crisis

Sanaa, Yemen – It was August 2023, and Enaya Dastor was reading a school textbook while also keeping an eye on her goats as they grazed near her village, Jabal Habashy, in central Yemen’s Taiz governorate.

Whenever the livestock moved away, the then-13-year-old would walk or run to bring them back to the pasture near her house.

That afternoon, she was following them as usual when an explosion rang out.

A landmine had detonated beneath her.

“People gathered around me after the blast, and I was taken to the hospital immediately. It was a horrible moment, ” Dastor told Al Jazeera. Surgeons were forced to amputate her left leg, leaving her with a lifelong disability.

The incident took place more than a year after fighting between Yemen’s government and Houthi forces largely stopped, following a ceasefire in April 2022.

But landmines left behind on former battlefields and front lines continue to kill and injure Yemenis.

The hidden risks have turned fields, roads, and villages into areas of ongoing danger. Landmines and other explosives have killed at least 339 children and injured 843 since the 2022 truce, according to Save the Children. The organisation found that nearly half of child casualties related to the conflict were due to landmines and explosive remnants of war.

‘Sleeping killers’

The parties to Yemen’s conflict planted thousands of mines during the civil war, which began in 2014.

Two months before Dastor’s incident, a boy in a nearby village had stepped on a landmine. One of the boy’s legs was amputated in the explosion, she told Al Jazeera.

“Landmines are sleeping killers, waiting for the innocents to step on them or move them without caution. That is how they wake up to shed blood and take human souls,” said Dastor.

“I used to go with other girls to the pasture. We grazed the cattle and play for hours. We were not aware of the danger, and we did not know when these deadly objects were planted,” she added.

After the landmine explosion took her leg, her family and others fled the village, which had previously been on a front line.

To date, Dastor’s family has not returned. They now live in the city of Taiz.

“I do not want to see another child harmed or hear another landmine explosion. I loathe walking on the soil under which mines were planted,” she said.

In the first half of 2025 alone, 107 civilians were killed or injured, most of them children, according to Save the Children. Included in that number are five children who were killed while playing football on a dirt field in Taiz.

Lost hope

From 2015 through 2021, ground fighting was brutal, and warplanes continuously bombed across Yemen, killing and injuring thousands of civilians.

The landmines have added a lasting layer of danger. A study carried out in 2022 by Yemeni human rights groups found that 534 children and 177 women were killed by mines between April 2014 and March 2022.

In addition, 854 children, 255 women, and 147 elderly people were injured during the same period in 17 Yemeni provinces, with the heavily fought-over Taiz recording the highest number.

In 2018, Mohammed Mustafa lost his left leg in a landmine explosion in Taiz’s Maqbna district. He was only 20 years old. Eight years on, he can still recall the details of that moment.

“I stepped on a landmine when I was walking in a mountainous area at sunset time. After the blast, I looked towards my feet, and I found my left leg was gone,” he told Al Jazeera.

Mustafa was in a rural area with no hospitals nearby. He had to travel five hours by ambulance to the city of Taiz, and the distance he covered to reach a healthcare centre added to his pain.

“I fainted repeatedly on the way to Taiz city. The next day, I woke up in the hospital, and saw my leg amputated up to the knee,” he said.

With support from family, relatives and friends, he recovered. Mustafa is now a member of the Yemeni Amputee Football Federation, a father, and a small business owner.

“My family and friends stood by me, lifted my morale, and accompanied me on outings in the city to help me forget my pain and worry. I realised I was not alone,” he said.

De-mining challenges

Efforts to remove landmines from many areas in Yemen continue. But totally ridding the country of the problem remains complex, particularly as no final deal has been agreed upon to end the war.

Project Masam, a de-mining team funded and initiated by Saudi Arabia, said in a statement in March that, since the project’s launch in July 2018, a total of 549,452 mines, unexploded ordnance, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) had been removed by March 20, 2026.

During the same period, the project’s teams cleared explosives from 7,799 hectares (19,272 acres) in Yemen. Similarly, the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) said early this month it has cleared more than 23,302 square metres (250,820sq ft) of Yemeni land from mines and explosive remnants of war.

Adel Dashela, a Yemeni researcher and non-resident fellow at the MESA Global Academy, focusing on conflict and peace building studies, said that many factors make the de-mining process challenging.

“The mines have been planted indiscriminately in different areas, and some of the territories are under the control of different armed groups, which makes them inaccessible to de-miners,” Dashela told Al Jazeera.

“Other challenges facing the de-mining process in Yemen include the lack of clear maps and the lack of qualified local personnel to handle these mines effectively. There is also a shortage of government’s modern equipment for detecting these devices and explosives,” he added.

Dashela noted that flash floods, such as those Yemen experienced in August 2025, sweep away explosives from one area to another, complicating the clearance process and exposing more people to further risks.

This means many more Yemenis will likely suffer.

The loss of a limb might bring lasting sorrow to landmine survivors, but some, like Dastor, are determined not to dwell on the past. She is focusing on the future.

“Today, I am in tenth grade, and I will finish high school in two years,” she said. “After that, I will enrol in law college and will graduate as a lawyer. I want to defend those who face injustice.”

“The injury has changed how I move or walk, and separated my family from our home,” she said. “But it cannot disable my mind or stop my dreams.”

The comment from the owner of BA comes after Jet2 said it would not introduce surcharges on any booked flights or holidays to cover cost increases

The parent company of British Airways has cautioned that airfares are set to climb as the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, triggered by the Iran conflict, has caused oil prices to surge dramatically.

International Airlines Group (IAG) announced on Friday that the ongoing Middle East crisis will push up the cost of flights to account for soaring jet fuel prices.

Airlines routinely purchase a portion of their fuel in advance at fixed rates to shield themselves from price fluctuations, a strategy commonly referred to as “hedging”.

Despite this, IAG warned that it remained “not immune” to the wider consequences of the Middle East conflict. The group insisted it had yet to experience any disruption to its jet fuel supply, amid growing concerns over potential future shortages as a result of the ongoing hostilities.

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The government is “closely monitoring” fuel stocks as airlines brace themselves for possible shortages, with oil tankers still unable to navigate the Strait of Hormuz. It has also emerged that airports are set to make it simpler for airlines to cancel flights without jeopardising their allocated take-off and landing slots, should fuel shortages prevent them from operating. The Department for Transport (DfT) announced that airlines will no longer be obliged to adhere to the “use it or lose it” rule at UK airports, whereby carriers must utilise at least 80% of their allocated slots during a season in order to retain them for the following year. “Airport Coordination Limited, the independent body that manages slot allocation at UK airports, has updated its guidance so that airlines will not lose their slots if fuel shortages prevent them from flying,” the DfT statement confirmed.

“Airlines can now apply for an exemption from the ‘use it or lose it’ rule in these circumstances.”

Meanwhile, Jet2 has revealed it will not be imposing surcharges on any previously booked flights or holidays to offset rising costs, reassuring customers that the price they book is the price they will pay.

The policy covers all flights and holidays booked through any channel, whether online, via the mobile app, contact centre or through an independent travel agent. Steve Heapy, CEO of Jet2 said: “Holidaymakers should have every right to book their hard-earned break in the sun, without worrying about being hit with additional costs, and they can have that complete assurance when they book a flight or holiday with Jet2. As a result of today’s announcement, customers booking with Jet2 know that they are locking in their price without additional cost surprises later and we strongly believe that is the right thing to do by them. Ahead of a busy summer this is yet more evidence of why, on top of our incredible holidays and award-winning customer service, nothing beats a Jet2holiday.”

On April 20, the United States fired at and then seized an Iranian-flagged container ship close to the Strait of Hormuz in the northern Arabian Sea, amid its blockade of Iranian ports.

It was similar to a scene which played out in the 1980s during the so-called Tanker War between Iran and Iraq, during which both countries fired on each other’s tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, seeking to cripple each other’s economies.

As naval tensions rise again in the Strait of Hormuz – this time between Iran and the US – we break down what happened in the 1980s and examine the parallels and differences between the situations then and now:

How the 1980s Tanker War played out – a timeline

The war between Iran and Iraq began in 1980 when then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein launched a full-scale invasion of Iran following Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution.

In 1984, this war reached the Gulf when Iraq attacked Iranian oil tankers, seeking to cripple its oil-revenue-dependent economy. Iran retaliated by firing at oil tankers belonging to Iraq and its allies in the Gulf.

According to a report by the University of Texas’s Robert Strauss Center for International Security and Law, Iran also threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz then, but did not do so since its own economy, already crippled by the war, was dependent on exporting oil to the rest of the world through it.

In November 1986, when Iran struck Kuwait’s ships, Kuwait asked for foreign help. The former Soviet Union was the first to respond and helped escort the nation’s ships in the Gulf.

The US, led by then-president Ronald Reagan, launched Operation Earnest Will in July 1987, also seeking to protect tankers in the Gulf and render more assistance than Moscow. The operation involved reflagging Kuwaiti tankers with the US flag so they could legally sail under US protection.

