Defense

June 24 (UPI) — Senate lawmakers have approved a war powers resolution directing President Donald Trump to halt U.S. hostilities with Iran or seek congressional authorization.

The Senate voted 50-48 on Tuesday, with four Republicans — Sens. Bill Cassidy of Louisiana, Susan Collins of Maine, Lisa Murkowski of Alaska and Rand Paul of Kentucky — joining their Democratic colleagues in passing H.Con.Res. 86. Sen. John Fetterman, D-Pa., was the only Democrat to vote against the measure.

The measure’s legal force was disputed. Though concurrent resolutions are non-binding, Democrats argue H.Con.Res. 86 is binding because it was adopted under the War Powers Resolution.

Either way, the measure shows the deepening fissure in support among Trump’s Republican Party for the war his administration unilaterally launched in late February.

Democrats have been forcing repeated war powers resolution votes for months, most of which have been stonewalled by Republicans. But GOP support for the war has waned as it has dragged on, culminating Tuesday when the Senate approved the measure that the House narrowly passed 215-208 earlier this month.

“Both chambers have now made clear that the president cannot continue this war of choice and must cease all hostilities against Iran,” Rep. Gregory Meeks, the resolution’s sponsor and ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said Tuesday after the vote.

“Regardless of what President Trump says, this measure is binding under the War Powers Resolution, and I will explore all legal avenues to ensure the Executive complies with the will of Congress.”

Democrats argue that the U.S. war with Iran — as well as other military actions taken by Trump, including attacks on suspected drug-trafficking boats in international waters — is illegal as Congress has not authorized war, a power the Constitution gives to Congress.

Trump has responded that he does not need authorization, and any war powers resolution is moot due to the fragile U.S.-Iran cease-fire that went into effect in early April.

Amid the cease-fire, Trump has been seeking an agreement to end the war, and his administration was actively negotiating terms with Iran when the vote was held Tuesday.

In a social media statement, Trump lambasted Congress over the vote, saying it was informing Iran that the United States does not support him while hee has “Iran on the ‘ropes,’ ready to go down for the fall.”

“Four Republican Losers voted with the Dumocrats,” he said, while calling the measure “poorly timed and meaningless.”

“These Senators have just made my job more difficult, but I will get it done, one way or the other, because I always get it done.”

SEOUL, June 23 (UPI) — North Korean leader Kim Jong Un called for accelerating the expansion of North Korea’s nuclear forces, citing increasingly hostile military cooperation between Seoul and Washington and an unstable global security environment, state media reported Monday.

Kim led a plenary meeting of the Ninth Central Committee of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea from Saturday through Monday to review progress on national goals for the first half of the year and outline priorities for the remainder of 2026, according to the official Korean Central News Agency.

The meeting reaffirmed Pyongyang’s commitment to strengthening and expanding its nuclear forces, describing them as “the core of the military sovereignty of the country” and the foundation of its war deterrent.

“To thoroughly exercise the position of a nuclear weapons state is the most correct and unique way to actively and confidently cope with the unpredictable international military and political situation,” KCNA said.

North Korea passed a law declaring itself a nuclear-armed state in 2022. Kim later amended the country’s constitution to enshrine the permanent growth of its nuclear arsenal, calling the status “irreversible.”

The remarks come weeks after Kim toured a newly inaugurated nuclear fuel production facility and vowed to continue expanding the country’s fissile material at an “exponential rate.”

In an address to the meeting, Kim said it was necessary to bolster North Korea’s defense capabilities in response to an increasingly volatile international environment.

“Wars, bloodshed and political and economic instabilities are becoming a daily occurrence in the world due to the gangster-like and unlimited geopolitical greed and misuse of strength,” Kim said, according to KCNA.

The North Korean leader criticized the U.S.-South Korea military alliance, citing regular joint military exercises and Seoul’s pursuit of a nuclear-powered submarine.

Kim also singled out the allies’ Nuclear Consultative Group, which met in Seoul earlier this month, calling it a “nuclear war body” and accusing Washington and Seoul of developing plans for a nuclear strike against North Korea.

He further accused Japan of transforming itself into a “war state” and warned that military buildups in Northeast Asia were heightening regional tensions.

In addition to expanding the country’s nuclear program, Kim outlined broader military modernization goals, including construction of a 10,000-ton strategic guided missile cruiser, expansion of munitions production and the development of new naval facilities. He also called for completing ongoing efforts to harden the border with South Korea.

The remarks come as North Korea continues extensive fortification work near the Military Demarcation Line inside the DMZ, including the installation of barbed-wire fencing and preparations for mine-laying operations.

South Korea’s Defense Ministry on Monday called the activity a violation of the armistice agreement that ended fighting in the 1950-53 Korean War.

North Korea has revised its constitution to remove all references to reunification with South Korea, formalizing Kim’s push to redefine inter-Korean ties as relations between two separate states.

“In particular, it is essential to thoroughly adhere to the principle of struggle against the enemy set forth by our party which defined the ROK as the most hostile state,” Kim said, using the official acronym for South Korea.

The remarks underlined Pyongyang’s continued rejection of South Korean President Lee Jae Myung’s outreach efforts since taking office last year.

Last week, Lee said he discussed North Korea with U.S. President Donald Trump during the Group of Seven summit in France, arguing that sanctions had failed to halt Pyongyang’s nuclear development and suggesting a more phased approach.

Trump met Kim three times during his first term and has repeatedly said he would be open to meeting the North Korean leader again since returning to office.

“President Trump said it was time to pay attention to the North Korea issue again,” Lee said.

The disruption caused by the Iran war and the temporary closure of the Strait of Hormuz has prompted countries around the world to reconsider their energy security strategies. Governments that suffered economic damage from supply shortages and soaring prices are now looking to build larger strategic oil and gas reserves, potentially creating demand for hundreds of millions of additional barrels over the coming years.

Hormuz Crisis Exposed Energy Vulnerabilities

The near-total closure of the Strait of Hormuz disrupted around one-fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas supplies for more than three months, sending shockwaves through energy markets.

Brent crude prices surged to nearly $120 a barrel as import-dependent economies faced rising fuel costs, supply uncertainty and growing inflationary pressures.

Emergency Reserves Helped Stabilize Markets

One of the key factors preventing a deeper energy crisis was the release of strategic petroleum reserves.

All 32 members of the International Energy Agency agreed to a record release of 400 million barrels from emergency stockpiles, helping offset supply disruptions and ease pressure on global markets.

The coordinated action highlighted the importance of maintaining large emergency reserves during major geopolitical crises.

China’s Stockpile Strategy Pays Off

China emerged from the crisis in a stronger position than many other major importers due to its massive strategic petroleum reserve.

The country has spent years building what is believed to be the world’s largest emergency oil stockpile, estimated at more than one billion barrels.

During the conflict, China significantly reduced crude imports, allowing it to avoid buying large volumes of oil at elevated prices and limiting the economic impact of the disruption.

Import-Dependent Economies Face Greater Pressure

Countries with limited strategic reserves faced much greater challenges.

Several Asian economies relied on emergency measures such as:

• Fuel subsidies
• Consumption restrictions
• Reduced working hours
• Energy-saving programs

The experience exposed vulnerabilities among countries heavily dependent on Middle Eastern energy supplies without substantial emergency stockpiles.

India Eyes Larger Strategic Reserves

India is among the countries most likely to expand its emergency storage capacity.

As the world’s third-largest oil importer and one of the fastest-growing energy consumers, India currently holds reserves covering only a small fraction of its import needs.

Meeting International Energy Agency standards would require hundreds of millions of additional barrels of storage capacity.

Recent plans under consideration suggest New Delhi is moving toward expanding its strategic petroleum reserve network.

Pakistan Also Reviewing Energy Security

Pakistan, which relied heavily on Middle Eastern oil and LNG imports before the conflict, is also examining ways to increase domestic storage capacity.

The Hormuz disruption underscored the risks facing countries that lack sufficient reserves to absorb prolonged supply interruptions.

Australia Moves to Address Reserve Gap

Australia, long criticized for failing to meet International Energy Agency stockpile requirements, has announced plans to significantly increase fuel reserves.

The move reflects a broader recognition that energy security has become a national security issue amid growing geopolitical uncertainty.

Europe Considers Additional Gas Storage

Europe already maintains extensive gas storage infrastructure to manage winter demand.

However, the war has renewed concerns about dependence on imported LNG, particularly as the region increasingly relies on overseas suppliers.

Additional government-controlled gas storage facilities may become part of future energy security planning.

Gulf Producers Seek Overseas Storage

The lessons of the Hormuz disruption are also influencing major energy exporters.

National oil companies in the Gulf are exploring opportunities to expand storage capacity outside the region to maintain export flexibility during future crises.

Additional overseas storage could help producers continue serving customers even if regional shipping routes face disruptions.

Oil Market Impact

The expansion of strategic reserves worldwide could create substantial new demand for crude oil and refined products.

At the same time, emergency reserves that were depleted during the conflict will need to be replenished.

Together, reserve rebuilding and new storage programs could generate demand for roughly one billion barrels over the coming years, providing support for global oil prices even if overall supply growth remains strong.

What It Means for Global Energy Security

The Hormuz crisis has reinforced a lesson many governments learned during previous energy shocks: supply security can be just as important as supply availability.

Countries are increasingly viewing strategic reserves not as emergency assets to be used rarely, but as a core component of economic and national security planning. The crisis has also demonstrated how large stockpiles can provide governments with flexibility to reduce imports during periods of market stress and extreme prices.

Analysis

The most significant consequence of the Iran war may not be the temporary spike in oil prices but the long-term shift in how countries manage energy security. The conflict exposed a clear divide between nations with large strategic reserves and those forced to absorb the full impact of supply disruptions. China emerged as a model for energy resilience, while countries such as India and Pakistan were reminded of their vulnerability to geopolitical shocks.

If governments follow through on plans to expand storage capacity, the global oil market could gain a major new source of structural demand. Reserve construction and replenishment may help absorb future supply surpluses and provide a floor for prices, particularly during periods of weak economic growth.

At the same time, larger strategic stockpiles could make future oil shocks less severe. Countries with substantial reserves are better positioned to reduce imports during crises, dampening demand spikes and limiting extreme price volatility. In the longer term, the world could emerge from the Hormuz crisis with a more resilient energy system, but one in which strategic stockpiles play a much larger role in shaping oil demand, trade flows and government policy.

With information from Reuters.

June 22 (UPI) — China announced Monday that it is adding 10 U.S. defense companies to its export control list, restricting business with those firms.

