crisis

Glaciers aren’t stationary. Immense and imposing, formed through the downward trajectory of water from mountains as it collects and freezes, they have always moved. Now, however, they’re leaving. The demise of glaciers is a fact inherent in all the bad news about the effects of climate change on what once seemed permanent. But for Icelanders, whose connection to glaciers is ancient and mythic, our human epoch has become an extended hospice for the landscape of their lives.

Somehow, though, Sara Dosa’s documentary on this matter, “Time and Water,” avoids playing like a funeral in waiting. Built around Icelandic writer Andri Snær Magnason’s voiced lamentations on a vanishing frozen world, along with archival footage of his family, it’s no simple howl of grief, even when it takes us to a publicly held memorial in 2019 for Iceland’s Ok glacier, the first such “death” diagnosis in the country’s history. Rather, Dosa’s film is a meditation on change — both the kind that we accept with a heavy heart and something more general. “Time and Water” is a curiously vibrant elegy, teeming with appreciation for the intimate majesty that is all life, generational and geologic.

Dosa has finessed this emotional-meets-elemental space before in her Academy Award-nominated 2022 documentary “Fire of Love,” about married volcanologists Katia and Maurice Krafft. That was a wonderfully eccentric romance forged in molten lava. Here, she’s in a collaboration of sorts with her subjects, both human and elemental. Magnason’s opening narration over spectacular footage of glaciers — up close and from far away — gently informs us that we’re watching a time capsule, one where the bonds of family and environment are intertwined.

We learn how Iceland’s glaciers, essentially rivers of varying pace, begat their unique ecosystems, but also how they provided the breathtaking terrain upon which Magnason’s grandparents Hulda and Árni fell in love. (Grandma Hulda was the first woman to fly in Iceland, itself a very cool fact.) The onset of dementia in Árni spurs his grandson to consider what’s lost when the markers of memory depart. “Time and Water” touches on the epic verse called rimurs, passed down via chanted song by Icelandic women, their descriptive, sorrowful tales like dispatches from previous ages.

“Tone poem” is an overused term in cinema, but the humbling “Time and Water,” graced with a playful, atmospheric Dan Deacon score, earns that distinction. Naturally, it helps that you can never tire of all the air-crisped glacier imagery, captured digitally and in 16mm. Folded into the cozy slide-show vibe of Magnason’s home videos and the carefully chosen archival footage, the movie plays like a scrapbook portrait in which home just happens to boast the grandest of backyards.

How much longer will Icelanders enjoy it? The glaciers are predicted to be gone within 200 years. That’s an eternity or a drip, depending on whose survival we’re talking about. Still, “Time and Water” collapses the notion that we are somehow separate from these ancient, essential formations: an encouraging hello to the future from inside a sobering goodbye.

Mogadishu, Somalia – Mustafa, 33, dreads election time in Somalia. He drives a bajaj — a three-wheeled taxi — and says that when tensions rise, as they always do when polls are near, the whole city feels it, and drivers like him are among the first.

On Wednesday, he was passing through the Hawl Wadaag district when heavy gunfire between government and opposition forces erupted all around him.

“I couldn’t even think. Everyone was shouting and running for their lives, and we all fled from the bullets,” he told Al Jazeera. “We haven’t seen fighting this bad in years.”

The shooting that began that afternoon around the homes of former Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire and, later, former President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, came as opposition figures were planning to organise protests against what they describe as an illegal term extension by incumbent President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.

Khaire and Sharif Sheikh Ahmed were among opposition leaders spreadheading the planned protests amid rising tensions with the federal government.

The government said the planned protests would undermine security in a city still grappling with persistent armed violence.

Hundreds of families fled neighbourhoods near the fighting, and by the next day, many of the capital’s central areas had emptied. The sudden eruption of violence ended a period of improving security in Mogadishu, shattering the perception that the city had begun turning a corner.

“The most frustrating thing is that we have nothing to do with it, and it impacts so many of us,” Mustafa said. “We make our living in this city”.

Security forces sealed Maka al-Mukarama Road, one of Mogadishu’s main arteries, while Bakara market, the largest commercial hub in the city, was effectively closed for business.

“Look, it’s midday, and there’s almost no one here, shops are closed, and usually by this time the place is jammed,” Ahmed, a street vendor at Bakara market, told Al Jazeera, gesturing at shuttered stalls.

Ali Wardheere, the deputy central bank governor, estimated the direct cost to businesses and services at $3.8m, though he stressed the figure was a model-based projection, not an official or final tally.

Like most Somalis, Mustafa has never voted for a president or a member of parliament. The country has not held a direct election for national leadership since the late 1960s.

Since the state was re-established in 2012 after its 1991 collapse, leaders have been selected through an indirect system negotiated by clan elders and political elites.

As presidential terms near their end, low trust among political actors often leads to intense competition over power — and at times violence — as disputes over the electoral timetable come to a head.

At a press conference in late May, Sharif warned that the political deadlock could turn violent if negotiations failed.

“Where do things stand? [We say] Leave, and [you say] I won’t leave. What comes next? Bullets.”

The warning echoed events in 2021, when then-President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo remained in office more than a year beyond the end of his term, triggering clashes in Mogadishu before a political agreement was reached.

Higher stakes this election

This time, the political standoff carries higher stakes.

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud says that constitutional amendments approved by parliament extended his mandate by an additional year from May 15. The opposition rejects that and has begun referring to him as a “former president”.

Two of Somalia’s most influential federal states also reject the amendments, leaving the country divided over the constitutional framework governing the next election, with no constitutional court to resolve the dispute.

After parliament approved the changes, Mohamud declared that the “provisional constitution, and the provisional era, was a sun which set yesterday,” signalling that his administration would press ahead despite objections from its opponents.

Tensions had been building for days. Ahead of a protest planned for Thursday, opposition leaders left the heavily fortified “green zone” near Mogadishu’s airport and returned to their residences across the city.

Some opposition figures said they would deploy their own armed guards at the demonstration, a proposal Mohamud rejected. The dispute heightened fears of a confrontation before fighting eventually broke out.

Both sides blame the other for starting the clashes. Khaire accused Mohamud of directing a “sustained and indiscriminate military assault” that lasted more than 20 hours, a claim Sharif echoed after fighting reached his own residence.

Ahmed Moalim Fiqi, the defence minister, accused the opposition of militarising the standoff, likening it to Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces and alleging that opposition figures had “distributed mortars and artillery across the capital”.

“Force and militias,” he said, would no longer be allowed to “seize power or block the state.”

How it came to this

The roots of the crisis run back to the 2012 provisional constitution, which set up a federal, parliamentary system built on broad consensus and clan-based power-sharing, which every government since has promised to achieve and failed to attain.

This year, after a long review, parliament amended the constitution through a disputed process that split the political class. The government has insisted that the new constitution advances the statebuilding process and that the Somali public should be allowed to directly elect its representatives.

For Ahmed Abdi Koshin, a federal MP who boycotted the draft, the danger is that the whole settlement comes apart. The process, he said, “clearly doesn’t have buy-in,” and the original constitution, for all its faults — “an imperfect product of compromise” — was the “only glue holding Somalia together”.

Koshin is not against a direct vote in principle, he said, but does not believe the country is ready for one. “We don’t have legislation for a direct vote; censuses and the security situation remains compromised. It really is up to the president to either reach a deal and save Somalia, or watch it fall apart,” he said.

The opposition, organised as a coalition known as the Somali Future Council and including two serving federal-state presidents, former prime ministers and a former president, has pressed Mohamud to accept that his mandate has ended and negotiate a new electoral framework, as in past transitions.

It alleges that his push for a direct vote is a pretext for extending his term and potentially securing another.

The government rejects that, casting a national one-person, one-vote election — the first since the 1960s — as essential to a drawn-out state-building project. When electoral talks collapsed on May 15, the Ministry of Information accused the opposition of bringing demands that ran counter to “the citizen’s fundamental right to vote and to be voted for”, and vowed to press ahead.

Mohamed Ibrahim Moalimuu, a lower-house MP who backed the amendments, said further delay could not be justified. “We’ve waited for more than 12 years,” he told Al Jazeera.

“If they had arguments against them, they should have taken part in the process and raised their issues. A constitution isn’t a Quran, and they should come back and work through parliament to make their views clear.”

A whole generation of Somalis, he noted, have never cast a ballot, and a real election “would be a major milestone and would bring some hope”.

The old indirect system, he added, was notoriously corrupt, with parliamentary seats changing hands for anywhere from $100,000 to as much as $1.3m. “This system is too dirty and keeps people out,” said Maliumuu. “It needs to be changed.”

A deeper problem

A regional official, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was not authorised to talk to the media, described an elite “divided strategically over what type of country they want, whether a strong centralised state or a weak decentralised one, and tactically over who the right candidate is to take them there”.

Mohamud, the official said, had moved from a decentralised vision for Somalia that embraces federalism towards a stronger executive, and his early, promising relationships with the federal-state leaders had since soured.

Those fractures have opened on several fronts at once.

Somaliland, which declared independence in 1991 and has stayed out of the constitutional review entirely, was recognised by Israel late last year after earlier courting Ethiopia.

Puntland and Jubaland, two of Somalia’s six federal states, have withdrawn from the federal system over the new constitution, while more than 100 MPs and senators from both boycotted the final vote.

Broader regional crises, from Sudan’s civil war to disease outbreaks elsewhere on the continent, have pushed Somalia further down the list of international priorities, leaving international engagement more fragmented and inconsistent.