According to an article by the Veterans Breakfast Club, a US-based website which shares experiences of former US military veterans, during Washington’s very first escort mission in July 1987, a reflagged tanker hit an Iranian mine in the Gulf.

“The convoy continued, but the incident made clear that the United States had entered a shadow war with Iran at sea,” the article said.

“Over the next fourteen months, dozens of US warships rotated through the region escorting tankers and protecting shipping lanes. US forces also conducted special operations to hunt Iranian mine-layers at night and conducted strikes against Iranian military positions and ships. The mission wasn’t a small one, consuming 30 US Navy ships at one time,” the article added.

Then in April 1988, the US frigate USS Samuel B Roberts was damaged by an Iranian mine in the Strait of Hormuz. Historian Samuel Cox, writing for the US Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC), noted in 2018 that by the end of 1987 that vessel was so badly damaged, that “the only thing actually holding the ship together was the main deck”.

So, the US launched Operation Praying Mantis, seeking to destroy Iranian vessels.

The tanker war eventually ended in August 1988, following a United Nations-brokered ceasefire agreement between Iran and Iraq.

Cox noted that by the end of 1987, “Iraq had conducted 283 attacks on shipping, while Iran attacked 168 times. Combined, the attacks had killed 116 merchant sailors, with 37 missing and 167 wounded, from a wide variety of nationalities.”

“Initially, there was great concern that the attacks would cut off the vital flow of oil from the Arabian Gulf, but all they really did was drive up insurance rates. The world’s need for oil was so great, that over 100 dead merchant seamen was apparently an acceptable price,” he wrote.

What is happening in the Strait of Hormuz now?

The current hostilities between the US and Iran in the Strait of Hormuz began when Tehran, whose territorial waters extend into the strait, closed passage to all vessels after the US and Israel began bombing the country. On March 4, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) declared that it was in full control of the strait, and ships would need to get clearance from them to pass through it.

Shipping through the strait collapsed by 95 percent, sending the price of oil – 20 percent of global supplies of which are shipped this way – soaring above $100 a barrel.

Iran, through its imposition of control over who passes through Hormuz, has for almost eight weeks now, determined which vessels can exit the strait from the Gulf into the Gulf of Oman.

At first, Iran indicated that it would allow “friendly” ships to pass if they paid a toll. On March 26, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told Iran’s state TV: “The Strait of Hormuz, from our perspective, is not completely closed. It is closed only to enemies. There is no reason to allow the ships of our enemies and their allies to pass.”

Vessels from Malaysia, China, Egypt, South Korea, India and Pakistan passed through the strait through most of March and early April.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) provided these vessels with an alternative route through the Strait of Hormuz to avoid potential sea mines. US officials, including Donald Trump, have said mines have been placed there by Iran, although it has not officially confirmed or denied this.

But on April 13, alarmed that Iran was continuing to ship its own oil out of the strait, the US imposed a naval blockade of all Iranian ports. Since then, US Central Command has said US forces have directed 33 Iran-linked vessels to turn around or return to an Iranian port.

On Monday, the US military fired on and then captured the Iranian-flagged container ship Touska close to the Strait of Hormuz in the northern Arabian Sea, and, a day later, detained another oil tanker sanctioned for transporting Iranian crude oil as it sailed in the Bay of Bengal, which links India and Southeast Asia.

In a post on social media after detaining the Touska, the Pentagon wrote: “As we have made clear, we will pursue global maritime enforcement efforts to disrupt illicit networks and interdict sanctioned vessels providing material support to Iran – anywhere they operate.
International waters are not a refuge for sanctioned vessels.”

Since the US naval blockade of Iranian ports began, Tehran, which was earlier allowing vessels from “friendly” nations to pass through the Strait of Hormuz, has further tightened its grip on the strait.

Justifying the decision not to allow any foreign ships to pass until the US ends its naval blockade on April 19, Iran’s First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref said the “security of the Strait of Hormuz is not free”.

“One cannot restrict Iran’s oil exports while expecting free security for others,” he wrote in a post on X.

Last Saturday, Iran reportedly fired at two Indian-flagged merchant vessels in the strait. The IRGC said the two ships were attacked because they were “operating without authorisation”, according to state media reports.

Then, on April 22, Iran captured two container ships seeking to exit the Gulf via the Strait of Hormuz after firing on them and another vessel.

What are the parallels between the two wars?

Just like during the Tanker War of the 1980s, shipping has been severely disrupted by the US-Israel war on Iran, upending global oil and gas prices.

According to an April 17 article by the World Economic Forum, from the mid-1980s when the Tanker War took place, to the start of the new millennium, a barrel of crude oil averaged $20.

On Friday, while a ceasefire between the US and Iran was in effect, a naval battle was still playing out in the Strait of Hormuz, and Brent crude, the international benchmark, topped $106 per barrel. During open warfare between the US, Israel and Iran in March and early April, oil rose as high as $119 per barrel.

Mines in the sea are another problem common to both time periods.

While vessels were damaged by mines during the 1980s Tanker War, there has so far been no report of vessels being damaged by mines in the current war. However, the risk is the same.

US President Donald Trump has said the US will ramp up efforts to remove mines from the Strait of Hormuz. This has not begun yet, however.

According to CNN, there are only a few US minesweeping ships in the Gulf. The US Navy also told the broadcaster that four dedicated minesweepers stationed in the Gulf region were decommissioned last year.

John Phillips, a British safety, security and risk adviser and former military instructor, told Al Jazeera: “There are some clear parallels between the current situation in Hormuz and the Tanker War of the 1980s. In both cases, the basic idea is the same: pressure at sea can have effects far beyond the water itself.

“A relatively small amount of naval disruption, whether that means mining, harassment of shipping, missile threats, or attacks on tankers, can create real strategic and economic consequences, especially in a chokepoint like the Strait of Hormuz. So in that sense, the original Tanker War is a useful reminder of how vulnerable global trade can be when the maritime domain becomes part of a wider political or military confrontation.”

What are the differences between the two wars?

During the Tanker War, the US escorted ships to protect them from Iranian attacks and also deployed vessels to remove mines. NATO countries like the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, France and Italy also joined.

But in the current standoff in the Strait of Hormuz, US allies like the UK and other NATO nations have refused to join Washington in reopening the Strait of Hormuz, or begin minesweeping operations, fearing they will be dragged into the war.

In a post on Truth Social in early April, the US president took aim at allies, “like the United Kingdom”, which, he said, have “refused to get involved in the decapitation of Iran”, telling them to either buy US fuel or get involved in the rapidly escalating war.

“You’ll have to start learning how to fight for yourself, the U.S.A. won’t be there to help you anymore, just like you weren’t there for us. Iran has been, essentially, decimated. The hard part is done. Go get your own oil!” Trump wrote.

The framework of the US-Israel war on Iran is different from that of the war between Iraq and Iran in the 1980s, experts say.

“In the 1980s, the Tanker War was part of the broader Iran-Iraq War, so the shipping attacks were tied to a much larger land conflict between two regional armies. Today, the situation is more about Iran’s standoff with the United States and its allies, and the maritime activity is less about asymmetrical war at sea and more about deterrence, signalling and the threat of escalation,” said Phillips.

“The military lesson, really, is that Hormuz is still one of those places where limited actions can have outsized effects, but the modern setting is more fast-moving, more technologically advanced and potentially more volatile than the original Tanker War,” he added.

Analysts have also pointed out that, unlike in the 1980s, Iran is currently stronger when it comes to withstanding attacks and naval blockades by the US.

In the Tanker War, Iraq was militarily supported by Western allies, while Iran was under a US arms embargo imposed in 1979 after the Iranian revolution. While this gave Iraq a military advantage, Iran’s IRGC used asymmetric warfare tactics by striking Iraq’s allies’ ships and oil tankers.

Experts also say that since the 12-day war between Iran and Israel last year, Tehran has shifted its military doctrine from one that is primarily about defensive containment to an explicitly offensive asymmetric posture.

“Iran today appears more structurally aggressive in doctrine where it is formally embracing earlier and more extensive use of regional missiles, drones, cyberattacks and energy coercion [when energy resources and infrastructure are targeted or cut off], but is operationally constrained by battle damage, sanctions and internal instability,” Phillips, the risk adviser and a former military chief instructor, told Al Jazeera in an interview on March 2.

A former US ambassador to Bahrain, Adam Ereli, also told Al Jazeera that Iran and the IRGC have “revolutionary fervour”, which means they can “survive”.

“They can tolerate pain for a lot longer than I think most American decision-makers and planners calculate,” he said.

People in the Russian city of Tuapse are worried about the toxic effects of a huge oil refinery fire that’s been burning for days after a Ukrainian drone attack. Al Jazeera’s Yulia Shapavalova is there.

On the outskirts of Somalia’s southern port city, the land has become an open graveyard for cattle. Some are left where they fell, while others are buried in shallow graves after consecutive failed rainy seasons.

For many families here, pastoralists who rely on livestock for milk, meat, and income, animals were everything, but what was once a lifeline of food and income has now become a stark symbol of loss.

The impact is not just felt in Kismayo, but across the country, with 6.5 million people forced to skip meals and go hungry every day. Drought and rising costs only pushing the country deeper into crisis.

