range even further, blurring the boundary between an IRBM and an ICBM.

DF-26 (CSS-18)

Increasingly the centerpiece of the PLARF’s regional strike force is the DF-26, which appears to be a substantially enlarged and more capable evolution of the DF-21. Development is believed to have begun before 2010, with the first images emerging from Chinese sources around 2012 before U.S. intelligence publicly acknowledged the missile’s existence in 2014. Mounted on a highly mobile six-axle TEL, the two-stage, solid-fueled DF-26 made its public debut during China’s 2015 military parade and entered operational service the following year.

The DF-26 combines significantly greater range with exceptional mission flexibility. Unlike many earlier PLARF missiles, it is believed to be genuinely dual-capable, able to carry either conventional or nuclear warheads that can reportedly be exchanged relatively quickly depending on operational requirements.

In addition to land-attack missions, China has also fielded an anti-ship variant, equipped with a MaRV, and effectively extending the DF-21D’s “carrier killer” concept many hundreds of miles farther out to sea.

The DF-26 is thought to have a range of more than 3,000 kilometers (1,864 miles).

Just as significant as the DF-26’s capabilities is the pace at which it has been fielded. The missile has become one of the fastest-growing elements of the PLARF’s inventory, reflecting Beijing’s increasing emphasis on longer-range conventional strike options. The U.S. Department of Defense estimated that China possessed more than 200 DF-26 launchers by 2020, a figure that had grown to around 250 just two years later. Combined with its ability to strike targets as far away as Guam while performing both conventional and nuclear missions, the DF-26 is poised to remain one of the PLARF’s most important regional strike weapons for the foreseeable future.

DF-27 (CSS-X-24)

A next-generation system, the DF-27, represents the PLARF’s continued modernization. The Pentagon’s 2023 assessment described the DF-27 as still being under development, but a tranche of leaked U.S. intelligence documents earlier that year suggested at least a limited number had already entered service. If accurate, the DF-27 would represent another significant leap in China’s long-range precision strike capabilities. The Pentagon has stated that the missile could have a range of 5,000-8,000 kilometers (3,107-4,971 miles), pushing into the intercontinental-range category. Even at the lower end of this assessment, it could strike targets far beyond the Second Island Chain, including parts of Alaska and Australia, depending on launch location. At the higher end, it would be sufficient to reach Hawaii and potentially parts of the U.S. West Coast from some launch locations.

One missile I was hoping to see in yesterday’s PLA parade was the DF-27—a new long-range hypersonic missile that’s been discussed in the annual DoD China Military Power Report for the last few years.

However, it was missing from the parade…or was it??? pic.twitter.com/GPIGwkMgUG

— Tom Shugart (@tshugart3) September 3, 2025

Available reports indicate the missile is designed to carry an HGV and will likely be fielded in both land-attack and anti-ship variants. That combination could substantially expand the PLARF’s ability to threaten high-value targets across the Western Pacific, extending the reach of China’s A2/AD network farther into areas where U.S. carrier strike groups have traditionally operated under reduced threat.

The missile’s payload remains undisclosed, but given the PLARF’s growing inventory of dual-capable ballistic missiles, it would not be surprising if the DF-27 were ultimately able to carry either conventional or nuclear warheads.

Air-launched ballistic missiles

Falling into an interesting category is the air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM). The ALBM concept is far from new, with designs dating back to the Cold War, although they are currently seeing something of a comeback, with multiple nations around the globe now pursuing their capabilities. China is among them, and the best-known of these weapons, the JL-1, is today considered to constitute the airborne arm of the Chinese nuclear triad.

JL-1

The JL-1 ALBM can be launched by the modernized H-6N missile carrier aircraft of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). These aircraft feature a modified fuselage that allows for the external carriage of these large weapons, as well as an in-flight refueling probe, extending their range.

The JL-1 ALBM is assumed to be the same missile that has been referred to in the past in the West as the CH-AS-X-13, and which is understood to have been in development since at least the mid-2010s. This missile is reported to be an adapted, air-launched version of the DF-21 MRBM and similarly equipped with a MaRV. The possible relationship with the DF-21, and the DF-21D specifically, has prompted previous speculation about the H-6N having an anti-ship role, particularly against U.S. carrier strike groups, as well as being able to hit land targets.

China released first in-flight footage of an H-6N bomber carrying the JL-1 nuclear-capable air-launched ballistic missile, escorted by two J-20 stealth fighters.

JL-1: Nuclear-capable ALBM, ~8,000 km range, hypersonic reentry, also usable for anti-ship/land-attack. pic.twitter.com/e9uokWFnvz

— Clash Report (@clashreport) August 4, 2026

China has said the JL-1 (presumably coupled with the H-6N) has a range of approximately 8,000 kilometers (4,971 miles), although this is very much unconfirmed.

The latest Pentagon report on Chinese military capabilities refers to the H-6N as a “nuclear weapons-capable bomber,” and that its JL-1 ALBM is a “highly precise theater weapon that would be well suited for delivering a low-yield nuclear weapon.” However, it may also have the option of a conventional warhead.

Imagery has also emerged in the past, as seen below, which has contributed to discussions about the possibility of a second variation on the Chinese ALBM concept, with what may be a wedge-shaped unpowered HGV on top. As with the JL-1, this weapon could also be anti-ship capable.

KD-21

Finally, the H-6K variant can carry the smaller KD-21 ALBM on its center-wing pylons. This designation indicates an anti-ship missile, but it may well have the capability to strike ground targets, too.

In terms of its appearance, the weapon is very similar to the Russian Kinzhal (known in the West as the AS-24 Killjoy), a missile that is launched from adapted MiG-31 Foxhound interceptors and which has been employed in the war in Ukraine, apparently with only mixed success. Like the Kinzhal, which is an air-launched development of the Iskander SRBM, the KD-21 may be derived from a land-based weapon. In particular, the Chinese missile bears a close resemblance to the CM-401 land-based anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), a weapon offered for export. The truck- or ship-launched CM-401 is also capable of hitting static land targets and is said to have a terminal speed of between Mach 4 and 6 and a range of up to 290 kilometers (180 miles).

Missile numbers

Estimating the size of the PLARF’s missile arsenal remains challenging, and, understandably, publicly available figures differ depending on whether they refer to launchers or missiles.

Recent Pentagon assessments estimate the PLARF operates roughly 200 SRBM launchers backed by around 1,000 missiles, approximately 300 MRBM launchers with some 1,300 missiles, and another 300 IRBM launchers fielding roughly 550 DF-26-class missiles.

While the number of Chinese SRBM launchers used for the DF-15 and DF-16 missiles, both of which are conventionally armed, has remained static in recent years according to Western estimates, Beijing has prioritized the development and deployment of land-based MRBMs and IRBMs, such as the dual-capable DF-21 and DF-26. From 2018 to 2019, for example, the Pentagon noted that the number of Chinese IRBM launchers and missiles had at least roughly tripled from roughly 30 to 80. In its 2020 report, the Pentagon noted that the PLARF had further increased this number to approximately 200 launchers.

These figures are informed estimates, and they vary noticeably across successive Pentagon reports as intelligence assessments evolve. Even so, they underscore the extraordinary scale of China’s regional strike force and, perhaps more importantly, its substantial magazine depth. This would allow the PLARF to conduct repeated waves of missile strikes in a high-intensity campaign. Current conflicts, especially between Iran and the United States/Israel, as well as in Ukraine, have shown just how critical these weapons are, and underscore that they can be a deterrent just by existing in huge numbers. The cost of air defense is also very high for the one being targeted. These lessons learned will likely accelerate China’s acquisition of more missiles and improved designs.

Taken together, the missile families detailed here illustrate how dramatically the PLARF has evolved from a relatively small strategic force into one of the world’s most capable missile services. Older systems such as the DF-11, DF-15, and DF-21 continue to provide valuable magazine depth, while newer designs including the DF-16, DF-17, DF-26, and emerging DF-27 emphasize greater range, improved accuracy, enhanced survivability, and increased operational flexibility.

Just as importantly, Beijing has increasingly blurred the line between conventional and nuclear deterrence by fielding a growing number of dual-capable missile systems, complicating an adversary’s ability to determine China’s intentions during a crisis.

Coupled with expanding production, continued technological refinement, and the proliferation of hypersonic and anti-ship capabilities, the PLARF’s regional missile arsenal has become a central pillar of China’s military modernization and one of the most consequential strike forces in the Indo-Pacific. Any future conflict involving Taiwan, the First Island Chain, or U.S. forces in the Western Pacific is certain to feature these missiles prominently from its opening hours.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Aug. 4 (Asia Today) — More than half of the unresolved cases at South Korea’s anti-corruption agency have been pending for more than three months, raising concerns that chronic understaffing is undermining its ability to investigate alleged crimes involving senior government officials.

Data submitted by the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials to People Power Party lawmaker Shin Dong-wook showed that 646 of its 1,243 unresolved cases had been pending for more than three months as of July 22.

The figure represented 52% of the agency’s unresolved caseload. The agency generally classifies cases pending for more than three months as long-running investigations.

The data showed that 597 cases had been pending for three months or less. An additional 252 cases had been pending for more than three months but less than six months, while 248 had been unresolved for six months to less than a year.

Another 146 cases had remained unresolved for at least one year.

The agency attributed the backlog primarily to a continuing increase in criminal complaints and accusations, along with a chronic shortage of personnel.

Under the law establishing the agency, it may employ 25 prosecutors, including its chief and deputy chief. It currently has 23 prosecutors, meaning it has not filled even its legally authorized staffing level.

The agency operates four investigative divisions, but only 18 prosecutors, including four division chiefs, are assigned directly to investigative work. Based on the total backlog, that is equivalent to more than 300 unresolved cases for each division.

The agency was launched in 2021 under the administration of former President Moon Jae-in to investigate alleged abuse of authority, bribery, violations of political funding laws and other crimes involving senior public officials and their family members.

Its creation was intended to strengthen oversight of powerful officials and root out corruption in government. Staffing shortages, however, have repeatedly been cited as a major limitation on the agency’s operations.

Legal experts said a prolonged backlog could damage public confidence not only in the agency’s investigative capabilities but also in the institution itself.

Cases involving high-ranking officials frequently involve complex facts, extensive questioning of witnesses and time-consuming efforts to obtain evidence. Excessive delays, however, can weaken the effectiveness of an investigation.

Concerns about South Korea’s overall ability to process criminal cases are also likely to increase as prosecutors face a growing number of unresolved investigations while long-pending cases accumulate at the anti-corruption agency.

“The number of long-running cases has increased because of the continuing rise in criminal complaints and accusations and the chronic shortage of personnel,” an agency official said.

“All members of the agency are making every effort to process cases promptly,” the official said.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260803010000486

A Pacific island has become one of the biggest economic success stories of the year so far.

Taiwan has witnessed a dramatic boom in recent months driven by the mania for artificial intelligence (AI). Earlier this year, its stock exchange soared to become the fifth largest in the world based on market capitalisation, the value of its publicly traded shares, overtaking the United Kingdom, Canada and India.

Much of that upward momentum has been driven by AI and other technology exports highly sought after by the United States.

Last year, the US imported $201bn worth of goods from Taiwan, nearly double its rate from 2024, when it acquired $116bn in imports. In May, Taiwan eclipsed China to become the third-largest source of US imports, after Mexico and Canada.

Experts have described Taiwan’s market acceleration as a return to its status as a “tiger economy” — a term used to capture surging growth in East Asia. Much of the credit, they say, falls to its flourishing technology sector.

“Artificial intelligence helps explain the rising importance of Taiwan,” said Chad Bown, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

But critics warn that, while Taiwan’s market remains strong, factors like tumultuous international relations, as well as demographic concerns, could complicate the island’s long-term outlook.

“It seems to be a win-win for now,” said Reza Hasmath, an academic faculty adviser at The China Institute at the University of Alberta. “But Taiwan is just postponing a reality that’s not sustainable.”

An economic boom

Taiwan’s thriving export market helped boost its gross domestic product (GDP) to 8.63 percent in 2025.

That rocket-ship trajectory continued into the first quarter of this year, when the GDP saw an exhilarating 13.69 percent rise.

Government data released on Friday showed that the island is continuing that momentum, with its economy growing an impressive 12.92 percent in the second quarter of the year, which ended in June.

“The GDP growth is going like gangbusters,” said Dexter Tiff Roberts, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub.

Roberts expects the trend to be “long term”, as Taiwan produces about 90 percent of the advanced chips used to power leading AI models.

“That’s not going to go away. We know the world, and the US, needs this,” he added.

While the AI boom is a global phenomenon, the US has become a major market for such chips, with billions of dollars flowing into the industry each year.

US President Donald Trump, meanwhile, has pledged to bolster his country’s status as “the world leader in artificial intelligence”. His administration has claimed to attract more than $2.7 trillion in tech and AI investments since the start of his second term.

