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United States President Donald Trump has said a nuclear agreement currently being negotiated with Iran will be “far better” than the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which he withdrew from in 2018 during his first term in office.

The original 2015 accord took roughly two years of negotiations to reach and involved hundreds of specialists across technical and legal fields, including multiple US experts. Under it, Iran agreed to restrict the enrichment of uranium and to subject itself to inspections in exchange for the relaxation of sanctions.

But Trump took the US out of that pact, calling it the “worst deal ever”. Before the initial US-Israeli strikes on Iran at the end of February, the US had made new demands – including additional restrictions on Tehran’s nuclear programme, the restriction of its ballistic missiles programme and an end to its support for regional armed groups, primarily in Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq.

Trump’s latest remarks come amid growing uncertainty about whether a second round of talks will proceed in the Pakistani capital Islamabad, as a two-week ceasefire between the US-Israel and Iran approaches the end in just a day.

So, what was the JCPOA, and how did it compare to Trump’s new demands?

What was the JCPOA?

On July 14, 2015, Iran reached an agreement with the European Union and six major powers – China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the US, and Germany – under which these states would roll back international economic sanctions and allow Iran greater participation in the global economy.

In return, Tehran committed to limiting activities that could be used to produce a nuclear weapon.

These included reducing its stockpile of enriched uranium by about 98 percent, to less than 300kg (660lb), and capping uranium enrichment at 3.67 percent – far below weapons-grade of 90 percent, but high enough for civilian purposes such as power generation.

Before the JCPOA, Iran operated roughly 20,000 uranium-enriching centrifuges. Under the deal, that number was cut to a maximum of 6,104, and only older-generation machines confined to two facilities, which were subject to international monitoring.

Centrifuges are machines which spin to increase the concentration of the uranium-235 isotope – enrichment – in uranium, a key step towards potential bomb-making.

The deal also redesigned Iran’s Arak heavy water reactor to prevent plutonium production and introduced one of the most intrusive inspection regimes ever implemented by the global nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

In exchange, Iran received relief from international sanctions which had severely damaged its economy. Billions of dollars in frozen assets were released, and restrictions on oil exports and banking were eased.

The deal came to halt when Trump formally withdrew Washington from the nuclear deal in 2018, a move widely criticised domestically and by foreign allies, and despite the IAEA saying Iran had complied with the agreement up to that point.

“The Iranian regime supports terrorism and exports violence, bloodshed and chaos across the Middle East. That is why we must put an end to Iran’s continued aggression and nuclear ambitions. They have not lived up to the spirit of their agreement,” he said in October 2017.

He reimposed crippling economic sanctions on Tehran as part of his “maximum pressure” tactic. These targeted Iran’s oil exports, as well as its shipping sector, banking system and other key industries.

The goal was to force Iran back to the negotiating table to agree to a new deal, which also included a discussion about Tehran’s missile capabilities, further curbs on enrichment and more scrutiny of its nuclear programme.

What has happened to Iran’s nuclear programme since the JCPOA?

During the JCPOA period, Iran’s nuclear programme was tightly constrained and heavily monitored. The IAEA repeatedly verified that Iran was complying with the deal’s terms, including one year after Trump announced the US’s withdrawal from the agreement.

Starting in mid-2019, however, Iran began incrementally breaching the deal’s limits, exceeding caps on uranium stockpiles and enrichment levels.

In November 2024, Iran said it would activate “new and advanced” centrifuges. The IAEA confirmed that Tehran had informed the nuclear watchdog that it planned to install more than 6,000 new centrifuges to enrich uranium.

In December 2024, the IAEA said Iran was rapidly enriching uranium to 60 percent purity, moving closer to the 90 percent threshold needed for weapons-grade material. Most recently, in 2025, the IAEA estimated that Iran had 440kg (970lb) of 60-percent enriched uranium.

What are Trump’s latest demands for Iran’s nuclear programme?

The US and its ally, Israel, are pushing Iran to agree to zero uranium enrichment and have accused Iran of working towards building a nuclear weapon, while providing no evidence for their claims.