The humanitarian director at Save the Children, Francesca Sangiorgi, says the crisis is being driven by repeated climate shocks that are compounding over time. “We’re seeing multiple rainy seasons that have failed across the country,” she tells Al Jazeera, adding that even when rain arrives, it is often too uneven and too late to restore livelihoods that have already collapsed.

What’s the scale of the crisis?

The scale of Somalia’s hunger crisis is severe and rapidly worsening.

With a third of the population facing severe food insecurity (classified as IPC Phase 3 and above), many households are struggling to get enough food to meet their basic daily requirements (PDF) — and in some cases going without food altogether, leaving them more vulnerable to malnutrition and illnesses such as diarrhoea, measles, and other infections.

Of these, more than 2 million people are in the most critical conditions short of famine (IPC Phase 4 or emergency levels), where families are facing extreme shortages and are increasingly forced into displacement in search of basic needs, moving towards already overcrowded aid camps where resources are rapidly dwindling.

Children are among the most affected. According to the UN, an estimated 1.8 million children under five in Somalia are at risk of acute malnutrition, putting their survival in immediate danger.

Sangiorgi notes that the deterioration has been unfolding rapidly, its effects already evident.

“The situation of children across the country is extremely concerning,” she explains. “We’re seeing the spread of child illnesses across the country. Dropout rates are extremely high right now, and they continue to rise because of the drought. We want to make sure that children have a chance at life—access to the health and nutrition services they need, as well as education.”

According to Doctors Without Borders, known by its French initials MSF, more than 3.3 million people have been displaced, severely straining the already limited resources and basic services in these communities.

What does the crisis look like on the ground?

Near Kismayo, one of Somalia’s largest camps for displaced people has formed, sheltering families who have nothing to eat and have travelled from across Jubbaland.

One woman describes how her herd has fallen from 200 cattle to just four, ending her very livelihood.

Barwaqo Aden, a displaced Jamame resident in Lower Juba, arrived at the camp only recently, but her eight-month-old daughter is already in the local hospital with severe malnutrition due to the lack of resources.

Others arrive after exhausting journeys, fleeing areas controlled by the armed group al-Shabab. A displaced resident, Hodhan Mohamed, walked for days and crossed the River Juba by boat before reaching a crowded settlement, unsure what she would find. Like many new arrivals, she now waits for assistance that is limited and uncertain.

Sangiorgi explains that secondary displacement – when people who have already been forced from their homes are displaced again – is becoming increasingly frequent. “As services and commodities continue to shrink across the country, the prices of essential goods keep rising as well.”

More than 3.8 million Somalis are currently displaced, making up 22 percent of the population. Many have been uprooted multiple times, moving from one settlement to another as aid resources dwindle and access to support becomes more limited.

What’s driving the crisis?

At its core, the crisis is primarily driven by climate shocks.

Somalia has had three consecutive failed rainy seasons in recent years, drying out rivers, wells, and pasturelands.

For livestock-dependent communities, the impact has been immediate: animals are dying, and with them, livelihoods are disappearing.

As local production collapses, families are forced to buy from markets even as food, fuel, and water prices continue to rise. In rural areas, especially, incomes no longer stretch far enough to meet needs.

Insecurity caused by armed conflict adds further strain, displacing communities and limiting access for aid workers in some regions.

Beyond Somalia, the global economic crisis linked to the US–Israeli war on Iran has also played a role in constricting supply chains. A UN aid chief told the Reuters news agency in March that these disruptions are compounding costs and weakening the ability to deliver assistance, as humanitarian systems come under growing strain.

MSF reported last month that transport costs have risen by up to 50 percent in parts of Somalia, making it harder for people to reach health facilities and increasing the cost of delivering care as fuel prices climb.

The organisation also said more than 200 health and nutrition facilities have closed since early 2025 due to sharp funding cuts, leaving critical gaps in already overstretched health services.

What does the aid collapse look like?

As the need for aid rises, humanitarian funding and response capacities are only shrinking.

The UN response plan for Somalia is currently funded at just 20 percent of what is required — with $1.42bn needed but only $288m received. That discrepancy has forced major cuts, reducing the number of people targeted for assistance from 6 million to just 1.3 million.

For Somalia, which relies heavily on imported food and external assistance, the consequences are immediate. Fewer supplies are reaching ports, while the cost of delivering essentials continues to rise, testing an already fragile system.

As UN humanitarian chief Tom Fletcher told Reuters in March, “These [constraints] will damage our humanitarian supply chains, reduce ‌the ⁠humanitarian supplies we can get to people who need them, but they’ll also drive up energy costs and food costs across the region, this really is a perfect storm of factors right now, and I’m seriously worried,” he stated.

The humanitarian response has been cut by 75 percent, meaning millions of Somalis are no longer receiving assistance, even as the crisis deepens on the ground.

ONE of the world’s biggest airlines has said they could soon increase the cost of flights due to ongoing conflict.

United Airlines has warned that fares could go up by as much as 20 per cent because of soaring jet fuel prices.

The airline flies mainly to America from a number of UK airports including Edinburgh, Manchester and London Heathrow.

According to Reuters, the airline’s CEO Scott Kirby said on Wednesday that the airline could increase flight prices by between 15 and 20 per cent to offset the surge in fuel costs.

For example, if a flight was £500 before, after the price rise it could be as much as £600.

The airline added that it has already begun raising some prices, as well as higher baggage fees – all to offset increased fuel costs.

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Kirby added that the airline has not yet seen a drop in demand, despite prices rising.

However, he also accepted that if the airline does introduce higher prices, it may test and put off travellers.

United Airlines has also already confirmed that five per cent of flights would be cancelled – or around 250 flights a month – because of rising fuel cost fears.

This news follows data released by The Transport & Environment (T&E) that disruption to jet fuel supplies has added as much as $100 (£77) per person to the price of long-haul flights from Europe.

As such, for a family of four heading on a long-haul holiday it would cost them an extra £308.

For short-haul flights within Europe, prices have increased by £25.26 per passenger – which would be more than £100 per family heading on holiday.

And a number of airlines have already raised their prices to offset the increasing cost of jet fuel.

For example, on Virgin Atlantic flights economy fares have been increased by £50.

Anyone flying in premium economy will pay an extra £180 and those in business class will pay an extra £360.

Air France and KLM, which are part of the same company, are also increasing round-trip fares by €100 (£87) on most of their long-haul flights.

Some airlines have cancelled flights as well.

For example, Lufthansa has cancelled 20,000 flights up to September, Air New Zealand and Scandinavian Airlines have cancelled around 1,000 flights, KLM has cancelled 160 flights and Cathay Pacific has cancelled two per cent of flights up to June.

In other flight news, a major airline is set to axe 20,000 flights this summer amid soaring fuel costs due to Iran war.

Plus, Brits are being warned that their summer holidays are at risk of being cancelled as jet fuel runs low and thousands of flights are axed.

The sharp rise in the cost of jet fuel, driven by escalating tensions in the US-Israel war with Iran, has forced several airlines to hike fares, cut routes and reassess their financial forecasts

Multiple airlines are cancelling flights and introducing new charges as a deepening jet fuel crisis sends shockwaves through the global aviation industry.

Prices have surged dramatically in recent weeks, climbing from roughly $85-$90 per barrel to as high as $150-$200, driven by escalating tensions in the US-Israeli war with Iran.

The sharp rise in costs has now forced carriers to hike fares, cut routes and reassess their financial forecasts. The spike has triggered warnings of major disruption, with International Energy chief Fatih Birol cautioning that Europe could have as little as six weeks of jet fuel supply remaining if the Strait of Hormuz stays closed.

There are more than 30 airlines around the world who say they have been forced to cancel flights or add charges:

AirAsia X – Cut around 10% of flights and introduced a fuel surcharge of roughly 20%.

Air France-KLM – Raising long-haul fares, plus cabin fares by 50 euros per round trip, as well as cancelling flights. KLM, the group’s Dutch arm, is set to scrap 160 European services in the coming months.

Air India – Switching to distance-based fuel surcharges, warning current pricing does not cover rising costs, reports the Independent.

Air New Zealand – Reducing flights through May and June, increasing fares and suspending its full-year earnings forecast.

Akasa Air – Introducing fuel surcharges ranging between 199 and 1,300 Indian rupees ($2 to $14) on both domestic and international routes.

Alaska Air – Increasing checked baggage fees by up to $150 on North American routes, as well as for its Hawaiian Airlines unit.

American Airlines – Raising baggage fees by $10 each for the first and second checked bags and by $150 for the third checked bag, while cutting some economy benefits.

Asiana Airlines – Cutting 22 flights between April and July due to fuel costs.

Cathay Pacific – Cancelling a small portion of flights from mid-May until the end of June and increasing fuel surcharges.

China Eastern Airlines – The airline said it would raise ⁠fuel surcharges for domestic flights from April 5, with flights of 800km and below hit with a 60 yuan ($9) surcharge and a 120 yuan surcharge for flights over 800km.

Delta Airlines – Delta said it would cut capacity by around 3.5 percentage points from its original plan and raise fees for checked bags.