To secure US access to Taiwan’s cutting-edge semiconductor technology, the Trump administration signed an agreement under which Taiwan will invest $500bn in the US.

Half of that amount is expected to come in the form of direct investments by Taiwanese semiconductor and tech firms, including through the development of onshore tech manufacturing.

The rest is largely comprised of credit guarantees for additional investments from Taiwan in the US.

Under the agreement, Taiwanese firms would be allowed to import 2.5 times the capacity of their US factories, without fear of steep tariffs.

In a subsequent trade agreement, Taiwan agreed to reduce its tariffs on 99 percent of US exports.

Taiwan has also boosted its tech exports to the US through investments in nearby Mexico, with cross-border plants manufacturing inputs for data centres in Texas.

‘Unbalanced relationship’

But Hasmath, the faculty adviser at the University of Alberta, warns that there are troubling signs on the horizon for Taiwan-US relations.

Trump has long sought to eliminate trade deficits with US economic allies, and he has lashed out at countries that export more to the US than they import.

Hasmath pointed out that Taiwan is building a robust trade surplus with the US, close to $200bn and counting. That could spark a backlash.

“This is an unbalanced relationship and not conducive to Taiwan in the long term,” Hasmath warned.

Trump will not tolerate a hefty trade surplus for long, he added. Hasmath believes the US president will soon look to renegotiate his country’s deals with Taipei.

Roberts at the Atlantic Council, meanwhile, warned that Trump is “mercurial” — and with such a temperament comes “uncertainty”.

Then there’s the question of political upheaval in the US. Trump’s approval ratings are low, and he is ineligible under US law to run for a third term as president.

Demographic problems

While Taiwan’s economic boom is “very real” and “very obvious”, Roberts said there are clear vulnerabilities even on the domestic front.

Taiwan’s traditional export sectors like plastics and textiles are underperforming. Plus, Roberts pointed out that only a small fraction of the Taiwanese population is involved in the AI sector.

“A majority of the younger population is not in hi tech, so that’s a real problem,” he said.

While the booming stock market has sparked a “wealth effect” — those with rising portfolios feel richer and are more inclined to spend — that helps the wider population only to an extent.

With most of Taiwan’s employment concentrated outside of the AI sector, economists have warned that the island could develop what’s called a K-shaped economy, where the wealthy see growth, while the poorer segments of society stagnate or decline.

The chip industry employs up to 350,000 people at most, experts say.

Meanwhile, TSMC, Taiwan’s biggest chip company, makes up to 40 percent of the stock market and provides four percent of the island’s GDP growth. That lopsided proportion is “unsustainable”, according to Hasmath.

Plus, Taiwan has a rapidly ageing population, with roughly a fifth of its population over the age of 65.

The island also has other vulnerabilities. For example, it relies heavily on foreign imports of energy products, particularly oil, and has struggled with water scarcity.

Then, there’s the superpower next door: China. The government in Beijing considers Taiwan, a self-governing island, as its own territory, and it has taken aggressive measures to limit the island’s ability to establish diplomatic relations of its own.

That conflict has added fuel to the debate around Taiwan’s growth, with a spokesperson for the Chinese government reportedly saying the island’s growing proximity to the US tech sector will “drain Taiwan’s economic interests” and “hollow out” the country’s major industry.

Hasmath said that, if the AI boom backfires on Taiwan, all of that ultimately adds up to a “recipe for electoral change, a shift in government” in Taipei.

China fields the largest and most sophisticated ballistic missile arsenal in Asia, supported by what the U.S. Department of Defense has described as “the world’s most active and diverse missile development program.” In the first of this series, TWZ provides an overview of the country’s intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs), representing the leading edge of Beijing’s nuclear deterrent forces.

China has rapidly expanded and modernized the arsenal of its People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), fielding a growing number of ballistic missiles capable of delivering either conventional or nuclear warheads. The backbone of the force now consists of road-mobile, solid-fuel medium-, intermediate-, and intercontinental-range missiles. However, legacy liquid-fueled systems such as the Dong Feng-5 (CSS-4) remain in service, and a new silo-building program will change the balance yet again.

The expansion shows no signs of slowing. According to one report, by the start of this decade, the number of Chinese ballistic missile brigades had grown by more than 35 percent in just three years, with most new formations operating medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) alongside ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs).

Perhaps most dramatically, China has embarked on a rapid expansion of its ICBM silos. In 2021, open-source researchers observed the construction of several hundred new missile silos. These are located near Yumen (120 silos), Hami (110 silos), and Ordos (around 90), and they raise big questions about how many ICBMs China aims to deploy. The analysts responsible for locating the new solos described it as “the most significant expansion of the Chinese nuclear arsenal ever,” but its full significance remains to be seen.

Leaving some of the new silos empty might be an option, revisiting the ‘shell game’ that was planned for the U.S. Peacekeeper ICBM in the late 1970s. However, the U.S. State Department has said that the U.S. intelligence community believes every silo will have a missile ‘loaded.’ You can read our previous assessment of this development here.

At the same time, Beijing is improving the survivability and effectiveness of its strategic arsenal through the deployment of multiple independent re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) and penetration aids, while advancing new sea- and air-based nuclear delivery systems. These include the Type 096 ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and its JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), as well as the nuclear-capable H-20 stealth bomber currently under development, further strengthening China’s emergence as a fully fledged nuclear triad power.

As for the nuclear warheads that arm the ICBMs and SLBMs discussed below, the numbers available are a closely guarded secret. However, the Pentagon has estimated that China had surpassed 600 operational nuclear warheads in its stockpile as of mid-2024 and will have over 1,000 operational warheads by 2030, much of which will be deployed at higher readiness levels.

DF-5 (CSS-4)

Range: 12,000+ kilometers

With the DF-4, a ‘limited-range ICBM,’ having been retired from service around 2023, the DF-5, China’s first true ICBM, is now the oldest in the inventory.

On account of its size, the two-stage, liquid-fueled DF-5 was always intended for silo deployment.

Although tested as early as 1971, the missile wasn’t successfully flown over longer ranges until 1980. It appears that China had particular challenges getting the powerful new engines to work, and other new developments over the DF-4 included using nitrogen tetroxide as an oxidizer and steering via gimballed engines and vernier engines rather than jet vanes.

As tensions with the Soviet Union increased, China accelerated the program, placing the missiles in experimental silos by December 1980, a month after the handover of the first DF-5.

As early as 1983, work began on the improved DF-5A, known in the West as the CSS-4 Mod 2, four units of which were reportedly operational by 1992. Deployed DF-5 units were gradually replaced with the DF-5A. The DF-5 and DF-5A both featured a multi-megaton warhead.

In 2015, the further-improved DF-5B (CSS-4 Mod 2) variant was unveiled. In a first for China, this version is understood to differ from its predecessors in carrying multiple warheads, reportedly four re-entry vehicles per missile. The delay in fielding a missile with nuclear-armed multiple independent re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) may seem surprising, but reflects the major technological challenges, which saw China lag behind the Soviet Union (later Russia) and the United States for many years.

At the same time, it appears that, instead of attempting to boost penetrative power against enemy defenses by adopting MIRVs, China instead focused more on rapid launch sequences and hardened silos for its ICBMs.

It should be noted that the DF-5 also served as the basis for China’s important Long March 2 series of space launch vehicles and its successors.

The latest version of the missile is the DF-5C (CSS-4 Mod 4). This features an enlarged final stage section, which the Pentagon has suggested carries a multi-megaton-sized warhead. This would indicate a counter-value rather than a counter-force system, i.e., expected to target enemy population centers and economic assets, rather than its military capabilities like missile silos and command bases.

The DF-5 and its improved variants remain in service as China’s last liquid-fueled ballistic missiles. According to Western estimates, there are 20 known DF-5 silos, although China is building additional silos which may well also be used to house these weapons, as well as more modern missiles.

DF-31 and DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 1 and CSS-10 Mod 2)

Range: DF-31 (CSS-10 Mod 1) 7,000+ km; DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 2) 11,000+ km

With Sino-Soviet relations hitting a low in the early 1970s, China launched the development of a solid-fuel ICBM (and a submarine-launched counterpart) as part of a major overhaul of its strategic forces.

Initial work on what became the DF-31 began in 1974, but the program made little progress until 1978. Successful tests of a new solid-fuel motor in 1983 spurred these efforts and led Beijing to scrap work on a new liquid-fuel ICBM. In 1984, an official directive called for a shift from liquid to solid propellants, as well as a focus on tactical rather than strategic missile systems.

Solid-fueled missiles, when combined with mobile launchers, can leave cover and launch far more quickly, eliminating the lengthy fueling process required while the missile is erected. As a result, they are significantly less vulnerable to preemptive strikes. The shorter launch timeline also drastically improves the ability to respond to a crisis.

From 1985, China embarked on its ‘second-generation strategic missile’ program, spearheaded by the DF-31 and the submarine-launched JL-2.

In 1999, the three-stage DF-31 was publicly unveiled for the first time during a parade. However, the missile didn’t enter service until 2006, reportedly due to difficulties related to the guidance systems.

As a mobile solid-fuel ICBM, the closest match to the DF-31 is perhaps Russia’s Topol. The U.S. Minuteman III is similar in terms of size and configuration but is exclusively silo-based and has significantly better performance.

The DF-31 is an important part of Beijing’s strategic force. Most significantly, perhaps, it reflects a shift from a Chinese ICBM force dominated by heavy, liquid-fuel missiles to one fielding a larger number of smaller, mobile solid-fuel missiles.

As well as the original DF-31 (CSS-10 Mod 1), of which around eight launchers are understood to be deployed, China operates around 24 launchers armed with the DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 2). The DF-31A reportedly first flew in 1999 and has a longer range thanks to a lighter guidance system and other improvements. Both types carry a single warhead.

There is also a silo-based version of the missile, which Beijing is now presumed to have installed in many of the silos in its missile fields. This is designated as the DF-31BJ, but few details about it are known.

DF-31AG (CSS-10 Mod 3)

Range: unknown

In 2017, China publicly displayed a new variant of the DF-31, the DF-31AG. Mounted on a new transporter-erector-launcher (TEL), the new missile system has a distinctly unique appearance and likely has certain different capabilities, perhaps including multiple warheads. Based on commercial satellite imagery, it appears that China is converting at least some of its existing DF-31A brigades to this new variant.

Compared to the tractor-trailer configuration of the MEL used on the DF-31/DF-31A, that for the DF-31AG is highly mobile and much more suitable for off-road operations, suggesting a different employment concept. Around 30 launchers are understood to be deployed.

DF-41 (CSS-20)

Range: 12,000+ km

While the DF-31 series marked a step change for China’s strategic forces, these ‘second-generation strategic missiles’ were just a part of the process of modernizing the deterrent.

By 1986, China was working on an even more ambitious three-stage solid-fuel missile, the DF-41. This was intended to fully replace the liquid-fuel DF-5 by no later than 2010, although this goal was not achieved.

Like the DF-31, the new ICBM would be mobile, and, in parallel with its development, China made efforts to make portions of its highway network more suitable for handling the heavy mobile launchers.

The DF-41 was revealed to the public during a parade in 2019. At the time, it was announced that two brigades were already equipped with this system.

In contrast to the DF-31, the DF-41 is thought to be equipped with multiple warheads, although sources disagree on how many. Published figures range from three to 10 MIRVs, although it’s probable that a range of different numbers and yields can be accommodated. One Pentagon assessment said that “the system is likely intended to carry no more than three warheads per missile and has improved range and accuracy over DF-31 class ICBMs.”

In addition to the road-mobile version, the U.S. Department of Defense has assessed that both silo-based and rail-based variants are under development. Potentially, the newly built silos could accommodate other ICBMs, like the DF-31 and DF-5, but the more modern DF-41 appears a more likely candidate.

Looking at the road-mobile type only, a total of 18 launchers for the DF-41 are understood to be deployed.

DF-61

Range: unknown

The latest Chinese ICBM to have been revealed is the DF-61, shown publicly for the first time during the parade celebrating the 80th anniversary of victory in World War II, in September 2025. There have been suggestions that the missile could be the launcher for one or more intercontinental-range nuclear-armed HGVs. (It is unclear what happened to the ‘missing’ DF-51 designation, which only ever appears to have been used speculatively).

U.S. intelligence considers that there is a Chinese counterpart to Russia’s Avangard, namely, an intercontinental-range hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), which may be carried atop the DF-61. Designed to fly at high speeds and low altitudes, it would seriously complicate an adversary’s ability to provide precise warning. It is likely the same gliding re-entry vehicle that China tested in 2021 as a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) capable of defeating U.S. missile defences.