The country is also grappling with a deepening humanitarian crisis and aid cuts, prompting famine monitors to warn of a heightened risk of hunger in parts of Somalia.

Yusuf Aynte, a veteran religious leader and former MP, said Somalia’s leaders needed to build consensus rather than push through changes that risk deepening divisions.

“The president says what he is doing is good, and that may be so,” he told Al Jazeera. “But the most important thing is what everyone can agree on.

“At the moment, Somalia has too many problems, and can’t afford to be distracted like this.”

Jamal Shiil, a youth activist, told Al Jazeera that Somalia’s large youth population would ultimately bear the cost of the persistent instability.

“Young people want to make a living here, for Somalia to be peaceful and not to have to leave because of the problems,” he said. “But if things don’t change it won’t leave them much of a choice”.

Brussels, Belgium – Bilal knows life behind bars.

Over the past 10 years, the 34-year-old has served a sentence in five prisons across Belgium. He most vividly recalls conditions in Mons, a 19th-century prison near the French border, where he said 9-square-metre (97-square-foot) cells housed three to four detainees. He remembers bouts of scabies, bed bugs and monkeypox spreading widely and guards who faced severe exhaustion.

“During my 10 years in prison, things only got worse,” Bilal told Al Jazeera on condition that we use only his first name. “They took away some of our time outside of our cells, various activities.”

Belgium, one of Europe’s richest countries, is grappling with a deepening prison overcrowding crisis.

In mid-May, its 39 prisons counted 13,733 inmates – significantly exceeding a capacity of 11,064, according to data provided by the directorate-general of prisons.

“The combination of ever-increasing overcrowding and staff shortages makes the situation very, very, very difficult,” warned Pieter Houbey, vice-chairman of the Central Prison Monitoring Council (CCSP), an independent watchdog.

“It’s become almost impossible to maintain a detention system … aimed at reintegrating people,” he said.

In mid-May, 754 detainees were sleeping on mattresses on the floor, up from 672 in December.

Across Europe, prison populations have increased dramatically since the COVID-19 pandemic, with overcrowding affecting one-third of prison administrations.

Occupancy rates are highest in Cyprus, followed by Slovenia, France, Croatia, Italy, Romania, Austria and Belgium.

As a result, governments find themselves under pressure, with experts and workers criticising common responses – from building more detention facilities to transferring prisoners abroad – as ineffective.

‘Mice in a cage’

“To ensure decent conditions, we must first respect their rights – that is, stop treating them like mice in a cage,” said Yasin Sarikaya, vice-president of Brussels’ prisons.

Prisoners, especially those on remand, are often left in their cells for 22 to 23 hours a day, exacerbating the lack of privacy, as well as potentially pre-existing health and substance abuse issues. Receiving medical support can take months.

Loic*, who is serving his third of seven years at Saint-Gilles Prison in Brussels – meant to shut down by 2028 – said that work or other activities are hardly offered at the facility. Most detainees do not have a residency permit, he said.

“It’ll be tough to get back into the workforce,” the 23-year-old told Al Jazeera, looking at the floor while he spoke.

Bilal, convicted of two bank robberies and attempted murder, said he experienced suicidal ideation during imprisonment.

In recent years, videos circulating online have shown drones smuggling goods into prisons. In 2024, a video went viral showing a prisoner being tortured by five fellow inmates in his cell while the guards, on a 48-hour strike, failed to notice for days.

Guard burnout

Those conditions reinforce existing staff shortages.

At Haren, the country’s largest jail complex, “some guards are injured and can’t come to work”, said Sarikaya, who works at the complex.

According to the directorate-general of prisons, critical incidents in prisons doubled within a year.

With general crime rates having fluctuated in past years, experts connect the situation to Belgium’s carceral policy and its attempts to crack down on drug-related crime. While the country has struggled with overpopulation for decades, its most recent increase is mainly linked to a decision in 2023 to enforce all sentences of up to three years, previously served primarily under electronic monitoring.

Belgium also detains people for ever longer periods. Currently, the average detention lasts 9.9 months – a 39.4 percent increase over five years. Belgium’s pretrial detention rate of 32 percent is well above the European average (24.7 percent in 2024).

Emergency measures

Last July, Belgium’s parliament passed an emergency bill. The law, drafted by Justice Minister Annelies Verlinden, encourages the use of alternative punishments for sentences under three years and allows directors to release inmates, sentenced to a maximum of 10 years, six months before the end of their sentences.

In the longer term, the government seeks to install modular units and to renovate existing prisons pending the construction of new facilities.

That, however, is unlikely to reduce overcrowding, warned An-Sofie Vanhouche, a professor in the criminology department of Vrije Universiteit Brussel.

“Research shows that the more [prison] space we have, the more people we usually send to prison,” she said.

Cells to rent

As part of a stricter migration policy, Belgium is also seeking ways to deport detainees without legal residency, who comprise about a third of the prison population.

Earlier this year, Verlinden visited Estonia to discuss renting cells there. The government has already eyed similar deals with Kosovo and Albania.

Belgium is not the only European country considering such agreements.

Sweden has struck a deal with Estonia to rent 400 prison cells. According to the Estonian Ministry of Justice, prisoners could start arriving by the end of the summer. In 2019, Denmark reached an agreement to rent 300 prison cells from Kosovo.

Vanhouche described the moves as “very populist and symbolic”.

While only having a “small impact”, they raise numerous ethical questions around the protection of prisoners’ rights and their wellbeing, she argued.

The Belgian Ministry of Justice, as well as the Swedish and Danish ministries, did not respond to requests for comment. The Estonian ministry said that “prisoners remain protected under European human rights standards and applicable international law”.

Ways forward

Critics are calling on Belgium to move towards a greater emphasis on societal reintegration rather than just security – also through alternative punishment.

“Prison leads to recidivism,” warned Tahar Elhamdaoui, the founder of NGO Collectif Desistance, which helps young former prisoners reintegrate into society.

According to Houbey, Belgium’s reoffending rate is 60-70 percent.

Thanks to Elhamdaoui’s NGO, Bilal is interning as a football coach. Meanwhile, Loic* is trying out different jobs on day release.

But that’s not the norm, Elhamdaoui warned.

“As long as there are no prisons that prepare people to succeed outside,” he said, “we will not only be producing more crime upon release, but also a sense of despair so deep that people will not be able to reintegrate into society.”

Bolivia’s president has warned protesters “time is running out” amid a weeks-long standoff over the country’s economic and political crisis. President Rodrigo Paz has secured powers to declare a State of Emergency, but protesters remain unmoved.

Across South Asia, concerns over press freedom, political influence, and media credibility are drawing increasing international scrutiny. From Bangladesh and Pakistan to India, journalists and independent media organisations face mounting political, economic, and legal pressures that are reshaping how information is produced and consumed.

Recent international assessments point to what rights groups describe as a broader regional decline in media independence. The 2026 World Press Freedom Index placed multiple South Asian countries near the lower end of global rankings, reflecting concerns over censorship, political pressure, and growing ideological polarisation within news ecosystems.

Among these cases, India continues to attract the most sustained global attention due to its scale, democratic profile, and influence as the world’s largest electoral democracy.

When a country that defines itself as a global democratic model falls to 157th out of 180 nations on the World Press Freedom Index, the question is no longer whether there are challenges within its media environment. The question is how deeply those challenges have reshaped journalism itself.

Together with other regional indicators, the findings suggest not isolated failures but a structural transformation in how media systems operate across South Asia.

The concerns highlighted in global reports do not exist in isolation. Across South Asia, governments and political actors are increasingly accused of exerting pressure on journalists through legal action, advertising influence, regulatory scrutiny, and informal intimidation.

According to World Press Freedom Index in 2026, Bangladesh stood at 152nd. Afghanistan remained among the lowest-ranked countries globally, reflecting ongoing restrictions on press activity. Nepal, while comparatively better positioned at 87th, has also faced periodic concerns over political influence and media ownership concentration.

Analysts argue that while each country’s political context differs, a shared pattern is emerging: fragile media economies, heightened political polarisation, and increasing hostility toward independent journalism.

However, India’s trajectory is often singled out due to its democratic stature and its role as a regional political and cultural benchmark. This contrast between democratic identity and media freedom rankings has intensified global debate about the state of its information ecosystem.

Political Influence and the Changing Nature of News

Within India, one of the central concerns raised by international observers is the perceived growth of political influence over large sections of mainstream media.

A detailed report by Genocide Watch described what it termed a “severe crisis of credibility” in parts of the Indian media landscape, arguing that dominant narratives in some outlets increasingly align with those of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party rather than independently scrutinising power.

This does not imply uniformity across the entire media sector. India still has a diverse ecosystem of investigative journalists, regional newspapers, and independent digital platforms producing critical reporting. However, critics argue that the dominant tone of mainstream television and high-visibility digital media increasingly reflects political messaging rather than adversarial journalism.

The Reporters Without Borders (RSF) assessment echoed concerns about structural vulnerabilities. It highlighted the heavy dependence of Indian media on advertising revenue, including significant spending by both central and state governments. Critics argue that this financial structure creates subtle incentives for compliance, where editorial decisions may be influenced not through direct censorship, but through economic dependency.

In such an environment, formal restrictions are often unnecessary. Editorial caution can emerge internally, as news organisations weigh political and financial risks before pursuing certain stories.

The Rise of Divisive Television Narratives

Another recurring concern involves the increasing polarisation of televised political discourse.