Easyjet – CEO Kenton Jarvis previously said European consumers should expect higher ticket prices towards the end of summer, when existing fuel hedges come to an end.

Greater Bay Airlines – Said it would raise fuel surcharges on most routes from April 1, while keeping them unchanged on mainland China and Japan routes. Its surcharge for flights between Hong Kong ‌and the Philippines will more than double, the carrier said.

Hong Kong Airlines – The airline said it would raise fuel surcharges by up to 35% from March 12, with the sharpest increase on flights between Hong Kong and the Maldives, Bangladesh and Nepal

Indigo – India’s biggest airline said it would introduce fuel charges on domestic and international flights from March 14.

Jetblue Airways – The US-based low-cost carrier said it was increasing fees for optional services such as checked baggage as it experiences “rising operating ⁠costs”. Baggage prices will rise by either $4 or $9, it said.

Lufthansa – Grounding 27 planes early and cutting more aircraft from its fleet.

Norse Atlantic Airways – Axed its London Gatwick to Los Angeles route because of fuel costs.

Pakistan International Airlines – Raising domestic fares by $20 and international fares by up to $100.

SAS – Will cancel 1,000 flights in April after already hiking fares.

Spring Airlines – The airline will raise domestic fuel surcharges from April 5.

Southwest Airlines – Hiking baggage fees to $45 for a first bag and $55 for a second.

SunExpress – The airline will add a temporary 10-euro fuel surcharge on Turkey-Europe routes.

TAP Air Portugal – Said fare rises would soften the blow from higher fuel prices.

Thai Airways – Increasing fares by up to 15%.

United Airlines – United Airlines is scaling back loss-making routes over the next six months. It has also been able to push up fares without seeing a major impact on bookings, chief commercial officer Andrew Nocella said, despite the sharp rise in oil and jet fuel costs.

United is also increasing first and second checked baggage fees by $10 for customers travelling within the US, Mexico, Canada and Latin America, according to Reuters.

VietJet Air – Cut flights on some routes because of fuel shortages.

Vietnam Airlines – plans to cancel 23 domestic flights a week from April. The airline reportedly requested government assistance to remove an environmental tax on jet fuel.

Virgin Atlantic – The airline is adding fuel surcharges to fares and will still struggle to return to profitability this year, its CEO Corneel ‌Koster told the Financial Times.

Volotea – Introduced a pricing policy that could add fuel surcharges of up to 14 euros per passenger.

WestJet – Cutting seats, combining flights and adding a C$60 fuel surcharge on some bookings, according to the Canadian press

Ulster continue to count the cost of Friday’s 29-21 defeat by Leinster in the United Rugby Championship [URC] with six players added to the injury list for this Saturday’s trip to face Munster at Thomond Park [17:30 BST].

Angus Bell (foot), Scott Wilson (ankle), Tom O’Toole (hand), James Hume (neck), Jude Postlethwaite (hand) and Bryn Ward (shoulder) have all been ruled out after picking up injuries against Leo Cullen’s side.

They join a list of unavilable players that already includes Nick Timoney (hip), James McNabney (knee), Rob Herring (calf), Robert Baloucoune (elbow), Rory McGuire (shoulder) and Stewart Moore (knee).

Ulster dropped to fifth in the URC standings following last week’s defeat, one point above Munster as the season enters its final three rounds of games before the play-offs.

“Not winning at home was a big moment for us, but then add the guys who have picked up knocks,” Ulster coach Richie Murphy told BBC Sport NI.

“There will be a bit of pressure on our squad depth this week, but that’s exciting as well with everyone wanting to put their hand up for what is ahead.

“It’s going to be interesting, not going to be easy, but it is an exciting couple of weeks ahead.”

Murphy’s side have a home European Challenge Cup semi-final against Exeter Chiefs to look forward to on Saturday, 2 May as they seek to end their 20-year wait for silverware and while there is “no timeline” but feels some have a “really good chance of playing next week”.

One player who may feature this week is Michael Lowry who has returned to full training and his availability for the trip to Limerick will be assessed throughout the week.

“Mikey has had a really tough run over the last while and at the start of the season, we played some of our best rugby with him in the team,” Murphy continued.

“He played for Ireland ‘A’ against Spain and picked up an injury. From that moment, he’s struggled for fitness, but was flying around in training today and a great addition to our squad for the next few weeks.”

April 20 (UPI) — Venezuela’s interim president, Delcy Rodríguez, said her government is talking with two major companies to address the country’s power crisis, citing recent diplomatic engagement with the United States.

“Thanks to that diplomatic dialogue, I can say we are now in direct contact with Siemens and General Electric to resolve the electricity problem in Zulia state,” Rodríguez said Sunday during a public event broadcast by state television.

She said the government decided to “open a new chapter in national political life” and in Venezuela’s international relations following a Jan. 3 U>S> military operation that captured President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores.

Analysts say Zulia, a key oil-producing region in western Venezuela, is critical to the country’s hydrocarbons industry. Persistent electricity shortages have limited efforts to boost crude production, making restoration of the power system a strategic priority for economic recovery.

Situated at the western edge of the national grid, Zulia is the last region to receive electricity transmitted from the south. Failures in the transmission network often leave it disconnected. The system in the region operates at less than 40% of installed capacity.

According to local outlet El Tequeño, both companies conducted technical missions in March to assess Venezuela’s electrical infrastructure and present rehabilitation proposals.

The inspections included hydroelectric facilities in the Bajo Caroní complex in Bolívar state, following a February visit to Caracas by U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright.

Rodríguez made the remarks at the launch of a 13-day pilgrimage she called to demand the full lifting of economic sanctions imposed on Venezuela.

“Enough sanctions against the noble Venezuelan people,” she said, addressing the governments of the United States and Europe, according to Globovisión. She added that economic freedom is a sovereign right, not a concession from foreign powers.

The mobilizations began in Zulia, Amazonas and Táchira states and were led by Rodríguez, National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez and ruling party leader Diosdado Cabello.

International sanctions have worsened Venezuela’s electricity crisis by limiting access to financing and technology needed to maintain and upgrade infrastructure.

A partial easing of U.S. sanctions on the oil and mining sectors has opened the door to talks with companies such as Siemens and General Electric to address those gaps.

The global fallout of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz may create the impression that the world cannot function without fossil fuels. Nothing could be further from the truth. Every single industry can and must decarbonise.

For global shipping, this process would be relatively easy because technological solutions exist and a single United Nations agency can set legally binding rules for all ships. The first steps have already been made.

In 2025, member states of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) agreed on a policy mechanism to cut shipping emissions: the Net-Zero Framework (NZF). But they opted to postpone a decision on formal adoption of this landmark agreement.

This delay is emblematic of obstructive tactics used by countries opposing climate action.

The IMO Framework – the world’s first global carbon price on any international polluter – took years of compromises and watering-down. As it stands, it is the lowest possible bar Pacific Island states like the one I represent can accept. We cannot give in another inch.

While I join the First Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels in Santa Marta, Colombia, next week, delegates will gather again at the IMO in London to decide whether to uphold their unanimous commitment to phase out fossil fuels in a just and equitable way.

The delegates of Vanuatu who travel to London have a mandate to push for the adoption of the NZF this year.

Should anyone reopen the framework to water it down, our position is clear: We will revert to our original Pacific demand for a universal levy on emissions of $150 per tonne of carbon dioxide.

Last year my country abstained from the vote on the NZF agreement. We reached that decision because the mechanism is not nearly ambitious enough. Even so, it is a starting point we can work with.

But since then, the tide has shifted dramatically.

After the delay in adoption, a small group of countries is now suggesting further weakening the ambition in the framework to meet the demands of particularly influential states whose current policy positions are not aligned with climate ambition. This strategy is problematic as reducing our collective actions to align with those that want no climate action at all is incompatible with our people’s continued survival.

The world’s poorest countries, and the planet, simply cannot afford anything less than what is already on the table.

The framework, as it is, gives the world and the industry some chance of meeting the climate obligations that IMO countries committed to in 2023, namely reaching net-zero emissions by 2050 in a just and equitable way.

The NZF introduces penalty fees – eg emission pricing for noncompliance with the regulation. This provides the regulation with a “stick” to ensure ships comply or else they must pay.

The penalties also represent revenues, up to $10bn to $12bn a year, to both incentivise industry transition and enable a fair transition for all. This fund is a lifeline for developing – and especially least developed – states to be able to afford clean maritime energy upgrades and compensate for the rising trade costs because of this transition.

Some claim that revenues raised by the NZF will blow out transport costs. This is preposterous.

The penalties charged through this framework come down to less than $1.50 per year for every living human being – although the biggest polluters should pay this cost. If the richest 10 percent of the world’s population foots this bill, it adds up to less than $15 per person. That’s a few coffees a year, which the world’s richest can easily spare.

Losing both financial penalties for noncompliance and financial support for countries like mine in the name of a political compromise with rich oil-producing states is a bad deal. Not just for all climate-vulnerable states but also for the industry that demands and deserves clarity.

If anything, we need more action and more ambition in the framework.