The move prohibits Chinese companies from exporting certain items to those companies, including drones, robotic hardware and software that is used for defense and national security capabilities. There are also items for nonmilitary uses that are restricted.

The companies added to the export control list are: AVEOX, Red Cat Holdings, Teal Drones, IMSAR, Jaia Robotics, Ball Aerospace and Technologies, Oshkosh Defense, L3Harris Maritime Services, MP Materials and USA Rare Earth.

“Exporters are prohibited from exporting dual-use items to the aforementioned 10 entities, and any organization or individual from any country or region is prohibited from transferring or providing dual-use items originating in China to the aforementioned entities; any ongoing related export activities must be immediately ceased,” the Chinese Ministry of Commerce announced.

The Chinese Finance Ministry also announced that 46 U.S. companies are banned from participating in government procurement projects. Many of those companies are also defense contractors.

Companies that are banned from participating in government procurement projects include Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and General Atomics.

Both bans take effect immediately, however China has included some flexibility in situations where exporting is “truly necessary.”

China’s new trade restrictions are in response to the Pentagon accusing a number of Chinese companies of aiding its military. The Pentagon updated its list of companies believed to be aiding the Chinese military earlier this month, blocking the Department of Defense from awarding direct contracts to those companies.

The update included the additions of Alibaba Group, Baidu and BYD, a Chinese automaker.

Diplomatic sparring between Ukraine and Belarus escalated sharply on 19 June, when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky demanded that Belarus dismantle communications infrastructure allegedly used by Russia to extend the range of its strike drones. Zelensky has offered a week for such removals to take place, reportedly saying, “I am giving a week for it to be withdrawn; otherwise, we will do it ourselves.” This marks a severe deterioration in relations since Belarus allowed Russian forces to cross Ukraine’s northern border using Belarusian territory in 2022. Following Russia’s withdrawal from Ukraine’s northern regions, Belarus has not enabled further assaults from its own territory but has actively aided Russian efforts, in part, by allowing drones to operate over Belarusian territory to strike Ukrainian targets with less warning. These increased tensions follow recent statements from Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko aimed at easing tensions, stating, “If Volodymyr Oleksandrovych was offended, I apologize to him for those words… Perhaps I shouldn’t have spoken so sharply about it. But, on the other hand, he should understand, as we often say: you get what you give.” As Zelensky applies pressure to Russia’s key European ally, Lukashenko’s response may determine whether his country will begin to withdraw support or play a larger part in this war.

Belarus’ Assistance in Putin’s Invasion

Belarus has played a vital role in Russia’s aggression since 2022, remaining one of Moscow’s most important enablers throughout the war. On the opening days of the conflict, 45,000 Russian soldiers crossed into the capital region of Kyiv. Since Russia’s withdrawal from northern Ukraine, Belarus has remained a tacit supporter of the invasion, finding auxiliary ways to support its key strategic ally’s actions in Ukraine without directly becoming involved itself. While weapons transfers and diplomatic support aid Moscow’s war effort, Belarus’ most valuable contributions come from two primary sources. First, Belarus’ expansive border with Ukraine. The two countries share a border that stretches over 1,000 kilometers. The existence of a Russian ally on Ukraine’s northern border introduces the risk of another attack from this direction, requiring the dedication of over 100,000 soldiers to the defense of a region that may not become active for the duration of the war. Second, neutral airspace was made available to long-range strike drones. Without this advantageous lane of attack, Russian drones, such as the Geran-2, must spend hours loitering over Ukrainian territory, where they are exposed to interception attempts while trying to reach their targets. Additionally, and central to Zelensky’s latest ultimatum, Belarus has reportedly allowed Russia to build a network of relays along Ukraine’s border to expand the range of its strike drones, allowing greater operational reach and improved resistance to electronic warfare.

Belarusian Capabilities

Threats made without the capability to enforce them are functionally pointless, suggesting that Zelensky believes Ukraine occupies a militarily advantageous position relative to Belarus. This warrants analysis of Belarus’ military capabilities to determine whether they pose a threat to Ukraine. As of 2022, Belarus reportedly maintained an active-duty army of approximately 48,000 soldiers, with inactive trained reserves and additional supporting personnel amounting to another 300,000 people. The country fields 1,200 main battle tanks and 3,400 other armored fighting vehicles, although it is unclear how many remain in active service. Many of these vehicles are of questionable utility, with Belarus operating mainly vintage Soviet equipment and few vehicles having been modernized to contemporary standards. The Belarusian Air Force fares slightly better, fielding 48 front-line fighter aircraft, of which 16 are new Su-30SM/SM2 airframes. The war and its rapidly changing dynamics have forced Belarus to invest in the modernization of its armed forces. However, in contrast to many Western modernization programs, which frequently involve high-value equipment deals, Belarusian efforts have focused more heavily on improving infantry capabilities. Belarus currently funds several programs for procuring modern armored vehicles and has recently made new equipment purchases from Russia, including the nuclear-capable intermediate-range ballistic missile known as Oreshnik. More transformative, however, are efforts to reform the country’s mobilization system and employment of experienced Wagner mercenaries to train Belarusian soldiers in drone-centric combat techniques. This could be interpreted either as an inability to afford more comprehensive reforms or as a deliberate shift away from traditional reliance on armored formations in favor of unmanned systems. Regardless of the motivation, these programs demonstrate substantive efforts to improve the military readiness of a vital ally to Russia.

Ukrainian-Belarusian Diplomatic Efforts

Zelensky’s demand follows months of escalating tensions between Belarus and Ukraine, contrasting Belarus’ traditionally ancillary role in Ukrainian foreign relations. Due to Belarus’ refusal to participate directly in combat operations, Kyiv had little incentive to press diplomatic issues and antagonize its northern neighbor. Until the recent flare-up, it was in Ukraine’s interest to keep Belarus on the sidelines while accepting the reality of Belarusian aid and weapons transfers that benefited Russia. Relations between the two countries followed a repeated cycle of saber-rattling, military posturing, de-escalation, and periods of calm. Lukashenko has repeatedly offered his services as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine, although Kyiv has rejected these offers because of Belarus’ close ties to Moscow. Tellingly, despite Belarus aiding its aggressor, Ukraine has maintained diplomatic ties with Minsk throughout the conflict. Lukashenko further offered to open bilateral talks with Kyiv in late 2025 in an attempt to reduce rising tensions. These efforts failed to bear fruit as relations deteriorated to their lowest point since the beginning of the war in May 2026. Following the construction of additional drone launching facilities in Belarus and an increase in Russian drone strikes, Ukrainian diplomacy shifted towards the application of direct pressure. Kyiv’s announcement that it had identified more than 500 strategic Belarusian targets in the event of conflict culminated in Zelensky’s ultimatum to dismantle Russia’s drone relay network within a week. The ultimatum suggests that Ukraine is abandoning its previous strategy of managing tensions with Belarus in favor of direct pressure. It also followed the largest Ukrainian drone strike on Moscow to date. Viewed in that context, Zelensky appears to be leveraging Ukraine’s growing long-range strike capabilities while simultaneously attempting to disrupt a component of Russia’s own drone warfare infrastructure.

WASHINGTON — Bobby Ray Inman’s bizarre withdrawal as the defense secretary nominee provides a glimpse into a peculiar Washington phenomenon–the insider who has spent so long behind the scenes that he is unprepared for the glare of the public limelight.

For more than 20 years, first as a Navy admiral and later as director of the National Security Agency and then deputy CIA director, Inman was part of a cadre of people who exercise great power in government but are insulated from the give-and-take of daily political life.

Inman’s remarks in announcing his withdrawal Tuesday and interviews with some of his friends suggest that the retired admiral was unequipped to step into the public arena. Despite his stated reasons, that lack of exposure to public life has emerged as the most plausible explanation for Inman’s abrupt turnabout.

“We thought: ‘He’s an insider–he probably knows the rules of the game.’ But he didn’t,” said Stephen H. Hess, a Brookings Institution political analyst. “We were all caught off guard by that.”

William Safire, the New York Times columnist accused by Inman of mounting unfair attacks, said Wednesday that he suspects Inman withdrew because he and other journalists were working on stories that might have damaged Inman’s chances for winning confirmation.

In his column appearing today, Safire wrote that Inman might have been worried by probes into reports that Inman had used a source on the Senate Intelligence Committee staff to help “manipulate” unsuspecting senators during Inman’s time at the CIA.

Inman had blamed a “new McCarthyism” in the press and the threat of a “partisan attack” by Republicans for his decision, but the media coverage and the GOP were overwhelmingly favorable toward him.

There were other ingredients as well: By Inman’s own admission, he did not thirst for the post. “I did not want a job in Washington,” he said in an interview.

He said he accepted Clinton’s offer because, as a career military officer, he found it difficult to refuse a presidential request.

Friends suggest that Inman’s longtime insecurities, apparently stemming from his days as a clumsy, bespectacled youngster, may have played a part by prompting him to overreact to fears that his reputation was being besmirched.

Inman’s experience is not unique in Washington politics. Others who have made the transition–notably Dwight D. Eisenhower, who went from five-star general to President, have had similar adjustments to make, although Eisenhower managed it more deftly.

Being an admiral or general provides a degree of insulation that often is a handicap for a would-be politician. Few are willing to criticize a senior military officer, especially in public.

And someone who has spent the bulk of his career as an intelligence officer is even more protected. By nature, the chiefs of the nation’s intelligence agencies stay in the background, even while advising presidents, briefing congressional leaders and influencing policies.

Especially during the Cold War, the bulk of their contact with the outside was behind closed doors–with lawmakers or reporters respectfully grateful for any morsel of information they were given.

Inman’s circumstances, and his own talents, accustomed him to receiving nothing but plaudits. Presidents, lawmakers and even the press praised him lavishly, extolling his brilliance and wisdom. Hardly an unkind word was to be found.

What Inman actually had to face during his few short weeks as defense secretary-designate was mild:

* A potential flap over his failure to pay Social Security taxes for a housekeeper peaked a few hours after it was announced, leaked by the White House to head off any serious brouhaha. The issue had been a major element in toppling two candidates for top Justice Department posts.

* News stories, backed up by bankruptcy records, noted his mixed performance in various business ventures. The articles were brought on mainly by Inman’s statements that he planned to bring more business techniques to government.

As Inman eventually admitted, the only real criticism came from a handful of columnists. News coverage and most editorials were heavy with praise; Inman said Tuesday that the working press had treated him fairly.

Inman did “more to besmirch his own reputation in his press conference than the press or the Republicans ever did,” Hess said. “Most people think his response bordered on the bizarre.”

Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole (R-Kan.), whom Inman accused–apparently without foundation–of spearheading a GOP attack against him, offered perhaps the unkindest cut of all:

“I think it’s probably a break for President Clinton that he didn’t get the job, the way he carried on yesterday,” the senator said Wednesday on CBS-TV’s “This Morning” program, in a view shared by some White House aides.

Times staff writer James Risen contributed to this story.

The Chinese strategy employs research and intelligence institutions working to foster closer ties between Iranian national security institutions and the Egyptian military, aiming to undermine the American presence in the Middle East. Prominent among these institutions are the Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University, the China Institute of International Studies, and the Center for West Asian and African Studies. These Chinese research centers, which shape China’s relations with countries in the region and the Gulf, include the Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University (SISU), which directs studies related to security and defense issues and facilitates direct dialogue between think tanks in Iran and research centers in Egypt. Another example is the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), which reports directly to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and works to engineer diplomatic plans that align Egypt’s strategic interests with the objectives of Tehran and resistance movements in the region. Chinese think tanks and intelligence agencies also rely on a number of People’s Liberation Army-backed space intelligence companies, such as MizarVision and EarthEye. These Chinese companies have provided high-resolution satellite imagery and intelligence data to support operations targeting US bases in the Gulf and the Middle East. These Chinese entities coordinate and plan operations through various mechanisms and initiatives officially launched by China, most notably the Global Security Initiative (GSI). Beijing also uses forums, such as the China-Arab Cooperation Forum, to pressure Middle Eastern and Gulf countries to withdraw foreign forces and end US hegemony in the Gulf and the Middle East. This is framed as ending direct interference in the internal affairs of countries in the region. Beijing is also seeking to establish permanent overseas bases, most prominently the Djibouti naval base in East Africa, to support its regional alliances and ensure the continuity of global supply lines for Chinese interests and investments within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative.

The relationship between Chinese military and intelligence think tanks and the Egyptian army is highlighted by their shared goal of countering American hegemony and expelling US military bases from the Gulf and the Middle East. China is strengthening its strategic cooperation with the Egyptian army as part of the Djibouti-UAE-Egypt axis, with Beijing relying on Cairo as a key launching pad to secure maritime navigation and reduce American military influence. Beijing is utilizing its strategic institutions and think tanks to provide technological and logistical support to the Egyptian army, aiming to create a regional power capable of maintaining strategic balance in the region against American hegemony and interventions. This escalating security and strategic relationship between the Egyptian and Chinese armies rests on several key pillars, most notably intelligence and military partnership. China aims to train the Egyptian military elite through Egyptian military academies and coordinate threat assessments and mutual monitoring of the military movements of the United States and its allies in the Gulf and the wider region. With the implementation of several joint exercises between the two sides, the Chinese vision crystallized in the (Civilization Eagles maneuvers), which brought together the air forces of China and Egypt. This paves the way for the transfer of military technology and the integration of Chinese systems with Egyptian defenses independent of the West, along with the localization of Chinese military industries in the heart of Cairo. China is negotiating with the Egyptian Ministry of Defense to develop local manufacturing capabilities and transfer defense technology. There are also reports of integrating Chinese systems into Egyptian systems to reduce Egypt’s dependence on American-supplied weaponry. Beijing seeks to create a counterweight to American hegemony in the Middle East and the Gulf. China sees Egypt’s refusal to host any American military bases as a cornerstone of its strategy, relying on the Egyptian and Emirati armies to guarantee regional security as an alternative to the traditional American presence in the Gulf and the Middle East.

Chinese research, military, and intelligence think tanks are working to engineer an asymmetric strategic partnership to end American hegemony in the Middle East and the Gulf. Chinese think tanks, military research centers, and intelligence agencies are operating according to a clear strategic vision aimed at building asymmetrical partnerships in the Middle East and the Arabian Gulf to reduce American influence and establish a multipolar world order. Beijing provides Tehran with technical and intelligence support to deter Washington, while simultaneously seeking to strengthen military cooperation with Egypt as a pivotal regional power. This strategy aims to diminish American influence and secure China’s vital economic interests. The Chinese strategy in the region rests on several pillars, most notably its strategy toward Iran and its technical and intelligence support for the country. China has secretly supplied Iran with advanced satellite technology from its BeiDou satellite system, bypassing Western and American GPS systems, as well as sophisticated air defense systems. This has significantly enhanced the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s ability to monitor and target American military bases in the region and the Gulf.

The objectives of Chinese think tanks, political, strategic, military, and intelligence research centers become apparent here, as they attempt to plan a path to link Iran to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and transform Iranian military pressure into a tool for destabilizing the US bases deployed in the region and the Gulf. The convergence between China and the Egyptian military is highlighted through the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries. Beijing is inclined to strengthen military cooperation with Egypt, capitalizing on its political stability and its geographic location controlling vital maritime trade routes, and to transfer advanced Chinese military technology to Egypt. Beijing has revealed its desire to be a major supplier of equipment to the Egyptian army, such as the J-10 aircraft. This aims to increase Egypt’s strategic maneuvering room and reduce the dominance of Western weaponry.

The stability achieved by the Egyptian leadership is a fundamental pillar supporting the comprehensive strategic partnership, as Beijing seeks to secure its economic and military interests with a stable and influential regional power. Therefore, China is investing in the Belt and Road Initiative, for which the Suez Canal is a vital artery in the Middle East. Cooperation extends to the exchange and transfer of military technology, joint military manufacturing, advanced air defense systems, and the evaluation of potential acquisitions of modern Chinese fighter jets. Furthermore, joint air exercises have been conducted, with the Egyptian Armed Forces carrying out their first-ever joint air exercise, dubbed Eagles of Civilization with China, involving multi-role fighter aircraft from both countries, underscoring the deepening defense partnership between them.

In this context, China relies on the Egyptian military within the framework of its strategic and African axis to counter American influence. For China, Egypt represents its strategic gateway to the African continent and a cornerstone in its maneuvers against the US Africa Command (USAFRICOM). In addition to joint military exercises, China and Egypt have conducted joint air force drills, a clear indication of an unprecedented military rapprochement that has drawn close American scrutiny. With China’s move to transfer technology and arms deals to Cairo, it is positioning itself to support the Egyptian army with advanced air defense systems, such as the HQ-9B. This enhances Egypt’s air deterrence capabilities and forms part of strategic military deals aimed at reducing dependence on the United States and its Western allies. On the other hand, China relies on Iran as a deterrent and direct driver, exerting pressure on American bases in the region. Iran represents the spearhead of China’s brinkmanship policy against American military bases in the Gulf, Iraq, and Syria, with Tehran threatening to strike them should any regional conflict erupt. In conjunction with the economic and diplomatic alliance between Beijing and Tehran, China uses emerging alliances, such as the BRICS group and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), to establish Iran’s political foothold. It sometimes resorts to mediation policies as a tool to reduce the likelihood of a direct confrontation with Iran, which could harm its commercial interests, such as China’s sponsorship of Pakistani mediation efforts between Iran and the United States to stop the war against Iran and allow the Strait of Hormuz to be opened to global trade and navigation.

China’s major objectives in the Middle East lie in a strategy of attrition against the United States. China uses Iranian actions as a clever pressure tactic to test and deplete American military technology without direct involvement in wars of attrition, while simultaneously attempting to create a new regional order. Here, Chinese intelligence agencies coordinate networks of overlapping interests to push countries toward understandings that transcend the American security umbrella, paving the way for the future withdrawal of foreign military bases. The pillars of China’s strategy for alternative hegemony are based on asymmetric partnerships. Beijing focuses on presenting itself as a reliable economic and technological partner without political conditions or interference in internal affairs, unlike the American model based on conditionality and direct military alliances. With China’s emphasis on the economy as a gateway to security, it utilizes the Belt and Road Initiative and its massive investments in infrastructure and ports, such as the Khalifa Port in the UAE and the Port of Duqm in Oman, to solidify its strategic presence and transform economic dependence into long-term geopolitical influence. With Beijing’s use of security diplomacy and mediation, Chinese decision-making centers have adopted a common security approach and offered political mediation, such as sponsoring the Saudi-Iranian agreement, to solidify Beijing’s role as an international peacemaker and portray the United States as a destabilizing force through the militarization of the region. This is coupled with China’s technological and intelligence penetration of the region and the Gulf, where Chinese partnerships focus on transferring 5G technologies, artificial intelligence, and space cooperation with Gulf states. This grants Beijing intelligence-gathering capabilities and allows it to connect the region’s vital systems to the Chinese technological infrastructure. Chinese think tanks and intelligence agencies are planning to cautiously fill the void, as China avoids direct military confrontation with Washington in the region and prefers to capitalize on the Gulf states’ desire to diversify their partnerships and hedge against the gradual decline of American interest in the Middle East.

Accordingly, we analyze that China’s military strategy in the Middle East and Africa relies on building defense partnerships with diverse objectives. It utilizes the Egyptian army as a pivotal regional power to bolster its influence and counterbalance the American presence through advanced training cooperation while simultaneously leveraging its relationship with Iran to exert pressure on American bases, particularly in the Gulf, and secure its oil interests all within a comprehensive policy aimed at dismantling American hegemony in the region.

June 19 (Asia Today) — North Korea marked the second anniversary of its defense treaty with Russia on Friday by calling the agreement an “essential legal weapon” for achieving global strategic stability and pledging to further strengthen bilateral ties.

The Rodong Sinmun, the newspaper of North Korea’s ruling Workers’ Party, published an article titled “The Power of the North Korea-Russia Alliance Is Being Demonstrated More Forcefully” to commemorate the anniversary of the treaty.

The newspaper described the agreement as “a reliable guarantee” for establishing a new international order and securing a brighter future for humanity.

“It is the unwavering position and will of the government and people of our republic to permanently expand and develop the traditional North Korea-Russia friendship through close and multifaceted solidarity in all fields on the basis of the new interstate treaty,” the newspaper said.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in Pyongyang on June 19, 2024. The agreement includes a mutual defense clause requiring either country to provide assistance if the other comes under armed attack.

The Rodong Sinmun said the treaty had led to an unprecedented increase in communication across politics, economics, culture, defense, diplomacy and security.

It also said cooperation had expanded in trade, science and technology, education, public health and the arts.

The newspaper cited the construction of a North Korea-Russia friendship hospital, the resumption of direct flights between Pyongyang and Moscow and North Korea’s participation in Russia’s war against Ukraine as results of the closer relationship.

“The victory of the sacred common cause of the peoples of North Korea and Russia is certain,” it said. “The great friendship between the two countries, forged in blood and growing stronger by the day, will remain immortal.”

North Korea has sent troops and weapons to support Russia’s war against Ukraine. Pyongyang and Moscow have presented their military cooperation as an implementation of the strategic partnership treaty.

