crisis

Europe is facing a severe jet fuel crisis due to the Middle East conflict, with International Energy Agency chief Fatih Birol warning the region has ‘maybe six weeks or so’ of jet fuel left and that flight cancellations could follow

Europe has just six weeks’ worth of jet fuel remaining due to the ongoing Middle East conflict, with major airlines grounding flights.

Fatih Birol, executive director of the International Energy Agency (IEA), warned that flight cancellations could follow “soon” if oil supplies continue to be restricted by the Iran war. Iran maintains a firm grip on tankers navigating through the Strait of Hormuz, with Mr Birol telling the Associated Press this is triggering “the largest energy crisis we have ever faced”.

He warned that Asian nations such as Japan, India and China, which depend heavily on Middle Eastern energy supplies, are on “the front line”, with the pressure set to “come to Europe and the Americas” shortly after.

Europe has just six weeks of fuel left, according to the IEA director. He added that if the Strait of Hormuz remains blocked, the knock-on effect could mean “some of the flights from city A to city B might be canceled as a result of a lack of jet fuel”.

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Which airlines are cancelling flights?

A number of airlines have warned that they might have to cancel flights if the situation continues, but the number of those that have already done so is fewer.

Swedish flag carrier SAS has said it would cancel 1,000 flights in April because of high oil and jet fuel prices, after cancelling a “couple hundred” flights in March.

United Airlines said that five per cent of flights would be cancelled in the second and third quarters of 2026, while Dutch airline KLM has cancelled 160 flights for the coming month.

South Korean airline Asiana will slash 22 flights between April and July due to the fuel cost increase.

Hong Kong airline Cathay Pacific will cut some flights from mid-May until the end of June, with about 2% of its scheduled passenger flights grounded. Its budget airline HK Express is cutting around 6% of flights.

German airline group Lufthansa said it would ground 27 planes servicing its short-haul CityLine subsidiary earlier than it had planned, blaming jet fuel prices.

Vietnam Airlines plans to cancel 23 flights per week across domestic routes from April.

Air New Zealand will be cutting back on flights over the next two months, it announced in March. It is expected that 1,100 flights will be impacted.

Norse Atlantic Airways has removed all flights to Los Angeles International Airport from its summer schedule, blaming the fuel shortage.

Although major airlines including British Airways, Ryanair and easyJet have highlighted the potential impact of the fuel price rise on ticket costs and schedules, they are yet to cancel flights as a direct consequence.

However, BA is stopping its route from London Heathrow to Jeddah, although this is due to a shift in demand, according to the airline.

Last week, easyJet chief executive Kenton Jarvis sought to reassure passengers, stating that all airports the airline serves are “operating as normal”.

He continued: “We only ever in this industry have three to four weeks’ visibility (of jet fuel supplies), and that is the same as it was pre-crisis. We have visibility to the middle of May, and we have no concerns. What we’re seeing is airports and fuel suppliers working well to bring jet fuel to the airports.”

EasyJet revealed the Middle East conflict set the airline back roughly £25 million in elevated jet fuel costs last month. The Luton-based carrier said it anticipates reporting a headline pre-tax loss of between £540 million and £560 million for the six months ending in March.

The conflict has created “near-term uncertainty around fuel costs and customer demand”, easyJet revealed.

Bookings have dropped by two percentage points for the three-month periods ending in both June and September when compared with the previous year.

The alert regarding larger-than-anticipated first half losses sent easyJet shares tumbling by as much as 9% during early Thursday trading, before stabilising around 4% down.

Sparked by the Iran war and the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, oil is no longer flowing out of the Middle East as it did earlier this year, which is having a major impact on the aviation industry

Holidaymakers face soaring flight prices and more expensive package breaks even if they’ve already booked because of the looming shortage of jet fuel.

Sparked by the Iran War and the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, oil is no longer flowing out of the Middle East as it did earlier this year. Supplies of jet fuel built up by European countries have been severely depleted.

In general, some European countries hold several months’ worth of jet fuel inventory at a time, according to an IEA report released last week. “Every passing day that the Strait of Hormuz remains shut, Europe is edging closer to supply shortages,” said Amaar Khan, head of European jet fuel pricing at Argus Media. “The Strait accounts for around 40% of Europe’s jet fuel imports, but no jet fuel has passed the Strait since the war broke out.”