They also want Iran’s estimated 440kg stock of 60pc enriched uranium to be removed from Iran. While that is below weapons-grade, it is the point at which it becomes much faster to achieve the 90 percent enrichment needed for atomic weapons production.

Iran has insisted its enrichment effort is for civilian purposes only. It is a signatory to the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

In March 2025, Tulsi Gabbard, the US director of national intelligence, testified to Congress that the US “continues to assess that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon”.

On Sunday, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, in a strongly worded statement, said Trump had no right to ⁠⁠”deprive” Iran of its nuclear ⁠⁠rights.

What else is Trump asking for?

Restrictions on ballistic missiles

Before the US-Israel war on Iran began, Tehran had always insisted negotiations should be exclusively focused on Iran’s nuclear programme.

US and Israeli demands, however, extended beyond that. Just before the war began, Washington and Israel demanded severe restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missile programme.

Analysts say this demand was at least partly triggered by the fact that several Iranian missiles had breached Israel’s much-vaunted “Iron Dome” defence system during the 12-day war between the two countries in June last year. While Israel suffered only a handful of casualties, it is understood to have been alarmed.

For his part, Trump has repeatedly warned, without evidence, about the dangers of Iran’s long-range missiles, claiming Iran is producing them “in very high numbers” and they could “overwhelm the Iron Dome”.

Iran has said its right to maintain missile capabilities is non-negotiable. The JCPOA did not put any limits on the development of ballistic missiles.

However, a United Nations resolution made when adopting the nuclear agreement in July 2015 did stipulate that Iran could not “undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons”.

Ending support for proxy groups

The US and Israel have also demanded that Iran stop supporting its non-state allies across the Middle East, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and a number of groups in Iraq. Together, these groups are referred to as Iran’s “axis of resistance”.

In May last year, Trump said Tehran “must stop sponsoring terror, halt its bloody proxy wars, and permanently and verifiably cease pursuit of nuclear weapons”, during a GCC meeting in Riyadh.

Three days before the war on Iran began in February, during his State of the Union address to Congress, Trump accused Iran and “its murderous proxies” of spreading “nothing but terrorism and death and hate”.

Iran has refused to enter a dialogue about limiting its support for these armed groups.

Can Trump really get a new deal that is ‘much better’ than the JCPOA?

According to Andreas Kreig, associate professor of Security Studies at King’s College, London, Trump is more likely to secure a new deal that closely resembles the JCPOA, with “some form of restrictions on enrichment, possibly with a sunset clause, and international supervision”.

“Iran might get access to frozen assets and lifted sanctions much quicker than under the JCPOA, as it will not agree to a long drawn-out, gradual lifting of sanctions,” Krieg pointed out.

However, he warned that the political landscape in Tehran has hardened. “Iran now is a far more hardline and less pragmatic player that will play hardball at every junction. Trump cannot count on any goodwill in Tehran,” he said.

“The IRGC is now firmly in charge… with likely new powerful and tested levers such as the Strait of Hormuz,” he said, referring to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which operates as a parallel elite military force to the army and has a great deal of political and economic power in Iran. It is a constitutionally recognised part of the Iranian military and answers directly to the supreme leader.

Overall, Krieg stressed, the US-Israel war on Iran “leaves the world worse off than had Trump stuck to the JCPOA”, even if a new compromise is eventually reached.

Moreover, since the revocation of the JCPOA, the US and Israel have waged two wars on Iran, including the current one. The 12-day war in June last year included attacks on Iran’s nuclear sites and killed more than 1,000 people.

Attacks on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure have continued since the latest war began on February 28, including on the Natanz enrichment facility, Isfahan nuclear complex, Arak heavy water reactor, and the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

Nevertheless, King’s College’s Krieg said there is still room for a negotiated outcome if Tehran and Washington scale back their demands.

“Both sides can compromise on enrichment thresholds, and on temporary moratoriums on enrichments. But Iran will not surrender its sovereignty to enrich altogether, and the Trump administration will have to meet them halfway,” he said.