Separately, Kim Yo Jong, the sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and a senior Workers’ Party official, condemned a Group of Seven statement calling for the denuclearization of North Korea.

In a statement Thursday, Kim accused the G7 leaders of repeating what she called an outdated demand and said denuclearization was a matter that had been permanently closed.

“The nuclear weapons we acquired to defend ourselves after being subjected to constant and persistent nuclear threats from our adversaries should cause concern to no one except those who intend to harm us,” Kim said.

She said North Korea’s nuclear status was written into its constitution and portrayed the country’s arsenal as a defensive and retaliatory capability.

“Possession of nuclear weapons is our core interest that must be firmly defended, and denuclearization is an irreversible line that can never be crossed,” Kim said.

She warned that challenging the core interests of what she called a nuclear-armed state would be “the worst and most disastrous choice.”

South Korea’s Unification Ministry reiterated that Seoul remains committed to pursuing North Korea’s denuclearization through a phased and realistic approach.

“Our position remains unchanged that, based on reality, we must develop phased and feasible measures that are acceptable to both sides to achieve a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula,” Deputy Ministry spokeswoman Jang Yun-jeong said at a regular briefing Friday.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260619010006805

For decades, satellites have provided critical data for military activities in active and non-active combat zones. One of the most significant integration of space-based technologies emerged in missile defense systems during the Cold War. Satellite constellations provided critical data on the launch sites and trajectories of ballistic missiles. The US Defense Support Program (DSP) was the first program to launch satellite constellations to detect heat signatures of Soviet ICBMs with infrared sensors. The Soviet Union launched the first generation of early warning systems under OKO satellite constellations against US missile threats. These systems of satellite constellations allowed both the US and the USSR to maintain a close watch over each other’s strategic capabilities and allowed for much needed early warning that upheld mutual deterrence between the two powers.

Fast forward to the current era, today’s missile defense systems have shown a very limited success rate against hypersonic missiles. The tracking and interception capabilities of current missile defense systems have remained effectively limited due to speed, maneuverability, and depressed flight of hypersonic missiles. Traditional missile defense systems have been outmaneuvered by hypersonic missiles, which increases the threat level due to their capability to reach and hit targets with a high success rate. Modern hypersonic missiles can still be detected with infrared sensing during their boost phase, but Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs) are extremely difficult to track and intercept primarily due to their maneuverability. The radar-evading capabilities of HGVs affect the strategic calculus by shrinking detection and reaction time duration during crises and conflicts.

As a remedy, the US has introduced the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensors (HBTSS) to counter the threat of HGVs and Hypersonic Cruise Missiles (HCMs). The HBTSS will be a major component of the US Golden Dome missile defense project. It is a layered network of command-and-control systems, interceptors, and space-based sensors to build an advanced layer of missile defense system. What makes HBTSS different from traditional missile defense systems is the satellite constellation, which provides real-time tracking data of missiles. Traditional defense systems like Space Based Infrared System (SBIR) could detect the launch of missiles, but HBTSS can detect, track, and possibly predict the target of the missile.

Because HGVs present a unique challenge due to low flight path and maneuverability and often operate under the coverage of conventional radars, which make it difficult for traditional defense systems to detect. HBTSS relies on space-based sensors, which can detect and track continuously from space. Theoretically, it can be called a space-based missile defense system reflecting the growing strategic importance of space in the military domain. It relies on an interconnected satellite network that can work as a kill web across the globe against the threat of hypersonic missiles.

HBTSS is an emerging strategic shift as it starts a new era of space weaponization with a layer of satellites for enhanced detection and tracking. A reliable space-based tracking system bolsters a state’s capabilities to deal with the threat of hypersonic missiles with improved early warning and missile tracking systems, and reduces the threat of surprise attacks from an adversary. Although missile forces hold great impact on deterrence stability, the induction of HTBSS will question the effectiveness of missiles during crises and conflicts if a more advance missile defense system is introduced. This will provide a wider view from space with more accuracy and precision, and increase the vulnerability of missile forces of states.

Because ground-based nuclear forces are considered vulnerable, many countries have developed second-strike capabilities, particularly at sea, to preserve deterrence even after absorbing an initial attack. But the development of HBTSS undermines the survivability of a state’s missile forces with an enhanced detection and tracking system. Even though the United States and Russia continue to maintain certain crisis management and risk reduction mechanisms, including hotlines and military deconfliction channels, the suspension of New START has weakened the broader framework of strategic stability. While in conflict-prone regions like South Asia, India and Pakistan possess a more limited and less institutionalized set of confidence-building measures (CBMs), making crisis management in South Asia particularly challenging due to emerging technologies.

The peaceful use of outer space depends on the intent and actions of major powers. Sometimes measures taken for self-defense can also prompt a proportionate reaction in the form of countermeasures. The strategic impact of HBTSS on the missile forces may lead to more advance, fast, and lethal missiles for survivability. The development of HBTSS will not end the arms race, it will intensify the arms race with countermeasures.

June 19 (Asia Today) — South Korea is seeking to transform its defense industry into a national growth engine by integrating military procurement, weapons exports, advanced technology and industrial policy, government and industry officials said Friday.

Officials at a public-private seminar in Seoul rejected the long-standing argument that growing foreign orders could divert production capacity from the South Korean military and delay domestic weapons deliveries.

Instead, they said an analysis of about 2,000 South Korean defense companies found that exports increased factory utilization, encouraged investment in research and production facilities and eventually reduced manufacturing costs.

The findings were presented at a seminar titled “A New Leap Forward in Acquisition and the Defense Industry,” held at the Fairmont Ambassador Seoul in the city’s Yeouido financial district.

The Defense Acquisition Program Administration organized the event as it marked the 20th anniversary of its establishment.

Participants included lawmakers, officials from the defense, industry, science and small-business ministries, defense company executives and academic researchers.

They called for an end to treating military procurement and defense exports as separate policy areas.

Lee Yong-cheol, minister of the Defense Acquisition Program Administration, said South Korea’s annual defense exports had grown from about $250 million when the agency was established to $15.4 billion last year.

“Defense exports are no longer merely a supplement to domestic military procurement,” Lee said. “They have become a central growth engine driving the Republic of Korea as a whole.”

Lee said South Korea also needed to move beyond selling individual weapons.

He proposed combining weapons with energy systems, infrastructure, maintenance, repair and overhaul services and other forms of industrial cooperation.

“The era of selling weapons as stand-alone products is over,” Lee said. “We will transform the K-defense paradigm through cross-industry package cooperation.”

Lawmakers from South Korea’s governing and opposition parties pledged bipartisan legislative support for faster procurement and stronger financing for small and midsized defense companies.

They said a system that can take about 15 years to plan, develop and deploy a weapon is not suitable for an era in which artificial intelligence, drones and robotic systems evolve rapidly.

Participants also cited research indicating that financial instability among smaller suppliers, rather than export production, was a more important cause of delivery delays.

They called for expanded government-backed financing to prevent small manufacturers in the defense supply chain from being overwhelmed by debt and working-capital shortages.

Study links exports to stronger domestic production

South Korea’s defense industry has long debated whether large export contracts weaken or strengthen the country’s own military procurement.

Critics have warned that foreign orders could occupy production lines and delay the delivery of weapons to South Korean forces.

Supporters have argued that exports create economies of scale, preserve production capacity and lower the price paid by the South Korean military.

Research presented at Friday’s seminar supported the second view.

A team led by researchers from Myongji University analyzed data from about 2,000 South Korean defense-related companies.

The analysis found that increasing exports produced an immediate rise in factory utilization. Higher utilization was then associated with greater investment in research, development and production facilities.

Researchers said the benefits became more evident about three years after an export increase.

The analysis identified improvements in operating profit, lower production costs and greater independence in critical technologies after that period.

Repeated production also allowed factory workers and engineers to improve their skills and reduce defects, a process commonly described as a learning effect.

At the same time, producing weapons in larger quantities spread fixed development and manufacturing expenses across more units.

Researchers said those effects increased the competitiveness of South Korean products in foreign markets while potentially lowering the cost of weapons purchased by the South Korean military.

Industry experts cited South Korea’s large exports of K2 tanks and K9 self-propelled howitzers to Poland as an example.

They said the contracts increased domestic production, helped reduce unit costs and accelerated work on upgraded models.

Kim Myung-keun, an executive at Hyundai Rotem, said the company achieved economies of scale after receiving Poland’s large K2 tank order.

“Mass production lowered costs, reduced the acquisition cost for our own military and accelerated the development of upgraded models,” Kim said.

Yoon Byung-jo, an executive at SNT Motiv, said repeated production generated through large export orders also strengthened technical capabilities on factory floors.

“The learning effect accumulated by technicians during repeated production is the most powerful tool for reducing defects in critical components and increasing technological independence and localization,” Yoon said.

Lee Jung-hyun, a Myongji University professor involved in the study, said the analysis did not identify export volume as the principal cause of delayed deliveries.

“The real causes of delivery delays were companies’ debt ratios and financial soundness,” Lee said. “Exports instead improved operating profits and technological capabilities after a time lag of about three years.”

Lee said the government should strengthen the financial stability of smaller defense companies rather than restrict exports.

Officials seek to shorten 15-year procurement cycle

Government officials said South Korea’s traditional weapons acquisition process is too slow to keep pace with civilian advances in AI, drones, robots and human-machine teaming systems.

Weapons programs can take about 15 years from initial planning through development and operational deployment.

Officials said that schedule risks delivering technology that has already become outdated by the time it reaches military units.

Won Jong-dae, an assistant defense minister, said the existing system had become a national security obstacle.

“In the age of AI and drones, an acquisition process that takes 15 years is an impediment to security,” Won said.

He said the government would seek legislation tentatively called the Advanced Defense Capabilities Projects Act to shorten the process from initial requirements planning through deployment.

Kim Seong-su, a senior research and development official at the Science and Technology Ministry, said innovation in the civilian sector was advancing more quickly than military technology.

Kim called for an adaptive research and development system that would allow mature commercial technologies to be introduced into the military without passing through the full conventional development process.

The acquisition agency said it plans to expand rapid-introduction programs, particularly for drones and AI-related technologies.

The programs would allow the military to test and deploy promising civilian products more quickly while making adjustments based on operational experience.

Jeong Hwan, chief executive of infrared sensor manufacturer i3system, said smaller companies with advanced commercial technologies often cannot withstand the military’s complicated testing requirements and lengthy acquisition schedule.

He urged the government to make rapid acquisition programs more flexible and accessible to technology companies.