There are four main ways that the jet fuel shortage could impact British holidaymakers: rising flight prices, extra fees, cancelled flights and package break surcharges. We’ve explained each one below.

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Rising flight prices

Jet fuel — a refined kerosene-based oil product — is airlines’ biggest cost, making up about 30% of overall expenses, according to the International Air Transport Association. And jet fuel prices have roughly doubled since the war began. Shortages could start next.

Already, a number of airlines have started bumping up the cost of tickets.

Just last week, it emerged that Virgin Atlantic had increased some flight costs with an extra £50 fuel surcharge on economy-class tickets, while premium economy fares are climbing by £180 and business class by £360.

Air France and KLM fares are also going up. They are likely to cost an additional €50, bringing the fuel surcharge to €100 (£86.98) on top of the standard fare. Meanwhile, flights to the United States, Canada and Mexico could increase by €70 (£60.89), and an economy round trip could cost an extra €10 (£8.70).

If you’ve already got your flights booked, you don’t need to worry. You are not going to be asked retrospectively to pay extra on your air fare. Once you have paid, the airline will not come after you for any more cash – unless the government hikes aviation fees, which they don’t appear poised to do.

Extra fees

Many passengers will have booked their flights months in advance, before the US and Israel attacked Iran and fuel prices started rising. Because airlines can’t bump up fares that’re already booked but for which they’re now making less money, they have started looking for other ways to make a bit of extra cash.

American Airlines has said it would hike checked baggage fees by $10 (£7.40) each for the first and second checked bags and by $150 (£111) for the third checked bag on domestic and short-haul international flights. Southwest Airlines has said it will hike checked baggage fees by $10 for the first and second bags, raising costs to $45 (£33) for the first bag and $55 (£40) for the second.

As passengers often add extra luggage just before they fly, these rises could impact passengers who booked flights before the invasion.

No major European airlines have made similar changes.

Cancelled flights

Last week, International Energy Agency Director Fatih Birol said Europe has “maybe six weeks” of remaining jet fuel supplies and said the global economy faces its “largest energy crisis.”

Many major airlines have already cancelled flights because of the fuel price rises and falling demand, and more are likely to do so.

Swedish flag carrier SAS has said it would cancel 1,000 flights in April because of high oil and jet fuel prices, after cancelling a “couple hundred” flights in March. United Airlines said that five per cent of flights would be cancelled in the second and third quarters of 2026, while Dutch airline KLM has cancelled 160 flights for the coming month.

Other airlines, such as BA, have suspended whole routes to parts of the Middle East due to the conflict, while Virgin Atlantic announced earlier this month that it would be permanently scrapping its London flight to Riyadh from April.

Under UK law, if your flight is cancelled more than 14 days before it is due to depart, you are not entitled to compensation. However, your airline does have to offer you a full refund or help you find an alternative flight.

In the latter case, it’s up to you whether to fly as soon as possible after the cancelled flight, or at a later date that suits you. Although most airlines will book you onto another of their flights to the same destination, if an alternative airline is flying there significantly sooner or other suitable modes of transport are available, then you may have the right to be booked onto that alternative transport instead. You can discuss this with your airline.

Given that airfares may be significantly higher than when you booked, opting for an alternative flight rather than taking a refund may work out in your favour.

Extra package break costs

A largely overlooked clause in package holiday terms and conditions could result in the price of a package holiday increasing by hundreds of pounds – even after you’ve already made your booking and payment.

An article by Which? drew attention to the obscure clause found within Package Travel Regulations. It reveals that UK holiday companies can impose an additional charge of up to 8% on a package holiday price, without being required to provide a free cancellation option, under three specific circumstances.

These circumstances include: a destination introducing additional taxes or other charges, a significant shift in currency exchange rates, or a rise in the price of fuel or power. Given the ongoing Middle East conflict, fuel costs have been rising noticeably, which means there’s potential for package holiday operators to invoke this rule for Brits who’ve already booked their holidays should these expenses continue climbing.

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Brent crude falls more than 9 percent after Iran said it will reopen the strategic waterway, only to shut it down again over US blockade of its ports.

Oil prices have plummeted to their lowest point in weeks after Iran said the Strait of Hormuz was open for passage during a ceasefire in Lebanon, and United States President Donald Trump said he expected to ⁠reach a deal to end the war soon.