Chinese officials have hinted at such a capability in the past. In 2024, then-Principal Assistant Deputy Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, Dr. Vipin Narang, described a ‘strategic hypersonic glide missile that can carry nuclear warheads’ in Beijing’s arsenal. Such a missile would provide a long-range, strategic complement to the theater-range, conventionally armed DF-17 hypersonic boost glide vehicle.

JL-2 (CSS-N-14)

Range: 7,000 km

Soon after embarking on its nuclear program, China began looking at launching a ballistic missile from a nuclear-powered submarine. The ambition was long delayed, since the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) did not commission its first nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) until 1984. The goal was further thwarted when it deprioritized its SSBN program, and only a single Type 092 class boat was ever fielded.

Ultimately, China did not possess a true sea-based deterrent until the mid-2010s. The PLAN deployed its first Type 094 Jin class SSBN in 2007 and commissioned its sixth example in 2021.

Each Jin class submarine carries 12 JL-2 (CSS-N-14) submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), which are derived from the DF-31 ICBM. The three-stage solid-fuel missile was reportedly tested for the first time in 2004. British and U.S. intelligence reports on the status of the JL-2 were generally circumspect, and they only started to list the missile as operational around 2015.

The limited range of the JL-2 means that the Type 094 submarines would need to operate in areas north and east of Hawaii if China wanted to strike targets on the U.S. east coast. This puts a serious dent in the credibility of China’s sea-based deterrent, and this is exacerbated by the fact that only a portion of what is already a small SSBN force will be on patrol at any given time.

Most Western sources consider that the JL-2 is armed with a single warhead, although there have been rumors of a multiple-warhead configuration with three to eight MIRVs.

JL-3

Range: 10,000 km (estimated)

China is developing a follow-on to the JL-2, the JL-3, which would allow it to target portions of the continental United States from its own territorial waters. This missile is expected to be deployed on the new Type 096 submarine, which China likely began constructing in the early 2020s. These new SSBNs are expected to enter service in the 2030s and will provide China with a much more credible sea-based deterrent. The Pentagon has also reported that some of the older Type 094 submarines may have been equipped to carry the JL-3 as well as the older JL-2.

The JL-3 is presumed to be a three-stage, solid-fuel weapon carrying multiple warheads.

“Over the next decade, the PRC [People’s Republic of China] probably will continue to modernize, diversify, and expand its nuclear forces rapidly,” the Pentagon had noted in the unclassified version of an annual report on Chinese military developments that it sent to Congress in December 2024.

“The PLARF is advancing its long-term modernization plans to enhance its ‘strategic deterrence’ capabilities,” the report added.

The development of new ICBMs and SLBMs is an important part of this, and one that will significantly improve its nuclear-capable missile forces. However, these weapons are just one part of the picture. China is busy working on fielding a larger and more diverse missile force, both nuclear and conventional. China’s bewildering array of intermediate-, medium-, and short-range ballistic missiles will be discussed in a forthcoming article.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

AMMAN, Jordan — When Iranian ballistic missiles repeatedly struck Jordan last week, killing three American service members and wounding dozens of others, it brought the spotlight on a U.S. military presence the government of this desert kingdom has long worked to downplay.

Jordan has been a decades-long military and counterterrorism partner with the United States, opening its territory over the years to U.S. and other Western troops in their engagements throughout the region. But faced with a population that is overwhelmingly pro-Palestinian and suspicious of the U.S. for its all-out support of Israel, the government had kept those relationships at a low profile.

But now, Jordan’s growing role in the United States’ war with Iran — and the intensifying Iranian retaliation that role invites — is spurring uncomfortable conversations for the government.

“Jordanians are trapped in a dilemma: They’re being dragged into a war they didn’t want, but the cause of that war is ironically the ally they bargained with to protect them in the first place,” said Sean Yom, a professor of political science and Jordan expert at Temple University who wrote the book “Jordan: Politics in an Accidental Crucible.”

“So they’re asking what’s the wisdom of having this geopolitical bargain with a patron like the U.S. when one of the sources of our instability is the relationship that’s supposed to guarantee our security.”

Since the ceasefire broke down July 8 and the U.S. began launching near-daily waves of strikes on Iran, Jordan has been targeted on nine occasions, with ballistic missiles and drones hitting U.S. assets and facilities and endangering some 4,000 service members at a number of Jordanian military bases across the country.

One of those salvos, on July 17, hit a housing unit in Muwaffaq Al-Salti, a Jordanian base in the country’s east, killing three U.S. service members and wounding at least four others. Also attacked were King Faisal Airbase, Prince Hassan Airbase and the airport in Aqaba.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps claimed the strikes not only killed and wounded dozens of U.S. military personnel, but also damaged drones, helicopters, F-15 preparation hangars, radar sites, missile defense systems and munitions depots.

More worryingly for Jordan, the IRGC issued statements thanking “honorable people” in Jordan for providing “sincere cooperation and precise information,” which it said enabled it to target and kill “dozens of American terrorist forces.”

“Seize every opportunity to dismantle American institutions and expel the American occupation army from Jordan,” one of the statements said.

As word of the attacks spread, Jordan’s government, normally reticent about foreign military deployments in the country, embarked on damage control.

Officials and members of parliament swiftly condemned Tehran for violating the country’s sovereignty, while the foreign ministry summoned Iran’s charge d’affaires in Amman, the Jordanian capital, and demanded Iran cease attacks on the kingdom. Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi, meanwhile, rejected Iran’s claim that the U.S. has bases in the country.

“There are no American bases in Jordan. We have American troops that are in Jordan as part of our long-standing military cooperation,” he said at the Aspen Security Forum earlier this month. Safadi was referring to the 2021 defense agreement that allows U.S. forces unfettered access to 12 facilities in Jordan, including five air bases; the agreement was approved via royal decree and bypassed parliament.

“Their presence is governed by a defense agreement that fully respects our sovereignty,” he said.

Yet government statements didn’t do much to allay concerns. Though many Jordanians have little love for Iran, more than 300 politicians, academics, lawyers, retired military officers and tribal leaders signed an open letter last week calling on the government to withdraw from the defense agreement and keep Jordanian installations neutral — a bold move in a country where opposition to government policies (especially in security matters) can be a red line.

“Jordan is not a party to this war. Its people should not have to bear the consequences or pay the price for policies that do not serve the nation’s supreme interests,” the letter said.

“We urge the avoidance of the dangers associated with aligning ourselves under the American umbrella; this requires adopting a policy of genuine neutrality, based on refraining from any military or logistical involvement that serves any party to the conflict.”

Another sign of popular anger came Sunday: When one member of parliament exhorted the body to send condolences to Congress for the killing of the U.S. service members, others shouted him down, saying the legislature wasn’t a funeral parlor to console “criminals” and “child killers,” in reference to the United States’ support for Israel in Gaza.

Jordan grapples with questions similar to those facing its gulf neighbors, all of which rely on the U.S. security umbrella that has exposed their nations to Iranian attack. But those countries’ oil riches afford them leverage to push back on the U.S. presence, while Jordan — a resource-poor nation of some 11 million people — cannot.

The conflict, meanwhile, has only compounded Jordan’s economic woes. Tourism, which official figures say accounts for almost 15% of the country’s GDP and had just begun to recover from the 2023 Gaza war, has cratered since the start of military operations against Iran. One month after the war, gas prices rose by 11%, a body blow for Jordan’s perpetually anemic economy.

All that has made the kingdom ever more reliant on U.S. largesse. Washington gives Amman roughly $1.45 billion annually, including around $800 million that go straight to government coffers for budgetary support. It would be hard pressed to substitute that level of support from Europe or elsewhere, experts say.

At the same time, Jordan has become a vital nerve center for U.S. forces. The U.S. military has since 2019 spent hundreds of millions of dollars on upgrades for Muwaffaq Al-Salti and other facilities, according to U.S. federal contracting documents, laying aircraft aprons, taxiways, munitions depots and other infrastructure.

Satellite imagery of those bases from 2019 onward show significant construction and an increasing presence of U.S. assets, including F-16s, F-18s, drones and helicopters.

Now, with U.S. troops deployed in gulf nations proving vulnerable to Iranian barrages, Pentagon planners have transferred assets to locations farther away from Iran, especially Jordan.

In recent days, despite a pause in operations against Iran, flight tracking sites showed brisk U.S. military traffic, with logistical aircraft — including the massive C-17 Globemaster and KC-35 fueling tankers — making repeated trips between Jordan and U.S. military hubs in Europe.

Major central banks are confronting an increasingly difficult inflation landscape as multiple price pressures converge, raising questions over whether policymakers can continue treating inflation shocks as temporary.

The U.S. Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan and the Bank of England all meet this week against a backdrop of elevated inflation driven by rising energy costs, geopolitical tensions, supply chain disruptions, fiscal stimulus, labor market tightness and climate related risks.

While central banks have traditionally argued that isolated price shocks eventually fade without requiring aggressive monetary tightening, economists warn that today’s inflation environment is no longer defined by a single disruption but by several overlapping forces reinforcing one another.

Inflation remains well above target

The Federal Reserve’s preferred inflation measure, the Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) Price Index, is expected to remain significantly above the central bank’s 2 percent target.

Economists expect headline PCE inflation to stand at 3.7 percent and core inflation, which excludes food and energy, at 3.3 percent.

Inflation has remained above the Fed’s target for more than five consecutive years, complicating expectations that price growth will naturally return to normal levels.

Energy prices return as a major concern

Renewed military tensions in the Middle East have pushed crude oil prices sharply higher, adding fresh uncertainty to the global inflation outlook.

Brent crude briefly climbed above $100 per barrel before easing, while volatility in oil markets has increased as conflict around the Gulf and Red Sea threatens global energy supplies.

Higher crude prices have translated into rising fuel costs, with average U.S. gasoline prices now more than 30 percent above levels recorded a year earlier.

For central banks, energy inflation remains particularly difficult because monetary policy cannot directly resolve geopolitical conflicts or supply disruptions.

Food inflation adds further pressure

Food prices are emerging as another source of concern.

Annual U.S. food inflation already stands near 3 percent, while forecasts suggest stronger El Niño weather conditions could reduce agricultural production and lift global food prices over the coming months.

Some projections indicate food inflation could approach 5 percent next year, adding further upward pressure to overall consumer prices worldwide.

Unlike financial market volatility, rising food and fuel costs directly affect households and often shape public perceptions of inflation more than broader economic indicators.

Core inflation refuses to ease

Although policymakers often focus on core inflation because it removes volatile food and energy prices, underlying price pressures remain stubbornly elevated.

Persistent wage growth, continued strength in consumer spending and resilient labor markets have prevented meaningful progress toward the Fed’s inflation target.

Economists also warn that prolonged increases in food and energy prices eventually feed into broader consumer prices, making it increasingly difficult to separate temporary inflation from structural trends.

Tariffs and artificial intelligence create new price risks

Additional inflationary risks are emerging from trade policy and technological investment.

President Donald Trump’s renewed tariffs on imported goods could increase costs across multiple industries, while continued demand for artificial intelligence infrastructure has intensified shortages in advanced semiconductor markets.

Higher chip prices are expected to affect consumer electronics and industrial production, creating another potential source of inflation in manufactured goods.

Meanwhile, expansionary fiscal policies and strong financial conditions continue to support consumer demand, limiting the slowdown in prices that central banks have been seeking.

Strong labor markets complicate policy

Employment conditions remain exceptionally resilient across advanced economies.

In the United States, unemployment has remained near historically low levels, while wage growth above 3 percent continues to support household spending.

Although robust labor markets are generally viewed as positive for economic growth, they also contribute to persistent service sector inflation by increasing business labor costs.

This has made it harder for central banks to achieve price stability without risking slower economic growth.

Analysis: Inflation risks are becoming structural

The challenge facing central banks is no longer whether one inflation shock will fade but whether multiple overlapping shocks are creating a new inflation environment.

Energy markets remain vulnerable to geopolitical conflict. Climate related disruptions continue to threaten food production. Trade barriers are increasing production costs, while the rapid expansion of artificial intelligence is reshaping industrial demand and supply chains. At the same time, strong labor markets and expansionary fiscal policies continue to support consumer spending.

Individually, policymakers can argue that each of these factors is temporary or outside the influence of interest rates. Collectively, however, they reinforce one another and increase the likelihood that inflation remains above target for longer than anticipated.

For the Federal Reserve and other major central banks, the risk is no longer simply misjudging one temporary shock. The greater challenge is determining whether today’s inflation reflects a lasting structural shift in the global economy. If these pressures persist simultaneously, policymakers may be forced to maintain higher interest rates for longer, even at the cost of slower growth, making the path back to price stability significantly more difficult than markets currently expect.

With information from Reuters.