Genocide Watch and other rights-focused assessments have warned that sections of mainstream media increasingly frame political and social issues through identity-based narratives, often centred on religion and nationalism. Complex policy debates are frequently simplified into binary positions, contributing to heightened social tension.

Human Rights Watch, in its World Report 2026, also documented concerns that hostile rhetoric in parts of media and online spaces has coincided with rising incidents of discrimination and attacks against minority communities, including Muslims in different parts of the country.

While causation is difficult to establish definitively, observers argue that repeated framing of communities through suspicion or collective identity can contribute to an environment where social hostility becomes easier to normalise.

The RSF report additionally pointed to structural imbalances within media representation, noting concerns about concentration of leadership within certain social groups and the underrepresentation of women in prominent political debate programming. These imbalances, critics argue, shape not only who speaks in media spaces, but also which perspectives are amplified or marginalised.

Self-Censorship and Invisible Constraints

Not all constraints on journalism are explicit. In many cases, they manifest as self-censorship.

According to Genocide Watch, journalists and editors increasingly avoid topics that could lead to political backlash, regulatory scrutiny, legal threats, or coordinated online harassment campaigns. Over time, this produces a newsroom culture in which certain subjects are quietly excluded before formal editorial decisions are even made.

This form of pressure is difficult to measure, but its effects can be significant. When reporters internalise risk calculations, the range of publicly available information can narrow without any formal ban or directive.

RSF similarly highlighted concerns over actions taken against independent journalists, commentators, and publications. It cited instances of restrictions, legal pressure, and bans on certain media outlets in sensitive regions, including Jammu and Kashmir, where authorities have taken action against publications accused of promoting separatism.

Critics argue that such measures contribute to a wider climate of caution, particularly around politically sensitive reporting.

A Broader Democratic Stress Test

The implications of these developments extend beyond journalism alone.

Genocide Watch framed the weakening of press freedom as part of a broader institutional credibility challenge linked to political polarisation and majoritarian dynamics. In this view, media independence is not an isolated issue but part of a wider ecosystem that includes accountability, governance, and civic trust.

A free press plays a central role in democratic systems by enabling scrutiny of power and facilitating informed public debate. When that role weakens, the consequences extend into how citizens engage with institutions and interpret political realities.

India’s trajectory in the RSF index over recent years reflects this concern. The country ranked 150th in 2022, fell further to 161st in 2023, improved slightly to 151st in 2025, and then declined again to 157th in 2026. Analysts interpret this pattern not as random fluctuation but as part of a longer-term structural challenge.

At the same time, government supporters argue that India remains a robust electoral democracy with active institutions, a vibrant political opposition, and a highly diverse media landscape. They contend that international rankings often fail to capture the complexity of India’s scale, security challenges, and internal diversity.

The debate, therefore, is not solely about classification, but about how democratic quality itself should be assessed.

South Asia in a Global Decline

These concerns are unfolding within a broader global downturn in press freedom. RSF’s 2026 index noted that worldwide media freedom has reached its weakest level in 25 years, with more than half of all countries classified as having “difficult” or “very serious” conditions.

South Asia reflects this global trend particularly sharply. Alongside India, countries such as Bangladesh remain in the lower tiers of the global rankings, highlighting shared regional challenges around political influence, media ownership concentration, and journalist safety.

Yet despite this broader pattern, analysts continue to emphasise that each country’s trajectory is shaped by its own political history and institutional structures. In India’s case, its global influence and democratic identity make developments in its media landscape particularly consequential for international observers.

What Is Ultimately at Stake

The credibility of media systems plays a central role in shaping the health of democratic life. Journalism informs not only public debate but also citizens’ ability to evaluate leadership, understand policy decisions, and hold institutions accountable.

When trust in media declines, democratic accountability becomes harder to sustain.

The findings from Genocide Watch and RSF should therefore be viewed not simply as criticism of individual outlets or governments, but as indicators of broader institutional stress across South Asia.

Addressing these challenges would require a combination of stronger protections for editorial independence, more diversified ownership structures, reduced reliance on state advertising, and greater safeguards for journalists facing intimidation or harassment.

Despite these pressures, the region continues to produce significant investigative journalism and independent reporting under difficult conditions. Many journalists continue to work at considerable personal and professional risk to maintain public access to information.

Acknowledging structural challenges across South Asia is not an indictment of any single democracy. Rather, it is increasingly seen by analysts as a necessary step toward strengthening the democratic principles that the region’s constitutions and institutions claim to uphold.

With information from Reuters.

It has been almost nine months since rebel groups imposed a fuel blockade on Mali’s capital Bamako. In late April, the conflict escalated further. The Al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), along with members of Tuareg separatist movements, launched a coordinated attack on the Malian army and its Russian allies, the African Corps (formerly Wagner), which killed the Malian Defence Minister Sadio Camara.

The rebels seized control of military camps, recaptured the largest northern city of Kidal, and tightened the blockade on Bamako. This latest offensive is part of a long series of rebellions in what the Tuareg call Azawad, an area comprising the regions of Timbuktu, Taoudenit, Kidal, and Gao, which is predominantly populated by Tuareg communities.

The present crisis is compounded by the weakening of the Malian state following the 2021 coup and foreign intervention. In the absence of any serious effort to address it, instability could spill over across the whole Sahel region.

Ever since the country announced independence from France in 1960, Mali’s north has seen repeated upheaval as local Tuareg communities have demanded self-determination. Fourteen years ago, Tuareg groups allied with groups affiliated with al-Qaeda launched yet another rebellion. They managed to seize several cities in northern Mali, and had it not been for a French military intervention in 2013, they could have marched on Bamako.

Two French operations resulted in the weakening of the Tuareg movements and groups affiliated with al-Qaeda. This helped persuade them to participate in negotiations with the government, which ultimately ended with the signing of the Algiers Accords in 2015.

One of the most prominent clauses of this agreement was decentralisation in the Azawad region, which gave local leaders more power. Through this agreement, the Malian government secured the country’s territorial integrity in return for promises like the enhancement of development in the Azawad region, the integration of separatist fighters into the army, and the appointment of their leaders to political positions.

These accords helped maintain relative stability in Mali and the Sahel region by containing the sources of tension and secessionist calls. However, peace did not last long. Several challenges emerged, the most important of which was the failure of the government to honour its commitments to implement development projects in the north.

The situation got worse after the 2021 military coup led by General Assimi Goita. France, Algeria, and members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) refused to recognise the new authorities in Bamako. As a result, in 2022, the military government expelled French troops, and in 2024, abolished the Algiers Agreement. Thereafter, instead of diplomacy and dialogue, it adopted a militarised approach to controlling the restive north.

These steps strained Mali’s relations with Mauritania, Algeria, and France, with Bamako accusing them of providing logistical support to the rebels and interfering in its internal affairs. Consequently, the Malian state was weakened militarily and economically, as military coordination and trade with neighbours declined.

JNIM and the separatist movements exploited the situation. They sought to choke the capital by attacking key transport arteries where most imports and exports are routed. They disrupted supplies of gasoline and diesel coming from Senegal and the Ivory Coast, and began attacking Moroccan trucks carrying food supplies via Mauritania.

Like in 2012, the alliance between the Tuareg movements and al-Qaeda affiliates has proven successful. It has routed the Malian military, capturing more territory and operating freely close to Bamako.

This time, foreign forces have not been able to help the Malian army, as its Russian allies were forced to withdraw following the attack in late April. Meanwhile, Turkiye has seen its involvement in Mali grow amid growing instability. In early May, following the attacks on the Malian military, Ankara signed several defence agreements with the Malian military government.

The danger here is that the Malian crisis may not be contained only within the political crisis between the government and the separatist movements. It could also invite more foreign intervention as regional and global rivalries transfer onto Malian territory.

There is also the issue of the alliance between Azawadi movements and al-Qaeda affiliates, which could prove to be a ticking time bomb. There are clear contradictions within this relationship, as the two sides have no common ground except the agreement to overthrow the military regime in Bamako. This is why a future war in the north between the Azawadi movements and the Islamist groups is quite likely.

The Malian crisis inevitably has regional repercussions. The ongoing humanitarian crisis could trigger a major migration wave towards Europe and North America. Continuing instability in the north could open more space for the growth of extremist movements, which can expand their attacks across the region. Consequently, the Malian crisis can become a direct security threat to neighbouring countries, the region, and the world.

As the situation stands now, no warring side is able to achieve a decisive military victory. Therefore, a resolution of the conflict can only be achieved through dialogue and negotiation. Bamako needs to seriously consider the grievances of Tuareg communities in the north and their demands.

It is in the collective interest of neighbouring countries and regional powers to bring the parties to the negotiating table and seek peaceful solutions to this crisis. Under the threat of a regional spillover, there is no time to waste.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

PROJECT Sunrise, which is set to operate the world’s longest direct flight, has been pushed back once again.

The Qantas project would see a non-stop, 22-hour flight between London and Sydney, which would make it the longest of its kind in the world.

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Despite plans to launch in early 2027, this has since been delayed.

The ongoing Iran War has resulted in supply chain challenges and disruption to Airbus‘ production of its modified A350 aircraft by four months.

It’s now expected to arrive in April 2027, rather than its original timeline of late 2026.

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Talking to Simple Flying, Qantas said despite the delayed first delivery, the next four Project Sunrise aircraft are expected to arrive in relatively quick succession.

According to the airline, the overall rollout schedule should return to its schedule by November 2027.

Qantas added that test flights were a matter of “weeks away” and that information on the first route and timing of the “inaugural commercial services” will be revealed in June.