Brent crude, the international benchmark, fell more than 9 percent to $90.38 a barrel on Friday, taking it below $91 for the first time since March 10.

The plunge came after Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said the strait was “completely open” and would remain so for the duration of the 10-day ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon, which took effect on Friday.

Hailing Tehran’s announcement, Trump declared the waterway “ready for business and full passage,” but said the US Navy’s blockade of Iranian ports would remain in “full force” until the sides reached a peace deal.

On Saturday, however, Iran rowed back on its decision to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, warning that it would continue to block transit through the key waterway as long as the US blockade of Iranian ports remained in effect.

The announcement came after Trump said the blockade “will remain in full force” until Tehran reaches a deal with the US, including on its nuclear programme.

Roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil passes through Hormuz and further limits would squeeze already constrained supply, driving prices higher once again.

Amid the escalation, Pakistani officials say they are trying for more talks between the US and Iran ahead of the April 22 ceasefire deadline.

Meanwhile, ship tracking data displayed by MarineTraffic earlier on Saturday showed a significant uptick in vessels crossing the strait, which is located between Iran, the United Arab Emirates and Oman.

“It’s busy out there, the busiest I’ve seen it since the Strait of Hormuz was effectively closed at the beginning of the war,” Michelle Wiese Bockmann, an analyst at maritime intelligence firm Windward, said in a post on X.

“Last night there were few ships taking the risk but overnight there seems to have been a change.”

While Iran allowed a limited number of vetted ships to transit the waterway since the start of the war, traffic has remained at a trickle compared with pre-conflict levels.

The near-total closure of the strait has triggered one of the worst energy shocks in history, driving up fuel prices and prompting governments to roll out emergency measures.

Oil prices have swung wildly since the US and Israel launched strikes on Iran on February 28, hitting a post-conflict peak of $119 a barrel on March 19.

There is another way to read the ongoing Middle East crisis, one that makes legible what standard analysis consistently struggles to explain. It begins not with capability but with the geometry of the system through which capability must travel to produce effects. The United States and its partners possess overwhelming military superiority over Iran, and that superiority is not in question, yet the conflict has produced a pattern that defies its logic. A superpower coalition has been unable to impose coherent strategic outcomes against an adversary operating through proxies, low-cost disruption, and the systematic exploitation of global commercial vulnerabilities.

Over the past two years, we have seen multiple instances of this kind of disruption with consequential effects on the global system. Houthi drones force the rerouting of global shipping, with Red Sea cargo volumes falling by roughly 50% through early 2024 as major carriers diverted around the Cape of Good Hope, adding up to two weeks to transit times, driving freight costs sharply higher across European markets, and costing Egypt nearly $800 million per month at peak in lost Suez Canal revenue. A non-state network spanning Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Gaza has absorbed sustained air campaigns, targeted eliminations of senior commanders, and repeated ground operations without losing its capacity to generate coordinated pressure across multiple theaters simultaneously. The asymmetry seems to follow a deliberate strategic logic that raw power analysis struggles to read, precisely because the conflict operates on a surface that capability assessments were never designed to map. What this suggests is that the decisive variable is not what actors possess but whether the relationships connecting them can transmit coordinated action when the system is under strain.

When that system cannot coordinate, something important breaks down. An alliance that formally exists but faces operational friction at every decision point ceases to be an alliance in any meaningful strategic sense. A security guarantee that cannot be transmitted rapidly to the partner it is meant to protect has, in effect, already failed its primary function. It follows that the gap between what a system formally is and what it can actually do under pressure is not a secondary consideration but the surface on which this conflict is being decided. Conventional analysis, calibrated to count warheads and assess intentions, consistently leaves this gap unmapped.

Analysts know that Saudi Arabia’s OPEC production decisions have repeatedly positioned Riyadh against Washington’s economic preferences, they know that European energy dependency complicates transatlantic alignment, and they know that Iran’s proxy network extends across five countries and absorbs military pressure without fracturing. Yet what the available frameworks cannot do is convert that knowledge into a structural reading of the system. They show that these conditions exist. What they cannot show is how those conditions interact, where they compound, and what the aggregate geometry of their interaction means for whether coordinated action is possible at all.