Financial support sought for smaller suppliers

Officials said South Korea must also strengthen small and midsized companies that produce components and materials for major weapons manufacturers.

Park Yong-soon, a senior official at the Ministry of SMEs and Startups, said the research presented Friday showed that financial weakness was a major source of supply-chain disruption.

Park said the government would shift policy toward stronger financial support for vulnerable suppliers and seek to increase the share of domestic defense revenue generated by small companies.

Smaller companies currently account for about 18% of South Korean defense industry sales. The government aims to raise the proportion to 25%.

Officials said those businesses can face severe cash-flow pressures because defense contracts require lengthy development, testing and certification before companies receive full payment.

The problem can become more serious when a small supplier must expand production rapidly to meet a major overseas order.

Park said the government must ensure that otherwise competitive companies do not collapse because they cannot obtain sufficient operating capital.

Park Dong-il, a senior official at the Industry Ministry, also warned that South Korea’s export portfolio remained concentrated in ground weapons.

More than 60% of the country’s defense exports come from land-based systems, he said.

Park said the government would work to diversify the industry into aerospace, next-generation satellites and advanced naval vessels while strengthening the domestic manufacturing and component ecosystem.

South Korea plans national security export packages

The acquisition agency said future export efforts would go beyond individual tanks, aircraft or artillery systems.

The government plans to package defense products with energy projects, transportation and industrial infrastructure, information and communications technology, maintenance services and technology transfers.

Officials described the approach as exporting an integrated security platform rather than a single weapon.

They cited Poland as a model.

South Korean arms agreements with Warsaw have included not only K2 tanks, K9 howitzers and other weapon systems but also plans for local production, technology cooperation, training and long-term maintenance.

An industry official said future transactions could involve building a partner country’s broader security and industrial system.

“The business will no longer be about exporting one tank,” the official said. “It will become a platform business that exports an entire national security system.”

Such packages can help importing countries create domestic jobs, develop supply chains and maintain weapons locally.

They can also give South Korean companies access to long-term revenue from training, spare parts, upgrades and depot-level maintenance after the initial sale.

The approach, however, requires coordination among several ministries because infrastructure, export financing and industrial cooperation extend beyond the authority of the acquisition agency.

Kim Il-dong, deputy minister of the Defense Acquisition Program Administration, said procurement and exports should be viewed as two sides of the same coin.

Kim said the acquisition agency could not achieve South Korea’s defense industry goals on its own.

He called for coordinated action by the defense, science, industry and small-business ministries to develop the sector as a strategic national industry.

Seoul targets 5% share of global defense market

The Defense Acquisition Program Administration said it aims to increase South Korea’s share of the global defense market to at least 5% and establish the country as one of the world’s four largest defense exporters.

Officials said South Korea’s defense industry had already approached the global top five based on its 2025 export performance.

Future growth will depend on moving beyond the country’s current strength in tanks, armored vehicles and artillery, they said.

The government plans to support companies working in AI, space systems, drones, advanced ships and autonomous and human-machine teaming technologies.

It also wants to foster globally competitive defense startups and companies capable of reaching valuations of more than $1 billion.

Officials and industry representatives said South Korea’s defense sector had completed an initial period of quantitative growth and now needed to focus on technology, productivity and supply-chain resilience.

“The past 20 years were a period of quantitative growth in which K-defense built weapons capabilities from the ground up,” seminar participants said. “The next 20 years should be remembered as an era of qualitative growth centered on AI, space, drones and unmanned systems.”

They said military procurement and the defense industry should no longer be treated as separate areas.

Instead, both should be viewed as parts of a single strategic industry supporting South Korea’s security, technological development and economic growth.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260619010006831

BEIRUT, Lebanon, June 19 (UPI) — The Iran war may be over, but southern Lebanon is likely to remain a battlefield and a bargaining chip in regional negotiations, despite Lebanon’s inclusion in the memorandum of understanding between Iran and the United States — a provision Israel rejected to preserve its freedom of action against Hezbollah, analysts said.

Violence in southern Lebanon subsided after the United States and Iran announced a 14-point preliminary agreement to end hostilities, reopen the Strait of Hormuz, and begin nuclear talks under a 60-day extended ceasefire.

The MOU was signed remotely on Wednesday by U.S. President Donald Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, two days ahead of a formal signing ceremony scheduled to take place in Switzerland.

Rather than a cessation of hostilities, southern Lebanon witnessed a sharp escalation in fighting, with Israel intensifying its airstrikes and Hezbollah targeting Israeli forces seeking to seize the strategic Ali Taher hill in the Nabatiyeh district. Both sides traded accusations of violating the ceasefire established under the MOU.

The overnight exchange left 47 people dead, including women and children, and 97 others wounded in Israeli strikes on several areas of Lebanon, including Nabatiyeh and the eastern Bekaa Valley. Four Israeli soldiers, including a lieutenant colonel, were also killed by Hezbollah fire.

Israeli airstrikes continued beyond a new ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, brokered by the United States and Qatar with Iranian assistance, and set to take effect at 4 p.m. Friday.

It remains to be seen how long this new truce will last, as is the case with the U.S.-Iran ceasefire, given ambiguities in the MOU and differing interpretations of its clauses.

Israel, which rejected Trump’s “betrayal” and the agreement with Iran, is seeking to change the arrangement by force in order to preserve its freedom of action against Hezbollah threats in southern Lebanon. It also seeks to maintain control of a security zone in southern Lebanon and is not willing to withdraw its forces unless its northern region is secured and safe.

Riad Tabbarah, Lebanon’s former ambassador in Washington, said Israel believes it has the right, as it usually does, to modify the agreement on the ground after “accepting it on paper, so as not to annoy Trump.”

“This is exactly what they did last time, and what they do every time,” Tabbarah told UPI. “Today, they are doing the same.”

He was referring to the Nov. 27 ceasefire agreement brokered by the United States and France to halt the war that began when Hezbollah opened a support front for Gaza on Oct. 8, 2023.

Despite the truce, Israel continued to carry out strikes against Hezbollah, which refrained from retaliation for 15 months as it sought to reorganize its ranks before resuming fighting on March 2 in support of Iran.

The March escalation increased the human and material toll in Lebanon after Israel applied what was described as a “scorched earth” policy to empty border areas of residents and render them uninhabitable.

More than 3,980 people have been killed and 12,001 injured in the past 109 days, with 1.2 million displaced under Israeli evacuation orders. Large areas were devastated, including the complete destruction of 70 villages and heavy damage to infrastructure.

It would be “pure imagination and illogical” to think that Israel would easily withdraw and relinquish the security zone it is building in southern Lebanon, intended to prevent anyone from crossing its border and carrying out kidnappings like Hamas did from Gaza on Oct. 7, 2023, according to Tabbarah.

What could stop the frustrated Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu from sabotaging Trump’s efforts to finalize a lasting peace deal with Iran and continuing his military campaign in Lebanon?

The tension between Trump and his administration on one side, and Netanyahu and his government officials on the other, over the Iran deal “is growing, and we need to wait and see how it will develop,” said Lebanese former foreign minister Fares Boueiz.

As for Iran, Boueiz noted that as long as it believes it is benefiting from the deal with Trump, it “won’t do anything to jeopardize the understanding.”

“It is clear that the U.S.-Iran war is over, with no winner and no loser and no complete victory for anyone,” he told UPI. “The next 60 days will determine whether a final agreement is reached and whether Netanyahu will be able to obstruct it.”

The fear that Lebanon remains an open battlefield and a bargaining chip has grown, despite Iran’s pledge to Hezbollah that it will not proceed with the MOU talks if Israel fails to observe a full ceasefire in Lebanon and withdraw from the southern region.

Lebanese retired Maj. Gen. Abdul Rahman Chehaitli argued that the war in south Lebanon was “an Iran-Israel war sponsored by the U.S.”

“Now that Iran has reconciled with the U.S., signed an agreement, and is negotiating, the battle is over for them,” Chehaitli said in an interview with UPI. “This means that Lebanon should work toward a solution with Hezbollah and engage in serious negotiations to secure Israel’s withdrawal and end any illegitimate armed presence.”

Lebanon, which opted for U.S.-mediated direct talks with Israel to end the war despite Hezbollah’s objections, is preparing for another round of diplomatic talks with Israel scheduled to take place in Washington next week.

While Hezbollah leader Sheikh Naim Qassem has set new terms for the talks, saying they should be limited to “mutual security,” Israel is insisting on disarming the Iran-backed group and keeping it away from its borders.

Hezbollah has also been pushing to drop the Lebanon-Israel direct negotiations in favor of the U.S.-Iran track.

“Hezbollah can say whatever it wants, but Lebanon should negotiate on its own,” Chehaitli said, adding that the militant group “is concerned about the day after, seeking security guarantees or immunity.”

Lebanon has no option but to negotiate its way out of the war, but the process will be long, and southern Lebanon will remain under Israeli fire and a bargaining chip in Iran’s hands until a final deal with Washington is reached, according to some analysts.

Tabbarah argued that Israel did not go through all this war only to back down, while Iran seeks a high price in return for Hezbollah and its other regional armed proxies.

“I don’t think Iran will go to war again. It will find a formula to save face for its armed militias,” he said, adding that the U.S., on its part, will have to restrain Israel and force Netanyahu to accept a full ceasefire in Lebanon.

He explained that a decision by Trump to stop U.S. military assistance to Israel, or “anything of the sort,” would be a serious step.

Tabbarah, however, warned that the solution “is not for tomorrow unless Israel drops its dream of establishing Greater Israel.”

June 19 (UPI) — Scheduled talks to implement the U.S.-Iran memorandum aimed at de-escalating their war have been postponed, Switzerland said Friday, hours before the meeting was to be held.

Bern’s Foreign Ministry said the planned talks have been “postponed.” Neither a reason nor a new date was given.

“Switzerland remains ready to facilitate these talks,” it said in a statement. “The relevant preparatory work at Burgenstock is continuing.”

U.S. President Donald Trump signed the memorandum of understanding Wednesday while in Paris.

Though all of its specifics have not been made public, the MOU stipulates certain conditions, such as the United States lifting its naval blockade and Iran permitting commercial passage through the Strait of Hormuz.

The first round of negotiations on the MOU’s implementation was scheduled for the mountaintop resort of Burgenstock for Friday. The location had been proposed by mediators Pakistan and Qatar, as well as the United States and Iran, with Switzerland to act as a facilitator in the process.

The cause for the postponement was not initially clear.

A White House spokesperson told reporters in a statement that Vice President JD Vance would not be departing the United States to attend the Swiss negotiations.

The spokesperson said that plans for the talks had not been finalized and their logistics had “never been simple or predictable.”