Though ostensibly aimed at giving diplomacy another shot at ending the conflict with Iran, the Trump administration’s pause in attacking the Islamic Republic reportedly comes as concerns linger over the supply of munitions, especially air defense interceptors. It is a notion that the president again dismissed on Monday; however, the lack of sufficient magazine depth is an issue that TWZ has raised frequently for years, and especially in regard to America’s air and missile defenses, in particular. In fact, we laid out in detail these exact concerns and how they would be a major issue in war with Iran just prior to the conflict starting in a feature you can read in full here. Meanwhile, amid the lull in fighting between the U.S. and Iran, Saudi Arabia and Jordan say they are still being attacked.

The U.S. and Iran stopped firing at each other late last week, leading to a pause after 13 straight days of continuous tit-for-tat operations. There hasn’t been a U.S. strike on Iranian territory since last Thursday. On Monday, President Donald Trump claims the U.S. has sufficient weapons stockpiles.

“…we have a lot,” Trump proclaimed to reporters aboard Air Force One when asked if he is concerned about a shortage of high-end munitions like interceptors for Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems. “We have a lot of the mid-level stuff too. Maybe more than we could ever use, no matter what. But we have a lot. I’d like to have more, to be honest.”

After again blaming the Biden administration for giving away too many weapons to Ukraine, Trump said the U.S. is restocking.

“So we’re building it very rapidly,” he exclaimed. “Plants are being built. A lot of equipment’s being built. The Patriots, in particular, are being built. That system is going up. We have a lot. Every one of our contractors is building four to five plants right now, and we’re in very good shape. But for some of the more sophisticated stuff, we certainly like that part.”

Before Trump spoke, the Pentagon on Monday announced that it signed “two landmark seven-year framework agreements” with Lockheed Martin and L3Harris “to expand production capacity for key components of the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) interceptor and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) weapon system.”

“Under this agreement, L3Harris will accelerate the production of its advanced two-pulse solid rocket motor, Attitude Control Motors, and the Lethality Enhancer,” the Pentagon said in a media release. “The motors deliver the critical speed, extended range, and precise maneuverability the PAC-3 MSE needs to defeat advanced tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and enemy aircraft.”

Concurrently, “the THAAD interceptor propulsion agreement, signed by the DoW, L3Harris, and Lockheed Martin, will expand manufacturing of two critical components: the solid rocket boost motor that launches the interceptor and the highly responsive Liquid Divert and Attitude Control System (LDACS),” the Pentagon added. “The LDACS provides the vital in-flight maneuverability required to engage and neutralize ballistic missile threats both inside and outside Earth’s atmosphere.”

As we have noted in previous reporting, current production PAC-3 MSE “is around the baseline rate of 650 interceptors per year, with half the deliveries going to the United States and the rest to allies and partners,” CSIS postulated in a May report about the severity of the depletion of U.S. offensive and defensive weapons during the 39 days of Epic Fury. 

Under a contract with the Pentagon inked in January, Lockheed is committed to boosting Patriot annual production to 2,000.

Still, the supply of these weapons remains a major issue.

The Wall Street Journal on Sunday reported that questions about the supply of U.S. offensive and defensive weapons are a large factor in the Trump administration’s reasons for halting attacks on Iran.

“The U.S. military had been poised Friday to launch an intensive series of strikes against Iran, which could have lasted up to two weeks,” the Journal noted, citing officials.

But the operation was delayed “so diplomacy could proceed and as officials discussed the effect a major attack could have on the U.S.’s shrinking stocks of Patriot and other air defense interceptors,” the publication added. “The president could still order an attack, officials said, noting that the situation remains fluid.”

The White House “has been informed of the declining inventories of air defense interceptors by Gen. Dan Caine, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” the publication continued. “The issue is a concern for Caine, who believes that the low inventories wouldn’t preclude a resumption of major combat operations against Iran, but would add to the risk.”

Several officials said Adm. Brad Cooper, who leads U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), “believes the U.S. can cope with the limited stocks of Patriot and other air defense interceptors because stepped-up U.S. strikes, if they are approved by Trump, would blunt Iran’s ability to launch large numbers of missiles.”

We reached out to CENTCOM for comment.

Questions about American stocks of high-end weapons also extend to Europe and Asia.

“U.S. officials now worry that President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia and Xi Jinping of China could be factoring the shortages into calculations of their next moves, in Ukraine and Europe for Mr. Putin and perhaps against Taiwan for Mr. Xi,” The New York Times posited on Sunday.

Trump also claimed that the Iranians are eager to reach a peace accord.

Iranian leaders requested a meeting and “the only reason they want to meet is because we’ve been hitting them very hard,” Trump told reporters.

Asked how much patience he has for negotiations, he said: “I have a lot of patience.”

“We’ll see what happens,” the president added. “I think there is a good chance that something could happen. If it doesn’t, we go back to doing what we were doing two days ago.”

Officials in Tehran scoffed at Trump’s assertion, saying there are no direct negotiations taking place.

The American leader also dismissed an assertion by Ukrainian President Volodymy Zelensky that Russia was providing Iran with satellite imagery used to help Iran strike U.S. an allied targets in the Middle East.

“We’ll find out if that’s true,” Trump told reporters. “I’ll ask Putin about it. It hasn’t had much impact, because we knocked the hell out of them.”

SACRAMENTO — When attorney Janice Rogers Brown left her job as Gov. Pete Wilson’s legal adviser last year to become a justice on the state’s 3rd District Court of Appeal, she cashed out the vacation, personal leave and holiday time accumulated in her years in state service.

Her unused 138 days off were converted into a lump sum payment of $52,359 when she moved to the judiciary, according to payroll records obtained from the state controller’s office.

“When I was in the governor’s office, I didn’t get much time off,” said Brown, who had earlier worked for the state attorney general.

The jurist was one of thousands of state employees who accumulate their vacations–and eventually cash them out–rather than use them.

While there is no question that they are entitled to the money–courts have ruled that the time is a vested right–the vast accumulation of vacation and leave time represents a sizable liability for state government.

As of June 30, California taxpayers owed their government employees more than $1.1 billion in accumulated vacation time, according to a controller’s office estimate.

And the amount is growing.

“We have given leave time as a benefit when we didn’t have cash,” said Patricia Pavone, chief of benefits and training for the state Department of Personnel Administration. “Now it’s coming back to haunt us. It’s borrowing in the future. Instead of a liability in 1991, we have it in 2001 in higher dollars when people retire.”

State policies that put a cap on the amount of leave time that can be accrued and eventually cashed out are not observed uniformly. A department computer survey of 72,000 state employee records found that 6,665 had accumulated vacation and leave time in excess of their limits.

More than 100 employees have accrued the equivalent of half a year’s pay or more, according to the study, and one unidentified individual has saved up more than 2,000 hours–the equivalent of a year’s pay.

As Pavone and others point out, unused leave time is cashed out at a worker’s final salary, which in most cases has risen with cost of living adjustments and promotions.

“The system is far too generous,” said one former high-level executive branch appointee, who cashed out a sizable amount of accumulated time when he left government. He asked not to be identified. “If you added the state holidays, the floating holidays, the annual leave hours, you can accumulate enormous amounts of time. You can take a reasonable or small amount of vacation and leave state service and have an enormous accumulation.”

Official state policy and negotiated employee contracts set the maximum at 50 days of vacation time, or 80 days for employees who decide to forgo sick days in exchange for a more generous “annual leave” system.

In contrast, federal government policy allows workers to carry only 30 days of accrued leave time into the next year. And several states also have a 30-day limit, including Florida, Arizona, Nevada and Washington, according to a survey conducted by Workplace Economics Inc. of Washington, D.C.

Many private businesses along with the federal government take a “use it or lose it” approach to vacation time, limiting their future liability by putting a cap on the amount that an employee can carry over into the next year.

However, California is legally unable to enforce its relatively generous limits, officials say. To take away excess time that has not been used at the end of the year would require a change in state law and would be subject to labor negotiations, said Pavone’s boss, personnel administration director David J. Tirapelle.

Instead, supervisors are supposed to sit down with their employees and set up vacation schedules that will ensure that vacation time is used.

“We want employees to take their vacations,” said Department of Personnel Administration spokeswoman Shirley McCall. “It’s there to use, not to accumulate for financial purposes.”

Generally, the higher the employees’ rank in the bureaucracy, the more likely that they will exceed the cap, department statistics show.

The highest ranking employees, people such as the governor’s former legal adviser, Justice Brown, say they find it almost impossible to get away for more than a few days at a time because of the demands of their jobs.

And career employees in certain departments–Emergency Services, Caltrans and the California Highway Patrol–find it difficult to use up their time as fast as they accumulate it.

When four ranking Highway Patrol officers left their jobs last year–to retire or because of disability–they took with them lump sum payments totaling $245,800 in vacation and compensatory time.

For example, former chief deputy Harry T. Adair cashed out 46 weeks of accumulated time worth $82,894.

Lynn Newquist, commander of personnel services for the CHP, said her agency tries to comply with state policy. “The commanders review vacation and annual leave balance usually around June 1 of each year and usually encourage employees to plan on time off,” she said.

But a broad exception to the state leave policy is made to allow for natural emergencies and public calamities, she said. And the unused time can accumulate quickly.

New state employees start earning as much as 16.5 days off a year–10.5 days of vacation plus six additional days if they decide to trade sick days, which cannot be cashed out, for added “annual leave” days.

After the third year, they begin to earn 22.5 days of leave time annually. The amount of annual leave time continues to climb in increments to a maximum of 30 days after 25 years.

Few private employers have been quite so magnanimous with benefits, according to a 1993 survey conducted by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Only one in 10 companies surveyed offered their workers more than 20 vacation days off each year–even after 20 years of service.

And in an effort to balance the state budget during California’s lean recession years, state workers in 1991 were given one additional day off a month in exchange for a 5% pay cut. For most workers, the additional days were given for a year and a half, until the pay cut was restored. For many of the governor’s appointees, however, the pay cut remains in place, and they continue to accumulate the added time. (This added leave time does not count toward the state’s 80-day limit.)

“The theory is since we couldn’t give them a pay raise, we should give them a day off instead,” said Wilson press secretary Paul Kranhold.

But large numbers of state workers simply banked the time, waiting for the day when they would leave government service and cash it out.

There are a number of reasons why state workers find it easy to accumulate leave time rather than use it.

For one, the state is generous with paid holidays–13 per year. Only six other states observe that many, according to the Workplace Economics survey.

And many have been able to accumulate large amounts of compensated time off–or “comp time”–for working extra hours or on weekends. This is time that they can use in place of leave time for their vacations.

The top salaried state employees, including the governor’s top appointees and attorneys, are generally not eligible for comp time, although exceptions can be made in recognition of several days of unusually arduous work, said Edmund Brehl, labor relations counsel for the Department of Personnel Administration.

But this year the state auditor reported that a number of supervisors, managers and attorneys working for the Department of Fish and Game and the legal division at the Department of Transportation had been banking sizable amounts of comp time, in violation of state policy. The employees were using the time instead of vacation leave. One unnamed Caltrans attorney had banked almost a half a year’s worth of comp time–the equivalent of $43,891, the auditor’s report said.

Other Caltrans employees have been allowed to accumulate vacation time far in excess of state limits.

When former Caltrans district director Jerry B. Baxter left his $85,900-a-year post in Los Angeles last year for a top-paying job at the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, he cashed out his vacation time.

The 161 days of leave time that he had accumulated in his 35 years with the department entitled him to a lump sum payment of $56,730.

Caltrans spokesman Jim Drago said part of the problem has been downsizing the agency. “As we’ve been reducing the size of the department, the opportunity for other people to take vacation time gets reduced,” he said.

Top employees at other departments say they find they cannot break away for prolonged vacations. Charles S. Poochigian, the governor’s former appointments secretary, said he rarely was able to get away for a vacation for more than a few days at a time while working for Wilson or for Gov. George Deukmejian.

“I’m not claiming I was overworked and underpaid,” said Poochigian, who last year ran successfully for the Assembly from Fresno. “I think the compensation was quite good given the job opportunity and satisfaction. But there are few opportunities for time off when you work for the governor or the Speaker of the Assembly, people at that level.”

Last year, Poochigian said he used up leave time in his successful campaign for the Legislature. But he still had enough left over after seven years of government service to receive a lump sum of $26,770 for his unused time.

When James W. Robinson left his job as Atty. Gen. Dan Lungren’s communications director last year, he cashed out his remaining vacation time–118 days and six hours–for $45,384. He had accumulated the time over more than a decade in government, starting under Gov. Deukmejian.

In a recent interview, Robinson told a reporter: “If you’re suggesting that a person in a relatively high-level, high-pressure job can quickly accumulate a lot of time that can then be cashed out in what sounds like big amounts, that’s absolutely right. That’s the way the system is set up.”

Airlines have different rules to cope with the new sports gear

A woman was left ‘in tears’ when her ‘lucky’ padel racket was confiscated before her flight home due to one simple error. Henrietta Jones-Chapman brought the racket ‘worth more than £100’ to Bali so she could play the sport during a work trip.