Power analysis was built to read capability differentials between states, and it does that well. Alliance theory was built to read the conditions under which formal commitments hold or fail, and it does that too. Neither, however, was built to read the operational weight of the ties through which capability and commitment must travel to produce effects.

The instruments available are calibrated to answer questions different from those the current situation poses. Deploying them on a problem they were not designed to read produces the consistent failure to explain what is actually happening that has marked analysis of this conflict from the start.

Adjacency mapping is an instrument designed to read that gap by mapping connectivity, by which I mean their operational weight, specifically their capacity to carry coordinated action under strain. What distinguishes it from standard approaches is its unit of analysis. Rather than the actors themselves, it treats the weight of the relationships as primary. The question it asks is not who holds power but whether the ties connecting power-holders can transmit that power when the system needs them to. Two states can be formally allied, operationally integrated in name, and structurally disconnected at the same time, and nothing in standard analysis will tell you which of those conditions is actually operative until the moment of crisis reveals it.

The instrument assigns each significant relationship in the system a weight between 0 and 1, reflecting how frequently the two actors interact operationally, how reliably information moves between them, how the tie has behaved under recent stress, and how quickly it transmits pressure when the system is under strain. At the higher end of the scale, a weight at or above 0.6 indicates that coordination approaches automaticity, and the tie carries load without constant investment to maintain it. Around 0.3, friction accumulates. In this setting, decisions require deliberate effort at every juncture, slowing the system and making it susceptible to gradual degradation that never triggers a visible rupture. At or below 0.2, the tie has effectively ceased to function as a transmission pathway, leaving the actors operationally disconnected regardless of what their formal relationship nominally says.

These weights are analytical judgements calibrated against observable evidence. In other words, their value lies in making visible what experienced analysts already carry as intuition and in giving that intuition a structure precise enough to argue about. The numbers are therefore analytical judgements, not measurements. A more rigorous application would derive them from quantifiable indicators across each dimension, including military interoperability, intelligence exchange depth, crisis responsiveness, economic interdependence, and signaling consistency, averaged and weighted systematically. That work lies beyond the scope of this piece, but the architecture is designed to accommodate it.

There is a risk management dimension to this reading that is worth making explicit. Standard geopolitical risk assessment focuses on actor-level variables such as regime stability, military capability, and leadership intentions. What adjacency mapping adds is a structural layer that those assessments typically miss. A coalition whose load-bearing relationships operate in the friction zone is exposed to a category of risk that capability assessments do not capture and that becomes visible only when the system is read structurally.

What the matrix adds is the ability to see how compound weakness across multiple relationships produces cascading effects that bilateral assessment alone would struggle to predict. A system whose dominant actor holds several weak partnerships faces more than friction. As a consequence, the geometry of those weaknesses determines whether any concerted response is structurally possible at all. Aggregate capability becomes, in that light, secondary to that question.

If we apply this to the Middle East security complex, the instrument produces one possible reading. This reading differs considerably from the picture conventional analysis generates. Its value is not in the precision of the numbers but in making the system’s geometry visible enough to argue about.

The matrix below maps operational connectivity across the system’s key actors. The numbers are analytical judgements, not measurements.

The geometry they make visible is what matters here.

The matrix is intentionally non-symmetric. Where operational influence flows asymmetrically between two actors, the weights reflect that directionality.

The matrix reveals, in this light, a system whose dominant actors are connected at fundamentally different weights. And more significantly, its most important bilateral relationship is operating in the friction zone. It’s formally excluded adversary has constructed the only alternative connectivity architecture in the system. What this implies is that the geometry of the conflict runs considerably deeper than standard alliance analysis tends to suggest.

On the coalition side, the US has high adjacency with Qatar, Bahrain, Israel, and Kuwait, ties that enable rapid coordination and require little maintenance, constituting the operational backbone of what Washington can actually activate quickly.