For years, Pacific states have pushed for the IMO regulation to be in the form of a universal levy on emissions, by pricing all emissions. We managed to get the majority of IMO member states on board, including the European Union, South Korea and Japan, as well as important Global South states, such as Panama and Liberia. However, the US has been very effective in exerting its influence in this area, which is resulting in shifts to some positions to the detriment of us all.

Our position was always backed by the best available scientific evidence.

A levy on all shipping emissions is the best way to send an unambiguous signal to the industry: Invest in the future now! The revenues, up to 10 times more than those from the NZF, serve as both a bigger stick for polluters and a bigger carrot for first movers and cash-poor countries.

This is not a handout: Hitting net zero by 2050 is not possible if our countries cannot invest in clean ships.

The bridge we have built in the form of the NZF through years of compromise and evidence is still standing. Let us cross it together by adopting it as agreed without any further dilution.

Pacific states stand ready to fight for what science and justice demand, and we call on our partners to stand with us.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

The warning comes at a time of global turmoil

Ryanair has issued a warning to passengers hoping to fly in the days ahead. The budget airline has sent emails to travellers flying from the UK to large parts of Europe.

It cautions of ‘longer queues, particularly at busy airports’. The reason is the new Entry and Exit System (EES), which has been rolled out by the European Union (EU). It requires all travellers from the UK and other non-EU nations to be photographed and fingerprinted at EU airports and border crossings.

The objective is for the new system to replace manual passport stamping and more efficiently track the 90-day visa-free limit, but there have been accounts of it causing delays stretching to several hours at busy airports. It has even been temporarily suspended at times to clear the backlog.

In a message to customers titled ‘Important: Changes to Passport Control’, Ryanair says: “From 10 April 2026, the EU’s Entry/Exit System (EES) is in place at all Schengen Area external borders. As a result, passport control may take longer for some passengers.

“You are affected if you hold a non‐EU / non‐EEA / non‐Swiss passport (e.g. UK, USA, Canada, Australia), and are flying into or out of the Schengen Area.

“Commonly affected routes include flights between the Schengen Area and countries such as: UK, Ireland, Cyprus, Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, Türkiye, Egypt, Israel and others.

“At passport control you may need to:

• Scan your passport
• Provide fingerprints
• Have a facial image taken

These checks may cause longer queues, particularly at busy airports. Queues may form before security.

If affected, please:

• Arrive at the airport early to allow for queues
• Have your travel documents ready
• Follow signs marked EES / Passport Control

Those who are not affected:

• EU, EEA and Swiss passport holders
• Flights within the Schengen Area (e.g. Spain–Italy, France–Germany)

“If you are denied entry, this will be due to EU policy, not Ryanair’s rules.”

Greece has reportedly opted to pause the EES rollout following considerable delays. A statement on the Greek Embassy website and posts across official social media channels said: “In the framework of the implementation of the Entry/Exit System, as of 10 April 2026, British passport holders are exempt from biometric registration at Greek border crossing points.”

Airport representatives and the European Commission convened a meeting on Tuesday to address issues surrounding the system. Approximately 122 passengers were left stranded and unable to board their flight from Milan Linate to Manchester on Sunday, following severe hold-ups at passport control linked to the introduction of the EES.

The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has confirmed that your details will need to be re-registered every three years. A statement also warned that travellers may face longer waiting times when entering or departing a country. It states: “The European Union’s (EU) Entry/Exit System (EES) started on 12 October 2025 This is a new digital border system that has changed requirements for British citizens travelling to the Schengen area.

The countries in the Schengen area are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.

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The Republic of Ireland and Cyprus are not within the Schengen area, and therefore EES is not applicable when travelling to either of these countries. If you are travelling to a country in the Schengen area for a short stay using a UK passport, you may be required to register your biometric details, such as fingerprints and a photo, when you arrive. You do not need to take any action before you arrive at the border, and there is no cost for EES registration.

EES registration is replacing the current system of manually stamping passports when visitors arrive in the EU. EES may take each passenger extra time to complete so be prepared to wait longer than usual at the border.

“On your first visit to the Schengen area, you may be asked to create a digital record at the port or airport on arrival. You may be asked to submit your fingerprints and have your photo taken at dedicated booths. You don’t need to provide any information before travelling to a Schengen area country. The checks may take slightly longer than previously, so be prepared to wait during busy times.”

“If you enter the Schengen area through the Port of Dover, Eurotunnel Le Shuttle at Folkestone or Eurostar, St Pancras International, any EES checks will be completed at the border, before you leave the UK. You may also be asked to provide either your fingerprint or photo when you exit the Schengen area.”

“If you frequently travel to the Schengen area for work and/or leisure purposes, you must ensure that your total stay in the Schengen area is no more than 90 days in every 180 days. You must be aware of the penalty and enforcement approach for exceeding the immigration limit in any individual Member State you plan to travel to, or through.”

Europe is facing a severe jet fuel crisis due to the Middle East conflict, with International Energy Agency chief Fatih Birol warning the region has ‘maybe six weeks or so’ of jet fuel left and that flight cancellations could follow

Europe has just six weeks’ worth of jet fuel remaining due to the ongoing Middle East conflict, with major airlines grounding flights.

Fatih Birol, executive director of the International Energy Agency (IEA), warned that flight cancellations could follow “soon” if oil supplies continue to be restricted by the Iran war. Iran maintains a firm grip on tankers navigating through the Strait of Hormuz, with Mr Birol telling the Associated Press this is triggering “the largest energy crisis we have ever faced”.

He warned that Asian nations such as Japan, India and China, which depend heavily on Middle Eastern energy supplies, are on “the front line”, with the pressure set to “come to Europe and the Americas” shortly after.

Europe has just six weeks of fuel left, according to the IEA director. He added that if the Strait of Hormuz remains blocked, the knock-on effect could mean “some of the flights from city A to city B might be canceled as a result of a lack of jet fuel”.

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Which airlines are cancelling flights?

A number of airlines have warned that they might have to cancel flights if the situation continues, but the number of those that have already done so is fewer.

Swedish flag carrier SAS has said it would cancel 1,000 flights in April because of high oil and jet fuel prices, after cancelling a “couple hundred” flights in March.

United Airlines said that five per cent of flights would be cancelled in the second and third quarters of 2026, while Dutch airline KLM has cancelled 160 flights for the coming month.

South Korean airline Asiana will slash 22 flights between April and July due to the fuel cost increase.

Hong Kong airline Cathay Pacific will cut some flights from mid-May until the end of June, with about 2% of its scheduled passenger flights grounded. Its budget airline HK Express is cutting around 6% of flights.

German airline group Lufthansa said it would ground 27 planes servicing its short-haul CityLine subsidiary earlier than it had planned, blaming jet fuel prices.

Vietnam Airlines plans to cancel 23 flights per week across domestic routes from April.

Air New Zealand will be cutting back on flights over the next two months, it announced in March. It is expected that 1,100 flights will be impacted.

Norse Atlantic Airways has removed all flights to Los Angeles International Airport from its summer schedule, blaming the fuel shortage.

Although major airlines including British Airways, Ryanair and easyJet have highlighted the potential impact of the fuel price rise on ticket costs and schedules, they are yet to cancel flights as a direct consequence.

However, BA is stopping its route from London Heathrow to Jeddah, although this is due to a shift in demand, according to the airline.

Last week, easyJet chief executive Kenton Jarvis sought to reassure passengers, stating that all airports the airline serves are “operating as normal”.

He continued: “We only ever in this industry have three to four weeks’ visibility (of jet fuel supplies), and that is the same as it was pre-crisis. We have visibility to the middle of May, and we have no concerns. What we’re seeing is airports and fuel suppliers working well to bring jet fuel to the airports.”

EasyJet revealed the Middle East conflict set the airline back roughly £25 million in elevated jet fuel costs last month. The Luton-based carrier said it anticipates reporting a headline pre-tax loss of between £540 million and £560 million for the six months ending in March.

The conflict has created “near-term uncertainty around fuel costs and customer demand”, easyJet revealed.

Bookings have dropped by two percentage points for the three-month periods ending in both June and September when compared with the previous year.

The alert regarding larger-than-anticipated first half losses sent easyJet shares tumbling by as much as 9% during early Thursday trading, before stabilising around 4% down.

Sparked by the Iran war and the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, oil is no longer flowing out of the Middle East as it did earlier this year, which is having a major impact on the aviation industry

Holidaymakers face soaring flight prices and more expensive package breaks even if they’ve already booked because of the looming shortage of jet fuel.

Sparked by the Iran War and the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, oil is no longer flowing out of the Middle East as it did earlier this year. Supplies of jet fuel built up by European countries have been severely depleted.

In general, some European countries hold several months’ worth of jet fuel inventory at a time, according to an IEA report released last week. “Every passing day that the Strait of Hormuz remains shut, Europe is edging closer to supply shortages,” said Amaar Khan, head of European jet fuel pricing at Argus Media. “The Strait accounts for around 40% of Europe’s jet fuel imports, but no jet fuel has passed the Strait since the war broke out.”