But the 27-year-old says that before her flight home, security staff at Bali Denpasar Airport, Indonesia, confiscated the orange racket. ‘Heartbroken’ Henrietta says she was left in tears and could only think workers were worried she’d start ‘hitting someone round the head’ with it’.

She filmed a TikTok video moments after the incident and captioned it ‘don’t bring your padel racket in your hand luggage coming home from Bali’. The clip, which now has more than 230,000 views, includes footage of Henrietta admitting ‘I’m actually crying, it’s so pathetic’.

She explains she brought the racket into the country in the same handbag so is confused why it’s been taken from her. Henrietta says she had to ‘kick up a fuss’ to convince staff to put the racket in the hold for free so she could keep it.

In Indonesian law padel rackets are not allowed in the cabin because they are classified as ‘dangerous devices’ so she should have checked it into the hold. UK Government guidelines allow tennis rackets to be taken as hand luggage but prohibit ‘heavy bats and sticks’ including ‘baseball, softball and cricket bats’.

The list doesn’t appear to contain a rule on padel rackets, which take a tennis shape but are stringless and more solid. However passengers should check with specific airlines regarding equipment restrictions as some allow them on board and others don’t.

Padel is booming in the UK, with an estimated 1,000,000 people now playing the sport. Player participation has surged by over 2,500% making it the fastest growing sport in the country.

Henrietta, from Harlow, Essex, said: “I was heartbroken. I know it’s a bit dramatic but it’s an item that was important to me. I was gutted. It was not just your average racket, it was more than £100 and personalised by my brother so it was sentimental.

“I took it there [Bali] and it was fine to take there so it was still in my hand luggage on the way out like normal and I had no issues at all. It was in my handbag and I didn’t even take it out at security or put it in the tray, I just left it in the bag.

“Then a lady came over with a sign with a padel racket saying it’s a new law that they’re not allowed to bring it in your hand luggage essentially. The lady said ‘no you can’t bring it through’ and I cried. I don’t know if it was because I was leaving Bali as well. I was panicked.

“She took it off me but she was apologetic because she could see I was crying. It was my lucky racket. I don’t see what the danger is unless I start hitting someone round the head with it on the plane but that could be anything, your laptop.

“Because I wasn’t expecting this I was kicking off a bit of a fuss and getting upset and saying ‘I think there should’ve been a warning before we got to that point’. If I hadn’t kicked off it would’ve just been in the bin and gone. I was really relieved.”

Airlines have their own rules on sports rackets such as Ryanair who prohibit them as ‘blunt instruments capable of causing serious injury’. However, British Airways allows passengers to pack padel rackets as long as they’re in a slim protective case.

Henrietta, who had been working in Bali as a girls-only holiday host, says staff told her about the Indonesian law surrounding rackets being banned from hand luggage. They reportedly added that in future they wouldn’t let her go back to check the racket into the hold.

She’s now warning holidaymakers the should always put their rackets in hold luggage to avoid making the same mistake she did. Henrietta said: “Make sure rackets are in your check-in bag if you’re traveling to Bali. Maybe if you’re worried about it getting broken get a proper case or padel bag.

“Make sure it’s checked in with all your rest of your stuff and not have it in your hand luggage because if I was any later my bag might’ve already gone through. There could’ve been extra costs but I was lucky they didn’t charge me but there would’ve been going forwards.

“Now you know it’s one of those things you can easily do. At least now people know it can be safely kept in the hold. I do think there’ll be a lot of people that travel back from Bali with their racket because it’s cheaper to get one over there and it’s played a lot.”

Bali Denpasar Airport has been contacted for comment.

WASHINGTON — The relationship between President Trump and Senate Republicans neared a breaking point this week as he upended their efforts to speedily confirm one of his own nominees and said he would not sign the renewal of a key surveillance law unless they agree to new terms.

Trump’s overnight social media post Wednesday that he was delaying Jay Clayton’s nomination to become national intelligence director, just hours before the U.S. attorney’s confirmation hearing, further strained relations between the Senate and White House that have been worsening for weeks. Later that day, some Republican senators who have been hesitant to challenge the president directly on the Iran war were blunt in their criticism of his deal to end it.

“This is the worst foreign policy blunder in decades,” Sen. Bill Cassidy (R-La.) said in a post on X.

The open tensions are an almost complete reversal from a year ago when Senate Republicans worked closely with Trump on a complicated effort to push through his massive package of spending and tax cuts.

At the time, criticism of the president was almost nonexistent among Republicans on Capitol Hill, and they planned to highlight passage of that bill in the midterms. But as the November election draws closer and Republicans are trying to defend their majorities, Trump is instead needling Congress with his demands and reversals, driving several Republican senators to disparage his actions publicly for the first time.

“I think somebody’s not dialing the president into the complexities of what he’s done here,” Sen. Thom Tillis (R-N.C.) said Wednesday after Clayton’s confirmation was postponed. “I mean, my God.”

The slow unraveling of what once seemed like an airtight alliance between the executive and legislative branches in a Republican-led Washington extends to their policy priorities.

Trump appears to have lost interest in most of the GOP agenda and has become almost singularly focused on his voting legislation to require proof of citizenship, which has almost no chance of passing. At the same time, he has asked members of Congress to fund parts of his White House ballroom project, allow a temporary intelligence director that none of them likes and cede their powers on the Iran war.

The growing rift has brought much of the Senate’s business to a halt and put Republicans who are up for reelection this year on the defensive. It has also put pressure on Senate Majority Leader John Thune, who has been upfront with Trump about what he can and cannot do in the Senate.

Trump pressures Thune on voting bill

Trump has pressured Thune (R-S.D.) relentlessly to scrap the filibuster and pass the strict proof-of-citizenship legislation, called the SAVE America Act. Thune has told Trump publicly and privately that the votes are not there for either step. Still, Trump has kept up the push.

In a social media post Thursday, Trump said he would be “the last Republican president” if the voting bill does not pass.

“Senate Majority Leader John Thune, and the Republican Senate, must not let this ‘carnage’ happen,” Trump said. “They will go down on the wrong side of History, as will all Republicans who just stood by and watched.”

Nonetheless, Trump has yet to go after the well-liked Republican leader on a personal basis, as he often did with Thune’s predecessor, Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.). Trump once called McConnell a “ dour, sullen, and unsmiling political hack.”

Trump and Thune talk frequently, even as Thune is sometimes giving the president news he does not want to hear. As Trump pushed for the voting bill, Thune scheduled weeks of floor time to consider it, an effort to make clear that the Senate was supportive, even if the votes are lacking.

Missouri Sen. Eric Schmitt, one of the president’s closest allies in the Senate, said he has never heard Trump say anything negative about Thune.

“It’s a difficult position,” Schmitt said of Thune’s role in the Senate. “I think they have a good working relationship.”

One of Thune’s closest allies, Republican Sen. Mike Rounds of South Dakota, said the even-keeled leader is the “right person at the right time.”

“In the Capitol today, he is the stable force,” Rounds said. “In Washington, D.C., today, he is the stable force.”

No signs of revolt among Senate GOP

There were no signs of a revolt within the GOP conference, for now, despite Trump’s pressure.

Thune “has managed it better than anyone else could manage it,” said Cassidy, who has become a more frequent Trump critic since a primary loss to a Trump-backed challenger.

Criticism of Trump has at times surfaced even among his closest Senate allies, especially with his proposed $1.776-billion settlement fund for his political allies and his pick for acting intelligence director, Bill Pulte, who has no known intelligence experience.

But the rift with Trump has also stoked some new internal tensions.

Several Republican senators criticized Sen. Mike Lee (R-Utah), who has waged an online campaign to eliminate the filibuster and pass the SAVE America Act, in a private conference lunch this week for stoking dissension within the party in an election year.

Unbowed, Lee has kept up his social media campaign, including a post Friday on X in which he said that giving up because Republicans lack the votes is a “recipe for failure.”

Texas Sen. John Cornyn, one of those who spoke out at the meeting, replied that it is Lee’s job to find the votes, “if you can.”

“Can’t just complain about others,” Cornyn posted. “Prove us wrong.”

Trump’s dwindling number of allies

Some Senate Republicans have made clear they have no plans to separate themselves from Trump.

As several of his colleagues criticized Trump’s agreement with Iran this week, first-term Sen. Bernie Moreno (R-Ohio) aggressively defended it on social media.

“Let’s get the Nobel Peace Prize ready!” Moreno posted on X.

But Trump has far fewer of those Senate allies than he did when they narrowly passed the tax and spending cuts legislation a year ago. That is in part because he has picked off some of the most loyal Republican votes himself.

Cassidy and Cornyn lost in primaries last month after Trump endorsed their opponents. Tillis announced he was not running for reelection last year after Trump repeatedly criticized him on social media.

Now all three have become frequent critics.

Shortly after his election loss, Cornyn posted on social media a fable about a frog and a scorpion. The scorpion asks the frog to carry it across a river, according to the fable, and then stings the frog in the middle of the river, “dooming them both.”

“The dying frog asks the scorpion why it stung despite knowing the consequence,” Cornyn’s post read. “To which the scorpion replies: ‘I am sorry, but I couldn’t help myself. It’s my character.’ ”

Jalonick writes for the Associated Press.

Brazilian police have intercepted 108 Cuban nationals in a single day as they were being smuggled into the country.

In a statement on Tuesday, officials noted that the incident was part of a growing trend of undocumented immigration leaving the beleaguered Caribbean island for Brazil.

Brazil’s Ministry of Justice and Public Security described the operation as a “rescue”, designed to disrupt human trafficking and irregular migration.

“According to the Federal Highway Police (PRF), this was the largest humanitarian rescue operation ever recorded in a single incident in Roraima,” the ministry said, referring to one of Brazil’s 26 states.

Roraima is situated in the Amazon rainforest, along the border with Guyana and Venezuela. The ministry said that a “large portion” of Cubans are using Guyana as a gateway to enter Brazil.

Some 57.6 percent of the Cuban immigrants living in Brazil are either in Roraima or Amapa, another northern border state.

Cuba has been facing a heightened humanitarian crisis in recent months, as it weathers a de facto fuel blockade imposed by the United States.

Since January, no foreign oil has been allowed to reach the Caribbean island, save for one Russian tanker. The US has threatened steep tariffs against any country that might seek to supply Cuba with oil, a necessary fuel for its fragile energy grid.

The blockade has had wide-ranging repercussions, with public services in many areas grinding to a halt. The country has been gripped by multiple island-wide blackouts, and residents are reporting difficulties accessing basic supplies like food and medication.

Critics fear the pressure will lead to new waves of migration off the island. During the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, economic decline contributed to a mass exodus, with Cuba’s population dropping by roughly 10 percent or more.

Since 2024, Brazil’s Federal Highway Police say they have “rescued” roughly 297 migrants and asylum seekers in Roraima, most of them Cuban.

Five “coyotes”, or human smugglers, were arrested during Monday’s law enforcement efforts, which come as part of Operation Safe Route, an initiative launched in December 2024 to ensure roadway safety.

Three separate sets of arrests were made. One involved a convoy of three vehicles that attempted to flee federal police after being signalled to stop. Inside the vehicles were 39 Cubans, including children, being “transported in precarious conditions”.

“Many reported having gone without food for at least two days,” the Justice Ministry said.

In another incident, police found eight Cuban immigrants after seizing a vehicle that crossed the border illegally. In a third, law enforcement followed a vehicle suspected of human smuggling to a residence where 61 Cubans were found.

All 108 of the Cubans recovered on Monday were transferred to police officials for “immigration regularisation and subsequent referral to the social assistance network”, according to the Brazilian security ministry.

In its annual migration report for 2025, the ministry described Cuban immigration to Brazil as stable or even descending during the last decade, up until the early years of the COVID-19 pandemic.

“Migration flows of Cubans to Brazil were never particularly intense,” the report said. But then, starting in 2022, Cuban immigration into Brazil started to “rebound vigorously”.

“It is important to note that, in 2025, refugee applications submitted by Cubans surpassed those submitted by Venezuelans — not only due to a drop in applications from the latter group but, above all, due to the sharp rise in cases filed by Cubans, exceeding 40,000 requests,” the report explained.

The report also warned that the upward trend could continue, given the conflict between the US and Cuba.

Since returning for a second term, US President Donald Trump has taken an active role in Latin American politics and has suggested he may use military force to initiate regime change in Cuba.

“Should geopolitical tensions between Cuba and the United States of America escalate, migration flows toward Brazil could very well increase,” the report concluded.

BUENOS AIRES, June 9 (UPI) — International fashion, luxury and sports brands are accelerating expansion into Argentina after years of absence, driving multimillion-dollar investments and prompting the country’s leading shopping mall operators to expand capacity to meet growing demand for retail space.