“While the Iranians will commit on paper not to develop a nuclear weapon, they will want to keep R&D [research and development] in this space alive.”

Economic incentives will be central, he added. “Equally, Iran would want to get immediate access to capital and liquidity. Here, the Trump administration is already willing to compromise.”

Defence deal is latest example of deepening ties between Canberra and Tokyo amid shared concerns over China’s rise.

Australia and Japan have signed contracts for the first three of 11 warships set to be delivered to the Australian navy under a landmark $7bn defence deal, as the two close US allies in the Asia Pacific region deepen defence cooperation.

Australia’s Defence Minister Richard Marles and Japanese Defence Minister Koizumi Shinjiro made the announcement in Melbourne on Saturday at the signing ceremony for the Mogami-class warships.

The “Mogami Memorandum” pledges to deepen military ties, including through “closer industrial cooperation” in defence.

Japan’s Mitsubishi Heavy Industries will build three of the stealth frigates in southern Nagasaki Prefecture, while Australia’s Austal will build eight in Western Australia.

The first of the Japanese-built warships is scheduled to be delivered in 2029 and enter service in 2030.

“Our surface fleet is more important than at any time in decades,” Marles said in a statement.

“These general-purpose frigates will help secure our maritime trade routes and northern approaches as part of a larger and more lethal surface combatant fleet.”

Shinjiro said closer defence coordination was becoming more important as Australia and Japan faced an “increasingly severe security environment”.

Australia’s government last year announced that it had chosen Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to build its fleet of next-generation warships, following a bidding war between the Tokyo-based firm and Germany’s Thyssenkrupp.

Australia has committed to a record $305bn in military spending over the next decade, as part of a widespread defence overhaul aimed at boosting the country’s naval power to levels not seen since World War II.

Under the plans, Canberra’s defence spending is set to rise to 3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) by 3033, from about 2 percent now.

Australia and Japan, two of the United States’ closest allies, have ramped up military cooperation in recent years amid shared concerns about shifts in the regional security environment, particularly China’s rising influence. Tokyo and Canberra are also members of the Quad security bloc led by the US.

Published on 18/04/2026 – 22:58 GMT+2•Updated
23:06

A coalition of EU-based chemical producers of titanium dioxide – a strategic chemical used in green energy and aerospace – has lodged a complaint with the Commission alleging unfair foreign subsidies against leading Chinese producer LB Group, which is seeking to acquire a UK plant of British competitor Venator, Euronews has learned.

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The move follows the European Commission’s decision in January 2025 to impose anti-dumping duties on LB Group, a trade defence measure targeting low-priced imports into the EU.

Acquiring a production plant in the UK would allow the Chinese group to export its products to the European market duty-free under the EU-UK trade agreement, circumventing EU anti-dumping tariffs.

The EU chemical sector is under pressure from growing competition from Chinese rivals, which are flooding the market with overcapacity.

The alliance behind the complaint against LB Group includes several companies producing in the EU — US-based Tronox and Kronos, Czech Precheza and Slovenian Cinkarna — collectively accounting for about 90% of EU titanium dioxide production.

Enforcing the Foreign Subsidies Regulation outside the EU

Sources said the complaint was filed in December 2025, urging the European Commission to investigate the Chinese company over alleged unfair foreign subsidies used to finance the acquisition of Venator’s plant.

The EU’s Foreign Subsidies Regulation, adopted in 2022, allows the Commission to investigate non-EU companies to assess whether they benefit from distortive foreign subsidies to make acquisitions in the EU or take part in public procurement.

The tool was initially designed with China in mind, reflecting concerns over excessive state subsidies support for Chinese companies acquiring strategic EU assets or infrastructure. However, the regulation has not yet been applied outside the EU.

The plant targeted by LB Group is located in Greatham in northeast England, which left the EU in 2020 after Brexit. The UK’s Competition and Markets Authority is currently reviewing the deal and is expected to issue a decision in May.

If the European Commission opens an investigation under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation, it could set a precedent and send a strong signal globally.