There are four main ways that the jet fuel shortage could impact British holidaymakers: rising flight prices, extra fees, cancelled flights and package break surcharges. We’ve explained each one below.

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Rising flight prices

Jet fuel — a refined kerosene-based oil product — is airlines’ biggest cost, making up about 30% of overall expenses, according to the International Air Transport Association. And jet fuel prices have roughly doubled since the war began. Shortages could start next.

Already, a number of airlines have started bumping up the cost of tickets.

Just last week, it emerged that Virgin Atlantic had increased some flight costs with an extra £50 fuel surcharge on economy-class tickets, while premium economy fares are climbing by £180 and business class by £360.

Air France and KLM fares are also going up. They are likely to cost an additional €50, bringing the fuel surcharge to €100 (£86.98) on top of the standard fare. Meanwhile, flights to the United States, Canada and Mexico could increase by €70 (£60.89), and an economy round trip could cost an extra €10 (£8.70).

If you’ve already got your flights booked, you don’t need to worry. You are not going to be asked retrospectively to pay extra on your air fare. Once you have paid, the airline will not come after you for any more cash – unless the government hikes aviation fees, which they don’t appear poised to do.

Extra fees

Many passengers will have booked their flights months in advance, before the US and Israel attacked Iran and fuel prices started rising. Because airlines can’t bump up fares that’re already booked but for which they’re now making less money, they have started looking for other ways to make a bit of extra cash.

American Airlines has said it would hike checked baggage fees by $10 (£7.40) each for the first and second checked bags and by $150 (£111) for the third checked bag on domestic and short-haul international flights. Southwest Airlines has said it will hike checked baggage fees by $10 for the first and second bags, raising costs to $45 (£33) for the first bag and $55 (£40) for the second.

As passengers often add extra luggage just before they fly, these rises could impact passengers who booked flights before the invasion.

No major European airlines have made similar changes.

Cancelled flights

Last week, International Energy Agency Director Fatih Birol said Europe has “maybe six weeks” of remaining jet fuel supplies and said the global economy faces its “largest energy crisis.”

Many major airlines have already cancelled flights because of the fuel price rises and falling demand, and more are likely to do so.

Swedish flag carrier SAS has said it would cancel 1,000 flights in April because of high oil and jet fuel prices, after cancelling a “couple hundred” flights in March. United Airlines said that five per cent of flights would be cancelled in the second and third quarters of 2026, while Dutch airline KLM has cancelled 160 flights for the coming month.

Other airlines, such as BA, have suspended whole routes to parts of the Middle East due to the conflict, while Virgin Atlantic announced earlier this month that it would be permanently scrapping its London flight to Riyadh from April.

Under UK law, if your flight is cancelled more than 14 days before it is due to depart, you are not entitled to compensation. However, your airline does have to offer you a full refund or help you find an alternative flight.

In the latter case, it’s up to you whether to fly as soon as possible after the cancelled flight, or at a later date that suits you. Although most airlines will book you onto another of their flights to the same destination, if an alternative airline is flying there significantly sooner or other suitable modes of transport are available, then you may have the right to be booked onto that alternative transport instead. You can discuss this with your airline.

Given that airfares may be significantly higher than when you booked, opting for an alternative flight rather than taking a refund may work out in your favour.

Extra package break costs

A largely overlooked clause in package holiday terms and conditions could result in the price of a package holiday increasing by hundreds of pounds – even after you’ve already made your booking and payment.

An article by Which? drew attention to the obscure clause found within Package Travel Regulations. It reveals that UK holiday companies can impose an additional charge of up to 8% on a package holiday price, without being required to provide a free cancellation option, under three specific circumstances.

These circumstances include: a destination introducing additional taxes or other charges, a significant shift in currency exchange rates, or a rise in the price of fuel or power. Given the ongoing Middle East conflict, fuel costs have been rising noticeably, which means there’s potential for package holiday operators to invoke this rule for Brits who’ve already booked their holidays should these expenses continue climbing.

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Brent crude falls more than 9 percent after Iran said it will reopen the strategic waterway, only to shut it down again over US blockade of its ports.

Oil prices have plummeted to their lowest point in weeks after Iran said the Strait of Hormuz was open for passage during a ceasefire in Lebanon, and United States President Donald Trump said he expected to ⁠reach a deal to end the war soon.

Brent crude, the international benchmark, fell more than 9 percent to $90.38 a barrel on Friday, taking it below $91 for the first time since March 10.

The plunge came after Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said the strait was “completely open” and would remain so for the duration of the 10-day ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon, which took effect on Friday.

Hailing Tehran’s announcement, Trump declared the waterway “ready for business and full passage,” but said the US Navy’s blockade of Iranian ports would remain in “full force” until the sides reached a peace deal.

On Saturday, however, Iran rowed back on its decision to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, warning that it would continue to block transit through the key waterway as long as the US blockade of Iranian ports remained in effect.

The announcement came after Trump said the blockade “will remain in full force” until Tehran reaches a deal with the US, including on its nuclear programme.

Roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil passes through Hormuz and further limits would squeeze already constrained supply, driving prices higher once again.

Amid the escalation, Pakistani officials say they are trying for more talks between the US and Iran ahead of the April 22 ceasefire deadline.

Meanwhile, ship tracking data displayed by MarineTraffic earlier on Saturday showed a significant uptick in vessels crossing the strait, which is located between Iran, the United Arab Emirates and Oman.

“It’s busy out there, the busiest I’ve seen it since the Strait of Hormuz was effectively closed at the beginning of the war,” Michelle Wiese Bockmann, an analyst at maritime intelligence firm Windward, said in a post on X.

“Last night there were few ships taking the risk but overnight there seems to have been a change.”

While Iran allowed a limited number of vetted ships to transit the waterway since the start of the war, traffic has remained at a trickle compared with pre-conflict levels.

The near-total closure of the strait has triggered one of the worst energy shocks in history, driving up fuel prices and prompting governments to roll out emergency measures.

Oil prices have swung wildly since the US and Israel launched strikes on Iran on February 28, hitting a post-conflict peak of $119 a barrel on March 19.

There is another way to read the ongoing Middle East crisis, one that makes legible what standard analysis consistently struggles to explain. It begins not with capability but with the geometry of the system through which capability must travel to produce effects. The United States and its partners possess overwhelming military superiority over Iran, and that superiority is not in question, yet the conflict has produced a pattern that defies its logic. A superpower coalition has been unable to impose coherent strategic outcomes against an adversary operating through proxies, low-cost disruption, and the systematic exploitation of global commercial vulnerabilities.

Over the past two years, we have seen multiple instances of this kind of disruption with consequential effects on the global system. Houthi drones force the rerouting of global shipping, with Red Sea cargo volumes falling by roughly 50% through early 2024 as major carriers diverted around the Cape of Good Hope, adding up to two weeks to transit times, driving freight costs sharply higher across European markets, and costing Egypt nearly $800 million per month at peak in lost Suez Canal revenue. A non-state network spanning Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Gaza has absorbed sustained air campaigns, targeted eliminations of senior commanders, and repeated ground operations without losing its capacity to generate coordinated pressure across multiple theaters simultaneously. The asymmetry seems to follow a deliberate strategic logic that raw power analysis struggles to read, precisely because the conflict operates on a surface that capability assessments were never designed to map. What this suggests is that the decisive variable is not what actors possess but whether the relationships connecting them can transmit coordinated action when the system is under strain.

When that system cannot coordinate, something important breaks down. An alliance that formally exists but faces operational friction at every decision point ceases to be an alliance in any meaningful strategic sense. A security guarantee that cannot be transmitted rapidly to the partner it is meant to protect has, in effect, already failed its primary function. It follows that the gap between what a system formally is and what it can actually do under pressure is not a secondary consideration but the surface on which this conflict is being decided. Conventional analysis, calibrated to count warheads and assess intentions, consistently leaves this gap unmapped.

Analysts know that Saudi Arabia’s OPEC production decisions have repeatedly positioned Riyadh against Washington’s economic preferences, they know that European energy dependency complicates transatlantic alignment, and they know that Iran’s proxy network extends across five countries and absorbs military pressure without fracturing. Yet what the available frameworks cannot do is convert that knowledge into a structural reading of the system. They show that these conditions exist. What they cannot show is how those conditions interact, where they compound, and what the aggregate geometry of their interaction means for whether coordinated action is possible at all.

Power analysis was built to read capability differentials between states, and it does that well. Alliance theory was built to read the conditions under which formal commitments hold or fail, and it does that too. Neither, however, was built to read the operational weight of the ties through which capability and commitment must travel to produce effects.

The instruments available are calibrated to answer questions different from those the current situation poses. Deploying them on a problem they were not designed to read produces the consistent failure to explain what is actually happening that has marked analysis of this conflict from the start.

Adjacency mapping is an instrument designed to read that gap by mapping connectivity, by which I mean their operational weight, specifically their capacity to carry coordinated action under strain. What distinguishes it from standard approaches is its unit of analysis. Rather than the actors themselves, it treats the weight of the relationships as primary. The question it asks is not who holds power but whether the ties connecting power-holders can transmit that power when the system needs them to. Two states can be formally allied, operationally integrated in name, and structurally disconnected at the same time, and nothing in standard analysis will tell you which of those conditions is actually operative until the moment of crisis reveals it.