The Qantas flight service previously announced delays in March 2025, and before that faced delays due to Covid.

When the flights begin, the airline will make history as the first to fly non-stop between London and Sydney, as well an between Australia and New York.

With flight time of up to 22 hours, the routes will make it the longest non-stop ones in the world.

This beats the current 18.5 hour flight from Singapore to New York.

With almost a whole day of flying, the A350 aircraft has been kitted out so that passengers can be comfortable for a long period of time.

Inside, passengers can expect First Class suites, Business Class, Premium Economy and Economy seats.

A Wellbeing Zone will be onboard too where passengers can get up and move about for their circulation – here there will also be healthy snacks and drinks.

This space is open to all passengers – and there’s access for all when it comes to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth.

In First Class, there will be six cabins each with a two-metre-long bed that lies flat – there’s also a separate reclining armchair.

There will be 52 Business suites with sliding doors for privacy.

The 40 Premium Economy seats will have 20.3cm “winged privacy headrest” and a calf rest, to keep comfy on the 22-hour flight.

Economy passengers will have 83.8cm of legroom each at the 140 seats.

The plane is kitted out with 12 lighting settings including sunrise and sunset so that passengers can stay in sync with time zones and reduce jet lag.

For nearly 20 years, Mario Habib has run a barbershop in Beirut’s Furn el Chebbak neighbourhood – through wars, economic collapse and political crisis in Lebanon. Mario says many customers now come not just for haircuts, but for relief, conversation and a sense of normal life in a country where, as he puts it, ‘normal life itself became the dream’.

The crisis caused by the US-Israel war on Iran has affected the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) at different levels.

Oman has barely felt any shock as its ports and terminals continue operating as usual. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have been able to reroute some oil exports through terminals in Yanbu and Fujairah, respectively, to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar, on the other hand, have been practically cut off from the global market and are facing the prospect of economic contraction.

Under these circumstances, the GCC states more than ever need to demonstrate unity and address the crisis through collective action. The issue of solidarity is not about showing benevolence to neighbours. It is about setting up mechanisms now that can diminish the consequences and value of any future threat of closure. It is about the survival of the whole idea of GCC unity and the leverage it has on the global scene.

Collective action, common interest

Even if some sort of agreement is reached between the warring sides today, the GCC will continue to suffer under the shadow of the nearly three-month closure. States face the risk of losing clients due to the risk of not fulfilling their obligations or being perceived as a risky supplier. Only a joint effort can stop a free fall.

So far, self-interested approaches are winning over collective action. For instance, the UAE’s exit from OPEC was largely driven by the perception of the Emirati leadership that the Strait of Hormuz crisis was an opportunity to grab greater oil market share.

If this trend of unilateral crisis response continues, it would have grave economic consequences for the whole GCC and threaten its existence. With no burden-sharing mechanism, Gulf countries would end up competing against each other in a zero-sum game. This would reduce the influence the GCC has as a regional bloc and diminish its ability to sway energy markets.

Up until now, there have been some demonstrations of solidarity in rhetoric. During the GCC consultative meeting in Jeddah on April 28, Gulf leaders attempted to show unity and discuss possible ways out of the crisis. The meeting led to discussions about what the GCC states could do in practical terms, yet there are still no signs that these discussions have moved beyond the expert level.

Nevertheless, there are practical steps the GCC can take now that could help address the present crisis and ensure stability in the face of future risks. One of them could be the introduction of swap arrangements.

Swap as an instrument of solidarity

There are three relevant swap mechanisms that the GCC could consider: physical, contractual and quality swap deals. Physical and contractual swap deals allow one party to deliver an equivalent commodity to fulfil a contract on behalf of another.

A quality swap, on the other hand, exchanges one grade or product for another to align the feedstock needs of refineries or optimise transport costs.

Thus, instead of Kuwaiti, Qatari or Bahraini cargo physically passing through the Strait of Hormuz, a buyer can receive an acceptable substitute at Yanbu, Fujairah, Duqm, Ras Markaz, Sohar, Qalhat, Singapore, India, Korea, Japan or Europe, while the parties involved settle the accounts through future delivery, cash compensation, product exchange, or a retained-volume fee.

The swap does not require the trapped commodity to move immediately. It requires a transparent title, valuation and reconciliation, so that a substitute commodity can be delivered to the end user.

The strongest swap deals, therefore, resemble clearing systems. They are most reliable when they are established before the crisis, but they can also be assembled during a crisis if the parties already have pre-existing experience of trading, a trusted customer base or alternative physical infrastructure to be utilised.

In fact, the swap deals are not something completely unfamiliar to the GCC member states. In 2013, when Egypt failed to fulfil its contractual gas obligations, Qatar agreed to export its own liquefied natural gas (LNG) directly to the customers that Egypt otherwise could not serve while it channelled its gas for domestic needs.

In 2021, the UAE’s Emirates National Oil Company (ENOC) won a tender to swap 84,000 tonnes of Iraqi fuel oil for 30,000 tonnes of Grade B fuel oil and 33,000 tonnes of gas oil to supply to Lebanon. In 2024, the state-owned Oman LNG conducted about two swap tenders per month, with Atlantic cargoes originating from the United States delivered to Spain, while the company delivered its LNG to clients in Asia.

All of these examples show that Gulf countries and their national energy companies have the required expertise to carry out intra-GCC swaps.

The most practical way to implement such deals now would be to establish an energy swap facility through a coordinated clearing mechanism among national oil companies, major regional refiners, selected traders, insurers, banks and key Asian and European buyers.

Its function would be to match blocked obligations with delivery alternatives and to reconcile the value later.

Insurance for the future

The implementation of any swap arrangement would require substantive effort to operationalise, not to mention a high level of political will, trust and mutual determination. Moreover, at present, there are physical limitations before any arrangement, as the GCC infrastructure does not have the capacity to reroute export volumes that pass through the Strait of Hormuz completely.

In the immediate term, swap arrangements imply that one group of countries – Saudi Arabia, Oman and the UAE – would sacrifice a bit of income and market share to the advantage of the others, namely Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait, by allocating part of their current export, storage or transport capacities. But in the longer term, all would benefit.

The critical call is on Saudi Arabia, which has the largest options to bypass Hormuz and provide the largest pool of deliverable crude. Its command of customer credibility, global familiarity with Saudi oil grades, Red Sea export infrastructure and Aramco’s trading capacity make it the main pillar of any future swap system.

Complementing its role as market regulator within OPEC/OPEC+ with the leadership within the GCC, Riyadh can help stabilise the market by covering priority cargoes for strategic buyers.

The UAE can also play a major role by utilising its export capacity through Fujairah, and so can Oman, which has crude storage capacity at Ras Markaz, refining capacity at Duqm, LNG experience and ports that can receive and dispatch cargoes without having to cross the Strait of Hormuz.

If such swap deals are implemented, they can strengthen the GCC unity and help the members avoid internal economic rivalry in the future. More importantly, they can encourage the launch of a larger regional infrastructure drive that would lessen dependence on the Strait of Hormuz and diminish its value as a geopolitical tool to be used against the Gulf.

If there are a well-functioning swap mechanism and infrastructure in place that can be used whenever a threat of closure is made, then clients would feel more confident in continuing their relationships with all Gulf suppliers. In the longer term, this could serve as the GCC’s insurance against any new turbulence in the region.

The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

The European Commission on Thursday cut its 2026 growth forecast for the European economy, as the ongoing conflict in the Middle East drives energy prices sharply higher.

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The EU economy is now expected to grow by just 1.1% in 2026, down from the 1.4% projected in the Commission’s autumn forecast. The eurozone outlook was revised down further to 0.9%.

In its report, the Commission warned that disruption to global energy markets — caused by escalating tensions around the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s key oil and gas shipping routes — has significantly worsened Europe’s economic outlook.

“Before the end of February 2026, the EU economy was expected to continue expanding at a moderate pace, alongside a further decline in inflation,” the report said. “However, the outlook has changed substantially since the outbreak of the conflict.”

Inflation is also expected to rise sharply due to the disruption around Hormuz.

EU inflation is forecast to reach 3.1% this year — a full percentage point higher than previously expected — driven mainly by soaring energy costs after oil and gas prices surged amid fears of supply disruptions in the Gulf.

For EU officials, the shock recalls 2022, when Russia’s invasion of Ukraine triggered Europe’s worst energy crisis in decades.

The Commission described the latest turmoil as “the second such shock in less than five years”, warning that Europe’s dependence on imported fossil fuels leaves it highly vulnerable whenever geopolitical tensions threaten global energy supplies.

Consumer confidence has already fallen to a 40-month low, according to the forecast, as households prepare for higher heating and fuel bills while businesses face rising operating costs and weaker demand.

Investment is also expected to slow as companies confront tighter financing conditions and growing uncertainty. Export growth is weakening as global demand softens.

Despite the deteriorating outlook, Brussels said the bloc is better prepared than during the Ukraine-related energy crisis, thanks to years of investment in renewable energy, lower gas consumption and efforts to diversify away from Russian supplies.

“The push towards supply diversification, decarbonisation and lower energy consumption has left the EU economy better placed to absorb today’s shock,” the Commission said.

However, EU officials acknowledged that risks remain heavily skewed to the downside.

The report warned that prolonged disruption in the Strait of Hormuz or across wider Middle Eastern supply chains could drive energy prices even higher, derail the expected easing of inflation in 2027 and potentially stall Europe’s recovery altogether.