The renewed interest from foreign companies reflects Argentina’s changing economic environment since President Javier Milei took office.

Looser import restrictions and other market-opening measures have revived the appeal of a market that for years had been left out of the expansion plans of many international firms.

The expansion comes despite a challenging consumer environment. According to consulting firm Scentia, sales of mass-market consumer goods fell 3.8% year over year in April 2026 and were down 3.3% during the first four months of the year.

Federico Vaccarezza, an economist and professor in Austral University’s Faculty of Business Sciences, told UPI that international brands closely monitor sales data from Argentina’s leading shopping malls because they reflect the behavior of the consumers targeted by their products.

He noted that many of these brands are not seeking to reach the broader population, but rather higher-income consumers — a segment that has shown greater resilience in maintaining spending levels despite economic difficulties.

Vaccarezza said those groups represent roughly the top 10% to 20% of income earners in Argentina.

The international chains that have announced plans to enter Argentina are focusing their projects on Buenos Aires’ most exclusive shopping centers and key cities across the country. The trend includes companies entering the market for the first time, brands returning after years away and firms expanding existing operations.

International companies view Argentina as a long-term opportunity because of its market size, with more than 45 million residents, and expectations surrounding recent economic changes.

The influx of brands is already affecting the commercial real estate sector. Shopping mall operators report growing demand for retail space from foreign companies.

To meet that demand, several groups have accelerated expansion and construction projects. Chilean retailer Cencosud, one of Latin America’s largest retail groups, will invest $60 million to expand Unicenter, Argentina’s largest shopping mall, betting on rising demand for commercial space from international brands.

The project will add more than 215,000 square feet of space and 85 new stores by 2027.

“This expansion represents a concrete long-term commitment to Argentina,” Dolores Fernández Lobbe, country manager of Cencosud Argentina, told La Nación.

Meanwhile, IRSA, Argentina’s largest shopping mall operator and owner of some of the country’s most valuable retail assets, including Alto Palermo, Patio Bullrich, Alcorta Shopping and DOT, is moving forward with three new developments in the Buenos Aires area and the cities of La Plata and Mar del Plata. The company has not opened a new shopping center since 2015, when it inaugurated a project in the Patagonian province of Neuquén.

“Shopping mall customers are still there. What has changed is that competition on prices is now more intense,” IRSA President Eduardo Elsztain told La Nación.

According to business news outlet iProfesional, the expansion spans multiple sectors. Fashion, beauty, sports equipment, accessories and luxury goods are among the industries seeking to capitalize on Argentina’s new economic environment.

June is expected to be one of the busiest months for store openings. U.S.-based Skechers will open a new location, while Dolce & Gabbana will launch its first store in Argentina.

In July, Bullpadel, a company specializing in padel equipment, will enter the market. Padel has experienced rapid growth across Latin America in recent years.

U.S. apparel company Lucky Brand will enter Argentina through a partnership with local group Oxford. According to La Nación, the company plans an initial $1 million investment, will open its first store in July and aims to develop a network of 30 standalone stores across the country.

The company also plans to align prices with those in the U.S. market to compete with other brands in the segment.

Spanish fashion retailer Mango confirmed its return to Argentina through a franchise agreement with local group Grimoldi. The company plans to open five stores over the next five years, including a first location at Alto Palermo scheduled for September.

Vaccarezza said 2025 was a favorable year for Argentina’s shopping malls, although the trend began to weaken in 2026, with sales declining about 5% in the first quarter compared with the same period a year earlier.

The economist said looser import regulations and previously unmet demand help explain foreign companies’ interest in Argentina. He added that investment decisions by international brands are driven primarily by market-specific studies rather than broader economic indicators.

“It is a calculated risk. Companies have a clear understanding of the consumers they want to reach. The results will become evident later,” he said.

Economist and consultant Néstor Requelme expressed a similar view, saying the arrival of new international brands reflects recent economic changes and the presence of consumers with strong purchasing power.

Martín Burgos, an economist and researcher at the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences, or Flacso, said the arrival of new companies could increase competition and help lower clothing prices in Argentina, a market that has historically been more expensive than many others.

“There is a policy aimed at reducing clothing prices. For years, apparel prices in Argentina were above international levels, and the easing of import restrictions is facilitating the arrival of these brands,” he told UPI.

However, Burgos agreed that many of the companies entering the country are primarily targeting higher-income consumers, one of the segments that has best withstood recent economic changes.

“The data show that overall consumption remains weak, but these brands are targeting consumers with greater purchasing power. For that reason, their expansion does not necessarily reflect a broad recovery in consumer spending,” he said.

WASHINGTON — A relentless push by President Trump to reshape Washington‘s cityscape is facing mounting resistance, threatening a slate of transformative monuments intended to cement his legacy in the nation’s capital.

Eager to see his projects completed before leaving office, Trump has responded to growing legal and political obstacles by pushing ahead, attempting to force approvals through faster than opponents can challenge them. But the scramble to fast-track construction has inflated their costs for taxpayers, imperiling his plans and amplifying his political risks as the midterm elections approach.

Urban design has become a preoccupation for Trump since the start of his second term. Cranes dot the skyline of the city, and construction fences block access to many of its most cherished parks and venues less than a month before the nation celebrates 250 years since its founding on July 4.

Cranes from the White House East Wing ballroom construction project rise from behind the U.S. Treasury Department building on Thursday in Washington, D.C.

(Kevin Carter/Getty Images)

Government lawyers are defending the president’s use of the wrecking ball, arguing in court that he has unfettered power to build and destroy. Should he ever choose to tear down the Statue of Liberty, the Justice Department told a judge Friday, no one could stop him.

Yet a recent series of legal setbacks, as well as increasing Republican opposition on Capitol Hill, have cast doubt on the fate of his most lavish designs, including the construction of an imposing ballroom at the White House and the erection of a massive triumphal arch on the sightline of the National Mall.

It’s become a race against time for the president, who could soon confront a Democratic-controlled Congress armed with renewed oversight authority and subpoena power, further gumming the works of elaborate construction projects, which could stymie their completion before he leaves office.

“This is very much on the committee’s radar,” said one Democratic source with the House Oversight Committee, citing “serious concerns surrounding corruption.”

Visitors at the Mall gather in front of the Lincoln Memorial and near the Reflecting Pool, which is under renovation on Friday in Washington, D.C. President Trump dismissed criticism of the recent Lincoln Memorial Reflecting Pool renovations, rejecting claims the project amounted to merely a “paint job.”

(Roberto Schmidt / Getty Images)

Trump as ‘builder-in-chief’

Several of Trump’s more modest initiatives, referred to by the administration as beautification projects, are complete or well underway.

At the White House, a historic rose garden conceived by Jacqueline Kennedy was paved over, and its adjoining colonnade refurbished with black granite and gilded presidential portraits. The Palm Room foyer was decked in marble and chandeliers. New flagpoles fly supersized American flags on the North and South lawns.

The en suite bath of the Lincoln Bedroom in the residence has been gutted and renovated. And the Oval Office now practically drips in gold, while an adjoining study, once used by Franklin Roosevelt to scrutinize war maps and Lyndon Johnson to monitor the space race, was converted into the president’s personal swag shop.

A temporary Ultimate Fighting Championship arena constructed on the White House South Lawn is another example of how Trump is leaving a visual mark on the presidential residence. The structure, which towers over the White House, was paid for by the UFC, which is scheduled to host a series of fights on the premises.

Outside the White House complex, fountains across the city are coming back to life after decades of neglect, from DuPont Circle to Freedom Plaza and Union Station. The idyllic Logan Circle, surrounded by historic mansions, is being revitalized by the National Park Service, as is Lafayette Square, the site of an infamous clash between Trump and protesters shortly after George Floyd’s murder in 2020.

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1. National Park Service Conservator for the National Mall and Memorial Parks Ali Cavicchio puts a clear coat over the recently repainted “I Have a Dream” marker at the Lincoln Memorial on June 05, 2026 in Washington, DC. The marker’s letters are carved into stairs of the Lincoln Memorial where Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. stood and delivered his “I Have A Dream” speech in 1963. (Chip Somodevilla / Getty Images) 2. Members of the West Branch Area School District in Morrisdale, Pennsylvania, student marching band perform at the Lincoln Memorial on the National Mall on June 05, 2026 in Washington, DC. (Chip Somodevilla / Getty Images)

In some parks, even the turf is getting a makeover.

“People are all thanking me because Washington is beautiful again,” Trump told reporters last week. “The parks are open, we changed the grass. You know, grass has a life, also. Like people, grass has a life, and that grass hasn’t changed in 70 or 80 years.”

On Friday morning, several people sat by the restored cascading fountain at Meridian Hill Park. They walked their dogs, read books and exercised by the water.

Jean Luc, 33, was one of them. As he took a stroll with his 2-month-old daughter, Juno, he said it had been nice to see the government fix up the park, which he says he tries to enjoy with his daughter daily.

“It’s been nice to see the whole process,” he said. “I love it.”

President Trump displays a chart titled “Our Pool is Bigger than Skyscrapers” while discussing his renovations to the Lincoln Memorial Reflecting Pool on Wednesday in the Oval Office.

(Kevin Dietsch / Getty Images)

The Lincoln Memorial Reflecting Pool has been painted over in “American Flag Blue” by a firm that Trump said had worked on the swimming pool at his golf club in Virginia. Millions will be spent to regild the hulking Art Deco statues that buttress Arlington Memorial Bridge. And Trump has plans to connect the Lincoln Memorial to the Potomac River by building a promenade, one of many projects he has said may be named after himself.

Federal contracting data show that the Virginia firm Terra Site Constructors has been awarded roughly $60 million in contracts from the National Park Service to complete work on the various fountain rehabilitation projects across the city.

Another Virginia firm, Atlantic Industrial Coatings, holds a contract for $14.2 million to paint the reflecting pool.

The funding for both contracts comes from the entrance fees paid by national park visitors.

“How fortunate are we to have the builder in chief?” Interior Secretary Doug Burgum said Thursday in the Oval Office. “Someone who both has the vision and the understanding of how to get projects done that would make our city safe and beautiful.”

Construction continues on the White House East Wing ballroom on May 29, 2026.

(Kevin Carter / Getty Images)

‘The finest ballroom anywhere in the world’

Yet other, more controversial projects, exacting irreversible change to capital institutions, are facing greater opposition.

On Thursday, the Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts directed its staff to begin removing Trump’s name from its facade after a judge ruled that the attempted name change, and his effort to close the venue for two years of dramatic renovations, were illegal.

Angered by the court’s decision, Trump directed the Commerce Department to make arrangements to transfer control of the Kennedy Center to Congress. The move would give lawmakers power over the center’s operations, maintenance and management. It was originally an act of Congress that gave the Kennedy Center its name and mandate.

In other areas of the city, preservationists have successfully delayed the president’s bid to paint over the natural gray granite of the Eisenhower Executive Office Building. And Republican lawmakers have refused to vote to fund the construction of a ballroom at the White House that has already laid waste to the East Wing and, if completed, would dwarf the landmark residence.

Construction crews began tearing down the East Wing in October to make way for the 90,000-square-foot facility. Trump, who built a career as a real estate developer, has frequently touted the project, gushing over the sounds of jackhammers and excavation trucks.

Construction continues on the White House South Lawn on June 1, 2026, for an upcoming UFC match. President Trump is hosting a UFC match on the White House grounds to mark the nation’s 250th birthday.

(Kevin Carter / Getty Images)

“Oh, that’s music to my ears. I love that sound,” Trump told Republican senators at a White House event last fall. “A lot of people don’t like it. When I hear that sound, it reminds me of money.”

The ballroom project was initially expected to cost $200 million, a price that has since doubled. It is being financed by private donors and Trump, who has called it a “gift to the United States.”

“We are building what will be the finest ballroom anywhere in the world,” the president said last month.

More than half of the publicly identified donors of the ballroom projects — 14 of the 27 known corporate contributors — have won new or bigger federal contracts worth more than $50 billion in the six months since construction began, according to a report released by Public Citizen, a watchdog group.

“These giant corporations aren’t funding the Trump ballroom fiasco out of the goodness of their hearts,” said Jon Golinger, a public policy advocate at Public Citizen and author of the report. “They have massive interests before the federal government and they hope to curry favor with, and receive favorable treatment, from the Trump administration.”

White House military aides stand next to the giant mirror that hangs along the Rose Garden Colonnade at the White House on May 21, 2026.

(Chip Somodevilla / Getty Images)

The White House has challenged the report’s assertions, saying critics of how the project is being funded are “only people who suffer from a severe and incurable disease known as Trump Derangement Syndrome.”

“President Trump is making the White House beautiful and giving it the glory it deserves at no cost to taxpayers — something everyone should celebrate,” White House spokesman Davis Ingle said in a statement.