The instrument assigns each significant relationship in the system a weight between 0 and 1, reflecting how frequently the two actors interact operationally, how reliably information moves between them, how the tie has behaved under recent stress, and how quickly it transmits pressure when the system is under strain. At the higher end of the scale, a weight at or above 0.6 indicates that coordination approaches automaticity, and the tie carries load without constant investment to maintain it. Around 0.3, friction accumulates. In this setting, decisions require deliberate effort at every juncture, slowing the system and making it susceptible to gradual degradation that never triggers a visible rupture. At or below 0.2, the tie has effectively ceased to function as a transmission pathway, leaving the actors operationally disconnected regardless of what their formal relationship nominally says.

These weights are analytical judgements calibrated against observable evidence. In other words, their value lies in making visible what experienced analysts already carry as intuition and in giving that intuition a structure precise enough to argue about. The numbers are therefore analytical judgements, not measurements. A more rigorous application would derive them from quantifiable indicators across each dimension, including military interoperability, intelligence exchange depth, crisis responsiveness, economic interdependence, and signaling consistency, averaged and weighted systematically. That work lies beyond the scope of this piece, but the architecture is designed to accommodate it.

There is a risk management dimension to this reading that is worth making explicit. Standard geopolitical risk assessment focuses on actor-level variables such as regime stability, military capability, and leadership intentions. What adjacency mapping adds is a structural layer that those assessments typically miss. A coalition whose load-bearing relationships operate in the friction zone is exposed to a category of risk that capability assessments do not capture and that becomes visible only when the system is read structurally.

What the matrix adds is the ability to see how compound weakness across multiple relationships produces cascading effects that bilateral assessment alone would struggle to predict. A system whose dominant actor holds several weak partnerships faces more than friction. As a consequence, the geometry of those weaknesses determines whether any concerted response is structurally possible at all. Aggregate capability becomes, in that light, secondary to that question.

If we apply this to the Middle East security complex, the instrument produces one possible reading. This reading differs considerably from the picture conventional analysis generates. Its value is not in the precision of the numbers but in making the system’s geometry visible enough to argue about.

The matrix below maps operational connectivity across the system’s key actors. The numbers are analytical judgements, not measurements.

The geometry they make visible is what matters here.

The matrix is intentionally non-symmetric. Where operational influence flows asymmetrically between two actors, the weights reflect that directionality.

The matrix reveals, in this light, a system whose dominant actors are connected at fundamentally different weights. And more significantly, its most important bilateral relationship is operating in the friction zone. It’s formally excluded adversary has constructed the only alternative connectivity architecture in the system. What this implies is that the geometry of the conflict runs considerably deeper than standard alliance analysis tends to suggest.

On the coalition side, the US has high adjacency with Qatar, Bahrain, Israel, and Kuwait, ties that enable rapid coordination and require little maintenance, constituting the operational backbone of what Washington can actually activate quickly.

Its relationship with Saudi Arabia, however, sits at 0.4. That number is analytically more significant than almost anything else in the matrix. Saudi Arabia remains, on most readings, the relationship on which Gulf order coherence formally depends, the anchor of the security architecture since the 1970s, and it is operating in the friction zone where every significant decision requires renegotiation from scratch rather than flowing through an established channel. Saudi Arabia’s invitation to join BRICS in August 2023, yuan-denominated oil transactions with China, and its participation in the Chinese-brokered rapprochement with Iran in March 2023 all point in the same direction. Riyadh is hedging structurally toward China and the broader non-Western order, a posture that sits uneasily alongside its formal security alignment with Washington. Taken together, these are not isolated political episodes but evidence of a tie that has been operating below the coordination threshold for years and whose weakness is, on this reading, the system’s most consequential structural vulnerability.

Through the normalization architecture, the UAE has arguably become the system’s most structurally reliable node at 0.6 with both the US and Israel, its operational integration exceeding Saudi Arabia’s despite Saudi Arabia’s formal primacy. The Abraham Accords of September 2020 established the formal foundation for that integration. The operational depth it has since generated, across intelligence sharing, defence cooperation, and coordinated positioning on Iran, has made the UAE the coalition’s most functionally connected Gulf partner. Oman holds what is perhaps the system’s most anomalous position, meaningful adjacency with both the US coalition and Iran simultaneously, a profile no other state actor in the matrix replicates. That structural position gave Oman the back-channel role it played through the early phases of the conflict, with documented precedent in the secret US-Iran nuclear negotiations that began in Muscat in 2012 and ran through 2013. As the conflict has intensified, Pakistan has assumed the primary mediation function, but Oman’s position as a quiet facilitator has not disappeared; it has simply been supplemented by a node with more direct access to both capitals at this particular moment.

Pakistan has emerged as the conflict’s primary mediation node, hosting the highest-level direct negotiations between Washington and Tehran since 1979 and brokering the April 2026 ceasefire. That role reflects a structural position the matrix makes legible: high Saudi adjacency, a functioning Iran tie, and a rehabilitated relationship with Washington that no other regional actor currently combines. China’s influence over both Pakistani and Iranian decision-making operates as an exogenous pressure that the matrix only partially captures, and Pakistan’s own domestic constraints, including its difficulty developing direct channels with the IRGC, limit how far that mediation role can ultimately reach.

Iran’s position is where the matrix becomes most analytically revealing. Across the state actors in the system, Iran’s adjacency sits at or near fragmentation, built up through sanctions, absent operational channels, and decades of adversarial signalling that have left Tehran formally isolated from the coordination architecture the United States and its partners have constructed.

And yet the only high-weight tie Iran holds is with its proxy network at 0.7. That single number may go further toward explaining the architecture of the entire campaign than any other figure in the matrix.

It is an asymmetric relationship in which Tehran’s capacity to activate and direct exceeds the reverse influence those actors exert over Iranian strategic decisions. What that single structural condition implies goes further toward explaining the architecture of Iranian pressure operations than most analyses of Iranian intentions or capabilities tend to reach. Iran is geographically central and formally excluded. It is precisely that combination, positioned to apply pressure across every theatre while bearing none of the coordination costs that formal inclusion imposes. That, from this vantage point, is what makes legible a strategy that standard analysis, focused on actors and their capabilities, cannot see.

Seen through this lens, what Iran is doing across the region is something more structurally ambitious than a military campaign. It is attempting to restructure the matrix itself. The goal appears to be less about battlefield victory than about the gradual degradation of the ties connecting the United States to its regional partners, below the threshold at which coordinated response becomes automatic, eroding the will to keep paying the price of alignment while simultaneously building alternative adjacency in the nodes where US-aligned connectivity is weakest.

The Houthi campaign against Red Sea shipping is calibrated to stay below the threshold that would compel a unified military response. It introduces friction into the economic relationships connecting European states to the Gulf system, raising the cost of alignment with Washington’s regional posture without forcing the kind of direct confrontation that would unite the coalition. Strikes on Gulf infrastructure follow the same calibration, persistent enough to signal that the US security guarantee cannot insulate its partners from costs, yet restrained enough to avoid crossing the point at which coalition fragmentation becomes irrelevant because a unified response becomes compulsory. Across Iraq and Syria, simultaneous pressure from affiliated militias prevents the concentration of attention that sustained coalition coordination requires. In each case, the instrument targets a relationship rather than a capability, specifically the weight of the ties whose degradation would restructure the system’s geometry without requiring Iran to displace the existing order directly.

The US-Saudi tie at 0.4 is the primary focus of that degradation effort. Should that threshold be breached, Saudi Arabia hedges. As hedging reduces operational interactivity the tie weakens further. The process risks becoming self-reinforcing. Iranian military superiority over any individual partner is not required to sustain it.

The same logic extends across European actors, though not uniformly. Germany’s industrial exposure to energy price volatility, France’s residual strategic autonomy instinct, and the EU’s institutional preference for de-escalation all produce different thresholds for continued alignment with Washington. Their shared energy dependency gives them asymmetric stakes in the Gulf system’s stability, but their appetite for risk diverges from Washington’s in ways that are not identical across capitals, and each time Iran forces a decision about the cost of continued alignment, that divergence fragments the coalition’s coordination surface further.

By sustaining operational ties with non-state actors across the region, Iran is constructing alternative adjacency in precisely the nodes where US-aligned connectivity is weakest. These are populations and factions that the existing regional order has excluded from the dominant coalition’s coordination architecture. Deliberately so — Iran is building in the structural gaps the system leaves open. Displacing the existing order appears unnecessary. Becoming the more reliable pole of alignment for the actors that order has failed to integrate may be sufficient. All that is required is that the order fragment sufficiently at its margins for that offer to appear credible, and the current trajectory of US-Saudi friction and European hedging is steadily moving in that direction.

The coalition’s instruments are calibrated to military threats. The system, however, is failing along a different surface entirely, or so this reading suggests. The formal architecture remains largely intact, security guarantees have not been withdrawn, Gulf states remain formally aligned, and normalisation agreements hold. And yet the operational adjacency that gives that architecture its functional weight is under sustained pressure from an actor that has correctly identified the gap between formal commitment and operational tie as the system’s primary vulnerability. That identification is outpacing the coalition’s capacity to respond.