Its relationship with Saudi Arabia, however, sits at 0.4. That number is analytically more significant than almost anything else in the matrix. Saudi Arabia remains, on most readings, the relationship on which Gulf order coherence formally depends, the anchor of the security architecture since the 1970s, and it is operating in the friction zone where every significant decision requires renegotiation from scratch rather than flowing through an established channel. Saudi Arabia’s invitation to join BRICS in August 2023, yuan-denominated oil transactions with China, and its participation in the Chinese-brokered rapprochement with Iran in March 2023 all point in the same direction. Riyadh is hedging structurally toward China and the broader non-Western order, a posture that sits uneasily alongside its formal security alignment with Washington. Taken together, these are not isolated political episodes but evidence of a tie that has been operating below the coordination threshold for years and whose weakness is, on this reading, the system’s most consequential structural vulnerability.

Through the normalization architecture, the UAE has arguably become the system’s most structurally reliable node at 0.6 with both the US and Israel, its operational integration exceeding Saudi Arabia’s despite Saudi Arabia’s formal primacy. The Abraham Accords of September 2020 established the formal foundation for that integration. The operational depth it has since generated, across intelligence sharing, defence cooperation, and coordinated positioning on Iran, has made the UAE the coalition’s most functionally connected Gulf partner. Oman holds what is perhaps the system’s most anomalous position, meaningful adjacency with both the US coalition and Iran simultaneously, a profile no other state actor in the matrix replicates. That structural position gave Oman the back-channel role it played through the early phases of the conflict, with documented precedent in the secret US-Iran nuclear negotiations that began in Muscat in 2012 and ran through 2013. As the conflict has intensified, Pakistan has assumed the primary mediation function, but Oman’s position as a quiet facilitator has not disappeared; it has simply been supplemented by a node with more direct access to both capitals at this particular moment.

Pakistan has emerged as the conflict’s primary mediation node, hosting the highest-level direct negotiations between Washington and Tehran since 1979 and brokering the April 2026 ceasefire. That role reflects a structural position the matrix makes legible: high Saudi adjacency, a functioning Iran tie, and a rehabilitated relationship with Washington that no other regional actor currently combines. China’s influence over both Pakistani and Iranian decision-making operates as an exogenous pressure that the matrix only partially captures, and Pakistan’s own domestic constraints, including its difficulty developing direct channels with the IRGC, limit how far that mediation role can ultimately reach.

Iran’s position is where the matrix becomes most analytically revealing. Across the state actors in the system, Iran’s adjacency sits at or near fragmentation, built up through sanctions, absent operational channels, and decades of adversarial signalling that have left Tehran formally isolated from the coordination architecture the United States and its partners have constructed.

And yet the only high-weight tie Iran holds is with its proxy network at 0.7. That single number may go further toward explaining the architecture of the entire campaign than any other figure in the matrix.

It is an asymmetric relationship in which Tehran’s capacity to activate and direct exceeds the reverse influence those actors exert over Iranian strategic decisions. What that single structural condition implies goes further toward explaining the architecture of Iranian pressure operations than most analyses of Iranian intentions or capabilities tend to reach. Iran is geographically central and formally excluded. It is precisely that combination, positioned to apply pressure across every theatre while bearing none of the coordination costs that formal inclusion imposes. That, from this vantage point, is what makes legible a strategy that standard analysis, focused on actors and their capabilities, cannot see.

Seen through this lens, what Iran is doing across the region is something more structurally ambitious than a military campaign. It is attempting to restructure the matrix itself. The goal appears to be less about battlefield victory than about the gradual degradation of the ties connecting the United States to its regional partners, below the threshold at which coordinated response becomes automatic, eroding the will to keep paying the price of alignment while simultaneously building alternative adjacency in the nodes where US-aligned connectivity is weakest.

The Houthi campaign against Red Sea shipping is calibrated to stay below the threshold that would compel a unified military response. It introduces friction into the economic relationships connecting European states to the Gulf system, raising the cost of alignment with Washington’s regional posture without forcing the kind of direct confrontation that would unite the coalition. Strikes on Gulf infrastructure follow the same calibration, persistent enough to signal that the US security guarantee cannot insulate its partners from costs, yet restrained enough to avoid crossing the point at which coalition fragmentation becomes irrelevant because a unified response becomes compulsory. Across Iraq and Syria, simultaneous pressure from affiliated militias prevents the concentration of attention that sustained coalition coordination requires. In each case, the instrument targets a relationship rather than a capability, specifically the weight of the ties whose degradation would restructure the system’s geometry without requiring Iran to displace the existing order directly.