The report came out as the ballroom project has faced persistent hurdles in court and Congress.

The National Trust for Historic Preservation sued to stop construction, arguing the administration had not followed the legally required review process and had not secured congressional approval. In March, a federal judge halted aboveground construction, but an appeals court quickly allowed work to resume through June while the case proceeds.

On Friday, the panel heard the case and expressed skepticism about Trump’s push to build the ballroom without congressional approval.

On Capitol Hill, Senate Republicans dropped a proposal to set aside $1 billion in security funding for the ballroom after several GOP senators said it lacked the votes to pass.

Trump has insisted the funding is not necessary to complete the project, though he said it would help secure the complex. Without it, he told reporters last month, “the White House won’t be a very secure place.”

(Los Angeles Times photo illustration; Photo by Kevin Dietsch / Getty Images)

Arc de Trump

The president is also seeking to build a 250-foot-tall “triumphal arch” near Arlington National Cemetery, across the Potomac River at the foot of Memorial Bridge.

Renderings show the arch would be twice the height of the Lincoln Memorial, crowned by a golden statue of Lady Liberty sporting outstretched wings. An observation deck on its roof would offer sweeping views of the city.

Preservationists have criticized the plan as disrupting a sacred sightline between the memorials to Abraham Lincoln and Robert E. Lee, designed as a statement of unity after the Civil War. Even advocates of adding an arch in Washington have criticized the size of Trump’s proposed structure as overbearing. And a group of Vietnam War veterans has sued to try to stop its construction, arguing the project lacks congressional approval and would “dishonor their military and foreign service” because it would block the view of the cemetery.

Commission of Fine Arts member Pamela Hughes Patenaude, left, hands colleague Matthew Taylor a model of President Trump’s proposed triumphal arch to commemorate the country’s 250th anniversary during the commission’s public meeting at the National Building Museum in Washington on April 16, 2026.

(Andrew Harnik / Getty Images)

Despite public opposition, the National Capital Planning Commission last week advanced the project in its review process.

Trump praised the planning commission’s support, saying that “when completed, it will be, without question, the Greatest Arch of them all!”

The president has yet more plans to leave his mark — in some cases with his name, in others with his face.

Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy has proposed a $22-billion overhaul of Dulles International Airport outside the capital that would include a new terminal brandishing Trump’s name. Limited-edition U.S. passports will feature his portrait. And the Treasury has plans to mint a $250 bill featuring Trump’s mugshot from his 2023 Fulton County arrest, pending congressional approval — an unlikely prospect.

A walkway with the numbers “45” and “47” leading to construction on the new ballroom extension of the White House in Washington, D.C., on May 19. President Trump said a military hospital and research facilities will be built on the site of his planned White House ballroom, offering more details about the scope of the sprawling, controversial project.

(Samuel Corum/Bloomberg via Getty Images)

In a moment that went viral on social media, Sen. Jon Ossoff (D-Ga.), who is generating buzz over a potential run for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2028, offered a theory on what’s driving the president.

“He’s trying to put his face on the money. He’s building a monument to himself,” Ossoff told a crowd of supporters.

“But see, Atlanta, he’s doing these things now because no one will honor him when he’s gone,” he added, “because he’s a failed president and a national disgrace.”

Wilner reported from Los Angeles and Ceballos from Washington. Times staff writer Ben Wieder contributed to this report.

The Middle East has been a difficult region to deal with in oil markets. When it comes to energy geographies, the region has proven to be a disproportionately significant part of the world’s energy resources, with export facilities traversing a handful of maritime routes and political situations that have been tense, if not outright volatile, at times. The change in 2025 and into 2026 isn’t the nature of the forces but rather the confluence of overlapping pressures: ongoing sanctions enforcement, multiple theaters of conflict, OPEC+ tensions that are more public than ever in previous years, and disruptions to shipping in the Red Sea, which now seem to have become a semi-permanent part of the shipping route landscape.

There is no background information for commodity traders, market analysts, and energy investors. It’s a real-time, constantly evolving dynamic that can make all the difference in the day-to-day performance of prices, and it’s particularly important when prices are sliding around rapidly, and the stories behind them are changing just as fast.

The Behavior of Prices and the Risk of Middle East Supplies

Traders who follow crude oil price live data are the first ones to witness this. Real-time feeds are a reflection of more than just the fundamental supply-demand elements, but the market’s real-time assessment of the value of geopolitical risk and how much it “should” be worth at any given moment. A news event, which is a minor detail in a more stable environment, can cause future prices to move $5 or more in less than an hour. The consistent and tough question – and it is a tough one – is, which events actually have physical supply implications and which ones are sentiment-driven moves that die in a session or two?

The Strait of Hormuz

About 20-21 million barrels per day of crude oil and petroleum products go through the Strait of Hormuz, which is about 20% of the world’s oil consumption. No readily available bypasses can be found that can absorb that flow at a similar cost. There are partial alternatives, including the IPSA pipeline and Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline, but they would not even come close to filling the deficit should the Hormuz be closed en masse.

Source

It is a strait between Oman and Iran. Geography makes it so that any serious disruption in U.S.-Iran relations or of security conditions in the Gulf in general puts Hormuz back on the market’s agenda. Traders are all familiar with this: when there is a lot of Iranian tension, the futures positioning will always reflect the chokepoint risk, even if there is no incident per se.

Production Outages That Don’t Make the Front Page

Key Risk Factors Shaping Market Sentiment in 2026

Active Conflict Zones and Exposure to Infrastructure

The Persistent Iranian Supply Question

Infrastructure Concentration Risk

OPEC+ Internal Dynamics

Non-State Actor Activity and Shipping Friction

How the Market Prices Geopolitical Risk

Risk Premium in Practice

Geopolitical risk premiums in times of heightened Middle East tension have varied from around $4 to $10 per barrel, depending on the market participants’ views on the probability of actual physical supply disruptions in the case of Brent crude, according to S&P Global Commodity Insights. That’s a fairly broad window for economic trading, and it has a tendency to close up very fast when the tension subsides and without a supply event, which is the more common scenario.

The geopolitical risk premium factors analysts may consider are:

• The nearness to active conflict, producing fields, or the working export terminals.
• Production capacity that would be available to make up for the loss of production elsewhere.
• The availability and magnitude of the IEA’s strategic stockpiles to be tapped.
• Current tanker market conditions and the viability of an alternative route.
• Diplomatic messages sent by governments in the area, including the United States and other great powers
• Past examples of similar events, which have had identifiable supply impacts.

It is not easy to give exact weights to these inputs. Part of the reason for the price action to seemingly be different with comparable geopolitical events can be due to different analysts forming different conclusions from the same events.

Historical Supply Disruptions and Price Responses

The 2025-2026 entry is a more diffuse form of market pressure than those acute events listed above. It is not one particular incident, but rather sanctions enforcement and Iranian volumes kept low and shipping activity in the Red Sea continuing to cause friction in the transport system, which has kept transport costs elevated. The World Economic Outlook from the IMF pointed out that this type of persistent supply constraint is likely to have a longer-lasting impact on medium-term price expectations than acute supply shocks, which markets have historically been able to absorb and turn around in relatively short periods of time. Thus, a slow-burning risk premium can be more ‘sticky’ than a dramatic risk premium.

Broader Market Implications

Strategic Reserve Releases (SRRs) as a Counterweight

Geopolitical Risk Analysis: What It Does and Doesn’t Accomplish

Conclusion

Disclaimer

Across South Asia, concerns over press freedom, political influence, and media credibility are drawing increasing international scrutiny. From Bangladesh and Pakistan to India, journalists and independent media organisations face mounting political, economic, and legal pressures that are reshaping how information is produced and consumed.

Recent international assessments point to what rights groups describe as a broader regional decline in media independence. The 2026 World Press Freedom Index placed multiple South Asian countries near the lower end of global rankings, reflecting concerns over censorship, political pressure, and growing ideological polarisation within news ecosystems.

Among these cases, India continues to attract the most sustained global attention due to its scale, democratic profile, and influence as the world’s largest electoral democracy.

When a country that defines itself as a global democratic model falls to 157th out of 180 nations on the World Press Freedom Index, the question is no longer whether there are challenges within its media environment. The question is how deeply those challenges have reshaped journalism itself.

Together with other regional indicators, the findings suggest not isolated failures but a structural transformation in how media systems operate across South Asia.

The concerns highlighted in global reports do not exist in isolation. Across South Asia, governments and political actors are increasingly accused of exerting pressure on journalists through legal action, advertising influence, regulatory scrutiny, and informal intimidation.

According to World Press Freedom Index in 2026, Bangladesh stood at 152nd. Afghanistan remained among the lowest-ranked countries globally, reflecting ongoing restrictions on press activity. Nepal, while comparatively better positioned at 87th, has also faced periodic concerns over political influence and media ownership concentration.

Analysts argue that while each country’s political context differs, a shared pattern is emerging: fragile media economies, heightened political polarisation, and increasing hostility toward independent journalism.

However, India’s trajectory is often singled out due to its democratic stature and its role as a regional political and cultural benchmark. This contrast between democratic identity and media freedom rankings has intensified global debate about the state of its information ecosystem.

Political Influence and the Changing Nature of News

Within India, one of the central concerns raised by international observers is the perceived growth of political influence over large sections of mainstream media.

A detailed report by Genocide Watch described what it termed a “severe crisis of credibility” in parts of the Indian media landscape, arguing that dominant narratives in some outlets increasingly align with those of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party rather than independently scrutinising power.

This does not imply uniformity across the entire media sector. India still has a diverse ecosystem of investigative journalists, regional newspapers, and independent digital platforms producing critical reporting. However, critics argue that the dominant tone of mainstream television and high-visibility digital media increasingly reflects political messaging rather than adversarial journalism.

The Reporters Without Borders (RSF) assessment echoed concerns about structural vulnerabilities. It highlighted the heavy dependence of Indian media on advertising revenue, including significant spending by both central and state governments. Critics argue that this financial structure creates subtle incentives for compliance, where editorial decisions may be influenced not through direct censorship, but through economic dependency.

In such an environment, formal restrictions are often unnecessary. Editorial caution can emerge internally, as news organisations weigh political and financial risks before pursuing certain stories.

The Rise of Divisive Television Narratives

Another recurring concern involves the increasing polarisation of televised political discourse.

Genocide Watch and other rights-focused assessments have warned that sections of mainstream media increasingly frame political and social issues through identity-based narratives, often centred on religion and nationalism. Complex policy debates are frequently simplified into binary positions, contributing to heightened social tension.

Human Rights Watch, in its World Report 2026, also documented concerns that hostile rhetoric in parts of media and online spaces has coincided with rising incidents of discrimination and attacks against minority communities, including Muslims in different parts of the country.

While causation is difficult to establish definitively, observers argue that repeated framing of communities through suspicion or collective identity can contribute to an environment where social hostility becomes easier to normalise.

The RSF report additionally pointed to structural imbalances within media representation, noting concerns about concentration of leadership within certain social groups and the underrepresentation of women in prominent political debate programming. These imbalances, critics argue, shape not only who speaks in media spaces, but also which perspectives are amplified or marginalised.

Self-Censorship and Invisible Constraints

Not all constraints on journalism are explicit. In many cases, they manifest as self-censorship.

According to Genocide Watch, journalists and editors increasingly avoid topics that could lead to political backlash, regulatory scrutiny, legal threats, or coordinated online harassment campaigns. Over time, this produces a newsroom culture in which certain subjects are quietly excluded before formal editorial decisions are even made.

This form of pressure is difficult to measure, but its effects can be significant. When reporters internalise risk calculations, the range of publicly available information can narrow without any formal ban or directive.

RSF similarly highlighted concerns over actions taken against independent journalists, commentators, and publications. It cited instances of restrictions, legal pressure, and bans on certain media outlets in sensitive regions, including Jammu and Kashmir, where authorities have taken action against publications accused of promoting separatism.

Critics argue that such measures contribute to a wider climate of caution, particularly around politically sensitive reporting.

A Broader Democratic Stress Test

The implications of these developments extend beyond journalism alone.

Genocide Watch framed the weakening of press freedom as part of a broader institutional credibility challenge linked to political polarisation and majoritarian dynamics. In this view, media independence is not an isolated issue but part of a wider ecosystem that includes accountability, governance, and civic trust.

A free press plays a central role in democratic systems by enabling scrutiny of power and facilitating informed public debate. When that role weakens, the consequences extend into how citizens engage with institutions and interpret political realities.

India’s trajectory in the RSF index over recent years reflects this concern. The country ranked 150th in 2022, fell further to 161st in 2023, improved slightly to 151st in 2025, and then declined again to 157th in 2026. Analysts interpret this pattern not as random fluctuation but as part of a longer-term structural challenge.