“We look forward to beginning technical talks as soon as possible,” the spokesperson said.

This is a breaking story.

June 19 (UPI) — President Donald Trump has awarded the Medal of Honor to three veterans, honoring their acts of heroism in battle in Vietnam and Afghanistan.

At a White House ceremony on Thursday, Trump awarded the nation’s highest military honor to retired Marine Corps Maj. James Capers Jr. and retired Army Maj. Nicholas Dockery. He also awarded the medal posthumously to Marine Corps Col. John Ripley, who died in 2008, with the honor accepted by his son, Tom Ripley.

Trump opened his remarks by touting the stock market and lower oil prices, then appeared to joke that he wanted to award himself the nation’s highest military honor but was told he could not. He then introduced Capers, saying he was the first Black Marine in history to receive a battlefield commission during wartime when he was promoted to second lieutenant during the Vietnam War.

Capers was awarded the medal for his “acts of gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty” in the spring of 1967, when he led a four-day reconnaissance patrol that made contact on three separate occasions with a superior enemy force, and on the final day, was ambushed, the White House said in a release.

Trump said Capers was hit by an explosion that sent him into a tree, “ripping open his abdomen.” His body was pierced by 17 pieces of shrapnel and his leg was broken, but despite his injuries, he refused to be extracted before his men were safe.

Trump said that Capers was recommended for the award that year, but his commanding officer died before he could sign the paperwork.

“That’s a bad break. But now you’re doing it. This is maybe, this is better,” he said, adding that “The nation kept you waiting far too long.”

Ripley was also awarded the medal, though posthumously, for acts of heroism during Vietnam. The White House said Ripley played a pivotal role in halting a major North Vietnamese mechanized assault by destroying a bridge in the village of Dong Ha.

Trump described Ripley as completing five trips to move explosives into position on the bridge while under gunfire.

“When John detonated the explosives, the bridge collapsed into the river, crushing the advance and saved the hope of a free Vietnam for Easter morning,” the president said.

Dockery received the medal for actions taken to save his platoon in Kapisa Province, Afghanistan, on Oct. 2, 2012.

Trump said about 150 Taliban fighters ambushed Dockery’s platoon that fall day as they were guarding the governor’s compound. For more than four hours, he fought the Taliban, risking his life on several occasions to protect and evacuate three wounded members of his platoon, according to the White House.

Trump said Dockery personally rescued members of his platoon and at one point killed a Taliban fighter and detained two others, and killed two others in a separate confrontation. He also administered CPR on one of his platoon members whom he found unconscious “until the sergeant’s heart kicked back in,” Trump said.

“As we approach the 250th anniversary of our founding, we remember that we owe everything to heroes like those we celebrate today — men who went willingly to the darkest and most dangerous corners on Earth to defeat evil so we could live free,” Trump said.

“That’s exactly what happened. These are great men, great people.”

June 18 (Asia Today) — Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has left open the possibility of deploying the Self-Defense Forces to the Strait of Hormuz following an agreement between the United States and Iran to end hostilities.

“Nothing has been decided at this point,” Takaichi said Wednesday when asked about a possible deployment during a news conference marking the end of the Group of Seven summit near Évian-les-Bains, France, Japanese media reported Thursday.

Takaichi said Japan must closely examine the U.S.-Iran agreement and conditions in the region before making a decision.

The Strait of Hormuz is a critical shipping route for crude oil from the Middle East. Instability in the waterway could directly affect shipping, energy prices and Japanese industry because the country relies heavily on imported energy.

The U.S.-Iran agreement has shifted Japan’s immediate focus from preventing further fighting to securing freedom of navigation and considering its role in post-conflict efforts.

Even after fighting ends, naval mines and other threats to commercial vessels could remain. Japan would then have to determine whether its involvement should be limited to diplomatic support or include operations by the Maritime Self-Defense Force.

Security in the Strait of Hormuz and other major shipping routes was among the issues discussed at the G7 summit.

Japan faces the challenge of coordinating with its allies and partners while keeping any military involvement within the limits imposed by its pacifist Constitution.

“We will continue every possible diplomatic effort, including those related to reconstruction,” Takaichi said of the situation in the Middle East.

She said Japan would consider necessary measures to secure freedom of navigation through the strait and “steadily carry out what we are capable of doing,” including diplomatic efforts.

Britain, France and other countries have called for the unconditional reopening of the waterway and indicated that mine-clearing operations could be required. Japan has signaled its willingness to participate in a related joint statement.

Takaichi said Japan’s participation in such a statement would remain within constitutional limits.

The central issue is how extensively the Self-Defense Forces could participate.

Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution prohibits the use of force except in circumstances involving the country’s right to self-defense. Mine-clearing operations conducted while fighting continues could therefore be viewed as the use of force against the country that placed the mines.

Clearing mines left behind after a cease-fire, however, may be permitted under Japan’s Self-Defense Forces Act.

Japan deployed Maritime Self-Defense Force minesweepers to the Persian Gulf after the 1991 Gulf War cease-fire. The mission marked the Self-Defense Forces’ first operational deployment overseas and became a turning point in Japan’s debate over its international security role.

Takaichi’s remarks did not amount to an immediate deployment decision. They indicated, however, that Japan could consider participating in maritime security operations depending on implementation of the U.S.-Iran agreement and conditions in the Strait of Hormuz.

Japan’s possible role in the post-conflict Middle East – whether limited to diplomatic and reconstruction support or expanded to include Maritime Self-Defense Force operations – is expected to remain a major foreign and security policy issue.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260618010006401

June 18 (UPI) — The U.S. military on Thursday lifted naval blockades in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman, with reports showing that shipping vessels have departed the region through the Strait of Hormuz.

U.S. Central Command said in a series of posts on X that, following direction from President Donald Trump, blockades on maritime traffic along the coasts of Iran have ended.

Centcom noted, however, that the U.S. Navy will stay in the “general area” to be sure that “all aspects” of the peace agreement signed by the United States and Iran “are adhered to, obeyed and in full force and effect.”

Trump signed the agreement Wednesday at the Palace of Versailles in France after the G7 Summit wrapped up, which included among its 14 points reopening the Strait of Hormuz, which is a vital shipping route for the region and much of the world.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian had signed the deal earlier in the day.

“American forces are not impeding the transit of vessels to or from Iranian ports,” Centcom said in one of the posts on X on Thursday.

“All U.S. military blockade efforts have ceased,” it said.

At least 12 energy tankers transited the Strait on Thursday, reopening a sailing route through which roughly 20% of the world’s oil supply is shipped around the globe, CNBC and the New York Post reported.

Among the vessels that transited the Strait were three Saudi Arabian supertankers, which together are carrying six million barrels of crude oil and are the kingdom’s first tankers to sail the shipping route since before the three-month-long U.S.-Iran war launched in February.

Vice President JD Vance also told reporters that more than 12 million barrels of oil had shipped through the Strait overnight Wednesday after the deal had been signed.

China officially objected through its Foreign Ministry to the Japanese draft resolution to increase armaments and abandon Japan’s post-World War II commitment not to rearm its military, as approved by the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan during its general council meeting. The draft resolution proposed amending three key security documents, which are the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Medium-Range Defense Forces Enhancement Plan. It was to be submitted to the Japanese government and parliament for further discussion. Chinese authorities officially rejected and objected to the draft, deeming it a threat to their national security and their spheres of direct influence in Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Indo-Pacific region. They considered it a radical escalation of Japan’s security strategy, detrimental to Chinese national security and to the global security initiative proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Here, the revision of Japan’s three security documents, represented in the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Force Enhancement Plan, represents a strategic shift away from its post-war pacifist constitution toward more proactive and independent military policies. The nature of this shift is evident in Tokyo’s easing of restrictions on lethal weapons exports and its reorientation of its armament toward counter-offensive capabilities and missile development. Under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s administration, the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan has adopted a proactive approach, reshaping Japanese industries and institutions to address the greatest strategic challenge posed by China. The updated National Security Strategy has already fundamentally altered the country’s pacifist military doctrine by disarming the Japanese military and preventing its rearmament since World War II, a move that has drawn staunch opposition from China, which seeks to protect its own national security. The most significant amendments to the three Japanese security documents included Japan’s acknowledgment of its ability to double and enhance its counter-strike capabilities. This was achieved by allowing Japan to possess long-range missiles capable of striking enemy targets before launch. Simultaneously, Japanese authorities approved doubling defense spending, raising the military budget to 2% of GDP.

China objected to the Japanese draft resolution, which aimed to increase Japanese armament and militarize the region and global supply chains, and threatened to escalate the situation. Beijing strongly condemned these trends, describing them as new militarism. A key point of contention for China was what Chinese intelligence and military circles perceived as a warning of Japanese and foreign interference in Taiwanese affairs, as China considers Taiwan an integral part of its territory. Beijing condemned the Japanese leadership’s statement that any emergency in Taiwan is an emergency for Japan, describing a potential Chinese military intervention in Taiwan as an act of aggression. Here, Beijing rejects Japan’s new military approach, characterized by advanced military deployment. China has officially protested and taken countermeasures against Japan’s plans to deploy defensive missiles on Yonaguni Island, located only about 110 kilometers from Taiwan. China has strongly accused Japan of violating its commitments, arguing that this new Japanese military expansion violates Tokyo’s international obligations and its pacifist constitution. China has warned Japan that it will pay a heavy price if it intervenes militarily in the Taiwan Strait.

Chinese intelligence, military, security, and defense circles link Japan’s armament activities in Taiwan to American interference in Chinese affairs through its network of allies in the Asian region, such as Japan, given its close alliance with Washington. Here, Japan defends its military rearmament against China, with several of its officials sending political and security warnings to China. They argue that, given the uncertainty in Japan stemming from US policies and the fluctuating stance in Washington, Japan seeks to bolster its own capabilities and build regional alliances (with the Philippines, Australia, and NATO) to expand deterrence against Beijing and maintain regional security from a Japanese perspective. Strategic circles in Tokyo view the potential fall of Taiwan to China as a direct and existential threat to Japanese national security and vital shipping lanes, making the protection of the Taiwan Strait a fundamental component of Japan’s updated defense doctrine.