The Commission also cautioned that shortages of refined oil products, fertilisers and other industrial inputs could spread through global supply chains, increasing food and manufacturing costs across Europe.

Meanwhile, European governments are preparing for growing fiscal pressure. Public deficits across the EU are expected to widen as governments increase spending to protect households from rising energy bills while also boosting defence expenditure amid mounting geopolitical instability.

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has recently urged the European Commission to relax fiscal rules for households and industries struggling with soaring energy costs, arguing that energy security should be treated with the same urgency as defence spending.

At the centre of Rome’s request is the EU’s national escape clause, adopted on 8 July, which allows member states temporary fiscal flexibility to increase defence spending under exceptional circumstances.

Meloni said Brussels had already shown a willingness to loosen budget rules in response to Russia’s war in Ukraine and growing concerns about Europe’s military preparedness. Italy is now seeking similar flexibility for emergency energy measures.

141 UN member states voted in support of the ICJ’s finding climate change is an ‘existential threat’.

The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) has voted to support a landmark ruling from the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which found states have a legal responsibility to act to prevent the climate crisis from worsening.

More than two-thirds of UN member states, 141, voted in favour of the resolution on Wednesday, with eight voting no and 28 abstaining.

Ralph Regenvanu, the minister for climate change from Vanuatu, which championed the case, described the vote as a victory for “communities on the frontlines of the climate crisis”.

“Today the international community affirmed that climate change is not only a political and economic challenge, but a matter of law, justice, and human rights,” Regenvanu said in a statement.

“For vulnerable countries like Vanuatu, this resolution is deeply significant because it confirms that no State is above its obligations to protect people, future generations, and our planet.”

The historic ruling from The Hague-based court in July last year found that states have a legal obligation to act on the “existential threat” of climate change.

The case was the biggest ever to be considered by the ICJ’s 15 judges, who reviewed tens of thousands of pages of written submissions and heard two weeks of oral arguments before delivering their verdict.

The case came to the court at the request of the UNGA after a resolution led by Vanuatu was adopted by consensus in March 2023.

Wednesday’s vote, by contrast, attracted a number of objections, with Belarus, Iran, Israel, Liberia, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United States and Yemen voting no.

Al Jazeera reported in February that the US had sent a diplomatic cable urging UN member states not to support the resolution.

“We are strongly urging Vanuatu to immediately withdraw its draft resolution and cease attempting to wield the Court’s Advisory Opinion as a basis for creating an avenue to pursue any misguided claims of international legal obligations,” a copy of the cable seen by Al Jazeera stated.

Wesley Morgan, a fellow with the Climate Council, an Australian nonprofit, said the vote confirmed states had a legal duty to act on climate change.

“This landmark resolution is a massive victory for Vanuatu and the Pacific leaders who have spent decades fighting for survival on the frontlines of the climate crisis and a warning for Australian governments,” Morgan said in a statement.

“For far too long, fossil fuel heavyweights have treated climate action as a political choice, but the UN General Assembly has now confirmed it is a binding legal duty,” he added.

Los Angeles City Councilmember Nithya Raman, who serves the 4th District, makes her way across an empty, unnamed backlot, presenting her case to be the city’s next mayor.

“Studio lots like this one used to be filled with people, costumers, electricians, set medics, caterers, thousands of Angelenos making a living,” she says in the video posted on social media. “Now these lots are quiet. Since 2018, shooting days in the city have fallen by half.”

After telling voters this issue is “personal” (her husband is a TV writer and producer), criticizing Mayor Karen Bass’ leadership on the matter and outlining her own plans, Raman proclaims, “I’m running for mayor to make sure Los Angeles stays the film and TV capital of the world.”

Placing the concerns of the entertainment industry at the center of the city’s mayoral race would have been unthinkable even in the last election cycle. But the production crisis, which has rocked Hollywood and pummeled its workforce, has reached a critical juncture. The state of L.A.’s signature industry is now a political flashpoint alongside affordability, crime and homelessness in the upcoming election.

A person films an interaction between mayoral candidate Spencer Pratt and another person on his cellphone during a “Community Meet and Greet” event out of a house for sale on Long Ridge Avenue in a residential neighborhood of Sherman Oaks on Saturday.

(Etienne Laurent/For The Times)

In campaign ads, interviews and the recent televised debate, the top three contenders: incumbent Mayor Bass, former reality TV villain Spencer Pratt and Raman, have made the ongoing production slump a pivotal topic, highlighting their plans to revitalize the industry while deploying the issue to undercut one another.

For decades, elected officials have not had to focus on the film and TV business, let alone turn it into a campaign issue. It was simply a given that local production would continue to play a dominant role in the city’s economy as it has for more than a century.

But the cumulative effects of consolidation, runaway production to tax-friendly states and countries and the end of the streaming boom has caused Los Angeles to lose billions in economic activity, shed some 57,000 jobs over the last four years and led to the closing of more than 80 film and television production service businesses across the city since 2022.

“For us, ‘save Hollywood’ is more than a slogan and more than headline. It is what needs to be done,” said Pamala Buzick Kim, one of the co-founders of Stay in LA, a grassroots campaign aimed at increasing film and television production in Los Angeles.

To be sure, the biggest driver of where studios and producers film are state and federal tax credits, over which the city has no control.

But Buzick Kim and others argue that “there is lots the mayor can do, hand-in-hand with the City Council.”

Mayor Karen Bass, center, walks with Avance Democratic Club President Nilza Serrano, to the right of Bass, during Avance’s politics and tacos event at Ernest E. Debs Regional Park in Los Angeles on Saturday.

(Christina House/Los Angeles Times)

For starters, say filmmakers and advocates, much can be done to tackle the city’s sclerotic bureaucracy, onerous regulations and a slow and costly permitting process that has pushed filmmakers to flee to friendlier and cheaper locales.

While steps have been put in place recently, including a pilot program offering reduced-cost filming permits for shoots that demonstrate a “low impact” to the surrounding community, many complain such steps have come too little and too late.

Scott Niner, president and owner of Dangling Carrot Creative, checks on woodwork being produced at his shop in North Hollywood.

(Jason Armond/Los Angeles Times)

“The industry is in collapse and people have been talking about fixing things for years, but all we get are incremental little changes,” said Ed Lippman, a location manager of 34 years who lives in Sherman Oaks and has worked on such shows as “ER” and “The X-Files” and movies including “Galaxy Quest.” “And if the city is not being business-friendly, the business will go elsewhere.”

Compounding the problem, the Los Angeles area has more than 100 jurisdictions, many of which have their own set of rules and regulations regarding filming.

“There needs to be universal standards,” said Travis Beck, a location manager for commercials, small films and music videos. “Burbank is different from Glendale, which is different from Pasadena.”

The recent kerfuffle over filming “Baywatch,” the lifeguard reboot at Venice Beach, underscored both the efforts to bring production back to L.A. — enticed by a $21-million tax credit — and the complex, baffling red tape required to film here.

When shooting began in March, the production encountered a number of hiccups, including that it needed nearly double the parking space it had received a permit for, which was not part of the original approvals.

An anonymous crew member claimed on Facebook that government restrictions had forced production to relocate from Venice Beach. Production staff denied they had relocated. However, the incident prompted a backlash, becoming a rallying cry over L.A.’s burdensome filming bureaucracy.

The “Baywatch” team quickly met with city and county officials and resolved the issue, securing an agreement for a 20% parking discount from the city, and the mayoral candidates used it as an opportunity to score political points.

Pratt slammed the city’s permitting problems.

“LA turned its back on Hollywood — now the golden goose needs CPR,” he wrote on his Substack.

Bass highlighted her administration’s leadership on the matter.

“The City of Los Angeles will always clear bureaucratic barriers, making it easier and more affordable to film in the entertainment capital of the world,” she wrote on X last month.

On April 21, the mayor unveiled programs to offer productions 20% discounts on city-owned parking lots and other equipment, reduced filming fees at places like the Griffith Observatory and reopened the Central Library for filming. Last August, she appointed Steve Kang, president of the Los Angeles Board of Public Works, as the city’s film liaison.

Raman has pledged her support for expanding the state’s $750-million tax incentive program, streamlining permitting and lowering fees and eliminating those for small productions. She has also said she will establish a dedicated city film office with a liaison who understands production.

Councilmember and mayoral candidate Nithya Raman speaks to a crowd at the “Families for Nithya” event at Vineyard Recreation Center in Los Angeles on Saturday.

(Myung J. Chun/Los Angeles Times)

“Los Angeles is losing Hollywood,” Raman said in a statement. “Not because productions want to leave, but because we’ve made it too hard for them to stay.”

On his Substack and various podcast interviews, Pratt has promised to slash location fees in half, speed up permit approvals, reduce on-set city staff for the majority of productions and waive all fees for shoots with budgets under $2 million.

All three candidates have attacked one another over their approach to Hollywood.

Pratt and Raman have said Bass moved too slowly to address spiraling production and retain film jobs, saying she enacted measures only recently as the mayoral race was heating up.

Speaking on the Monks & Merrill podcast, Pratt criticized Bass’ moves to cut costs to film at the Griffith Observatory, saying, “Who needs that shot right now with the homeless poop all around it?”

The incumbent mayor has defended her administration’s record with the entertainment industry.

Bass and Pratt have taken Raman to task, calling her out for what they say is her lack of advocacy during her time on the City Council.

“She feels very strongly about it. But never offered one motion on the industry, and when motions came up on the industry she either recused herself, or got up and walked out,” said Bass during a debate this month.