The US-Saudi tie at 0.4 is the primary focus of that degradation effort. Should that threshold be breached, Saudi Arabia hedges. As hedging reduces operational interactivity the tie weakens further. The process risks becoming self-reinforcing. Iranian military superiority over any individual partner is not required to sustain it.

The same logic extends across European actors, though not uniformly. Germany’s industrial exposure to energy price volatility, France’s residual strategic autonomy instinct, and the EU’s institutional preference for de-escalation all produce different thresholds for continued alignment with Washington. Their shared energy dependency gives them asymmetric stakes in the Gulf system’s stability, but their appetite for risk diverges from Washington’s in ways that are not identical across capitals, and each time Iran forces a decision about the cost of continued alignment, that divergence fragments the coalition’s coordination surface further.

By sustaining operational ties with non-state actors across the region, Iran is constructing alternative adjacency in precisely the nodes where US-aligned connectivity is weakest. These are populations and factions that the existing regional order has excluded from the dominant coalition’s coordination architecture. Deliberately so — Iran is building in the structural gaps the system leaves open. Displacing the existing order appears unnecessary. Becoming the more reliable pole of alignment for the actors that order has failed to integrate may be sufficient. All that is required is that the order fragment sufficiently at its margins for that offer to appear credible, and the current trajectory of US-Saudi friction and European hedging is steadily moving in that direction.

The coalition’s instruments are calibrated to military threats. The system, however, is failing along a different surface entirely, or so this reading suggests. The formal architecture remains largely intact, security guarantees have not been withdrawn, Gulf states remain formally aligned, and normalisation agreements hold. And yet the operational adjacency that gives that architecture its functional weight is under sustained pressure from an actor that has correctly identified the gap between formal commitment and operational tie as the system’s primary vulnerability. That identification is outpacing the coalition’s capacity to respond.

On this reading, the surface on which the conflict appears to be decided is not the one the coalition is defending.

What adjacency mapping reveals is a story about geometry. The system’s dominant actor holds formal commitments at weights the system cannot sustain under the pressure being applied to it. Its adversary, in turn, has built the only alternative coordination architecture in the space that those weakening ties leave open. The conflict is likely to be determined by which ties the system can no longer afford to lose under sustained and calibrated pressure. The question is whether the actors currently holding those ties in the friction zone can rebuild them to the coordination threshold before the process of degradation becomes irreversible. That is a question that capability assessments are not well-positioned to answer, and one that a structural reading of the system’s connectivity at least helps to make visible.

RISING fuel costs linked to the war in Iran have forced a major airline to slash more than 100 flights – including services to and from London.

Dutch company KLM is axing 160 flights across Europe over the next month as soaring fuel prices pile pressure on the industry ahead of the busy summer period.

The cuts will hit routes in and out of Amsterdam’s Schiphol Airport, with departures and arrivals split evenly .

Despite the disruption, the airline insists there is no shortage of jet fuel, saying the move is purely down to spiralling costs.

A KLM spokesperson said: “Passengers affected by these changes will be rebooked onto the next available flight.

“As these are destinations KLM serves multiple times a day, such as London and Düsseldorf, travellers can usually be accommodated quickly.

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“KLM expects a busy May holiday period and is making sure passengers can travel to their holiday destinations as planned.”

KLM’s flight cancellations comes after the head of the International Energy Agency Fatih Birol said mass flight cancellations will begin “soon” if the Strait of Hormuz remains closed.

“In the past there was a group called ‘Dire Straits.’ It’s a dire strait now, and it is going to have major implications for the global economy”, Birol told AP.

Adding: “And the longer it goes, the worse it will be for the economic growth and inflation around the world.”

Birol’s deadline means airports could face critical fuel shortages by May, causing travel chaos for Brits heading abroad during the school May half-term holidays.

Oil prices have soared since the start of March after Iran closed off the Strait in response to US-Israeli forces bombing.

The Persian Gulf chokehold sees around 40 per cent of the world’s jet fuel supply pass through.

It comes after ACI Europe, which represents European airports, said the key trade route must open within three weeks or fuel reserves will run drastically low on Friday.

A number of airports in Italy have already warned that they were running out of fuel.

According to local reports earlier this week, Brindisi-Casale Airport confirmed that Jet A1 fuel was not available for a short period of time.

And British Airways has announced it will permanently axe its service from London Heathrow to Jeddah in Saudi Arabia from April 24.