For these reasons, China’s decisive response was seen as a challenge to its national security, especially given Japan’s de facto official classification of Beijing as the greatest and most unprecedented strategic challenge to its security. This classification was further reinforced by Japanese authorities’ approval of developing military production, strengthening domestic defense industries, and easing restrictions on arms exports. This is where the dimensions of China’s official rejection and objection lie, as it is considered a violation of the pacifist principle enshrined in the Japanese military doctrine, which was internationally and regionally agreed upon after World War II for Japan’s disarmament. Beijing believes that Tokyo is abandoning its pacifist constitution and returning to a militaristic path, while Japan exaggerates the narrative of a China threat. Beijing accuses Japan of fabricating flimsy pretexts to justify its military expansion and arsenal, which threatens China’s regional security. Therefore, China warned that these Japanese steps to increase armament undermine peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and jeopardize the principles of China’s global security initiative. China also registered its objection to Japan’s exclusionary approaches to its initiative based on shared and sustainable security. Furthermore, China linked this Japanese escalation in its confrontation with China in the region to the sensitive issue of Taiwan and the close alliance between the United States and Japan, while categorically rejecting Japanese interference in Taiwan’s affairs and considering the island’s security an integral part of China’s national security.

Iran’s government has portrayed the interim agreement with the United States as a victory that ended months of conflict and prevented further escalation. The deal halted a war that saw U.S. and Israeli airstrikes, disruptions to trade, and severe economic damage across Iran.

However, interviews with ordinary Iranians reveal a starkly different picture. Many citizens say years of sanctions, combined with the recent conflict, have left them struggling with rising prices, declining living standards, and deep uncertainty about the future. While the fighting may have stopped for now, many remain unconvinced that the agreement will bring meaningful economic relief or lasting stability.

Economic Hardship Continues to Dominate Daily Life

For many Iranians, the ceasefire has not changed the reality of daily economic struggles.

Business owners, students, and workers interviewed across the country described a population focused on survival rather than recovery. Many reported cutting household spending, reducing social activities, and adjusting to higher living costs. Small businesses continue to face weak consumer demand, while young people increasingly worry about their economic prospects.

The war added another layer of pressure to an economy already weakened by years of international sanctions, inflation, and limited foreign investment. As a result, many citizens see little immediate prospect of improvement even if the ceasefire holds.

Divided Views on the Outcome of the Conflict

The agreement has exposed a clear divide between the government’s narrative and public sentiment.

Supporters of the Islamic Republic view the deal as proof that Iran resisted external pressure and preserved its political system. Some hardliners argue that the country emerged stronger and demonstrated resilience despite military and economic pressure.

Many ordinary citizens, however, are less focused on geopolitical outcomes and more concerned about living standards. For them, the key measure of success is whether the agreement leads to lower prices, economic opportunities, and greater stability. So far, few appear convinced that such changes are imminent.

Concerns Grow Over Political Freedoms

Beyond economic concerns, many Iranians fear that the post war environment could lead to tighter political controls.

Some citizens believe the government may use the conflict and national security concerns to justify stronger oversight and restrictions. These fears are particularly pronounced in regions populated by ethnic minorities, where previous protests have often been met with heavy security responses.

There is also uncertainty about whether public frustration over economic conditions could trigger future demonstrations. While many people remain cautious after previous crackdowns, underlying grievances over jobs, inflation, and political freedoms remain unresolved.

The ceasefire may have reduced the immediate threat of war, but it has done little to address the deeper challenges facing Iran. Public opinion appears increasingly shaped by economic realities rather than political declarations of victory.

The government may benefit in the short term from ending the conflict and avoiding further military escalation. However, lasting stability will depend on whether authorities can deliver tangible economic improvements and restore public confidence.

The biggest challenge for Tehran is that expectations remain extremely low. Many Iranians do not see the ceasefire as a turning point but rather as a temporary pause in a broader cycle of economic hardship and political uncertainty. If future negotiations fail to produce sanctions relief, investment, and economic recovery, public frustration could continue to grow despite the end of active conflict.

Stakeholders

• Iranian government and political leadership
• Iranian citizens and businesses
• United States
• Israel
• Ethnic minority communities in Iran
• International investors and energy markets
• Regional governments monitoring stability in the Middle East

What’s Next

Attention will now shift to negotiations aimed at turning the interim agreement into a permanent settlement. Iranian leaders will seek economic benefits and sanctions relief, while Washington is expected to push for further commitments on security and nuclear issues.

Domestically, the government faces the challenge of managing economic expectations and maintaining stability. Whether the ceasefire translates into meaningful improvements for ordinary Iranians may ultimately determine how the agreement is judged inside the country.

With information from Reuters.

June 15 (UPI) — South Korea’s Hyundai Rotem said Monday that the company is showcasing its AI-powered anti-drone technologies at Eurosatory 2026, a defense fair that takes place in Paris this week.

The affiliate of Hyundai Motor Group noted that it has publicly unveiled the system designed to counter unmanned aircraft, including drones, for the first time.

The solution aims to protect troops and military assets from drone attacks by combining AI-driven threat detection and automated response functions, according to Hyundai Rotem.

The firm said that the platform can assess a wide range of battlefield scenarios in real time, analyzing various factors such as the type, distance and altitude of incoming threats to determine the most effective countermeasures.

Built around an unmanned turret platform, the multi-layered defense solution integrates both soft-kill and hard-kill capabilities, Hyundai Rotem said.

The growing importance of such technologies has been recognized by recent conflicts, including the wars in Ukraine and Iran.

Hyundai Rotem is also displaying an export-oriented version of its K2 main battle tank at the exhibition. It has emerged as one of South Korea’s most successful defense exports, as Poland purchased hundreds of the tanks over the past few years.

“By strengthening our capabilities in AI-based protection solutions, including multi-layered defense systems, we will further diversify our business portfolio and enhance our presence in the global market,” Hyundai Rotem said in a statement.

“We will continue to advance key protection and unmanned technologies geared toward preserving human lives, reinforcing our leadership and competitive edge in the defense industry,” it added.

The share price of Hyundai Rotem rose 2.16% on the Seoul bourse on Monday, while the benchmark KOSPI jumped 5.2%.

June 15 (UPI) — California’s Edwards Air Force Base said eight crew members are believed dead following the Monday crash of a B-52 Stratofortress.

The base confirmed the B-52 Stratofortress, which was carrying a crew of eight, crashed shortly after takeoff at 11:20 a.m. Monday morning.

“Initial indications are that the crash was not survivable,” the base said in a release posted to X.

Emergency response personnel were on scene working to account for all eight crew members.

“Our thoughts and prayers are with the families and unit members at this time,” the post said.

The airfield was closed following the crash and all incoming aircraft were diverted.

“All non-commercial visitor passes have been suspended until further notice to allow the installation to focus entirely on emergency response operations,” the base said in an earlier post.

Video captured nearby the base shows a plume of black smoke rising over the Mohave Desert.

Edwards Air Force Base, located about 100 miles north of Los Angeles, frequently hosts test flights for new and experimental Air Force and NASA aircraft.

The base said more information on the crash will be provided as it becomes available.

The preliminary memorandum represents the first formal framework outlining how Washington and Tehran intend to move from military confrontation toward diplomacy.

While many details remain unpublished, statements from U.S., Iranian and Pakistani officials provide a broad outline of the deal’s structure.

Rather than resolving every dispute immediately, the agreement establishes a phased process aimed at reducing tensions first and addressing more difficult issues later.

The approach reflects the reality that both sides were able to reach consensus on ending hostilities more easily than on the underlying disputes that fueled the conflict.

Phase One: Ending the Fighting

The first stage focuses on immediate de-escalation.

According to mediator Pakistan, both sides have agreed to permanently halt military operations across all fronts.

The formal memorandum is expected to be signed in Switzerland, after which implementation would begin.

The objective of this phase is straightforward: stop active hostilities, reduce the risk of escalation, and create space for broader negotiations.

This represents the most immediate achievement of the agreement and is likely the reason markets reacted positively.

Reopening the Strait of Hormuz

The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz is arguably the agreement’s most significant economic provision.

The waterway serves as one of the world’s most important energy transit routes and has been at the center of global concerns throughout the conflict.

Both sides indicate that commercial shipping will resume following the signing of the memorandum.

The restoration of maritime traffic could:

• Increase global oil supply.
• Reduce shipping disruptions.
• Ease pressure on energy prices.
• Lower inflation risks for major economies.

However, questions remain over how the route will be governed.

Iran has suggested it will coordinate management of traffic with Oman, potentially giving Tehran a more formal role in overseeing one of the world’s most strategically important waterways.

That issue could become a future source of diplomatic friction.

The Nuclear Issue Has Been Deferred

The most controversial subject in the negotiations remains unresolved.

Rather than settling the nuclear dispute immediately, both sides appear to have agreed to address it during a 60-day negotiation period.

According to Iranian officials, Tehran would freeze nuclear activities during that time by halting additional enrichment and refraining from expanding facilities.

The long-term future of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure remains unclear.

Washington continues to emphasize inspections and preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.

Tehran continues to insist that its nuclear program is peaceful and seeks recognition of its right to maintain civilian nuclear activities.

These competing positions are likely to dominate the next phase of talks.

Sanctions Relief Could Shape the Success of the Deal

Economic issues may ultimately prove as difficult as nuclear negotiations.

Iran expects meaningful sanctions relief as part of any final settlement.

Iranian officials have spoken about:

• Temporary waivers on oil sanctions.
• The release of frozen assets.
• Financial support mechanisms.
• A pathway toward lifting U.S. and international sanctions.

The Trump administration has signaled a more cautious approach.

Washington has indicated that sanctions relief will depend on Iranian compliance and future negotiations rather than automatic implementation.

This difference highlights one of the central tensions in the agreement: each side expects benefits on different timelines.

Lebanon Remains a Flashpoint

The agreement’s treatment of Lebanon illustrates how regional conflicts have become intertwined.

Iran views a ceasefire in Lebanon as a critical component of the broader settlement.

Lebanese political leaders have welcomed the inclusion of Lebanon in the framework.

Israel, however, has made clear that it does not consider itself bound by all aspects of the agreement and intends to maintain military positions in areas it views as strategically important.

This creates uncertainty about whether the Lebanon component can be implemented as envisioned.

The issue could quickly become one of the first tests of the agreement’s durability.

Why This Matters

The memorandum matters because it shifts the conflict from the battlefield to the negotiating table.

The agreement addresses several immediate concerns:

• Rising energy prices.
• Shipping disruptions.
• Escalating regional instability.
• Growing economic uncertainty.

At the same time, it leaves the most difficult questions unresolved.

This means the framework should be viewed as the beginning of a diplomatic process rather than its conclusion.

Its success will depend on whether negotiators can transform temporary understandings into binding commitments.

Key Stakeholders

• United States
• Iran
• Pakistan (mediator)
• Israel
• Lebanon
• Oman
• European powers
• Gulf Arab states
• International energy markets
• Global shipping industry
• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and nuclear inspectors

What to Watch Next

• Formal signing of the memorandum in Switzerland.
• Reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.
• Progress during the 60-day negotiation period.
• Discussions on Iran’s nuclear program.
• Decisions regarding sanctions relief.
• Reactions from Congress and international partners.
• Israeli actions in Lebanon and other contested areas.