At the same time, government supporters argue that India remains a robust electoral democracy with active institutions, a vibrant political opposition, and a highly diverse media landscape. They contend that international rankings often fail to capture the complexity of India’s scale, security challenges, and internal diversity.

The debate, therefore, is not solely about classification, but about how democratic quality itself should be assessed.

South Asia in a Global Decline

These concerns are unfolding within a broader global downturn in press freedom. RSF’s 2026 index noted that worldwide media freedom has reached its weakest level in 25 years, with more than half of all countries classified as having “difficult” or “very serious” conditions.

South Asia reflects this global trend particularly sharply. Alongside India, countries such as Bangladesh remain in the lower tiers of the global rankings, highlighting shared regional challenges around political influence, media ownership concentration, and journalist safety.

Yet despite this broader pattern, analysts continue to emphasise that each country’s trajectory is shaped by its own political history and institutional structures. In India’s case, its global influence and democratic identity make developments in its media landscape particularly consequential for international observers.

What Is Ultimately at Stake

The credibility of media systems plays a central role in shaping the health of democratic life. Journalism informs not only public debate but also citizens’ ability to evaluate leadership, understand policy decisions, and hold institutions accountable.

When trust in media declines, democratic accountability becomes harder to sustain.

The findings from Genocide Watch and RSF should therefore be viewed not simply as criticism of individual outlets or governments, but as indicators of broader institutional stress across South Asia.

Addressing these challenges would require a combination of stronger protections for editorial independence, more diversified ownership structures, reduced reliance on state advertising, and greater safeguards for journalists facing intimidation or harassment.

Despite these pressures, the region continues to produce significant investigative journalism and independent reporting under difficult conditions. Many journalists continue to work at considerable personal and professional risk to maintain public access to information.

Acknowledging structural challenges across South Asia is not an indictment of any single democracy. Rather, it is increasingly seen by analysts as a necessary step toward strengthening the democratic principles that the region’s constitutions and institutions claim to uphold.

With information from Reuters.

WASHINGTON — The YOLO caucus is in session.

In a Republican-led Congress defined by deference to President Trump, there’s a small but steadily growing cohort who have found themselves more willing to break with the White House. Although the president maintains a firm grip on Republican voters, the expanding club could hinder his agenda on everything from the Iran war to immigration funding at a moment when his party holds a tenuous majority on Capitol Hill.

Sen. Bill Cassidy of Louisiana is the newest member of the club. Just days after losing his primary to a Trump-backed challenger, Cassidy on Tuesday reversed himself on legislation involving the war in Iran and voted with Democrats to rein in U.S. military action.

“The way our Constitution is set up, Congress should hold the executive branch accountable,” he told reporters the day before.

Sen. John Cornyn of Texas could be next after Trump endorsed Ken Paxton, Cornyn’s rival for the Republican nomination in next week’s runoff.

Rep. Thomas Massie of Kentucky is perhaps a founding member of the YOLO caucus — slang for “you only live once,” used to punctuate unbothered or even foolhardy behavior. He frustrated Trump since the president’s first term, and his status was solidified after losing his primary on Tuesday to a Trump-backed challenger. Massie has enraged Trump by voting against his signature tax and spending bill and by pushing for the release of the Jeffrey Epstein files.

He hinted there’s more to come before he leaves office.

“I got seven months left in Congress,” Massie said with a grin during his concession speech as the crowd erupted.

More Republicans feel free to shrug off Trump

Other similarly situated Republicans include Sen. Thom Tillis, who was a fierce critic of former Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem and has more recently turned his attention to Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. There’s also Sen. Lisa Murkowski of Alaska, who joined Democrats last week in a bid to curb Trump’s war powers in Iran. Sens. Susan Collins of Maine and Mitch McConnell of Kentucky have voted against some of Trump’s Cabinet picks. And in the House, Rep. Don Bacon of Nebraska has pushed to reclaim congressional power over tariffs.

“If the legislative branch always votes with the president, we do have a king,” Massie said in his concession speech Tuesday.

This hardly amounts to a revival of the Never Trump movement that some Republicans unsuccessfully hoped would curb the president’s excesses during his first term or block him from returning to office. Many in the party, including Trump’s occasional detractors, have either stood by or been unable to block the president as he launched the war in Iran and presided over an aggressive immigration enforcement operation and the dismantling of the federal workforce.

Today’s unencumbered Republicans don’t fit into an ideological box. But they are united by a sense of emboldening that can only be attained in a few ways in Trump’s Washington.

Many, like Tillis, McConnell and Bacon, have decided to retire and can cast votes knowing they’ll never again have to face Republican primary voters. Others like Collins and Murkowski have more leeway because they represent states that tend to reward political independence. And some like Massie banked on the idea that voters could support both Trump and someone who occasionally crossed him.

It’s a paradox for Trump. As he demands total loyalty and pushes out Republican dissenters, he’s left with a growing cohort who, for one reason or another, owe Trump nothing.

Democrats look to capitalize

That could be a problem for Senate Majority Leader John Thune and House Speaker Mike Johnson, who are already governing with threadbare majorities. Shifting loyalties of even a few Republican lawmakers could dramatically complicate the ability for either chamber to pass substantial legislation ahead of the November midterm elections.

Thune called Cornyn a “principled conservative” and “very effective senator” on Tuesday.

“None of us control what the president does,” he said.

The next tests could come later this week as Thune pushes a funding package for Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection designed to pass on a party line basis.

Democrats are eager to pounce.

Speaking at an event in Washington on Tuesday sponsored by the Center for American Progress, House Democratic leader Hakeem Jeffries said he would aim to drive a wedge between Republicans by using a so-called discharge petition to bring issues directly to the floor for a vote.

That tactic has been successful in securing House passage on issues including the Epstein files and temporary protection of Haitian immigrants.

“When we’re disciplined and when we’re focused and when we put pressure in particular on the so-called swing seat Republicans, they have been breaking with us,” Jeffries said.

California Gov. Gavin Newsom told reporters on Tuesday that Trump’s endorsement of Cornyn’s rival was a sign that his political power lies within the Republican base — not the American public at large.

“He’s showed the only influence he has, and that’s an outsize influence within the base of the party,” the potential 2028 Democratic presidential contender said. “Otherwise he’s shown little to no influence with the American people.”

Counting the votes

That leaves Republicans gaming out how they might cobble together the votes needed to pass legislation.

Sen. John Hoeven of North Dakota called Cassidy a “good friend” and said the loss was “tough for him.” He said Cassidy “will always vote in line with what he thinks is best” but doubted he will become a less reliable Republican vote.

His fellow Louisianan, Sen. John Kennedy, said Cassidy deploys power “rationally and maturely” and “will continue to do the same thing.”

Cassidy repeatedly rejected the notion that he will spend his final months in Washington as a troublemaker for Trump, saying he’s going to do “what’s good for my country and my state.”

Yet the independent streak that ended his political career quickly resurfaced. A week after Trump visited China, Cassidy spoke of a Western alliance that’s “totally falling apart” and will be unable to “push back on the threat China represents.” He seemed stunned that the administration would create a nearly $1.8-billion fund to compensate Trump allies who they believe have been unjustly investigated and prosecuted.

“I just came off the campaign trail,” he said. “People are concerned about making their own ends meet, not about putting a slush fund together without a legal precedent.”

Sloan and Cappelletti write for the Associated Press. AP writer Stephen Groves in Washington contributed to this report.

May 19 (Asia Today) — South Korea’s fast-growing defense industry is confronting a major new obstacle in the U.S. market as the Pentagon fully implements strict cybersecurity certification requirements across its global supply chain.

The U.S. Department of Defense has begun enforcing the final version of the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification, or CMMC, program, requiring all companies participating in U.S. defense contracts to meet specific cybersecurity standards.

Industry officials warn that Korean defense firms unable to obtain certification could be excluded not only from exports to the United States but also from ship maintenance, repair and overhaul projects and future joint weapons development programs.

The certification system applies not only to primary contractors but also to subcontractors supplying parts and components.

Even companies with advanced technology and competitive pricing can be blocked from bidding if they fail to meet required cybersecurity levels.

For many South Korean defense firms, the most critical threshold is CMMC Level 2, which is required for handling Controlled Unclassified Information, or CUI, tied to U.S. military programs.

The requirement is considered especially important for South Korea’s ambitions to participate in U.S. Navy ship maintenance and repair projects, as well as broader bilateral defense cooperation initiatives.

Defense analysts say the new rules are becoming a de facto trade barrier across Western defense markets.

“Losing access to the U.S. market effectively means being pushed out of the global defense supply chain,” one industry expert said.

Defense Acquisition Program Administration has launched information sessions and consulting support programs in response to growing industry concerns.

The agency is working with regional defense innovation clusters, the Korea Defense Industry Association and the Defense Agency for Technology and Quality to help companies prepare for certification.

But smaller suppliers say the burden remains overwhelming.

Industry estimates suggest that achieving Level 2 certification can cost companies from hundreds of thousands to several million dollars due to infrastructure upgrades, consulting fees and final audits. Preparation alone can take more than a year.

Large defense contractors have already formed dedicated task forces, but many second- and third-tier suppliers lack both funding and cybersecurity specialists.

Because the CMMC system requires certification across the entire supply chain, failure by even a single subcontractor could jeopardize broader export opportunities involving larger Korean defense firms.

Additional complications stem from differences between U.S. and South Korean encryption standards.

One key CMMC requirement involves use of cryptographic modules certified under U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology guidelines known as FIPS standards.

Many South Korean defense companies, however, rely on domestic encryption systems validated under the country’s K-CMVP framework overseen by intelligence and defense authorities.

Industry experts are calling for government-level negotiations between Seoul and Washington to seek mutual recognition or equivalency between Korean and U.S. encryption standards.

Some officials argue such talks could be linked to ongoing negotiations over a Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreement between the two allies.

Concerns are also growing over South Korea’s lack of domestically accredited third-party CMMC assessment organizations, forcing companies to rely on U.S.-based auditors and raising concerns about defense technology exposure.

Analysts say South Korea’s defense industry must now treat cybersecurity as strategically important as weapons performance itself if it hopes to become a top-tier global arms exporter.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260519010005245

WASHINGTON — In the latest escalation of a fight over the use of paid social media creators, Tom Steyer’s campaign for governor filed a complaint Tuesday accusing influencers who posted content supportive of Xavier Becerra’s campaign of failing to disclose that they had been paid, which is required by California law.

The complaint, filed with California’s Fair Political Practices Commission, accuses Jay Gonzalez of producing at least 14 pro-Becerra posts on Instagram and Facebook in late April and early May, after he was hired by the campaign, and only belatedly editing the posts to acknowledge they had been sponsored by the campaign.

The complaint also said that a social media creator named Maggie Reed, who posts under the username mermaidmamamaggie, created four pro-Becerra posts on Instagram and had previously offered to create paid posts for another gubernatorial campaign, though the complaint doesn’t specify how the campaign knows Reed was paid.

Reed and a talent agency that represents her did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

The Becerra campaign maintained that it has not paid influencers who have created posts in support of the campaign.

“All of the content you see online is entirely and purely organic,” said Becerra spokesman Jonathan Underland.

Becerra and Steyer have been the top two Democratic candidates in recent polling for the governor’s race, with Becerra consistently maintaining a slight edge in those polls.

The complaint by Steyer’s campaign comes after two influencers who support Becerra filed a complaint last week accusing social media creators hired by the Steyer campaign of failing to disclose that they had been paid to produce their posts.

The campaign of the billionaire candidate for governor had previously disclosed payments to some influencers with large audiences, including one creator with the user name zayydante, who has 1.8 million followers on TikTok, and another with the user name littleyeg, who has nearly 350,000 followers on TikTok. The complaint filed last week said that both of these influencers failed to disclose that they had been paid by the campaign to produce content.

The complaint also highlighted several accounts created by user who don’t appear to live in California who created posts promoting Steyer and, in at least one case, posted elsewhere that they had been paid by the campaign.

The influencers who filed the original complaint said they saw the newly filed complaint as an attempt by Steyer’s campaign to deflect criticism.

“All he’s done is attack his opponent instead of taking accountability for violating the law,” said Kaitlyn Hennessy, one of the two influencers who filed the complaint against Steyer’s campaign. Hennessy and the other influencer who filed the complaint both said they have not been paid by the Becerra campaign.

In a post on Substack, Steyer defended his campaign’s use of paid social media influencers and said that it had been transparent about their use.

“Every creator we compensate has been and will be publicly disclosed as required by law,” he wrote.

Under a California law passed in 2023, social media creators who create paid content on behalf of a political campaign are required to disclose in their post that the material was sponsored and who paid for it.

The onus is on creators to provide the disclosure, but campaigns are required to notify influencers they hire of the requirement.

Violation of the rules doesn’t trigger criminal, civil or administrative penalties but the FPPC can take alleged offenders to court and ask a judge to force compliance with the law.