Citing a potential conflict of interest over her husband’s work in television, Raman refrained from voting on several motions related to Hollywood.

Many working in the industry would like to see full-throttled support coming from the mayor’s office that will get results. They note how New York City has successfully promoted itself as a leading film destination over the years. (Kang, the city’s chief film liaison, said the city is working on a similar marketing campaign to promote filming that will launch by early fall.)

“For all the talk about, ‘We need to support and bring back filming,’ if they just did basics like lowering the fees and simplifying the process … that would actually help people and get things produced,” said Chris Fuentes, 66, who worked for 30 years as a location manager until he retired last year.

“We’ve heard a lot of great things, but not all things are possible in the mayor’s remit,” said Buzick Kim, noting that tax incentives are a state and federal issue.

Still, she said, “the mayor must understand that Hollywood needs to be made a priority and to find and create inspired thinking to make things easier and cheaper.”

Kang agrees, but says there are limits to what the mayor can achieve.

“We definitely can do a lot to really open up the entertainment industry, but at the same time, we recognize the larger impact needs to come from Sacramento and Washington, D.C., because L.A. just does not have the resources to compete with other jurisdictions in providing millions of dollars in tax incentives,” he said.

For most working in the industry, they just want city leadership that will execute on more than just talking points.

“This is the birthplace of cinema,” Beck said. “It shouldn’t be so hard to film here.”

Hundreds of Tunisians have marched through the capital to denounce a worsening economic crisis and what they say is a widening crackdown on dissent. President Kais Saied is accused of undermining the country’s hard-won post-2011 revolution system.

As criticism of Israel mounts over its wars on Gaza, Lebanon and Iran, along with the escalating settler violence in the occupied West Bank, the country is ramping up its PR offensive.

From a carefully managed appearance of Benjamin Netanyahu on CBS’s 60 Minutes to a major expansion of Israel’s Hasbara operation, the push includes pouring money into digital campaigns and media messaging.

The goal is to reverse the collapse of public support for Israel, especially in the US, but no amount of spin can make audiences unsee what they have watched in real time.

Contributors:
Miriyam Aouragh – Professor of digital anthropology, University of Westminster
Matt Lieb – Host, Bad Hasbara podcast
Emily Schrader – Journalist, ILTV News
Oren Ziv – Reporter, Local Call

On our radar

Israeli officials have dismissed a recent New York Times report on sexual violence against Palestinians as “blood libel”.

But while the government denounces the allegations, many of the claims in the report have been openly discussed in the Israeli media.

Nicholas Muirhead reports.

Zaragoza Data Farms

The generative AI boom is prompting a global race to build vast, energy-hungry data centres. In Spain’s Aragon region, authorities have welcomed tech giants and the jobs, investment and digital transformation they claim to bring.

But behind the glossy narrative lies a different reality – one in which enormous facilities consume natural resources and exploit legal loopholes, often at the expense of the communities that live alongside them.

Featuring:
Alonso Llorente – Journalist, Arainfo
Pablo Jimenez Arandia – Investigative reporter
Mar Vaquero – Vice president, Aragon Minister of Economy, Employment & Industry

When US Energy Secretary Chris Wright visited Venezuela in February, he left Miraflores with an ambitious message. After meeting Delcy Rodríguez in Miraflores, he told reporters: “This year, we can drive a dramatic increase in Venezuelan oil production, in Venezuelan natural gas production and Venezuelan electricity production.”

Three months later, large parts of the country are enduring heavy electricity rationing, with daily cuts lasting between five and eight hours. Even after the government imposed a 45-day electricity-saving plan in late March to cope with high temperatures and surging demand, the situation continues to deteriorate. As the system faces renewed strain, the US Embassy in Caracas publicized a meeting with Ronald Alcalá, Delcy’s new electric energy minister, where US Chief of Mission John Barrett said Washington will “work with the interim authorities to rebuild the power grid.”

“The three-phase plan of President Trump and Secretary Rubio focuses on restoring reliable energy supply through experience, investment, and collaboration with the US,” Barrett’s brief statement read.

Caracas has resorted to nationwide measures like banning cryptocurrency mining, as power consumption recently reached its highest levels in nearly a decade. El Pitazo reported that current nationwide rationing has exceeded those seen in 2012 across much of the country, with Caracas remaining the main exception.

The latest chapter of this long-running crisis arrives at a sensitive moment for the post-Maduro regime. As has been widely reported, Rodríguez is trying to boost some parts of the economy and attract foreign investment into oil, gas and mining. But the country’s electrical system—weakened by decades of underinvestment, mismanagement and institutional collapse—has re-emerged as an obstacle.

For Luisa Palacios, a Venezuelan professor and energy executive that served as CITGO’s chairwoman, the current blackout cycle reveals something deeper than previous ones.

“This new episode should serve as a wake-up call about the urgency of restructuring the country’s electrical system,” she says. “We are witnessing a stress test of the system even under a modest recovery in demand.

One huge challenge is to bring back investment and expertise required, Palacios wrote in February along with Francisco Morandi, an AES Corporation executive who did strategic planning for Electricidad de Caracas. However, some major companies are hesitating to join after meetings with officials last month, Reuters reported. One executive shared his view: “I returned very skeptical from Venezuela (…) The power plants have not been properly repaired in 10 years, so the needs are almost infinite. But they still have no clue on how we would get paid.”

“The electricity sector is a highly capital-intensive sector that requires large investments to be made before a single cent of profit is seen,” Palacios told Caracas Chronicles. “That is why counterparty risk is fundamental in the electricity sector: ensuring that the user pays you, and on time, is essential.”

The most immediate problem is straightforward. Except for Haiti, Venezuela is the only country in the region where power consumption has actually declined over the past decade, according to OLADE, with per capita consumption falling by roughly 30% since 2014. Nevertheless, the country still does not generate enough electricity to meet demand.

Palacios was firm in the idea that it is necessary to move beyond the State’s central role in power generation, which can’t afford the necessary investments, and that the time to do so is now. 

“Without increasing power generation offered significantly by the private sector and improving transmission and distribution, the country won’t recover from the structural electric crisis that today remains the main bottleneck in terms of infrastructure”.

One of the central proposals advanced by Palacios and other energy experts is to restore thermal generation using Venezuela’s own natural gas resources. Large volumes of gas currently burned or flared during oil production could instead feed thermal plants and combined-cycle gas turbine (CCGT) facilities, systems that generate electricity more efficiently by combining gas and steam turbines. Such a shift would not only reduce pressure on the hydroelectric system but also lower emissions associated with gas flaring.

“This could be the single biggest climate action Venezuela could take in the short term,” Palacios argues. 

Other proposals involve allowing independent power producers to generate electricity for specific industrial regions and oil hubs, reducing pressure on the fragile national grid. She has also suggested the creation of autonomous microgrids operating in “island mode” (localized systems capable of functioning independently when the national grid fails) to provide more reliable service to critical industrial, commercial, and residential areas. Battery storage systems could also help stabilize electricity supply.

Renewable energy is also part of the conversation. Venezuela relies on largely clean, hydroelectric energy, but Palacios sees potential for solar, wind and biofuel projects. Other oil-producing neighbors like Brazil, Colombia and Argentina serve as prime examples in that sense.

The challenge is not just technical. Broadly speaking, there is agreement among specialists about what Venezuela’s electrical system needs, and what requires fixing: new thermal generation, modernization of transmission infrastructure, decentralized generation capacity, tariff reform, and a new regulatory framework capable of attracting investment. The financing problem is huge: rebuilding Venezuela’s grid would require enormous amounts of long-term capital. Gelvis Sequera, who chairs the domestic Association of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, places the required investment at around $20 billion.

“The electricity sector is a highly capital-intensive sector that requires large investments to be made before a single cent of profit is seen,” Palacios told Caracas Chronicles. “That is why counterparty risk is fundamental in the electricity sector: ensuring that the user pays you, and on time, is essential.”

But many investors remain cautious. According to Reuters, several companies that recently held meetings with Venezuelan officials left unconvinced about the prospects of doing business. One executive summarized the dilemma bluntly: “The power plants have not been properly repaired in 10 years, so the needs are almost infinite. But they still have no clue how we would get paid.”

The vicious cycle of regional power cuts affecting refineries and fuel production, and therefore also undermining the power sector, needs a major overhaul to finally be brought to an end.

When considering whether to deploy capital in Venezuela, investors are less confused about the needs and more about the ifs. They are uncertain about whether the Venezuelan State can offer credible guarantees, stable regulation, enforceable contracts, and reliable payment mechanisms over the long term.

As Palacios put it: “Power infrastructure is a low-margin business, established for the long term and highly dependent on regulatory and macroeconomic risks.” For that reason, she argues that regulatory clarity, transparent tariffs, and technically competent institutions are indispensable if Venezuela hopes to attract serious capital into the sector.

This also raises uncomfortable political questions about the future role of CORPOELEC, the omnipotent overseer of Venezuelan electricity. Founded by Hugo Chávez in 2007, the public company serves as the power grid’s service provider, operator and developer.

“Venezuela needs to seriously rethink the role of CORPOELEC and the State in providing such a fundamental service,” Palacios says. “It is not possible to solve this crisis with the current management structure.” At the moment, however, there are few signs that such reforms are imminent.

“To build and rebuild a reliable system will depend on having the right actors on the table”, she continues, pointing out that multilateral organizations can provide technical capacity and long-term financing that can “de-risk investment”, giving some assurances to the private sector.