The move would come as the EU chemical industry loses market share in Europe.

According to Cefic, which represents the sector in Brussels, the bloc has lost around 9% of its production capacity since 2022, resulting in the loss of 20,000 direct jobs.

The recently concluded 14th Ministerial Conference of the WTO produced mixed results. While the multilateral system remains stuck on Appellate Body appointments, one of the most extensive pre-conference discussions focused on the Chinese-led Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement (IFDA). With 129 member states backing the IFDA, including countries like Bangladesh and several least developed countries (LDCs) from Africa, this has put India’s position as a key representative of the third world into question.

However, a thorough examination of India’s position reveals deeper concerns about the WTO within the ever-changing framework of global economic governance. In this article, I argue that India’s opposition to the IFDA is based not merely on apprehensions about China’s strategic influence, but also on other considerations founded on the grounds of jurisdiction, sovereign right to regulate and the procedure.

The Jurisdictional Argument & Potential Fragmentation of the International Trade Regime:

India’s primary objection to the IFDA emerges from a very pivotal question in the field of international law, challenging the jurisdiction and mandate of the WTO. In a rules-based transnational system, international organizations operate on a mandate-based framework. This mandate is primarily derived from the substantive provisions of their founding agreements and the consent of member states. Historically, the WTO’s mandate has centred on trade, specifically the regulation of trade in goods and services, as well as certain trade-related aspects of intellectual property and investment. While instruments such as the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) incidentally touch upon investment, they do so only insofar as it is in relation with trade.

Given that the WTO’s mandate and primary focus are on trade, India maintains that the regulation of investment as an autonomous domain fall outside its negotiated competence. This position is grounded in the collapse of the “Singapore Issues,” which included investments as one of its four development agenda and were explicitly dropped from the Doha Developmental Agenda in 2004. The reintroduction of investment facilitation through the IFDA is thus viewed as lacking a legitimate mandate, raising serious concerns about the WTO’s overreach.

Another factor closely linked to the lack of mandate is the plurilateral character of the proposed agreement. Unlike multilateral agreements, which bind all WTO members on the basis of consensus, plurilateral agreements apply only to a subset of willing participants. While such arrangements are not unprecedented within the WTO framework, India views the IFDA as a symbolic representation of a broader trend towards fragmentation. The primary concern of New Delhi is the risk that plurilateralism brings to the system. India’s apprehension stems from creation of a two-tier system within the WTO, wherein economically powerful states effectively set the rules, leaving others in a position of reactive compliance. This seriously undermines the foundational principle of sovereign equality among the WTO members and erodes the consensus-based decision-making model that has historically been a salient feature of the WTO.

Right to Regulate

A further dimension of India’s opposition to the IDFA pertains to the preservation of regulatory autonomy. The IFDA, although framed as a facilitative instrument, introduces disciplines that may constrain domestic policymaking. The current bilateral system on which international investment law is based relies heavily on bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and dedicated chapters on investment in comprehensive economic partnership agreements (CEPA). This empowers developing countries such as India to specifically negotiate foreign investment policy in accordance with domestic requirements and national priorities.

However, under the IFDA’s plurilateral approach, India’s apprehension is grounded in obligations relating to non-discrimination, administrative review, and procedural standardisation, which over time may limit the flexibility required to implement industrial policy, promote local value addition, or regulate sensitive sectors in the public interest.

Further, India is also careful of the potential consequences that may arise from incorporating investment-related disciplines within the WTO framework. Although the IFDA does not formally include investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms, its provisions could nonetheless be invoked indirectly in arbitral proceedings under bilateral investment treaties (BITs).

Given India’s prior experience with investment treaty arbitration and the subsequent revisiting of its Model BIT in 2016 to ensure regulatory balance, this concern carries considerable weight. While at face value these provisions might seem benign and aimed at facilitation of flow of investments, their pro-investor interpretations might create problems by exposing India to international liability.