On this reading, the surface on which the conflict appears to be decided is not the one the coalition is defending.

What adjacency mapping reveals is a story about geometry. The system’s dominant actor holds formal commitments at weights the system cannot sustain under the pressure being applied to it. Its adversary, in turn, has built the only alternative coordination architecture in the space that those weakening ties leave open. The conflict is likely to be determined by which ties the system can no longer afford to lose under sustained and calibrated pressure. The question is whether the actors currently holding those ties in the friction zone can rebuild them to the coordination threshold before the process of degradation becomes irreversible. That is a question that capability assessments are not well-positioned to answer, and one that a structural reading of the system’s connectivity at least helps to make visible.

RISING fuel costs linked to the war in Iran have forced a major airline to slash more than 100 flights – including services to and from London.

Dutch company KLM is axing 160 flights across Europe over the next month as soaring fuel prices pile pressure on the industry ahead of the busy summer period.

The cuts will hit routes in and out of Amsterdam’s Schiphol Airport, with departures and arrivals split evenly .

Despite the disruption, the airline insists there is no shortage of jet fuel, saying the move is purely down to spiralling costs.

A KLM spokesperson said: “Passengers affected by these changes will be rebooked onto the next available flight.

“As these are destinations KLM serves multiple times a day, such as London and Düsseldorf, travellers can usually be accommodated quickly.

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“KLM expects a busy May holiday period and is making sure passengers can travel to their holiday destinations as planned.”

KLM’s flight cancellations comes after the head of the International Energy Agency Fatih Birol said mass flight cancellations will begin “soon” if the Strait of Hormuz remains closed.

“In the past there was a group called ‘Dire Straits.’ It’s a dire strait now, and it is going to have major implications for the global economy”, Birol told AP.

Adding: “And the longer it goes, the worse it will be for the economic growth and inflation around the world.”

Birol’s deadline means airports could face critical fuel shortages by May, causing travel chaos for Brits heading abroad during the school May half-term holidays.

Oil prices have soared since the start of March after Iran closed off the Strait in response to US-Israeli forces bombing.

The Persian Gulf chokehold sees around 40 per cent of the world’s jet fuel supply pass through.

It comes after ACI Europe, which represents European airports, said the key trade route must open within three weeks or fuel reserves will run drastically low on Friday.

A number of airports in Italy have already warned that they were running out of fuel.

According to local reports earlier this week, Brindisi-Casale Airport confirmed that Jet A1 fuel was not available for a short period of time.

And British Airways has announced it will permanently axe its service from London Heathrow to Jeddah in Saudi Arabia from April 24.

The airline had been operating a four flights a week service since November 2024.

But a shift in demand, due to the conflict in the Middle East, has led to the airline terminating the service.

KLM stressed the cancellations make up just one per cent of its European schedule.

But the move will still spark concern for Brits planning trips abroad as airlines battle rising operating costs.

It comes as carriers across Europe scramble to balance the books amid the fuel crisis.

Earlier this month, UK airline Skybus pulled the plug on all future flights between London Gatwick and Newquay.

The route, which launched in November 2025, had been backed by Cornwall Council and the Department for Transport under a public service scheme due to run until the end of May.

However, a slump in passenger numbers combined with higher fuel costs forced the airline to ground the service early, with its final flights taking off on April 2.

The latest cuts raise fresh fears of further disruption for holidaymakers as the peak summer season approaches.

Meanwhile other vital UK services could also face shortages if a deal to end the Middle East war is not struck soon.

Medicines UK, which represents companies making 85 per cent of NHS prescriptions, said NHS patients could face prescription shortages within weeks.

This could place “significant pressure for the NHS as early as June”, the organisation warned.

And Brits could even face shortages of supermarket staples such as beer and meat as officials fear the blockade of the Strait could cut vital carbon dioxide supplies.

CO2 is used in food packaging to improve the shelf life of salad, packaged meats and baked goods – and also slaughtering nearly all pigs and most chickens.

Tim Lang, professor of food policy at the University of London, who has been a member of several government bodies including the UK Council of Food Policy Advisors, told The Sun that the UK has “next to no food storage”.

As airlines grapple with the soaring jet fuel prices and global shortage due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, two more have been forced to increase their prices for passengers

Due to the escalating fuel crisis sparked by the Middle East conflict, two more airlines have been forced to raise their prices.

Air travel has been severely disrupted with cancelled routes and a sharp rise in jet fuel prices since US-Israeli strikes erupted on February 28, 2026. The situation was further heightened by Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20 per cent of the world’s oil and gas passes, triggering a global shortage.

As a result, airlines have been grappling with rising jet fuel costs and have been forced to raise prices. Air France and KLM are the latest airlines to confirm they’ve had to increase ticket prices as a result.

READ MORE: Major European airport issues ‘arrive early’ alert for all passengers amid delaysREAD MORE: EasyJet boss warns of summer price hike after £25million hit from jet fuel costs

The airlines, which are part of the same company Air France–KLM, had previously added a surcharge last month to offset soaring jet fuel prices. At the time, economy fares were bumped up by an extra €50 (£43.47) for a round trip, reported The Sun.

Now, with another increase announced, a long-haul round trip with Air France or KLM could cost an additional €50, bringing the fuel surcharge to €100 (£86.98) on top of the standard fare. Meanwhile, flights to the United States, Canada and Mexico could increase by €70 (£60.89), and an economy round-trip could cost an extra €10 (£8.70).

The Mirror has contacted Air France and KLM for comment.

Air France and KLM aren’t the only airlines to raise prices amid the ongoing fuel crisis. Just this week, it emerged that Virgin Atlantic had increased some flight costs with an extra £50 fuel surcharge on economy-class tickets, while premium economy fares are climbing by £180 and business class by £360.

Virgin Atlantic Chief Executive, Corneel Koster, warned travellers that flight prices could climb in the coming months and potentially throughout the remainder of the year. He said: “We have never seen jet fuel at this level and airlines cannot sustain those sorts of high costs.”

“If the fuel price goes much higher, I think the surcharges may go higher. If they go up in a week and you book in two weeks’ time, you’ll be paying higher.”

While there are no fuel shortages at present, Koster acknowledged it was impossible to guarantee supplies in the months ahead. “We have contracts with multiple suppliers who have a wide range of diversity of where the jet fuel comes from,” he explained.

“We have good visibility and no concern for the coming one to two months – certainly for the remainder of April and May. Beyond that I have less visibility, but that is quite normal.”

Meanwhile, it’s also been reported that airlines, such as JetBlue, have increased luggage fees in a bid to offset the soaring fuel costs. For off-peak economy fares, bags are expected to cost $4 more (£2.95), jumping to $39 (£28.79), while peak economy fares are set to be $49 (£36.17).

Do you have a travel story to share? Email webtravel@reachplc.com

It has already been established Manchester United will be trying to sign at least two central midfield players in the summer.

Casemiro’s impending departure creates one space but the reality is there is no depth.

Kobbie Mainoo’s absence with what Carrick said before the game was a “small issue” deprived Manchester United of an effective link between defence and attack, someone who can take the ball in tight spaces and move it on quickly.

It sounds simple, yet when it is not there, the loss is all too apparent.

Manuel Ugarte does not have Mainoo’s control on the ball, or his awareness. The Uruguay midfielder was not Manchester United’s worst player, but he lacks the ability to lift a toiling team.

He works hard and hopes someone else can create the magic. This is not enough for where United are, let alone where they want to be.

It will probably be Thursday, when Carrick is due to speak to the media again before the Chelsea trip, when an indication of Mainoo’s availability for Chelsea and beyond will be clarified.

If the England international is missing again, it will be a major issue, even if Carrick tried to make light of it.

“He has been fine when he has played since I have been here,” he said.

“This was a tough game, a tough night – not just for him. When we went down to 10 men I thought he was really important and did a lot of covering for other players.”

Carrick also took the bold decision to leave Bryan Mbeumo on the bench for the first time in the Premier League this season. It did not work.

Neither Mbeumo nor Amad Diallo have found their form since returning from Africa Cup of Nations duty. Matheus Cunha flits in and out of games and Benjamin Sesko – who had the home side’s best two chances and was unlucky not to find the net – has been more effective off the bench.

It means the burden falls on skipper Bruno Fernandes to create opportunities.

Fernandes claimed a 17th Premier League assist, three short of the record for a season, when he crossed for Casemiro to head home. But deep in stoppage time, when he had the chance to cross deep into the penalty area again, he only found a Leeds head. Someone has to share the responsibility.

UK Prime Minister Kier Starmer has announced talks to be held this week and co-hosted with France, aiming at a diplomatic end to the war on Iran and securing safe passage in the Gulf shipping afterwards.

Swiss musician To Athena has performed inside a cave in a melting glacier to highlight accelerating ice loss in the Alps. Scientists say the Morteratsch glacier is shrinking by around 50 metres a year, with the cave itself unlikely to survive another summer as temperatures rise.