The airline had been operating a four flights a week service since November 2024.

But a shift in demand, due to the conflict in the Middle East, has led to the airline terminating the service.

KLM stressed the cancellations make up just one per cent of its European schedule.

But the move will still spark concern for Brits planning trips abroad as airlines battle rising operating costs.

It comes as carriers across Europe scramble to balance the books amid the fuel crisis.

Earlier this month, UK airline Skybus pulled the plug on all future flights between London Gatwick and Newquay.

The route, which launched in November 2025, had been backed by Cornwall Council and the Department for Transport under a public service scheme due to run until the end of May.

However, a slump in passenger numbers combined with higher fuel costs forced the airline to ground the service early, with its final flights taking off on April 2.

The latest cuts raise fresh fears of further disruption for holidaymakers as the peak summer season approaches.

Meanwhile other vital UK services could also face shortages if a deal to end the Middle East war is not struck soon.

Medicines UK, which represents companies making 85 per cent of NHS prescriptions, said NHS patients could face prescription shortages within weeks.

This could place “significant pressure for the NHS as early as June”, the organisation warned.

And Brits could even face shortages of supermarket staples such as beer and meat as officials fear the blockade of the Strait could cut vital carbon dioxide supplies.

CO2 is used in food packaging to improve the shelf life of salad, packaged meats and baked goods – and also slaughtering nearly all pigs and most chickens.

Tim Lang, professor of food policy at the University of London, who has been a member of several government bodies including the UK Council of Food Policy Advisors, told The Sun that the UK has “next to no food storage”.

As airlines grapple with the soaring jet fuel prices and global shortage due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, two more have been forced to increase their prices for passengers

Due to the escalating fuel crisis sparked by the Middle East conflict, two more airlines have been forced to raise their prices.

Air travel has been severely disrupted with cancelled routes and a sharp rise in jet fuel prices since US-Israeli strikes erupted on February 28, 2026. The situation was further heightened by Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20 per cent of the world’s oil and gas passes, triggering a global shortage.

As a result, airlines have been grappling with rising jet fuel costs and have been forced to raise prices. Air France and KLM are the latest airlines to confirm they’ve had to increase ticket prices as a result.

READ MORE: Major European airport issues ‘arrive early’ alert for all passengers amid delaysREAD MORE: EasyJet boss warns of summer price hike after £25million hit from jet fuel costs

The airlines, which are part of the same company Air France–KLM, had previously added a surcharge last month to offset soaring jet fuel prices. At the time, economy fares were bumped up by an extra €50 (£43.47) for a round trip, reported The Sun.

Now, with another increase announced, a long-haul round trip with Air France or KLM could cost an additional €50, bringing the fuel surcharge to €100 (£86.98) on top of the standard fare. Meanwhile, flights to the United States, Canada and Mexico could increase by €70 (£60.89), and an economy round-trip could cost an extra €10 (£8.70).

The Mirror has contacted Air France and KLM for comment.

Air France and KLM aren’t the only airlines to raise prices amid the ongoing fuel crisis. Just this week, it emerged that Virgin Atlantic had increased some flight costs with an extra £50 fuel surcharge on economy-class tickets, while premium economy fares are climbing by £180 and business class by £360.

Virgin Atlantic Chief Executive, Corneel Koster, warned travellers that flight prices could climb in the coming months and potentially throughout the remainder of the year. He said: “We have never seen jet fuel at this level and airlines cannot sustain those sorts of high costs.”

“If the fuel price goes much higher, I think the surcharges may go higher. If they go up in a week and you book in two weeks’ time, you’ll be paying higher.”

While there are no fuel shortages at present, Koster acknowledged it was impossible to guarantee supplies in the months ahead. “We have contracts with multiple suppliers who have a wide range of diversity of where the jet fuel comes from,” he explained.

“We have good visibility and no concern for the coming one to two months – certainly for the remainder of April and May. Beyond that I have less visibility, but that is quite normal.”

Meanwhile, it’s also been reported that airlines, such as JetBlue, have increased luggage fees in a bid to offset the soaring fuel costs. For off-peak economy fares, bags are expected to cost $4 more (£2.95), jumping to $39 (£28.79), while peak economy fares are set to be $49 (£36.17).

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