Another vital dimension of India’s critique pertains to the procedural legitimacy of the IFDA negotiations. It is quite commonly observed that the legitimacy of outcomes is intricately linked to the legitimacy of the processes that produce them. These negotiations were initiated through a Joint Statement Initiative (JSI) which remains controversial within the WTO system. India’s argument relies on the absence of an explicit mandate which contradicts the WTO’s decision-making framework, which is based on consensus.

Beyond these factors, India’s position can also be understood as a negotiation strategy. By resisting the incorporation of new issues such as investment facilitation into the WTO package, India seeks to preserve negotiating leverage in ongoing and future discussions. Accepting the IFDA could open a pandora’s box for the introduction of other areas, including digital trade and e-commerce, thereby shifting the balance of negotiations away from priorities of developing countries, such as agricultural subsidies.

It is important to note that India does not oppose investment facilitation in principle; rather, its criticism is related to the form, venue, and legal consequences of introducing non-trade disciplines at the WTO. India has, in fact, undertaken substantial domestic reforms aimed at improving the ease of doing business and attracting foreign investment. Its objection is more precisely directed at the form, forum, and legal implications of embedding such non-trade disciplines within the framework of WTO.

In summary, the refusal of India to sign the IFDA is a reflection of careful consideration of complex legal factors combined with prudence regarding institutional development and developmental policy. It underscores a broader tension within the contemporary multilateral trading system aiming to balance the ever-expansive rule-making to protect & promote investments, with preservation of regulatory policy space for host states.

A federal judge has blocked Nexstar Media Group’s $6.2-billion acquisition of its rival, upending the already consummated union of the nation’s two largest television station groups.

U.S. District Court Chief Judge Troy L. Nunley on Friday issued a preliminary injunction that forbids Nexstar, which owns KTLA-TV Channel 5 in Los Angeles, and its takeover-target, Tegna Inc., from combining operations amid a legal dispute with California Atty. Gen. Rob Bonta and seven other state attorneys general.

The order takes effect Tuesday.

“Nexstar must permit Tegna to continue operating as a separate and distinct, independently managed business unit from Nexstar,” Nunley wrote in his 52-page order. “And Nexstar must put measures in place to maintain Tegna as an ongoing, economically viable, and active competitor.”

The injunction is Nexstar’s latest setback in the controversial deal championed by President Trump.

Bonta and the others are opposed to the merger, arguing it violates a 112-year-old U.S. antitrust law by knocking out a major competitor. The deal would give Irving, Texas-based Nexstar control of 265 television stations across the country, up from 164. And, in dozens of markets, including San Diego and Sacramento, Nexstar would own multiple TV network affiliates.

That duplication has raised concerns about staff consolidations and widespread newsroom layoffs.

“This is a critical win in our case,” Bonta said in a statement. “This merger is illegal, plain and simple. The federal government may have thrown in the towel, but we’ll keep fighting for consumers, for workers, for affordability and for our local news.”

Nexstar, in a statement, said that it will appeal the ruling, but that it has taken steps to comply with the court order.

“For nearly thirty years, Nexstar has provided free over-the-air access to all its broadcast stations — local news, weather, and community-focused programming alongside major network programming,” Nexstar said. “This procompetitive transaction will make local stations stronger and support continued investment in local journalism and fact-based news.”

Bonta and other state attorneys general sued to block the merger March 18. The state officials, all Democrats, alleged the union would create “a broadcast behemoth” with the “power to raise prices for television consumers” and diminish “local news and sports,” their lawsuit stated.

El Segundo-based DirecTV separately sued. It alleged the merger would dramatically tilt the pay-TV playing field, forcing DirecTV to pay dramatically higher fees for the rights to carry Nexstar-Tegna station programming, including local news and NFL football. Those costs, DirecTV said, would be passed along to its 10 million customers.

Trump had been agitating for the deal, writing in a February social media post: “GET THAT DEAL DONE!”

On March 19, the day after the lawsuits, the Trump administration approved the deal. The U.S. Justice Department terminated its antitrust review and the Federal Communications Commission’s Media Bureau authorized the transfer of Tegna’s station licenses to Nexstar.