“There’s a lot of Venezuelan entrepreneurship more than willing to invest in a system with clear rules based on international standards”.For now, as hopes of an economic recovery reach their highest levels since the Chávez era, Venezuelans long accustomed to blackouts are desperate to avoid a repeat of the worst 2019-esque scenarios. The contradiction is also acute for Delcy Rodríguez, whose critical infrastructure problem is one of the most immediate constraints on the reopening she is attempting. The vicious cycle of regional power cuts affecting refineries and fuel production, and therefore also undermining the power sector, needs a major overhaul to finally be brought to an end.

Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), an international humanitarian organisation, has released its 2025 activity report for Nigeria, and the findings are sobering. The medical emergency organisation, also known as Doctors Without Borders, unveiled the report during an event in Abuja, North Central Nigeria, on Wednesday, May 13, documenting the disturbing rise in malnutrition cases in the country’s northern region.

With more than 3,500 workers delivering essential healthcare services across ten states, MSF reported treating over 440,000 children for malnutrition, more than 300,000 individuals for malaria, and assisting with over 33,500 deliveries in 2025.

This surge, according to the humanitarian organisation, underscores the fragility of Nigeria’s health system and the growing vulnerability of women and children in conflict-affected regions.

The 2025 report shows that MSF recorded more than 600,000 outpatient consultations, 48,000 inpatient admissions, and treated 341,239 patients for malaria, 38,753 children for measles, 6,123 patients for diphtheria, and 985 others for meningitis across its facilities in the region.

These findings are specific to the ten Nigerian states where MSF has been operating since 1996, including Jigawa, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, Zamfara, and Cross River. The organisation says it has provided a wide range of essential medical services, including paediatric and maternal health care, treating children with malnutrition, responding to disease outbreaks, caring for survivors of sexual violence, offering mental health support, and performing life‑saving surgical interventions. 

The MSF country representative, Ahmed Aldikhari, revealed that in 2025, the organisation observed a pattern consistent with that of previous years, starting in 2022. Aldikhari stated that malnutrition is one of the year’s greatest challenges, linking it to the region’s fragile conditions, which are severely affected by insecurity that has worsened food security.

“We are seeing a vicious cycle where malnutrition is both a cause and a consequence of diseases such as measles, malaria, and diphtheria, among others, which continue to affect vulnerable communities, especially when healthcare is delayed or inaccessible,” he said, suggesting that Nigeria might soon experience the peak of the malnutrition crisis. 

“That is why we are consistently working side-by-side with the ministries of health, humanitarian affairs, budget and planning at the state and federal levels, and also, with our Nigerian colleagues to ensure that efficient services are provided, but they are not enough.”

HumAngle has previously reported on the broader impact of the crisis, stressing how displacements, insecurity, and climate change, among other natural and human-induced disasters, have compounded the problem. In July 2025, MSF, in collaboration with the Katsina State government, mobilised state and non-state actors to address the escalating malnutrition crisis in the northwestern region. 

During the 2024 MSF conference in Abuja, organised in collaboration with the North West Governors’ Forum and the Katsina State Government, stakeholders emphasised that malnutrition in the northwestern region is no longer a seasonal emergency but rather a structural crisis that requires urgent mobilisation. The governors acknowledged that insecurity and climate pressures were eroding food systems, but MSF urged greater investment in therapeutic feeding centres and preventive programmes.

Northern Nigeria continues to face a critical malnutrition crisis, with Katsina particularly affected, according to MSF’s 2025 activity report. Findings reveal that since 2021, MSF has been present in the state, with the organisation’s leadership revealing that they have witnessed a sharp rise in the number of malnourished children since responding to the growing crisis in recent years.

In 2025, MSF reported treating the highest number of malnourished children in Katsina. With the support of the state Ministry of Health, the organisation focused on preventing illness and malnutrition to reduce mortality and morbidity among children suffering from acute malnutrition.

“Katsina State has faced a chronic malnutrition crisis for over a decade, driven by insecurity, climate shocks, limited primary healthcare services, and high birth rates,” the report revealed. “Throughout 2025, MSF admitted 26,445 patients for inpatient care, provided treatment to 146,301 children through its outpatient centres, and conducted 15,387 outpatient consultations for malaria.”

In response to this, MSF established a new Ambulatory Therapeutic Feeding Centre (ATFC) in Mashi and a second inpatient therapeutic feeding centre at the Turai Yar’aduwa Hospital to handle the increased patient load during peak seasons.

Beyond nutrition in Kebbi, the report states that MSF responded to multiple infectious disease surges and outbreaks by tackling the increase in meningitis cases from February to May, while supporting the Ministry of Health facilities in Jega, Gwandu, and Aliero with logistics, medical supplies, staff training, and facility rehabilitation.

Following the escalating insecurity in neighbouring Zamfara and Niger that led to mass displacement to the Danko-Wasugu areas of Kebbi State as of June, the humanitarian organisation provided basic healthcare and distributed non-food relief kits to vulnerable households.

In Zamfara alone, MSF admitted 47,164 children to inpatient therapeutic feeding centres and provided 14,167 outpatient consultations in 2024, with numbers continuing to rise in 2025. According to Aldikhari, this increase in admissions is due to multiple overlapping crises, including conflict and insecurity in the northwestern and northeastern regions, which have displaced thousands of families, cutting them off from farmlands. 

While the 2025 activity report warns that malnutrition is no longer a seasonal emergency but a permanent feature of Nigeria’s humanitarian landscape, it also highlights the fact that the sheer scale of admissions suggests the crisis is outpacing the humanitarian response. 

The next global food crisis is unfolding in a narrow stretch of water.

The United Nations warns that if fertilisers cannot pass through the Strait of Hormuz within just a few weeks, the world could face mass starvation.

It says the consequences could be severe if shipping disruptions linked to the Iran conflict drag on.

Food prices are already at a three-year high, while fertiliser costs critical for agriculture have rocketed.

Aid agencies fear a prolonged disruption could push tens of millions more people into hunger.

For vulnerable economies already struggling with debt and high import costs, the risks are growing fast.

US President Donald Trump has called Cuba ‘a failed nation’, as his administration expands its pressure campaign. Cuba has announced it’s getting rid of its fixed prices at the petrol pump as fuel shortages and power cuts worsen.

Signing off her letter, Phillips said: “I want a Labour government to work and I will strive as I always have for its success and popularity, but I’m not seeing the change I think I, and the country expect, and so cannot continue to serve as a minister under the current leadership.”

Photo by Rodrigo Abd for The Associated Press, May 2019 

The window international operators had waited years opened overnight in Venezuela. The interim government has signed new hydrocarbon and mining laws. US officials have been in and out of Caracas. The government of Delcy Rodríguez has landed several new deals in a matter of months. Everything is happening so fast that elements that seemed obvious when Nicolás Maduro was in charge are suddenly overlooked or underdiscussed.

For the last thirteen years I have worked in indigenous communities in the Venezuelan Amazon, in border towns along the Colombian border, and in barrios in and around Caracas. The Venezuelan towns and territories are not the ones the companies coming back will remember.

Almost eight million people left Venezuela during the crisis, one of the largest displacement events in history. The oil-dependent towns of Zulia, Anzoátegui, and Monagas were not spared, nor were mining communities in Bolívar and Amazonas. In some places, a large share of the working-age population is simply gone. What remains is older, poorer, and more dependent on informal survival than the country they left.

Institutions have followed. Hospitals in oilfield regions operate, where they operate at all, at drastically reduced capacity. Schools have hemorrhaged teachers. Local government in many areas has ceased to perform basic functions. Chronic blackouts compound everything. Formal PDVSA employment, the organizing principle of community life in these regions, collapsed along with the company. In many places there are no longer legitimate interlocutors left to negotiate with as the local civic infrastructure that companies elsewhere take for granted has been hollowed alongside everything else.

Once the rigs come back, however, these towns will not stay hollow. They will hastily be filled with returnees, prospectors, informal traders, and internal migrants chasing rumored hiring. The Mining Arc has already shown what this looks like: since 2016, gold has pulled in shifting populations of miners, intermediaries, and military protection chains, with towns like Tumeremo and El Callao expanding and contracting to the rhythm of the frontier economy.

A criminalized operating environment

In most resource markets, companies enter with a clear distinction between the formal environment and the informal risks around it. That distinction broke down in Venezuela a long time ago.

Research by Insight Crime and the International Crisis Group has documented how, over a decade, the line between State oversight and participation in illicit extraction dissolved. Individuals linked to the military and the ruling party benefited from illegal mining, using it as political currency and to cement alliances with Colombia’s ELN and FARC dissident factions. Gold mining was estimated to generate more than $2.2 billion last year, much of it through channels that evaded oversight. In the oil sector, criminal groups have been documented siphoning roughly 30% of fuel in some regions.

“There is deep political skepticism in the communities. Many do not believe that this time will actually bring lasting reforms,” a senior humanitarian told me.

The Rodríguez-led interim government intends to change this, and the foreign policy pressure behind the new laws is real. But the continuity problem deserves precision. The recent turnover at the top of the security apparatus—Defense, military intelligence, the presidential guard—was a selective reshuffle within the chavista system, not an outsider takeover or institutional rupture. The personnel and chains of command sitting inside this supposedly new architecture are not new. Informal structures built over a decade do not dissolve with a reshuffle among the same political elite.