The memorandum creates a framework for de-escalation, but its long-term success remains uncertain.

If implemented effectively, the agreement could stabilize energy markets, reduce regional tensions, and create momentum for broader diplomatic engagement.

However, many of the issues that triggered the conflict remain unresolved.

Nuclear enrichment, sanctions, regional security arrangements, and competing strategic interests are all likely to generate difficult negotiations.

The coming 60 days will therefore be more important than the announcement itself.

They will determine whether the framework becomes a durable peace process or merely a temporary pause in a conflict whose underlying disputes remain intact.

Analysis

The structure of the agreement reveals a pragmatic calculation by both Washington and Tehran.

Rather than attempting to solve every dispute at once, negotiators prioritized issues where agreement was achievable: ending active hostilities, reopening shipping routes, and creating a mechanism for future talks.

This approach reflects the political realities facing both governments.

For President Trump, reducing energy prices and ending a costly conflict addresses growing domestic pressure. For Iran, halting military operations while preserving room to negotiate on sanctions and nuclear issues offers a path to economic relief without immediate capitulation.

Yet the framework’s greatest strength may also be its greatest weakness.

By postponing the hardest questions, the agreement creates momentum for diplomacy but also leaves significant room for disagreement later. Nuclear enrichment, sanctions relief, and regional security arrangements are not peripheral issues—they are the core disputes that drove the conflict.

As a result, the memorandum should be viewed less as a peace treaty and more as a diplomatic bridge. It lowers immediate risks and creates opportunities for negotiation, but it does not yet resolve the strategic rivalry between the United States and Iran.

Whether this becomes a historic breakthrough or a temporary truce will depend on what happens after the signatures are placed on the document. The real negotiations are only beginning.

With information from Reuters.

Behind a veil of good-natured diplomacy, American adversaries are exploiting the conflict in Iran by gaining insights, strategic lessons, and geopolitical power while the United States wages feckless war against the Middle Eastern theocracy. Beyond the bombings, the blockade, and the oil prices, Russia and China keenly watch how America struggles, succeeds, and scrambles. In doing so, these adversaries are leveraging the conflict to challenge America’s readiness, aid its adversaries, and gain invaluable intel on America’s successes and failures.

The concept of observing a conflict to acquire critical intelligence on how to best conduct combat is not unique to the war in Iran. For example, in the Russo-Ukrainian War, America has gained indispensable knowledge on the most and least effective tools of 21st-century warfare, including information on the power of unmanned aerial systems. With the war in Iran, though, Russia and China are the scientists, and America is the experiment. The Middle East is now a testing ground for cutting-edge drone swarm technologies and a catalyst for how smaller powers can effectively deny their adversaries from accomplishing their objectives—a lesson that China is certainly eager to learn about for a possible conflict over Taiwan. Therefore, when America wages war against Iran, there are consequences that are crucial to recognize, and one of those consequences is that the United States is inadvertently empowering and informing its adversaries.

Maintaining its signaled commitment of multipolarity and geopolitical neutrality, China’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning commented, “…China…has been making active efforts to promote ceasefire and peace…we will continue playing an active role in restoring…tranquility to the Middle East…” Reality demonstrates that this is false. China is discreetly gaining intelligence on the U.S. military’s readiness, pacing, and warfighting strategies. Furthermore, China has directly supported Iran, providing anti-missile weaponry, building blocks for ballistic missiles, and invaluable military intelligence to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Instead of promoting peace and tranquility, these actions are designed to empower Iran and keep America locked in the struggle, weakening the country and allowing China to acquire more intelligence on U.S. readiness. Despite China’s claimed intentions, it’s clear that the nation is bolstering Iran’s strength and sustaining its defenses. Even from a domestic point of view, these actions are increasing domestic American division and the depletion of America’s defense resources. The conflict with Iran is not limited to Iran; by proxy, it’s with America’s foremost adversaries, too.

Similarly, Russia has provided critical support to Iran in the form of targeting intelligence, which Iran couldn’t have otherwise acquired. Shahed drones, assets that have proven to be exceptionally effective against western defenses, are manufactured in Russia’s Alabuga Special Economic Zone and are being provided to Iran by Russia. Contradicting these actions, a statement by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that the country “…stands ready to assist in advancing peaceful solutions grounded in international law, mutual respect, and a balanced consideration of interests.” But equipping Iran with efficacious tools of war is not a peaceful solution. Giving the nation targeting information cannot be construed as a neutral or geopolitically insignificant act. In reality, America’s adversaries are taking an active, hands-on approach to the war in Iran, indirectly but clearly aiding the nation and actively working against U.S. goals.

In response to this tacit yet significant aid to Iran, the natural response for America should be to publicly highlight the hostile actions of its adversaries. But the United States has been hesitant, if not downright unwilling, to do so. For example, Matthew Whitaker, the U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO, commented that “China certainly is not participating and is not aiding and abetting the Iranian demise…” Separately, he claimed, “There’s no indication that we can talk about publicly that the Russians are participating with the Iranians.” Public investigations, though, have proven both those assertions false. The trepidation of the United States to clearly and confidently condemn its adversaries’ belligerence in the region is an enormous blunder of strategic communications. Contrasting this, Russia and China have simultaneously and aggressively pursued campaigns of condemnation to weaken America’s global power. For example, Russia has often claimed that certain U.S. support to Ukraine may constitute an act of war; China strongly condemned recent American intervention in Venezuela as violating the international laws by which America claims to be guided. U.S. adversaries are eager and willing to strategically undermine and criticize U.S. actions, yet America is unwisely unwilling to do the same.

Russia’s and China’s cooperative aid to Iran demonstrates that the conflict is, in many senses, between world powers. A new ‘axis of resistance’ against Western liberalism is developing, and allowing American adversaries to act without denunciation is a failure of strategic communications and allows these nations to act with undeserved impunity. As the United States continues to wage war against Iran, it’s crucial to recognize that every bomb America drops, every mission American soldiers complete, and every destroyed military asset is a datapoint that U.S. adversaries will exploit. Russia’s and China’s critical support to Iran is hostile and counter to American goals; ignoring this is strategically imprudent. Beyond the explosions, America’s adversaries are watching—and acting. It’s the responsibility of the United States to expose those actions for what they really are.

With its recent Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Delhi, the Quad has again shown it remains active, defying widespread rumours of collapse.

While the Japanese and Australian foreign ministers highlighted their countries’ strong relations with India and the Quad’s central role in shaping the Indo-Pacific security architecture, Marco Rubio’s four-day visit to India was the most noteworthy aspect, as he repeatedly emphasized the significance of Indo-US relations.

Speculations about the Quad’s potential dissolution, reminiscent of developments in the 2000s, were fuelled by the postponement of the leaders’ summit, President Trump’s apparent lack of interest, and a more conciliatory approach toward China. Even so, the meeting reaffirmed the US’s ongoing engagement in the region and its support for the Quad.

The Quad’s momentum currently faces its principal challenge not from India’s or the US’s relations with Australia and Japan, but from a complicated Indo-US relationship.

Two factors show why India-US relations are central to the Quad’s minilateral framework.

Over the past year, India has faced unprecedented criticism from the US administration, particularly from President Trump, who has been critical of India on trade and security fronts. Issues such as tariff disputes, H-1B visa restrictions affecting Indian professionals, deepening US relations with the Pakistan Army, and increased US involvement in Bangladesh and Nepal have contributed to growing distrust about the US’s willingness to cooperate with India and promote stability in the Indo-Pacific.

In response to several contentious statements by President Trump directed at India, Rubio’s visit served as a diplomatic effort to restore bilateral relations. His repeated emphasis on India’s role as a strategic partner signalled a commitment to improving ties. While a single visit cannot resolve all tensions from the past year, it reassures India and reduces the risk of further deterioration.

The Quad Foreign Ministers’ meeting became feasible only after India and the US undertook concerted efforts to revive bilateral relations. Notable examples include India’s invitation to the US to attend the AI Impact Summit in February 2026, ongoing trade agreement negotiations, and the US decision to invite India to the Pax Silica initiative. The meeting occurred only after a certain level of normalization had been achieved. Even so, a leaders’ summit is unlikely unless President Trump and Prime Minister Modi demonstrate a clear commitment to advancing India-US relations.

Second, without proactive American engagement, Japan, Australia, and India may develop their own trilateral regional strategies, perhaps with some Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore. However, the impact of such an alternative would be limited and localized. Japan could take a greater role in sustaining and rebuilding regional economic frameworks, replicating the Trans-Pacific Partnership experiment. Still, due to constitutional and capacity constraints, Tokyo is unlikely to replace Washington as the region’s primary security guarantor soon.

Although the Quad’s resilience is maintained by the agency and commitment of Australia, India, and Japan rather than by exclusive US leadership, strong US involvement in the Indo-Pacific security mechanism will remain a cornerstone of the Indo-Pacific architecture.

China’s persistent assertive behaviour remains the central factor. It continues to employ coercive tactics and expand its influence in regions critical to the US and its partners, so the original motivations for revitalizing the Quad remain relevant. Although the US approach to China is evolving, the fundamental dynamics of US-China relations remain unchanged. In the long term, Washington will require frameworks such as the Quad to maintain stability in the Indo-Pacific and prevent the erosion of its strategic influence. Consequently, the Quad is likely to remain central to regional strategy, with India as a key partner.

The US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau’s statement that the US is not going to make the same mistakes with India that it made with China 20 years ago must not guide Indo-US relations. The US needs India as much as India needs the US, and unlike China, India-US relations rest on shared values – democracy, freedom of speech, multiculturalism, and a common vision of maintaining a rules-based liberal international order. Both countries require mutually beneficial cooperation to advance their strategic objectives. Other Quad members and Indo-Pacific stakeholders also depend on collaboration between Washington and New Delhi to maintain strategic equilibrium and preserve the bloc’s cohesion.

The US regards India as a responsible stakeholder and a regional counterweight to China, especially after the limited outcomes of President Trump’s recent visit to China. Conversely, India depends on the US for advanced technology, strategic investments, and long-term defense needs. This mutual dependence makes both countries indispensable to each other, and significant short-term trade diversification is unlikely. Even if achieved, it would likely harm both parties.

The US must strengthen its engagement in the Indo-Pacific by leveraging the Quad and its member states to develop an effective regional strategy. Closer strategic coordination among Quad partners, particularly with India, is essential to this effort.