Within an hour, Nexstar announced that it had finalized the purchase of its McLean, Va.-based rival.

Tegna was dissolved and its stockholders were paid out — raising questions about the fate of Tegna’s stations.

“Nexstar must not influence the management of the held-separate TEGNA business unit,” Nunley wrote. “Tegna personnel must maintain control over Tegna’s decisionmaking, including … negotiations [with pay-TV partners], newsroom personnel, operations and programming, product and service offerings, product development, advertisement sales, and personnel.”

Nexstar has complained about the unusual nature of blocking a transaction after-the-fact. But the plaintiffs noted that Nexstar had been aware of the state attorneys general concerns since at least March 10 — more than a week before DirecTV and the state regulators sued.

Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, New York, North Carolina, Oregon and Virginia have joined California in the lawsuit.

The merger was not approved by the full FCC commission, prompting two U.S. senators — Ted Cruz (R-Texas) and Maria Cantwell (D-Wash.) — to question the FCC’s handling of the matter.

“This decision raises serious concerns about the Commission’s use of delegated authority in matters involving significant legal, policy, and economic consequences,” the two lawmakers wrote in a March 30 letter to the FCC. “The transaction is unprecedented in scale, resulting in the largest local broadcast television group in U.S. history.”

Nexstar has built itself into a colossus through a series of acquisitions, including its $6.2-billion takeover of Tribune Broadcasting, the longtime owner of KTLA, in 2019 — during the first Trump term.

Opponents have argued that Nexstar’s proposed purchase of Tegna gives Nexstar stations in 44 states covering 80% of the U.S. population — exceeding a 39% ownership cap set by Congress.

DirecTV has argued that the combination of the nation’s two largest television station groups could harm its pay-TV business by raising prices for consumers and potentially increasing programming blackouts.

The judge late last month combined the two lawsuits.

During a two-hour hearing earlier this month, Nexstar attorneys argued against the injunction, saying it had obtained the necessary federal approvals to take control of the Tegna stations.

“Setting aside the unusual FCC clearance process here, the Court does not find Defendants’ arguments persuasive,” Nunley wrote.

Nexstar contends the deal would strengthen TV station economics, allowing stations to bolster their news gathering and expand the number of newscasts. But DirecTV countered that in markets where Nexstar owns two stations, it relies on just one newsroom to program both channels.

“We commend the Court’s decision, which reinforces the coalition of states’ and our shared belief that unchecked station consolidation will force consumers to pay more for less by reducing the quality and variety of local news coverage,” DirecTV said in a statement.

Nexstar attorney Alexander Okuliar said the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the merger posed an immediate threat to the public.

Nunley, who was appointed by former President Obama, wrote in his order that the plaintiffs demonstrated they had a path to prevail at a trial due to the merits of their arguments.

Nexstar had asked the judge to require the plaintiffs to post a $150-million bond to compensate it for damages it would suffer from any delays in closing the deal.

But the judge denied that request, writing that Nexstar did not offer a “financial analysis or documentary evidence to support a bond in this amount” or any evidence that it would incur financial losses should the injunction be overturned.

WASHINGTON — Upbeat claims from President Trump over an imminent peace deal to end the war with Iran were met with deep skepticism Friday across the Middle East, where Iranian and Israeli officials questioned the prospects for a lasting agreement that would satisfy all parties.

The outlines of an agreement began to emerge that would provide Iran with a major strategic victory — and a potential financial windfall — allowing the Islamic Republic to leverage its control over the Strait of Hormuz to exact significant concessions from the United States and its ally Israel as Trump presses for a swift end to the conflict.

In a series of social media posts and interviews with reporters, Trump announced that the strait was “fully open,” vowing Tehran would never again attempt to control it. But Iranian officials and state media said that conditions remained on passage through the waterway, including the imposition of tolls and coordination with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Iranian diplomats posted threats that its closure could resume at any time of their choosing, and warned that restrictions would return unless the United States agreed to lift a blockade of its ports. Trump had said Friday that the blockade would remain in place.