Informal actors are not parallel to the formal system, but intertwined with it, which presents a complex practical consequence to the investors. Companies entering these zones will negotiate, in practice, with all of them at once: the local political boss, the garrison commander asking for vacuna, the colectivo that controls the access road, the gestor who can speed a permit, the sindicato, the guerrilla commander. The single regulator is a fiction.

What communities remember

These are not communities without prior experience of extraction. Many have decades of it, enough to have formed hard views about what operators promise, what they deliver, and what gets left behind. Those views were then tested against a decade of watching investment withdraw, oil spills go unaddressed, and industry jobs disappear.

The environmental record is severe and specific. Aging pipelines and wells around Lake Maracaibo, once the engine of the Venezuelan oil industry, have left slicks visible from the air, fishing communities along its shores watching their catch collapse, and a persistent green bloom of algae fed by untreated sewage and hydrocarbon residue. In mining regions, studies have found that up to 90% of Indigenous women in the Orinoco Mining Arc carry dangerously high mercury levels. These are not abstract concerns. They are the lived experience of the population any operator will meet.

The damage is also in the memory of being told it would be different. Communities have seen “openings” before. A senior humanitarian, who has spent years working on community engagement throughout the country, put it to me while I was writing this piece: “There is deep political skepticism in the communities. Many do not believe that this time will actually bring lasting reforms, and that hardens their initial positions. Even well-intentioned and hopeful promises can be met with radical distrust.”

Sanctions, fiscal terms, and reservoirs can be modeled from afar. The social landscape of a specific Zulia oilfield town or a Bolívar Indigenous territory cannot.

For an operator arriving with standard community-engagement  language, the problem is not that the offer isn’t understood. Other versions of it have been heard before, and the probability it fails to hold is being priced in.

Skepticism in Venezuela also comes pre-supplied with vocabulary. Almost three decades of State rhetoric have framed foreign extractive capital as imperial extraction (saqueo, entrega). People do not have to believe the framing to use it. Many will reach for it because it is the only available vocabulary for criticizing a returning company. The corporate language that lands well in a boardroom across an ocean arrives into a discursive space that has been filled for a generation.

None of which prepares an operator for the deepest mismatch. Where the State has withdrawn from basic services, foreign companies will not be received as purely economic actors. They will be received as potential substitutes for the State and expected to provide what the hospital, the school, the utility, and the municipality no longer do. A company arriving to play a bounded role (taxes, permits, a defined social investment envelope) may find the limits it has drawn around itself are not recognized on the other side of the gate. Conflict may rise not because the company has done something wrong, but because the role it is willing to play is smaller than the role it is being asked to fill. And past experience tells people that the only leverage they have, when promises don’t hold, is disruption.

The carpentry problem

In their 1984 book El caso Venezuela: una ilusión de armonía, Moisés Naím and Ramón Piñango argued that Venezuela had lived for decades in an unsustainable harmony, oil revenue papering over political frustrations. Today there is no harmony and there is no illusion. The arbiters are weaker than they have ever been. The redistributive cushion is gone.

In a 2024 retrospective, Naím and Piñango named a specific mode of failure: the neglect of what they called, in a deliberate understatement, la carpintería, the carpentry. The unglamorous work of implementation, where plans either succeed or quietly fall apart. Small, dismissed flaws in execution had repeatedly proved fatal. When everything was a priority, nothing was.

This is where the current opening risks repeating the failure, transposed from public policy to private investment. A former senior executive at a major international oil company recently told me that the industry’s preference for offshore projects in Venezuela is shaped to a meaningful extent by a desire to avoid the social dynamics on land, not only by reservoir quality. Sanctions, fiscal terms, and reservoirs can be modeled from afar. The social landscape of a specific Zulia oilfield town or a Bolívar Indigenous territory cannot, and the speed of the opening is pulling capital past the groundwork that determines whether a project actually runs.

The contracts will be signed in Caracas and approved in Houston or London. They will fail or hold somewhere else: at the gate of a refinery in Anzoátegui and on the road into a mining town, in front of a hospital that hasn’t run a power generator in a year. The plans are moving faster than the country they describe. That is the carpentry. That is where the projects will come apart: not on the page, but among neighbors more changed, more skeptical, and more demanding than the plan assumed.

The Department for Transport has also given its latest advice

People from the UK heading abroad for the Spring Bank Holiday are being given the latest advice on holidays amid growing fears over jet fuel shortages and flight disruption. Travel experts say flights are continuing to operate “as planned” despite airlines across Europe drawing up contingency measures following soaring fuel prices linked to conflict in the Middle East.

Concerns have grown after reports that some airlines are preparing for possible refuelling stops on long-haul routes if shortages worsen. German airline Lufthansa has reportedly already begun contingency planning after one of its flights was forced to divert for fuel during a recent journey to South Africa.

The airline has also cut thousands of flights from its wider summer schedule as fuel costs continue to rise. However, travel industry figures insist UK holidaymakers should not panic.

Mark Tanzer, Chief Executive of ABTA – The Travel Association, said: “We really don’t want people worrying about their holidays; planes are taking off daily and people are continuing to get away on their holidays. The Government and airlines are clear that there isn’t a problem with fuel supply.

“If you have a holiday booked in for the coming months – including the May half term – we expect it to go ahead as planned.”

He added: “Whilst there have been reports about cancellations globally, these amount to less than one per cent of overall flights.”

According to aviation analytics firm Cirium, around 13,000 flights worldwide have reportedly been cut during May. Munich and Istanbul are believed to be among the worst-affected destinations.

The Department for Transport has also said there is currently “no need” for travellers to change their plans. Officials say UK airlines buy fuel in advance and airports continue to maintain reserves to help prevent disruption.

Passengers are still being advised to check flight updates with airlines before travelling and ensure they have suitable travel insurance in place. Some 120 flights from the UK this month have been cancelled, new figures show, as jet fuel prices surge and fears of shortages grow.

Cirium said airlines have axed 120 of the 22,613 departures initially scheduled from UK airports in May, equivalent to 0.53%. The number of outbound flights planned for June is 36 lower than a week ago. This represents a 0.2% reduction and means capacity for the month has fallen by 7,972 seats.

The final week of May is a peak period for holidays as it is half-time at many schools. For all flights globally, some 13,005 planned for May were cancelled between April 10 and April 21, equivalent to 1.5%. That reduced capacity by almost two million seats.

Julia Lo Bue-Said, chief executive of Advantage Travel Partnership, a network of independent travel agents, said airlines are “assessing poor performance flights and consolidating or cancelling as required”.

She added that UK departures to popular summer hotspots “remain unaffected” and insisted “customers can continue to book with confidence”. Paul Charles, founder of travel consultancy The PC Agency, said: “Airlines are now being forced to cut flights and make difficult decisions ahead of the peak season.

“It is better for them to cancel flights well in advance so that passengers are less inconvenienced than a last-minute change of plan. As the Iran conflict continues, there will need to be many more cancellations as the jet fuel supply is squeezed.”

Lufthansa’s airline group announced in April it would cancel 20,000 flights over the following six months to save fuel. Iran continues to have a stranglehold on tankers passing through the Strait of Hormuz, leading to a surge in oil prices and concerns of jet fuel shortages.

But on Sunday, Transport Secretary Heidi Alexander said summer holiday plans will not face major disruption because of the latter. She revealed that more fuel has been imported from America, while refineries have upped their production.

The Government has also introduced a temporary rule change allowing airlines to group passengers from different flights together on to fewer planes to save fuel.

A MAJOR airline boss has said that the ongoing fuel crisis is causing more problems than Covid did.

AirAsia chief executive Tony Fernandes said the quick increase in jet fuel overnight was “much worse”.

He told the FT: “I thought I’d seen it all with Covid but having seen jet fuel go up almost three times – this is much worse.

“You wake up one day and your major cost has tripled – it was quite a new experience for me and I’ve been through a lot in my life.”

This was backed by the Chancellor of Germany earlier this year who said if it continues, it would affect the European economy as “heavy as we recently experienced during the Covid pandemic”.

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz since March has already caused problems for airlines, due to shortages of fuel.

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All the airlines that have cancelled flights amid jet fuel shortage holiday fears

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Airlines have been forced to cancel thousands of seats, with European airlines such as Lufthansa and Scandinavian Airlines already scrapping routes this month.

Globally, major airlines such as United, Cathay Pacific and Emirates have all reduced capacity as well.

Data from Cirium estimated that there were two million fewer seats on sale in May compared to predicted.

American budget airline Spirit Airlines was even forced into administration, citing the higher jet fuel costs as a major cause.

Thankfully, UK airlines are yet to be massively affected, with most tour operators confirming that holidays are still going ahead as planned.

The only disruption is to the Middle East with destinations like Dubai still on the travel ban list.

On The Beach has even launched a new initiative for travellers this summer, where, if their flight is cancelled, they will get a refund on the same day.

However, Ryanair boss Michael O’Leary warned that unless fuel prices dropping, airlines are at risk of failing this summer.

According to Politico, he said: “If pricing stays higher for longer this summer, we think a number of our airline competitors in Europe are going to face real financial difficulties. I think there will be failures.”

To protect passengers from last minute travel chaos, the Department for Transport has also revealed new measures which will allow airlines to cancel flights up to two weeks in advance, without losing their airport slots.

Transport Secretary Heidi Alexander said it would “give families long-term certainty and avoid unnecessary disruption at the departure gate this summer.”

But Which? Travel Editor Rory Boland warned: “Many passengers will understand that disruptions can occur and may be happy to travel a few hours or a day later.

“But for those on short trips or connecting flights it could mean the trip is no longer worthwhile.”