“The conditional and limited reopening of a portion of the Strait of Hormuz is solely an Iranian initiative, one that creates responsibility and serves to test the firm commitments of the opposing side,” said a top aide to Iran’s president, dismissing Trump’s statements on the contours of a deal as “baseless.”

“If they renege on their promises,” he added, “they will face dire consequences.”

In an overture to Iran, Trump said Israel would be “prohibited” from conducting additional military strikes in Lebanon, where the Israeli government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu seeks to prevent Hezbollah, an Iranian proxy militia, from rearming, a potential threat to communities in the Israeli north.

But in a speech delivered in Hebrew, Netanyahu would say only that Israel had agreed to a temporary ceasefire, while members of his Cabinet warned that Israel Defense Forces operations in southern Lebanon were not yet finished. A top ally of the prime minister at a right-wing Israeli news outlet warned that Trump was “surrendering” to Iran in the talks.

It was a day of public messaging from a president eager to end a war that has proved historically unpopular with the American public, and has driven a rise in gas prices that could weigh on his party entering this year’s midterm elections.

Yet, Republican allies of the president have begun warning him that an agreement skewed heavily in Tehran’s favor could carry political costs of its own.

Trump was forced to deny an Axios report Friday that his negotiating team had offered to release $20 billion in frozen Iranian assets in exchange for Tehran agreeing to hand over its fissile material, buried under rubble from a U.S. bombing raid last year.

That sum would amount to more than 10 times what President Obama released to Iran under a 2015 nuclear deal, called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, that was the subject of fierce Republican criticism in the decade since.

“I have every confidence that President Trump will not allow Iran to be enriched by tens of billions of dollars for holding the world hostage and creating mayhem in the region,” said Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), a strong supporter of the war. “No JCPOAs on President Trump’s watch.”

Still, Trump said in a round of interviews that a deal could be reached in a matter of days, ending less than two weeks of negotiations.

He claimed that Tehran had agreed to permanently end its enrichment of uranium — a development that, if true, would mark a dramatic reversal for the Islamic Republic from decades developing its nuclear program, and from just 10 days ago, when Iranian diplomats rejected a U.S. proposal of a 20-year pause on domestic enrichment in favor of a five-year moratorium.

He said Iran had agreed never to build nuclear weapons — a pledge Tehran has made repeatedly, including under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, in a religious decree from then-Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and in the 2015 agreement — while continuing nuclear activities viewed by the international community as exceeding civilian needs.

And he repeatedly stated that Iran had agreed to the removal of its enriched uranium from the country, either to the United States or to a third party. Iranian state media stated Friday afternoon that a proposal to remove the country’s highly enriched uranium had been “rejected.”

Iran’s agreement to allow safe passage for commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz is linked to a ceasefire in Lebanon that the Israeli Cabinet approved for only a 10-day period. Regardless of whether it holds or is extended, Israeli officials said their military would not retreat from its current positions in southern Lebanon — opening up Israeli forces to potential attack by Hezbollah militants unbound by a truce brokered by the Lebanese government.

The Lebanese people, Hezbollah officials said, have “the right to resist” Israeli occupation of their land. Whether the fighting resumes, the group added, “will be determined based on how developments unfold.”

An Iranian official threw cold water on the prospects of reaching a comprehensive peace deal in the coming days, telling Reuters that a temporary extension of the current ceasefire, set to expire Tuesday, would “create space for more talks on lifting sanctions on Iran and securing compensation for war damages.”

“In exchange, Iran will provide assurances to the international community about the peaceful nature of its nuclear program,” the official said, adding that “any other narrative about the ongoing talks is a misrepresentation of the situation.”

Trump told reporters Friday that the talks will continue through the weekend.

While Trump claimed there aren’t “too many significant differences” remaining, he said the United States would continue the blockade until negotiations are finalized and formalized.

“When the agreement is signed, the blockade ends,” the president told reporters in Phoenix.

Times staff writer Ana Ceballos contributed to this report.